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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Building Castles on Sand?

Ignoring the Riptide of

Information Operations

CARLA D. BASS

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No.15

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

September 1998
DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

Dominating the information spectrum is as critical to

conflict now as controlling air and space, or as occupy 

ing land was in the past. . . . Whoever has the ability

to gain, defend, exploit, and attack information, and

deny the same capabilities to an opponent, has a dis 

tinct strategic advantage.

—Air Force Doctrine Document 1-

Air Force Basic Doctrine 

In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argu

that the American military, underestimating vulnerabili

of the US information infrastructure, has based its stra

gic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has bu

castles on sand. Such documents as Joint Vision 2010 a

United States Air Force Global Engagement assume 

United States will have unimpeded access to informat

on our own forces and on the enemy’s forces as well, d

largely to our technological sophistication. They prop

application of a downsized US military in a still very dea

world, based on the premise of information superior

However, the United States will not achieve informat

superiority until we first attain information assurance 

securing our own information systems. Indeed, the 

fense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in 

report delivered to the secretary of defense in Novem

1996.

Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United Sta

cannot simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely 

extensively on information and information technol

without comparable attention to information and inform

tion systems protection and assurance. As outlined by 

Defense Science Board in its Task Force on Informat

Warfare-Defense, this attention, backed up with suffici

resources, is the only way the Department of Defen

(DOD) can ensure adequate protection of our forces in 

face of the inevitable information war.

This paper postulates that the information operatio

(IO) mission should be centralized at the unified comma

level, specifically Atlantic Command (ACOM), to capt

iii
the plethora of uncoordinated, IO-related activities ongo

throughout DOD. Using Special Operations Comma

(SOCOM) as a model, ACOM would assign teams to co

batant commands to help plan and execute informat

operations missions. ACOM should be allocated a progr

element (PE) for information operations, paralleling S

COM’s major force program 11. This would alleviate a m

jor criticism identified in several national-level studies 

garding insufficient, sporadic, and uncoordinated 

expenditures. Establishing an information operations 

would also minimize the conflict with conventiona

minded elements of DOD that resist realigning kinetic 

sources to fund IO initiatives, another problem identified 

the national level. Designated as commander in chief 

information operations and armed with an informati

operation program element, ACOM could lead the way 

DOD to attain information assurance, thus establishin

firmer foundation for US strategic policy.

TIMOTHY A. KINN

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Carla D. Bass (colonel-selectee) chose Air Fo

intelligence as her profession more than 20 years ago. H

broad experience, both geographically and functiona

has taken her to Germany, Korea, Hawaii, and several 

cations throughout the continental United States. Colo

Bass served two tours of duty in Washington, D.C., one 

which included the Air Staff Training Program. Functi

ally, she is experienced in special security operations; 

planning, programming, and budgeting systems; tact

intelligence applications; intelligence analysis; and lo

range planning. She commanded the 324th Intellige

Squadron, which was the United States Air Force elem

of a joint operation in Kunia, Hawaii. Colonel Bass pinn

on her O-6 rank in July 1998 and assumed command 

the 694th Intelligence Group at Fort Meade, Maryla

Lieutenant Colonel Bass is a 1998 graduate of the Air W

College.

v
And What, Pray Tell,

Is Information Operations?

In preparations for national defense we have to follow an

entirely new course because the character of future wars

is going to be entirely different from the character of pas

wars . . . we had better get accustomed to this idea and

prepare ourselves for the new conflicts to come.

—Giulio Douhet 

The New Form of War

“We had better get accustomed to this idea and prep

ourselves for new conflicts to come.” Douhet was, 

course, referring to the revolution in military affairs (RM

of his time, the airplane. His philosophy of anticipat

and preparing for advances in warfare applies equally w

today, especially in the context of information operatio

(IO). However, before we can “get accustomed to this ide

we must first understand exactly what is IO? Departm

of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3600.1 and Air Force D

trine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, b

define IO as “actions taken to affect adversary informat

and information systems while defending one’s own inf

mation and information systems.”1

 Specifically, IO cons

of operations security, psychological operations (PSYO

deception, electronic warfare (EW), physical destructi

and especially from the United States Air Force (US

perspective, information attack. The concept of informat

attack in an IO context spans the extreme from physi

destruction, to impeding data flows, to covertly manipu

ing data content. The goal of information operation is 

obtain information superiority by employing some or al

these tools in a given strategy. DODD S-3600.1 defin

information superiority as “that degree of dominance in 

information domain which permits the conduct of ope

tions without effective opposition.”2

 IO tools may be e

ployed in support of air-, land-, sea-, or space-based ope

tions, or they may be compiled into an IO campaign pl

The military conducts information operations through

1
the conflict spectrum, during all phases of an operati

and across the range of military operations. Informat

warfare (IW) is the application of IO tools during a crisis 

conflict.

Embroiled in a War of Words

Many professionals within DOD do not, as yet, und

stand IO. Sloppy use of terminology at the most sen

levels of the DOD definitely exacerbates the problem. Wh

asked questions concerning IO, several senior leaders 

the flag rank preface their responses with, “IO mea

many things to many people,” and proceed to misuse 

term, badly skewing their answers. These individuals m

a valuable opportunity to elucidate on information ope

tions and further contribute to the confusion. Indeed, se

ices themselves generate frustration with the plethora 

service-specific and frequently changing IO terminology

illustrated in figure 1.3

 NETWORK ASSURANCE

 ELECTRONIC WARFARE INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECT 

 COMPUTER SECURITY

 MILITARY INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

 INFORMATION ASSURANCE INTELLIGENCE 

 SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED DATA

 DECEPTION INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

 COUNTERDEFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFAR

 INFORMATION OPERATIONS

 INFORMATION SUPERIORITY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION

 PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION NETWORK VULNERABILITY 

 COUNTEROFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

 INFORMATION OPERATIONS OFFENSIVE 

Figure 1. Information Operations Terms
So much energy is wasted grappling with bureaucra

nuances, individuals essential to successfully conduct

IO disengage out of impatience when faced with other co

peting operational priorities. This process damages 

credibility and, even more importantly, wastes valua

time needed to develop and employ IO defensive measur

Too often, information operations is mistakenly and exc

sively associated with computer warfare. This serious m

understanding undermines the ability to protect 

United States from attacks and impedes development 

successful counter and offensive IO strategies.

Information operations are conducted daily, althou

they are not always recognized as such. For example, d

lomats employ IO as demonstrated by the frequent ver

sparring between Iraq and the United States. As seen he

the psychological aspects of IO sometimes approximate 

game of poker by employing techniques of bluffing wh

trying to ascertain strengths of the opponent’s hand. If 

carefully considered, IO strategies can backfire, as seen 

the town meeting held in February 1998 at Ohio St

University with Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Sec

tary of State Madeline Albright, and National Security A

visor Sandy Berger. Rather than mustering public supp

for military action against Iraq, the meeting embarra

ingly highlighted to the world a lack of US concurrence 

that very point.

Love It or Hate It

Information operations provokes strong reactions, pa

leling the response to airpower in the first half of the tw

tieth century. One extreme position advocates IO (some 

these proponents are considered evangelists), while th

at the other extreme view IO as little more than tren

terminology, employed because funds are currently av

able for IO-affiliated projects. The pragmatic position 

somewhere in between. Why this intense response? So

early proponents of IO lost credibility, as did early ad

cates of airpower, by claiming operational benefits far 

yond what was technically available at the time. In 

1920s and into the early 1940s, visionaries of airpow
claimed capabilities that would not come to pass u

much later in World War II. Billy Mitchell, for examp

postulated that “nothing can stop the attack of aircr

except other aircraft.” He even predicted the day wh

“aerial torpedoes” would be “guided by gyroscopic inst

ments and wireless telegraphy.”4

 Strategists working in 

Air War Plans Division in August 1941 also overestima

capabilities of strategic airpower. Those planners pos

lated that bombers would win air superiority while purs

aircraft would protect bases in a defensive role. 5

 T

Eighth Air Force subsequently sent large groups of un

corted heavy bombers deep into the German heartla

This strategy was disastrous until technology caught up 

strategy. Similarly, airpower strategists in Desert Sto

oversold airpower’s potential with the plan Instant Thu

der. They claimed that airpower could win the war by e

cuting 700 daily strikes deep in Iraq for six consecut

days. The plan lost some credibility when it made no allo

ances to attack ground forces and could not respond to 

question, “What happens after day six?” 6

What were the overzealous claims of information ope

tions? Enthusiasts champion IO as a truly unique form 

warfare, otherwise known as a revolution in military 

fairs, a provocative statement in itself. They forecast do

nant battlespace awareness, where wars would be fou

and won exclusively in the electronic domain with virt

combat staffs zapping information across networks. Oth

make alarmist, Doomsday-like predictions of impend

catastrophic attack on the US strategic information inf

structure, sometimes dramatically referred to as an “el

tronic Pearl Harbor.”

In Search of a Balanced Approach

Is IO an RMA as many claim or a just a logical extens

of existing technology? Pragmatists argue the latter. Ga

exploit, defend, and attack. The fundamentals of inform

tion warfare—attacking an opponent’s information wh

protecting and enhancing friendly information—have 

changed through time. Information has been viewed 

both target and weapon for thousands of years. Sun Tz
principles, inculcated in disciples since 500 B.C., liber

apply such techniques as spies, rumors, deception, and 

erational security. Sun Tzu regarded information as essen

to war, “Delicate indeed! Truly delicate! There is no pl

where espionage is not used.”7

 His philosophy was to wag

war of perceptions, manipulating data, and public opini

the target was the mind of his enemy. Military objecti

included disrupting alliances, ascertaining enemy pla

strengths, and weaknesses, and attacking enemy strate

The ultimate objective for Sun Tzu’s army was to subdue 

enemy without fighting. He continues, “Those skilled in w

subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They capture 

cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state w

out protracted operations.”8

 Today, IO strategists apply S

Tzu’s principles powered by information age technology, s

porting the argument that information operations is not 

RMA. Hopefully, applying these principles will remove so

of the sensationalism decried by IO critics.

