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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Integrating Joint Operations

Beyond the FSCL

Is Current Doctrine Adequate?

DEWAYNE P. HALL

Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 12

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

November 1997
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

This detailed study examines the doctrinal issues c

cerning combat operations in that portion of the ba

space beyond the fire support coordination line (FSC

The author, Lt Col Dewayne P. Hall, US Army, make

strong case that lessons learned from Operation Des

Storm (ODS) illustrate a lack of consensus on who is 

sponsible for the integrated employment of combat pow

beyond the FSCL. This lack of consensus divides rat

than integrates US combat operations.

The study does an excellent job of defining the proble

It includes a comprehensive and useful summary of p

sent terminology and doctrinal differences between 

services. It then provides an assessment of the basic gui

lines, terminology, and control measures, and offers 

tailed doctrinal, definitional, and organization recomm

dations to resolve the problems.

The author makes an argument that placing the FSCL 

the political border prior to the allied ground offensive 

ODS was detrimental to the overall effort because it 

peded deep operations. His supporting evidence is sta

ments by ground commanders that they were preven

from preparing the battlefield. Nevertheless, in view of 

outcome, one could argue that the battlefield was well p

pared, and that what was missing was a dialog betwe

the operational and tactical levels—there was no struct

to give feedback to tactical commanders concerning 

decisions made at the strategic and operational levels 

garding apportionment, targeting, and so forth. The op

site view of this FSCL placement is illustrated by the ba

of Khafji. When the Iraqis mounted a three-division off

sive into Saudi Arabia, most of their maneuver took pl

beyond the FSCL; the Joint Forces Air Component Co

mander (JFACC) was able to integrate and control su

cient combat power to destroy or disable the bulk of t

threat prior to engagement against coalition ground forc

To add a different perspective to the author’s thesis, 

airman would state that the fundamental challenge in so

ing these problems is recognizing the differences betw

the corps commander’s tactical view of the battle spa

iii
and the operational/strategic view shared by the Jo

Force Commander (JFC) and functional components w

theater-wide responsibilities, such as the JFACC. T

FSCL is a tactical fire support coordination measure t

has unintended consequences at the operational level. 

example, in the ground offensive phase of ODS, the 

support coordination line was so deep that the JFACC w

prevented from concentrating forces against the retreat

republican guards, allowing their escape.

As a final consideration, this paper does not articul

the principal reasons airmen believe that the FSCL i

restrictive fire support coordination measure. First is un

of effort. If the area beyond the FSCL is a free-fire zone, 

JFC would have no mechanism to prevent a tactical co

mander from trying to destroy an objective with a mis

or deep helicopter attack after the JFACC had already 

stroyed it. A single commander must have the authority 

integrate these weapons at the operational level. Second 

prevention of fratricide. Just as the ground forces are 

risk inside the FSCL, so must the air commander be 

sponsible for deconfliction when aircrews are at risk 

yond it.

Whether viewed from an Army perspective or an 

Force perspective, we are pleased to publish this study a

contribution to understanding how the services view 

challenge of integrating the battlefield more effectively.

TIMOTHY A. KINN

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Dewayne P. Hall, US Army, is an artillery offi

with previous assignments as a fire support observer a

controller, operations officer, and commander. He h

worked closely as a battlefield coordinator of issues 

tween Army and Air Force elements in the field. Colo

Hall is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1997.

v

Preface

I decided to research the issue of joint operations in 

“deep battle area” to get a better grasp on causes of num

ous issues between the Army and Air Force regarding w

is in charge of that part of the battlefield. In a former job 

an observer-controller at brigade through corps levels, I 

perienced this same issue between Army commande

Now, as a student at a senior service college, I find 

issue exists at the joint level.

The issue of integrating the battlefield to allow multi

services (joint) to attack targets in the same vicinity h

existed since aircraft were first used in a combat role 

support ground troops. However, until after the Vietn

conflict, reliance on nuclear weapons and limited techn

ogy provided natural separations and, at the same tim

mutual support and integration. Ground forces conc

trated close in because of limited acquisition and atta

capabilities. The Air Force concentrated farther out 

cause of a lack of precision-attack capabilities to serv

individual high-payoff targets close in. Electronic att

methods (electronic warfare, jamming, and so on) were l

ited. These factors contributed to Air Force reliance on 

Army for suppression of enemy air defenses as it tra-ver

into enemy territory to attack deep targets.

The Army relied on the Air Force for battlefield air int

diction and close air support because of limited range 

artillery systems and survivable attack helicopters.

The shift in support and integration of relationships 

tween the services is the result of three occurrences: 

changes in roles and missions dictated by the demise 

the Soviet Union; (2) increases in acquisition and atta

capabilities within the services brought on by a pursui

technology to defeat the Soviet threat; and (3) the result

overlaps in capabilities between the services created 

this technology.

First, since the demise of the Soviet Union, the Uni

States has no credible conventional threat. As a resu

services face reductions in force structure and shrink

budgets. The result is competition for legitimacy, dolla

and relevancy. This type of competition causes paroch

vii
thinking and pursuit of additional roles and missions 

justify requests for additional funds and to support clai

of relevancy in future operations.

Second, as a result of deep battle studies back in 

early seventies, all military services focused on defeat

“echelon” tactics employed by the Soviet Union. Technol

yielded extended-range and more lethal attack syste

such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System, Army Tacti

Missile System, and Apache attack helicopters, accord

to the 1995 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-7, Decis

Force: The Army in Theater Operations. Longer-ranging, 

curate, real-time acquisition assets (Quick-Fix; OH-5

joint surveillance; target attack systems; unmanned ae

vehicles; and so on) were also fielded. At the same time, 

Air Force developed and fielded very sophisticated pre

sion-guided munitions such as the RAPTOR (AGM-142), 

air-to-surface, precision-guided, standoff missile; joint 

rect attack munitions; and the conventional air-launch

cruise missiles. These new munitions are deliverable w

pinpoint accuracy any place on the battlefield without s

nificant fratricide risks.

