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S. HRG. 110–1195 

CONSIDER PENDING NOMINATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 2, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming1

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ANDREW WHEELER, Minority Staff Director 

1Note: During the 110th Congress, Senator Craig Thomas, of Wyoming, 

passed away on June 4, 2007. Senator John Barrasso, of Wyoming, joined 

the committee on July 10, 2007. 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

OCTOBER 2, 2007 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ....................... 1 

Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho ............................... 2 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland .............. 3 

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia ......................... 5 

Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ........ 6 

Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from the State of Montana ............................ 6 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey .............. 9 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia ...................... 10 

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph, U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 76 

WITNESSES 

Cochran, Andrew R., nominee for Inspector General, Environmental Protection Agency ........................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Bresland, John S., nominee for Board Member and Chairman of the U.S. 

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board ............................................ 34 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Sanders ........................................................................................ 37 

Senator Vitter ............................................................................................ 39 

Senator Lautenberg ................................................................................... 40 

Senator Lieberman .................................................................................... 43 

Shearer, C. Russell H., nominee for Board Member, U.S. Chemical Safety 

and Hazard Investigation Board ......................................................................... 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 50 

Senator Lautenberg ................................................................................... 51 

Senator Lieberman .................................................................................... 59 

Senator Cardin .......................................................................................... 59 

Gilliland, Thomas C., nominee for Board Member, Board of Directors of 

the Tennessee Valley Authority .......................................................................... 69 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 70 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Statements: 

Williams, Susan R., reappointed TVA Board Member .................................. 77 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ......................... 78 

Graves, William H., reappointed TVA Board Member .................................. 81 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ......................... 82 

Letters: 

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board ................................ 85 

Fiori, Mario P., Springfield, VA ...................................................................... 170 

Russo, Frank B., Leesburg, VA ....................................................................... 172 

Amerine, David, B., Parsons senior vice president ........................................ 174 

Rollow, Tom, Fairfax Station, VA ................................................................... 176 
Page

IV 

Emails, Shearer, Russell.............................................................................................. 101 

Environment, Safety and Health Bulletins................................................................ 178 
(1) 

CONSIDER PENDING NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, Washington, DC. 

The full committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Barbara Boxer 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer, Craig, Baucus, Lautenberg, Cardin, 

Whitehouse, Isakson and Alexander. 

Also Present: Senator Chambliss. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. The Committee will come to order. 

I want to welcome everybody, and Senator Craig will be sitting 

in as Ranking Member today for Senator Inhofe. 

I just wanted to place in the record something, because we had 

a little contention at the Committee when I wanted to invite Senator Mikulski up to the dais, and Senator Inhofe said this had 

never happened before. We went back in the record and found out 

on Wednesday, September 13, 2006, Chairman Inhofe invited and 

allowed Senator Alexander to sit immediately to Senator Inhofe’s 

right, asked him to engage in questions. We will put this in the 

record, without objection, and the photographs that prove the point. 

The idea of doing this is that, I don’t mind if we have disagreements, but let’s not—let’s get the facts right. So I just wanted to 

make the case that I will continue to run this Committee the way 

Senator Inhofe did, and these decisions will be made. 

Now I see Senator Chambliss is up here which is fine. Then I 

would ask that Senator Craig make a unanimous consent request 

to permit that, if he would. 

Senator CRAIG. I would so ask unanimous consent request to 

allow Senator Chambliss to be at the dais for the purposes of introduction. 

Senator BOXER. Is there any objection? 

We are making an exception here. Also I would state that, if 

there is no objection, I would certainly allow the Senator to stay 

here, if he wishes to ask any questions, if there is no objection to 

that. So ordered. We have a new day at the Committee, and isn’t 

it nice to get along. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CRAIG. Kumbayah. 

[Laughter.] 
2 

Senator BOXER. So if you could put me back to five minutes, I 

will start my statement now. 

This morning, the Committee meets to consider the nomination 

of six individuals. We will first hear from Mr. Andrew Cochran of 

Virginia, who is nominated to be the Inspector General of the EPA. 

On the second panel, we will hear from Mr. John Bresland, of New 

Jersey, who is nominated to be both a member of the Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and its chairperson; Mr. C. 

Russell Shearer, nominated to be a member of that board. The second panel also includes Mr. Thomas Gilliland to be a member of 

the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority. I can say 

to you, sir, you have strong support from members of your State. 

Two other reappointment nominations for the board of TVA, 

Susan Williams and William Graves, are not present today, but 

they have submitted the required paperwork. 

Mr. Cochran, I intend to carefully review your qualifications for 

this position. The EPA Inspector General must be an individual 

who is committed to protection of the environment as well as an 

effective investigator. You must also be willing to maintain an adequately sized staff of qualified individuals to help you succeed in 

your job. Congress and the American public rely upon the IG to be 

thorough and objective and determined to ensure that the EPA fulfills its mission. 

Mr. Bresland and Mr. Shearer, it is critical that the Chemical 

Safety Board maintain itself as an independent Federal agency 

that investigates industrial chemical accidents. This is highly technical work, it is important to providing a safe workplace and protecting the public and our Nation’s economy. If confirmed, I would 

expect you both to be aggressive in reviewing effectiveness of regulations and regulatory enforcement that both avoid accidents and 

mitigate their impacts. 

We also, as I said before, have Mr. Thomas Gilliland, and your 

Senator, again, Senator Isakson, on this Committee, speaks very 

highly of you. I look forward to discussing with you your commitment to making sure that TVA demonstrates a commitment to environmental leadership including reducing greenhouse gases and 

addressing global warming. 

So that is my entire statement, and I will call on members in 

order of their appearance, but of course, I will turn it over to Senator Craig, who is sitting in for the Ranking. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, U. S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Senator CRAIG. Madam Chairman, first and foremost, thank you 

for scheduling this hearing and getting these nominees or renominations before the Committee, I think they and we appreciate it, 

in a timely fashion. As you have already mentioned, the Ranking 

Member, Senator Inhofe, has asked that I stand in this morning, 

at least for a period of time, as we start this hearing. 

So first and foremost, congratulations to each of the nominees before us today. I am pleased that we are having these hearings at 

this time. 

Since March 2006, the EPA has been without a confirmed Inspector General. This is a critical position, as the Chairman has al-
3 

ready mentioned, that needs to be filled, in my opinion, and I think 

the opinion of everyone, as soon as possible. The Chair has had 

some concern in the past over similar candidates’ auditing experiences. Andrew Cochran is a well-qualified candidate with a lot of 

experience, in my opinion, in auditing. He served as senior counsel 

for oversight and investigations on the Committee on Financial 

Services for the United States House of Representatives, and as 

audit division director and senior analyst at the Office of Inspector 

General at the Department of Commerce. That certainly appears, 

in this position, to be high qualifications. This type of experience 

obviously is critical to an inspector general. 

Let me welcome the other three nominees that are before the 

Committee for the first time: Thomas Gilliland, to be a board member of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and as has already been 

said, both Senators Chambliss and Isakson will introduce him. I 

therefore gather he is from Georgia. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CRAIG. Russell Shearer, to be a member of the Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; and John Bresland to be 

the Chairman of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 

Board. 

So again, Madam Chairman, thank you very much for holding 

this hearing. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator Craig, for sitting in for Senator Inhofe. 

Now we will go in order of arrival and back and forth, of members of the Committee, then we will get to Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U. S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Madam Chair, thank you very much. I welcome 

the nominees today, and I thank them for being willing to serve in 

these very important public positions. 

Madam Chair, I just really want to underscore the point that you 

made, the positions that we are considering today are very important for the health and safety of the people of this Country. When 

I think back, Nikki Tinsley and her role as Inspector General, in 

being aggressive in looking after the appropriate role for EPA, I 

just urge Mr. Cochran, when we talk today about your willingness 

to act as an independent person, willing to take on a President or 

an Administration. 

Your term, if confirmed, will go beyond the term of this Administration. So the continuity in the Inspector General’s office, to me, 

is a very important standard. I hope that you will be prepared to 

assure this Committee that your sole responsibility will be to make 

sure the laws are carried out, and willing to take on whomever to 

make sure that in fact takes place. 

The other nominees are for extremely important positions concerning public safety. Some come with experience, others do not. I 

hope that again, during the course of the confirmation process, that 

you will address the issues of the independence of your position of 

representing the public and not an Administration, because I think 
4 

that is the key role of each of the nominees, of the positions that 

you are seeking. 

Madam Chair, I will ask that my statement be made part of the 

record, and I thank you very much for the opportunity to make 

these opening comments. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF MARYLAND

Madame Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. 

I approach every Presidential nominee with a bias toward supporting that person. 

Public service is a great honor and it often comes at some significant personal sacrifice. 

I want to support nominees, and I am sure that I will support most, and perhaps 

all, of the nominees before the Committee today. 

Some of the people before the Committee today, quite frankly, need to put some 

of our concerns to rest before I’ll support them. 

The Inspector General of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is one of the 

lesser known leaders in the EPA, but the role can be an incredibly important one 

for the Agency and for the County. 

We saw during the tenure of Nikki Tinsley that the EPA IG can be an important 

catalyst within the Agency. Her greatest strength was to undertake aggressive, insightful programmatic reviews of EPA’s actions. 

The IG has to be independent. That person and his or her staff need to bring 

strong, independent knowledge to the job. We all benefit when EPA’s own internal 

watchdog is constantly pressing the Agency to organize its work around its core missions and to do so in the most effective and efficient fashion possible. 

The attributes that make up an excellent IG are 

• a person of the highest integrity, • a person with a passion for the mission of the Agency, and • a person who is willing to make other Agency leaders uncomfortable from timeto-time. 

Mr. Cochran, you have been nominated to this important position. We will be 

looking to you to address forthrightly how you fit that profile. 

That means you need to convince us that the concerns about the use of federal 

funds for lobbying by your employer are unfounded. 

You need to convince us that you will bring a sense of independence to the job. 

That means criticizing Bush Administration policies at EPA if you find that they 

are not working efficiently and effectively to protect human health and the environment, which is the core mission of EPA. 

This Senator and this Committee will demand a similar level of excellence in the 

other nominees that we will be hearing from today. 

Mr. Shearer, do you have a commitment to safety in the chemical industry and 

sufficient independence to tackle tough cases? 

Unlike Mr. Bresland, another nominee to the Chemical Safety Board before us 

today, you do not bring relevant private sector employment history to the job. You 

have held a number of positions within the present Administration, and the President should be given great deference in picking his team. 

But you are being nominated to a five-year term on the Chemical Safety Board. 

There you to do more than carry out Administration’s policies. You need to exercise 

independent judgment and provide dynamic leadership to a small but vitally important group. 

Today we will be listening carefully to learn how you will demonstrate such independent judgment and leadership. 

Madam Chairman, the nominees that we are considering are being asked to play 

a key role for all Americans. We owe it to the nation to make sure that the nominees we are considering meet the highest standards of public service. 

I look forward to hearing from our nominees and to today’s discussion. 

Thank you, Madame Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. I would ask unanimous consent that the extra 2 minutes that you did not use go to Senator 

Baucus, because I think he may need a little extra time. If you 

need them, then you will have 7 minutes for your statement. 

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you. 
5 

Senator BOXER. Senator Isakson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U. S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to at the 

outset acknowledge my deep appreciation to you and Bettina for 

the cooperation you have given in allowing Tom Gilliland, our appointee-designate to the TVA Board’s hearing to be held today. You 

have been a tremendous help to me and I am greatly appreciative 

of that. 

I am greatly appreciative of the opportunity to brag about somebody who is a deep personal friend of mine. A lot of time when you 

are up here, and somebody from your State has been nominated for 

something, you read from a script that they provide you, and you 

are as sincerely as you can complimentary of someone who know 

tacitly and not really very well. 

I know this gentleman extremely well. I have known him for 40 

years. He is an outstanding graduate of the University of Georgia 

and has a Juris Doctor degree from Emory University, Phi Beta 

Kappa. He married way over his head when he married Candy—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON [continuing]. They have two beautiful, handsome sons who, I must inject, only as I told them last night, their 

two sons, both are at Yale, both scored 1600 on the SATs. They are 

outstanding individuals. You could have squared my SAT score and 

it wouldn’t have gotten to 1600. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. I am just tremendously impressed with that. 

But Tom served as Chief of Staff to Lieutenant Governor Peer 

Howard, a Democrat who was one of my best friends in college. He 

has been appointed by both Democrat and Republican governors of 

Georgia to the Stone Mountain Authority. He has been an advisor 

on the transition team in terms of Lieutenant Governor Casey 

Kagel. He is No. 2 man at the third largest bank in the State of 

Georgia, United Community Bank. He is a lover of the environment, he is appreciative of business, he is appreciative of the opportunities that this great Country gives to us. I can assure you, 

there could be no better qualified individual to serve on the board 

of TVA than Tom. 

Lastly, I have only put one hold on one bill in my career in the 

U.S. Senate. Unbeknownst to me, it was the Majority Leader’s bill 

2 years ago, and that was Majority Leader Frist, when he introduced the recomposition of the TVA board. Citizens of Georgia have 

for years not been represented ever on the TVA board, and we constitute a part of the TVA service, and all 10 of our border counties 

with Tennessee, their EMCs derive their power from TVA. 

I am very appreciative of former Majority Leader Bill Frist, Senators Lamar Alexander and Bob Corker from Tennessee, the other 

States represented who came together and felt like it was right for 

the State of Georgia to be represented, and to Tom Kilgore, the 

now–Chairman and operating officer of the TVA Authority for having been so courteous as to call me and let us know when an opening came to consider Mr. Gilliland for this place. 
6 

So it is a privilege for me to introduce a distinguished citizen of 

our State, one who will do a good job in a tremendously important 

responsibility. Again, I want to thank the Chairman at the end for 

what I said at the beginning, for all her cooperation in making this 

happen today. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator. It was a pleasure 

to work with you. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just want very briefly to relate that in a discussion that I had 

with Mr. Cochran, he indicated that he saw his role in the Inspector General position at EPA as more than just protecting that 

agency against financial mis-deeds or defalcations, but also to have 

a role in ensuring that there was process integrity in its regulatory 

function, to make sure that there was not impropriety in the 

weight that was given, for instance, to industry views that the 

rules and regulations were followed, and that it was an agency in 

which both environmental and business interests could claim a fair 

shot. 

I think that is a very important point, and I am delighted that 

he sees his role that way. I wanted to make a record of it. 

If I may ask unanimous consent that an article from the Washington Post entitled Bush’s EPA is Pursuing Fewer Polluters, By A 

Full-Third from Sunday, September 30, 2007, be made a part of the 

record. 

Senator BOXER. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The referenced material was not available at time of print.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. That concludes my statement. Thank you, 

Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator Baucus. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF MONTANA 

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I thank you for calling this hearing. I look forward to hearing 

from all the nominees. However, I am going to direct my comments 

to Mr. Cochran. 

The Roman writer Juvenal famously asked, ‘‘Who will guard the 

guards?’’ The Environmental Protection Agency’s mission is to 

guard human health and the environment. Mr. Cochran, if confirmed as Inspector General of EPA, you will have to watch the 

guards. Across the Country, people will look to you to hold EPA’s 

feet to the fire and ensure that EPA is keeping us safe. 

Nowhere is this truer than in Libby, MT. I will support your 

nomination if I am certain in your ability to display independence 

and toughness. Regardless of what political party controls EPA, the 

people of Libby and the people across America deserve nothing less. 

Libby has been twice wronged. For decades, W.R. Grace’s 

vermiculite mill in Libby spewed toxic tremolite asbestos into the 

air. They gave it to residents to put on their lawns. They even 
7 

spread it on high school tracks. Over 200 people in Libby have died 

from asbestos-related disease because of W.R. Grace. 

Unfortunately, the tragedy has not ended for the people of Libby. 

Despite the best efforts of EPA staffers on the ground, one I will 

mention, Paul Parronard, the agency leadership has made serious 

mistakes. In August 2006, I asked the Inspector General of EPA 

to review EPA’s work in Libby. What the report found was truly 

outrageous. After 7 years, EPA has failed to complete the necessary 

toxicity studies to determine the safe level of human exposure to 

Libby amphibole. They failed to conduct the toxicity tests to determine how safe is safe. This means that after 7 years, EPA still cannot say how clean they need to make the homes and the businesses 

to protect the families in Libby. 

Why were these studies never done? According to a 2006 Inspector General report, EPA scientists requested the studies, but EPA’s 

budget office did not approve their request. EPA cut corners to save 

a buck. 

The review also found that EPA had given the people of Libby 

dangerously inaccurate information in so-called comfort letters. 

EPA told homeowners that their homes were clean, when in fact 

EPA had no idea what level of exposure to Libby asbestos is safe. 

EPA also published documents such as ‘‘Living with 

Vermiculite,’’ telling people it was okay to sweep up asbestos-laced 

vermiculite attic insulation in their homes. An outrage. 

I am also concerned by EPA’s decision not to declare a public 

health emergency in Libby. According to press reports, EPA was 

prepared to declare a public health emergency in Libby in the 

spring 2002. Administrator Whitman was so inclined. Declaring a 

public health emergency in Libby would have given the agency 

clear authority to remove all vermiculite attic insulation in homes 

in Libby. That declaration of public health emergency would have 

also required the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 

to provide some level of medical care for people in Libby. A huge 

problem. Now they don’t get the care. That declaration would also 

have implications nationwide. 

However, according to press reports, the Office of Management 

and Budget intervened and EPA never declared a public health 

emergency. Once again, EPA and OMB put saving a buck ahead 

of the people of Libby. 

Mr. Cochran, I hope I have impressed upon you, I am sick of the 

bean counters at OMB and EPA cutting corners in Libby to save 

money. According to your resume, you have extensive experience as 

an auditor, looking for financial waste. That is important. But 

quite frankly, it is not what is most needed in that job of Inspector 

General. The people of Libby and I am sure elsewhere in the Country need an Inspector General that will put them first. The people 

of Libby need someone whose first thought isn’t what is cost-efficient, but rather, someone whose first thought is what is right. 

I will be looking to see if you are that kind of person. Thank you, 

Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Baucus follows:] 
8 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA

Chairman Boxer, thank you for calling this hearing. I would also like to thank 

the nominees for their willingness to serve. 

I look forward to hearing all of the nominees’ testimony. However, I will direct 

my comments to Mr. Cochran. 

The Roman writer Juvenal (Jew-ven-all) famously asked, ‘‘who will guard the 

guards?’’ 

The Environmental Protection Agencies’ mission is to guard human health and 

the environment. 

Mr. Cochran, if confirmed as Inspector General of the EPA, you would have to 

watch the guards. Across the country, people would look to you to hold EPA’s feet 

to the fire and ensure that the EPA is keeping us safe. 

Nowhere is this truer than in Libby, Montana. Mr. Cochran, I will support your 

nomination if I am certain in your ability to display independence and toughness. 

Regardless of what political party controls the EPA, the people in Libby and across 

America deserve nothing less. 

Libby has been twice wronged. For decades the W.R. Grace vermiculite mill in 

Libby spewed toxic tremolite asbestos into the air. They gave it to residents to put 

on their lawns. They even spread it on the high school track. Over 200 people in 

Libby have died from asbestos related disease because of W.R. Grace. 

Unfortunately, the tragedy has not ended for the people of Libby. Despite the best 

efforts of EPA staffers on the ground, the Agency leadership has made serious mistakes. 

In August of 2006, I asked the Inspector General to review EPA’s work in Libby. 

What the report found was truly outrageous. After seven years, EPA has failed to 

complete the necessary toxicity studies to determine the safe level of human exposure to the Libby amphibole. 

This means that after seven years, EPA still cannot say how clean they need to 

make the homes and businesses to protect the families in Libby. 

Why were these studies never done? According to the 2006 Inspector General report, EPA scientists requested the toxicity studies, but EPA’s budget office did not 

approve their request. The EPA cut corners to save a buck. 

The review also found that EPA had given the people of Libby dangerously inaccurate information. In so called ‘‘comfort letters,’’ EPA told homeowners that their 

homes were clean, when in fact EPA has no idea what level of exposure to Libby 

asbestos is safe. 

EPA also published documents such as ‘‘Living with Vermiculite,’’ telling people 

that it was ok to sweep up asbestos laced vermiculite attic insulation in their 

homes. This is an outrage. 

I am also concerned by EPA’s decision not to declare a Public Health Emergency 

in Libby. According to press reports EPA was prepared to declare a Public Health 

Emergency in Libby in the spring of 2002. Declaring a Public Health Emergency in 

Libby would have given the Agency clear authority to remove all Zonolite Attic Insulation in homes in Libby. 

The declaration of Public Health Emergency also would have required the Agency 

for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) to provide some level of medical 

care for people in Libby. 

However, according to press reports, the Office of Management and Budget intervened and EPA never declared a Public Health Emergency. Once again EPA and 

OMB put saving a buck ahead of the people of Libby. 

Mr. Cochran, I hope I have impressed upon you that I am sick of the bean 

counters at OMB and EPA cutting corners in Libby to save money. 

According to your resume, you have extensive experience as an auditor looking 

for financial waste. This is an important skill. But, quite frankly, it is not what is 

most needed in Libby. 

The people of Libby need an Inspector General that will put them first. The people of Libby need someone who’s first thought isn’t ‘‘what is cost efficient’’ but rather 

someone who’s first thought is ‘‘what is right.’’ 

I will be looking to see if you are that kind of person. 

Senator BOXER. Senator, thank you. 

Senator Lautenberg. 
9 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, if our colleague, other 

colleague from Georgia has any particular—— 

Senator BOXER. Well, I am going to wait until all the members 

of the Committee are heard first. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I agree with you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I wanted to be able to criticize Saxby, actually. 

Anyway, it was offered in good nature. I am satisfied that we go 

on with our business. 

Madam Chairman, thanks for holding today’s hearing on the 

nominations for the positions at EPA and Chemical Safety Board 

and Tennessee Valley Authority. The role as defined by Senator 

Baucus is a recitation, I think, of something we said years ago, applies so well, and that is, you know, Mr. Cochran, that you have 

the responsibility of watching the watchers and making sure that 

they do their job, to coin a phrase. We see problems that we have 

had at EPA with problems of management of programs and where 

there are arbitrary decisions made not to meet the standards that 

were set down in programs that they have. 

Now, that is a fairly delicate area, I will admit. But the fact of 

the matter is that I would hope that your mission is to do everything that they are supposed to do as honestly and efficiently as 

can be done. I am concerned about something, Mr. Cochran, because the objectivity, the independence of the Inspector General is 

a critical issue. I will be looking for that independence and dedication. 

But I will ask you this. You are a member, an officer of the Federalist Society. They are not particularly supportive of environmental regulation that is often proposed or in place now. I wonder, 

and we will talk about that when I have a chance to ask you a 

question, I wonder what kind of an influence you bring as a result 

of your affiliation with that organization. 

Regarding the Chemical Safety Board, it was 1990, Madam 

Chairman, when Senator Durenberger and I created the Chemical 

Safety Board. It took until 1997 to get some funding for it. Our 

mission was to have the Board investigate the causes of serious accidents at chemical plants, oil refineries, industrial facilities, and 

make recommendations on how to better protect workers and the 

public. Those nominations come at a critical time for the Board. 

Former Chairperson Carolyn Merritt showed excellent leadership 

at the Chemical Safety Board, and we have to make sure that her 

work, excellent work, continues. Both nominees for the Chemical 

Safety Board must demonstrate that they are fully committed to 

protecting the safety of workers and the public from the potential 

dangers of a chemical accident. 

I chaired a subcommittee hearing on the Chemical Safety Board 

and its work just this past July. Several witnesses said that we 

need more board members with a background in chemical process 

safety. Mr. Bresland has already served on the Board for 5 years, 

has a long history of working on chemical process safety issues in 

the private sector. But I am less convinced, Madam Chairman, 
10 

about Mr. Shearer’s qualification. While he served as an attorney 

in several positions related to toxic chemicals in the Department of 

Defense and Energy, he has no obvious background, apparent background in chemical process safety, which is a primary focus of the 

Chemical Safety Board. 

So finally, when the Tennessee Valley Authority, while they have 

no direct impact on the State of New Jersey, its generation of electricity affects our climate and therefore all Americans. As nominee 

for its Board, Thomas Gilliland can play a critical role in the reduction of carbon emissions of TVA plants. So I look forward to learning about how he intends to do that. Madam Chairman, thank you 

again for calling this hearing. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Now, Senator Chambliss. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF GEORGIA 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

appreciate your courtesy of allowing me to be here this morning to 

share the introduction of a great Georgian with my long-time dear 

friend, my colleague, Johnny Isakson. 

I am very proud to introduce a fellow University of Georgia graduate, a man who has distinguished himself in our State over the 

last number of decades, and I want to give my wholehearted support to the nomination of Tom Gilliland to the TVA Board. Tom has 

been a friend for many years. His financial background and judicious demeanor make him well-qualified to sit on this very important Board. Tom is the Executive Vice President, Secretary and 

General Counsel for United Community Banks, which is the third 

largest bank holding company in our State. Therefore, from a financial background standpoint, he certainly has the qualifications 

to sit on this Board. 

In addition, Tom lives in the TVA service area. He and his wife 

live in Blairsville, GA, which is a very beautiful part of our State. 

He is very knowledgeable about the environmental, recreation and 

power resources provided by TVA. In addition, as a businessman, 

he knows and understands the economic impact that TVA has on 

our State and the entire region it serves. 

I am particularly pleased the Committee is considering Tom’s 

nomination, because although over 100,000 Georgia households are 

served by TVA, the State of Georgia has never been represented on 

this Board. TVA provides power to customers in 10 counties in our 

State, served by 3 electric membership corporations. TVA also has 

reservoirs located in Georgia as well. These reservoirs have a combined surface area of 14,522 acres and 300 miles of shoreline. 

Finally, Georgia is home to over 750 TVA retirees and their families. Clearly, there are a number of ties between North Georgia and 

the TVA. Tom’s confirmation to the TVA Board will enhance the 

existing relationship, and I believe he will be a great asset to the 

TVA Board. 

So I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to introduce my 

friend, Tom Gilliland. I believe you will find him worthy of the position for which he has been nominated, and I urge you to move 

his nomination very quickly. 
11 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

We are now going to start 5-minute rounds of questions. I am 

going to switch places with Senator Baucus, who has some commitments that he needs to fulfill. So I will start it off with Senator 

Baucus. Oh, you want to have the statement first. Go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW R. COCHRAN, NOMINEE FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Mr. COCHRAN. Good morning, Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate Committee on Environment and 

Public Works. I am Andrew Cochran, and I am honored to appear 

before you today as the nominee for Inspector General at EPA. 

I am grateful to the President and EPA Administrator Steven 

Johnson for this opportunity. If confirmed, I look forward to working with EPA, this Committee and the entire Congress as an independent, objective voice to assess and report upon EPA’s work to 

efficiently and economically improve human health and environmental quality. 

The Inspector General Act mandates the selection and confirmation of Inspectors General ‘‘without regard to political affiliation 

and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, 

public administration, or investigations.’’ I have years of experience 

and accomplishments in five of the seven named areas of expertise 

in the Executive Branch and on Capitol Hill. 

Since 2004, I have represented private sector firms and the concerns of terrorism victims, victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism in 

the 1980s, Hamas terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza, and the 

victims of 9/11 before Congress and the Executive Branch to fight 

for the approval of beneficial legislation that would help them seek 

justice in sole litigation. 

I also started and direct the counter-terrorism blog, one of the 

premier online centers in the world, for the dissemination of objective and independent terrorism and counter-terrorism news and 

analysis. During my nearly 11 years with the Commerce Department Inspector General’s Office, I directed numerous audits and inspections that significantly improved the management of Commerce Department programs, reported on important policies and 

procedures, or resulted in significant cost savings. 

As the first director of the NOAA performance audit division, I 

directed the first performance audit of a regional fishery and management decision by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council in 1992. We found violations of the National Environmental Policy Act, Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Act, as it was then 

known, and an important executive order on cost benefit analysis. 

Senator Baucus, in my oral exit conferences with senior departmental and NOAA officials, I told them that the proposed amendments by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council were unacceptable and indefensible. Despite heavy pressure from the allies 

of the Council, we stuck by our guns. We implemented the findings 

and recommendations and worked with NOAA to implement those 

recommendations. NOAA turned down the proposed amendment 

and came back with new amendments. 
12 

The Inspector General awarded me the bronze medal, the highest 

award in the OIG, for that report. Senator Baucus, based on what 

I read about Libby, the situation there, it is unacceptable and indefensible. My reports on that Council and other reports, numerous 

other reports, provided our expert and unbiased opinion on an important decision or standard practice without quantifiable cost savings. 

Three peer reviews conducted by other departments concluded 

that audits issued under my direction met generally accepted Government auditing standards. In March 2001, I was selected as the 

first senior oversight counsel for the House Financial Services 

Committee, and was lead counsel for the first Congressional hearings on Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom. 

I have enjoyed working with many outstanding inspectors general in the past 24 years. Their examples of a commitment to professional excellence, professional and personal courtesy will guide 

me in the years ahead. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of the 

respected veterans now serving as inspectors general. 

I assure the Committee that should I be confirmed, I will faithfully and independently discharge my duties to uphold the legacy 

established by so many in the position. To quote from a July hearing chaired by Senator Lieberman, I will be a watchdog, not just 

a junkyard dog or lapdog. 

The EPA stands as the Federal guardian protecting our environmental resources. I am truly excited at the prospect of serving as 

the Inspector General of that agency, which has a direct impact on 

the health and safety of all Americans every day. An Inspector 

General can serve as a positive force for change, and if confirmed, 

I pledge to continue the OIG’s record of honorable achievements 

and service to the taxpayers. 

If confirmed, I will work in a constructive, respectful atmosphere 

with the OIG employees, EPA management, Congress and other 

stakeholders. I will direct the work of the OIG in accordance with 

the high standards, principles and traditions of the profession. I 

will maintain frequent and open communications with EPA management and the Congress, and will report significant problems to 

the Congress when uncorrected by EPA. 

I want to thank my family, friends and associates, especially my 

wife, who is watching with her mother at home. Madam Chairman 

and members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cochran follows:] 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW R. COCHRAN, NOMINEE FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Good morning, Madam Chairman and distinguished Members of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. I am Andrew Cochran of Springfield, VA, 

and I am honored to appear before you today as the nominee for Inspector General 

of the Environmental Protection Agency. 

I am grateful to President Bush and EPA Administrator Steven Johnson for offering this opportunity. If confirmed, I look forward to working with EPA, this Committee, and the entire Congress as an independent, objective voice to assess and report upon EPA’s work to economically and efficiently improve human health and environmental quality. The Inspector General Act mandates the selection and confirmation of Inspectors General ‘‘without regard to political affiliation and solely on 

the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial 

analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.’’ I 
13 

have years of experience and accomplishments in five of the named areas of expertise. I practiced law and public accounting in the private sector; advised the Deputy 

Secretary of Commerce in the 1980s of potential improvements and budgetary savings in Commerce Department operations; conducted numerous program analyses 

and audits as a career professional in the Commerce Department’s Office of Inspector General; and conducted Congressional investigations into corporate accounting 

and stock offering irregularities as senior oversight counsel of the House Financial 

Services Committee. Since 2004, I have represented the concerns of terrorism victims, homeland security-related firms, and high-tech companies before Congress and 

the Executive Branch. working to obtain bipartisan approval of beneficial legislation 

and regulations. I also started and still direct one of the premier online centers in 

the world for the dissemination of independent and objective terrorism and counterterrorism news and expert analysis. Much of my professional success has involved 

reaching across the aisle to build coalitions with parties of different interests and 

desires. 

I wish to focus on the nearly 11 years, from 1990 to 2001, during which I was 

a career professional in the Commerce OIG. I directed numerous audits and inspections that significantly improved the management of Commerce Department programs, reported on important policies and procedures, or resulted in significant cost 

savings. I was the first director of a performance audit division focused totally on 

the operations of NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In 

that role I directed the first performance audit of a regional fishery management 

allocation decision by NOAA and a fishery management council. I have already provided a copy of the report on the fishery management allocation decision to the 

Committee. The Inspector General awarded me the Bronze Medal, the highest 

award in the OIG, for that report. I also directed the first OIG audit of a range of 

export licensing decisions; the first OIG audit of a spectrum licensing decision 

(which affected development of the then-infant digital messaging industry); and the 

first OIG audit report to recommend that an official Commerce Department publication should be disseminated entirely on the Internet (in 1999). These reports provided our expert and unbiased opinion on an important decision or standard practice, without quantifiable cost savings. They were among a number of highly sensitive audits that) directed and, along with many others, included findings and recommendations that were unwelcome within the audited agency. But when I left the 

Commerce OIG in 2001, all of the recommendations in my final performance audit 

reports had been resolved. I also directed audits that, in total, saved tens of millions 

of dollars for the taxpayer. Three peer reviews conducted by other departments during my tenure concluded that audits issued under my direction were conducted in 

compliance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In March 2001, I was selected as the first senior oversight counsel for the new 

House Financial Services Committee and served there during the period covering 

the 9–11 attacks and the corporate accounting scandals. I was lead counsel for hearings and investigations into terrorism issues and the accounting scandals, including 

the first Congressional hearings on the accounting issues at Enron, Global Crossing 

and WorldCom. During my tenure, I worked in partnership with Democratic committee staff to ask GAO and the Inspectors General of Treasury, HUD, and the federal financial regulators to conduct audits and report to Congress on issues such as 

the response of the regulators and financial markets to the 9–11 attacks; the protection of critical infrastructure from future attacks and disasters; mismanagement of 

public housing authorities; single-family mortgage fraud; and the search for dictators’ assets hidden throughout the world. 

My high respect for the men and women who occupy the position of Inspector 

General, and for the standards governing their conduct and performance, started 

with my first positions here in Washington. During the summer of 1979, I was a 

Congressional intern for my Congressman from Ohio, the Honorable Clarence J. 

Brown, who was an original co-sponsor of the Inspector General Act of 1978. In 

1983, he became the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, and I left the Cincinnati office 

of Arthur Andersen & Co., where I had practiced as a CPA, to assist him in overseeing the management of the Department of Commerce. 

I have enjoyed working with many outstanding Inspectors General on management issues over the past 24 years, from Sherman Funk at the Commerce Department in the 1980s, to Gaston Gianni and Jeffrey Rush when I was at the House 

Financial Services Committee. These examples of a commitment to professional excellence, independence, and personal courtesy will guide me in the years ahead and, 

if confirmed, I will seek the advice of the respected veterans now serving as Inspectors General. I assure the Committee that, should I be confirmed, I will faithfully 

and independently discharge my duties to uphold the legacy established by so many 

in the position. To quote from the recent hearing chaired by Senator Lieberman to 
14 

consider how to strengthen the role of Inspectors General, I will be neither a lapdog 

nor a junkyard dog, but a watchdog. 

The Environmental Protection Agency stands as the Federal guardian protecting 

our environmental resources, and I am excited at the prospect of serving as the Inspector General of this agency, which has a direct impact on the health and safety 

of all Americans every day. The taxpayers of our nation need an Office of Inspector 

General of committed, trained, assertive, and competent professionals to prevent 

and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in the delivery of EPA’s services. An Inspector 

General can serve as a positive force for change and, if confirmed, I pledge to continue the OIG’s record of honorable achievements and service to the taxpayers. 

If confirmed, I will work constructively in a respectful atmosphere with the OIG 

employees. EPA management, Congress, and other stakeholders. I will direct the 

work of the OIG in accordance with the high standards, principles, and traditions 

of the profession. I will maintain frequent and open communications with EPA management and the Congress, and will report significant problems to the Congress 

when uncorrected by EPA. 

Madam Chairman and members of the Committee, this nomination provides me 

with the opportunity to serve the nation as a federal management expert at the 

highest level of an Executive Branch agency. Thank you again for holding this hearing to consider my nomination, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Baucus. 

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Cochran, why do you want this job? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I was a management wonk long before I was a 

counter-terrorism wonk. I have years of experience in the area, far 

more than any other field. An inspector general position in an Executive Branch agency is one of the highest honors that a management and budget expert can possibly have. The EPA is one of the 

most important agencies in Government. It was truly an honor to 

receive the phone call and to be asked to consider taking this position. 

I want to assist EPA and the management of the agency work 

on behalf of the taxpayers to protect the Nation’s health, human 

health and environmental quality. 

Senator BAUCUS. So this is not a job that you sought? 

Mr. COCHRAN. No, sir. 

Senator BAUCUS. Who called you? 

Mr. COCHRAN. The White House called me. Nobody intervened 

with them on my behalf. 

Senator BAUCUS. The White House called you up and said, Andrew, we would like you to take this job? 

Mr. COCHRAN. They called me on April 12 on my cell phone, because I had talked with them 3 years ago about another position, 

they chose someone else. I was actually in Williamsburg with my 

wife. Out of the clear blue sky, the phone rang. 

Senator BAUCUS. Who called you? 

Mr. COCHRAN. The Office of Presidential Personnel. 

Senator BAUCUS. Who was that? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Jennifer Christy. 

Senator BAUCUS. Were there any reasons why they, why Jennifer 

said they were singling you? 

Mr. COCHRAN. They were looking through my file, and there had 

been a number of other inspectors general confirmed since 2004 

when I talked to them about Treasury. They found me, and I asked 

if there was anybody who intervened or anything else, and she said 

no. 
15 

Senator BAUCUS. Did you ask any questions of them, conditions 

of the job, or did they say anything to you about the conditions of 

the job? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I met with her a couple of times, I met with the 

EPA Administrator and the Deputy Administrator once each. They 

laid no conditions upon my work. We talked about general theory 

of an inspector general, which I have years of experience in. I had, 

there was no expectation of any hindrance to my independence, 

and I wouldn’t take any. I don’t honestly need this job to live. I 

have a good job and a good life. 

Senator BAUCUS. I am sorry, I missed your experience as inspector general. Where was that? 

Mr. COCHRAN. In the Office of Inspector General at the Commerce Department. 

Senator BAUCUS. At Commerce, in the office? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Right, not as the Inspector General. 

Senator BAUCUS. How long were you there? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Just 3 weeks short of 11 years. 

Senator BAUCUS. About 11 years in Commerce. OK. What did 

you do there? What was your job there? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I was division director and senior analyst. We 

had, we would move from area to area. So my first position as division director was actually over the NOAA audit division. I ended 

up auditing every agency of the Commerce Department, and conducting almost every type of performance audit. 

Senator BAUCUS. Did anything come up during your work there 

that you, an irregularity of some kind, that you did something 

about? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, as I said first, the North Pacific Fishery 

Management Council audit, where we basically forced NOAA to 

turn down the proposed amendments of that Council. 

Senator BAUCUS. Was that you or was that your boss or others? 

Was that you? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I directed the audit and all the dissertation Ph.D, 

and one other auditor, and we wrote the audit and our findings 

were not directed or guided from the Inspector General. Then in 

1995, if you are looking for sensitive audits, one audit I did not 

add, I am not sure I added to the list for the EPW work was that 

we did an audit of excessive travel charge card use by employees 

of the Commerce Department, including senior officials in the Department, and found charges for gifts, jewelry, meals in town and 

five figure unpaid balances. 

Senator BAUCUS. Turning to Libby, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, I am concerned about the very grave mistakes that EPA 

made, failing to conduct toxicity studies, inaccurate communication, 

in fact, misleading information to the people there. Also choosing 

not to declare a public health emergency. I want to find out what 

happened. To do that, I have requested documents from the agency, 

also from the White House and other relevant agencies. If confirmed, do you agree to give me and my staff access to copies of 

all documents relating to EPA, OMB, Grace and the White House’s 

involvement with Libby? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Senator, I will provide documents to the Committee concurrent with all the statutory and constitutional obliga-
16 

tions. I will work with the Committee to provide the documents 

that I can provide. 

Senator BAUCUS. Well, that is an easy answer. But you know, 

the proof is in the pudding. Because it is easy to hide behind things 

like privilege and so forth. 

Let me just tell you something. We had a hearing in Libby, and 

I asked for information. The EPA gave us some, but then redacted 

lots of information. It turned out some of the information redacted 

were public press releases by members of the Senate. There was 

no reason they should not be given over. In fact, I might say, the 

Assistant Administrator, when I asked her about this, had no idea 

what was not given to us and did not know that EPA had excluded 

certain matter claiming to be privileged by in fact totally public. 

So that answer you gave me is a nice, glib answer. But it doesn’t 

really indicate operationally how that might work. So could you answer again that same question, a little more fully? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I don’t know all the situation there, sitting on this 

side of the table. I certainly don’t have access to any of those documents and discussions on privileges. I will do what I can to provide 

all the necessary documents to the Committee. I have always done 

that. I would say, in fact, that at the beginning of the North Pacific 

Fishery and Management Audit, an official at NOAA wanted to 

withhold documents from us, and that just didn’t last. It didn’t last 

for about a day. 

Senator BAUCUS. Let me just remind you, the Inspector General 

Act states clearly, ‘‘Nothing in this section or any other provision 

of this Act shall be construed to authorize or permit the withholding of information from the Congress or any other committee 

or subcommittee thereof.’’ 

Mr. COCHRAN. I will enforce, I will live up to the measures of the 

Act as I did when I was at the Commerce Department. I also want 

to note that another audit I directed, I recommended administrative action against a contracting officer, it was the first time it had 

been done, for allowing excessive costs in National Weather Service 

offices. 

Senator BAUCUS. Well, I just urge you to think more clearly, 

more deeply how you might be more forthcoming the next couple 

of days and weeks. Because that response was basically, to be honest with you, is a typical bureaucratic response. It is not one that 

gives the people of Libby much comfort. We are going to find out 

exactly what happened here, and the degree to which there was 

some kind of a cover-up at the EPA, IG and so forth. 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is driven more by my not having intimate 

knowledge of the details, because I can’t, sitting on this side, and 

not for lack of desire to work with the Committee. 

Senator BAUCUS. All right. 

Senator BOXER. Senator, do you want some more time? 

Senator BAUCUS. Can I have a couple minutes? 

Senator BOXER. You can have it, yes, and I will extend—— 

Senator BAUCUS. I will indulge—— 

Senator BOXER. Take as much as you want. 

Senator BAUCUS. I don’t want to take advantage of my colleagues, here. 
17 

Senator BOXER. Well, we are going to give you another 3 minutes. 

Senator BAUCUS. OK, three. 

A great concern also is, how do you view your job? Are you a 

bean counter? 

Mr. COCHRAN. No, sir. 

Senator BAUCUS. Or are you somebody who is going to stand up 

and blow the whistle when something is not right? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Sir, the term performance audit is a really broad 

term. Under the Government Auditing Standards, there are actually five different types of those audits. There is program effectiveness, economy and efficiency, internal controls, compliance with 

laws and regs and prospective analyses. I have done at least four 

of the five, maybe all five. 

So it is definitely not a bean counter. There is a type of qualitative program effectiveness report that I have done. I did for instance numerous offices of the International Trade Administration 

overseas. I don’t know that any of them saved a dime. Conducted 

an audit of the ability of the Patent and Trademark Office to put 

its entire official gazette online. Didn’t save a dime. 

So I have done those types of reviews. I am certainly comfortable 

with those. What you need is qualified people, the right scope, it 

needs good planning, et cetera. So I did them at Commerce, and 

there isn’t anything new in that type of audit situation that I 

haven’t done and I can already do. 

Senator BAUCUS. I am also, frankly, concerned about the EPA’s 

failure to declare a public health emergency. It is very clear, according to press reports, there is a very enterprising reporter, who 

is a Seattle PI, long, long lengthy articles, lots of quotes and documented, it is quite clear that although declaration is proper and appropriate, that OMB did not want to, because it would mean taxpayers’ dollars would be used to give medical care to people who 

are suffering on account of asbestos diseases. That is basically 

what it looks like happened. 

Let me just remind you that people in Libby suffer from asbestos-related diseases at a rate of 40 to 60 times the national average. For mesothelioma, the cancerous type, 100 times greater than 

the national average. It is an outrage. Have you ever been to 

Libby? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I have not been there. But I have certainly heard 

about it. I have been reading about Libby for some time. 

Senator BAUCUS. You know what? If you take this job, you are 

going to be going to Libby. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Fine. 

Senator BAUCUS. I will guarantee that. 

Mr. COCHRAN. So do I. 

Senator BAUCUS. That is going to be a condition. That is going 

to be a condition. You spend some time up there, so you know what 

is going on. It is just so bad. 

Anyway, will you commit to completing a rigorous investigation 

as to why EPA never declared a public health emergency? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Senator, when I get in the job, I promise I am 

going to take a look at everything that is going on in Libby. I don’t 

know if there is something already underway as far as an inves-
18 

tigation. I look forward to working with the Committee and with 

you and your office. 

Senator BAUCUS. I asked a different question. Will you commit 

to complete a rigorous investigation as to why Libby was never declared a public health emergency? Will you, as IG, make that commitment and declaration here today now? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I will certainly take a long look at it, Senator, and 

I can commit to that. 

Senator BAUCUS. I said—OK, here are the words. You, Inspector 

General, complete a rigorous investigation, not anybody else, you, 

into why EPA never declared a public health emergency. I want 

you to dig into it, get to the bottom of it, you personally, IG, if you 

are the IG. You may not be the IG. But if you are the IG, will you 

make that public, solid, firm commitment here today that you will 

do that? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I will make the commitment to do everything possible to uncover what is going on in Libby and take care of that 

situation. 

Senator BAUCUS. No, that is not the question I asked. Let me restate the question. Will you commit to complete a rigorous investigation as to why the EPA never declared a public health emergency, never declared a public health emergency? Will you conduct 

a rigorous investigation as to why that declaration never occurred? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, I will. 

Senator BAUCUS. You will do that? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, I will. 

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Senator, if you would like to stay for another 

round. 

Senator BAUCUS. My time has expired. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator Craig. 

Senator CRAIG. Mr. Cochran, first and foremost, thank you very 

much for allowing yourself to be nominated to this very important 

position. 

The Senator from Montana and I share some very common 

ground. He has a Superfund site, I have a large Superfund site. It 

is old mine legacy, what we know now we didn’t know 100 years 

ago or 50 years ago, but we know it now. A very large chunk, in 

fact, one of the largest Superfund sites in the Nation, is in the 

great old Coeur d’Alene mining district of north Idaho. His was asbestos, mine was lead. We have worked our way through a decade 

of cleanup. 

I have constantly been on EPA, along with other agencies associated, to make sure it got done right and thoroughly, and I don’t 

blame the Senator from Montana for pursuing this. You have to, 

you must. Not only because of the legacy that must be cleaned up, 

if those communities are ever to experience economic and human 

vitality again, but also those who in a very innocent way were 

damaged, injured, or lost their lives as a result of it. We now know 

a great deal more about asbestos and lead than we ever did before, 

and obviously, from what we know now, this Country, our Government is doing everything it can to make sure that it is not allowed 
19 

into the mainstream of human association and a lot of other reasons. 

So I am pleased that the Senator from Montana is pursuing what 

he is pursuing. If there are still outstanding legal issues, and I 

don’t know that of Libby, then obviously there are difficulties. 

There were some for a time in Idaho, in which you pressed but 

could not legitimately get information, because there was a legal 

process underway. But I simply know of Libby, I don’t know the 

details of it. But we share a similar kind of environment. 

Let me ask you these questions, because I think it is important 

that we understand your broad, along with your specific, capability. 

When you were at the Office of Inspector General at the Department of Commerce, 1990 through 2001, how broad was your auditing experience? I think you listed five different types of audits, and 

you had done at least four. If you could give us that kind of specificity, I think it would be very important. 

There are good audits, if you will, there are positive reports to 

be made sometimes. Sometimes it is right to tell the right story 

that is there, that sometimes we just forget about, when and audit 

is produced and all the right things are found, versus the negatives. Because I think not only does the public and does Congress 

want to hear what isn’t going on right, but I think there is also a 

responsibility to tell what may be going on right. Would you respond to your ability in those kinds of audit differences? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I conducted audits of all 

types of agency activities, grantees, contractors, program effectiveness audits, audits to determine if a program was actually working, 

the compliance audits to determine if they are actually in compliance with laws and regulations. Then typical, you know, some typical bean counter audits that are part of the standard inventory, 

bank card audits, travel charge card, et cetera. I covered every 

agency of the Commerce Department. 

I would say also that I would look forward to trying to assist the 

agency in developing best practices. David Williams, the current 

Postal Service Inspector General, has conducted a number of audits 

under what he calls value propositions with the agency, and he 

conducted the last peer review at EPA IG. If confirmed, I will look 

forward to meeting him and discussing how to take that structure 

into the EPA IG office. 

Senator CRAIG. How comfortable will it be for you to switch subject matter to the management of EPA and associated issues from 

your current emphasis on counter-terrorism? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I have done it before. I don’t think it would be difficult. I have done it before. I did it when I moved from the Inspector General’s office when I was selected to be the first senior oversight counsel at House Financial Services. I moved into financial 

institutions, insurance, housing. 

Actually, inspectors general switch agencies all the time. David 

Williams is on his fifth agency. He was the Acting Inspector General at HUD when I was on the committee, while simultaneously 

serving at the IRS as the Inspector General for the IRS. Also, obviously I am not going to be alone there, I am going to have upwards 

of 300 dedicated professional people with hundreds of years of experience who have done outstanding work for EPA and the Con-
20 

gress and the taxpayer. I look forward to working with them if confirmed on the matter. 

Senator CRAIG. You speak of a variety of audits, audits of efficiency, audits of effectiveness, audits of some might call it bean 

counting, but effective use of taxpayers’ money. How many tax dollars have you saved the American public by being an auditor to 

date? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, it is upwards of tens of millions. We try to 

be careful in the quantification. But for instance, the audit of the 

National Weather Service office buildings where the contracting officer wasn’t controlling the costs, we saved at least $10 million 

there. When the Economic Development Administration sold a steel 

mill that had been in its inventory for years, back to the 1970s, 

and we found they could release an environmental reserve worth 

$61 million for better use in EDA’s programs. 

NOAA had a series of unliquidated obligations worth $10 million 

one year and $30 million the next year that we helped unlock, instruments that hadn’t been liquidated for upwards of 15 years and 

they could use that for other purposes. So it is a lot of money. 

Senator CRAIG. Madam Chairman, one more question, if I may? 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Senator CRAIG. As an inspector general, and you are an interesting and extremely important group of people across the system 

of our Government, because we oftentimes refer to the work done 

or not done through the offices of the inspectors general of the different agencies. It is a basis from which chairmen, ranking members, all members of the Senate and the Congress look for information as to what an agency is or is not doing appropriately. 

Do you have an inspector general or someone who, in that line 

of work, current or retired that you view as the model, the kind of 

person you see yourself being in a role at EPA? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I already mentioned David Williams, who has 

been very effective with a number of agencies. I was very impressed with the way Glenn Fine at Justice and the FBI director 

handled that very sensitive national security letter audit in which 

you had Mr. Fine release the audit and then the next day the director of the FBI sits in front of open microphones and says, I 

didn’t do this, I didn’t do this, and I promise to do this. That takes 

weeks, months of constant communication and agreement toward 

the findings and recommendations. That was a great example. 

I worked with Sherman Funk years ago at the Commerce Department and Jeff Rush and Gaston Giani, when they were at the 

Treasury and FDIC, respectively, and I was on the committee. I 

worked with Democratic staff on the committee to start a number 

of audits and special projects for Congress, and with the GAO also. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you very much, Andrew. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CRAIG. Madam Chairman, thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator Craig. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Cochran, I mentioned the Federalist Society and your affiliation there. Could you describe their attitudes about environmental 
21 

programs? They are opposed to larger parts in Government, et 

cetera. How do they portray those? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Senator, I have been on the executive committee 

of the financial services and e-commerce practice group. There are 

different practice groups. Honestly, I haven’t paid any attention to 

the environmental group. I have been just shoehorned in there. 

What we have talked about is State versus Federal regulation of 

financial services, financial institutions, the proper role of attorneys general and governors of State and, for instance, New York 

State Banking Commission, and financial institutions. 

So I haven’t really touched the environmental part of the Federalist Society. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much. I find your statement 

a little surprising, and obviously you are a person with a lot of experience. But not to be looking at what the organization’s principles are as opposed to the finances, as contrasted to the interest 

in the financial side, I think is what has gotten a lot of corporate 

America into serious problems, looking at the balance sheet and 

the financial statements, but not at the purpose, at the mission. 

I would ask you to take a look and send me a note about what 

their policies are, so that we both have a clear idea what they are, 

and that—and I won’t ask you to—I will reserve the opportunity 

to ask further questions when I get that information. 

How about whistleblowers? Do you think they are an important 

source of information for inspectors general? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, they are, they have been very important. Actually, the North Pacific audit started with a letter from the outside, an outside interest group with all the pertinent facts we needed to start that audit. If it hadn’t been for that, I doubt we would 

have done that very sensitive audit. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So you would welcome that source of information, and make sure that these people are protected from recrimination? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Certainly. Congress and the Executive Branch, I 

believe, have agreed recently to provide additional protections. If 

they have done that, that is fine. I worked with whistleblowers at 

the Commerce Department Inspector General’s office all the time. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We have a situation in New Jersey that I 

think if you go through the 50 States, probably the District as well, 

you can find situations that are seriously neglected by no attention 

from EPA or poor decisions on their part. We have one at a place 

called Ringwood, New Jersey. I don’t know whether you saw the recent decision to relieve Ford of any of its responsibility for the 

dumping of paint and chemicals all over the area in a little town 

in New Jersey that has a population of Native Americans. I have 

been up there several times and looked at the material that they 

have left lying around. 