Pragmatists also downplay the impending onset of 

electronic Pearl Harbor. Such a coordinated strike acr

our infrastructure would require extensive, detailed inte

gence on vulnerabilities spanning political, economic, a

military systems. The President’s Commission on Crit

Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) reached the same conc

sion in its final report published in October 1997: “T

Commission has not discovered an immediate threat su

cient to warrant a fear of imminent national crisis.” 9

 

other major study conducted by the Defense Science Bo

(DSB) does not accept the assertions of popular press t

a few individuals can easily bring the United States to 

knees.10 DSB assesses a major strategic disruption by 

year 2005 as “low.”11

This discussion does not intimate, however, that we c

ignore IO in the interim. Both studies assess the curr

IO threat as ‘‘significant’’ based on numerous intrusio

system vulnerabilities, and an as-yet minimal ability 

detect, deter, and respond to these attacks. That sa

DSB report assesses as “widespread” the threat of orch

trated tactical information warfare by the year 2005. Wh

these two reports are significant, they are also dated (table 

Technological developments spring forth almost overnig
and so do capabilities of IO adversaries and subsequ

vulnerabilities of the US infrastructure. Unfortunately, 

structured, sophisticated computer attack waged agai

the DOD in February 1998 indicates the PCCIP and D

threat assessments may now be overly optimistic.

A Whole New World

So, what is new? The most monumental change is 

explosion of information technology and potential ramifi

tions of a large-scale “malfunction.” Military profession

agree that information technology affects the art of w

War has indeed evolved from applying information in w

also known as intelligence, to focusing on information a

means to wage war; that is, “information warfare.” That imp

tance has been reflected in both joint and service doctrines.

Questions arise, however. To what extent can IO sha

the battlefield? Have we protected our own information 

Table 1

Projected Threat Assessment

Threat Assessment Validated

Existence

 Existence

Likely but not

 Validated

Likely by

2005

Beyo

200

Hacker W — — —

Disgruntled W — — —

Employee — — — —

Crook W — — —

Organized Crime L — — —

Political Dissident — W — —

Terrorist Group — L W —

Foreign Espionage L — W —

Tactical

Countermeasures — W — —

Orchestrated Tactical IW — — L W

Major Strategic

Disruption of US — — — L
frastructure? Does the United States have an IW ea

warning system? What are the indications and warn

signs of an impending IW attack? How susceptible is 

United States to information warfare, both at home and 

deployed locations? These questions entail everything fr

the adversary affecting our command and control (C2

) 

formation flow to national media influencing public opin

and driving foreign policy.

To answer these and other questions, one must und

stand the intricacies of the current information environme

The relationship of data automation even five years ago co

pared to that of today is analogous to a conventional bo

contrasted with a nuclear warhead. The explosion of conn

tivity (such as the Internet and World Wide Web), data tra

mittal rates, networking, telecommunications, and depe

ence thereon, quite simply transformed military, politi

and economic dynamics on a global scale. The Internet n

transcends national borders. Individuals of common in

ests form and operate within their own cyberterrain. Glo

technology trends are reflected in table 2. 12

Few individuals foresaw the exponential growth of 

global Internet or the degree of reliance by technologica

advanced nations. Hence, when systems were initially 

veloped and subsequently linked, network security to 

level needed today was not a prime consideration. Con

quently, network owners are currently retrofitting th

systems to negate demonstrated vulnerabilities, even 

adversaries continue to hone their own predatory ski

Deregulation, restructuring, and economic troubles a

drove some of these changes, causing corporations 

downsize and merge, eliminate forward-deployed offic

and rely instead on “virtual” offices by way of interc

nected networks and the Internet. When times improv

network owners expanded and upgraded their informat

infrastructures. Increasing network connectivity proved 

be both a blessing and a curse. To the positive-think

owner, increased connectivity improved overall system r

ability by providing backup programs. To the negat

owner, increased network connectivity exacerbates ove

vulnerability in that a weak link in one system can dam

the entire network.
Information: America’s New Achilles’ Heel

The United States is arguably one of the world’s m

technologically sophisticated nations, among the most 

pendent on information infrastructures and the most v

nerable. Stand-alone local area networks (LAN) rapi

evolved to what is now referred to as cascading informat

infrastructures at the DOD (DII), national (NII), and glo

(GII) levels. Most of our $7 trillion economy relies on 

estimated 125 million computers, associated networks, a

satellite connectivities. These automated infrastructures h

an estimated financial value as indicated in figure 2. 13

According to the PCCIP, the United States uses 42 p

cent of the world’s computing power and 60 percent of 

world’s Internet assets. It operates on-line 200 mill

hours daily. The commission also determined the exten

which private and government functions depend upon 

Table 2

Global Technology Trends

CATEGORY 15 YEARS AGO 1996 5 YEARS

HENCE

PERSONAL

COMPUTERS THOUSANDS 400 MILLION 500 MILLIO

LOCAL AREA

NETWORKS THOUSANDS 1.3 MILLION 2.5 MILLION

WIDE AREA NETWORKS HUNDREDS THOUSANDS TENS OF

THOUSAND

VIRUSES SOME THOUSANDS TENS OF

THOUSAND

INTERNET DEVICES

ACCESSING THE

WORLD WIDE WEB

NONE 32 MILLION 300 MILLIO

POPULATION WITH

SKILLS FOR CYBER

ATTACK

THOUSANDS 17 MILLION 19 MILLION

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMS CONTROL

SOFTWARE

SPECIALISTS

FEW 1.1 MILLION 1.3 MILLION
formation and communications. Specifically, 90 percen

large businesses and 75 percent of small ones have LA

and the federal government spends $40 billion annually 

information technology.14 Another significant observat

concerned the eroding distinctions between DII, NII, a

GII. Commercial ownership of a majority of the connec

networks adds a further complication to the challenge 

information protection.

Impact on National Defense

The US military, traditionally charged with defend

continental borders of the United States, has no jurisd

tion over the borderless cyberspace and little control o

NII infrastructures upon which its forces depend. 15 Skep

frequently underestimate the military’s dependence up

civilian infrastructure. They claim that while the civil

infrastructure is vulnerable, “military systems are usu

so isolated and uniquely programmed that there is li

assurance they could be disabled in a military strike.” 16

Figure 2. Infrastructure Values
Recognizing the fallacy of this argument, President 

Clinton signed Executive Order (EO) 13010 on critical 

frastructure protection because “certain national inf

structures are so vital that their incapacity or destruct

would have a debilitating impact on the defense or e

nomic security of the United States.” 17 EO 13010 est

lished the PCCIP, which combined the efforts of fede

state, and local government officials with private sec

chief executive officers and chief information officers to 

dress the issue of information assurance. The commiss

was charged to assess the specific components of the inf

structure, identify vulnerabilities, and make recommen

tions to protect these national assets. This study examin

energy (electric power and gas and oil storage/ transpor

tion), physical distribution (railroads, highways, air traf

maritime transport, and pipelines), banking and finan

information and communications (computer hardware a

software and satellite communications), and vital hum

services (water supply system, emergency rescue servic

social security, and welfare).18

The secretary of defense simultaneously tasked the 

fense Science Board (DSB), a federal advisory committee

address information warfare defense (IW-D). The efforts 

concurrently, but the scope of coverage was specifically 

conflicted to preclude duplication of effort. Note, howev

that the two studies reached similar conclusions. The D

task force made 50 recommendations in its final report, 13 

which were deemed “imperative.” Several recommendati

are carryovers from previous DSB reports spanning the p

three years and indicating progress not yet made. The rep

noted that DOD employs more than 2.1 million compute

an estimated 10,000 LAN, and more than 100 long-dista

networks. It uses them to support all facets of military ope

tions.19 Lack of progress in eliminating system vulnerabili

and increasing US reliance on these strategic infrastructu

is a potentially disastrous combination. The most urgent r

ommendation contained in the November 1996 report w

that the secretary of defense “designate an accountable 

focal point.” The second recommendation was that D

should organize for IW-D by establishing “virtual organi

tions that draw on existing assets and capabilities.” T
DSB suggested allocating approximately $3 billion to 

plement recommended fixes.20

A third study, this one conducted by the National D

fense Panel (NDP), also made strong observations. Its D

cember 1997 report contrasted likely antagonists and 

ture threats (e.g., IW and weapons of mass destructi

with current DOD organizational structure and projec

budgets. The NDP identified a major disconnect. Its ov

arching recommendation was that the DOD realign 

sources to best accommodate future threats and vuln

abilities. Using the Toffler analogy, the United Sta

should transition from an industrial (Second Wave) to 

information (Third Wave) military posture.21

A modicum of progress has been made towards resolv

these shortfalls. The DOD intensified its approach to b

offensive and defensive aspects. As an example, in Ma

1998 Secretary of Defense Cohen proposed a new dep

assistant secretary for IO within the extant structure of 

assistant secretary of defense for Command, Control, Co

munications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3

I). This new posit

would oversee two directorates: one for information ass

ance and the other for offensive information operatio

According to Barry Collin, senior research fellow at 

Institute for Security and Intelligence, “It’s the most ex

ing revelation to date on the information operations fro

It shows the maturing nature of information operations 

an offensive tool, which is new. It’s going to be taken se

ously.”22 Meanwhile, vulnerabilities persist.

