II 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4433 

To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve 

the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 23, 2024 

Mr. RICKETTS (for himself and Mrs. SHAHEEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve the security of Taiwan, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Building Options for 

5 the Lasting Security of Taiwan through European Resolve 

6 Act’’ or the ‘‘BOLSTER Act’’. 

7 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress finds the following: 

9 (1) In an October 2022 speech before the 20th 

10 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 


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1 General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this Act as 

3 the ‘‘PRC’’) has not ruled out the use of force re4 garding Taiwan. 

5 (2) The Office of the Director of National 

6 Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. 

7 Intelligence Community, published on February 6, 

8 2023, noted that ‘‘Beijing is working to meet its 

9 goal of fielding a military by 2027 designed to deter 

10 U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait crisis.’’. 

11 (3) The risk of economic disruption following a 

12 conflict in the Taiwan Strait could amount to ap13 proximately $2,000,000,000,000 in a blockade sce14 nario, which would immediately, and potentially irre15 versibly impact global trade and investment, key 

16 supply chains for semiconductors, and other trade 

17 and national security priorities. 

18 (4) The European Union’s foreign and security 

19 policy service, the European External Action Service, 

20 recognizes that the European Union may use sanc21 tions to promote the objectives of its Common For22 eign and Security Policy, all of which have potential 

23 relevance in the event of military action or coercion 

24 against Taiwan. 


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1 (5) The European Union has imposed sanctions 

2 on— 

3 (A) PRC officials and entities responsible 

4 for human rights abuses in Xinjiang; and 

5 (B) PRC entities for their support of Rus6 sia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine. 

7 (6) In July 2022, Jorge Toledo Albinana, Am8 bassador of the European Union to the People’s Re9 public of China, said, ‘‘In the event of a military in10 vasion [of Taiwan], we have made it very clear that 

11 the European Union, with the United States and its 

12 allies, will impose similar or even greater measures 

13 than those we have now taken against Russia.’’. 

14 (7) On January 18, 2023, the European Par15 liament passed a resolution calling upon ‘‘all com16 petent European Union institutions to urgently draw 

17 up a scenario-based strategy for tackling security 

18 challenges in Taiwan.’’. 

19 (8) In an April 18, 2023, speech to the Euro20 pean Parliament, European Commission President 

21 Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that the European 

22 Union ‘‘stand[s] strongly against any unilateral 

23 change of the status quo [in the Taiwan Strait], in 

24 particular by the use of force.’’. 


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1 (9) The PRC has supported Russia’s illegal, 

2 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by resupplying Rus3 sia’s defense industrial base. 

4 (10) Taiwan has— 

5 (A) aligned itself with European Union 

6 sanctions against Russia in response to the full7 scale invasion of Ukraine; and 

8 (B) provided Ukraine more than 

9 $113,000,000 in financial support and more 

10 than 950 metric tons of humanitarian supplies. 

11 SEC. 3. CONSULTATIONS, PLANS, REPORTS, AND BRIEF12 INGS. 

13 (a) CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERN14 MENTS REGARDING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PRC 

15 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.— 

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Office of 

17 Sanctions Coordination at the Department of State, 

18 in consultation with the Director of the Office of 

19 Foreign Assets Control at the Department of the 

20 Treasury, shall engage in regular consultations with 

21 the International Special Envoy for the Implementa22 tion of European Union Sanctions and appropriate 

23 government officials of European countries, includ24 ing the United Kingdom, to develop coordinated 

25 plans and share information on independent plans to 


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1 impose sanctions and other economic measures 

2 against the PRC, as appropriate, if the PRC is 

3 found to be involved in— 

4 (A) overthrowing or dismantling the gov5 erning institutions in Taiwan, including engag6 ing in disinformation campaigns in Taiwan that 

7 promote the strategic interests of the PRC; 

8 (B) occupying any territory controlled or 

9 administered by Taiwan as of the date of the 

10 enactment of this Act; 

