area handbook series

Jordan

a country study



Jordan

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Helen Chapin Metz

Research Completed

December 1 989
On the cover: Mosaic of a man with a bird, from a Byzantine

church in Madaba, ca. 500-700

Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1991.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Jordan : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 4th ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series) (DA pam ; 550-34)

"Research completed December 1989."

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 293-305) and index.

1. Jordan. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA

pam ; 550-34.

DS153.J677 1991 91-6858

956.9504—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-34

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being

prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program. The

last page of this book lists the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Acting Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

111

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- lowing individuals who wrote the 1980 edition ofJordan: A Country

Study: Robert Rinehart, Irving Kaplan, Darrel R. Eglin, Rinn S. Shinn, and Harold D. Nelson. Their work provided the organization of the present volume, as well as substantial portions of the text. The authors are grateful to individuals in various government

agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research

materials, and expertise to the production of this book. Special

thanks are owed to the Jordan Information Bureau, which provided numerous photographs not otherwise credited, as well as photographs that served as the basis for the art work in this volume.

Thanks go also to Dr. Helen Khal for her assistance in obtaining

both the photographs and some data on Jordanian social welfare

legislation.

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal Research

Division who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These people include Thomas Collelo, who reviewed all drafts and graphic material; Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and who served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; and

Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing and production. Also in- volved in preparing the text were editorial assistants Barbara

Edgerton and Izella Watson.

Individual chapters were edited by Sharon Costello. Catherine

Schwartzstein performed the final prepublication editorial review,

and Shirley Kessel compiled the index. Malinda B. Neale and Linda

Peterson of the Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared the

camera-ready copy, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley.

Invaluable graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto,

Sandra K. Ferrell, and Kimberly A. Lord. Harriett R. Blood assisted in preparing the final maps.

The authors would like to thank several individuals who provided

research and operational support. Arvies J. Staton supplied information on ranks and insignia, and Ly H. Burnham assisted in obtaining demographic data.

v

Contents

Page Foreword in Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile xv Introduction xxi Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Mark Lewis

THE JORDAN REGION IN ANTIQUITY 5 ISLAM AND ARAB RULE 10 OTTOMAN RULE 13 CONFLICTING NATIONALISMS: ARAB

NATIONALISM AND ZIONISM 17 WORLD WAR I: DIPLOMACY AND INTRIGUE 20

TRANSJORDAN 26

HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN 29

Hussein's Early Reign 30

Crisis and Realignment 34

Development and Disaster 36

The Guerrilla Crisis 38

WAR AND DIPLOMACY 44

THE RABAT SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND AFTER 46

Relations with the Palestine Liberation

Organization 50

Jordanian-Syrian Relations 50

The Camp David Accords and Inter-Arab Politics ... 52

JORDAN IN THE 1980s 55

The Islamic Revolution and a New Arab

Alignment 55

In Search of a Solution to the Palestinian Problem ... 57 Economic Austerity 58

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 59

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 63

Julie M. Peteet GEOGRAPHY 66

Boundaries 66

vii
Topography 67

Climate 71 POPULATION 72 THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY: COHESION

AND CONFLICT 76

Ethnicity and Language 77 Tribes and Tribalism 81

Villages 86

Palestinians 90

Urban Areas and Urbanization 92

Migration 93

KINSHIP, FAMILY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 95

Family and Household 95

Family Relationships 97

Changing Social Relations and Values 100

Women and Work 101 RELIGIOUS LIFE 103

Early Development of Islam 104 Tenets of Sunni Islam 106

Islam in Social Life 109

Islamic Revival 110

Religious Minorities 112 EDUCATION 114

HEALTH AND WELFARE 117 Chapter 3. The Economy 125

Robert Scott Mason

STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE ECONOMY ... 128

GDP by Sector 129

The Late 1980s 133

THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 137

A Mixed Economy 138

The Budget 141 Development Planning 142

LABOR FORCE 145

Labor Emigration 145

Remittance Income 145

Labor Force and Unemployment 146

INDUSTRY 147 Manufacturing 149

Industrial Policy 149

Electricity Generation 153

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 154

Transportation 154

Vlll
Telecommunications 158

NATURAL RESOURCES 160

Phosphates 160

Potash 161 Oil and Gas 161 Water 164

AGRICULTURE 166

Agricultural Development 167

Cropping and Production 168

Livestock 170

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 170

Trade Balance 170

Composition of Exports and Imports 170

Direction of Trade 173

BANKING AND FINANCE 174

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 179

Eric Hooglund

THE CONSTITUTION 182

THE GOVERNMENT 183

The King 185

The Council of Ministers 187

The Legislature 188

The Judiciary 191 Local Administration 192

THE POLITICAL SETTING 193

The Political Elite 193

Political Dissent and Political Repression 197

The Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation

Organization 198

FOREIGN POLICY 209

Relations with Israel 209

Relations with Arab States 212

Relations with the United States 215

Relations with Other Countries 218

Membership in International Organizations 219

MEDIA 219

Chapter 5. National Security 221

Jean R. Tartter SECURITY: A PERENNIAL CONCERN 224

Dimensions of the Military Threat 225

Internal Security 229

The Palestinian Factor 232

ix
THE MILITARY HERITAGE 233

Historical Role 234

World War II to 1967 235

June 1967 War and Aftermath 236

THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL LIFE 238

THE ARMED FORCES 241

Command Structure 241

Army 243

Air Force 247

Defense Spending 250

PERSONNEL: COMPOSITION, RECRUITMENT,

AND TRAINING 251

Conscription 254

Women in the Armed Forces 255

Conditions of Service 255

Ranks and Insignia 256

Training and Education 256

People's Army and Reserves 257

MILITARY RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES . . 259

Meeting Jordan's Equipment Needs in the 1980s .... 260

Military Cooperation with the United States 261

Military Cooperation with Other Arab States 263

THE INTERNAL SECURITY SYSTEM 265

Police Forces 265

General Intelligence Department 269

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 270

Criminal Code 272

Incidence of Crime 273

Procedures in Criminal Law 274

Martial Law Courts 276

Penal System 276

Appendix. Tables 279

Bibliography 293

Glossary 307

Index 3ii

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Jordan, 1989 xx

2 The Jordan Valley in Biblical Times 8

3 Mandate Allocations at the San Remo Conference,

April 1920 24

4 Topography and Drainage 70

5 Population of the East Bank by Age and Sex, 1987 74

x
6 United Nations Relief and Works Agency Camps in Jordan,

1989 78

7 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of Origin,

1978 and 1987 132

8 Land Use and Other Economic Activities, 1989 148

9 Transportation System, 1989 156

10 Government Organization, 1989 184

11 Abbreviated Genealogy of the Hashimite Family, 1989 .... 186

12 Structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO), 1989 204

13 Comparison of Force Strengths in the Middle East, 1988 . . 228

14 Organization of National Defense, 1989 244

15 Major Military Installations, 1988 246

16 Military Ranks and Insignia, 1989 258

XI

Preface

Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic,

and military aspects of contemporary Jordanian society. Sources

of information included scholarly journals and monographs, offi- cial reports of governments and international organizations,

newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Chapter bibliographies ap- pear at the end of the book; brief comments on some of the more

valuable sources suggested as possible further reading appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric sys- tem; a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix). A

glossary is also included.

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases follows a modified version of the system adopted by the United States Board on

Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic

Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN sys- tem. The modification is a significant one, however, in that diacritical markings and hyphens have been omitted. Moreover, some

personal and place names, such as King Hussein, Jordan River,

and Petra, are so well known by these conventional names that

their formal names—Husayn, Nahr al Urdun, and Batra, respectively, are not used.

xiii

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Short Form: Jordan.

Term for Citizens: Jordanian(s).

Capital: Amman.

Date of Independence: May 25, 1946 (as Transjordan).

Geography

Size: About 91,880 square kilometers. xv
Topography: Most of East Bank (see Glossary) consists of arid

desert. Dead Sea lowest point on surface of earth (more than 400

meters below sea level). Jabal Ramm (1,754 meters) is Jordan's

highest point. Except for short coastline on Gulf of Aqaba, country landlocked.

Society

Population: In 1987 East Bank population—about 70 percent

urban—2.9 million with annual growth rate variously given as between 3.6 and 4 percent.

Languages: Almost all Jordanians speak a dialect of Arabic as mother tongue; increasing numbers speak or understand Modern

Standard Arabic. Most of those people who have another native

language (e.g., Circassians, Armenians) also speak Arabic.

Ethnic Groups: Significant distinction between Palestinians (see

Glossary)—estimated 55 to 60 percent of population—and Transjordanians (see Glossary). Small numbers of non-Arabs originating elsewhere include Circassians, Shishans (Chechens), Armenians,

and Kurds.

Religion: Most Jordanians Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims; about

2,000 Shia (see Glossary) Muslims. Christians (Eastern Orthodox,

Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, a few Protestants) constitute between 5 and 8 percent of population. Also other

small religious groups, such as Druzes and Bahais.

Education: First six years (primary) and next three years (preparatory) compulsory and free; grades ten through twelve (secondary)

also free. In 1987 more than 900,000 students enrolled in 3,366

schools with approximately 39,600 teachers. Nearly 68 percent of

adult population literate; nearly 100 percent of ten-to-fifteen agegroup literate. Health: Water shortage and concomitant sanitary problems contribute to health problems. Steady increase in health facilities and

medical personnel in major urban areas. Following adoption of

primary health care concept, facilities and personnel better distrib- uted in rural areas than in past. In 1986 life expectancy at birth was sixty-five years. Economy

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1987 estimated at slightly more

than US$5 billion; in 1988 about US$2,000 per capita; GDP real growth rate in 1989 estimated at 2 to 3 percent.

xvi
Currency and Exchange Rates: 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = 1 ,000

fils. Average exchange rates 1989 US$1 = 571 fils; 1 JD = $1.75

(see Glossary).

Government Budget: Forecast in 1989 at JD1.035 billion, including a JD122 million deficit. Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Industry: Contributed about 14.6 percent of GDP in late 1980s;

90 percent of small and large industries concentrated in north between Amman and Az Zarqa. Industry consisted mainly of small

establishments with few large companies accounting for much of

employment and value added. In 1989 largest industries phosphate

mining, fertilizers, potash, cement, oil refining, and electric power

generation; most such firms partially government owned. Jordan

turning in late 1980s to light-manufactured goods and technical

industries, such as pharmaceuticals.

Agriculture: Main crops cereals, vegetables, fruit. Self-sufficient

in poultry and eggs. Dependent on imports for substantial part of

food supply.

Imports: In 1987 JD915.5 million. Major commodities: oil, foodstuffs, machinery, and transportation equipment, mostly from

Western Europe, United States, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

Exports: In 1987 JD248.8 million. Major commodities: phosphates,

potash, fertilizers, fruits, and vegetables to member countries of Arab

Cooperation Council, Asian countries, and European countries.

Transportation and Communications

Roads: In 1989 more than 7,500 kilometers, of which 5,500 kilo- meters asphalted; remainder gravel and crushed stone. Two major

roads: north-south Desert Highway from Amman to Al Aqabah;

east-west highway from Al Mafraq to Iraqi border.

Railroads: In 1989 619 kilometers of 1 -meter narrow gauge, sin- gle track; newer spur lines to connect old Hijaz Railway with phosphate mines and port of Al Aqabah.

Port: Al Aqabah on Gulf of Aqaba contains sections for general

cargo, phosphates in bulk, and potash and fertilizers. Airports: In 1989 nineteen usable airports, of which fourteen had

permanent surface runways. Two major airports: Queen Alia In- ternational Airport, thirty kilometers south of Amman, and old xvn
international airport at Marka, King Abdullah Airport, used

primarily by Royal Jordanian Air Force. Pipelines: In 1989 total of 209 kilometers, consisting mainly of

segment of Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) and connecting link

to refinery at Az Zarqa.

Telecommunications: In 1989 government-owned communications system included telephones, telex, telegraph, fax, and televi- sion. Telephone service being improved, with more than 200,000

telephones in service and 85,000 customers awaiting phones; one

Atlantic Ocean Intelsat station; one Indian Ocean Intelsat station; one Arabsat station.

Government and Politics

Government: Constitution of 1952 grants king both executive and

legislative powers. Between 1967 and 1989, King Hussein has ruled

as almost absolute monarch. Bicameral legislature, National Assembly, consists of Senate appointed by king and popularly elected

House of Representatives. In late 1989 first national election since

1967 held. National Assembly met in December 1989. In July 1988,

government renounced claims to reassert sovereignty over West

Bank, under Israeli military occupation since June 1967 War, and

turned over responsibility for links with West Bank to Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO). Subsequently, Jordan recognized

PLO's declaration of independent Palestinian state in West Bank

and Gaza Strip.

Politics: Political parties banned from 1957 to 1990; political groupings, in addition to existent Muslim Brotherhood, began to form

for 1989 elections. Latent pressures for political participation,

especially among Palestinians, who were underrepresented in top

layers of narrowly based, Transjordanian-dominated power struc- ture. Justice: Court system consisted of civil, religious, and special courts. Tribal law abolished in 1976. No jury system; judges decide matters of law and fact. Administrative Divisions: Jordan divided into eight governorates

or provinces. Governorates further subdivided into districts, subdistricts, municipalities, towns, and villages.

Foreign Affairs: Jordan traditionally maintained close relations

with United States, Britain, and other Western countries. During

1980s, however, Jordan expanded relations with Soviet Union,

xviii
while remaining strongly committed to pan-Arabism and closely

aligned with countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1988 armed forces totaled about 85,300; components were army, 74,000; navy, 300; and air force, 11,000. National Service Law of 1976 required two years' service by males

at age eighteen or when education completed; liberal exemptions

granted for medical or compassionate reasons. Major Tactical Military Units: Army had two armored divisions,

two mechanized divisions (each division had three brigades), a Royal Guards Brigade, a Special Forces airborne brigade, and in- dependent artillery and air defense battalions. Air force had four

fighter ground-attack squadrons, two fighter squadrons, one advanced training squadron with backup combat potential, one trans- port squadron, and four helicopter squadrons. Navy, an integral

part of army with coast guard mission, operated five coastal patrol

boats in Gulf of Aqaba; three larger armed craft ordered in 1987.

Major Equipment: Bulk of armored vehicles, artillery, and antitank missiles provided by United States; additional tanks from Brit- ain; tactical air defense missiles from Soviet Union; fixed Hawk

air defense missiles from United States. Combat aircraft consisted

of newer French-manufactured Mirages and older United States F-5s.

National Security Costs: Defense budget of JD256 million

(US$763 million) in 1988, although not all assistance from Arab

states—mainly Saudi Arabia—recorded in budget. Defense budget

constituted 22 percent of total government spending in 1987.

Internal Security Forces: National police, known as Public Security Force, estimated to total 4,000 in 1988, under Ministry of Interior in peacetime but subordinated to Ministry of Defense in event

of war. Internal and external security responsibility of General

Intelligence Directorate, civilian agency headed by senior army

officer reporting directly to prime minister and King Hussein.

xix
Mediterranean

.

Sea J )

Lake

Tiberius

UmTED NATIONS

. DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVERFOffce 20NE SYR I A

IRAQ

y

GOLAN HEtGiiTS

Psraetfocxajpteof

Irbidl. w

IRBID - l Al Mafraq

/AL MAFRAQ

/WEST SANK V

* Salf^ ® ^ A?2a«?a 111^ ^ Amman AMMAN

R A E \J^_ALKARAK

i

I AtTafilah^ W, AT TAFILAH

l

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MAAN

SAUDI ARABIA

\

\

UDl ARABIA

• — International boundary — Governorate boundary 1949 Armistice line •• 1967 Cease-fire line National capital Governorate capital

25 50 Kilometers "SO mi

32 H

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions ofJordan, 1989

xx
Introduction

THE PRESENT KINGDOM of Jordan has had a separate exis- tence for almost seventy years, from the time of the creation in 1921

of the Amirate of Transjordan under Abdullah of the Hashimite

(also seen as Hashemite) family, the grandfather of King Hussein.

To form Transjordan, the Palestine Mandate was subdivided along

the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. At its creation, Jordan was

an artificial entity because inhabitants of northern Jordan have

traditionally associated with Syria, those of southern Jordan have

associated with the Arabian Peninsula, and those of western Jordan have identified with Palestinians in the West Bank (see Glossary). Moreover, the area that constituted Jordan in 1990 has served

historically as a buffer zone between tribes living to the west of

the Jordan River as far as the Mediterranean Sea and those roaming the desert to the east of the Jordan River. Over the centuries,

the area has formed part of various empires; among these are

the Assyrian, Achaemenid, Macedonian, Nabataean, Ptolemaic,

Roman, Ghassanid, Muslim, Crusader, and Ottoman empires.

Transjordan' s creation reflected in large measure a compromise

settlement by the Allied Powers after World War I that attempted

to reconcile Zionist and Arab aspirations in the area. Britain

assumed a mandate over Palestine and Iraq, while France became

the mandatory power for Syria and Lebanon. In a British government memorandum of 1922, approved by the League of Nations

Council, Jewish settlement in Transjordan was specifically excluded.

As Transjordan moved toward nationhood, Britain gradually

relinquished control, limiting its oversight to financial and foreign

policy matters. In March 1946, under the Treaty of London, Transjordan became a kingdom and a new constitution replaced the 1928

Organic Law. Britain continued to subsidize the Arab Legion, a

military force established in 1923. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1948,

the Arab Legion gained control for Transjordan of the West Bank,

including East Jerusalem. The war added about 450,000 Palestinian Arab refugees as well as approximately 450,000 West Bank

Arabs to the roughly 340,000 East Bank (see Glossary) Arabs in

Jordan. In December 1948, Abdullah took the title King of Jor- dan, and he officially changed the country's name to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in April 1949. The following year he

annexed the West Bank.

Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in July 1951. Abdullah's son, Talal, who was in ill health, briefly succeeded to the throne

xxi
before being obliged to abdicate in favor of his son, Hussein, in

1952. Hussein, who had been studying in Britain, could not legally

be crowned until he was eighteen; in the interim he attended the

British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and returned to Jor- dan in 1953 to become king.

The survival of Hussein as king ofJordan represents one of the

longest rules in the Arab world, thirty- seven years. Hussein's sur- vival has entailed a keen sense of what is politically possible; moving cautiously and seeking to build consensus, he has exercised

skillful diplomacy, both domestically and regionally. For Hussein

survival has involved achieving a balance between more liberal

Palestinians and more traditionally oriented Transjordanians, particularly the loyal beduin tribes of the East Bank, as well as negotiating a place for Jordan among the Baathist regimes of Syria and

Iraq, the Arab nationalism of Gamal Abdul Nasser and Egypt's

successor governments, and the conservative rulers of Saudi Arabia

and the Persian Gulf states. Moreover, Jordan has the longest

border with Israel of any Arab state. Although Jordan has never

signed a peace treaty with Israel, having lost the West Bank and

East Jerusalem to Israel in the June 1967 War, Hussein nevertheless achieved an unofficial working relationship with Israel con- cerning the West Bank.

Despite Hussein's preference for cautious consensus, he is capable

of decisive action when the maintenance of Hashimite rule is threat- ened. He took such action in connection with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrilla groups (fedayeen) in Jordan,

based in the refugee camps, who became almost a state within a

state. Intermittent fighting occurred from 1967 onward, with Israel engaging in reprisal raids against Jordan for fedayeen operations

launched from Jordan, and the fedayeen increasingly directing their

efforts against the Jordanian government rather than against Israel. Ultimately, in September 1970 a civil war broke out, martial law was reaffirmed, and as many as 3,500 persons are thought to have

died. Despite various cease-fire agreements, sporadic fighting continued through July 1971, when the Jordanian government ordered

the fedayeen either to leave Jordan or to assume civilian status. Isolated by the other Arab states because of its repression of the

fedayeen, Jordan gradually had to repair relations with those countries because they constituted the major source of its financial aid. In the process of maintaining Jordan's tenuous position in the

region, Hussein's basic orientation has been pro-Western; he has

sought economic and military assistance from the United States and Britain in particular. When arms purchases were blocked by

the United States Congress, however, he did not hesitate to buy

xxii
weapons from the Soviet Union. Regionally, following the Arab

world's boycott of Egypt as a result of Anwar as Sadat's signing

the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, Hussein sought a more significant leadership role. Fearful of Syria, which had inter- vened in Jordan in 1970, and apprehensive over the 1979 Iranian

Islamic Revolution's destabilizing influence on the area, Hussein

strongly supported Iraq in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and established friendly relations with Iraqi president Saddam Husayn.

Hussein's precarious balancing act has resulted, to a significant

degree, from Jordan's disparate population. According to unofficial estimates (the government does not provide a breakdown of

statistics on East Bank and West Bank inhabitants), from 55 to 60 percent ofJordan's population is Palestinian. Moreover, in contrast to the strong rural element in Jordan's early history, according to the World Bank (see Glossary) in the late 1980s about 70

percent of the population was urban, one-third of the total residing in the capital of Amman (see fig. 1). Tribal relations characterized pre- 1948 Transjordan, extending to village dwellers and

many in the cities as well as rural areas. Such relations hindered

the assimilation of West Bank Palestinians, who by the 1980s had

established substantial economic and cultural influence in Jordan

and who tended to be more liberal regarding the role of women.

The government sought to minimize distinctions between people

from the East Bank and those from the West Bank in large part

by upgrading education; in 1989 Jordan had the highest number

of students per capita of any country except the United States. A

societal problem Jordan faced, however, was the disrespect for tech- nical education and manual labor as opposed to academic education. Despite this difficulty, Jordan regarded its educated work force

as its major economic asset. Having such a work force enabled Jor- dan to provide skilled and professional workers to other Arab states, particularly those in the Persian Gulf, and worker remittances were

a leading source of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary).

In 1988 such remittances exceeded US$1 billion. Jordan's relatively small population of fewer than 3 million per- sons in 1987 resulted in a limited domestic market unable to achieve

economies of scale; thus, Jordan needed to develop export markets. Apart from its labor force, which the government actively

encouraged to seek work abroad in view of scanty domestic employment opportunities, Jordan's principal natural resource consisted of phosphates—it was the world's third largest phosphates

producer—and potash. It also was actively engaged in a search for

oil and gas; small amounts of both had been discovered. These extractive industries, however, required large capital investments

xxin
beyond the capability ofJordan's private sector. In consequence,

the government not only played the key role in development planning but also became a major economic participant, ultimately shar- ing in forty semipublic companies, contrary to its avowed advocacy

of free enterprise. In addition, Jordan benefited from the Civil War

in Lebanon that began in 1975 and the war's troubled aftermath,

which heightened Jordan's role as a provider of banking, insur- ance, and professional services formerly supplied by Lebanon.

Jordan's long-term plans called for economic self-sufficiency, and

the king's brother, Crown Prince Hasan, and the Jordan Technology Group that he founded in 1988 were key elements in Jordan's economic endeavors. The surface prosperity of the early

1980s, however, was ended by the downturn of oil prices in the

late 1980s, the resulting return home from the Persian Gulf of thousands ofJordanian workers, the decrease in Arab subsidies to Jor- dan (from more than US$1 billion in 1981 to about US$400 million

in 1990), and Jordan's increasing debt (estimated in early 1990

at between US$6 and US$8 billion). Austerity was reflected in the

1988-89 devaluation of the dinar (for value of the dinar—see Glossary) by more than 40 percent to counter the black market, the

freezing of the exchange rate, and increased import duties on luxury goods. These measures, combined with the reduction of subsidies on many basic commodities to comply with International

Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) requirements led to riots by

East Bankers and beduins in several towns in late 1989. Jordan

had been obliged to reduce subsidies as part of an economic stabili- zation program so as to qualify for a US$79.3 million IMF credit. IMF loan endorsement was a precondition forJordan's rescheduling

payment on many of its outstanding loans and obtaining new loans

of more than US$300 million from the World Bank, Japan, and

the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Furthermore,

Jordan was sharply affected by the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988; during the war, because of its good transportation facilities,

especially between the port of Al Aqabah and Amman, Jordan

served as the primary transshipment point for goods destined for Iraq.

The development of service industries, of industries involving

import substitution, and of export industries, such as industrial

chemicals and pharmaceuticals that required technical expertise, was an economic necessity for Jordan because its agricultural potential was very limited—the greater part of the country is desert. Moreover, Jordan was facing a water shortage in the near future.

With a population estimated to be growing by at least 3.6 per- cent per year, plus expanded industrial use of water, some experts

xxiv
estimated that the demand for water could outstrip supply by the

early 1990s. Jordan's attempt to stimulate exports was a major factor in its formation in early 1989 of the Arab Cooperation Council,

consisting ofJordan, Egypt, Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic

(North Yemen), with headquarters in Amman. This regional

arrangement, however, promised relatively little economic advantage because the participants tended to produce similar goods. In

spite of all of its efforts, Jordan continued to rely heavily on for- eign aid, which in the 1980s constituted between 30 and 40 per- cent annually of government revenue before borrowing.

Economic reasons thus shaped not only Jordan's domestic development and employment policies—the government was the largest single employer, accounting for more than 40 percent of the

work force—but also its foreign policy because ofJordan's dependence on foreign aid. Although Jordan is a constitutional monarchy,

the king has extensive legal powers that allow him to shape policy

by appointing the prime minister, other cabinet ministers, and the

thirty-member Senate, as well as by dismissing the National Assembly (composed of the Senate and the eighty-member House of

Representatives) and ruling by decree if he sees fit. Traditionally,

prime ministers have come from East Bank families loyal to the

Hashimites. The House of Representatives originally had equal

representation from both the East Bank and the West Bank; prior

to the elections of November 1989, no general election had been

held for more than twenty-two years (since the June 1967 War)

in view of the impossibility of elections in the Israeli-occupied West

Bank. Experts believe that a major reason for holding the 1989

elections was to defuse discontent, reflected in the 1989 riots, among

beduins and East Bankers traditionally loyal to the crown. Although martial law remained in effect, the 1989 elections were

free, the king having released all political prisoners in a general

amnesty in the first half of 1989. Elections were preceded by considerable press criticism of government policies and active campaigning by 647 candidates. Among the criticisms was that of

disproportionate representation: electoral districts were so drawn

as to give greater weight to rural areas at the expense of cities. Political parties had been banned since 1957 so candidates ran with

only informal affiliations. To the government's chagrin, twenty

Muslim Brotherhood adherents, fourteen Islamists with other

affiliations, and ten secular antigovernment candidates were elected,

leaving progovernment representatives in the minority. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood was not surprising because it was

the only organized quasi-political organ participating in the elec- tions and because the PLO intentionally remained on the sidelines. xxv
The Muslim Brotherhood appealed to the poor particularly and

advocated jihad, or holy war, against Israel to liberate the West

Bank. Many observers believed that the Muslim Brotherhood gar- nered protest votes primarily and that genuine Brotherhood sympathizers were relatively few. It should be noted, however, that

Jordan is an overwhelmingly Muslim country. More than 90 per- cent of the population are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims; there are some Shishans who are Shia (see Glossary) Muslims; and the re- mainder of the population is made up of a small number of Christians of various sects, Druzes, and Bahais.

In November 1989, the king named as prime minister Mudar

Badran, considered to have better Islamic links than his predecessor, Zaid ibn Shakir. Badran succeeded in forming a cabinet that

included two independent Islamists and two leftist nationalists from

the Democratic Bloc, a new informal political group, but he was

obliged to make some concessions to the Muslim Brotherhood, such

as bringing Jordanian law closer to Islamic sharia law. A major

task facing the new government is the drawing up of the National

Charter (Mithaq al Watani), a statement of principles to guide the

country's political system. This charter is to be devised by sixty

representatives of various political persuasions appointed by the

king in May 1990. The charter is expected to stress popular loyalty

to the monarchy and to limit the existence of political parties controlled by external influences, such as the Communist Party of

Jordan.

Because ofJordan's large Palestinian population, a major aspect

of its external relations concerns its dealings with the PLO. Following the 1970-71 civil war, relations between Jordan and the

PLO were strained, but in 1975 Hussein and PLO chief Yasser

Arafat agreed to end recriminations. The king, however, refused

to allow the PLO to reestablish a military or political presence in

Jordan. Jordan was formally linked to the peace process as a result of the signature of the 1978 Camp David Accords, and a number

of meetings occurred between Hussein and Arafat. When the PLO

was expelled from Lebanon in 1982, Hussein relaxed his restric- tions and allowed some PLO presence in Jordan. The Palestine

National Council met in Amman in November 1984, strengthening Arafat's position with the more moderate PLO elements.

Cooperation between Hussein and Arafat continued with the

signing in February 1985 of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agreement on a peace framework. By terms of the agreement, the PLO

would represent Palestinians but be part of a joint JordanianPalestinian delegation at an international peace conference. Hussein, who has long supported United Nations (UN) Security Council

xxvi
Resolution 242 setting forth terms for a Middle East settlement,

sought to persuade Arafat to endorse publicly both UN resolutions

242 and 338, which implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist. Arafat's failure to do so eroded their relationship, and Hussein

ended the Jordanian-PLO agreement in February 1986. Both Hussein and Arafat vied for influence in the West Bank in 1986 and

1987, but the intifadah, or Palestinian uprising, which began in

December 1987, showed the tenuous nature of West Bank support

for Hussein. As a result of this weak support and the resolutions

of the June 1988 Arab summit conference in Algiers that provided

funds to support West Bank Palestinians through the PLO, in July

1988 Hussein formally abandoned Jordan's claim to the West Bank.

Jordan has stressed its support of the Arab cause in general, and

its relations with most of the Arab states have been cordial, particularly relations with Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Hussein had advocated Egypt's reintegration into the Arab family of

nations as early as 1981 —Egypt was expelled from the League of

Arab States (Arab League) in 1978, following the Camp David

Accords. Jordan was one of the first Arab states to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt, doing so in 1984; after this date, rela- tions between Hussein and Egyptian president Husni Mubarak

became close. A friendly relationship with Iraq had arisen out of

Jordan's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia and

Kuwait, also having hereditary royal families, were the major contributors of financial aid to Jordan, in accordance with resolutions

reached at Arab summit conferences. (At the Arab summit conference held in Baghdad in late May 1990, Hussein obtained

renewed commitments of financial support for Jordan from vari- ous participants.) Jordan's relations with Syria were correct but

distant. Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations with Libya

in June 1990, relations remained somewhat tense because of Libyan support of anti-Hussein Palestinian guerrilla groups since 1970.

Potential threats to Jordan's external and internal security led

to Jordan's devoting approximately 30 percent of government

spending to national security. In view of his military training and

qualification as a jet pilot, Hussein took a keen personal interest

in Jordan's armed forces, both as regards top military appointments

and materiel purchases. Because ofJordan's military tradition, dating back to the establishment of the Arab Legion in 1923, in 1990

the Jordan Arab Army was a well-trained and disciplined force with

impressive firepower although it had not seen battle since 1971.

Historically, Israel has been seen as Jordan's primary threat. Since

the latter half of 1989, Hussein has stressed repeatedly the danger

xxvii
to the stability of the area, particularly to the West Bank and to Jordan, of the influx of thousands of Soviet Jewish immigrants to

Israel. In principle, two-year military service was compulsory for Jor- danian males, but the number called up annually was limited by

economic considerations and potential inductees could postpone

service to complete higher education. Jordan also provided qualified military personnel to a number of other Arab states, especially

those of the Arabian Peninsula, and trained their nationals in Jor- danian military institutions.

Jordan's internal security forces, which like the military dated

back to the Arab Legion, operated under constitutional legal restraints. The Public Security Force, the national police, came under

the Ministry of Interior and was traditionally commanded by a

senior army general. Other than maintaining law and order, the

police and the General Intelligence Department monitored potentially disruptive elements in the population, such as left-wing fac- tions and right-wing Muslim extremists.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 found Jordan

itself in a difficult situation, hard pressed both economically and

politically. The enforcement of austerity measures in accordance

with IMF loan requirements had improved Jordan's balance of payments position, but because of the decrease in the transit trade across Jordan to Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War ended and the return of

Jordanian workers from the Persian Gulf states resulting from the

downturn of oil prices, Jordanian unemployment had increased

to between 15 and 20 percent. Economic austerity measures had

widened the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" and

had caused discontent among elements of the population traditionally loyal to the monarchy: the beduins and the East Bankers.

To some extent, the discontent had been countered by the opportunity for political expression reflected in the November 1989

elections and by the king's ability to devote more time to East Bank

problems following his giving up claim to the West Bank. The lat- ter action minimized to some degree the competing nationalisms

ofJordanians and Palestinians. The election results, however, in- dicated a marked degree of dissatisfaction with the government.

This dissatisfaction was seen in the growing criticism of corruption among government officials and the demand for trials of those

involved. There was also resentment that martial law as well as limitations to press freedom remained in force. Members of the

middle class particularly seemed to have gained an awareness that

the liberties they enjoyed were based primarily on the king's benevolence rather than on acknowledged democratic rights and a system

xxvin
of checks and balances on what appeared to be increasingly centralized authority. The urban majority of the population considered

themselves underrepresented in the National Assembly, and the

conservative religious elements felt that little had been done to make

existing legislation conform with Islam. The victories of the left in elections of professional associations and trade unions in late 1989 and early 1990 indicated the growing public role of the left. Organized political parties began to come into existence after the November 1989 elections. One of the first political entities to be formed, in July 1990, was a leftist grouping, the Arab Jordanian

Nationalist Democratic Bloc (AJNDB), composed of Marxists, panArab nationalists, and independent leftists. In August the

Democratic Unity and Justice Party was formed, advocating the

"liberation of occupied Palestinian Arab territory" by force and

a strong role for government in a free economy. In contrast to these

leftist inclined groups, in October the Muslim Brotherhood and

other Islamists announced the formation of the Arab Islamic Coalition. The Jordanian Democratic Unity Party, an offshoot of the

leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a member of

the overall PLO organization, came into being in November. Thus,

it was not surprising that in early January 1991 , responding to these

political realities, Prime Minister Badran announced that five Muslim Brotherhood members and two AJNDB members were being

incorporated into the cabinet. The king also announced his approval

in early January of the National Charter that endorsed constitutional rule, political pluralism, and the legalization of political

parties.

Regionally, Jordan found itself between Scylla and Charybdis.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the United States response in sending forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf

and encouraging UN economic sanctions against Iraq put Jordan

in a quandary. In accordance with the UN resolution, it closed

the port of Al Aqabah to Iraq, and Hussein announced that Jordan refused to recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. But Jordan

expressed reservations concerning the Arab League resolution to endorse the sending of an Arab force to Saudi Arabia.

Hussein saw his role as that of an active mediator between Saddam Husayn and both the other Arab states and the West. Between August 1990 and late January 1991, the king held countless

meetings with Western and Arab world leaders, including President Bush in mid-August. Initially, Hussein sought to promote an "Arab solution" to the Gulf crisis. Disappointed at the failure of

this effort, he pursued an "Islamic solution" involving Islamic states outside the Arab world, and after the war began on January 16

xxix
he strove to end the conflict. This policy resulted from a number

of factors. The king shared the view of the majority Palestinian

element of Jordan's population that the West, led by the United

States, was using a double standard in denouncing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the point that it was willing to go to war, while

ignoring Palestinian grievances over Israel's occupation policies

in the West Bank. This stance made the king popular with Palestinians, as did permission for the September holding of a pro-Iraqi

conference by Jordanians and representatives of several major PLO

groups, sponsored by the AJNDB. Yasser Arafat's August endorsement of Saddam Husayn had, however, created a rift in the PLO

as well as cut off Saudi financial assistance to the PLO. Hussein

also had a longstanding fear that Israel planned to make Jordan

the substitute Palestinian state—this aim had been stated on numerous occasions by prominent members of Prime Minister Yitzhak

Shamir's Likud Bloc—thus leading to the downfall of the Hashimite monarchy. The Gulf crisis was seen as a focus that would divert

attention from the Israeli-Palestinian question and allow Israel greater latitude to pursue such a course of action. Both of these

elements were reflected in the king's request to Jordanian parliamentarians in August to refer to him as "sharif" Hussein,

demonstrating the king's view that the Gulf crisis represented a

conflict between the Arab sovereignty and foreign domination similar to the situation that his greatgrandfather, Sharif Hussein of

Mecca, faced at British hands in 1925.

Perhaps the most important reason for the king's seeking to reconcile the conflict was the economic consequence to Jordan of

the crisis and the subsequent war. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

created a stream of refugees, primarily Arab and Asian expatriate

workers and their dependents, who had been living in Iraq and

Kuwait. These persons entered Jordan at the rate of more than

10,000 per day, a total of more than 500,000 as of late September;

they required food and shelter before most could be repatriated.

This influx further strained Jordan's economy, in part because

promised Western financial contributions to help defer costs of the

humanitarian enterprise were slow in arriving. For example, Jor- dan was obliged to ration subsidized foods such as rice, sugar, and

powdered milk at the beginning of September. Meanwhile, the boycott of Iraq had a major impact on Jordan because Iraq had been

Jordan's principal export market and its major source of cheap oil (providing almost 90 percent ofJordan's oil), whereas Kuwait had

been Jordan's second largest market.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, which had provided substantial eco- nomic support to Jordan in the past, was so angered over Jordan's xxx
failure to back it in its dispute with Iraq that it cut off oil exports

to Jordan on September 20 and shortly afterward expelled twenty

Jordanian diplomats. In turn, in early October Jordan closed its borders to trucks bound for Saudi Arabia and instituted fuel austerity conservation measures. The crisis also resulted in a dramatic drop in tourism income, a major component ofJordan's GDP.

The situation caused Minister of Finance Basil Jardanah in the

latter half of September to estimate that Jordan would lose US$2.

1

billion the first year of the boycott and would need US$1 .5 billion

(by January this figure had been revised to US$2 billion) in aid

to avoid economic collapse. He made a strong plea for financial

aid to the UN and the West in general; various Western nations

and Japan promised loans.

In early January, reflecting Jordan's concern over being caught

between Iraq and Israel and the tension prevailing, Jordan mobilized its armed forces and transferred a number of troops from the

east to the Jordan Valley, indicating that it considered the threat

from Israel to be the more serious. As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait came on January 15, Jordan announced that

it would protect its land and air borders against external aggression.

Whatever the final outcome of the crisis resulting from Iraq's

annexation of Kuwait, Middle East alignments have changed appreciably, and the fiction of Arab unity has been destroyed. Jordan's position in the midst of this regional dilemma has been

rendered more precarious than it has been for many years.

January 29, 1991 Helen Chapin Metz

xxxi

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Mosaic of a man in a boat, from the Byzantine Church of Saint Lots and Saint Prokopius at Khirbat al Muhayyat, ca. 550
JORDAN'S LOCATION as a buffer zone between the settled region of the Mediterranean littoral west of the Jordan River and

the major part of the desert to the east contributed significantly

to the country's experience in ancient and more recent times. Until 1921 , however, Jordan had a history as a vaguely defined terri- tory without a separate political identity. Its earlier history, closely

associated with the religions ofJudaism, Christianity, and Islam,

therefore comes under the histories of the contending empires of

which it often formed a part.

By the time the area was conquered by the Ottoman Empire

in the sixteenth century, the inhabitants of three general geographic

regions had developed distinct loyalties. The villagers and town

dwellers of Palestine, west of the Jordan River, were oriented to the major cities and ports of the coast. In the north of present-day

Jordan, scattered villagers and tribesmen associated themselves with

Syria while the tribesmen of southern Jordan were oriented toward

the Arabian Peninsula. Although most of the populace were Arab

Muslims, the integration of peoples with such differing backgrounds

and regional characteristics hampered the creation of a cohesive

society and state. In 1921 the Amirate of Transjordan was established under British

patronage on the East Bank by the Hashimite (also seen as Hashemite) prince Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi, who had been one

of the principal figures of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman

Empire during World War I. Direct British administration was

established in Palestine, where Britain (in the Balfour Declaration

of 1917) had pledged to implement the founding of a Jewish

homeland.

In 1947 Britain turned the problem of its Palestine Mandate over

to the United Nations (UN). The UN passed a resolution that

provided for the partition of the mandate into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and an international zone. When on May 14, 1948, the

British relinquished control of the area, the establishment of the

State of Israel was proclaimed. Transjordan' s Arab Legion then

joined the forces of other Arab states that had launched attacks on

the new state. The end of the 1948-49 hostilities—the first of five Arab-Israeli wars—left Transjordan in control of the West Bank

(see Glossary) and the Old City of Jerusalem. Abdullah changed

the name of the country to Jordan, proclaimed himself king, and

in 1950 annexed the West Bank. In the June 1967 War (known

3
Jordan: A Country Study

to Israelis as the Six-Day War), Israel seized the West Bank and

reunited Jerusalem. In late 1989, the area remained under Israeli occupation (see fig. 1). The dominant characteristic of the Hashimite regime has been

its ability to survive under severe political and economic stress. Major factors contributing to the regime's survival have included

British and United States economic and military aid and the per- sonal qualities first of King Abdullah and then of his grandson,

Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi. King

Hussein has been a skillful politician who has dealt adroitly with

foreign and domestic crises by using caution and by seeking consensus. One exception to this style of policy making occurred during the 1970-71 batde against Palestinian resistance fighters, when

the king ordered his mostly beduin-manned army to remove completely the Palestinian guerrillas, even after neighboring Arab states had called for a cease-fire.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, regional events severely

tested Jordan's stability. The election of the more hawkish Likud

government in Israel and the expansion of Israeli settlements in

the West Bank lent urgency to Hussein's quest for an Arab-Israeli

territorial settlement. Arab ostracism of Egypt following the 1978

signing of the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty of Peace

Between Egypt and Israel ended Jordan's alliance with the Arab

world's most politically influential and militarily powerful state. Jordan's vulnerability increased significantly in February 1979,

when Shia radicals overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of

Iran. The Iranian revolutionaries threatened to expunge Western

influences from the region and to overthrow non-Islamic Arab

governments such as that ofJordan. Less than two years later, Iran and Iraq were embroiled in a costly war that caused a further shift- ing of Arab alliances; Jordan and the Arab states of the Persian

Gulf sided with Iraq, while Syria supported Iran. Syrian-Jordanian

relations deteriorated and nearly erupted in military conflict during the 1981 Arab summit conference in Amman, when Syrian

president Hafiz al Assad accused Hussein of aiding the antigovernment Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Finally, the downward slide of world oil prices that began in 1981 drained Jordan's economy

of the large quantities of Arab petrodollars that had stirred eco- nomic development throughout the 1970s.

The turmoil besetting the Arab states in the 1980s presented Jor- dan with both risks and opportunities. With the traditional Arab

powers either devitalized or, in the case of Egypt, isolated, Jordan was able to assume a more prominent role in Arab politics.

4
Historical Setting

Moreover, as the influence ofJordan's Arab neighbors waned, Hussein pursued a more flexible regional policy.

The weakness of the Arab states, however, enabled the Begin

government in Israel to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy

and to accelerate the pace of settlements in the occupied territories. Thus, between 1981 and 1982, the Arab states reacted apathetically to Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, its annexation

of the Golan Heights, and its June 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Is- raeli aggressiveness and Arab passivity combined to raise fears in Jordan that Israel might annex the occupied territories and drive

the Palestinians into Jordan. These fears were fueled by frequent

references by Israel's hawkish Minister of Agriculture Ariel Shar- on to Jordan as a Palestinian state. The Jordan Region in Antiquity

The Jordan Valley provides abundant archaeological evidence

of occupation by paleolithic and mesolithic hunters and gatherers.

A people of neolithic culture, similar to that found around the

Mediterranean littoral, introduced agriculture in the region. By

the eighth millennium B.C., this neolithic culture had developed

into a sedentary way of life. Settlements at Bayda on the East Bank

and Jericho on the West Bank date from this period and may have

been history's first "cities." Bronze Age towns produced a high

order of civilization and carried on a brisk trade with Egypt, which

exercised a dominant influence in the Jordan valley in the third

millennium. This thriving urban culture ended after 2000 B.C.,

when large numbers of Semitic nomads, identified collectively as the Amorites, entered the region, which became known as Canaan. Over a period of 500 years, the nomads encroached on the

settled areas, gradually assimilated their inhabitants, and—by the

middle of the second millennium—settled in the Jordan Valley,

which became a Semitic language area. At about this time, Abraham (known to the Arabs as Ibrahim) and his household entered

the area from the direction of Mesopotamia. The Canaanites and

others referred to this nomadic group of western Semites as the

habiru, meaning wanderers or outsiders. The name Hebrew probably derived from this term. More abrupt was the incursion of the

Hyksos from the north, who passed through Canaan on their way

to Egypt.

After recovering from the Hyksos invasion, Egypt attempted to regain control of Syria, but its claim to hegemony there was contested by the empire-building Hittites from Anatolia (the central

region of modern Turkey). The prolonged conflict between these

two great powers during the fifteenth to thirteenth centuries B.C.

5
Jordan: A Country Study

bypassed the East Bank of the Jordan, allowing for the development of a string of small tribal kingdoms with names familiar from

the Old Testament: Edom, Moab, Bashan, Gilead, and Ammon,

whose capital was the biblical Rabbath Ammon (modern Amman).

Although the economy of the countryside was essentially pastoral,

its inhabitants adapted well to agriculture and were skilled in metallurgy. The Edomites worked the substantial deposits of iron and

copper found in their country, while the land to the north was fa- mous for its oak wood, livestock, resins, and medicinal balms. The

towns profited from the trade routes crisscrossing the region that

connected Egypt and the Mediterranean ports with the southern

reaches of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.

Midway through the thirteenth century B.C., Moses is believed

to have led the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt and to have

governed them during their forty-year sojourn in the Sinai Peninsula. When they were barred by the Edomites from entering Ca- naan from the south, the Israelites marched north toward Moab.

Under Joshua, they crossed west over the Jordan River. The conquest of Canaan by the Israelite tribes was completed between 1220

and 1 190 B.C. The tribes of Gad and Reuben and half of the tribe

of Manasseh were allocated conquered land on the East Bank. At

about this time the Philistines, sea peoples who originated from

Mycenae and who ravaged the eastern Mediterranean, invaded

the coast of Canaan and confronted the Israelites in the interior.

It was from the Philistines that Palestine derived its name, preserved

intact in the modern Arabic word falastin. Late in the eleventh century B.C. , the Israelite tribes submitted

to the rule of the warrior-king Saul. Under his successor David

(ca. 1000-965 or 961 B.C.), Israel consolidated its holdings west

of the Jordan River, contained the Philistines on the coast, and

expanded beyond the old tribal lands on the East Bank. Ancient

Israel reached the peak of its political influence under David's son, Solomon (965-928 B.C. or 961-922 B.C.), who extended the borders of his realm from the upper Euphrates in Syria to the Gulf

of Aqaba in the south. Solomon, the first biblical figure for whom

historical records exist outside the Bible, exploited the mineral

wealth of Edom, controlled the desert caravan routes, and built

the port at Elat to receive spice shipments from southern Arabia.

With Solomon's passing, however, his much reduced realm divided

into two rival Jewish kingdoms: Israel in the north and Judah

(Judea), with its capital at Jerusalem, in the south. The history

of the Jordan region over the next two centuries was one of constant conflict between the Jewish kingdoms and the kingdoms on

the East Bank (see fig. 2).

6
Historical Setting

In 722 B.C. Israel fell to the Assyrian king, Shalmaneser, ruler

of a mighty military empire centered on the upper Tigris River.

As a result, the Israelites were deported from their country. Judah

preserved its political independence as a tributary of Assyria, while

the rest of the Jordan region was divided into Assyrian-controlled

provinces that served as a buffer to contain the desert tribes—

a

function that would be assigned to the area by a succession of for- eign rulers. Assyria was conquered in 612 B.C., and its empire was absorbed

by the Neo-Babylonian Empire in Mesopotamia. Judah was taken

by Nebuchadnezzar, who destroyed Jerusalem in 586 B.C. and car- ried off most of the Jewish population to Babylon. Within fifty years, however, Babylon was conquered by the Persian Cyrus II. The

Jews were allowed to return to their homeland, which, with the rest of the Jordan region, became part of the Achaemenid Empire.

The Achaemenids dominated the whole of the Middle East for two centuries until the rise of Macedonian power under Alexander

the Great. With a small but well-trained army, Alexander crossed

into Asia in 334 B.C., defeated Persia's forces, and within a few

years had built an empire that stretched from the Nile River to the Indus River in contemporary Pakistan. After his death in 323

B.C., Alexander's conquests were divided among his Macedonian

generals. The Ptolemaic Dynasty of pharaohs in Egypt and the line of Seleucid kings in Syria were descended from two of these

generals.

Between the third century B.C. and the first century A.D., the

history of Jordan was decisively affected by three peoples: Jews,

Greeks, and Nabataeans. The Jews, many of whom were return- ing from exile in Babylonia, settled in southern Gilead. Along with

Jews from the western side of the Jordan and Jews who had re- mained in the area, they founded closely settled communities in

what later became known in Greek as the Peraea. The Greeks were

mainly veterans of Alexander's military campaigns who fought one

another for regional hegemony. The Nabataeans were Arabs who

had wandered from the desert into Edom in the seventh century

B.C. Shrewd merchants, they monopolized the spice trade between

Arabia and the Mediterranean. By necessity experts at water

conservation, they also proved to be accomplished potters, metalworkers, stone masons, and architects. They adopted the use of

Aramaic, the Semitic lingua franca in Syria and Palestine, and

belonged entirely to the cultural world of the Mediterranean.

In 301 B.C. the Jordan region came under the control of the

Ptolemies. Greek settlers founded new cities and revived old ones

as centers of Hellenistic culture. Amman was renamed Philadelphia

7
Jordan: A Country Study
Historical Setting

in honor of the pharaoh Ptolemy Philadelphia. Urban centers assumed a distinctly Greek character, easily identified in their

architecture, and prospered from their trade links with Egypt.

The East Bank was also a frontier against the rival dynasty of

the Seleucids, who in 198 B.C. displaced the Ptolemies throughout Palestine. Hostilities between the Ptolemies and Seleucids en- abled the Nabataeans to extend their kingdom northward from their capital at Petra (biblical Sela) and to increase their prosperity based on the caravan trade with Syria and Arabia.

The new Greek rulers from Syria instituted an aggressive policy of Hellenization among their subject peoples. Efforts to suppress Judaism sparked a revolt in 166 B.C. led by Judas (Judah)

Maccabaeus, whose kinsmen in the next generation reestablished an independent Jewish kingdom under the rule of the Hasmonean Dynasty. The East Bank remained a battleground in the continuing struggle between the Jews and the Seleucids.

By the first century B.C. , Roman legions under Pompey methodically removed the last remnants of the Seleucids from Syria, converting the area into a full Roman province. The new hegemony

of Rome caused upheaval and eventual revolt among the Jews while

it enabled the Nabataeans to prosper. Rival claimants to the Hasmonean throne appealed to Rome in 64 B.C. for aid in settling

the civil war that divided the Jewish kingdom. The next year Pompey, fresh from implanting Roman rule in Syria, seized Jerusalem and installed the contender most favorable to Rome as a client king. On the same campaign, Pompey organized the Decapolis,

a league of ten self-governing Greek cities also dependent on Rome

that included Amman, Jarash, and Gadara (modern Umm Qays), on the East Bank. Roman policy there was to protect Greek in- terests against the encroachment of the Jewish kingdom.

When the last member of the Hasmonean Dynasty died in 37

B.C., Rome made Herod king of Judah. With Roman backing,

Herod (37-4 B.C.) ruled on both sides of the Jordan River. After his death the Jewish kingdom was divided among his heirs and

gradually absorbed into the Roman Empire.

In A.D. 106 Emperor Trajan formally annexed the satellite Nabataean kingdom, organizing its territory within the new Roman

province of Arabia that included most of the East Bank of the Jor- dan River. For a time, Petra served as the provincial capital. The

Nabataeans continued to prosper under direct Roman rule, and

their culture, now thoroughly Hellenized, flourished in the second

and third centuries A.D. Citizens of the province shared a legal

system and identity in common with Roman subjects throughout

the empire. Roman ruins seen in present-day Jordan attest to the

9
Jordan: A Country Study

civic vitality of the region, whose cities were linked to commercial

centers throughout the empire by the Roman road system and

whose security was guaranteed by the Roman army.

After the administrative partition of the Roman Empire in 395,

the Jordan region was assigned to the eastern or Byzantine Empire, whose emperors ruled from Constantinople. Christianity,

which had become the recognized state religion in the fourth century, was widely accepted in the cities and towns but never developed deep roots in the countryside, where it coexisted with

traditional religious practices.

In the sixth century direct control over the Jordan region and

much of Syria was transferred to the Ghassanids, Christian Arabs

loyal to the Byzantine Empire. The mission of these warrior-nomads was to defend the desert frontier against the Iranian Sassanian

Empire to the east as well as against Arab tribes to the south; in

practice, they were seldom able to maintain their claim south of

Amman. The confrontations between Syrian, or northern, Arabs

represented by the Ghassanids—and the fresh waves of nomads

moving north out of the Arabian Peninsula was not new to the his- tory of the Jordan region and continued to manifest itself into the

modern era. Contact with the Christian Ghassanids was an important source of the impulse to monotheism that flowed back into

Arabia with the nomads, preparing the ground there for the in- troduction of Islam.

Islam and Arab Rule

By the time of his death in A.D. 632, the Prophet Muhammad

and his followers had brought most of the tribes and towns of the

Arabian Peninsula under the banner of the new monotheistic

religion of Islam (literally, submission), which was conceived of

as uniting the individual believer, the state, and the society under

the omnipotent will of God. Islamic rulers therefore exercised both

temporal and religious authority. Adherents of Islam, called Muslims (those who submit to the will of God), collectively formed the

House of Islam, or Dar al Islam (see Early Development of Islam,

ch. 2). Arab armies carried Islam north and east from Arabia in the

wake of their rapid conquest, and also westward across North Africa. In 633, the year after Muhammad's death, they entered the

Jordan region, and in 636, under Khalid ibn al Walid, they crushed

the Byzantine army at the Batde of Uhud at the Yarmuk River.

Jerusalem was occupied in 638, and by 640 all Syria was in Arab

Muslim hands. Conversion to Islam was nearly complete among

Arabs on the East Bank, although the small Jewish community in

10
The Monastery, or Dir, at Petra, a 2, 000-year-old Nabataean city

The Treasury,

or Khaznah, at Petra

11
Jordan: A Country Study

Palestine and groups of Greek and Arab Christians were allowed

to preserve their religious identities. Arabic soon supplanted Greek

and Aramaic as the primary language of the region's inhabitants

in both town and countryside.

Muhammad was succeeded as spiritual and temporal leader of

all Muslims by his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, who bore the tide caliph

(successor or deputy) for two years. Under Umar (A.D. 634-44),

the caliphate began efforts to organize a government in areas newly

conquered by the Muslims. The Quran, Islam's sacred scripture, was compiled during the caliphate of Uthman (644-56), whose reign was brought to an end by an assassin. Uthman was succeeded by

Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali, the last of the four so- called orthodox caliphs, who was also assassinated in 661.

A dispute over the caliphal succession led to a permanent schism

that split Islam into two major branches—the Sunni (see Glossary)

and the Shia (see Glossary). The Shias supported the hereditary

claim of Ali and his direct descendants, whereas the Sunnis favored

the principle of consensual election of the fittest from the ranks of

the ashrqf (or shurfa—nobles; sing., sharif—see Glossary). Muslims

in the Jordan region are predominantly Sunni.

After Ali's murder, Muawiyah—the governor of Syria and leader

of a branch of Muhammad's tribe, the Quraysh of Mecca

proclaimed himself caliph and founded a dynasty—the Umayyad

that made its capital in Damascus. The Umayyad caliphs governed

their vast territories in a personal and authoritarian manner. The

caliph, assisted by a few ministers, held absolute and final authority

but delegated extensive executive powers to provincial governors.

Religious judges (qadis) administered Islamic law (sharia) to which

all other considerations, including tribal loyalties, were theoretically subordinated.

The Umayyad Dynasty was overthrown in 750 by a rival Sunni

faction, the Abbasids, who moved the capital of the caliphate to Baghdad. The Jordan region became even more of a backwater,

remote from the center of power. Its economy declined as trade

shifted from traditional caravan routes to seaborne commerce,

although the pilgrim caravans to Mecca became an important source of income. Depopulation of the towns and the decay of sedentary

agricultural communities, already discernible in the late Byzantine period, accelerated in districts where pastoral Arab beduins,

constantly moving into the area from the south, pursued their no- madic way of life. Late in the tenth century A.D. the Jordan region was wrested from the Abbasids by the Shia Fatimid caliphs in Egypt.

The Fatimids were in turn displaced after 1071 by the Seljuk Turks,

who had gained control of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad.

12
Historical Setting

The Seljuk threat to the Byzantine Empire and a desire to seize

the holy places in Palestine from the Muslims spurred the Christi- an West to organize the First Crusade, which culminated in the

capture ofJerusalem in 1099. The crusaders subsequently established the Latin Kingdom ofJerusalem, a feudal state that extended

its hold to the East Bank. The crusaders used the term Outre Jourdain (Beyond Jordan) to describe the area across the river from

Palestine—an area that was defended by a line of formidable castles like that at Al Karak.

In 1174 Salah ad Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub—better known in the

West as Saladin—deposed the last Fatimid caliph, whom he had

served as grand vizier, and seized power as sultan of Egypt. A Sunni

scholar and experienced soldier of Kurdish origin, Saladin soon

directed his energies against the crusader states in Palestine and

Syria. At the decisive Battle of Hattin on the west shore of Lake

Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), Saladin annihilated the crusaders' army

in 1187 and soon afterward retook Jerusalem.

Saladin 's successors in the Ayyubid Sultanate quarreled among

themselves, and Saladin' s conquests broke up into squabbling petty

principalities. The Ayyubid Dynasty was overthrown in 1260 by

the Mamluks (a caste of slave-soldiers, mostly of Kurdish and Circassian origin), whose warrior- sultans repelled the Mongol incursions and by the late fourteenth century held sway from the Nile

to the Euphrates. Their power, weakened by factionalism within

their ranks, contracted during the next century in the face of a dynamic new power in the Middle East—the Ottoman Turks.

Ottoman Rule

Mamluk Egypt and its possessions fell to the Ottoman sultan,

Selim I, in 1517. The Jordan region, however, stagnated under

Ottoman rule. Although the pilgrim caravans to Mecca continued

to be an important source of income, the East Bank was largely

forgotten by the outside world for more than 300 years until European travelers "rediscovered" it in the nineteenth century.

For administrative purposes Ottoman domains were divided into

provinces {vilayets) that were presided over by governors (pashas).

The governors ruled with absolute authority, but at the pleasure

of the sultan in Constantinople. Palestine was part of the vilayet

of Beirut, and Jerusalem was administered as a separate district (sanjak) that reported directly to the sultan. The East Bank comprised parts of the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus. The latter was

subdivided into four sanjaks: Hama, Damascus, Hawran, and Al

Karak. Hawran included Ajlun and As Salt and Al Karak comprised the area mostly south of Amman. The territory south of the

13

Columns and temple ruins at Jarash, second century A.D.

Greco-Roman city north of Amman

15
Jordan: A Country Study

Az Zarqa River down to Wadi al Mawjib was under the control

of the pasha of Nabulus, who was under the vilayet of Beirut.

From 1831 until 1839, Ottoman rule was displaced by that of

Muhammad Ali—pasha of Egypt and nominally subject to the

sultan—when his troops occupied the region during a revolt against

the Sublime Porte, as the Ottoman government came to be known.

Britain and Russia compelled Muhammad Ali to withdraw and

they restored the Ottoman governors.

The Ottomans enforced sharia in the towns and settled countryside, but in the desert customary tribal law also was recognized.

Because of the unitary nature of Islamic law—encompassing reli- gious, social, civil, and economic life—it was inconceivable that

it could be applied to non-Muslims. The Ottoman regime used

the millet system, which accorded non-Muslim communities the

right to manage their personal affairs according to their own reli- gious laws. The European powers also concluded separate treaties

(capitulations) with the Porte whereby their consuls received extraterritorial legal jurisdiction over their citizens and clients in the

Ottoman Empire. In addition, France claimed the special right to protect the sultan's Roman Catholic subjects, and Russia to protect the sultan's more numerous Orthodox subjects,

i At every level of the Ottoman system, administration was es- sentially military in character. On the East Bank, however, Ottoman rule was lax and garrisons were small. Ottoman officials were

satisfied as long as order was preserved, military levies were provided when called for, and taxes were paid. These goals, however, were not easily achieved. To stabilize the population, in the late 1800s the Ottomans established several small colonies of

Circassians—Sunni Muslims who had fled from the Caucasus

region of Russia in the 1860s and 1870s (see Ethnicity and Language, ch. 2). Although the Ottoman sultan in Constantinople was

the caliph, Ottoman officials and soldiers were despised by the

Arabs, who viewed them as foreign oppressors. Truculent shaykhs

regularly disrupted the peace, and the fiercely independent beduins

revolted frequently. In 1905 and again in 1910, serious uprisings were suppressed only with considerable difficulty. In 1900 the Porte, with German assistance, began construction

of the Hijaz Railway. By 1908 the railroad linked Damascus with

the holy city of Medina. Its purpose was to transport Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and to facilitate military control of the strategic

Arabian Peninsula. To protect the railroad, the Porte increased

its Ottoman military presence along the route and, as it had done

earlier to safeguard caravan traffic, subsidized rival Arab tribal shaykhs in the region.

