RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0216-19

I.M.R.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.R.S.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted November 5, 2020 – Decided October 13, 2021

Before Judges Fuentes and Whipple.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FV-12-0228-20.

Law Offices of Jonathan F. Marshall, attorney for 

appellant (Jeff Thakker, of counsel; Jason Seidman, on 

the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

1 Because this appeal involves allegations of domestic violence, we use initials 

to identify the parties pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(9) and (10).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-0216-19

FUENTES, P.J.A.D.

Defendant A.R.S. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) issued by 

the Family Part on August 5, 2019, under the Prevention of Domestic Violence 

Act of 1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, in response to a complaint filed 

by plaintiff I.M.R. and a subsequent temporary restraining order (TRO) issued 

by the Woodbridge Township municipal court ex parte on July 21, 2019. 

Defendant argues, inter alia, that the Family Part judge who conducted the 

FRO hearing (1) failed to make specific findings that defendant committed the 

predicate offense of criminal mischief and (2) did not find an FRO was necessary 

to protect plaintiff from future acts or threats of domestic violence by defendant, 

pursuant to the two-prong analytical paradigm this court established in Silver v. 

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006), which was subsequently 

adopted by the Supreme Court in J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 488 (2011). We 

agree with defendant's arguments and reverse. We also hold the hearing 

conducted by the Family Part judge did not adhere to basic adjudicative 

principles of sound courtroom management.

Plaintiff alleged

[o]n July 21, 2019, around 2:00 a.m. [he] woke up and 

[saw] his car had been egged. There was also writing 

on his car with mustard that said "suck it" (penis 

drawing on vehicle). Plaintiff stated he contacted his 
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ex-girlfriend via Facebook asking her why she egged 

his car. The defendant stated we did not do it. The 

plaintiff asked her who she did it with but she did not 

tell him. The defendant stated that she was with the 

people who did it but did not provide the names of who 

did it. 

The PDVA complaint checked criminal mischief and harassment as the 

two predicate acts of domestic violence plaintiff's former romantic partner 

committed against him. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(10) (13). The parties' prior 

relationship gave the municipal court jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's account 

of events ex parte and issue the TRO. 

The Family Part judge conducted the FRO hearing on August 5, 2019. 

Both parties appeared before the court pro se. The judge gave a brief recitation 

of the nature of the hearing and told defendant she had the right to be represented 

by counsel, but he could not appoint an attorney to represent her. Defendant 

said she was "ready to proceed." The judge conducted the proceeding by asking 

the parties direct questions.

Plaintiff testified his romantic relationship with defendant ended in 2015. 

On July 21, 2019, plaintiff testified he "woke up" at around two o'clock in the 

morning saw that his car had been "egged" and immediately "suspected it was 

[defendant]." When the judge asked why he suspected defendant, plaintiff 

responded: "She's pretty much the only person that I know . . . that . . . knows 
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my . . . house and knows my car before my girlfriend now . . . ." The judge 

asked plaintiff whether he had any recent communication with defendant prior 

to this incident. Plaintiff testified he contacted defendant "about two months 

prior" because he wanted to "try and become friends again, [and] see how she 

was doing." 

The judge then refocused plaintiff's testimony to the July 21, 2019 

incident and confirmed plaintiff did not see who egged his car. This prompted 

the following testimony: 

PLAINTIFF: So I messaged her and asked her if she -

- you know, I told her that I thought it was her and --

THE COURT: Did she admit to doing it? 

PLAINTIFF: Yes.

THE COURT: What did she say? 

PLAINTIFF: She said that she was in the car, that she 

wasn't the one doing the -- the act.

THE COURT: That she was in the car? 

PLAINTIFF: Yes and that it was her -- there was other 

people that were in the car that did it. 

At the judge's request, plaintiff gave the court his cell phone, allegedly 

containing the messages. Without attempting to ascertain the authenticity of the 

messages, the judge addressed defendant, while in the midst of plaintiff's direct 
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testimony, and asked her: "Did you send him a text message about it[?]" 