The Pen Is Mightier than the Sword

Information has never been more powerful than it is 

day. Proponents of Star Trek-like information warfare m

consider the vulnerability and susceptibility of the med

the American public, and our policy makers to the dec

tion and psychological operations waged daily against 

United States. Adversaries expertly manipulate the med

leveraging them against America’s well-publicized lack of 

erance for American bloodshed or ill-treatment of a ‘‘defen

less’’ people. They wage IW against the United States in 

form of psychological operations, altering perceptions and 
will of the American public, with the aim of affect

American foreign policy. For decades, terrorists adroitly 

ploited the media to state their case to the general pub

or to amplify the terror of their attack.

In the information age, adversaries have refined this sta

craft into a fine art, actively courting the power of the press 

sway world opinion. The press willingly obliges. Examp

abound: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia, to nam

few. Saddam Hussein deflects attacks from such strate

sites as command posts by collocating civilians as hum

shields. He stages anti-American riots in the streets of Ba

dad, bolstering domestic morale and simultaneously mak

a global statement. In Somalia, the warlord Gen Mohamm

Aidid and his low-tech insurgents waged information warf

and soundly defeated the United States. Mimicking Sadda

techniques, Aidid transformed the Mogadishu Hospital int

strongpoint for militia operations, realizing that the Uni

Nations would not target the facility. He was a master 

manipulation and deception, staging events that were c

veniently accessible for media coverage. Aidid successfu

manipulated peace initiatives and cease-fires, thus depriv

the international force of a political rationale to milita

oppose his political maneuverings.23 Images of a dead, na

American soldier gleefully dragged through dirty Somali stre

trumped our technologically superior military might.

“All the world is a stage.” Thanks to the media, 

much passes unseen in the information age. For examp

the entire world watched and learned military lessons fr

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. That the United Sta

mustered daunting force-on-force was a point missed 

few, friends and foes alike. These operations explosiv

proclaimed America’s conventional military might, stron

discouraging adversaries from engaging the United Sta

in similar conflicts. That this conflict heralded the age 

information warfare was also widely noted. Sun Tzu c

rectly advises warriors to view battles from the adversar

perspective, to determine inherent strengths and we

nesses (physical and psychological), and presume th

weaknesses to be prime targets in future conflicts. Just 

the United States possesses lethal and effective conv
tional forces, numerous nations and nonstate actors 

intently developing the art of information warfare.

They Are Here! But Who Are They?

The cold war is dead, but an information warfare, 

same war that killed the cold war, still rages. Its pri

characteristics—stealth, manipulation, and deception—

so subtle that the American public is left manifestly a

dangerously unaware. Information technologies are in

pensive and easily obtained, originating points of atta

are difficult to locate, perpetrators hard to identify, a

damage often difficult to detect. Recognized as strate

targets, elements throughout our NII and DII are attack

daily. NII targets frequently hit include public switch

telephone networks, financial institutions, and transpor

tion control points, all obviously crucial to employmen

USAF forces. Attacks on the DII are also prevalent. T

Government Accounting Office estimated 250,000 

tempted penetrations of unclassified DOD systems dur

calendar year 1996.24 The Defense Information Syst

Agency (DISA) estimates 65 percent of DOD unclassified s

tems are vulnerable to penetration.25 Only a small fraction 

penetrations are detected, and an even smaller percentag

actually reported. Unclassified systems, usually less str

gently protected than their classified counterparts, p

tempting and lucrative targets. Disrupting, corrupting, 

otherwise impeding the flow of unclassified data can sever

block military operations.

DOD Feels Pinch of Recent IO Attack

In February 1998 the DOD experienced a widespre

structured, and systematic attack on unclassified co

puter systems. Over at least a two-week period, perpet

tors targeted 11 sites belonging to the Air Force and Na

Most of the attacks concentrated on domain name serv

(DNS), which transmitted such unclassified but still sen

tive defense information as logistics, personnel, and pay

data. It might be helpful at this point to quantify the se

ousness of such a security breach. In compromising 
DNS, a perpetrator could access multiple passwords, p

clude message delivery, and even alter the content of m

sages—unbeknownst to the intended recipient. The D

scrambled to assess the damage and identify the perpet

tor(s), both incredibly challenging objectives. According 

an article by the Associated Press, Deputy Secretary 

Defense John Hamre speculated that attacks have b

aimed at inserting hidden trapdoors into the system 

future surreptitious entry.26 Aviation Week carried an a

cle on offensive IW not more than two weeks prior to th

series of intrusions. The author supposed, “In some fut

international crisis, communications switching stati

may be primary targets for offensive attacks by compu

hackers serving the US military. These sites provide seve

needed elements for getting ‘inside an opponent’s mind

some US officials describe the task of penetrating fore

computers to read communications traffic.”27 In retrosp

this article seemed almost prophetic in its timing a

ironic in that the United States was the victim rather th

the perpetrator, as the author presumed.

Two footnotes to this attack must be mentioned. The f

is the identification of the perpetrators. Some analysts 

itially speculated that this attack might be associated w

the US buildup in the Middle East. Other analysts asses

the attack as teenage hacking, acts of highly skilled 

nonetheless amateur “cyber-kids.” The probes lacked the 

tensity of a focused, professional attack. As it turned out, th

teens were indeed the culprits: two Americans in Califor

and their mentor, Enud Tennenbaum, an Israeli hacker, a

known as “The Analyzer.” The second sobering observat

was the DOD’s lack of preparation to respond effectively a

expeditiously. In absence of a clearly delineated IO struct

within DOD, the center of gravity for rallying a response fel

the Joint Staff/J39, an organization charged with policy de

opment, not running defensive operations. Recall the cliché

you can’t stand the answer, don’t ask the question.” T

United States does not have the luxury of avoiding a poign

question here. “If two teenagers can singularly grip the att

tion of the DOD and cause havoc regarding information 

fense, how will the United States respond to a covert, m

insidious, and purposeful attack?”
IO Adversaries: Can You Detect Them?

Potential adversaries, plentiful as targets within our 

frastructure, are multiplying: amateur computer hacke

“professional” nonstate actors (that is, terrorists); org

ized crime (that is, drug cartel or Mafia); the traditio

adversarial nation-state; and even disgruntled domes

employees. According to a Department of Energy and N

tional Security Agency (NSA) estimate, 120 countries 

developing IO capabilities.28 China, for example, inten

focused on IO, recognizes that on battlefields of the futu

“Information and Information Technologies (IT) will be 

dominant factors.” The British Broadcasting Compan

Summary of World Broadcasts in August 1996 carried 

item which announced China’s development of the Milit

Strategies Research Center’s focus on IO and translated 

article published in the Chinese paper, Jiefangjun Bao’, 

21 May 1996. An extract of the same follows:

After the Gulf War, when everyone was looking forward to eterna

peace, a new military revolution emerged. This revolution i

essentially a transformation from the mechanized warfare of th

industrial age to the information warfare of the information age

Information warfare is a war of decisions and control, a war o

knowledge and a war of intellect. . . . The all conquering stratagem

of Sun Tzu more than two millenniums ago, such as “vanquishing

the enemy without fighting” and subduing the enemy by “so

strike” or “soft destruction” could finally be truly realized unde

today’s technological conditions.29

Russian Legacy:

From “Active Measures” to IO

The Russians are experts in IO. They can claim ope

tional experience dating back to the 1920s when Fe

Dzershinsky founded the Cheka, which later evolved i

the KGB. It is important to remember that, as discus

above, information operations encompasses many te

niques and tactics other than computer penetration 

automated data processing (ADP) manipulation. The R

sians employed active measures on a global scale, litera

This benign term encompasses forgeries, deceptive in

mation, rumors, staged protests, use of front organi

tions, blackmail, bribery, and manipulation of the med
Some analysts estimate that during the height of the c

war, the Soviet Union spent $3 billion annually on act

measures. Stanislav Levchenko, a former high-rank

KGB official who defected to the United States, warned t

“by weakening or destroying the consensus within a f

country, active measures do much more harm than clas

cal espionage. In the West, few people understand t

concept.”30 One example of media manipulation that 

curred in 1979 bears repeating because of its relevan

today and its potential application by such contempor

adversaries as Iraq. A French journalist, Pierre-Charles 

the, was exposed after covertly serving as a media mou

piece of the KGB for 19 years. During this time, he beca

a highly respected member of the media and wielded gr

influence in both governmental and industrial circl

When his complicity was discovered, he was tried, fou

guilty, and sentenced to five years in prison. 31

Regarding the technologically advanced computer warfa

the Soviet Union was among the leaders there as well. One 

the first highly publicized instances of computer penetrati

detailed in Clifford Stoll’s book, The Cuckoo’s Egg: Trackin

Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage, was trac

back to the Bulgarian KGB.32 Despite current econo

woes, Russia continues an active research and developm

(R&D) program in the area of IO and is among those cou

tries attempting to use computer viruses as weapons. Rus

recently institutionalized its efforts by creating the obliqu

titled Federal Agency for Government Communications a

Information.33 This analysis doesn’t necessarily postulate 

immediate IO threat posed by the Russians. But it does r

ognize their history of in-depth expertise in the IO field a

serves as a reminder that once learned, such lessons ou

not to be forgotten.