Now, would a decision like that come in any way before the IG 

to see whether or not that decision is appropriately made? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, I would take a look, again, it is hard to 

speak on this side of the table. But if the current inventory, and 

I noticed there is a new Inspector General report on Ringwood, and 

see where that is headed and resolve the recommendations in conjunction with the agency and pursue that. 
22 

Senator LAUTENBERG. What we see now happening is that the 

agency made decisions that didn’t square with the reality. For instance, post-9/11, the agency made a decision, made a statement 

that said people were not in danger as a result of the aftermath 

of 9/11, the exposure to poor air quality, the building materials, et 

cetera. We are finding now that there are people, 6 years later, who 

have serious illnesses, life debilitating conditions. At what point 

does the IG look at something like that and say, challenge a decision that is made? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Senator, I want to address that first by telling you 

that the issue has always been close to my heart, because of my 

visit to Ground Zero with a group of Congressional staff in 2001, 

November 2001, where I stood on that small wooden platform at 

the edge of the debris field. I can’t forget the above-ground wreckage and the smoldering ruins from below, the numbed faces of the 

rescue workers. They had to hose down the area constantly, wear 

the masks. I will remember the odor and the smell forever. 

So I have followed that issue on the counter-terrorism blog and 

as a consultant. It is one of the things that motivates my work for 

9/11 victims here on the Hill. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I would hope that there is a specific 

action that can be taken to look at these things. I don’t know when 

a challenge is made to an important decision like that, but obviously the wrong decision. There can’t be a non-consequential position on that and say, okay, someone decided that everything was 

going to be all right, and it was far off the mark. 

Again, I don’t want to extend your authority, please note that if 

I do here, as the IG. But is there a point in time when appeals are 

made and who would review something like that? If there was an 

appeal to EPA that said, no, you’re wrong, there are lots of sick 

people out there and we ought to take some responsibility for it? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I don’t know the exact answer to that question, 

Senator. As management oversight, I am not an advocate for policy, but that is something that is an issue, of course, that will arise 

if I am confirmed. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, I will have some other 

questions for Mr. Cochran. There is one thing if I may take a couple of seconds more. 

There is strong evidence that EPA, the Department of Transportation and the White House coordinated a lobbying effort against 

the Pavely Waiver. This waiver would allow California and other 

States to have decreased emissions from their cars and not be overridden by the Federal Government. 

Is it appropriate for EPA to be involved in a lobbying campaign 

to defeat a waiver like this? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Senator, I have read something about that, but 

that is something that if I am confirmed, and I arrive at the agency 

and that is still an issue, I will look forward to working with EPA 

and the Committee on that. I can’t make a judgment on it at this 

time. If it is still an issue when I—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is an issue and a question of preemption 

that has to be clearly examined, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. COCHRAN. It could be, if the Committee requested, I don’t 

know if the Committee requested an audit of the waiver decision 
23 

process, if that has already been done, or if the office has already 

started it. I don’t know. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I would ask that you also take note of that 

and get back to me, please. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. I think that was very important. I am going to 

pick up on it. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Cochran, for your willingness to serve. 

I don’t like hypothetical questions, but sometimes it is impossible 

in your position to answer a historical question, in a hypothetical 

circumstance. But let me ask you a hypothetical question, in your 

responsibilities, if you are appointed. If in the course of audit or inspection or investigation within the Department you came upon information that you clearly indicated there may be an impropriety 

within the management of the Department, what action would you 

take? Where would you go? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I would go to the counsel to the Inspector General 

and the experienced, dedicated professionals in the Office of Investigations. Also, what is the recommendation, what are the facts. It 

is not going to matter to me that there is a senior official implicated. Honestly, I have been involved already in audits in which 

senior officials were frankly, embarrassed. It didn’t change any of 

the audit findings or recommendations. 

Senator ISAKSON. That office is an office that serves all IGs, is 

that correct? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, there is a counsel to the IG in the EPA IG 

office. Of course, the EPA IG has a number of dedicated outstanding professional investigators. 

So that is where the recommendation is going to come from on 

cases. I am not going to be driven by somebody’s office title. 

Senator ISAKSON. You were in the House Financial Services Committee, I take it, during the Sarbanes-Oxley years? 

Mr. COCHRAN. For better or for worse, yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. You were there specifically during the investigations of the accounting scandals that resolved around 

WorldCom, Global Crossing and Enron, is that correct? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. You were there when Sarbanes-Oxley became 

law, first Sarbanes’ initiation here and then Oxley’s iterations in 

the House and the final law, is that correct? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. Nobody has ever accused that of being anything other than one of the more effective, far-reaching pieces of 

legislation in the history of the Congress of the United States of 

America, I would think. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, sir, thank you. The investigations involved 

stepping on a lot of toes in the business world, I might add. 

Senator ISAKSON. A lot of connected toes in the business world. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. You made reference, you say you also started 

and still direct one of the premier online centers in the world for 

the dissemination of independent and objective terrorism/counter- 
24 

terrorism news and expert analysis. Is that private or is that part 

of your function in the Government? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I started that on January 5, 2005, actually I started in the consulting business in 2004. By the end of 2004, I saw 

a need in the marketplace for a single multi-expert Web site dedicated solely to counter-terrorism facts and news and analysis. 

Senator ISAKSON. So it is private? 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is private. 

Senator ISAKSON. But nothing in your public responsibilities has 

been merged with that private responsibility, has it? 

Mr. COCHRAN. No. No, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. Last question. You made reference in your testimony, you worked in partnership with Democratic committee 

staff to ask GAO and the Inspectors General of Treasury, HUD and 

the financial regulators to conduct audits and report to Congress 

on issues such as the response of the regulators and financial markets to 9/11. Would you expand on that? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Soon after the attacks, the committee generated 

requests to GAO for a comprehensive series of audits and reports. 

I worked to basically kind of slice that bologna up into smaller 

pieces so it could be done more quickly. For instance, I think most 

Americans don’t realize the Herculean effort it took to reconstruct 

the technology of lower Manhattan, how the markets and the 

telecom companies and the Federal Reserve System did a heroic job 

to do that. The effort out of that to build a stronger critical infrastructure protection scheme, that is what we asked GAO and the 

financial regulators to report on. 

Senator ISAKSON. When you made reference to working in partnership with the Democratic committee staff, was that your initiation with them or their initiation with you to get involved in that? 

Mr. COCHRAN. We worked together often on the Financial Services Committee. I had a co-counsel for oversight matters, and we 

worked together all the time. 

Senator ISAKSON. You worked as a team? 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is close to a team. We helped each other provide 

information and issues and prepare questions. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

I don’t know exactly where to start, but I will ask you this. Mr. 

Cochran, how many program evaluations, not audits, but evaluations of environmental programs have you led in your professional 

career? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam Chairman, I had a copy of the North Pacific audit in a box at home. All those contents, it is not online anywhere, unfortunately, and I couldn’t find out exactly how many audits or evaluations of any type I did over that 11-year period. 

Senator BOXER. No, no, no. I am just saying environmental programs. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, at least one on the Council and two audits 

of the use of Superfund monies by Commerce Department programs. Then some other Weather Service audits. 

Senator BOXER. But I am talking about not audits, but evaluations of environmental programs, whether the environmental pro-
25 

gram was meeting its goals, was being enforced, that there was no 

corruption, that kind of thing. How many? 

Mr. COCHRAN. At least the one. 

Senator BOXER. The one on? 

Mr. COCHRAN. On the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. 

Senator BOXER. OK, one. OK. I want to reiterate Senator Lautenberg’s question. Do you believe it is appropriate for EPA to be involved in a lobbying campaign to defeat the California waiver? 

Mr. COCHRAN. It all comes down to what you define as a lobbying 

campaign. I don’t know exactly what they have done. 

Senator BOXER. Well, it is in the record. There have been hearings in the House that there were phone calls made from the Department of Transportation to members of Congress that the EPA 

was involved in it. So direct phone calls to members of Congress, 

telling them to be against the California waiver. Do you believe it 

is appropriate for the EPA to involve in such a lobbying campaign 

to defeat the waiver? 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is improper. I know it is improper for agency 

officials to lobby, and then there is the provision of information. A 

matter like that should be taken up within the investigatory structure of transportation, of DOT. 

Senator BOXER. Well, this is EPA was involved in it. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Or EPA, if they are involved. 

Senator BOXER. So you don’t think it is appropriate for the EPA 

to have been involved in a lobbying campaign to defeat the California waiver? 

Mr. COCHRAN. If the facts meet the requirements in law for agency, for the improper lobbying of the Hill by agency officials, that 

is a matter for EPA’s investigators to take up. 

Senator BOXER. Well, if you are the IG, do you commit to me that 

you would launch an investigation into this improper lobbying by 

EPA? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I will take a look at it, yes, Madam Chairman. 

Yes, I will. 

Senator BOXER. You commit to me that you will launch an investigation into the involvement of EPA in a lobbying campaign to defeat the California waiver, yes or no? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, I will. 

Senator BOXER. OK. I wanted to ask you, I was looking at your 

resume, which is very interesting, and you have had a lot of interesting experiences. I wanted to go over a couple of these items on 

here. 

What is the Virginia Ridge Foundation? 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is just a girls club that my wife started to provide cooking classes for young girls, based on something, and that 

friends ran in Maryland. We never did anything with it, honestly, 

but the Committee form asked me for all the memberships. 

Senator BOXER. Because you are still president of it. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, I know, but we are going to get rid of it. 

Senator BOXER. OK, got you. What is the Counter-Terrorism 

Foundation? 

Mr. COCHRAN. The Counter-Terrorism Foundation is the vehicle 

for helping to fund and manage the counter-terrorism blog. It has 
26 

tax-exempt status. It was started last year. I am one of the board 

members. There are five other board members. 

Senator BOXER. What is your experience in counter-terrorism? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, I started into the issue with the House Financial Services Committee. I was very active in conducting terrorist financing investigations for the 3 years I was there. Then 

when I came out, after representing companies and some non-profit 

organizations, and, well, not really organizations, one expert, Steve 

Emerson, an investigative project. Then in 2005, started representing the Motley Rice law firm on behalf of its terrorism victims who were seeking justice in court. 

Senator BOXER. So I assume that if you get this job, you won’t 

be doing that any more? 

Mr. COCHRAN. That is right. I would give it all up. I have signed 

an ethics agreement on that already. 

Senator BOXER. Right. OK. Do you know Steven Johnson? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I only met him once. I had the one interview with 

him in April and that was it. 

Senator BOXER. An interview about? 

Mr. COCHRAN. About the job. It was just kind of a standard job 

interview and the situation, the White House called, I talked with 

them, I went to EPA, met with them. That was it. I didn’t know 

him before and I haven’t seen him since. 

Senator BOXER. I am sorry, say that again? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I didn’t know him before and I haven’t seen him 

since. 

Senator BOXER. Yes, but you were interviewed by Steven Johnson for the job of Inspector General? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, it is standard procedure. 

Senator BOXER. I am just asking questions. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. You thanked him in your opening statement because he is supporting your nomination, is that where that is? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Now, Mr. Cochran, when working for GAGE, did 

you ever perform any work for the telecommunications company 

Vonage? 

Mr. COCHRAN. No, I did not. 

Senator BOXER. Now, Mr. Cochran, news reports indicate that 

Federal attorneys may be investigating GAGE for potential violations of Federal law when lobbying for organizations that receive 

Federal money through earmarks. Are you aware of that investigation? 

Mr. COCHRAN. No. I have never been asked any question about 

that, and I don’t know to what organizations they would be referring. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Did you ever lobby any members of the Senate in your position at GAGE or their staffs? Did you ever phone 

them about anything? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, sure. I have lobbied, I have—— 

Senator BOXER. What would that be? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I met with numerous members and staff of the 

Senate to, for the concerns of clients. 
27 

Senator BOXER. Give us an example, please. What lobbying did 

you do toward, for example, members of this Committee? 

Mr. COCHRAN. OK. Well, not members of this Committee, I don’t 

think. For instance, there is a bill on the Floor this week which 

would authorize national subpoena authority by both sides in the 

9/11 aviation trials. I worked with Senate Judiciary staff on that. 

It is now a bipartisan bill with support from both sides of the aisle. 

Senator BOXER. So could you make available for this Committee 

the members or staff of the Senate that you have lobbied and what 

you have lobbied them on? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I can. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cochran, do you think there is a difference between conducting an audit and evaluating a program? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, as I said, the term performance audit, really 

I think there might be a misunderstanding. It is really a broad 

term. So it can include a program evaluation, and I think people 

see the word audit and think numbers. It doesn’t have to be numbers in the Inspector General context. So it can include program 

evaluations. 

Now, in the Inspector General world, there are offices of program 

evaluations that do quicker turnaround inspections or program 

evaluations that meet different types of standards. But I conducted 

all types. 

Senator BOXER. Well, EPA and Department of Commerce say 

that there is a definition for what evaluators do. Do you know what 

that is? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Somewhat. But it differs. I read that, I don’t have 

it committed to memory. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, I will say, evaluators plan and conduct 

comprehensive reviews of programs and use design and methodology strategies that maximize innovation, identify new issues and 

focus on increased understanding of programs. So that is why I 

keep asking, how many program evaluations, not audits, but evaluations of environmental programs have you led in your career. 

You said one you could think of. 

OK. All right. I am going to—Senator Baucus. 

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Cochran, several publications have reported that your current employer, GAGE LLC, is under investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s office for questionable financial dealings. At issue is 

whether or not a GAGE client, a Montana-based alliance, used appropriate dollars to pay GAGE for lobbying services. I don’t presume to know whether these accusations are true, but they are 

troubling. 

So as Inspector General, if you are, would you be the conscience 

of the agency, that is, would you agree to provide me with a description of the nature of all the work you have conducted for your 

clients? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I am sorry, I didn’t quite catch that. 

Senator BAUCUS. The nature. I mean, in addition to a list of the 

clients, the nature of the work that you did for each of those clients. 
28 

Mr. COCHRAN. I didn’t do any work for Enza. My work at GAGE 

started September 1, 2005 as a result of a merger. Quite honestly, 

I have never done anything for any Montana-based client. So I will 

provide—— 

Senator BAUCUS. You began when? What date? 

Mr. COCHRAN. September 1, 2005. When I came off the Hill, January 1, 2004, I worked for a firm named Public Policy Partners. We 

merged with GAGE September 1, 2005. 

Senator BAUCUS. But there are reports that the U.S. Attorney’s 

office is looking into improper financial dealings with GAGE. 

Mr. COCHRAN. No one has asked me any questions. My life is an 

open book. I have just never—— 

Senator BAUCUS. Are you aware of this investigation? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I have read news reports. But I have learned in 

24 years in town to not take as gospel every news report of every 

possible investigation. 

Senator BAUCUS. Have there been any discussions in the firm 

about this? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I didn’t actually, I mean, I am trying to remember 

a conversation. There may have been, Senator, I just don’t recall, 

because since I didn’t do any work for Enza—I have a special 

niche, the Homeland Security/Counter-Terrorism niche. That has 

been my niche at the firm since I came over, an I have just never 

done any work for a Montana-based client. 

Senator BAUCUS. I am sorry, the home what? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism. 

Senator BAUCUS. I am curious, what does that have to do with 

the Inspector General for an environmental agency? That is very 

different, isn’t it? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, it is different, except that the standards 

under which every Inspector General operates are the same. Basically, I would be switching subjects. 

Senator BAUCUS. Well, there is something to that, but again, to 

some degree, I don’t how to state this, if you want to have a heart 

transplant, you go to a cardiac surgeon, you go to somebody who 

knows the subject. If you want to have a really good IG in the environmental area, I suppose it is different than the IG at the Defense 

Department, might be different than the IG at the Agriculture Department. Agriculture is a little bit different from Defense, different from environmental issues. 

Mr. COCHRAN. The Inspector General Act envisions a cadre of 

trained professional evaluators, auditors, inspectors general. That 

is why so many of them have moved around from agency to agency. 

Senator BAUCUS. But it sounds a little bit like just the bean 

counter game, just looking at the financials. Irrespective of policy. 

Mr. COCHRAN. But there is still a group of up to 300 dedicated 

professionals, many of whom have been there for years and years. 

So the Inspector General doesn’t plan or conduct the audit work by 

himself. He has a strategic vision and a mind set, and he concludes 

the audits and the reports. But the professionals are right there behind him all the time. 

Senator BAUCUS. But I think EPA’s Inspector General, who is 

more in the nature of a whistleblower, found some things that were 

not quite right. 
29 

Mr. COCHRAN. All Inspectors General eventually become whistleblowers, and investigations are an important part of all offices of 

inspectors general. 

Senator BAUCUS. It is also true there are some IGs who I think 

are pretty tepid, lapdogs of agencies. That is also true. So how are 

we going to figure out what camp you are in? How do we know 

what kind of a person you really are? 

Mr. COCHRAN. My consulting practice at this point is really heavily oriented towards helping terrorism victims. Honestly, there are 

companies and countries who won’t hire me because of the clients 

I have. One of my main clients is a trial litigation firm that has 

pursued the InterBank in civil suit, pursued airlines and airports 

over aviation security on 9/11. I think my career actually screams 

objectivity and independence, both in private practice, on the Hill, 

on the House Financial Services Committee, and in the Inspector 

General’s office. 

Senator BAUCUS. What are your views about climate change? 

How aggressively should the United States move to address climate 

change issues? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Inspectors General are not a policy—— 

Senator BAUCUS. Tell us your personal view. You are a citizen, 

Mr. Andrew Cochran. You are an American citizen. You read the 

newspapers, you have a personal view. What is it? 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is a very important issue. It needs to be addressed. If confirmed as Inspector General, whatever programs and 

policies—— 

Senator BAUCUS. I am not talking about that. I am just talking 

about you as a—I am trying to figure out who you are. I am trying 

to figure out what your inclination is. 

Mr. COCHRAN. I am trying not to bias my independence, bias one 

way or another towards one particular view or another. In case I 

am confirmed, I just want to assure you that no matter what the 

issue, if a policy is put in place or a program at EPA, that I will 

faithfully, independently, objectively, assertively determine whether that policy is being carried out—— 

Senator BAUCUS. Yes, but there is a moral dimension here, like 

what is right and what is wrong, which is independent often of the 

numbers, whether the balance sheet balances, whether—you know 

what I am getting at? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Sure, and it wouldn’t be confined to just whether 

the numbers balance. It would be whether the program is being effectively implemented, whatever that program is. 

Senator BAUCUS. So if you were to see, your view, that the EPA 

had not conducted toxicity studies, at the same time EPA was putting out a pamphlet saying to people in Libby, Montana that these 

levels are OK, what would you do about that at that time? Anything? Looks like the numbers are OK. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Offices of Inspector develop annual plans and then 

leave room for audits and program evaluations where there needs 

to be a quick turnaround, such as the Libby, Montana evaluation 

done in the last quarter of last year. That would be something I 

would talk with the professionals at the Inspector General’s office 

and agency management and the Congress, and outside interest 

groups, all of which is invited and urged upon by the auditing 
30 

standards, to see if there is a way to conduct a timely program 

evaluation with dedicated, talented, qualified professionals. 

Senator BAUCUS. If you are named IG, how long is your term? 

Mr. COCHRAN. There is no set term in law right now, although 

there are proposals to change that. It is subject to removal by the 

President. It would at this point continue into the next Administration. 

Senator BAUCUS. It would continue? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator BAUCUS. So are you saying it would continue indefinitely 

until you were either removed or resigned? 

Mr. COCHRAN. It is not just an indefinite term. It is at the pleasure of the President. That is what the IG Act stipulates at this 

time. 

Senator BAUCUS. Does that mean that the next President could 

just find a new IG? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Sure. 

Senator BAUCUS. Because my understanding is, something says 

a 5-year term, that it is difficult within a 5-year period, anyway, 

for a new President to remove an IG. Is there anything to that? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I don’t know. I have never heard of that. 

Senator BAUCUS. So as far as you are concerned, to your knowledge, if you are confirmed, you are there solely at the pleasure of 

the President? 

Mr. COCHRAN. That is my understanding of the law at this time. 

Senator BAUCUS. Madam Chairman, I think our understanding 

needs to be cleared up a little bit. I am not convinced that that is 

exactly the law in this case. But I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Cochran. I appreciate the time you have taken. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Craig? 

Senator CRAIG. I don’t know that I have anything additional. I 

would be happy to yield to Senator Alexander for any questions. 

Senator BOXER. My understanding is Senator Alexander wants to 

introduce a member of the next panel, is that correct? 

Senator ALEXANDER. I will be glad to come back and do that. 

Senator BOXER. We are at the end here. I have about five minutes of questions, and I don’t know if anyone—Senator Isakson 

doesn’t, and I don’t think Senator Craig does. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I will be glad to wait. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Craig, did you want to—— 

Senator CRAIG. Well, just the last question that I thought Senator Baucus asked about not only the qualifications but the terms 

of an Inspector General. I didn’t know there was a question there. 

I am now curious, because I thought that Inspectors General were 

appointed by Presidents and served at the pleasure of Presidents 

and that the term was not a fixed term. 

Mr. COCHRAN. Correct. 

Senator CRAIG. It could live or die with the coming of a new 

President. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. COCHRAN. That is my understanding. 

Senator CRAIG. OK. Well, it was mine, but if there is a gray area, 

we need to know about it. 

With that, I have no further question, Madam Chairman. Thank 

you. 
31 

Senator BOXER. I have just a couple. How long did your meeting 

with Mr. Johnson last in April when you had that meeting? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Half an hour, maybe half an hour. 

Senator BOXER. What were his questions that he asked you? 

Mr. COCHRAN. He asked me about background and why I want 

the job and how I see the mix of, how I see the communication flow 

with the Inspector General’s office. I said with respect to audits 

and program evaluations, that should be constant and continuous. 

I cited the Glenn Fine audit of national security letters. 

Then investigations of course are private, secret. He was fine 

with that. There was no attempt to influence the direction of the 

office or the hiring practices of the office whatsoever. 

Senator BOXER. OK, I wasn’t asking you that. But you had a 30 

minute meeting. What else did he ask you about? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Background, what did I do, standard type of job 

interview, actually. 

Senator BOXER. Did he mention any particular ongoing issues 

that were happening now at the Department? 

Mr. COCHRAN. No. 

Senator BOXER. OK. We now have an e-mail that says very clearly that Steven Johnson gave his OK to DOT to lobby members of 

Congress. Do you think that is allowed by law? 

Mr. COCHRAN. I don’t know, because I am not an attorney in that 

area. I think that is, that requires a legal interpretation of legal 

counsel, and to take a look at that. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I would call to your attention Chapter 93, 

Section 1913 that says, ‘‘No part of the money appropriated by any 

enactment of Congress shall, in the express authorization by Congress, be used,’’ and it lists a number of things, and it talks to influence, in any manner, a member of Congress. Is that clear to 

you? 

Mr. COCHRAN. That is the first time I have seen that, but it 

is—— 

Senator BOXER. It is the first you have ever seen this and you 

are nominated for Inspector General? You were, worked in the Inspector General’s office? I am a little stunned at that. 

So given the fact that I have an e-mail here, and I am picking 

up on Senator Lautenberg’s line of questioning on the waiver, that 

we have an e-mail that shows that a CEQ employee wrote, ‘‘It’s OK 

for Secretary of Transportation to make calls, I spoke with Steve 

Johnson this morning.’’ So I am asking you again, now that you 

know this law and you know we have the e-mails, do you think this 

is against the law, what happened there? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, I think counsel to the IG or some other 

counsel would have to look at the case law on that, and whether 

that e-mail fits that kind of description. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, I have some concerns here. I think you 

are a nice person, believe me, it is nothing personal. But it took 

three times for you to agree to do something that Senator Baucus 

asked, which I think is a no-brainer to look into, this horrific situation at Libby. You danced around it and finally said yes. It took 

three proddings from me and you don’t know about—I don’t know. 

I am just, I am open, I am not closed, but I am concerned. 
32 

Senator Lautenberg, I am sorry. I didn’t realize that you had 

come back. Do you have any final questions? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I want to be here for the next panel. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Mr. Cochran, before you leave, I have to ask 

you certain questions, I am sorry, in order for this Committee and 

other committees to exercise the legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that committees of Congress are able to 

receive testimony, briefings and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed as Inspector General of the EPA, 

to appear before this Committee or designated members of this 

Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress and 

provide information subject to appropriate and necessary security 

protection with respect to your responsibilities as Inspector General 

of the EPA? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Do you agree when asked to give your personal 

views, even if those views differ from the Administration in office 

at the time? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, 

documents and electronic and other forms of communication of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other 

appropriate committees in a timely manner? 

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Do you know of any matters which you may or 

may not have disclosed that might place you in a conflict of interest 

if you are confirmed as Inspector General of EPA? 

Mr. COCHRAN. No. 

Senator BOXER. OK. We thank you very much. Appreciate your 

testimony. 

We have asked the next panel to come up. Actually, we are going 

to ask all the others to come up, right, at this time. John Bresland, 

Russell Shearer, Thomas Gilliland, William Graves, Susan Richardson Williams. We welcome all of you to the table. While we are 

doing that, we are very happy to give Senator Alexander as much 

time as he may wish to make his statement. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you for your courtesy, Madam Chairman. 

I thank you for your expeditious hearings on Tom Gilliland’s 

nomination and the renomination of Bishop Graves and Susan Williams. 

Senator BOXER. Senator, if you would yield, I erred. Those last 

two are not here today. But they have filed their papers. So this 

is a hearing on them as well. Please proceed. 

Senator ALEXANDER. The reason that is so important is the Tennessee Valley Authority is the largest utility. It is a unique agency. 

It has the capacity for doing some things that are consistent with 

what this Committee is trying to do. 

For example, in its strategic plan, it is thinking about how to reduce carbon in its coal plants, how to expand nuclear power, which 

is carbon free, it is exploring geothermal and solar power, which 

are the more appropriate renewable energies in our part of the 

world. Because of the new governance structure that the Congress 

has created for the Tennessee Valley Authority, for the first time 
33 

it has a modern governance structure. The President and the Congress have appointed really talented men and women to the board 

and they are moving in a very strong direction to create a charter 

for reliable, clean, large amounts of reliable, clean energy for the 

Tennessee Valley. 

Now, it is in that that I am very pleased the President has nominated Tom Gilliland. I have heard a good deal about him from Senator Isakson, who knows his reputation. But the strength, Madam 

Chairman, that he brings to the TVA Board to me seems to be one 

of legal, business and audit background. This, as I said, is the largest utility. He has extensive experience with audits. TVA now has 

the responsibility, as other agencies, as public institutions do, of 

letting the sun shine in on their business operations. Mr. Gilliland 

is committed to that. 

So I simply wanted to come here today and express my support 

for his nomination and to say that I am convinced that if he should 

be confirmed, which I hope he is, he will add business and audit 

strength to an already strong Board. I thank you for the time. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator. So I will give up 

my place here to Senator Lautenberg, because I know he has some 

time problems. So please go ahead, Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I do have another appointment. This is the Chemical Safety 

Board appointment, so it is critical. I wanted to express my appreciation for Mr. Bresland’s appearing. You identified him as a New 

Jersey person. We welcome that affiliation, I promise you. But he 

also has another redeeming quality, he spent a lot of years in Ireland. Therefore, he comes with not only the knowledge that he has 

gained thoroughly over his career but also has a certain charm that 

goes with the individual. I am pleased to welcome you here, and 

all of you. 

I am going to, Madam Chairman, ask that questions be submitted and that we hold the record open. New Jersey has a very 

active interest, as we have across the Country, in our Chemical 

Safety Board. There is so much exposure in the State of New Jersey, there is a 2-mile stretch identified by the FBI as the most inviting stretch for a terrorist attack. It is described as the most dangerous 2 miles, from the Newark Liberty Airport to the harbor of 

New Jersey and New York. There are chemical facilities galore 

there. Heaven forbid that if there was an attack on those facilities, 

12 million people would be at risk. 

The Chemical Safety Board has enormous responsibly in terms 

of making sure that the security measures that are taken are serious, stringent enough, Madam Chairman, and well financed 

enough, domestic security, so that we can give assistance to the 

communities and the companies where necessary to make sure that 

they are properly protected. I welcome the others of you here as 

well. But again, I will reserve the time for questions to be submitted in writing. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Lautenberg, thank you. I just need to 

say that you have been a true leader on this issue of chemical safety. I remember when Senator Corzine was here, the two of you 

teamed up and worked very well on this, and you have carried the 
34 

ball forward with Senator Menendez. So I just want to thank you 

very much. 

Senator do you have any comments, or should we just go to the 

testimony? 

Senator ISAKSON. In the interest of their time, let’s just go to the 

testimony. But can I do one thing? 

Senator BOXER. You can. 

Senator ISAKSON. There are two lovely ladies here I meant to introduce before. First is Candy. Candy, would you stand up? Candy 

Gilliland, this is Tom Gilliland’s wife. Next is a lady that is very 

familiar to all of us, Emily Reynolds. Emily was Secretary of the 

Senate and now serves as Secretary of the TVA Board. 

Senator BOXER. Excellent. Thank you for that. 

OK, gentlemen. I am sure you are just thrilled and delighted, 

after you sat through the other witness, to take your place in the 

hot seats. We really do welcome you, and I assure you your experience will be a bit different. 

We will start with Mr. Bresland, and again, thank you all for 

agreeing to hold these positions. Go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN S. BRESLAND, NOMINEE FOR BOARD 

MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY 

AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD 

Mr. BRESLAND. Thank you, Chairman Boxer and distinguished 

members of the Committee. 

My name is John Bresland. I am honored to appear before you 

today to describe my background and to express my strong commitment to carrying on the important life-saving work of the Chemical 

Safety Board. 

With me this morning is my wife, Beth, who is sitting over here. 

She is an oncology social worker at Sibley Memorial Hospital here 

in Washington, D.C. 

It is also an honor to have Senator Lautenberg present at the 

hearing this morning. We all salute the Senator’s extraordinary 

leadership on the issue of chemical safety and his role in establishing the CSB in 1990. 

In 2002, the Senate confirmed me as a CSB Board member. During my 5-year term, I had the privilege of working with Carolyn 

Merritt, the Board Chairman, whose 5-year term ended in August. 

Carolyn did an exceptional job, and I congratulate her for that. 

Through her efforts and the hard work of the Board members and 

staff, the productivity and the prominence of the Chemical Safety 

Board has increased dramatically. The CSB is now known around 

the world as the preeminent independent agency investigating accidents in chemical plants and oil refineries. 

I am convinced that as a result of our investigations and safety 

recommendations, lives have been saved and communities have 

been protected. I am proud to have been part of Carolyn’s legacy 

and would hope to continue it and build on it should I be confirmed. 

I believe that my 35 years of experience in the chemical industry 

and 5 years at the CSB make me uniquely qualified to serve as the 

next chairman. During my career in industry, I served in high 

management positions involving responsibility for worker safety 
35 

and the environment, including as a chemical plant general manager and as corporate director of risk management for Honeywell. 

I am totally committed to the mission of the CSB: to save the 

lives of workers and to protect the public by conducting truly independent investigations that pull no punches in getting to the root 

causes of tragic industrial chemical accidents. In my 5 years on the 

Board, I have strongly supported our investigations staff in producing fair but thorough and tough accident reports with appropriate recommendations to companies, trade organizations, and 

Government agencies such as EPA and OSHA. As an active Board 

member, I traveled to many accident sites with the investigation 

teams to represent the agency and to see first-hand what had happened. 

I believe that the CSB’s accident investigations, which are independent of any company, industry or government influence, can 

bring to light serious problems that when corrected will save lives 

and reduce worker injuries. I have given more than 100 speeches 

and presentations on the CSB’s work to industry groups, labor 

gatherings and other stakeholders. My message is always the 

same: you must be committed to safety 100 percent of the time. Accident prevention is the moral thing to do, it is also the only rational business model because chemical plant explosions and fires are 

so destructive and result in severe economic consequences. Businesses must be good stewards of their workers and good neighbors 

in their communities. 

If confirmed, my goals for the CSB include first, continuing to 

conduct tough, independent investigations of chemical plant accidents; second, increasing the size and the expertise of our investigative staff; and third, broadening our outreach, especially to 

smaller businesses and to the emergency preparedness and response communities. 

Finally, I fully support the testimony of Chairman Merritt before 

this Committee in July where she called for improvements to the 

CSB’s authorizing statute, which would strengthen and clarify the 

Board’s investigative authority. These changes are needed to assure the continued quality and speed of the Board’s investigations. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Committee 

on these issues. 

In conclusion, it has been a privilege for me to serve on the 

Chemical Safety Board and to have worked with the talented and 

dedicated people at the CSB. As a first generation American who 

had the opportunity to come to the United States in my 20’s and 

became a citizen in 1983, I am deeply honored to have been nominated by the President to serve as a chairman of the Chemical 

Safety Board. I offer you my integrity, my judgment and my experience. 

If confirmed, I commit to work tirelessly to improve the safety of 

the chemical processing and oil refining industry in the United 

States. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bresland follows:] 
36 

STATEMENT OF JOHN S. BRESLAND, NOMINATED TO BE A BOARD MEMBER AND

CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD

Thank you, Chairman Boxer and distinguished members of the committee. 

My name is John Bresland. I am honored to appear before you to describe my 

background and to express my strong commitment to carrying on the important, 

live-saving work of the Chemical Safety Board. 

With me this morning is my wife, Beth, who is an Oncology Social Worker at Sibley Memorial Hospital. 

It is an honor to have Senator Lautenberg present at the hearing this morning. 

Senator, we all salute your extraordinary leadership on the issue of chemical safety 

and your role in establishing the CSB in 1990. 

In 2002, the Senate confirmed me as a CSB Board member. During my five-year 

term I had the privilege of working with Carolyn Merritt, the Board Chairman, 

whose five year ended in August. Carolyn did an exceptional job and I congratulate 

her. Through her efforts and the hard work of the Board members and staff the productivity and the prominence of the Chemical Safety Board increased dramatically. 

The CSB is now known around the world as the preeminent independent agency investigating accidents in chemical plants and oil refineries. I am convinced that as 

a result of our investigations and safety recommendations lives have been saved and 

communities have been protected. I am proud to have been a part of Carolyn’s legacy, and would hope to continue it and build on it should I be confirmed. 

I believe that my 35 years of experience in the chemical industry and 5 years at 

the CSB make me uniquely qualified to serve as the next chairman. During my career in industry I served in high management positions involving responsibility for 

worker safety and the environment—including as a chemical plant general manager 

and as a corporate director of risk management for Honeywell. 

I am totally committed to the mission of the CSB—to save the lives of workers 

and to protect the public by conducting truly independent investigations that pull 

no punches in getting to the root causes of tragic industrial chemical accidents. 

In my five years on the Board I have strongly supported our investigations staff 

in producing fair but thorough and tough accident reports with appropriate recommendations to companies, trade associations and government agencies such as 

EPA and OSHA. As an active board member, I traveled to many accident sites with 

the investigation teams to represent the agency and to see first hand what had happened. 

I believe that the CSB’s accident investigations—which are independent of any 

company, industry, or government influence—can bring to light serious problems 

that, when corrected, will save lives and reduce worker injuries. I have given more 

than 100 speeches and presentations on the CSB’s work to industry groups, labor 

gatherings, and other stakeholders, and my message is always: you must be committed to safety 100% of the time. Accident prevention is the moral thing to do. It 

is also the only rational business model, because chemical plant explosions and fires 

are so destructive and result in severe economic consequences. Businesses must be 

good stewards of their workers and good neighbors in their communities. 

My goals for the CSB include: 

• First, continuing to conduct tough, independent investigations of chemical accidents 

• Second, increasing the size and expertise of our investigative staff; 

• Third, broadening our outreach, especially to smaller businesses and to the 

emergency preparedness and response communities. 

Finally, I fully support the testimony of Chairman Merritt before this Committee 

in July, where she called for improvements to the CSB authorizing statute which 

would strengthen and clarify the Board’s investigative authority. These changes are 

needed to assure the continued quality and speed of the Board’s investigations. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Committee on these issues. 

In conclusion, it has been a privilege for me to serve on the Chemical Safety 

Board and to have worked with the talented and dedicated people at the CSB. As 

a first generation American who had the opportunity to come to the United States 

in my 20s and who became a citizen in 1982, I am deeply honored to have been 

nominated by the president to serve as Chairman of the Board. 

I offer you my integrity, my judgment, and my experience. 

If confirmed, I commit to work tirelessly to improve the safety of the chemical 

processing and oil refining industry in the United States. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 
37 

1We notified the Coast Guard because that agency was present at the accident site, due to 

its proximity to a navigable river, and there was concern about a potential impact of firewater 

runoff on those waters. 

RESPONSE FROM JOHN S. BRESLAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR SANDERS

Question 1. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations Board plays a critical 

role in investigating industrial chemical accidents. This continued success is dependent on an effective working relationship with state and local authorities. Concerns 

have been raised about the CSB’s response to previous incidents, especially regarding the CSB’s procedures for notifying incident commanders prior to its arrival on 

scene. What specific steps has the CSB taken to alert incident commanders of its 

intent to deploy investigators to an incident previous to their arrival? 

Response. I agree that the CSR’s success is greatly aided by effective working relationships with state and local authorities, including local incident commanders 

who oversee emergency response activities under the National Incident Management System (NIMS). For the most part, we have established effective working relationships with state and local officials at sites around the country—despite the 

CSB’s relatively short history and limited staffing. States and localities derive substantial benefits from the CSB’s independent safety investigations, recommendations, and outreach, which lead to safer chemical facilities and communities around 

the country. As chairman, I will be fully committed to continuing and growing the 

CSB’s positive working relationships with state and local officials. 

As a matter of course prior to deploying any investigative team, we notify: 

• Site management 

• Corporate management 

• Local tire, police, and emergency management, including the incident commander if one has been designated 

• Fire marshal, if on scene or expected on scene 

• The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), if on scene or 

expected on scene 

• The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), if on the scene or expected, and 

any EPA on scene coordinator 

• The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), if on scene 

or expected 

• The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), in the event 

of off-site consequences 

• The Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) chairman or Office of 

Emergency Management 

• The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), if the incident involved a 

ship, barge, railcar, tank truck or pipeline located at a fixed facility 

• Other national or regional response teams 

• Union(s) representing workers at the facility. 

In addition, in cases where we have not have prior dealings with specific state 

or local fire services, we often contact organizations such as the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) to help establish positive relationships with 

relevant officials before our investigators arrive. NASFM has strongly supported the 

Board’s mission, and their recent efforts at facilitating these local contacts have 

been particularly helpful. 

I believe the ‘‘concerns’’ noted in the questions relate to certain claims made in 

an unsigned, one-page statement distributed by several representatives of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) in September 2007, more than 10 months 

after the CSB’s deployment to a major chemical accident site in Danvers, Massachusetts, in November 2006. The CSB has thoroughly refuted those claims in a 16-page 

letter to the Committee last month, which I include for the record. 

Specifically, the CSB letter explains how, prior to the arrival of our investigators, 

the agency had notified the Massachusetts state tire marshal, the Danvers Fire Department, the EPA, the U.S. Coast Guard,1 the Danvers town manager, the Danvers 

director of public health, and the offices of Representative John Tierney, Senator 

Edward Kennedy, and Senator John Kerry. When the CSB team arrived at the site 

on November 24, team members promptly approached town officials and the incident commanders (bearing appropriate, signed letters of authority under the Clean 

Air Act) and described the mission of the agency and the reasons for the deployment. Unfortunately, after all these notifications and contacts had occurred, the 

CSB was blocked from the accident site for a period of five days. 
38 

Question 2. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, the Administration established a ‘‘single comprehensive approach to domestic incident management . . . 

to ensure that all levels of government have the capability to work efficiently and 

effectively together. . . .’’ Under this directive, the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS) was developed ‘‘to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, 

or complexity.’’ How are the CSB’s protocols for responding to incidents at chemical 

facilities consistent with the NIMS? How many members of the CSB have been 

trained and certified in the NIMS? 

Response. All of our career investigators, including investigation supervisors and 

investigation managers, have had thorough training on the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Most of our investigators received their NIMS training in 

an eight-hour course presented by Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute (MFRI) in 

2005 and were registered with FEMA. Those who did not take the MFRI course 

completed an online independent study course (IS–00700) and were also registered 

with FEMA. We plan to continue providing comprehensive NIMS training for all our 

investigators, as we have done for the past several years. 

As a matter of both policy and actual practice, the CSB does nothing to interfere 

with NIMS or other emergency response activities at accident sites, and that will 

be my continued policy as chairman if confirmed. At any accident site, if emergency 

response activities are ongoing or an Incident command system is in place, our procedure calls for the CSB lead investigator to report directly to the incident commander (IC) upon arrival. The lead investigator should establish the authority of 

CSB to investigate while being sensitive to avoid possible disruptions to any ongoing 

emergency response operations. 

It would clearly be inappropriate, however, for an incident commander to seek to 

direct the CSB’s investigation or to prescribe the terms under which the CSB can 

interview witnesses or access the site, other than for reasons of protecting safety 

or completing emergency response actions. In many cases, the CSB’s investigators 

have specialized chemical expertise that is highly useful to incident commanders 

(many of whom have never had to respond to a major chemical accident) and other 

agencies, and we invariably seek to be of assistance where possible. 

I should emphasize that the CSB is not an emergency response agency but was 

created by Congress solely as independent investigative body. In some cases, the 

CSB’s investigations examine the effectiveness of emergency response activities, coordination, and command structures. The CSB’s position on this issue is similar to 

that of the NTSB, which also examines the effectiveness of emergency response as 

part of its accident investigations. 

Question 3. What steps does the CSB intend to take to ensure better coordination 

of its activities with other federal, state, and local agencies? 

Response. During the recent public comment period on the National Response 

Framework (NEW) this month, the Chemical Safety Board asked the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) to incorporate specific language into the NRF stating 

that ‘‘nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities 

under law.’’ This would conform the NRF to the language in paragraph 5 of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD–5). The Board also requested DHS to 

emphasize that incident commanders should seek to coordinate with federal safety 

investigations, such as those conducted by the CSB and the NTSB. 

If I am confirmed as chairman, we will continue to work with DHS and FEMA 

to seek refinements to both the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) which would promote improved coordination, 

particularly during the phase when emergency response activities are being completed and safety investigations are getting underway. I will also continue and expand the CSB’s successful outreach to local and state fire and response organizations, as described below. 

Question 4. Many members of the public safety community apparently are not 

aware of the CSB and its role and mission. What steps will you take as chairman 

to improve the CSB’s outreach to the public safety community? 

Response. Communities and responders benefit from the CSB’s thorough, independent investigations of chemical accidents, but it remains a significant challenge 

for the CSB to be known by all fire departments throughout the country. The CSB 

is currently a $9 million, 40-person agency with only a handful of staff focused on 

outreach. By contrast, the U.S. has more than 30,000 fire departments, served by 

more than 1.1 million firefighters, both career and volunteer. 
39 

The CSB’s board and staff have made numerous presentations to fire safety organizations over the past five years, including the National Fire Protection Association, the National Association of State Fire Marshals, the National Association of 

SARA Title Three Program Officials, and the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs. We have also published articles describing the CSB’s mission, investigations, 

and safety products in a number of fire-related magazines and websites, including 

the International Association of Fire Chiefs On Scene newsletter, Industrial Fire 

World, Firehouse.com, Fireengineering.com, and many others. Our safety videos arc 

also featured on the website of the U.S. Fire Administration. We have received more 

than 400 individual requests for our safety video DVD’s from fire chiefs, officers, 

and other emergency responders—many accompanied by strong words of praise for 

the agency’s investigations and efforts at reaching out to the tire community. 

If confirmed as chairman, I intend to continue and increase the CSB’ s vigorous 

outreach to the emergency response community by speaking at fire safety conferences, contributing articles to fire safety publications and websites, and making 

our CSB safety videos and materials freely available to firefighters and others on 

CSB.gov, YouTube, and fire safety websites. 

RESPONSE BY JOHN S. BRESLAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR VITTER

Question 1. Temporary trailers are used for turn around or construction projects 

within plants. Assuming it is more cost effective to operate within the process area, 

would it be reasonable to require someone to rent structures that ARE blast resistant (instead of not) to protect people in the blast zone? 

Response. The BP Texas City explosion and fire occurred on March 20, 2007. Because all of the fatalities occurred in occupied temporary trailers close to the scene 

of the explosion, the Chemical Safety Board made an urgent recommendation on October 25, 2007 to the American Petroleum Institute (API). The wording of the recommendation was: 

In light of the above findings concerning the March 23rd incident at BP’s Texas 

City refinery, revise your Recommended Practice 752, ‘‘Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings’’ or issue a new Recommended 

Practice to ensure the safe placement of occupied trailers and similar temporary 

structures away from hazardous areas of process plants. 

As its response to the CSB recommendation, in June 2007 API published its Recommended Practice 753 ‘‘Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings’’. API’s response is currently being evaluated by the 

CSB to determine if it is acceptable. 

Recommended Practice 753 is based on the following guiding principles: 

• Locate personnel away from covered process areas consistent with safe and 

effective operations 

• Minimize the use of occupied portable buildings in close proximity to covered 

process areas 

• Manage the occupancy of portable buildings, especially during periods of increased risk including unit start-up or planned shut-down operations 

• Design, construct, install and maintain occupied portable buildings to protect 

occupants against potential hazards 

• Manage the use of portable buildings as an integral part of the design, construction, maintenance and operation of a facility 

The CSB does not promulgate regulations and thus cannot ‘‘require someone to 

rent structures’’. However I would encourage facilities to follow the API Recommended Practice, regardless of whether they rent or purchase the structures. 

I believe that the CSB ’s recommendation to API and the implementation of the 

API Recommended Practice 753 by the oil refining and chemical industry will have 

a very positive impact on the safety of employees in those industries. 

Question 2. Can you define ‘‘Neutral Risk’’ as it relates to occupied structures in 

blast zones? 

Response. The term ‘‘Neutral Risk’’ is not a term that I am familiar within the 

context of chemical or oil refinery process safety. I worked in the chemical industry 

for 35 years and at the CSB for five years. During that time I worked closely with 

the American Petroleum Institute, the American Chemistry Council and the Center 

for Chemical Process Safety and I have not heard the term Neutral Risk used as 

a chemical process safety term. The term is used in financial markets and in the 

nuclear power industry. 
40 

Question 3. How does the ‘‘Neutral Risk’’ standard protect people from the blast 

and ensure that the building protects occupants from not only the building itself 

during a blast but also the blast environment? 

Response. As I stated above I am not familiar with the ‘‘Neutral Risk’’ standard 

in the context of chemical or oil refining facilities. 

Question 4. Because of the neutral risk standard, I understand that tents are allowed in blast areas as a means to protect workers from blasts because the interpretation of the ‘‘neutral risk’’ standard means occupants face minimal risk from the 

tents themselves. Does CSB allow for Tents in blast zones? How do Tents ensure 

the people are protected from the blast environment? 

Response. The CSB does not promulgate standards and thus does not ‘‘allow’’ or 

forbid the use of tents in blast zones. API Recommended Practice 753 excludes 

‘‘lightweight fabric enclosures such as tents’’ from the definition of portable building. 

In its review of API 753 the CSB is assessing this exclusion. 

Question 5. Shouldn’t any structure such as a bath room be blast resistant if located in a blast zone? 

Response. Section 3 of the API Recommended Practice 753 gives a method for facilities which have the potential for an explosion hazard to determine an appropriate location for portable buildings. If the bathroom is a portable structure, the 

facility should consult API Recommended Practice 753. If the bathroom is a permanent structure, its design, location and installation should take into account the potential for a fire. explosion or toxic gas release. 

RESPONSE BY JOHN S. BRESLAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR LAUTENBERG

Question 1. Why did you decide to vote against recommending a new OSHA standard to prevent combustible dust explosions? 

Response. In 2003 there were two catastrophic combustible dust explosions (West 

Pharmaceutical, Kinston, NC; and CTA Acoustics, Corbin, KY) which killed a total 

of 13 employees and destroyed both facilities. The CSB investigated both incidents, 

determined the root causes and made recommendations to the companies, their suppliers and various safety organizations and regulatory agencies. I voted to completely accept both reports. Following these two incidents and a third in October 

2003 in Huntington, Indiana the CSB decided to carry out a comprehensive study 

of combustible dust hazards in the United States. I supported that effort. The study 

resulted in a CSB staff recommendation that OSHA develop a new standard for preventing combustible dust explosions. After considerable thought and discussion with 

other Board members I decided not to support that recommendation. In my vote 

against recommending a new OSHA standard I concluded that the most effective 

way to prevent future dust explosions was to use the available literature to undertake a comprehensive education program to the industries using combustible dusts. 

I believe that this would be a much faster way to get the message out to the industry than waiting for OSHA to go through the prolonged process of writing a regulation on combustible dusts. I believe that there is ample information available on the 

issue of prevention of combustible dust explosions. Three examples come to mind: 

• ‘‘Dust Explosions in the Process Industries’’ by Rolf K. Eckhoff 

• NFPA Standard 654 for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the 

Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, 

2006 Edition 

• ‘‘Guidelines for Safe Handling of Powders and Bulk Solids’’ Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2004 

Edition 

While I was working as a Staff Consultant to the Center for Chemical Process 

Safety (CCPS) in 2001 and 2002 I managed the writing of the CCPS book ‘‘Guidelines for Safe Handling of Powders and Bulk Solids’’. The final product, published 

in 2004, is approximately 800 pages long and it is a very comprehensive survey of 

techniques available to prevent dust explosions. 

Recommendation 5 to OSHA in the November 2006 CSB Combustible Dust Study 

called on OSHA to ‘‘. . . identify manufacturing industries at risk and develop and 

implement a National Special Emphasis Program on combustible dust studies in 

general industry.’’ I agreed with that recommendation. On October 19, 2007 OSHA 

issued a new safety and health instruction that details OSHA policies and procedures for inspecting workplaces that handle combustible dusts and that may have 

the potential for a dust explosion. 
41 

Question 2. Why did you vote against the Combustible Dust Study in November 

2006 that was supported by the Board on a 3–2 vote? 

Response. I believe that the Board’s staff did an excellent job in researching and 

writing the November 2006 Study on combustible dust explosions. My vote was not 

against the Study as a whole but against recommendation 1 to OSHA. My vote was 

motivated because I believed that action needed to be taken sooner than waiting for 

OSHA to write a standard. Quoting from my remarks at the November 9, 2006 CSB 

Public Meeting on Combustible Dust Hazard Study Findings and Proposed Recommendations: 

‘‘I would just like to reemphasize the major point that I am trying to make and 

that is realizing and recognizing that there is a hazard right now and we have certainly seen that with the dust explosions that have taken place. We, OSHA, the industry, trade organizations, need to be doing something today. We don’t need to be 

waiting for five years for a regulation to be published. We need to get out there 

today and start educating people on this to make sure that the sort of tragedies that 

we’ve seen don’t happen again.’’ 

Question 3. Do you continue to support extending EPA and OSHA process safety 

regulations to cover reactive chemicals and mixtures, as the CSB recommended in 

2002? 

Response. Yes, I continue to support the 2002 CSB recommendation. If confirmed, 

I will meet with the leadership of both OSHA and EPA and emphasize the continued interest of the CSB in having them comply with the CSB’s recommendation. 

Question 4. Do you believe it is preferable to have third-party audits of oil and 

chemical plants instead of federal inspections by OSHA and EPA personnel? If so, 

please describe the potential benefits and detriments to this approach? 

Response. I believe that third party audits of oil and chemical plants could supplement inspections done by EPA and OSHA. Third party audits would have certain 

advantages over federal inspections by EPA and OSHA personnel. 

Some of the pros of this approach are: • There is a larger pool of independent personnel with specific expertise in 

chemical and refinery operations than there currently is within OSHA and 

EPA • Audit quality requirements would have to be developed and approved by EPA 

and/or OSHA • Audit protocol requirements would have to be developed and approved by 

EPA and/or OSHA 

The possible cons of this approach include: 

• The cost to industry would be greater as they would have to bear the costs 

of the inspections • Conflict of interest provisions would be needed to assure impartial audits • The question of the public availability of audit results would have to be resolved. 

Question 5. Do you believe that OSHA and EPA’s existing process safety programs 

should be consolidated into a new federal regulatory and inspection program? If so, 

please describe how such a consolidation would work and what benefits you would 

foresee from such an approach? 

Response. There is considerable similarity between the EPA’s Risk Management 

Program for chemical facilities and OSHA’s Process Safety Management of Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals Standard. The OSHA standard deals with hazards and the 

prevention of accidents inside the facility and the EPA program deals with the prevention of accidents that would impact the community around the facility. The programs could be combined without a significant effect on the regulated community. 

However, to combine them would require rewriting the Clean Air Act Amendments 

of 1990. One of the issues facing both EPA and OSHA in the regulation of oil and 

chemical plants is a shortage of personnel with expertise in chemical plant and refinery operations. Combining the programs without authorizing the hiring of additional experienced personnel would not, in my opinion, improve the regulatory oversight of the industry. 

Question 6a. Could you please explain the ‘‘safety case’’ approach to licensing oil 

and chemical plants that is used in Europe? 

Response. As a result of major industrial chemical accidents in Europe in the 

1970s (the Flixborough, England explosion in 1974 and the Seveso, Italy dioxin release in 1976) the Seveso Directive was issued by the European Community in 1982. 

The regulations implementing the Seveso Directive are the 1984 Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations (CIMAH) and the 1999 Control of Major 
42 

Accident Hazards (COMAH). To comply with the CIMAH and COMAH regulations 

operators of certain facilities in the European Community have been required to 

submit ‘‘safety reports’’ to the ‘‘competent authority’’ (in the United Kingdom the 

competent authority is both the Health and Safety Executive and the Environmental Agency). Facilities affected by the regulations are typically in the chemical, 

oil refining, explosives and nuclear industries. Once a facility determines that it is 

covered by the regulations (based on threshold quantities of dangerous substances) 

it has the following responsibities: 

• Submit details of dangerous substances on site to the competent authority • Describe site activities • Take all measures necessary to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences (this is a general duty standard) • Prepare and test an on-site emergency plan • Prepare a safety report which includes the following: (1) a policy on how to 

prevent and mitigate major accidents (2) a management system for implementing that policy (3) a method for identifying any major accidents that 

might occur (4) methods to prevent and mitigate major accidents (5) information on safety precautions built into the plant (6) details of measures to limit 

the consequences of any major accident that might occur (7) information on 

the site emergency plan, which is also used by the local emergency responders. 