11 (C) violating the territorial integrity of 

12 Taiwan; 

13 (D) taking significant action against Tai14 wan, including— 

15 (i) creating a naval blockade or other 

16 quarantine of Taiwan; 

17 (ii) seizing the outer lying islands of 

18 Taiwan; or 

19 (iii) initiating a cyberattack that 

20 threatens civilian or military infrastructure 

21 in Taiwan; or 

22 (E) providing assistance that helps the se23 curity forces of the Russian Federation in exe24 cuting Russia’s unprovoked, illegal war against 

25 Ukraine. 


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1 (2) SEMIANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL BRIEF2 INGS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 

3 enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter 

4 for the following 5 years, the head of the Office of 

5 Sanctions Coordination shall provide a briefing re6 garding the progress of the consultations required 

7 under paragraph (1) to— 

8 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

9 the Senate; 

10 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

11 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 

12 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

13 the House of Representatives; and 

14 (D) the Committee on Financial Services 

15 of the House of Representatives. 

16 (b) COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT IN

17 A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY.— 

18 (1) PLAN.—Not later than 1 year after the date 

19 of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of 

20 the United States Agency for International Develop21 ment (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Adminis22 trator’’), in coordination with the Secretary of State, 

23 shall develop a plan to deliver humanitarian aid to 

24 Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or 


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1 military invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Libera2 tion Army (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘PLA’’). 

3 (2) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In devel4 oping the plan required under paragraph (1), the 

5 Administrator shall consult with the European Com6 mission’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre 

7 and appropriate government officials of European 

8 countries regarding cooperation to provide aid to 

9 Indo-Pacific countries as the result of a blockade, 

10 quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the 

11 PLA, including the extent to which European coun12 tries could backfill United States humanitarian aid 

13 to other parts of the world. 

14 (3) CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT.—Upon 

15 completion of the plan required under paragraph 

16 (1), the Administrator shall provide a briefing re17 garding the details of such plan and the consulta18 tions required under paragraph (2) to the Com19 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 

20 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep21 resentatives. 

22 (c) REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PRC 

23 MILITARY ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN.— 

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after 

25 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 


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1 shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign 

2 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For3 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 

4 contains an independent assessment of the expected 

5 economic impact of— 

6 (A) a 30-day blockade or quarantine of 

7 Taiwan by the PLA; and 

8 (B) a 180-day blockade or quarantine of 

9 Taiwan by the PLA. 

10 (2) ASSESSMENT ELEMENTS.—The assessment 

11 required under paragraph (1) shall contain a de12 scription of— 

13 (A) the impact of the blockade or quar14 antine of Taiwan on global trade and output; 

15 (B) the 10 economic sectors that would be 

16 most disrupted by a sustained blockade of Tai17 wan by the PLA; and 

18 (C) the expected economic impact of a sus19 tained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA on the 

20 domestic economies of European countries that 

21 are members of NATO or the European Union. 

22 (3) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT.— 

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—The assessment re24 quired under paragraph (1) shall be conducted 

25 by a federally-funded research and development 


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1 center or another appropriate independent enti2 ty with expertise in economic analysis. 

3 (B) USE OF DATA FROM PREVIOUS STUD4 IES.—The entity conducting the assessment re5 quired under paragraph (1) may use and incor6 porate information contained in previous stud7 ies on matters relevant to the elements of the 

8 assessment. 

9 SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 

10 EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REGARDING IN11 CREASING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELA12 TIONS WITH TAIWAN. 

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

14 (1) Representative offices in Taiwan have been 

15 established by— 

16 (A) 16 of the 27 European Union member 

17 states; 

18 (B) the European Union; 

19 (C) the United Kingdom; and 

20 (D) Switzerland. 

21 (2) Taiwan has representative offices in— 

22 (A) 19 of the 27 European Union coun23 tries; 

24 (B) the United Kingdom; and 

25 (C) Switzerland. 