Finally, the first two occurrences resulted in overl

and redundancies in traditional roles and capabilities 

the two services. Whereas the Army once concentrated 

to 50 kilometers (km) forward of the forward line of o

troops or forward edge of battle area, it now has the ca

bility to acquire and engage targets out to beyond 150 k

The Air Force can safely engage targets within hundreds 

meters of friendlies without significant risks of fratrici

Gen Michael Dugan stated in his article “Inside the 

War,” published in the 11 February 1991 issue of U

News & World Report, that through improved precision, 

operation that required thousands of bombs and aircraf

World War II can now be done with the same probability 

success—and far less risk to aircraft or civilians—with 

single aircraft. The result— both services can fight ess

tially anywhere on the battlefield.

These peacetime occurrences manifest themselves 

training and on the battlefield. The overlaps and redu

dancies occur primarily in the deep battle area—an 

defined area at the far limits of tactical level operations a

viii
the close limits of operational level operations. This is 

area where the FSCL is normally drawn—the line at 

center of the service controversy. The issue is the integ

tion of assets beyond the FSCL. This study does not exa

ine who should be the integrator in the deep battle a

beyond the FSCL; instead, it examines whether the ba

guidelines are in place to effect integration.

Doctrine is the basis for resolving these types of issu

The fact that these issues exist, and have gone unresolv

points to flaws in doctrine. The purpose of this study is 

determine if there are flaws in doctrine, and if so, w

they are, and whether they have an operational impact 

battlefield integration. The working hypothesis of the stu

is that joint doctrine does not provide the necessary dir

tives in clear terminology and graphic control measures 

effect integrated combat operations in the deep battle ar

In my opinion, current doctrine for joint operations in 

deep battle area is ambiguous, creating an environm

where services develop individual doctrines that are n

ther mutually supporting nor focused toward common 

jectives.

ix
Integrating Joint Operations

Beyond the FSCL

Is Current Doctrine Adequate?

Control of joint assets employed beyond the fire support coor -

dination line, regardless of boundaries, is the responsibility of

the joint force air component commander.

—US Air Force Position

Control of assets (fires) within the boundaries of the ground

maneuver commander is the responsibility of that ground ma -

neuver commander.

—US Army Position

The age-old “turf battle” between the US Air Force and 

US Army is alive and well. The two service positions abo

taken from “Army–Air Force Operational Issues,”1

 are but 

tip of the iceberg. There are numerous diverging views 

tween the services on battlefield integration (in some cas

battlefield separation) at the operational level. One of 

most prevalent points of contention is the disagreement o

who controls fires, targeting, and interdiction beyond the 

support coordination line (FSCL), the area where operatio

and tactical level operations overlap (fig.1).

A contributing factor is that this area has no univers

accepted official name or function. Army references descr

this area as the deep battle area. When a ground comman

implements an FSCL, he or she is freeing up a portion of 

deep battle area for engaging targets of opportunity by s

porting organizations, to include the Air Force, but not re

quishing control of that part of the battlespace.

Air Force references describe the area beyond the FS

simply as an area where interdiction occurs. Current d

trine states that the Air Force is responsible, overall, 

interdiction. Joint doctrinal manuals do not specifically 

dress the area beyond the FSCL. However, references 

reflect that a ground commander is responsible for ope

tions inside his or her boundary or area of responsibility

ground commander’s area of responsibility extends beyo

the FSCL. Joint doctrine also states that geograp

boundaries should not be applied to interdiction. If 

1
joint force air component commander (JFACC) is respon

ble for interdiction theaterwide, and the joint force la

component commander is responsible in his or her ar

which includes the FSCL, then who really is responsible 

operations beyond this line?

The failure to answer this question has had negat

effects during combat operations. It contributed to mis

opportunities to further demilitarize the Iraqi army dur

the latter part of Operation Desert Storm (ODS). The Ar

and Air Force reverted to physically dividing the battlefi

rather than integrating it. Iraqi forces escaped to Baghd

as the two services sought answers.

The problem, service rivalry over control of a particu

part of the battlefield (beyond the FSCL), has gone un

solved since at least 1989. According to current joint d

trine, both services are right and both are wrong in th

positions. There are no clear, accepted directives regard

terminology and graphics in current joint doctrine that 

solve the differences.

Figure 1. Linear Battlefield
The author believes that the correct approach to a so

tion of the problem of who controls fires, targeting, a

interdiction beyond the FSCL would be for the chairman 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the services to define 

FSCL and to agree on specific rules and control measu

to preclude individual service interpretations and appli

tions. Until such action is taken and taught in the serv

schools, there can be no solution to the problem. Imp

mentation of this recommendation would give the co

manders in chief (CINC) a good starting point for tak

service-coordinated actions toward common objecti

without having to suffer the consequences of conflict

interpretations, confusion, inability to take prompt acti

and finger pointing, as is the case now.

Doctrinal Assessment

The USAF views the area beyond the FSCL as their area of

responsibility. It is extremely difficult to coordinate ATACMS

and Apache attacks beyond the FSCL within the Corps’s area

of responsibility.

—G3, VII Corps

At least fifty to sixty percent of the Republican Guard Divisions

escaped with their equipment due to this joint warfighting

problem. . . .

—U.S. News & World Report

These two problems resulted from the services’ divid

the battlefield. Are there doctrinal implications in th

scenarios? If so, is this the result of faulty doctrine, n

compliance with established doctrine, or misinterpre

tions of established doctrine?

Overview

Doctrine is the foundation of military operations. It 

tablishes the guidelines and principles under which 

military trains, equips, organizes, deploys, and fights. T

principles for joint operations are found in Joint Publi

tion (Joint Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Milit

departments use this as a guide for everything from prof

sional military education to designing tanks and aircr
Commanders in chief use this basic doctrine to organ

their forces and assign missions. The spirit of this doctr

finds its way down to the lowest ranking soldier on 

battlefield as he presses the fire switch on his Army Ta

cal Missile System (ATACMS) to engage an enemy SC

position. In this way, joint doctrine stretches from the P

tagon to the front line of troops.

Doctrine Defined

Military Doctrine — fundamental principles that guid

the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative. I

provides the instilled insights and wisdom gained from

our collective experience with warfare. Doctrine facili 

tates clear thinking and assists a commander in deter 

mining the proper course of action under the circum

stances prevailing at the time of the decision. Though

neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the

fundamental issue of how best to employ the nationa

military power to achieve strategic ends.2

Joint Doctrine — fundamental principles that guid

the employment of forces of two or more Services in

coordinated action toward a common objective. . . . 3

To be totally effective, joint doctrine should be flexi

enough to allow the combatant commander to use it a

guide to fit his particular situation. Yet it must be descr

tive and directive enough to require service components 

function in a unified and synchronized manner. Doctr

must have a clear language (terminology and graphics) a

must be precise in its principles. Above all, it must 

understood and accepted by those who must execute it.

