## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Hoch v. Boehm e , 2013 IL App (2d) 120664

Appellate Court Caption J OE HOCH, a/k/a J oseph E. Hoch, an d L I NDA HOCH, a/k/a L inda R. Hoch, Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants-A ppellees, v. L I L L IAN C. BO EHME; ROY E. SCHMI DT, Individually and as Trustee under Trust Ag ree ment Dated J uly 24, 1998, a/k/a The Roy E. Schmidt Revoca ble Trust; L I NDA SCHMI DT, Individually and as Trustee under Trust Agre em en t dated J uly 24, 1998, a/k/a The L inda J

. Schmidt Revoca ble Trust; and UNKN OWN OTHERS, Def endants and CounterplaintiffsAppellants.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-12-0664

Filed May 9, 2013

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r te r of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In a dispute seeking to qu i et title to a parc el betwee n the parties’
proper ties, the judgme nt for plaintiffs was reve rsed an d the cause was

rema nded with direc tions to en t er judgme nt for defe ndants on their
counter claim, since plaintiffs failed to establish a clai m to the parc el pursuant to section 13-110 of the L imitations Act based on their pay ment of the taxes on the “vac ant and unoccupie d land,” and t h ey did not

rec eive an i n t ere st in the parc el throug h the chain of title, while defe ndants showed a superior rig ht to title arising from the evidenc e that they had enclose d the parc el with a fe nce a nd supported their claim that it was not “vac ant and unoc cupied.”

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of McHe nry County
, No. 05-CH-960; the Hon. Michae l T. Caldwell, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded with dire ctions.Counsel on

Appea l Thomas W. Gooch I I I
, of Gauthier & Gooch, of Wauconda, for appellants.

J ames A. Campion a

nd L ori E. Fulton, both of Campion, Curran, L amb & Cuna baugh, P.C., of Cry stal L ake, f or appe llees.

Panel J USTI CE BI RKETT delivered t he judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Bur

ke and J ustice McL are n concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, J oe and L inda Hoch, filed a complaint ag ai n s t d ef en d an t s, Roy and L inda Schmidt et al. , seeking to quiet title to a parce l of land in McHe nry County . The Schmidts
counter claimed for a decr ee quieting title in their fa v o r. Following a bench trial, the court quieted title in favor of the Hochs. The Schmidts appea l. For the rea s ons that follow, we

reve rse the judgme nt f

or the Hochs and rema

nd for the trial court to e nter judgme nt f or the Schmidts on t heir c ounterc laim.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 The a

ppendix t o this dispos ition is an enla rg ement of pa

rt of def endants’ e x hibit No. 1
at trial, which is a plat of survey of proper ty immediately south of Colli nwood Subdivis ion. We ref er to it in its totality as the “B oehme proper ty ,” afte r L illian Boe hme, who once owned the entire trac t pictured south of Colli nwood Subdivis ion. To the east of the Boe hme proper ty is Way side Dr i ve, running north and south. There are sever al deeds in the rec ord. In the

ear liest deeds that purport to convey the Boe hme proper ty , the land immediately north of the Boe hme prope rty

is describe d as the “ trac t of land conve y ed by C. Ben Jacoby

and wife to Anna Dianis by Warranty Dee d dated Fe bruar y 2 1
, 1 9 2 2
, and rec orded in Book 164 of Dee ds, Pag e 307, McHe nry County
, I llinois .” The easte rn boundary of the J acoby proper ty

was 20 fee t w est of the easte rn boundary of the Boe hme proper ty

. In those older deeds, the Boe hme prope rty

is reckone d from a point 20 fee t east of the J acoby proper ty . The Jacoby
proper ty is now part of Colli nwood Subdivis ion
, which extends 20 fee t east of the former J acoby proper

ty

. Consequently
, the later deeds rec kon the (now sub d i v i ded) Boe hme
proper ty simply from the southea st corner of Collinwood Subdi vision. ¶ 4 We have added numbers to the individual parc els. There are nine in all

. T h e ea rl i es t deeds in the rec ord identify a single division within the Boe hme proper ty

. Specifica lly
, these deeds convey the entire Boe hme proper ty but for “the East 20 fee t and the North 20 fee t” of

-2-the proper ty

. These east and north 20-foot strips wer e later divided into parc els 4 throug h 9. Parce l 4, the disputed parc el here
, is shaded on defe ndants’ ex h i b i t No. 1. Def endants’ exhibi t No. 1 repr esents the parc el as being 477.84 fee t along
, extending from the southeast

corne r of the former J acoby proper ty , but the deeds in the rec ord descr ibe the trac t as being 497.84 fee t along

–that is, as extending from the southeast corne r of Colli nwood Subdivis ion. The discr epanc y

is not material for our

purposes. ¶ 5 There is no dispute in this action that parc els 2, 5, and 7 are owned by the Hochs, and that
parc els 1
, 3, 6, 8, and 9 are owned by the Schmidts. The Hochs and the Schmidts are in 1 conflict over parc el 4 alone. It is und i s p u t ed t hat, since the 1980s, the Schmidts have maintained a fenc e around parc el 4. (Judged by photogr aphs in the rec ord, the fenc e appea rs 2
to be composed of steel-link sections an d wood posts.) Both couples trac e their claims of

owner ship of parc el 4 ultimately to L illian Boe hme, who died in 1974. The Hochs claim they

rec eived parc els 2, 4, 5, and 7 through a trustee’ s deed dated August 6, 2003, pursuant to a purcha se agree ment betwee n the Hochs and Charles and L ee Ann Bla ck, who had place d the
proper ty in trust in 1995. The Schmidts claim owner ship of parc el 4 throug h quitclaim deeds and assignments of intere st from the survivingheirs of L illian Boehme