The safety report has to be submitted to the competent authority and kept up to 

date as operating conditions at the facility changes. It must be updated and resubmitted at least every five years. 

Several important factors should be noted: 

• All costs associated with the development of the safety report are borne by 

the operating company. These costs include those of the competent authority 

in assessing and commenting on the safety report. • With the exception of nuclear installations and off-shore oil facilities, the safety case is not a ‘‘permit’’ to operate. • Facilities are required in their safety reports to demonstrate that they have 

reduced risks to ‘‘as low as reasonably possible’’. 

Question 6b. Should the United States adopt a ‘‘safety case’’ approach? 

Response. The EPA Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations are similar in 

some respects to the European safety report rules. However the information required to be submitted in the safety report is much more comprehensive and detailed than in the RMP submittals. For the United States to adopt the European 

safety case approach changes would require changes in the underlying Clean Air 

Act legislation. In the United Kingdom there are 750 lower hazard facilities and 375 

high hazard facilities covered by the COMAH regulations. The Health and Safety 

Executive has 150 inspectors applying 45 man-years each year to evaluating safety 

reports. In the United States there arc approximately 15,000 RMP facilities. The option of adopting the European safety report approach in the United States should 

be looked at in the context of the availability of government personnel with the expertise to evaluate the safety reports. 

Question 7a. Do you support specific legislation to provide CSB with investigation 

authority like the NTSB’s? 

Response. CSB needs additional statutory authority to avoid delays in their investigations caused by local autorities blocking entry to sites and prevent the destruction of evidence during clean-up operations after the emergency response has ended. 

A good starting point for discussions on additional authority could be the NTSB 

statute at 49 USC §§ 1101–1155 and NTSB regulations at 40 CFR 830.10 and 40 

CFR 831.5. 

Question 7b. Do you support specific legislation to clarify the CSB’s evidence preservation authority? 

Response. Because of ongoing issues with evidence preservation at accident sites 

I believe that the CSB’s evidence preservation authority should be clarified, either 

by legislation or by regulation. On January 4, 2006 the CSB published a proposed 

rule in the Federal Register, requiring that facilities having an incident being investigated by the CSB should preserve evidence relevant to the investigation. The CSB 

received many comments on this proposal and has not published a final rule. 

Question 7c. Do you support specific legislation to provide CSB with authority like 

the NTSB’s to decide on testing procedures for the physical evidence recovered from 

accident sites? 

Response. Yes. 
43 

1See AP Domestic News, November 26, 2006 ‘‘Probers Look for Clues in Mass Blast,’’ Boston 

Globe November 26, 2006. ‘‘Dispute besets blast probe U.S. investigators barred from site by 

Danvers chief;’’ Salem News, November 27, 2006, ‘‘Investigators probe blast cause, feds fight to 

get access.’’ 2See Salem News, November 29, 2006. ‘‘Others Welcomed Chemical Safety Board,’’ by Paul 

Leighton. 

Question 7d. Do you support specific legislation to clarify and strengthen CSB’s 

access to OSHA and EPA personnel and records that are relevant to the CSB’s investigations? 

Response. CSB’s accident investigations often evaluate the roles of EPA and 

OSHA in regulating the facility or the industry. It has proved difficult at times to 

get access to EPA and OSHA personnel and records. If discussions with EPA and 

OSHA leadership cannot resolve these issues in the future, then specific legislation 

would be warranted. 

Question 7e. Do you support specific legislation to provide for a 3–2 party split 

in appointments to the Board, similar to the NTSB? 

Response. I have not given this issue an extensive review. However, in a small 

agency like the CSB, the most important criteria for Board appointments should 

continue to be expertise and experience, regardless of party affiliation. I would be 

interested in discussing this option with the leadership at the NTSB to understand 

what their experience has been with the 3–2 party split. 

RESPONSES BY JOHN S. BRELAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Question 1. As you know, there was a dispute last year between the Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) and officials of the Massachusetts fire 

service in the aftermath of an explosion at a chemical plant in Danvers, MA. Fire 

officials maintain that CSB personnel created tension and confusion at the scene by 

failing to properly notify state and local officials of their arrival and failing to coordinate with the already established incident command structure. CSB disputes 

these assertions and complains that local officials improperly denied its personnel 

access to the incident scene. 

Regardless of who is right in this dispute, the very fact that there was such a 

conflict in Danvers raises concerns that there may be a larger problem in CSB’s relationship with state and local officials and first responders. CSB regularly needs 

to perform its work at scenes at which various federal, state, and local officials may 

all have responsibilities. We cannot afford to have future disputes that may potentially interfere with both local incident management and CSB’s ability to conduct 

effective investigations. 

If confirmed as Chairperson of CSB, what steps will you take to ensure that there 

is a good working relationship between and among CSB and state and local officials 

and first responders? Given the problems in Danvers, do you think it might be a 

good idea to convene a meeting with firefighters (and perhaps other first responders) from around the nation to ensure that everyone understands each other’s roles, 

and that roles and procedures are discussed in advance of future incidents? 

Response. The question appears to refer to certain claims made in an unsigned, 

one-page statement distributed by several representatives of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) in September 2007, more than 10 months after the 

events in question. The CSB has thoroughly refuted those claims in a 16-page letter 

to the Committee last month, which I include for the record. 

The central issue in Danvers was not one of notification or coordination; it was 

the fact that the fire services did not recognize the CSB’s federal investigative jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act. Shortly after the arrival of CSB investigators, the 

Danvers fire chief publicly declared the CSB to be ‘‘uninvited,’’ ‘‘unwelcome,’’ ‘‘not 

a piece of the pie,’’ and ‘‘a distraction that has taken time away from the real investigators.’’1 By contrast, a number of other fire chiefs have complimented the CSB’s 

investigative work, its professionalism, and its coordination with local authorities, 

as noted in an article2 published by a regional Massachusetts newspaper, the Salem 

News, during the unfortunate situation in Danvers. 

Overall, the CSB enjoys excellent relationships with state and local fire and emergency preparedness and response officials, and in most cases there has been effective coordination at accident sites. My goal as chairman will be to continue those 

valuable relationships for the next five years. The success of the CSB’s interactions 

with fire officials over the past five years is reflected in the endorsements I have 

received from the nation’s leading fire safety organizations, including the National 

Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM), the National Fire Protection Associa-
44 

3Senate Report 109–332, which accompanied the legislation, credited the CSB’s independent 

safety investigations with establishing the importance of improving chemical emergency preparedness throughout the country: ‘‘During the Committee’s four chemical security hearings, 

witnesses highlighted the importance of emergency preparedness in dealing with a chemical release as well as weaknesses in the current state of preparedness of many facilities and communities. In particular, Carolyn Merritt, Chairman of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). and Gerald Poje, a former member of the CSB, were critical of chemical 

plant preparedness across the country. Both Merritt and Poje emphasized in their testimony 

that effective emergency response planning and capabilities can mitigate the consequences of 

a terrorist attack on a chemical facility.’’ (See Senate Report, p. 20) The legislation was reported 

from committee but not acted upon by the full Senate. 

tion (NFPA), the International Code Council (ICC), the National Association of 

SARA Title Three Program Officials (NASTTPO), and other response and preparedness officials. 

State and local fire authorities benefit from the CSB’s work, and they take our 

safety recommendations seriously. For example, in 2005 we recommended that the 

State of Kentucky identify and inspect industrial facilities at risk for catastrophic 

dust explosions, following an accident in 2003 that killed seven workers. The state 

promptly adopted the recommendation, gaining additional funding from the legislature for the state fire marshal to make the inspection of facilities with combustible 

dust hazards a high priority and to develop remediation plans. In 2003, the CSB 

called on New York City to reform its antiquated 85-year-old fire code, following a 

chemical explosion in Manhattan that injured dozens of people including several 

firefighters. Following the CSB’s recommendation, the city is now nearing completion of a three-year effort to adopt a modern fire safety code, a step that will help 

protect the lives of millions of New York City residents, workers, and visitors. 

On April 27, 2005, then-CSB Chairman Carolyn Merritt testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, which you now chair, 

on deficiencies in local emergency preparedness for chemical releases. Such deficiencies put the lives of police and firefighters at risk due to inadequate funding, 

planning, or protective equipment—as in the case of a 2004 chemical accident in 

northwest Georgia where 15 responders were injured by exposure to toxic chemical 

vapor. Chairman Merritt and I were pleased when S. 2145, the bipartisan CollinsLieberman chemical security bill that followed the hearing, included extensive new 

provisions for improving planning and preparedness for chemical emergencies.3 As 

you noted to Chairman Merritt at the April 2005 hearing: 

‘‘You may know that Senator Collins and I were successful in amending the 

budget resolution in the Senate to restore a considerable amount of funding, I 

guess about $550 million, for the coming year for first responders, and obviously 

we have to make sure the money is well spent. But you point to a very urgent 

need which will not be met unless we give the first responders money. Then 

once we do that, we have to help them use it for that purpose. I thank you.’’ 

Communities and responders benefit from the CSB’s thorough, independent investigations of chemical accidents, but it remains a significant challenge for the CSB 

to be known by all fire departments throughout the country. The CSB is currently 

a $9 million, 40-person agency with only a handful of staff focused on outreach. By 

contrast, the U.S. has more than 30,000 fire departments, served by more than 1.1 

million firefighters, both career and volunteer. 

The CSB’s board and staff have made numerous presentations to fire safety organizations over the past five years, including the NFPA, NASFM, NASTTPO, and the 

RFC. We have also published articles describing the CSB’s mission, investigations, 

and safety products in a number of fire-related magazines and websites, including 

the International Association of Fire Chiefs On Scene newsletter, Industrial Fire 

World, Firehouse.com, Fireengineering.com, and many others. Our safety videos are 

also featured on the website of the U.S. Fire Administration. We have received more 

than 400 individual requests for our safety video DVD’s from fire chiefs, officers, 

and other emergency responders—many accompanied by strong words of praise for 

the agency’s investigations and efforts at reaching out to the fire community. If confirmed as chairman, I intend to continue and increase the CSB’s vigorous outreach 

to the emergency response community. 

Question 2. In another context, that of homeland security, the issue of how myriad 

federal, state and local officials all work together in an incident, is a prominent concern. We saw the need for such coordination in the response on 9/11, and we saw 

the challenges that can arise in the response to Hurricane Katrina—including the 

tragic consequences that can result when all the players are not prepared to work 

together. 
45 

One of the key ways through which federal, state and local responders work together is through the National Incident Management System—or ‘‘NIMS’’—which 

utilizes a unified command structure. The Homeland Security Act gives the Department of Homeland Security, through the FEMA Administrator, responsibility for 

maintaining NIMS, and relevant federal agencies are all required to comply with 

NIMS in responding to incidents. FEMA has developed courses and approves 

courses to train individuals in the federal government and in the states on NIMS. 

Does CSB provide for NIMS training for its employees? If so, who receives training? Is the training through the Department of Homeland Security or does CSB do 

it’s own training? Do you have any plans for future changes in, or expansion of, 

NIMS training at CSB? 

Response. All of our career investigators, including investigation supervisors and 

investigation managers, have had thorough training on the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Most of our investigators received their NIMS training in 

an eight-hour course presented by Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute (MFRI) in 

2005 and were registered with FEMA. Those who did not take the MFRI course 

completed an online independent study course (IS-00700) and were also registered 

with FEMA. We plan to continue providing comprehensive NIMS training for all our 

investigators, as we have done for the past several years. 

However, I must point out that the situation in Danvers was not directly related 

to NIMS, which is designed to promote the fast integration of federal, state, and 

local efforts to respond to major disasters. NIMS is a system for emergency response 

and recovery and is not a system for investigating the causes of disasters. Where 

emergency response and investigations may overlap, emergency response must come 

first. In the case of Danvers, however, the fires had been extinguished, the neighborhood had been searched for victims and evacuated, and the emergency had ceased 

on November 22, two days prior to the arrival of CSB investigators. In that sense 

the ‘‘incident’’ was already over. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) and NIMS are not intended 

to, and do not, interfere with the CSB’s authority to carry out its investigative mission. Paragraph 5 of HSPD-5 states unambiguously that ‘‘nothing in this directive 

alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of Federal departments 

and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law.’’ In fact under NIMS, the 

responsibility of the local incident commander in Danvers was to rapidly integrate 

the CSB into the existing command structure so that the Board’s lawful functions 

could proceed. Had they done so all parties could have more effectively coordinated 

their respective responsibilities, but regrettably this did not happen. 

During the recent public comment period on the National Response Framework 

(NRF) this month, the Chemical Safety Board asked DHS to incorporate the specific 

HSPD-5 language above into the NRF and to emphasize that incident commanders 

should seek to coordinate with federal safety investigations, such as those conducted 

by the CSB and the NTSB. These federal safety investigations are vital for protecting communities around the country from possible future accidents. 

Question 3. I understand that CSB hired a public relations firm in connection 

with the Danvers incident. On its web site, that firm, Crawford Strategies, says it 

was charged with ‘‘upholding CSB’s public image’’ and claims credit for, among 

other things, having ‘‘generated substantial press and editorial coverage aimed at 

setting the record straight’’ on the Danvers situation. Two examples cited by the 

firm are an editorial and a column in the Boston Globe that portray the dispute in 

a light favorable to CSB and very unfavorable to local fire service officials. 

Did CSB, through Crawford Strategies or otherwise, undertake a public relations 

strategy designed to generate criticism of state and local officials? If so, isn’t it likely 

that such actions could further damage the relationship between CSB and state and 

local officials, and ultimately lead to further distrust of CSB? Do you think CSB’s 

use of a public relations firm for this purpose is appropriate? As a Board member, 

were you aware of the ‘‘public relations’’ activities undertaken in Danvers? 

Response. The premise of these questions is not accurate. Like many government 

agencies that interact with the public, the CSB employs public affairs contractors 

who specialize in media relations. Because the CSB does not operate field offices, 

we frequently employ local public affairs firms to identify and contact the news 

media on our behalf, particularly during the early stages of investigations. It is simply not possible for the CSB’s limited staff to maintain media contacts simultaneously in several hundred regional markets around the country. 

During the deployment to the Danvers accident site, the CSB hired Crawford 

Strategies, a local Boston area firm, to compile media lists, distribute advisories, 

and make initial contacts with journalists, who can then follow up with CSB board 

members and staff directly on more specific and substantive issues. This particular 
46 

4See AP Domestic News, November 26, 2006 ‘‘Probers Look for Clues in Mass. Blast;’’ Boston 

Globe, November 26, 2006. ‘‘Dispute besets blast probe U.S. investigators barred from site by 

Danvers chief;’’ Salem News, November 27, 2006, ‘‘Investigators probe blast cause, feds fight to 

get access.’’

contractor performed only a modest amount of work for the CSB, with a total value 

of less than $3,100. 

As a board member. I was aware of the public affairs work done in the connection 

with the Danvers case, and that work was authorized and approved by then-Chairman Carolyn Merritt. However, I emphasize that there was no ‘‘public relations 

strategy’’ of the kind suggested in the question. What occurred in reality was that 

on Saturday, November 25, 2006. alter blocking the access of CSB investigators to 

the accident site and refusing to recognize the agency’s jurisdiction under the Clean 

Air Act, the Danvers fire chief proceeded to hold a public news conference where 

he declared the CSB to be ‘‘uninvited,’’ ‘‘unwelcome,’’ ‘‘not a piece of the pie,’’ and 

‘‘a distraction that has taken time away from the real investigators.’’4

The CSB had said nothing publicly about the dispute to that point and had certainly not criticized the fire chief or other local officials. Rather, we had worked behind the scenes in an effort, we hoped, to quickly resolve the issues, but this effort 

was fruitless. On Sunday, after a news cycle where the Danvers chief’s striking comments were widely reported, Mr. Crawford made initial contacts with staff from the 

Boston Globe for follow-up later in the day by the CSB’s director of public affairs. 

The public affairs director, in consultation with the CSB chairman, was the official 

spokesperson for the agency and discussed the substantive issues with Globe reporters and writers. The purpose of the contacts was, first and foremost, to explain our 

mission to the community in Massachusetts and to discuss the value of independent 

safety investigations, following the fire chief’s pointed criticism. 

The CSB believed that it was urgent to access the accident site—particularly since 

the state and local fire services were in the process of clearing large portions of the 

site using heavy equipment, causing the irreparable loss of potential evidence. 

It is curious to suggest that the CSB or any other party has an ability to control 

the editorial content of the Boston Globe, one of the nation’s oldest and most respected newspapers. The CSB simply explained to the Globe our statutory authority 

and mission, our proven expertise in handling and analyzing complex accident sites, 

and our history of promoting the safety of communities nationwide against chemical 

accidents. The Globe’s reporters, editors, and columnists then formed their own 

opinions about the confrontational public position taken by the state and local fire 

services. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Bresland. 

Mr. Shearer of Delaware, to be a member of the Chemical Safety 

and Hazard Investigation Board for 5 years. 

STATEMENT OF C. RUSSELL H. SHEARER, NOMINEE FOR 

BOARD MEMBER, U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD 

Mr. SHEARER. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the 

Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 

With me today is my wife, Michelle, and my 11⁄2-year-old daughter, Eliza, upon whom I may call to answer questions, because nobody can be mad at a little girl with a smile such as hers. 

I am grateful and honored by the President’s nomination to serve 

as a member of the Chemical Safety and Hazards Investigation 

Board. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Committee today. 

I likewise appreciate having had the counsel of the Committee 

members, their staff and of other Congressional staff. Understanding their views has been instructive and I will continue these 

communications if confirmed. 

I look forward, if confirmed, to working closely and collegially 

with the Chairman and board members. They have wisely hewn 
47 

fast to Congress’s mandate to investigate events, to devise lessons 

learned and recommendations from them and to communicate that 

information to workers, the public, industry and government agencies. That mandate is an important one, because in it Congress recognized that investigating and communicating lessons learned is 

the first step to building safety performance. 

Industry, in a perfect world, would uniformly recognize the wisdom of that fact and universally act on it, performing this function 

on its own and sharing the operating experiences. But it has not 

and, so Congress created the Board to fill that void. 

My experience is in high hazard chemical and nuclear operations 

as a program manager and as a chief environment, safety and 

health officer. I routinely use the Board’s products. The Board’s expertise in conducting investigations and devising lessons learned 

and recommendations is, in my assessment, outstanding. The challenge is to ensure that the lessons are effectively communicated in 

a timely fashion to the intended audience. 

I therefore intend, if confirmed, to work with the Chairman and 

Board members to build on that excellent progress already made, 

and to promote the following three objectives. First, the Board 

should continue to build the base of safety knowledge by expanding 

the number of investigations it conducts. Each investigation is an 

opportunity to learn new information, to gain additional insights 

into mechanical system, management system and human behavior. 

This safety knowledge, I believe, is critical in this post–9/11 operating environment because safer plants provide the defense-indepth required to prevent or mitigate the acts of potential malevolent actors. 

Second, the Board should adopt additional cost effective methods 

for outreach to and awareness among the public, workers, industry 

and government agencies. I believe that communication is vitally 

important, because it builds accountability and transparency. It ensures that the lessons learned are translated into actions that improve safety performance. 

Third, the Board should continue to analyze operating experience 

data that identify adverse and little-understood trends, and that 

point out generic safety issues with broad applicability across the 

chemical industry. 

I will bring to the Board, if confirmed, the commitment I have 

demonstrated in prior civil service to safe and reliable operations, 

to identifying and working with stakeholders and to sharing information openly and conducting affairs transparently. I will also 

bring to the Board, if confirmed, hands-on experience, including the 

following: understanding and respecting worker and public safety 

as a foremost consideration. Conducting performance-based investigations. These investigations have included typical chemical 

events, such as process safety management, chemical fires, failure 

to follow procedure and equipment failure, as well as common industrial accidents, such as arc flashes and the failure to use fall 

protection. 

I also have experience in developing and implementing an operating experiences program that is a formal process of sharing information. Promoting the development and use of specific tools beyond 

simple lagging metrics to enhance operational awareness of real- 
48 

1 I view the generic term ‘‘safety’’ to encompass public safety, worker safety and health, plant 

safety, and protection of the environment, and I am a firm believer that a high performing environment, safety, and health (ES&H) program will include each of these components. I believe, 

moreover, that performance in any one aspect of an ES&H program—whether it is environment, 

safety, or health—is a good indicator of performance in each of the others. 

time facility-level safety and promoting the development of expectations that integrate safety throughout a facility’s life cycle. 

Madam Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before 

this Committee and its consideration of my nomination. I will seek 

to answer any questions that the Committee members may have, 

and I have submitted my complete testimony for the record. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shearer follows:] 

STATEMENT OF C. RUSSELL H. SHEARER, TO BE A BOARD MEMBER, U.S. CHEMICAL

SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. With me today are my wife, 

Michelle, and my one and a half year old daughter Eliza, upon whom I may call 

to answer questions because nobody can be mad at a girl with her smile. 

I am grateful for and honored by the President’s nomination to serve as a member 

of the Chemical Safety and Hazards Investigation Board (‘‘Board’’), and I appreciate 

this opportunity to appear before your committee today. I likewise appreciate having 

had the counsel of the committee members, their staff, and of other congressional 

staff. Understanding their views has been instructive, and I will continue these communications if confirmed. 

I look forward, if confirmed, to working closely and collegially with the Chairman 

and Board Members. They have wisely hewn fast to Congress’s mandate to investigate events, to devise lessons learned and recommendations from them, and to 

communicate that information to workers, the public, industry, and government 

agencies. That mandate is an important one because in it Congress recognized that 

investigating and communicating lessons learned is the first step to building safety 

performance. Industry in a perfect world would uniformly recognize the wisdom of 

that fact and universally act on it, performing this function on its own and sharing 

the information and operating experiences both within and without the chemical industry. But it has not and so Congress created the Board to fill that void. 

The Board, then, has a critical national safety function in executing a performance-based investigation program that seeks out root and contributing causes, the 

solutions to which may require technical, managerial, policy, or regulatory solutions, 

or a mix of each. Congress and the Board have thus taken an important step beyond 

traditional, limited-scope assessments of simple compliance with existing regulations, and into the more important function of building from events a good base of 

safety knowledge, lessons learned, and operating experience. I therefore view the 

Board’s mission to be similar to—albeit an imperfect analogy—a high-performing 

corporate safety office whose responsibility is to use events as learning tools that 

change behavior in order to prevent the recurrence of that or similar events. 

My experience is in high-hazard chemical and nuclear operations—as a program 

manager and as a chief corporate environment, safety, and health officer—and I 

routinely use the Board’s products. The Board’s expertise in conducting investigations and devising lessons learned and recommendations is, in my assessment, outstanding. The insights gained from these investigations serve a critical role in fostering excellence in chemical-safety performance because they form the technical 

basis to help the industry and the appropriate regulatory agencies identify and formulate corrective actions. The challenge is to ensure that the lessons are effectively 

communicated in a timely fashion to the intended audience. I therefore intend, if 

confirmed, to work with the Chairman and the Board Members to build on the excellent progress already made and to promote the following three objectives: 

• First, the Board should continue to build the base of safety1 knowledge by expanding the number of investigations it conducts in a manner, of course, that maintains the excellence for which these investigations have become known. Each investigation is an opportunity to learn new information, to gain additional insights into 

mechanical-system, management-system, and human behavior. Indeed, enhanced 

safety performance begins with building safety knowledge, including developing les-
49 

2Lessons learned is the data collected from an event or events, which is stored in a database 

or other less formal method; operating experiences is that same data when applied to operations 

in order to improve safety or reliability or some other attribute of plant function. 3 A ‘‘best practice’’ is a description of process proven to generate favorable results written in 

a way that others may apply it with equal success. 

sons learned, operating experiences,2 and best practices.3 This safety knowledge, I 

believe, is critical in this post 9–11 operating environment because safer, more robust, and better and more intelligently designed and engineered plants provide the 

defense-in-depth required to prevent or mitigate the effects of potential malevolent 

acts. 

Building this base of safety knowledge is also an important national asset because 

companies with good safety records are profitable companies. These companies have 

learned the truism that integrating safety into production yields safe and reliable 

operations that, in turn, produce excellent products. This is true because the focus 

is on quality—quality in safety, quality in worker health, quality in environmental 

performance, and quality in production—rather than production alone. The integration of these attributes is the pillar of an overall Quality Assurance program, which 

studies have time and again shown to be the foundation of a competitive enterprise. 

These companies have therefore come to the enlightened self-interest that safety is 

not only morally right; it is a good business practice. 

• Second, the Board should adopt additional cost-effective methods for outreach 

to and awareness among the public, workers, industry, and government agencies. 

I believe that communication of information learned from events to all of these 

groups is vitally important. It builds accountability and transparency and ensures 

that lessons learned are translated into actions that improve safety performance. 

The Board, for example, should establish forums to learn, share, and consider 

state-of-the-art and best practices from diverse stakeholders, including the public, 

labor unions, workers, industry associations, corporate representatives, national consensus-standard setting groups, environmental groups, the public, and others. These 

meetings should not be mere press events but gatherings where technically- and 

not-so-technically-minded people can share information and insights with the explicit objective of improving safety performance. An important lesson learned over 

the last two decades is that institutions must be technically inquisitive for a safety 

culture to flourish, and that they must be open to new ideas and practices from outside their experiences in exercising that inquisitiveness. 

The Board might also build on the Institute for Nuclear Power Operators’ ‘‘Prevent Events’’ model in preparing talking points that synopsize its reports. These 

talking points would then be available for industry to use at plan-of-the-day or daily 

‘‘tool box’’ meetings so that it could explain to its workers exactly how an event at 

another facility applies to them personally. It is a tool, in short, that makes abstract 

events personal to the workers and helps them understand how to behave more 

safely. 

The Board should also seek out successful companies that have demonstrated an 

understanding of, and put into practice, the concept of integrating safety with production. The experience and practice of these companies can then be used as case 

studies to communicate the concept and to form the basis of best practices. 

• Third, the Board should continue to analyze operating-experience data that 

identify adverse—and little understood—trends and that point out generic safety 

issues with broad applicability across the chemical industry. In 2002, for example, 

the Board analyzed 150 accidents involving uncontrolled-chemical reactions with the 

objective of improving reactives-hazard management. This report resulted in several 

recommendations to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 

I will bring to the Board, if confirmed, the commitment I have demonstrated in 

prior civil-service positions to safe and reliable operations, to identifying and working with stakeholders, and to sharing information openly and conducting affairs 

transparently. I will also bring to the Board, if confirmed, hands-on experience that 

will be useful in understanding the precursors that cause accidents, recognition of 

business- and safety-management systems that influence an organization’s safety 

culture, and techniques that may resolve those issues, including the following: 

• Understanding and respecting worker and public safety as a foremost consideration; 

• Conducting performance-based accident investigations that focus on underlying 

root causes and employ innovative methodologies, such as Human Performance Improvement, which seeks to ferret out latent organizational defects that lead to most 

human error; 
50 

• Developing and implementing an operating-experiences (lessons-learned) program that is not a mere data-collection exercise but a process that shares those experiences among the corporate specialists and executives who make decisions about 

capital investments in vital plant systems, infrastructure, and technical-staff development that ensure continued safety and reliability; 

• Building a well-developed operating experiences program that looks beyond the 

parochial experiences of a particular industry to analyze analogous events in others, 

such as the Columbia Space Shuttle accident and the Davis-Besse nuclear power 

plant event (involving reactor-vessel head corrosion), in order to derive comprehensive and balanced operating experiences, recommendations, and operational requirements; 

• Promoting operational rigor through procedures in a program previously guided 

by ad-hoc, expert advice, sometimes known as ‘‘tribal knowledge;’’ 

• Promoting the development and use of specific tools, beyond simple lagging 

metrics, to enhance, throughout an organizational structure, operational awareness 

of real-time, facility-level safety and production performance, which, in turn, promotes information sharing about and accountability for that performance; and • Promoting the development of expectations (standards) that integrate safety 

throughout a facility’s life cycle, including site selection, design (especially, early design stages), construction, operation, and dismantling and decommissioning. 

Madam Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee, 

and its consideration of my nomination. I will seek to answer any questions that 

the Committee Members may have. Thank you. 

RESPONSE BY RUSSELL H. SHEARER ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. Involvement in Activities that Occurred in Anniston, Alabama. Please 

provide me with all records held by the Department of Defense, yourself, or from 

other people that you can readily obtain, including all emails, memos, letters, electronic files and other records relating to your involvement in an effort by employees 

of the Department of Defense to plan exercises designed to prepare for a possible 

accident or incident at the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, when it was known 

that local officials lacked key equipment to participate in such exercises. 

Response. I have attached to this submission all records that I could obtain responsive to this request. 

Attachment 1, All e-mails of which I retained a printed copy. 

Attachment 2, Complete set of the e-mails, including those on which I was neither 

addressed nor copied. These e-mails were originally and are now attached to a letter 

from Senator Shelby sent to my principal, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations & Environment). These e-mails have had names on the ‘‘To’’ and ‘‘CC’’ 

list redacted, which is the manner in which I received them from Senator Shelby’s 

office. This set is also the sole complete set of e-mails now available. 

Attachment 3, Letter from Congressman Bob Riley. 

Attachment 4, E-mails and talking points discussing intent of leaked e-mails. 

Attachment 5, Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce Resolution adopted after 

e-mail leak (August 19, 2003) commending my principal for work in bringing Anniston plant on-line. 

My detailed response regarding the news reports of my involvement in the Anniston, Alabama, event appears in my response to Senator Lautenberg’s QFRs 1 and 

2 below. 

Question 2. Involvement in Department of Energy’s Beryllium-Associated Worker 

Registry—Please describe your involvement, including any past involvement, in the 

Department of Energy’s Beryllium-Associated Worker Registry. 

Please include any formal evaluations of the program conducted by the Department of Energy or independent offices, including Inspector Generals, of this Registry 

while you were associated with it. 

Please also provide any evaluation of your work performance while at the Department of Energy, including any evaluation of your performance related to the Registry. 

Response. The President appointed me to serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety & Health in August 2004. I served in 

that role until March 2006, when I became the Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy 

for Environment, Safety & Health (‘‘EH’’). 

From August 2004 until March 2006 my portfolio did not include the BerylliumAssociated Worker Registry because that function resided in the Office of Worker 

Health, a sub-office within EH. The Assistant Secretary managed the affairs of that 
51 

1Please see Attachment 12, the end of paragraph 3. 

office, except for adoption of the Worker Safety Rule (10 C.F.R. Part 851), an action 

on which we both worked. 

In March 2006 I became the Acting Assistant Secretary for EH and, at that time, 

was made aware of the ongoing audit by the Department of Energy’s (DOE’’) Inspector General’s office. Shortly thereafter my staff briefed me on the Inspector General’s audit findings and on April 5, 2006, less than a month after becoming the Acting Assistant Secretary, I signed and transmitted EH’s response to the Inspector 

General’s findings. 

I have attached as Attachment 6 the audit report of the registry, U.S. Department 

of Energy-Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Implementation of the Department of Energy’s Beryllium-Associated Worker Registry (DOE/IG–0726) (April 

2006). The EH response is included in the Audit Report at page 10. 

I have attached as Attachment 7 my job performance reviews assessing my performance during the period August 2004 to October 1, 2006, the most recent rating 

that I have received. Please continue to accord these documents the confidentiality 

of the Privacy Act and manage them as Official Use Only. 

[The referenced documents may be found in committee’s file.] 

RESPONSES FROM RUSSELL H. SHEARER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR LAUTENBERG

Question 1. In 2002, you were reportedly part of an effort by the Pentagon to challenge local officials in Alabama to participate in emergency response exercises, 

knowing that they would refuse, so that the Pentagon could send out press releases 

shifting blame over lack of local preparedness for a potential release from a chemical weapons incinerator. 

Response. News reports concerning the incident you describe were incorrect in 

suggesting that the Army’s effort was geared toward embarrassing local officials and 

shifting blame. To the contrary, as I explain in detail below, our efforts were aimed 

at encouraging the Anniston communities to engage in more emergency-preparedness exercises and to help them obtain the funding for the resources that these communities needed. 

Five years ago, several newspapers in Alabama reported on a string of e-mails, 

in which two of mine appeared, that evaluated an idea for inviting the communities 

around the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility to engage in emergency-preparedness exercises. These e-mails were written to execute the instructions of my 

principal,1 who had three broad objectives: (1) Prepare the communities for emergency-preparedness, which my principal and I held as essential to beginning operations; (2) Begin operations because the chemical weapons in storage in the communities presented a safety risk, especially in light of September 11, 2001; and (3) 

Break a long-standing deadlock in which some communities refused to engage in 

emergency—preparedness exercises until all emergency-preparedness funding had 

been provided, even though the Army had already provided more than $100 million 

in funding. The e-mails also articulated an additional legal and business rationale, 

which was to document the Army’s efforts at building readiness in the likely event 

that Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, or a lawsuit sought evidence 

of it. 

The true object then, contrary to the news reports, was to build emergency-preparedness and community safety in order to destroy chemical agent, which would 

also enhance community safety. 

The newspapers also reported that these e-mails reflected a so-called ‘‘plan.’’ The 

fact is, however, that they merely related our preliminary thinking on how best to 

build emergency preparedness and the staff’s internal debate on it. Neither the emails nor the news reports reflect any final decisions or hard-and-fast plans. We 

were, in short, trying to figure out what to do. 

But the preceding discussion is no slight-of-hand to avoid responsibility for my involvement in the e-mail discussion of how to engage the communities. It simply sets 

out the mitigating circumstances of that involvement. Our execution was flawed and 

I regret that. 

Intergovernmental communication is an art not a science, and our communications plan should have focused on meeting with the communities and engaging 

them, rather than on worrying about what we would do in the event they declined 

to engage with us. A corollary to this principle is that we should have been more 

careful about tone. Rather than inviting the communities, which may be perceived 

as an ultimatum even if it is not intended that way, we should have, again, engaged 
52 

2The agent located at two other sites (Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky) had been 

segregated from the program and made part of another program utilizing alternative technology; 

i.e., technology and other than incineration or neutralization. 3 I served as his Special Assistant from November 2001 to August 2004, and as the Acting 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Chemical Demilitarization from September 2002 to February 

2003. While I seek to deflect no attention from my own involvement in this incident, the fact 

is that I received my instruction from the Assistant Secretary. Please see Attachment 12, the 

end of paragraph 3. 4 Not all of the local communities shared this concern and were therefore disengaged. Several 

key communities were engaged in exercising their emergency-response systems. 

at the local level. We should have, in short, worked more closely with local communities and their Congressional delegations, even in devising this preliminary path 

forward. 

I had come to this conclusion myself as a consequence of the intense internal debate. Indeed, throughout the process of exchanging views on this matter I was 

learning, and coming to the conclusion that my principal should not ‘‘invite,’’ ‘‘drive,’’ 

or ‘‘challenge’’ the local community to emergency preparedness. I had not formulated 

an alternative to break the deadlock that the idea then under consideration was to 

address, yet my focus was turning in that direction. But before I could advise my 

principal that the idea was unwise, someone leaked the e-mail chain and the learning became moot. 

The incident and the lessons it taught were a hard knock at the time, but they 

have positively influenced me and my work has concretely benefited from them. I 

believe that I possess a full suite of tools to address even the most vexing circumstances. I therefore believe my career and my record substantiate that I have 

been dedicated to protecting worker and public safety and health and the environment. This is the true nature of my professional work—not the abstractions of a few 

news reports based on two e-mails trying to focus staff work on developing proposals 

to solve a problem. 

BACKGROUND

In approximately December 2001 my principal, the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Installations & Environment), was assigned, by the Secretary of the Army, 

to take control of the chemical demilitarization program, which had the mission of 

destroying the Nation’s stockpile of chemical weapons. By this time, it had come 

under increasing scrutiny from Congress and the Office and Management and Budget for repeated cost overruns, from the communities for emergency preparedness, 

and from the international community for compliance with a multilateral treaty 

mandating the destruction of all chemical weapons. The technologies for destroying 

the agent that was under the jurisdiction of this program2 had been selected and 

the plants, such as that in Anniston, were built, or very nearly built, and undergoing the final steps necessary to bring them on-line. September 11, 2001, moreover, 

had created a palpable, almost physical, imperative to destroy the agent and rid the 

communities of the potential threat and terrorist target it presented. 

The Assistant Secretary, who maintained day-to-day management of the program 

due to the safety management and operational challenges it presented,3 adopted a 

phased approach to the plants. That is, he evaluated the issues at each facility and 

addressed those at the operating plants first (Johnson Atoll and Tooele, Utah), the 

plants closest to beginning operations next (Aberdeen, Maryland; Umatilla, Oregon; 

and Newport, Indiana); and the plants scheduled to begin operations thereafter 

third (Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Anniston, Alabama). All the while, we were also involved in an operation known as ‘‘Roving Osprey’’ to place the chemical agent and 

weapons in more hardened storage facilities and to work with the communities to 

accelerate the disposal schedules. 

CIRCUMSTANCES AT ANNISTON

June and July 2002 found the Assistant Secretary progressively more interested 

in events at Anniston due to its impending startup date and the need for it to operate in order to eliminate the safety risk presented by the weapons in storage there. 

Briefing on briefing painted a consistently challenging situation: Some of the local 

governments worried that the Army’s funding had been insufficient for some emergency-preparedness equipment, and so they were disinclined to participate in emergency-preparedness activities until the funding for that equipment was provided.4

For its part, the Army compounded the situation (prior to my principal inheriting 

the program) by failing to observe all of its commitments. 

The entire issue was further compounded by a technical debate, which tied into 

the first concern set out above, among the Army staff and some of the local commu-
53 

5The debate, in many regards, illustrated the phenomenon described by Mr. Timothy R. 

Gablehouse, President of the National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials, at the 

July 10, 2007, Subcommittee on Transportation for emergency-preparedness exercises to engage 

in once yearly exercises that tested the entire emergency-preparedness program with no ‘‘runup’’ exercises on the parts. 6Please see Attachment 12, the end of paragraph 3. 

nities about which emergency-preparedness equipment was necessary, how it could 

be used, and whether it could be maintained.5 It, in turn, was exacerbated by the 

practice of the separate agencies responsible for emergency-preparedness exercises 

to engage in once yearly exercises that tested the entire emergency-preparedness 

program with no ‘‘run-up’’ exercises on the parts. 

GOAL WAS TO ENSURE THE COMMUNITY’S SAFETY AND ENGAGE IT BETTER IN

EMERGENCY-PREPAREDNESS PLANNING

All of this swirling argument prevented the two most important things: (1) preparing the community for operations, and (2) operating the plant to destroy the 

agent, which, again, had a visceral importance in the very recent wake of September 

11th. The Assistant Secretary and I viewed the community’s emergency preparedness as an absolute requirement—a condition precedent—for the safe startup of the 

agent-destruction plant. But the startup of that plant was also an absolute requirement, in our minds, for the safety of that community because without it the community would be left living with the chemical weapons, which was a potential terrorist 

target and safety hazard in light of September 11, 2001. 

Neither he nor I were thus satisfied with the Army’s emergency-preparedness activities in the community or with some of the community’s engagement in that planning. More palpable as all of this bureaucratic bickering was going on was the worry 

of the people in the community, which was fueled, in part, by the frequent negative 

press that did not always seek out the factual details but instead appeared to rely 

on overly simplistic, sometimes misleading ‘‘talking points.’’ 

We perceived that our job was to engage the communities, encourage them to participate in fruitful and regular training exercises, provide those training exercises, 

obtain the resources for the remaining necessary equipment, and, through media reports on those fruitful exercises, build public confidence in emergency preparedness. 

The Assistant Secretary and I therefore fundamentally wanted to engage the communities in emergency preparedness drills and to ensure their safety, which, again, 

we believed, was our foremost responsibility in preparing for the destruction of 

chemical agent. 

He then directed me to evaluate with my staff the idea of sending an invitation 

to the communities and asking them to participate in a series of emergency-preparedness exercises. These exercises and the equipment for emergency preparedness 

would be funded by the Army, which would also announce those communities that 

elected to participate and those that did not. I was to return to him ‘‘shortly’’ with 

a draft of a letter or memorandum and with a discussion of staff views. He would 

then make the determination whether to execute.6

The objective, then, was to encourage more emergency-preparedness exercises and 

training, obtain the funding for the resources that the community’s needed, and encourage the participation of all the local communities. The objective was not to 

bully, coerce, or embarrass any of the local communities in order to shift blame from 

the Army for any of its own shortcomings. 

These points are set out in detail in the e-mail exchange, but the newspapers 

elected not to report on them. In the first e-mail of the exchange, dated August 28, 

2002, Mr. Lawrence Skelly, who worked for me, recited the objective to encourage 

more emergency-preparedness: ‘‘We wholeheartedly support the exercise [of emergency-preparedness systems] described below. It is imperative that we begin building trust and confidence in the Anniston region emergency response system that the 

Army, through CSEPP [Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Plan], has 

pumped over $100M into the last twelve years.’’ Skelly to Distribution (Aug. 28, 

2007). 

Mr. Skelly further elaborated on our commitment to preparing the community for 

safe operations, stating that current methods of encouraging preparedness had not 

worked well: 

In summary, we have a responsibility to the community to help it get ready [for 

operations]. Clearly, the current CSEPP approach for conducting a once-a-year exercise is not working in Anniston. The public is nervous and we are troubled by the 

recent refusal of certain county agencies to participate in exercises. The community 

is not ready [emergency preparedness] for toxic operations [introducing chemical 
54 

7This concept of exercising more than once a year and exercising parts in addition to the 

whole had worked elsewhere and so we believed it would also work at Anniston: ‘‘This model 

has worked exceptionally well at the Umatilla [Oregon] site and we believe it will work in Anniston too.’’ Skelly to Distribution (Aug. 28, 2002). 8Lt. Colonel Lantzer, of the Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM), to whom 

my e-mail was addressed, was offended that our office, which had policy, guidance, and oversight responsibilities, was stepping into her turf to execute. Yet we were seeking to do just that: 

Begin the process of developing the policy on engaging communities and Mr. Skelly’s e-mail was 

the very first step in that process. 

SBCCOM was not part of my office or of my principal’s office. It was a separate Army organization in the military, not civilian leadership, portion of the Army. 

agent into the plant], despite the millions of dollars poured into emergency management in the region. We must change that status. 

Id. He laid out the concept of ‘‘looking at taking an aggressive, proactive approach 

to conducting a series of exercises . . . beginning in the very near future and continuing until the community declares itself adequately prepared for a CSEPP emergency.’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

Mr. Skelly also laid out an idea for exercising more frequently than once a year:7

‘‘What we envision is a monthly exercise paradigm that focuses on specific response 

activities. One exercise might drill the medical component of the response system. 

The next exercise might focus on command and control. Each exercise could work 

more than one CSEPP functional component.’’ Id. The point here, of course, was to 

be forward leaning, to show leadership in proposing a series of exercises to enhance 

community safety and engage it in emergency preparedness planning. 

My own e-mail of August 28, 2001, the first of two in the exchange, also emphasized that point, stating that ‘‘I did not read Larry’s e-mail [of August 28, 2001] to 

imply that anyone in the Army (or FEMA) [Federal Emergency Management Agency] performed poorly but to reflect the reality that Anniston is refusing to cooperate 

in preparedness activities.’’ Shearer to Lantzer (Aug. 28, 2001).8 I emphasized that 

point again in another e-mail of September 9, 2001, the second of the two in the 

exchange, stating that the ‘‘objective of the Army’s invitation, to be issued by Dr. 

Fiori (ASA(I&E)) [Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations & Environment], 

is to encourage Anniston to participate in the very drills that it has heretofore declined.’’ Shearer to Conklin (Sept. 9, 2001). 

Some of the newspapers reported that the objective of this concept was to issue 

a ‘‘challenge’’ or ‘‘invitation’’ that we knew would be rejected. The Army, the newspapers asserted, would then attempt to shift the blame for delayed operations from 

itself to the communities when the ‘‘challenge’’ or ‘‘invitation’’ was rejected. The 

newspapers predicated this contention on the well-known fact that the communities 

had been funded for some, but not all, of the necessary emergency-preparedness 

equipment. 

The facts and the plain statements in the e-mails, however, belie the newspaper 

assertions. Mr. Skelly recognized the vital importance of funding the remaining necessary emergency-preparedness equipment in his very first e-mail proposing the 

idea and seeking comment on it. He noted that the Army had an obligation to ‘‘ensure’’ that the community had sufficient resources and support to carry out the proposal: ‘‘We will begin developing the proposed program with SBCCOM [Soldier Biological and Chemical Command], AMC [Army Material Command], and FEMA to 

ensure the Anniston community has sufficient resources and support to carry out this 

proposal.’’ Skelly to Distribution (Aug. 28, 2007) (emphasis supplied). Obtaining 

funding for the remaining equipment was thus an integral part of the idea from the 

very start. 

Mr. Skelly’s e-mail proposing the idea, moreover, laid out a phased approach so 

that exercises would take place with the resources on hand and progress as more 

became available: ‘‘A range of drills falling between basic tabletop exercises and full 

up field exercises with deployment hot lines, field response teams, and so forth, 

probably would accomplish the objective of providing the Anniston CSEPP community with a variety of exercise opportunities.’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). Tabletop exercises, for example, require no field equipment because they simulate command-andcontrol responses. They require, instead, tables, paper, telephones, and people, 

which were in ready supply. The inclusion of these type exercises flatly rebuts some 

newspaper claims that the Army’s intent had to be malevolent because the community did not have field equipment, such as first responder suits. One can participate 

in a tabletop exercise without first responder suits. 

In addition to our very serious concern about community safety, our second objective was to document the Army’s obligations to exercise and prepare the local communities. We sought also, as part of this, to document the Army’s due diligence in 

adhering to that preparation obligation in the likely event that Congress, the Office 
55 

of Management and Budget (‘‘OMB’’), or a lawsuit sought evidence of it. The program at that time received a significant amount of guidance from the Congress, 

OMB, and occasional lawsuits, and we had an obligation under the Administrative 

Procedures Act and good-business practices to document our efforts and to build an 

administrative record. 

I stated this need to build a record: ‘‘He [Mr. Skelly] is doing so at my request, 

which is predicated on our . . . need to build a record showing that the Army has 

exercised all due care in preparing for operations.’’ Shearer to Lantzer (Aug. 28, 

2001). But I also emphasized that the primary purpose was to encourage emergency 

preparedness: ‘‘The objective of the Army’s invitation, to be issued by Dr. Fiori 

(ASA(I&E)), is to encourage Anniston to participate in the very drills that it has 

heretofore declined. The further purpose of the invitation is to create a record demonstrating that the Army has exercised due diligence in preparing for operations, 

including encouraging Anniston to participate in exercises intended to prepare it for 

a potential emergency.’’ Shearer to Conklin (Sept. 9, 2001). I concluded that ‘‘[i]n 

sum, the Army seeks to document the invitation and to document the response or 

lack thereof.’’ Id. 

The objective underlying each of the preceding two, and perhaps among the most 

important, was obtaining the funding necessary to provide the community with all 

the resources it needed. Mr. Skelly pointedly focused on that need in his first articulation of the idea to engage the local communities: ‘‘We will begin developing the 

proposed program with SBCCOM, AMC, and FEMA to ensure the Anniston community has sufficient resources and support to carry out this proposal.’’ Skelly to Distribution (Aug. 28, 2007). Contrary to the newspaper reports, then, obtaining the 

funding for the resources was as much a part of the initial thinking as planning 

an exercise schedule and documenting Army due diligence. 

So, in sum, the initial thinking on how to engage the local communities included 

three crucial objectives: (1) encourage more emergency-preparedness exercises and 

training and the participation of all the local communities; (2) document the Army’s 

efforts at building readiness; and (3) obtain the funding for the resources that the 

community’s needed. 

E-MAILS AND NEWS REPORTS REFLECT PRELIMINARY THINKING—NOT FINAL DECISIONS

While the newspapers reported that these e-mails reflected a so-called ‘‘plan,’’ the 

fact is that they merely related our preliminary thinking on how best to build emergency preparedness and the staff’s internal debate on it. Neither the e-mails nor the 

news reports reflect any final decisions or hard-and-fast plans. We were, in short, 

trying to figure out what to do. 

My principal directed me to prepare a draft letter that reflected his notion on how 

to proceed and that also reflected the thinking of his staff, both that favoring and 

disfavoring the proposal. My mission was to transmit his objectives to the staff and 

to manage the compilation of a draft path forward and comments favoring and 

disfavoring it. He then intended to review the draft path forward, debate it with 

staff, and make a decision about whether to proceed with it or some other course. 

Indeed, this internal thinking then represents a snapshot in time of the staff’s 

thinking about the facts, procedures, and external pressures. It does not represent 

a final product, my recommendation to my principal, or my principal’s decision. 

The e-mails show that there was great, sometimes acrimonious, debate among the 

staff working this issue, and that I was seeking to articulate the preliminary objectives and focus staff energy on preparing a proposal and recommendations. They 

also show some poorly chosen words, which I address below. But more than anything, they show that we were thinking through an idea: 

• ‘‘We would greatly appreciate your comments. We will begin developing the 

proposed program with SBCCOM, AMC, and FEMA to ensure the Anniston 

community has sufficient resources and support to carry out this proposal.’’ 

Skelly to Distribution (Aug. 28, 2007) (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘We are looking at taking an aggressive, proactive approach to conducting a 

series of exercises . . . .’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘What we envision. . . .’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘One exercise might drill . . . .’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• The next exercise might focus . . . .’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘He [Mr. Skelly] has sought comment among action officers at his level in 

order to obtain the information necessary to prepare my request for the requisite 

staffing. Larry [Skelly] and I will staff the action [i.e., provide it for concurrence] 

to come to you because you have the resources to conduct the activities.’’ Shearer to Lantzer (Aug. 28, 2001) (emphasis supplied). 
56 

9 ‘‘He [Mr. Skelly] has sought comment among action officers at his level in order to obtain 

the information necessary to prepare my request for the requisite staffing. Larry [Skelly] and 

I will staff the action [i.e., provide it for concurrence] to come to you because you have the resources to conduct the activities.’’ Shearer to Lantzer (Aug. 28, 2001) (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘The attached draft . . . .’’ Skelly to Distribution (Sept. 3, 2002) (emphasis 

supplied). 

• ‘‘I recommend a phased review process . . . .’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘[P]lease let them [the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(‘‘DASA’’) for Chemical Demilitarization (Russell Shearer) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety & Health] know this is 

just the first review and that we still need to send it to SBCCOM, AMC, and 

FEMA before we bring it back to them for [the two DASA’s] final approval and 

signature [before a draft and recommendation could go to the Assistant Secretary].’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘I assume that this will be staffed with OGC [Office of General Counsel], 

OCLL {Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison], SAFM [Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller], OCPA [Office of the Chief of Public Affairs], etc.’’ Ray to Skelly (Sept. 4, 2002). 

• Yes, the proposed memo needs to go through full staffing, including AMC and 

SBCCOM.’’ Skelly to Ray (Sept. 5, 2002). 

• ‘‘Thanks for the opportunity to comment on your exercise proposal.’’ Conklin 

to Distribution (Sept. 9, 2002) emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘I believe he would appreciate red-line edits to the original document or detailed comments that he could easily input. I encourage you and any others who 

perceive an issue with the current draft to provide him with any specific comments you might have.’’ Shearer to Conklin (Sept. 9, 2002) (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘I appreciate your thoughts on the proposal . . . .’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘They have also sought to obtain comments on the proposed invitation . . . .’’ 

Id. (emphasis supplied). 

• ‘‘I invite all those to whom this e-mail is addressed to consider the following 

concern: Many people copied on this and prior e-mails in this chain were unnecessary, and we should be more circumspect in addressing our correspondence. 

I believe we would all enjoy the courtesy of debating the relative merits of a 

point outside an audience of General Officers, SESs [Senior Executive Service], 

and Army Secretariat.’’ Id. (emphasis supplied) (The point here is that, in my 

experience, the inclusion of General Officers, SESs, and Army Secretariat in a 

debate tended to curtail the debate, which some in the e-mail chain sought. My 

principal and I wanted a full and vigorous debate on the idea so he could reach 

an informed decision.) 

These statements show that we were weighing a proposal and trying to determine 

a path forward. They also demonstrate that the consideration of that idea would follow a robust comment procedure, including the Army Staff, both at the senior and 

staff levels; the Soldier Biological and Chemical Command; the Army Material Command; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It also shows that my principal and I would be at the end of the process and would have the benefit of staff 

views to evaluate whether to undertake the idea. To the extent that I injected myself into that process—or was brought into it—it was to keep the staff work moving 

so that we had a recommendation on a proposed path forward. 

Mr. Skelly states in one e-mail, contrary to all of the above, that ‘‘Dr. Fiori wishes 

that we move out quickly on this project . . . So we don’t have time for the usual 

deliberate staffing within the Army or the usual FEMA snail’s pace to accomplish 

anything.’’ Skelly to Ray (Sept. 5, 2002). This comment, however, must be understood in context. In this same e-mail, September 5, 2002, Mr. Skelly had already 

committed to full staffing, which was the expectation of my principal and me: ‘‘Yes, 

the proposed memo needs to go through full staffing, including AMC and SBCCOM.’’ 

Skelly to Ray (Sept. 5, 2002). I believe his intent (I was not copied on this particular 

e-mail) was to impart the sense that the consideration process, although very important, was also time-critical because the longer we delayed, the greater the schedule 

would slip for operations and the longer the community would be left living with 

a potentially attractive terrorist target. 