DOD Exercises Develop IO Muscles

Recognizing vulnerabilities inherent in the informat

age, the USAF is developing and conducting exercises 

determine the severity of the IO threat and our ability 

respond. The first such groundbreaking exercise, Eligi

Receiver, was concluded in June 1997. This no-notice 
ercise was a “first” in several respects. It brought into pl

by way of both script and real action, all elements of inf

mation warfare: deception, EW, PSYOP, information 

tack, and physical attack.34 The scenario included an 

versary PSYOP campaign that made efficient use of the 

news media, scripted terrorist attacks on public power a

communications, actual “hostile” IW attacks on DOD co

munications and computer infrastructures, and extens

E-mail spoofing to confuse the Blue Team. The exerc

demonstrated accessibility of US databases to advers

intrusion and the difficulty that national-level organi

tions—including the Department of Justice (DOJ), N

and DOD—experienced differentiating a normal out

from an actual attack, and even recognizing database co

promise once it had occurred. Also highlighted was 

cumbersome coordination process at the national le

which slowed the process of sharing information relative 

an ongoing IW attack and impeded efforts to recover l

data while protecting as yet unaffected systems. 35

The major benefits resulting from this exercise were 

identification of what didn’t work and operational degra

tion of IO attacks. In several instances IO attacks did, in fa

delay deployment of US forces. Coordination among fede

agencies was painfully slow, taking days rather than hou

The DOD lacked an organization to arrange notices of atta

publicize responses as situations deteriorated, and show 

forts to reconstitute. These responsibilities fell to the exerc

joint staff by default. Little coordination occurred betw

the military and private companies, which impeded the ev

tual recognition of a coordinated attack on the infrastruct

as opposed to random accidents. Organizations invol

demonstrated minimal IO awareness. In most instances, s

tem administrators failed to detect successful, real-wo

physical computer penetrations.

On the offensive side, the exercise commander in ch

(CINC) experienced great difficulty in obtaining approva

implement IW operations. Furthermore, most of the p

sumed ADP-related offensive IW weapons are so sheathed 

secrecy that they were simply unavailable for exercise p

This begs the question of the utility of such weapons, es

cially when juxtaposed against the theory of “train in pe
as you would execute in war.” One of the significant l

sons learned from this exercise was the need for an IO 

integrated into the CINC’s war-fighting staff. This devel

ment led to an imaginative and thought-provoking qu

tion, “What might be the composition of an IO dream te

and what would it contribute to a war-fighting CINC?”

IO Dream Team:

Composition and Mission

Of primary importance, the IO dream team must 

joint. It would consist of personnel skilled in the vario

aspects of information operations, much like the Jo

Command and Control Warfare Center, now manned 

these assorted skills. The center recently incorpora

PSYOP expertise. Legal representatives must also be 

cluded within the IO cell to clarify rules of engagem

as they pertain to application of IW. Public affairs p

sonnel must also be intimately involved in both the pl

ning and execution of information operations. The IO c

would be charged with developing an IO campaign su

porting traditional air, land, sea, and space forces, c

tainly. However, this team would also recognize and 

sist the inherent, restrictive tendency to apply n

weapons technology exclusively to established war-fig

ing doctrine as a mere force multiplier. This occurren

is reminiscent of the tension in WW II that resulted fr

subordinating airpower to Army commanders for close 

support of ground forces as opposed to maintaining a

power as its own entity and applying air assets to a n

mission—strategic bombing.

The team must literally think like the enemy. It m

anticipate his response to external stimuli; his predispo

tion on religious, social, cultural, and economic issues; 

degree of popular support; and his particular streng

and weaknesses. To obtain these insights, the intellige

community must reinvigorate geopolitical and econom

analyses. These areas suffered from cutbacks in rec

years, as organizations chose to consolidate resources 

the more technical and military-related analysis. With t

information, the IO cell could devise a penetrating a
effective IO campaign. Gen George Patton exemplified t

approach in his battles against Field Marshal Erwin Ro

mel. Why was Patton so successful? One scene in 

movie Patton! offers an explanation, when, while gazing 

at a distance, the general crows, “Rommel, you magnific

bastard, I read your book!”

Ideally, IO officers would be trained in proven inform

tion operations techniques employed during the twenti

century to either emulate or counter, as appropriate. T

1930s and 1940s were replete with IO innovations, incl

ing such technological advances as radar, expanded ra

of radio waves, advances in cryptology, and resulting 

pact on signals intelligence; innovative methods of dec

tion; and manipulation of mass media and psycholog

operations by such propaganda masters as Joseph Go

bels. The cold war gave birth to active measures and te

niques of meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and intercepti

Perhaps experts within the emerging Russian democr

might provide that training as an initial step towards sh

ing IO methodology with allies. Or, perhaps those who h

already defected could impart that hands-on expertise. 

wise student chooses to learn from the experts, and in 

cold war, the Russians were the best. To meet the challen

of contemporary IW, we should study such adversaries 

Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Somalia’s Aidid.

Aftermath of Eligible Receiver

Several questions were raised at the conclusion of ex

cise Eligible Receiver. How can we distinguish a hos

attack from an amateur perpetrator and a single ev

from a planned campaign? (Figure 3 illustrates the co

plexities in making this determination.) How do DOD a

DOJ legally share data on computer attacks? How c

interagency coordination be expedited from hours to m

utes? Which agency should function as a central point 

detecting, alerting, and responding to information attac

How can DOD effectively develop and retain skilled syst

administrators? Should DOD establish a commander 

chief for IO? Eligible Receiver spotlighted this weakn

and, as the three teenage hackers painfully demonstra
eight months later, it’s still not fixed. Consequences of 

action, to include step-by-step political, economic, and 

cial unraveling of the United States, are depressingly a

vividly depicted in such articles as “The Great Cyber Wa

2002” and “How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007

Warning from the Future.” As a country, the United Sta

does not want to go there, but it may not have a choic

adversaries are calling the shots. Time’s a wastin’!

Sand Does Not a Good Foundation Make!

Air Force policy focuses today on such concepts as 

spectrum dominance, dominant battlespace awarene

and “find, fix, track or target anything that moves on 

surface of the earth” (fig. 4). 36 Pretty presumptuous c

cepts. Joint Vision 2010 also sets lofty operational stra

gies: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focu

logistics, and full-dimensional protection. In a speech 

the 1997 Air Forces Communications and Electronic As

ciation convention, Adm William A. Owens, United Sta

Figure 3. Accident or Attack?
Navy, Retired, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

Staff, envisioned all-encompassing sensors enabling 

United States to view in detail adversary movements in a

theater of battle.37 The enemy would presumably ackn

ledge his infallibility due to our all-seeing sensors and v

untarily acquiesce to US desires. The accompanying 

strategy would seem to be to intimidate by information

addition to recklessly assuming inviolability of our rec

naissance and surveillance technology, this approach s

ously underestimates the adversary’s religious or revo

tionary fervor. Admiral Owens demonstrates the US w

fighters’ failure to think like the enemy and his persist

proclivity to expect the enemy to respond as would 

commanders. This is a proven flawed strategy and a less

US war fighters seem unable to learn.

Foundation for the Castle:

How Firm Is It?

Upon what do these strategies depend? Technology is 

good answer, but why the emphasis? Global deploymen

US forces and an increasing number of military operati

other than war (MOOTW), coupled with a decreasing D

budget and downsized military, have created a gap in 

force projection and war-fighting capabilities. Technology 

supposedly close that gap. What underlying foundation 

absolutely fundamental? Information—the assured av

ability of friendly data (termed information assurance) a

knowledge of adversary intentions, movements, and sta

of forces (that is, intelligence).

Recognizing improvements in technology and informatio

systems . . . full spectrum dominance allows joint forces to prevai

Figure 4. Castle on the Sand
across the range of national military strategy from peacetim

engagement to deterrence and conflict prevention, to fighting an

winning in combat.38

Strategies laid out in the US Air Force’s Global Enga

ment and Joint Vision 2010 are based on several presum

tions. First, our C2

 systems are interoperable and fu

capable of transmitting data among allied forces and 

forces. Second, intelligence collection, production, appli

tion, and dissemination are sufficiently robust to coll

against any required target, employing both technical a

human intelligence (HUMINT) resources, as appropria

Third, US wartime data flow will be impervious to IW 

tacks. And fourth, services will recognize, exploit, in

grate, and apply IO in future operations.

All four presumptions are flawed. First, our C2

 syste

are not yet interoperable among DOD forces, and certai

not with allied systems. The National Defense Panel a

recognized this shortfall when it said, “We must move r

idly to the next level of jointness among uniformed s

vices: full commonality of US military information system

This commonality must be interoperable with the inform

tion systems of our allies as well, if we are to reap 

advantages of coalition operations.” The report furt

specified that the United States should develop greater 

teroperability with allies in the areas of doctrine, traini

operational techniques, and R&D.39 Furthermore, we h

not completed protocols for determining what informat

to share, with whom, and how, and we are only beginn

to view this from an IW perspective.

Second, while intelligence might provide data to find a

target most items on the face of the earth (but certainly 

all, as we saw in Iraq), intelligence can still be deceived 

dummies and decoys; thus, the issue becomes one of t

geting the right item. Also, air- and space-based syste

cannot supplant intelligence provided by the guy on 

ground. HUMINT adds a unique and essential dimens

to the intelligence product and will have an even larger r

in the information age. Therefore, the DOD HUMINT eff

must certainly be strengthened to better support both t

tical and strategic applications.

IO also introduces an entirely new paradigm affecting 

entire intelligence cycle. The US intelligence community m
identify and collect IO-related essential elements of in

mation, generate and apply timely analytical products, 

establish an indications and warning system to anticipate 

attacks. Finally, we must develop the tools and methodol

to detect penetration instantly, to quickly move to block 

ploitation, and to ascertain damage inflicted from an i

attack (that is, equivalent of kinetic bomb damage asse

ment) waged both against us and against our adversar

These efforts are only now beginning.