. ¶ 6 In Dec ember 2005, the Hoch s fi l ed s u i t t o quiet title to parc el 4. First, they cited the August 2003 trustee’ s deed as convey ing them the parc el. Second, they claimed owner ship under section 13-110 of the L imitations Act (Ac t) (735 I L CS 5/13-110 (West 2010)), which provides that a person will be adjudge d the owner of “vaca nt and unoccupied land” wher e the person has a g ood-fa ith claim to title an d h as p ai d the leg ally imposed taxes on the
proper ty for se ven succ essive year s. ¶ 7 The S chmidts filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a )(9) of t he Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (1) (West 2010)), arguing that the Hochs could no t cl ai m

owner ship unde r section 13-110 beca use parc el 4 was not “ vaca nt and unocc upied,” as the Schmidts had maintained a fenc e around it since the late 1 9 8 0s. In response , the Hochs
argue d t h at the Schmidts’ motion addre ssed only one g round for the Hochs’ asser tion of

owner ship, namely
, section 13-110, while the Hochs wer e alternativ el y cl ai m ing title by virtue of a

deed. Reg arding the Schmidts’ mention of the fenc e around parc el 4, the Hochs submitt ed that the Schmidts’
“cla im with respe ct to the prope rt y ap p ea rs to be the fac t that they have enclose d the subject proper

ty , toge ther with their proper ty , for 17 or 18 y ear s. It is prec isely this eff ort by the Def

endants to acquir e title by adver se possession f or 20 year s that has prompted the Plaintiffs to init iate this lawsuit at this ti me.” 3

T her e a re dee ds i n t he r eco rd foral l i ndi vidual par cel s e xce pt par cel 1. 1

I t is n ot cl earwhet herth e f enc e runs th e e nti re per imeterof par cel 4, o r wheth er the tr act 2 is ope n to the sou th wher e it adj oin s par cel 3. I t is suf fi ci ent for purpos e s o f t h i s act ion tha t the
par cel is fe nce d- off

fr om la nd n ot ownedby the Sch m idt s.

T he Hochs con ti nue to re pre sen t on a p p e a l t hat the Schmidt s cl ai m ed bel ow tha t the y 3 obt ai nedowne rs hip of

par cel 4 thr ough 20- year pos ses si on. See 735 I LCS 5/1 3- 101 (W est 2010 ).

-3-¶ 8 In their reply in support of the motion to dismiss
, the Schmidts expanded their ar gument

to dispute as well the Hochs’ claim to title based on a deed. The trial court denied the motion to dismi ss, but the rec ord does not re flec t a rationale for the decision. ¶ 9 The Schmidts s ub s eq u en t l y fi l ed an an s we r to the Hochs’ complaint, pleadingas aff irmative defe nses the same g rounds on which they had moved for dismiss al. The Hochs then m oved for summary judgme nt, cl ai m i n g that it was undisput ed that (1) they rec eived

a trustee’ s deed dated August 6, 2003, that specific ally included parc el 4; (2) they and their immediate prede cessor s in interest to parc el 2 paid the taxes on parc el 4 fo r a combi ned seven successive y ear s, as required by section 13-110; and (3) the Oct o b er 2 2
, 1987, deed that the Schmidts rec eived from their immediate prede cessor s in interest, Tade usz Sz ydlowski and Maria Galbar ski, specific ally excluded parc el 4. In opposition to summary judgme nt, the Schmidts aga in a sserted that parc el 4 was, be cause of the fe nce e nclosingit, not “ vaca nt a nd unoccupie d” per section 13-110. The Schmidts also submitt ed an aff idavit from Charles Bla ck, who aver red that, to the best of his know ledg e, he never owned parc el 4. ¶ 10 An Oc t o b er 2 0
, 2006, order by the trial court indicates that the summary judgm en t motion was hear d in court. No transcript of the hearing, howeve r, appea rs in the rec ord. On November 1, 2006, the trial court enter ed a written order g ranting summary judgme nt for the Hochs, quieting title to parc el 4 in their favor

. The order char acte rizes the summary judgme nt

as “par tial” b u t d o es n o t s tate what issues wer e resolved. The court included in the order languag e from I llinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010))

nece ssary to authorize an appea l from “a final judgme nt as to one or more but few er than all the par ties or claims.” ¶ 11 The Schmidts moved the court t o re co n s i d er t he summary judgme nt ruling
, and also moved for leave to file a co unterc laim. They repr esente d that they had located L illian Boe hme’s li ving heirs, Gloria Ruth Fishe r and James Griff in, and had obtaine d from them deeds to parc el 4 as we l l as assig nments of their interests in the proper ty

. The Schmidts
argued that, based on the documents, they should “re main in the case in a differ ent capa city
, as assignee s,” and that it would be “premature ” for the co u rt to require them to appea l the
summary judgme nt ruling

. There fore
, the Schmidts asked the court to strike the Rule 304(a) languag e from its order

. The court struck the languag e and g rante d the Schmidts leave to file
a counte rcla im. ¶ 12 In their counterclaim, the Schmidts alleg ed that, subsequent to t h e s u m mary judgme nt ruling
, they acquir ed title to parc el 4 from Fisher and Griff in. The Schmidts at t ache d quitclaim deeds dated Dec ember 14, 2006, from Fisher and Griff in purporting to convey parc el 4. The Hochs moved to dismiss the counter claim sin ce t h e S chmidts had failed to plead as assig nees of Fisher and Griff in. The court g rante d the motion to dismiss with leave to refile. T he cour

t also denied the Schmidts’ motion to rec onsider the summ ary judgme nt ruling

. The Schmidts subsequently filed an amende d counter claim styling themselves as the

As we re ad the re cor d, ho w e ve r , the Schmidt s ci te d the exi st enc e of the fe nce onl y to def eat the Hochs ’ c la im to po sse ssi on u nde r t he l imita ti ons pr ovisi on i n se ct ion 13- 110.

-4-assig nees of L illian Boehme

. ¶ 13 After notice by publication, and the failure of any additional parties to claim an intere st in parc el 4, the trial c ourt enter ed a de fault judgment ag ainst “the unknown othe rs” na med in the Hochs’ c omplaint. ¶ 14 The case proce eded to an evidentiar y hearing. Numerous d ee d s we re ad m itted into evidence. As noted, the Hochs and the Schmidts all trac e their claims of title to L illian Boe hme. Th e s u cc es s i o n of title can be divided into three main phases. First, there is the

succ es s i o n fr om Be n and Henrietta J acoby
, throug h L illian Boe hme, t o Theodor and M ila Kotiw. By war

ranty deed dated August 31, 1938, the J acoby s conveyed to J oseph Sikes a trac t o f l and, which, as initially descr ibed, was inclusive of all the trac ts numbere d in the appendix to this opinion. Howeve r, a p ro v i s o at the end of the leg al descr iption rea ds: “excepting and rese rving there from the East 20 fee t there of to be used as a private road.” By these terms, parc els 6, 7, and 8 (which at that point wer e not distinguished from eac h other)

wer e excluded. An identical exception appea rs in the Februar

y 7, 1939, war

ranty deed from J oseph and L ois Sikes to Max and L illian Boe hme. The September 25, 1954, war ranty deed from L illian Boe hme (now a wi dow) to Theodor and Mila Kotiw contains an added exception: “excepting and rese rving there from the East 20 and the North 20 fee t there of to be used as a private road” (empha sis added)