Neither my principal nor I, moreover, was copied on this particular e-mail or we 

would have directed that it be fully vetted in accord with my prior written instructions.9 The staffing of whatever document was produced also had to come through 

me before being transmitted to my principal. I would not have permitted a document to reach my principal unless it had been fully vetted and, especially, vetted 
57 

10 E-mails that transmitted a draft were exchanged at the staff level, and I was not included 

on them. 

by our general counsel’s office and by our public affairs office. This vetting was our 

standard operating procedure, and one from which I would not deviate then or now. 

Finally, my e-mail of September 9, 2002, states a due date of approximately September 20, 2002, for a draft letter inviting the community to engage in emergency 

preparedness activities: ‘‘The Army intends to send the invitation to Anniston by the 

middle of next week, and so a draft must be prepared by close-of-business for Thursday of this week.’’ Shearer to Distribution (Sept. 9, 2002). That due date is a managerial driver to focus energy and produce a straw-man document that could be debated with my principal. It is also a series of dates that accorded to the expectations 

my principal held of me for when such a discussion would occur. Without such a 

driver, in my experience, staff debate would draw on without end. The due date 

thus was not a date certain on which some preconceived notion would be executed 

but, instead, a date on which I expected to be able to advise my principal. 

Perhaps I might have articulated this point better, but, as with all of the statements, this statement must be considered in the context of the statements from numerous individuals and individual e-mails, interspersed throughout the entire chain 

of e-mails, all of which demonstrate that we were trying to figure out what to do. 

They also demonstrate that we were in the midst of that process and that the staff 

understood it to be a deliberative process—not that we were marching toward some 

inexorable, preconceived end point. We were evaluating an idea, trying to produce 

a straw-man document (variously referred to as a ‘‘memo’’ or ‘‘letter’’ or ‘‘invitation’’) 

so that staff could comment and debate it, and so that we could then present that 

information (the straw-man and the views favoring and disfavoring it) to my principal for his decision. These e-mails thus represent a snapshot in time of the staff’s 

thinking about the facts, procedures, and external pressures. It does not represent 

a final product, my recommendation to my principal, or my principal’s decision. 

In addition, the date of my last e-mail was September 9, 2002, and my principal 

received a letter from Senator Shelby on September 20, 2002, advising him that the 

thinking reflected in the e-mail chain was unwise. The news reports appeared on 

September 21, 2002. A letter of the sort contemplated in the e-mail chain was not 

sent and did not appear before or after September 20, 2002. 

No letter was ever sent because no letter or other document was ever brought to 

me to review or to my principal.10 This, of course, reflected the fact that the staff 

exhibited intense feelings disfavoring the idea. This disfavor and, more importantly, 

the rationale expressed for it had changed my own thinking about approaching the 

situation. Indeed, throughout the process of exchanging views on this matter I was 

learning, and coming to the conclusion that my principal should not ‘‘invite,’’ ‘‘drive,’’ 

or ‘‘challenge’’ the local community to emergency preparedness. I had not formulated 

an alternative to break the deadlock the idea then under consideration was to address, yet in the eleven days between September 9, 2002, and September 20, 2002, 

my focus was turning in that direction. But before I could advise my principal that 

the idea was unwise, someone leaked the e-mail chain and the learning became 

moot. 

I GAINED VALUABLE AND UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE THROUGH INTERNAL DEBATE AND AS

CONSEQUENCE OF NEWS REPORTS

The preceding discussion is no slight-of-hand to avoid responsibility for my involvement in the e-mail discussion of how to engage the communities. I accept responsibility for it. The preceding simply sets out the mitigating circumstances of 

that involvement. 

I gained valuable and uncommon experience through that internal debate five 

years ago. I gained additional valuable and uncommon experience as a consequence 

of the e-mail leak and the concern its disclosure prompted in the communities. I admittedly would have preferred that the learning would have come through the educational process of the internal debate alone instead of jointly with the hard knock 

of the e-mail leak, congressional interest, and news reports. But that preference is 

another lesson learned that I do not have to repeat. 

Intergovernmental communication is an art not a science and in this instance we 

failed to appreciate how the source of an idea and tone can dramatically impact relations. The e-mails of Mr. Skelly and me interchangeably use the terms ‘‘chal-
58 

11See e.g., Shearer to Lantzer (Aug. 28, 2002) and Skelly to Distribution (Sept. 3, 2002). 

Mr. Skelly also stated in an e-mail, which he later corrected, that the ‘‘attached draft is my 

effort to toss the gauntlet on the ground without attacking the State or the counties for inaction.’’ Skelly to Distribution (Sept. 3, 2002). He later corrected his statement to note that the 

‘‘[i]ntent is not to ‘tell’ the State but to ‘invite’ them to participate.’’ Skelly to Ray (Sept. 5, 2002). 12See, e.g., Shearer to Conklin (Sept. 9, 2002) and Skelly to Ray (Sept. 5, 2002) (‘‘Intent is 

not to ‘tell’ the State but to ‘invite’ them to participate.’’). 13 Conklin to Shearer (Sept. 9, 2002). 

lenge’’11 and ‘‘invitation.’’12 Later e-mails recognize that an invitation is a better approach than a challenge, but, in the end, that is immaterial, too. We should have 

sought to work from a ‘‘ground-up’’ perspective rather than a ‘‘top-down’’ perspective. That is, we should have consulted with the local communities even in developing an initial proposal. 

While we perceived the idea to be a genuine invitation, with resources attached, 

such an invitation from on high might be understood as an ultimatum. Quiet discussions at the local level might have a more productive impact. This was a fine point, 

a key distinction, that staff debate13 made to me and that I had accepted as the 

news reports broke. 

Our idea to issue a ‘‘challenge’’ or ‘‘invitation’’ was a product of the poor relations 

that existed when my principal assumed management of the program. But we 

should not have assumed that an adversarial rapport with the community would 

flow from our efforts. The newspapers accurately reported that Mr. Skelly commented that the Army would record and make known those who elected to participate and those who did not: ‘‘To support this robust exercise program we would 

launch a media campaign that informs the public about the purpose if the drills, 

who we hope to have participate and what our objectives are. We would also make 

it known what agencies refused to participate and their excuses.’’ Skelly to Distribution (Aug. 28, 2007). 

Our objective was not to embarrass the community but to encourage—perhaps 

strongly encourage—the communities to participate in emergency preparedness. Indeed, the centerpiece of the thinking was not a public relations battle against the 

local and state agencies but to devise a method that caused them to be engaged in 

emergency-preparedness and allowed us to destroy the chemical stockpile and the 

risk it presented. But that, as before, is immaterial. Our communications plan 

should have focused on meeting with the communities and engaging them, rather 

than on worrying about what we would do in the event they declined to engage with 

us. While I present these as lessons learned, the fact is that I was learning this information as staff debate progressed. I could not act on this information because the 

e-mails were leaked before I had an opportunity to take action. Learning from an 

event, accepting responsibility, and using the lessons taught by the event, I believe, 

is the mark of maturity and the desire to improve. In my situation, I learned that 

inter-governmental communication is complex, and I now work more closely with 

local communities and their Congressional delegations, even in devising preliminary 

paths forward. I believe that this experience and sensitivity to the complexity of 

inter-governmental communication is far from ubiquitous and so I have gained an 

important asset. 

My record shows that I have engaged in effective communication with local communities both before the event and after: 

• I worked with the local community at the Aberdeen Proving Ground and the 

Maryland congressional delegation, principally Senator Mikulski and her staff, 

to change radically the plan for destroying mustard agent there and thereby 

safely expedite the agent destruction schedule by several years (January–August 2002). 

• I worked with the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian reservation to 

prepare them for the safe operation of the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal 

Facility (December 2001–February 2003). 

• I reversed, along with my principal, a prior DOE Assistant Secretary’s policy 

to centralize worker-health screenings and instead kept them at the local level. 

Working with workers and their representatives at the local level was essential 

to structuring a program that was most useful to them (August–September 

2004). 

• I worked with local worker groups to devise methods to provide them with 

operating-experience data more efficiently (January 2006–October 2006). 

• I am currently working with individual workers and worker groups to address 

beryllium monitoring and reassignment to non-beryllium areas (July 2007–current). 
59 

My career and my record thus substantiate that I have been dedicated to protecting worker safety and health and the environment. This is the true nature of 

my professional work—not the abstractions of a few news reports based on two emails trying to focus staff work on developing proposals to solve a problem. 

As a final footnote to the Anniston event, the Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce of Calhoun County, Alabama, the location of the Anniston Chemical Agent 

Disposal Facility (ANCDF), adopted a Resolution commending my principal for his 

work in bringing the ANCDF on-line. (Attachment 5). 

Question 2. Could you explain to the Committee what your role was in this controversy? 

Response. See Response to Question 1. 

Question 3. Please provide the Committee with all of the emails or other documents relating to this matter in your possession, or the possession of the Department of Defense. 

Response. I have included these documents in my response to Senator Boxer’s 

QFR 1. 

Question 4. Why did you leave the Department of Defense? Please provide any 

evaluation of your work performance while at the Department of Defense, including 

any evaluation of your performance in relation to the issues at Anniston described 

above. 

Response. I resigned my appointment at the Department of Defense because the 

President promoted and appointed me to serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Energy (Environment, Safety & Health). 

I have attached as Attachment 8 my job performance reviews assessing my performance during the period November 2001 to August 2004. Please continue to accord these documents the confidentiality of the Privacy Act and manage them as Official Use Only. 

[The referenced documents may be found in committee’s file.] 

RESPONSE BY RUSSELL H. SHEARER TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Question. As was discussed at the hearing, it has been reported that you were involved in an incident in September 2002 in which the Army was having a dispute 

with officials in Anniston, Alabama concerning participation in a training exercise 

related to a chemical weapons incinerator. According to news reports, local officials 

were unwilling to join in the exercise until they had received certain relevant equipment. Unable to resole the dispute, certain Army officials apparently came up with 

a plan to issue a challenge to local officials that was certain to be rebuffed and then 

use that refusal as the basis for a series of press releases blaming the local officials 

for any lack of preparedness. According to the Birmingham News, there was an 

email from you indicating you had been the one who had directed that the challenge 

be issued. At the hearing you acknowledged the email and your involvement in this 

incident. 

The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board frequently needs to work 

with state and local officials who also may be responding to or investigating the 

scene of a chemical incident. If confirmed, will you commit to working to resolve disputes with state and local officials in a cooperative manner and to refrain from 

using your position to conduct public relations battles against state and local officials. 

Response. I am absolutely committed to working with state and local officials in 

a cooperative manner to resolve disputes and to refrain from using my position to 

conduct public relations battles against state and local officials. 

I have set out my involvement in the Anniston, Alabama, event in my response 

to Senator Lautenberg’s QFRs 1 and 2. 

RESPONSE BY RUSSELL H. SHEARER TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR CARDIN

Question. You do not appear to have relevant private sector experience in chemical safety processes. What specific knowledge do you bring to this position that is 

directly relevant to the subject matters that the Chemical Safety Board considers? 

Response. My professional career has focused on high hazard operations including 

chemical and nuclear operations. I have had the opportunity to work for programs 

and companies involved in chemical refining, distillation, blending, blend-down, 

catalytic regeneration, rework, and destruction operations. I have also had the opportunity to work for programs involved nuclear reactor testing, nuclear weapons 
60 

14 In fact, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, often cited as the ‘‘Father of the Nuclear Navy,’’ is 

credited with implementing and employing the most careful and exacting process-safety management standard known. THEODORE ROCKWELL, THE RICKOVER EFFECT: HOW ONE 

MAN MADE A DIFFERENCE (2002). The Navy, as a consequence, has safely steamed more 

than 133 million miles on nuclear power. It is in this strict standard of process-safety management in which I have been trained. 

The Atomic Energy Commission developed similar criteria for safety analysis in the 1960s, 

a more refined and codified version of which is still used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

to license commercial nuclear facilities. 15 In addition to the following technical PSM expertise, my credentials also demonstrate experience in accident analysis and reconstruction, human factors, and professional standing, which 

the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board’s organic statute lays out as alternate 

means of qualification. 16 29C.F.R. § 1910.119 (1997); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.64 (1997). 17Some of the following pigeonholing is not how I would typically characterize my work because the process-safety management methodology in which I am trained is more robust, integrated with much better feedback loops, and casts as overarching functions some of the individual steps in the OSHA process. I have therefore listed some skill sets twice in order to reflect 

the fact they fit more than one place. 

production, cleanup of nuclear weapons facilities, sophisticated national laboratories, and chemical weapons destruction facilities, all of which employ numerous 

chemical processes in their operations. 

True, some of the experience is not from the ‘‘private sector,’’ but that is because 

I have dedicated more than three-fourths of my professional career to public service. 

Looking exclusively at private-sector experience in my case would be misleading for 

three reasons. First, all of the government agencies for whom I have worked employed chemical processes that are either the same, similar, or directly analogous 

to processes employed by the private sector. Second, all of the government agencies 

for whom I have worked contract with the very best and brightest private-sector 

companies to operate their facilities. I have been responsible for setting the standards of process-safety management (‘‘PSM’’) with which these private sector companies must comply, for providing technical expertise to help them comply, and for enforcing against them when they fail to comply. Third, the private sector employs a 

less rigorous PSM methodology than that in which the Government has trained me 

for many years. 

I can therefore bring technical competency in a more rigorous approach to PSM.14

I explain some aspects of that more rigorous approach below in my comments on 

how the standard should be improved. But for the purpose of explaining my skill 

set, I will lay out the standard briefly and show examples for each of its steps.15

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Process Safety Management 

Rule16 generally requires that once a plant has been built or significantly modified 

the employer must (1) gather process safety information; (2) prepare a process hazard analysis for each process at the plant; and (3) prepare operating procedures. The 

rule mandates (4) employee participation as part of gathering process safety information and preparing the process hazard analysis. It further requires before startup 

(5) preparation of a pre-startup review; (6) training of the operators; (7) preparation 

of a mechanical integrity plan, including a quality assurance process; and (8) preparation of a management of change process. The rule finally requires (9) investigations when a safety incident occurs, and (10) periodic auditing of whether the plant 

is in compliance with the rule. 

PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE

(1) Process Safety Information17

•Led effort and developed design guidance (Department of Energy (‘‘DOE’’) 

Standard 1189) for integrating safety into design throughout the lifecycle of the 

facility; includes as a keystone element PSM at each stage and especially PSM 

for selection of safety class and safety significant systems, structures, and components; 

• Also applicable to Process Hazard Analysis, Operating Procedures, Employee Participation, Pre-Startup Review, Training, Mechanical Integrity, 

and Change Management; 

• Developed Dissenting Professional Opinion (‘‘DPO’’) process whereby professional opinions on technical matters are entered into a formal system and evaluated through an appeal process by progressively more senior levels of management (retaliation for DPOs prohibited); 
61 

• Also applicable to Process Hazard Analysis, Operating Procedures, Employee Participation, Pre-Startup Review, Training, Mechanical Integrity, 

Change Management, Investigations, and Audits; 

•Principal author of practical guide to facility and activity walk downs, which 

teaches management and employees to walk the spaces and ask knowledgeable 

questions designed to ‘‘pull-the-thread’’ on key issues indicative of safety performance. 

• Also applicable to Process Hazard Analysis, Operating Procedures, Employee Participation, Pre-Startup Review, Training, Mechanical Integrity, 

Change Management, Investigations, and Audits; 

• Established safety-research office to examine important safety issues that 

cross-cut program offices; created system to coordinate research among offices 

so that results could be centralized and available to all; digested past research 

work and maintained it in database so that research could be easily searched 

and obtained, even though span of operations was nation- and, in some instances, world-wide. 

• Also applicable to Process Hazard Analysis, Operating Procedures, Employee Participation, Pre-Startup Review, Mechanical Integrity, Change 

Management, and Investigations; 

• Developed guidance on reviewing process-safety information documents; 

(2) Process Hazard Analysis 

• Conducted hazard analysis and advised senior management on numerous facilities, including: 

• Wet chemical and metallurgical facility; 

• Manufacturing facility for pyrophoric metals; 

• Manufacturing facility for mixed-oxide fuels from pyrophoric metals; 

• National laboratory complex including wet and dry chemistry laboratories; 

• High-intensity lasers and neutron sources; 

• Dangerous metals; 

• Chemical- and radioactive-waste processing facility; 

•Two chemical refineries producing specialized metals; and 

•Five chemical incinerators and two neutralization facilities. 

• Developed guidance on reviewing process-hazard analysis documents; 

• Drafted risk-assessment guide for undertaking probabilistic and deterministic 

risk-assessment methodologies used in assessing process hazards; 

• Developed program to identify, collect, and analyze un-reviewed safety questions; i.e., safety questions not already analyzed in existing process hazard analyses or that arise due to changes in operations. 

• Assessed hazards of DOE chemical and nuclear facility operations to determine whether they exhibit characteristics of high-consequence—low-probability 

events, such as Columbia Space Shuttle accident; 

• One of key senior officials responsible for establishing Central Technical Authorities (‘‘CTAs’’); CTAs grew out of analysis of Columbia Accident Investigation Board findings, coupled with recommendation from Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, that large, complex organizations often require centralized 

authority responsible for tracking day-to-day compliance with operating limits 

and any variance from those limits; CTAs help ensure compliance with processsafety documents and operating limits; 

•Familiarized with design basis threat (‘‘DBT’’) analysis, uncommon skill that 

analyses facility’s ability to withstand attacks of various sorts, such as wellarmed terrorist squad or detonation of explosive device; DBT analysis cross-cuts 

safety because safety systems must be sufficiently robust to withstand DBT but 

cannot create threat to the workers; with the Department of Homeland Defense 

focusing on ensuring that commercial chemical and other high-hazard facilities 

can withstand DBT, increasingly important to ensure protection methods do not 

create un-mitigated or unreasonable risks to workers or public; 

• Implemented integrated safety management system (ISMS) that utilizes a 

quality assurance methodology and feedback loop to perform work safety: (1) define scope of work; (2) analyze hazards; (3) define hazard controls; (4) conduct 

work in accord with hazard controls; and (5) provide feedback on performance 

of the work and the ISMS system and analysis; system applies not only at 

macro level of process information, process hazard analysis, writing procedures, 

pre-startup reviews, training, mechanical integrity and quality assurance, 

change management, and incident investigations but also at individual worker 
62 

level, whether that work is turning a spade or dirt or loosening the bolts to 

change-out a valve; 

• Determined proper national consensus standards to be incorporated in standards and, therefore, analyses. 

(3) Operating Procedures 

• Revised existing operating procedures to reflect best practices and changes for 

improvement, such as new operating-experiences program; 

• Developed new safety procedures, such as nanotechnology safety policy and 

best practices; 

• Created system of reports to alert facilities of operating experiences that may 

mandate change in procedures or incorporation of best practices; 

• Developed special-emphasis safety programs to enhance safe operations, including electrical safety, laser safety, rigging and hoisting, and Lock out/Tag 

(LOTO) out; 

• Implemented, educated, and championed conduct-of-operations (also called 

rigor-in-operations), in order to bring disciplined operations to chemical and nuclear facilities; successfully changed the safety culture of these facilities and 

thereby reduced events that could affect safe and reliable operations. 

(4) Employee Participation 

• Engaged employees and labor unions to find means of communicating operating experience, such as incident investigation findings, directly to workers in 

timely manner. 

• Established training and special-emphasis safety programs to educate workers 

on procedures with which they were having difficulty (as reflected in safety-performance metrics). 

(5) Pre-Startup Review 

• Developed guidance under which pre-startup review plans were undertaken 

and analyzed; 

• Reviewed pre-start-up review plans and results. 

(6) Training 

• Devised and managed safety-training programs for workers and management, 

such as Federal Technical Competency Panel, which prepared and evaluated (by 

examination) individuals from shop floor through senior management possessed 

adequate skills, and Nuclear Executive Leadership Training, which trained and 

evaluated (by written examination) management to ensure they understood and 

could perform process-safety management and other key safety functions. 

• I was also trained by the course and certified by written examination; 

• Managed training program for conduct-of-operations (also called rigor-in-operations) in order to educate plant managers and bring better discipline of operations to their facilities; 

• I was also trained by the course and certified by written examination. 

(7) Mechanical Integrity Plan & Quality Assurance 

• Developed program to identify, collect, and analyze un-reviewed safety questions; 

• Managed sophisticated Quality Assurance and Quality Control program for 

chemical and nuclear facilities, which included: 

• Designing facilities and safety systems, structures, and components 

(‘‘SSCs’’); 

•Procuring materials; 

• Construction, including welding, pouring concrete, and other key tasks; 

• Component changes, including in-kind changes or for new or different 

equipment; 

•Plant software to operate key systems, including key safety systems; managed development of the standard (procedure) governing preparation of 

quality assurance programs for software; 

• Suspect/Counterfeit Items and Defective Items (SCI/DI) program, which 

communicates information to facilities about under-rated or defective parts 

so that parts will be removed from service and, thereby, prevent accident 

or event; 

• Safety quality Assurance (Integrated Safety Management System); 

• Environmental quality assurance (ISO 14001); 

• Nuclear quality assurance (ASME NQA-1); 

•Product quality assurance (ISO 9000); 
63 

18These reports were prepared at my direction and using the focus that I provided. 19These reports were prepared at my direction and using the focus that I provided. 

• Integrating all of the quality assurance systems (safety, environment, nuclear, and product); 

• Managed enforcement program with civil penalty authority for violations of quality assurance and quality control programs; 

• Built team to assist field with maintenance issues in order to better understand 

how structures, systems and component reliability can be improved to avoid safety 

issues, functional failures, minimize equipment and facility downtime, maximize 

component life, identify critical failure modes, and maximize asset performance. 

(8) Change Management 

• Managed effort to regain configuration control of chemical facilities so that 

they existed in a known and analyzed condition and so that the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (‘‘P&IDs’’) reflected the true physical state of the plant 

(ball valves had been swapped out for gate valves, for example, and change was 

undocumented on P&IDs and unanalyzed for safety and function impact); 

• See also Mechanical Integrity Plan & Quality Assurance. 

(9) Incident Investigations 

• Managed and conducted more than thirty accident and event investigations 

and analyses that employ root-cause and other methodologies only recently 

adopted by Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board: 

4 Investigations and analyses include typical chemical events, such as failure to 

follow elements of process-safety management (failure to follow procedure and 

equipment failure, for example), chemical fires, contamination, chemical exposure, and vapor inhalation, as well as common industrial accidents, such as arc 

flashes and failure to use fall protection; 

• Directed use of new root-cause analytical technique, ‘‘Human Performance Improvement,’’ which ferrets out latent organizational defects that lead to most 

human error, rather than focusing on ‘‘blaming the worker;’’ 

• Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board recently applied methodology 

in its BP Texas City report; 

• Conducted detailed analysis of data, including events inside and outside my company or agency to ascertain whether they contained insights for our safety performance; this analysis included, among others, the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration’s Columbia Space Shuttle accident, the Davis-Besse nuclear 

power plant event (involving reactor-vessel head corrosion), and Chemical Safety 

and Hazard Investigation Board findings on chemical sector events; 

• Developed set of leading corporate safety performance metrics; 

• Aggregated data to seek out broad (generic) implications and operational improvements; devised a sophisticated analytical tool to promote operational awareness of real-time, facility-level safety and production performance; 

• Created system of reports to alert facilities of operating experiences that may 

mandate change in procedures or incorporation of best practices, including: 

• Daily Operating Experience Reports—daily reports of events in near real-time; 

• Operating Experience Summaries—monthly reports digesting issues across 

complex to assess trends and other important insights; 

• Special Operations Reports—analyses that drive action to prevent event recurrence; 

• Alerts—analyses that initiate immediate action on significant safety issues; 

• Bulletins-analyses share information and recommend actions on safety issues 

[See Attachment 9 for Bulletin on Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 

Board report on Delaware City event; See Attachment 10 for Bulletin on Texas 

City];18 and 

• Safety Advisories—analyses provide information on potentially significant 

safety or health issues [See Attachment 11 for Advisories on Texas City and on 

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board report];19

• Communicate best practices in all of the preceding documents; 

• Implemented technique known as ‘‘Prevent Events,’’ which supplies talking 

points synopsizing an analysis in a manner immediately useful to workers on 

shop floor; 

• Managed report and recommendations prepared by my office designed to address 

recurring chemical incidents. 

(10) Auditing 
64 

•Trained in concept of oversight and self-assessment, which is more robust process than simple compliance auditing; oversight and self-assessment are constant, 

ongoing processes that continuously evaluate the state of safety performance—not 

just compliance with the rules—to ensure that performance exceeds mere compliance; oversight and self-assessment also seek out and correct potential safety 

issues before they become a near miss or event; it also includes setting standards 

of excellence against which performance is measured; 

• Managed program reviews to evaluate whether they met basic safety-system 

standards and thus complied with requirements; also evaluated extent to which 

programs excelled beyond mere compliance; 

• Implemented new integrated oversight procedure, that includes safety, environment, and health oversight; 

• Oversaw development of safety performance assessment guide; 

• Oversaw development of extent of condition review guide, which explains how 

to assess the prevalence and persistence of an issue across a facility, operation, 

or entity. 

BROADER PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE

I also possess additional experience that overarches the entire process-safety management regime: 

• Served as the Acting Assistant Secretary and as the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Environment, Safety & Health, which function as Chief and Principal Deputy Chief Safety Officers, respectively, of the Department of Energy 

(DOE, if it were a private entity, would be among the largest manufacturing corporations in the world); 

• Directed a $100M annual, 200-person safety, environment, and health program; 

• Ran DOE’s chemical safety program, including oversight of DOE’s chemical hazard characterization and analysis process, annual chemical management conference, and development of chemical management best practices; 

• Educated and certified (by written examination) by DOE as senior manager 

qualified to oversee and manage process-safety management functions. 

• Managed, oversaw, and advocated for DOE’s promulgation of the Worker Safety 

and Health Program rule (10 C.F.R. Part 851), which is DOE’s equivalent of the 

OSHA regulations; I also resolved key issues associated with its implementation, 

such as incorporation of national consensus standards; 

• Brought new corporate focus to building an assessment-driven, rather than 

event-driven, complex through emphasizing translation of lessons learned into operating experiences used at the facilities, through enhanced oversight, through enhanced self-assessment, through promulgation of new evaluative techniques, such 

as Human performance Improvement, and through assessing extent of problems 

rather than merely studying the problem at-hand; 

•Former manager of a program operating five thermal destruction and two neutralization facilities to destroy chemical weapons; 

• Embedded elements of process-safety management in program; brought concept of conduct-of-operations to program; improved safety performance record; 

•Trained in Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (‘‘EPCRA’’) 

and served as Savannah River Site’s EPCRA attorney. 

• Advised at length on pollution prevention in order to minimize the emissions, 

discharges, and hazardous waste reportable on Form R; applied process-safety 

management as part of this advice to encourage clients to incorporate less hazardous constituents in process, engage in closed-loop recycling, and adopt operating procedures that result in less off-specification material. 

I have also attached the independent evaluations of my skills by Dr. Mario P. 

Fiori, a consulting engineer (Attachment 12); Mr. Frank B. Russo, Senior Advisor 

for Environment, Safety & Health to the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; and Mr. David B. Amerine, Senior Vice President of Parsons. 

My long-term involvement has allowed me to become competent in both standards 

of process-safety management—that employed in the hazard operations in which I 

have been engaged and that adopted by OSHA. I have viewed the OSHA rule as 

a vital component in safe commercial operations but it is only a floor, and a floor 

that contains elements that I believe should be strengthened. I will therefore seek, 

if confirmed, to work with the Chairman and Board Members to issue recommendations and provide practical recommendations on improving the PSM rule in a sen-
65 

20The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, National Fire Protection Association, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, International Standards Organization (commonly 

known as ‘‘ISO’’), among others, are good sources for proven, applied national consensus standards. 

sible manner that does not create safe, but ultimately un-operable, inefficient, and 

un-economic facilities. Safety is foremost but it must be—and can be—executed in 

a manner that does not break the backs of small and large operations alike. 

I will accordingly lay out seven safety management principles that influence my 

preliminary views on improving the PSM rule, which follow those principles. 

SAFETY MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

1. Safety is a foremost consideration. 

• Companies have a moral and legal duty to ensure worker safety. 

• Governmental inspections and internal auditing alone will not drive safe behavior. 

• Employers must set and abide by high standards in order to encourage and 

create a good safety culture. 

2. Safety is Free. 

• Safety is a good business practice. 

• Safety investments must be integrated with production throughout a facility’s 

life. 

• Safety will become part of routine operations if it is integrated. 

• Integrated safety will drive reliability, efficiency, and productivity. 

• Safety is not an add-on cost when integrated: ‘‘Safety is Free.’’ 

3. Involve the worker. • No safety management program—process management or otherwise—works 

unless the worker on the shop floor understands safety and is engaged in its 

promotion. 

• Good safety records can be aided—but not created—by management. 

• Workers on the shop floor create good safety records. 

• Managers create the environment for such a record to flourish by providing 

attention to and support for safety. 

•The purpose of a procedure, in fact, is to allow a worker to perform his duties 

in a safe and productive manner that will result in overall safe and reliable operations. 

4. You can’t tell what’s wrong unless you know what’s right. 

• Subjective judgments and ‘‘pencil-whipping’’ a problem do not create a safe 

working environment. 

• Adherence to proven, accepted, and applied national consensus standards20

can create a safe working environment. 

•Plant personnel must be technically competent and inquisitive. 

5.What management does speaks louder than what management says. 

• Managers need to talk about the importance of safety. 

• But it will only be ‘‘talk’’ unless managers also demonstrate a commitment to 

safety by, for example, walking engineering spaces, participating in hazards and 

safety analyses, and attending tool-box briefings or plan-of-the-day meetings 

where forthcoming work is discussed. 

6. Experience is the best teacher. 

•People make mistakes and equipment fails. 

• Operating experience takes the information from those events and applies it 

to ongoing operations in order to avoid repeating the same mistake. 

• A critique program is essential, especially at new facilities with new equipment that lack operating experience, in order to review the events as a whole 

rather than individually so that insights and trends can be deduced. 

7. Conduct-of-Operations is critical to safe operations. 

• Conduct-of-Operations is a defined process by which rigor in operational safety 

is imbued in all aspects of a process, and it includes, as a minimum, the following elements: 

• Configuration control; 
66 

21 I further recognize that the PSM rule also applies to existing facilities where thes elements 

can be applied only to the as-built facility. 

• Maintaining the facility in a known and analyzed state is a key linkage 

between the hazards analysis, which sets out safe operating limits, and operation of the facility; 

• Verbatim compliance with procedures and no ad-hoc procedures developed for 

‘‘special occasions’’ or ‘‘on-the-fly;’’ 

•Procedures are another key linkage between the hazards analysis, which 

sets out safe operating limits, and operation of the facility; 

• A change or deviation in procedure must be evaluated in advance in order 

to determine its affect on safety systems and operations; 

• Command and control; 

• No bifurcation of control; 

• Hold the senior control-room manager accountable for activities at the entire facility or process during the shift. 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE PROCESS-SAFETY MANAGEMENT RULE

The preceding principles constitute my ‘‘acceptance criteria’’ for evaluating the 

PSM rule, and based on them I find several opportunities for improvement. I have 

also sought to lay out these opportunities for improvement with an eye to the results that I believe should be sought. 

•The PSM rule should use its elements as analytical tools that can assist the 

design and construction process. 

The PSM rule is, generally, retrospective (i.e., it applies once the facility is built 

and operating) and thus misses the best opportunity to influence the formulation of the safety envelope. Gathering process safety information, preparing 

process hazard analyses, writing procedures, setting up a change management 

process, implementing a mechanical integrity program, building a quality assurance and quality control system, designing an accident investigation program, 

formulating an audit program, and beginning training only begins when a full 

up plant is waiting to be operated. The PSM rule misses an opportunity for 

process safety information and process hazard analyses, for example, to influence design and construction. 

• I recognize that the appendix to the rule offers up using some process-hazard 

analysis as a ‘‘good practice,’’ but this information is far too critical to be considered merely a ‘‘good practice.’’ I believe therefore the PSM rule should integrate 

these elements into the entire lifecycle of the plant, including conceptual and 

final design, systematization (turn-over from engineering to operations), operations, and decommissioning.21

•The PSM rule should adopt more rigorous analytical techniques. 

The PSM rule currently provides no direction on the application of the processhazard analytical techniques it provides as ‘‘safe harbors.’’ It does not, for example, mandate more robust techniques for more complex facilities; even the guidance in the appendix and the enforcement guide focus the rigor of analysis on 

the size—not complexity—of the plant. The rule therefore provides no substantial check on applying a less-rigorous method, such as a check-list approach, to 

a complex facility. The PSM rule should specifically mandate a ‘‘graded approach’’ that directs more complex or hazardous facilities to employ more rigorous means of process safety analysis. 

•The PSM rule should adopt a more robust approach to procedures. 

The PSM rule currently requires only that operating procedures be readily accessible. It does not require that operating procedures be used and followed verbatim. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board’s report on the BP 

Texas City, Texas, explosion found that failure to follow procedures after a turnaround was an important cause of the event. The PSM rule should require use 

of and verbatim compliance with procedures. It should also endorse a conductof-operations approach to operations. 

•The PSM rule should adopt an overarching approach to quality assurance and 

quality control. 

The PSM rule and appendix refer to quality assurance in the mechanical integrity context, and even then only in the context of construction materials, fabrication, inspection, and installation. It refers to quality control only in the operating procedures context, and it is limited to quality control of raw materials 

and hazardous chemical inventory levels. 
67 

The PSM rule should, instead, establish quality assurance and quality control 

as the overarching management system and gate keeper, respectively, that they 

should be when undertaking high-hazard operations. It should express some 

fundamental expectations about a quality assurance and quality control processes. It should also endorse integrating quality assurance into all the other 

necessary processes, such as the conduct of work itself, configuration control, 

procedure development, and change management, among others. It should endorse integrating quality assurance systems with one another, such as Integrated Safety Management (‘‘ISMS’’) for safety, ISO 14000 for environment, and 

ISO 9000 for products. The PSM rule should, lastly, endorse more than a mere 

compliance audit. Utilizing a graded approach, the rule might endorse a selfassessment and oversight program that seeks more than just mere safety compliance. 

•The PSM rule should show a strong linkage between its safety-management 

focus and technical standards that lay out the methodology for conducting analyses, determining adequacy of design or operation, or managing risks. 

The PSM rule shows no linkage between process-safety management and technical standards. It lists some potential sources of those standards in the appendix but it does not cull out or mandate particularly important standards even 

for conducting a process-hazard analysis. This lack of interface between the rule 

and the standards makes it very difficult to assess the objective ‘‘reasonableness’’ of an analysis, design, and operating procedures, among others. 

The PSM rule should point to, incorporate by reference, adopt, or even refer to 

specific national consensus standards that are typically the benchmark by 

which ‘‘reasonableness’’ is assessed. I believe that anything would be better 

than simply leaving the question wide open because certain disciplines have 

hard-and-fast tests for reasonableness. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers standards for pressure vessels are, for example, the benchmark for assessing that equipment. Even some local codes reference these national consensus standards; the PSM rule, which is, in a sense, a national safety code, 

should do likewise. 

Question 2. What evidence can you point to in the last two years that demonstrates your independence and willingness to press a reluctant Administration 

into action? 

Response. My record demonstrates numerous instances where I have taken unpopular actions to ensure that environment, safety, and worker health are properly 

protected. The examples provided below demonstrate my willingness to take the 

necessary steps to protect worker safety and health and the environment. 

•The Department of Energy (‘‘DOE’’) regulates itself for occupational safety. Until 

2006, DOE had no regulation governing occupational safety and no means of enforcing against its contractors for violations of the Department’s expectations regarding occupational safety. It relied, instead, on a Department of Energy Order. 

I managed, oversaw, and advocated for DOE’s promulgation of the Worker Safety 

and Health Program rule (10 C.F.R. Part 851), which is DOE’s equivalent of the 

OSHA regulations. I also resolved key issues associated with its implementation, 

such as incorporation of national consensus standards. The rule had previously 

failed to be adopted under a prior Assistant Secretary because of internal disagreements about the incorporation of national consensus standards and even the 

need for such a rule, despite Congressional direction to adopt one. My principal 

and I provided the leadership in the Department to accomplish the task, and I 

provided technical guidance to my staff to resolve key issues. 

• I have spent much of the last three years at DOE expressing the need for Federal employees to spend time out of their offices and in the field where work, such 

as high-level waste transfer operations, is conducted. Because the office of environment, safety, and health has no authority to direct program activities outside 

its own office, I was unable to direct Federal employees in other programs to 

spend more time in the field. My observations and recommendations, thus, met 

with notable resistance, principally from senior career staff who felt they spent 

enough time in the field. I continued in making this recommendation, including 

at senior staff calls, and achieved some success in encouraging a greater field 

presence. 

• I conceived of the need for and established the general parameters of a departmental ‘‘design and build’’ standard, DOE Standard 1189, currently under review, 

which provides binding guidance for integrating safety into design throughout the 

lifecycle of a facility. The standard includes as a keystone element PSM at each 

stage and especially PSM for selection of safety class and safety significant systems, structures, and components. The need for such a standard was not widely 
68 

22 I understand this question to inquire about my views of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, which is also known as SARA Title III and became law through the 

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (‘‘SARA’’). 

agreed upon, even among my own staff, and I had to exercise considerable leadership within the Department in order to win its development. 

Question 3. Do you believe that Community Right-to-Know laws are a help or a 

hindrance or simply irrelevant to the safe functioning of chemical plants in America? 

Response. The answer to this question, from any safety professional’s perspective, 

is emphatic: Community Right-to-Know laws are critical.22 These laws, and specifically EPCRA, require emergency planning, emergency notification in the event of a 

release of a reportable quantity, hazardous chemical storage reporting requirements, 

and toxic chemical release inventory (Form R). 

The emergency planning requirements of EPCRA are the lynchpin by which local 

responders know what sorts of events and chemical to which they may potentially 

have to respond. It is also the mechanism by which evacuation plans are developed 

and by which emergency responder training takes place. 

The emergency notification requirement is the mechanism that causes the facility 

that is the source of the release to notify the local and state emergency responders 

and planning commissions. It also requires the facility to report key information 

about the release that is helpful to responders and commissions in addressing that 

release. 

The hazardous chemical storage reporting requirements inform the community 

about the sorts of hazardous materials stored by a facility in that community. The 

requirements, equally importantly, mandate that the facility provide the state and 

local emergency planning commissions with information about the chemicals stored 

at the facility (either on a Materials Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) or on a detailed list 

of MSDSs). Finally, it requires that facilities submit an inventory of hazardous 

chemicals stating the maximum amount held at the facility, the daily average 

amount, and the location of the chemicals. 

Finally, EPCRA requires annual submission of the Form R, or Toxics Release Inventory (‘‘TRI’’). This Form R informs the public and local governments about releases from the facility, both those permitted under the pollution-control statutes, 

such as the Clean Air Act, or those that occur accidentally. It provides, in my experience, an important forcing function to require facilities to aggressively seek out the 

pollution prevention required by other statutes, such as the Resource Conservation 

and Recovery Act. 

Collectively these provisions provide the tools that state and local communities 

and facilities require to respond in the event of a chemical event. I therefore view 

them as critical to safe operations in the chemical sector. 

Question 4. Finally, can you cite an instance in which you have promoted additional legislation or regulations to increase public and/or worker safety in any of 

your previous positions? 

Response. I am able to cite several instances in which I have promoted additional 

legislation in order to promote both worker and public safety: 

• I managed, oversaw, and advocated for the Department of Energy’s (‘‘DOE’’) promulgation of the Worker Safety and Health Program rule (10 C.F.R. Part 851), 

which is DOE’s equivalent of the OSHA regulations; 

• I issued binding recommendations for the improvement of safety-management 

functions at DOE. These recommendations resulted from a review I managed and 

participated in that evaluated the safety insights presented by the reports on the 

Columbia Space Shuttle Accident Investigation and the corrosion of the Davis— 

Bessie Reactor Pressure Vessel Head; 

• I have managed and conducted more than 30 accident and event investigations, 

which have resulted in numerous recommendations to change DOE and other 

agency procedures, standards, or rules in order to improve safety performance; 

• I wrote an article advocating adoption of the Basel Convention governing international hazardous waste transfers and the Bamako regional convention (Africa) 

on the same subject; I observed while a volunteer law clerk for the United Nations 

Environment Programme in Nairobi, Kenya, that the international waste trade 

resulted in some notable injury to public health when the receiving nation was 

not well prepared to store or manage those wastes; and 

• I volunteered as a law clerk in the Natural Resources Defense Council air program analyzing clear-air law for legislative and regulatory opportunities for improvement (1994). 
69 

•Finally, I was a plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging a state supreme-court rules 

change. The rules change adversely affected the ability of law clinics to represent 

indigent and moderate-income clients in environmental matters, and thus to protect the safety and health of the public. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Mr. Gilliland, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. GILLILAND, NOMINEE FOR BOARD 

MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 

Mr. GILLILAND. Madam Chairman, thank you for your leadership 

in today’s hearing, and to the members of the Committee, I want 

to thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you in 

this confirmation process. 

I also want to thank Senator Isakson, Senator Chambliss and 

Congressman Deal for their recommendation, and to the President, 

my thanks for this nomination. I am grateful to all of them and 

humble for their confidence in me that this nomination represents. 

I also want to thank my wife, Candy, who is here with me today. 

I am grateful for her encouragement and support in undertaking 

the responsibilities and time that will be necessary to serve as a 

director of the Tennessee Valley Authority if I am confirmed. 

Our home is in a small community in the mountains of north 

Georgia, where generations of my family have lived. Until the late 

1930s, this area, as well as much of the Tennessee Valley, was 

without electricity. The Tennessee Valley Authority not only 

brought light, it brought economic growth, flood control and environmental stewardship to our region. In the late 1930s, my father 

graduated from law school at the University of Kentucky. His first 

job was at the TVA, handling land acquisitions for reservoirs and 

power generating facilities in the mountains of north Georgia. 

There he met my mother, so in many ways I appear before this 

Committee today because of the Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Although I have never held public office, over the years I have 

had the privilege of serving on numerous boards and committees, 

having been appointed from both sides of the aisle. I have always 

taken these tasks and responsibilities with the utmost seriousness 

and commitment to the challenge at hand. For the past 8 years, I 

have served on the board and chair of the authority which oversees 

one of the largest metropolitan parks in America. My service includes overseeing both the financial management of Georgia’s largest tourist attraction and the maintenance of the environmental integrity of over 3,000 acres of this largely undeveloped scenic park. 

I have also had the opportunity to guide a public regional banking company through the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley 

legislation, a rule, statutes and regulations which I support and applaud. 

With the structural changes to TVA created by Congress in 2005, 

the agency has progressed quickly to embrace a more efficient and 

open business structure, all the while remaining true to its original 

mission of energy, environment and economic development. I am 

proud to offer my experience, both from the public and private sector, as a lawyer and a banker. I am confident that my experience 
70 

will be helpful to the Nation’s largest power producer as I seek to 

become Georgia’s first representative on the TVA board. 

If confirmed, I look forward to offering my time and energy to 

this very important and vital component of our economy and our 

Nation’s responsibility to its citizens. Once again, thank you for 

your time and the opportunity to address the Committee. It is an 

honor to be with you, and I look forward to any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilliland follows:] 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. GILLILAND, NOMINEE FOR BOARD MEMBER, BOARD OF

DIRECTORS OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Madame Chairman, thank you for your leadership in holding today’s hearing. To 

you, Senator Inhofe, and to all the Members of the Committee, I want to thank you 

for giving me the opportunity to appear before you in this confirmation process. 

I also want to thank Senator Isakson, Senator Chambliss and Congressman Nathan Deal for their recommendation, and to the President. my thanks for this nomination. I’m grateful to all of them, and humbled. for their confidence in me that this 

nomination memento. 

I also want to thank my wife. Candy, who is with me today. I’m grateful for her 

encouragement and support in undertaking the responsibilities and time that will 

be necessary to serve as a Director of the Tennessee Valley Authority if I am confirmed. 

Our home is in a small community in the mountains of north Georgia where generations of my family have lived. Until the late 1930’s, this area, as well as much 

of the Tennessee Valley, was without electricity. The Tennessee Valley Authority 

not only brought light, it brought economic growth, flood control and environmental 

stewardship to Our region. 

In the late 1930’s my father graduated from law school at the University of Kentucky. His first job was with TVA, handling arid acquisition for reservoirs and 

power generating facilities in the mountains of north Georgia. There he met my 

mother, so in many ways I appear before this Committee today because of the Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Although I have never held public office, over the years I have had the privilege 

of serving on numerous boards and committees. having been appointed from both 

sides of the aisle. 1 have always taken these tasks and responsibilities with the utmost seriousness and commitment to the challenge at hand. 

For the past eight years, I have served on the board and as Chair of the authority 

which oversees one of the largest metropolitan parks in America. My service includes overseeing both the financial management of Georgia’s largest tourist attraction, and the maintenance of the environmental integrity of over 3,000 acres of this 

largely undeveloped scenic park. 

I’ve also had the opportunity to guide a public regional banking company through 

implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation; a statute. rules and regulations 

which I support and applaud. 

With the structural changes to TVA created by Congress in 2005, the agency has 

progressed quickly to embrace a more efficient and open business structure, all the 

while remaining true to its original mission of energy, the environment and economic development. 

I am proud to offer my experience, in both the public and private sector, as a lawyer and a banker. I am confident that my experience will be helpful to the nation’s 

largest public power producer as I seek to become Georgia’s first representative on 

the TVA Board. 

If confirmed, I look forward to offering my time and energy to this very important 

and vital component of our economy and our nation’s responsibility to it’s citizens. 

Once again, thank you for your time and the opportunity to address the Committee. 

It’s an honor to be with you and I look forward to your questions. 

RESPONSES BY THOMAS GILLILAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. TVA is one of our nation’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide, emitting 

over 100 million tons annually. As the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works 

Committee (EPW) looks at addressing global warming, please explain what strate-
71 

gies TVA is implementing to reduce carbon emissions and what additional policies 

you would support to reduce TVA’s greenhouse gas emissions. 

Response. I am committed to working with my fellow board members, TVA management and staff to explore ways to reduce CO2 emissions through increased efficiency. As I suggested in the hearing on October 2, I am eager to learn more about 

advanced technologies like Integrated Gasification/Combined Cycle (IGCC), carbon 

sequestration and advanced nuclear that may help TVA reduce and avoid future 

carbon dioxide emissions. As a longtime resident of the TVA service region I have 

a keen interest in enacting policies that result in cleaner air for the Tennessee Valley. 

Question 2. Does TVA have any plans to retire any older inefficient coal units in 

the Agency’s current business plan? If so, what units and/or locations are being considered? 

Response. I am unaware of any specific plans to retire coal units at this time. I 

know that TVA is investing in pollution-control equipment at their coal plants. I anticipate a full briefing on the matter if I am confirmed by the United States Senate 

to the TVA Board. 

Question 3. Has TVA looked at fossil fuel electricity with carbon sequestration 

technology for the TVA system? If so, what units and/or locations are being considered? 

Response. It is my understanding that TVA is investigating technologies of the 

future including Integrated Gasification/Combined Cycle (IGCC), participating in 

the Coal Fleet of the Future project, and supporting additional research on the issue 

of Global Climate Change through participation in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). I am not aware of an evaluation of specific units and locations at 

this time. 

Question 4. Besides nuclear power what other technologies is TVA actively pursuing to control carbon emissions? 

Response. I am familiar with the TVA Green Power Switch program, which enables customers to purchase some of their energy from non-emitting sources such 

as solar, wind and methane gas generation in the Valley. Beyond the Green Power 

Switch program, I am not yet familiar with all of the efforts TVA is making to control carbon emissions. It is something I look forward to learning should I become 

a TVA board member. 

Question 5. Does TVA support a renewable energy standard? If yes: Please explain 

how this fits into TVA’s plan to reduce carbon emissions. If no: Why not? 

Response. I am not aware of TVA’s position on a renewable energy standard. I 

do know that in its new 2007 Strategic Plan, TVA recognizes that renewable energy 

will play an increasingly important role in TVA’s future generation. 

Question 6. A recent TVA funded study by the University of Tennessee (‘‘Resources and Employment Impact of a Renewable Portfolio Standard in the Tennessee Valley Authority Region’’) indicated significant job creation in the TVA service area if a renewable energy standard was enacted. Specially, the study found that 

under a Federal RPS requiring 10% by 2020 would produce nearly 45,000 jobs in 

the TVA service area. The majority of the requirement could be met by co-firing biomass at existing TVA coal-fired power plants. Are the members of the TVA Board 

aware of this study? Does this study affect TVA’s view of a renewable energy standard? If so how? 

Response. I have not yet read the report but will ask for a copy and briefing from 

TVA staff, should I be confirmed. 

Question 7. TVA has a strong history in doing research on bio-energy opportunities. What is the current state of your programs looking at using biomass for power 

generation, including co-firing at your existing facilities as the above study identified as an opportunity. 

Response. I am not yet familiar with TVA’s bio-energy activities, but if confirmed 

will commit to you that I will research the matter and learn what TVA is doing in 

this area. 

Question 8. TVA has a voluntary program for customers to support renewable energy called the Green Power Switch. What plans does TVA have to develop renewable energy other than the voluntary Green Power Switch program in the near future? Please explain any plans in detail. 

Response. It is my understanding that TVA has been successful signing up residents of the Tennessee Valley with the Green Power Switch Program and continues 

its marketing efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my fellow board 
72 

members, TVA management and staff to help develop strategies for utilizing available renewable energy sources in the Valley. 

Question 9. TVA announced a new commitment to energy efficiency in its most 

recent strategic plan. Will you share with us the details of the specific energy efficiency goals in this plan and how they will be met? 

Response. As part of the Strategic Plan developed over the last year, TVA stated 

that it ‘‘will strive to be a leader in energy efficiency improvements and peak demand reduction over the next five years.’’ It also stated in the Strategic Plan that 

becoming a leader in energy efficiency will require a cooperative effort between 

TVA, its distributors and the end use consumer along with its direct served customers. 

If I am confirmed I will commit to working with TVA staff and our stakeholders 

in the Valley on energy efficiency measures to reduce energy consumption. 

Question 10. Many utilities are now viewing energy efficiency as an important recourse to meet new demand. What are your views on advancing energy efficiency 

investments at TVA? Do you view TVA as a leader in this effort? 

Response. As I mentioned in my opening statement on October 2, TVA has served 

residents of the Tennessee Valley well for nearly 75 years by promoting economic 

development, serving as a steward of the environment and providing affordable, reliable electricity. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee, TVA 

leadership and my colleagues on the Board to ensure that TVA as an agency of the 

federal government carries its share of responsibility in areas such as energy-efficiency and conservation. 

Question 11. A recent utility industry collaborative produced a National Action 

Plan on Energy Efficiency. It concludes that utilities with ‘‘best practices’’ spend 

about 1% of their annual revenues on energy efficiency investments. TVA recently 

announced a $20 million dollar annual investment toward energy efficiency, yet 

TVA’s annual revenues for 2008 are expected to be $9.7 billion dollars. One percent 

would exceed $97 million dollars annually. Can you explain this shortfall? What are 

your thoughts on increasing TVA’s investment? 

Response. As a nominee, I have not been privy to TVA’s spending priorities, nor 

have I had the opportunity to review the National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency. 

However, if confirmed by the Senate, I will commit to participate fully in Boardlevel discussions and decisions about energy efficiency investments at TVA. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, sir. 

I don’t have any questions for you, which I am sure you are 

greatly relieved to know. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Bresland, I know that my staff spoke to you 

about the Contra Costa regulations that we have, our chemical 

plant safety program there. Have you gone over them? Are you familiar with them? 

Mr. BRESLAND. Yes, I am, I am very familiar with what happens 

in Contra Costa County. 

Senator BOXER. What is your feeling about what they do? They 

have a very strong community protection plan. I just wondered how 

you felt about it. 

Mr. BRESLAND. Contra Costa County is just east of San Francisco, as you know. 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Mr. BRESLAND. It probably has the strongest environmental and 

chemical process safety program in the United States. In Contra 

Costa County, there are 50 chemical plants and oil refineries, I 

think 6 or 7 oil refineries, the rest are chemical plants. They have 

a very strong program there that is headed up by Mr. Sawyer, 

Randy Sawyer. He has five engineers who work in the program. 

They do audits of their facilities every 3 years. It is an excellent 

program. 
73 

Senator BOXER. All right. I think that is important. I have a 

number of questions that I would love for you to answer, none of 

which are trick questions, they are just pretty straightforward. But 

this is such an important position and it means so much to all of 

us. We are very hopeful with you taking the lead on these that we 

will make some progress. 

Mr. Gilliland, I am going to send you, for you to answer in writing, because it is too complicated, really, asking you what strategies you believe TVA should be using to reduce its carbon emissions. But I am very interested, as you know, in that issue, and 

look forward to your written response on that. Because it is a 

longer issue. 

And then I have a question to ask Mr. Shearer from Senator 

Lautenberg. In 2002, you were reportedly part of an effort by the 

Pentagon to challenge local officials in Alabama to participate in 

emergency response exercises, knowing that they would refuse, so 

that the Pentagon could send out press releases shifting blame over 

the lack of local preparedness for a potential release from a chemical weapons incinerator. 

I am going to place in the record, unless there is any dissent 

here, a list of the articles that ran at that time in the Birmingham 

News, the first paragraph: ‘‘The Army intends to embarrass 

Aniston officials and shift public scorn over the chemical weapons 

incinerator away from itself with a strategy revealed in recent emails exchanged at the Pentagon.’’ This is kind of a sorry situation 

that our military got themselves into and I wondered if you were 

part of that plan, what role you played in it. 

[The referenced material follows:] 

Mr. SHEARER. Madam Chairman, it was indeed a sorry state of 

events, and given the opportunity to do that over, that is one that 

I would do differently. 

Senator BOXER. So you were involved in it? 