Third, the United States should not plan combat ope

tions presuming either a benign or information-friendly en

ronment. Here’s a caution: technology can be deceptively a

intoxicatingly disarming. For example, tensions in the T

wan Straits in 1995 seemed to substantiate futurist proj

tions of a virtual staff. Most command information exchan

between deployed US Navy forces during this crisis w

based on video teleconferences and electronic mail wh

enhanced the speed of command and situational awarene

making communication “light years better than phone c

and AUTODIN messages that once took hours or days

However, it is important to keep this situation in conte

specifically since the US Navy enjoyed the benefits of IA te

nology because an adversary did not aggressively coun

that technology. In actuality, tensions in the Taiwan Stra

in 1995 demonstrated the need for a more balanced asse

ment of technology in the IA, recognizing its limitations 

well as its capabilities.

IW is likely to become a prominent feature of fut

wars, largely because this concept is gaining recognit

globally. Maj Gen Wang Pufeng, former director of 

strategy department at the Academy of Military Science 

Beijing, makes this very point when he argues that

In the near future, information warfare will control the form and

future of war. We recognize this developmental trend of informatio

warfare and see it as a driving force in the modernization of China’

military and combat readiness. This trend will be highly critical t

achieving victory in future wars. The thrust of China’s militar

construction and development of weapons and equipment will n

longer be toward strengthening the “firepower antipersonnel system

of the industrial age, but toward the strengthening of information

technology, information weapon systems, and informatio

networking. Our sights must not be fixed on the firepower of th

industrial age, rather they must be trained on the information warfar

of the information age.41
The author then astutely analyzes US operations in Des

Storm from an IW perspective and concludes with his o

proposed strategy for conducting IW attacks against Chin

adversaries. Senior DOD leaders, military and civilian al

should recognize valuable strategic insights contained 

General Pufeng’s open-source writing and, perhaps using 

article as a backdrop, reexamine some of our own natio

security strategies and operational concepts.

Fourth, services are just beginning to incorporate IO 

exercises, subsequently experiencing and understanding 

results of IW attacks. This aspect highlights the defens

aspect; that is, the need to protect information. It does 

yet allow teams to exercise offensive IO weapons, which 

still shrouded programs. As in the early days of airpow

some of IO’s most stringent critics are among DOD’s upco

ing senior leadership. Some critics even walk the halls 

military academia. Lt Gen Douglas D. Buckholtz, Joint S

director for Command, Control, Communications, and Co

puter Systems (J-6), warns that

Awareness [of the IW threat] is singularly the biggest problem w

have. We’ve got to get folks up to speed on this. . . . The problem is

getting war fighters to really understand that this is every bit a

significant as some enemy bomber that comes in and doe

something to the United States. It’s just that they’ve been raised on

tanks and planes. Getting the war fighter who has been under fir

many times to agree that networks are better than [weapons] tha

shoot is tough. There’s a big mind-set you’ve got to overcome. 42

Horns of the Dilemma—What to Do?

The US military faces a conundrum. On one hand, 

DOD relies heavily on technological advances in the IA 

response to defense challenges and global commitments 

the twenty-first century. For example, the DOD levera

technology to offset reductions in manpower. On the ot

hand, inherent vulnerabilities of global connectivity could 

our nemesis. Is this dichotomy incongruous? Differences 

be resolved and the DOD can establish a foundation firm

than sand, but only with significant resource investment a

dedicated, bold, and conscious effort. How? Prudence d

tates the United States achieve strong, demonstrable IO 

terrence soon. Douhet recognized the urgency for bold act

and cautions and warned that “to break away from the p
is disturbing. . . . If we have a tendency to deviate as li

as possible from the beaten path, we will find oursel

diverging from reality, and we will wind up far remo

from the realities of our time.”43

The Key Ingredient to a Firm Foundation

Information assurance is the key ingredient to credi

IO deterrence. Information assurance is the certainty 

information readiness, reliability, and continuity. It p

vides that firm foundation upon which we can base 

Force doctrine with some realistic expectations of succe

We’ve defined it and recognized its importance. Now, w

must we do to obtain information assurance? The st

described below focus on DOD challenges. However, b

DSB and PCCIP reports strongly emphasize that most 

these same steps must be mirrored by cooperative effo

between commercial and government organizations at 

local, state, and national levels.

Constructing a Firm Foundation

Achieving information assurance is a six-step proce

First, the DOD must secure vital information systems a

then convince adversaries that these systems are, in fa

resilient. Accomplishing this feat involves calculated r

management: identifying, protecting, and making robust o

those information systems and processes most critical to 

tional defense. This approach parallels the one used by 

Continuity of Government operations during the cold w

The DOD should identify the most crucial databases the c

ruption or destruction of which could severely impede m

tary operations. It should be noted that these databa

would not necessarily be classified exclusively. The D

should then either maintain duplicate backup systems 

increase its automated defenses for these systems. Seco

we need a viable indication and warning (I&W) capability 

anticipate, preclude, or ameliorate effects of IW attacks. T

process entails developing an indication and warning me

odology and establishing a joint 24-hour center to anal

information and warning indicators, publish warnings, co
dinate data on attacks in progress, assess the damage, a

monitor efforts to reconstitute. Geographically focu

emergency response teams would complete the I&W ca

bility. Third, we must be able to respond to an informat

attack in kind and clearly convey to adversaries the facts 

that capability and our willingness to apply it.

The fourth element lies with the American judicial s

tem, although it affects daily application of DOD inform

tion operations policies and procedures. Laws must 

modified to reflect offensive and defensive aspects of 

information age, and procedures must be streamlined 

expedite data sharing among DOD, DOJ, and commer

organizations. This is admittedly a difficult area to neg

ate from a legal perspective. On the one hand, such c

liberties as freedom of speech and even freedom of asse

bly are intertwined on the Internet with extremist grou

sharing data on how to hack computers and build bom

On the other hand, current legal restrictions prohibit lo

ing beyond one computer hop without a court order. Th

prohibitions severely curtail DOD investigative agencies 

their attempts to detect who is waging an IW attack. Ad

tionally, punishments for convicted hackers must be sw

and sufficiently severe to deter. Current punishments s

ply do not deter nor reflect the extent of resulting dama

For example, in 1997 a Swedish hacker jammed 911 lin

in Miami, diverted emergency calls, and while access

the public telephone system, generated 60,000 unauth

ized calls. The penalty? He was tried in Sweden as a ju

nile and fined $345. It should be noted also that ma

countries have no laws whatsoever pertaining to compu

crime.44

The fifth element requires changes in the design specifi

tions for ADP systems. The United States must stop build

systems with internal weaknesses, making them vulnera

to malevolent exploitation and manipulation. Designing m

secure systems will increase the end-cost, but having them 

much more pragmatic than fixing system vulnerabili

later, assuming we detect them. Granted, some of the abo

mentioned actions are difficult, if not impossible, to acco

plish with today’s technology. Nonetheless, these shortf

point the way to needed R&D investments. Taken togeth
these components comprise the principle of deterrence 

plied to what is now known as information operations 

the “the fifth battlespace domain.”

Sixth, the law of armed conflict should be thoroughly 

viewed in the international arena and used to resolve seve

basic issues. On the one hand, does IW constitute an ac

war? Is response in kind considered fair play? Should 

international community define a level of acceptable dam

generated by IW? Should it outlaw IW, using a vehicle sim

to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty? Considering that IO is 

ready conducted daily and that IW will most certainly 

conducted in war, can a ban realistically push Pandora b

into her box? Would such an approach merely handicap s

natories while benefiting adversaries who don’t play by 

rules? On the other hand, should the United States ev

surface such questions to the international arena? One th

is certain. The United States may be faced with an advers

who seeks to offset our advantages by using asymme

means and threatening the use of chemical and/or biolog

weapons, information attacks, terrorism, urban warfare

anti-access strategies. Thus, America must quickly seize 

initiative from the aggressor. A new way of looking at conf

is emerging.45

Who’s on First? What’s on Second?

Like supercharged electrons, organizations through

DOD are scrambling for IO-related projects. Projects, c

tracts, and working groups proliferate but under no cent

guidance and with no set methodology to share lesso

learned. The skeptics are correct, to a certain extent. IO 

the political emphasis de jour because funding is availa

But, the threat is real and organizations are reacting. F

ure 5 illustrates the plethora of organizational activity. T

list is not inclusive, by any means.

Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) is the par

organization for both the 67th Intelligence Wing, the la

est IO wing in the Air Force, and the Air Force Informat

Warfare Center (AFIWC). The AFIWC synthesizes a mu

tude of specialties (such as engineers, pilots, intellige

operators, and scientists), reflecting the diverse nature 
IO. AFIWC is parent to the Air Force information warf

battlelab and the Air Force Computer Emergency Respo

Team (AFCERT). Electronic Systems Division (ESD) a

AFIWC co-chair an IW technology planning integrat

process team. The 609th IW Squadron, subordinate 

Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC), assists 

commander in chief of ACC in both offensive and defens

IO missions. The newest Air Force organization is the 

and Space C2

 Agency at Langley Air Force Base. The N

has implemented its Navy Information Warfare Activ

(NIWA), focusing on long-term and budgeted affiliated asp

of IW, and its Fleet Information Warfare Center to prov

current IO support to deployed forces. The Army most 

cently initiated its Land Information Warfare Agency (LIW

The Defense Intelligence Agency leads the effort to develop 

indication and warning methodology for IW and also leads 

interdepartmental IW-threat working group. ESD’s IW D

sion selects, installs, and sustains information-protect

products. AFCC is active in Air Force-wide information p

tection efforts and chairs the Air Force Command, Cont

Communications, and Computers Panel. AF/XOI chairs 

UNITS WITH IO FUNCTIONS . . . TO NAME A FEW!

