### The Honorable Diana E. Murphy, then United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the District of Minnesota, now United States Circui t Judge for the Eighth Circuit. ___________ No. 96-2288

___________ Reginald Woodards, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. United States of America, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: January 15, 1997 Filed: January 21, 1997

___________ Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

In 1991, Reginald Woodards and several others were convicted o f conspiring to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113(a ) (1994), aiding and abetting attempted bank robbery in violation of 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a) (1994), and aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 924(c)(1), and 2113(a) (1994). The Dist rict Court 1 sentenced Woodards to 183 months' imprisonment, including a consecutive 60

- month term on the firearm count, and we affirmed on direct appeal. United State s v. Johnson , 962 F.2d 1308, 1311-12, 1315 (8th Cir. 1992), cert
. denied , 506 U.S. 928 (1992) and 507 U.S. 974 (1993).

### The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge 2 

### fo r the District of Minnesota, adopting the report an d reco mmendations of the Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, then Unite d States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota, now United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. A defendant who did not personally use or carry a firearm may 3 

### be found guilty of violating section 924(c)(1) under either a coconspirator theory of liabil ity, see Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946) (conspirator is criminally liable for substantive offense committed by another conspirator within scope of and in furtherance of consp iracy, unless that offense could not reasonably have been foreseen as necessary or natural consequence of conspiracy), or an aiding-and-abetting theory, see United States v. Delpi t , 94 F.3d 1134, 1151 (8th Cir. 1996) (individual may b e found guilty of aiding and abetting if, before or at time cr ime was committed, he knew offense was being committed or was going to be committed; he knowingly acted to encourage, aid, or cause offense; and he intended offense be committed). We recently held tha t Bail ey does not preclude the continued application of a co conspirator theory of liability to section 924(c)(1) offenses

. See Rodger , 100 F.3d at 91 n.2. We now conclude that the sam e holds true for aiding-and-abetting liability. See United St ates v. Girald o , 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir.) (post- Bailey application o f aiding-and-abetting theory to § 924(c)(1) offense), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 135 (1996).
-2- In January 1996, Woodards filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) motion, claiming that his section 924(c)(1) conviction should be set aside, becaus e he did not “use” a firearm as defined in Bailey v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), and because section 924(c)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. The Dist rict Court denied relief. Woodards appeals, and assert s 2 additional claims of trial error. We affirm.

Woodards procedurally defaulted these claims by not raising them on direct a ppeal, and he has made no showing of cause and prejudice or o f actual innocence. Se e United States v. Rodger , 100 F.3d 90, 91 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Williams v. United States , 98 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir

. 199 6); Ramey v. United States , 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (pe r curiam). We agree wi th the District Court that the evidence at trial was suffic ient to convict Woodards of a “carry” violation under establishe d princi ples of coconspirator and aiding-and-abetting liability. Se e 3 Bailey , 116

### -3-

S. Ct. at 507-09 (pre serving “carry” as alternative basis for § 924(c)(1) charge); Williams , 98 F.3d at 1054-55 (holding § 2255 movant procedurally defaulted argument that § 924(c)(1) conviction was invalid in light o f Bailey ; no actual prejudice because evidence was sufficient to convict him of § 924 (c)(1) “carry” violation). It is undisputed that some o f Woodards’s codefendants were carrying firearms at the time of their arrest , and the jury found that Woodards knew about and was involved in the armedbank-robbery scheme. Cf. United States v. Simps on , 979 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming § 924(c)(1) conviction under aiding-and-abettin g theory; acts of codef endant in committing armed bank robbery became those of defendant, as aider and abettor, where defend ant’s conduct in providing transportation and means of concealment was integral to crime).

We need not address the claims Wooda rds raises for the first time on appeal. See Thomas v. United States , 27 F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.