16
Historical Setting

Conflicting Nationalisms: Arab Nationalism and

Zionism

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, two separate

movements developed that were to have continuing effects for all of the Middle East—the Arab revival and Zionism. Both movements aimed at uniting their peoples in a national homeland. They

were to converge and confront each other in Palestine where, it was initially thought by some, they could each achieve their aspirations in an atmosphere of mutual accommodation. The two move- ments would, in fact, prove incompatible.

By 1875 a small group of Western-oriented Muslim and Christian Arab intellectuals in Beirut were urging the study of Arab his- tory, literature, and language to revive Arab identity. By means

of secretly printed and circulated publications they attempted to expose the harsh nature of Ottoman rule and to arouse an Arab

consciousness in order to achieve greater autonomy or even in- dependence. The idea of independence always was expressed in

the context of a unified entity—"the Arab nation' ' as a whole. After

only a few years, however, Ottoman security operations had sti- fled the group's activities. At about the same time, a Jewish revival that called for the return of the Jews in the Diaspora to their historic homeland was finding

expression in Europe. The impulse and development of Zionism were almost exclusively the work of European Jews. In 1897 Theodor Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress at Basel, Switzerland, where the Zionist Organization was founded with the stated

aim of creating "for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured

by public law." As a result of Zionist efforts, the number ofJews

in Palestine rose dramatically to about 85,000, or 12 percent of

the total population, by the start of World War I. The increased Jewish presence and the different customs of the

new settlers aroused Arab hostility. The rising tension between

Jewish settler and Arab peasant did not, however, lead to the

establishment of Arab nationalist organizations. In the Ottomancontrolled Arab lands the Arab masses were bound by family, tribal, and Islamic ties; the concepts of nationalism and nation-state were viewed as alien Western categories. Thus, a political imbalance evolved between the highly organized and nationalistic

Jewish settlers and the relatively unorganized indigenous Arab

population.

A few Western-educated Arab intellectuals and military officers did form small nationalist organizations demanding greater local autonomy. The major impetus for the coming together of these

17
Jordan: A Country Study

educated Arabs was their discontent with the rule of Sultan Abdul

Hamid II (reigned 1876-1909).

In 1908 a group of reform-minded nationalist army officers in

Constantinople, known as the Young Turks, forced Sultan Abdul

Hamid II to restore the 1876 Ottoman constitution. The next year

the Young Turks deposed Hamid in favor of his malleable brother,

Mehmed V. Under the constitution, Ottoman provinces were

represented by delegates elected to an imperial parliament. The

restoration of the constitution and installation of Mehmed V initial- ly generated a wave of good feeling among the empire's non-Turkish

subjects and stimulated expectations of greater self-government.

It soon became clear, however, that the Young Turks, led by

Enver Pasha, were bent instead on further centralizing the Ottoman administration and intensifying the ''Turkification'' of the

Ottoman domains. Arab opposition to the Turkish nationalist poli- cies asserted itself in two separate arenas: among urban intellectuals and in the countryside. One source of opposition developed

among Arab intellectuals in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, who

formulated the ideas of a new Arab nationalism. The primary moving force behind this nascent Arab nationalist movement was opposition to the policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid. The removal of

Sultan Abdul Hamid by the Committee of Union and Progress

(the umbrella organization of which the Young Turks was the major

element) was widely supported by Arab nationalists. The committee's program of institutional reform and promised autonomy raised

Arab nationalist hopes.

After 1908, however, it quickly became clear that the nationalism of Abdul Hamid' s successors was Turkish nationalism bent on Turkification of the Ottoman domain rather than on granting

local autonomy. In response, Arab urban intellectuals formed clan- destine political societies such as the Ottoman Decentralization

Party, based in Cairo; Al Ahd (The Covenant Society), formed

primarily by army officers in 1914; and Jamiat al Arabiyah al Fatat (The Young Arab Society), known as Al Fatat (The Young Arabs),

formed by students in 1911. The Arab nationalism espoused by

these groups, however, lacked support among the Arab masses. A more traditional form of opposition emerged among the re- mote desert tribes ofJordan and the Arabian Peninsula, which were

politically inarticulate but resentful of foreign control. The link between the urban political committees and the desert tribesmen was

Hussein ibn Ali Al Hashimi, the grand sharif and amir of Mecca

and hereditary custodian of the Muslim holy places. Hussein, head

of the Hashimite branch of the Quraysh tribe, claimed descent from

the Prophet. Hussein and his sons Abdullah and Faisal (who had

18
The street of columns at Jarash

19
Jordan: A Country Study

been educated as members of the Ottoman elite as well as trained

for their roles as Arab chieftains) had spent the years 1893 to 1908

under enforced restraint in Constantinople. In 1908 Abdul Hamid

II appointed Hussein amir of Mecca and allowed him and his sons

to return to the Hijaz, the western part of present-day Saudi Arabia. Some sources contend that Hussein's nomination was suggested

by the Young Turks, who believed that he would be a stabilizing

influence there, particularly if he were indebted to them for his

position. In his memoirs, however, Abdullah stated that Abdul

Hamid II named his father in preference to a candidate proposed

by the Young Turks. Hussein reportedly asked for the appointment on the grounds that he had an hereditary right to it. From

the outset, Abdullah wrote, his father was at odds with the attempts

of the Young Turk regime to bring the Hijaz under the centralized and increasingly secularized administration in Constantinople. Once in office, Hussein proved less tractable than either the

sultan or the Turkish nationalists had expected.

Abdullah and Faisal established contact with the Arab nationalists in Syria. Faisal delivered to his father the so-called Damascus Protocol in which the nationalists, who appealed to Hussein

as "Father of the Arabs" to deliver them from the Turks, set out

the demands for Arab independence that were used by Faisal in

his subsequent negotiations with the British. In return, the nationalists accepted the Hashimites as spokesmen for the Arab cause. World War I: Diplomacy and Intrigue

On the eve of World War I, the anticipated break-up of the enfeebled Ottoman Empire raised hopes among Arab nationalists.

The Arab nationalists wanted an independent Arab state covering

all the Ottoman Arab domains. The nationalist ideal, however, was not very unified; even among articulate Arabs, competing vi- sions of Arab nationalism—Islamic, pan-Arab, and statist

inhibited coordinated efforts at independence.

Britain, in possession of the Suez Canal and playing a dominant

role in India and Egypt, attached great strategic importance to the

region. British Middle East policy, however, espoused conflict- ing objectives; as a result, London became involved in three dis- tinct and contradictory negotiations concerning the fate of the

region.

In February 1914, Abdullah visited Cairo, where he held talks with Lord Kitchener, the senior British official in Egypt. Abdullah inquired about the possibility of British support should his father

raise a revolt against the Turks. Kitchener's reply was necessarily

noncommittal because Britain then considered the Ottoman Empire

20
Historical Setting

a friendly power. War broke out in August, however, and by

November the Ottoman Empire had aligned with Germany against

Britain and its allies. Kitchener was by then British secretary of

state for war and, in the changed circumstances, sought Arab support against the Turks. In Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, British

high commissioner and Kitchener's successor in Egypt, carried on

an extensive correspondence with Hussein.

In a letter to McMahon in July 1915, Hussein specified that the area under his independent "Sharifian Arab Government" should

consist of the Arabian Peninsula (except Aden, a British colony),

Palestine, Lebanon, Syria (including present-day Jordan), and Iraq.

In October McMahon replied on behalf of the British government.

McMahon declared British support for postwar Arab independence,

subject to certain reservations, and "exclusions of territory not entirely Arab or concerning which Britain was not free to act without

detriment to the interests of her ally France." The territories as- sessed by the British as not purely Arab included "the districts of

Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west

of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo."

As with the later Balfour Declaration, the exact meaning of the

McMahon pledge was unclear, although Arab spokesmen have

maintained that Palestine was within the area guaranteed independence as an Arab state. In June 1916, Hussein launched the Arab

Revolt against the Ottoman Empire and in October proclaimed

himself "king of the Arabs," although the Allies recognized him

only as king of the Hijaz, a tide rejected by most peninsular Arabs.

Britain provided supplies and money for the Arab forces led by

Abdullah and Faisal. British military advisers also were detailed

from Cairo to assist the Arab army that the brothers were organizing. Of these advisers, T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) was

to become the best known.

While Hussein and McMahon corresponded over the fate of the

Middle East, the British were conducting secret negotiations with

the French and the Russians over the same territory. Following

the British military defeat at the Dardanelles in 1915, the Foreign

Office sought a new offensive in the Middle East, which it thought

could only be carried out by reassuring the French of Britain's in- tentions in the region. In February 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (officially the "Asia Minor Agreement") was signed, which,

contrary to the contents of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence,

proposed to partition the Middle East into French and British zones

of control and interest. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine was to be administered by an international "condominium"

21
Jordan: A Country Study

of the British, French, and Russians, whereas Transjordan would come under British influence.

The final British pledge, and the one that formally committed

Britain to the Zionist cause, was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. The Balfour Declaration stated that Britain viewed with

favor "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the

Jewish People." After the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine had

taken on increased strategic importance because of its proximity

to the Suez Canal, where the British garrison had reached 300,000

men, and because of the planned British attack from Egypt on Ottoman Syria. As early as March 1917, Lloyd George was determined that Palestine should become British and he thought that

its conquest by British troops would abrogate the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The new British strategic thinking viewed the Zionists as a potential ally capable of safeguarding British imperial interests

in the region.

The British pledge transformed Zionism from a quixotic dream

into a legitimate and achievable undertaking. For these reasons

the Balfour Declaration was widely criticized throughout the Arab

world, and especially in Palestine, as contrary to the British pledges

contained in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. The wording of the document itself, although painstakingly devised, was in- terpreted differently by different people. Ultimately, it was found

to contain two incompatible undertakings: establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews and preservation of the rights

of existing non-Jewish communities. The incompatibility of these

two goals sharpened over the succeeding years and became irreconcilable. In November 1917, the contents of the Sykes-Picot Agreement

were revealed by the Bolshevik government in Russia. Arab consternation at the agreement was palliated by British and French

reassurances that their commitments to the Arabs would be honored and by the fact that Allied military operations were progressing favorably. Hussein had driven the Turkish garrison out of

Mecca in the opening weeks of the Arab Revolt. Faisal's forces

captured Al Aqabah in July 1917, and the British expeditionary

force under General Sir (later Field Marshal Viscount) Edmund

Allenby entered Jerusalem in December. Faisal accepted the mili- tary subordination of his army to overall British command, but

for him the fighting was essentially a war of liberation in which

Britain was actively cooperating with the Arabs. The British com- mand, however, considered the Arab army an adjunct to the Allied offensive in Palestine, intended primarily to draw Turkish

attention to the East Bank while Allenby mopped up resistance in

22
Historical Setting

Galilee and prepared for a strike at Damascus. In September 1918,

the British army decisively defeated the Turks at Megiddo (in con- temporary Israel), and an Arab force under Lawrence captured

Daraa, thus opening the way for the advance into Syria. Faisal

entered Damascus on October 2, and the Ottoman government

consented to an armistice on October 3 1 , bringing the war in that

theater to a close. Between January 1919 and January 1920, the Allied Powers met

in Paris to negotiate peace treaties with the Central Powers. At

the conference, Amir Faisal (representing the Arabs) and Chaim

Weizmann (representing the Zionists) set forth their cases. Weizmann and Faisal reached a separate agreement on January 3, 1919,

pledging the two parties to cordial cooperation; however, Faisal

wrote a proviso on the document in Arabic that his signature depended upon Allied war pledges regarding Arab independence.

Since these pledges were not fulfilled to Arab satisfaction after the war, most Arab leaders and spokesmen have not considered the

Faisal-Weizmann agreement as binding.

President Woodrow Wilson appointed an American panel, the

King-Crane Commission, to investigate the disposition of Ottoman territories and the assigning of mandates. After extensive sur- veys in Palestine and Syria, the commission reported intense

opposition to the Balfour Declaration among the Arab majority

in Palestine and advised against permitting unlimited Jewish immigration or the creation of a separate Jewish state. The commission's report in August 1919 was not officially considered by the

conference, however, and was not made public until 1922.

Mandate allocations making Britain the mandatory power for Palestine (including the East Bank and all of present-day Jordan)

and Iraq, and making France the mandatory power for the area

of Syria and Lebanon, were confirmed in April 1920 at a meeting

of the Supreme Allied Council at San Remo, Italy (see fig. 3). The

terms of the Palestine Mandate reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, called on the mandatory power to "secure establishment of

the Jewish national home," and recognized "an appropriate Jewish agency" to advise and cooperate with British authorities toward

that end. The Zionist Organization was specifically recognized as that agency. Hussein and his sons opposed the mandate's terms on the grounds that Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant

adopted at Versailles had endorsed the Wilsonian principle of self- determination of peoples and thereby, they maintained, logically

and necessarily supported the cause of the Arab majority in

Palestine.

23
Jordan: A Country Study

Figure 3. Mandate Allocations at the San Remo Conference, April

1920

For the British government, pressed with heavy responsibilities and

commitments after World War I, the objective of mandate administration was the peaceful development of Palestine by Arabs and Jews

under British control. To Hussein, cooperation with the Zionists had

meant no more than providing a refuge for Jews within his intended

Arab kingdom. To Zionist leaders, the recognition in the mandate was simply a welcome step on the way to attainment of a separate

Jewish national state. A conflict of interests between Arabs and Jews

and between both sides and the British developed early in Palestine

and continued thereafter at a rising tempo throughout the mandate

period.

After the armistice, the Allies organized the Occupied Enemy

24
Historical Setting

Territory Administration to provide an interim government for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. In July 1919, the General Syrian Congress convened in Damascus and called for Allied recognition of an independent Syria, including Palestine, with Faisal as its king.

When no action was taken on the proposal, the congress in March

1920 unilaterally proclaimed Syria independent and confirmed

Faisal as king. Iraqi representatives similarly announced their country's independence as a monarchy under Abdullah. The League

of Nations Council rejected both pronouncements, and in April

the San Remo Conference decided on enforcing the Allied mandates in the Middle East. French troops occupied Damascus in July,

and Faisal was served with a French ultimatum to withdraw from

Syria. He went into exile, but the next year was installed by the

British as king of Iraq.

At the same time, Abdullah was organizing resistance against

the French in Syria, arousing both French ire and British conster- nation. Assembling a motley force of about 2,000 tribesmen, he

moved north from Mecca, halting in Amman in March 1920. In October the British high commissioner for Palestine called a meeting

of East Bank shaykhs at As Salt to discuss the future of the region,

whose security was threatened by the incursion of Wahhabi sec- tarians (adherents of a puritanical Muslim sect who stressed the

unity of God) from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. It became clear

to the British that Abdullah, who remained in Amman, could be

accepted as a ruler by the beduin tribes and in that way be dis- suaded from involving himself in Syria.

In March 1921, Winston Churchill, then British colonial secretary, convened a high-level conference in Cairo to consider Middle East policy. As a result of these deliberations, Britain subdivided

the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. The eastern portion—called Transjordan—was to have a separate

Arab administration operating under the general supervision of

the commissioner for Palestine, with Abdullah appointed as amir.

At a follow-up meeting in Jerusalem with Churchill, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, and Lawrence, Abdullah agreed to abandon his Syrian project in return for the amirate and a substantial British subsidy.

A British government memorandum in September 1922, approved by the League of Nations Council, specifically excluded Jewish setdement from the Transjordan area of the Palestine Mandate.

The whole process was aimed at satisfying wartime pledges made

to the Arabs and at carrying out British responsibilities under the

mandate.

25
Jordan: A Country Study

Transjordan

At its inception in 1921, the Amirate of Transjordan had fewer

than 400,000 inhabitants. Of this number, about 20 percent lived

in four towns each having populations of from 10,000 to 30,000.

The balance were farmers in village communities and pastoral no- madic and seminomadic tribespeople. The amirate 's treasury oper- ated on British financial aid established on the basis of an annual

subsidy. A native civil service was gradually trained with British

assistance, but government was simple, and Abdullah ruled directly

with a small executive council, much in the manner of a tribal shaykh. British officials handled the problems of defense, finance,

and foreign policy, leaving internal political affairs to Abdullah.

To supplement the rudimentary police, in 1921 a reserve Arab force was organized by F. G. Peake, a British officer known to the Arabs

as Peake Pasha. This Arab force soon was actively engaged in suppressing brigandage and repelling raids by the Wahhabis. In 1923

the police and reserve force were combined into the Arab Legion

as a regular army under Peake 's command (see The Military

Heritage, ch. 5). In 1923 Britain recognized Transjordan as a national state preparing for independence. Under British sponsorship, Transjordan made measured progress along the path to modernization.

Roads, communications, education, and other public services slowly

but steadily developed, although not as rapidly as in Palestine, which was under direct British administration. Tribal unrest remained

a persistent problem, reaching serious proportions in 1926 in the

Wadi Musa-Petra area. In the same year, Britain attached senior

judicial advisers to Abdullah's government, and formed the Transjordan Frontier Force. This body was a locally recruited unit of

the British Army assigned to guard the frontier and was distinct

from the Arab Legion (see The Military Heritage, ch. 5). Britain and Transjordan took a further step in the direction of

self-government in 1928, when they agreed to a new treaty that

relaxed British controls while still providing for Britain to oversee

financial matters and foreign policy. The two countries agreed to promulgate a constitution—the Organic Law—later the same year

and in 1929 to install the Legislative Council in place of the old

executive council. In 1934 a new agreement with Britain allowed

Abdullah to set up consular representation in Arab countries, and

in 1939 the Legislative Council formally became the amir's cabinet, or council of ministers. In 1930, with British help, Jordan launched a campaign to stamp

out tribal raiding among the beduins. A British officer, John Bagot

26
Historical Setting

Glubb (better known as Glubb Pasha), came from Iraq to be

second in command of the Arab Legion under Peake. Glubb organized a highly effective beduin desert patrol consisting of mobile

detachments based at strategic desert forts and equipped with good

communications facilities. When Peake retired in 1939, Glubb suc- ceeded to full command of the Arab Legion.

Abdullah was a faithful ally to Britain during World War II. Units of the Arab Legion served with distinction alongside British

forces in 1941 overthrowing the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali regime that

had seized power in Iraq and defeating the Vichy French in Syria.

Later, elements of the Arab Legion were used in guarding British

installations in Egypt.

During the war years, Abdullah—who never surrendered his

dream of a Greater Syria under a Hashimite monarchy—took part

in the inter-Arab preliminary discussions that resulted in the for- mation of the League of Arab States (Arab League) in Cairo in

March 1945. The original members of the League of Arab States were Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,

and Yemen.

In March 1946, Transjordan and Britain concluded the Treaty

of London, under which another major step was taken toward full sovereignty for the Arab state. Transjordan was proclaimed a kingdom, and a new constitution replaced the obsolete 1928 Organic

Law. Abdullah's application for membership in the UN was dis- approved by a Soviet Union veto, which asserted that the country was not fully independent of British control. A further treaty with

Britain was executed in March 1948, under which all restrictions on sovereignty were removed, although limited British base and

transit rights in Transjordan continued, as did the British subsidy

that paid for the Arab Legion.

By 1947 Palestine was one of the major trouble spots in the British

Empire, requiring a presence of 100,000 troops to maintain peace

and a huge maintenance budget. On February 18, 1947, Foreign

Minister Ernest Bevin informed the House of Commons of the

government's decision to present the Palestine problem to the UN.

On May 15, 1947, a special session of the UN General Assembly

established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

(UNSCOP), consisting of eleven members. UNSCOP reported on

August 31 that a majority of its members supported a geographically complex system of partition into separate Arab and Jewish

states, a special international status for Jerusalem, and an eco- nomic union linking the three members. Supported by both the

United States and the Soviet Union, this plan was adopted by the

UN General Assembly in November 1947. Although it considered

27
Jordan: A Country Study

the plan defective in terms of expectations from the mandate agreed

to by the League of Nations twenty-five years earlier, the Zionist

General Council stated its willingness in principle to accept partition. The Arab League Council, meeting in December 1947, said

it would take whatever measures were required to prevent implementation of the resolution. Abdullah was the only Arab ruler

willing to consider acceptance of the UN partition plan.

Amid the increasing conflict, the UN Implementation Commission was unable to function. Britain thereupon announced its intention to relinquish the mandate and withdrew from Palestine on May

14, 1948. On the same day, the Declaration of the Establishment

of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs

refused to set up a state in the Arab zone. In quick succession, Arab forces from Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq,

Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia advanced into Israel. Except

for the British-trained Arab Legion, they were composed of inexperienced and poorly led troops. Abdullah, the sole surviving leader

of the Arab Revolt of World War I, accepted the empty title of

commander in chief of Arab forces extended to him by the Arab

League. His motive for ordering the Arab Legion into action was

expressly to secure the portion of Palestine allocated to the Arabs

by the 1947 UN resolution. The Arab Legion, concentrated on

the East Bank opposite Jericho, crossed the Jordan on May 15 and

quickly captured positions in East Jerusalem and its environs. The

Legion also created a salient at Latrun northwest ofJerusalem to pinch the Israeli supply line into the city. Abdullah had been particularly insistent that his troops must take and hold the Old City

of Jerusalem, which contained both Jerusalem's principal Muslim holy places and the traditional Jewish Quarter. Other Arab

Legion units occupied Hebron to the south and fanned out through

Samaria to the north (Samaria equates to the northern part of the

West Bank—see Glossary). By the end of 1948, the areas held by

the Arab Legion and the Gaza Strip, held by the Egyptians, were

the only parts of the former Mandate of Palestine remaining in

Arab hands.

Early in the conflict, on May 29, 1948, the UN Security Council established the Truce Commission headed by a UN mediator,

Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte, who was assassinated in Jerusa- lem on September 17, 1948. He was succeeded by Ralph Bunche, an American, as acting mediator. The commission, which later evolved into the United Nations Truce Supervision OrganizationPalestine (UNTSOP), attempted to devise new settlement plans

and arranged truces. Armistice talks were initiated with Egypt in

January 1949, and an armistice agreement was established with

28
Historical Setting

Egypt on February 24, with Lebanon on March 23, with Transjordan on April 3, and with Syria on July 20. Iraq did not enter

into an armistice agreement but withdrew its forces after turning over its positions to Transjordanian units.

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The population of Transjordan before the war was about 340,000.

As a result of the war, about 500,000 Palestinian Arabs took refuge

in Transjordan or in the West Bank. Most of these people had

to be accommodated in refugee camps, which were administered

under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency

(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, set up in 1949.

In addition there were about 500,000 indigenous residents of the

West Bank.

In December 1948, Abdullah took the title of King of Jordan,

and in April 1949 he directed that the official name of the country

East Bank and West Bank—be changed to the Hashemite Kingdom

ofJordan, a name found in the 1946 constitution but not until then

in common use. In April 1950, elections were held in both the East

Bank and the West Bank. Abdullah considered the results favorable, and he formally annexed the West Bank to Jordan, an important step that was recognized by only two governments: Britain

and Pakistan. Within the Arab League, the annexation was not

generally approved, and traditionalists and modernists alike con- demned the move as a furtherance of Hashimite dynastic ambitions.

Abdullah continued to search for a long-term, peaceful solution

with Israel, although for religious and security reasons he did not

favor the immediate internationalization of Jerusalem. He found

support for this position only from Hashimite kinsmen in Iraq. Nationalist propaganda, especially in Egypt and Syria, denounced him

as a reactionary monarch and a tool of British imperialism.

The Arab League debates following the Jordanian annexation

of the West Bank were inconclusive, and Abdullah continued to

set his own course. The residual special relationship with Britain

continued, helping to keep the East Bank relatively free from dis- turbance. Although not yet a member of the UN, Jordan supported the UN action in Korea and entered into an economic

developmental aid agreement with the United States in March 1951

,

under President Harry S Truman's Point Four program.

On July 20, 1951, Abdullah was assassinated as he entered the

Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Friday prayers. His grandson,

fifteen-year-old Prince Hussein, was at his side. Before the assassin was killed by the king's guard, he also fired at Hussein. The

assassin was a Palestinian reportedly hired by relatives of Hajj Amin

29
Jordan: A Country Study

al Husayni, a former mufti ofJerusalem and a bitter enemy of Abdullah, who had spent World War II in Germany as a pro-Nazi

Arab spokesman. Although many radical Palestinians blamed Abdullah for the reverses of 1948, there was no organized political

disruption after his murder. The main political question confronting the country's leaders was the succession to the throne.

Abdullah's second son, Prince Naif, acted temporarily as regent,

and some support existed for his accession to the throne. Naifs

older brother, Prince Talal, was in Switzerland receiving treat- ment for a mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia. It was widely

believed that Abdullah would have favored Talal so that the succession might then pass more easily to Talal' s son, Hussein. Accordingly, the government invited Talal to return and assume the duties

of king. During his short reign, Talal promulgated a new Constitution in January 1952. Talal showed an inclination to improve

relations with other Arab states, and Jordan joined the Arab

League's Collective Security Pact, which Abdullah had rejected.

Talal was popular among the people of the East Bank, who were

not aware of his periodic seizures of mental illness. But the king's

condition steadily worsened, and in August the prime minister

recommended to a secret session of the Jordanian legislature that

Talal be asked to abdicate in favor of Hussein. Talal acceded to the abdication order with dignity and retired to a villa near Istanbul, where he lived quietly until his death in 1972.

Hussein, who was a student at Harrow in Britain, returned

immediately to Jordan. Under the Constitution he could not be

crowned because he was under eighteen years of age, and a regency council was formed to act on his behalf. Before he came to the

throne, he attended the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. When he was eighteen years old by the Muslim calendar,

he returned to Jordan and in May 1953 formally took the constitutional oath as king.

Hussein's Early Reign

The chief influences that guided the young Hussein were the

example and teachings of his grandfather and his own education

in conservative English schools. Although Jordan was a constitutional monarchy, as king Hussein had extensive legal powers. For

example, the Constitution allowed him to dismiss the National

Assembly and to appoint the prime minister and other ministers.

In addition, he enjoyed the traditional support of the East Bank

beduin tribes. Considered the backbone of the Hashimite monarchy, the Arab Legion was composed of intensely loyal beduins,

whose equipment and salaries were paid for by Britain.

30
Historical Setting

The majority of Jordan's population, however, did not consist

of beduins. Between one-half and two-thirds of Hussein's subjects were Palestinians, whereas the government elite was mostly from

the East Bank. This elite was more conservative and traditional

in its political attitudes than the Palestinians, whose spokespersons

often reflected a radical brand of Arab nationalism. In Cairo the

successful coup d'etat carried out by the Egyptian Free Officers

movement (headed by Gamal Abdul Nasser) had overthrown the

monarchy in July 1952 and established a republic. Palestinians,

who generally blamed Britain, the United States, and the Hashimites for their misfortunes, regarded Nasser as a champion of Arab

nationalism.

As border incidents with Israel escalated into a succession of

reprisals and counterreprisals between Palestinian infiltrators and

Israeli security forces, Hussein's problems grew. The Arab Legion

tried to secure the armistice line and prevent infiltration, but its numbers were inadequate to provide complete and continuous

coverage of the border. In response to the terrorist attacks, Israel adopted the technique of massive retaliation that often went deep

into Jordanian territory (see The Guerrilla Crisis, this ch.). In 1953 and early 1954, Israel tentatively accepted a United States plan (the Eric Johnston Plan) for distribution of the water taken

from the Jordan River. Although the plan was recognized as technically sound from an engineering standpoint, ultimately it was

rejected by Jordan and the other Arab states concerned because

it involved cooperation with—and the implied recognition of

Israel. Given the stress of inter-Arab political relationships, it was

impracticable for Jordan to initiate a settlement with Israel, even though there were strong incentives to do so. Britain agreed to a new financial aid arrangement with Jordan in

1954 in which London evinced an interest in coordinating military and economic aid to Amman, with Jordanian participation,

in the context of an overall Middle Eastern defense system. In

February 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan joined Britain

in signing the Baghdad Pact, which ultimately became the Central

Treaty Organization (CENTO). A high-ranking British military

delegation visited Amman to discuss conditions under which Jordan

might also become a participant. The purpose of the visit was generally known, and Arab nationalist propaganda, especially from Pales- tinians and Radio Cairo, raised a storm of protest denouncing the

pact and the monarchy as

4 'tools of Western imperialism" and a

4 'sellout to the Jews." In December Hussein asked Hazza al Majali

to form a government. Majali came from a distinguished family

of tribal shaykhs and was known to be pro-Western. Shortly after

31
Jordan: A Country Study

forming his cabinet, he stated unequivocally that he intended to take Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Three days of demonstrations

and rioting in Amman began after the announcement, and the Arab

Legion was called in to restore order. The Majali government

resigned after only a week in power, and it became clear that Jor- dan would not become a signatory of the Baghdad Pact. In March 1956, Hussein, responding to the public reaction

against joining the British- sponsored Baghdad Pact, attempted to show his independence from Britain by dismissing Glubb as com- mander of the Arab Legion. Glubb's dismissal precipitated a diplomatic crisis that threatened to isolate Hussein from his principal

benefactor, Britain. Relations were strained for many years

although the British subsidy was not withdrawn.

Hussein designated Ali Abu Nuwar, an officer known for his

nationalist sympathies, as Glubb's successor in the Arab Legion.

The name of the force was officially changed to the Jordan Arab

Army, and British officers were phased out of the service (see World

War II to 1967, ch. 5). Border incidents with Israel were a continuing source of anxiety in 1956. In October an Israeli task force, supported by aircraft

and artillery, attacked the West Bank village of Qalqilyah, killing

forty-eight persons in reprisal for a guerrilla attack in Israel. Palestinians clamored for war, and in this crisis atmosphere Jordanian

politics ventured into anti-Western nationalism.

In the parliamentary elections of October 21 , 1956, the National Socialist Party received a plurality of votes, and Hussein designated its leader, Sulayman Nabulsi, as prime minister. Several

National Front Party (Communist Party ofJordan) members and

members of the Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party)

also gained seats in the National Assembly, although independents

and the older, conservative parties were represented about equally with the leftists and nationalists. Nabulsi was an ardent admirer

of Nasser and shaped the policies of his government accordingly.

Nonetheless, when Israel attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai

Peninsula on October 29 and after British and French forces landed at Port Said on November 5, Nabulsi suddenly proved indecisive. Hussein proposed that Jordan attack Israel at once but Nasser

discouraged him from wastingJordan's forces in a war that by then was already lost. British participation in the attack on Egypt made

it politically imperative that Jordan end its special relationship with

Britain.

Under the Arab Solidarity Agreement that resulted from the Arab

summit meeting in Cairo in January 1957, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

and Syria undertook to pay Jordan the equivalent of US$35.8

32
A fresco from the palace of an eighth century

Umayyad caliph at Qasr Amrah, east of Amman

million annually for ten years, with Saudi Arabia paying an amount

equivalent to that paid by Egypt and Syria together. The money

would effectively free Jordan from the British subsidy. Saudi Arabia, however, made only one quarterly payment; Egypt and Syria

made no payments. The Anglo-Jordanian Agreement of March

1957 abrogated the basic Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948, terminated the British subsidy, and initiated the turnover of British

installations and the withdrawal of all British troops still in Jordan.

In early 1957, Jordan's internal political scene shaped up as a power struggle between the monarchy and the Nasserist Nabulsi

government. Hussein and the conservatives suspected that Nabulsi was maneuvering to abolish the monarchy. Nabulsi began negotiations to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and obtain Soviet arms aid. In April, as political tension increased,

Hussein, exercising his constitutional prerogative, demanded the

resignation of the Nabulsi government.

The situation was further confused when Ali Abu Nuwar, the

commander of the Jordan Arab Army (then still popularly known

in English as the Arab Legion), made a statement to Said al Mufti,

who was then attempting to form a caretaker government. Said

al Mufti misinterpreted the statement to be an ultimatum that any

33
Jordan: A Country Study

new cabinet be approved by the army. A sequence of dramatic

events followed that became known as the "Az Zarqa affair. " The

public in Amman, sensing the explosive political atmosphere, be- came restive. Rumors that the king was dead spread at the main

army base at Az Zarqa. Taking Abu Nuwar with him to demonstrate that he, the king, was very much alive and that he, not Abu

Nuwar, was in control Hussein set off for Az Zarqa. En route he

met several truckloads of troops, who were overjoyed at seeing the

king alive but who demanded the execution of Abu Nuwar. At Abu

Nuwar' s request, Hussein allowed him to retreat to the safety of

the royal palace. Continuing to Az Zarqa, Hussein spent several

hours amid wildly enthusiastic troops anxious to demonstrate their

loyalty to him and to the throne; he returned to Amman after reas- suring and quieting the troops. On the next day, Abu Nuwar fled the country. During the balance of April, several cabinet crises oc- curred, as the remnants of the Nabulsi faction fought a rearguard

action against Hussein. Ibrahim Hashim, a Hussein loyalist, eventually succeeded in forming a government and outlawed all politi- cal party activity.

Hussein had won a remarkable political victory. What had mattered most was the loyalty of the combat units of the army, and

that loyalty clearly belonged to the king. But Jordan was

beleaguered—Nasserites were arrayed against the king, the British subsidy was gone, the Arab Solidarity Agreement had evaporated, and the rift was wider than ever between the East Bank and

the West Bank. To counteract these disabilities, Hussein unequivocally placed his country in the Western camp and sought a new

source of aid—the United States. Crisis and Realignment

The United States replaced Britain as Jordan's principal source

of foreign aid, but it did so without a bilateral treaty or other for- mal alliance mechanisms. In April 1957, the White House offi- cially noted that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary

of State John Foster Dulles regarded "the independence and in- tegrity ofJordan as vital." Although Hussein did not specifically

request aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine—by which the United

States pledged military and economic aid to any country asking

for help in resisting communist influence—he did state publicly

that Jordan's security was threatened by communism. Within

twenty-four hours of Hussein's request for economic assistance,

Jordan received an emergency financial aid grant of US$10 million from the United States—the first of a long series of United

34
Historical Setting

States grants. Washington expanded existing development aid pro- grams and initiated military aid. In seeking a viable, long-term arrangement for political stabili- ty in the face of the hostile, Nasser- style revolutionary nationalism then prevalent in the Middle East, Jordan turned to neighboring

Iraq. Iraq, far larger and more populous than Jordan, was also

far wealthier because of its oil and other resources. Iraq had usually

supported Jordan in Arab councils, although without deep involvement, since the 1948 war. Its conservative government had taken

Iraq into the Bagdad Pact in 1955 to ensure continued Western

support against the Soviet Union or, more particularly, against radical movements.

On February 1, 1958, Egypt and Syria announced the integration of their two countries to form the United Arab Republic

(UAR). This development was greeted with great enthusiam by

the new nationalist advocates of Arab unity, but it made the position of conservative or moderate regimes more perilous. The initial phase of Jordanian-Iraqi negotiation was quickly concluded,

and on February 14, 1958, Hussein and his cousin, King Faisal

II, issued a proclamation joining the Hashimite kingdoms of Iraq

and Jordan in a federation called the Arab Union. Faisal was to be head of state and Hussein deputy head of state. The Arab Union, however, was short-lived. The Hashimite

monarchy in Iraq was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift,

predawn coup executed by officers of the Nineteenth Brigade under

the leadership of Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd

as Salaam Arif. The coup was triggered when King Hussein, fearing

that an anti-Western revolt in Lebanon might spread to Jordan,

requested Iraqi assistance. Instead of moving toward Jordan,

Colonel Arif led a battalion into Baghdad and immediately proclaimed a new republic and the end of the old regime. An Iraqi

motorized brigade under the command of Brigadier Qasim seized

control of Baghdad. King Faisal and other members of the Iraqi

royal family were murdered. Hussein, enraged and overcome by

shock and grief, threatened to send the Jordanian army into Iraq

to avenge Faisal's murder and restore the Arab Union. His civilian ministers, however, advised against taking this course. In Iraq the

army and police supported the coup, and Qasim became presidentdictator, taking Iraq out of the Arab Union and the Baghdad Pact. Jordan was isolated as never before. Hussein appealed both to the United States and to Britain for help. The United States insti- tuted an airlift of petroleum, and Britain flew troops into Amman

to stabilize the regime. Ironically, these aircraft overflew Israel,

because clearances for alternate routes over Arab countries could

35
Jordan: A Country Study

not be obtained in time. These events in Iraq and Jordan coincided with the landing of United States troops in Lebanon to bolster

the regime there.

For some weeks, the political atmosphere in Jordan was explosive, but the government kept order through limited martial law.

The army continued its unquestioning loyalty to the king, and the

Israeli frontier remained quiet.

The ensuing two-year period of relative tranquility was broken

in August 1960 when the pro-Western prime minister, Hazza al Majali who had been reappointed in May 1959, was killed by the

explosion of a time bomb concealed in his desk. Analysts speculated that the conspirators expected the killing to generate a public

uprising. It had precisely the opposite effect; beduin troops who

moved into Amman maintained order, and Hussein appointed a new conservative prime minister, Bahjat at Talhuni. The plot was

traced to Syria and further identified with Cairo. Four suspects were caught, convicted, and hanged, and the army made a show

of force. In June 1961, Talhuni was replaced by Wasfi at Tal to improve relations with Egypt, after Cairo implicated Amman for influencing Damascus' s decision to secede from the United Arab

Republic.

Development and Disaster

By early 1964, Arab governments and Palestinian spokesmen

had become alarmed by an Israeli project to draw water from Lake

Tiberias to irrigate the Negev Desert. Nasser invited the Arab heads

of state to attend a summit conference in Cairo in January 1964

at which the principal issue was the Jordan water question. Despite

Syria's militant rhetoric, the conference rejected the idea of provoking a war because—it was argued—the Arab states lacked a unified military command. Instead, three alternative courses of action were approved: the diversion of the tributary sources of the Jor- dan River north of Lake Tiberias in Lebanon and Syria; the es- tablishment of the United Arab Command under an Egyptian

commander; and the recognition of the new Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO), headed by a former Jerusalem lawyer, Ahmad Shuqayri (also cited as Shukairi), as the representative of Pales- tinian resistance against Israel. The Cairo Conference ofJanuary

1964 ended in an euphoric atmosphere of goodwill and brotherhood.

Talhuni became prime minister for the second time in July 1964,

pledging his government to implement the spirit of the Cairo Conference "according to the king's instructions." Jordan cultivated

friendship with Egypt. In May 1965, Jordan joined nine other Arab

states in breaking relations with the Federal Republic of Germany

36
Historical Setting

(West Germany) because of its recognition of Israel. Jordan and

Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in August defining for the first time the boundary between the two countries. Under this agreement, Jordan gave up some territory in the southeast but was able

to gain an extension of about eighteen kilometers down the gulf

from the crowded port of Al Aqabah.

Almost from the start, trouble developed between the PLO and

Hussein's government. Shuqayri, famous for his often hysterical

political rhetoric, had organized the PLO in Jerusalem in 1964 with

the objective of liberating Palestine in cooperation with all Arab

states but without interfering in their internal affairs or claiming

sovereignty in the West Bank. Conflict arose because the PLO at- tempted to assume quasi-governmental functions, such as taxing

Palestinians and distributing arms to villagers in the West Bank

and among the refugees, acts that infringed on Jordanian

sovereignty. The guerrilla organization, Al Fatah, was formed in Damascus with Syrian assistance in December 1957, under the

leadership of Yasir Arafat.

Jordanian policy since 1949 had been to avoid border incidents

and terrorism that would generate Israeli reprisals. Al Fatah and

the PLO, however, carried out raids and sabotage against Israel without clearance from either the United Arab Command or Jor- dan. These attacks, although planned in Syria, most often were

launched into Israel by infiltration through Lebanon or Jordan.

Israeli reprisals against selected West Bank targets became harsher and more frequent from May 1965 onward. Meanwhile, Syri- an propaganda against Hussein became increasingly strident. In

July 1966, when Hussein severed official endorsement and support for the PLO, both that organization and the Syrian government turned against him. In reprisal for the terrorist attacks by

the fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas), in November Israel assault- ed the West Bank village of As Samu. Israel was censured by the

UN, but public rioting against the Jordanian government broke

out among the inhabitants of the West Bank. The levels of rioting

exceeded any previous experience. As in the past, Hussein used

the army to restore public order. Political pressure against Hussein mounted, however, along with armed clashes on the SyrianJordanian border.

Tension also mounted on the Syria-Israel border, where a land

and air engagement took place on April 7, 1967. Syria and Jordan

severely criticized Egypt for failing to send support. In mid-May

Egypt commenced an extensive military build-up in Sinai in

response to Syrian allegations that Syria was in imminent danger

of invasion by Israel. Nasser declared a state of emergency on

37
Jordan: A Country Study

May 16 and two days later demanded removal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai, where it had served

as a peacekeeping force since 1957. The UN secretary general acceded to Nasser's demand.

On May 23-24, Nasser announced the closure to Israeli shipping of the Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba,

a measure that Israel immediately declared to be an act of war. Hussein quickly decided that this time it would be impossible for Jordan to stay out of the impending conflict. He hurriedly proceeded

to Cairo and on May 30 signed a military alliance with Egypt. Hussein's move represented a response to political pressures at home

and the fulfillment of basic pan-Arab commitments. The alliance

put the Jordanian army under the field command of an Egyptian

general officer. On June 5, Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egyptian forces deployed in Sinai. The Israeli prime minister, Levi

Eshkol, attempted in vain to contact Hussein through UN channels to keep him out of the war. The Egyptian field marshal in overall command of Arab forces ordered Jordanian artillery to open fire on Israeli positions, and Jordan's small air force conducted a bombing raid in the Tel Aviv area. Within hours, however, Israeli warplanes had effectively eliminated the Arab air forces on the ground.

After only two days of combat, Jordan's main armored unit had

been defeated. Hard fighting continued, as Hussein was determined

to hold as much ground as possible in the event that a cease-fire was arranged. By the time he agreed to a truce on June 7, Israeli forces had seized the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem.

Of all the Arab belligerents, Jordan, which could least afford

it, lost most in the war. Government figures listed over 6,000 troops

killed or missing. During the short war, about 224,000 refugees

many of whom had first been refugees from the 1948-49 war

fled from the West Bank to the East Bank. One-third to one-half

of the country's best agricultural land and its main tourist attractions were lost to Israel. OnJune 27, the Israeli parliament (Knesset)

formally annexed the Old City ofJerusalem, an act that the United

States and many other nations refused to recognize.

The Guerrilla Crisis In the wake of the June 1967 War, Hussein's government faced

the critical problems of repairing a shattered economy, providing

for the welfare of the refugees, obtaining external aid, readjusting

foreign policy, and rebuilding the armed forces. Internally,

however, the major problem was the continuing confrontation with

the several Palestinian guerrilla organizations.

38
Historical Setting

The Arab League heads of state met in Khartoum at the end

of August 1967. The conference reached four major decisions generally considered to represent the views of Arab moderates: resumption of oil production, which some oil-producing states had

suspended during the war; continued nonrecognition of and nonnegotiation with Israel, individually and collectively; continued

closure of the Suez Canal and the elimination of all foreign military bases in Arab territory; and provision of financial subsidies

to Egypt and Jordan by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait. The

total annual subsidy promised for the indefinite future amounted

to the equivalent of US$378 million, of which Jordan was to receive

about US$112 million. Donor states at first regularly paid their

shares in quarterly installments, but Libya and Kuwait withdrew

their support to Jordan during the 1970-71 war between the Jor- danian government and the fedayeen.

In addition to the Khartoum subsidies, Jordan also received

grants from Qatar, and the shaykhdom of Abu Dhabi, and a special grant of US$42 million from Saudi Arabia for arms purchases.

Aid also came from Britain and West Germany, with whom Jor- dan had resumed relations. Although direct United States aid had

been terminated, substantial long-term government loans were ex- tended to Jordan for emergency relief, development, and military

assistance. In February 1968, the United States resumed arms shipments to Jordan. Jordan narrowly averted financial disaster.

After months of diplomatic wrangling, on November 22, 1967,

the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 as a guideline

for a Middle East settlement. The principal provisions of the reso- lution proclaimed the inadmissability of territorial acquisition by

war; withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas occupied in the June

1967 war; termination of all states of belligerency; acknowledgment

of the sovereignty of all states in the area—including Israel—within

secure and recognized boundaries; freedom of navigation on all international waterways in the area; and a just settlement of the

refugee problem. Jordan, Egypt, and Israel all accepted this reso- lution in principle but each country interpreted it differently (see

Relations with Arab States, ch. 4). King Hussein has been the most consistent advocate of UN Resolution 242. He viewed it as the most viable means by which the

Palestinian problem could be resolved while also preserving an important Jordanian role in the West Bank.

The intractability of the Palestinian problem has been due in

large part to the widely differing perspectives that evolved after the June 1967 War. For the Israelis, in the midst of the nationalist

euphoria that followed the war, talk of exchanging newly captured

39
Jordan: A Country Study

territories for peace had little public appeal. The government of

Levi Eshkol followed a two-track policy with respect to the territories that would continue under future Labor Party governments: on the one hand, it stated a willingness to negotiate, while on the

other, it laid plans to create Jewish settlements in the disputed territories. Thus, immediately following the war, Eshkol stated that

he was willing to negotiate " everything" for a full peace, which

would include free passage through the Suez Canal and the Strait

of Tiran and a solution to the refugee problem in the context of

regional cooperation. This was followed in November 1967 with

his acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242. At the same

time, Eshkol' s government announced plans for the resettlement

of the Old City of Jerusalem and of the Etzion Bloc (kibbutzim on the Bethlehem-Hebron road wiped out by Palestinians in the

1948-49 War), and for establishing kibbutzim in the northern sector of the Golan Heights. Plans also were unveiled for new neighborhoods around Jerusalem, near the old buildings of Hebrew University and near the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus.

The 1967 defeat radicalized the Palestinians, who had looked

to the Arab countries to defeat first the Yishuv (the Jewish community of Palestine before 1948) and after 1948 the State of Is- rael, so that they could regain their homeland. The PLO had no

role in the June 1967 War. After the succession of Arab failures

in conventional warfare against Israel, however, the Palestinians

decided to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics as the most effective

method of attacking and defeating Israel. In February 1969, Arafat

(who remained the leader of Al Fatah) became head of the PLO.

By early 1970, at least seven guerrilla organizations were identified in Jordan. One of the most important organizations was the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by

George Habash. Although the PLO sought to integrate these various groups and announced from time to time that this process had

occurred, they were never effectively united (see The Palestinians

and the PLO, ch. 4). At first by conviction and then by political necessity, Hussein sought

accommodation with the fedayeen and provided training sites and

assistance. In Jordan's internal politics, however, the main issue

between 1967 and 1971 was the struggle between the government

and the guerrilla organizations for political control of the country.

Based in the refugee camps, the fedayeen virtually developed a state within a state, easily obtaining funds and arms from both the Arab

states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting Jordanian law.

As the guerrilla effort mounted, Israel retaliated quickly and with

increasing effectiveness. In March 1968, an Israeli brigade attacked

40
Historical Setting

the Jordanian village of Al Karamah, said to be the guerrilla capital. Although the brigade inflicted damage, it was driven back and

in the process suffered substantial losses. The incident boosted Pales- tinian morale and gave the PLO instant prestige within the Arab

community. In reprisal, Israel launched heavy attacks on Irbid in June 1968 and on As Salt in August. It soon became obvious to the PLO that the generally open terrain of the West Bank did not

provide the kind of cover needed for classic guerrilla operations.

Moreover, the Palestinian population residing in the territories had

not formed any significant armed resistance against the Israeli oc- cupation. By late 1968, the main fedayeen activities in Jordan

seemed to shift from fighting Israel to attempts to overthrow

Hussein.

A major guerrilla- government confrontation occurred in November 1968 when the government sought to disarm the refugee camps,

but civil war was averted by a compromise that favored the Palestinians. The threat to Hussein's authority and the heavy Israeli reprisals that followed each guerrilla attack became a matter of grave concern to the King. His loyal beduin army attempted to suppress

guerrila activity, which led to sporadic outbursts of fighting between the fedayeen and the army during the first half of 1970. In June 1970, an Arab mediation committee intervened to halt two

weeks of serious fighting between the two sides. In June Hussein designated Abd al Munim Rifai to head a

"reconciliation" cabinet that included more opposition elements

than any other government since that of Nabulsi in 1957. Although

the composition of the cabinet maintained a traditional balance between the East Bank and the West Bank, it included a majority

of guerrilla sympathizers, particularly in the key portfolios of defense, foreign affairs, and interior. But the king's action did not

reflect a new domestic policy; rather, it indicated Hussein's hope

that a nationalist cabinet would support peace negotiations generated by a proposed UN peace mission to be conducted by Gunnar

Jarring. On June 9, 1970, Rifai and Arafat signed an agreement

conciliatory to the fedayeen. According to its provisions, the government allowed the commandos freedom of movement within Jor- dan, agreed to refrain from antiguerrilla action, and expressed its support for the fedayeen in the battle against Israel. In return, the

commandos pledged to remove their bases from Amman and other

major cities, to withdraw armed personnel from the Jordanian capital, and to show respect for law and order.

Small-scale clashes continued throughout the summer of 1970,

however; and by early September, the guerrilla groups controlled

several strategic positions in Jordan, including the oil refinery near

41
Jordan: A Country Study

Az Zarqa. Meanwhile, the fedayeen were also calling for a general strike of the Jordanian population and were organizing a civil disobedience campaign. The situation became explosive when, as part of a guerrilla campaign to undermine the Jarring peace talks to which Egypt, Israel, and Jordan had agreed, the PFLP launched an airplane hijacking campaign.

Within the space of two hours on September 6, PFLP gangs

hijacked a TWA jet, a Swissair jet, and made an unsuccessful at- tempt to seize control of an El Al airplane. About two hours later,

another PFLP group hijacked a Pan Am jet and forced the crew

to fly to Beirut airport, where the airplane landed almost out of

fuel. The next day the airliner was flown to the Cairo airport, where

it was blown up only seconds after the 176 passengers and crew had completed their three-minute forced evacuation.

King Hussein viewed the hijackings as a direct threat to his

authority in Jordan. In response, on September 16 he reaffirmed

martial law and named Brigadier Muhammad Daud to head a cabi- net composed of army officers. At the same time, the king appointed

Field Marshal Habis al Majali, a fiercely proroyalist beduin, com- mander in chief of the armed forces and military governor ofJor- dan. Hussein gave Majali full powers to implement the martial

law regulations and to quell the fedayeen. The new government

immediately ordered the fedayeen to lay down their arms and to evacuate the cities. On the same day, Arafat became supreme com- mander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the regular mili- tary force of the PLO.

During a bitterly fought ten-day civil war, primarily between

the PLA and Jordan Arab Army, Syria sent about 200 tanks to aid the fedayeen. On September 17, however, Iraq began a rapid

withdrawal of its 12,000-man force stationed near Az Zarqa. The

United States Navy dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and Israel undertook "precautionary military

deployments" to aid Hussein, if necessary, against the guerrilla

forces. Under attack from the Jordanian army and in response to outside pressures, the Syrian forces began to withdraw from Jor- dan on September 24, having lost more than half their armor in

fighting with the Jordanians. The fedayeen found themselves on

the defensive throughout Jordan and agreed on September 25 to a cease-fire. At the urging of the Arab heads of state, Hussein and

Arafat signed the cease-fire agreement in Cairo on September 27.

The agreement called for rapid withdrawal of the guerrilla forces

from Jordanian cities and towns to positions "appropriate" for con- tinuing the battle with Israel and for the release of prisoners by

both sides. A supreme supervisory committee was to implement

42
Historical Setting

the provisions of the agreement. On September 26, Hussein appointed a new cabinet; however, army officers continued to head

the key defense and interior ministries.

On October 13, Hussein and Arafat signed a further agreement

in Amman, under which the fedayeen were to recognize Jordani- an sovereignty and the king's authority, to withdraw their armed

forces from towns and villages, and to refrain from carrying arms

outside their camps. In return the government agreed to grant amnesty to the fedayeen for incidents that had occurred during the

civil war. The civil war caused great material destruction in Jordan, and

the number of fighters killed on all sides was estimated as high as 3,500. In spite of the September and October agreements, fighting continued, particularly in Amman, Irbid, and Jarash, where

guerrilla forces had their main bases. Hussein appointed Wasfi at Tal as his new prime minister and minister of defense to head a

cabinet of fifteen civilian and two military members. The cabinet

also included seven Palestinians. Tal, known to be a staunch opponent of the guerrilla movement, was directed by Hussein to comply with the cease-fire agreements; furthermore, according to Hussein's written directive, the government's policy was to be based on ' 'the restoration of confidence between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian resistance movement, cooperation with the

Arab states, the strengthening of national unity, striking with an

iron hand at all persons spreading destructive rumors, paying special

attention to the armed forces and the freeing of the Arab lands oc- cupied by Israel in the war of June 1967." The closing months

of 1970 and the first six months of 1971 were marked by a series of broken agreements and by continued battles between the guerrilla forces and the Jordanian army, which continued its drive to oust the fedayeen from the populated areas. Persistent pressure by the army compelled the fedayeen to withdraw from Amman in April 1971 . Feeling its existence threatened,

Al Fatah abandoned its earlier posture of noninvolvement in the

internal affairs of an Arab state and issued a statement demanding the overthrow of the Jordanian "puppet separatist authority."

In a subsequent early May statement, it called for "national rule"

in Jordan. Against this background of threats to his authority, Hussein struck at the remaining guerrilla forces in Jordan.

In response to rumors that the PLO was planning to form a government-in-exile, Hussein in early June directed Tal to "deal

conclusively and without hesitation with the plotters who want to establish a separate Palestinian state and destroy the unity of the

Jordanian and Palestinian people." On July 13, the Jordanian

43
Jordan: A Country Study

army undertook an offensive against fedayeen bases about fifty

kilometers northwest of Amman in the Ajlun area—the fedayeen 's last stronghold. Tal announced that the Cairo and Amman agreements, which had regulated relations between the fedayeen and

the Jordanian governments, were no longer operative. OnJuly 19,

the government announced that the remainder of the bases in north- ern Jordan had been destroyed and that 2,300 of the 2,500 fedayeen

had been arrested. A few days later, many of the captured Palestinians were released either to leave for other Arab countries or

to return to a peaceful life in Jordan. Hussein became virtually

isolated from the rest of the Arab world, which accused him of harsh

treatment of the fedayeen and denounced him as being responsible for the deaths of so many of his fellow Arabs.

In November members of the Black September terrorist group

who took their name from the civil war of September 1970—avenged

the deaths of fellow fedayeen by assassinating Prime Minister Tal

in Cairo. In December the group again struck out against Hussein in an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Jordanian ambassador to Britain. Hussein alleged that Libya's Colonel Muammar

al Qadhafi was involved in a plot to overthrow the monarchy.

In March 1973, Jordanian courts convicted seventeen Black September fedayeen charged with plotting to kidnap the prime minister

and other cabinet ministers and to hold them hostage in exchange

for the release of a few hundred fedayeen captured during the civil war. Hussein subsequently commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment "for humanitarian reasons" and, in response to outside Arab pressures, in September released the prisoners—including

their leader Muhammad Daud Auda (also known as Abu Daud)

under a general amnesty.

War and Diplomacy

After his victory over the fedayeen, Hussein sought to reestablish his authority in the country and his image in the Arab world

through the implementation of dynamic domestic and foreign policies. In September 1971, he announced the formation of the Jor- danian National Union to serve as the nation's sole authorized

political organization, representing—at least in theory—both banks

of the Jordan. The union was not a political party in the traditional sense but, according to the king, would be used "as a melting pot

for the Jordanian people." With the exception of communists,

Marxists, and "other advocates of foreign ideologies," all citizens were eligible for membership within the union, which would "provide constructive opposition from within its own ranks."

44
Historical Setting

Hussein also introduced a plan for the creation of a federation

to be called the United Arab Kingdom. Under the plan, the West

Bank and the East Bank would become autonomous provinces

within the sovereign Hashimite kingdom. Seats in the National

Assembly would continue to be divided equally among representatives of the two regions. The PLO repudiated the United Arab

Kingdom and the Jordanian National Union, and neither plan was

ever implemented.

Hussein paid a state visit to the United States in February 1973

during which President Richard M. Nixon assured him of his

"firm . . . support for Jordan" and promised increased economic and military aid. During interviews Hussein, who earlier had

called for United States intervention to bring about a comprehensive Middle East settlement, reaffirmed that he contemplated no

partial or separate agreements with Israel that would be prejudicial to Arab unity, but he left the door open for bilateral talks and

condemned the PLO for its divisive influence. On his return to Amman, Hussein reemphasized that all of East Jerusalem must

be returned but offered to put the holy places there under international supervision.

At the Arab summit in Cairo in September 1973, a reconciliation mediated by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took place among

Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the "front-line" or confrontation states against Israel. On October 6, less than a month after the meeting,

Egyptian and Syrian armies launched simultaneous attacks across

the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights that caught the Israelis by

surprise. After initially threatening to break through Israel's in- ner defenses, the Syrians were checked and then thrown back by

an Israeli counteroffensive that drove to within thirty kilometers

of the strong defense emplacements surrounding Damascus. By

October 10, Jordan had mobilized nearly 70,000 men, forcing

Israeli troops to deploy in the West Bank. Hussein did not open

a third front against Israel, but he sent 3,000 Jordanian troops in

two armored brigades to the Golan front on October 1 3 , and they saw limited action under Syrian command in fighting near Lake

Tiberias. More than 25,000 regular Palestinian troops also were engaged under separate command.

With the Arab armies in retreat, the Soviet Union called a special session of the UN Security Council on October 21 to impose an immediate cease-fire. Although accepted by Israel and Egypt,

the cease-fire did not become effective for another three days.

On the northern front, Israeli troops retained control of the Golan

Heights, and in the southwest they had opened bridgeheads across the Suez Canal and occupied more than 1,500 square kilometers

45
Jordan: A Country Study

of territory in Egypt. UN Security Council Resolution 338, submitted on October 22, reiterated the Security Council's position on Israeli-occupied territory, first expressed in Resolution 242 in

1967.

At a postmortem on the fourth Arab-Israeli war held in November in Algiers, the Jordanian representative stressed that the ceasefire did not mean peace and called again for Israel to evacuate the

occupied territories that combined Arab forces had failed to win

back in battle. Over Jordanian protests, the summit conference

voted to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the

Palestinian people. Hussein, who conceded in Amman that he did

not claim to speak for the Palestinians, supported their right to self- determination—"but," he added, "only after the occupied terri- tories are liberated."

Hussein stated on more than one occasion his willingness to leave

the liberation of the West Bank to the PLO, but he pointedly boycotted a meeting with PLO officials in Cairo at which Egypt and

Syria were expected to deal with the PLO as the "only legitimate

representatives" of the Palestinian people—a position that Hussein admitted he had no alternative but to accept in practice. President Anwar as Sadat of Egypt, however, warned the PLO that its refusal to cooperate with Hussein could lead to an Arab civil war

on a broader scale than that of 1970-71. When the Palestinians

refused to compromise their claim to total sovereignty in the West

Bank, Hussein requested a postponement of the Arab summit

scheduled for Rabat in October 1974. The purpose of the summit

was to give formal recognition to the PLO's role. In an abrupt turn- about in policy, Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmi responded by declaring that Egypt now opposed the return of the West

Bank to Jordan and accepted without reservation the PLO claim

to represent the Palestinian people.

The Rabat Summit Conference and After

The Rabat Summit conference in October 1974 brought together

the leaders of twenty Arab states, including Hussein, and representatives of the PLO. PLO leaders threatened a walkout if their

demands for unconditional recognition were not met. The PLO

required a statement from the conference that any Palestinian

territory liberated by Arab forces would be turned over to the

"Palestinian people" as represented by their organization. Jordan

protested, pointing out that recognition on these terms would give

the PLO sovereignty over half of the population in the East Bank

and that in fact the annexation of the West Bank had been approved

by popular vote.