. The italicized languag e excepts parc els 4, 5, and 9 (which at that point wer e not distinguished from eac h other). There fore
, all of parce l s 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 wer e excluded from the September 1954 conveyance from L illian Boe hme to the Kotiws. ¶ 15 The rec ord contains no evidenc e of any other conveyance s by L ilian Boe hme or her he irs until the Dec ember 2006 quitclaim deeds from Griff in and Fisher to the Schmidts. Wil liam Doland, who prepa

red defe ndants’ exhibi t No. 1, testified that he examined the deeds dating from when the proper

ty depicted in the exhibi t was still a single parc el. He was asked, “Prior
to the time [the Schmidts] obtained quitclaim deeds [from Griff in and Fisher ], did you ever find a de ed out for the Boe hme prope rty by Wil liam Boe hme of the 20-foot are a known as

a private road commencing at the no rt h we st corne r and g oing to the northea st corne r? ” 4 Doland said no. ¶ 16 The second phase of conveyance s consisted of three deed s fr o m t h e 1 9 6 0 s. L ike the

ear lier deeds, they purport to c onvey the entire Boe hme proper ty , with a rese rvation for the north and east 20-foot strips. The third deed, dated November 2, 1967, conveys the proper ty to Peter and Sophie Kulis. ¶ 17 The thi rd m ain phase of conveyance s beg an wh en t h e Kulises subdivided the B oehme
proper ty and sold parc els 2 and 3 to separ ate parties. The first branc h of the third phase beg an

T her e is no “W il li am” Boeh m e m ent ion ed e l s e w h e r e in the re cor d. Mo st li kely, cou nse l 4 ei the r m is spo ke or “Li ll ia n” was m is ta kenly tr ans cr ibe d as “W il li am.” T his asi de, a m ore per ti nen t que st ion woul d have bee n whet her
, pri or to the Dece m ber 20 0 6 qui tc la im dee ds, the re was any

con vey anc e of the 20- foo t st ri p by Lil li an or Ma x Boeh m e or the ir hei rs

. At le ast in the re cor d bef ore us, the re is no eviden ce of any ear li er con vey anc e by t he Boeh m es or the irhei rs of any por ti on o f the north or eas t 2 0- foo t s tr ip.

-5-when, by war ranty deed dated J uly 22, 1974, the Kulises conveyed parc el 3 to Tade usz and Maria Sz ydlowski. The deed re serve d “the Ea st 20 feet a nd the North 20 fe et there of to be used as a private road.” The October 22, 1987, war ranty deed from Tade usz Sz ydlowski and Maria Galbar ski (for

merly Sz ydlowski) to the Schmidts has an identical proper ty description and re servation. ¶ 18 The second branc h of the third main phase commence d with three deeds dated November 1, 1 9 7 6
, fr o m the Kulises to Peter and Rita L azzari. The first is a war ranty deed that descr ibes parc el 2 but excepts
“the North 20.00 fee t of the West 252.07 fee t of the East 749.91 fee t, and the East 20.00 fee t of the South 243.00 fee t of the North 428.00 fee t (as measure d along the North and East lines there of), of that part of said Southwest 1/4 lying South of the South line of the
trac t of land conveyed by C. Be n J acoby and wife afor esai d
, al l i n McHe nry County
, I llinois .” That is, the deed excepts parc els 5 and 7. These parc els wer e, howeve r, conveyed separ ately to the L azzaris by

two quitclaim deeds of the same date. ¶ 19 Subsequently
, by three deeds dated J uly 3, 1985, with proper ty descr iptions identical to the t hree November 1976 deeds, the L azzaris conveyed p ar ce l s 2, 5, and 7 to Howar d and Aisha Hinman. In J une 1988, the Hinmans convey ed all three parc els to Charles and L ee Ann Bla ck. On this occa sion, only two deeds wer e used: a war ranty deed for par ce l 2 and a quitclaim de ed for both pa rce ls 5 and 7. Parce ls 2, 5, and 7 wer e identified as parc els A, B, and C, respe ctively

. The descr iptions of the individual parc els wer e the same as those in the J uly 1985 deeds. ¶ 20 In Marc h 1995, the Bla cks deede d all three parc els to a trust. They used a single deed that identified the parc els, ag ain, as A, B, and C, using the s am e descr iptions appea ring in the J une 1988 dee ds. ¶ 21 The August 6, 2003, trustee’ s deed to the Hochs likewise combined parc els 2, 5, and 7, labeled once ag ain as A, B, and C. J oe Hoch testified that, when he revie wed the August 2003 deed at cl o sing, he rea liz ed that none of the leg al descr iptions included parc el 4. He

as k ed t h e Blacks to sign a quitclaim deed for the parc el, and they agree d. L ater , howeve r, McHe nry County personne l informed J oe that the deed had to come from the trust. The trust then issued a deed, which appar ently was backdated to August 6, 2003. The deed, we note, descr ibes three parc els: A, B, and C. Parce l A includes both parc el 2 and parc el 7. Parce l B is pa rce l 5. Parce l C is pa

rce l 4. The descr iption of parc el 4 in this second trustee’ s deed of August 2003 is identical to the descr iption of parc el 4 in the Dec ember 2006 quitclaim deeds from Gr iffin and F isher to the Schmidts, which we quote below. ¶ 22 J oe Hoch acknow ledg ed that, when he purcha sed the parc els from the trust, parc el 4 was alre ady enclose d with a fenc e. Awar e of the law on adver se possession, J oe hired an attorney to file a quiet-title action. Hoch identified a photo grap h of his proper ty showing a pile of asphalt shaving s on his proper ty near the fenc e around parc el 4. Ho ch t es t i fi ed that he planned to use the shaving s to build a road on parc el 4 to acc ess the north end of his proper ty

. ¶ 23 During their cross-e x amination of Hoch, the Schmidts moved to introduce the aff idavit of Charles Bla ck that they had submitt ed during the summary judgme nt proce edi n gs