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1 (3) The PRC has used its economic power to 

2 pressure Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to cut ties and 

3 switch diplomatic recognition to the PRC, which has 

4 reduced Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to just 12, includ5 ing The Holy See. 

6 (4) On November 18, 2021, Taiwan formally 

7 opened the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lith8 uania, which is the first such office in Europe that 

9 uses Taiwan in its title rather than the PRC-pre10 ferred title, ‘‘Taipei’’, despite actions of economic co11 ercion imposed on Lithuania by the PRC. 

12 (5) Since 2020, legislative bodies in Poland, 

13 Lithuania, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the 

14 Czech Republic, Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, Bel15 gium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and Slovakia 

16 have passed legislation or resolutions that call for— 

17 (A) deepening ties and exchanges with Tai18 wan; 

19 (B) supporting Taiwan’s participation in 

20 international organizations; or 

21 (C) maintaining the status quo in the Tai22 wan Strait. 

23 (6) Since 2020, parliamentary delegations from 

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1 tugal, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Estonia, Lat2 via, and the European Union have visited Taiwan. 

3 (7) In May 2023, representatives from the 

4 United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Czech 

5 Republic joined the United States, Australia, and 

6 Japan in a joint statement calling for Taiwan’s in7 clusion in the 76th World Health Assembly. 

8 (8) The November 2023 Group of 7 Japan 

9 2023 Foreign Ministers’ Statement expressed ‘‘sup10 port for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in inter11 national organizations, including in the World 

12 Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings.’’. 

13 (9) As of 2022, Taiwan was the European 

14 Union’s 13th largest trading partner overall and its 

15 5th largest Asian trading partner. 

16 (10) Taiwan is a leading investor in the Czech 

17 Republic, which currently hosts more than 

18 $1,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment from 

19 Taiwan, resulting in thousands of jobs for Czech 

20 citizens. 

21 (11) From 2021 to 2022, trade between Lith22 uania and Taiwan increased by 50 percent. Taiwan 

23 has invested in Lithuania’s emerging chip sector, 

24 laser companies, and other high-tech industries. 


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1 (12) In June 2022, the European Commission, 

2 for the first time, upgraded its trade and investment 

3 dialogues with Taiwan, which had been ongoing at 

4 the technical level for more than 20 years, to the 

5 ministerial and director-general level for the first 

6 time in recognition of the benefit from higher-level 

7 coordination. 

8 (13) In August 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor 

9 Manufacturing Company Limited announced part10 nerships with various European technology firms 

11 and investments of $3,500,000,000 to build its first 

12 semiconductor plant in Europe in Germany. 

13 (14) On November 8, 2023, the Government of 

14 the United Kingdom signed an Enhanced Trade 

15 Partnership agreement with Taiwan. This is the 

16 first such agreement between Taiwan and a Euro17 pean country. 

18 (15) On December 13, 2023 the European Par19 liament passed a resolution that— 

20 (A) urges the European Union to pursue a 

21 resilient supply chain agreement with Taiwan; 

22 and 

23 (B) calls for a bilateral investment agree24 ment between Taiwan and the European Union 


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1 to enhance a 2-way partnership in digital trade 

2 and cyber resilience. 

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that— 

5 (1) the United States, Europe, and Taiwan are 

6 like-minded partners that— 

7 (A) share common values, such as democ8 racy, the rule of law and human rights; and 

9 (B) enjoy a close trade and economic part10 nership; 

11 (2) bolstering political, economic, and people-to12 people relations with Taiwan would benefit the Eu13 ropean Union, individual European countries, and 

14 the United States; 

15 (3) the European Union can play an important 

16 role in helping Taiwan resist the economic coercion 

17 of the PRC by negotiating with Taiwan regarding 

18 new economic, commercial, and investment agree19 ments; 