Mr. SHEARER. Yes, ma’am, I was part of the e-mail chain that 

was disclosed, that was leaked from the Army to the Aniston News, 

which first broke the story. Our intentions in that instance were 

quite good, and that was to get Aniston prepared for the operation 

of that facility, emergency management being part of that. Our execution, however, could have been better. 

The situation also involved two Army staffers, one of whom directly worked for me, the other who was, through a variety of 

memoranda of understanding, also worked for us, and they were 

adversarial. Unfortunately, our intent didn’t get properly translated to either of them and as a consequence, they engaged in a 

rather adversarial e-mail exchange that founded the basis of what 

was disclosed to the Aniston newspapers. 

But from that experience I have learned, and would in a similar 

circumstance endeavor to work far more closely with the Congressional delegation of the State and also work to ensure that my staff 

had a better understanding of what it is that my boss and I sought 

to do. 

Senator BOXER. Well, let me just simply say that, a lot of us 

would like to have do-overs in our life, OK? All of us, every one of 

us, there is no one that I know lived a perfect life or made every 

decision. But I think the troubling thing about this, and Senator 
74 

Lautenberg is the one who brought this to my attention, is, it goes 

to the heart of who you are. There is an e-mail here from you that 

essentially, it is right here in the Birmingham News, where you directed this whole thing, you directed Skelley to issue the challenge. 

I just think this is a problem for me. I don’t know if anyone else 

feels this way. But again, when Senator Shelby says that this plan 

was perverse and irresponsible, this isn’t a partisan hit from me 

at all. I am glad you said you wouldn’t do it again, but the fact that 

you did it is very concerning to me. So I just want you to know that 

is where I am coming from. 

Senator Isakson, did you have any questions? 

Senator ISAKSON. Yes, I do, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Please go forward. 

Senator ISAKSON. I wanted to discuss with Tom Gilliland just for 

a second two or three points for the record. One of the concerns of 

the TVA, back under the old operational model, which has now 

changed, and during the 1990s was the tremendous amount of 

debt, would you share with the Committee what the cost of debt 

is to TVA today versus what it was in that decade? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Yes, Senator Isakson, I had an opportunity to 

look into that. In 1997, 34 percent of the revenue, that is revenue, 

generated by TVA went to pay interests costs. This year, 13 percent of revenue is applied to interest cost. I think that is a significant improvement. 

Senator ISAKSON. On the question that Senator Boxer is going to 

send to you, I would like to just talk to you about it in this five 

minutes about renewable energy. When we had the energy debate, 

we had a provision on requiring at least 15 percent of energy to be 

replaced with renewable energy sources being either wind or solar. 

We have difficulty in the southeast with both, we don’t have 

enough wind in particular. 

What are our other sources of renewable energy in the south, 

other than carbon-based improvements? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Hydro, improvements to hydro, of course nuclear. 

We have 60 percent of our power production at TVA is fossil fuel, 

30 percent is nuclear, 10 percent are alternate sources. Nuclear is, 

well, for instance, in August, we reached record load demands multiple times during the month of August. Of course, you have to 

have the nuclear in order to have the reliability as well, at least 

in this system, as well as to meet those peak loads. 

The issues relative to carbon, I was pleased to see that the May 

2007 strategic plan for TVA incorporated addressing global climate 

issues. I know they are spending a million dollars a day on carbon 

emission issues. They have already spent $5 billion, and those initiatives continue. 

Senator ISAKSON. On the hydro, too, amount to which we can go 

from coal to hydro is limited by any number of factors in impoundment, not the least of which is wetland destruction. 

Mr. GILLILAND. We are experiencing a 100-year drought right 

now. Hydro only represents 5 percent or so of the total production. 

An when you don’t have the water in the reservoirs, obviously you 

don’t have the capacity. 

Senator ISAKSON. This next question is going to seem silly to you, 

because you and I have already talked about it. But it is important 
75 

to the people of Georgia. One of the issues that caused this whole 

concern about a lack of representation of the State of Georgia on 

the TVA board was the concern that their voices of those people in 

those 10 counties in Georgia would not be heard. I know your answer to this already, but for the record, will you pledge yourself to 

be sure that those 10 counties in north Georgia get the representation on the TVA they deserve, both from the standpoint of their 

lake levels as well as the costs and reliability of their energy? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Yes, I will, for the people of the State of Georgia 

as well as the other seven States. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you for your willingness to serve, and 

thank you both, I am going to give you all a pass, just like Senator 

Boxer gave Tom as pass. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

So we are at the end of this, so I am going to ask the same questions, but I will do it one and then two together. Well, let’s see, we 

will do the TVA first. 

Do you agree, if confirmed as a member of the Board of Directors 

of the TVA to appear before this Committee or designated members 

and other appropriate committees and provide information subject 

to appropriate and necessary security protection with respect to 

your responsibilities as a member of the Board of Directors of the 

Tennessee Valley Authority? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Sir, do you agree when asked to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in 

office at the time? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, 

documents, electronic and other forms of communication or information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely fashion? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Yes, I do. 

Senator BOXER. Do you know of any matters which you may or 

may not have disclosed that might place you in any conflict of interest if you are confirmed as a member of the Board of the TVA? 

Mr. GILLILAND. No, I do not. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, sir. 

And so the next two, if you could just answer together, do you 

agree, if confirmed as chairperson and a member of the Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Board to appear before this Committee or designated members of this Committee and other appropriate committees, provide information subject to appropriate and necessary security protection with respect to your responsibilities as chair and 

a member of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board? 

Mr. BRESLAND. I do. 

Mr. SHEARER. I do. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even when those views differ from the Administration 

in office at the time? 

Mr. SHEARER. Yes. 

Mr. BRESLAND. Yes. 
76 

Senator BOXER. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, 

documents, electronic and other forms of communication or information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely fashion? 

Mr. BRESLAND. Yes. 

Mr. SHEARER. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Do you know of any matters which you may or 

may have not disclosed that might place you in any conflict of interest if you are confirmed as chair and a member of the Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Investigations Board? 

Mr. BRESLAND. No. 

Mr. SHEARER. No. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very, very much, all of you, for being 

here today. The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12 o’clock p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Thank you, Madame Chairman. We have a number of nominations before the 

Committee today. I would like to speak briefly about one of those—the nomination 

of Mr. Bresland as Chairman of the Chemical Safety Board. 

As you know the Chemical Safety Board is an independent Federal agency that 

is tasked with the important role of investigating industrial chemical accidents. 

Through their in-depth analysis they can locate deficiencies in the management system, engineering, equipment failure or human error that was the cause of an accident. These root cause investigations allow the Chemical Safety Board to make corrective recommendations to the plants involved in the accidents, to the industry atlarge, and to regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. 

The Chemical Safety Board’s staff is composed of specialists in chemical and mechanical engineering, as well as other industry specialists. Mr. Bresland’s extensive 

experience in the chemical industry, specifically with Honeywell International, 

makes him a highly qualified and appropriate selection for membership on the 

Chemical Safety Board. I have no doubt of his commitment or ability to fulfill the 

missions of the Chemical Safety Board, ultimately improving chemical plant process 

safety, and in turn saving lives and protecting the environment. 

Nonetheless I have some serious concerns about how well the Chemical Safety 

Board is working with state and local officials during its investigations. In a wellpublicized incident in Danvers, Massachusetts last year, the CSB wound up in a 

full-blown clash with state and local responders. If Mr. Bresland is confirmed as 

Chairman of the Board he will be establishing the tone of its interactions with other 

agencies and with state and local officials. I hope to hear from Mr. Bresland about 

how he intends to improve the cooperation and coordination of the Chemical Safety 

Board with the state and local officials and first responders. We all have an interest 

in seeing that investigations of incidents at chemical facilities are thorough and professional and that any findings made are complete and accurate to help us prevent 

similar incidents in the future. Regardless of the cause of a chemical incident— 

whether from terrorism, natural disaster, or accident—it is essential that all levels 

of government work hand in hand in the response and any investigation. 
77 

October 25, 2007 

Dear Senator Boxer, 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the questions you had following the hearing 

on October 2. The answers to your questions are attached. 

I very much appreciate your interest in energy efficiency, the reduction of carbon dioxide 

and alternative energy sources. I share your interest and can assure you that these issues 

are a priority for me and my colleagues on the TV A Board. 

In fact at our last Board meeting, TV A's CEO announced the appointment of a Vice 

President of Energy Efficiency and Demand Response. This person will be responsible 

for developing TVA's five to ten year energy efficiency and demand response plan. 

TVA's new strategic plan also recognizes that energy efficiency and renewable energy 

will play an increasingly important role in TV A's future generation. 

In my first year on the Board, I chaired the Community Relations Committee whose first 

priority was to tackle land conservation issues. After gathering a tremendous amount of 

public input, our Committee recommended and the Board adopted a policy to protect the 

land over which TV A has stewardship. It was a landmark decision and I am proud to 

have been a part of it. 

TV A is a complex and dynamic agency staffed by bright and hard-working people. I am 

proud to serve on the new Board and hope to be confirmed and continue my service. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to respond. I appreciate your consideration. 

Sincerely, 

Susan R. Williams 
78 

RESPONSES BY SUSAN RICHARDSON WILLIAMS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. TVA is one of our nation’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide, emitting 

over 100 million tons annually. As the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works 

Committee (EPW) looks at addressing global warming, please explain what strategies TVA is implementing to reduce carbon emissions and what additional policies 

you would support to reduce TVA’s greenhouse gas emissions. 

Response. As a long-time resident of Tennessee, a current TVA board member and 

a grandmother of two, I have a tremendous interest in seeing that the air is cleaner 

for the next generation of citizens in the Tennessee Valley. The new nine-member, 

part-time board of TVA serves to function as a high-level policy setting entity, and 

in that capacity the board strives to articulate strategies that guide TVA management and staff in their day to day business operations. I can assure you that the 

current board is committed to implementing strategies to reduce greenhouse gas 

emissions. 

In 1995, TVA was the first utility to partner with the Department of Energy to 

participate in its newly created program, Climate Challenge. As a result of this program, TVA has reduced, sequestered or avoided more than 305 million tons of CO2. 

TVA has also been a participant in the President’s Climate VISION program, 

which calls on the electric utility sector to help meet a national goal of reducing the 

greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18% from 2002–2012. 

Going forward, the TVA board has expressed interest in pursuing voluntary actions in two pivotal areas to reduce carbon emissions: notably expanding the diversity in our electric generation mix with safe, clean, zero-emission power; and reducing emissions through increased energy efficiency. 

In June, TVA restarted Unit 1 at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in northern Alabama, the first U.S. nuclear unit to be brought on-line in the 21st century. Browns 

Ferry Unit 1 is expected to initially provide additional generating capacity of approximately 1,150 megawatts and eventually will produce 1,280 megawatts. 

In addition, the board recently approved the completion of Unit 2 at the Watts 

Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee. The operation of Watts Bar Unit 2 

would add another 1,170 megawatts of non-CO2 emitting generation to the TVA system. 

As we increase capacity, the board is mindful of the need to increase energy efficiency and conservation. TVA has begun this effort at home, so to speak, in TVA 

buildings with the use of energy efficient lighting, temperature set-backs, high efficiency motors, occupancy sensors, heat pumps, passive solar heating and automatically turning off lights in office spaces. 

I assure you that I will remain a strong voice for these issues should I be confirmed. 

Question 2. Does TVA have any plans to retire any older inefficient coal units in 

the Agency’s current business plan? If so, what units and/or locations are being considered? 

Response. Existing coal assets play a large and important role in meeting the energy needs of the Tennessee Valley, and in supporting energy needs and energy 

independence for the entire United States. TVA’s long-term capacity plan includes 

a ‘‘placeholder’’ for retirement of one of the older, less efficient fossil plants in the 

post 2020 timeframe. 

The board has said before that it is committed to retiring higher emitting fossil 

plants if energy efficiency efforts result in lower demand than currently forecasted. 

If demand continues to grow, retirements of existing generating assets would have 

to be replaced by investments in new generating assets to meet the growing needs 

of the Valley. 

Next year, TVA will celebrate its 75th anniversary, a significant milestone. As a 

board member, I will continue to encourage adding clean energy sources to the generation portfolio and encourage energy efficiency, all the while preparing for the continued demands on our system with projected growth of two percent each year for 

the foreseeable future. 

Question 3. Has TVA looked at fossil fuel electricity with carbon sequestration 

technology for the TVA system? If so, what units and/or locations are being considered? 

Response. TVA is a member of the Southeast Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership, one of seven teams participating in this Department of Energy-sponsored 

program. TVA also supports the sequestering of greenhouse gases through the 

UtiliTree and PowerTree Carbon Companies, which are developing reforestation 

projects in the Lower Mississippi River Valley and elsewhere. 
79 

Additionally, TVA participates in the Coal Combustion Products Partnership program. This program is a cooperative effort that promotes the beneficial use of coal 

combustion products to reduce greenhouse gases and the amount of material sent 

to disposal. 

I will continue to encourage TVA management and staff to make decisions that 

give strong consideration to fuel mix and generation assets that are low or zero carbon emitting resources, continue to invest in research and development on low carbon generation options, carbon reduction, carbon capture and sequestration technologies. 

Question 4. Besides nuclear power what other technologies is TVA actively pursuing to control carbon emissions? 

Response. TVA is exploring the possibilities of reducing carbon intensity by increasing renewable generating capacity. Solar, wind, incremental hydro, biomass, 

and landfill gas are among the renewable sources that would be considered. Additionally, advanced clean and renewable technologies, such as low-head hydro, heat 

recovery systems, and end-user generation offsets will also be considered. TVA also 

continues to monitor the status of emerging technologies such as hydrogen, fuel 

cells, micro-turbines, and energy storage technologies. 

TVA participates in organizations such as the Coal Utilization Research Council 

(CURC), EPRI’s Coal Fleet for Tomorrow program, and the Gasification Technologies Council (GTC). These organizations promote the research and development 

of clean coal technology. 

Question 5. Does TVA support a renewable energy standard? If yes: Please explain 

how this fits into TVA’s plan to reduce carbon emissions. If no: Why not? 

Response. In the 2007 Strategic Plan, the TVA board recognizes that renewable 

energy will play an increasingly important role in TVA’s future generation. TVA 

staff is currently developing a long term strategy to reduce the carbon intensity of 

the TVA generation fleet. This includes evaluating potential Valley resources, technologies and opportunities that will help us and our power distributors meet potential RES requirements. 

Question 6. A recent TVA funded study by the University of Tennessee (‘‘Resources and Employment Impact of a Renewable Portfolio Standard in the Tennessee Valley Authority Region’’) indicated significant job creation in the TVA service area if a renewable energy standard was enacted. Specially, the study found that 

under a Federal RPS requiring 10% by 2020 would produce nearly 45,000 jobs in 

the TVA service area. The majority of the requirement could be met by co-firing biomass at existing TVA coal-fired power plants. Are the members of the TVA Board 

aware of this study? Does this study affect TVA’s view of a renewable energy standard? If so how? 

Response. I have not been briefed on the report. However, I look forward to hearing the results of the study and how it may impact TVA’s long term strategy addressing renewable assets in the Valley. 

Question 7. TVA has a strong history in doing research on bio-energy opportunities. What is the current state of your programs looking at using biomass for power 

generation, including co-firing at your existing facilities as the above study identified as an opportunity. 

Response. TVA is currently conducting commercial-scale, low-level biomass co-firing at Colbert Fossil Plant in North Alabama. Co-firing at Colbert has provided TVA 

with benefits in the area of fuel diversity and fuel cost management. We are evaluating the feasibility of expanding wood waste co-firing at other TVA fossil plants. 

In addition to the wood waste co-firing, TVA is co-firing biogas methane at the 

Allen Fossil Plant located in Memphis, Tennessee. The biogas is a product of wastewater treatment anaerobic digestion at the municipal treatment facility for the City 

of Memphis. The generation from this installation is part of TVA’s Green Power 

Switch generation mix. 

We are also involved in advanced bio-energy research including a joint biomass 

demonstration project with EPRI and Southern Company and an animal waste 

project where the resulting biogas will be utilized to fuel a Stirling engine for power 

generation. 

Question 8. TVA has a voluntary program for customers to support renewable energy called the Green Power Switch. What plans does TVA have to develop renewable energy other than the voluntary Green Power Switch program in the near future? Please explain any plans in detail. 

Response. The Green Power Switch program has helped us learn more about the 

potential for solar, wind and methane gas generation in the Valley. TVA’s ongoing 
80 

hydro modernization efforts and biomass co-firing projects have helped position TVA 

to optimize the use of the Valley’s available renewable sources. 

The TVA Strategic Plan promotes the increase in renewable generation beyond 

the Green Power Switch. TVA staff is currently developing a long term strategy to 

reduce the carbon intensity of the TVA generation fleet. 

Question 9. TVA announced a new commitment to energy efficiency in its most 

recent strategic plan. Will you share with us the details of the specific energy efficiency goals in this plan and how they will be met? 

Response. As part of the Strategic Plan which we developed over the last year, 

we stated that ‘‘TVA will strive to be a leader in energy efficiency improvements 

and peak demand reduction over the next five years.’’ We also stated in the Strategic Plan that becoming a leader in energy efficiency will require a cooperative effort between TVA, its distributors and end-use consumers, along with direct-serve 

customers. 

If I am re-appointed I will work with the TVA staff and our stakeholders in the 

Valley to develop a detailed five year plan that has a goal to reduce energy consumption by approximately 1,200 MW by the year 2013. This plan will also explore 

additional reductions in the years beyond 2013. In addition, we expect to reduce energy consumption by 64 MW in FY08 by enhancing existing energy efficiency programs and developing new pilot programs. 

Question 10. Many utilities are now viewing energy efficiency as an important recourse to meet new demand. What are your views on advancing energy efficiency 

investments at TVA? Do you view TVA as a leader in this effort? 

Response. TVA’s load is expected to grow approximately two percent each year 

over the next 10 years. That equates to about 750 MW per year. In order to meet 

that type of demand growth TVA will not only need to add additional generation 

but will have to aggressively develop, promote, and implement programs to slow 

that growth. Those programs will require a significant investment in resources to 

achieve. The plan that TVA is currently developing for energy efficiency and demand response will outline the resources required to meet our goals. 

Over the years TVA has had a number of programs designed to improve energy 

efficiency and reduce load growth. With energy demand in the Valley at an all-time 

high, the board has made a renewed commitment to position TVA as a leader in 

energy efficiency and demand reduction. Addressing energy efficiency is also a personal priority of mine. 

Question 11. A recent utility industry collaborative produced a National Action 

Plan on Energy Efficiency. It concludes that utilities with ‘‘best practices’’ spend 

about 1% of their annual revenues on energy efficiency investments. TVA recently 

announced a $20 million dollar annual investment toward energy efficiency, yet 

TVA’s annual revenues for 2008 are expected to be $9.7 billion dollars. One percent 

would exceed $97 million dollars annually. Can you explain this shortfall? What are 

your thoughts on increasing TVA’s investment? 

Response. The $22 million is not intended to reflect TVA’s long term commitment 

to reduce load growth. For FY2008 the energy efficiency budget has two objectives. 

The first is to work with our stakeholders to develop a 5-year plan with a reduction 

goal of about 1,200 MW over that time period. The second objective is to meet our 

current business plan goal of reducing demand by 64 MW through enhancement of 

TVA’s existing efficiency programs and developing new pilot programs. 

TVA is a member of the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency with the participation of our Vice President for Energy Efficiency and Demand Response on its 

Leadership Group. 
81 

October 25, 2007 

Dear Senator Boxer, 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your questions regarding my re-nomination 

to the TV A Board. I am pleased to address your inquiries and have attached my 

responses for your review. 

My background as a pastor and as Bishop of the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church 

gives me a profound appreciation for TVA's mission. That mission is based on 

improving the quality of life in the Tennessee Valley. 

It is a worthy mission indeed, and I will use all my faculties, my strength, and the power 

that is in me to consider the challenges facing TV A and make sound and careful 

decisions. 

Throughout my professional life, I have worked with people from all walks of life, As a 

Board Member of Memphis Light, Gas & Water, TVA's largest single customer, I 

learned much about the challenges facing TV A as a power provider keeping pace with 

the exuberant growth of our region's economy, 

I am personally invested in every decision we make as members of the Board, I would 

consider it a great honor and a humbling challenge to continue to serve the people of the 

Tennessee Valley. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to respond, I appreciate your consideration, 

Sincerely, 

Bishop William H, Graves 
82 

RESPONSES BY WILLIAM H. GRAVES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. TVA is one of our nation’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide, emitting 

over 100 million tons annually. As the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works 

Committee (EPW) looks at addressing global warming, please explain what strategies TVA is implementing to reduce carbon emissions and what additional policies 

you would support to reduce TVA’s greenhouse gas emissions. 

Response. As a resident of Memphis, Tennessee and a current TVA board member, I have a tremendous interest in seeing that the air is cleaner for the next generation of citizens in the Tennessee Valley. The new nine-member, part-time board 

of TVA serves to function as a high-level policy setting entity, and in that capacity 

the board strives to articulate strategies that guide TVA management and staff in 

their day to day business operations. I can assure you that the current board is committed to implementing strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

In 1995, TVA was the first utility to partner with the Department of Energy to 

participate in its newly created program, Climate Challenge. As a result of this program, TVA has reduced, sequestered or avoided more than 305 million tons of CO2. 

TVA has also been a participant in the President’s Climate VISION program, 

which calls on the electric utility sector to help meet a national goal of reducing the 

greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18% from 2002–2012. 

Going forward, the TVA board has expressed interest in pursuing voluntary actions in two pivotal areas to reduce carbon emissions: notably expanding the diversity in our electric generation mix with safe, clean, zero-emission power; and reducing emissions through increased energy efficiency. 

In June, TVA restarted Unit 1 at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in northern Alabama, the first U.S. nuclear unit to be brought on-line in the 21st century. Browns 

Ferry Unit 1 is expected to initially provide additional generating capacity of approximately 1,150 megawatts and eventually will produce 1,280 megawatts. 

In addition, the board recently approved the completion of Unit 2 at the Watts 

Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee. The operation of Watts Bar Unit 2 

would add another 1,170 megawatts of non-CO2 emitting generation to the TVA system. 

As we increase capacity, the board is mindful of the need to increase energy efficiency and conservation. TVA has begun this effort at home, so to speak, in TVA 

buildings with the use of energy efficient lighting, temperature set-backs, high efficiency motors, occupancy sensors, heat pumps, passive solar heating and automatically turning off lights in office spaces. 

I assure you that I will remain a strong voice for these issues should I be confirmed. 

Question 2. Does TVA have any plans to retire any older inefficient coal units in 

the Agency’s current business plan? If so, what units and/or locations are being considered? 

Response. Existing coal assets play a large and important role in meeting the energy needs of the Tennessee Valley, and in supporting energy needs and energy 

independence for the entire United States. TVA’s long-term capacity plan includes 

a ‘‘placeholder’’ for retirement of one of the older, less efficient fossil plants in the 

post 2020 timeframe. 

The board has said before that it is committed to retiring higher emitting fossil 

plants if energy efficiency efforts result in lower demand than currently forecasted. 

If demand continues to grow, retirements of existing generating assets would have 

to be replaced by investments in new generating assets to meet the growing needs 

of the Valley. 

Next year, TVA will celebrate its 75th anniversary, a significant milestone. As a 

board member, I will continue to encourage adding clean energy sources to the generation portfolio and encourage energy efficiency, all the while preparing for the continued demands on our system with projected growth of two percent each year for 

the foreseeable future. 

Question 3. Has TVA looked at fossil fuel electricity with carbon sequestration 

technology for the TVA system? If so, what units and/or locations are being considered? 

Response. TVA is a member of the Southeast Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership, one of seven teams participating in this Department of Energy-sponsored 

program. TVA also supports the sequestering of greenhouse gases through the 

UtiliTree and PowerTree Carbon Companies, which are developing reforestation 

projects in the Lower Mississippi River Valley and elsewhere. 
83 

Additionally, TVA participates in the Coal Combustion Products Partnership program. This program is a cooperative effort that promotes the beneficial use of coal 

combustion products to reduce greenhouse gases and the amount of material sent 

to disposal. 

I will continue to encourage TVA management and staff to make decisions that 

give strong consideration to fuel mix and generation assets that are low or zero carbon emitting resources, continue to invest in research and development on low carbon generation options, carbon reduction, carbon capture and sequestration technologies. 

Question 4. Besides nuclear power what other technologies is TVA actively pursuing to control carbon emissions? 

Response. TVA is exploring the possibilities of reducing carbon intensity by increasing renewable generating capacity. Solar, wind, incremental hydro, biomass, 

and landfill gas are among the renewable sources that would be considered. Additionally, advanced clean and renewable technologies, such as low-head hydro, heat 

recovery systems, and end-user generation offsets will also be considered. TVA also 

continues to monitor the status of emerging technologies such as hydrogen, fuel 

cells, micro-turbines, and energy storage technologies. 

TVA participates in organizations such as the Coal Utilization Research Council 

(CURC), EPRI’s Coal Fleet for Tomorrow program, and the Gasification Technologies Council (GTC). These organizations promote the research and development 

of clean coal technology. 

Question 5. Does TVA support a renewable energy standard? If yes: Please explain 

how this fits into TVA’s plan to reduce carbon emissions. If no: Why not? 

Response. In the 2007 Strategic Plan, the TVA board recognizes that renewable 

energy will play an increasingly important role in TVA’s future generation. TVA 

staff is currently developing a long term strategy to reduce the carbon intensity of 

the TVA generation fleet. This includes evaluating potential Valley resources, technologies and opportunities that will help us and our power distributors meet potential RES requirements. 

Question 6. A recent TVA funded study by the University of Tennessee (‘‘Resources and Employment Impact of a Renewable Portfolio Standard in the Tennessee Valley Authority Region’’) indicated significant job creation in the TVA service area if a renewable energy standard was enacted. Specially, the study found that 

under a Federal RPS requiring 10% by 2020 would produce nearly 45,000 jobs in 

the TVA service area. The majority of the requirement could be met by co-firing biomass at existing TVA coal-fired power plants. Are the members of the TVA Board 

aware of this study? Does this study affect TVA’s view of a renewable energy standard? If so how? 

Response. I have not been briefed on the report. However, I look forward to hearing the results of the study and how it may impact TVA’s long term strategy addressing renewable assets in the Valley. 

Question 7. TVA has a strong history in doing research on bio-energy opportunities. What is the current state of your programs looking at using biomass for power 

generation, including co-firing at your existing facilities as the above study identified as an opportunity. 

Response. TVA is currently conducting commercial-scale, low-level biomass co-firing at Colbert Fossil Plant in North Alabama. Co-firing at Colbert has provided TVA 

with benefits in the area of fuel diversity and fuel cost management. We are evaluating the feasibility of expanding wood waste co-firing at other TVA fossil plants. 

In addition to the wood waste co-firing, TVA is co-firing biogas methane at the 

Allen Fossil Plant located in Memphis, Tennessee. The biogas is a product of wastewater treatment anaerobic digestion at the municipal treatment facility for the City 

of Memphis. The generation from this installation is part of TVA’s Green Power 

Switch generation mix. 

We are also involved in advanced bio-energy research including a joint biomass 

demonstration project with EPRI and Southern Company and an animal waste 

project where the resulting biogas will be utilized to fuel a Stirling engine for power 

generation. 

Question 8. TVA has a voluntary program for customers to support renewable energy called the Green Power Switch. What plans does TVA have to develop renewable energy other than the voluntary Green Power Switch program in the near future? Please explain any plans in detail. 

Response. The Green Power Switch program has helped us learn more about the 

potential for solar, wind and methane gas generation in the Valley. TVA’s ongoing 
84 

hydro modernization efforts and biomass co-firing projects have helped position TVA 

to optimize the use of the Valley’s available renewable sources. The TVA Strategic 

Plan promotes the increase in renewable generation beyond the Green Power 

Switch. TVA staff is currently developing a long term strategy to reduce the carbon 

intensity of the TVA generation fleet. 

Question 9. TVA announced a new commitment to energy efficiency in its most 

recent strategic plan. Will you share with us the details of the specific energy efficiency goals in this plan and how they will be met? 

Response. As part of the Strategic Plan which we developed over the last year, 

we stated that ‘‘TVA will strive to be a leader in energy efficiency improvements 

and peak demand reduction over the next five years.’’ We also stated in the Strategic Plan that becoming a leader in energy efficiency will require a cooperative effort between TVA, its distributors and end-use consumers, along with direct-serve 

customers. 

If I am re-appointed I will work with the TVA staff and our stakeholders in the 

Valley to develop a detailed five year plan that has a goal to reduce energy consumption by approximately 1,200 MW by the year 2013. This plan will also explore 

additional reductions in the years beyond 2013. In addition, we expect to reduce energy consumption by 64 MW in FY08 by enhancing existing energy efficiency programs and developing new pilot programs. 

Question 10. Many utilities are now viewing energy efficiency as an important recourse to meet new demand. What are your views on advancing energy efficiency 

investments at TVA? Do you view TVA as a leader in this effort? 

Response. TVA’s load is expected to grow approximately two percent each year 

over the next 10 years. That equates to about 750 MW per year. In order to meet 

that type of demand growth TVA will not only need to add additional generation 

but will have to aggressively develop, promote, and implement programs to slow 

that growth. Those programs will require a significant investment in resources to 

achieve. The plan that TVA is currently developing for energy efficiency and demand response will outline the resources required to meet our goals. 

Over the years TVA has had a number of programs designed to improve energy 

efficiency and reduce load growth. With energy demand in the Valley at an all-time 

high, the board has made a renewed commitment to position TVA as a leader in 

energy efficiency and demand reduction. 

Question 11. A recent utility industry collaborative produced a National Action 

Plan on Energy Efficiency. It concludes that utilities with ‘‘best practices’’ spend 

about 1% of their annual revenues on energy efficiency investments. TVA recently 

announced a $20 million dollar annual investment toward energy efficiency, yet 

TVA’s annual revenues for 2008 are expected to be $9.7 billion dollars. One percent 

would exceed $97 million dollars annually. Can you explain this shortfall? What are 

your thoughts on increasing TVA’s investment? 

Response. The $22 million is not intended to reflect TVA’s long term commitment 

to reduce load growth. For FY2008 the energy efficiency budget has two objectives. 

The first is to work with our stakeholders to develop a 5-year plan with a reduction 

goal of about 1,200 MW over that time period. The second objective is to meet our 

current business plan goal of reducing demand by 64 MW through enhancement of 

TVA’s existing efficiency programs and developing new pilot programs. 

TVA is a member of the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency with the participation of our Vice President for Energy Efficiency and Demand Response on its 

Leadership Group. 
85 

U.S. Chemical Safety and 

Hazard Investigation Board 

Hon. William E. Wright 

Board Member 

Han, Gary L. Visscher 

RW'IIdMcmom 

Hon. William B. Wark 

Board Member 

Senator Barbara Boxer, Chairman 

Senator James M. Inhofe, Ranking Member 

2175 K Str •• t, NW • Suite 650 • Washington, DC 20037-1809 

Phon.: (202) 261-7600 • Fa., (202) 261-7650 

www.csb,gov 

September 27, 2007 

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 

410 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairman Boxer and Senator Inhofe: 

Yesterday an unsigned document, appearing on the letterhead of the International Association of 

Fire Chiefs (IAFC), was circulated to the staff of the Senate Environment and Public Works 

Committee. The document makes a variety of claims concerning the investigation by the U.S. 

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) of a major chemical accident that occurred 

last year in Danvers, Massachusetts. 

The CSB is an independent federal agency that investigates and determines the causes of chemical 

accidents. The agency is headed by five members appointed by the president and confirmed by the 

Senate and employs a professional staff of engineers, safety specialists, and other technical personnel 

who conduct the investigations. We issue public reports and safety recommendations designed to 

prevent future accidents. These reports are distributed throughout the U.S. and around the globe in 

an effort to prevent further loss of life and environmental damage from chemical disasters. 

I write to inform the Committee that the IAFC document that surfaced yesterday contains a number 

of significant errors of both fact and law. 

The chemical explosion that shook Danvers in the early morning hours of November 22, 2006, 

originated in a chemical factory that produced printing inks and paints. The explosion damaged or 

destroyed more than 100 homes and businesses off-site. It exposed a number of Danvers families 

to life-threatening dangers as their houses literally collapsed around them while they slept. 

As authorized and required under 42 U.S.c. § 7412(r)(6), the federal Clean Air Act, the CSB began a 

federal investigation to independendy determine and make public the causes of the accident.' The 

, The LiFC document states with evident disapproval that "the CSB attempted to initiate an investigation 

independent of the ongoing federal, state, and local investigation." In fact, the Clean, \ir Act provisions 

establishing the Board and the accompanying legislative history make absolutely dear the requirement for CSB 

investigations to be separate and independent of other investigations. The CSB authorization was patterned on the 

National Transportation Safety Board; see 42 U.S.c. § 7412(r)(6) and Senate Report 101-228, stating that "the 

Page 1 of9 
86 

Clean Air Act clearly states, "In no event shall the Board forego an investigation where an accidental 

release causes a fatality or serious injury among the general public, or had the potential to cause 

substantial property damage or a number of deaths or injuries among the general public." 

The IAFC document states that "Unfortunately, there were a number of problems with [the CSB's] 

arrival on scene, including the fact that the incident commander and state fIre marshal were not 

informed of their arrival ... " This statement is simply false. 

On November 22, 2006, a few hours after the explosion, then-CSB Chairman Carolyn Merritt made 

the decision to deploy CSB investigators to the site in Danvers. Consistent with the CSB's standing 

protocols and with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the CSB General Counsel 

prepared letters of authority and introductions for specifIc CSB personnel stating the applicable U.S. 

statutes, for presentation at the accident site. The CSB investigator-on-duty that day, Mr. James Lay, 

P.E., promptly contacted the executive assistant to the Massachusetts State Fire Marshal and 

requested that she notify the marshal of the planned deployment on November 24. He further 

requested that the state fIre marshal relay back the name and contact information of the incident 

commander to the CSB lead investigator, Mr. John Vorderbrueggen, P.E.2 

The CSB incident screener on duty on November 22, Ms. Katherine Leskin, further notifIed the 

Danvers Fire Department, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard of 

the planned deployment two days later on November 24. A CSB public affairs offIcer, Ms. Jennifer 

Jones, contacted the state offices of Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator John Kerry, and U.S. 

Representative John Tierney to inform them of the pending deployment of CSB investigators and to 

schedule briefIngs for November 24 at the various members' local offices. She further contacted the 

Danvers Town Manager's office to inform authorities of the deployment and was subsequently 

referred to the town's director of public health, with whom she scheduled a briefing for November 

24. 

Finally, in the late afternoon of November 22, the CSB issued a news release stating our plan to 

begin an investigation. The CSB news release was widely reported by statewide news media 

including the Boston Globe, the Boston Herald, the Associated Press, and others on November 22-23. 

The CSB investigative team arrived at the site at approximately noon on November 24, and I was 

the board member accompanying the team. Consistent with both the CSB's standing protocols and 

with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), my fIrst action on arriving in Danvers was 

to formally log in at the command center established by the state and local fIre services and the state 

police, in an effort to further introduce the Board and team. 

A short time later, my assistant and I were told that a coordination meeting was about to begin and 

it was made clear to us by an official in the command center that we were not welcome to attend. 

We left the command center to meet the town manager. In the meantime, the CSB lead investigator 

duly arrived at the command center and was instructed to talk to Detective Lieutenant Martin Foley, 

the state police arson investigation team operations commander, who reported directly to the state 

independence of the Board in its official duties (finding the cause or probable cause of chemical accidents and 

recommending requirements or orders which will prevent accidents in the future) is essential for several reasons" 

and noting that "the independence of the Board was strengthened by amendments adopted during Committee 

markup," 

2 So far as is known, the state ftre marshal never responded to this request. 

Page 2 of9 
87 

fire marshal. Mr. Foley acknowledged that the arrival of the CSB team was expected and assembled 

the incident command team for a short presentation by Mr. Vorderbrueggen. 

Mr. Vorderbrueggen gave a brief introduction of the CSB and our mission to the incident command 

team, which included the state fire marshal, arson team operations commander, the Danvers fire 

chief, the deputy fire chief. Mr. Vorderbrueggen further reiterated that the CSB team would closely 

coordinate their activities with the ongoing state activities. However, the arson team commander 

immediately disputed the Board's authority to conduct an investigation and then dismissed both Mr. 

Vorderbrueggen and CSB investigator Johnnie Banks from the command center. 

From that point forward, the arson team operations commander repeatedly denied the CSB team 

access to both the destroyed chemical facility and the surrounding damaged neighborhood over the 

next five days, until Wednesday, November 29, when the site was turned over to the EPA. 

On Saturday, November 25, the Danvers Fire Chief conducted a news conference where he stated 

that rhe Board was "uninvited," "unwelcome," "not a piece of the pie," and "a distraction that has 

taken time away from the real investigators." He further stated: "We have a team that knows how to 

work together, they've been working together for years, and they're not part of our team.'" At the 

same time, the CSB made restrained public statements, characterizing the situation as a 

"misunderstanding" which we were hopeful of quickly resolving. 

Over the next several days, the CSB's lead investigator, Mr. John Vorderbrueggen - a highly 

experienced mechanical engineer who has led many CSB investigations - made several further 

personal attempts to approach Mr. Foley and constructively discuss the situation. Mr. 

Vorderbrueggen was unsuccessful in establishing any dialogue and was told he was interfering with 

and disrupting the investigation and was summarily and repeatedly dismissed from the site. + Mr. 

Vorderbrueggen was also threatened with removal from the police-controlled area if he continued 

"to interfere.') 

The September 25 IAFC document states that local fire and law enforcement officials were engaged 

for some period of time in determining if the explosion was caused by a criminal act. However, at 

no time since November 22, 2006, did local or state officials offer any evidence, either in private or 

in public, that the explosion in Danvers was anything other than a process-related chemical accident, 

clearly subject to the CSB's investigative jurisdiction. Further, CSB investigators have worked on 

numerous incidents in which concurrent civil and criminal investigations were conducted in the 

initial days following the incident, and CSB investigators are trained and acknowledged as experts in 

evidence preservation at chemical accident sites. 

, See j\P Domestic News, November 26, 2006, "Probers Look for Clues in Mass. Blast;" Boslon Glob" November 

26,2006, "Dispute besets blast probe US inyestigators barred from site by Danvers chief;" Salem News, November 

27,2006. "Investigators probe blast cause, feds fight to get access." 

4 The IAFC document is accurate in stating that the CSB sent a video crew to Danvers prior even to the arrival of 

investigators, The purpose of the video crew was to document the extensive damage to the community before 

structures collapsed or were either razed or repaired. The crew carned appropriate contractor credentials issued by 

the CSB. Although the CSB regrets that the crew arrived before CSB investigators, there is no indication 

whatsoever that this smail, professional crew was in any way disruptive Or discourteous to state or local officials. 

The crew remained outside a police checkpoint and eventually left the area after it proved impossible to arrange 

access. The CSB never sought to have the crew enter the destroyed facility or its immediate vicinity. The sole 

purpose of the video crew was to attempt to document the blast damage to the community which extended up to a 

mile away from the destroyed C\J/"\rnel facility. 

Page 3 of 9 
88 

As already indicated, eSB recognizes and follows the NIMS system. The NIMS system was 

established in February 2003 by Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 with the purpose to 

"prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies." In the case of Danvers, the fires had extinguished, the community had been searched 

and evacuated, and the emergency had ceased on November 22, two days prior to the arrival of eSB 

investigators. 

NIMS is designed to promote the fast integration of federal, state, and local efforts to respond to 

major disasters - a goal which the eSB clearly supports. NIMS is a system for emergency response 

and recovery and is not a system for investigating the causes of disasters. Where emergency 

response and investigations may overlap, emergency response must come first. But HSPD-5 and 

NIMS are not intended to, and do not, interfere with the eSB's aurhority to carry out its 

investigative mission. Additionally, we do not view these as mutually exclusive functions. Paragraph 

5 of HSPD-5 states unambiguously that "nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to 

carry out, the authorities of Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under 

law." In fact under NIMS, the responsibility of the local incident commander in Danvers was to 

rapidly integrate the eSB into the existing command structure so that the Board's lawful functions 

could proceed. Had they done so all parties could have more effectively coordinated their respective 

responsibilities, but regrettably this did not happen. 

Between November 25 and 27, while the eSB continued to be blocked, it became clear from media 

reports that the Danvers accident site was being irrevocably damaged by the state-led investigation. 

State and local authorities brought heavy equipment, such as front-end loaders, into the site to 

rapidly clear the debris field, without apparent regard to the possible evidentiary value the debris and 

damaged equipment might have in establishing the causes of the accident. The modification and 

destruction of the accident site by state and local fire services is clearly documented in the 

accompanying photographs (see attachment). 

Facing an intractable and rapidly changing situation on the ground, the eSB chairman personally 

authorized the eSB general counsel to seek the intercession of the U.s. attorney for the District of 

Massachusetts to protect the Board's interest in the accident site. The eSB further sent a letter on 

the morning of November 27 to the state fire marshal, citing the eSB's authority under the Clean 

Air Act to "enter the accident site and 'do all things therein necessary for a proper investigation' 

including inspecting 'records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities' and taking relevant 

samples."; The letter stated that the eSB was not seeking to preempt the Massachusetts 

investigation and, despite all that had occurred, asked state authorities to "work cooperatively with 

the eSB to ensure that relevant evidence is preserved from alteration of destruction." The eSB 

received no response to the letter. 

The eSB chairman further authorized the eSB director of congressional, public, and board affairs to 

contact state and federal elected officials and other stakeholders - including Governor Romney, 

Senator Kennedy, Senator Kerry, and Representative Tierney - to describe the current situation in 

Danvers and the ongoing destruction of the physical evidence. The eSB chairman authorized the 

director to speak to the news media, including the Boston Globe and others, concerning the serious 

situation in Danvers and the need to provide the Board's experts with immediate access to the site 

and the physical evidence before it was lost. 

5 Letter dated November 27, 2006, from CSB Lead Investigator John Vorderbrueggen to Massachusetts State Fire 

Marshal Stephen Coan (see attachment). 

Page 40f9 
89 

Following extensive editorial criticism of the position taken by Massachusetts fire authorities, chiefly 

by the Boston Globe," those authorities backed down on November 28 and allowed the CSB to enter 

the accident site the follov.-ing day, However, it is misleading to suggest, as the IAFC document 

does, that "the U,S, District Attorney [sic] finally worked out an arrangement to bring peace to the 

situation" as though the U,S, attorney had valiandy inserted himself into a lawless conflict. In fact, 

the CSB had contacted the U.S, attorney's office the previous day in an effort to protect the Board's 

interest in the accident site under federal law, 

Unfortunately, the accident site had been extensively disturbed during the preceding several days by 

the state-led investigation. Key pieces of physical evidence could never be found, including the 

steam valves on a large solvent tank that was later believed to have overheated on the night of the 

accident and released the flammable vapor that exploded. Despite the loss of evidence, CSB 

investigators and blast experts worked for weeks at the accident site and for months afterward to 

conduct the most thorough investigation possible under the circumstances, 

On May 9, 2007, the Board held a large community meeting in Danvers, which was attended by 

approximately 200 residents, government officials, safety experts, and journalists, where the CSB 

investigative team presented its preliminary findings, Among other conclusions, CSB investigators 

detertnined that the CAl! Arnel facility had not complied \vith existing Massachusetts state fire codes 

for the use of flammable liquids, that the facility had not been thoroughly inspected in several years, 

and that the facility had not sought or received state-required permits for handling flammable 

substances. 

At the public meeting, the CSB received overwhelmingly positive comments from the residents and 

officials about the quality and thoroughness of our investigation in Danvers.' Massachusetts has 

since established a program to improve its inspection of chemical plants for code compliance and is 

considering additional state legislation. 

The Board remains fully committed to effective coordination with federal, state, and local officials 

during all stages of its investigations - as it always has been. The CSB has a notable record of 

successful, concurrent civil/criminal investigations at incident sites throughout the country, We 

have conducted such concurrent investigations at many major accident sites, including the massive, 

fatal explosions at the BP Texas City refinery; the West Pharmaceutical facility in Kinston, NC; and 

the CTA Acoustics facility in Corbin, KY, to cite just a few examples, 

Finally, I note that U.S. firefighters benefit greatly from accurate, thorough, independent 

investigations of chemical accidents. A number of fire chiefs have complimented the CSB's 

investigative work, as noted in an article puhlished by the Salem News during the unfortunate 

situation in Danvers,8 Firefighters' lives are ultimately on the line when chemical disasters occur, 

and the Board has made a number of safety recommendations aimed at improving emergency 

preparedness, equipment, and training around the country. Additionally, the CSB has received 

numerous requests from fire departments, officers, and trainers around the country seeking the use 

of CSB investigative products in educational efforts for firefighters, and we always assist in any way 

possible, 

" See Boslon Glob, column, November 27, 2006, "No time for turf war," by Adrian Walker; Boslon Glob, editorial, 

November 28, 2006, "Another Danvers Blowup" (see attachment). 

7 A transcript of the public meeting is available at CSB.gov. 

8 See Sa/,m News, November 29, 2006, "Others Welcomed Chemical Safety Board," by Paul Leighton (see 

attachment), 

Page 5 of9 
90 

If you have any questions or require further clarification on any point raised in this letter, please 

contact the CSB's Director of Congressional, Public, and Board Affairs, Dr. Daniel Horowitz, at 

(202) 261-7613. Thank you for your ongoing support of the Board and its mission. 

William E. Wright 

Board Member and Interim Executive Authority 

Attachments: 

Photographs of Danvers accident site documenting evidence disturbance 

Editorial articles from the Boston Globe 

Salem News, November 29, 2006, "Others Welcomed Chemical Safety Board" 

CSB letter to the Massachusetts state fire marshal, November 27, 2006 

Cc: Senator Frank R. Lautenberg 

Senator David Vitter 

Senator Edward M. Kennedy 

Senator John F. Kerry 

Representative John F. Tierney 

The Honorable Deval L. Patrick, Governor of Massachusetts 

Kevin Burke, Massachusetts Secretary of Public Safety 

Stephen Coan, Massachusetts State Fire Marshal 

Wayne Marquis, Danvers Town Manager 

James Tutko, Danvers Fire Chief 

Jim Harmes, IAFC President 

Mark W. Light, IAFC Executive Director 

The Honorable Gary L. Visscher, CSB Board Member 

The Honorable William B. Wark, CSB Board Member 

The Honorable Carolyn W. Merritt, CSB Chairman (2002-2007) 

Page 6 of9 
91 

Figure la. Aerial photograph of Danvers, Massachusetts, explosion site taken on Friday, 

November 24, 2006, two days after the explosion. The photograph was taken after the emergency 

had ceased but before the removal of debris/evidence by state and local fire services. Yellowenclosed area includes key evidence zones that were disturbed over the next several days before the 

CSB was given access to the site on November 29. 

Page7of9 
92 

Figure lb. Aerial photograph of Danvers, Massachusetts, explosion site taken on December 6, 

2006, showing the area (outlined in yellow) that was disturbed and cleared of debris/ evidence by 

Massachusetts fire services between November 24 and November 29,2006. 

Page 8 of9 
93 

Figure le. Close-in photograph taken from a manlift basket on December 15,2006, showing the 

extent of the evidence disturbance that occurred between November 24 and 29 (area that was 

cleared of debris/ evidence using heavy equipment is outlined in yellow). 

Page 9 of9 
94 

Wile 1805iolt ~lob£ Burrellesluce 

November 27, 2006 

No time for 

turfwar . IfJJ~~l~e Danvers fire chief, reallywants to do something to aid the invest!-

gationinto the 

stunning explosion last 

.we,eK;tiJ.ereis one step h~ C()W\'l'el\silytake: Get 

. out oftbeway. 

It is absi1i-d-1:hat the 

,safety BolU'd can't get 

l;>nto the 81 . '.. . ~e of th.~ blaZe,becausetheiire officllll has. - !lec!ded~ aren'tneedi;d.'· . 

.' 'lUtkO said Saturday thatbe already has a team inveStigatingtheblaze..:..· 

made up of State Police and loCal and 

state fire officials - and the federal investigators are not part of it-.He described the teds as a "distraction.D Speculation that good sense Wouldqulcldy 

bring the dispute to bay JiUllcl!lllorne 

out. '.~'" 

Daniel Hofuwitz. aspokeslllanfortbe 

safety bolU'd, said yesterdity,"'VIfe!fema. 

}l!!!.~~tnowi!!li~n;~~~. ing cooperatiori rronistate and li.ltalari~ . ,., thorities so ollr work can go fOl:wa.rd," His 

frustration was palpable. 

The nationli.l board is a fire equivlllent 

of the Nationlll Traffic Safety Board. Its 

role is 1:9 go into scenes sucJi as this and assess the cause of the fire and, just as importsnt, what steps might be taken to 

prevent such disasters . . "Jtisthesecondofthosedutiesthat 

sometimes causes friction·withlOcal· 

ofticials;tne:reilS'maY find, for example 

that inhaequate JOcaI fire COdes contrlmn. 

~ tiJa.ftrE!. 'rieynmyfind that inSpections were not up to par in some regard. 

They l11cay also produce.t)ndingStba:i 

aiffer froin tboseoflOcal offlci,als, who are accuStomed to investigating fires 

together -:- and, in some cases, covering . each other's backs... . 

"Our ro1e is to determine the'root 

causes and make those public, so other 

communities in Massachusetts and elseWhere are protected from this kind of 

aevastating accidem;" Horowitz said. 

While conflict5srimetimes occur, they 

seldom deVelop into the type of standoff 

that is going on in Danvers, Horowitz 

said. This kind of stubbornness is unusu- al, as well as counterproductive. 

He insisted that under federal law the 

safety bolU'd does not need local pennissiontodoI1;lljob~ '. . . ._. .. .!!We.bl!#~he fu!l'authinitYto gRtMr'[~" 

evidence, subpoena whatever witnesses 

we need to, and convene public hearings, 

and we will use whatever legal authority we need to carry this investigation fOrward:' 

While that may be true, it matters that 

the safety boIU'd is, at this point, locked 

out. Its investigators need to see evidence 

before it has been picked oVer by several 

other investigators. Otherwise, the safetY 

board investigators' ability to reconstruct 

the fire could be severely compromised. 

One of thelast things anyone needs at 

this point is a turfbattle. A fire has displaced hundreds and wrecked the peace 

of a city. When a plane crashes, local investigators do their work, and federal 

investigators do theirs. That is the way to serve the public interest, and frankly 

there's no good reason any of this should 

be up to the Danvers fire chief. 

The collapse of the Big Dig ceiling 

)hade one fact clear: There can never be 

enough Competent review of a tragic 

a.ccident. The loc:aJs should investigate 

the fire, the state should investigate the 

loc:aJ officials, and the federal govern· 

ment should keep an eye on everyone, 

Instead of that, we have a bureaucrat 

jealously guarding his turf, his little piece 

ofpower. 

One would think the absurdity of that ~ould be obvious. tn1\rtko, whose town is 

living everydayWith the wreckage 

wrought on Wednesday morning. 

Other than assisting the residents who 

bore the brunt of the damage, nothing 

should be a higher priority than learning 

what happened. 

But Tutko takes a different view. He 

has his team, and, according to him, they 

have it covered. That someone eise would 

have something to contribute seeIns barely to bave crossed his mind. 

: That's why the federal investigators 

needto be allowed.in - and why he 

shouldn't be making\:llese deciSions, 

Adrian Walkeris a Glebe columnist. He can be reaehed atwallcer@globe.com. 
95 

Burrellesluce 

Another Danvers Blowup 

November 28, 2006 

Whether the danger is a chemical 

explosion on the North Shore or an 

eruption of gang violence in Boston, the 

public is never well-served by turf 

battles among federal, state, and local 

officials. Efforts by the Danvers Fire 

Department to keep federal investigators 

away from the site of Wednesday's blast 

at a paint and ink manufacturing site is 

an egregious case in point. 

The cause of the early-morning blast, 

which damaged about 70 homes and 

businesses, is unknown. Answers may 

be harder to come by because Danvers 

officials closed the site to investigators 

from the federal Chemical Safety Board. 

Since 1998, teams of experts from the 

board have conducted independent 

investigations into the causes of 

hazardous spills, fires, and other 

chemical accidents. While confusion at 

accident scenes results in occasional 

delays, the blockade by Danvers Fire 

Chief James Tutko is "unprecedented," 

according to safety board spokesman 

Daniel Horowitz. 

It's understandable that local 

firefighters who risk their lives 

responding to chemical explosions might 

take a proprietary approach to such sites. 

But cooler heads, such as those from the 

State Fire Marshal's office, are supposed 

to recognize the immediate value of a 

federal team that includes chemical and 

mechanical engineers with decades of 

investigative experience, blast modelers, 

and combustible dust experts. And 

unlike local officials, federal 

investigators not only examine the 

factors contributing to the blast but also 

analyze and publicize their findings to 

prevent similar explosions across the 

country. Stiff-necked local fire officials 

have no cause to interfere with such 

work. 

Limited access to the site may be 

provided this morning. But local 

officials maintain they don't want federal 

investigators tramping through a 

potential crime scene. That doesn't make 

sense. The Chemical Safety Board has 

conducted 40 investigations concurrently 

with local officials nationwide. People in 

this line of work respect the need to give 

wide berth to criminal investigators. 

They aren't likely to pollute a crime 

scene. 

Those who lost their homes and 

narrowly escaped death or serious injury 

deserve an independent federal probe 

that examines whether state and local 

failures might have contributed to the 

blast. Despite the presence of hazardous 

materials, it appears the plant wasn't 

inspected by state authorities for several 

years. Federal authorities also will need 

to look closely at enforcement of local 

fire codes. 