. T h e

-6-trial court declined to admit the aff idavit, noting that it would not revisit the issues decide d
on summary

judgme nt. ¶ 24 L inda Schmidt testified that she and her husband purcha sed parc el 3 in 1987 and parc el 1 in 1 9 9 6

. W hen they purcha sed parc el 3, the Schmidts believed that they wer e also purcha sing parc el 4. In 1988, the Schmidts ere cted a fenc e around parc el 3. Some y ear s later, they fenc ed in parc el 4. Schmidt testified that she and her husband cur rently raise c attle on
parc el 4. ¶ 25 W h en s h o wn t h e October 1987 war ranty deed from Tade us Sz ydlowski and M ar i a Galbars k i
, L inda acknow ledg ed that the deed excluded both the northern 20 fee t and the
easte rn 20 fe et of parce l 3. L inda t estified that she later obtaine d quitclaim deeds for those
trac ts from Griff

in and Fisher

. Eac h of the two Dec ember 2006 quitclaim deeds from Griff in and F isher desc ribes thre e par cels: A, B , and C:
“Parc el ‘A’ : Part of t he Northea st Quar ter of the Southwest Quar ter of Section 29, Township 44 North, Rang e 9, East of the Third Principal Meridian descr ibed as follows: Commencing
at a point located at the intersec tion of the Easter ly line of the said Northea st Quar ter of the Southwest Quar

ter and the Southerly line of Colli nwood Subdivis ion ac c ording to the play [ sic ] t here of as Doc ument #517657 in Mc Henr y County
, I llinois ; the nce Westerly along t h e Southerly line of said Colli nwood Subdivis ion for a distance of 497.84 fee t; then Southerly along a line para llel with the Easter ly line of said Northea st Quar ter of the Southwest Quar

ter for a distance of 20.00 fee t; thence Easter ly along a line para llel with the Southerly line of said Colli nwood Subdivis ion f or a distance of 497.84 fee t; thence Norther ly 20.00 fee t a long the Easter ly line of said Northea st Q uarte r of the Southwest Quar ter to the point of Be g inning. All c ontaining .2285 a cre s more or le ss in McHenry County , I llinois

. Parce l ‘B’ : The North 20.00 Fe et of the West 252.07 fee t of the East 749.91 Fe et (as measure d along the North and East lines there of), of that part of the Southwest fra ctional 1/4 of Section 29, Township 44 North, Rang e 9, East of the Third Principal Meridian lying South of the South line of a trac t of land conveyed by C. Be n J acoby and wi fe to Anna Dianis by Warranty Dee d dated Fe bruar y 21, 1922, and rec orded in Book 164 of Dee ds, Pag e 307, in McHenr

y County , I llinois

. Parce l ‘C’:
The North 20.00 Fe et, ex cept the East 749.91 Fe et m easur ed along t he North and East lines of that part of the Southwest fra ctional qu ar ter of Section 29, lying South of the South line of a trac t of land conveyed by C. Be n J acoby and wife to Anna Diani s by Warranty Dee d dated Fe bruar y 21, 1922[,] and rec orded in Book 164 of Dee ds, Pag e 307, in McHe nry County
, I llinois and East of the East line of a private road (Commonly known as L ittle Ro ad ) as s h o wn on the Plat of J acoby ’s Second Fox River addition,

acc ording to the Plat there of rec orded August 31, 1923, as Document 60326, in Book 4 of Plats, Page 103, all in McHenr y County , I llinois .”
Parce ls A, B, and C appea r to be, respe ctively
, parc els 4, 5, and 9–that is, the entire north 20-

-7-foot strip of the B oehme pr operty

.

¶ 26 The September 17, 2010, deposition of Griff in was admitted at trial. Griff in testified that 5 he is the grandson of L illian Boe hme and that Fisher is his sister. Griff in rec alled that L illian owned proper

ty in I llinois

. Griff

in had been under the impression that L illian sold all of her I llinois proper

ty with i n h er l ifetime. I t was a “complete surprise” to Griff in to lear n of t he exis tence of the 20-foot strip of land. Griff in had “no idea” why his grandmother would have
reta ined that strip of land. Griff in confirme d that he and his sister executed quitclaim deeds
convey ing the 20-foot strip to the Schmidts. ¶ 27 I n ad d i t i o n t o t h e fo re going evidenc e of conveyance s, there was doc umentat i o n , introduced by the Hochs, that they or their pr edec essors in intere st as to parc el 2 have paid
t h e p roper

ty taxes on parc el 4 since 1994. Thoug h section 13-110 of the Act was not specific ally

cited at tria l, the Hochs a sserted a s follows in closing a rgument: “The evidenc e is that the taxes have been paid on [parcel 4] at least from 2000–from 1994 on *** by the Bla cks and/or t h e Hochs. So we have more than seven y ear s of
pay ment of taxes, and we ha

ve color of title.
* * *
*** For a long time [t he Hochs] h av e paid taxes on that ***. And [the Hochs] have–ha ve possessed it for–a

nd their prede cessor s for over seven y ear s, clea rly
, they own that.” ¶ 28 After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion concluding that the Hochs had a superior claim of title to parc el 4 than did the Schmidts. The court found: “The deeds in evidenc e show a chain of titil e [ sic ] from L illian Boe hme throug h sever al
g rante es and ultimately to Cha rles Bla ck and L ee Ann Bla ck. The Bla cks conveyed the entire parc el into a tru s t

. I t wa s the Fifth [T] hird Ba nk as trustee of the proper ty that
conveyed the pa

rce l to the plaintiffs.” ¶ 29 The trial court then quoted the proper ty descr iptions for parc els A, B, and C from the first trustee’ s deed dated August 6, 2003. The court deter mined that parc el 4 “cle arly” was excluded from the leg al descr iption of parc el A, but that parc el 4 and parc el B wer e “one and the same proper

ty and that the subject proper ty was included in the assemblag e of rea l estate conveyed to the Hochs.” The court found that “[n] o subsequent deed attempted to divest the Hochs of their owner shi p of [parcel 4].” The court further deter mined that, though the Schmidts obtained from the heirs of L illian B oehme quitclaim de eds for parc el 4, the heirs had no intere st in that parce l to convey . The c ourt then made the followingfinding s: “1.) Joseph Hoch a

nd L inda Hoch c lear ly

are the owner s of the subjec t property ; 2.) Roy Schmidt and L inda Schmidt did n o t ac qu i re any interest in the subject
proper ty by virtue of the sever al quit claim deeds t h at they acquir ed from the heirs of L illian Boehme [; ] [ and]

A sec ond, Oct obe r 2009
, dep osi ti on of Gri ff in is inc lud ed in the app end ix to the Schmidt s’ 5
ope nin g bri ef on app eal

. As fa r as we can te ll
, the Oct obe r 2009 dep osi ti on was not admitt ed at tr ia l.