Doctrinal References

Doctrine for joint operations that addresses the issue s

cifically is contained in several joint publications. Joint P

3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, is the basic doctrine for 

conduct of joint operations. It is supplemented by Joint P

3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, wh

focuses on the air portion. Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for J

Interdiction Operations, goes one step farther and deals s
cifically with interdiction operations at the joint and ope

tional level. This publication is further supplemented 

Joint Pub 3-03.1, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction of Follow

Forces, which addresses interdiction operations for the “s

ond echelon” forces. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint F

Support,” is not yet published. This document has been 

draft form since at least 1989, partially due to controver

issues contained in it regarding the FSCL. Joint Pub 1-

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associa

Terms, provides common definitions relating to the issue. 

of these documents, directly or indirectly, address the is

surrounding the FSCL, deep operations, and interdiction.

Deep Battle Doctrine

Operations beyond the forward line of own troo

(FLOT), often referred to as the “deep battle or deep ope

tions area,” require the synchronized and integrated effo

of all services and all available assets. Ground comma

ers traditionally use this area to set the conditions for 

close battle. Air commanders traditionally use this area 

strategic attack, offensive counter air, and air interdict

operations. From a joint perspective, this is where tact

end and strategic operations become the focus. From 

operational perspective, deep operations for ground and 

are referred to as joint and interdiction operations, and 

contained in the fundamental principles of operational a

Three of the applicable fundamental elements of ope

tional art are synergy, simultaneity, and depth.

While the close battle is waged near the FLOT or 

forward edges of the battle area, joint and combined ass

interdict enemy forces, in depth, out to the limits of th

weapon systems. Strategic and joint assets also strike 

the enemy’s center of gravity and war-making abilit

This concept provides a synergistic effect on the enemy a

prevents his follow-on forces from massing with a well-

ordinated effort. The synergy achieved by synchroniz

the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operatio

forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions 

ables joint force commanders (JFC) to project focused 

pabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to 

enemy to exploit.4
The fact that multiple services participate simulta

ously in this “deep battle” dictates that joint doctrine m

clearly delineate roles and responsibilities. Control me

ures must be focused to facilitate rather than elimin

joint and combined operations. The doctrine or tact

techniques, and procedures (TTP) must be simple and 

corporated in all peacetime training and exercises to 

sure all service personnel are well versed on the ope

tional parameters. This process will reduce the risk 

fratricide, exploit overlaps in capabilities, eliminate redu

dant engagements, and enhance joint cooperation and 

erations. A comprehensive joint doctrine will also facilit

simultaneity and depth—the foundations of deep ope

tions. Again, the intent of the concept of simultaneity a

depth is to bring force to bear on the opponent’s ent

structure simultaneously. Furthermore, this action m

occur within the decision-making cycle of the opponent. 

Doctrine Evaluation

Joint doctrine does not provide a battlefield framew

as a guide that delineates the JFC’s area of operation 

deep attack, interdiction, air interdiction, interdiction fir

deep supporting fires, or joint precision interdiction (fu

tions and effects). This is partially attributed to the f

that several of these terms or phrases are effects based 

an intended outcome rather than a specific target a

particular point on the battlefield. Perhaps this is one 

the primary shortcomings. It is difficult to picture how 

numerous operations are synchronized and integrated 

attain the synergistic effects desired. Figure 2 provide

linear battlefield structure or framework containing so

of the operations that may take place simultaneously 

the deep battle area.

A review of the list of terms associated with de

operations indicates proliferation of inconsistent doctri

terminology at the joint level. A detailed examination of 

guidance contained in the list of joint doctrinal manu

and a graphical portrayal (fig. 2) with associated ter

lend credibility to this accusation.

After one analyzes the numerous functions and effects 

sociated with joint operations in the deep battle are a, 

cluding service interpretation and application, one m

conclude that three fallacies in joint doctrine are reve a

(1) doctrinal terms are vague and too numerous; (2) the ov

all concept for interdiction is ill-defined; and (3) graph

control measures are inadequate for separating roles a

integrating functions.

Operation Desert Storm provided numerous examples 

scenarios that highlight these shortcomings in doctri

The following sections are dedicated to assessing the 

pact of these fallacies during ODS.

Doctrinal Terminology

Unlike the Army, the US Marine Corps interprets the FSCL as

authority to fire beyond it, regardless of boundaries, without

coordination. The Air Force interpreted the FSCL as a restric -

tive fire support coordination measure directly opposed to joint

and Army definition.

—Desert Storm Deep Battle Observation

Terminology is the foundation on which doctrine a

procedures are based. Terminology describing an operat

employing airborne maneuver forces, artillery, tactical 

and remotely piloted vehicles must be absolutely conc

and universally understood. Without common und

standing in language, probabilities of mission failure a

fratricide increase. A control and coordination measure t

integrates and synchronizes lethal assets like the ATACM

Apache helicopters, and B-52 bombers, while special ope

tions forces, reconnaissance elements, and civilians may 

within hundreds of meters, must be absolutely understo

and universally applied! Conversely, the FSCL, a meas

used for this purpose, was interpreted differently by air a

ground forces during ODS.

Everyone must use and understand common terms—maneuve

commander, and fire supporter, Army and Air Force, and our allies

The most important and misunderstood term in this war (ODS

seemed to be the FSCL [fire support coordination line]. 6

Fire Support Coordination Line

The FSCL can be traced back to 1961. It replaced the 

bomb safety line; it was defined as a no-fire line betwe
corps and higher echelons and as a bomb line for grou

and air forces.7 Of special note, it separated fires betw

two ground units (corps and higher echelons— field arm

and separated fires (bombs) between ground and a

Ground commanders had few systems to fire or maneu

beyond the FSCL. This allowed the air effort to focus on 

area beyond the FSCL with strategic attack and interd

tion.