AFIWC LIWA

 JBC JC2WC

JCSE AIA 

 JFWC ACOM JCMA

 NIWA AFCERT JWAC

 AF IW BATTLELAB

 NSA/IOTC DISA

Figure 5. Who’s On First?
Information Dominance Panel. Academia and defense c

tractors are also heavily involved in IO initiatives.

The Joint Staff’s Operations Directorate (J3) and Co

mand, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems 

rectorate (J6) are heavily involved, as are other joint orga

zations. The Joint Command and Control Warfare Cen

(JC2WC), collocated with Headquarters AIA and AFIWC, 

gages in a plethora of IO activities ranging from modeling a

simulation to assisting theater CINCs in planning and e

cuting C2W and EW in both exercises and real-world cont

gency operations. The Joint Communications and Secu

Monitoring Activity (JCMA) surveys DOD telecommuni

tions and automated information systems to identify vuln

abilities and then recommend countermeasures and corr

tive actions. The JCMA also supports both exercises a

real-world operations. The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) 

sures effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum and is 

DOD focal point for spectrum supremacy aspects of inform

tion warfare. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center provides 

joint staff and unified commands with effects-based, pr

sion-targeting options for selected networks and nodes. T

Joint Battle Center provides combatant commands at 

joint task force level with an ability to experiment with a

assess combat applications of command, control, commu

cations, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconn

sance. The Joint Communications Support Element p

vides contingency and crisis communications to unif

commands, services, defense agencies, and non-DOD ag

cies (for example, State Department, Federal Emerge

Management Association, North Atlantic Treaty Organ

tion, and United Nations). The Joint Warfighting Center 

sists the CJCS, CINCs, and service chiefs in preparation 

joint and multinational operations through conceptual

tion, development, and assessment of current and fut

joint doctrine, and application in training and exercis

Exemplifying the “who’s on first” analogy, JC2WC, JCM

and JSC each interfaces separately with supported co

manders in chief. No system currently exists to generat

single, integrated product.46

To be sure, some coordination occurs to the credit 

participating organizations. For example, the Defense 
vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DISA, and N

formed a “virtual” joint technical office to optimize the u

of limited R&D funds and expedite delivery of info prot

technology, among other goals.47 This union imaginativ

capitalizes on three related but distinct focuses. DAR

concentrates on long-term, advanced R&D accomplished 

concert with partners in industry and academia. DISA 

DOD’s first line of IO defense. It receives inputs from s

vice computer emergency response teams (CERT) to iden

current problems, researches viruses, and attempts co

puter penetration to determine weaknesses. DISA is a

parent to the automated systems security incident supp

team (ASSIST), a computerized 911 service that helps 

defend against attacks and distributes warning notices c

cerning impending threats and computer vulnerabilities. 

nally, NSA is the focal point for cryptography, telecommu

cations security, classified information systems secur

and related R&D. While this cooperation promotes in

nal synergy, it does not characterize efforts throughout DOD

“Cry Havoc and Let Loose the Dogs of War

Who will lead the IO charge? Who’s the point person 

investigating IO concepts and applications, strategiz

R&D investment, sharing lessons learned, training a

equipping for information operations? Right now, no o

This is a significant shortfall at the joint and service leve

How should we organize for information operations?

Several proposals have surfaced, ranging from est

lishing an IO wing subordinate to each extant numbered 

force (NAF) to creating a global IO center subordinate 

AF/XOI and comprised of the Air Intelligence Agency’s 

center, AFIWC, the IW battlelab, and functional expe

from ACC, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Special Ope

tions Command, and Air Force Space Command. One 

sightful article recognized the diversity of joint efforts a

recommended consolidation of joint efforts under a flag o

cer.49 The National Defense Panel suggested giving the 

mission to SPACECOM and transferring DISA to SPAC

COM as a subordinate command. SPACECOM would m

age the information infrastructure globally.50 Yet anot
study recommended forming a DOD organization to att

information assurance, suggesting either United States 

lantic Command (USACOM) or Strategic Command 

given this responsibility.51 Some consider a unified co

mand approach to information operations inappropria

arguing that IO is not a unique mission as are special 

erations and, therefore, does not need to be concentra

with a single CINC. Furthermore, IO is a problem endem

to every CINC, whether functional or geographic in orien

tion. Actually, this logic supports the argument for charg

one unified command with developing IO offensive and 

fensive capabilities. This consolidated approach enab

other CINCs to focus on primary missions and preclu

duplication of effort as each struggles to resolve sim

problems. Another suggestion would be to detail IO as 

additional duty to an IO officer, paralleling duties of the 

Force safety officer and assigning an IO officer at vario

organizational levels. This approach, however, would r

gate IO to a support backwater and dilute DOD’s ability 

rapidly respond to attacks. Additionally, IO is a comp

field, comprised of several distinct disciplines. A single 

officer can not be adequately fluent in all areas.

A Numbered Air Force

Yet another suggestion was to transform parts of the 

Intelligence Agency into a numbered air force, subordin

to Air Combat Command. This is actually how the 

Force Special Operations Command evolved—first an N

then subsequently designated a major command with 

establishment of the United States Special Operatio

Command (USSOCOM). This approach, however, sor

misses the mark. An NAF lacks sufficient intensity a

thrust, not to mention a four-star IO proponent, to eff

tively consolidate IO initiatives replete throughout the 

Force and other services, as well. This approach a

misses the mark with the IO NAF subordinated to an 

Force MAJCOM tasked with manning, equipping, a

training, as opposed to as an IO MAJCOM itself, subor

nated to an operationally focused IO unified command.
The most serious shortcoming to the NAF proposal is t

it fails to capture the synergy extant in developing and te

ing IO concepts within the joint realm. IO is a complex sta

ment of fact. Due to its many and varied facets (PSYO

deception, and EW), IO development and testing must not 

restricted to a service environment, only to be introduced i

a joint task force in a moment of crisis. A successful 

campaign depends on early and thorough joint integrati

Solving this dilemma from an Air Force-exclusive persp

tive—that is, the IO NAF—is not the answer. DOD needs 

organizational solution at a much higher level to unite 

plethora of ongoing IO efforts and to “let loose the dogs 

war,” thus fiercely tackling the IO challenge head-on.

Unified Command—the Right Level

Centering the focus at the unified command level off

the best leverage of limited resources. The issue then 

comes whether to organize geographically or functiona

At first glance, geographical organization seems most 

propriate. Every combatant CINC needs to attain inform

tion superiority. This approach allocates to each serv

the responsibility for IO training and equipping, and 

each combatant CINC responsibility for IO planning a

execution. A geographical orientation, however, places 

related resource requirements in direct conflict with 

other weapon systems and training requirements t

compete for finite funds. It also allows each CINC to in

pendently pursue avenues of info protect/info attack, f

ters duplication of effort, and complicates the process 

sharing lessons learned. The geographical approach ech

early calls to divide air forces, and subordinates them 

individual ground components.

Functional Unified Command—

the Right Focus

Organizing IO functionally at the unified command le

capitalizes on three long-held military principles. The fi

unity of command “ensures the concentration of effort 

every objective under one responsible commander. . . . 
efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a co

mon objective . . . to gain most efficient application.” 52 T

is especially critical today when organizations through

DOD are recognizing the vulnerability inherent in inform

tion infrastructures. Working groups and R&D efforts p

liferate, due in large part to funds associated with IO 

forts. Efforts are, to a large degree, uncoordinated amo

organizations and unevenly focused across the defens

and offensive facets of IO. Both time and funds are fin

they must be applied with concentrated intensity a

coordinated among potential users. Vice Adm Arthur 

Cebrowski, the Navy’s director of space and electronic w

fare, agrees with this approach and likens it to nucl

warfare. As he puts it, “We created an environment 

which the various disciplines that contribute to nucl

warfare could come together and be managed as a m

rather than as a collection of career stovepipes. We need 

do similar work with information technology.” 53

The second principle, that of mass, “focuses combat pow

at a decisive time and place. . . . Mass is an effect that air a

space forces achieve through efficiency of attack.” 54 Fu

tional organization under a single CINC allows focused id

tification of IO objectives for training, equipping, and R&D 

fashion tools for info protect and info attack. It would a

generate synergy and expedite IO-related advances by sh

ing lessons learned among projects. The third princip

economy of force, “selects the best mix of combat power. 

ensure overwhelming combat power is available, minim

combat power should be devoted to secondary objectives

IO projects competing for funds can be systematically pri

tized, weak points identified, and funds effectively allocat

This also capitalizes on resident IO expertise. Individuals w

versed in IO tactics will be able to recommend the m

effective mix of IO assets for applications in military ope

tions other than war or crisis situations.

STRATCOM: The Appropriate Model?

This new IO command might extrapolate elements 

STRATCOM in planning and executing strategic IW ope

tions. The destructive potential of strategic IW has of
been compared to that of weapons of mass destructi

Analysts argue that this similarity necessitates centrali

planning, control, and execution. Indeed, joint doctr

currently stipulates that IW execution must first be 

proved by the national command authorities (NCA). T

analogy continues that this unified command, char

with centralized IO strategic planning, would have a cou

terpart to the joint strategic target planning staff to deve

the single integrated information-warfare operating p

that could be expeditiously executed upon NCA directi

When asked if IO should be treated in the same manner 

nuclear weapons, Admiral Cebrowski agreed, “Yes, yes. 