-8-3.) The claim of owne rs h i p to the subject proper ty by Roy Schmidt and L inda Schmidt is a cloud on the title of t h e P l ai n t i ffs[ ,] J oseph Hoch and L inda Hoch[,] that should be remove d.” The court direc ted counsel for the Hoch s t o prepa re “an appropriate order or decr ee in

acc ordanc e with the finding s in this m emora ndum decision.” ¶ 30 The Schmidts filed a motion to reconside r. The Hochs opposed the motion and moved
to clar ify the memorandum opinion to ref lect that the court “alr eady found that the Hochs had color of title and pa

y ment of re al estate taxes for in excess of seve n y ear s.” ¶ 31 Subsequently
, the trial court issued its written judgme nt. The judgme nt stated in r eleva nt part: “THE COURT FI NDS that the Plaintiffs, J OE HOCH an d L I NDA HOCH[,] have superior title to the disputed proper ty claimed by the Schmidt Def endants[ ] as assig nees of the L illian Boehme heirs, James Griffin a nd Gloria F isher;
THE COURT FI

NDS that the Plaintiffs, J OE HOCH and L I NDA HOCH, have color of title pur suant to a series of deeds in the ir favor rec orded in 2003 and 2004, and have paid taxes (or their prede cessor s have) on the disputed proper ty for a period in excess of
seven year s; THE COURT FI

NDS that the quit-claim deeds obtained by the Schmidt Def endants from the he irs of L illian Boehme transfe rre d no interest in the subjec t property and ar e inferior to the title held by

the Hochs ***.”
T h e court then commented that it had previously enter ed summary judgme nt “ag ains t t h e Schmidts on their claims and defe nses of owner ship, independe nt of the af t er- acquir ed deeds.” The court conclude d that the Schmidts’ claim of owner ship to parc el 4 was a cloud on the Hochs’ title and should be remove d. ¶ 32 The Schmidts filed this tim ely appea l.

¶ 33 ANALYSI S ¶ 34 One of the Schmidts’ two main contentions on appea l is that the Hochs have not proven

owner ship of parc el 4 under section 13-110 of the Act. The Schmidts addre ss the issue as if it had been decide d at trial, not on summary judgme nt. The section 13-110 issue was in fac t raised in the summary judgme nt proce eding
, but the court’ s written judgme nt g ranting partial
summary judgme nt to the Hochs does not ref lect any re s olution of that issue. When we inquired at oral argument as to what exactly was decide d on summary judgme nt, the parties
agree d that the section 13-110 issue was not decide d at that stag e. The parties char acte rized the summary judgme nt as based strictly on the deeds submitt ed during that proce eding
, and they further agree d that the sec tion 13-110 issue was in fa ct dec ided at trial. ¶ 35 Yet, while at trial the court acc epted evidenc e and argument from the Hochs on matters rele vant to a s ec t i o n 13-110 inquiry –namely
, pay

ment of taxes, color of title, and

-9-p o s s es s i on –the court’s memorandum opinion afte r trial was conce rned solely with th e 6 meaning of the deeds introduced at trial. Subsequently
, the Hochs moved to clari fy the court’s decision to ref

lect that the court had “ already found that the Hochs had color of title and pay ment of rea l estate taxes for in excess of seven y ear s” (empha sis added)

. The court 7 then issued a written judgme nt finding
, inter alia
, that the Hochs “have color of title pursuant to a series of deeds in their favor rec orded in 2003 and 2004, and have paid taxes (or their prede cessor s have) on the disputed proper ty for a period in excess of seven y ear s.” We will
not speculate whether the court was reiterating a determ i nation made at an earlier stag e of the proce eding s, as the parties do not dispute that the section 13-110 issue was not resolved until trial, and the rec ord is consistent overa ll with that position. There fore
, we turn to revie w the cour t’s section 13-110 de termination made at trial. ¶ 36 Section 13-110 i s one of sever al provisi ons in the Act that vest o wn er s h i p of l and in a
person though his proof of leg al title is defic ient. Perhaps the most familiar of the limit ation provisions is section 13-101 of t h e Ac t (735 I L CS 5/13-101 (West 2010)), which incorpora tes the common-law doctrine of adver se possession. See Joiner v. Janssen
, 85 I ll. 2d 74, 81 (1981) (“Wh at i s es s ential in order to establish title under the 20-year adver sepossession doctrine incorporated in [section 13-101] is that t h er e m u st be 20 y ear s’

concur rent exis tence of the five elements: (1) continuous, (2) hostile or adver se, (3) actua l, (4 ) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owne r.”) . Section 13-110 states:
“Va cant land–Pay

ment of t axes with color of t i tle. Whenever a person having color of title, made in g ood faith, to va cant and unoccupie d land, pay s all taxes lega lly assessed th ere on for 7 succe ssive y ear s, he or she shall be deeme d and adjudg ed to be the leg al

owner of such vaca

nt and unoccupie d land, to the extent and acc ording to the purport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such taxpay er, by purcha se, leg acy or desce nt, befor e such 7 year s expired, and who continue to pay the taxes, as above set out,

so as to complete the pay

ment of taxes for the such term, are entitled to the benef it of this S ec t i o n

. Howeve r, if any person, having a better paper title to such vaca nt and unoccupie d land, during the term of 7 y ear s, pay s the taxes assessed on such land for any

one or more y ear s of the term of 7 y ear s, then such taxpay er, his or her heirs, leg atee s or assig ns, shall not be enti t l ed t o t he benef it of this Section.” 735 I L CS 5/13-110 (West 2010). ¶ 37 The Hochs claim that the case law is unclea r on what standard of revie w g overns section 13-110 deter

min at i o n s

. They sug g est that there is authority for both the manifest-w eig ht standard and the clea

rly -er roneous standard (b u t m aint ain that they preva il under either standard)

. As authority for the clea rly -er roneous standard, the Hochs cite Dotson v. Former

T he requir ement of posse ssi on is not expr ess ed in the te xt of sec ti on 13- 110, but ra the r is 6 a j udi ci al gloss . See inf

ra ¶ 40.