The current definition of the FSCL as found in Joint P

1-02 is as follows:

Fire support coordination line—a line established by th

appropriate land or amphibious force commander to ensur

coordination of fires not under the commander’s control but which

may affect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination

line is used to coordinate the fires of air, ground, or sea weapon

systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. Th

fire support coordination line must be coordinated with th

appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements

Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire suppor

coordination line without prior coordination with the land o

amphibious force commander, provided the attack will not produc

adverse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks agains

surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with th

appropriate land or amphibious force commander.8

Over time, roles, responsibilities, and capabilities h

resulted in changes in interpretations of application for 

FSCL. Table 1 provides a synopsis of current service int

pretations of its functions and uses.

The Fire Support Coordination Line

in Operation Desert Storm

The initial FSCL for ODS was established along 

Saudi berm, which was a defensive measure establish

along the Saudi-Iraqi border. The fact that coalition for

fought an air war that was followed by a ground war c

tributed from the start to the initial FSCL’s being a “restr

tive” measure as opposed to a “permissive” measure. Sin

the Air Force was the primary service involved in com

operations beyond the FSCL, there were no prevailing r

sons for other services to control operations beyond. Pr

lems started and grew from this point.

The establishment of the FSCL on an international boundar

restricted the corps’s ability to shape the battlefield and caused

most of the corps’s fires to occur inside of the FSCL. 9
Table 1

FSCL Interpretations

Jointa Armyb Air Forcec Navyd Marinee

Establishing

Authority

Appropriate

Land or

Amphibious

Commander—

after Coordination with

Supporting &

TAC Air

Commander

ARFOR

Commander

Not Stated Ground

Component

Commander

Ground

Compone

Comman

Purpose Ensure

Coordination

of Fires Not

under

Control of

Establishing

Authority

That May

Affect TAC

Opns

Allow

ARFOR,

Subordinate,

Supporting

(i.e., Air

Force) Units

to Swiftly

Attack

Targets of

Opportunity

Define the

Limits of

Interdiction

Facilitate Atk

of Targets

Beyond;

Endure

Safety from

Air Atk; Max

Weapon

Capabilities;

Ensure

Aviators

Understand

Battlefield

Geometry

Ensure

Control o

Air-Groun

Ops by

Ground;

Ensure

Aviators

Understa

Battlefield

Geometr

Coordination

Req.’s to

Fire Beyond

Supporting

Elements

May Attack

Beyond w/o

Prior Coordination If No

Negative

Effects

Supporting

Units Must

Coord. with

All Affected

Cdrs to Avoid

Fratricide (Air

Force)

Command

Authority

for

Interdiction

None for

Supporting

Elements

Should

None

Application Land, Air, Sea

Weapons

with Any Type

Munitions

Not Stated Not Stated Land, Air,

Sea with Any

Munitions

All Weap

Systems

Munitions

Implications

on Other

Operations

Interdiction

Not Bounded

Interdiction

Occurs Short

and Beyond—

Planned

Interdiction on

Either Side

Required No

Coordination

—Targets of

Opportunity

Should Be

Coordinated

Interdiction

Occurs

Beyond

Not Stated Not State

Sources:

a

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, 2

b

Field Manual (FM) 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, May 1995, 7-4.

cDCS/Plans and Programs, Headquarters USAF, JFACC Primer, 2d ed., February 1994, 33.

dMaj David H. Zook, The Fire Support Coordination Line: Is It Time to Reconsider Our Doctrine

Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992, 55.

e

Zook, 53.
The continuing confusion at CENTCOM [Central Command] leve

over the moving of FSCLs and their use by four different corp

finally led to the implementation of a CENTCOM FSCL by Genera

Horner, the JFACC. . . . 10

The definition of the FSCL as contained in joint doctr

contributes to improper uses of this type. There are th

problems with the definition that foster these problems. Fi

the definition does not clearly specify who may establish 

FSCL—the term appropriate land or amphibious force c

mander is too ambiguous. During ODS, the FSCL was est

lished by corps and higher level commanders. Additiona

the rapid movement of corps elements caused numer

changes to the corps FSCL.11 This caused problems for 

involved because when individual corps commanders chan

their FSCL, that action caused the United States Ar

Forces Central Command (ARCENT) consolidated FSCL 

change too frequently. These changes made it difficult for 

Air Force to keep its aircrews briefed on the current FS

Conversely, when ARCENT moved the FSCL, it did not fit 

needs of the corps commanders. To facilitate stabilizati

CENTCOM finally established an FSCL; however, the FS

was established two levels above the intended corps level.

Traditionally, the FSCL is established by the lower co

mander (corps) to allow him or her to shape the battlefi

based on his or her estimate of the situation, disposition 

forces, and asset capabilities. Corps FSCLs are then c

solidated at the next higher level into an Army-level FS

The frequent movement is offset by establishing a series 

on-order FSCLs disseminated ahead of time and imp

mented as needed. The rapid and unparalleled advance 

coalition ground forces negated this practice.

Despite the events in Operation Desert Storm, joint d

trine should establish a standard that everyone is expec

to meet. Additional guidelines can be covered in thea

standard operating procedures or operations orders a

the theater is established. The current standard stating 

“appropriate commander establishes the FSCL” lea

room for all to apply their individual interpretations, wh

is what occurred during ODS.

Additionally, the definition of FSCL says that “suppo

ing elements may attack targets forward of the fire supp

coordination line without prior coordination.”
The Air Force viewed the FSCL as a restrictive fire control measur

that required the Army to coordinate all surface-to-surface fire

beyond the FSCL with the Air Force. 12

Joint Pub 3-0, paragraph e, states, “The JFACC is 

supported commander (emphasis added) for the JFC’s ov

all air interdiction effort.”13 Paragraph f states, “Land a

naval force commanders responsible for synchroniz

maneuver and interdiction within their AOs [area of 

eration] should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities” (e

phasis in original).14

Does the second statement imply that land and na

force commanders are also supported commanders for 

JFC’s air interdiction effort? This question has not be

answered.

The Air Force uses the FSCL as the separating line 

interdiction. The FSCL is drawn within the operatio

commander’s AO (fig.2). Who is really the supported co

mander between the FSCL and the forward boundary 

the land component commander’s AO? Are the desired 

fects interdiction or deep battle?

Again, the FSCL is a very important but controversial co

dination measure. The level of controversy between the se

ices surrounding its use and meaning dictates joint reso

tion. This is not an issue to be left to interpretation.

