1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES SANFORD,

CASE NO. CIV. S-04-1791 WBS CMK

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RED ROBIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

dba RED ROBIN #78; and DOES 1

through 10,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff James Sanford alleges that defendant Red

Robin International, Inc., dba Red Robin #78, violated Title III

of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§

12101-12300, and various California statutes. He now moves for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

based on the Declaration of plaintiff’s experts, Joe Card and

Harold Littlejohn.

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

Case 2:04-cv-01791-WBS-CMK Document 46 Filed 12/15/05 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). 

Because the substantive law governing a case determines

the materiality of a fact, the relevant provisions of the ADA

also inform the legal standard in this case. T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inc. v. P. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987). Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against

disabled individuals in places of public accommodation. 42

U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“No individual shall be discriminated against

on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . .”). 

The law further charges the operators of public accommodations

with a duty to “remove architectural barriers . . . where such

removal is readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 

Discrimination under the ADA encompasses passive limitation on

access for people with disabilities who are wheelchair-bound. 

See Parr, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (citing Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81

F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

To succeed on a ADA claim based on architectural

barriers in an existing facility, plaintiff must prove that: “(1)

he has a disability; (2) [defendants’ restaurant] is a place of

Case 2:04-cv-01791-WBS-CMK Document 46 Filed 12/15/05 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

public accommodation; (3) he was denied full and equal treatment

because of his disability; . . . [(4) defendants’] place of

business presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the

ADA, and [(5)] the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” 

Parr, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 

It is uncontested that plaintiff has met the first two

requirements for a successful ADA claim; he has a disability and

defendants’ restaurant is a place of public accommodation. 

(Pl.’s Mot. for Sum. Judg. 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B));

cf. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts.) To

demonstrate the other three requirements, plaintiff has alleged

many different barriers that he claims impeded his access related

to parking spaces, paths of travel inside and outside the

restaurant, improperly placed or nonexistent International Signs

of Accessibility, the men’s restroom, seating in the dining area,

and the service counters. (Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts

2-3.) Defendants respond that many of these issues are moot

because defendants has remedied the violations. (Def.’s Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. Sum. Judg. 12.) 

At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel argued that

although some barriers may be moot, plaintiff has not seen the

changes made and therefore cannot be certain that the alleged

barriers have been removed in accordance with the ADA. However,

as plaintiff’s counsel went on to concede, even if defendants’

recent changes are also not ADA compliant, the very fact that

changes have been made leaves open questions of fact sufficient

to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, because

disputed issues of material fact remain, plaintiff is not

Case 2:04-cv-01791-WBS-CMK Document 46 Filed 12/15/05 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his claims

under the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act, which

plaintiff argues “are wholly predicated upon a violation of the

[ADA],” thus must also be denied. (Pl.’s P. & A. in Supp. of

Mot. for Summ. J. at 18.)

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: December 14, 2005

Case 2:04-cv-01791-WBS-CMK Document 46 Filed 12/15/05 Page 4 of 4