T he Hochs ’ sugg est ion
, in the ir m oti on to cl ar if y, that the tr ia l cou rt p r e viousl y r eso lved 7 the is sue , pre sumably at summ ary j udgm ent , is dif fi cul t to re con ci le wit h thei r pres ent at ion at tr ia l of eviden ce andar gum enton t he r equ is it es of sec ti on 1 3- 110.

-10-Shareholders of Abraham Lincoln Land & Cattl e Co.
, 332 I ll. App. 3d 846 (2002), wher e the First District of the Appellate Court discussed what standard of proof and what standard of revie w g overn deter

minati o n s u n d er section 13-110. The court in Dotson had conflicting
sug g estions from the parties as to the standard of revie w. The plaintiff sug g ested revie w for abuse of discretion, while the defe ndants sug g ested that the proper standard was whether the trial court’s judgme nt was clea rly err oneous. Id. at 854-55. Attempting to resolve the issue, the cour t said:
“We failed to locate any case aff irmatively stating the standard of re v i ew i n ca ses brought pursuant to section 13-110 of the L imitations Act. In addition to the case s cited by defe ndants, we find persua sive the simil arity betwee n adver se possession c ases (see 735 I L CS 5/13-101 (West 1996)) an d t hose brought under section 13-110. In adver se possession case s, all presumptions are made in favor of the rec ord titleholder
, and

overc oming the presumption require s strict proof of the element[s]
, which may not be made out by infere nce or implication. [ Citation.] The burde n of proof upon an adverse
possessor require s eac h element be proved by clea r and unequivoca l evidenc e. [C it ation.] Since our s upreme court has not explained ‘cle ar and unequivoca l proof,’ courts have applied the clea

r and convincing burden of proof in adver se possession case s. [C itation.]
We conclude this is the appropr iate standard in claims brought under section 13-110 of the L imitati o n s Ac t as well. Many ear ly case s addre ssing prede cessor sections to section 13-110 indicate all presumptions should be made in favor of the holder of leg al title, and, as ag ainst him, no presumptions should be made in favor of the holder of mere color of title. [Cit ations.]” Id. at 855. The court conclude d that deter minations under section 13-110 should be revie wed for whether they are clea rly err oneous. Id. ¶ 38 We agre e wi t h t h e Dotson court that, g iven the simil arity betwee n the inquiries under sections 13-101 and 13-110, t h e clea r-a nd-convinc ing standard is the proper standard of proof under section 13-110. As further support for Dotson ’s conclusion, we note McCauley

v. Mahon
, 174 I ll. 384, 386 (1898), a case brought under a prede cessor of section 13-110, wher e the supreme court commented: “It is well s ettled by the decisions of t his co u rt that,

as the pay ment o f t ax es u nder color of title operates to defe at the para mount and all other titles when relied on , t h e p roof must be clea r and convincing .” Clear- and-c onvincing evidence is “the quantum of proof that leave s no rea sonable doubt in the mind of the fac t finder as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Bazydlo v. Volant
, 164 I ll. 2d 207, 213 (1995). “Althoug h stated in terms of rea sonable doubt, courts consider clea r and convincing evidenc e to be more than a preponde ranc e while not quite approa ching the degree of proof

nece ssary to convict a pe rson of a

criminal off

ense.” Id. ¶ 39 We agree with Dotson as to the standar d of proof , but not as to the standard of revie w. Dotson cited no direc t authority that section 13-101 deter minations are s ubject to clea rly

err oneous revie w, but, relying on an administrative revie w case , seeme d convince d that the standard was appropr iate beca use (as the court opined) section 13-101 issues prese nt mix ed questions of law and fac t. See Dotson
, 332 I ll. App. 3d at 854-55 (citing AFM Mess enger

-11-Servic e, Inc . v. De partment of Employme nt Security , 198 I ll. 2d 380, 391 (2001)). Dotson 8 overlooke d that it is well established in the case law that deter minations under section 13-101

are revie wed for whether they are ag ainst the manife s t we i gh t of the evidenc e. See, e.g. , Joiner
, 85 I ll. 2d at 79 (dete rmining t h at the trial court’s finding s wer e “not ag ainst the manifest weight of t h e ev i d en ce”); Duncan v. Abell
, 340 I ll. 613, 616 (1930) (question on appea l was “w h ether [the trial court’s finding ] is manifestly ag ainst the weight of the evidenc e”) ; Estate of W

elliver v . Alberts , 278 I ll. App. 3d 1028, 1036 (1996) (“ On re view,

a court will not disturb the finding s of a trial court as to the proof of [t he elements of adver se possession] unless the finding s are ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e.”)

. Following this case law, we disag ree with Dotson and hold that the revie wing court must judge section 13-1 1 0 d eter

minations, like section 13-101 deter minations, under the manifest-w eig ht standard. “A judgme nt is ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e only when an opposite conclusion i s appar ent or when findings ap pear to be unreasonable
, arbitra ry , or not based on the evidenc e.” Lawl or v. North American Corp. of Illinois , 2012 I L112530, ¶ 70. ¶ 40 The Hochs note that, for the seven year s prec eding trial in this matter, either they or their prede cessor s in interest as to parc el 2 paid the taxes on parc el 4. Reg ardle ss, their claim under section 13-110 fails. It is undisputed that the Schmidts have fenc ed off parc el 4 from neig hbors’ parc els since the late 1980s and are curr ently raising ca t t l e on the land. The Schmidts note “a long- standing judicial construction” of section 13-110 “re quiring a person seeking to perf

ect title under section 13-110 [t o] also take possession of t he proper ty” ( Dotson
, 332 I ll. App. 3d at 854). Dotson cited Slatin’s Properties, Inc. v. Hassler
, 53 I ll. 2d 325, 328 (1972) (“ Nu m er o u s decisions of this court have construed [section 13-110] as requiring that the person having color of title made in g ood faith and thereafter paying the leg ally assessed taxes for seven succe ssive y ear s must also take possession of the proper ty .”). The Schmidts note that the Hochs have never taken p o s s essi on of parc el 4. The Hochs respond that they eff

ectively took possession of parc el 4 by piling asphalt shaving s near the fenc e, “as any

thing more would have require d the Hochs’ [ sic ] to fo rc ibly remove the Schmidts’ fenc ing.” The rea son, howeve r, that possession of parc el 4 was not prac ticable for the Hochs was that the land was not “vac ant and unoccupie d” as section 13-110 require s. A fenc e serve s as notice of actua l occupa ncy