The lack of common understood joint fire support doctrine and th

parochial interpretation of fire support coordination measure

caused significant problems in fire support coordination

particularly at EAC [echelons above corps]. Unlike the Army, the US

Marine Corps interprets the FSCL as authority to fire beyond th

FSCL, regardless of boundaries, without coordination; the Air Forc

interprets the FSCL as a restrictive fire support coordination

measure, directly opposed to the joint and Army definition. 15

There are additional points to be considered for a co

plete understanding of the FSCL. First, it is not a boun

ary and therefore should not be interpreted as a means 

assigning responsibility. Second, there is no requirem

to establish an FSCL. It is an optional fire support coor

nation measure established only after considering the f

tors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops a

support available, time available (METT-T), and system 

pabilities. Again, as an optional measure, it is not b

suited to delineate responsibilities. Third, it is first a ta

cal measure that may be established by individual co
commanders. It can, however, be established or cons

dated by the Army forces operational level commander 

an operational level measure. Finally, the FSCL is a p

missive measure, intended to allow relative freedom of 

gagement beyond. This is the exact opposite of a bounda

which means restrictive engagement beyond. Both Ar

and Air Force interpretations portray it more as a rest

tive measure. Again, joint resolution is needed.

Deep Operations (Battle) Terminology

When XVIII Airborne Corps began deep-battle operations, it becam

apparent there’s a great disconnect between the Air Force and Arm

concerning the use of Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) an

application of the FSCL. The Army doctrinally uses BAI to allow th

corps commander to shape the battlefield. . . . The Air Force prefer

air interdiction (AI) because it allows them greater flexibility. . . . 16

Deep (Battle) Operations. The area beyond the FS

has no universally accepted name. Figure 2 provides ter

associated with operations that occur in this area with in

cations of where they may appear in relation to the FSCL

the absence of an official title, the area is labeled according 

the functions performed.

The Army labels this area “deep operations.” 17 The te

deep battle is used throughout this study along with so

Army references to limit the scope to physical combat. Ar

deep operations focus on the enemy’s command and cont

logistics, and firepower. Deep operations occur within 

ground commander’s AO, but is more a function than 

effect. Like interdiction, deep operations focus on uncomm

ted enemy forces. Deep operations are conducted in c

junction with close operations for a synergistic effect.

The Army further defines deep operations by target se

For example, in the defense, the corps’s initial deep ope

tion will normally focus on the combined arms Army un

and support systems to the rear of the main defens

belt.18 This technique assists the corps in isolating the c

rent close battle and fighting the enemy in depth.

In general, Air Force references refer to functions or effe

as opposed to a particular target set or place on the bat

field—close support, interdiction, and strategic attack. H

ever, two references, JFACC Primer and Air Force Man

(AFM) 2-1, Aerospace Operational Doctrine, refer to interd
tion occurring beyond the FSCL (a particular place). In 

Force doctrine, interdiction disrupts, delays, or destroys 

enemy’s military potential before it can be used agai

friendly forces.19 The area beyond the FSCL then is simpl

place where the Air Force conducts interdiction, strate

attack, counterair, and so on—it’s where the JFACC operate 

Joint doctrinal manuals used in this study do not defin

deep battle or operation area. There is also no reference 

the FSCL’s use as a boundary or delineation line for interd

tion. Joint doctrine refers to two areas that do encompass 

FSCL (the deep battle area), but on a much larger sc

These two geographical areas are the area of responsib

and area of operation.

20 Note that both are general, referr

to the overall battlefield rather than any particular part.

Area of Responsibility (AOR) — the geographical area

associated with a combatant command within which

a combatant commander has authority to plan and

conduct operations.

Area of Operation (AO) — an operational area defined

by the joint force commander for land and nava

forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire op 

erational area of the joint force commander bu

should be large enough for component commanders

to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

Interdiction. Joint Pub 3-03 states, “Great disconn

between the Air Force and Army concerning the use of B

and the application of the FSCL. . . . The terms BAI and 

[air interdiction] need clarification. . . .” 21

The only common term or function that encompas

the activities around the FSCL is interdiction. This is 

cause of the broad scope of interdiction and the fact tha

is a function, aimed at effects. As a function, interdict

has specific objectives.

Interdiction aims to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy surfac

military potential before it can be used effectively against friendl

forces.22

The JFC should not apply strict geographic boundar

to interdiction but should plan for its theaterwide appli

tion, coordinating across boundaries or between sub

ments, to take full advantage of the effect of interdiction 
the operational level.23 When applied at the tactical or 

erational levels near the FSCL, interdiction is provided 

any service, with any weapon system. It is directed agai

follow-on forces; air defenses; supplies; command, cont

and communications; and other targets that are not 

ready affecting friendly operations. The flexibility includ

in the interdiction concept also fosters varying interpre

tions on its application (table 2).

As revealed in table 2, the interdiction concept is int

preted differently. Although the definition is straight

ward, it is all but impossible to universally apply wh

there are so many varying interpretations. Because of 

universal application in all parts of the battlespace, it w

inevitably cross service roles and responsibility lines, c

ating additional controversy. The FSCL is not a solution 

separating these overlaps because of varying interpretat

of its functions.

The varying interpretations of close air support (C

versus battlefield air interdiction (BAI) versus air interd

tion (AI) also had a negative impact on operations dur

ODS. Initially, the FSCL was along the Saudi-Iraqi bor

Table 2

Interdiction Interpretations

Joint Army Air Force

Purpose

(Why)

Divert, Disrupt, Delay,

or Destroy Enemy

Surface Military

Potential

Destroys Enemy

Forces; Delays and

Disrupts Maneuver;

Diverts Resources

Diverts, Disrupts,

Delays, or Destroys

Enemy Surface Milit

Potential

Application

(Where)

Theaterwide—No

Boundaries

Short of and beyond

FSCL

Beyond FSCL

Control

Authority

(Who)

JFC—Normally

Appoints JFACC for

Overall Interdictionn;

Ground Cdr within His

AO

JFC; Ground

Commander within His

AO

JFACC Theaterwide

and beyond FSCL o

Cdr with Forces at R

beyond FSCL

Focus (What) JFC’s Concept JFC Concept or

Ground Commander’s

Concept when Ground

Ops Is Decisive

Initiative

JFC/JFACC Concep

Timing

(When)

Prior to Effective Use

against Friendly Forces

Prior to Effective Use

against Friendly Forces

Prior to use against

Friendly Forces
(the berm). As a result, all missions, including reconna

sance, required clearance through the Air Force. Since 

Air Force position was that anything beyond the FSCL w

interdiction, and interdiction was the domain of 

JFACC, ground commanders were hampered from sett

the conditions for the attack.