46
Historical Setting

A compromise solution was adopted that nonetheless favored

PLO interests. The conference formally acknowledged the right

of the Palestinian people to a separate homeland but without specifying that its territory was restricted to the West Bank. Most important, the PLO was for the first time officially recognized by all the

Arab states as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestini- an people." The Arab heads of state also called for close cooperation

between the front-line states and the PLO but prohibited interfer- ence by other Arab states in Palestinian affairs. The Rabat Summit declaration conferred a mantle of legitimacy on the PLO that was previously absent. It gave official Arab

recognition to PLO territorial claims to the West Bank and un- ambiguously put the fate of the Palestinian people solely in the hands

of the PLO. Hussein opposed the declaration, although he eventually signed it under intense Arab pressure and after the Arab

oil-producing states promised to provide Jordan with an annual

subsidy of $US300 million. Despite his acquiescence to the Rabat

declaration and subsequent statements in support of the PLO, Hussein persisted in viewing the declaration as an ambiguous document that was open to differing interpretations. The PLO, along

with the rest of the Arab world, viewed Hussein's consent at Rabat

as a renunciation of Jordanian claims to the West Bank. Hussein

nonetheless continued to have aspirations concerning Jordanian

control of the occupied territories. The wide gulf separating the

two views was the major source of tension between the PLO and

Jordan throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Following the Rabat Summit, the PLO scored an impressive

political victory in the international arena. In late November 1974,

the UN recognized PLO representation of the Palestinian people,

and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat addressed the General Assembly in Arabic, his pistol at his side. In addition, in a joint communique issued the same month, President Gerald R. Ford of the

United States and General Secretary of the Communist Party of

the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged the "legitimate

interests" of the Palestinians in accordance with the UN resolutions. Nonetheless, a UN draft resolution in 1976 proposing to reaffirm the right of the Palestinians to self-determination—and

including the right to establish an independent state —was vetoed

in the Security Council by the United States, which called instead

for a "reasonable and acceptable definition of Palestinian interests."

After the Rabat Summit, Hussein stressed the need for Jordanian political self-sufficiency. He told his subjects, "A new reality

exists and Jordan must adjust to it. The West Bank is no longer

Jordanian." But having surrendered title to half his kingdom at

47
Jordan: A Country Study

the behest of the Arab states, Hussein confessed concern that the

East Bank might become a "substitute Palestine," swallowed up

as the balance of political power there shifted to its Palestinian

majority.

The tone of Hussein's approach to the Palestinians in the East

Bank changed markedly following the Rabat Summit. He advised

that the resident Palestinians—estimated at 900,000 or more

must choose between Jordanian citizenship or Palestinian identity. No attempt would be made to oust those who chose the latter,

he said, and they would be permitted to remain in Jordan as "guests." He also insisted that any Palestinian choosing to keep

his Jordanian citizenship must be allowed to do so without endangering his rights in the West Bank; he further promised that any

Palestinian living in the East Bank who chose to identify his in- terests with those of the "Palestinian people" could do so without

jeopardizing his rights as a Jordanian citizen. In response to the new political situation following the Rabat

Summit, Hussein reorganized Jordan's political and administrative institutions. On November 9, he amended the Constitution

to give the king authority to dissolve the House of Representatives

(also called the Chamber of Deputies—see The Legislature, ch.

4) and to delay elections as he saw fit. Using this constitutional

prerogative, Hussein dissolved the lower house of the National

Assembly—the elected House of Representatives—when it had

completed its work on November 23. The House of Representatives, half of whose sixty members represented West Bank constituencies, could no longer function without undermining the newly

recognized representative status of the PLO. The Constitution was amended to provide for the indefinite postponement of elections

for a new House of Representatives so as to avoid elections in the East Bank alone, which if held would have symbolized the final separation of the West Bank from Jordan. In addition to dissolving the House of Representatives, Hussein directed Prime Minister

Zaid ar Rifai to form a new government that did not include Palestinians from the West Bank. No move was made, however, to relieve Palestinians in the Jordanian army, where they composed

one-third of the officer corps, albeit mostly in noncombatant functions (see Personnel: Composition, Recruitment, and Training,

ch. 5). The government also continued to pay the salaries of 6,000

civil servants and teachers in the West Bank, which amounted to about US$40 million a year. As a result of Hussein's partial reversal from the commitments

made at Rabat, Jordanian-PLO relations deteriorated throughout

much of 1975. At the year's end, however, the Palestine National

48
The Timna arches in the Wadi al Jayb, southern Jordan

Council, meeting in Damascus, backed an effort to reconcile its differences with Hussein. The broadcast of antiregime propaganda was temporarily suspended and, although PLA units remained

stationed in Jordan in military camps, the PLO accepted restric- tions on its political and military presence there. At the Arab summit

conference held at Cairo in January 1976, Jordan and the PLO

once again were embroiled in a dispute over Jordan's role in

negotiating an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Jordan

declared that it had no responsibility for negotiating such a withdrawal. In response, the PLO resumed its hostile propaganda shortly after the meeting.

In February 1976, Hussein summoned an extraordinary session

of the National Assembly—attended by about half of the representatives elected from the West Bank—to enact legislation enabling

the king to postpone indefinitely the general elections scheduled

for later in the month. The king's spokespersons explained that

the action was necessary because of "compelling circumstances"

that prevailed in the country. That same month, Hussein abolished

the Jordanian National Union.

In July Zaid ar Rifai, who had led the government since 1973,

stepped down as prime minister. Hussein replaced him with Mudar Badran, chief of the royal court. The Badran government set up the Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs, headed by former

members of parliament from West Bank constituencies, ostensibly

49
Jordan: A Country Study

to coordinate and advise on relations with Palestinians in Israeli- occupied territory. The government also conducted discussions on

the renewed possibility of some form of federation between the West

Bank and the East Bank. The PLO charged that the newly created

Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs had been formed to channel

support to pro-Jordanian candidates in municipal elections to be held

in the West Bank in April 1977. Badran denied these allegations and

reaffirmed Jordan's commitment to the concept that the Palestini- ans themselves must decide the future of the West Bank. PLO-backed

candidates won an overwhelming victory in the April elections. Relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization

The recrudescent tension between Jordan and the PLO was symptomatic of their differing visions of an Arab-Israeli setdement. Jordan accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the

basis for any settlement, including the question of Palestinian national rights. Within this framework, Jordan demanded total Is- raeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967; a solution

to the refugee problem either by repatriation or compensation; the

right of Palestinians to self-determination; and mutual guarantees

for peace. The PLO consistently rejected both 242 and 338 on the

grounds that the Palestinian people are only mentioned in the reso- lutions as refugees and not as a people deserving a national homeland.

On the issue of self-determination, Hussein agreed with the PLO

that the Palestinians had the right to establish "a national and political entity," but he refrained from giving his support to a fully

independent Palestinian state, which he saw as a direct threat, particularly if headed by the PLO. Moreover, he believed that if he

could neutralize the PLO, the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations would accept an arrangement based on his own federation plan.

Despite his desire to be the primary Arab negotiator over the

territories, Hussein also realized that his role in any future negotiations required a clear mandate from the Arab states. He could

not deviate too far from the Arab consensus concerning the oc- cupied territories for fear of losing badly needed economic aid or

instigating military attacks from Iraq and Syria. As a result, Hussein chose to participate in the proposed October 1 , 1977, Geneva

Conference on the Middle East as a "confrontation state" but not

as the representative of the Palestinians.

Jordanian-Syrian Relations

Despite along history of hostility, between 1975 and 1977 Jor- dan's major regional ally was Syria. During 1975 Jordan and

50
Historical Setting

Syria agreed to coordinate their defense, foreign policy, economic, information, education, and cultural activities. They established a joint military command to provide a single defensive line against

Israel. Syria halted anti-Hussein propaganda and imposed restric- tions on Syrian-based Palestinian activities that might be considered prejudicial to Jordan's sovereignty.

The marked improvement in relations between Hussein and Syri- an president Hafiz al Assad primarily reflected a shared desire to minimize the role of the PLO in any future Middle East peace

negotiations. Despite the commitments made at Rabat, neither Jor- dan nor Syria wanted the PLO to emerge from Middle East peace

talks as leader of a proposed Palestinian national entity in the oc- cupied territories. Their opposition to the PLO, however, stemmed

from very different sources. Jordan opposed the PLO because of

conflicting territorial objectives; Hussein wanted to reintegrate the

West Bank as a part of a pre- 196 7 Jordan. Assad opposed a PLOled ministate because he feared that such an entity would reduce

Syria's regional role and would significantly lessen the chances of

Syria regaining the Golan Heights. At the same time, Damascus

rejected Hussein's claims to the West Bank and vehemendy opposed

any Jordanian attempts to reach a separate peace agreement with

Israel. This position severely limited the flexibility of Jordanian

diplomacy and ultimately divided Jordan and Syria.

In 1975 Lebanon became engulfed in a bloody civil war that had

major ramifications for the regional political balance. Like the Black

September incident of 1970, the Lebanese Civil War pitted a rapidly

expanding Palestinian political infrastructure against a sovereign

Arab state. Between September 1970 and 1975, the Palestinians

created in Lebanon a " state within a state." They had their own

military establishment, an autonomous political structure, and

separate collection of taxes. Unlike Jordan in 1970, however, Leb- anon had a weak and badly divided political structure. As a result,

in the spring of 1975, after a number of skirmishes with Lebanese

Christian militias, the Palestinians allied with an array of leftist Lebanese forces and began an offensive. In the spring of 1976, it appeared that the Palestinians and their leftist allies would win the

fighting. President Assad, fearing a radical Palestinian force on

Syria's southern border, entered the fray on the side of the Christians and tilted the military balance in their favor. Jordan supported

the Syrian intervention, fearing that a Palestinian victory would

give the PLO a base of operations from which to destabilize the

region.

Jordan's relationship with Syria also improved as Jordan became

increasingly disenchanted with its relationship with the United

51
Jordan: A Country Study

States. Since the early 1970s, Jordan had negotiated for the purchase of a US$540 million air defense system from the United States

to be financed by Saudi Arabia. When the United States Congress

objected to the arms sale, Hussein commented that relations with

his one-time sponsor had reached "a sad crossroads." In 1976,

with Syrian encouragement, he traveled to Moscow to sound out

the Soviet Union on its willingness to provide a similar system. In the face of persuasive American and Saudi lobbying, Hussein

eventually opted to purchase the American Improved Hawk air defense system (see Military Cooperation with the United States,

ch. 5). His trip to Moscow, however, marked a significant improvement in Jordanian-Soviet relations and was a factor in his decision to support the concept of a Middle East peace conference

attended by both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Camp David Accords and Inter-Arab Politics

During the spring of 1977, the international climate strongly sup- ported some type of superpower-sanctioned settlement to the ArabIsraeli dispute. Newly elected United States president Jimmy Carter

and Soviet leader Brezhnev advocated a comprehensive Arab-Israeli

settlement that would include autonomy for the Palestinians. On

October 1 , 1977, in preparation for a reconvened Geneva Conference, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint state- ment committing themselves to a comprehensive settlement

incorporating all parties concerned and all questions. The proposed

summit, however, was preempted by events in Egypt.

Jordan, like the rest of the Arab states, was taken by surprise

by President Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem in November

1977. Hussein, however, muted his criticism of the Egyptian president's historic trip and called on the Arab states to reserve judgment. The king feared that an outright rejection of the Egyptian

initative might provoke an alienated Sadat to seek a separate agree- ment with Israel. He also saw many positive elements in Sadat's

opening statement to the Knesset, such as his rejection of a separate

settlement to the Palestinian problem, his emphasis on the need

to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, the recognition of

Jordan's special relationship with the West Bank, and the proposal

to incorporate Jordan, rather than the PLO, into the peace process. Despite his enthusiasm for Sadat's speech, Hussein was reluc- tant to join the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. He feared that by

joining the negotiations he would isolate Jordan in the Arab world,

incur Syria's wrath, and potentially destabilize Palestinians on the

East Bank with little possibility for Jordanian gains. Moreover,

52
Historical Setting

Hussein did not want to represent Palestinian interests at such

negotiations unless he had a clear Arab and Palestinian mandate

to do so. The final version of the Camp David Accords signed by Egypti- an president Sadat, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, and

United States president Carter separated the issues of the future

of the West Bank and the return of Sinai. Whereas the sections

dealing with the return of Sinai were very explicit, the sections on

the West Bank were vague and open to various interpretations.

They called for Egypt, Israel, and "the representatives of the Palestinian people to negotiate about the future of the West Bank and

Gaza." A five-year period of "transitional autonomy" was called

for "to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority." The

agreement also called for peace talks between Israel and its other

Arab neighbors, particularly Syria.

The Camp David Accords fell far short of meeting even Jordan's

minimal demands. Hussein expressed anger that Jordan was in- cluded in the Camp David framework without his prior knowledge

or approval. He viewed the division of the accords into two agreements with no linkage between Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and

progress on the Palestinian issue as a sign that Sadat was more

interested in regaining Sinai than in brokering a viable peace set- tlement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hussein was fur- ther alienated from the Camp David peace process because Israel refused to negotiate over East Jerusalem, insisted on its rights to establish settlements in the occupied territories, and reserved the

right to demand sovereignty over those areas at the end of the transition period.

Following the signing of the Camp David Accords, Jordan ac- cepted an Iraqi invitation—accompanied by a US$30 million Iraqi

grant—to attend the Baghdad Conference. The summit conference's decision to allot to Jordan the relatively large sum of US$1 .25

billion per year helped keep Jordan in the Arab fold. At the Baghdad Conference held in November 1978, the Arab states unequivocally rejected the Camp David Accords and officially ostracized

Egypt from the Arab League.

Jordanian-Egyptian relations deteriorated even further after the

signing of the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel in March

1979. The Israeli government's limited view of Palestinian autonomy became apparent shortly after the peace treaty was signed.

In April the Begin government approved two new settlements between Ram Allah and Nabulus, established civilian regional councils

for the Jewish setdements in the territories, and prepared autonomy plans in which Israel would keep exclusive control over the West

53
Jordan: A Country Study

Bank's water, communications, roads, public order, and immigration into the territories. The acceleration of settlements, the growth

of an increasingly militaristic Jewish settier movement, and Israel's stated desire to retain complete control over resources in the terri- tories precluded the participation in the peace process of either

moderate Palestinians, such as the newly formed National Guidance

Committee composed of West Bank mayors, or of Hussein. The

PLO refused from the beginning to participate in the peace process. In response, the Jordanian government recalled its ambassador

from Cairo on March 28 and on April 1 it severed diplomatic re- lations with Egypt. Not all ties were broken, however; the Jordanian and Egyptian airlines still flew about ten flights a week between

their respective cities and, most important, Egyptian workers in

Jordan continued to enjoy the same status as before. The Jordani- an media and public officials intensified anti-Israel rhetoric, showing

particular hostility toward the United States for supporting the ac- cords. Hussein's greatest fear was that, with Egypt removed from

the Arab-Israeli military balance, Israel might be tempted to trans- form the East Bank into an "alternative homeland" for the Palestinians. Jordanian fears were fueled when, at the end of March

1979, Israeli minister of agriculture Ariel Sharon issued a state- ment to the effect that the Palestinians ought to take over Jordan

and establish a government there. Hussein, although fully backing the Baghdad accords, sought

a very different objective than the more hard-line Arab states such

as Syria and Iraq. His goal was not to punish Egypt or overthrow

Sadat, but rather to set up an alternative strategy to the Camp David

framework supported by an Arab consensus that would provide

a more equitable and viable solution to the Middle East conflict. The essence of the Jordanian alternative was to return the Palestinian problem either to the UN Security Council or to the Geneva Conference where all the relevant parties—including the United

States, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic

Community—could work together in reaching a comprehensive

Middle East peace plan.

Hussein's attempt to develop a united Arab stand did not suc- ceed. At the Tunis Summit of November 1979, in the face of strong

Syrian objections, Hussein was unable to mobilize an Arab consensus behind an alternative to the Camp David Accords. Syrian

president Assad's strong objections to Hussein's proposal marked

the beginning of rapid deterioration in Syrian-Jordanian relations.

Hussein was further rebuffed when Assad revived the Steadfast- ness and Confrontation Front consisting of Syria, Libya, Algeria,

the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and

54
Historical Setting

the PLO. The Syrian leader accused Jordan of supporting Syrian

elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been involved in a series of attacks against his regime. Although Syria continued

to be a major Soviet ally in the Middle East, Jordan joined nearly

the entire Arab world in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, Syria, unlike Jordan, was unwilling to participate in any alternative to the Camp David Accords.

Jordan in the 1980s

The overthrow of the shah of Iran in February 1979 and the emergence of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini caused grave concern in Amman. The vehement anti-Western, antimonarchical, Islamic revolutionary fervor sweeping Iran throughout 1979

cast a threatening shadow over Jordan. Not only was Hussein a monarch allied with the West, but also he had been a close ally

of the shah for many years. The Islamic Revolution and a New Arab Alignment

Hussein followed a two-track policy to counteract the looming

Iranian threat. One track was domestic; the other, foreign. Domestically, he made a more concerted effort to appear religiously observant in public and to emphasize Islam in the day-to-day life of

Jordan. He also increased financial support for mosques and Is- lamic charities and encouraged the payment of zakat (the Muslim

religious tax) by exempting those who paid it during the month

of Ramadan from 25 percent of their income tax. In addition, during the month of Ramadan some of the provincial governors closed

down bars and night clubs on some religious holidays and banned

films described as obscene.

For most of his reign, Hussein had appeased the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups in Jordan as a way of counterbalancing the more radical and, in his view, more destabilizing groups

such as the communists, Baathists, and Nasserists. Although the

Muslim Brotherhood came out in support of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the organization in Jordan was not prepared to challenge openly the authority of the Hashimite regime that opposed the Iranian Revolution.

Hussein altered Jordan's Arab alignments in response to the new

regional balance of power caused by the Islamic Revolution in Iran,

the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the growing rift with Syria.

The focus of Jordan's new regional outlook was improved rela- tions with Iraq. Both countries saw ominous implications in the

developments in Iran. Moreover, with Egypt no longer in the Arab

fold, Jordan sought an Arab military alliance capable of deterring

55
Jordan: A Country Study

a more militaristic regime in Israel from meddling in Jordanian

affairs. Hussein also needed Iraqi support to stave off the Syrian

threat, which had grown significantly during 1980. Finally, Baghdad and Amman feared the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and

its implications for the regional balance of power.

After a series of high-level meetings in the early 1980s, a wide

range of exchanges took place . Iraq greatly increased economic as- sistance to Jordan and discussed a possible project for supplying

Jordan with water from the Euphrates. The outbreak of the Iran- Iraq War in September 1980 further tightened relations. From the

beginning of the war, Jordan was the most outspoken of the Arab

states supporting Iraq. The Iraqi connection became increasingly

important as tensions mounted between Jordan and Syria. Between

September 1980 and late 1981, Jordan reportedly received US$400

million in economic aid from Iraq. In October 1981, an IraqiJordanian Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation was set up. Jordan's most demonstrative act of support for the Iraqi war effort occurred in January 1982 when Hussein an- nounced the formation of the Yarmuk Brigade, a Jordanian force

of volunteers that pledged to fight for Iraq.

Throughout 1982, as Iran scored significant victories in the Iran- Iraq War, Jordan substantially increased its support to Iraq. Al

Aqabah replaced the besieged Iraqi port of Basra as Iraq's major

marine transportation point. During 1981 and 1982, the turmoil

besetting the Arab states both benefited and threatened Jordan.

Egypt, the most populous and militarily strongest Arab country, was ostracized; Syria faced serious domestic unrest and a growing

rebellion in Lebanon; Iraq seemed to be losing its war with Iran

and was in danger of losing strategically important territory in the

south; Syria and Iraq were hostile to each other; and the Persian

Gulf states were suffering from the downturn in world oil prices.

The weakness of the other Arab states enabled Jordan to play a more important role in Arab politics and allowed Hussein to pursue a more flexible regional diplomacy.

Jordan's improved status in the Arab world resulted in Amman

hosting its first Arab summit in November 1981. Hussein reportedly hoped to obtain a breakthrough on the Palestinian question

and to mobilize support for the Iraqi war effort. The summit,

however, was boycotted by members of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front led by Syria. In addition, Syria had massed troops on the Jordanian border. Hussein countered by mobilizing a force

of equal strength on the Syrian border. Although the situation was

eventually defused through Saudi mediation efforts, the potential

for future Syrian-Jordanian conflict remained.

56
Historical Setting

In Search of a Solution to the Palestinian Problem

Jordan's relations with the PLO have reflected the conflicting

territorial claims of the Palestinians and Jordan. Since the June

1967 War, both the PLO and Jordan have staked claims to the

West Bank and East Jerusalem. Although Hussein and the PLO,

like the rest of the Arab world, have rejected Israeli suzerainty over

the territories, they differed widely on how the occupied territories should be administered and by whom.

Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jordan asserted its role in the lives of West Bank Palestinians in various ways. Jor- dan distributed financial assistance, oversaw the freedom of move- ment of people and merchandise across the bridges of the Jordan

River, assumed the role of protector of the rights of the population under Israeli occupation, and sought the condemnation of Is- rael in the international community for alleged acts of injustice

against the people of the West Bank. Beginning in 1979, individuals from the West Bank, like other Jordanian citizens, were required

to obtain new identity cards to benefit from Jordanian government

services and to obtain Jordanian passports. Mutual mistrust,

however, had prevented agreement between Jordan and the PLO

on any form of long-term political cooperation beyond the joint

distribution of funds to the occupied territories. Jordanians, however, remained adamantiy opposed to the fedayeen reestablishing bases in Jordan from which to launch guerrilla

operations against Israel. Hussein feared that Israel, maintaining a distinct military advantage over the badly divided Arab states, would launch punishing reprisal raids against Jordan if guerrilla operations were to resume. This appraisal was strongly reinforced by the Israeli air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June

1981.

During the second half of 1980, talk of the so-called "Jordanian

option" revived because of the approaching elections in Israel, Presi- dent Ronald Reagan's election victory in the United States, and

talk of a new European initiative in the Middle East. On the surface, the Jordanian option resembled Hussein's version of a set- tlement with Israel; it envisioned Jordan acting as the major Arab

interlocutor in a peace settlement with Israel. Jordan, however,

could not outwardly appear as if it were breaking away from the

Arab fold and usurping Palestinian prerogatives, unless it were likely

that concessions made by Jordan would be reciprocated by Israel. Given the right-wing Likud government in power in Israel, Hussein surmised that such Israeli territorial concessions would not be

forthcoming.

57
Jordan: A Country Study

As a result, Jordan's public posture on the Palestinian question was ambiguous. In public statements acknowledging PLO representation of the Palestinian people Hussein frequently emphasized the

important role Jordan had played in the Palestinian struggle against

Israel. Moreover, he rarely identified the PLO as the "sole" legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

Economic Austerity

Since the creation of Transjordan in 1921, the nation had depended on external economic aid. This dependence rendered it eco- nomically vulnerable. For many years the economy was underwritten by Britain. By the early 1950s, after Jordan had officially

annexed the West Bank, foreign aid accounted for 60 percent of

government revenues. The crucial event for the Jordanian econo- my, as it was for the Arab world as a whole, was the quadrupling

of world oil prices that followed the October 1973 War. Possess- ing little oil of its own, Jordan nonetheless became inexorably linked

to the volatile world oil market. Between 1973 and 1981, direct

Arab budget support rose more than sixteen-fold, from US$71.8

million to US$1,179 billion. In the same period, the value ofJor- danian exports jumped almost thirteen-fold, from US$57.6 million to US$734.9 million. In addition, Jordan sent to the Persian

Gulf states an estimated 350,000 doctors, engineers, teachers, and

construction workers who by 1981 had sent back home more than

US$1 billion. Even after deducting the outward flow of dinars from

the 125,000 foreign workers inside Jordan holding agricultural and

unskilled jobs, net worker remittances rose from US$15 million

in 1970 to US$900 million in 1981 (see Structure and Dynamics

of the Economy, ch. 3). The accelerated pace of economic growth fueled by the oil price

increases of the 1970s also caused inflation and growing import

bills. Most important for Jordan, the economic boom years of the

1970s raised popular expectations of continued economic prosperity.

As a result, when world oil prices began spiraling downward in

the early 1980s, the government halted many large-scale construction projects, slashed food and other subsidies, and significantly

reduced public employment. These actions stirred public dissatis- faction.

Hussein's response to the rise in public discontent was to ease

restrictions on the political process. First, in 1981 he increased membership of the National Consultative Council (NCC) from sixty

to seventy-five. The NCC had been created in April 1978 to fulfill the legislative functions of the dissolved House of Representatives.

The NCC, however, was empowered only to debate and discuss

58
Historical Setting

bills and had no authority to make laws. As a result, the enlargement of the NCC's membership did not appease the opposition

seeking democratic reforms. In addition, in March 1982 a new

weekly publication, Al Ufuq (Horizons), campaigned for greater

democratic freedom and for the reestablishment of political parties banned since 1957 (see Political Dissent and Political Repression, ch. 4). Two political groups were formed: the Arab

Constitutional Alignment and the Arab National group. Both

groups called for greater public participation in the affairs of state. The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon significantly altered

Jordan's geostrategic position. Israel's willingness to remove PLO

bases from Lebanon by force, despite widespread international criti- cism, raised apprehensions that Israel might launch an offensive

against Jordan. The Arab states, weakened by internal rivalries,

the Iran-Iraq War, and Egypt's isolation, did not respond forcefully to the Israeli actions. Hussein viewed the Lebanon invasion

as part of a pattern of more aggressive Israeli policies that included the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, confrontations

with Syria, and an ambitious settlement policy in the occupied territories. The government of Menachem Begin, unlike its predecessors, was willing to use force to attain its territorial objectives. This

led to concerns that Israel might have designs on Jordan, or that

the PLO, after having its major base of operations in Lebanon destroyed, might attempt to reestablish itself in Jordan. Hussein also feared that Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank was rapidly reducing the chances of an acceptable settlement there. To many Middle East experts, the increase in settlements, their

strategic location, the militancy of many of the Israeli settlers, the

rise of religious nationalism inside the political mainstream in Israel,

and the expansionary views of the Likud leadership lent urgency

to the need to reach a negotiated settlement. Jordan hoped to con- vince the Reagan administration to push policy makers in Jerusalem toward an acceptable peace settlement.

On September 1, 1982, President Reagan launched the Reagan Plan. Hussein applauded the new American proposal, seeing

in it a clear break from the Camp David framework. In announcing the new plan, Reagan stated that "it was the firm view of the

United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West

Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance

for a durable and lasting peace,

'

' specifying that the United States would not support the establishment of a Palestinian state. The

59
Jordan: A Country Study

Reagan Plan also stressed UN Resolution 242, stating that the reso- lution applied to all fronts, including the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip, and that the final status of Jerusalem should be decided

through negotiation.

The war in Lebanon and the publication of the Reagan Plan

ushered in a new symbiosis in Jordanian-PLO relations. Hussein

needed PLO acceptance of Jordan's participation in the peace

process in the framework of the Reagan Plan; PLO chairman Yasir

Arafat, considerably weakened by the PLO's devastating defeat

in the war in Lebanon, needed Jordanian support to gain access

to the political process. In October 1982, Hussein and Arafat began a series of meetings designed to formulate a joint response to the Reagan Plan. These negotiations centered around the formation of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to future peace talks,

and—because neither Israel nor the United States recognized the

PLO-6n the extent to which the PLO would be directiy associated

with this delegation. Jordan proposed that the PLO appoint West

Bank residents who were not members of the PLO to represent

the Palestinians. In November 1982, agreement was reached on

the formation of a HigherJordanian-Palestinian Committee headed

by Prime Minister Mudar Badran and Arafat.

Because of conflicting objectives sought by Arafat and Hussein,

the joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee never materialized.

Whereas Hussein saw the proposed confederation as a means to reestablish Jordanian control over the West Bank, Arafat viewed

the negotiations as a means to gain PLO sovereignty over the oc- cupied territories. In addition, Hussein and Arafat required evi- dence that Washington was willing to pressure Israel to make

significant territorial concessions. Meanwhile, Israeli troops still occupied part of southern Lebanon, and the Israeli government

had not made any commitments on the settiement issue. Moreover,

given Iran's recent victories in its war with Iraq, tensions with Syria,

and a depressed world oil market, Hussein could not isolate Jor- dan by unilaterally participating in the Reagan Plan without some

show of Israeli flexibility.

Following Hussein's decision in April 1983 not to join the Reagan Plan, Jordan increasingly criticized Washington's inability to apply pressure on Israel to halt settlements in the West Bank. United

States-Jordanian relations were further strained in May 1983 when

the Reagan administration lifted a ban on the sale of F- 1 6 aircraft to Israel. The ban had been imposed to pressure Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. The United States opposed a Jor- danian draft resolution submitted to the UN Security Council in

July 1983 asserting the illegality of Israeli settlement activity in the

60
Historical Setting

West Bank, and relations between the two countries were further

soured by the signing in November 1983 of a new agreement on

strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States. Syria emerged from the war in Lebanon as a pivotal regional

power, able and willing to play a role in the affairs of neighboring

Arab states. Whereas Syrian power was on the rise, Jordan's most

powerful Arab ally, Iraq, seemed to be losing its costly war with

Iran. Hussein tried to counterbalance the Syrian threat by making overtures to President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, but did not

yet reestablish diplomatic relations. Hussein hoped that Mubarak,

who had replaced Sadat after the latter' s assassination in September 1981, would bring Egypt back into the Arab fold after Sinai was returned to Egypt in September 1982.

High-level talks between Egypt and Jordan occurred regularly

throughout 1983 and 1984. In addition, Egyptian newspapers,

banned in Jordan after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, were al- lowed into the country in October 1983. Also, Jordan and Egypt

signed a trade protocol in December 1983 and discussed the ex- pansion of scientific and agricultural cooperation. Finally, in September 1984, Jordan officially announced the resumption of

diplomatic relations with Egypt.

* * *

Philip K. Hitti's History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present is a classic survey of the subject by an eminent historian.

Much material on the origin and development of the Transjordanian amirate is found in J.C. Hurewitz's The Struggle for Palestine and Christopher Sykes's Crossroads to Israel, 1917-1948. For a scholarly analysis of the growth of Arab nationalism, see Zeine N.

Zeine's The Emergence of Arab Nationalism and The Struggle for Arab

Independence, which may be used to supplement George Antonius's more familiar The Arab Awakening. Glubb's Legion, by Godfrey Lias,

is a sympathetic, popular treatment of the activities of the Arab

Legion. Sir John Bagot Glubb's memoir, A Soldier with the Arabs,

is both entertaining and informative. Another firsthand British ac- count ofJordan's historical development is Charles Johnston's The

Brink ofJordan. Both King Abdullah and his grandson, Hussein,

have provided readable memoirs that can be studied profitably in

conjunction with more objective scholarly works. Peter Snow, a

British journalist, has written the most accessible biography of

Hussein.

Two excellent scholarly books focusing on Britain's role in the

development ofJordan were published in the late 1980s. These are

61
Jordan: A Country Study

Mary C. Wilson's King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making ofJordan

and Avi Shlaim's highly controversial Collusion Across the Jordan,

which depicts secret Zionist- Hashimite collaboration over the final settlement of Palestine. Another useful work covering the early his- tory of Jordan is Uriel Dann's Studies in the History of Transjordan,

1920-1949. Avi Plascov's The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan,

1948-1957 offers an interesting analysis of the Palestinian refugee

problem.

A solid general survey of Jordan is Peter Gubser's Jordan. The

Jordan sections in the Middle East Contemporary Survey provide fair- ly detailed coverage of political and economic events. Robert B. Satloff s Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to the Domestic Stability

ofJordan focuses on the more recent history of Jordan. Bernard

Avishai's articles on Jordan in the New York Review ofBooks during

the early 1980s provide keen insights into contemporary Jordani- an history. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

62
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Mosaic of a gazelle from a Byzantine church in Amman, ca. 500-700
WHEN THE AMIRATE of Transjordan was created by the Brit- ish in 1921, the vast majority of the people consisted of an assort- ment of tribally organized and tribally oriented groups, some of

whom were sedentary cultivators and some nomadic or seminomadic. The total population was fewer than 400,000 people. By

1988 nearly 3,000,000 people, more than half of whom were Palestinians, inhabited the region east of the Jordan River-Dead SeaGulf of Aqaba line, referred to as the East Bank (see Glossary).

The term Palestinians refers narrowly to citizens of the British mandated territory of Palestine (1922-48). In general usage, however,

the term has come to refer to Muslims or Christians indigenous

to the region between the Egyptian Sinai and Lebanon and west

of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqaba line who identify themselves primarily as Palestinians. Narrowly defined, the term Trans- jordanian referred to a citizen of the Amirate of Transjordan

(1921-46). Generally speaking, however, a Transjordanian was considered a Muslim or Christian indigenous to the East Bank region,

which was within the approximate boundaries of the contemporary

state ofJordan. The formerly rural society ofJordan had been trans- formed since independence into an increasingly urban one; by 1985

nearly 70 percent of the population resided in urban centers that were growing at an annual rate of between 4 and 5 percent. In the late 1980s, class polarization was increasingly evident.

Nonetheless, a variety of social forces (such as national identity

and regional or tribal affiliation) continued to cut across class lines. The uprooting of so many East Bank citizens from their places of

origin contributed to social fragmentation. In addition to the Palestinians, who retained a strong sense of national identity and out- rage at the loss of their homeland, many Transjordanians had

migrated from their rural and/or desert villages to urban centers

in search of work for themselves and education for their children.

Many Transjordanians thus shared a sense of loss and rootiessness.

Probably the most important force supporting cohesion and in- tegration was the Arab-Islamic cultural tradition common to all but a few members of the society. Arabic, a potent force for unity

throughout the Middle East, was the mother tongue of the over- whelming majority of residents. Also, more than 90 percent of the

population adhered to Sunni (see Glossary) Islam. These commonalities, although important, have been insufficient to forge an in- tegrated society.

65
Jordan: A Country Study

Every year since the late 1950s, increasing numbers ofJordan's

youth have received formal training in the country's rapidly ex- panding education system. By the late 1980s, all children aged six years to twelve years were attending free and compulsory primary

schools. Nearly 80 percent of children between the ages of thir- teen and fifteen attended three-year preparatory schools, also free and compulsory. But possession of an education, once a near cer- tain vehicle for upward mobility, no longer guaranteed employment. Unemployment was probably one of the most critical issues

facing Jordan in the late 1980s. It was accompanied by growing

political frustration and radicalization over the Palestinian uprising (intifadah) in the Israeli-occupied West Bank (see Glossary).

Geography

The territory ofJordan covers about 91,880 square kilometers.

Until 1988, when King Hussein relinquished Jordan's claim to the

West Bank, that area was considered part ofJordan, although only

officially recognized as such by Britain and Pakistan. At that time

the West Bank—which encompasses about 5,880 square kilometers

had been under Israeli occupation since the June 1967 War between

Israel and the states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

Jordan is landlocked except at its southern extremity, where nearly twenty-six kilometers of shoreline along the Gulf of Aqaba provide access to the Red Sea. A great north-south geological rift, forming the depression of Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), the Jor- dan Valley, and the Dead Sea, is the dominant topographical

feature.

Boundaries

Except for small sections of the borders with Israel and Syria,

Jordan's international boundaries do not follow well-defined natural

features of the terrain. The country's boundaries were established

by various international agreements, and, with the obvious exception of the border with Israel, none was in dispute in early 1989.

The de jure border with Israel is based on the Armistice line agreed on in April 1949 by Israel and what was then Transjordan,

following negotiations held under the auspices of a United Nations

(UN) mediator. In general, the border represents the battle positions held by Transjordanian and Israeli forces when a cease-fire

went into effect and has no relation to economic or administrative

factors. Until the Israeli occupation of the West Bank that occurred

during the June 1967 War (also known as the Six-Day War), the

demarcation line divided the city ofJerusalem, with Jordan holding the Old City and most of the holy places.

66
The Society and Its Environment

Jordan's boundaries with Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia do not have the special significance that the border with Israel does; these

borders have not always hampered tribal nomads in their movements, yet for a few groups borders did separate them from traditional grazing areas and water sources. By the time political

boundaries were drawn across the deserts around Transjordan af- ter World War I, most of the nomadic tribes in that region had

long-established areas lying within the confines of the new state. To accommodate the few cases where tribal peoples traditionally

had moved back and forth across the country's borders, agreements

with neighboring countries recognized the principle of freedom of

grazing and provided for a continuation of migratory practices,

subject to certain regulations.

The border between Jordan and Saudi Arabia (only partially

delimited by a series of agreements between Britain and the government of what eventually became Saudi Arabia) was first formally

defined in the Hadda Agreement of 1925. In 1965 Jordan and Saudi

Arabia concluded a bilateral agreement that realigned and delimited

the boundary. The realignment resulted in some exchange of ter- ritory, and Jordan's coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba was lengthened by about eighteen kilometers. The new boundary enabled

Jordan to expand its port facilities and established a zone in which

the two parties agreed to share petroleum revenues equally if oil were discovered. The agreement also protected the pasturage and

watering rights of nomadic tribes inside the exchanged territories. Topography

The country consists mainly of a plateau between 700 and 1 ,000

meters high, divided into ridges by valleys and gorges, and a few

mountainous areas. Fractures of the earth's surface are evident in the great geological rift that extends southward from the Jordan

Valley through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, gradually dis- appearing south of the lake country of East Africa. Although an

earthquake-prone region, as of early 1989 no severe shocks had

been recorded for several centuries.

By far the greatest part of the East Bank is desert, displaying

the land forms and other features associated with great aridity. Most

of this land is part of the great Syrian (or North Arabian) Desert

(see fig. 4). There are broad expanses of sand and dunes, particularly in the south and southeast, together with salt flats. Occasional jumbles of sandstone hills or low mountains support only meager

and stunted vegetation that thrives for a short period after the scanty

winter rains. These areas support little life and are the least populated regions of Jordan.

67
Jordan: A Country Study

The drainage network is coarse and incised. In many areas the

relief provides no eventual outlet to the sea, so that sedimentary

deposits accumulate in basins where moisture evaporates or is absorbed in the ground. Toward the depression in the western part

of the East Bank, the desert rises gradually into the Jordanian

Highlands—a steppe country of high, deeply cut limestone plateaus

with an average elevation of about 900 meters. Occasional summits in this region reach 1,200 meters in the northern part and

exceed 1 ,700 meters in the southern part; the highest peak is Jabal

Ramm at 1 ,754 meters. These highlands are an area of long-settled

villages. Until about the 1940s, persons living in these villages depended upon rain-fed agriculture for their livelihood.

The western edge of this plateau country forms an escarpment

along the eastern side of the Jordan River-Dead Sea depression

and its continuation south of the Dead Sea. Most of the wadis that

provide drainage from the plateau country into the depression carry water only during the short season of winter rains. Sharply incised

with deep, canyonlike walls, the wadis, whether wet or dry, can

be formidable obstacles to travel. The Jordan River is short, but from its mountain headwaters

(approximately 160 kilometers north of the river's mouth at the

Dead Sea) the riverbed drops from an elevation of about 3,000

meters above sea level to more than 400 meters below sea level. Before reaching Jordanian territory the river forms Lake Tiberias, the surface of which is 212 meters below sea level. The Jordan

River's principal tributary is the Yarmuk River. Near the junction of the two rivers, the Yarmuk forms the boundary between

Israel on the northwest, Syria on the northeast, and Jordan on the

south. The Az Zarqa River, the second main tributary of the Jor- dan River, rises and empties entirely within the East Bank.

A 380-kilometer-long rift valley runs from the Yarmuk River

in the north to Al Aqabah in the south. The northern part, from

the Yarmuk River to the Dead Sea, is commonly known as the

Jordan Valley. It is divided into eastern and western parts by the

Jordan River. Bordered by a steep escarpment on both the eastern and the western side, the valley reaches a maximum width of

twenty-two kilometers at some points. The valley is properly known

as the Al Ghawr (the depression, or valley, also seen as Al Ghor;

see Water, ch. 3). The rift valley on the southern side of the Dead Sea is known

as the Southern Ghawr and the Wadi al Jayb (popularly known

as the Wadi al Arabah). The Southern Ghawr runs from Wadi

al Hammah, on the south side of the Dead Sea, to Ghawr Faya,

about twenty-five kilometers south of the Dead Sea. Wadi al Jayb

68


The Society and Its Environment

is 180 kilometers long, from the southern shore of the Dead Sea

to Al Aqabah in the south. The valley floor varies in level. In the

south, it reaches its lowest level at the Dead Sea (more than 400

meters below sea level), rising in the north to just above sea level. Evaporation from the sea is extreme because of year-round high

temperatures. The water contains about 250 grams of dissolved

salts per liter at the surface and reaches the saturation point at 1 10 meters. The Dead Sea occupies the deepest depression on the land sur- face of the earth. The depth of the depression is accentuated by

the surrounding mountains and highlands that rise to elevations

of 800 to 1,200 meters above sea level. The sea's greatest depth

is about 430 meters, and it thus reaches a point more than 825

meters below sea level. A drop in the level of the sea has caused

the former Lisan Peninsula to become a land bridge dividing the sea into separate northern and southern basins.

Climate

The major characteristic of the climate is the contrast between

a relatively rainy season from November to April and very dry

weather for the rest of the year. With hot, dry, uniform summers

and cool, variable winters during which practically all of the precipitation occurs, the country has a Mediterranean-style climate. In

general, the farther inland from the Mediterranean Sea a given

part of the country lies, the greater are the seasonal contrasts in

temperature and the less rainfall. Atmospheric pressures during

the summer months are relatively uniform, whereas the winter

months bring a succession of marked low pressure areas and ac- companying cold fronts. These cyclonic disturbances generally move

eastward from over the Mediterranean Sea several times a month

and result in sporadic precipitation.

Most of the East Bank receives less than twelve centimeters of

rain a year and may be classified as a dry desert or steppe region.

Where the ground rises to form the highlands east of the Jordan

Valley, precipitation increases to around thirty centimeters in the

south and fifty or more centimeters in the north. The Jordan Valley, lying in the lee of high ground on the West Bank, forms a nar- row climatic zone that annually receives up to thirty centimeters

of rain in the northern reaches; rain dwindles to less than twelve

centimeters at the head of the Dead Sea. The country's long summer reaches a peak during August. January is usually the coolest month. The fairly wide ranges of temperature during a twenty-four-hour period are greatest during

the summer months and have a tendency to increase with higher

71


Jordan: A Country Study

elevation and distance from the Mediterranean seacoast. Daytime

temperatures during the summer months frequently exceed 36°C

and average about 32 °C. In contrast, the winter months

November to April—bring moderately cool and sometimes cold

weather, averaging about 13°C. Except in the rift depression, frost

is fairly common during the winter, and it occasionally snows in

Amman.

For a month or so before and after the summer dry season, hot,

dry air from the desert, drawn by low pressure, produces strong

winds from the south or southeast that sometimes reach gale force. Known in the Middle East by various names, including the khamsin, this dry, sirocco-style wind is usually accompanied by great

dust clouds. Its onset is heralded by a hazy sky, a falling barometer, and a drop in relative humidity to about 10 percent. Within

a few hours there may be a 10°C to 15°C rise in temperature. These

windstorms ordinarily last a day or so, cause much discomfort, and

destroy crops by desiccating them.

The shammal, another wind of some significance, comes from

the north or northwest, generally at intervals between June and

September. Remarkably steady during daytime hours but becoming a breeze at night, the shammal may blow for as long as nine

days out of ten and then repeat the process. It originates as a dry

continental mass of polar air that is warmed as it passes over the

Eurasian landmass. The dryness allows intense heating of the earth's surface by the sun, resulting in high daytime temperatures that

moderate after sunset. Population

Official Jordanian statistics gave a 1987 population figure of

2,896,800 for the East Bank. A 1982 population of 2,399,300 thus

indicated an annual growth rate of between 3.6 and 4 percent. United Nations statistics projected a peak in the annual growth rate

at 4. 1 1 percent in the period from 1990 to 1995, followed by a steady

decline to 2.88 percent in 2020.

Rapid development in the provision of health care services during the 1970s and 1980s led to a decline in the crude death rate from 17 per 1,000 population in 1965 to 7 per 1,000 population

by 1986 (see Health and Welfare, this ch.). During the same period, the infant mortality rate, a major indicator of a country's development and health status, dropped from 115 to 46 per 1,000

live births. In 1986 life expectancy at birth was sixty-five years (sixtythree for males and sixty-seven for females). The lowered death

rate, a high birth rate, and lowered infant mortality rate combined

to generate a major demographic problem in the late 1980s. At

72
The Society and Its Environment

the end of the decade, more than half Jordan's population was

below fifteen years of age (see fig. 5). This situation strained the

country's already limited resources, and employment for the burgeoning group of young people became increasingly difficult to provide.

Accurate demographic figures were difficult to compile because

of the substantial number of Jordanians residing and working

abroad and the continuous flow of West Bank Palestinians with

Jordanian passports back and forth between the East and West

banks. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, about

224,000 people were admitted to UNRWA refugee camps in the East Bank immediately after the June 1967 War. In 1986 UNRWA

cited 826,128 registered refugees living on the East Bank, of whom

about 205,000 were living in refugee camps.

The exact number of Palestinians living on the East Bank was unknown. Estimates usually ranged from 60 to 70 percent of the

total population. Official government statistics did not distinguish

between East Bank and West Bank Jordanians (see Palestinians,

this ch.).

The government did not have an officially articulated population policy or birth control program. Rather, in 1979 it adopted

a

' 4 child spacing program" that was designed to improve the health

of mother and child but not specifically to lower the fertility rate. This noninterventionist approach considered family planning to be one component of an integrated maternal-child health and

primary health care program. Government clinics and private medical services delivered family planning services upon request, and

contraceptives were widely available at low cost. In 1987 there were

116 maternal-child health care centers—up from 93 in 1983

providing prenatal and postnatal care and a wide range of birth

control information.

Jordan's high population growth can be attributed primarily to high fertility rates. In 1986 the World Bank (see Glossary) calculated this rate as 6.0 births for each woman over the span of her

reproductive years, one of the highest fertility rates in the region.

This rate was projected to decline to 4.2 births by the year 2000.

The fertility rate varied, however, between women residing in rural

and urban areas and according to educational attainment. Educated women tended to marry at a slightly older age than uneducated women, and this delay contributed to a lower fertility rate. Urban women achieved lower fertility rates through modern

methods of contraception, particularly the pill. Fertility rates were

lowest in Amman, higher in smaller urban areas such as Irbid

73
Jordan: A Country Study

AGE-GROUP

70 and over 65-69

60-64

55-59 MALES FEMALES

50-54 ssss

45-49

40-44

35-39

30-34

25-29 20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9 0-4 300 200 1 00 1 00 200 300

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, Amman, 1988, 18.

Figure 5. Population of the East Bank by Age and Sex, 1987

and Az Zarqa, and highest in rural areas. In rural areas modern

contraceptive usage was lower, although breast-feeding, which

serves to delay the return of fertility, was extended for a longer

period than in the cities. World Bank data indicated that 27 per- cent of married women of child-bearing age were using contraception in the 1980s.

A woman was expected to have to bear five children, including

at least two sons, in fairly rapid succession. Women gained status and security in their marital household by bearing children. According to a study conducted in the early 1980s by Jordanian anthropologists Seteney Shami and Lucine Taminian in a poor, squatter area in Amman, reproductive behavior was subject to several factors. If a woman had given birth to two or more sons, she might

begin to space her pregnancies or stop bearing children for a while.

Household structure—nuclear, extended, or multiple family—also appeared to be a crucial factor in determining fertility. The presence

of other women in a household encouraged women to bear more

children to improve their relative position in the household.

The overall population density for the East Bank in 1987 was

established at about thirty persons per square kilometer. There was

wide regional variation and the rate of urbanization was high. East

74
The Society and Its Environment

of Al Mafraq, in an area encompassing almost two-thirds of the

country, no towns had a population of more than 10,000. The bulk

ofJordan's population was centered in the governorate of Amman

and the smaller urban areas of Irbid, As Salt, and Az Zarqa. The

1987 population totals of the eight governorates ranged from

1,203,000 in Amman to 101,000 in the Maan Governorate. According to World Bank figures, about 70 percent of the population lived in urban areas. The nation's capital, Amman, accounted

Tor more than one-third of the total population. Rapid urbanization appeared to be the result of a high fertility rate and rural-urban

migration. If urbanization continued at the high annual rate of 4

to 5 percent, it was estimated that by the year 2000, nearly threefourths of the population could be living in Amman, Az Zarqa,

Irbid, As Salt, and Ar Ramtha.

The remainder of the population resided in villages scattered in an uneven pattern throughout Jordan. The nomadic and seminomadic population was very small, at most 2 to 3 percent of the population. The clearest concentrations of villages were in the fertile northwest corner and the Jordan Valley. Village size varied markedly from region to region. At one time, size related to the productive capacity of the surrounding farmland. Larger villages were

located in the more fertile, generally irrigated regions where family members could reach their fields with relative ease. While vil- lage populations continued to grow, rural-urban migration drained

off a steady stream of young men and sometimes whole families.

Villages provided litde employment for their residents, and agricul- ture as a way of life had declined precipitously since the 1950s.

Camps of nomadic and seminomadic beduins still existed in the

late 1980s. Nomadic tribes were found mainly in the desert area

east of a line from Al Mafraq to Maan. The area, about 400 kilo- meters long and 250 kilometers wide, is known as the badiya (pi.,

bawaadi, meaning desert or semidesert). Seminomadic beduins were

located in the Al Ghawr and near Irbid. These seminomads

descended to the Jordan Valley in the winter because of its warm

climate and grazing ground for their herds. Traditionally, many

of these seminomads also farmed plots of land in the valley. In the

summer, they moved their herds up into the hills to avoid the in- tense heat.

The native inhabitants of the Jordan Valley are known as Al

Ghawarna, or people of Al Ghawr. Prior to the June 1967 War,

the valley was home to about 60,000 people engaged in agricul- ture and pastoralism. In 1971 the population had declined to 5,000

as a result of the June 1967 War and the 1970-71 conflict between

the Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian armed forces (see The

75
Jordan: A Country Study

Guerrilla Crisis, ch. 1). By 1979, however, the population had

reached 85,000 as a result of government development efforts designed to attract people to settle in this area. Refugee camps emerged in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War

of 1948. The original refugee settlements were tent camps, but in

most places tents were replaced by rows of galvanized steel, alu- minum, and asbestos shelters. There were initially five refugee

camps—Irbid, Az Zarqa, Amman New (Al Wahdat), Al Karamah

(later dismantled), and Jabal al Hussein— but six additional emer- gency camps were established for refugees from the June 1967

War—Al Hisn, Suf, Jarash, Baqah, Talbiyah, and Marka. Most

of the camps were located near major cities in the northwest (see

fig. 6). The Organization of Society: Cohesion and Conflict

In the pre- 1948 East Bank, the dominant sociopolitical order was

tribalism. Tribalism was characteristic not only of the beduin

nomads and seminomads upon whom the Hashimite (also seen as Hashemite) rulers relied for support, but also of many of the vil- lage people and even those who were technically urban. After 1948

this sociocultural system was inundated by masses of Palestinians,

largely sedentary village and town dwellers, many of them literate and well educated. The sheer numbers of Palestinians who came

to the East Bank after 1948 and the comparatively simple econo- my and society of the indigenous Transjordanians made the as- similation of the Palestinians to the local patterns improbable.

Indeed, some analysts have argued that by the early 1970s Palestinians had established a cultural dominance in the East Bank. In

any case, by the late 1980s, Palestinians had considerable economic

and cultural influence.

Jordanians responded in part to the development of Palestinian

economic and cultural elites by upgrading education. By the late 1980s, the gap between Transjordanian and Palestinian educational

achievements had narrowed considerably. Jordan's position also was changing in the global political economy. Agriculture and

nomadism had gradually given way to more viable livelihoods based on skilled labor, secular education, and increasing levels of litera- cy. Labor migration, particularly of the skilled and educated, was

a key factor in social mobility in the 1970s and 1980s. A concomitant shift in values was apparent: prestige was increasingly associat- ed with modern occupations, and education came to be seen as the key to social mobility.

Aside from the fundamental distinction between Jordanians of East Bank origin and those of Palestinian origin, other sociocultural

76
The Society and Its Environment

distinctions or affiliations were evident in Jordanian society, in- cluding ethnic and regional origins, gender, class, tribe, religion,

and life-style (e.g., nomadic, village, or urban). These various pat- terns of affiliations structured the ways in which Jordanians relat- ed to one another and gave rise to different sorts of individual

identity. For example, most Christian Jordanians were Arabs and

shared many cultural habits and values with Muslim Jordanians.

Their sense of identity, however, was based less on Islamic in- fluences than that of Muslim Jordanians. Christians interacted daily

with Muslims, working, studying, and socializing together. But

intermarriage between Muslims and Christians remained infrequent

in the late 1980s. Little information was available on the extent

to which these social interactions contributed to conflict or tension.

The most that observers could conclude was that religious differ- ences carried a potential for conflict. Class structure in Jordan was exceedingly difficult to assess. Many social divisions, such as East Bank or Palestinian origins and

identity, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and rural or urban lifestyle, cut across class divisions. The forces of the political economy in

the late 1970s and 1980s were forging embryonic classes; however,

it was debatable to what extent they were self-conscious and co- hesive.

Class structure in Jordan resembled a pyramid. At the top was

a small, wealthy group comprising large landowners, industrialists,

leading financial figures, and members of their families. The oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s also had created a new class of wealthy Jordanians who made large amounts of money abroad,

which was displayed by conspicuous consumption at home in Jor- dan. Just below this group were professionals, army officers, and

government officials who lived a somewhat less grand but still comfortable life. White-collar workers, schoolteachers, and returning

migrants struggled to retain a style of life that separated them socially from the small shopkeepers and artisans below them. At the

bottom of the pyramid, a large lower class included increasing numbers of the unemployed. The system of family support tended to cushion unemployed university graduates and professionals from

falling into the ranks of the poor.

Ethnicity and Language

In the late 1980s, several ethnic and religious groups coexisted on the East Bank. Roughly 5 to 8 percent of the total population were Christians (see Religious Minorities, this ch.). Of these, most

were Arabs, including a small number—unique among Christians in the Middle East—who recently had been pastoral nomads.

77
Jordan: A Country Study

Figure 6. United Nations Relief and Works Agency Camps in Jordan, 1989

The largest group of non-Arab Christians were the Armenians,

perhaps 1 percent of the population, who resided primarily in Ir- bid and Amman.

The Circassians, a Sunni Muslim community of approximately

78
The Society and Its Environment

25,000 people, were descendants of families brought from the region

of the Caucasus Mountains when Caucasian territory was ceded

to Russia in the 1880s. By encouraging the Circassians to settle in northern Jordan, the Ottomans sought to provide an element

loyal to the sultan that could counterbalance the beduins. Circassians originally settled in Amman and the then-abandoned city of

Jarash. Despite their small numbers, they have long been important in government, business, and the military and security forces. In 1938, for example, Circassians constituted 7.3 percent of the

non-British government officials in Transjordan. Twenty-six of the

thirty-three cabinets between 1947 and 1965 included one or more

Circassians. Circassian families included prominent landowners

and leaders in commerce and industry. Peter Gubser, a United

States authority on Jordan, contended in 1983 that the Circassi- ans were not ' 'politically assertive as a group,

'

' although they were known for "their loyalty to the Hashemites." It is likely, however,

that their relative cultural and economic importance diminished

with the increasing predominance of the Palestinians, on the one

hand, and the improved education level of the Jordanians, on the

other. The Circassians remained heavily represented in senior mili- tary ranks, however, which caused some resentment among other

Jordanians. All Circassians spoke Arabic, and the rate of intermarriage between Arab Jordanians and Circassians was high.

Another, much smaller group originating in the Caucasus was

the Shishans (also seen as Chechens), whose roughly 2,000 members were Shia (see Glossary) Muslims, the only representatives

of this branch of Islam in Jordan. Another religious minority were

small numbers of Arabic-speaking Druze villagers. A few Arabicspeaking Kurds lived in several northern villages.

A category of immigrants different from the Palestinian refugees may be noted. Between the early 1920s and the late 1940s, some hundreds of families, perhaps more, settled in Transjordan,

having left Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz region in Saudi Arabia. Arabs, and usually Sunni Muslims, they were nevertheless

only partially integrated into the local communities in which they

lived. This incomplete assimilation occurred in part because they were foreigners in the context of the tribal structure of such communities, and in part because, as merchants, most were looked at askance by tribally oriented groups. Generally, they tended to marry

among themselves or with persons of similar origin. In the 1980s,

however, most of these families had lived in the East Bank for nearly

three generations, and the tribal system that had excluded them

had become less significant within the society.

79
Jordan: A Country Study

All Jordanians, regardless of ethnicity or religion, speak Arabic, the official language of Jordan. Throughout the Arab world,

the language exists in three forms: the classical Arabic of the Quran, the literary language developed from the classical and known

as Modern Standard Arabic, and the local form of the spoken language. Modern Standard Arabic has virtually the same structure wherever it is used, although its pronunciation and lexicon may

vary locally. Educated Arabs tend to know two forms of Arabic

Modern Standard Arabic and their own dialect of spoken Arabic.

Even uneducated Arabic speakers usually can comprehend the

general meaning of something said in Modern Standard Arabic

although they cannot speak it themselves and often have difficulty

understanding specific expressions. Classical Arabic is known chiefly to scholars; many people have memorized Quranic phrases by rote but cannot speak the classic form.

Dialects of spoken Arabic vary gready throughout the Arab world.

Most Jordanians speak a dialect common to Syria, Lebanon,

Jordan, and parts of Iraq and, like people speaking other dialects,

they proudly regard theirs as the best. (Small numbers of nomads

traversing Jordan from Saudi Arabia may speak a dialect akin to one used in that country.) Few people believe that their dialect is actually good Arabic in the sense of conforming to the ideal. Although they converse in colloquial Arabic, they generally agree

that the written form of Modern Standard Arabic is superior to the spoken form because it is closer to the perfection of the Quranic language. Arabs generally believe that the speech of the beduins

resembles the purer classical form most closely and that the local dialects used by the settled villagers and townspeople are unfortunate corruptions.

Within a given region, slight differences in speech distinguish a city dweller from a villager and more significant ones distinguish

either of these from a nomad. Even within the villages, various

quarters often display unique pronunciations, idioms, and vocabulary specialized to particular lifestyles. Grammatical structure may

differ as well. Arabic is a Semitic language related to Aramaic, Hebrew, vari- ous Ethiopic languages, and others. Rich in synonyms, rhythmic,

highly expressive and poetic, Arabic can have a strong emotional

effect on its speakers and listeners. As the language of the Quran,

believed by Muslims to be the literal word of God, it has been the

vehicle for recounting the historic glories of Islamic civilization. Arabic speakers are more emotionally attached to their language than

are most peoples to their native tongues. Poetic eloquence was one

of the most admired cultural attainments and signs of cultivation

80
The Society and Its Environment

in the Arab world, among rural people, sedentary and nomadic,

as well as among literate city dwellers. Arabic speakers long have

striven to display an extensive command of traditional phrases and

locutions. Beauty of expression was highly valued, and the speaker and writer traditionally sought an elaboration and circumlocution in«both spoken and written forms that Westerners might find

flowery or verbose.

Tribes and Tribalism

Before the events of the post-World War II period thrust it onto

the center stage of international affairs, the territory that is now

the East Bank was first a provincial backwater of the Ottoman Empire and later a small and weak desert amirate. Straddling the transitional area between the 'desert and the sown," it participated

only marginally in the social and intellectual changes that began

sweeping the Arab world during the nineteenth century (see Ottoman Rule, ch. 1). Although ringed by the hinterlands of such major

cities as Jerusalem and Damascus, Jordan lacked a significant ur- ban center of its own until the late 1940s; consequendy, it did not

display artistically, intellectually, commercially, or governmentally

the sophisticated form of Arab culture characteristic of urban life. The basic form of social organization in Transjordan was tribal,

and the social relations among the various nomadic and seminomadic tribes and between them and villagers (many of whom were

also tribally organized) were based on trade and the exchange of

tribute for protection.

In 1983 Gubser classified Jordanians along a continuum: no- madic, seminomadic, semisedentary, and sedentary. Nomads, or beduins, were a fully nomadic group whose livelihood was based on camel herding. Tribes and animals existed in a symbiotic rela- tionship; the camels supplied much of the food and other needs

of the beduins, while the tribespeople assured the animals' survival

by locating and guiding them to adequate pasturage. This fine adaptation to an extremely demanding ecological niche required a

versatile, portable technology that was, in its way, extremely

sophisticated. It also required a high degree of specialized knowledge

and a flexible social structure that could be expanded and contracted

according to need. The beduins, however, were also dependent

upon settled communities—villages, towns, and cities—for trading animals and their products for goods they did not produce.

Tribal social structure, as described by tribal members, was based on the ramification of patrilineal ties among men. In reality,

matrilineal ties also were significant in providing access to material

81
Jordan: A Country Study

and social resources. The ideological dimension to patrilineality

became more apparent when endogamy, or marriage within the

group, was considered. The preference for endogamy—historically

prevalent in the Middle East, especially for paternal cousin marriage in the first instance and then in descending levels of

relatedness—gives rise to a network of kin relations that are both

maternal and paternal at the same time. Ultimately, the kinship

system takes on many characteristics of a bilateral system. Descent and inheritance, however, are traced in a patrilineal fashion.