Defendant answered: "Yes, Your Honor." The judge then proceeded to read 

into the record the content of this electronic conversation initiated by plaintiff. 

In his recitation, the judge did not distinguish between the parties. Several times 

while reading this exchange, the judge asked the parties to interpret the meaning 

of certain words and abbreviations. Because defendant did not include a printout 

of this electronic conversation in her appendix, we are left only with the 

inscrutable exchange reflected in the trial transcript. 

The only other exhibits plaintiff attempted to introduce as evidence were 

photographs allegedly depicting the condition of his car on July 21, 2019. 

THE COURT: What else other than the text messages?

. . . .

PLAINTIFF: I have pictures of the car if you're 

interested in looking at it.

THE COURT: I'll look at the pictures of the car in a 

moment. [Addressing defendant:] Let me hear your 

version of the events.

The court did not admit these photographs into evidence nor describe the 

condition of the vehicle when he placed his findings on the record at the 

conclusion of the FRO hearing.
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Defendant acknowledged receiving a message from plaintiff about two 

months before the incident but denied he made any overture of friendship. She 

also characterized plaintiff's efforts to contact her about an unrelated car 

accident as "weird" because "he doesn't have me on any social media." 

Defendant also claimed plaintiff had contacted her several times and made a 

number disparaging comments about her. In response to the judge's questions 

about the July 21, 2019 incident, defendant denied vandalizing plaintiff's car but 

claimed she knew who did.

According to defendant, on the night of the incident, she had gone out 

with a friend. While drinking alcoholic beverages, they talked about their prior 

romantic relationships, including defendant's relationship with plaintiff. Her 

friend was particularly upset about how her recent relationship ended. At some 

point, they decided to take an Uber to plaintiff's house. Although defendant did 

not remember plaintiff's address, she guided the driver in the direction of his 

house where they found his car. Defendant testified that, without any 

prompting, her friend said "let's get out of the car and let's throw some eggs at 

his car." Defendant testified she believed her friend "had a lot anger due to her 

[former] boyfriend." 

At this point, the judge asked defendant: 
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THE COURT: Okay, so you want to put it all on her? 

DEFENDANT: Most of it is on her.

. . . .

THE COURT: All right, I've heard enough. 

Based on this testimonial record, the judge made the following findings:

Defendant would like the [c]ourt to believe that she had 

nothing to do with it other than finding the home, and 

the other person got out of the car and egged the car and 

scratched the car, et cetera.

Well it doesn't work that way, young lady. You would 

have never got there but for you telling where the 

address is. Whether it was you or a person who was 

doing it on their behalf this is would have never -- no -

- un un this is not time for an exchange. You should 

have never been there. And the other person, according 

to you, doesn't even know the plaintiff.

So, this is all your fault, you should have never went 

there, despite of what he may or may not have said to 

you, this is ridiculous. You two drink, you get upset, 

you start talking about exes and you decide well let's go 

take out a little revenge. Whether she threw the egg, 

you threw the egg, it doesn't matter, you caused all of 

this go into motion.

And then I'm reading the text messages, and quite 

frankly the text messages . . . you inculpate yourself by 

saying oh I'll pay for it, et cetera. This is all because 

you did something silly.

The [c]ourt finds that the predicated act of criminal 

mischief has been established based on the testimony 
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of the plaintiff -- strike that -- of the defendant as well 

as the text messages which shows that she inculpated 

herself by suggesting she was there. But what the 

[c]ourt is concerned about is she doesn't take 

responsibility; she wants to blame the girlfriend as 

opposed to blaming herself. 

[(emphases added).]