Because the Air Force absolutely would not fly short of the FSCL

before G-Day, we kept the FSCL in close to facilitate air attack o

division and corps high priority targets. This caused two problems

Every fire mission or AH-64 attack beyond the FSCL had to b

carefully and painstakingly cleared with the Air Force. Even

counterfire required this lengthy process. Equally bad, air sortie

beyond the FSCL were completely the domain of the Air Force. VI

Corps could nominate targets beyond the FSCL, but could never b

sure they would be attacked.24

There are more than 10 similar issues raised by ground co

manders on their inability to conduct “deep operations.” T

is partially due to a lack of joint recognition for deep battle 

an operational concept. The area beyond the Saudi-Iraqi b

der (berm) or FSCL, immediately to the ground forc

front—an area into which they would be required to 

tack—was virtually inaccessible for reconnaissance 

preparation. In essence, the area beyond the FSCL was 

area that might be called “No Man’s land, being a part 

Grand Tartary.”25 Operation Desert Storm ended on a not

frustration on the part of both services over this issue.

Graphic Control Measures

The situation prompted the violation of established doctrine an

development of new fire control support measures (Reconnaissanc

Interdiction Planning Line [RIPL]) and Artillery Deconfliction Line

and TTP for fire support at Army level during Operation Deser

Storm [emphasis in original].26

In order to obtain the synergistic effects of joint, sim

taneous, deep operations, control measures must be cl

and concise, universally understood, and capable of ra

dissemination when the situation changes. Commande

both Army and Air Force, found themselves wanting for 

control measures to expedite their operations during O

eration Desert Storm. Basic graphical control measu

were inadequate for integrating, synchronizing, and fac

tating unit or service operations. Measures implemen
during the operation were beneficial for the most part, b

also caused confusion because they were nondoctrinal a

had no universally understood definitions or application

After reviewing joint and service doctrine, one sees t

there are three universally used graphical control measu

associated with deep operations: (1) boundaries; (2) ph

lines; and (3) FSCL. The FSCL was discussed earlier.

Doctrinal Control Measures

Universally accepted and understood control measu

are required to delineate responsibilities for interdicti

Doctrinal control measures include the concepts of bou

ary and phase line, both of which are universally und

stood and, except in the case of interdiction, unconteste

Boundary. The basic boundary has existed since grou

forces. Its use is universally understood and is not c

tested except in the case of interdiction. The official def

tion provides clarity to its use.

Boundary—a line which delineates surface areas fo

the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconflic

tion of operations between adjacent units, formations

or areas.27

Note that by official definition, air is unconstrained 

the boundary. It can therefore be interpreted that interd

tion is not limited or controlled by the boundary.

Phase Line. The phase line, like the boundary, is u

versally used and understood and not contested.

Phase Line—a line utilized for control and coordina

tion of military operations, usually a terrain feature

extending across the zone of action. 28

Note that the phase line has military-wide application 

cording to joint doctrine. Additionally, it may apply across 

entire zone of action for control and coordination. Accord

to its definition, the phase line is more appropriate for div

ing responsibilities than is the FSCL. However, all servi

are reluctant to use it because of its proliferation and use 

a routine ground tactical control measure.

In summary, there are no universally accepted and und

stood control measures appropriate to delineate responsib
ties for interdiction. By definition, the phase line is usab

however, like the boundary, since it is considered a grou

or maneuver control measure. The FSCL is not intend

for that purpose, has too many different meanings, and 

intended as a tactical (rapid change) line as opposed to 

operational one. As stated in the definition, the bound

technically applies only to ground forces; the phase l

applies to all military operations but is not universally 

cepted other than in the ground maneuver community.

Doctrinal Implications

After ODS, a survey revealed that participants (staffs) 

that control measures did ensure cooperation betw

forces.29 One hundred seventy-nine (179) voted “yes”; 

voted “no.” When questioned if they were too restrictive, 

replied “yes”; 109 replied “no.” A follow-up question ask

respondents to “describe any difficulties with control me

ures.” Of the 401 responding, the most prominent issue w

difficulties with the FSCL. The nondoctrinal use of this c

trol measure caused great confusion and concern. Wha

unclear from the survey is whether control measures fac

tated control and cooperation between ground forces, or 

tween the Army and the Air Force. Either way, the sur

supports findings in lessons learned that the FSCL is a u

versally misunderstood measure.

Initiatives and Recommendations

Air and ground commanders must be constantly on the alert to

devise, and use, new methods of co-operation . . . There can

never be too many projectiles in a battle.

—Gen George S. Patton Jr

The issues of who establishes the FSCL, who contr

fires both short of and beyond the FSCL, what separa

the subordinate and higher commander’s deep battles, a

what separates Army and Air Force responsibilities h

been studied in detail for the last 10–20 years. There 

literally hundreds of books and monographs that rev

very innovative solutions. Most solutions fall in the ca
gory of new organizations, increased training, impro

doctrine and TTP, or new systems.

This study finds that several of these solutions are ap

cable and needed. However, needed above all is a set 

guidelines that clearly designate roles and responsibilit

for the services and provide directives on how services w

operate in a joint environment.

Joint Publication 3-09

Joint Pub 3-09 is the joint initiative currently under w

to resolve the deep battle integration issue. The main foc

is the integration of operations that occur between jo

forces under the umbrella of “joint fire support.” Joint 

support may include the lethal effects of close air supp

(by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft), air interdiction 

within component boundaries, naval surface fire supp

artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as n

lethal effects such as electronic warfare. 30

A review of Joint Pub 3-09 reveals that, like most jo

doctrine, it is very general and nondescriptive. This allo

joint TTP, services, and combatant commanders the fle

bility to fill in needed details at the appropriate lev

However, when contrasted specifically with the FSCL iss

several areas are not adequately addressed.

First, the interface and overlaps between joint fire su

port, interdiction, deep operations, and maneuver are 

clearly defined. Vague statements such as “detailed in

gration with the fire and maneuver of the supported fo

may be required” are too ambiguous to be of any practi

value. The term fire support connotes a concept of supp

ing maneuver. This suggests integration with maneu

will be required. These types of phrases foster the sa

type controversy that now clouds the definition and 

quirements for coordinating, implementing, and mov

the FSCL.

