Filed 2/4/16 P. v. Taylor CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FARMONTAE TAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B265211

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA244373)

APPEAL from an order from the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, 

Craig Veals, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of David R. Greifinger, David R. Greifinger, under appointment by 

the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant was convicted in 1990 and 1996 of second-degree robbery (Pen. 

Code, § 2111). In 2003 he was again convicted of second-degree robbery (the underlying 

case) and sentenced to 25 years to life as a third-strike offender. In April 2015, defendant

filed an application for resentencing under Proposition 47 (section 1170.18).

2

The trial 

court denied the application, stating “[defendant’s] underlying convictions were for 

[section] 211, and he therefore is not eligible for the relief he seeks.” Defendant filed his 

notice of appeal. 

On appeal, appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief in accordance 

with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) requesting this court conduct an 

independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable appellate issues. 

On October 30, 2015, we gave notice to defendant that his counsel had filed a Wende

brief and defendant had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief. Defendant 

filed a letter brief in which he appears to contend there were errors in the proceedings 

underlying the 2003 judgment and the judgments in other prior cases, and his appellate 

counsel in this appeal provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 

advance those contentions. 

Defendant did not appeal the underlying judgment or the judgments in his prior 

cases. Acting on his own behalf, he filed an unambiguous notice of appeal, referencing 

the underlying trial court case number here, appealing “the erroneous denial of [his] 

[P]roposition 47 motion [made] to the court.” “Our jurisdiction is ‘limited in scope to the 

notice of appeal and the judgment appealed from. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ellis v. Ellis

(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 846; Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. 

Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 46.) In addition, even had defendant appealed those 

judgments, the appeal would have been untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104; 

Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666-667.) We therefore 

do not address defendant’s contentions of error. 

 

1 All statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

2

Section 1170.18 “was enacted as part of Proposition 47.” (People v. Rivera (2015)

233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) 
3

In addition to reviewing the matters raised in defendant’s letter brief, we have 

made an independent examination of the entire record to determine if there are any other 

arguable issues on appeal. Based on that review, we have determined there are no other 

arguable issues. We are therefore satisfied that defendant’s counsel has fully complied 

with his responsibilities under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

KUMAR, J.

We concur:

KRIEGLER, Acting P. J.

BAKER, J.

 



Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.