Our scope of review of a Family Part judge's findings of fact in a bench 

trial is a narrow one. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). When we 

review an FRO issued by the Family Part in a domestic violence matter, we are 

bound to defer to the trial judge's findings of fact and the legal conclusions that 

are supported by competent evidence. D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 

(App. Div. 2013). Stated differently, we will not "'engage in an independent 

assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court of first instance.'" Div. of 

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 433 (App. Div. 2002) 

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). 

However, we are also compelled to reverse a trial court's decision when our 

review reveals an absence of competent evidence to support the factual findings, 

or a misunderstanding or misapplication of the relevant legal principles. 

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

In his PDVA complaint, plaintiff claimed defendant committed two 

specific predicate acts of domestic violence: harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and 
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criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3. The judge did not address the harassment 

charge in his findings and issued the FRO based only on testimonial evidence 

related to the predicate act of criminal mischief. Our scope of review will 

therefore be limited accordingly. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3 defines this offense as 

follows:

A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he [or she]:

(1) Purposely or knowingly damages tangible property 

of another or damages tangible property of another 

recklessly or negligently in the employment of fire, 

explosives or other dangerous means listed in 

subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2; or

(2) Purposely, knowingly or recklessly tampers with 

tangible property of another so as to endanger person or 

property, including the damaging or destroying of a 

rental premises by a tenant in retaliation for institution 

of eviction proceedings.

The record shows the Family Part judge found defendant committed the 

predicate act of criminal mischief based on her friend's act of throwing eggs at 

plaintiff's car. In the judge's own words: "Whether she threw the egg, you threw 

the egg, it doesn't matter, you caused all of this go into motion." (emphasis 

added). The judge's decision to hold defendant culpable of committing the 

predicate act of criminal mischief based only on her decision to drive by 
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plaintiff's residence and thereafter witness her friend throw eggs at plaintiff's car 

is incorrect as a matter of law.

It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a person's "mere 

presence" at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish culpability. The 

Model Jury Charge approved by the Supreme Court on accomplice liability 

under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 provides, in relevant part:

Mere presence at or near the scene does not make one a 

participant in the crime, nor does the failure of a 

spectator to interfere make him/her a participant in the 

crime. It is, however, a circumstance to be considered 

with the other evidence in determining whether he/she 

was present as an accomplice. Presence is not in itself 

conclusive evidence of that fact. Whether presence has 

any probative value depends upon the total 

circumstances. To constitute guilt there must exist a 

community of purpose and actual participation in the 

crime committed.

While mere presence at the scene of the perpetration of 

a crime does not render a person a participant in it, 

proof that one is present at the scene of the commission 

of the crime, without disapproving or opposing it, is 

evidence from which, in connection with other 

circumstances, it is possible for the jury to infer that 

he/she assented thereto, lent to it his/her countenance 

and approval and was thereby aiding the same. It 

depends upon the totality of the circumstances as those 

circumstances appear from the evidence.

2

2 State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 590-91 (2017).
11 A-0216-19

[Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Liability for 

Another's Conduct" (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6) (rev. July 7, 

2021) (emphases added).]

Here, the judge did not consider the totality of the circumstances to hold 

defendant legally liable for the conduct of her friend. Defendant testified the 

person who actually threw the eggs at plaintiff's car was motivated by the anger 

she felt against her former boyfriend, not by anything connected to plaintiff. 

Despite this evidence, the judge nevertheless found defendant culpable based 

only "on the text messages which shows that she inculpated herself by 

suggesting she was there." Although further inferences could potentially be 

drawn from the parties' testimony and the circumstances surrounding the 

incident, the judge did not place these potential findings on the record and our 

review is thus limited accordingly. In this light, even under the preponderance 

of the evidence standard applicable in this civil proceeding, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(a), defendant's mere presence at the scene, without more connecting her to 

the alleged criminal mischief, is legally insufficient to find her liable for her 

companion's actions. Randolph, 228 N.J. at 591-92. 