Secondly, Europe, Korea, and ARCENT identified a 

quirement for a line other than the FSCL (reconnaissan

interdiction planning line [RIPL], deep battle synchroni

tion line [DBSL]) for use at the theater or operational lev

Specifically, a line is needed as a separator for deep ba

responsibilities, interdiction, and air-ground efforts. T
was a key issue in ARCENT and corps after-action repo

from ODS. Joint Pub 3-09 does not directly address t

military-wide, joint issue.

Finally, this publication has been in draft form for 

least six years. The first indication that the controve

may be coming to an end occurred 4–5 December 1996

the Army–Air Force Warfighter Conference at Fort Bl

Texas. During the conference, the Army and Air Fo

chiefs of staff discussed this very issue. The two serv

chiefs made the following agreements on joint fires, 

support, and Joint Pub 3-09:31

• Deleting the notional graphic depicting joint fires a

related language from Joint Pub 3-09;

• Changing the name of the joint forces fires coordi

tor (JFFC) so it does not connote any command fu

tion and would be an option primarily for joint ta

forces (JTF);

• Defining elements of the fires hierarchy in terms 

“effects” rather than specific platforms;

• Identifying the surface component commander as 

supported commander for joint fires throughout 

area of operations. Beyond the surface compon

commander’s (SCC) boundaries, the air compon

commander (ACC) is the supported commander. 

the deliberate planning process, all targets for jo

fires will be coordinated to the maximum extent pos

ble; and

• Specifying all targets beyond the FSCL and inside 

SCC’s area of operations will be coordinated with 

affected commanders to the maximum extent pos

ble. If not practical because of time, sensitivity, em

gency, or exceptional circumstances, then all affec

commanders will be informed with the comman

executing the mission accepting the operational ris

Although these agreements are a first step, they w

probably not resolve the issues. When examined in det

these agreements simply bring Joint Pub 3-09 in line w

other often contradictory joint publications. Still to be 

solved are (1) Marine Corps views on the FSCL agreemen

(2) the control mechanism for integrating, coordinati
and separating interdiction and deep battle; and (3) 

agency responsible for implementing and updating 

FSCL. These open issues and the five or so years’ delay 

updating other affected publications, regulations, and T

indicate that it may still be some time before a compreh

sive solution is in place.

Recommendations

The results of this study indicate that three actions 

required to resolve the issues surrounding the FSCL a

deep battle operations: (1) publish Joint Pub 3-09, inclu

ing proper control measures for separating roles and 

sponsibilities, while integrating functions and effects; 

update Joint Pub 1-02 to reflect preciseness in definitio

and eliminate proliferation in terminology; and (3) imp

ment the joint force fires coordinator concept to orch

trate the integration of fires and maneuver at the jo

operational level.32

A search of the Center For Army Lessons Learned a

the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System databa

yield more than 55 AAR or lessons-learned comments fr

the field on fire support coordination. Most deal direc

with the FSCL or a related fire support coordination me

ure. The need is apparent. Operation Desert Storm p

vided an opportunity to test the new JFACC concept a

the fire support system. The operation provided the fe

back necessary to correct several deficiencies in our jo

fire support doctrine. These lessons learned should be 

corporated into joint doctrine and published immediatel

Joint Publication 3-09. Prior to publishing Joint P

3-09, three corrections are required. First, the definition 

FSCL needs to be clarified. A recommended definit

reads as follows:

A fire support coordination measure established b

the corps level commander or commander Amphibi 

ous Task Force within their boundaries after consult

ation with superior, subordinate, supporting, tactica

air, and affected commanders. The FSCL is used to

prevent fratricide, deconflict efforts of the close and

deep battle, and coordinate fires of all weapon sys 
tems using any type munitions against surface tar 

gets. Supporting elements, operating within the geo

graphical boundaries of the establishing unit, to in

clude tactical air, may attack targets forward of th

FSCL without prior coordination with the establishing

unit provided the attack will not produce adverse sur 

face or air effects (from ground level up to the coordi

nating altitude) on or to the rear of the line. Attacks

against surface targets behind this line must be coor 

dinated with establishing unit commander. This def

nition and purpose applies to all US military forces .

This definition clarifies several issues identified in O

eration Desert Storm. First, it labels the FSCL as a co

tactical measure so that all will recognize that it applies 

a particular corps’s sector. Additionally, subordinate, s

porting, adjacent, and tactical air units will know exac

with whom coordination is required. Second, it requi

coordination with the tactical air commander prior to 

plementation or change. Third, it eliminates the guessw

of who can attack beyond it and with whom coordination 

required. Fourth, it adds the old coordinating altitude ba

to protect aircraft either supporting the corps or transit

the corps sector to attack deep. It requires the air a

artillery to coordinate if they are going to transit the othe

attack space. Finally, it removes the ambiguity of appli

tion—it applies to the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine

The second correction to Joint Pub 3-09 is that it m

add additional fire support coordination measures that 

applicable at the operational level. This can be a RI

DBSL, or, as proposed by the Institute for Defense, a jo

fire support coordination line.33 The name of the meas

is not important. What is important is that some type 

measure entrenched in doctrine be added to joint and se

ice curriculums, doctrines, and TTPs. Additionally, this w

eliminate the theater-specific operational mea-sures t

were “implemented on the fly” during ODS.

The third correction is for Joint Pub 3-09 to clearly 

dress the distinction between joint fire support and int

diction. The two concepts are used interchangeably as 

air interdiction and interdiction. This is part of the curr

problem with fires, deep battle, and interdiction. Additi
ally, the JFACC’s role requires clear articulation to ens

cooperation and integration beginning at the plann

process.

Joint Pub 1-02. Joint Pub 1-02 is the bible for jo

doctrinal terminology. Yet this document does not def

newer concepts such as joint fire support and joint pre

sion interdiction. Additionally, there are concepts used 

the tactical levels (BAI, deep battle) that are joint ope

tions and warrant a universal joint definition. This wo

help resolve proliferation of terms and concepts that cau

confusion within the services and theaters. A case in po

is the concept of interdiction. There are currently four 

ferent interdiction concepts, of which only two are defin

in Joint Pub 1-02, interdiction and air interdiction. Over

there is interdiction, air interdiction, battlefield air int

diction (BAI—NATO and Korea), and joint precision int

diction.