We created an environment in which the various dis

plines which contribute to nuclear warfare could come 

gether and be managed as a mass rather than as a coll

tion of career stovepipes. We need to do similar work w

information technology.”56

Consider, however, the legacy of Strategic Air Co

mand. The United States invested significant resour

to establish an organization that never, thankfu

launched a nuclear weapon, strategic or tactical. Sho

the United States categorize IW in this same restrict

manner, as a weapon never to be used? The better obj

tive is to devise a strategy that allows employment o

wide range of IO options rather than an approach t

precludes their application. Strategists and targeteers, 

example, should consider the following when identify

IW targets: If the United States would not employ conv

tional weapons against a specific target—for examp

bomb an adversary’s stock market—then applying 

against that same target is also probably inappropria

Thus, while STRATCOM is a logical thought, the nucl

analogy is a non sequitur.

Special Operations Command

Is a Much Better Fit

SOCOM is a better model, offering an excellent balance 

centralized control of strategic planning, budgeting, resea

and development, developing IO applications, and shar

lessons learned across the services, with decentralized pl
ning and execution by the combatant CINCs. Capitaliz

on SOCOM’s technique, the IO command would colloc

IO teams with supported CINCs to assist the Joint T

Force as it plans and executes theater-level IO options. 

IO command also offers the advantage of fully concentr

ing on IO challenges of the twenty-first century.

CINC IO: SPACECOM, STRATCOM, ACOM?

Assigning the IO mission to an existing unified co

mand is a necessity, given constrained DOD resourc

The question is which CINC? SPACECOM is initially 

pealing considering the magnitude of battle-related in

mation transmitted through space and the growing 

pendence on space-based assets. However, the two m

crucial areas in the coming decade warranting concer

attention are IO and space. Assigning the IO mission 

SPACECOM would, by definition, dilute the IO focus due 

competing challenges and existing missions of that unif

command. For this reason, SPACECOM is the most in

propriate extant command to be dual-hatted as “CINC I

Dual-hatting space and IO would detract from both m

sions at a crucial point in the evolution of each. At fi

glance, STRATCOM could vie as a potential candidate 

CINC IO, especially considering the ostensibly strong p

allels in destructive potential between information warf

and nuclear attacks. However, STRATCOM’s nuclear m

sion is critical, allowing no margin for error. Assigning 

formation operations here would either dilute attent

from its primary nuclear mission or result in half-hear

development of IO concepts, applications, and offens

and defensive measures.

And the Winner for “CINC IO” Is—

The Atlantic Command (ACOM) is, without a doubt, 

best repository for the critical IO mission. A major thrus

ACOM’s mission is training and integrating members of 

Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to work toget

as one team. Joint service interoperability is critical to w

fighting now and into the twenty-first century. Rather th
focusing on one specific service, combatant command

are now capabilities-centered, which often require

blending of the unique skills and capabilities individ

services have to offer. Accordingly, ACOM refocused its 

forts from primarily a maritime command to become 

premier joint trainer, force integrator, and deployer 

CONUS-based land, maritime, and air force troops to 

war-fighting commanders in chief. Today, ACOM integra

the military capabilities of nearly all of the forces based 

the continental United States through its components: 

Air Force’s Air Combat Command, the Army’s Forces Co

mand, the Marine Corps’s Marine Forces Atlantic, and 

Navy’s Atlantic Fleet.

ACOM’S Evolving Mission

Additionally, ACOM’s mission is evolving. The defe

reform initiative recently announced by the secretary 

defense will realign the following five joint activities 

USACOM effective 1 October 1998: Joint Warfighting C

ter, Joint Communications Support Element, Joint Co

mand and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC), Joint Ba

Center, and the Joint Warfighting Analysis Center. Ot

joint organizations are being considered as well. The s

ergy is real, it’s happening, and the operational poten

is, well, exciting! This realignment will streamline the jo

staff by divesting operational functions and organizatio

to ACOM, thus enabling the joint staff to better conc

trate on its primary role of formulating policy and gu

ance. The realignment will also strengthen USACOM’s r

in joint functional training and improve joint force integ

tion, particularly in the evolution of advanced joint tact

techniques, procedures, and equipment. Incorporat

these organizations into USACOM yields the opportunity 

regularly develop, test, evaluate, and integrate IO te

niques within the joint arena.

Once integrated, USACOM holds the potential for est

lishing a sorely needed joint task force for IO that is 

sponsive to combatant CINCs.57 No longer would an inf

mation protect crisis team be formed out of necessity 

the joint staff. As CINC IO, Atlantic Command would a
be the designated DOD representative at the national le

in coordinating the defense of the civilian infrastructu

critical to successful execution of military operations. 

sum, USACOM could propel the DOD towards both reso

ing defensive vulnerabilities and developing offensive ski

all the while providing the perfect opportunity to “train 

peace as you would fight in war.” The end result will 

vastly improved services to war-fighting CINCs. ACO

leaders must recognize the timing and seize the oppor

nity, despite the dearth of national-level guidance. Cou

geous leaders astutely recognize the subtle benefit ext

in a lack of guidance and, within that vacuum, h

pressed hard to forge great programs. Will ACOM be up 

the challenge?58

Conclusion

This paper represented a lengthy but important jo

ney, spanning thousands of years from Sun Tzu to 

information age (fig. 6). That information has alwa

been a valuable commodity is unquestioned. What h

changed are the amount, speed, and methods by wh

information is transmitted and received. Technologica

advanced democratic societies are most dependent 

the availability of information; therefore, they are a

the most vulnerable to the interruption, corruption, 

manipulation of that data flow. A host of potential 

Figure 6. From Sun Tzu to the Information Age
tagonists have noted this weakness, and several of th

already skillfully wage and win information wars agai

the United States. We can expect these attacks to incre

in number and severity due to our susceptibility and 

ease and low risk associated with such attacks.

Any Progress Made? Somewhat

Has DOD stepped up to the plate? Somewhat. Secret

of Defense Dick Chaney announced the bold proposal 

establish the IO position within ASD/C3

I. The Joint Staf

realigning staff as opposed to operational missions. ACO

is poised and full of potential to make headway on th

pressing IO issues. Agencies throughout the Air Force a

other services are scrambling for IO-related projects. T

good news: We are shoring up our defenses, slowly. T

bad news: Many senior leaders doubt the efficacy of IO a

demonstrate great difficulty in breaking the paradigm 

industrial-level war. These individuals impede the tran

tion of funds from the kinetic force to prepare for wars 

the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the DOD is s

caught in a bureaucratic quagmire of IO terminolo

which impedes substantive headway due to a war of wor

We must get beyond this stalemate. While we dissect w

ten nuances by way of staff summary sheets, such cou

tries as Russia and China are actively developing IW too

to say nothing of the nonnation state adversaries.

So What’s the Answer? And Is It Feasible?

What is the proposed solution? How can we get the

What should be the lineup of extant unified comman

First, looking five years hence, ACOM will be the undispu

center of gravity for IO and will be giving decisive, step-

leadership. The name will be America Command (AMCO

amended to reflect its primary mission: the defense of the 

homeland. In this respect, AMCOM will have a geograp

focus much like Europe Command for the European reg

and Pacific Command for the Pacific region. Second, in ad

tion to elements divested from the Joint Staff, other eleme

should also be resubordinated to this command, specific
JCMA, JSC, appropriate elements of JCS/J3/J6, and 

formation operations elements within DISA (fig. 7).

Objective Structure for

IO Unified Command

Following the SOCOM model, AMCOM will collocate o

team with each combatant CINC to interface with the th

ter IW cell. This team will integrate services currently p

vided by JC2WC, JCMA, and JSC. JC2WC teams alre

interface closely with combatant CINCs. They provid

ready-made nucleus for an IO joint task force, which wo

work for CINC AMCOM but will deploy to and be operati

ally controlled by supported CINCs, upon direction by 

National Command Authorities.

Another element of AMCOM, the Joint Information W

fare Center (JIWC) will alleviate a significant shortfall r

ognized by national-level studies. JIWC will provide a c

tralized joint organization to monitor the health of the D

automated infrastructure, warn of impending attack, 

Figure 7. Objective Structure for IO Unified Command
spond effectively to minimize and assess damage, and in

ate efforts to reconstitute. Located at Kelly AFB, the JIW

will capitalize on the expertise of the collocated IO un

(JC2WC, Headquarters AIA, AFIWC, AFCERT, and IW b

tlelab). JIWC will include liaison officers from service co

ponents IO agencies (for example, Air Force AFIWC, Ar

LIWA, and Navy NIWA) and representatives of such 

tional-level agencies as the FBI and NSA’s Information O

erations Technical Center. Service CERT will report pos

ble IO-related discrepancies to a joint ASSIST agen

which would also interface with the JIWC.

The Air Force must restructure to centralize and strea

line IO operations. Headquarters AIA would become the 

Force’s IO MAJCOM, serving as the Air Force componen

the IO unified command. This migration would necessit

AIA severing its organizational ties to the Air Staff, as 

currently exists in AIA’s status as a forward operat

agency (FOA). This change parallels the ongoing restr

ture of the Joint Staff and would likewise allow AF/XO 

concentrate on policy and guidance issues, as opposed 

IO operational support to combatant CINCs. AIA, as an 

MAJCOM, must sharpen its IO focus by divesting fu

tions supporting the Air Staff. It can accomplish this e

by transforming the Washington, D.C.-based 497th Inte

gence Group into a separate FOA, which reports to He

quarters AF/XO, and augmenting it with necessary m

power. The 609th Intelligence Squadron should be disban

because of capabilities resident in AIA or resubordina

from ACC to AFIWC. This will eliminate redundancy a

detrimental competition with other Air Force IO elemen

The AFCC and the Air Force Weather Agency, two other s

nificant IO-related organizations, should be incorporated i

this Air Force IO MAJCOM. AIA’s relationship to AMCOM 

then parallel AFSOC, with heavy emphasis on support

combatant CINCs.