Federal investigators have served 

notice to the governor's office that they 

intend to access the entire site this 

morning. Anyone who interferes with 

that effort is harming, not protecting, 

public safety 
96 

wlp~ 1Bnstnn ~lnh.e Date 

location 

ClrclJlatlon(OMA} 

Type (Frequency): 

Page 

Keyword' 

Monday. May 14, 2007 

BOSTON, MA 

434,330(7) 

Newspaper (0) 

AS 

CSB 

Burrellesluce 

Aftershocks in Danvers 

THE POWERFUL explosion last year at an ink manufactnringplant in 

Danvers exposed massive defects in 

the inspection afloeal businesses 

that use and store dangerous chemicals. The blast that damaged or destroyed 

270 homes and businesses yielded many lessons on how to avoid such accidents, but it is 

unclear who, if anyone, has the authority and 

qualifications to apply such lessons in the 

future. 

Last week, a team from the federall:ll&mical Safety Board determined that the likely 

cause of the blast at CAl Inc. was the ignition 

of flammable solvent vapor that accumulated 

after workers turned off the building's ventilation system at the end of the day. The federal investigators also charged that the com- panyfailed to follow standards for the safe 

storage, handling, and use offlammable sol- vents. Failure to detect those problems, ac- cording to the agency, falls On the Danvers 

Fire Department, the state fire marshal's 

office, and the federal Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration. 

The company flatly disputes the Chemical 

Safety Board's findings. That question should 

be resolved as the investigation deepens. But 

the most worrisome aspect of this case is that 

both the state fire marshal's office, which 

provides technical assistance to fire depart~ 

ments, and the Danvers Fire Department 

deny responsibility for inspection of such 

hazardous workplaces. Westwood Fire Chief 

C C<ljIy'lght ~on nosTON GlOOt: 

All Rogh .. flc.OlWd 

William ScobIe, president of the Fire Chiefs' 

Association of Massachusetts, adds that it is 

the rarest firefighter who is competent to assess chemical processes. The result, says 

Scoble, is a "black hole of authority:' 

State fire prevention regnlations state clearly that it is the "duty and responsibility of the 

marshal or the head of the fire department" to enforce the fire code. But it is not so clear 

about who is responsible for finding the violations in the first place. A lack of specific 

permitting instructions for workplace chemicals clouds matters even more. The fire regulations, in fact, offer better gnidance on permits needed to refinish bowling alleys or 

burn Christmas trees. The fire chiefS make a pOint. But it shouldn't require a doctorate in chemistry to notice 

the absence offlaor-Ievel ventilation or auto- matic shutoffvalves, and other dangers in 

Danvers cited by the federal officials. People 

living near hazardous workplaces want to 

know that their chiefs are taking all reason- able steps to protect them. And there is no ground for such confidence nOw. 

The National Fire Protection Association in 

Quincy boasts chemical experts capable of 

training local fire officials how to spot workplace dangers. The group trained fire officials to recognize pyrotechnic dangers after the 

2003 Rhode Island nightclub fire that killed 

100 people. Similar exercises in chemical 

safety might help to quiet the effects of the 

Danvers blast. 

Account: 11923A (298) 

Page 1 of 1 
97 

Salem News 

Published: 11/29/2006 

Chemical Safety Board welcomed by other towns 

Ona mom some garbage at 12 Riverside St. yesterday as 

homeowners worked to repair their damaged homes. Photo by Paul Bilodeau/Salem News. 

By Paul Leighton 

Staff writer 

Public safety officials from other communities affected by chemical explosions say the federal 

agency that was barred from the Danvers site for almost a week was a big help with their 

investigations. 

Officials from North Carolina, Texas and Mississippi said they had no problems with the U.S. 

Chemical and Safety Hazard Investigation Board, a federal agency authorized by Congress to 

look into major chemical accidents around the country. 

"Not a bit. They were very helpful, actuallY," said Mark Haraway, fire chief of Apex, N.C., 

where an explosion at a hazardous waste company forced the evacuation of 16,000 residents 

Oct. 5. "They kept us apprised of everything. They didn't do anything we didn't want them to." 

Until yesterday, Danvers fire Chief James Tutko and state Fire Marshal Stephen Coan 

prohibited investigators with the Chemical Safety Board from entering the site of last week's 

chemical plant explosion on Water Street. 

Coan said the five members of the federal agency were kept off the site because they are not 

trained to carry out criminal investigations, which the Danvers case is considered until foul 

play has been ruled out. A spokesman for the Chemical Safety Board said this was the first 

time in the agency's eight-year existence that its investigators had been barred from a site in 

the first few days after an explosion when access to evidence is critical. 

Other public safety offiCials around the country said the Chemical Safety Board has provided 

valuable expertise in the aftermath of devastating explosions in their communities. 
98 

Fire Chief Gerald Grimm of Texas City, Texas, praised the board's investigators for their work 

after a series of explosions at an oil refinery in his city killed 15 workers and injured about 170 

on March 23, 2005. It was the biggest industrial accident in the United States in 15 years, 

according to the Chemical Safety Board. 

"We found them not to be an impediment but of great aSSistance to the city," Grimm said. 

"Their report was very conclusive, very comprehensive. They held a number of forums that 

were well-attended by the public. Of all the things that happened here, theirs was most often 

in the light of day and therefore the most credible to the public." 

Grimm said the Chemical Safety Board investigators had the kind of expertise in industrial 

aCCidents that local officials lacked. 

"They bring with them a wealth of talent in that area," he said. "That is their niche in life. They 

came in unvarnished and unbiased, and they left with that image." 

Mark Tolbert, the public safety chief in Morgantown, N.C., said he can understand how local 

authorities would be wary of a little-known federal agency. Like many state and local officials 

here, Tolbert said he had never heard of the Chemical Safety Board until it showed up in his 

town of 17,300 people on the day of the blast. 

But he said authorities worked out jurisdictional issues among the 53 agencies that descended 

on Morgantown after a chemical plant explosion Jan. 31 killed a worker and injured a dozen. 

"Let's just say we had some issues (with the Chemical Safety Board) early on, and they were 

resolved," Tolbert said. "They got what they needed and we cooperated. We entered into a 

gentlemen's agreement. We sat down and opened up the lines of communication a little bit 

and did a better job of trying to pull from the agencies as to what they needed and the 

timetable." 

Kevin Butler, the emergency management director for Smith County in Mississippi, said local 

authorities had no problems with the Chemical Safety Board investigating an explosion June 5 

at an oil field in the small town of Raleigh, Miss., that killed three people. 

"They wanted to interview all the people involved, and we set up the interviews for them," 

Butler said. "They were very accommodating. They didn't just come in and exert authority and 

push people around. They came in and did their job." 
99 

U.S. Chemical Safety and 

Hazard Investigation Board 

Office of Investigations 

November 27, 2006 

Stephen D. Coan 

Massachusetts State Fire Marshal 

Massachusetts Department of Fire Services 

P.O. Box 1025 State Road 

Stow, Massachusetts 01775 

By Facsimile and First Class Mail 

Dear Fire Marshal Coan: 

2175 K Street. tNI/. Suite 400' Washington, DC 20037·1809 

Phone: (202) 261-7600 • Fax: (202l 261-7650 

www,csb,gov 

As you know, the U,S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Boar1l (CSB) is conducting an 

investigation, pursuant to the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(C)(i), of the incident that 

occurred at the CAl, Inc. and Arnel Company, Inc. facilities in Danvers, Massachusetts, and the 

surrounding community that was damaged in the incident (collectively the "accident site"), on 

November 22, 2006. This letter serves as formal Written notice to the Massachusetts State Fire 

Marshal and Department of Fire Services, the Danvers Fire Chief, and their agents (collectively 

"Massachusetts authorities"), that physical evidence at the accident site is relevant to the CSB 

investigation and will be inspected andlor tested by the CSB, under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 

7412(r)(6)(L)(ii). This letter also serves to outline CSB expectations with respect to the site and 

relevant evidence related to this incident. 

Federal law authorizes the CSB to enter the accident site and "do all things therein necessary for 

a proper investigation," including inspecting "records, files, papers, processes, controls, and 

facilities" and taking relevant samples. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(L)(ii). The law of the 

Commonwealth in no manner precludes the CSB from exercising this authority. Moreover, the 

CSB is not seeking custody of any physical evidence at this time or to otherwise preempt the 

Commonwealth's investigation. 

Up to this point, however, Massachusetts authorities have denied CSB investigators unrestricted 

access (including photographic documentation of blast damage) to the site areas determined by 

the EPA to be clear of chemical hazards and have publicly challenged the CSB authority to 

conduct an investigation as provided in the CSB statute. Therefore, it is important that 

Massachusetts authorities immediately acknowledge federal jurisdiction at the accident site and 

work cooperatively with the CSB to ensure that relevant evidence is preserved from alteration or 

destruction. Federal authorities, Massachusetts authorities, and the victims of this incident share 

a common objective that phYSical evidence is handled in a manner that respects the concerns of 

all interested parties. 

CSB investigators will be present at the accident site to continue their investigation according to 

CSB statutory authority on Tuesday, November 28, 2006, at 9:00 a.m, Specifically, CSB 
100 

- 2-

investigators intend to take photographs to document the scene, collect relevant samples, map 

debris, and to outline CSB concerns to Massachusetts authorities regarding possible alteration of 

the CAl and Arnel companies' property during the origin and cause investigation by the 

Massachusetts authorities. The CSB intends to continue to work to the best of its ability to 

conduct its investigation in a manner that respects the important role of the Massachusetts 

authorities in determining the cause of the incident. Likewise, the CSB anticipates that 

Massachusetts authorities will respect the role of the CSB. Our primary purpose in this 

investigation is to expand beyond the cause and origin elements of the incident to report fully on 

what operational, maintenance, training, or other company activities may have led to this 

incident. The CSB intends to make appropriate recommendations to involved parties and similar 

industries in order to help prevent a similar tragedy from happening again, either in the 

Commonwealth or elsewhere in the U.S. In order to achieve this important mission, we ask for 

your fullest cooperation from this point forward. 

Accordingly, the CSB requests that Massachusetts authorities take no further action to alter the 

CAl and Arnel companies' property from its as-found state until CSB investigators are afforded 

full access to the accident site and the full cooperation of Massachusetts authorities, including 

direct involvement in the remaining evidence collection and site cleanup decision process. / 

The CSB investigation team is immediately available to work with the site response team. If an 

emergency necessitates the further alteration of the CAl and Arne! companies' property before 

our arrival on Tuesday, as noted above, please notify the CSB contact designated in this letter. 

Such notice should be provided before the alteration occurs so that the CSB may document the 

pre-alteration condition of the companies' property. 

The designated CSB contacts for all notifications described in this letter are as follows: 

Primary Contact: John Vorderbrueggen, P.E. Alternate Contact: Stephen J. Selk, P.E. 

Investigator-in-Charge Investigation Manager 

(202) 261-7618 (office) (202) 261-7623 (office) 

(202) 378-3518 (ceU) (202) 378-3515 (cell) 

john. vorde.rbrueggen@csb.gov steve.selk@csb.gov 

If yon have any questions concerning the jurisdiction of the eSB, please contact our General 

Counsel, Christopher Warner, at 202-261-7624. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation 

with the CSB's investigation. We look forward to working with you in a professional and 

respectful manner. 

Sincerely, 

lsI 

John Vorderbrueggen 

Investigator-in-Charge 

Cc: Steven Rourke, General Counsel, Department of Fire Services 

Wayne P. Marquis, Danvers Town Manager 

Michael C. Lehane, Esq., Danvers Town Counsel 
101 

RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" Page 1 of2 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA·I&E ------'----------'----------------

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Cc: 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA-I&E 

Monday, September 09, 2002 8:37 PM 

'Conklin, Craig' 

Skelly, Lawrence E Mr ASA-I&E; Civis, Daniel; Correa, Joe; Dries, James E Mr ASA-ILE; Fisher, 

Denzel L Mr ASA-I&E; Holmes, Charles M Mr ASA I&E; Hanline, Jay Mr OASA(I&E); Church, Kelli Ms 

ASA-I&E; Ray, Nancy M COL ASA-I&E; Legel, Dennis R SBCCOM; Carnithan, Paul T SBCCOM; 

Abrams, Mike ANNISTON CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION FIELD OFC PAO; Fiori, Mario P Dr ASAI&E; Brletich, Richard W SBCCOM; Bunch, Delbert F PMCD; Davis, Henry J COL SBCCOM; Jones, 

Robert E LTC SBCCOM; 'brodersend@anad,army,mil'; 'Lantzer, Paula K LTC SBCCOM'; Doesburg, 

John C MG SBCCOM; Pelerson, Craig A BG Army G8-FD; Parker, Michael A SBCCOM; Ferriter, John 

M Dr. SBCCOM; Newing, Edward W COL SBCCOM; Fatz, Raymond J Mr ASA-I&E; Fiori, Mario P Dr 

ASA-I&E; Skelly, Lawrence E Mr ASA-I&E 

Subject: Invitation to Anniston to Participate in CSEPP Drills 

Mr. Conklin, 

Thank you for your e-mail earlier today. I appreciate your thoughts on the proposal to invite Anniston County to 

participate in several CSEPP exercises. The objective of the Anmy's invitation, to be issued by Dr. Fiori (ASA 

(I&E)), is to encourage Anniston to participate in the very drills that it has heretofore declined, The further 

purpose of the invitation is to create a record demonstrating that the Army has exercised due diligence in 

preparing for operations, including encouraging Anniston to participale in exerCises intended to prepare it for a 

potential emergency. In sum, the Army seeks to document the invitation and to document the response or lack 

thereot 

The Army intends to send the invitation to Anniston by the middle of next week, and so a draft must be 

prepared by close-of-business for Thursday of this week, The content of that draft is less important so long as it 

contains one basic element: an invitation to Anniston to engage in CSEPP exercises in advance of the scheduled 

start of operations, Mr, Jim Dries, who is now responsible for preparing the letter, would appreCiate any ~pg9mg 

assistance he could obtain on the draft (I understOOd from your e-mail that you have reviewed a copy of the 

draft), For example, I believe he would appreciate red-line edits to the original document or detailed comments 

that he could easily input I encourage you and any others who perceive an issue with the current draft to provide 

him with any specific comments you might have. 

You also mentioned in your note that "floating ideas" is not an optimal manner for coordinating work on CSEPP 

issues, I agree, But I do not perceive that Larry Skelly "floated" the idea to invite Anniston to engage in 

preparedness activities. Rather, Mr. Skelly carried out an instruction that I gave him and for which I will not fault 

him. The Army has a responsibility, as I explained previously, to build a record documenting its efforts to prepare 

for operations. The invitation to Anniston is part of that effort, and Mr. Skelly, and now Mr. Dries, have sought to 

assist me in building that record. They have also sought to obtain comments on the proposed invitation to 

Anniston, and I appreciate your interest and the interest of those to whom I have copied this note, 

I invite all those to whom this e-mail is addressed to consider the following concern: Many people copied on 

this and prior e-mails in this chain were unnecessary, and we should be more CIrcumspect in addressing our 

correspondence, I believe we would all enjoy the courtesy of debating the relative merits of a point outside an 

audience of General Officers, SESs, and Army Secretariat Thank you for conSidering my views, and for your 

commitment to assist Dr. Fiori in inviting Anniston to become more prepared. I am 

Sincerely, 

Russell Shearer 

C. Russell H, Shearer 

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Chemical Demilitarization) and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of 

9/20/2002 
102 

RE: The Armiston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" 

the Army (I&E) 

110 Army Pentagon (2E613) 

Washington, DC 20310-0110 

Voice: (703) 692-9800 

Facsimile: (703) 692-9808 

RusseII.Shearer@hqda,army,mil 

Page 2 of2 

This Internet e-mail message contains legally PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL information intended for the use 

of the addressee only, Please contact the undersigned by telephone or e-mail and report that you have received 

this message if you are not the intended recipient Thereafter, please delete this message from your system, 

9/20/2002 
103 

RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" Page 1 of 4 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA-I&E --_._-------------------"._---------- From: Conklin, Craig [Craig.Conklin@fema.govj 

Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 11 :49 AM 

To: 'Lantzer, Paul~ K l TC SBCCOM'; Do~sburg, John C MG S8CCOM; Peterson, Craig A 8G Army GaFD; Parker, MIchael A SBCCOM; Fernter, John M Dr. SBCCOM; Newing, Edward W COL SBCCOM; 

Fatz, Raymond J Mr ASA-I&E; Fiori, Mario P Dr ASA-I&E 

Ce: Skelly, Lawrence E Mr ASA-I&E; Conklin, Craig; Civis, Daniel; Correa, Joe; Shearer, Russell SES 

ASA-I&E; Dries, James E Mr ASA-ILE; Fisher, Denzel L Mr ASA-I&E; Holmes, Charles M Mr ASA I&E; 

Hanline, Jay Mr OASA(I&E); Church, Kelll Ms ASA-I&E; Ray, Nancy M COL ASA-I&E; Legel, Dennis R 

SBCCOM; Carnithan, Paul T S8CCOM; Abrams, Mike ANNISTON CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION 

FIELD OFC PAO; Fiori, Mario P Dr ASA-I&E; Brtetich, Richard W S8CCOM; BunCh, Delbert F PMCD; 

Davis, Henry J COL SBCCOM; Jones, Robert E LTC SBCCOM; 'brodersend@anad.army.mil' 

Subject: RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" 

To All, 

Thanks for the opportunity to comment on your exercise proposal. I have taken some time to think about the 

exercise proposal and have the following concerns. 

First, I think such a headquarters level, top-down mandated approach would not be very successful in Anniston. 

there is one thing I have learned in the short I have been here at FEMA it is that in order to be effective we must 

develop good relationships with the State and local officials. This approach does not lend itself to that We need 

to include them up front if we expect to get their buy-in. 

Second, the exercise proposal would place a significant burden on State and local officials without consulting 

them. I think we need to include them in any decision about changing the way we examine the ability of the State 

and local governments to respond to an accident/incident at the facility _ I think this type of action will not be well 

received by the State and local officials unless we can provide the additional funds it would take to conduct these 

extra exercises 

Third, it is my understanding that a recent hazmat exercise showed that the community was capable of 

responding. I believe that we are developing a strong emergency preparedness foundation in the Anniston 

community and that we can build on the partnership that is beginning to develop between Federal, State and local 

officials. While there are improvements that can be made in the level of preparedness, we need to recognize that 

improvements have been made and the community is better prepared than it was when the program started. So 

any change in exercise activities must value added. 

Lastly, I would like to comment on this method of floating ideas. It is not one I prefer. It basically circumvents 

what I would consider normal CSEPP channels of communication. If someone has an idea for improving the 

program, then that person should contact the other stakeholders directly so the idea can be discussed. Using the 

courtesy copy on emails is not a good way to develop support for an idea, especially when it involves an area that 

has been under someone else's direction. 

Craig Conklin, FEMA 

-----Orl9inal Message-----

9/20/2002 
104 

RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" Page 2 of4 

From: Lantzer, Paula K'LTC SBCCOM [mailto:paula.lantzer@SBCCOM.APGEA.ARMY.MILJ 

Sent: Wednesday, August 28,2002 11:21 AM 

To: Doesburg, John C MG SBCCOMi Peterson, Craig BG SBCCOM(N)i Parker, Michael A SBCCOM; Ferriter, 

John M Dr. SBCCOMi Newing, Edward W COL SBCCOMi Fatz, Raymond ASA·I&E; Fiori, Mario Dr. ASA(I&E) 

Cc: Skelly, Lawrence ASA-I&E; LanlZer, Paula K LTC SBCCOM; 'Craig Conklin (craig.conklin@fema.gov)'; 

'Dan Civis (daniel.civis@fema.gov)'; 'Jose Correa (Joe,Correa@fema.gov)'; Shearer, Russell ASA(I&E); 

Dries, James HQDA; Fisher, Denzel HQDA; Holmes, Charles M Mr ASA I&E; Hanline, Jay Mr OASA(I&E); 

Church, Kelli Ms ASA-I&E; Ray, Nancy COL HQDA; Legel, Dennis R SBCCOM; Carnithan, Paul T SBCCOM; 

Abrams, Mike ANNISTON CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION FIELD OFC PAO; Fiori, Mario Dr, ASA(I&E); 

Brlelich, Richard W SBCCOM; Bunch, Delbert F PMCD; Davis, Henry J COL SBCCOM; Jones, Robert E LTC 

SBCCOM; 'brodersend@anad.army,mil' 

Subject: RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" 

Importance: High 

Sirs, 

This is the first that I have heard about this initiative, Please note that I, the Army's PM, am only a cc on 

the distribution; my exercise team leader is not on the address line at all; and the message is directed 

towards Mike Abrams, the ANGDF PAO, To my knowledge, this has not been coordinated with FEMA. 

While I am always in favor of using any opportunity for demonstrating, assessing and improving 

capabilities and agree that We should exhaust every opportunity to assist ALL of our GSEPP communities, 

this clearly indicates that the office charged with GSEPP policy, guidance and oversight intends to run the 

Alabama exercise program, to include directing the number of exercises that the depot and our off-post 

partners are expected to execute, Once again, the organizations charged with the management and 

execution of GSEPP are being told how and whem to suck eggs! 

If I am doing such an inadequate job that HQDA must step in, why has this not been brought to the 

attention of my chain of command? 

The imperial "we" is used throughout the message below. I don't know who that is? 

V.R" Paula 

9/20/2002 

····-Origina I Message--·--

From: Skelly, Lawrence E Mr ASA-I&E [mailto:Lawrence.5kelly@hqda,army,milj 

Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 8: 18 AM 

To: 'Abrams, Michael'; 'paul.carnlthan@sbccom.apgea,army,mil'; 'Dennis Legel 

(dennis,Iegel@SBCCOM.APGEA.ARMY.MIL)' 

Cc: 'Paula Lantzer (paula,lantzer@SBCCOM,APGEA,ARMY.MIL)'; 'Craig Conklin 

(craig,conklln@fema,gov)'; 'Dan Civis (daniel.civis@fema,gov)'i 'Jose Correa 

(Joe,Correa@fema,gov)'; Shearer, Russell SES ASA·I&E; Fatz, Raymond J Mr ASA·I&E; Dries, 

James E Mr ASA·ILE; Fisher, Denzel L Mr ASA·I&E; Holmes, Charles M Mr ASA I&E; Hanline, 

Jay Mr OASA(I&E); Church, Kelli Ms ASA·J&E; Ray, Nancy M COL ASA·I&E 

Subject: RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness 

today" 

Folks, 

We wholeheartedly support the exercise discussed below, It is imperative that we begin building public 

trust and confidence in the Anniston region emergency response system that the Army, through 

CSEPP, has pumped over $lOOM into the last twelve years. 
105 

RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" Page 3 of 4 

9/20/2002 

We are looking at taking an aggressive, proactive approach to conducting a series of exercises in the 

Anniston CSEPP community beginning in the very near future and continuing until the community 

declares itself adequately prepared for a CSEPP type emergency. We defme that community as 

comprising the depot, all the CSEPP counties and the Alabama state agencies. What we envision is a 

monthly exercise paradigm that focuses on specific response activities. One exercise might drill the 

medical component ofthe response system. The next exercise might focus on command and control. 

And each exercise could work more than one CSEPP functional component. This model has worked 

exceptionally well at the Umatilla site and we believe it will work in Anniston too. 

This will require the Anniston Chemical Activity to plan and conduct monthly CArRA-type exercises, 

although they do not have to be full blown CAIRAs. A range of drills falling between basic tabletop 

exercises and full up field exercises with deployment of hot lines, field response teams, and so forth, 

probably would accomplish the objective of providing the Anniston CSEPP community with a variety 

of exercise opportunities. These drills also would provide excellent opportunities to improve on post 

capabilities, if properly planned and executed. 

To support this robust exercise program we would launch a media campaign that infonns the public 

about the purpose of the drills, who we hope to have participate and what our objectives are. We also 

would make it known what agencies refused to participate and their excuses, 

In summary, we have a responsibility to the community to help it get ready. Clearly, the current 

CSEPP approach for conducting a once·a·year exercise is not working in Anniston. The public is 

nervous and we are troubled by the recent refusal of certain county agencies to participate in exercises. 

The community is not ready for toxic operations, despite the millions of dollars poured into emergency 

management in the region. We must change that status. 

We would greatly appreciate your comments. We will begin developing this proposed program with 

SBCCOM, AMC and FEMA to ensure the Anniston community has sufficient resources and support to 

carry out this proposal. 

Michael, please forward this email to your new commander. I do not have his email address. 

Thanks. 

Larry Skelly 

Room I A875, Pentagon 

phone: 703.695.1042 

fax: 703.614.5822 

·--··OriginaJ Message-·~-· 

From: Abrams, Michael [mailto:mabrams@all"gi&r!l] 

Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 7:23 AM 

To: Abrams, Michael 

Subject: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne Cqunty tests preparedness today" 

The Anniston Star - Page IB - Wednesday - August 28, 2002 

Cleburne County tests preparedness today 

by Matthew Creamer, Star Staff Writer 

(ht1pjlwww . ..!!rust9lJstar.com/newsI2002Ias-cleburne-0828-mcreamer-2h28aI908.htm) 

Sirens and tone-alert radios will be tested in Cleburne County today as part of a local exercise to 
106 

RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" Page 4 of 4 

9120/2002 

prepare for a chemical weapons accident at the Anniston Army Depot. 

The drill will measure the response of officials working in the county emergency operations 

center as well as that of residents, who have been asked to rehearse their shelter-In-place plans. 

"Exercising your plans during the drill will help families to test their plans and to discover 

possible oversights one might not realize ifth.e plan were not practiced," said Steve Swafford, director 

of the Cleburne County Emergency Management Agency. 

For Cleburne residents, this involves going indoors, closing windows and doors, turning off 

heating, cooling and ventilation systems and remaining in an interior room. 

Cleburne will be only one of the six counties in the emergency preparedness program to perform 

a drill this year. A full-scale exercise was cancelled earlier this year because of disputes between the 

federal government and Calhoun County and state officials. 

"We're calling this a local exercise," said the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Terry 

Madden, who's in Cleburne County to evaluate the exercise. 

Depot officials will support the exercise electronically by notifYing county officials of a staged 

mishap at the chemical stockpile. 

--- 30 ---

«Anniston Star 28aug02 Exercise,doc» 
107 

Shearer. Russell 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Subject: 

Importance: 

RJssell, 

Conklin, Craig [Craig.Conklin@dhs.govj 

Thursday, October 25, 2007 1 :04 PM 

Shearer, Russell 

FW: Alabama Drill/Exercise Initiative 

High 

I am forwarding this email in response to your request. Additional emails will follow. 

think this will be easier that trying to put them into one document, 

Craig Conklin, Director 

Sector Specific Agency Executive Management Office 

Office of Infrastructure Protection 

Department of Homeland Security 

Crystal City Office 703-605-1228 

Glebe Road Office 703-235-5065 

Craig. Conklin@DHS.GOV 

From: Conklin, Craig 

Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 20027:51 AM 

To: 'Dries, James E Mr ASA-ILE'; Conklin, Craig; 'Ferriter, John, SBCCOM' 

Cc: CiV1S, Daniel 

Subject: R8; Alabama Drill/Exercise Initiative 

Importance: High 

Gentlemen, I apologize for the length of time it has taken for me to respond to the Army's 

drill proposal for the Anniston depot and surrounding communities, After discussing the 

proposal with F£MJ\ headquarters staff, I would like to provide the following corrmlents. 

First, based on :hc recent lack of participation by the some of the corrununities 

surrounding the Anniston depot, questions about the level of preparedness can be 

expected, so we (FE:MA and Army) need to take positive action to get the communities reinvolved. 

Second, the initiative needs to be coordinated in a partnership-like manner by both FEMA 

and Army personnel from Hendquarters. However, it needs to have the buy-in from the 

community IPT. Therefore, we need to visit with the IFT and layout our proposal and get 

their input on how to make it valuable and efficient for them. Obviously it would be best 

if we did not have to be heavy handed in order to get them to participate. 
108 

Third, we need to be able to address any concerns of theirs with regard to resources. 

Since t;his is a new initiative, we will need to address the funding issue that will come 

with this previously unplanned activi!:y. Who will pay, which contractor to use, etc. I 

recommend we use the FEMA contractors that currently wor-k on the exercise program for the 

offsite portions of these drills since FEMA has the lead role per the MOU for offsite 

preparedness. I don't. want to make any changes in how we ODerate with reaard to the 

program, Until those changes are incorporated im:o a revised ar.d agreed upon MOD. 

Fourth, 1 want to make it clear, that I do not think the exercise program as a whole is broken because one community decided not to partlcipate in an exercise. The program is 

working quite well at other sites. I think the cause of the non-participation was more to 

do with the fundinq fights we were having than anything else. 

Fifth, we can not let this initiative evolve into an us versus them situation. There may 

be some very reasons for their wanting to modify our proposal. I think we will need to be 

flexible, listen to thelr concerns and adapt as necessary to make this work. Any 

disagreements that might arise should be handled by the 1PT and should not be played out in the media. 

If you have any questions, please feel free to email or call me. I look forward to 

working with ya' 11 on this initiative. 

Craig Conklin 

-----Original 

From: Dr ies I James Mr ASA-IL£ [mail to: James. Dries@hqda. army. mil J Sent: Wednesday, September 11, 2002 5:54 PM 

To: 'Craig Conklin (craig.conklin@fema.gov)'; 'Ferriter, John, SBCCOM' 

Subject: Alabama Drill/Exercise Initiative 

Gentleman, As you are aware, Dr. Fiori would like to take us to take a more active 

engagement posture with Alabama. This office is proposing a series of one day "drills" 

that tocus on a small aspect of the emergency response procedures. We recognize that our 

organizations and the communi ties cannot expend a considerable amount of resources on a 

monthly drill. Accordingly, these small, focused drill events should be developed so 

that several can be conducted in one day--ensuring a high degree of success by the end of 

the drill. At the same time, the drills should build to a successful annual exercise. 

The attached document is my attempt to put this proposal before the governor--it does not 

have Army secretariat approval nor has not been out for staffing, and I would appreciate 

your i:lslghts!suggestions before formal statfing. 

Thanks «Alabama exercise letter 9-11. doc» 

James Dries 

ODASA(ESOH) 

Pentagon, Room lA875 

Phone: 703-695-1020 

Fax: -103-614-5822 
109 

Shearer. Russell 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Subject: 

Importance: 

Conklin, Craig [Craig,Conklin@dhs,govj 

Thursday, October 25, 2007 1 :06 PM 

Shearer, Russell 

FW: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Clebume County tests preparedness today" 

High 

Email from Skelly on the exercise effort. 

Craig Conklin, Director 

Sector Specific Agency Executive Managerr.ent Office 

Office of Infrastructu~e Protection 

Department of Homeland Security 

Crystal City Office 703-605-1228 

Glebe Road Of fioe 703-235-5065 

Craig. Conklin@DHS.GOV 

From: Skelly, Lawrence E Mr ASA-I&E [mailto;Lawrence.Skelly@hqda.army.milj 

Sent: Wednesday, August 28/ 2002 8:18 AM 

To: 'Abrams, Michae';"'; 'paul.carnithan@sbccom.apgea.army.mil'; 'Dennis Legel 

(dennis, legel@SBCCOM.APGEA,ARMY.MIL) • 

Cc: 'Paula Lantzcr (paula.lantzer@SBCCOM,APGEA.ARMY.MIL)'; 'C:::-alg Conklin 

(craig.conklin@fema.gov) I; 'Dan Civis (daniel.civis@fema.gov)'; 'Jose Correa 

(Joe.Correa@iema.gov)'; Shearer, Russell SES ASA~I&E; Fatz, Raymond J Mr ASA-I&E; Dries, 

James E Mr ASA-ILE; Fisherl Denzel L Mr ASA-I&E; Holmes, Charles M Mr ASA I&Ei Hanline, 

Jay Mr OASA{J&F.) i Church, Kelli Ms ASA-I&E; Ray, Nancy M COL ASA-I&E 

Subject; R.E: The Anniston Star - August 28 1 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness 

today" 

f"olks, 

We wr.oleheartedly support the exercise discussed below. It is imperative that we begin 

building publ~c trust and confidence in the Anniston region emergency response system that 

the Ar:ny, through CSEPP I has pumped over $lQOM inlo the last twelve years. 

We are at taking an aggressive, proactive dpproach to conductlng a series of 

Anniston CSEPP community beginning in the near future and continuing 

declares itself adequately prepared for a type emergency. We 

as cornprlsing the depot, all the CSEPP counties and the Alabama 

state agencies. we enVision is a monthly exerCl.se paradigm that focuses on specific 

response activities. One exercise might drill the medical component of the response 

system. The next exercise might focus on comnand and control. And each exercise could work 

more than one CSEPP functional component. This mode':' has worked ezceptionally well at the 

Umatilla site and we believe it will work in Anniston tuo. 

This will require the Anniston Chemical Activity to plan and conduct monthly CArRA-type 
110 

exercises, ~lthough they do not have to be full hlown CAIRAs. A range of drills falling 

between baslc tabletop exercises and full up field exercises with deployment of hot lines, 

field r~sponse teams, and so forth, probably would accomplish the objective of providing 

the Ann.l.ston CSEPl? community with a variety of exercise opportunities. These drills also 

would provide excellent opportunities to improve on post capabilities, if properly planned 

and executed. 

To support this robust exercise program we would launch a media campaign that informs the 

public about the purpose of the drills, who we hope to have participate and what our 

objectives are. We also would make it known what agencies refused to participate and their 

excuses. 

In sum.-rna:!:"y, we have a responsibility to the community to help it get ready. Clearly, the 

current CSEPP approach for conducting a once-a-year exercise is not working in Anniston. 

The public is nervous and we are troubJed by the recent refusal of certain county agencies 

to participate in exercises. The community is not ready for toxic operations, despite the 

mi.llions of dollars po~red into emergency rr.anagement in the region. We must c:-lange that 

status. 

We would greatly appreciate your comments. We will begin developing this proposed program 

with SBCCOM, AMC and FEMA to ensure the Anniston community has sufficient resources and 

support to carry out this proposal. 

Michael, please forward this email to your. new commander. I do not have his email address. 

Thanks. 

Larry Skelly 

Room lA875, Pentagon 

phone: 703.695.1042 

fax: 703.614.5822 

-----Original Message-----

From: Abrams, Michael [Itail to :mabrams@ancdf.org) 

Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 7:23 AM 

To: Abrams, Michael Subject: The .l'mniston Star - August 28, 2002 - nCleburne County tests preparedr.ess today" 

The Ar:niston Star Page 18 - Wednesday - August 28, 2002 

Cleburne Cour.ty tests preparedness today 

by Matthew Creamer, Star Staff Writer 

(ht tp; I Iwww.annlstonstar.com/news/2002/as-clebur ne-0828-mcre amer-2h28a1908.htm) 

Sirens and tone-alert radios wlll be tested in Cleburne County today as part of a 

local exercise to prepare for a chemical weapons accident at the Anniston Army Depot. 

The drill will measure the response of officials working in the county emergency 

operations center as well as that of residents, who have been asked to rehearse their 

shelter-in-place plans. 

"Exercis_ng your plans during the drill will help families to test their plans and 

to discover possible oversights one might not realize if the plan were not practiced," 

said Steve Swafford, director of the Cleburne County Ercergency Management Agency. 

For Cleburne residents, this involves going indoors, Closing windows and doors, 

turning off heating, cooling and ventilation systems and remaining in an interior room. 

Cleburne will be only one of the six counties in the emergency preparedness 

program to perform a drill this year. A full~·scale exercise was cancelled earlier this 

year because of disputes between :he federal government and Calhoun County and state 

officials. 

"we're cal J ing this a local exercise," said the Federal Emergency Management 
111 

Agency's Terry Madden, Wh01S in Cleburne County to evaluate the exercise. 

Depot officials will support the exercise electronically by notifying county 

officials of a staged mlshap at the chemical stockpile. 

--- 30 ---

«Anniston Star 28aug02 Exercise.doc» 
112 

Shearer. Russell 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Subject: 

Alabama exercise 

letter9»11.d .•• 

Conklin, Craig [Craig.Conklin@dhs.gov] 

Thursday, October 25, 2007 1 :07 PM 

Shearer, Russell 

FW: Alabama Drill/Exercise Initiative 

This email from Jim contilins the attachment that is missing from the first 

email I sent you. I do not think the attached draft ",,'as ever signea. 

Craig Conkli~1 Director 

Sector Specific Agency Executive Management Office 

Office of Infrastructure Protection 

Department of Homelar.d Security 

Crystal City Office 703-605-1228 

Glebe Road Office 703-235-5065 

Craig. CO:lklin@DHS.GOV 

From: Dries, James F: Mr ASA-ILE [mailto:James.Dries@hqda.army.mil] 

Sent: Wednesday I September 11, 2002 5: 54 PM 

To: 'Craig Conklin {craig.conklin@fema.gov)'; 'Ferriter, John, SBCCOM' 

Subject: Alabama Drill/Exercise Initiative 

Gentleman, As you are aware, Dr. Fiori would like to take us to take a more active 

engagement posture with Alabama. This office is proposing a series of one day "drills" 

that focus 0" a small aspect of the emergency response pr"ocedures. We recogni ze that DU.!" 

organizations and the communi ties can:1ot expend a considerable amount of resources on a 

monthly drill. Accordingly, these small, focused drill events should be developed so 

that several can be conducted in ODe day--ensuring a high degree of success by the end of 

the drill" At the same time, the drills should build to a successful annual exercise. 

The attached document is r.ty attempt to put this proposal before the governor--it does :1ot 

have Army secretariat appL"oval nor has not been out for staffingl and 1 would appreciate 

your i:1sights/suggestions before formal staffing. 

Thanks «Alabama exercise letter 9-11.doc» 

James Dries 
113 

The Honorable Don Siegelman 

Governor 

State Capitol 

Room N-104 

600 Dexter Avenue 

Montgomery, AL 36130 

Dear Governor: 

We invite the State of Alabama and the counties participating in the Army's 

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness (CSEPP) to join the 

Anniston Army Depot workforce this October in a chemical emergency 

response drills to maintain the state of readiness community. We 

believe that regular joint training exercises to demonstrate that 

the Army, the State and the counties are and ready to protect 

the community. 

These self-evaluation d Army Depot and the 

surrounding communities the to focus on speCific response activities 

during each exercise. For event could focus on the medical 

component of the response Another might focus on command and 

control, including hazard analysis, selection of a protective action strategy, and 

initiation of community warning protocols. Still another could focus on the 

protective actions to be taken by special needs facilities such as schools, 

hospitals, and retirement communities. These will lead up to the Anniston Full 

Scale Exercise in March. Drills after March would be used to strengthen and 

reinforce the March exercise. 

If the Alabama CSEPP participants accept our invitation to participate in 

these drills, then we recommend that the community Integrated Process Team 

(IPT) serve as the overarching planning and evaluation mechanism for these 

exercises. The IPT could set out strategic objectives for the exercise series, 

develop performance measures and success criteria, map out individual exercise 

objectives, and identify where changes to plans or procedures are indicated. 
114 

The Army will provide contractor support to the IPT and the response 

agencies to assist in all aspects of the drill planning. coordination, execution and 

documentation. The contractor will coordinate and integrate the efforts of all 

participating agencies. provide Simulation support. assist in developing 

performance measures and success metrics. document the results of each 

exercise drill and recommend areas for improvement. Of course. the Army 

Materiel Command and the Soldier and Chemical Biological Command also will 

support this effort. 

We believe the citizens deserve our best efforts to demonstrate that we are 

collectively prepared for any accident involving the chemical stockpile. These 

drills and the annual exercise will give our first responders and emergency 

response agencies the opportunity to excel. The ultimate payoff will be a wellprepared community that is better able to respond tOltura, disasters as well as 

any accident at the Depot. f 

We invite you to join us in showing tie . i the Anniston community 

we are serious in our pledge to protect the e sequences of a chemical 

accident at Anniston Army Depot to e participation of your 

project officer at Headquarters.p'~ he Army. will work closely with your 

agencies as well as the county In nthly drills. Larry Skelly. our 

staff and the Anniston IPT to im *~~ program. His phone number is (703) 

695-1042. His email addressis:nce.skelly@hqda.army.mil. 

Thank you for your strong support of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency 

Preparedness Program. 

Sincerely. 

Raymond J. Fatz 

Deputy Assistant Secretary 

(Environment, Safety and 

Occupational Health) 

Department of the Army 

Date: ______ _ 

Copy fumished: 

Bruce P. Baughman 

Director 

Office of National Preparedness 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Date: ____________ _ 

Director, Alabama Emergency Management Agency 

Chairperson, xx County Commission (each county) 

Director, xx County Emergency Management Agency (each county) 

Director, Region IV, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Chairperson, Alabama Citizens Advisory Commission 
115 

Senator Shelb 

~enator seSSi~ns epresentative Riley 
116 

09;]9/02 )7:37 FAX 141 001 

RichardShelby 

Committees: 

Vice Chairman· Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Committee on Appropriations 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportalion 

Committee on Banking. Housing. & Urban Affairs 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Special Committee on Aging 

FAX TRANSMISSION SHEET 

United States Senator * Alabama 

Addresses: 

110 Hart Building. Washington. D.C. 20510-0103 

(202) 224-5744 E·Mail:senalor@shelby.senate.gov 

Website: http://www.senate.gov/-shelbyl 

Siale Offices: 

1800 Fi~h Ave .. North. 321 Federal Building. Birmingham 

Al35203 (205) 731-1384 fax: (205) 731-1386 

Huntsville Int'I Airport. 1000 Glenn Hearn Blvd .• Box 20127 

HuntSVille. AL 35824 (256) 772-0460 fax: (256) 772-8387 

113 St. Joseph St.. 308 U.S. Courthouse. Mobile. AL 36602 

(251) 694-4164 fax: (251) 694-4166 

15 lee St., B28 U.S. Courthouse. Montgomery. AL 36104 

(334) 223-7303 fax: (334) 223-7317 ' 

1118 Greensboro Ave .• #240. Tuscaloosa. AL 35401 

(205) 759-5047 fax: (205) 759-5067 

Date: __ ~?Ht......;lo,---___ _ Page1of~Z~L=-_______________ ___ 

To: C. IZussdt ~. SIAoct~r 

Fax Number: _Tu:t.l3-"'-'-l' b .... 9...,l.:.,.:.._9=8=08""-___________ _ 

From: 

Phone: (202) 224-5744 

Fax: (202) 224-3416 

Message: __________________________________________________ _ 

The mfWl'!'ll'lbO(l C\lfl\iilloe~ In Ihl:; 1.l:l;$ ItyallY priVl\tsleO aMi co:nr,de"~! in\endec' gnly lor Ihe1#K of Ihe inUt.tdll;iol Of en/!!y /'Ia"",o ,b<)ve. 11 the flJilder d lIli, mt:!'II$Q;<I t$ nol ~ ifl!cndellltJQPHl'n1. 

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117 

09119/02 17:38 FAX 

RICHARD SHELBY ALABAMA 

COMMI'rTf~OPR'.nON$ 

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'llinitcd ~tatcs ~cnQtc 

o 110H"""t'St:NAnOITICI:8lJ~ 

WAStllmiTON. DC 20510-0103 

(201)224-5744 

http;/hJ)u.jby.$enalll.govl 

E-mlll!"s\\'J'lBIQrl&shlllbv.$lmate.goy 

The Honorable Thomas E. White 

Secretary of the Anny 

101 Army Pentagon 

Washington, DC 20310-0101 

Dear Mr. Secretary, 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0103 

September 19, 2002 

~002 

STATE OFFtCeS; 

o 1800"I"' .. Avf~U{NOOrH 

321i'£D(RAl8UIUlINtl 

thJlMII<GMAU,AL'lS'03 

{205~ 731-13&4 

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(205)1S~7 

I write to relay very troubling information conceming the administration and leadership 

of the Anny's Chemical Demilitarization Program. I have included as an attachment information 

that I believe deserves your personal attention. 

Regarding those attached messages, I would first state that I wholeheartedly agree with 

Mr. Larry Skelly, OASA (I&E), in his first message dated August 28 that "it is imperative that 

we [the Army] begin building public trust and confidence in the Anniston region." I believe, 

however, this information paints a very disturbing picture of how the Army seeks to "begin" to 

right the ship. This information goes to the heart of nwnerous letters in which I have questioned 

the leadership, operational effectiveness and focus of the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency 

Preparedness Program (CSEPP). 

I, along with the state and local emergency officials in Alabama, welcome CSEPP 

exercises, but a "challenge" in the form of an "invitation" as directly expressed within this 

information, is ill-conceived at best. 

Mr, Secretary, I would submit that "improving the Anny's image" in this area would best 

be achieved by respecting the state and loeal officials' concerns and communicating with them 

regarding the adequacy of CSEPP as it exists in Alabama, not by "challenging" the community in 

an effort to make "the community declarers] itself adequately prepared for a CSEPP-type 

emergency." An iron fist approach is wrong and. as pointed out in the attached by severaJ 

officials who are most familiar with the administration and operation of the CSEPP program. will 

not work. 

This effort is nothing more than a perverse and irresponsible attempt to deflect attention 

away from the Army's failures by employing a totally inappropriate strategy which is, by the 

comments of those who have created it. designed to set up the community and, apparently, give 

the Anny cause to withhold future CSEPP funding. This effort to "toss the gauntlet on the 

ground" amounts to a media stunt with the desired outcome being "improvement of the Anny's 

image" at the corrununity's expense, 
118 

09/19/02 17:38 FAX 1i!J003 

State and local officials in Alabama have worked diligently with the Army for years in an 

effort to have the Army take their valid safety concerns seriously. As an example, a look back at 

the funding requests made by the Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency reflects a 

significant concern for the safety of "special needs" citizens in the community as well as for 

"collective protection" of schools within the IRZ. Years of funding requests have passed and the 

issues remain unresolved. 

Now the Army intends to "take the offensive in Alabama," by "challenging the site." I 

am not sure what this means considering the Army has given FEMA, by MOU, responsibility of 

all off-post CSEPP execution. Yet, the Anny chemical demilitarization program leadership 

seeks to "tell" FEMA and the Army's own CSEPP apparatus exactly how this exercise campaign 

will be carried out with little or no consultation. The fact is, despite the Army having "pumped 

over $100 million" into Alabama the last twelve years, much work remains to be done. The 

Army and FEMA are well aware of the remaining safety concerns. 

The attached information, however, clearly outlines the Army leadership's strong desire 

to concoct and force "challenge" exercises on the community tlrrough which they hope to 

"improve the Army's image" rather than to do the real job with which they have been tasked-to 

work with FEMA and state and local emergency professionals in Alabama to make sure 

"maximum protection" is provided to the people who live and work in and around the Anniston 

Chemical Destruction Facility (ANCDF). 

I have long asked for greater oversight, leadership and refonn within this program. 

Surely this information proves the basis for my concerns and those of emergency officials in 

Alabama who have sought to work with the Army. 

Thank you for your time and attention to this letter and the attached information. I look 

forward to your response. 

~ 

~;:,-;:y, \ .,u~ J.. 

Richard Shelby 

United States Senator 
119 

091]9/02 17:38 FAX 

-----Original Message-----

From: lantzer, Paula K l TC SBCCOM 

Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2002 12 :53 PM 

Subject: DASA(ESOH) Alabama Exercise Proposal 

Importance: High 

Sir, 

@004 
120 

09/19/02 17:38 FAX IilJ005 

We received the e·mails below today. They are the background on DASA(ESOH),s proposal for Ihe Anniston 

exercises, The referenced memo must have been cleaved off in the forwarding process. While Mr, Skelly is very 

careful fo use the word "recommend," it is apparent that there is no intention of providing AMC, S8CCOM or 

FEMA any real opportunity to partiCipate in the decision makIng process. 

While I have the greatest respect for the professionalism and abilities of Madhu Beriwal and the entire staff at IEM, 

Mr Sk.elly's comments regarding the use of IEM as the support and integratIon contractor raises a number of rSSU0f: 

Flfst, It sounds like the fox guarding the henhouse. If they've developed a/l the plans (which is grossly misleading). 

then should there not be an independent agency evaluating them? Second, while IEM is running the show in Oregon, 

they do not enjoy the same relalionship with Alabama. Finally, though not stated, Mr. Skelly believes that having IEM 

conduct exercises in Oregon is saving money, fn fact, it costs an additional $1 OO~250K, and they are only evaluatIng 

the State of Oregon and 2 counties, are nOl responsible for scenario development and planning and do not use the 

holistiC approach that we've developed with the Integrated Performance Measure (IPE) process. They strictly observe 

and assess against individual perfonmance measures. Since we (SBCCOM and FEMA) still have the responsibifrty to 

conduclthe UMCD, Washington State and Benton County portions, this means that we have muttiple evaluation 

methodologies being used, IEM can not be given responsibility for evaluation of the storage sttes, so there would 

always be at least 2 methodologies. For Alabama, the evaluation involves ANCA, the State and 6 counties. I, and I'm 

certain FEMA, don't have that programmed in the FY03 budget. Isuspecl that he intends to withhold that amount from 

me Dr maybe that's what the $4.1 M withheld last year is intended for 

I've attached the previous a-mails that addressed this issue, 

While this was received thru PAO channels, I would appreciate anything that can be done to protect COL Nancy 

Ray. 

V.R., Paula 

.. ···Original Message---

From: Ray, Nancy M COL ASA·I&E [mailto:Nancy.Ray@HQDA.army,mUj 

PM 

FYI·.thIS can cause big publicity {negatlve!) for the program and for the Army 

N"ncy Ray 

-·-~"O(jglnaJ Message---

From: Skelly. lawrence: E Mr ASA·l&E 

Sent Thursday, September 05, 2002 10:37 AM 
121 

09119/02 17:38 FAX Ii1J006 

Subject: RE: Alabama Srte ExerCIses· 2d Attempt 

Narcy, 

Yes. the proposed memo needs to go through full staffing. including AMC and SBCCOM But I wanted you to review il 

first anc' run it by Mr. Fatz and Mr. Shearer before we started the formal stafftng process. 

Intent IS not to "teU" the State but to "invite" them to participate. And to widely announce in media releases that we 

have invited them to join us. Yes. we will do the monthly drills - tasker from ASA (I&E) or DASA (ESOH) through 

ARSTAF to AMC will be necessary to cause this series of drills to occur, since it is more than AR 50-6 requires. But 

Of. Fiori believes it is essential 10 improving the Army's Image that we show initiative and leadership. 

I already explained to Dr. Fiori I thought it highly unlikely the Stale or Calhoun County would participate but the other 

counties might, as eVidenced in Mike Abram's news clipping last week. Dr. Fiori understands the probable outcomes. 

When either the State or Calhoun County say "no" he wants a series of press releases directed at their "no" telling the 

public is their agencies, no~ the Army, that IS unwilling 10 help Improve emergency preparedness at the Anniston site. 

Jim Dries has some ideas 011 how we might try 10 make thiS a Fatz-FEMA joint letter. Please discuss your concerns 

with him. 

Dr. Fiori wishes that we move out quickly on this project. And, in fairness to the Depot. if we are going to require these 

monthly exercises to start in October, then we need to give them as much planning time as possible, Also need to 

coordinate within the site IPT to get their buy-in and participation. As well as the site CAC. So we don't have time for 

the usual deliberate staffing within the Army.or the usual FEMA snail's pace to accomplish anything 

Thanks 

Larry Skelly 

__ Original MessageFrom: Ray. Nancy M COL ASA~I&E 

'-Sent: wednesday, September 04. 2002 3:46 PM 

Subject: RE: Alabama SUe EKetcises . 2d Attempt 

Larry, 

: undersland the goal here, and I know it is a worthy one. I assume thai this will be staffed with OGC. oell. SAFM, 

OCPA, etc. before sending oul. ! doubl that the governor will commit to a cooperative arrangement with the Army just 

before an election .J am just wondering since he has sued us recently and with much publIcity. Can the Army 

Irnplement this plan wj\hout the stale's participation? (para 2 "we will begin conducting tile momhly CSEPP exercIses 

In October.") ! know that we can do on post exercises as often as we please. but if we need communities to play, we 

should probably ask them. not tell them. 
122 

09/19/02 17:39 FAX 

My Ihoughls for what they are worth, 

Nancy Ray 

JVt1nry.'/If. Yifl'y 

COL, OM 

Exec,utive Officer, DASA (Chern Demil) 

phone: 703.604.2303 

fax. 703.604.2344 

e-mail: nancy.ray@hqda.armymil 

•. ~··Orlgina! Message---

From: Sketly, lawrence E Mr ASA~'&E 

Sent: Tuesday. September 03.2002 3:57 PM 

Subject: Alabama SHe Exercises H 2d AUempt 

Folks, 

~007 

A week ago Dr FiOri directed me to prepare a letier to the Alabama Governor ·challenging" the site to a series of 

exercises 10 demonslrale the sile's emergency readiness. He understands that Calhoun County probably will reFuse to 

play Nevertheless, Dr. Fiori wishes to take the offensive in Alabama and become proactive rather than reactive to th6 

negatIve media coverage the last year. 

The attached draft is my effort 10 toss the gauntlet on the ground without attacking the State or the counties for 

inaction. 