Additionally, deep battle or deep operations are univ

sally used terms at the joint operational level, but they 

not defined in the joint dictionary. Definitions would h

eliminate the individual service and theater interpretatio

of their meanings. Manuals of this type (Joint Pub 1-

require updating at least biannually, if not in hard co

then on-line through the Joint Electronic Library.

Joint Force Fires Coordinator (JFFC). Synonym

with the concept of fire support is a fire support element 

integrate and synchronize fire support assets and their 

fects with the maneuver concept. From company throu

corps levels, this concept has proven to be indispensab

The only land maneuver level that does not include a 

support coordinator (FSCOORD) or fire support officer a

FSE is the joint land/surface component level. The bat

field coordination detachment (BCD), formerly known 

the battlefield coordination element, was proposed as 

solution. However, the BCD is colocated with the JFA

and serves a vital function there. The JFFC is needed w

the land component commander headquarters to perfo

the synchronization and integration function, full time, 

at the corps level. He or she would then pass the air p

tions of the process directly to the BCD for translation 

the JFACC. This solution, also identified numerous times 
ODS lessons learned and issues, would help deconflict s

eral coordination problems among the services.

Conclusions

Current joint doctrine does not provide clear, conc

terminology, graphical control measures, and a battlefi

framework necessary to integrate assets in deep battle 

erations. Conflicts between the services resulted in un

and staffs’ improvising by implementing nondoctrinal c

trol measures in the midst of preparing for combat in 

combat zone. Nondoctrinal use of established terminol

and concepts resulted in confusion and contributed 

missed opportunity to further demilitarize the Iraqi army

The intent of joint doctrine is to provide a set of fun

mental principles that guide the employment of forces 

two or more services in coordinated action toward a co

mon objective. Although ODS was a resounding succe

this may have been due more to the ingenuity of the le

ers, soldiers, airman, sailors, and marines, than to a w

refined doctrine. Also contributing to the success was 

strategy of fighting a sequential war instead of a simu

neous ground-air war. This minimized the impact of 

doctrinal shortfalls.

The FSCL issue has gone unresolved since prior to O

eration Desert Storm. A control measure of this imp

tance—coordinating the efforts of multiple services, assist

in fratricide prevention, and facilitating ground-soldier pre

ration for going face-to-face with an enemy—is too import

to be debated. This measure requires universal use and u

derstanding by all services. There should be no individ

service interpretations and applications. This is the role 

joint doctrine—if the services cannot resolve the issue, jo

doctrine should. This will provide three benefits.

First, a joint directed definition of and specific rules 

the FSCL and other control measures would facilit

training in service schools. Less time is lost debat

whether a particular measure is right for a particular si

ation, or whether one service or the other has the corr

interpretation. Second, such a definition and set of ru

would facilitate service-member transfer from one thea
to another. As of today, when service members trans

from Europe to Korea, they have to forget the reconna

sance interdiction planning line and learn the deep ba

synchronization line. When the same service memb

transfer stateside to III Corps, they have to forget both, a

become familiar with the battle synchronization line. T

situation causes confusion and detracts from learni

transfer of knowledge, and cooperation.

Finally, the proposed definition/rules allow leaders a

service members to deploy into a theater of combat wit

complete understanding of what measures are applica

in what situation. Time spent in Operation Desert Sto

relearning the use of a fire support coordination line, w

an RIPL or DBSL means (since there are no doctrinal d

nitions), and the rules for using them could have be

used for rehearsing combat operations. Standardizat

would not tie the CINC’s hands or deny him or her 

flexibility to organize the forces for his or her theater. W

it would do is establish a basic understanding and start

point from which to deviate for a particular situation 

theater. That option does not exist with the lack of speci

ity contained in joint doctrine on control and coordinat

measures.

Most of the current doctrinal manuals were updated 

ter Operation Desert Storm. However, problems identif

by field commanders were not adequately addressed. T

next ODS may not provide the luxury of training after 

tering the theater of operation. Peacetime understand

will enhance wartime execution.

Notes

1. “Army–Air Force Operations Issues,” 25 April 1996, 7.

2. Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 1-02, Department of Defense Dic

ary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, 120.

3. Ibid., 201.

4. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995

10–11.

5. Ibid., 201.

6. JULLS [Joint Universal Lessons Learned System] Lessons Learn

Operation Desert Storm, 1992, 26, On-line. Internet, 25 December 19

Available from http:/www. dtic.dla.mil/gulflink/db/army/080596_jun

declas_17 _0001.html.

25
7. Maj David H. Zook, The Fire Support Coordination Line: Is It Tim

Reconsider Our Doctrine? (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1992), 42.

8. Joint Pub 1-02, 148.

9. JULLS, 15.

10. Zook, 137.

11. ARCENT MI Hist, Target Systems: Historical Analysis, 18. On-

Internet, 19 December 1996. Available from http:/www-leav-akn.armlyl

1100/efsweb/ webfile/call.html.

12. JULLS, 22–25.

13. Joint Pub 3-0, IV-11.

14. Ibid., IV-15.

15. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Deep Battle Observations 

1, 1992, 26, On-line. Internet, 19 December 1996. Available f

http:/www-leav-akn.army.mil:1100/efsweb/ webfile/call.html.

16. JULLS, 55.

17. Field Manual (FM) 100-15, Corps Operations, September 1989, 3

18. Ibid., 5-12.

19. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Un

States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 12–13.

20. Joint Pub 1-02, 148.

21. Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, 11 

cember 1990, II-1.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., II-4.

24. Zook, 115.

25. Treavor Royle, A Dictionary of Military Quotations (New York

mon & Schuster, 1989), 161.

26. JULLS, 15.

27. Joint Pub 1-02, 58.

28. Ibid., 317.

29. JULLS, 42.

30. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support,” draft, Aug

1996, I-2.

31. Message, 172201Z DEC 96, Joint CSA-CSAF Agreements F

Army–Air Force Warfighter Conference, 4–5 December 1996.

32. Maj Michael J. Bradley, Operational Fires: Do They Requi

Theater FSCOORD? (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 2d term AY 88–89).

33. P. J. Walsh, Project Leader, Assessment of Organizational Opt

for Deep Attack, IDA Paper P-3099 (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Def

Analyses, June 1995), 27.

26
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