. Jones v. Unknown Heirs or Legatees of Fox
, 313 I ll. App. 3d 249, 257 (2000) (fe nce ere cted by the defe ndants raised question whether the land was “vac ant and unoccupie d” under section 13-110; there fore
, the defe nd ants established the exis tence of a meritorious defe nse to the plaintiff’s section 13-110 claim, and hence the defa

ult judgme nt enter ed ag ainst the defe ndants was vacated (citing Chicago Titl e & Trust Co. v. Darley
, 363 I ll. 197, 201-02 (1936) (enc losing proper t y b y fe n ce can constitute an act of dominion over the proper ty so as to establish adver se possession))). The Hochs failed to prove by clea r and convincing evidenc e a claim to parc el 4 under section 13-

T he sup re m e court has re m arked tha t it has “ci te d the cl ear ly erron eou s st and ar d of re view 8

o n l y i n c a ses gov erned by the Adm ini st ra ti ve Review Law [( 735 I LCS 5/3

- 101 et seq

. (W est 2010 )) ]” and has “l imite d the app li cat ion of tha t st and ar d to re viewin g adminis tr at ive dec is ion s on

m ixe d que st ion s of fa ct and la w.” Samou r, Inc

. v. Boar d of Ele ct ion Commis si one rs , 224 I ll

. 2d 530, 542 (20 07)

.
-12-110. The trial c ourt’s judg ment is ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. ¶ 41 Next, we determine if the Hochs proved a superior c laim to parc el 4 throug h the chain of title. An action to quiet title in proper ty is an equitable proce eding in which a party seeks
to remove a cloud on his title to the proper ty

. Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp.
, 398 9 I ll. App. 3d 21, 52 (2009). “A cloud on title is the semblance of title, either leg al or equitable,
appea ring in some leg al form but which is, in fac t, unfounded or which it wou ld be inequitable to enfor ce.” Id. To preva il in an action to quiet title, the pl aintiff must actua lly have title, though it need not be perf ect. Id. The plaintiff must rec over on the streng th of his

own title rathe r than on defe cts in the defe ndant’s title. Diaz v. Home F eder al Savings & Loan Ass’n of Elgin , 337 I ll. App. 3d 722, 726 (2002). ¶ 42 Our revie w require s us to construe a series of deeds. The parties do not dispute that these deeds repre sent the complete chain of title for the parc els in question datingback to 1938. W h er e a d ee d is ambiguous, extrinsi c evidenc e is admissible to asce rtain the intent of t h e g rantor and g rante e. Id. at 725. Whether an ambiguity exis ts is a question of law, which we revie w de novo

. Id. There is no indication that the tr i al co urt fo u n d any ambiguity in the deeds. A t trial, there was ample evidenc e apart from the dee ds, but none of it was dire cted toward clar ify

ing any of them. We ourselves fi n d none of the deeds to be ambiguous. There fore , our re view of what intere sts passed under the dee ds themselves is de novo

. ¶ 43 Fr om o u r re v i ew o f t h e d ee ds, the Kulises wer e the first to subdivide the B oehme
proper ty into parc els 2 and 3, and there is no dispute that the Hochs and the Schmidts are in the re spective lines of

succe ssion of those separ ate parce ls. Fr om the Kuli ses, t he Boehme
proper ty can be trac ed back throug h the Saraby ns to the Kotiws, who rec eived the proper ty from L illian Boe hme. The September 25, 1954, war ranty deed to the Kotiws convey s all of the Boe hme proper

ty “excepting and rese rving there from the East 20 and the North 20 fee t there of t o be used as a private road.” This languag e ex cepts all of parc els 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 (which at the time wer e not distinguished from eac h other) from the September 1954
conveyance . Notably , the Hochs a dmit that L illian “ reta ined the twenty -foot strip of land.” Parce ls 4 throug h 9, we conclude
, rema ined with L illian. Moreove r, there is no evidenc e in the rec ord of any conveyance by L illian or her heirs until the Dec ember 2006 quitclaim deeds
convey ing parc els 4, 5, and 9 to the Schmidts. Since owner ship of parc els 4 t h ro u gh 9

rema ined with L illian and her heirs, neither the Hochs nor the Schmidts could have rec eived interests in t h o s e p ar ce ls by virtue of the chains of title stemming from the Kulises. The

I t is que st ion abl e whet her thi s act ion is pro per ly an act ion to qui et ti tl e. See Lake vi ew Trus t 9 & Sav ing s Bank v. Est rad

a , 134 I ll

. App. 3d 792, 812 (19 85) (“ Wh er e the pro per ty is not vacant and is not in the pos ses si on of the par ty see king t o re m ove the cl ou d fr om his ti tl e, the pro per re m edy is not an act i o n for qui et ti tl e but ra the r an act ion in ej ect m ent .” (c it ing Mc Gooke y v. W int er , 381 I ll

. 516, 526 (19 43) (“ I t is wel l est abl is hed tha t in cha nce ry act ion s wher e the p r i ma r y purpo se of the li ti gatio n is to qui et the ti tl e in the pla int if f, the re m ust be al le gatio n and pro of tha t suc h pla int if f

was in pos ses si on when the sui t was st ar te d, unl ess it be averr ed and pro ved tha t the pre m is es wer e vacant or unoc cup ie d.”) ))

. Par cel 4 is nei t h e r in the Hochs ’ pos ses si on nor vacant , but ra the r is

occ upi ed by the Schmidt s, who have fe nce d it off fr om nei ghbors ’ par cel s. We not e, however
, tha t the cha ra ct erof

th is ac ti on h as notbee n qu est ion ed b y the p ar ti es or the tr ia l c our t.