20 (4) the United States and European countries 

21 should coordinate and increase diplomatic efforts to 

22 facilitate Taiwan’s meaningful participation in inter23 national organizations; 

24 (5) the United States and European countries 

25 should— 


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1 (A) publicly and repeatedly emphasize the 

2 differences between their respective ‘‘One 

3 China’’ policies and the PRC’s ‘‘One China’’ 

4 principle; and 

5 (B) counter the PRC’s propaganda and 

6 false narratives about United Nations General 

7 Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which claim 

8 the resolution recognizes PRC territorial claims 

9 to Taiwan; and 

10 (6) Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.S.-EU Trade 

11 and Technology Council’s Secure Supply Chain 

12 working group would bring valuable expertise and 

13 enhance transatlantic cooperation in the semicon14 ductor sector. 

15 (c) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 

16 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi17 annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary 

18 of State shall provide a briefing to the Committee on For19 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For20 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the 

21 Department of State’s engagements with the European 

22 Union and the governments of European countries to in23 crease political and economic relations with Taiwan, in24 cluding— 


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1 (1) public statements of support for Taiwan’s 

2 democracy and its meaningful participation in inter3 national organizations; 

4 (2) unofficial diplomatic visits to and from Tai5 wan by high-ranking government officials and parlia6 mentarians; 

7 (3) the establishment of parliamentary caucuses 

8 or groups that promote strong relations with Tai9 wan; 

10 (4) strengthening subnational diplomacy, in11 cluding diplomatic and trade-related visits to and 

12 from Taiwan by local government officials; 

13 (5) strengthening coordination between United 

14 States and European business chambers, univer15 sities, think tanks, and other civil society groups 

16 with similar groups in Taiwan; 

17 (6) establishing new representative, economic, 

18 or cultural offices in a European country or in Tai19 wan; 

20 (7) promoting direct flights to and from Tai21 wan; 

22 (8) facilitating visits by religious leaders to Tai23 wan; and 

24 (9) increasing economic engagement and trade 

25 relations. 


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1 SEC. 5. CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 

2 ON SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S SELF-DEFENSE. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

4 (1) In September 2021, the European Commis5 sion released the European Union Strategy for Co6 operation in the Indo-Pacific, which acknowledges 

7 that increased tensions between the PRC and Tai8 wan could impact European security and economic 

9 prosperity. 

10 (2) In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the French Navy 

11 sent warships to transit the Taiwan Strait and in 

12 2021, the British Navy frigate HMS Richmond 

13 transited the Taiwan Strait. 

14 (3) In November 2021, the German Navy com15 mitted to sending vessels to the Indo-Pacific every 2 

16 years to expand cooperation with like-minded states 

17 advocating for freedom of navigation and a rules18 based international order. 

19 (4) European deterrence efforts in the Taiwan 

20 Strait support the United States’ strategic interests, 

21 as the United States also sends warships through 

22 the Taiwan Strait to promote deterrence and re23 spond to aggressive behavior by the PRC towards 

24 Taiwan. 

25 (5) In April 2023, European Commission Vice26 President Josep Borrell Fontelles called on EuroVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:34 Jul 16, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4433.IS S4433

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1 pean navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to show Eu2 rope’s commitment to freedom of navigation. 

3 (6) In August 2023, French President Emman4 uel Macron signed into law legislation emphasizing 

5 that France would defend freedom of navigation in 

6 the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China 

7 Sea and the Taiwan Strait. 

8 (7) European countries, including France, Ger9 many, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the 

10 Czech Republic, and Lithuania, have developed Indo11 Pacific strategies. 

12 (8) At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North At13 lantic Treaty Organization unveiled a new Strategic 

14 Concept, stating that allies will work together ‘‘to 

15 address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to 

16 Euro-Atlantic security’’ and underscored the impor17 tance of the Indo-Pacific for NATO, ‘‘given that de18 velopments in that region can directly affect Euro19 Atlantic security.’’. 