I recommend a phased review process for this letter First, review within OASA (I&E). Get agreement at the action 

officer level between our two offices. Then present to Mr. Fatz and Mr. Shearer for their initial approval. Then blast oul 

to AMC and SBCCOM. Finally, to FEMA for review, However, I recommend we make it clear to SBCCOM and AMC 

we are not aSKing for their approval of the concept espoused in the letter. Given the opportunity, I am quite certain 

SflCCOM (LTC Lantzer) will make every efforllo kill thiS approach AMC should have no difficulty supporting thiS 

con'::8pr Since It reqUires (elatlvely few add!tional resources. Ali we are doing IS IncreasJng the quarterly CAIRAs to 

montl)ly And we are further reducing tile scope of each drill by (ocuslng on specific components of the response 

system 

FEMA also IS not likely to like this approach, since I! flies WI the face of the so~called exercise program they have se! 

uo However, HIe exerCIse program, as currently structured. accomplishes very little in Alabama We need to change 

cur approach Note tl1at the focus of this effort is at Ihe local !PT Let the communily be in charge of its destinY 

I recommend uSing IEM 10 be the support and integration contractor. IEM has conducted all of the emergency 

management studies at the site_ IEM also prepared the county Planning Guides. Finally, we have a contract in olace 

v/!th IEM that we should be able to add tnis effort to. 
123 

141008 

09/J9/02 }7:J9 FAX 

I am flying to Washington today. Stopping in Sail Lake City to change flights. I hope to email this to you at that time. I 

will c\)eck my email !ater.this evening when I check in at my motel (after COB your time). I would appreciate your 

feedback today. ! would like for us to provide to the two DASAs tomorrow, jf at all possible. If you are comfortable Wlt!l 

the letter as written. feel free to give to them today. However, please lei them know this is just the first review and that 

we suH need to se,'ld U to SBCCOM, AMC and FEMA before we bring It back to them for final approval and signature 

Larry Skelly 

« File: Alabama exercise letter 9~02,doc» «Message: Undeliverable: Alabama Site Exercises » 

Message-ID: <876D38F611 09514A85ACA5772B7B07BB238ED 1 <ill"""".'" V 

r.r. 

Subject RE: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests 

preparedness today" 

Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2002 07:46:26 -0400 

MIME-Version: 1.0 

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) 

Content-Type: multipart/alternative; 

boundary="---_ = _NextPart_003_01 C25B43.6DAAED1 0" 

Sirs, 

.... fft:!1 dlalflbe AGAINST centralIzed eXBtcise conlml at the last 2 program review seSSions, I fjnd it hard to 

believe that IS true 

This jncldent. coupfed WiHl his attempted embarrassment of me in front of my staff last Tuesday (before Dr. 

Ferriter's arnval). his and Oenzel's overtures to Dennjs Lege! to come work at the Pentagon as a "liaison" and the 

nurr.erous rude and unprofessional e-rnails and conversabons that I am subjected to on a recurring basis make this 

GlO unwnl-1\)!e situatIon for me. 

VR, Paula 
124 

09119/02 17: 39 FAX ~009 

Paula, 

Larry explained in his e-maillhal we (Dr, Fiori and I) are seeking to challenge Anniston to several drills in 

anticipation of operations beginning there. He is doing so at my request, which is predicated on our (Dr. Fiori and 

I) need to build a record showing thai the Army has exercised all due care in preparing for operations. I did nol 

read Larry's e-maitto imply that anyone in the Army (or FEMA) performed poorly but to reneel the reality that 

Anniston is refusing to cooperate in preparedness activities, Indeed. this very fact is the reason for my request to 

hIm, 

He has sough I commenl among action officers at his level in order to obtain the information necessary 

~: lo/prepare my request for Ihe requisite staffing. Larry and I will staff the action. to come to you because you have 

the resources to conduct the activities. Thanks for your help, 

CRHS 

P.S. ASA(I&E) is seeking no egg sucking, This office is full of sensHive, environmental types and our deep 

concern about botulism prOhibits it. I do favor the imperial "we," however, because it possess a certain panache, 

but only so long as I am included among it: I am otherwise a pluralist. 

C. Russell H. Shearer 

Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&E) 

110 Army Pentagon (2E613) 

Washington, DC 20310-0110 

Voice: (703) 692-9800 

Facsimile: (703) 692-9808 
125 

09119/02 17:39 FAX 14]010 

Russel! Shcarer@hqda.army.mil 

ThiS Internet e-mail message contains legally PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL mformahon Intended for the use 

of the addressee only Please contact the undersigned by telephone or e-mail and report that you have received 

this message if you are not the intended recipient. Thereafter, please delete this message from your system 

-----Original Message-----

From: Lantzer, paula K LTC SBCCOM (maitto:paula.lantzer@SBCCOM.APGEA.ARMY.Mll) 

Sent: Wednesday, Augus! 28, 2002 11 :21 AM 

Importance: High 

Sirs, 

This is Ihe first that I have heard about this initiative. Please note Ihat I, the Army's PM, am only a cc on the 

distribution; my exercise team leader is not on the address Itne at all; and the message is directed towards 

Mike Abrams, the ANCDF PAO. To my knowledge, this has not been coordinated with FEMA. 

While 1 am always in favor of using any opportunity for demonstrating. assessing and improving capabilities 

and agree that we should exhaust every opportunity to assist ALL of our CSEPP communrties, this clearly 

indicates that the office charged with CSEPP policy, guidance and oversight intends to run the Alabama 

exercise program, to include directing the number of exercises that the depot and our off~post partners 

are expected to execute. Once agaln, the organizations charged wlth the management and execution of 

CSEPP are being told how and when to suck eggsl 

tf I am dOing such an Inadequate job that HQDA must step In, why has thiS not been bf0ughl \0 the aHenllDn 

of my cham of command? 

Tne jrnpenal "we H is L1sed throughout lhe message below. ! dDn't know who that is? 

V R., Paula 
126 

~Ol1 

09/19/02 17:40 FAX 

Folks, 

We wholeheartedly support the exercise discussed below .. It is imperative that we begin building public 

trust and confidence in the Anniston region emergency response system that the Army, through CSEPP, 

has pumped over $100M into the last twelve years 

We are looking al taking an aggressive. proactive approach to conducting a series of exerCises in the 

Anniston CSEPP community beginning in the very near future and continuing unW the communlly declares 

itself adequately prepared for a CSEPP type emergency. We define that community as comprising the 

depot. all the CSEPP counties and the Alabama state agencies. What we envision is a monthly exercise 

paradigm that focuses on specific response activities, One exercise might drill the medica! component of 

the response system. The next exercise might focus on command and control. And each exercise could 

work more than one CSEPP functional component. This model has worked exceptionally well at the 

Umatilla site and we believe it will work in Anniston too. 

This will require the Anniston Chemical Activity to plan and conduct monthly CAIRA-type exercises, 

although they do nol have to be full blown CAIRAs. A range of drills falling between basic tabletop 

exercises and full up field exercises with deployment of hot lines, field response teams. and so forth, 

probably would accomplish the objective of providing the Anniston CSEPP community with a variety of 

exercise opportunities. These drills also would provide excellent opportunities to improve on post 

capabilities. if properly planned and executed. 

To support this robust exercise program we would launch a media campaign that informs the public about 

the purpose of the dl"i!ls. who we hope!o !)(lvr] PElrllclpate find what Olll objecl1ves are \'\:E: <-1!so WOUlt.1 

mdf..;e Jt known whal agen\":le;3 rerUS€lll to P8fllClpJte and ll'ell eXC\l~es 

In summary, we have a responsibility to the community to help it get ready. Clearly, the current CSEPP 

approach for conducting a once~a~year exercise is not working in Anniston, The public IS nervous and we 

are troubled by the recent refusal of certain cOlmly agencies to participate in exelcise5 The community IS 

not ready for toxic operations, despite the millions of dollars poured into emergency management in the 

region We must change that status 

We would greatly appreCiate your comments. We wi!! begin developing this proposed program with 

SBCCOM, AMC and FEMA 10 ensure the Anniston community has sufficient resources and support 10 

carry out this proposal. 
127 

09119/02 17: 40 FAX 

Michael, please forward this email to your new commander. I do not have his email address. 

Thanks. 

Larry Skelly 

Room 1A875, Pentagon 

phone: 703.695.1042 

fax: 703.614.5822 

-----Original Message-----

From: Abrams, Michael [<mailto:mabrams@ancdf,org>1 

Sent: Wednesday, August 28,20027:23 AM 

To: Abrams, Michael 

Subject: The Anniston Star - August 28. 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" 

The Anniston Star - Page 1B - Wednesday - August 28. 2002 

Cleburne County tests preparedness today 

by Matthew Creamer. Star Staff Writer 

«http:ttwww_annistonstar.com/news/2002/as-cleburne-0828-mcreamer2h28a 1908.htm» 

1ilJ012 

Sirens and lone-alert radios will be tesled in Cleburne County today as part of a local exercise to 

prepare for a chemical weapons accident at the Anniston Army Depot 

The urill wm measure the response of officials working in the county emergency operations center 

as well as that of reSidents. who have been asked to rehearse their shelter-in-place plans. 

"ExerCISing your plans during the drill will help families to test their plans and to discover possible 

overSights one might not realize if the plan were not practiced," said Steve Swafford, director of the 

Cleburne County Emergency Management Agency. 

For Cleburne residents, this involves going indoors, closing windows and doors. turning off heating, 

cooling and ventilation systems and remaining in an interior room. 

Cleburne will be only one of the six counties in the emergency preparedness program 10 perform a 

driB this year. A ful!~scale exercise was cancelled earlier this year because of disputes between the federal 

government and Calhoun County and state officials. 
128 

09/19/02 17:40 FAX IilI013 

"We're calling this a loca! exercise," saId the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Terry 

Madden, who's in Cleburne County to evaiuate the exercise 

Depot offiCials wii! support the exercise electronically by notifying counly officials of a staged mishap 

at the chemical stockpile. 

--·30 ---

«Anniston Star 28aug02 Exercise.doc» 

Me,ssa(]e-ID: <99AABCC30084D4118C4 70050886927E6018A3A2B@MWEXHQC01> 

I 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests 

preparedness today" 

Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 11 :48:55 -0400 

10 
129 

09/19/02 1i:40 FAX 

MIME-Version: 1.0 

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) 

Content-Type: multiparValternative; 

boundary="---- = _NextPart_003_01 C25B43.6DAAED10" 

To A". 

141014 

Thanks for the opportunity to comment on your exercise proposal. ! have tak.en some time to think about the exercise 

proposal and hClve the foflowlng Concerns. 

First. I think such a headquarters lever, top-down mandated approach would not be very successful in Anniston. If 

there is one thing I [laVe leamed in the short 1 have been here at FEMA it is that in order to be effective we must 

develop good relationships with the State and local offiCials. This approach does not lend itself to that We need to 

include them up front if we expect to get their buy-in. 

Second, the exercise proposal would place a significant burden on St~te and loca! officials without consulting them. 1 

think we need to include them in any decision about changing the way we examine the ability of the State and local 

governments to respond to an accident/incident at the facility. 1 think this type of action wiH not be we!! received by the 

State and local officials unless we can provide the additional funds it wOllld take to conduct these extra exercises. 

Third::ns my understanding that a recent hazmat exercise showed that the community was capable of responding. 

believe that we are developing a strong emergency preparedness foundation in the Anniston community and that we 

can build on the partnership that is beginning to develop between Federal, State and focal officials. While there are 

improvements that can be. made in the level of preparedness, we need to recognize that improvem~nts hav~ been 

made an(j the community IS better prepared than it was when the program started. So any change In exercIse 

ac!jvi1ies must value added. 

Lastly, I would like to comment on this method of floating ideas. It is not one I prefer. It basically circumvents what I 

would consider norma! CSEPP channels of communication. If someone has an idea for improving the program, then 

that person should contact the other slakeholders directly so the idea can be discussed. Using the courtesy copy on 

emails IS not a good way to develop support for an idea, especially when it involves an area that has been 

under someone else's direction. 

Craig Conklin. FEMA 

~---·Original Message-----

From: Lantzer. Paula K LTC SBCCOM [mailto:paula.lanlzer@SBCCOM.APGEAARMY.MILj 

Sent: Wednesday. August 28. 2002 1 t :21 AM 

11 
130 

09/19/02 17:41 FAX 

Subject: RE: The Anniston Star· August 28. 2002· "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" 

Importance: High 

SIrs, 

!ill 015 

This is the first that I have heard about this initiative. Please note that I, the Army's PM, am only a cc on the 

distribution; my exercise team leader is not on the address line at all; and the message is directed towards Mike 

Abrams. the ANCDF PAO. To my knowledge. this has not been coordinated with FEMA. 

While! am always in favor of using any opportunity for demonstrating, assessIng and improving capabilities and agree that we should exhaust every opportunity to assist ALL of our CSEPP communities. this clearty indicates 

that the office charged with CSEPP policy. guidance and oversight intends to run the Alabama exercise program. 

to include directing the number of exercises that the depot and our off-post partners are expected to execute. 

Once again, the organizations charged with the management and execution of CSEPP are being to!d how and 

whem to suck eggs! 

If) am doing such an inadequate job that HQOA must step In, why has thlS not been brought to the attention of 

my cbain of command? 

The imperial "we" is used throughout the message below, I don't know who that is? 

V.R .. Paula 

Fulks, 

We wholeheartedly support the exercise discussed below. It is imperative that we begin building public trust 

12 
131 

Igj016 

09/19/02 17:41 FAX 

and confidence in the Anniston region emergency response system that the Army, through CSEPP. has 

pumped over $100M into the last twelve years. 

We are looking at taking an aggressive, proactive approach to conducting a series of exercises in the 

Anniston CSEPP community beginning in the very near future and continuing until the community declares 

itself adequalely prepared lor a CSEPP type emergency. We define that community as comprising the depot, 

all the CSEPP counties and the Alabama state agencies What we envision is a monthly exercIse paradigm 

that focuses on specific response activities. One exercise might drill the medical component of the response 

system. The next exercise might focus on command and control. And each exercIse could work more than 

one CSEPP functional component. This mode! has worked exceptionally well at the Umatilla slle and we 

believe it wi!! work in Anniston too. 

This will require the Anniston Chemical Activity to plan and conduct monthly CAIRA-type exercises, although 

they do not have to be full blown CAIRAs. A range of drills falling between basic tabtetop exercises and full up 

field exercises with deploymenl of hot lines, field response teams, and so forth, probably would accomplish the 

objeclive of providing the Anniston CSEPP community with a variety of exercise opportunities. These drills 

also would provIde excellent opportunities to improve on post capabilities. if properly planned and executed. 

To support this robust exercise program we would launch a media campaign that Informs the public about the 

purpose of the drills, who we hope 10 have participate and what our objectives are. We also would make it 

known what agencies refused to participate and their excuses. 

In summary, we have a responsibility to the community 10 help it gel ready. Clearly, the current CSEPP 

approach for conducting a once-a~year exercise is not working In Anniston. The public is nervous and we are 

troubled by the recent refusal of certain county agencies to participate in exercises. The community is not 

ready for toxic operations, desplte the millions of dollars poured into emergency management in the region. 

We must change that status. 

We would greatly appreciate your comments. We will begin developing this proposed program with SBCCOM, 

AMC and FEMA to ensure the Anniston community has sufficient resources and support to carry out this 

proposal. 

Michael, please fOlWard this email to your new commander. I do no! have his email address. 

Thanks. 

Larry Skelly 

Room 1A875, Pentagon 

phone: 703.6951042 

fax: 703.614.5822 

~ ... ·Original Message--·--

From: Abrarns. Michael [<mailto:mabrams@ancdf.org» tnt: wedneSdaU rUgUst 28, 2002 7:23 AM 

II 
132 

09/19/02 17:41 FAX 1;J017 

Subject: The Anniston Star - August 28, 2002 - "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" 

The Anniston Star - Page 1B - Wednesday- August 28,2002 

Cleburne County tests preparedness today 

by Matthew Creamer, Star Staff Writer 

(<http://www.annistonstar.com/newsI2002Ias-cleburne-0828·mcreamer·2h28a1908.htm>) 

Sirens and tone-alert radios will be tested in Cleburne County today as part of a local exercise to 

prepare for a chemical weapons accident at the Anniston Army Depot. 

The drill will meaSUre the response of officials working in the county emergency operations center as 

well as that of residents, who have been asked to rehearse their shelter-in-piace plans. 

'Exercising your plans during the drill will help families to test their plans and to discover possible 

oversights one might not realize if the p!an were not practiced," said Steve Swafford, director of the Cleburne 

Counly Emergency Management Agency. 

For Cfeburne residents, this involves gOing indoors, dosing windows and doors, turning off heating. 

cooling and ventilation systems and remaining in an interior room. 

Cleburne will be only one of the six counties in the emergency preparedness program to perform a drill 

this year. A ful!~scale exercise was cancelled earlier this year because of disputes between the federal 

government and Calhoun County and state officials. 

"We're calling this a local exercise," said the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Terry Madden, 

who's in Cleburne County to evaluate the exercise. 

Depot officials will support the exercise electronically by notifying county officials of a staged mishap a\ 

the chemical stockpile. 

30---

«Anniston Star 28aug02 Exercise.doc>:::> 
133 

09/19/02 17:41 PAX 

.RlII!!!I!lII!!!"tp. in CSEPP Drills 

Date: Mon. 9 Sep 2002 20:36:39 -0400 

MIME-Version: 1.0 

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) 

Content-Type: multiparValternative; 

boundary="----_ = _NextPart_ 003_01 C25B43.6DAAED1 0" 

Mr. Conklin. 

~018 

rnan!\ yuu ,t,)!" your e-mail earlier toca~l< i appreciate yOU( irlOughts on the proposal to invite Anniston County to 

participatE' III several CSEPP exercises, The obJscllve of ihe Army'5 H'Ivitation, to be Issued by Dr. Flori (ASA(!&E)). I~' 

to encourage Anniston 10 participate in the very ddHs that it llas heretofore declined. The further purpose of the 

mvltatlOn IS to create a record dernonstrating that the Army has exerCised due diligence in preparing for operations, 

1f1clucilng encouraging Annlsron !o participate in exercises intended to prepare it for a potential emergency In sum, 

the Arm)' seeks 10 document Ihe inVitation and 10 cJocument thE' responSE: or lac\;; thereof, 

Ih;:: A.;IT\Y Intends to send 1he invitation to Annis!on by !he middle of next week, and so a draft must be prepared by 

c\Dse-Df-b~sln8ss fo;' Thursday of this week, The Ganien! of trlal draf! IS lesS Imporlant so long as it contams one basic 

e!ern~nt. em Invitation 10 Anniston to engage in CSEPP exercises In advance of ihe scheduled start of operations. Mr. 

Jim Dr4es, \fllho is now responsible for preparing the letter, would appreciate any specific assistance he could obtain 01"1 
134 

09/19/02 17:42 FAX ~019 

the draft {I understood from your e~mafl that you have reviewed a copy of the draft}, For example, I believe he would 

appreciate red-hne edits to the original document or detailed comments that he could easJly input. I encourage you 

and any others who perceive an issue with the current draft to provide him with any specific comments you might 

have. 

You also mentioned In your note that "floating ideas" is not an optimal manner for coordinating work on CSEPP 

issues. I agree. But I do not perceive that Larry Skel!y "floated" the Idea to Invite AnnIston to engage In preparedness 

aC~lvt!ies Rather, Mr Skelly carried out an instructIon that I gave him and for wh,ch 1 wi/! not fault t1im, The Army has 

a responsibility, as I explained previously, to build a record documenting its efforts to prepare for, operations. The 

invltallon to Anniston is part of that effort. and Mr. Skelly, and now Mr. Dries, halfe sought to assist me in building that 

record. They have also sought to obtain comments on the proposed invitation to Anniston, and I appreciate 

yOLlr interest and the interest of those to whom I have copied this note. 

I invile alilhose 10 whom this e-mail is addressed to consider the following concern: Many people copied on this 

and pnor e~maif5 in thiS chain were unnecessary, and we should be more circumspect in addressmg OUr 

correspondence. I believe we would all enjoy the courtesy of debating the relative merits of a POlOt outside an 

audience of General Officers, SESs, and Army Secretariat Thank you for considering my views, and for your 

commitment to assist Dr. Fiori in inviting Anniston to become more prepared. I am 

Sincerely, 

Russell Shearer 

C. Russell H. Shearer 

Acting Deputy Assistanl Secretary (Chemical Demilitarization) and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army II&E) 

110 Army Pentagon (2E613) 

Washington. DC 20310-0110 

Voice: (703) 692-9800 

Facsimile- (703) 692-9808 

Russel! Shearer@hqda.army mil 

This Internet e-mail rnessage contains legally PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL informalion intended for Ihe use of 

the addressee only. Please contact the undersigned by telephone or e-maiJ and report that you have received this 

message if YOLI are not the intended recipient Thereafter, please delete this message from your system 

16 
135 

09/19/02 17:42 FAX 

Subject: Contractor Concerns 

Date: Wed, 28 Aug 200216:01:28 -0400 

MIME-Version: 1.0 

X-Mailer: Internet Mail SeNice (5.5.2653.19) 

Content-Type: multipar1lmixed; 

boundary="----_ = __ NextPart __ 002_01 C25B43. 60AAED1 0" 

Bob, 

They strike again! 

IiiI020 

One of my contractors has voiced concerns that the Battelle employs under contract to DASA(ESOH), but not 

IPAs. are usmg ASA(l&E) office symbols in e-mails and when registering for conferences. Quoting from DA MEMO 17 

August 1999 Subject: Contractors in the Government Workplace. "When drafting service contracts. Govemment 

agencies will inClude a requirement thal contractor personnel must identify themselves as contractors when attending 

meetings, answering Government telephones, or working in situations where their actions CQuid be construed as 

official Government acts. The Government manager or COTR must ensure that the contracted employee displays his 

or her name and Ihe name of the company while in the work area, wears and displays a building pass al aI/ times, and 

includes the company name in his or her email display." . 

I've attached a recent e~rnail from Larry Skelly that includes Jay Hanfine and Charles Holmes with ASA(I&E) 

addresses. 

Paula / 

«RE: The Anniston Star· August 28, 2002 • "Cleburne County tests preparedness today"» 

Message-ID: <640C9567 4D781840982E 1AOOB1 018A2001332456@DADC131> 
136 

D9119/02 17:42 FAX 

preparedness today" 

Date: Wed, 28 Aug 200208:17:53 -0400 

MIME-Version: 1,0 

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5,5,2653, 19) 

Content-Type: multipart/alternative; 

boundary="----_ = _NextParL005_ 01 C25B43,6DAAED10" 

Folks, 

141021 

We wholeheartedly support the exercise discussed below, It is imperative that we pegin building pupfic trust and 

confidence in the Anniston region emergency response system that the Army, through CSEPP, has pumped over 

$100M into the last twelve years 

We are looking at taking an aggressive, proactive approach to conducting a series of exercises in the Anniston 

CSEPP community beginning in the very near future and continuing until the community declares itself adeqlJately 

prepared for a CSEPP type emergency, We define that community as comprising the depot, all the CSEPP counties 

and the Alabama state agencies, What we envision is a monthly exercise paradigm that focuses on specific response 

activities, One exercise might drill the medical component of the response system. The next exercise might focus on 

command and control. And each exercise could work more than one CSEPP functional component. This model has 

worked exr:eptlonally well at the Umatilla site and we believe it wi/! work in Anniston too 

This will require the Anniston Chemical Activity to plan and conduct monthly CAIRA-type exercises, although they do 

not have to be full blown CAIRAs, A range of drills falling Pe!ween basic tabletop exercises and full up field exercises 

with deployment of hot lines, field response teams, and so forth, probably would accomplish the objective of providing 

the Anniston CSEPP community with a variety of exercise opportunities, These drills also would provide excellent 

opportunities to improve on post capabilHies, if properly planned and executed, 

To support this robust exercise program we would launch a media campaign that informs the public about the purpose 

of the drills, who we hope to have participate and what our objectives are, We also would make it known what 

agencies refused to participate and their excuses. 

In summary, we have" ,esponsibUity to the community to help it get ready. Clearly, the current CSEPP approach for 

conducting a once-a-year exercise is not working in Anniston, The public is nervoUS and we are troubled by the recent 

refusal of certain county agencies to partiCipate in exercises, The community is not ready for toxic operations, despite 

the millions of dollars poured into emergency management in the region, We must change that status, 

We would greaily appreciate your comments, We will begin developing this proposed program with SBCCOM, AMC 

and FEMA to ensure the AnoJston community has suffjcient resources and support to carry out this proposal. 

Micl"'lael, please forward this email to your new cornmandeL I do not have his emai! address. 

Thanl,s 

Larry Skelly 

Room 1A875, Pentagon 

IS 
137 

09/19/02 17: 42 FAX 

phone: 703695,1042 

fax: 703,614,5822 

-----Original Message----~ 

From: Abrams. Michael [<mailto:mabrams@ancdf.org» 

~9USf 28.2002 7:23AM 

Subjecf' The Anniston Star· August 28. 2002 • "Cleburne County tests preparedness today" 

The Anniston Star· Page 18· Wednesday· August 28, 2002 

Cleburne County tests preparedness today 

by Matthew Creamer, Star Staff Writer 

«htlp:llwww.annislonstaLcom/newst2002/as-ciebume-OB2B-mcreamer-2h2Ba190B.htm> ) 

~022 

Sirens and tone·alert radios witl be tested in Cleburne County today as part of a local exercise to prepare for a 

chemical weapons accident at the Anniston Army Depot. 

The drill will measure the response of officials workIng in the county emergency operations center as well as that 

of residents, who have been asked to rehearse their sheJter-in-place plans. 

"Exercising your plans during the drill will help families to test theIr plans and to discover possible oversighls one 

might not realize if the plan were not practIced." said Steve SWafford, director of the Cleburne County Emergency 

Management Agency. 

For Cleburne residents, this involves going indoors, cloSing windows and doors, turning off heating, cooling and 

ventilation systems and remaining in an inter:cr room. 

Cleburne will be only one of the six counties in the emergency preparedness program to perform a drill this year, 

A fuU·scale exercise was cancelled earlier this year because of disputes bet\veen the federal government and Calhoun 

County and state officia!s 

"We're calling this a local exercise,n said the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Terry Madden, who's in 

Cleburne County to evaluate the exercise. 

Oepot officials wi!! support the exercise electronically by notifying county officials of a staged mishap at the 

chemical stockpile. 

··,30,· 

19 
138 

SfP. 20. 2002 4:45PM ------------NO.3257-P 1 __ _ 

TO: 

NUMBER: 

FROM: 

DATE: 

Fax Transmittal Notice 

OFFICE of Congressman Bob Riley . Third lJistrict of Alabama 

.322 Cannon HOB 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

ph: (202) 225-3261 

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139 

·W. 20. 20Q2 4: 45PM ----------NO.3257-p 2

'

----

BOB RILEY 3IWDIS'mICT,AlA8A,MA 

AsmsTAI<i'r "'lAJONrYWHIf" 

~2 CANNON HOUSE On:lta BI.<IUMNQ 

W,.,SHlNCTON, Oc 20515-0103 

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bOb,rifey@msil,house.gov 

WWW.hOUlie,gOvrril~y 

Dr. Mario Fiori 

(:ongrt55 of !be llniteb $Btate5 ~olUle of ~tprt1lmtatlbt1S 

'Baliblngton, iDtC 20515--0103 

September 20, 2002 

Assistant Secretary ofthe Army, 

for Installations and Environment 

110 Army Pentagon 

Washington, DC 20310-0110 

Dear Dr. Fiori, 

ARMED SERVlC£s COMMITTEE 

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It is with great disappointment that I recently learned of the aetions and intentions of your 

department regarding the Anny's Chemical Demilitarization Program in Anniston, Alabama. 

The Birmingham News reported today that the Army "intends to embarrass Anniston officials 

and shift public scom over the cbemi.<:al weapons incinerator away from itselfwith a strategy 

revealed in recent e-mails exchanged at the Pentagon," I am discoUIaged because this effort 

appears to be yet another troubling chapter in the Anniston aspect of Army's Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). 

The primary reason that this recent string of e-mails dismays me i. that the effort to 

embarrass Anniston officials is wholly unsuitable for a serious situation such as CSEPP. Instead 

of devising a public relations strategy to bann the public image of state and local officials, the 

Army should be concentrating instead on working with the relevant leaders to develop solutions 

to the many outstanding problems related to CSEPP in Alab3lll11. To date. the issues of 

collective protection of schools, provisions fO! "special needs" residents, toxicity data remain 

unresolved. Furthennore, and perhaps most importantly. the Army does not have a finn 

resolution regarding the rate and order with which the weapons stockpiled at Anniston will be 

destroyed. It would please me greatly to see the employees of your department in the Army 

devise a strategy to proactively engage stale and local officials in efforts to find solutions to these 

issues rather than fonnulate designs to discredit others. 

Secondly, I am truly concerned about the c1aodestine manner with which this information 

has been made public. It is irresponsible for Pentagon employees to convey e-mails concerning 

such strategies. It would have been more appropriate for your office to simply express your 

concerns with local and state leaders to me or my staff. If that had occurred, I may have been 

able to broach a compromise between the two sides. Sadly, this is often how infonnatioll has 

been communicated during the entire CSEPP process. For several years I have seen the Army's 

unwillingness to actively engage the Alabama Congressional delegation in constructive dialogue 

in many aspects of this issue. Unfortunately, this episode is another example of the Army's 

reluctance to interact with Alabama's leadership regarding CSEPP. 

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140 

SEP, 20. 2002 4: 45PM NO, 3257 P 3 

To that end, 1 request that you brief me personally within the next two weeks on this 

recent string of a-mails regarding the Army's public relations efiOrt for CSEPP in Anniston. I 

would like an explanation as to why this apparent strategy to etnblUTllSs local and state officials 

was undertaken by your staff. Finally, I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the many 

outstanding CSEPP issues remaining in regatds to Anniston. 

I thank you for your time and consideration to Ibis matter. I anticipate YOllI response to 

my request for a personal briefing. Please do not hesitate to contact me, or have your staff 

contact my office, at (202) 225-3261. As always, 1 remain, 

Sincerely. 

RRR/bS8 

~e 
141 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA-IE 

From: Begines, Tom J COL OCPA 

Sent: 

To: Friday, September 20, 2002 5:31 PM 

Ray, Nancy M COL ASA-I&E 

Cc: Begines,Tom J COL OCPA; Burwell, Rudolph L MAJ OCPA; Fatz, Raymond J Mr ASA-I&E; 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA-I&E 

Subject: HOT - Responses to Anniston Media 

Importance: Low 

Nancy, 

The four Alabama region media below are pressing for responses today to their queries, Our sensing is they will 

file their stories today whether we respond or not Those stories will likely be a repetition of the Birmingham News story 

(except for Mary Orndorffs story, which will be a follow up), If we do not respond today, we'll get "Army had no commenf' 

statements in the coverage and will lose our opportunity to shape the coverage, 

REQUEST APPROVAL FROM OASA(I&E) leadership to provide ON THE RECORD to the four outlets that have 

inquired the suggested responses below OR WHATEVER RESPONSES THE OASA(I&E) leadership prefers, 

Thanks, 

Col. Tom Begines 

Chief, Media Relations Division 

Army Public Affairs 

~··"·Origlna! Message""---

From: Burwell, Rudolph L MAl OCPA sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 5:16 PM 

To: Begines,Tom J COL OCPA 

Subject: Anniston Inquires 

Importance: Low 

Sir, 

Proposed responses, 

Birmingham News (Mary Orndorffl: Does the Army plan to conduct the preparedness exercises as outlined in the emails from the I&E Leadership? What comment do you have about Calhoun County officials calling for the dismissal or 

reassignment of Mr. Jim Skelley? (202,383,7837) 

We will continue to work with FEMA to prepare for additional Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 

(CSEPP) exercises that involve each of the local communities, The Army has as its highest priority in the Chemical 

Demilitarization program the goal of providing maximum protection to the public, the environmenl and the workforce, The 

suggested motivations and tactics detailed in the e-mails do not reflect the intent of the leadership of the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment Mr. Skelley remains in his current assignment 

Anniston star (Matt Creamer): 1st question: Same as above, If yes, then his follow-up is do we believe this plan is at 

odds with the FEMA plan (who are quoted as basically saying that it is), His next question is: Are we mostly concerned 

only with "public appearances" as mentioned in the e-mail string? What comment do you have about Calhoun County 

officials calling for the dismissal or reassignment of Mr, Jim Skelley (256,235,3550) 

We will continue to work with FEMA to prepare for additional Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 

(CSEPP) exercises that involve each of the local communities, The Army has as its highest priority in the Chemical 

Demilitarization program the goal of providing maximum protection to the public, the environment and the workforce, The 

suggested motivations and tacticS detailed in the e-mails do not reflect the intent of the leadership of the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and Environment Mr. Skelley remains in his current assignment 

AP (Kyle Wingfield): Are we going with the exercise schedule as outlined in the e-mails? Also, what is our response to 

Governor Siegle man's comment that we were more concerned with "covering our butts" than with public safety? 

1 
142 

(&00,821.3737) 

We will continue to work with FEMA to prepare for additional Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 

(CSEPP) exercises that involve each of the local communities, The Army has as its highest priority in the Chemical 

Demilitarization program the goal of providing maximum protection to the public, the environment and the workforce, The 

suggested motivations and tactics detailed in the e-mails do not reflect the intent of the leadership of the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and Environment. 

AP (Jeff McMurray): Basically same as above, Is our strategy to put pressure on the county? (202,776,9542) 

We will continue to work with FEMA to prepare for additional Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 

(CSEPP) exercises that involve each of the local communities, The Army has as its highest priority in the Chemical 

Demilitarization program the goal of providing maximum protection to the public, the environment and the workforce, The 

suggested motivations and tactics detailed in the e-mails do not reflect the intent of the leadership of the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and Environment. 

Major Rudy Burwell 

Weapons, Environment and Technology Media Relations 

Army Public Affairs 

703-697-7591 

rudolph,burwell@hqda,army,mii 
143 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA-IE 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Cc: 

Sohl, Jill M PMCD [jill.sohl@pmcd.apgea.army.mil] 

Friday, September 20, 2002 5:25 PM 

Fatz, Raymond J Mr ASA-I&E; Shearer, Russell SES ASA-I&E 

'dbunch1941@aol.com' 

Subject: Talking Points 

Suggested Talking Points 

Army's Priorities 

1. We subscribe to the maximum protection standard. 

2. We have no intent to start up Anniston until Counties and State are 

fully ready and have worked with us in planning and exercises to feel 

comfortable with both its role and that of the Army. 

3. We have been working with FEMA and Army elements to assure funding needs 

are identified and can be met. Staff dialogue continues. 

4. We recognize it will take time to improve the CSEPP situation. During 

this time, we are taking steps to further reduce the risk posed by the 

existing stockpile. 

-lightning protection 

-storage configuration 

5. Anniston start up is not a priority until the above items are done. 
144 

Shearer. Russell SES ASA-IE 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Subject: 

Ray, Nancy M COL ASA-I&E 

Thursday, September 19, 2002 7:27 PM 

Burwell, Rudolph L MAJ OCPA; Shearer, Russell SES ASA-I&E 

FW: Anniston CSEP Query 

-----Original Message-----

From: Finegan, Janis Civ AMe G5 

Sent: Thursday, September 19 t 2002 6:09 PM 

To: Ray, Nancy M COL ASA-I&E 

Subject: FTd: Anniston CSEP Query 

-----Original Message-----

From: Daughdrill, Marilyn J PMCD 

[mail to :marilyn. daughdrill@pmcd.apgea.army.milJ 

Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2002 5:42 PM 

To: 'Finegan, Jan'; Morales, Miguel L Mr. SBCCOM 

Subject: FW: Anniston CSEP Query 

Jan & Mickey: I'm forwarding this heads up to you -- realized that since I 

have warned Nancy that you both needed a warning as well. I got no answers 

when I tried to call the CSEP office, so I'm not sure who Mary will finally 

track down. As I noted below, I don I t have the e-mails that she was talking 

about, although I have heard rumors. Mike Abrams is also aware of this 

query and was trying to locate Cathy Coleman to 9i ve her a heads up. Hope 

I fm not out of my lane. Marilyn 

-----Original Message-----

From: Daughdrill, Marilyn J PMCD 

Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2002 5:33 PM 

> To: Bunch, Delbert F PMCD; Burnett, Donald J LTC PMCD; Lesniak, 

Christopher F COL PMCD; 'dbunch1941@aol.com ' 

Subj eet: Anniston CSEP Query 

I received a query from Mary Orndorf, Birmingham News. this afternoon 

> concerning the CSEP program. It appears that she is the recipient of a 

> faxed copy of a string of e-mails dealing with an Army proposal to conduct 

> monthly exercises in the Anniston community. Apparently some of the 

language in the e-mails is controversial, with the intent to publicize the 

county's refusal to prepare themselves. She recognized that PMCD is not 

> responsible for the CSEP program, she was just looking for a referral to 

> the appropriate office. Since I was not aware of these e-mails, I 

> suggested she try either the Army eSE? PAO or the Army public affairs 

> office. I did contact Nancy Ray to give her a heads up that this will be 

news tomorrow in Alabama. Ms. Orndorf had already shared these messages 

with the state/counties and indicated that they were not at all happy with 

> Dr. Fiori and the Army. The Army public affairs office has been alerted 

> -- the CSEP PAO is out of the office until Monday. Marilyn 
145 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA-IE 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Cc: 

Subject: 

Importance: 

Anniston 

edltorial.doc 

Michelini, Mark A Mr ASA-ILE 

Tuesday, September 24, 2002 3:55 PM 

Shearer, Russell SES ASA-I&E 

Ray, Nancy M COL ASA-I&E; Heilig, Gregg J Mr ASA-ILE; Yates, Kathryn E Ms ASA-I&E; 

Sears, Cynde Ms ASA (I&E); 'Cynde Sears (ICF) , (E-mail) 

Draft reply to Anniston Star Editorial 

High 

Anniston Star 24sep02 EdltO" .... 

Draft reply for consideration, also attached is the Editorial as published. 

VIR 

Mark 

Mark Michelini 

ICF Consulting 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, 

Chemical Demilitarization 

Phone (703) 604-2323 

Fax (703) 604-2344 
146 

The Army has as its highest priority in the Chemical Demilitarization Program the goal of 

providing maximum protection to the public, the environment and the workforce while 

proceeding to rid our communities of these outdated weapons. The suggested 

motivations and tactics detailed in the e-mails do not accurately reflect the intent ofthe 

leadership of the Office ofthe Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and 

Environment. The internal Army emails that were released outside official channels were 

records of "conversations" that can best be described as brainstorming, and clearly reflect 

some frustration with the issues that have beset this program. They also reflect the level 

of attention the Alabama CSEPP program commands. 

The Army remains committed to engaging state and local officials in ensuring the safe 

storage and disposal of the chemical stockpile in Anniston, Alabama, as well as at the 

other stockpile storage sites. Only through a renewed level of effort in working 

collaboratively can we safely and efficiently reduce the risk posed by the continued 

storage of the chemical stockpile at Anniston. 
147 

Page 1 of2 

The Anniston Star - Page 4A - Editorial- Tuesday - September 24, 2002 

Army ambush 

In our opinion 

(http://www.annistonstar.com/opinion/2002/as-editorials-0924-editorial-2i23q1850.htm) 

What exactly are the people in charge of chemical demilitarization at the Army doing 

these days? Certainly not their job, that's clear. 

What else is clear is that the only work the decision-makers in Washington have been 

doing lately is hatching a plot to try to ambush the Calhoun County Commission and the local 

emergency management agency with a public relations ploy. 

It is the height of arrogance, it is irresponsible and it shows that the people who are in 

charge of the program in Washington have their priorities about as confused as they could 

possibly be. 

Someone, maybe several people, ought to take his or her lack of talents elsewhere. 

Here's the problem: An internal email exchange between top Army personnel dealing 

with chemical demilitarization found its way to the press at week's end. The exchange, first 

revealed by the Birmingham News' Washington correspondent, left no doubt the Army intended 

to set local officials up for a very bad PRjob. 

The scheme called for the Army to hold a number of exercises designed to prepare for a 

possible accident or incident at the Anniston Army Depot. When the local EMA and County 

Commission would refuse to cooperate (what the Army anticipated them doing) the Army would 

then launch into a frontal public relations assault. 

Pentagon employee Larry Shelly described the plan in his email as an attempt to "take the 

offensive in Alabama and become proactive rather that reactive to the negative media coverage 

the last year." 

Mr. Shelly is mighty busy conjuring up ways to slam the local EMA and the County 

Commission. Ifhe and his colleagues turned all that energy and attention into solving the 

problems of emergency preparedness and the existing stockpile maybe we could rid ourselves of 

the problem. 

But this isn't just about Mr. Shelly, this is about a new culture that seems to have crept 

into the Washington side of this operation. Shelly'S email exchange is with Russell Shearer, an 

assistant to the director of the chemical demilitarization program, Assistant Secretary of the 

Army Mario Fiori. 

It is clear in the exchange that all three men know about and approve of the scheme. So it 

isn't just a lone bureaucrat who is engaging more of his time and energy in whacking local 

authorities than getting rid of the deadly nerve agent stockpile, but the leadership of the 

organization. 

That, good people of Anniston, stinks to high heaven and demands that changes be made 

high up if this community is to regain the respect of the chemical demilitarization leadership. 

This is a serious tum of events, but it is just the latest. A look over the past few weeks 

and months gives one the impression that Mr. Fiori has the attitude that the community is not 

nearly as important as the program. 

(More) 
148 

Page 2 of2 -- The Anniston Star - Editorial- Tuesday - September 24, 2002 

Army ambush ( ... continued) 

Note that not long ago we learned that again the Washington crowd was pushing a new 

plan for the disposal of the stockpile, even though it actually slightly increased the risk to the 

community. The word from Washington was that the changes were needed because it would 

eliminate the stockpile a few months sooner. 

That was and remains a bad idea, one that is not supported by this community, but for 

some odd reason - perhaps we are again in the public relations realm again - is championed 

by a cluster of apparent eggheads in the head office. 

As long as the stockpile sits there it poses a danger to this community. It must be 

destroyed and the best way to do that is by proven incineration methods. The Army certainly 

does not need to ambush the local authorities to get that point across. 

What it does need to do, however, is to start involving itself in a good faith dialogue with 

the community and our leaders. 

The truth can make for some good public relations. 

--- 30 ---
149 

REP\.YTO 

OEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT II&E) 

110 ARMY PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON OC 20310-0110 

ATTENTION Of C. Russell H. Shearer 

Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army II&E) 13E461) 

(703) 692-9817 

MEMORANDUM 

To: 

From: 

Honorable Mario P. Fiori 

C. Russell H. Shearer 

Date: September 19, 2002 

Re.: Senator Shelhy's Concerns Regarding Anniston CSEPP 

Senator Shelby raised several concerns in his letter of September 19,2002, regarding the 

CSEPP program at Anniston, Alabama. I have set out the points below that I believe we should 

emphasize: 

The Army is committed to providing maximum protection, and training for 

emergency preparedness is an essential element ofthat protection. 

The e-mails reflect no intent to subvert the chemical demilitarization process, the 

CSEPP preparedness process, or the CSEPP funding process. 

The e-mails reflect the agency-deliberative staff work searching for a fair and 

cooperative means of preparing the local communities for operations. 

o They also reflect some frustration with the issues that have beset this 

program. 

o More fundamentally they reflect the sincere desire of the Army to seek out 

the assistance and cooperation of the Army's CSEPP PMs and FEMA's 

CSEPP PMs to draft a plan to ensure the Anniston community's 

preparedness. 

o They reflect inter-agency deliberation on how to encourage more CSEPP 

exercises and training, obtain the sources of funding for those exercises, 

and encourage the participation of all the local communities. 

o They explain the Army's obligation to exercise and document due 

diligence in adhering to its operations schedule and in preparing the 

communities for operations. 
150 

Alabama CSEPP Concerns 

September 20, 2002 

The e-mails reflect the Army's earnest desire to work collaboratively with 

FEMA and its Regions. 

o This is demonstrated by the e-mail exchanges between Army and FEMA. 

The e-mails reflect the Army's earnest desire to work collaboratively with the 

local communities. 

o The e-mails explain that the communities were to be invited to participate 

in additional CSEPP exercises once logistics, funding, and other planning 

matters had been completed. 

No intent to withhold, now or in the future, CSEPP funding from Alabama that 

has been programmed. 

o To the contrary, the e-mails discuss the potential that funding would be 

diverted in this Fiscal Year from other efforts (or used from prior Fiscal 

Years) to fund the additional Anniston CSEPP exercises. 

o This matter is under deliberation, just as it was when it was discussed in 

the e-mails. 

• The Army regrets that the Army's staff work could be misinterpreted. 

o Nature of inter- and intra-agency deliberative staff work is that it is not 

intended for release outside the Government, and that it is intended to 

encourage the free flow and discussion of ideas. 

o Deliberative elements of staff work when released, and especially when 

released prematurely, fail to present the final product that results from the 

deliberative process and much less the decision maker's determination. 

2 

o Instead, those elements represent various snapshots in time of the staff's 

consideration of facts, procedures, external pressures, and even frustration. 

The Army will continue to prepare for operations at Anniston and, more 

importantly, to ensure that safety is paramount. 

o We will also continue to work with FEMA to prepare for additional 

CSEPP exercises that involve each of the local communities. 

o Meetings with FEMA to discuss this matter had been planned prior to 

Senator Shelby's letter and will take place shortly. 
151 

RESOLUTION 

WHEREAS; The presence of a the chemical stockpile has presented a risk to area 

residents for over forty years, and 

WHEREAS; Incineration is a proven means of safely destroying chemical agent as 

evidenced in Johnston Island Atoll, and 

WHEREAS; Anniston Chemical Demilitarization Facility (ANCDF) provides a safe and 

effective means of ridding the area of the dangerous weapons, and 

WHEREAS; Area residents have been provided opportunities to receive equipment 

and training, and 

WHEREAS; The beginning of operation to destroy the weapons took the cooperative 

effort of many agencies and organizations, as well as that ofindividual 

elected and appointed officials, and 

WHEREAS; As the process moves forward, area residents become safer each day, 

rocket by rocket, agent by agent, 

BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED THAT The Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce 

commends The Honorable Dr. Mario Fiori for his work 

Duly approved and Adopted by vote of the Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce Board 

o~;!;orA~~p,~ 

K nneth A. Deal Sherri J. Sunmers CE 

Chairman President 
152 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Audit Services 

Audit Report 

Implementation of the Department of 

Energy's Beryllium-Associated 

Worker Registry 
153 

Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

April 20, 2006 

MEMORANDUMFOR~S~~~ .. __ 

FROM: ~~/ 

SUBJECT: 

BACKGROUND 

Inspector General 

INFORMATION: Audit Report on 'Implementation of the 

Department of Energy's Beryllium-Associated Worker Registry" 

The Department of Energy (Department) has a long history of beryllium use due to the 

element's broad application to many nuclear weapon and reactor operations and 

proces,~es. Exposure to beryllium can cause beryllium sensitization or even Chronic 

Beryliium Disease, which is an often debilitating, and sometimes fatal, lung condition. 

In January 2000, the Department established a Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention 

Prograin in part to reduce worker exposure to beryllium at Energy facilities. 

A key component of the Prevention Program was the establishment of a BerylliumAssociated Worker Registry (Registry), designed to aggregate beryllium-assc" iated 

worker informatlon, such as exposure and medical data, from all Department sites. The 

DepaItment's Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) planned to 'J!;e the Registry 

as an occupational health research tool to assist it in determining the exposure profil'! and 

disease status of beryllium-associated workers and to better understand the 'lature of the 

disease. Registry policy and direction were the responsibility of EH. However, 

implementation was the responsibility of the individual facilities, with the Department's 

program offices ensuring compliance for sites under their cognizance. Operation of the 

Registry is a complex effort requiring the close coordination of EH, the program offices, 

and the Department's field sites. The Department required sites to begin submitting 

information to the Registry by January 2002. The objective of this audit was to 

determine whether the Department had established, maintained and effectively used the 

Registry to evaluate worker health effects associated with beryllium exposure, 

RESULTS OF AUDIT 

The Registry was established as planned. Yet, the Department had not maintained data 

completeness or accuracy; used the Registry to evaluate health effects of beryllium 

exposure; nor, used the Registry as initially envisioned to examine the prevalence of 

beryllium disease. Specifically: 

• The Registry was not complete. For example, the Fernald and Miamisburg 

Closure Sites and Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plants had not 

reported any data for inclusion in the Registry. Yet, at least two of these sites had 

workers with known Chronic Beryllium Disease; 

* hinted with soy ink on recycled paper 
154 

2 

• A number of required data fields in the Registry had not been populated. One 

such field concemed the use of a respirator by workers, an important tool in 

preventing beryllium exposure; and, 

• The Registry did not always contain accurate information. Some of the required 

data fields, for example, contained obvious discrepancies, such as inaccurate 

beryllium exposure information. These and other such fields appeared essential to 

the effectiveness of the Registry. 

In addition, the Department had not used the Registry to evaluate the health effects of 

beryllium exposure or the prevalence of beryllium disease. In fact, since the January 

2002 implementation, the Department had not issued even one report which relied on the 

data from the Registry. 

We found that not all of the Department's sites had determined the applicability of the 

Registry reporting requirements to their operations. Further, not all of the sites involved 

with the Registry had corrected known data errors and deficiencies. Although EH stated 

that it had contacted some Department sites regarding errors in the sites' Registry 

submissions, EH had not followed up with Department program offices to ensure that the 

errors had been corrected. In addition EH had not established an implementation plan 

that included identifying the specific analyses, supporting data, and reports needed to use 

the Registry as intended as an occupational health research tool. We concluded that this 

was the most likely reason that occupational health reports had not been generated using 

data in the Registry. 

The question of worker health and safety has been of primary concern to the Department 

for a number of years, especially given the vulnerabilities associated with the processes 

and materials in use throughout the complex. Since assuming agency leadership, your 

Administration has placed great emphasis on making the Department's work environment 

as safe as possible. In this vein, the Registry, from its conception, was intended to assist 

in the overall effort of ensuring worker health and safety. However, the audit results 

showed that Registry program implementation did not meet its own expectations nor was 

it as helpful as it could have been in achieving the worker safety objectives that you have 

established. While EH program officials informed us that they are committed to 

improving the effectiveness of the Registry, the audit report includes several 

recommendations to assist efforts in restructuring the Registry and, as a consequence, to 

advance the state of worker health and safety in the Department. 

MANAGEMENT REACTION 

Management concurred with the report's findings and recommendations with the 

exception of recommendation number four, for which it proposed an acceptable 

alternative. Management indicated that it will implement changes to the management of 

the Registry based on the recommendations to improve the quality of data submitted to 

the Registry. Management also noted that it completed the first report on the prevalence 

of beryllium sensitization and Chronic Beryllium Disease using registry data, SUbsequent 

to the completion of our audit. Management's verbatim comments are included in 

Appendix 3. 
155 

3 

Attachment 

cc: Deputy Secretary 

Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

Chief of Staff 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health 
156 

REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY'S BERYLLIUM-ASSOCIATED WORKER REGISTRY 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

Implementation of Beryllium Registry 

Details of Finding ............................................................................................................. . 

Recommendations and Comments ................................................................................... . 

Appendices 

4 

1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology ......................................................................... 6 

2. Prior Audit Report ..................................................................................................... 9 

3. Management Comments ............................................................................................ 10 
157 

Implementation of Beryllium Registry 

Maintenance and 

Use of Registry 

Page 1 

The data in the Department of Energy's (Department) BerylliumAssociated Worker Registry (Registry) was neither complete nor 

fully accurate. Further, the Department had not used the Registry 

to evaluate health effects of beryllium exposure or the prevalence 

of beryllium disease, two of the objectives of the Chronic 

Beryllium Disease Prevention Program (Prevention Program). 

Complete and Accurate Data 

The Department had not maintained the Registry to ensure the 

data's completeness and accuracy. Specifically, the Registry did 

not contain data from all of the Department's sites falling under the 

reporting requirement, nor had all of the required data fields been 

populated. In addition, many of the records in the Registry were 

inaccurate. 

Completeness 

The Registry did not contain data from all of the Department's sites 

falling under the reporting requirements. Currently, 20 of the 

Department's sites have submitted data to the Registry. While the 

scope of audit focused primarily on the completeness of the data 

within the Registry, we identified additional sites that had not 

reported any relevant data to the Registry. Specifically, two of the 

Department's closure sites, Fernald and Miamisburg, had not 

reported any data to the Registry despite the potential for beryllium 

exposure based on legacy Department operations at those sites. 

Further, available records document the existence of berylliumassociated workers at Miamisburg. Also, there was evidence of 

Chronic Beryllium Disease at the Department's two leased gaseous 

diffusion plants at Paducah and Portsmouth; however, none of this 

information was reported to the Registry. A prior Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) report (OAS-L-05-08, June 2005), 

referenced concerns that the Department needed to determine the 

extent to which the Prevention Program was applicable to Paducah 

and Portsmouth. At the time, the Department informed the OIG 

that it recognized these issues and had initiated action to address 

these concerns. 

In addition, not all of the required data fields in the Registry were 

populated. We reviewed the records from the Kansas City Plant 

(Kansas City), Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos), 

Pantex Plant (Pantex), Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), 

and Rocky Flats Closure Project (Rocky Flats), and found required 

data fields that were unpopulated for all of the sites. For example, 

none of the records tested for Kansas City, Pantex, or Rocky Flats 

Details of Finding 
158 

Page 2 

indicated whether respirator protection was used. In addition, 

medical data was missing for all of the worker records tested for 

Rocky Flats, as well as 20 of the 29 records tested for Los Alamos. 

Both respiratory protection and medical data are essential if the 

Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) is to provide 

complete and meaningful analyses of beryllium related issues. For 

instance, trend and correlation analysis cannot be made between 

exposure data, including the use of respiratory protection, and 

medical results, if data is missing from either of the fields. 

Accuracv 

Not all of the data reported in the Registry was accurate. We 

reviewed the records for Los Alamos, Pantex, and Y -12, and all 

had required data fields containing inaccurate data. For example at 

Y -12, 18 exposure records included data relating to the protective 

use of a respirator. However, the same set of records in another 

data field contained conflicting and irreconcilable information. 

Also, 26 records for individual workers at Pantex had a work 

termination date of January 1900, obviously prior to the workers' 

dates of birth. These exceptions were brought to the attention of 

representatives from both sites and we were told that efforts were 

being made to take corrective action. It is vital for EH to ensure 

the accuracy of these records, since each record is critical to 

tracking the beryllium work history and performing the analyses 

needed to mitigate further beryllium exposure. 