Tribes in Jordan were groups of related families claiming descent from a supposed founding ancestor. Within this overall loyalty,

however, descent from intermediate ancestors defined several levels of smaller groups within each tribe. Tribespeople described their

system as segmentary; that is, the tribe resembled a pyramid composed of ascending segments, or levels, each of which was both a

political and a social group. At some point, each unit automatically contained within it all units of the lower level. Ideally, in the

event of conflict, segments would unite in an orderly fashion from

the lowest level to the highest as conflict escalated. In reality, the

system was not so orderly; tribal segments underwent fission, and

in the event of conflict, fusion did not necessarily follow the ideal

pattern. The pattern of unity was much more varied and complex.

Beduins traditionally have placed great importance on the concept of honor (ird). Slight or injury to a member of a tribal group was an injury to all members of that group; likewise, all members

were responsible for the actions of a fellow tribal member. Honor

inhered in the family or tribe and in the individual as the representative of the family or tribe. Slights were to be erased by appropriate revenge or through mediation to reach reconciliation based on

adequate recompense.

Beduins had specific areas for winter and summer camping that were known to be the territory of a specific tribe. Seminomadic

groups raised sheep and goats and moved much shorter, well- defined distances; they also practiced some agriculture. But the

semisedentary groups were more involved in agriculture than either

nomads or seminomadic peoples. Parts of a semisedentary group

moved during different seasons, while others in the group remained

in permanent abodes.

By the 1980s, these differences among beduin groups were

minimal. Substantial numbers of nomads and seminomads had in- creasingly adopted a sedentary way of life. In his 1981 study of one section of the Bani Sakhar tribe, Joseph Hiatt noted that set- dement began in the post-World War I period and expanded rapidly

after the mid-1950s. In this case and many others, sedentarization

82
King Talal Dam, Jordan River Valley

was neither completely voluntary nor a result of an official settle- ment policy. Rather, it appeared to be a natural response to changing political and economic circumstances, particularly the formation

and consolidation of the state. In some cases, the administrative

policies of the state disrupted the nomads' traditional pastoral econ- omy. For example, national borders separated the nomads from

grazing lands and permanent wells. The creation of a standing army

that recruited nomads diluted labor once available for herding. Education had a similar effect. As the nomads took up agriculture and

as private titles to land were granted, the nomads' traditional rela- tionship to tribal territory decreased. Faced with these obstacles

to a pastoral way of life, nomads increasingly chose alternative oc- cupations, particularly in the military, and the sedentarization

process accelerated.

Government policies encouraged settlement by providing schooling, medical services, and the development of water resources. The

decrease in the number of nomads continued despite the influx of

pastoralists from the Negev Desert after the founding of Israel. By

the early 1970s, the beduin tribes constituted no more than 5 per- cent of Jordan's population. That proportion had dwindled to less than 3 percent by the late 1970s. Their small numbers, however,

did not correspond to their cultural and political importance in Jordan.

Despite the near-disappearance of the nomadic way of life, tri- bal social structure and organization have not necessarily been

83
Jordan: A Country Study

transformed as drastically. Hiatt contended that tribal organization

actually was reinforced during the initial process of sedentarization

because the tribe itself was the basis for allocation of land. Leadership patterns have changed significantly, however, as government-appointed officials have assumed many of the tasks formerly

associated with the position of shaykh (see Glossary). In the end,

tribal social structure was weakened; individual tides to land, which

can be rented or sold to outsiders, and individual employment dilut- ed lineage solidarity and cohesiveness.

Some indication of the recent status and aspirations of beduin

groups, both settled and nomadic, was provided by a 1978 survey

by a team from the University of Jordan. Among the beduins

studied, males increasingly were engaged in more or less sedentary occupations. Many were in the government or the army. The

researchers found that most beduin parents wanted a different way

of life for their children. Willingness to setde was contingent upon

settlement being more advantageous than the nomadic way of life. For the beduins, settlement often meant a continued association

with livestock raising and its attendant requirements of access to food and water. These hopes and wishes seemed to be consistent

with the government's strategy for a revitalized livestock (sheep

and goat) industry.

The beduin attitude toward education was two-sided and reflected the difficulty of adapting to a new way of life. Early observers not- ed that an army career tended to motivate beduins to acquire an

education. Some, such as the French ethnographer Joseph Chelhod, argued that "an educated beduin means an abandoned tent." Implied was abandonment of the entire beduin way of life. Many

beduin parents interviewed in the 1978 survey were concerned that

the education of their children beyond a certain level would threaten

the survival of the family. They feared that "an educated child

would naturally emigrate to work or pursue further studies in Amman or even outside the country." At the same time, these parents acknowledged that "the best future of their children lay in

education and in living and working in a settled society close to the country's urban centers. " It is not altogether clear whether the

beduins who have acquired enough education for an ordinary career

in the army have abandoned their allegiance to their families and

tribes or whether they have permanently rejected the beduin style

of life. Jordan was unique among primarily sedentary Middle Eastern

countries in that, at least until the mid-1970s, the Hashimite government gained its most significant political support from the beduin

tribes. Mindful of the intensely personal nature of his ties with the

84
The Society and Its Environment

beduins, Hussein visited them often, socializing in their tents and

playing the role of paramount tribal shaykh. People of beduin ori- gin constituted a disproportionate share of the army; that disproportion continued to prevail at the higher command levels in the

mid-1980s (see The Military in National Life, ch. 5). The opportunity for a lucrative, secure career that also carried high prestige

and conformed to traditional martial tribal attitudes has for over

half a century drawn recruits from the desert, first into the Arab

Legion under the British and later into its successor force, the Jor- dan Arab Army. Army service was an important influence for social change among nomadic tribes because it fostered desire for education and often provided the wherewithal for adaptations to

factors affecting the pastoral economy. For example, army pay could

permit a beduin family to buy a truck as a substitute for or in addition to camels, or to invest in the economically more significant

sheep.

Observers in the 1980s noted that a process of detribalization was taking place in Jordan, whereby the impact of tribal affiliation on the individual's sense of identity was declining. Sedentarization and education were prime forces in this process. Smaller

groups, such as the extended family and clan, were gradually replacing tribes as primary reference groups. The weakening of tribal

affiliation and identity led to the questioning of support for the

Hashimite regime. Tribal shaykhs no longer could guarantee the

support of tribal members, particularly the younger ones. This

process was uneven, however, with some tribes displaying more

cohesiveness than others.

The term tribalism was much in use in the 1980s. The intelligentsia

proposed that meritocracy rather than tribalism be the basis of selec- tion in the 1984 parliamentary by-elections. Anthropologist Linda Layne compared the intelligentsia's views of tribalism with the

electoral behavior of the beduins. Layne defined the intelligentsia's interpretation of tribalism as

4 'the placing of family ties before all other political allegiances" and concluded that tribalism

"is therefore understood to be antithetical to loyalty to the State."

Layne recognized the prominent role of tribalism in the 1984 elec- tion but stated that this was not at odds with a modern political

system. Rather, in reconstructing their identity in a modern Jor- danian state, Layne held that the beduins were maintaining a tribal- ism suffused with new elements such as a narrower role for tribal shaykhs in national politics and new sources of political legitimacy. Beduin electoral behavior was not homogeneous along tribal

lines, evidence that tribal shaykhs could no longer automatically

deliver the votes of their fellow tribesmen and women. In this sense,

85
Jordan: A Country Study

Layne found no tension between the beduin's identity as tribes- man or tribeswoman and as citizen; rather, these were complementary forms of identity.

Tribalism and tradition also lent legitimacy to Hashimite rule. The legitimacy of tradition, considered almost synonymous with

beduin or tribal culture, has been defended as part of the near

sacrosanct foundations of the state and as central to cultural heritage.

In the 1985 public exchange between King Hussein and Minister

of Information Layla Sharaf, Hussein responded to Sharaf s calls for liberalizing the law, particularly lifting censorship and dilut- ing the influence of tribalism in society. In the 1980s, a debate raged

among Jordanians and observers ofJordanian society over the appropriate role tribal influence and tradition should play in a modern

state. In early 1985, in the midst of this debate, King Hussein publicly supported the role of the tribe and tradition in Jordan's past

and future by stating, ' 'Whatever harms tribes is considered harmful to us. Law will remain closely connected to norms, customs,

and traditions. . . . Our traditions should be made to preserve the

fabric of society. Disintegration of tribes is very painful, negative

and subversive."

Thus, the role of tribes and tribalism, although transformed, re- mained a fundamental pillar of both society and political culture

in the late 1980s. Although numerically few Jordanians lived the

traditional life of the nomadic beduin, the cultural traditions based on this life-style were hardly diminished. Indeed, conceptions of

modern Jordanian cultural and national identity were deeply in- tertwined with the country's beduin heritage.

Villages

The principles of organization in settled communities resembled

those of the beduins in that villages were organized around kin

groups. The resemblance to nomadic groups was closest in the vil- lages of central and southern Jordan. There villagers retained, in

somewhat loose form, a tribal form of organization. Most villagers

lived in the much more densely settled north, where tribal organization in the late 1980s remained significant only among the re- cently settled. In most northern villages, the descendants of a common, relatively distant ancestor formed a hamula (pi. , hamail, meaning a clan).

The hamula ordinarily had a corporate identity; it often maintained

a guesthouse, its members usually resided in a distinguishable quarter or neighborhood, and it acted in concert in village, and often

regional, political affairs. The hamula was the repository of family

honor and tended to be endogamous. Some villages in the north

86
The Society and Its Environment

were dominated by one hamula; that is, everyone in a village belonged to the same descent group. Sometimes several smaller ha- mail also resided in a village dominated by one large hamula. Other

villages were characterized by the presence of several hamail of nearly

equal numerical size and importance in village political affairs and

landholdings. In some northern regions, a large hamula might have

sections in several villages.

Intermediate kin groups existed below the level of the hamula and

above that of the household. In many cases, a group of closely relat- ed households, descendants of a relative closer than the founder

of the hamula, formed entities called lineages (or branches). A still smaller unit was the luzum, a close consultation group, usually composed of several brothers and their families. A father's brothers' sons and their families could be included in or even constitute the

luzum. This group had the most significance for everyday life in

the village. Members of a hamula, especially those spread over several villages, sometimes saw each other only on occasions such as weddings, births, deaths, religious holidays, or a conflict involving a hamula member. Anthropologist Richard Antoun found the

luzum to be the significant unit in a variety of matters in the community he studied; its members were responsible for paying truce money in cases where honor had been violated. This was the group

that acted as a support system for the individual in the event of

need, providing access to resources such as land, bridewealth, or

financial aid in the event of illness or to pay for schooling.

Lineages and luzums varied in size and sometimes overlapped

in functions. For example, a large luzum sometimes carried the

weight of a smaller lineage in village politics, and it could be difficult to distinguish them. Kin groups, even at the level of lineages, were

not homogenous in terms of class; some members could be quite

well off and others rather poor. This internal differentiation in- creased as some members migrated to urban areas or abroad in

search of work, entered the army, or sought higher education (see

Migration, this ch.).

Social control and politics in the village traditionally grew out

of the interactions of kin groups at various levels. Social control over individual behavior was achieved through the process of so- cialization and a system that imposed sanctions for unacceptable

behavior. Such sanctions could range from gossip damaging to one's reputation and that of one's kin, to censure by one's kin group,

to penalties imposed by the state for infractions of its criminal codes.

Respected elder males from the various hamail (or lineages if the

village were populated predominantly by members of one hamula)

provided leadership in villages. They often made decisions by

87
Jordan: A Country Study

consensus. With the formation and consolidation of the state, tradi- tional leaders lost some power, but they continued in the late 1980s

to mediate conflicts, and state officials often turned to them when

dealing with village affairs. In cases of conflict in the village, leaders of the appropriate kin sections of groups attempted to mediate

the problem through kinship ties. Such leaders were usually elderly men respected for their traditional wisdom and knowledge of

customs, or slightly younger, secularly educated men, or persons

in intermediate positions between the two. If the conflict escalated or involved violence, the state, through the police and the court

system, tended to become involved. The state encouraged recourse

to traditional forms of mediation sometimes as an alternative and

sometimes as an accompaniment to processing the case through

the court system.

The mukhtar, or headman, of a small village linked the villagers

with the state bureaucracy, especially if there were no village or municipal council. The mukhtar''s duties included the registering

of births and deaths, notarizing official papers for villagers, and

assisting the police with their investigations in the village. Where

there were municipal or village councils, generally in villages with

a population of 3,000 or more, the mukhtar had little influence. Instead, the councils—bodies elected by the villagers—allocated

government authority and village resources. Young, educated men

from influential families, whose fathers may have been traditional

leaders in the village, often ran the councils.

As villages increasingly became integrated into the state economic

and political system, social stratification grew. Traditionally, large

landowners were able to command labor, surplus, and services as well as social deference from less wealthy villagers. However, a variety of village and religious customs eased this apparent class differentiation. Religious teachings and practices, such as the giving of alms and the distribution of gifts at the festival marking the

end of Ramadan and at other festival seasons, emphasized the

responsibility of the prosperous for the less fortunate (see Religious

Life, this ch.). Wealth also implied an obligation to provide a place

for men to gather and for visitors to come, in order to maintain

the standing of the village as a whole. Events such as weddings

were occasions for the wealthy to provide feasts for the whole village.

In the late 1980s, social change had strained village structure and values. The older generation's uncontested control of the eco- nomic resources necessary for contracting marriage, participating

in politics, and even earning a livelihood had guaranteed their

authority. The decline in significance of agriculture as a way of

life and the appearance of other opportunities led many younger

88
Women cleaning wool at Samar,

northwest of Amman

Courtesy Julie Peteet

A village scene with a mosque

in the background

Courtesy Julie Peteet

89
Jordan: A Country Study

people into other pursuits. As a result, some "agricultural" vil- lages eventually contained a majority of men engaged in other kinds

of work. Earning an income independent of their elders' control

and often considerably larger than the older generation could com- mand, such young people were in a position to challenge their

elders' authority. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, the individual

still remained enmeshed in a network of family relations and obli- gations. The young deferred less frequently to their elders in decisions about life choices than had been the custom, but respect for parents and elders remained evident.

Palestinians

Jordanians tended to refer to Palestinians as persons who fled or were driven from Palestine during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948

and the June 1967 War. Some immigrants from Palestine who had

entered Jordan in preceding centuries, however, were so thoroughly

integrated into the local society as to be indistinguishable from their

neighbors. The Majalis, for more than a century the leading tribe

in Al Karak area, came originally from Hebron. For political and

social purposes, they and others like them were considered Jordanians. Other Palestinians from Hebron, who came to Al Karak

as merchants well before 1948, remained to a considerable degree

outsiders, for the most part taking their spouses from the Hebron

area and maintaining economic and other ties there. Al Karak is not representative of the impact of Palestinians on

East Bank society and culture. In 1948 the population of the East

Bank was about 340,000. The 1950 annexation of the West Bank

increased the population by about 900,000. This increase included the West Bank population itself (around 400,000 to 450,000)

and about 450,000 refugees from those areas of Palestine that be- came Israel in 1948. In addition, many thousands of Palestinians

not classified as refugees entered Jordan after 1948. As a result of

the June 1967 War, in 1967 an additional 250,000 to 300,000 West

Bank Palestinians entered Jordan as refugees.

Most of the refugees, inside and outside refugee camps, continued

to live in Amman and areas to the north. In 1986 UNRWA reported

that 826,128 Palestinians were registered as refugees in the East

Bank; of these, nearly one-fourth resided in camps. Many other

refugees lived on the fringes of the economy in urban areas. A substantial number of Palestinians had the kind of education

and entrepreneurial capacity that enabled them to achieve substantial economic status. A few brought some of their wealth from Palestine. Some became large landowners or businessmen, whereas

others became professionals or technicians. A number worked for

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The Society and Its Environment

the government, often in posts requiring prior training. Many Pales- tinians were merchants on a small or medium scale, craftsmen or

skilled workers, or peasants.

Whatever the social or economic status of Palestinians in the East Bank, their sense of national identity had aroused much debate.

Such identity depended on international and regional political developments with respect to the Palestine question, the interests of

Palestinians themselves on the East Bank, and the balancing act of the government between East Bank Jordanians and those of

Palestinian origin. One observer indicated that the regime had an

interest in perpetuating the idea of a Palestinian majority so that

East Bank Jordanians would continue to perceive Hussein as en- suring their interests and that of the East Bank.

An autonomous Palestinian political identity did not begin to

assert itself until the mid-1960s. In the 1950s, no political organization existed around which a specifically Palestinian identity could

be articulated. Pan-Arabism was a dominant mode of political ex- pression, and the Hashimite regime strongly promoted Jordanian

sovereignty over Palestinian affairs and identity. Nevertheless, and

in spite of a security apparatus that kept a close watch on political

affairs, Palestinian national identity emerged and grew. The loss of the West Bank in 1967 and the repressive Israeli occupation contributed to nationalist sentiments, as did the Jordanian government's repression of opposition political movements. The rise in

the mid-1960s of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and

its international recognition furthered this nationalist climate. The

PLO offered an organizational format to Palestinian political identity separate from a Jordanian identity. The 1970-71 war between

the fedayeen (Arab guerrillas) and the Jordanian government and

the 1974 Rabat Summit further enhanced Palestinian nationalist

sentiment (see The Palestinians and the PLO, ch. 4). Wide divergences in political identity and sentiment existed

among the Palestinians in the East Bank. Factors influencing a per- son's identity included the date of arrival in the East Bank, whether

the person was a refugee or lived in a camp, and the degree of the

person's economic success. The merchants and professionals who

came prior to 1948 generally identified closely with the East Bank.

Refugees who came in 1948 but who did not reside in the camps

and were government employees or successful professionals or businesspeople tended to be tacit supporters of the regime and to invest heavily in homes and businesses. More militant were the

refugees who arrived in the wake of the June 1967 War, including

those refugees who were not living in camps. Persons residing in

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Jordan: A Country Study

the camps tended to be the most militant. They were the poorest

and had the least stake in the survival of the Hashimite regime.

Socioeconomic and political events in the late 1980s converged

to fuel growing frustration with East Bank political policies. The

reduced flow of remittances to Jordan from expatriate workers in

the oil-producing states was a source of anxiety for the regime. For

refugees living in the camps and for urban squatters, the economic downturn led to greater poverty, compounded by the high un- employment rate in the East Bank.

The Palestinian uprising {intifadah) in the occupied territories caused the Hashimite regime concern. The continuation of the uprising and the occupation seemed likely to radicalize less prosper- ous Palestinians in the East Bank.

Urban Areas and Urbanization

From ancient times, Middle Eastern society has been characterized by the interaction of nomads and peasants with the urban

centers. The region's highest achievements in cultural, political,

economic, and intellectual life took place in the vibrant cosmopolitan

centers. Arab-Islamic claims to be one of the world's major civili- zations rest largely on the products of city populations.

No major urban center existed in what is now Jordanian terri- tory until the late 1940s. East Bank towns served as local markets

and administrative centers rather than as centers of high culture.

Truncated by external political considerations rather than by in- ternal social or cultural realities, the East Bank consequently lacked

the kind of long-established metropolis that for centuries had dominated other parts of the Middle East. Amman, the major city of the East Bank, had ancient roots, but

in the 1980s it was scarcely more than a generation old as a modern

city. The Circassians were the first permanent inhabitants of Amman, settling there in 1878. In 1921 Amir Abdullah ibn Hussein

Al Hashimi established his capital in Amman. It passed its first decades as a provincial trading center and garrison on the margin

of the desert. In 1943 Amman had only 30,000 inhabitants. As

capital of the new kingdom ofJordan, Amman grew over the next

three decades into a booming, overcrowded metropolitan center. Population growth was largely a function of the influx of Palestinians since 1948. A high birth rate and internal migration, however,

have also been prominent features of the urbanization process (see

Population, this ch.).

In 1989 Amman lacked both the old quarters characteristic

of most Middle Eastern cities and an established urban population with a unified cultural outlook and an organic bond to the

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The Society and Its Environment

indigenous society of the area. Its people were a mixture of all the

elements of the country. Circassians and Christians, rather than

Muslim Transjordanians, set the tone before the arrival of the Palestinians, who in the late 1980s probably constituted 60 to 80 per- cent of its population. The smaller towns of the East Bank retained a good deal of the traditional kin- and quarter-based social organization characteristic of Middle Eastern towns.

In rapidly urbanizing areas such as Amman, the quasi-paternal

relationship of the rich to the poor had begun to break down, and

the old egalitarian values had given way to class distinctions based on income and style of life. Increasingly evident, class polarization was fueled by remittances from those working abroad. Remittances were invested in residential property, thus driving up the

cost of land and housing. New urban areas, dotted with lavish stone

villas and supermarkets and boutiques supplied with expensive imported items, coexisted with overcrowded areas where a jumble

of buildings housed the multitudes of the lower-middle class and

the poor. Furthermore, Western culture had introduced foreign

ideas among the educated that gradually estranged them from the

culture of the masses. Cultural and recreational facilities, for ex- ample, were limited to the well-to-do because of the high membership fees in the clubs that provided them.

Migration

In the late 1980s, Jordan experienced more than one form of

migration. Large segments of the labor force worked abroad, and

rural-urban migration continued unabated. In rural areas, substantial numbers of men were employed outside the village or were engaged in military service.

Jordan often has been referred to by economists as a laborexporting country. With the oil boom of the 1970s in the Persian

Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, substantial numbers of the well- educated and skilled labor force, from both rural and urban areas, temporarily emigrated for employment. Government figures for 1987 stated that nearly 350,000 Jordanians were working abroad,

a remarkably high number for such a small domestic population.

Approximately 160,900 Jordanians resided in Saudi Arabia alone.

Most of the Jordanians working abroad were of Palestinian origin.

The typical Jordanian migrant was a married male between

twenty and thirty-nine years of age. His education level was higher

than that of the average person on the East Bank. More than 30

percent of those working abroad were university graduates, and

40 percent were in professional positions. The average stay abroad

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Jordan: A Country Study

ranged from 4.5 years to 8 years, and the attraction of work abroad was the higher salary. Unlike most male migrants in the Middle

East, Jordanian migrants had a greater tendency to take their families with them to their place of employment.

Migration from Jordan was not a recent phenomenon. As early

as the late nineteenth century, Jordanian villagers were migrating

abroad. Migration abroad since the 1960s has generally been to Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Gulf states. Although most

of those migrant workers came from urban areas, more data is avail- able on the rural migrants.

The authors of a 1985 study of the effects of migration on a vil- lage in the northwest noted that more than 10 percent of families

had at least one member working abroad and 32 percent of male

heads of household were serving in the armed forces. Many others

held jobs in nearby urban centers and commuted between the village

and their place of employment. Of village migrants to the oil- producing states, more than half were employed in the public sector, particularly in teaching and in the military security forces. As

of the late 1980s, both of these areas faced a decline in employment

if the oil-producing states continued to reduce their foreign labor force. Labor migration in the 1970s and 1980s did not necessarily in- dicate a migrant's alienation from the village or a weakening of

his ties with fellow villagers. Nearly 75 percent of rural migrants

had a relative or village friend in the place of employment abroad.

In fact, migrants tended to facilitate the process for others, acting

as points of contact for individuals who migrated later. Migration

did not radically alter the authority of absent males in their households, whether rural or urban. Wives made many daily household

decisions, but, in most cases, major decisions awaited consultation with the husband. The flow of remittances to the village was

also a strong indication of the continuing ties between a migrant

and his family.

Remittances were used overwhelmingly by both rural and ur- ban migrants to pay off debts and then to invest in residential

property. The many new villa- style houses built in and around Amman and Irbid and in the villages reflected the large numbers of

men working abroad and the presence of ' 'oil money.

'

' In the northwest highlands, the purchase of property and the subsequent building of housing reduced the area of cultivable land. In contrast, in

the Jordan Valley remittances figured prominently in investments

in agricultural technologies. Returning rural migrants resided for the most part in the village and worked in Irbid, casting doubt on

projections that international labor migration would contribute significantly to further urbanization in the Amman area.

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The Society and Its Environment

Since the 1970s, increasing numbers of villagers had migrated

to Amman. Most of them had remained poor and had shallow roots

in the city. A significant land shortage, lack of job opportunities

in rural areas, and the availability of education and health resources

in Amman had sent a steady stream of villagers toward the city,

overcrowding its housing and overtaxing its resources. Urban housing for the city's poor was neither readily available nor affordable. Rural migrants, however, maintained close ties with their

natal villages. On Fridays (the official day off in Jordan) and during holidays, the villages were witness to family reunions of men

who worked in the cities during the week and returned home at week's end.

Kinship, Family, and the Individual

In the late 1980s, social life and identity in Jordan centered

around the family. The household was composed of people relat- ed to one another by kinship, either through descent or marriage,

and family ties extended into the structure of clans and tribes. Individual loyalty and the sense of identity arising from family membership coexisted with new sources of identity and affiliation. The

development of a national identity and a professional identity did

not necessarily conflict with existing family affiliations. Although

rapid social mobility strained kin group membership, kinship units were sometimes able to adapt to social change.

Gender and age were important determinants of social status. Although the systematic separation of women from men was not

generally practiced, all groups secluded women to some extent. The

character of gender-based separation varied widely among different sectors of society; it was strictest among the traditional urban middle

class and most flexible among the beduins, where the exigencies

of nomadic life precluded segregation. However, the worlds of men

and women intersected in the home. Age greatly influenced an in- dividual man or woman's standing in society; generally, attaining an advanced age resulted in enhanced respect and social stature. The formation of an educated middle class that included increasing numbers of educated and working women led in the late 1980s

to some strains in the traditional pattern. Men and women now

interacted in public—at school and in the universities, in the workplace, on public transportation, in voluntary associations, and at social events. Family and Household

The extended family continued to be a viable form of household in the late 1980s. More families had begun to live in nuclear

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Jordan: A Country Study

households, but Jordanians continued to rely on extended kin

relations for a variety of purposes, which can be described as ex- changes. Exchanges might include financial support; job information; social connections; access to strategic resources; marital

partners; arrangements, protection, and support in the event of

conflict; child care and domestic services; and emotional sustenance. In turn, an individual's social identity and loyalty continued to be oriented largely to the family.

Formally, kinship was reckoned patrilineally, and the household

usually was based on blood ties between men. There was no one form of family; and household structure changed because of births,

deaths, marriages, and migration. A household could consist of

a married couple, their unmarried children, and possibly other rela- tives such as parents, or a widowed parent or an unmarried sister. Alternatively, a household could consist of parents and their married sons, their wives, and their children. At the death of the father,

each married son ideally established his own household to begin

the cycle again. Although the kinship system was considered

patrilineal, maternal kin also were significant.

Because the family was central to social life, all children were

expected to marry at the appropriate age, and eligible divorced or widowed persons were expected to remarry. Marriage conferred

adult status on both men and women. The birth of children fur- ther enhanced this status, especially for women, who then felt more

secure in their marital households. Polygyny was practiced in only

a minority of cases and was socially frowned upon.

Traditionally, the individual subordinated his or her personal

interests to those of the family. The importance of the group out- weighed that of the individual. In the late 1980s, it was still un- common for a man to live apart from a family group unless he were

a migrant worker or a student. Grown children ordinarily lived

with parents or relatives until marriage. Children were expected

to defer to the wishes of their parents.

Marriage was a family affair rather than a personal choice. Because the sexes ordinarily did not mix much socially, young men

and women had few acquaintances among the opposite sex, although among beduins a limited courtship was permitted. Parents traditionally arranged marriages for their children, finding a mate either through the family or their social contacts. In the late 1980s, this pattern had changed substantially (see Changing Social Relations and Values, this ch.).

Among village and tribal populations, the preferred marriage

partner was the child of the father's brother. In most areas, a man

had a customary right to forbid his father's brother's daughter from

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The Society and Its Environment

marrying an outsider if he wished to exercise his right to her hand.

If the ideal cousin marriage was not possible, marriage within the

patrilineal kin group was the next best choice. Such endogamous marriages had several advantages for the parties: the bridewealth payments demanded of the groom's kin tended to be smaller; the family

resources were conserved; the dangers of an unsuitable match were

minimized; and the bride was not a stranger to her husband's house.

A University ofJordan medical department study in the late 1980s

pointed to a 50 percent rate of family intermarriage: 33 percent of

marriages were between first-degree relatives, 7 percent between

second-degree relatives, and 10 percent were within the extended family. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, endogamous marriages had declined

in frequency; previous rates of intermarriage may have been as high

as 95 percent. Increasing female education and employment allowed

young people more opportunities to meet and marry outside family

arrangements. Also, there was growing awareness that genetic

problems could arise in the offspring of endogamous marriages.

In Islam, marriage is a civil contract rather than a sacrament.

Representatives of the bride's interests negotiate a marriage agree- ment with the groom's representatives. The future husband and

wife must give their consent. Young men often suggest to their par- ents whom they would like to marry; women usually do not do

so but have the right to refuse a marriage partner of their parents'

choice. The contract establishes the terms of the union, and, if they

are broken, outlines appropriate recourse. Special provisions in- serted into the contract become binding on both parties.

Islam gives to the husband far greater leeway than to the wife

in terms of polygyny and in matters of divorce. For example, a man may legally take up to four wives at one time provided he can treat them equally; a woman can have only one husband at a time. A man may divorce his wife by repeating ' T divorce thee'

three times before witnesses and registering the divorce in court; a woman can instigate divorce only under very specific circumstances. Few women seek divorce because of the difficulty of tak- ing a case to court, the stigma attached to a divorced woman, and

the possibility of a woman's losing custody of her children. In theory and as a matter of public appearance, men exercise authority over women. That authority, however, is not as absolute as once

thought. Women wield considerable power within the home and

decision making often is a joint affair between husband and wife.

Family Relationships

The social milieu in which a Jordanian family lived significantly affected the position of the wife and her degree of autonomy.

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Jordan: A Country Study

In rural agricultural areas and among the urban poor, women fulfilled important economic functions. Traditionally, some women

of poor urban families worked outside the home, and rural women performed a wide variety of tasks in the household and in the

fields. Such women occupied a position of relative importance and

enjoyed a modicum of freedom in their comings and goings within the village or neighborhood. Although casual social contact between the sexes of the kind common in the West was infrequent,

segregation of the sexes was less pronounced than in traditional

towns. Among the traditional urban bourgeoisie, women fulfilled fewer and less important economic functions. Artisan and merchant

families earned their living from the skills of the men. Women's

responsibilities were more confined to the home. Among the new

urban middle class, women occupied a variety of positions, some

of them contradictory. Some women of this class were educated

and employed, and enjoyed a fair measure of mobility within

society; others, also educated and skilled, lived a more sheltered

life, with minimal mobility. Both groups of women frequently were

seen in the streets wearing Islamic dress (see Women and Work,

this ch.).

The allocation of space within the home was often gender-specific.

The houses of prosperous urban and rural families traditionally

contained distinct men's and women's areas: the reception room

where the men of the family entertained male guests and the women's quarters from which adult males other than relatives and ser- vants were excluded. Less wealthy urban or rural families were

unable to conform as easily to the standards of segregation. They

could not afford the extra room for male gatherings. In poorer rural areas, men and women often socialized together in the house.

Status within the household varied considerably depending on

sex, age, and type of household. In principle, men had greater au- tonomy than women. Their movements in public were freer, and

their personal decisions were more their own. Within the household, however, younger males were subject to the authority of senior

males, their grandfathers, fathers, and uncles. Decisions about education, marriage, and work remained family affairs. Older women exerted substantial authority and control over children and

adolescents, the most powerless sector within a household.

Household structure, whether nuclear or extended, also determined the extent to which women wielded power in a household.

In a household with multiple married women, senior women held more power and could exert more control over younger wives.

Younger women often preferred to live in a nuclear household

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The Society and Its Environment

where they had more autonomy in running the household and in

child rearing. They were then more subject, however, to the direct

control of the husband and had to manage the household alone

without the help of other women.

Children were given much affection and attention. Although not spared spanking and occasional harsh scolding, children were in- dulged and given much physical affection by household members

and neighbors alike. Their behavior was tolerated with amusement

until close to the ages of four and five. Children then were expected to assume some responsibilities in the household. Little girls at

this age began to help their mothers with household chores and

to care for younger children.

Segregation by gender was tied closely to the concept of honor (ird). In most Arab communities, honor inhered in the descent group

the family and, to a varying extent, the lineage or clan. Honor could

be lost through the failure of sisters, wives, and daughters to behave

properly (modestiy) and through the failure of men to exert self- restraint over their emotions toward women. For women, the constraints of modesty were not confined to sexual matters. Also, women could be held accountable for a loss of honor although they might

not have had any obvious responsibility in the matter. Loud speech, a woman's bearing or dress, or her appearing in public places could

lead to a loss of honor. For men, overt expressions of emotions (such

as romantic love) that revealed vulnerability to women could cause

a man's strength to be questioned, leading to a loss of honor. Men

were expected to be above such matters of the heart. A wife's failure to behave properly reflected on the honor of her husband and his

kin, but even more on her father and brothers and others of the group

from which she came. A man's failure to conform to the norms of

self-control and invulnerability to women shamed his immediate

and extended kin group.

Above all, honor was a matter of reputation. Perceptions were

as important as actions or events. An offense against honor could

be very lightly punished if it appeared that only the person's family knew of it. Harsher steps were required if persons outside the

family knew of the offense or believed it to have occurred.

The penalties for violation of the honor code differed for men

and women. Custom granted the males of a family the right to kill female kin known to have engaged in illicit sexual relations. A more common practice, however, was for the families involved to ar- range a hasty marriage. Men who lost honor through their actions were ostracized and lost face and standing in the community.

On the one hand, the segregation of women worked to minimize

the chances that a family's honor would be lost or diminished. On

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Jordan: A Country Study

the other hand, the education of women and their participation

in a modern work force tended to erode the traditional concept of

honor by promoting the mingling of the sexes in public life. Changing Social Relations and Values

Relations between men and women, along with all other aspects

ofJordanian society, had begun to change as people adopted values,

attitudes, and customs much different from those traditional in the

country. As new ideas reached all sectors of society, new perceptions and practices began to appear.

Increased social and physical mobility have undermined the

familial ties and the values that subordinated the individual to the

kin group. A growing individualism has appeared, especially among

the educated young. Many young people prefer to set up their own

household at marriage rather than live with their parents. Labor

migration has had a considerable impact on family structure and

relations. In some cases, where men migrate without their families, their wives and children see the husband only once or twice a year when he visits. If the wife and children live alone, this ar- rangement leads to increased responsibility and autonomy for women. Also, the children in such families grow up without knowing

their fathers well. When the wife and children live with the migrant's

extended family, they are usually under the authority of her husband's family.

Some of the most marked social changes have affected women's

roles. In urban areas, young women have begun to demand greater

freedom and equality than in the past, although traditional practices still broadly govern their lives. Since the 1960s, women have

become more active outside the home. In the 1980s, girls' school

enrollment was nearly parallel to that of boys, and female graduates entered the work force in increasing numbers (see Education,

this ch.). Girls who attended school were not as closely chaperoned

as they formerly were, although they rarely went out with friends

in the evening. Educated women also tended to marry later, often

after working for several years. The average age of marriage for women had risen from the mid-teens to the early twenties; the aver- age age for males was between twenty-six and twenty-eight years. The narrowing of the gap in age between marriage partners signified a changing conception of the conjugal unit and its relation to the larger family group. Companionship and notions of romantic

love were playing a greater role in marital arrangements than

heretofore. Marriages were still a family affair, but the relationship between man and wife was assuming increasing significance.

This change reflected a dilution in the strength of families as

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The Society and Its Environment

social units with corporate interests that subordinated those of the

individual.

By the late 1980s, some observers had noted that couples tended to want fewer children. This trend appeared to parallel the

changes in women's position in society and shifts in the political

economy, which had implications for family structure, relations,

and values. Women's education and employment patterns meant

that child rearing was no longer the only role open to women. The

need for dual-income households pointed to a decrease in the

amount of time women could devote to child rearing. In the transition from an agricultural and pastoral society to one based on

services, where literacy was a must, children required longer periods of education and thus were dependent for extended periods

upon their families. Large families were no longer as economically feasible or desirable as in the past.

The spread of the nuclear household encouraged the detachment

of the individual from the demands of the extended family. At the same time, social security lessened the dependence of the aged on

their children and other relatives. The functions of the extended

family, however, were not necessarily diminished; given economic upheavals and a weak infrastructure for state social services, Jor- danians continued to rely upon the extended family, even if many

of its members resided in nuclear units.

Generational conflicts, which observers believed to be increasing,

strained family relations when young people attempted to adopt stan- dards and behavior different from those of their parents. Modern,

secular education, with its greater emphasis on utility and efficien- cy, tended to undermine respect for the wisdom of age and the light- ness of tradition. Male wage earners also were less dependent on older

males for access to resources such as land and bridewealth.

Women and Work

Despite a seemingly conservative milieu, the number of women

working outside the home increased in the 1980s. Women formed

a little over 12 percent of the labor force in 1985. Many poor and

lower-class women worked out of economic necessity, but a substantial number of working women came from financially secure families. According to the Ministry of Planning, the proportion of women

working in professional and technical jobs was high. In 1985 women

constituted 35.4 percent of technical workers and 36. 1 percent of cler- ical staff. Women were least represented in agriculture and production. Women's increased access to education had led them to greater

aspirations to work outside the home. Moreover, inflation had made

the dual-income family a necessity in many cases.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Jordanian women served as a reserve labor force and were en- couraged to work during the years of labor shortages when eco- nomic expansion and development plans were high on the

government's priority list. In a 1988 study of women and work

in Jordan, journalist Nadia Hijab argued that cultural attitudes were not the major constraint on women's employment; rather,

need and opportunity were more significant factors. Most employed women were single. Unmarried women, in particular, were initially considered a source of untapped labor. Yet

cultural constraints clearly militated against women working in

agriculture, industry, and construction—areas of low prestige, but

also the sections with the most critical labor shortages. Development programs for women focused on technical training. Hijab

mentions that a typical project was "to train women on the maintenance and repair of household appliances."

To make work more attractive to women with children, the

government discussed amending the labor laws to improve conditions. Such proposed amendments included granting more maternity leave and providing day-care facilities at the workplace. In

addition, the media encouraged a more liberal attitude to women's working. Women's employment gained further legitimacy

through national ceremonies sponsored by the government and the

royal family honoring women's work.

The critical years of labor shortages were 1973 to 1981. By the

mid-1980s, the situation had changed as unemployment surged.

With the onset of high unemployment, women were asked to return

to their homes. Publicly and privately, Jordanians hotly debated

whether women should work. Letters to the editors of daily

newspapers argued for and against women's working. Some government leaders had decided that women should return to their homes.

Discussion about amending labor laws was shelved, and Hijab observed that by 1985 there was "almost an official policy" to en- courage married women to stay at home. Then Prime Minister

Zaid ar Rifai bluntly suggested in 1985 that working women who

paid half or more of their salary to foreign maids who sent the cur- rency abroad should stop working.

Differences in attitude towards women's employment frequently were based on the conditions of work. In a study of attitudes

toward women and work, Jordanian sociologist Mohammad Barhoum found that resistance was least to women working in traditionally female occupations such as teaching, nursing, and secretarial

work. He believed the change in attitude resulted from increased

educational opportunities for girls and their parents' realization

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Women weaving a carpet

that education was as important for girls as for boys, especially in

the event of widowhood or divorce. The erosion of male wages, no longer adequate to support a family, had also been a prominent factor in legitimizing female employment.

The impact of women's employment on relations within the

family remained difficult to assess in 1989. Employment and contribution to family income accorded women a greater voice in family matters. The traditional division of labor between men and

women within the family often remained relatively untouched when

women worked. Women's work at home was often taken up by

other women rather than shared between men and women. Women

earning lower incomes relied on their extended network of fe- male relatives to help with child care and housework, while upper

and middle income women hired maids (usually foreigners from

the Philippines, Sri Lanka, or Egypt) to tend to their homes and

children.

Religious Life

More than 90 percent ofJordanians adhered to Sunni Islam in

the late 1980s. Although observance was not always orthodox, devotion to and identification with the faith was high. Islam was the

established religion, and as such its institutions received government support. The 1952 Constitution stipulates that the king and

his successors must be Muslims and sons of Muslim parents.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Religious minorities included Christians of various denominations,

a few Shia Muslims, and even fewer adherents of other faiths. Early Development of Islam

In A.D. 610, Muhammad, a merchant belonging to the Hashimite branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town

of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel Gabriel and to denounce the polytheism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's economy was

based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to the Kaaba, the

sacred structure around a black meteorite, and the numerous pagan shrines located there, Muhammad's vigorous and continuing

censure eventually earned him the bitter enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he was invited to the town of Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (the city) because it was the center of his activities. The move, or hijra (known in the West as the hegira), marks

the beginning of the Islamic era. The Muslim calendar, based on

the lunar year, begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad—by this time known as the Prophet—continued to preach, eventually defeat- ed his detractors in battle, and consolidated both the temporal and

spiritual leadership of all Arabia in his person before his death in

632.

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his

words regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the

holy scripture of Islam. Others of his sayings and teachings as recalled by those who had known Muhammad (a group known as the Companions) became the hadith. The precedent of his personal

behavior was set forth in the sunna. Together the Quran, the hadith,

and the sunna form a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of an orthodox Sunni Muslim.

During his lifetime, Muhammad was both spiritual and temporal leader of the Muslim community; he established Islam as a

total and all-encompassing way of life for human beings and soci- ety. Muslims believe that Allah revealed to Muhammad the rules

governing proper behavior and that it therefore behooves them to

live in the manner prescribed by the law, and it is incumbent upon

the community to strive to perfect human society according to holy

injunctions. Islam traditionally recognizes no distinction between

religion and state, and no distinction between religious and secular life or religious and secular law. A comprehensive system of

religious law (sharia—see Glossary) developed gradually during

the first four centuries of Islam, primarily through the accretion

of precedent and interpretation by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century, however, legal opinion began to harden into

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The Society and Its Environment

authoritative doctrine, and the figurative bab at ijtihad (gate of in- terpretation) gradually closed, thenceforth eventually excluding flex- ibility in Islamic law. Within the Jordanian legal system, sharia

remains in effect in matters concerning personal status (see The

Judiciary, ch. 4). After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim community consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and

one of his earliest followers, as caliph, or successor. At that time, some persons favored Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of

his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the so-called Shiat

Ali or Party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice.

The next two caliphs—Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman,

who took power in 644—enjoyed recognition of the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah,

governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman

Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to Mesopotamia, where a short time later he, too, was murdered.

Ali's death ended the period in which the entire community of

Islam recognized a single caliph. Upon Ali's death, Muawiyah

proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali, however,

refused to recognize Muawiyah or his line, the Umayyad caliphs;

in support of claims by Ali's line to a presumptive right to the

caliphate based on descent from the Prophet, they withdrew and

established a dissident sect known as the Shia.

Originally political in nature, the differences between the Sunni and Shia interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical overtones. Ali's two sons, Hasan and Husayn, became

martyred heroes to the Shias and repositories of the claims of Ali's

line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sunnis retained

the doctrine of the selection of leaders by consensus, although Arabs

and members of the Quraysh, Muhammad's tribe, predominated

in the early years. Reputed descent from the Prophet, which King

Hussein claims, continued to carry social and religious prestige

throughout the Muslim world in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the Shia

doctrine of rule by divine right became more and more firmly es- tablished, and disagreements over which of several pretenders had

a truer claim to the mystical powers of Ali precipitated further

schisms. Some Shia groups developed doctrines of divine leadership far removed from the strict monotheism of early Islam, in- cluding beliefs in hidden but divinely chosen leaders with spiritual

powers that equaled or surpassed those of the Prophet himself.

The early Islamic polity was intensely expansionist, fueled both

by fervor for the new religion and by economic and social factors.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Conquering armies and migrating tribes swept out of Arabia,

spreading Islam. By the end of Islam's first century, Islamic ar- mies had reached far into North Africa and eastward and northward into Asia. The territory of modern Jordan, among the first to come under the sway of Islam, was penetrated by Muslim ar- mies by A.D. 633 (see Islam and Arab Rule, ch. 1). Although Muhammad had enjoined the Muslim community to convert the infidel, he had also recognized the special status of the

"people of the book," Jews and Christians, whose own revealed

scriptures he considered revelations of God's word and which contributed in some measure to Islam. Jews and Christians in Muslim

territories could live according to their own religious law, in their

own communities, and were exempted from military service if they

accepted the position of dhimmis, or tolerated subject peoples. This

status entailed recognition of Muslim authority, additional taxes,

prohibition on proselytism among Muslims, and certain restric- tions on political rights.

Social life in the Ottoman Empire, which included Jordan for 400 years, revolved around a system of millets, or religious communities (see Ottoman Rule, ch. 1). Each organized religious

minority lived according to its own personal status laws under the

leadership of recognized religious authorities and community leaders. These recognized leaders also represented the community to the rest of society and the polity. This form of organization

preserved and nourished cultural differences that, quite apart from

theological considerations, distinguished these communities.

Tenets of Sunni Islam

The shahada (testimony) succinctly states the central belief of Is- lam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his

Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many ritual occasions, and recital in full and unquestioning sincerity designates one a Muslim. The God preached by Muhammad was not a new

deity; Allah is the Arabic term for God rather than a particular name. Muhammad denied the existence of the many minor gods

and spirits worshiped before his prophecy, and he declared the omnipotence of the unique creator, God. Islam means submission to God, and one who submits is a Muslim. Being a Muslim also in- volves a commitment to realize the will of God on earth and to obey God's law.

Muhammad is the "seal of the Prophets"; his revelation is said

to complete for all time the series of biblical revelations received

by Jews and Christians. Muslims believe God to have remained

one and the same throughout time, but that men strayed from his

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The Society and Its Environment

true teaching until set right by Muhammad. Prophets and sages

of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham (Ibrahim), Moses (Musa),

and Jesus (Isa), are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christianity's deification of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels, the Day of Judgment, general resurrection, heaven and

hell, and eternal life of the soul. The duties of the Muslim—corporate acts of worship—form the

five pillars of Islamic faith. These are shahada, affirmation of the

faith; salat, daily prayer; zakat, almsgiving; sawm, fasting during the

month of Ramadan; and hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca. These acts of

worship must be performed with a conscious intent and not out

of habit. Shahada is uttered daily by practicing Muslims, affirming

their membership in the faith and expressing an acceptance of the

monotheism of Islam and the divinity of Muhammad's message.

The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after purification through ritual ablutions at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations

accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites facing toward

Mecca. Prayers imbue daily life with worship, and structure the

day around an Islamic conception of time. Whenever possible, men

pray in congregation at the mosque under a prayer leader and on

Fridays they are obliged to do so. Women also may attend public

worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men,

although most frequently women pray at home. A special functionary, the muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire community at the appropriate hours; those out of earshot determine

the proper time from the position of the sun. In the early days of Islam, the authorities imposed a tax on per- sonal property proportionate to one's wealth; this was distributed

to the mosques and to the needy. In addition, free-will gifts were made. While still a duty of the believer, almsgiving in the twentieth century has become a more private matter. Properties contributed by pious individuals to support religious activities are usually administered as religious foundations, or waqfs.

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period

of obligatory fasting that commemorates Muhammad's receipt of

God's revelation, the Quran. Fasting is an act of self-discipline that

leads to piety and expresses submission and commitment to God.

Fasting underscores the equality of all Muslims, strengthening sen- timents of community. During this month all but the sick, weak,

pregnant or nursing women, soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and young children are enjoined from eating, drinking,

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Jordan: A Country Study

smoking, or sexual intercourse during the daylight hours. Official

work hours often are shortened during this period, and some businesses close for all or part of the day. Since the months of the lu- nar calendar revolve through the solar years, Ramadan falls at various seasons in different years. A fast in summertime imposes

considerable hardship on those who must do physical work. Each

day's fast ends with a signal that light is insufficient to distinguish a black thread from a white one. Id al Fitr, a three-day feast and

holiday, ends the month of Ramadan and is the occasion of much

visiting.

Finally, Muslims at least once in their lifetime should, if possible, make the hajj to the holy city of Mecca to participate in special rites held during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. The

Prophet instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom

to emphasize sites associated with Allah and Abraham, father of

the Arabs through his son Ishmael (Ismail). The pilgrim, dressed

in a white, seamless garment (ihram), abstains from sexual rela- tions, shaving, haircutting, and nail paring. Highlights of the pilgrimage include kissing the sacred black stone; circumambulation

of the Kaaba, the sacred structure reputedly built by Abraham that

houses the stone; running seven times between the mountains Safa

and Marwa in imitation of Hagar, Ishmael' s mother, during her

travail in the desert; and standing in prayer on Mount Arafat. These

rites affirm the Muslim's obedience to God and express intent to renounce the past and begin a new righteous life in the path of

God. The returning male pilgrim is entitled to the honorific "hajj"

before his name and a woman the honorific "hajji." Id al Adha

marks the end of the hajj month.

The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on

earth, jihad, represents an additional general duty of all Muslims.

This concept is often taken to mean holy war, but most Muslims

see it in a broader context of civil and personal action. Besides

regulating relations between the human being and God, Islam regulates the relations of one human being to another. Aside from specific duties, Islam imposes a code of ethical conduct encouraging

generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect and explicitly propounds

guidance as to what constitutes proper family relations. In addition, it forbids adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption

of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol.

A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is neither intermediary nor clergy in orthodox Islam. Those men who

lead prayers, preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by vir- tue of their superior knowledge and scholarship rather than be- cause of any special powers or prerogatives conferred by ordination.

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The Society and Its Environment

Any adult male versed in prayer form is entitled to lead prayers—

a

role referred to as imam (see Glossary).

Islam in Social Life

Despite a strong identification with and loyalty to Islam, reli- gious practices varied among segments of Jordan's population.

This unevenness in practice did not necessarily correlate with a rural-urban division or differing levels of education. The religious

observance of some Jordanians was marked by beliefs and practices that were sometimes antithetical to the teachings of Islam.

Authorities attributed at least some of these elements to pre-Islamic

beliefs and customs common to the area. In daily life, neither rural dwellers nor urbanites were overly

fatalistic. They did not directly hold God responsible for all occurrences; rather, they placed events in a religious context that imbued them with meaning. The expression inshallah (God willing)

often accompanied statements of intention, and the term bismallah

(in the name of God) accompanied the performance of most important actions. Such pronouncements did not indicate a ceding

of control over one's life or events. Jordanian Muslims generally

believed that in matters that they could control, God expected them

to work diligently.

Muslims have other ways of invoking God's presence in daily

life. Despite Islam's unequivocal teaching that God is one and that no being resembles him in sanctity, some people accepted the notion that certain persons (saints) have baraka, a special quality of

personal holiness and affinity to God. The intercession of these beings was believed to help in all manner of trouble, and shrines to such people could be found in some localities. Devotees often visited the shrine of their patron, especially seeking relief from illness or

inability to have children.

Numerous spiritual creatures were believed to inhabit the world.

Evil spirits known as jinn—fiery, intelligent beings that are capable of appearing in human and other forms—could cause all sorts of malicious mischief. For protection, villagers carried in their cloth- ing bits of paper inscribed with Quranic verses (amulets), and they

frequently pronounced the name of God. A copy of the Quran was

said to keep a house safe from jinn. The "evil eye" also could be

foiled by the same means. Although any literate Muslim was able

to prepare amulets, some persons gained reputations as being particularly skilled in prescribing and preparing them. To underscore

the difficulty in drawing a fine distinction between orthodox and

popular Islam, one only need note that some religious shaykhs were

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Jordan: A Country Study

sought for their ability to prepare successful amulets. For example, in the 1980s in a village in northern Jordan, two elderly shaykhs

(who also were brothers) were famous for their abilities in specific areas: one was skilled in warding off illness among children; the

other was sought for his skills in curing infertility (see Health and

Welfare, this ch.).

Their reverence for Islam notwithstanding, Muslims did not al- ways practice strict adherence to the five pillars. Although most

people tried to give the impression that they fulfilled their religious

duties, many people did not fast during Ramadan. They generally avoided breaking the fast in public, however. In addition, most

people did not contribute the required proportion of alms to support religious institutions, nor was pilgrimage to Mecca common.

Attendance at public prayers and prayer in general increased during the 1980s as part of a regional concern with strengthening Is- lamic values and beliefs. Traditionally, social segregation of the sexes prevented women

from participating in much of the formal religious life of the community. The 1980s brought several changes in women's religious

practices. Younger women, particularly university students, were

seen more often praying in the mosques and could be said to have

carved a place for themselves in the public domain of Islam.

Although some women in the late 1980s resorted to unorthodox

practices and beliefs, women generally were considered more reli- giously observant than men. They fasted more than men and prayed more regularly in the home. Education, particularly of women,

diminished the folk- religious component of belief and practice, and

probably enhanced observance of the more orthodox aspects of Islam.

Islamic Revival

The 1980s witnessed a stronger and more visible adherence to Islamic customs and beliefs among significant segments of the population. The increased interest in incorporating Islam more fully

into daily life was expressed in a variety of ways. Women wearing

conservative Islamic dress and the head scarf were seen with greater

frequency in the streets of urban as well as rural areas; men with

beards also were more often seen. Attendance at Friday prayers

rose, as did the number of people observing Ramadan. Ramadan

also was observed in a much stricter fashion; all public eating es- tablishments were closed and no alcohol was sold or served. Police

responded quickly to infractions of the rules of Ramadan. Those

caught smoking, eating, or drinking in public were reprimanded

and often arrested for a brief period.

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The Society and Its Environment

Women in the 1980s, particularly university students, were actively involved in expressions of Islamic revival. Women wearing

Islamic garb were a common sight at the country's universities.

For example, the mosque at Yarmuk University had a large women's section. The section was usually full, and women there formed

groups to study Islam. By and large, women and girls who adopted Islamic dress apparently did so of their own volition, although

it was not unusual for men to insist that their sisters, wives, and

daughters cover their hair in public.

The adoption of the Islamic form of dress did not signify a return

to segregation of the sexes or female seclusion. Indeed, women who

adopted Islamic clothing often were working women and students

who interacted daily with men. They cited a lag in cultural atti- tudes as part of the reason for donning such dress. In other words,

when dressed in Islamic garb they felt that they received more

respect from and were taken more seriously by their fellow students

and colleagues. Women also could move more readily in public

if they were modestly attired. Increased religious observance also accounted for women's new style of dress. In the 1980s, Islamic

dress did not indicate social status, particularly wealth, as it had

in the past; Islamic dress was being worn by women of all classes,

especially the lower and middle classes. Several factors gave rise to increased adherence to Islamic practices. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Middle East region saw a

rise of Islamic observance in response to economic recession and

to the failure of nationalist politics to solve regional problems. In

this context, Islam was an idiom for expressing social discontent.

In Jordan, opposition politics had long been forbidden, and since

the 1950s the Muslim Brotherhood had been the only legal politi- cal group. These factors were exacerbated by King Hussein's public

support for the shah of Iran in his confrontation with Ayatollah

Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini and the forces of opposition,

by continued relations with Egypt in the wake of the 1979 Treaty

of Peace Between Egypt and Israel, and by the king's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.

Although Islamic opposition politics never became as widespread

in Jordan as in Iran and Egypt, they were pervasive enough for the regime to act swiftly to bring them under its aegis. By the close of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, government-controlled tel- evision regularly showed the king and his brother Hasan attending Friday prayers. The media granted more time to religious

programs and broadcasts. Aware that the Islamic movement might

become a vehicle for expressing opposition to the regime and

its policies, and in a move to repair relations with Syria, in the

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Jordan: A Country Study

mid-1980s the government began to promote a moderate form of

Islam, denouncing fanatical and intolerant forms.

Religious Minorities

Jordan's Constitution guarantees freedom of religious beliefs. Christians formed the largest non-Muslim minority. Observers es- timated in the late 1970s that the Christian community—comprising

groups of several denominations—constituted roughly 5 to 8 per- cent of the population. The principal points of concentration of

the East Bank's indigenous Christians were a number of small towns

in the "sown," such as Al Karak, Madaba, As Salt, and Ajlun

(see fig. 1). Christians also lived in Amman and other major cities. Overwhelmingly Arabic in language and culture, many Christians belonged to churches whose liturgical languages were, until

recently, other than Arabic. With some exceptions, the lower cler- gy were Arabs, but the higher clergy were rarely so. In the past,

Christians were disproportionately represented among the educated

and prosperous. With increased access to education for all of the

East Bank's peoples, this disproportion was less significant in the

1980s.

As of 1989, religious conflict had not been a problem in Jordan.

The influence of Islamic observance that made itself felt in Jordan

in the late 1970s and 1980s had not given rise to religious tensions.

As a minority in a largely Muslim society, however, Christians were affected by Islamic practices. With the stricter observance of

Ramadan in the 1980s, hotels and restaurants were prohibited by

the government from serving liquor to local Christians or foreigners. Restaurants that formerly had remained open during the day

to serve such persons were closed. The press and television also gave a greater emphasis to religion.

The largest of the Christian sects in the late 1980s, accounting

for roughly half of all Jordanian Christians, was that part of the

Eastern Orthodox complex of churches that falls under the patriarch of Jerusalem. With an elaborately organized clerical hierarchy, the patriarchate administered most of the Christian shrines

in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The parent church of Eastern

Orthodoxy was the Greek Orthodox Church, and the liturgical

language of the church in the patriarchate of Jerusalem included

both Greek and Arabic. The higher clergy, including the patriarch, were predominantly of Greek descent, but the priests were

native speakers of Arabic. Because of the typically national organization of orthodox churches, the relatively small numbers of Syri- ans and Armenians adhering to orthodoxy had their own churches.

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Training in catering at a community college in Amman

The Greek Catholic Church (Melchite, also seen as Melkite;

Catholics of the Byzantine rite) in Jordan was headed by the patriarch of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, who in turn was subject to the authority of the pope in Rome. The clergy generally were Arabs, and Arabic was used in most of the liturgy. Most Greek

Catholics lived in the West Bank, but one diocese—that of Petra- Philadelphia, the latter an old Greek name for Amman—had its seat in Amman.

The Roman Catholic Church had its own patriarch, who was

also subject to papal authority. Several other Catholic groups, each

headed by a patriarch who was in turn subordinate to Rome, were

represented. These included several hundred Syrian Catholics and

Armenian Catholics.

The approximately 1 1 ,000 members of various Protestant denominations had been converted primarily from the Orthodox and

Catholic churches. Muslims rarely converted to another faith. In

the rural areas, conversions from one Christian group to another

usually involved an entire kin-based group of some size. Such conversions often caused stress between the converting group and

another group of which it was part or with which it was allied. In- dividual conversions in such areas were rare. The effect of urbanization on this pattern has not been examined.

Protestant communities, generally established by North American

and European missionary activities, also were represented by the

113
Jordan: A Country Study

personnel of various international organizations. Some Protestant groups established schools and hospitals and constructed a few

churches. The Christian churches also had their own ecclesiastical courts that decided matters of alimony, divorce, annulment, and

inheritance.

Non-Christian religious minorities in the late 1980s included a small community of Druzes who lived in an area near the Syrian

border. They were members of a sect that originally had derived

from the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam. Ismailis were Shias who

believed that Imam Muhammad ibn Ismail (died ca. A.D. 765),

the Seventh Imam, was the last Imam, as opposed to others who

recognized Twelve Imams. The Druzes, primarily located in the

mountains of Lebanon and in southwestern Syria, have many secret beliefs and maintain that Hakim, the sixth Fatimid caliph, was

divine in nature and is still alive in hiding. A small settlement

of Bahais inhabited the village of Al Adasiyah in the northern

Jordan Valley. The Shishans, a group whose origins lie in the

Caucasus Mountains, were Shias. Estimates in the early 1980s

placed the number of Shishans at 2,000.

Education

The government's good intentions in the area of education con- tended with straitened financial circumstances, a rapidly changing

labor force, and the demographic problem of a youthful population (53 percent of the population was below the age of fifteen in

1988). Nevertheless, significant progress had been made in vari- ous spheres. Education has been a stated priority of the government for a number of years. In 1986 government expenditures on

education were 12.2 percent of the national budget. Education has

become widely available, although some observers have questioned

both the quality of the instruction and the appropriateness of the

curriculum to the economy's requirements. Recognizing the need

to supply training more suited to realistic employment prospects

and to improve the level of teacher training, the government was

continuing to strengthen vocational and technical education and

to provide in-service training for its teachers.

In 1921, when the Amirate of Transjordan was created, educational facilities consisted of twenty-five religious schools that provided a rather limited education. By 1987 there were 3,366 schools,

with more than 39,600 teachers and an enrollment of 919,645 stu- dents. Nearly one-third of the population in 1987 was involved in education as a teacher or a student at home or abroad (see table

2, Appendix). In 1985 nearly 99 percent of the nation's six- to twelve-year-olds were in the primary cycle, nearly 79 percent of

114
The Society and Its Environment

the twelve- to fifteen-year-olds were in the preparatory cycle, and

37 percent of the fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds were in the secondary cycle (see table 3, Appendix). Progress in literacy was

impressive. The Encyclopedia of the Third World, edited by George

T. Kurian, reported that in the mid-1980s Jordan had a 67.6 per- cent literacy rate, 81 percent for males and 59.3 percent for fe- males. The gap between rural and urban areas in terms of literacy was closing, but rural levels remained below those of the urban

areas; Maan Governorate lagged behind other rural areas. Education was free and compulsory for children between the ages

of six and fifteen. The educational ladder consisted of four parts:

primary (grades one through six); preparatory (grades seven through nine); secondary (grades ten through twelve); and postsecondary (all higher education). Promotion from the compulsory

cycle to the more specialized secondary schools was controlled by

a standardized written examination, as was passage from secondary to the postsecondary programs. The Ministry of Education,

which controlled all aspects of education (except community col- leges), administered the examinations. For grades one through

twelve, nearly 75 percent of the students attended the free government schools in the late 1980s; about 15 percent attended the

UNRWA schools, also free; and about 10 percent attended pri- vate schools. In 1987 the Department of Statistics reported that

there were 194 UNRWA schools and 682 private schools.