20 (9) In September 2022, the North Atlantic 

21 Council held its first dedicated discussion about the 

22 status of Taiwan, its democratic government, and its 

23 critical role in the manufacturing of microchips glob24 ally. 


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1 (10) In 2022, the United Kingdom approved a 

2 substantial increase in exports of submarine compo3 nents and technology to Taiwan to upgrade its naval 

4 forces. 

5 (11) In 2024, Taiwan’s defense ministry signed 

6 an agreement with France’s DCI Group for the sup7 ply of parts and accessories to maintain its Lafay8 ette-class frigates. 

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that— 

11 (1) preserving peace and security in the Taiwan 

12 Strait is a shared interest of the United States and 

13 Europe; 

14 (2) European countries, particularly countries 

15 with experience combating Russian aggression and 

16 malign activities, can provide Taiwan with lessons 

17 learned from their ‘‘total defense’’ programs to mo18 bilize the military and civilians in a time of crisis; 

19 (3) the United States and Europe should in20 crease coordination to strengthen Taiwan’s cyberse21 curity, especially for critical infrastructure and net22 work defense operations; 

23 (4) the United States and Europe should work 

24 with Taiwan— 

25 (A) to improve its energy resiliency; 


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1 (B) to strengthen its food security; 

2 (C) to combat misinformation, 

3 disinformation, digital authoritarianism, and 

4 foreign interference; and 

5 (D) to provide expertise on how to improve 

6 defense infrastructure; 

7 (5) European naval powers, in coordination 

8 with the United States, should increase freedom of 

9 navigation transits through the Taiwan Strait; and 

10 (6) European naval powers, the United States, 

11 and Taiwan should establish exchanges and partner12 ships among their coast guards to counter coercion 

13 by the PRC. 

14 (c) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 

15 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

16 semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years the Sec17 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De18 fense, shall provide a briefing to the Committee on For19 eign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed 

20 Services of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

21 of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 

22 Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding 

23 discussions with governments of European NATO coun24 tries about contributions to Taiwan’s self-defense 

25 through— 


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1 (1) public statements of support for Taiwan’s 

2 security; 

3 (2) arms transfers or arms sales, particularly of 

4 weapons consistent with an asymmetric defense 

5 strategy; 

6 (3) transfers or sales of dual-use items and 

7 technology; 

8 (4) transfers or sales of critical nonmilitary 

9 supplies, such as food and medicine; 

10 (5) increasing the military presence of such 

11 countries in the Indo-Pacific region; 

12 (6) joint training and military exercises; 

13 (7) enhancing Taiwan’s critical infrastructure 

14 resiliency, including communication and digital in15 frastructure; 

16 (8) coordination to counter disinformation; 

17 (9) coordination to counter offensive cyber oper18 ations; and 

19 (10) any other matter deemed important by the 

20 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. 

21 SEC. 6. EXPEDITED LICENSING FOR EUROPEAN COUN22 TRIES TRANSFERRING MILITARY EQUIPMENT 

23 TO TAIWAN. 

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 


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1 shall establish an expedited decision-making process for 

2 blanket third party transfers of defense articles and serv3 ices from NATO countries to Taiwan, including transfers 

4 and re-transfers of United States origin grant, Foreign 

5 Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales end-items not 

6 covered by an exemption under the International Traffic 

7 in Arms Regulations under subchapter M of chapter I of 

8 title 22, Code of Federal Regulations. 

9 (b) AVAILABILITY.—The expedited decision-making 

10 process described in subsection (a)— 

11 (1) shall be available for classified and unclassi12 fied items; and 

13 (2) shall, to the extent practicable— 

14 (A) require the approval, return, or denial 

15 of any licensing application to export defense 

16 articles and services that is related to a govern17 ment-to-government agreement within 15 days 

18 after the submission of such application; and 

19 (B) require the completion of the review of 

20 all other licensing requests not later than 30 

21 days after the submission of such application. 

Æ 


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