In addition, duplicate records were found in the Registry for four 

sites reviewed: Y-12, Rocky Flats, Los Alamos, and Pantex. In 

fact, since the implementation date of January 7, 2002, one Rocky 

Flats exposure record was repeated 192 times in the Registry. For 

the same period at Pantex, 386 of the 1,805 work history records 

were identified in multiple sets, including one record that occurred 

40 times. 

Use of the Registry 

Though the Registry was implemented several years ago, EH had 

not used it for at least one of its intended purposes, an occupational 

health research tool to determine the prevalence of disease and to 

document health effects associated with beryllium exposures. In 

fact, in the past four years EH had not generated any reports using 

the data from the Registry. EH is currently in the process of 

developing such a relevant health report; however, its usefulness 

may be limited given the questions that have been raised regarding 

Registry data quality. 

Details of Finding 
159 

Data Conversion 

and Programmatic 

Oversight 

Page 3 

Despite the fact that the Prevention Program was a Department 

priority, not all Department sites, including closure sites and 

leased facilities, had determined the extent to which the Registry 

reporting requirements were applicable to them. Further, the sites 

that had submitted data to the Registry had not corrected known 

data errors and EH had not followed up with Department program 

offices to ensure that the sites complied. Finally, EH had not 

established an implementation plan that included identifying the 

specific analyses, supporting data, and reports needed to use the 

Registry as an effective occupational health research tool. 

Consequently, the Registry effort had not resulted in the generation 

of a single report to assist the Department in its worker health and 

safety program. 

Responsible EH officials indicated that they were aware of data 

errors in the Registry and that they had directly contacted some of 

the sites, such as Rocky Flats, about the sites' errors. However, we 

found that EH had not followed up with the appropriate program 

offices to ensure that the data errors submitted by field sites had 

been corrected. The Department worked with the Oak Ridge 

Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) to establish the 

Registry. As part of its responsibility, ORlSE performed logic 

checks on the data received from each site to validate its 

credibility. Details of data errors identified in the submissions 

were provided by ORISE in writing to the reporting sites and to 

EH. However, EH did not have a comprehensive program in place 

to follow up with the Department program offices to ensure site 

compliance with Registry protocols. 

In addition, EH did not have an implementation plan to ensure that 

the Registry was useful as an occupational health research tool. 

One ofEH's performance measures was to maintain the Registry to 

determine the prevalence of beryllium disease and document the 

progression of health effects associated with beryllium exposure. 

However, EH had not designed an implementation plan that 

identified the frequency and type of analyses, the specific 

information needed to conduct such analyses, or the method of 

reporting results to the sites. The Department recently 

incorporated its Beryllium-Associated Worker Registry Data 

Collection and Management Guidance into a Department 

Technical Standard effective January 2006. However, the 

Technical Standard did not directly address the areas of concern 

noted above, nor was the use of the Technical Standard mandatory. 

Details of Finding 
160 

Ensuring Worker 

Health and Safety 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

MANAGEMENT 

REACTION 

Page 4 

The 2003-2006 Strategic Plan for EH states that maintaining the 

Registry to determine the prevalence of disease and document the 

progression of health effects associated with beryllium exposures 

is important to ensuring the safety and health of the workers at 

Department facilities. As a result of not being able to make full 

use of the Registry, four years of data had not been analyzed, data 

that may have assisted the Department in assuring the safety and 

health of its workforce. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Environment, 

Safety and Health direct the Office of Epidemiology and Health 

Surveillance to: 

1. Work with the appropriate Departmental program offices 

in order to ensure that sites: 

a. Identify whether they are required to report to 

the Registry; and, 

b. Correct existing errors and omissions. 

2. Establish procedures to ensure that subsequent 

corrections are made in a timely and accurate manner. 

3. Revise the Department's current Technical Standard to 

incorporate language pertaining to the Registry that 

defines the following: 

a. Analyses and trends to be completed, including 

the required relevant data to complete the 

analyses; and, 

b. Methods of summarizing and reporting the data 

to the sites. 

4. Work with Departmental program offices and sites to 

adopt the revised Technical Standard in the sites' 

individual Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention 

Programs. 

Management concurred with the findings and recommendations, 

with the exception of recommendation number four. In a draft of 

this report, we had recommended that management pursue making 

the revised Technical Standard mandatory for sites that are 

Recommendations and Comments 
161 

AUDITOR 

COMMENTS 

Page 5 

required to report to the Registry. Instead, management proposed 

an acceptable alternative by suggesting that EH will work with 

Departmental program offices and sites to adopt the revised 

Technical Standard in the sites' individual Chronic Beryllium 

Disease Prevention Programs. EH stated that this will make the 

Technical Standard enforceable and mandatory under a new 

Worker Safety and Health Program Rule being pursued by EH. 

This will also allow EH the flexibility to change the Technical 

Standard as needed to respond to changing conditions and events. 

In response to the other recommendations, management indicated 

that EH will become proactive in working with the appropriate 

Departmental program and Field Offices in the attempt to identify 

sites needing to report to the Registry as well as correct existing 

Registry errors and omissions. EH also intends to establish 

procedures to ensure that subsequent corrections are made in a 

timely and accurate manner. In addition, EH will analyze and 

report on the Registry data through the implementation of analysis 

and data reporting plans, with the presentation of the findings at 

annual scientific meetings. Management also stated that since the 

completion of this audit, EH had completed the first report on the 

prevalence of beryllium sensitization and Chronic Beryllium 

Disease, including exposure information, based on data submitted 

to the Registry. 

Management's comments are responsive to our recommendations 

and its actions, when fully implemented, should improve the 

Department's ability to use the Registry as an effective 

occupational health research tool. We agreed with management's 

proposed modification to recommendation number four and we 

have revised the report accordingly. Management's comments are 

included in their entirety in Appendix 3. 

Comments 
162 

Appendix 1 

OBJECTIVE 

SCOPE 

METHODOLOGY 

The objective of this audit was to determine whether the 

Department had established, maintained and effectively used the 

Registry to evaluate worker health effects associated with 

beryllium exposure. 

The audit was performed between June and December 2005, at the 

Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) and the 

Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), both located in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee. Testing procedures were performed on the data 

from Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri; Los Alamos 

National Laboratory (Los Alamos), Los Alamos, New Mexico; 

Pantex Plant (Pantex), Amarillo, Texas; and, Rocky Flats Closure 

Project, Golden, Colorado. 

We also conducted interviews and obtained information relating to 

other sites in the Department: 

• Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York; 

• Fernald Closure Project near Ross, Ohio; 

• Hanford Site, Richland, Washington; 

• Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Niskayuna, New York; 

• Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, 

California; 

• Miamisburg Closure Project, Miamisburg, Ohio; 

• Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; 

• Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; 

• Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky; 

• Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio; 

• Southwestern Power Administration, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and, 

• Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Menlo Park, California. 

The audit covered the Office of Environment, Safety and Health's 

(EH) efforts to meet the Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention 

Program's goal of determining the prevalence of disease and health 

effects associated with beryllium exposure. 

To accomplish the audit objective, we: 

• Reviewed laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and 

contract requirements relevant to the Department's 

Registry; 

Page 6 Objective, Scope, and Methodology 
163 

Appendix 1 (continued) 

Page 7 

• Held discussions with officials from EH, ORISE, and 

Department sites; 

• Obtained and reviewed site-specific Registry data from 

both ORISE and Department site offices; 

• Selected a judgmental sample of five of the twenty 

Department sites reporting Registry data to determine if 

the records were complete. These sites were selected 

based on analysis of the sites with a Prevention Program; 

the sites currently reporting to the Registry; and, the sites 

with reported beryllium operations. The completeness 

test was performed on the reported beryllium activities 

beginning January 7, 2002, and ending July 2005; and, 

• Selected 30 records from Los Alamos, Pantex, and Y-12, 

respectively, to determine if the records were accurate. 

This encompassed testing whether the I) information 

contained in the required data fields in the Registry was 

factually accurate in comparison to the information 

maintained at the individual Department sites that report 

to the Registry, and 2) existing data was reliable. 

The audit was performed in accordance with generally accepted 

Government auditing standards for performance audits and 

included tests of internal controls and compliance with laws and 

regulations to the extent necessary to satisfY the audit objective. 

Because our review was limited, it would not necessarily have 

disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at 

the time of our audit. 

We reviewed and assessed performance measures in accordance 

with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and 

concluded that EH had established a performance measure to 

maintain the Registry, but that the metric had not been met. In 

order to meet that performance measure, we included 

recommendations for EH to work with the appropriate program 

offices to ensure that sites meet the Registry requirements, and to 

update the current Technical Standard to include the methods of 

analyzing data in the Registry and summarizing and reporting the 

results to the sites. 

We relied on computer-processed data to accomplish our audit 

objective. Our procedures included gaining an understanding of 

the process for inputting information into the sites' databases and 

incorporating it into the Registry at ORISE, as well as the security 

access to the Registry to determine if the data was sufficiently 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 
164 

Appendix 1 (continued) 

Page 8 

reliable. Based on this, we decided to perform additional tests of 

Registry data to accomplish our objective. Various computer 

assisted audit tools were used to perform queries and testing of the 

databases received from both ORISE and the Department sites. 

The completeness and accuracy of the data is addressed in the 

body of the report. 

Management waived an exit conference. 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 
165 

Appendix 2 

Prior Audit Report 

• Occupational Safety and Health - Government Responses to Beryllium Uses and Risks 

(GAO/OCG-00-6, May 2000). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked 

to obtain information on beryllium as a hazardous material and report on the health and 

safety controls over its use. GAO found that from the 19605 to the 1990s, the 

Department of Energy had taken action to assess and to respond to risks associated with 

exposure to beryllium. Specifically, the Department improved working conditions at its 

facilities and implemented medical testing for its current and former workers during the 

19805 and 19905 after new cases of Chronic Beryllium Disease were identified during the 

1980s. From 1984 through 1999, 149 Department workers had been diagnosed with 

definite or possible Chronic Beryllium Disease. In 1999, the Department issued a rule 

that established new worker safety controls, such as increased use of respirators and 

assessing hazards associated with work tasks, for its facilities that use beryllium. The 

Department also proposed a compensation program for its workers affected by Chronic 

Beryllium Disease, which had been introduced as legislation in the Congress. 

Page 9 Prior Audit Report 
166 

Appendix 3 

Page 10 

Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

April 5, 2006 

MEMORANIlUM TO: GEORGE W, COLl.ARD 

FROM; 

SFBJECT; 

ASSISTANT INSPECiOR GENERAL FOR PERFORMANCE AUDlTS 

OFFICE OF INSl',ECTOR GE/IERAL , ( ___ 

C RUSSl:LL H. SIIEARI:R{: '7J.. /#4 ( 7Iv.4.~ ACTING ASSISTANT SECRr~rA~~'~ V\ 

ENVIRONMFNT, SAFE'IY AND HEALTH 

Rcspons~ to Audit Report on "Implementation of the Department of Energy's 

B(.·ryllium-Associated Worker Registry" 

The Office of Epidemiology and Health Surveillance (HI-53) has reviewed the recommendations cited in 

the Inspector General (lG) audIt report on the "Imph::mentati()fi ofthc Department of Energy's Heryllium~ 

A$$ocialed 'Vurker Registry," The Beryllium Registry was developed as an occupuuonal health research 

tool to help LIS understand the complex i.k"clopmcnt of and rJ.sk factors for chronic berylhum disease, As 

wllh oth<..'r longlltJthnal databases. 1i IS the :iccumularion of data oyer time that differentiates this database 

from others. The sIgnificance of analy11C tindings Wln increase as the database accumulates depth oyer 

tim~, J~sucs nnsHig in the operalion o[Ihc Rt'gistry are ht"lng \\-nrh'd and !'(·"olvcd. \\lc will implement 

changes to the management of the B~ryl)lum Registry hased on these rccommcndallllm. to improvt,' th~ 

quality of data submitted to the Rcglstry. Our response to the report and each !"CCi)mnK'ndrnlon li:-:rcd 

foll(".v!.': 

1i~~p.mm~J)Jl!t~LOJlJ: The Office of Environment, Saiety and I leahh (EH) ugr~es \'vjlh this recommendation, 

The Chronic Berylhulll Disease- PreventIOn Program (CHDPP) Final Rule title 10, Code or redcral 

RCgll13tlVIlS, part 850.10 (10 eFR 850.10) slates that "the responsible employer at n DOE faCIlity must 

ensure that a CnDPP is prepared fi)r the facility . .," Only the responsible employer (Le., the site contractor) 

has the knowleuge of actiVltics and operations at a given Department of Energy (DOE) sit!;! ne~ded for 

implementing all a:;pccfs of the Rule, il''1cluding self"rep()l'ting and sending accurate and compkfc data to 

the Registry. "J'he head of the t;,eld Element has primary responsIbility for assuring conlmctors comply 

with requirements of 10 CPR 850. El I cannot identifY all site5 f.'lHmg under the reponing rcquircm,·nt. 

However. to encourugt: the selFidentilkation of sites that arc required to submit data to the Registry. Ell 

\\il1 bt'comc proactive in working with Ihe appropTiate departmental program and site offices.. As. :\uch, 

EH~:,3 wiJIllndcI13kc thl." following ,lcrion plan: all Departmental Elements and site offices WJIl be 

formaJly contacted and rcmmdl.. .. d oftht: rtquin:mcnts under 10 eFR R50 Wlthin ~ months of this response. 

Dcpalimental Elemenls. and ~Itt: uJTict!!, WIll ht: asked to ensure that the respomHhlc emplQyers af'~ in 

complianCe with the Registry reporting rcqUlrcmcnts. EH wtll provide each DcpartmentDI Elc-mcnl and site 

oDin: with semiannual pro~css reports pcrtaming to the quality of data sl.lbmined as indicated by excessive 

numhcrs of enors. omissions. or nonrebponsc to Data Center inquiries, A point of contact to resolve 

Regis!!'y concerns Will be solicited in order to help resolve existing errors and omissions. This actIOn \vill 

be completed wnhm 6~~ rnonths from the response to thiS audlL We expect the promulgation of 

10 eFR 851 (I.'ffcctive May 2007) to have a positive Impact on the suhmlsslOn and quality of the data. Ell 

\\,111 be hett"" ahle to hold the responsible employer (Icc.ountable with cnforCCll1cnt through potential CiVil 

penalties und('r 10 eFR X51 < 

The report lndicales that the leased gaseous diffUSIOn plants at Paducah and Portsmouth did not report data 

to the Regl"tr),. It should be noted that 10 CFR g50 applies only to: (I) DOE onices responsible for 

operatIons; (2) DOE contractors: and (3) curren! DOE t'mployct's or other workers at a DOE facJlny. The 

Management Comments 
167 

Appendix 3 (continued) 

Page 11 

2 

Portsmouth 'Inti Paducah Gaseous. Diffu:-.ion Plants are {lnitcd St~HcS Enrichment Corpomtion facililies that 

arc cowred by the Occupational Safety and Health Admini,trullon standards (2'1 CFR 1'110.1(00); !lOE 

ha, no )uri~d!ction over them. 'A'hik we encourage lhe submission of data from these facilities, we cannot 

compel them to submlt d.ta Or follow the requirements of 10 efR 850. The report.lso states that Femald 

ami Miamis.hurg {Mound) had not rcpot1cd data to the Registry. \Ve will nmkc thaI SPCC1!iC point in our 

notificution of Departmentul Elements, 

Recommendation 2: We agree with thiS recommendation. CBlJI'P 10 CFR X50.3'1 (RccClrdkecping and the 

use ofinfonnation) states that the re);ponslb1c employer must semiannually transmit electronic records to 

the hH~53 Datu Center. The rt'! .. ptmstble employer is required to provide accurate and reliable data to the 

Registry in ~1 timely manner, To improve the quaHty ofthl: data llnd to ensure Ihat con'cctions arc made In 

a timely manner, the following nctwn will he undertaken: EH~5J will establish a procedure to ensure that 

subsequent corrections will be made in a timely and accurate manner. This procedure will be c-stabhshcd 

Wlthm 6~8 months after the submission ofthi5- response. UnJer this procedure, Departmental Elements and 

site offices will be provIded with the technical guidance standard for data submission 10 the R~gL"lry. The 

data center will t'omltlCI logIC and error cht:cks. within 2. months ofrecel\'ing data. Registry datil 

cuordimltors at I!ach sIte will continue to rCCC1VC i.'-mad nnltijJ.;ullOn rcgardmg the quality of the data. 

induding crror:--, illogKal d.lta, Had \)jl1l,,~i()ns. The d.lla coordinator will have 1 month to respond citht..'r by 

suhmission alth\.' (;orr~ctL't.l t.lata. or through a resolution of the problem with the data cC'nter. Arter that 

l-momh period, the responsible Departmental Element and site otT!cc will be notiiied to ensure that 

corrcctivJ: action is clltnpktcd, To (~nhancc data collc:ctlOn cfl()rts, Ell-53 wilt convene a regular meetmg 

of HlI Ihc slh.~ contractor duta coordinators to review the data reporting requirements in the technical 

standard. The first mcctmg IS scheduled ror the end of April 2006. 

Rccomm("ndatlOn 3: \\le agree with this recommendation. EH w1ll develop an analysis plan for the data as 

a suppkmental document to the ·rCchnlcai Standard which \\'e;- expect to be comp1eted withm 6 months (If 

this rt.'sponse-. Tht' supplcmcntnl document will include descriptive measurement::.. such as disease 

incidem.'C' and prevalence, us well a:; !i1i111stkal measurements using epidemiologic methods to examine 

trend" and the assodation between cxpusur~ and uiscl.l!:'e pH.'vaJence. A data reportmg plan WIll be 

devclop..xllo re-port tht> analytIc nndil1g~ haek to the ;-lit"s, and include methods 10 di;\fTlhute lhe information 

to E.nVlr0nmcnt, Sal't:ty and Hc::dth program managers and starr. workers, and the puolic. This plail will he 

com·plc,te hct\\'c('n 6-X months after thiS r.:sponsc has heen t;;uhmitted. Sl1mmarH .. ~~ of our findmgs, including 

lllt'lhnd.., and dutn repons, will abo be prc:...entcd annually at "CICJ)lIflc m('cllng::... 

R(.~comm~ndation:!; \Vt: disagn .. !c With this rccomm\.-'l1dution, The Beryllium Registry Technical Standard 

(DOE~STD*l187~2005) was developed to provide nonmamlatory guidanc(' for contractors in order to 

minimize ambiguities and to recommend reponing requirements for data submitted to the BeryllIUm 

Rcgi~1r)'. The IG has recommended thilt the technical standard become mandatory (i.e.~ through 

incorporJtion in a rule) in order to improve the quality of the data submiu(.."<i by the contractors, USing the 

nllemakmg process for thH; activity would rctluc\.~ Ell's flexibility to change the technical standard as 

needed to respond to changing conditions and events, As an alternative. ElI wm work with the Program 

and Fidd Offices (as part of8S1 Rule Implementation and Workshop:;) to dC'monstratc the value of 

udopting DOE-STD~ll R7 M 2005 in the site C13DPP. \Vc expect this acti\'lty to take J yc-ar. AdoptIOn oftlK~ 

'It'duw:al Standard In the sih:'" CHOPP makes it enforceahle and "mandarorv" undt:r the new \Vorkt.-r 

SafelY and llealth Pmgram Rule (! 0 CFR R51). . 

Since the compiction of the IG audit, ElI·53 has compietcd the fkst 1\.1'011. "Beryllium Work"r Health 

Surv('!lIance though 2004," based on data submitted to the Registry. The report is descriptive In nature; it 

provides mformatlOn about the prevalence of beryl hum ~ensitization and chronic beryllium disease, and 

cxpo~urc 111 formation across the DOE complex. The data from the report will be sent to the sites. posted on 

the Eli \Vt.'b site. und presented at a sCIe-ntlflc mCl"hng \v!thm 2 months ofthi5 report response. 

Management Comments 
168 

IG Report No. DOE/IG-0726 

CUSTOMER RESPONSE FORM 

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included in the report to assist management in implementing corrective actions? 

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5. Please include your name and telephone number so that we may contact you should we have 

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When you have completed this fonn, you may telefax it to the Office of Inspector General at 

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ATTN: Customer Relations 

If you wish to discuss this report or your comments with a staff member of the Office of 

Inspector General, please contact Judy Garland-Smith (202) 586-7828. 
169 

The Office of Inspector General wants to make the distribution of its reports as customer friendly and cost 

effective as possible. Therefore, this report will be avai lable electronically through the Internet at the 

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Your comments would be appreciated and can be provided on the Customer Response Form 

attached to the report. 
170 

Mario P. Flori - 7835 Belleflower Drive - Springfield, VA 22152 

Cell: 703-8S()'1331 - Marlof3609@aol.com 

24 October 2007 

Senator Joe Liebennan 

U.S. Senate 

Washington, DC Office 

Washington, 

706 Hart Office 

DC 

Buil~~g 

205~ 

_ ~ 

Dear sen~errnan, 

I am writing to you to endorse a particularly talented presidential appointee nominated to 

be a Member ofthe Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Mr. C. Russell H. 

Shearer. 

I have known Mr. Shearer since he joined my DOE staff in 1994 at the Savannah River 

Site, a DOE nuclear weapons facility. He was the youngest lawyer on my staff. He 

quickly demonstrated drive, talent, and a strong desire to get the job done. He supported 

me on numerous employee safety and environmental issues with well thought out plans 

and actions to meet the numerous requirements of both the federal and state 

environmental laws. He worked diligently to present his arguments to the South Carolina 

and Federal regulators and achieved a level of recognition of exceptional competence. 

He left government service in 1997 and worked for a law firm in Washington DC. When 

I was confirmed as the Assistant Secretary ofthe Army fur Installations and Environment 

(this also included Safety and Health although not in the title) in August 2001 I petitioned 

the White House to assign Mr. Shearer as my special assistant. He became a Presidential 

appointee assigned to my Anny staff in November 2001. I always relied on him to do a 

thorough and complete job and, I assigned him to be my Acting Deputy Assistant 

Secretary fur Chemical Weapons Demilitarization in September 2002. Again he 

demonstrated skill, knowledge and dedication to work With his staff to drive our 

Chemical Weapons program to a successful conclusion. I note that he has done an 

excellent job in responding to the questions of your Committee on Environment and 

Public Works, and specifically he did an excellent job in explaining the Anniston 

incident, for which I was responsible. He and I learned many lessons and I know he is 

better prepared for his future assignments in public service from that experience. 

When he transferred to the Department of Energy as the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, in August 2004, he rapidly provided 

outstanding assistance to his principal, the Assistant Secretary. 

Based on my experience, I consider him one ofthe most qualified leaders in the areas of 

safety, environmental, and health issues. He has a total grasp of the safety and health 

issues relating to high-hazard operations, including chemical manufacturing systems, 

nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons destruction. 
171 

Mario P. Fiori - 7835 Belleflower Drive - Springfield, VA 22152 

Cell: 703-850-1331- Mariof3609@aol.com 

I strongly recommend that the Committee on Environment and Public Works report Mr. 

Shearer's nomination to be a Member ofthe Chemical and Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board. He will make significant positive contributions to ensure the safety 

of our national infrastructure relating to chemical processes. 

Thank you for your consideration of this important issue. As always, I am ready to assist 

you on this particular issue and on the broader issues relating to the New London 

Submarine Base. I continue to fu llow the activities there and am delighted that Governor 

Rell has hired Mr. Justin Bernier, the outstanding staffer who assisted Representative Rob 

Simmons in saving the Submarine Base from the BRAC axe. 

v~ 

Mario Fiori 
172 

FRANK B. RUSSO 

43517 MONARCH BEACH SQ 

LEESBURG, VA. 20176 

October 25, 2007 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chairman, Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510-5175 

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg 

United States Senate 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Suite 324 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin 

United States Senate 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Suite 509 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Madam Chairman, Senator Lautenberg, and Senator Cardin: 

I am writing to you on behalf of Mr. C. Russell H. Shearer who has been nominated by 

the President to serve on the Chemical Safety Board. 

My name is Frank Russo and I am currently the Senior Advisor for Environment, Safety, 

and Health in the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of 

Energy. I advise the Administrator on all matters involving environment, safety and 

health at our nuclear weapons laboratories and production sites. Prior to this assignment, 

I served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Corporate Performance Assessment in the 

Department of Energy Office of Environment, Safety and Health. Mr. Shearer was my 

supervisor while I held that position. 

As you know, the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration conduct some ofthe most hazardous nuclear and chemical operations in 

the world. Since Mr. Shearer joined the Department, he has consistently demonstrated 

outstanding ability to understand 
173 

all facets of these complex operations and to ensure the safety of our workers the public, 

and the environment. 

While I worked with Mr. Shearer, he provided leadership to achieve significant 

improvements in environment, safety and health of the entire Department of Energy 

complex. Here are a few examples: 

• Leader for development and implementation of lessons learned from the NASA 

Columbia Space Shuttle Accident and the Reactor Vessel Head Corrosion Event 

at the Davis Besse commercial nuclear power plant in Ohio. These important 

lessons have been implemented with a reinvigorated operating experience 

program in the Department of Energy. 

• Champion for the Department of Energy Integrated Safety Management System 

which parallels the Chemical Industry'S Process Safety Management principles 

and best practices. In this venue, Mr. Shearer presented detailed<and 

comprehensive analyses ofthe accident at the Army's Chemical De-militarization 

site in Utah. 

• Leader for improvement in the Department's Quality Assurance Programs 

including significant changes in the management of software quality assurance. 

This is critical to not only our nuclear operations, but also to chemical process 

safety, and non-nuclear operations including most recently electrical power grid 

reliability. 

In summary, Mr. Shearer would bring a wealth of knowledge and experience in safety 

management in chemical process safety and many other safety disciplines. He knows the 

fundamental tenets of nuclear safety, including hazard analysis, proper hazard controls, 

and limiting conditions of operation to establish a facility's Authorization Basis, all of 

which parallel the tenets of chemical process safety. Mr. Shearer is also a leader in the 

Department's accident investigation program, and he has a solid background in the 

conduct of serious investigations of safety, health and security accidents. 

Mr. Shearer would be a great asset to the Chemical Safety Board, and I highly 

recommend your confirmation of him as a Chemical Safety Board member. 
174 

PARSONS 

1080 Sliver Bluff Road· Aiken, South Carolina 29803 It (803) 643-7100. Fax; (803) 643-7118 • www.parsons.com 

October 25, 2007 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chainnan, Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510-5175 

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg 

United States Senate 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Suite 324 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable Benjamin 1. Cardin 

United States Senate 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Suite 509 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Madam Chairman, Senator Lautenberg, and Senator Cardin: 

The President nominated Mr. C. Russell H. Shearer to be a Member of the U.S. 

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. I am writing to recommend his 

confirmation and to tell you something about his skills in process safety management. 

The Department of Energy (DOE) process safety management system includes all of the 

elements of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) process safety 

management rule, but does so in a more demanding mannef. 

[ met Russell in 2004 when he took over the function of deputy chief safety 

officer for the DOE (the title within the Department is "Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Energy fOf Environment, Safety & Health"). I was at the time the Energy 

Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) Chair; I am still an EFCOG Director. EFCOG 

consists of over sixty companies ranging from very large to small who do work in the 

DOE Complex. Its focus is to collectively work with the Department to improve safety 

and efficiency in how DOE's mission is accomplished. 

Russell and r have worked together closely since that time on a variety of issues, 

many of them focusing on the Department's requirements for its contractors to engage in 

a process safety management system. Most recently, Russell and I worked together on 

the Department's efforts to adopt a "design standard" that spells out its expectations for 

integrating safety, environment, and health concerns at an early stage of facility 

conceptual design and continuing on throughout the lifecycle of that facility. 

Russell has demonstrated a keen understanding of the process safety management 

method, and perceived the Department's lack of a "design standard" as an opportunity to 

improve its perfurmance of process safety management In doing so, he engaged the 
175 

contractors who work for the Department, the program managers within the Department, 

and employees to bring about a standard that was not only protective but one that could 

practically be applied. 

Russell also reoriented the focus ofms office from simply telling people what was 

wrong to also helping them correct the identified deficiencies. This was a very important 

shift in focus for this office because it contained important resources to help the facilities 

be more successful with their safety management processes but, in its past, had not 

sought to provide technical assistance. As a consequence of this work, EFCOG presented 

Russell with its Certificate of Appreciation plaque in recognition of his work to improve 

safety and efficiency throughout the DOE complex. 

I am therefore pleased to recommend Russell's confinnation to the Committee. 

Thank you. 

Sincerely, 

David B. Amerine 

Parsons Senior Vice President 

Salt Waste Processing Facility Project Manager 

2 
176 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chainnan. Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington. D.C. 20510-5175 

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg 

United States Senate 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Suite 324 

Washington. D.C. 20510 

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin 

United States Senate 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Suite 509 

Washington. D.C. 20510 

Dear Madam Chainnan. Senator Lautenberg, and Senator Cardin: 

October 25, 2007 

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with my recommendation for C. Russell H. Shearer to 

be a Member of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board. I understand that he has been nominated by the 

President for this position and is currently going through the confinnation process. Since I am 

currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Safety, I am compelled to say that this 

lettcr represents my personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Department of Navy. 

As you will sce in the following paragraphs, I think Mr. Shearer is well qualified for this position 

and would be a real asset to the Chemical Safety Board. 

I first met Mr. Shearer in 2004 when he assumed the duties of the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Energy for Environment. Safety and Health. At that time I was a senior executive 

(SES) in his organization. I was immediately impressed by his technical grasp of nuclear and 

radiological issues, his inquisitiveness and quest for technical understanding. and his commitment 

to safety. I recall one of my first interactions with him was to brief him on some incident 

involving Plutonium - I do not recall the specifics except that it had to do with a little known 

chemical property of Plutonium. Mr. Shearer was not satisfied until he had talked with DOE's 

most knowledgeable expert in Plutonium operations to understand every thing he could about the 

phenomenon. Whether a chemical property of a transuranic element or the latest safety 

management model, Mr. Shearer used every day at work as a learning opportunity. 

In 2005, Mr. Shearer assigned me to be the Director of the Department of Energy's Nuclear 

Safety Research Office. We began building that office in order to improve the Department's 

ability to collect data helpful in its Documented Safety Analysis Process (DSA), which includes 

hazard analysis, accident analysis, and analysis of safety controls. This DSA process is similar 

to. but more rigorous than, the OSHA process safety management rule components requiring 

process safety infonnation and hazard analysis. It was for us a key component to operating our 

facilities safely and in accord with analyzed and known safe practices. 

Prior to establishing this Office ofNuelear Safety Research, the Department's efforts were 

fragmented and stove-piped. There was little coordination between the various program offices 

on the sorts of safety research performed or sharing it among offices. We created this offiee to 

examine any issue affecting nuclear safety. whether from a chemical perspective (such as a 
177 

chemical process in the Department's chemical refineries that create nuclear materials) or any 

other potential risk to safe operations. And it was successful in consolidating data and making it 

widely available and in planning a future research program focusing on cross-cutting safety 

issues. 

Mr. Shearer has been well trained in the field of process safety management, in part, because he is 

a dedicated student constantly seeking to expand his knowledge. understanding, and technical 

competence. The fact that he has been intensively trained in a process safety management 

standard that is far more demanding than the OSHA standard means, in my opinion, that he has 

the knowledge and skills to help improve the safety performance of the Nation's chemical 

industry. 

Thank you and 1 hope the Senate will confirm Mr. Shearer's nomination. 

Very respectfully. 

~~ Tom Rollow. P.E. 

7818 South Valley Dr. 

Fairfax Station. V A 22039 

(w) 703-614-5179 
178 

Environment, Safety and Health Bulletin 

Hazards of Nitrogen Asphyxiation 

in Confined Spaces DOEIEH·0697 2005·17· UPDATE December 2005 

~are;ssuedtolnitiate 

management actions in response to events whose subject 

~& 

matter represents s;gnmcant Departmental safety concerns. 

] 41. are issued to initiate 

immediate action on potentially significant safety issues. 

Environment, Safety and Health Bulletins are issued to share 

information and recommend actions on potential safety 

issues. 

b1tlliLiJ!i!1ti are issued to provide information to the 

DOE Complex on potentially significant safety or health 

issues. 

PURPOSE 

This Safety Bulletin is being issued to alert readers to the 

potential hazard of nitrogen asphyxiation following the 

November 6, 2005, fatality of two contractor maintenance 

workers at the Valero Energy Corporation's Delaware City. 

Delaware refinery. 

Nitrogen gas, inert under most conditions, is widely used as a 

barrier to prevent unwanted reactions with oxygen or water. 

Most people are aware that breathing air contains about 78 

percent nitrogen. However, higher concentrations of nitrogen 

in air replace necessary oxygen, and can cause physiological 

problems, coma, and death. 

Section 146 of the OSHA Standard for General Industry 

(29 CFR 1910) requires employers to evaluate workplaces to 

determine if any spaces in which their employees will be 

working are confined spaces necessitating a permit. 

Examples of atmospheres that require a permit include: 

those having an oxygen concentration equal to or less 

than 19.5 percent; 

those having an oxygen concentration equal to or greater 

than 23.5 percent; 

the presence of toxic gases In concentrations equal to or 

greater than the 8-hour time-weighted average for the gas; 

or 

the presence of explosive or flammable gases equal to or 

greater than 10 percent of the lower flammable limit. 

BACKGROUND 

The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is investigating the 

accident at the Valero refinery. Preliminary information 

indicates that the two workers were reaUaching piping to a 

process vessel while performing maintenance activities. 

Because the vessel contained a catalyst that is sensitive to 

oxygen and moisture, the vessel was filled with a nitrogen 

blanket to prevent moisture from reaching the catalyst. 

Investigators believe that one of the workers became 

disoriented, passed out, and fell into the vessel after he 

breathed nitrogen near the manhole on top of the vessel. 

Witnesses stated that one worker appeared to fall into the 

vessel while reaching inside. The second worker then entered 

the vessel, most likely trying to save his coworker. Both 

workers died from nitrogen asphyxiation. At this time, it is not 

known whether or not the two workers were aware that the 

vessel contained nitrogen. A Valero spokesperson stated that 

the workers were authorized to work near, but not in, the 

vessel, explaining that personal protective eqUipment, 

including breathing apparatus, would have been required. 

In June 2003, the CSB issued a Safety Bulletin on the 

hazards of nitrogen asphyxiation. The Board's study identified 

85 incidents involving nitrogen in the United States between 

1992 and 2002 that resulted in 80 deaths and 50 injuries. 

Almost half of the incidents involved contractors, who 

accounted for more than 60 percent of the fatalities. The main 

causes were failure to detect nitrogen~enriched atmospheres, 

mistaking nitrogen gas for breathing air, and being 

inadequately prepared for rescue efforts. 

IMPLICATIONS 

Breathing oxygen~deficient air can have immediate, life~ 

threatening effects. Rescuers should never attempt to rush 

into an oxygen~deficjent space to retrieve fallen workers 

without first connecting to a supplied breathing air source. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

Facility managers should ensure that their personnel know 

how to work safely in the presence of nitrogen, particularly in 

confined spaces where they can be quickly overcome. 

Q\Je8IIona concemIng this Safely Bulletin should be _ 

10 Tom WIllIams by IIItephone at (301) 903-4859 or by_I at e. wilU 9Ol! 

Helping the field succeed with safe and reliable operations. 
179 

Safety Bulletin 2005·1 7 December 2005 

PREVENT EVENTS 

learning from Industry Experience 

PREVENT EVENTS is intended Training 

for use by personnel during 1. Are our training programs for the correct 

morning meetings, pre-job usage of personal protective equipment and 

briefings, and work unit ventilating work areas sufficiently 

meetings to communicate key comprehensive? 

industry experience. 2. Does our training program for confined spaces 

include a discussion about how temporary 

Management confined spaces can be inadvertently 

established by, for example, hanging a 

1. In areas where liquid or gaseous nitrogen are temporary barrier over an opening? 

used, are there processes for continuously 3. Is there a provision for annual refresher monitoring oxygen levels and alerting workers training for confined-space workers? of oxygen levels less than 19.5 percent? 

2. Does our process for work in confined spaces 

include a provision for placing a trained, Individual Worker 

equipped worker nearby to observe, 1. Do I understand what constitutes a confined communicate with, and, if necessary, retrieve space, and do I know how to work safely in overcome workers? one? 

3. Do we fiow down our safety expectations for 2. Do I use appropriate PPE (self-contained working in confined spaces or potential breathing apparatus, backup breathing air oxygen-deficient atmospheres to supplies) when working around nitrogen gas? subcontractors? 

Do we have positive controls in place to 3. Do I use the "buddy system" when entering a 4. confined space? prevent other workers from inadvertently 

coming into confined or oxygen-deficient 4. Do I know to stop work if I see a potentially 

spaces? dangerous situation? 

5. Are our existing confined spaces appropriately 5. Do I understand the procedures for worker 

placarded? retrieval should a worker lose consciousness 

while working in a confined space? 

Helping the field succeed with safe and reliable operations. 
180 

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & HEALTH 

SAFETY & HEALTH BULLETIN Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety & Health. U_S, Department of Energy. Washington, DC 20585 

Vigilance in New or Infrequent 

High-Hazard Operations 

DOE/EH-0697 Issue No> 2005-09 July 2005 

This Bulletin provides information about several serious 

events caused by a lack of vigilance and attentiveness on 

the part of those involved in conducting first-time or 

infrecuently performed high-hazard activities. Failure to 

identify the hazards, develop appropriate actions, and 

remain alert to the possible dangers involved in such 

activities could lead to potentially catastrophic outcomes at 

DOE sites. 

DISCUSSION 

In March 2005, a large explosion killed 15 workers and 

injured over 150 at the BP Texas City Refinery. The unit 

was undergoing a phased restart operation following 

isomerization catalyst replacement, which is performed 

every 10 years. The explosion occurred during the restart 

of the Isomerization Unit and was caused by an ignited 

hydrocarbon vapor cloud that was inadvertently released 

from a raffinate splitter that was overfilled and overheated. 

The pressure in the splitter column increased rapidly and 

exceeded the set pressure of the overhead line relief 

valves, overloading the stack with vapors and liquid. An 

unknown ignition source from one of numerous sources in 

the uncontrolled area ignited the resulting vapor cloud and 

triggered the explosion. 

BP Products North America, Inc. published an interim 

investigation report on the Texas City Refinery explosion 

on May 12, 2005 that identified many deficiencies and 

safety concerns. For example, the 1950s-designed vent 

system on the blowdown drum was antiquated and did not 

tie into a flare system to safely combust flammable vapors 

during a release. Also, temporary office and work trailers 

were sited only 150 feet from the blowdown drum and vent 

stack, tragically placing their occupants in the blast area. 

The report also identified various conduct of operations 

deficiencies and inadequacies. 

Explosion site at BP Texas City Refinery in March 2005 

Although DOE does not operate refineries, this event 

demonstrates the dangers associated with performing firsttime or infrequent high-hazard operations. A review of the 

interim investigation report from the perspective of DOE 

facility operations reveals similar causal factors seen in the 

following DOE occurrences: 

April 2005: During the replacement of a conveyor belt in a 

casting line glovebox at the Y-12 Site, Enriched Uranium 

Operations personnel failed to apply a job-specmc hazard 

analysis, which should have been required based on the 

criteria for breaching a boundary of a hazardous system. 

The task had not been performed in several years, and no 

work planning review protocols for potentially high-hazard 
181 

work were used, (DNFSB Site Representative Weekly Reports dated April 1 and April 15, 2005) 

July 2004: During reactor restart at the Idaho National 

Laboratory's Advanced Test Reactor following a shutdown, 

a second shutdown on high coolant pressure occurred. 

The facility was minimally staffed and faced a very limited 

recovery time, The procedure used to perform a quick 

reactor restart did not address possible operational 

difficulties, and command and control personnel did not 

identify error precursors before conducting critical, timesensitive evolutions. (ORPS Report 1D--BBWI-ATR-2004-0007) 

December 1999: While a crucible in a furnace was being 

changed out at the Y-12 Plant after 6 years of use, an 

explosion injured 11 workers when a new procedure, which 

was found to have numerOus deficiencies, was used, The 

procedure had unreviewed, unapproved handwritten 

changes and was missing a key step vital to preventing an 

explosion accident (Type A Accident Investigation, Muffiple 

Injury Accident Resulting from Sodium-Potassium Explosion in 

Building 9201-5 at the Y-12 Plant, dated February 2000) 

Causal factors for these events reveal similar inadequacies 

in work performed, 

Procedures 

omitting steps 

using an incorrect or unapproved procedure 

allowing operators' process knowledge to override 

procedural compliance 

Hazards analysis 

not recognizing the potential for multiple failure modes 

failing to comply with existing safety requirements 

ineffective emergency management planning 

Operational oversight 

less than adequate command and control during an 

unfamiliar operation and during upset conditions 

insufficient communication of process activities 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Below are recommendations for conducting infrequent or 

first-time applications when performing potentially highhazard work, 

Perform a hazards evaluation and operational 

assessment that are commensurate with the activity's 

complexity and associated safety risks, 

Conduct a detailed briefing with all parties involved in 

the project evolution, Discuss expected responses and 

necessary actions if problems occur. 

Always follow all of the procedures. 

Ensure that procedures used are current and 

incorporate system Or equipment modifications and 

ensure that operators are trained on any changes, 

Conduct a tabletop review Or walkthrough of 

procedures for first-time or infrequent evolutions, 

Ensure safety systems, instrumentation, and alarms 

are functional. 

Practice, from start to finish, all activities involved in the 

project evolution, 

Ensure that all personnel, including supervisors, have 

the required levels of experience and that training or 

certifications are current. 

Ensure that the command and control authority is 

clearly understood by all parties and is present during 

the evolution, 

Questions regarding this Safety Bulletin should be directed 

to Rolland Sigler at (301) 903-4658 or by email at Rolland. 

Sigler@eh,doe,gov, 

/ 
182 

Texas City Refinery Update: 

The Price of Safety Complacency 

DOE/EH·0699 2006·01 January 2006 

ES&H Safety Bulletin 2005·09 (July 2005) discussed the 

Texas City Refinery accident in the context of the need for 

vigilance in conducting infrequent, high-hazard operations. 

This advisory presents financial, regulatory, and legal impacts 

of the accident 

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 

fined BP Products North America, Inc. (BP) $21,361,500 on 

September 22, 2005 following the agency's investigation of 

the March 23, 2005 explosion at BP's Texas City refinery. 

That explosion fatally injured 15 workers and significantly in· 

jured hundreds more. The fine against BP is the largest ever 

levied by OSHA. OSHA issued citations to BP for 303 willful 

safety violations, 26 serious safety violations, and 3 otherthan·serious safety violations. OSHA's report cited BP's fail· 

ureto: 

Use intrinsically safe electrical equipment; 

Record and compile written process safety information; 

Ensure employees receive refresher training at regular 

intervals; 

Correct deficiencies in equipment operating outside acceptable limits; 

Adequately identify and evaluate potential risks before 

facility operation; 

Adequately evaluate the safety and health impact of 

catastrophic events; 

Ensure that operators follow safe and consistent startup 

procedures; and 

Warn employees of developing conditions that could 

threaten safety. 

OSHA classified several of the willful violations as "egregious," a term the agency only uses when violations occur in 

multiple instances across a range of activities. BP agreed to 

pay the multimillion..<follar fine as part of an agreement with 

the agency to improve safety conditions at the plant. OSHA, 

in conjunction with the Department of Labor, referred the 

Texas City refinery case to the Department of Justice on December 9. The managers and owners of BP now face not 

only monetary penalties, but also potential criminal penalties 

for poor safety oversight. 

The fallout from the Texas City refinery explosion demon· 

strates the high cost of ignoring routine maintenance, process 

safety oversight, and opportunities for improvement at an ag· 

ing facility. As a result of infrastructure downtime and repairs 

following the explosion, BP has lost an opportunity to invest 

approximately $1 billion of business capital into new programs 

and budget items. BP must instead deploy that capital to com· 

pensate for asset damage, facility downtime, lost product. and 

the administrative disruption that follows in the wake of a ma~ 

jor catastrophe and a Federal accident investigation, 

Secretary Bodman stated in February, 2005 that "when it 

comes to our collective safety, we must never lapse into complacencY ... complacency is safety's enemy.~ BP has learned 

this lesson the hard way, and now faces years of unexpected 

setbacks that will hobble the company's productivity and 

growth. DOE and its contractors must often address safety 

conditions that parallel those that existed at the Texas City 

refinery prior to the explosion. The routine use of steadily 

decaying infrastructure poses an escalating probability of an 

event if managers and operators are unwilling to adopt an 

inquisitive safety posture and adjust their habits to reflect 

changing conditions, 

As the principal trustee for the American public in a wide 

range of high-risk, high-consequence endeavors, it is the duty 

of the Department of Energy to build and maintain a sterling 

safety culture that will methodically eliminate accident precur· 

sors before they develop. The violations at BP's Texas City 

refinery represent the most common precursors for accidents 

that have occurred across the complex in the recent past. 

Anyone of these safety violations, on its own, may justify a 

"stop-work" order and should be addressed immediately, Together, these violations can only co-exist if both management 

and operators consciously ignore opportunities to halt operations in an increasingly threatening environment. 

The Office of Environment, Safety and Health requests that all 

DOE employees and contractors pay special attention to their 

colleagues' safety and security in the wake of this tragedy by 

reviewing the safety practices BP failed to implement (listed 

above) in its own operations and by reflecting on routine ac~ 

tlvities in their own workplaces. Facilities, eqUipment, and 

processes cannot adopt an inquisitive safety posture - only 

people can foresee and prevent accident precursors. With 

everyone's help, the Department can enhance its strong 

safety record and wholly eliminate the potential for catastrophic accidents. 
183 

Office of Health, Safety and Security (n~'\~ 

(' '.11 I Safety Advisory ~~{:/;';c 

No. 2007-02 April 2007 

Safety Culture Weakness Cited in BP Accident 

PURPOSE 

ThIS Advisory provides information and recommendations 

from an independent safety review 01 BP U,S, refineries 

following one of the most serious U,S. workplace disasters in 

the past two decades that resulted in 15 fatalities and more 

than 170 injuries at the BP Texas City refinery. The 

independent review cited weaknesses in corporate safety 

culture and process safety management, areas that are 

important to safe operations at Department of Energy (DOE) 

faciHties. 

In response to an urgent safety recommendation from the 

U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), BP's Board of Directors 

formed the BP U.S. Refineries Safety Review Panel to assess 

and report on the effectiveness of BP North America's 

corporate oversight of safety management systems at its five 

U.s' refineries and its corporate safety culture. An 11· 

member panel of experts was formed and chaired by former 

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III. 

SUMMARY 

The Baker Repor! points out that BP failed to adequately 

implement many important attributes of a sound safety 

program. Many of these parallel the 7 Guiding Principles of 

Integrated Safety Management that DOE established 10 

years ago as a new approach to enhance safety awareness, 

upgrade formality of operations, and improve safety 

performance. DOE and its contractors have had to address 

safety conditions similar to those that were ultimately 

precursors to the Texas City refinery disaster. It is therefore 

important that DOE and its contractors identify with, and learn 

from, the findings and recommendations from BP's 

independent safety review. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 23, 2005, a tremendous explosion occurred during 

an infrequent startup of an octane~boostjng isomerization unit 

that produces components for unleaded gasoline. During the 

startup, operators accidentally overfi!!ed a distillation tower 

and anached blowdown drum with highly flammable liquid 

hydrocarbons. The b!owdown drum, which vented directly to 

atmosphere, spewed flammable liquid and vapor onto the 

grounds of the refinery, causing a series ot explosions and 

fires. All of the fatalities occurred in and around temporary 

work trailers that were placed too close to the process units; 

areas that should have been evacuated before startup. 

Alarms and gauges that could have warned operators of the 

overfilled equipment failed to operate from tack of repair. The 

esa investigated the accident and wi!! release its final report 

on March 20, 2007. An investigation by OSHA resulted in 

fines of more than $21 million. 

DISCUSSION 

BP tended to have a shorHerm focus, and their decentralized 

management system and entrepreneurial culture delegated 

substantial discretion to their U.S. refinery plant managers 

without clearly defining process safety expectations, The 

Panel's findings are divided into three categories: corporate 

safety culture, process safety management systems, and 

performance evaluation, corrective action, and corporate 

oversight. 

Corporate Safety Culture 

BP did not ensure its management and workforce understood 

what was expected of them regarding process safety; 

emphasizing persona! safety over process safety. They relied 

on personal injury rate data as a process safety performance 

Indicator, which created a false sense of confidence that 

process safety risks were adequately being addressed. Their 

employees were not empowered with a positive, trusting, and 

open environment with effective lines of communication 

between management and the workforce. Process safety 

was not incorporated into management decjsion~making and 

management was not held accountable for process safety. 

The safety culture at BP's five U.S. refineries was not unified 

and was fraught with a lack of operating discipline, tolerance 

of serious deviations from safe operating practices, and 

complacency toward serious process safety risks. 

Process Safety Management Systems 

BP's programs for analyzing process hazards did not ensure 

adequate identification and rigorous analYSis of those 

hazards. Their corporate safety management system did not 

ensure timely compliance with internal process safety 

standards and programs for managing process risks, nor did it 

ensure timely implementation of external good engineering 

practices that could improve process safety performance. BP 

did not effectively define the level of process safety 

knowledge or competency required of senior management, 

refinery personnel, and contractors. Their corporate safety 

management system did not trans!ate corporate expectations 

into measurable criteria for management of process risk. 

Performance Evaluation, Corrective Action, and 

Corporate Oversight 

BP's use of injury rates to measure process safety 

performance hindered their perception of process risk, 

Although they tracked some metrics relevant to process 

safety, they didn't understand or accept what these data 
184 

Æ 

Safety Advisory 2007-02 April 2007 

indicated about the risk of a major accident. BP did not have 

effective root cause analysis procedures to identity systemic 

causal factors; therefore, corrective actions only addressed 

immediate or superticia! causes rather than the true root 

cause, which could contribute to future accidents. BP's 

process safety audit system relied on internal auditors that 

focused primarily on compliance and !egal issues rather than 

safety performance or assessing against industry best 

practices. They also failed to track process safety 

deficiencies to completion. BP's "bottom-up" reporting system 

allowed refinery-specific data to be aggregated and lost as it 

moved up the reporting chain. Executive management either 

djd not receive refinery-specific information regarding process 

safety deficiencies or didn't effectively respond to the 

information it received. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Baker Pane! was charged with making recommendations 

to improve corporate safety culture, corporate oversight of 

process safety, and process safety management systems. As 

a result of the Panel's findings, they prepared the following 

ten recommendations for BP's Board of Directors. The Panel 

also developed commentary that is integra! to the 

implementation of these recommendations. The complete 

commentary can be read in the Baker Panel Report 

http://www.bp.com/bakerpanelreport. 

1. Process Safety Leadership - BP's Board of Directors, 

executive management, and other members of BP's 

corporate management must provide effective leadership 

and establish appropriate goals for process safety. 

2. Integrated and Comprehensive Process Safety 

Management System - Establish and implement an 

integrated and comprehensive process safety 

management system that systematically and continuously 

identifies, reduces, and manages process safety risks. 

3. Process Safety Knowledge - Develop and implement a 

system to ensure that executive management, refining 

line management. and aU U.S. refining personnel, 

including managers, supervisors, workers, and 

contractors possess an appropriate leve! of process 

safety knowledge and expertise. 

4. Process Safety Culture - Have relevant stakeholders 

develop a positive, trusting, and open process safety 

culture within each U.S. refinery. 

5. Clearly Defined Expectations and Accountability for 

Process Safety - Clearly define expectations and 

strengthen accountability for process safety petiormance 

at all levels in executive management and in the refining 

managerial and supervisory reporting Une. 

6. Support for Une Management- Provide more effective 

and better coordinated process safety support for the 

U.S. refining line organization. 

7 Leading and Lagging Performance Indicators for Process 

Safety - Develop, implement, maintain, and periodically 

update an integrated set of leading and lagging 

peliormance indicators to more effectively monitor 

process safety performance at its U.S. refineries, 

8. Process Safety Auditing - Establish and implement an 

effective system to audit process safety performance. 

9. Board Monitoring - BP's Board should monitor the 

implementation of the Panel's recommendations and the 

ongoing process safety pertormance at their U.S. 

refineries. 

10. Industry Leader- Use the lessons learned from the 

Texas City tragedy and from the Panel's report to 

transform the company into a recognized industry leader 

in process safety management. 

MESSAGE TO DOE 

In order to achieve continuous improvement in the operation 

of DOE facilities, it is important to foster a safety culture that 

sets and maintains high standards; identifies and resolves 

problems and deficiencies; is open to criticism and 

recommendations for improvement; and promotes effective 

communication between line managers and independent 

oversight This can only be achieved if management is fully 

committed to safety. Guidance for implementing the OSHA 

Rule for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous 

Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119) can be found in DOE-HDBK1101-2004, Process Safety Management for Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals and in OOE·HDBK-1100-2004, 

Chemical Process Hazards Analysis. 

Safety culture has to be inherent in the thoughts and actions 

of all individuals within your organization. The decision to 

ensure workers have a safe working environment should not 

be based solely on the consequences if you don't, but 

because it's the right thing to do. 

ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION 

Safety Advisory 2006~01: Texas City Refinery Update: 

The Price of Safety Complacency 

Safety Bulietin 2005-09: Vigilance in New or Infrequent 

High~Hazard Operations 

OE Summary 2006-05: Preliminary Findings on Fatal 

Explosion at Texas Refinery 

OE Summary 2005-11: Refinery Explosion Involved 

Infrequently Performed, Hjgh~Hazard Work 

If you have any questions, please contact Tom Williams at 

301~903~4859 or bye-mail at thomas.e.williams@hg.doe.gov.