The primary curriculum stressed basic literacy skills. Subjects

taught included reading and writing in Arabic; religion (Islam for Muslims and the appropriate religion for non-Muslims); arithmetic;

civics and history, with emphasis on the history of the Arabs and

the concept of the Arab nation; geography, with emphasis on the

Arab countries; science; music; physical education; and drawing

for male students and embroidery for females. In the fifth grade,

English was added to the official curriculum (although many private

schools taught it earlier) and some schools offered French. Within

the primary cycle, promotion from grade to grade was required

by law and was essentially automatic. Children could be held back

only twice in six years, after which they proceeded to higher grades

regardless of the quality of their work.

In the preparatory cycle, work on academic subjects continued,

both to improve the skills of terminal students and to prepare those

going on to secondary studies. In addition, vocational education

began on a limited basis. Each school was required to provide

at least one course in a vocational subject for each grade. In general, each school offered only one vocational option, and all students

had to take that subject for three periods a week for three years.

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Jordan: A Country Study

The preparatory curriculum added geometry, algebra, and social studies to the academic courses offered in the primary grades.

On completion of the ninth grade, students could sit for the public

preparatory examination for promotion to the secondary level. Secondary education was somewhat selective in enrollment and

quite specialized in purpose. This level had both academic (general) and vocational divisions; the former was designed to prepare

students for university-level studies and the latter to train middlelevel technical personnel for the work force. Within the academic

curriculum, students further specialized in scientific or literary

studies. Because of the specialized nature and relatively limited

number of secondary facilities, male and female students did

not necessarily attend separate schools. The secondary program

culminated in the public secondary education examination, which

qualified students for postsecondary study.

In 1987 around 69,000 students were enrolled in higher education. Nearly half of these were women. Jordan had four universities with a combined enrollment of nearly 29,000; more than

one-third of the students were women (11,000). The University

of Jordan in Amman had a 1986-87 enrollment of nearly 13,000

students; Yarmuk University in Irbid had nearly 12,000 students;

Jordan University of Science and Technology in Ar Ramtha had

nearly 3,000 students; and Mutah University near Al Karak had

an enrollment of about 1,300.

In the 1980s, Jordan strove to implement an education system

that would address serious structural problems in its labor force. The country faced high rates of unemployment among educated

young people, particularly in the professions of medicine, engineering, and teaching, and also had a need for skilled technical labor.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the government began to expand its vocational and technical training programs to counteract the skilled labor

shortage brought about by the large-scale migration of workers to high-paying jobs in the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf

and Saudi Arabia. In spite of the recession and high unemployment among professionals, skilled technical labor remained in short

supply in the late 1980s. Cultural factors also played a prominent

role; great prestige attached to academic higher education as opposed to vocational training. In response to the need for education reform, the king called

for a reorientation of education policy to meet the needs of the country and the people. Community colleges played an essential role in

this reorientation. They were consonant with the cultural value

placed on higher education and also helped provide a skilled

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The Society and Its Environment

technical labor force. In the early 1980s, the government's teacher

training institutes and all other private and public training insti- tutes were transformed into community colleges. These education

institutions offered a variety of vocational, technical, and teacher

training programs and granted associates degrees based on two years of study. Upon graduation students were eligible to apply for transfer

to the university system if they wished. In the late 1980s, more than

fifty-three community colleges operated under the Ministry of Higher Education, which was created in 1985 to regulate the operations of all community colleges, although individual colleges were

administered by a variety of agencies. Scattered throughout the country, the community colleges had an enrollment of about 31,000 stu- dents, slightly more than half of all students in higher education.

More than half their students, about 17,000, were women.

Nearly 100 areas of specialization were offered in nine cate- gories of professional study: education, commerce, computers, communications and transportation, engineering, paramedical technologies, agriculture, hotel management, and social service professions.

According to observers, graduates were able to find employment

in industry, business, and government. The government sought

to confront the issue of unemployment among university graduates by encouraging more students to join community colleges. In 1987 the government introduced a career guidance program in the

secondary schools that explained the country's problems with un- employment.

Most Jordanian students in Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union were studying medicine and engineering. Some observers

have suggested that many of the students in Eastern Europe and

the Soviet Union were Palestinians whose education costs were

being borne by the host government. Observers believed that most

of the students in Western Europe and the United States were

being financed by their families and the rest by the government

ofJordan. Perhaps because of these connections, students from West

European and American schools tended to obtain the more desirable and prestigious positions on their return home. The perceived

higher quality of education in the West also was a factor in making these graduates more competitive in the job market.

Health and Welfare

Factors affecting the standard of living for the average citizen were difficult to assess in early 1989. Information was scanty. Living

conditions varied considerably according to region, kind of settle- ment, social position, and fortune of war. At the high end of the

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Jordan: A Country Study

spectrum, well-to-do city dwellers appeared to enjoy all the amenities of modern life. In cities, basic public services such as water,

sewage, and electricity were sufficient to meet the needs of most

residents. Nevertheless, mounting pressure on these services, particularly the demand for water, rose steeply during the 1980s and was bound to increase as the urban population continued its high

rate of growth. World Health Organization (WHO) figures indicated that, in the mid-1980s, the urban population had a 100-

percent rate of access to safe water within the home or within 1

5

minutes walking distance; in rural areas the figure was 95 percent.

Adequate sanitary facilities were available to 100 percent of the

urban population and to 95 percent of the rural population. The

rural poor, however, generally lived in substandard conditions.

Homes in some villages still lacked piped water. At the bottom were

the poorest of the refugees, many living in camps with minimal

services. Open sewage ran through dusty, unpaved streets. During

the late 1970s and the 1980s, electricity was gradually extended

to nearly all rural areas. Diet was generally adequate to support life and activity. Average daily caloric intake for adults in the 1980s was 2,968 (117 per- cent of the requirement), and protein intake was 52.5 grams, 115

percent of the daily requirement. Nonetheless, nutritional deficiencies of various kinds reportedly were common.

The number of health care personnel increased so that by the

mid-1980s Jordan had a surplus of physicians. The "brain drain,"

or emigration from Jordan of skilled professionals, apparently

peaked in 1983, after which the number of physicians started a gradual climb. According to the WHO, in 1983 Jordan had 2,662

physicians. In 1987 the Jordan Medical Association reported a

figure of 3,703, of whom 300 were unemployed. In the early 1980s,

the medical college of the University ofJordan started to graduate

students, further increasing the numbers. Fewer opportunities for physicians became available in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia

because of the recession in these countries. In 1987 the Ministry of Health and the Jordan Medical Association, concerned about high unemployment among physicians, put

forth various suggestions. These included opening more clinics in

rural areas and assigning physicians to schools, colleges, and large

industrial concerns. Other health care professions showed moderate increases; the

number of government-employed dentists, for example, increased

from 75 to 110. Pharmacists, a profession increasingly entered by

women, nearly tripled in number from thirty-eight in 1983 to

118
A child patient at King Hussein Medical Center, Amman

ninety-six in 1987. Government-employed nurses increased from

292 to 434 over the same period (see table 4, Appendix).

In the early 1980s, Jordan had thirty-five hospitals, of which

about 40 percent were state run. A number of other health facili- ties scattered throughout the country included health centers, vil- lage clinics, maternal and child care centers, tuberculosis centers,

and school health services. In 1986 government health expenditures represented 3.8 percent of the national budget.

Medical care services were distributed more evenly than in

the past. Previously most health professionals, hospitals, and technologically advanced medical equipment were located in major

urban areas, such as Amman, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, Az Zarqa, and

As Salt. People in smaller villages and remote rural areas had

limited access to professional medical care. With the focus on

primary health care in the 1980s, the WHO commented that treat- ment for common diseases was available within an hour's walk or

travel for about 80 percent of the population. The expense and in- convenience of traveling to major urban areas did, however, hinder

rural people from seeking more technologically sophisticated medical care. The WHO reported a general decrease in the incidence of dis- eases related to inadequate sanitary and hygienic conditions. A

reduction in the incidence of meningitis, scarlet fever, typhoid,

119
Jordan: A Country Study

and paratyphoid was noted, while an increase was registered in

infectious hepatitis, rubella, mumps, measles, and schistosomiasis. In the mid-1980s, only one reported case of polio and none

of diphtheria occurred. Childhood immunizations had increased

sharply, but remained inadequate. In 1984 an estimated 44 per- cent of children were fully immunized against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT); 41 percent had received polio vaccine;

and 30 percent had been vaccinated against measles. Cholera

had been absent since 1981. Jordan reported its first three cases of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) to the WHO

in 1987.

The most frequently cited causes of morbidity in government

hospitals, in descending frequency, were gastroenteritis, accidents,

respiratory diseases, complications of birth and the puerperium,

and urogenital and cardiovascular diseases. Among hospitalized

patients, the most frequent causes of mortality were heart diseases,

tumors, accidents, and gastrointestinal and respiratory diseases.

Traditional health beliefs and practices were prevalent in urban

and rural areas alike. These practices were the domain of women,

some of whom were known in their communities for possessing

skills in treating injuries and curing ailments. Within the family,

women assumed responsibility for the nutrition of the family and

the treatment of illness. Local health beliefs and practices were important not only for their implications in a family's general state of health but also in

determining when, and if, people would seek modern medical care. Local beliefs in the efficacy of healers and their treatments prevented

or delayed the seeking of medical care. For example, healers often

treated illness in children by massages with warm olive oil, a harmless procedure but one that often delayed or prevented the seeking

of medical care. Modern medicine had made tremendous inroads, however, into

popular knowledge and courses of action. People combined traditional and modern medical approaches. They sought modern medical facilities and treatments while simultaneously having recourse

to traditional health practitioners and religious beliefs. Infertility, for example, was often dealt with by seeking the advice of a physician and also visiting a shaykh for an amulet. In addition, traditional cures such as "closing the back" were used. In this cure, a woman healer rubbed a woman's pelvis with olive oil and placed

suction cups on her back. This acted to "close the back"; an "opened back" was believed to be a cause of infertility.

The acceptance of modern health practices and child care

120
The Society and Its Environment

techniques was closely related to household structure. A study by

two anthropologists noted that younger, educated women encountered difficulties in practicing modern techniques of child health

care when they resided in extended family households with older

women present. The authority in the household of older women

often accorded them a greater voice than the mother in setting pat- terns of child care and nutrition and in making decisions on health

expenditures.

Discrimination on the basis of gender in terms of nutrition

and access to health care resources was documented. In a study

conducted in the mid-1980s, the infant mortality rate for girls was found to be significantly higher than for boys. It was also noted that male children received more immunizations and were

taken to see physicians more frequently and at an earlier stage

of illness than girls. Girls were more apt to die of diarrhea and

dehydration than males. Malnutrition also was more common

among female children; boys were given larger quantities and better quality food. In addition, more boys (71 percent) were breastfed than girls (54 percent).

In the 1980s, government efforts to improve health were often

directed at women. In the summer, when outbreaks of diarrhea

among infants and children were common, commercial breaks on

television included short health spots. These programs advised

mothers how to feed and care for children with diarrhea and advertised the advantages of oral rehydration therapy (ORT) to pre- vent and treat the accompanying dehydration. The WHO noted

that the use of ORT helped lower the fatality rate among those chil- dren hospitalized for diarrhea from 20 percent in 1977 to 5 percent

in 1983.

During the 1980s, the Ministry of Health launched an antismoking campaign. Posters warning of the dangers to health could be

seen in physicians' offices and in government offices and buildings. Success was slow and gradual; for example, cigarettes were

less frequently offered as part of the tradition of hospitality.

Social welfare, especially care of the elderly and financial or other

support of the sick, traditionally was provided by the extended family. Nursing homes for the elderly were virtually unknown and were

considered an aberration from family and social values and evi- dence of lack of respect for the elderly. Social welfare in the form

of family assistance and rehabilitation facilities for the handicapped were a service of the Department of Social Affairs and more than

400 charitable organizations. Some of these were religiously affiliat- ed, and the overwhelming majority provided multiple services.

121
Jordan: A Country Study

UNRWA provided an array of social services, such as education, medical care, vocational training and literacy classes, and

nutrition centers to registered refugees.

Government expenditures on social security, housing, and welfare amounted to 8.6 percent of the budget in 1986. Social security was governed by the Social Security Law of 1978, which was

being applied in stages to the private sector. As of 1986, all establishments employing ten persons or more came under the law's

provisions. Ultimately the law will apply to all establishments

employing five or more persons. The employer contributed 10 per- cent of salary and the employee contributed 5 percent, and the contribution covered retirement benefits, termination pay, occupational

diseases, and work injuries. The plan was for medical insur- ance to be included eventually under the social security contribution. In April 1988, the Social Security Corporation covered 465,000

workers employed by approximately 7,000 public and private es- tablishments.

* * * Adequate published research in East Bank society and culture

remained limited as of the late 1980s. Richard T. Antoun's books,

Arab Village: A Social Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Community and Low Key Politics: Local Level Leadership and Change in the Middle East, describe a village and its surroundings in the northwest corner of the East Bank. Peter Gubser's book, Politics and

Change in Al-Karak, Jordan: A Study of a Small Arab Town and Its District, describes a town and its environs in west-central Jordan in

which tribal organization was still significant. Gubser also has published a very general book, Jordan: Crossroads ofMiddle Eastern Events, on Jordanian history, politics, society, and economy. More recent research studies are Linda Layne's "Women in Jordan's Workplace" and "Tribesmen as Citizens: 'Primordial Ties' and

Democracy in Rural Jordan"; Seteney Shami and Lucine Taminian's Reproductive Behavior and Child Care in a Squatter Area ofAmman;

NadiaHijab's Womenpower: The Arab Debate on Women at Work; Ian

J. Seccombe's "Labour Migration and the Transformation of a

Village Economy: A Case Study from North-West Jordan"; Lars

Wahlin's "Diffusion and Acceptance of Modern Schooling in Rural

Jordan"; and Laurie Brand's Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Searchfor State. These works provide background on a variety of social issues in Jordan such as tribalism, health

behavior, women and work, labor migration, education, and the

122
The Economy

Palestinians in Jordan. No recent work, however, deals in a comprehensive fashion with the social changes and emerging social forms

in Jordan in the 1980s. (For further information and complete ci- tations, see Bibliography).

123

Chapter 3. The Economy
Mosaic of a man carrying a basket of grapes from the Byzantine Church of Saint Lots and Saint Prokopius,

Khirbat al Muhayyat, ca. 550
JORDAN, A SMALL NATION with a small population and

sparse natural resources, has long been known by its Arab neighbors as their "poor cousin." In the late 1980s, Jordan was compelled to import not only many capital and consumer goods but

also such vital commodities as fuel and food. Officials even dis- cussed the possibility of importing water. Nevertheless, the Jordanian economy flourished in the 1970s as the gross domestic product

(GDP—see Glossary) enjoyed double-digit growth. The economy

continued to fare well in the early 1980s, despite a recessionary

regional environment. Indeed, by the late 1980s, Jordanians had

become measurably more affluent than many of their Arab neighbors. The 1988 per capita GDP of approximately US$2,000 placed

Jordan's citizens well within the world's upper-middle income

bracket.

Economic prosperity rested on three primary bases. Jordan's sta- tus as the world's third largest producer of phosphates ensured a

steady—if relatively modest—flow of export income that offset some

of its high import bills. More important, Jordan received billions

of dollars of invisible or unearned income in the form of inflows

of foreign aid and remittances from expatriates. These financial

inflows permitted domestic consumption to outpace production and

caused the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) to exceed

the GDP. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, GNP exceeded GDP

by 10 percent to 25 percent. High financial inflows from the mid1970s to the mid-1980s allowed Jordan to maintain a low current account deficit; in some years it registered a current account surplus, without much external borrowing and despite trade and budget deficits. Jordan's economy, therefore, demonstrated many of

the characteristics of wealthier and more technologically advanced

rentier economies. Jordan also capitalized on its strategic geographic

location, its educated work force, and its free enterprise economy

to become a regional entrepot and transit point for exports and

imports between Western Europe and the Middle East. Because

of these factors, it also became a magnet for foreign direct investment, and a purveyor of banking, insurance, and consulting ser- vices to foreign clients. Jordan's heritage as a merchant middleman

was centuries-old, dating back to the Nabatean kingdom of Petra. Because the economy depended so heavily on the professional ser- vice sector and remittance income from expatriates, the government

127
Jordan: A Country Study

sometimes called Jordan's manpower the nation's most valuable

resource. Jordan's economic strategy succeeded during the Middle East

oil boom of the 1970s. In the late 1980s, however, as the worldwide plunge in oil prices persisted, economic problems emerged.

Foreign aid was cut, remittances declined, and regional trade and

transit activity was suppressed by lack of demand, leading to a deterioration in the current account. The government was deeply con- cerned about the economy's vulnerability to external forces. Jordan's economy depended heavily on imported commodities and

foreign aid, trade, investment, and income. But because plans to increase self-sufficiency were only in the early stages of implementation, a short-term decline in the national standard of living and

increased indebtedness loomed as the 1990s approached; observers forecast that austerity would replace prosperity.

Structure and Dynamics of the Economy

In the late 1980s, despite recent economic setbacks, Jordan re- mained more prosperous than many developing countries, and its citizens were more affluent than their neighbors from other

nonpetroleum-exporting countries. Jordan's persistent economic

viability was surprising in several respects. Measured both in terms

of population and production, the Jordanian economy was one of

the smallest in West Asia, according to the United Nations (UN).

Its population—not including the West Bank (see Glossary)

numbered only about 3 million in 1989. Jordan's 1987 gross domestic product was estimated at less than US$5.5 billion. Furthermore,

Jordan's natural resources were not nearly as abundant as those

of other Middle Eastern nations.

Added to these disadvantages was the incalculable cost to eco- nomic development of the regional political and military environment. The economy was dismembered by the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank (see The Military Heritage, ch. 5). Jordanians regarded the loss of this territory not only as a military

and political defeat, but also as an enduring economic catastrophe

that cost them a large part of their infrastructure, resources, and

manpower. Jordan's defense burden, although only average by

Middle Eastern standards, was very large by world standards (see

Defense Spending, ch. 5). The country's 1987 defense expenditure of US$635 million constituted 22 percent of total government

spending.

Despite such handicaps, the economy grew rapidly in the 1970s

and continued to grow in the early 1980s. According to UN data,

the annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate of GDP averaged

128
The Economy

almost 16.5 percent between 1972 and 1975. The average annual

growth rate fell to 8.5 percent between 1976 and 1979, then peaked

at almost 18 percent in 1980. Jordan's economic growth appeared more spectacular in percentage terms than in absolute terms be- cause it started from low base figures; nonetheless, the pace of eco- nomic development was one of the highest in the world during this period. Jordan was not a petroleum exporter, a fact that made this growth rate all the more phenomenal.

Jordan dealt relatively well with the recession in the Middle East

triggered by plummeting petroleum prices. Between 1980 and 1985,

the average growth rate decelerated to about 4 percent a year, but

Jordan's economy was able to sustain this growth rate at a time

when other regional economies, such as those of the oil-producers on the Arabian Peninsula, were actually contracting. The boom

in transit trade to and from Iraq after the start of the Iran-Iraq

War in 1980 accounted for much of the growth. The immunity

of the large service sector to demand slowdown also postponed the

effects of the regional recession. The government, however, constituted a large component of the service sector. In its role as a major customer and employer, the government sustained an artificial level of growth through continued deficit spending and a relaxed fiscal policy. Despite the extra money and demand that

the government injected into the economy, GDP growth eventually

stagnated in the late 1980s. GDP growth in 1989 was estimated

at only 2 or 3 percent.

GDP by Sector

The large contribution of the service sector to GDP, versus the

small contribution of the industrial and agricultural sectors, has

long been a source of concern to economic planners. In the late 1980s, Jordan's aggregate private and public service sector continued to contribute about 60 to 65 percent of total GDP. This figure was exceeded only in some of the world's most industrially advanced

market economies. Figures nearly as high were reached by several

of the world's poorest economies, however, where unproductive

surplus labor was absorbed into the service sector. Some segments

of the service sector, such as banking and engineering, relied on

advanced and sophisticated skills. Nonetheless, the sector's overall contribution to GDP remained roughly constant in the 1970s

and 1980s, even though its share of total employment increased

significantly. The relative lack of growth called into question the

overall efficiency and productivity of the service sector. In 1987 the government, which employed more than 40 percent

of the labor force and more than 67 percent of service sector

129
Jordan: A Country Study

employees, contributed about 18 percent to GDP. Retail and wholesale trade—which included well-developed hotel and restaurant

subsectors—was the second largest contributor to GDP. This sec- tor generated 17 percent of GDP in 1987, a share that had declined

about 2 percent over the preceding decade. Finance, banking, real estate transactions, insurance, and business services made up 8 per- cent of GDP. Transportation and communications contributed

about 11 percent of GDP (see fig. 7). Manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and construction—the sec- tors that produced consumer or capital goods or inputs—together

accounted for only about 32 percent or less of GDP. The steady

growth of manufacturing, which climbed from about 4 percent of

GDP in 1970 to almost 15 percent in 1987, was regarded as a promising sign. Agriculture—including animal husbandry, forestry,

and fishing—constituted almost 40 percent of GDP in the 1950s

and about 15 percent of GDP in the early 1970s. By 1987, however,

its share had declined to 7 percent, which caused the government

considerable concern. Construction's contribution doubled between

1970 and 1975, reaching about 8 percent of GDP as spending on

both public works and private housing increased, and then sta- bilized. By 1987 construction had declined to 6 percent. Utilities such as electricity and water supply accounted for 3 percent of GDP,

and mining contributed 4 percent in 1987.

Jordan's demand structure in terms of GDP consumption was

distorted. In 1986 the government consumed more than 26 per- cent of GDP, a figure that was the fourth highest in the noncommunist world. Private consumption was about 87 percent of GDP,

also among the highest in the world. Consumption exceeded GDP

by 13 percent, the highest margin in the world except for the Yemen

Arab Republic (North Yemen). Jordan's exports of goods and nonfactor services (i.e., freight, insurance, and travel) amounted to 49 percent of GDP, and its negative resource gap—the excess of

imports over exports as a proportion of GDP—was minus 44 percent, by far the highest in the world. Inflows of capital from exter- nal sources financed all gross domestic investment (31 percent of

GDP) and part of domestic consumption.

Insofar as consumption exceeded GDP and the difference was made up partially by aid and remittances, Jordan did not fully earn

the growth it experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s. Jordan's

GDP, which rose from about US$2 billion to US$4 billion during

the period, was only between 75 percent and 90 percent of its GNP.

At the same time, annual inflows of unrequited—or, as the Jordanian government sometimes called them, "unrequested" transfer

payments—were in some years more than US$1 billion. These

130
The Economy

unearned transfers, in the form of foreign aid and expatriate worker remittances, permitted Jordan to register only a relatively small current account deficit. In several years, Jordan actually registered current account surpluses despite outspending its GDP by the

highest margin in the world. In 1980, for example, Jordan had

a current account surplus of almost US$375 million. As foreign

aid declined and remittance income tapered off, Jordan suffered a current account deficit of US$390 million in 1983. By 1987 the current account deficit had shrunk considerably, because a reduced

trade deficit more than compensated for declining aid and remit- tance inflows (see table 5, Appendix).

The total amount of foreign aid that Jordan received was difficult to pinpoint. Jordan never received all the aid it was promised, and some aid was in the form of loans at concessionary interest rates or in the form of commodities and services. Although the amount

of aid varied from year to year, it was always substantial. In 1980,

for example, foreign aid constituted 46 percent of government

revenue before borrowing; in 1985, it constituted 30 percent of pre- borrowing revenue.

Financial aid was received mostly from the Arab Organization

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (AOPEC). At the Baghdad Conference in November 1978, seven countries promised to donate

US$1 .25 billion annually to Jordan for ten years as a "war chest"

to fund its ongoing confrontation with Israel. Libya and Algeria

reneged on their commitments from the outset, and Iraq stopped

paying after the Iran-Iraq War started in 1980. In 1984 Qatar and

the United Arab Emirates stopped paying except on an ad hoc basis,

and in 1985 Kuwait suspended its payments. Only Saudi Arabia

consistently met its payment obligations, which amounted to US$360 million per year disbursed in six equal bimonthly install- ments. Total Arab aid to Jordan stood at about US$750 million

in 1980, with aid from non-Arab countries boosting total aid to about US$1.3 billion. Arab aid fell to about US$670 million in

1983 and to about US$320 million in 1984. In 1988, according

to Jordanian government figures, financial aid totaled about

US$474 million and development aid and soft loans (bearing no

interest or interest below the cost of the capital loaned) totaled about

US$260 million, yielding a total of US$734 million in outside as- sistance. This figure included a United States aid package that

authorized US$28 million of military training, US$20 million in budget support, and up to US$80 million in commodity credits. The figure also included United Nations Relief and Works Agency

(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East aid of about

US$10 million, World Bank soft loans in excess of US$100 million,

131
Jordan: A Country Study

GDP 1- 1978 = JD471 X million

(in millions of JD)

Other Services

(including social services, household services) JD21.6

Government

Services/'JD95

Mining

Agriculture

Manufacturing

JD5.2 Utilities

(electricity, water) Construction

Transportation and Communications

Trade GDP 1- 1987 = JD1686.32 million

(in millions of JD)

Other Services

(including social services, household services) JD84.0 Indirect Taxes

Agriculture

Transportation and Communications

.JD64.4 Mining

Manufacturing

JD48.1 Utilities

(electricity, water) Construction

Trade GDP at factor costs and in current prices; all figures are preliminary.

For value of the Jordanian dinar - - see Glossary.

^Industries Y/A Services

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Central Bank ofJordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Amman, April 1979, Table 40; and Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 1987, 383.

Figure 7. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of Origin, 1978 and 1987

132
The Economy

and Arab aid of at least US$350 million. The European Economic

Community authorized US$112.5 million in aid to Jordan to be

paid in installments between 1987 and 1991 . Worker remittances,

the other main source of external income, could not be estimated

precisely in 1988, but exceeded US$1 billion (see Remittance In- come, this ch.).

Foreign direct investment and reexports, particularly of goods

destined for Iraq, also contributed to GDP growth. The government ofJordan was one of only a few Arab governments that chose

to stake its future on an economic system that, if not laissez-faire, was by regional standards free, open, and market oriented. In the

1980s, however, Jordan began to compete for foreign investment

with Egypt, which was pursuing its own open-door policy. On the one hand, Jordan's open-door policy posed risks insofar as the country had to compete and cooperate with Arab governments that had

protectionist and subsidized state-controlled economies. On the

other hand, the policy was particularly effective because it was so

rare in the Middle East. Furthermore, with the devastation of Beirut

after the start of Lebanon's Civil War in 1975, Jordan was at least partially successful in replacing that city as a prime regional commercial center. In this role of merchant middleman, Jordan be- came an entrepot and conduit for trade and investment between

the West and the rest of the Arab world. It encouraged transit trade

through duty-free zones. Its open-door policy acted as a magnet

for inflows of foreign direct investment. It provided tax concessions to both domestic and foreign businesses. Until 1988 it maintained a sound and freely convertible currency backed by substantial

gold reserves. A sound currency, combined with relative political

stability, made Jordan a safe haven for Arab bank deposits. Jordan also established a strong professional service sector, including

well-developed banking and insurance industries that catered to international business. Total net foreign direct and portfolio in- vestment in Jordan could not be estimated, however, because for- eign investment was offset by capital flight abroad. Estimates of

Jordanian capital invested abroad ranged from US$4 billion to US$40 billion. Net direct investment in Jordan was estimated at US$23 million in 1985.

The Late 1980s

Superficial economic prosperity masked deep underlying struc- tural problems; in the late 1980s, a number of intractable longterm economic problems and a host of short-term potential crises loomed. In the long range, if Jordan's domestic market could not

grow sufficiently to permit the economies of scale necessary to

133
Jordan: A Country Study

sustain large manufacturing industries, capital investment and

manufacturing value added would continue to be low; however,

this difficulty might be offset if export markets were obtained. Gross

barter terms of trade would decline further if the volume and value

of manufactured imports rose faster than the volume and value of raw material exports. The merchandise trade deficit would continue because imports of certain commodities would continue to be necessary far into the future. The standard of living as measured by per capita GNP could eventually decrease as modest real economic growth was offset by a rapidly growing population.

Domestic unemployment could increase to more than 9 percent

as the young population matured and the domestic work force grew.

Although a price increase for oil could restimulate the Jordanian

economy by reopening Arabian Peninsula markets for goods and

services, the resultant increased oil import bill would offset some

of the gains. In the late 1980s, however, short-term financial problems including deflation, debt, and devaluation of the dinar (see

Glossary), which lost 42.5 percent of its value between October

1988 and May 1989, commanded the government's attention more

than did long-term problems.

Deflation

The problem of deflation, a sustained fall in overall prices, was

complex and not readily apparent to the average consumer. Prices were stable in 1986, and in 1987 the cost of living index actually

dropped, albeit by less than 0.5 percent. The greatest drops were

in housing, food, fuel, and utility costs. Although consumers

preferred deflation to the double-digit inflation of the early 1980s,

deflation had ominous implications for an economic downturn. Be- cause import costs rose during 1987, average domestic prices fell significantly, as much as 10 percent for some goods and services.

Total prices declined by 0.5 percent. Insofar as growth in domestic demand had contributed some 60 percent of manufacturing

growth, business and industry began to suffer. Companies that had

incurred dinar-denominated debts at high interest rates, expecting to repay their loans with inflated currency, were expected to suffer even more. The low interest rates that disinflation, a reduction in inflation, implied could spark even greater capital flight and

lower remittances. Increased government spending would revive

aggregate demand but would entail more external borrowing.

External Debt

As foreign aid and remittances declined in the 1980s, Jordan start- ed to draw down its foreign reserves. In 1980 Jordan's international

134
Al Aqabah Port, Jordan 's only seaport

reserves, including gold and hard currency, totaled US$1.74 bil- lion. By 1983 international reserves had shrunk to US$1.24

billion—US$824 million in currency and US$416 million in gold.

By 1986 international reserves had been reduced to US$854 million; currency reserves were down to US$438 million, but gold

reserves remained at previous levels. The Central Bank ofJordan

(hereafter Central Bank) held about US$130 million, and the rest was held by Jordan's private commercial banks. Whereas total in- ternational reserves were sufficient to cover six months' worth of

imports in 1980, by 1986 they equaled only three months' worth

of imports.

In the late 1980s, the government resorted to borrowing to cushion the economy from the shortfall of outside income. In 1970

external debt stood at US$120 million. By 1980, however, exter- nal debt had risen to about US$1 billion, and in 1986 it stood at US$4.13 billion. Total debt outstanding, including undisbursed

debt (obligations contracted but not yet received as loans), was US$4.31 billion. Whereas lower figures were reported by various

sources, such figures presumably did not count as debt some soft loans for development or trade credits that could be construed as debt or aid. Earlier loans had been contracted at concessional interest rates through foreign export credit agencies, other Arab governments,

and multilateral agencies. Debt to such official creditors rose from

135
Jordan: A Country Study

US$2.3 billion in 1982 to US$2.8 billion by 1986. Beginning in

1983, however, Jordan started to supplement soft loans from

governments with commercial credit. In 1982 debt to private creditors stood at US$512 million, but by 1986 that amount had tri- pled to US$1.5 billion. Funds raised on the Eurodollar market

(dollars held and loaned by European banks) included four commercial loans obtained between 1983 and 1987. But 1987 Eurodollar

borrowing totaled US$640 million.

In part because it had previously borrowed so little, Jordan was

regarded as a good credit risk. But as the country borrowed more

and as it turned to private sector creditors, terms tended to stiffen. For example, although the average interest rate that Jordan paid

in 1986 (7.3 percent) was the same as in the early 1980s, the amount

of debt subject to variable interest rates had doubled to 20 percent

of total debt; thus, Jordan was more vulnerable to a possible in- crease in world interest rates. At the same time, however, almost

50 percent of all debt remained at concessional interest rates. In

1986 Jordan paid an estimated US$610.5 million in debt service,

of which nearly US$431.8 million was for principal and nearly

US$178.8 million was for interest. These short-term interest and

principal payments as a percentage of export earnings—the debt

service ratio—rose from less than 8 percent in 1980 to almost 29

percent in 1986.

Devaluation

Growing external debt, declining remittance income and foreign

aid, and shrinking foreign currency reserves made Jordanian

citizens wary of keeping their savings in dinars. King Hussein's

severance of Jordan's official ties to the West Bank in July 1988

added to the worries of both foreign investors and citizens about

the long-term viability of the economy. These concerns culminated

in a financial crisis in 1988 as Jordanians—especially those of Palestinian origin—tried to exchange dinars for foreign currencies and

to move their savings outside the country, circumventing a Central Bank restriction that limited individual Jordanians to sending no more than JD5,000 worth of foreign currency out of the country per year for personal use. This capital flight brought pressure on the value of the dinar.

The dinar, pegged to the special drawing right (SDR—see Glossary), had long been one of the most stable and realistically valued

currencies in the Middle East. From 1982 to 1987, the dinar varied

only slightly in value, from about US$2.55 to US$3.04, reflecting

fluctuations in the value of both the dollar and the dinar. During

this period, no significant black market for dollars existed. But in

136
The Economy

a one-year period ending in January 1989, the dinar depreciated

by more than 30 percent, from an official exchange rate of US$2.90

per dinar to US$1.96. The Central Bank attempted to freeze the

exchange rate at the latter level, but money changers ignored the

official rate and opened a black market for United States dollars

and other foreign currencies. Although the Central Bank eased re- strictions on the amount of foreign currency Jordanians could keep

or bring into the country, it nevertheless was forced to cut the offi- cial rate repeatedly, chasing down the value of the dinar. By February 1989, the official rate had been cut another 10 percent to US$1.76, at which point it appeared to stabilize. Austerity Measures

To contain its financial crisis, the Jordanian government embraced several austerity measures in the late 1980s. It froze the

currency exchange rate and halted the operation of money changers,

who had facilitated the dinar's drop by ignoring official exchange

rates and acting as an open black market. In November 1988, the

government also imposed new import duties of 20 to 30 percent on most consumer goods and banned a wide array of so-called luxury imports, including automobiles, refrigerators, cameras, tele- visions, telephones, cosmetics, and cigarettes. The ban on luxury

imports was to last for at least one year, but statements by Jordanian officials indicated that it might last considerably longer. Taxes

and service charges at airports and hotels were increased, as were work permit fees for guest workers. The government also adopted an austerity budget that cut both current expenditure and development investment (see The Budget, this ch.). Prime Minister Zaid

ar Rifai sought to reassure Jordanians that the problems were temporary. In a February 1989 interview, he stated that "the Jordanian economy is active and suffers no troubles at all. Its troubles are financial, not economic." To the extent that this was true,

however, observers noted that Jordan's successful growth in the

1970s and early 1980s was likewise more financial than economic.

The Role of the Government

In the late 1980s, the government ofJordan remained a staunch

advocate of free enterprise. Unlike many of its Arab neighbors,

and for both pragmatic and ideological reasons, Jordan had never

nationalized businesses, seized private assets without compensation, or implemented socialism. But although the economic sys- tem was as liberal and market oriented as those of many fully

developed nations, the government continued to play a large eco- nomic role, both in development planning and as a financier.

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Jordan: A Country Study

A Mixed Economy

Government encroachment on the economy in the form of ownership or equity participation in corporations was inevitable and, to some extent, inadvertent. The government's role as financier derived from several interrelated factors. Most important, the government was the only channel through which foreign aid, loans, and

most expatriate worker remittances were funneled into the country. Acting as an intermediary in the distribution of these funds,

the government acquired a reputation in the private sector for its "deep pockets" and fostered in the business world a feeling of

entitlement to government support in the capitalization of certain

enterprises. Inadequate private capital investment, resulting in part

from an entrenched ' 'merchant mentality, " has been a weak point

in the economy for which the government has had to compensate.

Moreover, the large amount of capital investment required by some

extractive industries was beyond the reach of willing private sec- tor investors. In some industries, such as telecommunications,

government ownership was viewed simply as a prerogative. In numerous other cases, the government felt compelled to bolster pri- vate investor confidence and so stepped in to rescue insolvent pri- vate sector companies and banks with an infusion of capital, to buy

the receivables of exporting companies unable to collect payment

from foreign customers, and, when publicly held companies went

bankrupt, to compensate shareholders for the lost value of their

stocks. In this manner, the government essentially adopted companies that were abandoned by the private sector. Eventually, the government came to preside over a large mixed

economy of some forty semipublic corporations. The government's

share of the combined nominal equity of these companies was about

18 percent, but its share of their combined paid-up capital —a more

realistic measure of ownership—was over 40 percent. The government had contributed 100 percent of the paid-up capital of eleven

of the companies, although its share of their nominal capital was much lower. These firms included Arab International Hotels, the

Arab Company for Maritime Transport, the Jordan Cement Factories Company, the Arab Investment Company, and a number

ofjoint ventures with Iraq and Syria. In six of the companies, the

government was a minor investor, holding less than 10 percent of

the equity. The largest company in this group was the Jordan

Refinery Company, in which the government held only a 3 percent share. This group also included the Arab Pharmaceutical Manfacturing Company and the Jordan Ceramic Company. Public

investment tended to be highest in those companies with strong

138
Women workers in a shoe factory

domestic and export markets. In 1988 the government was pursuing plans to offer the government-owned telecommunications in- dustry and the national air carrier, Royal Jordanian Airlines, for

sale to a combination of Jordanian and other Arab private sector

investors.

Clearly, the government assumed responsibility for some aspects

of the economy by default because of lack of investment activity

and initiative in the private sector. Although total gross fixed capital formation was targeted by the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (known as the 1980-85 Five-Year

Plan) to grow at about 12 percent annually, it grew at less than

1 percent per year. Public sector capital investment during the period totaled almost JD60 million, 40 percent more than stipulated

in the plan, but private and mixed sector capital investment, at JD540 million, was only 75 percent of the planned target. The

declining value of share prices on the Amman Financial Market

since the early 1980s also indicated low private participation in equity markets.

Government officials have, on occasion, criticized the private

sector for its unwillingness to make capital investments and its general preference for trade and consumption rather than production and investment. Revitalization and expansion of the private

sector has been a long-standing official development priority.

Perhaps the government's most important policy tool has been

139
Jordan: A Country Study

Central Bank regulation of bank interest rates on both loans and

deposits. By setting ceilings on the interest rates that banks can

charge certain borrowers, the government has tried to channel loans

to capital- starved enterprises. The government also has encouraged

foreign direct investment in the hope of stimulating growth of the

domestic private sector through partnerships and joint ventures with

foreign companies.

The incentives that the government has had to provide foreign

and domestic businesses to invest in the economy have, however, run somewhat contrary to the free market philosophy. Under the

1984 Encouragement of Investment Law, foreign investors were

permitted to own up to 49 percent of a Jordanian company. In

certain cases (for example, export-oriented manufacturing enterprises), foreign investors could own all of a Jordanian company.

To encourage investment, companies received customs exemptions,

almost complete tax exemption for up to nine years, and unlimited profit repatriation. In some cases, they were given free land

and facilities. Free zones granting similar concessions were established near Al Aqabah and near the Syrian border to encourage

wholly owned Jordanian companies to engage in manufacture for export. Five industrial estates throughout the country offered the use of government-built infrastructure and extensive government- run services to Jordanian companies.

Although government economic support was weighted toward

fostering investment, the government also provided subsidies that were deemed necessary to guarantee citizens' welfare and politi- cal stability. The main government agent for subsidizing and set- ting prices was the Ministry of Supply, which was established in

1974 after merchants hoarded sugar to force up prices. The hoarding

sparked discontent in the country at large and particularly in the

armed forces. In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Supply imported

wheat, meat, and other basic foodstuffs and distributed them at subsidized prices and bought crops from Jordanian farmers at higher-than-market prices. In the 1989 budget, JD33.2 million was

allocated to food subsidies alone. The government also subsidized

fuel, water, and electricity.

The government repeatedly has stated that it intends to phase

out subsidies. The import restrictions imposed in 1988, however,

had almost immediate unintended price effects that necessitated

further subsidies and price setting. Although the government in- tended to ban only luxury imports, merchants began to hoard their

inventory of imported goods in expectation of future restrictions. Hoarding led to sharp and sudden price inflation of such vital items

as medicines and food. Domestic producers of goods that could

140
The Economy

substitute for imports also raised prices. In 1988 the Ministry of

Supply announced that for the first time it would set or subsidize

prices for tea, matches, electrical appliances, construction materials, and numerous other goods. For similar welfare reasons, un- employment was mitigated by public sector hiring, and the public

payroll swelled to account for more than 40 percent of the work

force in 1987.

In 1989 it was difficult to assess whether the government's role in the economy was increasing or decreasing. The government's

forceful intervention with specific restrictions to stabilize the econ- omy during the 1988 financial crisis was uncharacteristic. In general, the government appeared uncomfortable with the size of the

role it was forced to play in the economy.

The Budget

The government ofJordan consistently has run budget deficits. Domestic revenues were 67 percent of current expenditure in 1980,

but this figure had improved to 80 percent in 1985. Budgets tended

to be only approximations of actual expenditure and revenue. The

government did not present a consolidated budget; that is, the central government budget did not encompass the separate budgets

of the municipalities and some public institutions. Moreover, central government income depended on unpredictable disbursements of

aid from foreign donors, while spending usually was increased by

supplemental budgets submitted throughout the year. Expenditures

The discrepancy between income and expenditures appeared each

year as the difference between the planned and actual budget deficit,

with disclosure of the latter figure often delayed considerably. For

example, the 1988 budget called for a JD67 million deficit, but the

1989 budget planned for aJD122 million deficit. Although the actual

1988 deficit had not been announced by early 1989, the Ministry

of Finance disclosed that the planned 1989 deficit represented a 45 percent reduction from the 1988 level. The minister of finance

claimed that the government's 1989 assessment of income and

spending was more realistic than in previous years, and that the

government was committed to adhering strictly to the budget (see

table 6, Appendix).

Years of deficit spending effectively precluded the option of pursuing a relaxed fiscal policy, which Jordan's price deflation might

have warranted in 1989. The 1989 budget called instead for austerity

to achieve cuts in spending from 1988 levels. The 1989 budget fore- cast an expenditure of JD1 billion, as compared to JD1.1 billion

141
Jordan: A Country Study

in the 1988 budget. Of the 1989 planned expenditure, capital in- vestment and development spending were budgeted at JD346.5 million, a cut of JD105 million from the previous year. This cut apparently reflected the government's inability to spend the full capital budget in 1988 because of the economy's limited absorptive capacity. Recurrent expenditure was budgeted at JD688.9 million, an increase of about JD65 million over 1988. Insofar as the

defense component of recurrent expenditure was cut JD4.5 million from 1988, it appeared that other recurrent spending, for ex- ample on government salaries and services, was set to increase (see

table 7, Appendix).

Revenue and Taxation

Customs revenues from tariffs and a 15-percent across-the-board

import surcharge traditionally have been the largest sources of

domestically generated revenue, accounting for almost 40 percent

of government income before foreign aid receipts in 1985. Because

of a narrow tax base and the granting of numerous exemptions,

direct taxes on income have made only a small contribution to government revenue. In 1985 direct taxes accounted for 13 per- cent of government revenue, or 4 percent of GDP. Various indirect

taxes, however, were relatively high, so that indirect and direct taxes combined represented 14 percent of GDP. Jordan's revenue

policy dovetailed with its investment policy. High customs charges

and indirect taxes were designed to stifle consumer spending, while

low personal income taxes and even lower business taxes were meant

to channel the resulting savings to investments. For similar rea- sons, domestic borrowing was limited. In 1986 outstanding inter- nal public debt was only JD419 million (see table 8, Appendix).

Total 1989 revenue was projected at JD913 million. Customs

revenues were expected to contribute JD155 million, but it was

possible that the government import ban on luxury goods would

slash this figure. Other local revenue generated through direct and

indirect taxes was expected to contribute JD392 million. Foreign

aid was expected to contribute JD225 million, the same level as projected for 1988, although actual aid disbursed to Jordan in 1988

amounted to JD164 million. Development loans were expected to contribute another JD103 million to 1989 revenues. Development Planning

To the extent that achieving development planning goals depended on unpredictable inflows of transfer payments, the five- year plans were more useful as guides to intentions rather than capabilities; 37 percent of the total financing requirements for the

142
Solar energy plant near Al Aqabah

1986-90 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development

(known as the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan) were to be provided by

aid and remittances. Moreover, even when full funding was available, the economy's limited absorptive capacity prevented the

government from spending the full annual development budget.

The 1986-90 Five-Year Plan

In early 1989, it was not feasible to make a comprehensive as- sessment of Jordan's progress toward accomplishing the goals of

its 1986-90 Five-Year Plan. In the past, development goals had

been ambitious but progress was modest. For example, several

important goals of the 1980-85 plan were not met: planned GDP

growth was 1 1 percent per year, but actual growth was about 4

percent; planned investment growth was about 12 percent per year, but actual investment growth was less than 1 percent; and planned

growth in export of goods and services was 21 percent per year, but actual growth was 3.4 percent.

Total investment spending under the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan was targeted at JD3.2 billion, of which the government was to contribute JD1.8 billion and the private and mixed sectors JD1.4 bil- lion. National savings were to provide about 36 percent of the plan's

financing, transfer payments such as aid and remittances were to finance about 37 percent, and external borrowing was to finance

about 26 percent. The plan listed seven broad goals in order of

priority assigned by the government. The foremost goal was to at- tain and sustain a 5-percent rate of GDP growth and to increase

real per capita GDP by 1 .3 percent per year. The second goal was

to cap unemployment through the creation of more than 200,000

new jobs, of which almost 100,000 would be created through

investment-led economic growth. The remainder were to be created

143
Jordan: A Country Study

through the eviction of foreign guest workers and the emigration

of Jordanian labor. The third goal was to keep growth in public

and private consumption below GDP growth so that by 1990 con- sumption would equal production. The fourth goal was to increase

domestically generated government revenue to eliminate deficit spending. The fifth goal was to reduce, but not eliminate, the goods

and services trade deficit. The sixth goal was to strengthen inter- Arab economic cooperation through the establishment of international joint ventures and the reduction of trade barriers. Finally,

the plan called for more equitable distribution throughout the country of the benefits of development.

The plan also listed growth targets for the various economic sectors, including 46-percent real increases in agricultural income and

mining income and a 40-percent real increase in manufacturing

income over the five-year period. The plan envisioned a 2

3 -percent

real increase in service sector income over the same period. Because the goods-producing sectors were to grow faster than the ser- vice sector, the latter' s contribution to GDP would be reduced to about 61 percent.

Long-Range Planning

The 1986-90 Five-Year Plan listed several longer range economic

goals to be attained by the year 2000. The most important was

to keep Jordan's economy growing at a rate faster than the projected

rate of population growth so that gains in the standard of living

would not be diluted. Assuming a drop in the birthrate over the

decade beginning in 1990, this objective would entail maintaining an annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate in GNP of 2 percent. Another goal was to foster 6-percent annual growth of the consumer and capital goods producing sector of the economy

through the year 2000, so that it would eventually account for more

than 40 percent of GDP. Manufacturing value added was to be

increased by substituting domestic materials for imported industrial and raw material inputs. A related goal was to reduce imported

goods and services to 56 percent of GDP by the year 2000, down

from 90 percent in 1985. Technical training was to continue to en- sure that the labor force remained among the most skilled and

professional in the Arab world. Finally, domestic savings were to finance an increasing share of investment. The plan also listed several socioeconomic priorities for the year 2000: to continue to dis- tribute development more equitably throughout the country; to make the country's arid desert regions a focus of future development; and to ensure that all citizens had access to health, education, communications services, housing, and utilities.

144
The Economy

Labor Force

In the late 1980s, Jordan both exported and imported labor. The

total domestic active labor force in 1987 was about 659,000 workers. Of this number, approximately 150,000 (23 percent) were for- eign guest workers, and approximately 509,000 were Jordanian

citizens. Concurrently, an estimated 350,000 Jordanians worked

abroad. In 1988 the number ofJordanians living abroad, including dependents, was estimated at up to 1 million (see table 9, Appendix).

Labor Emigration

The oil price increases of 1973 and 1974 stimulated tremendous

labor demand in the Arab petroleum-exporting nations, which

tended to have small populations. Jordan, suffering from unemployment and having an educated and skilled work force, was pre- pared to fill this vacuum; over the following decade, several hundred

thousand Jordanians left their country to work in neighboring Arab

nations (see Migration, ch. 2). About 60 percent of Jordanian

emigrants worked in Saudi Arabia, about 30 percent worked in

Kuwait, and most of the remainder found employment in other

Persian Gulf states. Remittance Income

Remittances to Jordan traditionally have been the largest source

of foreign currency earnings and a pillar of economic prosperity.

In 1980 remittance income was US$666 million, but by 1986, ac- cording to official statistics published by the Central Bank, remit- tance income had increased to an estimated US$1 .5 billion at the

then-prevailing exchange rate. According to a UN estimate,

however, Jordan's 1986 remittance income was about US$1 .25 bil- lion and subsequently declined slightly. Actual remittance income

was probably higher because much of the money was funneled back

to Jordan through unofficial channels. Economist Ian J. Seccombe,

who has produced authoritative studies of the Jordanian economy,

estimated that real remittance inflows were perhaps 60 percent

higher than the official receipts. Another expert, Philip Robins,

estimated that real remittances could be twice the official receipts.

Official figures did not include remittances in kind, such as auto- mobiles brought back to Jordan and then sold by returning expatriates, nor remittance income exchanged at money changers rather

than at banks.

Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, official statistics reported that remittance income exceeded export income, in some

145
Jordan: A Country Study

years by over 200 percent. Remittance income accounted for between 25 percent and 33 percent of the liquid money supply, about

20 percent of the GNP, and exceeded the figures for total government development spending, or total foreign aid receipts.

As early as the mid-1970s, however, remittance income and labor

export created economic and demographic distortions. The problems were so pronounced that in the 1970s Crown Prince Hasan

called for the creation of an international fund to compensate Jor- dan and other labor-exporting nations for the negative effects of

emigration.

The billions of dollars that Jordanian emigrants pumped back

into their home economy fueled prolonged double-digit inflation,

especially of housing prices. To rein in inflation and to attract and

capture remittances, the government tried to tighten the money

supply by maintaining high interest rates for bank deposits. As a consequence, loan costs rose, hampering the investment activity

of businesses and farms that needed finance. Also, and because

remittances tended to be spent on imported luxury goods, the merchandise trade deficit expanded.

Jordanian labor export also had an unanticipated impact on the

domestic labor force. Over time, foreign demand grew disproportionately for Jordan's most highly educated and skilled technocrats

and professionals, such as engineers. This "brain drain" caused

a serious domestic scarcity of certain skills. At the same time, wages

for unskilled labor were bid up as Jordanian employers competed

for manual workers. Progress on major infrastructure development

projects was hampered. For example, according to a United States government study, the labor shortage idled heavy equipment on

the East Ghor (also seen as Ghawr) Canal project for up to 70 per- cent of the work day. Ironically, Jordan was obliged eventually to import "replacement labor" —usually low-skilled workers from

Egypt and South Asia—who transferred their wages out of Jordan. The number of foreign guest workers in Jordan grew compared to the number of Jordanians working abroad. The foreign

guest workers also sent home a greater proportion of their wages

than did the Jordanians working abroad. In the 1970s, such wage

outflows constituted less than 10 percent of Jordan's remittance

inflows, but by the late 1980s they offset nearly 25 percent of in- flows, neutralizing much of the benefit of labor export.

Labor Force and Unemployment

In the late 1980s, after years of internal labor shortages, Jordan

faced a looming unemployment problem. Throughout the 1970s

146
The Economy

and 1980s, Jordan sustained a high average annual population

growth rate of between 3.6 and 4 percent. This growth rate was augmented by about 0.5 percent per year because of immigration

into Jordan from the Israeli-occupied West Bank. In 1985 the

government calculated that the work force would grow 50 percent

to 750,000 by 1990. In the late 1980s, this prediction was proving

accurate; about 40,000 people were joining the domestic labor pool

every year. A combination of GNP growth, increased worker effi- ciency, emigration, and attrition created jobs for most new workers, and unemployment was kept to about 9 percent.

Experts believed, however, that unemployment and underemployment would probably increase rapidly in the 1 990s as the labor

pool continued to grow more quickly than labor demand. In 1986

only about 20 percent ofJordanian citizens worked or sought work,

a figure expected to grow dramatically as the youthful population

aged. In addition, because of the recession in Saudi Arabia and

the Gulf states caused by slumping oil prices, Jordanians who had

been working abroad were repatriating and seeking work at home.

The Ministry of Labor estimated that about 2,500 Jordanians

returned from abroad in 1986. Another source, however, estimated

the number of returning workers and their dependents at 35,000

in 1986. Moreover, women—who in 1986 made up only a little more than 12 percent of the working population but almost 50 per- cent of secondary school and college enrollment—were expected

to attempt to join the labor force in growing numbers (see Women

and Work, ch. 2). The work force had some elasticity in that approximately 150,000 foreign guest workers could be sent home and

their jobs given to Jordanian citizens; but even if all guest workers were repatriated, unemployment would persist. By one estimate

that did not include repatriating Jordanian workers, unemployment could grow to 30 percent of the work force in the 1990s in

the absence of extraordinary government action.

Therefore, although aware of the problems caused by labor

emigration, the government remained far more concerned about

unemployment—and declining remittances—than about the

problem of emigration. As of 1989, the government had stated explicitly that it would continue to permit unrestricted worker

emigration.

Industry

Manufacturing contributed about 14 percent of GDP in the late 1980s. Much manufacturing activity related to exploitation of natural resources and to the mining sector. Although extractive industries

147
Jordan: A Country Study

Figure 8. Land Use and Other Economic Activities, 1989

were distributed throughout the country, about 90 percent of both

small and large manufacturing entities were concentrated in the

north, in an industrial belt between Amman and Az Zarqa (see

fig. 8). Between 1975 and 1985, total manufacturing value added

grew at roughly the same rate as GNP, at an annual average rate of 13 percent through 1980, then decelerating to about 5 percent.

Employment in manufacturing grew slowly, and in the late 1980s was estimated at slightly more than 50,000, less than 10 percent

of the working population. For decades the government had emphasized industrial manufacturing development over other eco- nomic sectors, but growing excess industrial capacity prompted a

greater priority to agriculture and water resource development in

the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan.

148
The Economy

Manufacturing

The manufacturing sector had two tiers. On one level were the

large-scale, wholly or partially state-owned industrial establishments

that produced chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and mineral

products. These manufacturing entities included the "big five" companies that constituted the pillars of the industrial base: the Jordan

Phosphate Mines Company, the Jordan Fertilizer Industries Company, the Arab Potash Company, Intermediate Petrochemical Industries, the Jordan Cement Factories Company, and also a recently

enlarged oil refinery at Az Zarqa that employed about 3,000 persons. The chemical products sector employed about 4,000 workers

at about seventy facilities. Because these industries were established

to process the products of Jordan's mining and extractive sector,

it was difficult to distinguish between the industrial and natural resource sectors of the economy (see Natural Resources, this ch.).

Petroleum refining contributed 39 percent to gross output manufacturing; fertilizers, potash, and other nonmetallic minerals, 13

percent; industrial chemicals, about 8 percent; and iron, steel, and

fabricated metal products, about 10 percent. Thus, about 70 per- cent of total manufacturing output was closely linked to the mining and extractive sector. The high contribution of these industries

to the total value of manufacturing output resulted in part from

the high underlying value of the natural resource inputs on which

they were based. The same industries accounted for about 57 percent of total value added in manufacturing (see table 10, Appendix).

On the other level were small or medium-sized light manufacturing entities, many privately owned, that produced a wide array

of consumer products. Many of these entities were cottage industries or small bazaar workshops. By one estimate, in 1984 more

than 75 percent of the approximately 8,500 manufacturing companies employed fewer than five persons each. The most important, in order of contribution to gross output value, were food

processing, tobacco and cigarettes, paper and packaging, beverages, furniture, textiles, and plastics. These companies and other

smaller industries such as publishing, glass and rubber products,

electrical equipment, and machinery—each of which contributed

less than 1 percent of total manufacturing output value—together

contributed about 30 percent of gross manufacturing output and

43 percent of manufacturing value added.

Industrial Policy

Like most nations with ambitious development plans, Jordan

pinned its hopes on growth, particularly in the export of manufactured goods. Although high tariff and nontariff barriers sheltered

149
Jordan: A Country Study

selected industries from competition from lower cost imports, both

nominal and effective rates of protection generally were low by the

standards of developing economies. On the one hand, effective protection was high for paper and wood products, furniture, and

apparel. On the other hand, imports of machinery, electrical equipment, and transport equipment were effectively subsidized. In view

of its sustained high level of import of manufactured goods, observers viewed Jordan's pursuit of import-substitution industrialization as moderate.

Jordan's import policy theoretically was designed to promote

domestic manufacturing industries by ensuring their access to cheaper imported capital goods, raw materials, and other inter- mediate inputs rather than by granting them monopoly markets.

The government believed that development of a domestic manufacturing base had to be led by exports because Jordan's small

population could not generate enough consumer demand for manufacturing plants to achieve economies of scale or scope. In some cases, consumer demand was too low to justify building even

the smallest possible facility. Domestic consumer demand alone was insufficient to support some manufacturing industries despite

the relatively high wages paid to Jordanian workers; the high wages

resulted in increased product costs and diminished export sales of

manufactured goods. In the late 1980s, according to a Jordanian

economist, the country continued to experience constant returns

to scale despite its significant exports. Essentially, Jordan was still in the first stage of industrial production, in which the per unit

costs were high because of limited output.

The relative contributions to manufacturing expansion made by

domestic demand growth, export growth, and import substitution were difficult to assess accurately. Growth in domestic demand

stimulated almost 60 percent of manufacturing expansion, export

growth contributed a moderate 12 percent, and import substitution contributed nearly 30 percent. But exports accounted for about

33 percent of the growth of intermediate goods (fertilizers and other

inputs) industries and about 25 percent of the growth of consumer

goods industries. In contrast, external demand contributed virtually nothing to growth in the metal products, iron and steel, rubber, and glass industries; import substitution, domestic demand

growth, or a combination of the two accounted for all domestic

manufacturing growth, resulting in self-sufficiency. In the case of

the furniture, apparel, textile, and industrial chemical industries,

however, either increased domestic demand, increased foreign demand, or a combination of both led to simultaneous domestic

manufacturing growth and increased imports.

150
The Economy

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the government concentrated on

developing the first tier of the manufacturing sector—the production of chemicals and fertilizers—because, unlike consumer goods,

these commodities appeared to have guaranteed export markets.

The government followed this policy although the second tier of

the manufacturing sector—the production of consumer goods

had significantly higher value added. The government strategy was

to increase value added in exported commodities by producing and

exporting processed commodities, such as fertilizers from raw phosphates and metal pipes from ore and ingots. Because some other

Middle Eastern and West Asian nations had adopted the same

strategy, competition for markets increased at the same time that

demand slumped. Jordan suffered from declining terms of trade

as the value of its processed commodity exports fell relative to the

value of its consumer and capital goods imports. In the late 1980s, therefore, Jordan was reassessing its industrial strategy and searching for potential areas of comparative advantage in exporting light-manufactured goods and consumer and

capital goods that had higher value added. Consumer goods were

protected in many foreign markets, and Jordanian exports as a per- centage of output in the consumer goods sector ranged only between 2 percent and 9 percent, as opposed to a range of 12 percent

to 35 percent in the extractive industry based manufacturing sector. Accordingly, Jordan hoped to take advantage of its educated

work force and increase the manufacture of capital goods that were

either technical in nature or required engineering and technical

expertise to manufacture. Those types of products had more appeal in foreign markets. To promote such development, the government established the Higher Council for Science and Technology,

which in turn founded the private-sector Jordan Technology Group

as an umbrella organization for new high-technology companies.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the profitability of some capital goods industries, measured as a ratio of both gross output value

and of value added, fell steeply compared to profit ratios in the

commodities and consumer goods sectors. During the same period,

profitability of the natural resources sector declined minimally, while

profitability of the consumer goods sector rose. The capital goods

sector had been much more profitable than the natural resources

sector; but by the late 1980s, the two sectors were equally profit- able. The main cause of the plunge in profitability among capital

goods apparently was price inflation of imported intermediate in- puts. Especially affected, for example, were the electrical equipment and plastics industries—precisely the type of technical

industries that Jordan envisaged as important to its economic future.

