IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1356

Filed November 8, 2023

BRYAN LAMARR MITCHELL,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Lawson, 

Judge.

An applicant appeals the district court decision denying his application for 

postconviction relief from his conviction for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.

Stuart G. Hoover, East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Bryan Mitchell appeals the district court decision denying his application for 

postconviction relief (PCR) from his conviction for first-degree murder. Mitchell 

has not shown he received ineffective assistance based on defense counsel’s 

failure to depose a witness before trial. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 

district court.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

The facts relating to Mitchell’s underlying convictions are set out in State v. 

Mitchell, affirming Mitchell’s conviction for first-degree murder, willful injury, going 

armed with intent, and possession of a firearm as a felon. No. 05-0126, 2006 WL 

132083, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006). On August 9, 2004, Mitchell was 

at the home of Marchelle Miller in Davenport, along with several other people. Id.

at *1. Grayling Churn arrived at Miller’s home and began arguing with Miller’s son, 

Wade Jones, and Mitchell. Id. There was evidence that Mitchell went into Miller’s 

house and retrieved a gun kept by Jones. Id. A witness saw a man wearing orange 

pants shoot Churn. Id. at *2. Mitchell was wearing orange sweatpants at the time. 

Id. Churn was shot with Jones’s gun, and Mitchell claimed Jones was the shooter. 

Id. at *1. This court affirmed Mitchell’s convictions on direct appeal. Id. at *8.

Mitchell filed a PCR application, claiming he received ineffective assistance 

from defense counsel.1 He asserts defense counsel should have deposed Jones 

before the trial. The district court found defense counsel “did attempt to depose 

1 Mitchell raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel before the 

district court. On appeal, he limits his claim to one issue. We do not address the 

other issues that were before the district court.
3

Jones prior to trial. She attempted to subpoena him for a deposition but was 

unable to obtain service.” The court noted defense counsel had access to a 

lengthy videotape interview and a sworn statement Jones gave to officers, which 

were used to cross-examine Jones. In denying relief, the court stated:

In addition, Mitchell has not shown prejudice. The trial 

transcript reveals that [defense counsel] conducted a vigorous crossexamination of Wade Jones. She impeached him with inconsistent 

statements he made to the police. She thoroughly explored her

theory that the police coerced Jones into implicating Mitchell. She 

challenged his testimony regarding the events in the yard and prior 

threats by Churn.

Mitchell filed a timely appeal from the district court’s denial of his PCR 

application.

II. Standard of Review and Law Governing Ineffective-Assistanceof-Counsel Claims

We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v.

Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, an applicant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an

essential duty and (2) the failure resulted in prejudice. State v. El-Amin, 952

N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa 2020). “We presume counsel performed competently

unless the claimant proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.” State

v. Booth-Harris, 942 N.W.2d 562, 577 (Iowa 2020). For the prejudice prong, an

applicant must show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

State v. Boothby, 951 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2020).
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III. Ineffective Assistance

Mitchell contends that he received ineffective assistance because defense 

counsel did not depose Jones prior to his testimony during the criminal trial. He 

states defense counsel should have done more to try to depose Jones, such as 

requesting a continuance during the trial to depose him. Mitchell asserts that, in a 

deposition, evidence could have surfaced to show Mitchell did not know where the 

gun was located within Miller’s house. He claims that without evidence that 

Mitchell retrieved the gun from the house, the theory that Mitchell shot Churn with 

the gun fails.

2

We find Mitchell has not shown he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s 

performance. Mitchell presented no evidence to show that if Jones had been 

deposed, his testimony would have been any different than his trial testimony. He 

presents only speculation that if Jones was deposed evidence might have 

emerged to show Mitchell did not know where the gun was located within Miller’s 

house. See Gronstal v. State, No. 15-2113, 2017 WL 512482, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2 Mitchell is particularly critical of the following portion of Jones’s testimony during 

the criminal trial:

Q. Was your gun at the house that night? A. It was mine.

Q. I mean, was your gun still at the house? A. Yeah.

Q. Had you ever shown the gun to Bryan Mitchell? A. He 

probably seen it before, yeah. I never actually—

Q. And you said you kept it under— A. My mom’s bed.

Mitchell claims defense counsel should have asked a follow-up question to find out 

what Jones had started to say he had never actually done. He asserts Jones 

should have been questioned to determine whether Mitchell knew where the gun 

was located within the house. The problem with Mitchell’s argument is that this 

exchange was between the prosecutor and Jones. On cross-examination after 

this line of questioning, Jones testified that he saw Mitchell come out of the house 

with the gun. And on redirect Jones testified that he saw Mitchell with a gun that 

he recognized as Jones’s gun. 
5

Feb. 8, 2017) (“[W]e will not predicate a finding of ineffective assistance on 

speculation.”); DeMoss v. State, No. 11-1851, 2013 WL 104800, at *5 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Jan. 9, 2013) (“[S]uch speculation is insufficient to meet the prejudice prong 

of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test.”). And Mitchell testified that he did 

not push his counsel to depose Jones because, through no fault of defense 

counsel, Mitchell mistakenly believed only witnesses that had been deposed could 

testify at trial. 

“If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without 

deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” Ledezma v. State, 626 

N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). Because we determine that Mitchell has not shown 

prejudice, we conclude his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be 

denied.

We affirm the district court decision denying Mitchell’s PCR application.

AFFIRMED.