Independent of this error, the record also shows plaintiff did not present 

sufficient evidence to prove defendant committed the predicate offense of 
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criminal mischief as a matter of law. In determining whether plaintiff presented 

sufficient evidence to satisfy this burden of proof, 

[t]he court shall consider but not be limited to the 

following factors:

(1) The previous history of domestic violence between 

the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, 

harassment and physical abuse;

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or 

property;

(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and 

defendant;

(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the 

protection of the victim’s safety; and

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection 

from another jurisdiction. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) (emphasis added).]

The judge's findings and conclusion that defendant committed the 

predicate act of criminal mischief did not consider the relevant statutory factors 

codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). Although factors (4), (5), and (6) are 

obviously not relevant here, factors (1), (2), and (3) clearly are. The Model 

Criminal Jury Charge approved by the Supreme Court with respect to the offense 

of criminal mischief defines "damage to tangible property" to mean "to cause a 
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loss, injury or deterioration that reduces the value or usefulness of something." 

Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Criminal Mischief – Purposeful or Knowing 

Damage to Tangible Property N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a(1)" (rev. May 16, 2005).

In this case, plaintiff did not present any evidence that the value of his car 

was reduced or its usefulness diminished in any way by being hit with eggs. The 

judge's failure to make specific findings related to these mandatory factors 

renders the issuance of the FRO unsustainable as a matter of law. 

Furthermore, in Silver v. Silver, this court adopted a two-prong analytical 

paradigm to determine whether the issuance of an FRO is warranted. As our 

colleague, Judge Robert Fall, explained: 

We view the task of a judge considering a domestic 

violence complaint, where the jurisdictional 

requirements have otherwise been met, to be two-fold.

First, the judge must determine whether the plaintiff 

has proven, by a preponderance of the credible 

evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth 

in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19a has occurred.

. . . .

The second inquiry, upon a finding of the commission 

of a predicate act of domestic violence, is whether the 

court should enter a restraining order that provides 

protection for the victim.

[Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-26.]
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The absence of this critically important analysis also renders the issuance of an 

FRO a nullity.

Finally, we cannot conclude our analysis without addressing the way the 

judge conducted this FRO hearing. Our Supreme Court has made clear that 

"'[t]rial judges are given wide discretion in exercising control over their 

courtrooms' and have 'the ultimate responsibility of conducting adjudicative 

proceedings in a manner that complies with required formality in the taking of 

evidence and the rendering of findings.'" N.J. Div. of Child. Prot. & Permanency 

v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 366 (2017), (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. 

J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 264 (App. Div. 2002)). Here, the record shows the 

judge conducted this hearing in complete disregard of the rules of evidence and 

in violation of basic principles of courtroom management. 

The judge's decision to read into the record the parties' electronic 

messages, taken directly from plaintiff's cell phone, ignored a trial judge's 

responsibility "to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 

interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence . . . ." N.J.R.E. 611(a); see also

R. 1:2-3. This ad hoc, disorganized manner employed by the judge throughout 

these proceedings made it extremely difficult, if not nearly impossible, for this 

court to assess the probative value of this electronic conversation. 
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"Fundamentally, due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 

time and in a meaningful manner." Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995).

The protection of victims of domestic violence is of paramount 

importance. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. However, we are also committed to ensuring

the serious legal ramifications3flowing from being found guilty of committing 

a domestic violence offense are supported by competent evidence presented in 

a proceeding adhering to all the substantive and procedural due process 

protections associated with a fair trial. D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. at 606. 

Distilled to their essence, the allegations plaintiff made against defendant do not 

rise to the level of a domestic violence act. See Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. 

Super. 243, 250 (App. Div. 1995). The absence of competent evidence coupled 

with the Family Part's failure to adhere to rudimentary principles of court 

management and decorum compelled us to reach this legal conclusion.

The decision of the Family Part is reversed and the Final Restraining 

Order is vacated.

3 See Franklin v. Sloskey, 385 N.J. Super. 534, 541 (App. Div. 2006).