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Jordan: A Country Study

The drop in profitability was not irremediable, however, and

government officials continued to be optimistic about prospects in

technical industries, particularly those that were skill intensive and

labor intensive rather than capital intensive.

The pharmaceuticals and veterinary medicines industries were

examples of the new direction of industrial development policy.

The government-established Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing

Company exported more than 70 percent of its production in 1987.

A half-dozen other drug and medical equipment companies were

garnering a large share of the Middle Eastern market in the late 1980s. Engineering industries also were a development target. In

1985 this manufacturing sector accounted for about 9 percent of

manufacturing value added, 14 percent of total manufacturing employment, and about US$5 million in export sales. About 95 per- cent of the sector was devoted to basic fabrication of metal sheets,

pipes, and parts. Jordan also exported in limited quantities more

sophisticated products, such as domestic appliances, commercial

vehicles, electrical equipment, and machinery; eventually it wanted

to produce and export scientific equipment and consumer electronics. Another developing industry was plastic containers and packaging, of which about one-quarter of output was exported.

The strategy to boost manufactured exports ultimately had to take into account the low manufacturing productivity growth of

the 1980s. Average annual productivity growth was estimated at 2 percent to 3 percent, and in 1986 it was a mere 1.4 percent. In

several specific sectors, productivity was actually falling. Because

this low or negative growth occurred at a time when labor productivity was increasing rapidly, it was attributable to some combination of insufficient investment and stagnant domestic and foreign

demand. Jordan's average industrial capacity utilization, according to a UN report, was about 57 percent, but varied widely ac- cording to industry. Pent up consumer demand for some products was great enough so that any increase in capacity could be trans- lated automatically into increased production and sales. Capacity

utilization was almost 100 percent for certain chemical and con- sumer goods factories, indicating that more investment might be

warranted, whereas capacity utilization in the production of cer- tain household furnishings and building products was very low,

suggesting suppressed or little demand. Spare production capacity meant that manufacturers would be able to meet sudden demand surges. In 1987, following a period of declining production,

Egypt agreed to import construction materials, and output of ce- ment and metal pipes jumped 32 percent and 48 percent, respectively. Production of paper and cardboard also increased about 36

152
Fertilizer plant, Al Aqabah

percent as the packaging industry developed, but production of detergent dropped 8 percent and production of textiles dropped 13

percent, leaving spare capacity. The variability of capacity utili- zation indicated the problems that the government had to confront

in forecasting domestic and foreign demand for manufactured

goods.

Electricity Generation

Between 1980 and 1985, per capita consumption of electricity

doubled from 500 kilowatt hours per year to 1,000 kilowatt-hours

per year. The demand increase reflected the doubling in the number of households supplied with electricity as rural villages were

electrified. By 1985 about 400,000 households, or 97 percent of

the population, had access to electricity. Electricity generation in- creased to a 712-megawatt capacity in 1987 and production of 3.2

million megawatt-hours. After rural electrification was completed,

growth in capacity outpaced growth in consumption, which was

limited by conservation measures to about 3 percent to 4 percent

per year. Roughly 40 percent of the electric power generated was

used by industry, 30 percent was used by private citizens, 13

percent was used by commercial businesses, and the remainder was

used by water pumping stations. The Hussein Thermal Power

Station at Az Zarqa historically had produced more than 70

percent of the country's electricity, but at the end of 1987, the

153
Jordan: A Country Study

opening of the Al Aqabah Thermal Power Station added 260

megawatts, boosting Jordan's generating capacity to 972 megawatts

and ensuring self-sufficiency into the early 1990s. A 400-kilovolt

transmission line connected Al Aqabah and Amman. The Al

Aqabah plant was to be expanded to a total capacity of 520

megawatts by the mid-1990s, and was planned eventually to supply 1,540 megawatts.

Although Jordan depended entirely on imported oil to fire its generating plants in 1988, the government planned to reduce this dependency. The 1988 discovery of natural gas at Rishah, near

the Iraqi border, led to feasibility studies of retrofitting the Az Zarqa

plant with gas turbine generators. A 20-megawatt hydroelectric sta- tion was to be included as part of the planned Al Wahdah Dam

on the Yarmuk River. Discoveries of shale oil in the southern Wadi

as Sultani region kindled hopes of a 100-megawatt shale-fired electric plant in that area. In 1989 Jordan also was prospecting for underground geothermal sources. Transportation and Communications

An underdeveloped system of transportation and communications for many years impeded Jordanian economic development,

hampering in particular efforts to attract foreign direct investment

and to conduct transit trade. The government lavished spending on transportation and communication facilities in the late 1970s

and early 1980s. By 1989 in many respects Jordan had surpassed

its Arab neighbors in such facilities. Most such development,

however, has been confined to a narrow north-south corridor between Amman and Al Aqabah.

Transportation

The transportation system in Jordan comprised roads, railroads,

airports, and one port. Road quality varied widely, and newer rail- road lines were used primarily for transporting phosphates. One

national airline and two smaller airline companies served the public.

Roads

In 1989 the Jordanian road network, administered by the Ministry of Transportation, was more than 7,500 kilometers long. Of

the total system, 5,500 kilometers were asphalted and the remainder were composed of gravel and crushed stone. The backbone of the

road system was the 320-kilometer-long Desert Highway running

from Amman to Al Aqabah (see fig. 9). A second major highway

ran east to west from Al Mafraq to the Iraqi border. Because these

two highways were also the two main parts of the transit trade route

154
The Economy

between the port of Al Aqabah and Iraq, they often were congested by truck traffic. Jordan's road construction plans focused on

building ring roads, bypasses, and overpasses in the vicinity of

Amman, Al Aqabah, and other major cities to divert this truck

traffic and eliminate bottlenecks.

The quality of the major traffic arteries varied greatly. Only about

50 percent of the Desert Highway was more than two lanes wide.

A four-lane highway ran south from the Syrian border near Ar

Ramtha to Jarash, but the road between Jarash and Amman was

winding and narrow. Moreover, the common practice among

freight companies of grossly overloading their trucks had resulted

in severe damage to many stretches of road. This practice led in

1988 to increased government enforcement of load limits and the

imposition of penalties that could effectively put companies that

violated the limits out of business.

The freight and trucking sector was overdeveloped in the 1980s.

Competition among many private freight companies and several

large government-owned entities led to price-cutting and excess

capacity. The Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Company (IJLTC)

was the largest of the government-owned freight companies. Established in 1980, in 1987 it carried 1 .3 million tons of goods and almost

70,000 passengers between Al Aqabah and Iraq. In 1988 the IJLTC

had a fleet of about 900 trucks, 1,400 employees, and profits of over JD3 million. The Jordanian-Syrian Land Transport Company, established in 1976, was smaller but organized along similar lines. In 1988 trucks made more than 13,000 trips between Al

Aqabah and Baghdad, of which Jordanian trucks made 7,500 trips. In 1987 about 250,000 vehicles were registered in Jordan, an

increase from 60,000 vehicles ten years previously. This figure in- cluded about 131,000 passenger cars, 13,000 taxis, 4,000 buses,

and 8,500 heavy trucks of various types.

Railroads

Jordan had 619 kilometers of single-track narrow gauge (1.05

meters) railroad tracks. The main system was the Hedjaz-Jordan

Railway, part of the old Ottoman-era Hijaz Railway that had once connected Istanbul and the Arabian Peninsula. It ran north-south

through the length of the country and lay thirty kilometers east of the Desert Highway. Newer spur and branch lines constituted

the Al Aqabah Railway Corporation, and connected Al Aqabah's port and mines to the main north- south axis. Both railroad entities came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation.

The newer system was used almost exclusively for transport of phosphates from the mines at Al Hasa and Wadi al Abyad to Al Aqabah.

155
Figure 9. Transportation System, 1989

In 1987, about 2.6 million tons of freight and 20,000 passengers were conveyed by rail. Rolling stock included 26 locomotives and

600 freight, passenger, and tanker cars. The government envisioned

in the late 1980s upgrading capacity to 4.5 million tons a year. Ports Located on the Gulf of Aqaba, which leads to the Red Sea, Al

Aqabah was Jordan's only port. The modern port, established in

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The Economy

the 1950s, was under the authority of the Al Aqabah Ports Corporation, part of the Ministry of Transportation. The port grew

tremendously in the 1970s and especially in the early 1980s as transit trade through Al Aqabah became one of Iraq's few lifelines to the

outside world during its war with Iran. In 1985, according to the

government, 55 percent to 60 percent of Al Aqabah' s total cargo

capacity was devoted to transit trade with Iraq. Another estimate

placed this figure at 70 percent. Port facilities included seventeen

berths, two of them floating, that were specially equipped for loading or unloading general cargo, crude oil, and phosphates. One of the

newest berths, completed in 1985, was 580 meters long and configured for handling roll on/roll off cargo and container cargo. Associated facilities and services included warehouses and railheads.

Five new tugboats were ordered in 1988 to escort cargo ships in

the Gulf of Aqaba, which would bring to twelve the total number

of tugs. In 1987, more than 2,600 vessels called at Al Aqabah, loading 8.7 million tons of freight and unloading about 11.3 million

tons. The combined total tonnage represented a 19-percent increase over the previous year. Jordan has also established a small merchant marine. The National Maritime Company had four merchant vessels with a combined freight capacity of 71,400 tons. Also, the Syrian-Jordanian

Marine Transport Company operated two freighters with a combined capacity of 6,000 tons that transported about 70,000 tons of freight annually between the Middle East and Western Europe.

Since 1985 Jordan and Egypt have jointly operated an intermittent bridge and ferry service capable of carrying trucks and cars from Al Aqabah to the Sinai port of Nuwaybi. The service has cut

transit time between Al Aqabah and Cairo in half, to about nine

hours.

Civil Aviation and Airports

Royal Jordanian Airlines—known until 1987 as Alia—was the

national carrier. Wholly owned by the government and operating

since 1946, Royal Jordanian by 1988 had become one of the major

Middle Eastern air carriers. From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s,

passenger and freight traffic and reported profits grew almost 25

percent annually (although fuel and other hidden subsidies made

calculation of actual profitability impossible). Annual traffic growth

tapered off to single-digit figures after 1983 and the airline ex- perienced a US$30 million loss in 1984. A budget cut of almost

10 percent in 1986 resulted in staff and other overhead cuts that

apparently made the carrier more efficient, and in that year it reported a profit of US$5.6 million. In 1986 Royal Jordanian

157
Jordan: A Country Study

carried more than 1 million passengers and 42,500 tons of cargo. Load factors averaged over 48 percent. Jordan also had established some of the most advanced flight crew training and maintenance

and repair facilities in the Middle East, and it sold these services

to African and other Arab airlines. In the late 1980s, Royal Jordanian was in the midst of a major

program of long-term expansion and financial restructuring. The

program included the low-cost lease and purchase of new Airbus

Industrie airliners. Royal Jordanian also was negotiating an agree- ment to sell and lease back some of its Boeing and Lockheed air- craft to cut corporate debt. After restructuring the balance sheet,

the government planned to offer Royal Jordanian for sale to its 4,600 employees and to private sector investors, retaining only a

15-percent stake. In 1988 the Royal Jordanian fleet consisted of two Boeing 747-

200s, eight Lockheed L-1011 Tristars, three Boeing 727-200As,

and three Boeing 707-320Cs. In 1987 Royal Jordanian acquired

the first two of six Airbus Industrie A-310-300s, which were to replace its Boeing 707s. Royal Jordanian also had an option to purchase six Airbus Industrie A-320s to replace its Boeing 727s over

the decade from 1990 to 2000, and planned eventually to phase

out use of its Lockheeds in favor of new Airbus Industrie A-340s.

In 1987 Royal Jordanian added Moscow and Calcutta to the more than forty worldwide destinations it already served. New

scheduled flights were planned to East Asia, including Seoul, Tokyo,

Manila, and Sydney, as well as to Rio de Janeiro via Abidjan.

Jordan had two other minor airlines: Arab Air Cargo and Arab

Wings. Arab Air Cargo was owned in equal shares by Royal Jor- danian and Iraqi Airways. Arab Wings, a passenger charter ser- vice, was owned by Royal Jordanian (88 percent) and the Sultanate

of Oman (12 percent). The latter company also included a flying

ambulance service. There were nineteen usable airfields in Jor- dan in 1988, of which fourteen had permanent surface runways.

Of these, two near Amman were major airfields: the Queen Alia

International Airport, opened in 1983 and located at Al Jizah, thirty

kilometers south of Amman, and the old international airport at Marka, King Abdullah Airport, used primarily by the Royal Jor- danian Air Force. Telecommunications

The Jordan Telecommunications Corporation (TCC), a wholly

government-owned semi-autonomous entity under the Ministry of

Communications, was in charge of providing domestic and inter- national telecommunications services in 1988. Since 1971 the TCC

158
Queen Alia International Airport at Al Jizah, south of Amman,

showing Royal Jordanian Airlines airplanes

had exercised a monopoly over all forms of public telecommunications, including telephone, telex, telegraph, facsimile, and tele- vision transmissions. The TCC was profitable and a net contributor

to the budget. In 1988 the government was moving forward cautiously with plans to privatize the company in stages—using as its model the privatization of British Telecom—and planned eventually to sell all or part of the equity to public stockholders.

In the 1980s, TCC increased the number of connected telephone

lines by almost 20 percent per year while introducing technological improvements such as digital switching and microwave links. International direct dialing was introduced in 1982; in 1989, Jordan

had one Atiantic Ocean International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) station, one Indian Ocean Intelsat sta- tion, and one Arab Satellite Organization (Arabsat) station. In 1988, more than 200,000 direct lines were in service, with about 85,000

applicants on a waiting list, so that only about 70 percent of demand was satisfied. A private citizen waited about five years for a line, but most businesses could obtain a line quickly by paying

a surcharge to avoid the waiting list. Line density in 1988 was 7 percent of the population, better than in most countries with similar

per capita GNP. Telephone service was concentrated in Amman,

where more than 60 percent of all lines were installed. Altogether,

about 75 percent of Jordanian villages and cities had access to

159
Jordan: A Country Study

telephone service. Despite 12 -percent forecast annual demand

growth, line density was expected to grow to 12 percent of the population by the early 1990s because of a planned US$340 million in- vestment in new equipment and services. Local calls in Amman

were free and were subsidized by exorbitant international rates. In 1987, however, because of protests by businesses and private

citizens, international rates were cut drastically (up to 50 percent,

depending on the country called).

Natural Resources

Jordan's mineral wealth and extractive industries constituted a major source of its gross output manufacturing as well as of its total value added in manufacturing (see Manufacturing, this ch.). Such

natural resources also represented a significant element in Jordan's

exports.

Phosphates

Phosphate deposits were Jordan's primary natural resource and

a major source of export income. Estimates of Jordan's proven,

indicated, and probable reserves ranged from 1.5 billion to 2.5 bil- lion tons. Even if the more conservative figure were the most ac- curate, Jordan could produce at its present rate for hundreds of

years. Total 1987 production was 6.7 million tons, of which 5.7

million tons were exported as raw rock. The remainder was upgraded into fertilizer at several facilities and either retained for domestic use or exported. Jordan was the third ranked phosphate

exporter in the world, after Morocco and the United States, and

it had the capacity to produce well over 8 million tons annually. In 1986 phosphate sales generated US$185 million in income, which

made up 25 percent of export earnings and gave Jordan a 10-percent

share of the world market. Sales by volume in 1986 increased

approximately 14 percent over the previous year, but profits rose only 4 percent, an indication of the depressed price for phosphates on the world market. In 1986 long-term agreements were concluded

with Thailand and Yugoslavia that assured the added export of

almost 1 million tons per year. In 1985 the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company closed the country's original phosphate mine at Ar Rusayfah near Amman be- cause it produced low-grade rock; this left major phosphate mines

in operation at Al Hasa and Wadi Abu Ubaydah near Al Qatranah

in central Jordan, and a new high-grade mine at Ash Shidiyah,

forty kilometers south of Maan, where according to one estimate, reserves were more than 1 billion tons.

160
The Economy

AmongJordan's major development projects was the construction

of a US$450-million processing facility near Al Aqabah, completed

in 1982, to produce monoammonium phosphate and diammonium

phosphate fertilizer, and other chemicals such as phosphoric acid

from raw phosphate rock. The project was envisioned as a boon

to the extractive industry because it would increase value added

in its major export commodity. Instead, it became an encumbrance

as the prices of sulfur and ammonia (which Jordan had to import

to produce the diammonium phosphate) rose while the price of

diammonium phosphate on the world market slumped. Production costs of diammonium phosphate at various times between 1985

and 1987 ranged from 110 percent to 160 percent of world market

price for the product. Nevertheless, Jordan remained cautiously

optimistic about the long-term prospects for the fertilizer industry

because of its geographic proximity to the large Asian markets.

In 1985 Jordan exported more than 500,000 tons of fertilizer,

primarily to India and China.

Potash

Potash was the other major component ofJordan's mining sector. A US$480-million potash extraction facility at Al Aghwar al Janubiyah (also known as Ghor as Safi) on the Dead Sea, which was operated by the Arab Potash Company, produced 1.2 million tons of potash in 1987 and yielded earnings of almost US$100 million. The facility processed the potash into potassium chloride. Future plans included the production of other industrial chemicals

such as potassium sulfate, bromine, magnesium oxide, and soda

ash. As in the case of phosphates, India was a major customer,

buying almost 33 percent of output. Jordan was the world's lowest

cost producer, in part because it used solar evaporation. There was

lingering concern that possible Israeli construction of a Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal would dilute the Dead Sea, making

extraction far more expensive.

Oil and Gas

By the late 1980s, a twenty-year-long period of exploration had

resulted in the discovery and exploitation of three oil wells in the

Hamzah field in the Wadi al Azraq region west of Amman that

yielded only a small fraction of domestic energy requirements.

Jordan also had just discovered gas from what appeared to be a

field in the eastern panhandle near the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border.

Jordan remained almost entirely dependent on oil imported from

Saudi Arabia and Iraq to meet its energy needs. Jordan refined

the imported crude petroleum at its Az Zarqa refinery. In 1985

161
Jordan: A Country Study

the Az Zarqa refinery processed about 2.6 million tons of petroleum. Of this total, about 1 .8 million tons came from Saudi Arabia,

700,000 tons from Iraq, and 2,800 tons from Jordan's Hamzah

field. An additional 400,000 tons of fuel were imported from Iraq.

The Saudi Arabian oil was transported to Jordan via the TransArabian Pipeline (Tapline). Oil from Iraq was transported by tanker

truck. About 40 percent of oil imports were used by the transport

sector, 25 percent to generate electricity, 16 percent by industry,

and the remainder for domestic use. Jordan's oil bill was difficult to calculate and was subject to fluc- tuation as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) changed its posted price for crude. Since 1985, barter

agreements with Iraq to trade goods for crude oil have removed some ofJordan's oil bill from the balance sheet. Jordan also varied

its imports of crude oil and other, more expensive fuels, depending on its immediate fuel demand and its refinery capacity, and

cut consumption through conservation measures and price in- creases. The oil bill remained very large, however. A major irony ofJor- dan's energy dependence was that despite—or because of—its proximity to its main oil suppliers, it was sometimes obliged to pay

extremely inflated prices for its oil. In mid- 1986, for example, Saudi

Arabia charged Jordan the official OPEC price of US$28 per barrel at a time when oil was selling on the international spot market

for US$10 per barrel. Saudi Arabia's motives were perhaps as much

political as economic, in that it wanted to maintain the integrity

of the OPEC floor price for oil. Dependent on Saudi financial aid,

Jordan could not alienate its patron by shopping on the world market. In 1985 estimates of Jordan's oil import bill ranged between

US$500 million and US$650 million. At that time, imported oil constituted approximately 20 percent of total imports and offset 80 percent of the value of commodity exports. In 1986 and 1987,

Jordan's estimated fuel bill declined considerably, to less than

US$300 million. The drop resulted from barter with Iraq, decreased

fuel imports, and OPEC's reduction of its official price of crude

oil to bring it into line with world market prices. As prices dropped,

the Jordanian government—which had subsidized domestic fuel prices—was able to cut the subsidy from US$70 million to US$14

million instead of passing on savings to consumers.

Since 1984 Saudi Arabia has forced Jordan to underwrite the

entire cost of operating the Tapline. This has added more than

US$25 million per year to Jordan's oil bill. During the Iran-Iraq

War, therefore, Jordan tried to persuade Iraq to obtain an alter- native oil outlet by building a pipeline across Jordan to Al Aqabah.

162
Phosphate mine, southern Jordan

Unloading phosphates, Al Aqabah Port

163
Jordan: A Country Study

The project foundered because of Iraqi concern that the line was

vulnerable to Israeli attack and embarrassment over disclosure of

Jordanian attempts to obtain a secret Israeli pledge not to attack

the line. The 1980 discovery of from 10 billion to 40 billion tons of shale

oil deposits in the Wadi as Sultani area raised Jordanian hopes of

greater self-sufficiency, but there were doubts that large-scale exploitation of the deposits would be commercially viable in the near

future. Since 1985 Jordan has attempted to interest Western oil companies in exploring for oil. Amoco, Hunt Petroleum, Petro- Canada, Petrofina of Belgium, and the Japanese National Oil Company were conducting survey work in Jordan in the late 1980s.

Jordanian planners hoped that potentially extensive natural gas

reserves discovered at Rishah in eastern Jordan could eventually

replace oil for electricity generation, cutting imports by one-quarter.

Water

The government was concerned that scarcity of water could ulti- mately place a cap on both agricultural and industrial development.

Although no comprehensive hydrological survey had been con- ducted by the late 1980s, some experts believed that demand for water could outstrip supply by the early 1990s. Average annual

rainfall was about 8 billion cubic meters, most of which evaporated;

the remainder flowed into rivers and other catchments or seeped

into the ground to replenish large underground aquifers of fossil water that could be tapped by wells. Annual renewable surface and

subterranean water supply was placed at 1.2 billion cubic meters. Total demand was more difficult to project. In 1985 Jordan con- sumed about 520 million cubic meters of water, of which 111 million cubic meters went for industrial and domestic use, and 409

million cubic meters went for agricultural use. By 1995 it was esti- mated that domestic and industrial consumption would almost double and agricultural demand would increase by 50 percent, so that

total demand would be about 820 million cubic meters. By the year

2000, projected demand was estimated at 934 million cubic meters. Jordan, therefore, would need to harness almost all of its annual

renewable water resources of 1.2 billion cubic meters to meet fu- ture demand, a process that would inevitably be marked by

diminishing marginal returns as ever more expensive and remotely

situated projects yielded less and less added water. The process also could spark regional disputes—especially with Israel—over riparian rights.

The government had completed several major infrastructure

projects in an effort to make maximum use of limited water supplies,

164
The Economy

and was considering numerous other projects in the late 1980s. The

King Talal Dam, built in 1978 on the Az Zarqa River, formed

Jordan's major reservoir. In the late 1980s, a project to raise the

height of the dam by ten meters so as to increase the reservoir's

capacity from 56 million cubic meters to 90 million cubic meters was almost complete. A second major construction project underway in 1989 was the Wadi al Arabah Dam to capture flood waters

of the Yarmuk River and the Wadi al Jayb (also known as Wadi

al Arabah) in a 17-million cubic meter reservoir. These two dams

and innumerable other catchments and tunnels collected water from

tributaries that flowed toward the Jordan River and fed the

50-kilometer-long East Ghor Canal (see fig. 4). Plans called for the eventual extension of the East Ghor Canal to the Dead Sea

region, which would almost double its length. In 1989 about fifteen dams were in various stages of design or construction, at a total projected cost of JD64 million.

By far the largest of these projects was a joint Jordanian-Syrian

endeavor to build a 100-meter-high dam on the Yarmuk River.

The project, which had been contemplated since the 1950s but had

foundered repeatedly because of political disputes, was revived in 1988 after the thaw in Jordanian-Syrian relations and appeared

to be progressing in early 1989. Called the Maqarin Dam in previ- ous development plans, it was renamed the Al Wahdah Dam to

reflect the political rapprochement that made construction feasi- ble (Al Wahdah means unity). The dam was to create a reservoir

of 250 million cubic meters. The Jordanian estimate of the cost, which Jordan was to bear alone, was US$397 million. Independent estimates placed the figure at more than US$500 million.

Building time was estimated at two years after the planned 1989

starting date, but new political problems threatened to stall construction. In 1988 the United States attempted to mediate between

Jordan and Israel, which feared the dam would limit its own potential water supply; Syria, however, refused to join any tripartite

negotiations.

In 1989 serious consideration was being given to two proposals

to construct major pipelines to import water. Completion of either

project could be a partial solution to Jordan's water scarcity. Because of cost, however, neither project was likely to be constructed

in the near future. One project was to construct a multibillion dollar 650-kilometer-long pipeline from the Euphrates River in Iraq.

The pipeline would supply Jordan with about 160 million cubic

meters of water per year. The other project, on which feasibility

studies had been conducted, was to construct a 2,700-kilometerlong pipeline from rivers in Turkey, through Syria and Jordan,

165
Jordan: A Country Study

to Saudi Arabia. Jordan could draw an allotment of about 220 million cubic meters per year from this second pipeline. The estimated

US$20 billion cost of the latter project was thought to be prohibitive. Agriculture

Agriculture contributed substantially to the economy at the time

ofJordan's independence, but it subsequently suffered a decadeslong steady decline. In the early 1950s, agriculture constituted

almost 40 percent of GNP; on the eve of the June 1967 War, it was 17 percent. By the mid-1980s, agriculture's share of GNP was

only about 6 percent. In contrast, in Syria and Egypt agriculture

constituted more than 20 percent of GNP in the 1980s. Several

factors contributed to this downward trend. With the Israeli occu- pation of the West Bank, Jordan lost prime farmland. Starting in

the mid-1970s, Jordanian labor emigration also hastened the decline

of agriculture. Many Jordanian peasants abandoned farming to take more lucrative jobs abroad, sometimes as soldiers in the armies

of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states or in service industries in those countries. Others migrated to cities where labor short- ages had led to higher wages for manual workers. Deserted farms were built over as urban areas expanded. As the Jordanian government drove up interest rates to attract remittance income, farm

credit tightened, which made it difficult for farmers to buy seed

and fertilizer. In striking contrast to Egypt and Iraq, where redistribution of

land irrigated by the Nile and Euphrates rivers was a pivotal

political, social, and economic issue, land tenure was never an important concern in Jordan. More than 150,000 foreign laborers

mainly Egyptians—worked in Jordan in 1988, most on farms.

Moreover, since the early 1960s, the government has continuously

created irrigated farmland from what was previously arid desert,

further reducing competition for arable land. Ownership of rainfed land was not subject to special restrictions. Limited land re- form occurred in the early 1960s when, as the government irrigated

the Jordan River valley, it bought plots larger than twenty hectares, subdivided them, and resold them to former tenants in three- hectare to five-hectare plots. Because the land had not been very

valuable before the government irrigated it, this process was ac- complished with little controversy. In general, the government has

aimed to keep land in larger plots to encourage efficiency and

mechanized farming. The government made permanently indivisi- ble the irrigated land that it granted or sold so as to nullify tradi- tional Islamic inheritance laws that tended to fragment land.

166
Grain silos, AI Aqabah

Agricultural Development

Although the agricultural sector's share of GNP declined in comparison with other sectors of the economy, farming remained eco- nomically important and production grew in absolute terms. Between 1975 and 1985, total production of cereals and beans rose by almost 150 percent, and production of vegetables rose by more

than 200 percent, almost all of the increase occurring between 1975

and 1980. Production of certain cash export crops, such as olives,

tobacco, and fruit, more than quadrupled. Because farming had

remained labor intensive, by one estimate about 20 percent to 30

percent of the male work force continued to depend on farming

for its livelihood.

Even with increased production, the failure of agriculture to keep

pace with the growth of the rest of the economy, however, resulted

in an insufficient domestic food supply. Jordan thus needed to import such staples as cereals, grains, and meat. Wheat imports aver- aged about 350,000 tons per year, ten to twenty times the amount

produced domestically. Red meat imports cost more than JD30

million per year, and onion and potato imports cost between JD3

million and JD4 million per year. Between 1982 and 1985, the total food import bill averaged about JD180 million per year, accounting for more than 15 percent of total imports during the period.

At the same time, cash crop exports—for example, the export of

167
Jordan: A Country Study

7,000 tons of food to Western Europe in 1988—generated about

JD40 million per year, yielding a net food deficit of JD140 million. One emerging problem in the late 1980s was the erosion of

Jordan's traditional agricultural export market. The wealthy oil- exporting states of the Arabian Peninsula, concerned about their

"food security," were starting to replace imports from Jordan with

food produced domestically at costs far higher than world market

prices, using expensive desalinated water. Cropping and Production

Observers expected food imports to remain necessary into the

indefinite future. Much ofJordan's soil was not arable even if water were available; by several estimates, between 6 percent and 7 per- cent of Jordan's territory was arable, a figure that was being re- vised slowly upward as dry-land farming techniques became more

sophisticated. In 1989 the scarcity of water, the lack of irrigation,

and economic problems—rather than the lack of arable land—set a ceiling on agricultural potential (see Water, this ch.). Only about

20 percent ofJordan's geographic area received more than 200 millimeters of rainfall per year, the minimum required for rain-fed

agriculture. Much of this land was otherwise unsuitable for agricul- ture. Moreover, rainfall varied greatly from year to year, so crops were prone to be ruined by periodic drought.

In 1986 only about 5.5 percent (about 500,000 hectares), of the

East Bank's (see Glossary) 9.2 million hectares were under culti- vation. Fewer than 40,000 hectares were irrigated, almost all in

the Jordan River valley. Because arable, rain-fed land was exploited

extensively, future growth of agricultural production depended on

increased irrigation. Estimates of the additional area that could be

irrigated were Jordan to maximize its water resources ranged between 65,000 and 100,000 hectares.

Most agricultural activity was concentrated in two areas. In rainfed northern and central areas of higher elevation, wheat, barley,

and other field crops such as tobacco, lentils, barley, and chickpeas were cultivated; olives also were produced in these regions.

Because of periodic drought and limited area, the rain-fed uplands

did not support sufficient output of cereal crops to meet domestic

demand (see table 11, Appendix).

In the more fertile Jordan River valley, fruits and vegetables

including cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplants, melons, bananas, and

citrus crops often were produced in surplus amounts. The Jordan

River valley received little rain, and the main source of irrigation

water was the East Ghor Canal, which was built in 1963 with United

States aid.

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The Economy

Although the country's ultimate agricultural potential was small,

economic factors apparently limited production more than environmental constraints, as reflected by up to 100,000 hectares of potentially arable land that lay fallow in the late 1980s. The government

has expressed considerable concern about its "food security" and

its high food import bill, and it was implementing plans to increase

crop production in the 1990s. Growth in agricultural output was

only about 4 percent during the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan, despite

investment of approximately JD80 million during the period, in- dicating the slow pace of progress. In the late 1980s, Jordan was implementing a two-pronged

agricultural development policy. The long-term strategy was to in- crease the total area under cultivation by better harnessing water

resources to increase irrigation of arid desert areas for the cultivation of cereal crops, the country's most pressing need. In the short

term, the government was attempting to maximize the efficiency

of agricultural production in the Jordan River valley through ra- tionalization or use of resources to produce those items in which

the country had a relative advantage.

Rationalization started with a controversial 1985 government

decision to regulate cropping and production, primarily in the Jor- dan River valley. Farmers there had repeatedly produced surpluses

of tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplants, and squashes because they were

reliable and traditional crops. At the same time, underproduction

of crops such as potatoes, onions, broccoli, celery, garlic, and spices

led to unnecessary imports. The government offered incentives to farmers to experiment with new crops and cut subsidy payments

to those who continued to produce surplus crops. In 1986 cucumber production dropped by 25 percent to about 50,000 tons and

tomato harvests dropped by more than 33 percent to 160,000 tons,

while self-sufficiency was achieved in potatoes and onions.

Production of wheat and other cereals fluctuated greatly from

year to year, but never came close to meeting demand. In 1986, a drought year, Jordan produced about 22,000 tons of wheat, down

from 63,000 tons in 1985. In 1987 Jordan harvested about 130,000

tons, a record amount. Because even a bumper crop did not meet

domestic demand, expansion of dry-land cereal farming in the

southeast of the country was a major agricultural development goal

of the 1990s. One plan called for the irrigation of a 7,500-hectare area east of Khawr Ramm (known as Wadi Rum) using 100 million cubic meters per year of water pumped from a large underground aquifer. Another plan envisioned a 7,500-hectare cultivated area in the Wadi al Arabah region south of the Jordan River val- ley using desalinated water from the Red Sea for irrigation.

169
Jordan: A Country Study

Livestock

Livestock production was limited in the late 1980s. Jordan had

about 35,000 head of cattle but more than 1 million sheep and

500,000 goats, and the government planned to increase their numbers. In the late 1980s, annual production of red meat ranged between 10,000 and 15,000 tons, less than 33 percent of domestic

consumption. A major impediment to increased livestock production was the high cost of imported feed. Jordan imported cereals

at high cost for human consumption, but imported animal feed was a much lower priority. Likewise, the arid, rain-fed land that

could have been used for grazing or for fodder production was set aside for wheat production. Jordan was self-sufficient, however,

in poultry meat production (about 35,000 tons) and egg production (about 400,000 eggs), and exported these products to neighboring countries.

International Trade

Since independence, Jordan has imported far more than it has

exported. Throughout the 1970s, the gap widened as imports grew

faster than exports.

Trade Balance

Jordan did not seek to achieve a trade balance with any major

trading partner. In the mid-1980s, the United States and Western

Europe supplied almost 50 percent ofJordan's imports, while Arab

nations purchased nearly half of the country's exports.

Although Jordan's merchandise trade deficit was always high,

the total volume of external trade—defined as imports plus

exports—was much higher, indicating that exports were signifi- cant enough to offset part of the large import bill. Between 1982

and 1985, as economic growth slowed, import volume contracted

by about 4 percent per year. Exports grew by about 5 percent per

year during the same period, shrinking the annual trade deficit from more than JD800 million in the early 1980s to JD623 million in

1985. In 1987 the total value of imports was about JD9 16 million

while total exports were valued at about JD249 million, leaving

a trade deficit of JD667 million.

Composition of Exports and Imports

When it became apparent that Jordan could not shift the trade

balance in the short term by dramatically reducing imports and

increasing exports, government economic planners attempted to

alter the composition and direction of external trade by slowly

170
Government agricultural project using underground water

in Khawr Ramm Desert, southern Jordan

Hothouse in the Jordan River valley

171
Jordan: A Country Study

pursuing a two-pronged policy. Jordan tried to improve its gross barter terms by exporting products with higher value added; for example, prices of consumer goods tended to be higher and more

stable than those of raw materials. Likewise, Jordan tried to in- crease the efficiency of its imports by increasing imports of capital

goods and raw materials while lowering imports of consumer goods.

The concept was that Jordan should import relatively more and

export relatively less of goods that contributed directly toward eco- nomic growth.

The changes in the relative composition of exports were more

pronounced than changes in the relative composition of imports

between 1974 and 1986, according to figures compiled by the Central Bank. Nonetheless, changes were not dramatic in either

category. Consumer goods declined from 45 percent to about 37

percent of total imports, but capital goods also declined from 26

percent to 23 percent of total imports. Raw materials increased

from 19 percent to 34 percent of total imports, but this rise primarily

reflected a growing oil bill, as Jordan could no longer obtain oil at discount prices. Raw material exports declined from 53 percent

to 38 percent of total exports, capital goods exports were cut in

half from 12 percent to 6 percent, and consumer goods exports were

boosted from 35 percent to 56 percent of total exports. Phosphates

continued to generate 20 percent of export earnings.

Although the shift in external trade composition appeared to coincide with government policy, economist Rodney Wilson has pointed

out that part of the shift was illusory. Customs classifications may

have been misleading and also may have changed over time. Many

consumer imports were listed as capital imports, and raw material or capital goods exports often were listed as consumer goods exports. For example, fertilizers, a major export, were listed as con- sumer goods.

Because the categorization of imports and exports according to their value added or ultimate economic disposition was ambiguous, a more specific breakdown of exports and imports by product was warranted. In 1987 energy imports made up approximately

13 percent of the import bill; food imports constituted about 11 percent of the import bill. Basic manufactures, such as textiles, iron,

and steel together represented 9 percent of import cost; machinery

and transportation equipment constituted 20 percent, and imports

of miscellaneous manufactured articles constituted 10 percent of

imports (see table 12, Appendix). In 1987 28 percent ofJordanian

export earnings were of chemical products, including fertilizers. Raw phosphate exports generated about 25 percent of export earnings, and potash exports accounted for about 1 1 percent of export

172
The Economy

earnings. Food and food products constituted about 8 percent and

basic manufactures, such as cement, about 4 percent (see table 13,

Appendix).

At least some of the shift in import composition appeared to contribute to economic growth insofar as it was correlated with GNP

growth. In the early 1980s, the average value of consumer goods

imports as a percentage of GNP dropped marginally, from 23 per- cent to 21 percent, while capital goods imports increased from 15

percent to 23 percent of GNP. The value of total imports as a per- centage of GNP climbed almost 40 percent between 1973 and 1983,

reaching about 87 percent; however, the rate of this growth slowed

during the period and was outpaced by GNP growth.

Direction of Trade

Whereas almost 50 percent of Jordan's imports came from the

United States and Western Europe, these same countries bought

less than 10 percent ofJordanian exports. The direction of exter- nal trade generally followed Jordan's self- perceived economic identity as an indirect intermediary between the West and the developed

world on the one hand, and the Arab countries and the Third World

on the other. But because other Arab nations remained the most

important customers—buying almost 50 percent of the 1987 ex- port total of almost JD249 million—Jordanian markets were in- sufficiently diversified to benefit fully from this strategy. In early

1989, the Arab Cooperation Council, composed ofJordan, Egypt,

Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), was established to promote trade. This development, as well as the creation

of the Joint Syrian-Jordanian Economic Committee, could reinforce Jordan's concentration on nearby markets. In the late 1980s,

Jordan nevertheless sought to expand its export markets and had

targeted Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa as potential prospects.

In 1987 Iraq continued to be Jordan's largest export customer.

Jordan exported nearly JD60 million worth of goods to Iraq, but

most of this figure resulted from transit and reexport rather than

from bilateral trade. Saudi Arabia was Jordan's second largest ex- port customer. Jordanian exports to Egypt had grown more than

fourfold since 1985, demonstrating that Egypt was an important

new outlet. Other major Arab export markets included Kuwait,

Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (see table 14, Appendix).

South Asian and East Asian nations were regarded as promising markets, particularly for the sale of fertilizer and industrial

chemicals. In 1987 India was Jordan's third largest export customer. Exports to China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Japan also were growing. Furthermore, trade protocols signed in 1987 with both Thailand

173
Jordan: A Country Study

and Turkey may have opened the door to greater exports to both

the Asian and the European markets.

Italy was Jordan's only major West European customer. Jordanian officials envisioned improved prospects in Eastern Europe,

particularly in Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Jordan regarded

Africa as a potentially vast market that could constitute one of the

first experiments with the "South-South" relationship advocated

in Third-World circles. Whereas exports to Africa remained

minimal in 1987, Jordan's apparent willingness to consider counter- trade and barter remained attractive to such markets.

Jordan imported about JD9 16 million worth of goods in 1987.

Iraq was the largest source of imports, but much of the JD99 million worth of products it sent to Jordan were intended for reexport. Imports from Saudi Arabia, Jordan's third largest import

source in 1987, consisted mainly of oil. Almost 40 percent of Jor- dan's total import bill in 1987 came from eight West European

nations, headed by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Britain, and Italy. The United States was Jordan's second

largest source of imports and Japan was another significant import source. Banking and Finance

The dominant financial institutions in Jordan were the Central

Bank and the Amman Financial Market. Jordan's largest commercial bank was the Arab Bank. Until 1989 many small moneychanging offices were operated by small proprietors. Jordan also had three Islamic banks.

The Central Bank, established in 1964, was responsible for note

issue, management of exchange reserves, and regulation of credit.

It acted as the fiscal agent for the government, regulated the commercial banking sector, and sponsored the creation of certain new

financial institutions. In 1985, for example, the Central Bank acted

jointly with the Egyptian government to establish a new bank to finance bilateral trade. The government's presence in the financial sector was augmented by several specialized institutions that

filled voids in commercial lending activity: the Agricultural Credit

Corporation, the Housing Bank (which provided mortgages), and

the Industrial Development Bank (which channeled capital to small

start-up manufacturing businesses). The government also channeled equity capital to the private sector through large government

pension and social security funds.

The banking sector more than doubled loans and deposits between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. During the same period, the number of financial institutions tripled. The government

174
The Economy

encouraged the expansion of banking services as a key to its eco- nomic development policy. Deposits were attracted from other Arab

nations, and the savings and remittances of the many Jordanians

who traditionally had never used banks were captured. These

deposits were in turn funneled as loans to growing companies that

needed capital. Monetization—the use of legal tender as a medium

of exchange rather than barter—was very successful. By the mid1980s, Jordan was the only Arab country in which the value of

bank assets exceeded GDP. Total commercial bank assets rose from

JD1.1 billion in 1980 to JD2.3 billion in 1985. During the same

period, total deposits increased from about JD800 million toJD1.7

billion. Demand deposits decreased from about 35 percent to 20

percent of total deposits, while savings deposits grew. Strict Central Bank consumer credit controls and government success in en- couraging savings also were indicated by the growth of the liquid

money supply at about 7 percent per year from 1980 to 1987. The

liquid money supply reached about JD900 million during this period, with no significant inflation. In the mid-1980s, however, the government became apprehensive that the banking sector was expanding too rapidly. One con- cern was that the proliferation of banks could engender excessive

competition for assets and risky lending activity; as a result, in 1984

the Central Bank imposed a moratorium on the establishment of new commercial banks. The government also was worried that Jor- danian banks preferred making loans to foreign companies rather

than to Jordanian companies, that the banks avoided long-term

lending, and that loans often financed trade rather than capital in- vestment. In 1985 more than 27 percent of commercial bank credit

financed trade, whereas less than 10 percent financed corporate

investment.

Another concern was that banks had been so successful in at- tracting deposits that they were diverting public investment from

Jordan's stock exchange, the Amman Financial Market. As a result,

companies were unable to obtain equity finance and had no choice

but to finance themselves through bank loans. The value of traded

shares—less than JD70 million in 1984—had always been dwarfed

by banking activity. The total value of share prices on the stock

market grew an average of 20 percent annually from 1978 to 1982.

From 1983 to 1986, however, share prices dropped an average of

13 percent annually. Companies in the service and manufacturing

sectors were especially hard hit, and in 1986 their total share value was less than it had been in 1978. In 1987 and 1988, the stock market recovered as investors tried to hedge against the shaky dinar.

Trading volume reached a record high of JD149 million in 1987.

175
Jordan: A Country Study

To counterbalance fluctuating stock values and the rapid expansion of banking, the government initiated greater regulation of bank

activity. Banks were required to invest 8 percent of their deposits

in government bills and bonds. Investment of at least 15 percent

of capital in public and mixed sector corporate equity also was mandated, and the minimum capital requirement was increased to JD5

million. Binding interest rate ceilings were set on both loans and

deposits, and the dinar exchange rate was fixed by the Central Bank.

In the late 1980s, thirty major banks and financial institutions

operated in Jordan, including eight major locally based conventional commercial banks with numerous branch offices, six foreign

banks, two major Islamic banks, and a host of smaller or more

specialized foreign and domestic financial institutions, some of

which conducted merchant banking, investment banking, and trade or agricultural finance. By far the largest locally based commercial bank was the Arab Bank, a Palestinian institution that moved

to Amman from Jerusalem in 1948. Because the Arab Bank ca- tered mainly to Palestinians throughout the world, it was not a dominant force in the local market. In terms of total assets (primarily

loans) the Jordan National Bank, the Cairo-Amman Bank, the

Jordan-Kuwait Bank, and the Petra Bank were perhaps more important local institutions. Foreign banks included Citibank, Grindlays Bank, the Hong Kong-based British Bank of the Middle East,

as well as Iraq's Rafidayn Bank and Egypt's Arab Land Bank.

Chase Manhattan Bank left Jordan following the 1984 governmentimposed financial regulations.

The Central Bank had permitted the virtually unsupervised oper- ation of hundreds of small money-changing offices by individual

proprietors. The system had worked well when the dinar was valued

realistically compared to foreign currencies. But throughout 1988,

as the government attempted to prop up the value of the dinar by

freezing the official exchange rate, money changers became an open

black market that facilitated the slide of the dinar. In February 1989,

the government abruptly canceled the licenses of all money

changers, closed their offices, froze their bank accounts, and seized

their records.

Jordan also had permitted the establishment of three Islamic

banks that adhered to Islamic legal tenets proscribing interest rate

(riba) transactions. The Islamic banks paid no interest on deposits,

and collected no interest on loans. Instead, they made equity in- vestments in companies and then shared in the venture's profit or

loss, some of which would then be passed on to depositors. The

Islamic banks also were active in financing rural or low-cost housing as well as capital investment by manufacturing companies.

176
The Economy

Typically, Islamic banks built or bought a housing development

or a piece of equipment and then leased it to a client or company

on terms that approximated loan repayments. Jordan's Islamic

banks attracted the savings of pious Muslims from Jordan and other

Arab countries who would not use conventional, interest-charging

banks. The Islamic banks also financed socially desirable projects

that conventional banks regarded as too risky or unprofitable.

Islamic banks have had mixed success in Jordan. The Jordan

Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment was created in 1978 as a member of the Saudi Arabian-based Al Baraka network of Islamic

banks, but 90 percent of its capital was Jordanian owned. By 1986

it had become the sixth largest ofJordan's banks in assets and had

financed numerous projects. The Islamic Investment House, which was established with Kuwaiti backing in 1981, was shut down for an indefinite period by the government in 1984 because the projects

it had financed were losing money and were putting deposits at risk.

* * * The reader interested in more information on the Jordanian econ- omy can consult primary as well as secondary sources. The eco- nomic reports and statistics published and disseminated by the

government of Jordan are probably more comprehensive, relia- ble, and up-to-date than those produced by any other Arab country. Of particular value is the Five-Year Plan For Economic and Social Development: 1986-1990, published by the Ministry of Planning,

which contains in-depth information on all aspects of the economy,

from macroeconomic national income accounting to infrastructure

development.

One of the recognized experts on the Jordanian economy is Ian J

.

Seccombe, who has produced numerous authoritative articles dis- cussing Jordanian labor emigration and remittance income. Another

expert is Rodney Wilson, who has produced excellent work on Jor- dan's banking and financial system. In 1987 Seccombe and Wilson

together produced Trade and Finance in Jordan. Both authors contributed to The Economic Development ofJordan, an anthology edited

by Bichara Khader and Adnan Badran, which is arguably the best

book on the Jordanian economy. Of the many good articles ap- pearing in the book, those by Michel Chatelus and Francois Rivier

are noteworthy for their penetrating and original analysis. Another

valuable source of information on the Jordanian economy is Jor- dan to 1990: Coping with Change by Philip Robins, a special report

published in 1986 by the Economist Intelligence Unit. It concentrates on information that businesses would want to know about

177
Jordan: A Country Study

Jordan. Pamela Dougherty, a journalist who covers Jordan for the

Middle East Economic Digest, has produced high quality, informative, and timely articles. (For further information and more complete citations, see Bibliography.)

178
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Mosaic of the city of Amman, or Philadelphia, from the Umm ar Rasas pavement in a Byzantine church, ca. 780
IN LATE 1989, KING HUSSEIN ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn

Hussein Al Hashimi remained in firm control of Jordan's politi- cal system as the central policymaker and legislative and executive authority. He maintained tight control over key government

functions, such as national defense, internal security, justice, and

foreign affairs. Crown Prince Hasan, the king's younger brother

and heir apparent, complemented the small, Hussein-centered circle of power in his role as the king's right-hand man, especially in the areas of economy and administration.

Hussein's main power base continued to rest on the beduindominated army, which had been loyal to the Hashimite (also seen

as Hashemite) family for seven decades. Another source of strength was his astute ability to balance sociopolitical interests at home.

Equally important, Hussein was Jordan's most accomplished

diplomat-negotiator. During the 1980s, Hussein's autocracy also was substantially bolstered by his rapprochement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This significant development

greatly reduced the threat to Hussein's rule posed since 1970 by

various Palestinian guerrilla groups. Some groups, however, notably

the Black September and Abu Nidal factions, continued to seek

the overthrow of the entire monarchical structure. The Transjordanians (see Glossary) occupied a dominant place

in the existing power structure. Hussein's palace staff and his top

civil, judicial, and military officials were mostly Transjordanians.

Although there was a Palestinian (see Glossary) presence on the

periphery of power, the Palestinians' continued exclusion from substantive decision-making positions tended to alienate the Palestinian community and served as a potential source of political

instability. Hussein's decision in July 1988 to renounce Jordan's

claim to sovereignty over the West Bank (see Glossary) and his

subsequent recognition of the PLO's declaration of an independent Palestine may further affect the systemic integrity of Jordan

because the Palestinians living on the East Bank (see Glossary) must

choose whether they want Jordanian or Palestinian nationality.

Another source of political instability for Hussein's regime at the close of the 1980s was the continued severe recession that had

plagued the economy since the mid-1980s. This economic retrenchment was in sharp contrast to the economic growth experienced

during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The combination of high

inflation and high unemployment rates contributed to the pervasive

181
Jordan: A Country Study

sense of dissatisfaction that erupted in major antigovernment riots in several cities and towns in April 1989. Although all Jordanians were adversely affected by rising prices and falling income, the

Palestinians living in refugee camps—most of whom were poor before the recession—bore the brunt of the economic decline. Their

economic frustrations helped reinforce their political alienation.

The Constitution

The Constitution that was promulgated in 1952 and amended

in 1974, 1976, and 1984 remained in force in 1989. It declares Jor- dan a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary form of government and defines the people as "the source of all powers." The

people are officially stated as being part of "the Arab nation. " Islam

is the official religion of the state and Arabic the official language.

In nearly forty years of experience with the Constitution, adher- ence to the fundamental law of the land has varied in spirit as well

as in practice from time to time, depending upon domestic and

external circumstances.

Articles 5 through 23 of the Constitution stipulate the rights and

duties of citizens and guarantee a long list of personal freedoms.

Citizens are assured freedom from compulsory labor or forced loans,

and no one may be discriminated against for reasons of race,

religion, or language. Arrest, imprisonment, exile, forced residence,

and the expropriation of property without due process of law are

forbidden. Freedom of worship, opinion, and the press and the right

of peaceful assembly are ensured within the limits of the law. Censorship is allowed in time of martial law or when a state of national

emergency exists. The right of petition is guaranteed, and citizens are free to form political parties, trade unions, and associations

provided their objectives are lawful. Political refugees may not be

extradited. For grades one through nine, education is compulsory

and free in public schools. Every citizen is eligible for appointment

to public posts, subject only to the candidate's merit and qualification. The Constitution also outlines various principles of labor

legislation and directs the government to promote work and to protect labor.

Martial law was declared in 1967 and remained in force in 1989.

The emergency regulations under martial law effectively abridged

certain constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. These regulations per- mitted the martial law authorities and the secret police—popularly

referred to as the Mukhabarat rather than by its formal name of

Dairat al Mukhabarat or General Intelligence Department (GID)

to arrest persons suspected of security offenses and to detain them

182
Government and Politics

without trial or access to legal counsel for indefinite periods (see

General Intelligence Department, ch. 5). The emergency regulations also authorized the government to censor the press and other

publications, banned political parties, and restricted the rights of

citizens to assemble for political meetings and peaceful demonstrations.

The powers and functions of the state organs are elaborated in

articles 41 through 110. The Constitution includes sections on

finance, enforcement of laws, interpretation of the Constitution,

and emergency powers and constitutional amendments. An amendment requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members

of each legislative house, deliberating separately. When an amendment bill is twice rejected by either house, however, the bill must

be deliberated in a joint session of the legislature; in this instance, a two-thirds vote is required for adoption. An amendment bill takes

effect only on royal consent. In a move to ensure dynastic stability, the Constitution forbids any amendment concerning the rights

of the king and his heirs during a period of regency.

The five amendments to the Constitution that have been ap- proved since 1952 all pertain to the National Assembly. Two

amendments were adopted in November 1974. The first permitted the king to dissolve the Senate and to dismiss any individual senator for behavior unbecoming of the office. The second amendment permitted the king to postpone elections for the House of

Representatives for one year. In February 1976, a third amendment permitted the king to postpone parliamentary elections in- definitely. The two amendments adopted in 1984 authorized the

government to hold parliamentary elections in any part of the country where it was feasible, thus, only in the East Bank. Until late 1988, when Jordan renounced claims to political sovereignty over

the West Bank, the House of Representatives was empowered to

select deputies to fill vacant seats from the West Bank.

The Government

The Constitution divides the powers and functions of the government into executive, legislative, and judicial categories (see fig. 10).

The Constitution assigns the legislative power to both the bicameral

National Assembly and the king, who is also vested with executive

power. The king exercises his executive authority with the aid of

his cabinet ministers, collectively known as the Council of Ministers.

Judicial power is vested in independent courts. The authority and

services of the central government are extended to all corners of

the kingdom through the eight governorates or provinces.

183
Jordan: A Country Study

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184
Government and Politics

The King

Under the Constitution, the monarchy is the most important

political institution in the country. Articles 28 through 40 of the

Constitution enumerate the king's powers. He appoints the prime

minister, the president and members of the Senate, judges, and

other senior government and military functionaries. He commands

the armed forces, approves and promulgates laws, declares war,

concludes peace, and signs treaties (which in theory must be ap- proved by the National Assembly). The king convenes, opens, adjourns, suspends, or dissolves the legislature; he also orders, and

may postpone, the holding of elections. He has veto power that can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of each house. The

Constitution states that the king exercises his jurisdiction by iradah

(sing. ; pi. , iradat—royal decrees), which must be signed by the prime

minister and the minister or ministers concerned. As head of state, the king is accountable to no one. Royal succession devolves by male descent in the Hashimite dynasty (see fig. 11). The royal mandate is passed to the eldest son

of the reigning king, to the eldest son of the successor king, and

by similar process thereafter. Should the king die without a direct

heir, the deceased monarch's eldest brother has first claim, followed

by the eldest son of the other brothers according to their seniority

in age. Should there be no suitable direct heir, the National Assembly selects a successor from among ' the descendants of the

founder of the Arab Revolt, the late King Hussein ibn Ali" (see

World War I: Diplomacy and Intrigue, ch. 1). The heir apparent to the throne must be sane, a male Muslim,

the son of Muslim parents, and born of a lawful wife. In addition,

he must not have been excluded by a royal decree from the suc- cession "on the ground of unsuitability." In 1965 Hussein (b. 1935)

used this rule to exclude from the line of succession his two sons by his Muslim but British second wife Princess Muna. He also is- sued a royal decree that excluded his next younger brother Muhammad (b. 1945) and designated a second brother, Hasan (b. 1948),

as crown prince. In June 1978, Hussein designated Prince Ali (b.

1975), his son from his third wife (Queen Alia, who was killed in a helicopter crash in February 1977) to succeed Hasan as heir ap- parent on the latter' s succession to the throne.

When the throne is inherited by a minor, the powers of the king

are exercised by a regent or by a council of regency, both of which

may be appointed by a decree of the (previous) reigning king;

if the king dies without having made such an appointment, the ap- pointment is made by the Council of Ministers. The king attains

185
Jordan: A Country Study

HUSSEIN IBN ALI 1852-1931 SHARIF OF MECCA 1916-24

ALI

1879 SHARIF C

192

1935 F MECCA

1-25

1882-1951 AMIR OF TRANSJORDAN

1921-46 KING OF JORDAN

1946-51

d. 1950 MARRIED GHAZI

1912-58 REGENT OF

IRAQ

1939-53

1885-1933 KING OF SYRIA

1920 KING OF IRAQ

1921-33

TALAL

190

KIN( JOR

195

J-72

a OF DAN

1-52

HUSSEIN

1935- KING OF JORDAN

1953- SHARIFA DINA

(1ST WIFE) PRINCESS MUNA

(2D WIFE) QUEEN ALIA

(3D WIFE) QUEEN NUR

(4TH WIFE)

GHAZI

1912-39 KING OF IRAQ

1933-39 MARRIED ALIA DAUGHTER OF ALI

1948- CROWN PRINCE]

1965-

1935-58 KING OF IRAQ

1953-58

Figure 11. Abbreviated Genealogy of the Hashimite Family, 1989

186
Government and Politics

majority on his eighteenth birthday based on the Muslim lunar

calendar. Should the king be disabled by illness, his powers are exercised by a deputy, by a council of the throne appointed by the

king, or by the Council of Ministers if the king is incapable of such

appointment. The deputy or the council of the throne may also perform royal duties during the absence of the king from the country. If the absence extends to more than four months, the House

of Representatives is empowered to "review" the matter. The king has full responsibility for all matters pertaining to the

royal household. He appoints the chief of the royal court, an offi- cial who can play an influential political role through his control

of access to the monarch. Although the rank of the chief of the royal court is equivalent to that of a cabinet minister, his office is not

part of the executive branch.

The Council of Ministers

The cabinet, consisting of the prime minister and the other

ministers, is the top executive arm of the state. Its members serve

at the pleasure of the king, but the Constitution requires every new

cabinet to present its statement of programs and policies to the

House of Representatives for approval by a two-thirds vote of the

members of that house. If the house passes a vote of no confidence,

the cabinet must resign.

Traditionally, prime ministers have been recruited from families that have loyally served the Hashimites for many years. Zaid

ar Rifai, who was prime minister from 1985 to 1989, is the son

of a prominent Transjordanian politician who had served as prime

minister to Hussein's grandfather. His successors, Ash Sharif Zaid

ibn Shakir (April-November 1989) and Mudar Badran (designated

prime minister in November 1989), have each worked with the king

in a variety of political capacities. Significantly, both men served

as chief minister of the royal court prior to becoming prime minister. In September 1989, the cabinet included ministers responsible

for the following portfolios: agriculture; communications; culture

and information; defense; education; energy and mineral resources; finance and customs; foreign affairs; health; higher education;

tourism and antiquities; interior; justice; labor and social development; municipal, rural, and environmental affairs; planning;

religious affairs and holy places; supply; trade and industry; trans- portation; and youth. In 1989 the government also was served by

a minister of state for prime ministerial affairs. In 1986 the bureaucracy employed 109,523 Jordanians, making the government the principal employer in society. Selection

generally was based upon merit, although patronage and nepotism

187
Jordan: A Country Study

remained fairly widespread. The government trained civil servants

at a school of public administration in Amman, Jordan's capital.

A majority of them were Palestinians who had opted for Jordanian

citizenship; at the higher levels of the administrative hierarchy,

however, Transjordanians probably outnumbered Palestinians.

Allegiance to the monarchy and the Constitution remained an important factor in government service. In the aftermath of the Az

Zarka affair in 1957 and the civil war of 1970 and 1971, numerous Palestinian civil servants were dismissed because of suspected

disloyalty to the throne.

From the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank

in June 1967 until Hussein relinquished Jordan's claim to sover- eignty of the territory in July 1988, Amman continued to pay salaries and pensions to serving and retired West Bank municipal

government employees. During this period, the West Bank came

under the jurisdiction initially of the Bureau of Occupied Homeland

Affairs, attached to the prime minister's office and headed by a

cabinet-level minister; later this office became the Ministry of Occupied Territories. In addition to paying salaries, it was responsible for channeling Jordan's loans and development funds to Palestinian concerns in the West Bank. Following the decision at the Baghdad Summit meeting in November 1978 to set up a special fund for development and other projects in the Israeli-occupied

territories, this ministry worked jointly with the PLO in administering aid funds for Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip. By 1988, when Jordan terminated payments, more than

20,000 West Bank Palestinians were estimated to be receiving sala- ries from the Jordanian government. All of these employees were

granted retirement benefits or severance pay according to the number of years they had been municipal employees.

The Legislature

Under the Constitution, the bicameral legislature is called the

National Assembly and consists of the thirty-member appointed

Senate (sometimes called the House of Notables) and the popularly

elected House of Representatives (also called the Chamber of

Deputies). Prior to July 1988, both houses had an equal number

of representatives from each bank of the Jordan River. The Constitution stipulates that the size of the Senate cannot be more than

half that of the lower house. Of the two chambers, the Senate is regarded as the more elite; but like the lower chamber, it has had

little real influence in the legislative process. Although the House

of Representatives was vested with more legislative power than the

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Government and Politics

upper house, both chambers have been overshadowed by the executive side of government.

The senators are appointed by the king for four-year terms, with

half the membership retiring every two years at the end of a senate

session. A senator may be reappointed. Qualifications for a senator include a minimum age of forty years and prior government

or military service in relatively senior positions. Senators have in- cluded present and past prime ministers, former members of the

House of Representatives who had been elected at least twice,

former senior judges and diplomats, and retired officers who have

attained the rank of general.