-13-Bla cks, the immediate source of the Hochs’ claim of title to parc el 4, had no interest in that

parc el to convey

. Rather, the Schmidts obtained owner ship of p ar ce l 4 throug h quitclaim deeds f rom L illian’s heirs. 1 0 ¶ 44 The trial court appea rs to have believed that the first trustee’ s deed obtained by the Hochs in August 2003 encompa ssed parc el 4. The tr i al court rea d parc el A as initially including
parc els 2 and 4, but then ex ce pting parc el 4, which (the court thought) was conveyed
separ ately as parcel B . The leg al desc ription of parc el A, howe ver, doe s not include parc el 4, and neither does that of parc el B. Thus, parc el 4 does not fall within the leg al descr iptions in the first trustee’ s deed from August 2 003. Even J oe Hoch conce ded this at trial, and testified that the omission of parc el 4 prompted him to obtain a second deed from the trust. The trial c ourt err ed. ¶ 45 The Hochs, howeve r, asser t that “L illian Boe hme i n t en d ed t o ab an d o n the strip of
proper ty .” The only leg al authority they cite for this asser tion is Diaz
, wher e the plaintiff, the

owner of a restaur ant, sued a bank to quiet title to a strip of land near both the bank and the
restaur ant. Both parties ultimately trac ed t h ei r claims of title to a single g rantor, Erastus Teff t, who made conveyance s to the parties’ respe ctive prede cessor s in interest. The bank’s immediate prede cessor in interest was a railroa d, which had place d trac ks on the strip of land. Construing the rele vant deeds, we deter mined that the plaintiff rec eived the proper ty in f ee simple while the railroa d had at be st an ea sement i n the property

. Diaz
, 337 I ll. App. 3d at 729-31. We next deter

mined that
, throug h the following three actions, the railroa d manifested an intent to abandon the ease ment: (1) cea sing operations along the trac ks in late 1997 or ear ly 1998; (2) moving the trac ks from the ease ment in the middle of 1998; and (3) attempting to convey part of the ease ment to the bank in Marc h 1 9 9 9

. Id

. at 731-32. The bank, claiming that this was insufficient evidenc e of an intent to abandon, cited Departme nt of Conservation ex rel. v. Fairless
, 273 I ll. App. 3d 705 (1995). We did not discuss the fac ts of Fairless other than to note that the case was distinguishable beca use the rig ht-of-w ay was held by the railroad i n feesimple rather than as a n ease ment. Diaz
, 337 I ll. App. 3d at 732 (citing Fairless
, 273 I ll. App. 3d at 716). Notably
, Fairless itself distinguished another case , Schnabel v. County of Du Page
, 101 I ll. App. 3d 553 (1 9 8 1), on the g round that the latter involved a railroa d right-of-w ay held as an ease ment, not in fee simple. See Fairless
, 273 I ll. App. 3d at 716. Her e, the Hochs do not dispute that L illian Boe hme reta ined in the September 1954 conveyance a fee simple interest, not an ease ment, in the north an d ea s t strips that included parc el 4. Diaz expressly denies that it is addre ssing abandonme nt of a fee simple interest. The Hoc hs, theref ore, ha ve cited no pe rtinent authority

. ¶ 46 We note that Fairless did assume, arguendo
, that the principles g overning abandonme nt

o f ea s ements could apply to fee simple interests, and the court proce eded to find n o abandonme nt in any case

. See id. at 716-17. The court noted that “ ‘mere nonuse for a fix ed period is not of itself sufficie nt to establish an abandonme nt.’ ” Id. at 716 (quoting Schnabel
, 101 I ll. App. 3d at 558). The court held that the railroa d, simply by cea sing to run trains on

Couns el for the Hochs con ced ed at ora l ar gum ent tha t, bas ed st ri ct ly on the dee ds, i.e

. , 1 0
apa rtfr om

th e Hoc hs’ “a dverse pos ses si on a ct ivit y,” the Sch m idt s wou ld have “s upe ri or ti tl e.”

-14-t h e proper ty and eventua lly removing the trac ks, did not signify an intent to aband o n t h e proper ty

. Id. Assuming, l i k e the court in Fairless
, that the principles of abandonme nt of

ease ments apply here
, we note that the Hochs do not even rely on ces s ation of use or dismantlement of the means of use. Rather, they rely solely on the fac t that L illian Boe hme

never constructe d the private road ref ere nced in the September 195 4 d eed to the Kotiws. This, standing alone, does not persua de us that L illian Boe hme intended to abandon her fee simple interest in the north strip. See id. at 715 (“ ‘Aba ndonment occur s *** when nonuse is acc ompanied by acts which manifest an intention to abandon and which destroy either the object for which the ease ment was established or the means of its enjoy ment.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) (quoting Schnabel , 101 I ll. App. 3d at 558)). ¶ 47 The Hochs further contend that “a quiet title proce eding is equitable in nature ,” and that “[i] t would be inequitable to allow the Schmidts, who failed on their repe ated direc t attempts to acquir e the proper

ty , to do so indirectly by virtue of qu i t cl ai m deed acquire d afte r t hey lost their direc t claim on summary judgme nt.” We do not know what the Hochs mean by “re peate d direc t attempts to acquir e the proper ty .” The Hochs were t h e o n es who i nitiated this lawsuit. Following summary judgme nt in their favor (on what prec ise issue(s), howeve r,

we do not know), the S ch m i d t s moved to file a counter claim based on quitclaim deeds obtained from the heirs of L illian Boe hme. The Hochs d o n o t contend that the Schmidts should not have been allowed, under the rules of civil prac tice, to file their counter claim. Nor do we see any signific ance in the fac t that the Hochs a cquire d their dee d to parc el 4 bef ore the Schmidts obtained theirs. There is no inequity in holding that the Hochs have failed to
prove superior title. The Hochs need title in order to quiet title ( see Gambino
, 398 I ll. App. 3d at 52), and, as we have conclude d, they rec eived no interest in pa rce l 4 from the Bla cks. ¶ 48 As the Hochs failed to prove a claim to parc el 4 under section 13-110, and also failed to demonstrate that they rec eived an interest in parc el 4 throug h the chain of title, we hold that the trial court err ed in quieting title in fa v o r o f the Hochs. As the Schmidts demonstrated superior title, the c ourt should have quiete d title in their favor.

¶ 49 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 50 For the fore g oing re as o n s , we re v er s e the judgme nt of the circ uit court of McHe nry County and rema

nd for entry of j u dg ment for the Schmidts on their counter claim to quiet title.

¶ 51 Reverse d and re manded with dire ctions.

-15-