Atlantic Command should be allocated its own progr

element (PE), paralleling SOCOM’s Major Force Progr

11. This allocation will alleviate a major criticism uniform

specified by PCCIP, DSB, and NDP regarding insufficie

sporadic, and uncoordinated IO expenditures. Establish

an IOCOM program element will also resolve the impe
ment of convincing the conventionally focused military 

tablishment to shift kinetic funds to IO initiatives, a pr

lem experienced by special forces. Preparing an adequ

IW defense will require a fundamental reallocation of 

sources. AMCOM could seriously concentrate R&D fun

to eliminate such current and very fundamental shortf

as real-time detection, identification, and response to 

information attack. Additional R&D effort must be focu

to rapidly identify damage and reconstitute. While DOD 

capitalizing on commercial research and development, u

explored but militarily relevant areas exist that are eit

too speculative or not applicable for commercial inve

ment. AMCOM could spur investment in these are

Other benefits resulting from centralized budget mana

ment and execution include methodical dissemination 

lessons learned, coordination of contracts to maximize 

source investment, oversight to ensure that security i

prerequisite in future system design, and focused atten

on training and retention of IO specialists. AMCOM will a

comprise a single and effective interface with government a

commercial organizations that work towards the comm

goal of information assurance.

Caper Diem!

If DOD sustains bureaucratic inertia despite the pleth

of information warfare attacks and insightful predictions 

IW attacks to come, if DOD fails to seize the moment

offered by establishing AMCOM, then shame on us. As 

alternative, the Department of Defense could astutely g

AMCOM the IO lead. AMCOM could unabashedly fo

scarce resources and joint expertise into a concentrated p

suit of information assurance and offensive IW applicatio

The result is credible IO deterrence, which will enable sen

DOD leaders to build their castles— our national secu

policy—on a foundation much firmer than sand. This p

posed solution is definitely attainable.

It seems fitting to close with an insightful observat

from Douhet.

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in th

character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves afte

the changes occur. . . . Those nations who are caught unprepared
for the coming war will find, when war breaks out, not only that it is

too late for them to get ready for it, but that they cannot even ge

the drift of it.59

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Air Force Basic Doct

September 1997, 81; and Department of Defense Directive (DODD

3600.1, Information Operations (IO), 9 December 1996.

2. DODD S-3600.l.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Information Warfare: Legal, Regula

Policy and Organizational Considerations for Assurance, 2d ed. (Wash

ton, D.C.: The Joint Staff, July 1996), Fig. 3-4-1.

4. Brig Gen William Mitchell, “The Development of Air Power,” in 

War College Strategy, Doctrine, and Air Power, Book II (Maxwell AFB, 

Air War College, August 1997), 32–37.

5. Robert Frank Futrell, “AWPD-1: Air Planning for War,” in Air 

College Strategy, Doctrine, and Air Power, Book II (Maxwell AFB, Ala.

War College, August 1997), 93–97.

6. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, “Instant Thunder

Air War College Strategy, Doctrine, and Air Power, Book II (Maxwell A

Ala.: Air War College, August 1997), 447–73.

7. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (

York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 147.

8. Ibid., 79.

9. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protec

(PCCIP), Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, 

report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], Oct

1997), x.

10. Defense Science Board, “Task Force on Information War

Defense,” November 1996, sec. 2.2.

11. Ibid., exhibit 2-6.

12. Critical Foundations report, chap. 2, 9.

13. Information Warfare, 2-15.

14. Nancy J. Wong, commissioner, PCCIP, “Information and Comm

cations Sector: The Nation’s Central Nervous System,” lecture, San Anto

Tex., 5 September 1997.

15. Stevan Mitchell, commissioner, PCCIP, address, DOD Worldw

Antiterrorism Conference, n.p., 21 August 1997, 10.

16. Michael A. Dornheim, “Bombs Still Beat Bytes,” Aviation Wee

Space Technology, 19 January 1998.

17. Executive Order 13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection, July 19

18. Steven Mitchell, commissioner, PCCIP, address, Harvard Univer

JFK School of Government, Cambridge, Mass., 20 September 1997, 2.

19. Defense Science Board, sec. 2.3.

20. Ibid., sec. 7.

21. Alvin Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of 

Twenty-first Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993).
22. Robert Brewin and Heather Harreld, “DOD Adds Attack Capab

to Infowar/Move Follows Latest Rounds of Hacks ,” Federal Comp

Week, 2 March 1998.

23. Rick Brennan and R. Evan Ellis, A Case Study of Somalia, re

to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment, SAIC pro

no.: 03-9847-000, SAIC doc. no.: 96-6960, 18 April 1996.

24. Mitchell, 20 September 1997 address, 2.

25. Defense Science Board, sec. 2.3.

26. Suzanne M. Schafer, “Hackers Invade Pentagon Computers,” 

sociated Press, 26 February 1998.

27. “Attack Software Plays Key Offensive Role,” Aviation Week & Sp

Technology, 19 January 1998.

28. Information Warfare, 2-111.

29. Anthony Cajigas, “The Secret Battlefield, Computer Warfare C

tingencies II,” available from nick_dav@ix.netcom.com.

30. “Active Measures Key to Soviet Discrediting Campaign,” Wash

ton Times, 23 May 1985.

31. Ibid.

32. Clifford Stoll, The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the M

of Computer Espionage (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1989).

33. George Stein, Jane’s Special Report: US Information Warfare (A

andria, Va.: Jane’s Information Group, 1996), 22–26.

34. Kenneth D. Bryan, “Shop Talk: PACOM Team,” Cyber Sword 1

2 (Fall 1997): 38–39.

35. Whit Peters and Richard Marshall, Defensive Information Operat

briefing, USAF Information Operations Conference, 18 October 1997.

36. Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force (W

ington, D.C.: United States Air Force, 1997), 1.

37 “Military, Industry Partners Grab Information Systems’ B

Ring,” Signals Magazine, September 1997, 91.

38. AFDD 1-1, 36.

39. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Securi

the 21st Century, report (Arlington, Va.: National Defense Press, Dec

ber 1997), 14, 32.

40. “Military, Industry Partners,” 91.

41. Wang Pufeng, major general, Academy of Military Science, “

Challenge of Information Warfare,” China Military Science, Spring 199

42. Jason Sherman, “Infowar? What Kind of a Defense ?” Ar

Forces Journal 135, no. 1 (August 1997).

43. Giulio Douhet, “The New Form of War,” Air War College Strat

Doctrine, and Airpower, Book II (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 

vember 1997), 27.

44. John T. Correll, “War in Cyberspace,” Air Force Magazine, Jan

1998.

45. AFDD 1-1, 42.

46. Col Brian Fredericks, Information Warfare: The Organizationa

mension (Sun Tzu and Information Warfare) (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: 

Army War College, 1997), 88.

47. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Advanced Research 

jects Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Nati
Security Agency Concerning the Information Systems Security Resea

Joint Technology Office, March 1995.

48. Fredericks, 88.

49. Ibid., 96.

50. Transforming Defense, 72.

51. Kevin J. Kennedy et al, Grand Strategy for Information Age 

tional Security (Air University Press: Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Aug

1997), 54.

52. AFDD 1-1, 12.

53. Sherman.

54. AFDD 1-1, 16.

55. Ibid., 18.

56. Sherman.

57. Ibid.

58. Briefing, CCA Transition Update to CINCUSACOM, 28 Janu

1998.

59. Douhet, “The New Form of War,” in Air War College Strat

Doctrine and Airpower, Book II (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 

vember 1997), 28.
Glossary

ACC Air Combat Command

ACOM Atlantic Command

ASD/C3

I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Comman

Control, Communications, and Intelligen

AF Air Force

AFB Air Force Base

AFCERT Air Force Computer Emergency Response

 Team

AFIWC Air Force Information Warfare Center

AIA Air Intelligence Agency

ASSIST Automated systems security incident

support team

AWPD Air War Plans Division

C2 Command and Control

CERT Computer emergency response team

CINC Commander in chief

DISA Defense Information System Agency

DNS Domain name servers

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense Directive

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DSB Defense Science Board

EO Executive order

ESD Electronic Systems Division

EW Electronic warfare

FOA Forward operating agency

HQ Headquarters

HUMINT Human intelligence

IA Information age

IO Information operations

I&W Information and warning

IW Information warfare

IW-D Information warfare-defense

JBC Joint Battle Center

JC2WC Joint Command and Control Warfare Cen

JCMA Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity

JIWC Joint Information Warfare Center

JSC Joint Spectrum Center

45
JWAC Joint Analysis Center

JWFC Joint Warfighting Center

LAN Local area networks

LIWA Land Information Warfare Agency

MAJCOM Major command

MOOTW Military operations other than war

NAF Numbered Air Force

NCA National Command Authorities

NIWA Navy Information Warfare Activity

NDP National Defense Panel

PCCIP President’s Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection

PE Program element

PSYOP Psychological operations

RMA Revolution in military affairs

SOC Special Operations Command

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

USAF United States Air Force

46