Members of the House of Representatives are elected to fouryear terms by secret ballot. Candidates must be Jordanian citizens more than thirty years of age. Individuals representing foreign in- terests or having material interests in any government contract are

disqualified. Also excluded are persons who have been debarred

from public office or who have blood ties to the king within a prescribed degree of relationship. Ten of the eighty seats are reserved for minorities, including Christians, beduins, and Circassians (see Ethnicity and Language, ch. 2). Voters must be at least nineteen years of age. Suffrage has been

universal since 1973, when women were enfranchised. All Palestinian refugees who have adopted Jordanian citizenship enjoy equal

voting privileges with Transjordanians.

Prior to the November 1989 elections, the last national elections

for the House of Representatives had been held in April 1967. In 1970 Hussein cited the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as rea- son for postponing elections, but he decreed that serving members

would continue in office until circumstances permitted the holding of new elections. The 1974 decision by Arab heads of state at a summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people raised questions about the

political relationship of the West Bank to Jordan. In response to

this decision, in November 1974 Hussein dissolved the House of

Representatives, half of whose members represented the West Bank.

Nevertheless, Hussein was reluctant to sever ties to the Israeli- occupied territory, and subsequently he decreed that elections for a new house would be held in March 1976. Whether the elections

would include or exclude the West Bank had serious consequences

for Jordan's relations with the PLO. Moreover, some Arab states interpreted the Rabat decision to mean that Jordan should renounce

its claims to the West Bank—an interpretation to which Hussein

did not then subscribe. As the time for the elections drew near, Hussein decided that postponing the elections would be the prudent

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Jordan: A Country Study

course to avoid foreclosing future political options. Consequently,

in February 1976, he recalled the old house, with its West Bank

members. It convened briefly to approve the indefinite suspension

of elections for a new House of Representatives, then it adjourned.

In 1978, Hussein issued a royal decree that granted some legis- lative functions to a newly created sixty-member appointive body,

the National Consultative Council (NCC). The NCC, which did

not include any members from the West Bank, had a limited mandate to study, debate, and render advice on bills drafted by the

Council of Ministers. The NCC possessed no authority, however,

to make policy or to approve, amend, or reject any bill. The NCC

provided advisory opinions to the Council of Ministers on general

state policy when requested by the prime minister. The decree es- tablishing it stated that the NCC would be "lawfully dissolved when

the House of Representatives is elected and convened."

In January 1984, Hussein dismissed the NCC and reconvened

the suspended National Assembly. He appointed new members to the Senate but called back those members of the House of Representatives who were serving when the lower house last met in 1976.

By-elections were held in the East Bank in March to fill eight vacancies in the house that had resulted from the deaths of members since

the 1967 elections. In accordance with a January 1984 constitutional amendment, the house also voted to fill seven vacant West

Bank seats. In March 1986, the house approved a new electoral law that would increase its membership from 60 to 142; 71 members would be elected from the East Bank, 60 from the West Bank,

and 1 1 from Palestinian refugee camps on the East Bank; this law was never implemented. In 1987 the government began registering Jordanians on the East Bank so that they could vote in

parliamentary elections scheduled for 1988; these would have been

the first national elections in more than twenty-one years. At the

end of 1987, however, registration was halted, and the king issued a royal decree that postponed elections for two years. In July 1988, Hussein renounced Jordan's claims to the West

Bank. In light of the new political situation, the king dissolved the

House of Representatives. A royal decree issued in October postponed indefinitely elections for a reorganized legislature. A subsequent decree in December abolished the ministerial-level Office of

Parliamentary Affairs. Following antigovernment riots in April 1989,

however, outgoing Prime Minister Rifai promised that the interim

government would concentrate on carrying out the long delayed

parliamentary elections. In July Prime Minister Shakir scheduled

the elections for November. They were the first national elections

for the House of Representatives in more than twenty-two years.

190
Government and Politics The Judiciary

The legal system ofJordan is based on sharia (Islamic law) and

laws of European origin. During the nineteenth century, when Jor- dan was part of the Ottoman Empire, some aspects of European

law, especially French commercial law and civil and criminal proce- dures, were adopted. English common law was introduced in the

West Bank between 1917 and 1948, during most of which time

the area was incorporated into the British-administered Mandate

of Palestine, and introduced in the East Bank during the years 1921

to 1946, when the East Bank comprised the British Mandate of

Transjordan. Under the Court Establishment Law of 1951 and the

Constitution, the judiciary is independent. There are three kinds

of courts: civil courts, religious courts, and special courts. The civil courts adjudicate all civil and criminal cases not expressly reserved

to the religious or special courts. The civil jurisdiction is exercised at four levels: the magistrates'

courts, the courts of first instance, the Court of Appeal, and the

Court of Cassation (the supreme court of the land). There are four- teen magistrates' courts throughout the country. They exercise jurisdiction in civil cases involving small claims of no more than JD250

(JD or Jordanian dinar; for value of the dinar—see Glossary) and

in criminal cases involving maximum fines ofJD100 or maximum

prison terms of one year. The seven courts of first instance exercise general jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal. A panel

of three judges sits for all felony trials; two judges sit for misdemeanor and civil cases. The courts of first instance also exercise

limited appellate jurisdiction in cases involving judgments or fines

under JD20 and JD10 respectively.

There is a three-judge panel Court of Appeal that sits in Amman.

Its appellate review extends to judgments of the courts of first in- stance, the magistrates' courts, and the religious courts. The highest court is the Court of Cassation in Amman; its president, who is appointed by the king, serves as the country's chiefjustice. All seven judges of the court sit in full panel when important cases are being

argued. For most appeals, however, only five judges hear and rule on the cases. The religious courts are divided into sharia courts for Muslims

and ecclesiastical courts for the minority Christian communities.

These courts are responsible for disputes over personal status (marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance) and communal en- dowment among their respective communities. One judge, called a qadi, sits in each sharia court and decides cases on the basis of

Islamic law. Three judges, usually members of the clergy, sit in

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Jordan: A Country Study

each ecclesiastical court and render judgments based on various

aspects of canon law as interpreted by the Greek Orthodox,

Melchite, Roman Catholic, and Anglican traditions (see Religious

Minorities, ch. 2). Appeals from the judgments of the religious courts are referred to the Court of Appeal sitting in Amman. If any dispute involves members of different religious communities,

the civil courts have jurisdiction unless the parties mutually agree

to submit to the jurisdiction of one of the religious courts. In case of jurisdictional conflicts between any two religious courts or between a religious court and a civil court, the president of the Court

of Cassation appoints a three-judge special tribunal to decide jurisdiction or to hear the case. Special courts include the High Tribunal (or High Council or Supreme Council), which interprets the Constitution at the request

of the prime minister or of either chamber of the National Assembly; the Special Council, which may be called on by the prime

minister to interpret any law that has not been interpreted by the courts of law; and the High Court of Justice, which is to be constituted when necessary by the Court of Cassation. The High Court

of Justice hears habeas corpus and mandamus petitions and may

issue injunctions involving public servants charged with irregularities; it is also empowered to try cabinet ministers charged with

offenses. There is also a special court known as the Land Settle- ment Court. After 1976 when tribal law was abolished, tribal matters came under the formal jurisdiction of the regular courts, but

adjudication apparently was still handled informally in traditional

ways by local intermediaries or tribal authorities.

Local Administration

In 1989 local government authorities were essentially an extension of the central government seated in Amman. Under the general

supervision and control of the Ministry of Interior, the local units

operated at the governorate (sing., liwaa; pi., alwiyah), municipality, township and village (or town) levels. The East Bank was

divided into the eight governorates of Amman, Al Balqa, Irbid,

Az Zarqa, Al Mafraq, Al Karak, At Tafilah, and Maan (see fig.

1). Each governorate was subdivided into districts (sing., qada) and

subdistricts (sing., nahiya). The subdistricts comprised towns, vil- lages, and rural areas. Each of the eight governorates was headed

by an appointed commissioner. These commissioners were the principal agents of the king and supervised and coordinated the activities of various central government functions within their respective

administrative divisions.

192
Government and Politics The basic administrative unit was the village or town. The towns

and larger villages had municipal councils elected by popular vote. The normal practice was for the minister of municipal, rural, and

environmental affairs to confirm as mayor the council member who

received the highest number of votes in each municipal election.

Smaller villages continued to be governed by traditional headmen

known as mukhtars. The village and town authorities had limited

responsibilities for administration of markets, law and order, sanitation, and other community activities. The central government provided for local-level social services

such as education, health, welfare, and public works. The multiplication and extension of government services during the 1970s

and 1980s increased the influence of central authorities throughout the country. The elimination of tribal law in 1976 attested to the all-pervasiveness of central government penetration even in rural areas where tribal leaders traditionally had provided security and

limited welfare services.

The Political Setting

In 1989 the Jordanian political system continued to revolve

around Hussein, who ruled firmly and tolerated no opposition. He

had acceded to the throne in 1953, and the longevity of his tenure

has been almost unparalleled in the contemporary Middle East. His reign, however, has been marked by numerous political crises: abortive coups, assassination attempts, and the disastrous conse- quences of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Undoubtedly the most

serious threat to his rule was the civil war with the PLO guerrillas

in 1970 and 1971 (see The Guerrilla Crisis, ch. 1; The Palestinian

Factor, ch. 5). Hussein's ability to remain in power for nearly four

decades can be attributed to his own political acumen and a for- tuitous combination of domestic and external situations. Nevertheless, the continued absence of institutions through which citizens

could participate in the political process raised questions about the

ultimate stability of his regime.

The Political Elite In 1989 Hussein remained the single most important person in

Jordan's politics. His political preeminence derived in part from

his skill in dealing with various domestic and external problems.

He has traveled frequently to keep in touch with cross sections of

the population and to establish rapport with his troops, with university students, and with members of tribes. Hussein's personalized

approach has tended to counterbalance the virtual lack of independent, institutionalized channels that could serve as barometers of

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Jordan: A Country Study

popular sentiments and attitudes toward the government. Also,

Hussein's frequent visits to foreign capitals have enabled him to keep abreast of external developments and to obtain needed financial

and technical assistance for his kingdom. His ability to maintain

generally cordial relations with foreign states has been a critical asset for Jordan, in view of the country's heavy dependence on

external aid. Hussein has relied upon various political options to consolidate

his power. He has used his constitutional authority to appoint principal government officials as a critical lever with which to reward

loyalty and performance, neutralize detractors, and weed out in- competent elements. The Hussein-centered power structure comprised the cabinet ministers, members of the royal family, the palace

staff, senior army officers, tribal shaykhs, and ranking civil ser- vants. King Hussein has filled most of the sensitive government

posts with loyal Transjordanians. Since the early 1950s, he also has appointed to responsible positions Palestinians supportive of

the Hashimites. Beginning in the 1970s, he permitted an increasing number of Palestinians from families not traditionally aligned

with the Hashimites to be co-opted into government service.

The Hashimites, the royal family headed by Hussein, form an

extended kinship group related through marriage to several prominent Transjordanian families. The Hashimite family traces its ancestry back to the family of the Prophet, and for centuries it had

been politically prominent in what is now Saudi Arabia. Abdullah

ibn Hussein Al Hashimi (1882-1951), a son of Sharif Hussein of

Mecca (1851-1931), established the Jordanian branch of the family in 1921 after Britain had created the Mandate of Transjordan

and confirmed him as amir. London also permitted Abdullah's

younger brother, Faisal (1885-1933), to assume the kingship of

Iraq, another future state set up after World War I as a Britishadministered mandate. Abdullah changed his title from amir to king in 1946, when Transjordan was granted independence. Following his assassination in 1951 , Abdullah's son Talal (1909-1972)

ruled briefly.

Hussein was Talal 's oldest son. Before succeeding his father as king in 1953, Hussein was educated at Victoria College in Alexandria, Egypt and at Harrow School and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, both in Britain. In 1955, Hussein married his

first wife, Dina Abdul Hamid al Aun, an Egyptian of Hashimite

ancestry. They had one daughter before their marriage ended in

divorce. His second wife, Antoinette Gardiner of Britain, converted

to Islam and took the name Muna al Hussein. She and Hussein

had four children, two sons and twin daughters. Hussein divorced

194
195
Jordan: A Country Study

Princess Muna in 1973 and married his third wife, Palestinian Alia

Tukan. Hussein and Queen Alia had one daughter and one son

before her February 1977 death in a helicopter crash. In June 1978

Hussein married his fourth wife, Elizabeth Halaby, an American

of Arab and Swiss descent. He proclaimed her Queen Nur al Hussein (light of Hussein). Hussein and Queen Nur have four chil- dren, two sons and two daughters. Throughout the 1980s, Queen

Nur had a visible and active role promoting educational, cultural,

social welfare, architectural, and urban planning projects in Jordan.

Hussein has two younger brothers and one sister. His brothers

Muhammad and Hasan had significant political roles in 1989. The

most important Hashimite after Hussein was Hasan, whom the

king had designated as crown prince through royal decree in 1965.

Muhammad was a businessman and was active politically behind

the scenes. Families that were related to the Hashimites included

the politically prominent Sharaf and Shakir families. Hussein's cousin, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, was a close political adviser

throughout the 1970s and served briefly as prime minister before

his death in 1980. Another member of the family, Layla Sharaf, was Jordan's first woman cabinet officer, serving as minister of

culture and information in 1984-85. A third cousin, Field Marshal Ash Sharif Zaid ibn Shakir, was a longtime political confidant

who served the king in many sensitive positions. In December 1988,

Hussein appointed Shakir chief of the royal court and director of

the secret police (Mukhabarat); beginning in late April 1989 he

served for seven months as prime minister (see Political Dissent

and Political Repression, this ch.).

Hussein has been supported throughout his reign by the original Transjordanian population, particularly the beduin tribes who

revered him as a descendant of the family of the Prophet Muhammad and as a ruler imbued with those qualities of leadership they

valued most—courage, self-reliance, valor, and honesty. The beduin

have formed a prominent segment within the army, especially

among the senior ranks of the officer corps. Their loyalty helped

Hussein survive a number of crises and thereby served as a stabiliz- ing force within the country. Nevertheless, since the mid-1980s there

has been evidence of erosion of beduin and Transjordanian support for Hussein's regime. Significantly, it was primarily East

Bankers, rather than Palestinians, who participated in widespread

antigovernment riots that swept several towns of Jordan in 1989.

Other politically influential individuals were affiliated with the

old East Bank families. For example, Zaid ar Rifai, appointed prime

minister in 1985, was the son of Samir ar Rifai, a politician who

had served several terms as prime minister under the rule of

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Government and Politics

Abdullah during the 1930s and 1940s and subsequently was a prime

minister for Hussein. Many members of the Abdul Huda, Majali,

Badran, Hashim, Tal, and Qassim families also served the Hashimites loyally.

Another element of the political elite were the non-Arab Circassians, the descendants of Muslim immigrants who came from the

Caucasus Mountains in the late nineteenth century and settled in Amman and its environs. The Circassians allied with the Hashimites in the 1920s, and since that time leading Circassian politicians

have held important and sensitive positions in the government and

military. The Al Mufti family has been one of the most politically

prominent Circassian families, and one of its members, Said al Mufti, served as prime minister. In the 1980s, the influential scions of traditional and aristocratic

Palestinian families known for their Hashimite sympathies were outnumbered by Transjordanians in almost all top government

posts. The distinction between Transjordanians and Palestinians

tended to be played down, however, because officially the Palestinians of the East Bank have been accepted as Jordanian citizens. Palestinians continued to hold an important place in society as lead- ing merchants, financiers, professionals, educators, and technocrats.

Political Dissent and Political Repression

All political parties were banned in 1957 and have been illegal

since the establishment of martial law in 1967. In addition, Marxistoriented parties were forbidden under the Anti-Communist Law

of 1953. Evidence of illegal political activity is monitored by the

Mukhabarat, or secret police. Persons suspected of engaging in political activities are arrested by the Mukhabarat and may be detained without charges for prolonged periods. In 1989 several

Jordanian political parties existed in exile and were believed to have

many secret sympathizers and underground cells operating in Jor- dan. These parties included the Arab Constitutionalist Party, the

Communist Party ofJordan, the Palestine Communist Party, the

Islamic Liberation Party, the National Jordanian Movement, the

Muslim Brotherhood, and the Unionist Democratic Association. In addition, the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations clandestinely recruited in the refugee camps.

Up to mid- 1989, observers concluded that the Mukhabarat con- tinued to be generally effective in discouraging the expression of

political dissent or political activities within Jordan. It remained

unclear how extensive the political liberalization inaugurated in the summer of 1989 would become and what role the Mukhabarat

would have. It was also uncertain how greater tolerance of dissident

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Jordan: A Country Study

views would affect political groups outside the country. As late as 1988, several Jordanian and Palestinian political groups engaged

in terrorism directed against Jordanian officials and government

offices. The Black September group, formed by Palestinians to avenge the Jordanian army attack on Palestinian guerrilla bases

in Jordan in September 1970, remained committed to the over- throw of the Hashimite monarchy. Throughout the 1980s, it claimed responsibility for assassinations ofJordanian diplomats in

various cities of Asia and Western Europe; in 1988 it claimed

responsibility for several bombings that took place in Amman.

Although the government did not officially permit the banned

political parties to participate in the fall campaign for the November 1989 House of Representatives elections, it ignored the claims

of many candidates that they actually represented such parties. The

campaign for the eighty contested seats was relatively free of voter

intimidation, with the Mukhabarat keeping an uncharacteristically

low profile. A total of 647 candidates took part, including several

former political prisoners who were released from detention in the summer. The Muslim Brotherhood supported twenty- six candidates, of whom twenty actually won seats. Candidates affiliated with other Islamist groups won an additional fourteen seats. Thus,

Islamists emerged as the largest bloc in Parliament, controlling more

than 42 percent of the seats. Candidates representing various secular

groups opposed to the government won a total of ten seats. As a

result, the House of Representatives convened with a majority of

forty-four members upon whom the government could not count

for support, thirty-three government supporters, and three seats to be determined.

The Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization

Palestinians have been a complicating factor in the Jordanian

political process since the annexation of the West Bank in 1950.

Transjordanians tended to fear that the numerically preponderant Palestinians could emerge as a dominant force if competitive

politics were permitted to resume. For years many Palestinians

openly opposed Hussein's monarchical absolutism and demanded

equality and proportional participation in the political process. Their

frustrations under Hussein's rule, at least through the 1960s and

early 1970s, provided a fertile ground for their empathy and support for the PLO. Since 1971 , when the PLO guerrilla forces were

crushed and driven out ofJordan, Palestinians generally have been

politically dormant. Given the authorities' effective discouragement

of political expression critical of the regime, it was difficult in

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Government and Politics

1989 to ascertain what the political aspirations or preferences of

the Palestinians in Jordan might be.

The Palestinian equation became further complicated after October 1974 as external pressures were brought to bear on Jordan.

The catalyst was the unanimous decision of the Arab states meeting in Rabat to recognize the PLO as the sole authorized representative of the Palestinian people. Strongly prodded by Egypt, Syria,

and other Arab states, Hussein was obliged to assent to the Rabat

decision although he still claimed the West Bank as Jordanian terri- tory until 1988. This development has portended uncertain implications for Jordan's domestic politics and its relationship with the

West Bank.

Following the Rabat Summit, Hussein and PLO leader Yasir

Arafat met to reconcile relations, strained since the 1970-71 civil war. Their discussions resulted in the decision in early 1975 for Jordan and the PLO to cease mutual recriminations. Hussein re- jected, however, a PLO demand that it be permitted to reestablish its military and political presence in the East Bank. After 1974

there was a noticeable resurgence of Palestinian empathy for and

identification with the PLO in many parts of the world. This sen- timent was nowhere more evident than in the West Bank. There,

in the municipal elections that Israel permitted to be held in April

1976, candidates supporting the PLO defeated most of the candidates identified with Hussein. The outcome was a reversal of the

municipal elections held in 1972, when pro-Hussein candidates

handily won over pro-PLO candidates.

The process of reconciliation also was complicated by the link- age of the Jordanian-PLO equation to the broader configuration

of Middle East problems. In March 1977, Hussein and Arafat met

in Cairo as part of the Egyptian- Syrian efforts to prepare for an upcoming Geneva peace conference on the Middle East. The two

leaders addressed, inter alia, the question of future relations between Jordan and a proposed Palestinian state on the West Bank.

Their discussions focused on whether the PLO should be repre- sented as an independent delegation at the conference in Geneva

or as part of Jordan's delegation. The latter course was preferred

by Hussein.

The Hussein-Arafat contact became more frequent in the wake

of Egyptian president Anwar as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in

November 1977 and his signing of the United States-mediated

Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Treaty of Peace Between

Egypt and Israel in 1979. Nevertheless, Arafat and other PLO leaders were suspicious of Hussein's ultimate intentions vis-a-vis

the Camp David Accords. Although Jordan had no part in the

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Jordan: A Country Study

Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, it was directly linked to the process

for settling the future of the West Bank. The first agreement, called "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East," stipulated that Egypt

and Israel would negotiate with Jordan and Palestinian representatives for a transitional self-governing authority to administer the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a noncontiguous Palestinian enclave on the Mediterranean Sea that also was occupied by Israel. Jordan declared it was neither legally nor morally obligated to this agreement and refused to participate in the negotiations, which con- sequently made no progress. Hussein's decision to maintain a di- alogue with the United States, however, fueled the fears of some

Palestinians that the monarch tacitly supported the Camp David

Accords and was seeking ways to preclude the PLO from gaining

control of the West Bank.

The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion of that country brought the contradictory Jordanian

and PLO objectives into open conflict. Initially, relations improved

because Hussein agreed to accept a small contingent of expelled

fighters and to permit the reopening of PLO political offices for the first time since the 1970-71 civil war. In several face-to-face

meetings held between September 1982 and April 1983, Hussein

and Arafat discussed Jordan's role in future negotiations over the

fate of the West Bank. Because neither the United States nor Israel was willing to talk with the PLO at this time, Hussein tried to obtain Arafat's endorsement for Jordan to serve as spokesman for the Palestinians. More extreme Palestinian guerrilla leaders—often

called "rejectionists" because they rejected any compromises that

would circumscribe their goal of an independent Palestinian state that included all of pre- 1948 Palestine—distrusted Hussein and

would not be assuaged by Arafat's reassurances. Without a broadbased consensus within the PLO, Arafat apparently felt he could

not agree to a common negotiating strategy with Hussein. Consequently, Hussein broke off the talks in April 1983>; for the remainder

of the year, Jordan's relations with the PLO were strained.

Violent factional feuding engulfed the PLO beginning in May

1983, inducing the moderate elements (who generally coalesced

around Arafat) to revive contacts with Hussein. By this time, Jor- dan had decided to assert its influence in the West Bank more

aggressively, albeit within the limits tolerated by the Israeli occupation authorities. The National Assembly, dissolved following the

Rabat decision in 1974, was recalled in January 1984 and deputies were appointed to fill vacant West Bank seats in the House of

Representatives. Nevertheless, Hussein seemed to welcome the rap- prochement with the moderate faction of the PLO and gave his

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Government and Politics

blessing to the holding of a Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Amman in November 1984. The PNC meeting was an his- toric event that was broadcast on Jordanian television and picked

up by viewers in the West Bank. The meeting strengthened Arafat's

authority as leader of the PLO and enabled him to negotiate with

Hussein without fear of the inevitable recriminations from extremist

factions who had boycotted the Amman meeting.

Hussein and Arafat continued to cooperate after the PNC meeting, both leaders speaking of the need for Jordan and a Palestinian state to maintain a special relationship. In February 1985,

they announced a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agreement on a peace framework. This agreement called for the convening of an

international peace conference whose participants would include

the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security

Council and all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the

PLO would represent Palestinians, its PLO delegates would not

attend the conference separately but rather as part of a joint Jor- danian-Palestinian contingent. The agreement stipulated that the

Palestinian people would have the right to exercise national self- determination within the context of a proposed confederated state of Jordanians and Palestinians.

Following his agreement with Arafat, Hussein pursued two poli- cies simultaneously. While trying to serve as a spokesman for the

Palestinians in talks with the United States, and eventually even

with Israeli politicians, Hussein also tried to persuade Arafat to make a public declaration of PLO support for UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, both of which implicitly recognized

Israel's right to exist. Arafat, who still felt he had to be wary of

the influence of the more extreme factions in the PLO, was unwilling to be pushed as far toward moderation as Hussein had

hoped. The extremist guerrilla groups criticized Arafat for the agree- ment, claiming that it would deny Palestinians the right to establish a sovereign state within the pre- 1948 boundaries of Palestine.

Some of the extremists demonstrated their potential for undermining any possible compromise solutions by carrying out sensational

terrorist acts in September and October of 1985. The international

response to these incidents, especially the Israeli aerial bombing

of PLO headquarters in Tunisia, increased Arafat's reluctance to make the political concessions that Hussein believed were required

to obtain United States support for an international conference.

Hussein's disappointment in Arafat contributed to an erosion

of their political relationship. In February 1986, Hussein announced

that he was terminating the year-old Jordan-PLO agreement. Tensions with the PLO were exacerbated in May by the student

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Jordan: A Country Study

demonstrations at Yarmuk University in the northern Jordanian

city of Irbid. In July Hussein ordered the offices of Arafat's Al Fatah

organization closed following criticisms of the harsh manner in which Jordanian security forces had put down the Yarmuk demonstrations.

During 1986 both Hussein and Arafat intensified their competition for influence in the West Bank. The king appeared to have

the upper hand in this contest because Jordan's banking system

controlled the disbursement of pan-Arab funds earmarked for West

Bank (and also Gaza Strip) development projects. However, the

Palestinian uprising, the intifadah, which began in December 1987,

exposed the fragility of Hussein's influence in the occupied terri- tories. It became obvious during the first half of 1988 that, compared with the PLO, pro-Hashimite sympathizers had little support.

Hussein decided that political circumstances required a bold move

that would preserve Jordan's interests. Thus, in July he renounced

all claims to sovereignty over the West Bank. By doing so, Hussein apparently hoped to enhance the Jordanian position in a postintifadah era. If the PLO succeeded in consolidating its influence

in the occupied territories and in winning international support

for its claim to rule the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, then Hussein's abdication of responsibility would stand Jordan in good stead.

It would enable Jordan to forge political and economic links with

a new state, which, because of its small area and lack of natural

resources, would be dependent in various ways on its only neighbor to the east. If the PLO failed to deliver on the political aspirations being expressed by the intifadah, then Hussein would be ready

to offer Jordan's services as negotiator in terminating the Israeli occupation.

The PLO accepted Hussein's challenge. Arafat met with the king

during the late summer and early fall to discuss strategy. Among

the practical measures agreed to was a scheme for the PLO to as- sume responsibility for payment of the salaries of West Bank and

Gaza Strip municipal employees through Jordanian financial in- stitutions. Subsequently, at an historic PNC meeting in Algiers

in November 1988 at which all major factions were represented,

the PNC declared the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be the in- dependent state of Palestine. The PNC also renounced the use of

terrorism, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338

(both of which recognized the existence of Israel), and declared its willingness to negotiate the end of the occupation. Jordan was one

of the first nations to recognize the new state and announced its readiness to discuss how the two countries could maintain a special relationship.

202
Government and Politics

In 1989 the PLO remained essentially an umbrella organization

of numerous civilian and military groups (see fig. 12). It was originally founded in 1964 as a political organization to represent the

interests of Palestinians. The various Palestinian guerrilla groups were formed independently of the PLO, and they initially were

critical of the PLO's objectives and policies. In 1968-69, however,

most of the guerrilla groups joined the PLO, and their leaders as- sumed dominant roles in the organization. Although the PLO has

greatly expanded its various service functions in the cultural, diplomatic, economic, educational, health, humanitarian, political, social, and welfare fields since 1969, for most Western observers these

functions have been overshadowed by the military and terrorist

activities associated with the guerrilla groups.

The PLO guerrilla groups recruited most of their fighters from

the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Although some of these camps were established as early as 1948

and all have long since been transformed into permanent villages or urban neighborhoods, high levels of poverty and unemployment

remain dominant characteristics. Many young men raised in these

camps found the guerrillas' idealization of Palestinian nationalism

and politico-military organization appealing alternatives to the

despair fostered by routine idleness and lack of opportunity. Joining one of the guerrilla groups enabled such men to assert their

identity and channel their energies. Although the various guerrilla

organizations differed in temperament, ideology, and tactics, they

all shared the objective of establishing an independent Palestinian

state. The oldest, largest, and best equipped of the PLO guerrilla

groups was Al Fatah—the Palestine National Liberation Movement as the group was officially known. Arafat (also called Abu

Ammar) has led Al Fatah since its formation in 1957. Since 1969,

Arafat has also been chairman of the PNC's fifteen-member Executive Committee—and hence the dominant figure of the PLO leadership. For more than thirty years, Al Fatah has been a coalition

of moderate, conservative, and radical nationalists who accepted

the tactical necessity of cooperating with Arab governments, in- cluding those they regarded as reactionary, to help achieve their

goals. Predominantly Muslim in membership, Al Fatah generally

has eschewed commitment to radical ideologies such as Islamic revolution or Marxism and refrained from interference in the internal

affairs of Arab states. The progressive moderation of Al Fatah's goals after 1973 led

to major splits within the organization. The original objective to liberate all of pre- 1948 Palestine was replaced in 1974 with the aim

203
Jordan: A Country Study

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of establishing a transitional state on the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip. Sabri Khalil al Banna, known by his code name of Abu Nidal,

vehemently opposed this change. Abu Nidal and a small group of

his supporters defected from Al Fatah and formed the Al Fatah

Revolutionary Council. A more serious split occurred in 1983 when

Said Musa Muragha (also known as Abu Musa) organized Al Fatah

fighters in Lebanon who feared Arafat's reconciliation with Egypt

would lead eventually to recognition of Israel. The supporters of

Arafat and Abu Musa fought each other for control of Palestinian

refugee camps in Lebanon during 1983 and 1984, with heavy

casualties on both sides. The anti-Arafat forces received support

from Syria that helped them expel Arafat loyalists from camps in areas occupied by the Syrian army. Abu Musa and the Al Fatah

dissidents eventually formed a new group called Al Fatah Uprising.

From a tactical and ideological standpoint, the Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the principal counterpoint to Al Fatah. George Habash and Ahmad Jibril founded the

PFLP after the June 1967 War. The PFLP was a consciously

Marxist-Leninist organization. It defined as enemies not just Israel and Zionism, but also imperialism and the Arab regimes that

cooperated with the United States, the country it proclaimed to be the main imperialist power. It called such Arab regimes reactionary, advocated their overthrow and the establishment of progressive, democratic, and secular governments in all Arab states, including Palestine. Habash and the other PFLP leaders soon were

divided, however, on the issue of whether armed struggle or political considerations should take precedence in achieving their objectives. Jibril broke with Habash in 1968 and formed a rival organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command (PFLP-GC), which placed primary emphasis on armed struggle. The following year Nayif Hawatmah, who was

an East Bank Jordanian, also split from the PFLP and organized

the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

Hawatmah' s DFLP tended to stress exploring political options before resorting to armed struggle.

The PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP held attitudes toward reac- tionary Arab regimes that precluded cooperation with Hussein,

whose government they regarded as a prime candidate for revolutionary overthrow. Their openly professed ideology and maintenance of armed bases within Jordan's Palestinian refugee camps

were major factors in precipitating the 1970 conflict between the

guerrillas and the Jordanian army. After the guerrillas were suppressed, Habash, Hawatmah, and Jibril remained hostile and

unforgiving toward Hussein. When Arafat began the process of

205
Jordan: A Country Study

reconciliation with Hussein in 1973, they opposed any PLO ties or even dialogue with Jordan and publicly called for Hussein's over- throw. Habash and Jibril were the principal organizers in 1974

of the rejectionist front of guerrilla groups, which refused to ac- cept the PLO decision to establish a Palestinian state on the West

Bank and the Gaza Strip. The rejectionists were those groups that

rejected any negotiations or compromises with Israel and insisted on using armed struggle to liberate all of historic Palestine. In 1983

Jibril supported Abu Musa and the Al Fatah dissidents, joining

with them to form the National Alliance, which opposed any diplomatic initiatives or cooperation with Hussein.

In addition to Al Fatah and the Marxist groups, several smaller

guerrilla organizations were active in 1989. The most important

of these were As Saiqa, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

As Saiqa was formed in 1968 in Damascus and has continued to be politically and financially dependent upon Syria. Palestinians

who lived outside of Syria generally perceived As Saiqa as a tool of the Syrian government. As Saiqa' s counterpart was the ALF,

formed in Baghdad in 1969. In the 1970s, the ALF supported the

rejectionist front, as did Iraq. In the 1980s, however, the ALF

aligned itself with Arafat's Al Fatah, a position consistent with that

of Iraq. The PSF has consistently advocated armed struggle since

it was founded in 1967. Prior to 1980, the PSF was supported by

Iraq, but since 1980 Syria has been its principal backer. The PLF

was formed in 1977 as a result of a split within the PFLP-GC.

Originally part of the rejectionist front, since 1983 it has been one

of the groups trying to effect a reconciliation between Arafat and

Abu Musa.

The PLO's organizational equivalent to a parliament was the

Palestine National Council (PNC), in 1989 based in Algiers. The

PNC's 301 deputies represented the Palestinian diaspora. Included

among them were representatives of the Palestinian parties (the

political wings of the various guerrilla groups); the six guerrilla

groups that accepted the policies of the PLO (Al Fatah, PFLP,

DFLP, ALF, PLF, and the Palestine Communist Party); student

and educational groups; youth and women's groups; professional

associations; labor unions; and the Palestine Red Crescent Society. In addition, the Palestinian communities in various Arab and

non-Arab countries were represented.

The PNC was supposed to meet once a year, but political complications often forced the postponement of annual gatherings. The

factional strife that plagued the PLO following the sixteenth PNC

conclave in February 1983 prevented convening a full session for

206
Government and Politics

four years. Although a PNC meeting was held in Amman in November 1984, its legitimacy was questioned because several of

the guerrilla leaders, including Habash of the PFLP and Hawatmah of the DFLP, refused to attend. The eighteenth PNC, which

met in Algiers in April 1987, represented the first effort to heal

the rift in the PLO and achieve a consensus on policy. Although

the PFLP-GC, As Saiqa, the PSF, and the Abu Musa faction did

not participate, the PFLP, DFLP, and the Palestine Communist

Party—the three guerrilla groups that, like Al Fatah, had a reputation for independence of Arab governments—did attend and

agreed to accept PNC decisions. Abu Nidal also attended the eighteenth PNC. However, the other leaders voted not to grant his

group representation on the PNC because they believed his reputation as a notorious terrorist would tarnish the PLO's image at a time when the organization was seeking diplomatic support for an international peace conference.

The 1987 PNC meeting adopted several significant resolutions

pertaining to the PLO's conflict with Israel. It voted to endorse an international peace conference on the basis of UN General

Assembly resolutions that recognized the PLO and the right of the

Palestinians to self-determination; it called for PLO participation

in such a conference as a full partner, and not as part of a Jordanian delegation; it abrogated the PLO-Jordan accord of 1985, but

also advocated maintaining "special" ties between Jordanians and

Palestinians; and it authorized the PLO to develop relations with

groups in Israel that supported Palestinian self-determination. These

decisions were a prelude to the even more significant resolutions

that were passed at the historic nineteenth PNC meeting in Algiers

in November 1988.

Between PNC congresses, the Palestine Central Committee

(PCC), created in 1973, set policies and carried out specific

programs and actions undertaken by the PLO's cabinet, the fif- teen-member Executive Committee. The PCC's actual function,

however, was limited to a consultative role; its sixty members, appointed by the PNC based on the recommendation of the Executive Committee, included representatives from the Executive

Committee and the major guerrilla groups. The PNC's speaker

or chairman presided over PCC meetings. The legislative and

executive functions of these top PLO bodies were in accordance

with the principles and policies contained in three key documents:

the Palestinian National Charter; the Fifteen-Point Political Program; and the National Unity Program.

Although the PNC was officially described as the highest

policymaking body and supreme organ of the PLO, the real center

207
Jordan: A Country Study

of power was the fifteen-member Executive Committee. The committee's members were elected by and collectively responsible to the PNC . The manner of their election ensured representation of

the major guerrilla and political groups on the committee. Arafat was re-elected chairman of the Executive Committee in 1988, a

position he has held since 1969. Al Fatah had three seats on the

committee; in addition, Arafat generally obtained the support of

the seven "independents," the committee members who were not

affiliated with any of the guerrilla groups.

The administration of the PLO was grouped under nine main

functions that were carried out in different countries depending on local Palestinian needs. These were supported by funds collected and distributed by the PLO's treasury and financial arm, the Palestine National Fund. The fund obtained its revenues from payments

made by Arab governments in accordance with agreements made

at the summit level (i.e. , the Baghdad Summit of 1978); from voluntary contributions by Palestinians; from the 3 to 6 percent income

tax levied by some Arab states on the salaries of resident Palestinian workers; and from loans and grants by Arab as well as non- Arab countries. Iraq and Syria provided financial aid directly to particular guerrilla groups despite persistent efforts by the PLO

to terminate this practice and to centralize fund-raising and funddistributing procedures.

In 1989 the PLO maintained "diplomatic" missions in more

than 120 countries that recognized it as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Although the PLO had not proclaimed

a government-in-exile for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more

than twenty-five countries recognized it as the de jure government

of the independent state of Palestine, declared at the 1988 PNC

meeting in Algiers. The PLO has maintained a mission at UN headquarters in New York since being granted observer status in 1974.

The PLO also operated numerous "information offices" in the

major cities of the world. In 1988 the United States government

ordered the closure of PLO's information office in Washington.

The PLO's nearest equivalent to a Red Cross Society was called the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS). The PRCS supported

hospitals and clinics for Palestinians in Arab countries as well as

in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Prior to the Israeli invasion

of Lebanon in 1982, the PRCS operated ten major hospitals and

eleven clinics in that country. These facilities provided a broad

range of medical services to Palestinian refugees at no cost or for nominal fees. The hospitals and clinics were severely damaged during the occupation of south Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. Since

1983, the periodic fighting in Lebanon has seriously impeded the

208
Government and Politics PRCS' s efforts to reconstruct medical centers and provide health

services.

The PLO also sponsored numerous educational and cultural

projects and operated an economic enterprise called the Palestine

Martyrs' Works Society, better known by its Arab acronym

SAMED, which ran small factories. SAMED's workshops produced

such items as blankets, tents, uniforms, civilian clothes, shoes, handicrafts, furniture, and toys. SAMED was originally established in

1970 to provide vocational training for the children of Palestinian

men and women killed in service to the Palestinian national cause. After 1976 SAMED decided to accept any Palestinian needing employment if work were available. Most SAMED workshops were

in the refugee camps in northern Lebanon and thus were not af- fected by the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in 1982. SAMED

workshops and activities were disrupted, however, during the

1983-84 fighting between Arafat loyalists and dissidents in Palestinian camps in northern Lebanon.

The military function of the PLO was under the supreme com- mand of the chairman of the Executive Committee. The PLO's

regular military arm was called the Palestine Liberation Army

(PLA). Its units were stationed in various Arab countries where

they coordinated their activities with those of Arab armies. The

coordination was centrally handled by the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, which also was responsible for law and order in

Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Foreign Policy

Jordan's foreign policy has been a function mainly of its response

to developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its generally moderate and carefully measured response has been based on its appraisal

that effective Arab unity is a precondition for substantive peace

negotiations with Israel. The persistence of intra-Arab differences over the form and substance of pan-Arab cooperation has constrained Jordan to steer a flexible and prudent course. In addition,

the scarcity of domestic resources and the consequent heavy dependence on outside powers for economic and military support have

contributed to Jordan's caution in foreign policy. Moreover, the

PLO's enhanced stature since the mid-1970s as a key factor in the

processes of Middle East reconciliation and peace has been a fur- ther compelling reason for Jordan's generally pragmatic responses

to an uncertain foreign policy milieu.

Relations with Israel In 1989 Jordan still refrained from establishing diplomatic rela- tions with Israel. The absence of formal relations notwithstanding,

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Jordan: A Country Study

the two countries had cooperated directly or indirectly since 1967

in a multiplicity of matters pertaining to the West Bank, the Israeli- occupied territory whose Palestinian population retained Jordanian citizenship until 1988. Hussein's aim was to maintain influence

and eventually regain control of the West Bank, a goal that had

not been realized by 1988, when he renounced Jordan's claim to sovereignty of the area. Hussein's ambitions were frustrated by

Israel's unwillingness to negotiate seriously any withdrawal from

the West Bank and by the increasing popularity of the PLO. As

early as 1974, Israel's refusal to consider a United States-mediated

disengagement agreement with Jordan, similar to the ones that had

then been concluded with Egypt and Syria, weakened Hussein's

image as a leader who could recover occupied Arab land. Israel's refusal also helped to strengthen pan-Arab support for the PLO's

claim to represent West Bank Palestinians. Later that year, Arab

heads of state meeting in a summit conference in Rabat, Morocco,

agreed to recognize the PLO's right to establish an independent

state in the West Bank once the latter was liberated from Israel. Although Hussein paid lip service to the 1974 Rabat decision,

he continued to hope Jordan would recover the West Bank. His

hopes were nurtured by Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO. To

maximize Jordan's political leverage from the new situation, Hussein pursued simultaneously a highly visible policy of reconciliation with the PLO and a less perceptible policy of cultivating

pro-Hashimite politicians in the West Bank. The measures intended

to preserve Jordan's traditional links to the West Bank actually were undertaken with the tacit approval of Israel. These measures

included authorizing the continuation of the long-standing economic

and family ties between the East and West banks under the "open

bridges" policy; continuing payment (until 1988) of salaries to Palestinian officials on the government payroll before and since

1967; strengthening economic links by increased imports from the

West Bank and by continued extension of development grants and

loans to Palestinian firms in the West Bank; and providing government guarantees for private Jordanian loans to West Bank municipalities.

After 1977, when Egypt's President Anwar as Sadat initiated

direct negotiations with Israel that led to a separate peace agree- ment (and Egypt's temporary ostracism from the Arab world), Hussein was unwilling to follow Sadat's lead without prior pan-Arab

acquiescence. Hussein apparently believed that in the absence of

broad Arab support to legitimize any political talks with Israel, his own rule in the East Bank could be threatened. Consequently, he

refused to participate in the Camp David process and was skeptical

210
View of Amman, Jordan's capital

211
Jordan: A Country Study

of President Reagan's 1982 proposal for a West Bank "entity"

in association with Jordan. Israel's rejection of the Reagan Plan

provided Hussein the boon of not needing to respond to an initia- tive that the Palestinians claimed would deny them genuine self- determination. Two years later, when Shimon Peres became prime

minister of Israel, in September 1984, he offered to negotiate directly

with Jordan without the participation of the PLO. Hussein decided

the state of pan-Arab politics precluded his consideration of a "Jordanian option" at that time. Instead, he called for an international peace conference that would include a joint Jordan-PLO dele- gation. Hussein perceived an international forum that brought

together both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the principal Arab states and Israel as a protective umbrella under

which he could enter into negotiations with the Israelis. Peres, whose Labor Party was willing to consider Israeli withdrawal from at least part of the West Bank, endorsed Hussein's

idea of an international peace conference in an October 1985 speech

before the United Nations. Subsequently, he initiated secret meetings with Hussein to discuss procedures for convening such a conference and ways to finesse the issue of PLO participation. Peres

opposed the presence of the PLO at a possible conference, but did

not object to non-PLO representatives of Palestinians attending.

Hussein was not able to obtain firm Israeli commitments, however,

because Peres' s coalition partner, Likud Bloc leader Yitzhak

Shamir, opposed the convening of an international conference and

prevented the government from achieving consensus on the issue. After Shamir became prime minister in late 1986, Peres, as for- eign minister, continued his diplomatic efforts on behalf of an

international conference. Peres had at least one publicized meeting with Hussein in London, but he lacked support from his own

government. Hussein, who believed that Peres was interested in

substantive negotiations over the West Bank while Shamir was not,

took the unprecedented step during the Israeli elections of 1988

of announcing that a Labor Party victory would be better for the

peace process. Relations with Arab States In 1989 Jordan maintained relatively cordial relations with most

other Arab states. Jordan's closest ties were with Egypt, Iraq,

Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. King Hussein made frequent trips to these countries to confer with their leaders on regional and inter- national strategy. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil- producers provided Jordan with financial aid in accordance with

guidelines originally agreed on at the November 1978 Baghdad

212
Government and Politics

Summit. The total amount of these grants had declined dramatically by 1984 because of the budgetary problems that depressed

oil prices caused in petroleum-producing countries. Nonetheless,

they remained an important source of total government revenue

for Jordan (see GDP by Sector, ch. 3). Jordan's close relations with Iraq developed as a result of Hussein's strong support for President Saddam Husayn during the lat- ter' s eight-year war with Iran (1980-88). The monarch's ardent

backing of Saddam was attributable at least in part to his fears that a collapse of the Iraqi regime could result in Jordan's eastern neighbor being ruled by a radicalized Shia religious government allied to Iran. The relationship also benefited Jordan in various ways.

For example, Jordan's only port, Al Aqabah, served throughout

the war as a major transshipment center for Iraqi imports. Goods

off-loaded at Al Aqabah were trucked overland to Iraq by Jordanian transportation companies, in the process generating local employment, handling fees, and profitable business. Jordan also exported a variety of light consumer goods to Iraq, although the

value and volume of this trade fluctuated in accordance with Iraqi

foreign exchange problems. Both during and after the war, Iraq,

whose army used primarily Soviet-made equipment, periodically

gave to Jordan United States- and British-made military hardware

captured from Iran, including at least sixty United States- manufactured M-47 tanks (see Military Cooperation with Other

Arab States, ch. 5). In 1984 Jordan became the first Arab state to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt. Hussein had begun advocating Egypt's

reintegration into the Arab community of nations as early as 1981

.

The king perceived Egypt as an effective bulwark against the spread

of radical Islamic political movements that he believed were being

engendered by the Iran-Iraq War. Following the 1982 Israeli in- vasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO from that country, unofficial consultations with Egypt on regional security issues

became routine. PLO chief Arafat's trip to Egypt in December

1983 —the first by an Arab leader since the Baghdad Summit of

November 1978—paved the way for Jordan's resumption of offi- cial relations without fear of being branded a traitor to Arab nationalism.

Following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, Jordan and

Egypt became extremely close allies. Hussein frequently praised

Egyptian president Husni Mubarak as one of the Arab world's great

leaders. Mubarak supported Hussein's pro-Iraq policy, his efforts to involve moderate Palestinians in the peace process, and his call for an international peace conference. Hussein and Arafat met

213
Jordan: A Country Study

several times on "neutral" Egyptian territory; when their personal

relations were tense, such as in 1986-87, Mubarak mediated and

kept them on civil terms. Hussein reciprocated Mubarak's diplomatic support by trying to persuade other Arab heads of state that

Egypt should be readmitted to the League of Arab States (Arab

League). In February 1989, Egypt and Jordan joined with Iraq

and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) to form a new Arab

Cooperation Council, a regional organization modeled after the

Gulf Cooperation Council.

Jordan's relations with Syria were correct in 1989, although there

had been considerable strain between them during most of the previ- ous two decades. In September 1970, a Syrian military unit had

crossed into Jordan to aid the Palestinian guerrillas who were fighting the Jordanian army. The Syrian force was repulsed, but rela- tions remained tense and were severed in July 1971 . Relations with

Syria improved briefly following the October 1973 War, but deteriorated again by the late 1970s. Syria apparently feared Hussein's close ties with Washington would involve Jordan in the Camp

David process. When religiously inspired disturbances broke out

in Aleppo and other Syrian cities during the winter of 1979-80,

the government immediately suspected—and accused—Jordan of

complicity. In addition, Syria had a bitter rivalry with Iraq. Damascus perceived Amman's support of Iraq in that country's war with

Iran (initiated by an Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980) as confirmation of conspiracy theories about Baghdad trying to encircle Syria. By the end of 1980, relations between Jordan and Syria

had deteriorated to such an extent that military clashes appeared

possible along the common border where both countries had massed

troops. The escalating tension eventually was defused by Saudi

Arabian diplomatic intervention, although relations remained

strained.

Jordan broke diplomatic relations with Syria in 1981, charging

Damascus with plotting to assassinate its prime minister and kidnapping its ambassador to Lebanon. For the next five years, the

two neighbors were estranged. Amman accused Syria of assisting

radical Palestinian groups who carried out several political killings

ofJordanian diplomats in Europe and the Middle East. Tentative

efforts to improve relations in 1983-84 were aborted by Syrian

denunciation of Jordan's resumption of relations with Egypt.

Finally, in the fall and winter of 1985-86, Saudi Arabia mediated

reconciliation talks that led to a restoration of diplomatic ties. In

May 1986, the Jordanian prime minister became the first highranking official from Amman to visit Syria since 1977. Relations

between Jordan and Syria gradually improved since then.

214
Government and Politics

Jordan maintained cordial relations with the Arab states of the

Persian Gulf in 1989. These countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—were col- lectively Jordan's most important source of foreign financial aid. The level of their assistance, especially that from Kuwait, has fallen,

however, since 1981. Thousands of Jordanians and Palestinians

holding Jordanian passports continued to work in the Persian Gulf

in business, government, education, and engineering. The remit- tances they sent to their families in Jordan, especially those living

in the refugee camps, represented a significant proportion of Jor- dan's foreign exchange earnings. The Persian Gulf countries also were markets for Jordanian agricultural and consumer exports.

Jordan's relations with the other Arab states—excepting Libya

were generally good in 1989. Tensions existed over economic policy

between Jordan and Morocco, however, as both countries exported

phosphates. The amount ofJordan's reserves of these minerals and

the value of its exports were significantiy less than those of Morocco,

a major international producer. Jordan, which traditionally ex- ported its phosphates to Southeast Asia, complained that Morocco

had stolen its Asian markets between 1985 and 1987 by deliberately selling its phosphates at prices lower than it cost Jordan to mine and transport the minerals.

Jordan had a history of tense relations with Libya, deriving from

Libyan support since 1970 for Palestinian guerrilla groups opposed

to Hussein. The most serious incident between the two countries

occurred in February 1984, when the Jordanian embassy in Tripoli was destroyed during demonstrations organized by the Libyan

government to protest Hussein's support of Arafat and his call for reconciliation with Egypt. Jordan broke diplomatic relations fol- lowing this episode. In 1988 Jordan received a Libyan delegation

sent to Amman to discuss normalizing relations between the two

countries.

Relations with the United States Although Amman established diplomatic relations with Washington in 1949, the United States did not become actively involved

in Jordan until 1957, when it replaced Britain as the Hashimite

Kingdom's principal Western source of foreign aid and political

support. Jordan and the United States never entered into treaty

commitments, but Washington's policy was to ensure Jordan's con- tinued independence and stability. Thus, the United States assisted

Jordan in equipping and training its military forces. During the

civil war of 1970-71, the United States firmly supported Hussein,

although it did not become directly involved in the conflict. After

215
Jordan: A Country Study

Jordan's army had defeated the PLO guerrillas, Washington ex- tended substantial budgetary and military aid to the Hashimite

Kingdom. This aid contributed significantly toward Jordanian

recovery from the damages suffered not only in the civil war but

also in the June 1967 War and during the intensive Israeli shelling

of the Jordan Valley between 1968 and 1970. Hussein's close alignment with the United States before and after the civil war predictably aroused strong anti-American sentiment among Palestinians

in Jordan and elsewhere.

The October 1973 War, in which Jordan was not a direct participant, brought Jordan and the United States much closer in the

peace process that began after the conflict. Jordan joined with the

United States in support of UN Security Council Resolution 338.

This resolution called on the parties involved in the October 1973

War to cease their hostilities and to implement UN Security Council

Resolution 242 of 1967 providing for a peace based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Hussein hoped to obtain American backing for a return of the West Bank to Jordanian control.

His expectations were buoyed by Washington's success in negotiating disengagement and limited withdrawal of forces agreements

between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel. The failure of the United States during 1974 to persuade Israel

to pull back its forces from part of the West Bank as an initial step

toward a peace agreement with Jordan disillusioned Hussein with

respect to the ability of the Americans to pressure Israel on the

issue of withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories. Although he continued to value Washington's reaffirmations of sup- port for Jordan's security and economic progress, Hussein became

increasingly skeptical of American assurances that the West Bank

would be reunited with the East Bank. Consequently, he refrained

from participation in the Camp David process, which he was con- vinced would be used by Israel to perpetuate its control of the West

Bank. After Egyptian and Israeli negotiations on the autonomy

plan had stalled, Hussein tried to rekindle United States interest

in an international conference to deal with territory for the Palestinians.

Throughout the 1980s, the United States continued to assign

Jordan a key role in a resolution of the status of the West Bank.

Hussein believed, however, that Washington did not understand

how essential it was for the stability of his regime to regain full control over all of the West Bank and how politically dangerous

it would be for him to agree to any partial measures. For example, Hussein did not publicly criticize President Reagan's September

1982 proposal for Middle East peace; but since this plan restricted

216
Government and Politics

self-determination for Palestinians on the West Bank to an "autonomous authority" in association with Jordan, he regarded American expectation of his endorsement as unrealistic. Hussein accepted

that political developments since 1974 made it impossible to ignore

the PLO in any peace negotiations. Thus, one of his policy aims

vis-a-vis the United States became to convince Washington to deal—at least unofficially—with the PLO. From the end of 1982

until the end of 1988, Hussein served as an intermediary between

the United States and the PLO, attempting to get both parties to make the kind of political concessions that were necessary before a dialogue could be initiated. During the early 1980s, Hussein seriously considered expanding Jordan's military relations with the United States. He gave tentative approval for the creation of an unpublicized 8,000-strong

Jordanian strike force that would respond to requests for assistance

from Arab countries within a 2,400-kilometer radius of Jordan.

The intended target of this special force was to be the Persian Gulf,

where the traditional allies of both Jordan and the United States feared the potentially destabilizing consequences of the Iran-Iraq

War. The United States agreed to provide the special Jordanian

unit with weapons and other military equipment. In an apparent

effort to obtain approval of the United States Congress for the extra funding needed to arm the strike force, in early 1984 the Reagan

administration disclosed its formation. This unexpected disclosure

caused consternation in Amman, and news of the Jordanian strike force provoked harsh criticism from Syria and from Palestinian

guerrilla groups opposed to Hussein. In order to minimize negative repercussions, Hussein tried to distance his country from the

strike force by portraying it as a United States initiative in which

Jordan had no real interest or substantive involvement. Congress

did not approve the requested funds, and the plan was subsequently

abandoned.

Hussein's disappointment with American policy increased when

Congress later refused to authorize selling weapons to Jordan and

voted to reduce the amount of aid the administration requested

as punishment for its perception that Amman had failed to cooperate

with Israel. Hussein resented these measures because he believed

he had exerted great efforts in persuading Palestinian and other

Arab leaders to adopt more moderate and flexible positions and

had himself agreed to several private meetings with Peres. In 1989

Jordan's relations with the United States remained friendly and

cooperative in economic and military matters but were clouded by

Hussein's lack of confidence in Washington's policy toward Israel and the occupied territories.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Relations with Other Countries

In the years after independence, Jordan followed a generally pro- Western foreign policy as a result of its special relationship with

Britain, to which the Hashimite Kingdom owed its existence and

which became the principal supplier of financial and other aid. Jordan's special relationship with Britain ended, for all practical

purposes, in 1957, when the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 was

terminated by mutual agreement. Thereafter, the United States became actively involved in Jordan, replacing Britain as the principal Western source of foreign aid and political support but without

treaty commitments. Nevertheless, Britain and Jordan continued

to maintain cordial relations. Hussein made annual official visits to London to discuss Middle East policy. In 1984, Queen Elizabeth

II made the first trip ever by a British monarch to Jordan. Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher subsequently visited Amman in 1985.

During the 1980s, Britain again became a major weapons supplier

for Jordan. As of 1989, the most recent sale (in September 1988) was an agreement to provide Jordan with the advanced Tornado

aircraft. In 1989 Jordan maintained friendly relations with the Soviet

Union. Amman first established relations with Moscow in 1963.

Two years later, Jordan signed its first cultural and technical cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. Hussein made his first state

visit to Moscow in the wake of the June 1967 War. Since then there

have been numerous exchanges of high-level visits, including several

official trips by Hussein. Jordan has purchased military equipment

from the Soviet Union periodically since 1980 as part of a policy

to diversify military supply sources. In 1985 Jordan bought a major

Soviet air defense system after the United States Congress canceled a planned sale of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the country. Jordan

and the Soviet Union have signed several accords pertaining to cul- tural, economic, and scientific cooperation. In his advocacy of an

international peace conference to deal with the occupied Palestinian territories, Hussein has insisted that the Soviet Union be in- cluded. In 1989 Jordan had friendly relations with most other countries,

including those in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe. The

major exception was Iran, with which Jordan had severed diplomatic relations in 1981 as a demonstration of solidarity with Iraq.

The countries of the European Economic Community and Japan

were major sources ofJordan's imports. France also sold weapons

to Jordan, including twenty Mirage-2000 aircraft in 1988.

218
Government and Politics Membership in International Organizations

In 1989 Jordan was a member of the League of Arab States and

the Arab Cooperation Council, a regional economic pact that in- cluded Egypt, Iraq, and North Yemen. Jordan was a member of

the International Committee of the Red Cross and had been a member of the UN since 1955. The United Nations Relief and Works

Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East maintained ten refugee camps in Jordan (see fig. 6). UNRWA's biggest

task was the provision of primary, secondary, and vocational schools

for Palestinian refugee children living in the camps. UNRWA also operated health clinics and provided food for indigent refugees.

Media

In 1989 Jordan had four daily newspapers, all published in

Amman. One, TheJordan Times, was printed in English. The three

Arabic dailies were Sawt ash Shaab (Voice of the People), Ar Rai

(Opinion), and Ad Dustur (The Constitution). The press was mostly

privately owned and subject to censorship. The Arabic-language

papers had been suspended at various times throughout the 1980s

for publishing articles that the government considered objectionable. In 1988 the government ordered the dissolution of the board

of directors of all three Arabic papers. The Ministry of Culture

and Information was responsible for most press censorship on a

daily basis and frequently provided editors with guidance on how

to report on sensitive foreign policy and security matters. In practice, editors generally exercised self-censorship to minimize conflicts with the authorities.

The government also tried to control individual journalists by

rewarding those deemed cooperative and by punishing those whose

stories it considered critical. The most common punishment was

the withdrawal of government-issued press credentials, which all writers were required to have in order to work for a newspaper

or news agency. This procedure was used to prevent several journalists (including a principal writer for TheJordan Times) from publishing during 1987 and 1988. Journalists also have been subjected

to house arrest. In June 1987, the government dissolved the Writers'

Association, a professional organization ofjournalists, charging that

it had become a political group and had contacts with illegal parties. The Ministry of Culture and Information subsequently sponsored an official union, the Journalists' Association, and required

all writers to join it. The government attempted to discourage the Arabic press of East Jerusalem from publishing critical stories, especially about Hussein's

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Jordan: A Country Study

relations with the PLO, by such means as banning single issues

of papers and magazines, refusing to renew the passports of West

Bank journalists, and sending messages through discreet channels

that certain writers or editors would be arrested if they entered Jor- dan. Foreign publications and journalists also were banned when

their articles criticized Jordan. In 1986 Western correspondents

expressed concern about the government's interference with press freedom during and after the disturbances at Yarmuk University. In 1988 the government expelled an American correspondent for National Broadcasting Company (NBC) because he had reported on political repression in Jordan.

The government operated an official news agency known as PETRA. Several international news services maintained offices in Amman, including Agence France-Presse, Associated Press, Reuters,

and TASS. Radio and television broadcasting were controlled by

the government. Jordan Radio and Television had twenty hours

of Arabic radio programs daily, and fifteen hours in English. There

were an estimated 700,000 privately owned radio receivers in 1989;

also, radio reception in village cafes was popular. Jordan Radio and

Television also broadcast ninety hours weekly of television programs

in Arabic and English. In 1989 there were an estimated 250,000

television sets in the country. Both radio and television accepted advertisements.

The literature on Jordanian government and politics since the

early 1970s is relatively scarce. Among the readily available studies

in English that merit reading are Peter Gubser's Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events and Clinton Bailey's Jordan's Palestinian

Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political Challenge. Both books were writ- ten in the early 1980s and thus do not cover events from 1983 on. Middle East Insight, Middle East International [London], and Middle

East Report are magazines that regularly feature articles about Jor- dan's politics, relations with the PLO, and foreign policy. Lamis

Andoni, Naseer H. Aruri, Rashid Khalidi, and Robin Wright are

the principal writers who specialize on Jordanian affairs. Articles

by these authors also may be found in various other journals that

deal with international relations and Middle East politics. (For fur- ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

220
Chapter 5. National Security
Mosaic of a walled city, called Castron Mephaon,

from the Umm ar Rasas pavement in a Byzantine church, ca. 780
IN ASSESSING THE DIMENSIONS of national security in

Jordan, it is essential to recall that for centuries conflicts and rivalries of differing political and religious ideologies have generated ten- sion and crisis in this region. Since achieving sovereignty in 1946,

Jordan has experienced such destabilizing traumas as the assassi- nation of the country's first king and subsequently of two prime

ministers, five Arab-Israeli wars, a vicious civil war with Palestinian (see Glossary) guerrillas, and repeated assassination attempts

targeting King Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein Al

Hashimi.

Jordan not only has survived in this volatile climate but also, as of 1989, the thirty-sixth year of Hussein's reign, had achieved

a degree of stability in its domestic situation and in its relations

with its neighbors. The king's position has been strongly reinforced

by the allegiance of the Jordan Arab Army, the former Arab Legion.

A highly motivated, disciplined force with impressive firepower and

mobility despite its compact scale, the Jordan Arab Army has been

regarded as the most competent of any Arab army in the Middle

East. In contrast to the Syrian, Iraqi, or Israeli armies, however,

Jordanian troops have not been tested by exposure to major conflict for many years. Jordan's international security situation in 1989 seemed less precarious than it had been at almost any time in the past. Relations with surrounding states were on a relatively solid footing. The

border facing Israeli-held territories was peaceful. Jordan had suc- ceeded in suppressing attacks from its land that might bring Israeli retaliation, except for isolated incursions into Israeli-held territory

by extremist elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO). Although differences remained between Jordan and vari- ous Palestinian leaders over the approaches to Arab-Israeli peace

negotiations, Jordan's relations with the dominant Yasir Arafat

wing of the PLO were less strained than with Syrian-supported

extremists such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command. Disruptive actions by Palestinian militants in Jordan were curbed quickly by the security forces. Worries that

the uprising (intifadah) among Palestinians under Israeli occupation might spill over to the Palestinian population of Jordan had

not materialized. Unrest arising from the deteriorating economic

situation in 1989 had been directed against the prime minister rather

than the institutions of the monarchy.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Jordan's military posture was based primarily on the possibility

of conflict with Israel, although on its own Jordan would be unable

to counter a full-scale Israeli attack. The country's borders also were exposed to a long-term threat from a potentially hostile Syria.

Jordan retained sufficient capability to give an aggressively inclined

neighbor pause, but it did not have the resources to keep pace with

the buildup of modern arms by nearby countries of the Middle East. As of 1989, however, most observers considered the prospect of

armed conflict between Jordan and Israel, Syria, or other states in the region as remote.

Jordan has had a tradition of military cooperation with Britain

and the United States, and its organizational pattern, the outlook

of its military leaders, training concepts, and weapons arsenal have

reflected these links. The United States Congress had prevented

the executive branch from providing Jordan with certain advanced

ground and air weapons in the late 1980s. Forced to shift to other

sources of equipment, Jordan turned to France as the principal supplier of combat aircraft and to the Soviet Union for an array of

air defense missile systems. Even with heavy reliance on financial

backing from other Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, defense

imposed a heavy burden on the nation's frail economy. By the late 1980s, Jordan's deepening domestic economic plight had combined

with the tapering off of Arab aid to place severe pressure on the

military budget.

Backed by a traditionally loyal military and the efficient forces

of public order, Hussein's throne appeared to be secure. Nonetheless, in an era of rapidly evolving weapons technology, a constant

effort would be necessary to maintain the credibility of national

security institutions as the guarantors ofJordan's domestic stability, its territorial integrity, and its role as a moderating factor in

Middle East peace efforts. Security: A Perennial Concern

From the beginning of Hussein's reign in 1953, the king's position as a pro-Western moderate in the continuing struggle between

Middle East Arab states and Israel has kept him in the forefront

of political uncertainty. He has had to deal with the preeminent

strategic drawback of sharing a longer common border with Israel than any other Arab country. To compound the unease generated

by this 345-kilometer frontier, repeated Arab-Israeli wars demonstrated that Israeli forces always fielded vastly superior military

capability. As a consequence, the king for many years has avoided

engaging Israel in battle and has prevented provocations launched

from Jordanian territory by PLO militants that could spark Israeli

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National Security

retaliation. Domestically, the danger posed to Hussein's rule by

armed Palestinian groups during the 1960s had by the late 1980s

given way to new sources of potential instability—the increasing

militancy of the Islamic revival movement and the frustration of

lowered economic expectations, together with civilian impatience

over the limits on political expression. For the immediate future,

however, the security forces seemed sufficiently well equipped to suppress agitation and organized attempts to subvert the monarchy.

Dimensions of the Military Threat

As of mid- 1989, the Jordan River valley, forming the boundary

zone with Israel and the Israeli-occupied West Bank (see Glossary),

had been quiet for nearly two decades. In 1970 Hussein's army

had begun its drive against the PLO militia that was using Jordan

as a base for attacks on Israeli positions in the West Bank (see The

Palestinian Factor, this ch.). The Israeli leadership has acknowledged that pacification of this border has been the result ofJordanian measures taken to prevent PLO terrorism. Jordan was not

a declared belligerent in 1973 when Egypt and Syria simultaneously attacked Israel; however, Jordan did commit armored units

to support Syrian defenders on the Golan Heights during the last stages of the war in actions confined to Syrian territory (see The

Military Heritage, this ch.). Jordan did not join Syria and the PLO

in contesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Although Israel throughout the 1980s exercised restraint in its military conduct with respect to Jordan, the destructive potential

of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to preoccupy the Jor- danian command. Despite the long period intervening since raids

and bombardments by Israel in retaliation for attacks by PLO guerrillas, the ferocity of Israel's earlier punitive actions—most of the

victims being Jordanians with no links to the PLO—had left a per- manent impression of Israeli belligerence and hostility, Jordan was

also conscious of the sentiment in Israel that favored solving the

West Bank Palestinian problem by ejecting all Arabs from the area and sending them to Jordan. Any attempt to execute such a plan

would inevitably require military intimidation or the direct application of Israel's military superiority.

In the event of renewed hostilities between Israel and Syria, it was also possible that Israel would try to outflank Syrian positions

in the Golan Heights area by swinging south into Jordan. Such

an action would present its own problems, including a difficult river

crossing. During the 1973 conflict, neither Israel nor Syria violated Jordanian territorial integrity in spite of Jordan's efforts to reinforce the Syrian defenses.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Jordan was also obliged to take account of Syrian military power.

The aggressive Damascus regime had frequently been at odds politically with Hussein until an easing of bilateral relations began

in late 1985. Syrian tank units had crossed into Jordan in 1970

to aid the Palestinian militia defying the government. The Syri- ans had massed three divisions and more than 800 tanks on the

Jordanian border in 1 980 in a dispute over military training camps

in Jordan for opponents of the Syrian regime. Only pressure from

the United States and Saudi Arabia, together with Hussein's

promise to limit anti-Syrian activity inside the kingdom, caused

Damascus to back down. Syrian-sponsored terrorist activity beginning in 1983 was intended to intimidate Hussein in his efforts to get the peace process under way between the PLO and Israel. Like Israel's, Syria's military establishment vastly outmatched

that at Hussein's command. Syria had a quantitative personnel

advantage over Jordan by a ratio of four to one, its tank and artillery inventory exceeded Jordan's by a ratio of four to one, and

it had four times as many combat aircraft, most of them of more

advanced design. A corresponding disparity of scale existed between

the Jordanian and Israeli armed forces. The normal personnel

strength of the IDF was about 60 percent larger than that of Jor- dan 's armed forces, but Israel could rapidly expand its personnel

by mobilizing well-trained reserve units (see fig. 13).

Jordan also had common borders with Saudi Arabia and Iraq

and was separated from Egypt only by a narrow strip of Israeli territory in the Negev Desert. The 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq

War left Iraq with a large number of experienced fighting units.

As a revolutionary Arab state opposed to settlement with Israel,

Iraq had in the past been perceived as a potential threat by the

Amman government. Relations between Jordan and Iraq had been

good, however, throughout the 1980s. Jordan viewed Iraq as a

buffer against the strict Islamic interpretations expounded by Iran's leaders and provided tangible support to the Iraqi war effort. Saudi

Arabia, with an armed establishment about the size of Jordan's

but with no combat experience, was not regarded as a military

rival. To the contrary, the Saudi government had been the primary

financial source for equipment acquisitions by the Jordanian forces. During the 1960s, Egypt's militant Arab nationalist leader Gamal

Abdul Nasser had tried to destabilize Hussein's rule. Since that

time, however, Egypt had not been a source of concern militarily to Jordan. Under the political conditions prevailing in the

late 1980s, Egypt was perceived as a peaceful neighbor against

which no special security precautions were required. Rather, the

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National Security

Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement had progressed so far that joint

military exercises were held by the two countries in 1985.

Further evidence of Jordan's intention to increase its cooperation with other Arab states were the meetings in Amman on February 12, 1989, and in Baghdad on February 16, 1989, that resulted

in the founding of an Arab economic association. King Hussein

took the lead in creating this organization, to be known as the Arab

Cooperation Council, consisting of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the

Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). The permanent secretariat

of the body, which is patterned on the European Economic Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council, will probably be lo- cated in Amman.

Except for the Jordan River valley separating Jordan from the

West Bank, no major terrain features present a barrier to an in- vading army. Jordan shares a 375-kilometer border with Syria, and

the Syrian frontier is only 60 kilometers from Amman. The Yarmuk River, which forms the western part of the boundary between

the two countries, falls into a deep gorge to Lake Tiberias (Sea

of Galilee), but farther east a number of major roads link the two

countries across undulating terrain with no natural obstacles. The

city of Irbid and the air base at Al Mafraq are fewer than twenty

kilometers from the border, vulnerable to surprise attack or artillery

bombardment. The 742-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia and

the 134-kilometer border with Iraq are in open desert areas to the

south and east. The bulk ofJordan's population and its most productive agricul- ture have concentrated in the northwestern corner of the country, an area only about 60 kilometers wide and 160 kilometers long.

In the event of conflict, Amman and other cities would have only

a few minutes' warning against air attack from either Syrian or

Israeli planes based nearby. Israeli ground forces advancing from

the West Bank would face a major terrain obstacle in the form of

the escarpment about 800 to 1,200 meters above the floor of the

Jordan River valley. Although a number of surfaced roads lead

to the top of it, a well-entrenched defending force could make the

operation very costly. In the end, however, Israel's superior air power, possibly combined with a helicopter assault on key high

points, would almost certainly succeed in dislodging the Jordanians blocking an advance up the main routes to the central plateau

.

Israel also would have the option of seizing Jordan's sole port of

Al Aqabah in the south, although its army would face long and

exposed supply lines in a subsequent drive north toward Amman.

In the event of aggression by one of Jordan's stronger neighbors, the modest forces at Hussein's command might be obliged

227
Jordan: A Country Study

228
National Security

to confine resistance to the vital northern upland region, holding

the heights above the East Bank (see Glossary) or defending the

likely invasion routes from Syria. The army combat units and most

of the air bases were concentrated in the northwest. Jordan's vulnerability, particularly its limited defense against sustained air

strikes, would make it difficult for even a well-trained and highly

motivated army to prevail for long against a strong invading force. The overall national defense strategy was to maintain forces that

could give a good account of themselves, even when faced by su- perior attackers. A potential aggressor might thereby be deterred,

realizing that a move against Jordan would be a costly venture. Moreover, a strong defensive posture by Jordan would oblige any

aggressor to precede its attack by a mobilization in expectation of

major conflict, thus obviating the danger of a surprise takeover.

If an invasion nevertheless occurred, the Jordanian strategy would

be to conduct a stubborn delaying action to allow time for pres- sure to be brought to bear by Jordan's friends and the international community for abandonment of the aggression.

Internal Security

Violence and political murder were hallmarks of the early years

of the Hashimite (also seen as Hashemite) Kingdom. Hussein was

present and was himself a target when his grandfather, King

Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi, was shot to death in Jerusalem

in 1951. Two prime ministers were murdered, one in 1960 and

the other in 1971. As of 1989, Hussein had survived at least nine

attempted assassinations that could be documented; numerous other

plots had been rumored but denied by the Jordanian authorities.

The monarchy was beset by attempts at subversion, conspiracy,

and assassination and by smoldering tensions in many parts of the

society. The principal sources of these threats to overthrow or dis- credit Hashimite rule were Arab militants openly hostile to the

king's position as a pro-Western moderate in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hussein's pragmatic change of attitude in the late 1970s, when

he joined other Arab states in rejecting the Egyptian-Israeli peace

treaty, ended his estrangement and diminished Arab hostility to his regime. Since that time, the internal security risk has assumed two

forms—leftist, anti-Hashimite factions of the PLO and extremist

groups associated with the Islamic revival. Most of these movements

were small and scattered and, as of 1989, appeared to be effectively controlled and contained by the efficient Jordanian security apparatus

(see General Intelligence Department, this ch.).

Military support was so integral to the monarchy that the stability of the regime was assumed to be in no danger unless the armed

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Jordan: A Country Study

forces themselves were to be subverted. Although episodes of dis- content over conditions of service had occurred from time to time,

the beduin-dominated army as a whole was one of the most stable

institutions in the kingdom. The only open insurrection in the army

occurred early in Hussein's reign, in 1957, when a group calling

itself the Free Officers (possibly in imitation of the Egyptian 1952

movement by that name) attempted to wrest the throne from the

king. The loyalty of most officers and enlisted personnel, together

with Hussein's own decisive action, defeated the plot and ushered

in much stricter security precautions (see Hussein's Early Reign,

ch. 1). The last known conspiracy to involve military personnel

occurred in 1972 when 300 army and civilian personnel were

arrested after Palestinian militants bribed the acting commander

of an armored car unit to stage a coup d'etat. The Islamic revival was growing in strength in Jordan as in other

Arab countries but, as a security problem, appeared to be under

control as of 1989. The Muslim Brotherhood, the most important

of the politico-religious movements, had appeared in Jordan as early as 1946. It was officially recognized by the government and had

rights of expression denied to other groups. It was believed to have

many thousands of members as of 1988, enjoying the support of

perhaps 10 percent of the population. The Muslim Brotherhood

had gained a foothold in certain government ministries and was

also believed to have insinuated itself into the police and intelli- gence organizations. Proselytizing had occurred in the armed forces. Although hitherto not a source of antigovernment protests and dis- turbances (as in Egypt and elsewhere), the Muslim Brotherhood

had adopted an increasingly activist and critical tone in its pronouncements by the mid-1980s. Other, more militant, Islamic

groups remained small and fragmented. Jordanians were uncertain of the potential danger of the Islamic movement to the stability of the monarchy and whether its adherents might make a bid

for power should the regime falter. In late 1985, the government cracked down on the Muslim

Brotherhood as a warning against its growing stridency and political involvement. The action was also linked to Hussein's efforts to normalize relations with Syria. Syrian members of the Muslim

Brotherhood who had been forced to flee to camps in Jordan were

accused by the king of subversion aimed against the Damascus

government. They were rounded up and extradited to Syria. A

new law enacted in the same year prohibited political incitement

and accusations by imams and speakers in the mosques. The Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs was designated

to review Friday sermons and religious education in the mosques.

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National Security

Since Jordan's population adhered overwhelmingly to the mainstream Sunni (see Glossary) form of Islam, the militancy of the

Shia (see Glossary) branch emanating from Iran had made no in- roads. Unlike most neighboring Arab countries, Jordan had no

significant minority groups that were perceived as problems for the security forces. The 25,000 Circassians, whose forebears had

migrated from the Caucasus region of southern Russia, were Sunni

Muslims and traditionally loyal supporters of the monarchy (see

Ethnicity and Language, ch. 2). Many Circassians served in the

higher ranks of the military or were engaged in security work.

Student activism was carefully controlled through restrictions on

political organizations, demonstrations, and meetings. At the two

major institutions of higher learning, the University of Jordan in

Amman and Yarmuk University in Irbid, the student groups were

segmented into small organizations, generally associated with some

form of Islamic activism. Student protest rallies occurred at Yarmuk

University in 1986, a few days after the United States bombing

of installations in Libya. The students rallied against rising tui- tion costs, dismissals for low grades, and King Hussein's relationship with the United States. The protests were put down violently

by government forces, with a number of student deaths and many

injuries.

Concerned over the possible ideological indoctrination of the

several thousand Jordanian students attending universities in

Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the People's Democratic

Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), the government followed a

policy of strict passport controls and withdrawal of passports from

students believed to have questionable contacts abroad.

In April 1989, young people in several southern towns rioted

for five days over the sharp price rises on gasoline, cigarettes, and

other consumer goods attendant upon certain economic measures

agreed to between Jordan and the International Monetary Fund

(see Glossary). The demonstrations were aimed at the prime

minister and the cabinet, but there was apprehension that the result- ing political disequilibrium could escalate into attacks on the monarchy itself. The Palestinian population did not join the protesters,

who consisted primarily of beduins (normally considered the base

of the king's support). Observers claimed that Islamic activists exerted some influence over the young demonstrators.

Various small underground groups that formed the core of leftist opposition to the Hashimite regime were carefully watched by the

security services. They included the Soviet-oriented Communist

Party of Jordan (Al Hizb ash Shuyui al Urduni) and the Jordanian Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party), linked to the

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Jordan: A Country Study

socialist movement of Syria. These movements in turn backed other

groups that opposed Jordan's association with the West and with

the United States, and called for closer relations with Syria and

other Arab leftist elements. In addition to supporting some of these

groups, Syria had been linked to a number of assassination attempts on Jordanian diplomats abroad, rocket attacks on Jordanian

airliners, and grenade and bomb attacks within Jordan between

1983 and 1985. The attacks by Black September, Abu Nidal, or other terrorist groups under Syrian control apparently were cal- culated to intimidate Jordan into abandoning its Middle East peace

initiatives, which ran contrary to Syria's policies. Although the at- tacks ceased as relations with Syria improved in 1985, the government remained alert to the danger of renewed destabilizing attempts

by radical Arab groups.

The Communist Party of Jordan, led by General Secretary

Yaqub Zayadin, had been illegal since 1957, although the organization enjoyed periods of toleration by the regime, interspersed

with periods of repression. A tightly organized network of small

cells, its membership was believed to be about 500, but through

the party's organ it published steady attacks on the government's

Middle East policies and restrictions on civil rights. In an effort to fix blame for the 1986 riots at Yarmuk University, the government arrested the entire seventeen-member politburo. They were

released several months later, but the party remained banned. During the April 1989 protests against the government's price increases

for many consumer goods, 120 members of the Communist Party were detained after circulating leaflets calling for general strikes. The Palestinian Factor

Over a long period, the most serious threat to Hussein's con- tinuance in power had been posed by the militant and rejectionist

elements of the PLO that were supported by Syria and Libya.

Although the PLO's avowed goal was to regain the traditional Pales- tinian homeland for millions of Palestinians scattered throughout

the Middle East, the PLO's actions at times had given the impression that the initial phase of its program was to gain control over Jordan. In the aftermath of the June 1967 War, Hussein was per- suaded by fellow Arab leaders to permit the PLO to station some

of its military forces in the East Bank. By 1970 the fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) had acquired a powerful presence in the country

and had become openly defiant of Hussein's government. They

threatened to topple the monarchy and replace it with a regime

that would not interfere with guerrilla operations against Israel. After a series of crises during which Palestinian behavior became

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National Security

increasingly disruptive, a fierce civil war broke out in September

1970. By the summer of 1971 , after suffering heavy losses, the or- ganized PLO militia was forced to withdraw to new bases primarily in Lebanon (see The Guerrilla Crisis, ch. 1). Having ended the Palestinian military threat, Hussein was determined not to permit its reappearance. The departure of the PLO

meant relief from Israeli retaliatory shelling and incursions in

reprisal for PLO raids and rocket attacks on the West Bank. Hostility between Hussein and the PLO gradually abated after the October 1973 War. The king reluctantly assented to a decision taken

at a conference of Arab leaders in 1974 to designate the PLO as the sole authorized representative of the Palestinian people, in effect relinquishing his traditional role as representative of Palestinians

residing on the West Bank. In 1988 the king formally renounced

Jordanian claims to sovereignty over the West Bank. At the same

time, Hussein intensified his efforts to promote national unity in

the East Bank by encouraging the integration of Palestinians into

the indigenous political and social structure. Many Palestinian resi- dents had by 1989 become well absorbed into Jordanian society,

achieving prominence in government, business, finance, and in- dustry, with an investment in the stability of the Hashimite regime.

But there was still widespread discrimination against Palestinians

in favor of Transjordanians, and thousands of Palestinians remained

in Jordan as impoverished refugees.

As of 1989, the remaining potential for political subversion among

the Palestinians appeared to be confined to scattered and poorly

organized extremist groups operating mostly out of refugee camps.

These groups included radical factions of the Syrian-supported

anti-Arafat wing of the PLO, such as the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). In late 1987 and early 1988, the government detained without charge or expelled more than 100 Palestinians to prevent them from agitating in support of the intifadah (the Palestinian uprising in the West

Bank) and against Hussein's inaction. The Black September ter- rorist group claimed responsibility for bomb explosions in Amman

later in 1988 and charged the king with "conspiring against the

Palestinian revolution."

The Military Heritage

When the Amirate of Transjordan was formed in 1921, the small

scattered police elements left over from Ottoman days were inadequate to maintain order and establish central government control.

The police units were expanded, and a small mobile force of

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Jordan: A Country Study

balanced elements of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was created.

Two years later the police, numbering about 300, and the mili- tary force of about 1 ,000 were combined under the command of

British Captain F.G. Peake. The establishment was originally

known as the Arab Army (Al Jaysh al Arabi)—a perpetuation of

the military force led by the Hashimites in World War I against

the Turks—and this Arabic title has been retained. In English,

however, the name became the Arab Legion, a designation that

lasted until 1956 (see Transjordan, ch. 1). Historical Role

From the Arab Legion's inception, its primary mission was the

establishment of the central government's authority through the

maintenance of public order and the preservation of internal security. It was originally composed of Arabs from the defeated Ottoman armies and others from outside the amirate. Under the early

agreements between Transjordan and Britain, defense of the borders

against external attack remained a British responsibility. To this end, a British Royal Air Force (RAF) squadron and British army

armored car unit were stationed in the country. In 1924 they joined

with the Arab Legion to beat back a Wahhabi invasion from the area to the south that within a few years became Saudi Arabia.

The ability of the legion to protect the amirate from outside raids

helped to cement the legitimacy of Hashimite rule. By 1926 the Arab Legion had established an image as the protective arm of the central government, functioning as an agency

for tax collection as well as for security. The beduins remained wary

and hostile, however, convinced that the legion strengthened the

hand of the regime, whose purposes they mistrusted. Initially the

beduins refused to join the legion, thus forcing reliance on villagers

and townspeople to replenish its personnel. In early 1926 the British high commissioner for Palestine created

the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) to defend Transjordan'

s

northern and southern borders. The legion immediately incurred

a loss of more than half of its forces when they were transferred

as cadre for the new border security force. In addition to the drop

in personnel, the legion also was stripped of its machine guns, artil- lery, and communications troops. The much reduced force reverted

to a role of policing the towns and villages. The TJFF (roughly

1 ,000 officers and men) never was part of the legion and was responsible to the British high commissioner in Jerusalem rather than to Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. All officers above the rank of major were British. Officers of lesser rank were Arabs, Circassians, and

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Jews, but the promotion system precluded the advancement of any

Middle Easterners to a position of command over British troops.

With its effectiveness reduced by creation of the TJFF, the Arab

Legion was unable to cope with raids by tribal groups in the vast

desert regions of Transjordan during the late 1920s and early 1930s.

To counter these disturbances, a British captain was transferred

to the legion as second in command to Peake. This officer—later to become known as Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb,

or Glubb Pasha, the strongman of Jordan—had previously faced

similar pacification problems while serving in the Iraqi government.

Glubb understood the beduins and had acquired a knowledge of

strategy and tactics required for long-range desert operations. Under

his command a camel-mounted Desert Mobile Force was organized

in 1930, reflecting its leader's concepts of a military unit functioning in a desert environment. The Desert Mobile Force, which eventually merged with the Arab Legion, attracted principally beduins

to its ranks, establishing the identification of the beduins with the

monarchy that has persisted through Hussein's reign.

World War II to 1967

The Arab rebellion that occurred in Palestine from 1936 to 1939

led to additional measures to strengthen the legion, which on the eve of World War II consisted of about 1,350 officers and men. One thousand of these troops were organized for police duties and

the remaining 350 made up the Desert Mobile Force, which then

comprised two mechanized cavalry companies, having as its mission the prevention of Arab rebel incursions from Palestine.

Although the Arab Legion saw little action in the war, the mobile force became part of the tiny British columns that marched

against Iraq and the Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon in 1941

.

It established an excellent record that prompted its expansion to a mechanized infantry brigade but, by the time this unit was ready

for action, the war in the desert was over. The Arab Legion was

subsequently detailed to strategic guard duties as individual companies throughout the Middle East. These operations provided ex- perience that was to prove valuable when Arab-Israeli difficulties erupted in the postwar era. By the end of the war, the legion had

expanded to a force of about 8,000, but postwar economy measures reduced its size to 6,000 by May 1948, when the British gave

up their Palestine Mandate. At the same time, the TJFF was dis- banded, and many members of the unit were absorbed into the

legion.

About 4,500 legionnaires were combat troops at the time the

Arab-Israeli War began in 1948. Moving across the Jordan River,

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Jordan: A Country Study

the legion occupied most of the West Bank and assumed control

of the strategic Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. Commanded by Glubb

and about forty British officers, the legion fought better than any

other Arab force and held its positions longer when Israel took the

offensive in January 1949. The fighting left the legion in occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem and much of the Arab areas of

Palestine that made up the West Bank.

During the 1948 war, the legion's strength was expanded hurriedly to approximately 8,000. As a consequence of the British withdrawal, for the first time the legion had to develop its own technical

support services. A small air force unit was created for logistics,

reconnaissance, and liaison purposes, then enlarged in 1955 to in- clude a modest combat element (see Air Force, this ch.). By early

1956, when Hussein dismissed Glubb as commander of the mili- tary establishment, the legion had grown to about 23,000 officers and men. After Glubb 's departure it was redesignated the Jordan

Arab Army, and the national police element of about 6,000 was

shifted from the military to be brought under the supervision of

the minister of interior. Between 1951 and 1956 an entirely new National Guard was

formed, originally consisting merely of armed Palestinians in vil- lages of the West Bank vulnerable to Israeli raids. It was later built

up within Jordan proper by a conscription system, forming a territorial reserve army. Guardsmen, predominantiy Palestinians, were unpaid except for a small wage during their annual training period

under officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the legion.

In 1965 the National Guard, by then a force of 30,000, was dis- banded because of its unreliability and susceptibility to PLO in- fluence. About 40 percent of these troops, after passing careful

screening for loyalty to the monarchy, were allowed to join the Jor- dan Arab Army.

Although Jordan had signed a tripartite military treaty with Egypt

and Syria in October 1956, a few days before Israel's attack on

Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula, the conflict was confined to the Egyptian front. Israeli troops were positioned along the borders with

Syria and Jordan in the event that these countries joined the fighting, but the alliance was not invoked.

June 1967 War and Aftermath

At the onset of the June 1967 War, Jordan had four infantry

brigades and one armored brigade in the Jerusalem-Ram AllahHebron sector, two infantry brigades reinforced by armor and artillery in the Nabulus area, and one infantry brigade and one ar- mored brigade in the Jordan River valley as reserve for the Nabulus

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forces. After fighting from June 5 to June 7, the overwhelmed Jor- danians were forced to abandon Jerusalem and the entire West

Bank, withdrawing across the Jordan River to prevent the annihilation of their army. The Jordanians fought tenaciously, but the

Arab air forces were destroyed on the first day of battle by continual Israeli air attacks, leaving the Jordanian army without air cover. Mauled by Israeli jets, those reserve armored units from

the Jordan River valley that were able to reach the battie zone were

in poor condition to support the infantry. In the Old City ofJerusa- lem, where Israeli air power could not be brought to bear, Jor- dan's defense caused almost half the Israeli casualties in the war. Confusion and discord resulted from the Jordanian army's placement under an Egyptian commander and from false reports received

from President Nasser claiming Egyptian successes in air and land

fighting. Expected reinforcements from Syria, Iraq, and Saudi

Arabia failed to reach the battle area in time, leaving the Jordanian army to fight almost entirely alone. Jordan suffered 7,000 killed and wounded and the destruction of its entire air force and 80 per- cent of its armor.

Since the June 1967 War, the Jordanian armed forces have not

been involved in major hostilities, except for the bloody internal

battles in 1970 and 1971 that ended with the withdrawal of the

PLO's fedayeen from Jordan. The Palestinians were armed with

light modern weapons and were entrenched in central Amman and

in refugee camps surrounding the city. During three days of stiff fighting in September 1970, one Jordanian infantry division and

one armored division gradually gained control of the core of the

city. But the course of the conflict shifted when a Syrian division

reinforced with armor and a brigade of the Palestine Liberation

Army crossed the border at Ar Ramtha. Dug-in Jordanian tanks

battered about 200 advancing Syrian tanks before retiring to new

positions. The next day Hawker Hunters of the Royal Jordanian

Air Force decisively blunted the Syrian attack against a new Jor- danian defensive line. The failure of the Syrians to commit their

air force enabled the Jordanians to turn back the invasion, taking a severe toll in destroyed Syrian armor. Iraq had deployed a 12,000-man force near Az Zarka but began to withdraw it when

the fighting broke out. Returning its attention to the entrenched PLO militias, the Jor- danian army was able to clear Amman and the city of Irbid, which

the PLO had also occupied, within a week. A fragile cease-fire was

negotiated with the help of surrounding Arab states but intermittent fighting continued in early 1971 . The remaining fedayeen were

gradually pushed back into a mountain defensive complex in the

237
Jordan: A Country Study

north. A four-day attack launched in July 1971 resulted in the dis- persal of the last PLO holdouts.

Jordan was not a formal belligerent in the October 1973 War

when Syria and Egypt joined in attacking Israel. Hussein was asked

to open a third front but merely placed his army on alert, defending his action by claiming that Jordan had few combat aircraft and no antiaircraft missile protection. By the fifth day of fighting, the

Syrian drive had been broken and Syrian troops, abandoning their

tanks and artillery, had fallen back to their Golan Heights defensive line, Jordanian armor was moved into position at the southern

end of the line and, along with Iraqi forces, took part in one limited attack before a United Nations (UN) cease-fire commenced.

Jordanian losses were twenty-eight soldiers killed and eighteen tanks

destroyed. The Jordanian forces fought well but again lacked air cover, and their actions were poorly coordinated with the Syrians

and Iraqis.

The Military in National Life

Among the various social, economic, and political institutions

affecting Jordanian national life, none—with the exceptions of the

monarchy itself and the Muslim religion—has been more pervasive than the presence and power of the armed forces. This condition has persisted since the formation of the first military units early

in the country's political evolution. Soon after becoming king in

1953, Hussein remarked that "everywhere I go in Jordan I find

the Arab Legion doing everything." Throughout Hussein's reign,

the armed forces have been an indispensable instrument for the

protection of the monarchy. The government has periodically

turned to the army to prevent internal disruption and to maintain

law and order. The loyalty of the army during periods of stress has permitted the king latitude in the conduct of foreign policy by

offsetting domestic constraints on his actions.

The king spent eight months at the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst at age sixteen, soon after ascending the throne.

He continued to take a close interest in military affairs, cultivating the armed forces and identifying himself with the performance

of their national security mission. A number of foreign observers

and knowledgeable Jordanians have testified that Hussein was sel- dom as relaxed or as filled with confidence as when he visited his

military units, attired in suitable uniform. Hussein made frequent

visits to army units where he knew many of the officers by name. Even privates felt they might approach the king directly, often tugging at his sleeve for attention. The empathy that existed between

him and his troops was enhanced by his fascination for modern

238
239
Jordan: A Country Study

weapons, such as jet aircraft, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and

missiles. The king was a qualified pilot who often personally tested

new planes. He made the final decision on equipment acquisitions

and other matters affecting the modernization of the military es- tablishment.

Since the 1957 coup attempt, the armed forces have conducted

themselves in a professional manner, accepting their subordination to civil legal authority. No officer caste has developed with

ambitions to interfere with or dominate the government, although

the king has called upon trusted individual officers to serve in important civilian posts. The continued acceptance by the military

of Hussein's political and religious legitimacy has been a foundation stone of national stability. Authorities on Jordanian politics

believed that, in the event of the king's death, the army would act

to guarantee the legitimate Hashimite succession (see The King,

ch. 4). The consensual relationship between the state and the army was

cemented by the privileges and economic benefits accruing to the career military. This situation was particularly true for the beduin

constituency, which felt a special affinity to the throne. Its powers

and privileges were unlikely to survive if the monarchy were

replaced by a Palestinian-controlled government. Even soldiers of

Palestinian origin perceived a greater certainty of their status under

Hussein than under any regime that might replace his. During the

civil war in 1970 and 1971 , units staffed exclusively with Palestinians showed no hesitancy in mounting assaults on the Palestinian

guerrillas.

Key officers and senior NCOs continued to be disproportionately of beduin background in the mid- to late 1980s. A considerable number of Palestinian officers had always been present,

although they were more heavily represented in the technical units

such as signals and engineering, and they did not often rise above

battalion-level command in the main combat units. The social composition was changing, however, as a higher proportion of recruits

originated from nontribal sectors. Younger personnel, although better educated and more cosmopolitan, were less imbued with the

zealous loyalty of the past. As the army modernized and became more professional, the tribal basis of support for the king was a diminishing factor. Nevertheless, the army had become a valuable adjunct to Hussein's efforts to foster a sense of national character

and patriotism. As changes in structure took place both within the

military and in civilian society, it was difficult to foresee how these

would ultimately affect the intimate relationship between the king

and his soldiers. Observers predicted, however, that the political

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National Security

reliability of the Jordan Arab Army would remain intact through

the 1990s. In addition to their basic security role, the armed forces have

participated in a variety of civic action programs designed to benefit

the country's development efforts—projects that at the same time

have enhanced the public image of the military. Public services

by the armed forces have included such major items as bridge and

road construction and disaster relief, organized campaigns against

locust infestation, and such lesser actions as repair of wells and res- cue of people lost or stranded in the country's vast desert region.

Technical skills learned in the service eased the transition to civilian life. Persons with army or air force training in mechanics,

electronics, or engineering were looked upon as technically proficient, disciplined additions to the civilian work force. The military was, moreover, a channel for upward mobility. It was one

of the few institutions in the country that provided a means for those from the lower strata of society to embark on a respected career and earn a measure of personal prestige.

The Armed Forces

Composed of both regular or career personnel and conscripts,

the armed forces in 1988 had an active-duty strength estimated at 85,300 officers and enlisted personnel. Included in this total were an army of 74,000, an air force of 11,000, and a naval element

of 300. The naval force, with a coast guard-type mission, was or- ganizationally part of the army. The air force, which enjoyed high

prestige arising in part from Hussein's avid personal interest in aviation, had semi-autonomous status. Command Structure

Article 32 of the Constitution states that "the king is the Supreme

Commander of the Army, Naval, and Air Forces.

'

' The words here

have a connotation similar to commander in chief as applied to the president of the United States. King Hussein has, however,

generally exercised close control over the armed forces and has even assumed direct command of the army on many occasions. The king

has the constitutional right to declare war, conclude peace, and

sign treaties. The declaration of a state of emergency may be made

by decision of the Council of Ministers and is promulgated by royal

decree when required to "ensure the defense of the realm." In such

situations, the country's ordinary laws are suspended. As of

mid- 1989, Jordan had been formally in a state of martial law since

1967, enabling the king to legislate by the issuance of decrees.

241
Jordan: A Country Study

Broad policy issues relating to security were decided by the king,

advised by a small circle of officials and personal associates. These

included his brother, Crown Prince Hasan, senior palace officials,

and the prime minister. The post of minister of defense customarily had been held by the prime minister. The Ministry of Defense

had mainly administrative functions, including logistics, mobilization, conscription, and preparation of the defense budget. The

operational commander of the armed forces was theoretically

responsible to the minister of defense, but in reality the minister

did not issue directives of an operational nature unless they had

the king's approval. The commanding officer of the armed forces

had invariably been a confidant of the king and was generally a

leading member of a prominent beduin clan. Until he was appointed

a ranking palace official —chief of the royal court—in late 1988,

Field Marshal General of the Army Ash Sharif Zaid ibn Shakir, a cousin of the king, had been commander in chief for more than

twelve years. Zaid ibn Shakir' s family had always been close to the royal family, and Zaid ibn Shakir himself had been personally

linked with Hussein throughout his military career. In addition

to his high palace position, he also filled a newly created post of

adviser to the king on national security. The new position implied

that Shakir would retain considerable influence over military

policies.

Operational command of the armed forces was assumed by the

chief of staff, Lieutenant General Fathi Abu Talib, after the departure of Zaid ibn Shakir. It was expected that the title of commander

in chief of the armed forces would be eliminated. Accordingly, the

senior military commander under the king would henceforward

bear the title of chief of staff of the armed forces. The chief of staff presided over a headquarters in Amman known

as the Armed Forces General Command. Subordinate to him were

the air force commander and chiefs of staff for personnel, intelli- gence, operations, and administration, corresponding roughly to the G-l, G-2, G-3, and G-4 functional sections of the general

staff under the United States system. These positions were nor- mally held by officers of major general rank (see fig. 14). By legislation enacted in 1983, Jordan was divided into eight military

regions corresponding to the eight governorates, although it was

not clear how these regions fitted into the overall military com- mand structure. The commander of the semi-autonomous Royal Jordanian Air

Force—subordinated to the chief of staff—derived some logistical

support from the army and carried out a degree of policy coordination with the principal officers of the Armed Forces General

242
National Security

Command staff. The air force, however, had a separate headquarters at King Abdullah Air Base near Amman. The headquarters

had its own staff for the specialized operations, training, logistic,

and other requirements of the air force. Army

The 74,000 troops of the Jordan Arab Army were organized into

two armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, two independent brigades, and sixteen independent artillery battalions. After

the June 1967 War, Hussein and his government undertook a major

rebuilding and modernization program for the army. As of 1989,

it was still considered to be the best trained of all the Arab armies

and was larger and better equipped than at any time in its exis- tence. Nevertheless, it had long been outstripped in equipment by

the nearby Israeli and Syrian armies, which had been expanded

and re-equipped with modern armor and missile systems after the

October 1973 War.

The basic organization was pyramidal, with three brigades to a division and three battalions in each brigade. Each of the two

armored divisions consisted of two tank brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade. The two mechanized divisions were made up of two mechanized infantry brigades and one tank brigade.

The independent brigades consisted of a Royal Guards Brigade

and a Special Forces Brigade, the latter made up of three airborne

battalions. Some significant units were missing from each division,

and the weapons inventory of each division was closer to that of a reinforced brigade. For economy, the divisions did not have fully

integrated organic logistics and support units but depended on main

bases for supplies. Although the ratio of combat to support strength was favorable, the capability of independent brigades to operate

at a distance from these bases was seriously impaired.

The bulk of the ground forces were concentrated in the north,

at base complexes at Amman and Az Zarqa and at other installa- tions in the vicinity of Irbid and Al Mafraq. Smaller bases were

at Maan and Al Aqabah to the south (see fig. 15). No Jordanian

forces were deployed in the Jordan River valley, where they would

have been exposed to Israeli air power and artillery. They were

instead emplaced on the heights above the valley where they could

obstruct enemy movement up the routes to the central plateau lead- ing to the main cities. The most forward troop dispositions were

at Umm Qays overlooking the Jordan River in the northwest corner

of the country to counter any potential Israeli flanking movement

around the strong Syrian defenses concentrated in the Golan

Heights.

243
Jordan: A Country Study

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244
National Security

In spite of years of American training, British military concepts

continued to influence individual units. British forms of organization were particularly evident in administration, maintenance, and

many technical units. The weapons inventory was predominantly

of United States and British origin. Jordan's tank force consisted

of the United States M-60 model, together with its own conversion of the obsolete British Centurion, known as the Tarik, and

an improved version of the British Chieftain called the Khalid.

Armored personnel carriers were the familiar United States M-l 13

model. In 1988 Jordan benefited from a substantial gift of Chieftain and Scorpion tanks and M-l 13s captured by Iraq from Iran,

but it was not known whether the equipment could be introduced

into the armored inventory without extensive repair or reconditioning. The artillery battalions were equipped by the United States with guns ranging from 105mm to 203mm, both towed and self- propelled (see table 15, Appendix).

The ground forces were considered to be insufficiently protected

from attack from the air, although efforts were being made to over- come the problem by the introduction of Soviet air defense sys- tems. When the United States refused to replace obsolete forward

air defense weapons, Jordan turned to the Soviet Union for help

in 1981. Initial Soviet deliveries consisted of the SA-8 truckmounted surface-to-air missile (SAM) with a range of between ten and fourteen kilometers and the ZSU-23 radar-controlled gun

mounted on a lightly armored carriage. Both weapons had proved

vulnerable to suppression measures by Israel in fighting against

Syria. In spite of this, additional SA-8s were acquired in 1984,

together with infantry SAMs, the shoulder-fired SA-7, and the

SA-9. In 1985 the SA-13 and SA-14 were purchased as successors to the SA-9 and SA-7, respectively. Separate air defense

brigades (actually, battalion size) were being equipped with the

larger Soviet SAMs to be attached as needed to ground formations

to provide close, mobile tactical air defense.

Antitank defense was based on the TOW (tube-launched,

optically- sighted, wire-guided) antitank missile and the manportable Dragon system, both from the United States, together with more recent acquisition of the Apilas rocket launcher from France.

The LAW-80 antitank missile was acquired from Britain in 1987

to replace the Dragon. In 1985 the air force began taking delivery

of twenty-four Cobra AH-IS helicopters equipped with TOW missiles; these were eventually to be transferred to the army.

The naval element of the armed forces, although designated the

Royal Jordanian Navy, remained an integral part of the army. Per- forming essentially a coast guard mission, it had 300 officers and

245
Jordan: A Country Study

Figure 15. Major Military Installations, 1988

men based at Al Aqabah, the country's only port, with access to the Red Sea. The navy operated five coastal patrol boats of United

States manufacture armed with light machine guns. The navy as- sisted in the maintenance of harbor security, operating in conjunction with customs and immigration personnel to ensure the

enforcement of the country's laws and regulations. In late 1987,

three larger craft of ninety-five tons each were ordered from Brittain. When introduced, each would have a crew of sixteen and

246
National Security

would be armed with 20mm and 30mm guns. Israeli units at the

adjacent Israeli naval facility at Elat similarly consisted of small,

lightly-armed patrol boats.

Air Force

The Royal Jordanian Air Force was charged with the missions

of air defense of territorial integrity, close support of the army,

tactical bombing, and airlift of troops and supplies. The air force

began operations in 1949 as a component of the Arab Legion. Designated initially as the Arab Legion Air Force, the service depended

in large part on pilots and other technical personnel seconded to the legion from the RAF. Eventually, selected volunteers from the

legion were trained at the unit's airfield near Amman, and some

were sent to flight and technical schools operated by the RAF in

Britain. Growing unrest in the Middle East soon convinced the

Jordanian government of the need to expand the air force's mission to include combat capability, which was achieved in 1955 with

a British gift of nine Vampire MK 9 fighter-bombers.

Since its inception, the air force has struggled to develop and

maintain a level of combat capability that would be viable against

potential enemies in the region. The primary perceived threat has

been the superior air power of Israel. The constant modernization

of aircraft and associated weaponry essential to afford Jordanian

pilots some chance of success has posed a severe challenge.

From the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, the primary combat airplanes of the air force inventory consisted of Hawker Hunter

fighter-bombers that were transferred from the RAF but paid for by the United States. During the first few hours of the June 1967

War, Israeli pilots destroyed all but one of Jordan's serviceable

combat airplanes as well as three Hunters on loan from Iraq. To

assist Jordan in its recovery from the loss of virtually its entire air arm, additional Hunter aircraft were supplied by Britain and Saudi

Arabia. In mid- 1969, the United States provided twenty F-104

Starfighters to form the first Jordanian fighter-interceptor squadron.

To preclude a future recurrence of the 1967 disaster, Jordan in- stalled surveillance radars to cover most of the country, constructed

hardened shelters to protect all combat aircraft, and implemented

plans for the emergency dispersal of the air force. When the October 1973 War broke out, Israel refrained from

attacking the Jordanian bases and Hussein's air force did not play an active role in the war. In 1974 the United States began deliveries of F-5s. The F-5 was well regarded as a light fighter plane but

lacked modern avionics, thus limiting it to daylight, fair-weather

combat. Unable to obtain an American replacement for the obsolete

247
Jordan: A Country Study

Starfighters because of United States congressional opposition,

Hussein turned to France, acquiring between 1981 and 1983 more

than thirty Mirage F-ls, with Saudi Arabian financial assistance.

Armed with Matra and Magic air-to-air missiles, the Mirage air- craft were an improvement in terms of range and avionics but were

considerably inferior to the American F-15s and F-16s in the Israeli inventory and to the more advanced MiG-25 and MiG-29 Soviet

fighters in the Syrian inventory.

During the 1980s, repeated efforts were made to include an air defense version of the F-16 or the F-20 in United States military

assistance packages, but these were vetoed by Congress because

of Israeli objections (see Military Cooperation with the United

States, this ch.). In early 1988, it was announced that an order

had been placed with France for the purchase of twenty Mirage

2000 fighters and for the modernization of fifteen of the Mirage

F-ls. The transaction included an option for the acquisition of a

further twenty Mirage 2000s. The cost, estimated at US$1.3 bil- lion, was to be repaid under generous credit terms offered by the

French and may have involved partial funding by Saudi Arabia.

It was also announced that Jordan had contracted to buy eight Tornado strike aircraft from Britain but, according to a subsequent

report, Jordan canceled the transaction for cost reasons. In 1988 the air force was organized tactically into four fighterground-attack squadrons of F-5Es and F-5Fs, two fighter squadrons of Mirage F-ls, an advanced training squadron of F-5As and

F-5Bs, a transport squadron, and four helicopter squadrons (see

table 16, Appendix). The main air bases were King Abdullah Air

Base at Marka near Amman, King Hussein Air Base at Al Mafraq,

and Prince Hasan Air Base at pumping station H5 in the desert

east of Amman. These bases were all in the north within a few

minutes' flight time of either Israel or Syria. Other bases were at Azraq ash Shishan, also in the eastern desert, and dispersal bases

at King Faisal Air Base, Al Jafr and at Al Aqabah in the south.

The tactical fighter squadrons operated from the bases at Azraq

ash Shishan, Al Mafraq, and pumping station H5. In addition to serving as home for the air force headquarters, King Abdullah Air

Base near Amman accommodated the service's transport squadron

and its liaison and air rescue units.

Training of flight personnel, formerly accomplished in the United

States and Britain, in the later 1980s was conducted in Jordan.

The Royal Jordanian Air Academy at King Abdullah Air Base

provided cadets with both military instruction and an academic

education over a twenty- seven-month period preparatory to being

commissioned as second lieutenants. Initial flight training consisted

248
Flight simulator used in pilot training

at Royal Jordanian Air Force Academy

of 250 flying hours in British Bulldogs, followed by training on

Spanish C-101 Aviojets that could be fitted as light fighters and

reconnaissance aircraft. Pilots who qualified for jets progressed to F-5As and F-5Bs at Al Mafraq in a five-month course in tactics and weapons employment before being assigned to combat squadrons. The new Mirage 2000s on order and the upgrading planned for the Mirage F-ls and the F-5s helped to compensate in some degree

for Jordan's weaknesses in comparison to the air power of its Israeli and Syrian neighbors. As of 1989, however, both potential adversaries maintained a decisive advantage, rendering Jordan extremely

vulnerable to air attack. The main Jordanian base at Al Mafraq

was only fifty-five kilometers from Israel and only twelve kilometers

from the Syrian frontier. Even pumping station H5 in the eastern

desert was only 120 kilometers from Israel and 30 kilometers from

Syria. Although the aircraft were sheltered against surprise attack,

bombardment of the runways could make the bases inoperative.

Radar coverage was being improved but, because of the rough ter- rain features, gaps remained that experienced Israeli pilots could

exploit as attack corridors.

Ground-based strategic air defense was the responsibility of the

air force rather than the army. The air force operated fourteen

249
Jordan: A Country Study

Improved Hawk SAM batteries (126 launchers) that were sited to afford protection to key military and civil targets. The Hawk was

a high-quality, all-weather system with reliable target detection and

resistance to electronic countermeasures. Being immobile and at well-known sites, however, the Hawks were considered vulnerable to low-level Israeli air attack. Plans by the United States to pro- vide upgrading and mobility packages for these batteries and to

sell additional Hawk systems to Jordan had been frustrated by congressional opposition, and as of 1989 no comparable air defense

system was being considered as an alternative.

Defense Spending

Jordan's defense outlays have been burdensome for a small country without major resources or a highly developed industrial base.

Offsetting this burden to some degree has been the positive impact of defense spending on the national economy. Soldiers' pay,

the employment created by the military and security forces, and

the contracts and support services generated in the name of national security provided important stimulation for what generally

has been regarded as a sluggish economy. The financial and mili- tary subsidies that Jordan traditionally has received from other Arab

states have represented a net benefit to the economy while reducing the actual burden of the military effort to somewhat less than

it appeared to be in statistical terms. Nevertheless, the Jordanian

defense effort was facing acute budgetary and financial difficulties in the late 1980s, as a consequence of decreased financial aid from

the oil-producing Persian Gulf states and reduced remittance levels from Jordanian workers in other Middle Eastern countries.

Together, these sources had brought in as much as US$2.5 billion

annually in earlier years. Although other Arab states had pledged

at the Baghdad Summit in 1978 to provide Jordan with more than

US$1 .2 billion annually for ten years, only Saudi Arabia had fulfilled its commitment (see GDP by Sector, ch. 3; Military Relations with Other Countries, this ch.).

The 1988 defense budget ofJD256 million (US$763 million) was

about 60 percent higher than the allocation of a decade earlier. When inflation was taken into account, however, officially acknowledged defense costs appeared to have remained fairly steady until

1986, when an upward trend became evident. Possible explanations for this rise included moderate increases in the number of

men under arms, pay raises, some domestically absorbed equipment outlays, sharp increases in the international price of armaments, and a higher amortization level of foreign military debt.

Published government figures were incomplete since they did not

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include important elements of defense spending and were therefore understated. The United States Department of State estimated

that a little more than half of the subsidies from other Arab states was reflected in the budget, with the remainder applied to off-budget

defense expenditures.

The military debt had become a serious problem by early 1989,

as the difficulties of meeting the kingdom's overall debt-servicing

obligations continued to mount, placing additional strains on the

balance of payments. It was reported that Jordan was running about

eleven months behind on its military debt payments, with more

than US$95 million overdue.

In 1988 the officially acknowledged defense budget constituted

15.4 percent of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary). In

a comparative analysis by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) covering 1987 defense outlays, the

proportion ofJordan's GNP absorbed by defense in that year (13.9

percent) was near the average for the Middle East, which was 11 percent, and among the highest in the world, although below that

of Israel (16.6 percent of GNP). Nevertheless, defense expenditures as a ratio of GNP have followed a declining trend from 35

percent in the early 1970s to 20 percent in the early 1980s. According to the same ACDA study, Jordan's defense expenditures

in 1987 were 22 percent of total government expenditures, well

below the Middle East average of 32 percent. The portion of Jor- dan's government spending devoted to the military also reflected a steady decline during the 1970s and 1980s. Military expenditures

of US$285 per capita in 1987 were also lower than the average of

US$396 per capita for the Middle East as a whole. Jordan had one

of the highest proportions in the world of men under arms, with

36.4 uniformed personnel per 1 ,000 of population. Its ratio of armed

forces to population was exceeded only by such countries as Iraq,

Israel, Syria, and North Korea.

Personnel: Composition, Recruitment, and Training

Because such heavy reliance was placed on the military to safeguard the monarchy, the composition and attitudes of armed

forces personnel have been of vital importance to Hussein. Recruitment policies and promotion of senior personnel were subject to the approval of the king. During the early years of the Hashimite

regime, a traditional system of recruitment was followed that grew

out of British practices associated with the formation and maintenance of the Arab Legion. The legion was officered, trained, and

financed by Britain. The enlisted personnel were all locally recruited

villagers and tribesmen. Most British officers detached to serve with

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Jordan: A Country Study

the legion were contract employees of the Transjordanian government; others were simply seconded from the British army.

Initial public reaction to the Arab Legion was indifferent or at times even hostile, and recruiting was difficult. The military es- tablishment, however, soon developed high standards of organization, discipline, and training. Tribal uprisings and raiding

practices were suppressed, and criminal activity by restive tribal elements diminished. Civic assistance activities enhanced the

legion's public image, and it evolved into a proud and respected

professional force. Its well-trained regulars gained a reputation for firm and effective action, as well as for discipline and justice in

dealing with the civilian population. As a result, recruiting became

easy, with the further incentive of generous pay scales in the enlisted ranks in relation to other Middle Eastern armies.

The flow of volunteers made it possible to impose a system of

selection that strengthened confidence in the army as a stabilizing

factor in defense of the monarchy. As Glubb later wrote, "The

character and antecedents of every recruit were checked by the

police before his acceptance. Then again, in the Arab Legion, a

confidential report was submitted on every officer and man every

year." This careful screening to exclude potential subversives and

those of doubtful loyalty was expensive and time-consuming. But

support of a monarchy was at stake, and the background investigation of even the lowest recruit was an important detail in the

process. The long-term success of the effort was evident in the devotion the armed forces demonstrated to Hussein through three

decades of conflict with Israel, internecine Arab strife, and repeated

assassination attempts.

The system produced good soldiers, as the legion's record of per- formance amply demonstrated, and this tradition has persisted. Jor- danian troops have proved to be tough and resilient fighters. Men

of beduin origin, long accustomed to living in a harsh physical en- vironment and enduring Spartan conditions, showed a particular

affinity for and pride in military service. For many years, the sys- tem of carefully selected volunteers resulted in an army in which

the beduin element constituted the vast majority, particularly in

infantry and armored units. According to Glubb 's account, nearly

all of the legion's troops before and during World War II were

recruited from the beduins of southern Transjordan. After the war,

enlistment of beduins of northern Transjordan as well as residents

of the West Bank was also encouraged.

Following the dissolution of the National Guard in 1965, many

of its Palestinian members were accepted into the Jordan Arab

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Women military personnel receiving instruction

Army after careful security screening. Palestinians formed about

40 percent of the armed forces. The Palestinian component fell to 15 percent during the 1970s, when the country was wracked by

internal turbulence (highlighted by the assassination of the prime

minister in 1971 and the coup attempt financed by Palestinian bribes

in 1972). As many as 5,000 Palestinians were estimated to have

succumbed to PLO pressure to defect during the 1970-71 civil war, but approximately 20,000 remained loyal to the king and the armed

forces. Although no official statistics were available, observers believed that the proportion of Palestinians in the armed forces had

risen to between 30 percent and 40 percent by 1986. Observers

expected this percentage would probably continue to rise as a result of conscription and as doubts over Palestinian loyalty further subsided. Although education standards among the beduins had risen

sharply, there continued to be a premium in the late 1980s on the

educational and technical attainments that Palestinian recruits could more readily offer. Families of traditional background still dominated among senior

military officers. The principal tribes were well represented, but

a balance was deliberately maintained so that no one group en- joyed a prevailing influence. A significant portion of lower echelon officer positions, excluding first-line combat units, were held

by Palestinians. In the upper reaches of the officer corps, however,

Palestinians still constituted well under 10 percent.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Conscription

After an Israeli raid on a West Bank border village in 1966, the

government passed an emergency conscription act under which

physically fit males would be drafted for training and service with

regular military units for periods of up to two years. The same law,

however, provided the loophole of a fixed fee payable in lieu of

service, as well as other exemption provisions. In practice, mili- tary units kept their original character, recruiting continued for a time to be more than adequate, and the law became inoperative.

On January 1, 1976, a new National Service Law was issued

by royal decree, establishing a service commitment of two years

for men called to active duty by the General Directorate of Conscription and Mobilization of the Ministry of Defense. The new

law coincided with government plans to modernize the army, which was to be completely mechanized within eighteen months.

Moreover, the projected acquisition of sophisticated aircraft and

missiles for the air force had brought into sharp focus the need to upgrade the skills and technical abilities of active-duty personnel.

The new military service law was an effort to reduce reliance on

the less educated beduin servicemen by incorporating the better

educated and skilled city dwellers—most of them Palestinians—to meet personnel needs in an era of modern weaponry.

The new law provided for conscription at the age of eighteen

but encouraged students to continue their schooling through university level by a complex system of service postponements. Once an academic degree was received or the student reached the age of

twenty-eight, the two-year service commitment had to be fulfilled. Jordanians working abroad also could postpone their military obligation. Exemptions were limited to those who could not pass the

required medical examination because of permanent disability,

those who were only sons, and the brothers of men who had died

while in service in the armed forces. Any male of conscription age was prohibited from being employed unless he had been exempted

from service or unless his call-up had been deferred because the

armed forces had a temporary sufficiency. The law established an

extensive system of veterans' rights, including job seniority, for men who had fulfilled their service commitment.

Of approximately 30,000 Jordanians who reached military age

annually, about 20,000 were available for compulsory service,

although the actual number called up was limited by the prevailing budgetary situation. The conscription system also assisted in

filling gaps that had developed as a result of insufficient recruitment

by inducing a greater number of young men to join the regular

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army. Volunteers for an initial five-year enlistment were paid on

an adequate scale instead of the very low wage of conscripts and

could aspire to higher positions and training opportunities.

Women in the Armed Forces

Although they were not subject to compulsory service and did

not serve in combat-related positions, women had been recruited

at both officer and enlisted levels. Most of the female service per- sonnel occupied administrative or secretarial positions or served

in communications units. Women also were employed as doctors

and nurses in military hospitals. In 1989 the highest ranking

woman, a colonel, was in the Medical Corps. The facilities for- merly occupied by the Jordanian Military Academy near Az Zarqa

had been converted to a training school for women soldiers. Conditions of Service

Because of their critical role in safeguarding the monarchy, members of the armed forces have always enjoyed privileged status. The

few occasions of discord have almost invariably been caused by

dissatisfaction with the failure of pay increases to keep up with in- flation or the perception that rising living standards in the private

sector were outdistancing military compensation. With the more

heterogeneous ethnic composition of the armed forces rendering

traditional loyalty to the Hashimites less reliable, the king has been

personally concerned to ensure adequate, if not generous, financial provision for service personnel. As a consequence, maintaining income levels of existing personnel has remained a priority even

if this meant restrictions on the size of the armed forces and a delay

in improving the reserve system.

As of 1989, remuneration of the career military was extremely

modest by the standards of the United States armed forces. Pay

scales were low, although the total compensation and benefits for an enlisted soldier were calculated to be worth three times the basic

wage. Conscript pay was far lower than that of career personnel,

amounting to only about JD20 (for value of the Jordanian dinar

see Glossary) per month—barely sufficient to cover personal ex- penses. In addition to salary, military personnel were entitled to family allowances and access to subsidized post exchanges. Full

medical services were provided to soldiers, their immediate family,

and their parents. Free transportation was available; the military

had its own fleet of buses to convey soldiers between their posts

and their home communities. Family housing normally was not

provided on post, but a system of thirty-year loans on generous

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Jordan: A Country Study

terms enabled many officers and NCOs to purchase or build their

own homes.

Most officers of the rank of major and above were provided with

automobiles for both official and private use, including free fuel and maintenance. Successful completion of training and education

courses also resulted in a significant supplement to income. In the case of a senior officer receiving a master's degree after completion of the War College course, the increase could amount to as much as 60 percent of base pay. The minimum period of pensionable service was twenty years. Taking into account all forms of compensation, it was estimated that military personnel enjoyed a standard of living superior to that of civilian government officials in equivalent positions.

Ranks and Insignia

The rank structure of the Jordanian army and air force was identical to that of the United States and British armies. There were, however, fewer enlisted grades (see fig. 16). Insignia of rank were worn on shoulder straps by officers; chevrons with points down

were worn by enlisted men on upper right and left sleeves. Designation of officer ranks was based on combinations of seven-pointed

stars (sometimes called pips), the Hashimite crown, crossed sabers,

and wreaths. The system was similar to that of the British army

with minor differences in design. In the army the basic color of

the metal of insignia and buttons was gold; in the air force, silver. Many units were authorized to wear identifying shoulder patches or flashes, but these were not worn during periods of combat or

civil disturbance. In the field, branch and service were indicated

by the color of the beret: chocolate brown for infantry, black for armor, navy blue for artillery, light blue for engineers, dark green

for the Royal Guards, maroon for the Special Forces, and red for military police.

Training and Education

Army basic training in primary military skills and discipline was

conducted over a fourteen-week period for both volunteers and conscripts. More advanced training in individual weapons, as well as

in artillery, engineering, communications, and other specialties, was provided after recruits were assigned to their permanent units. Soldiers qualifying for promotion attended a general NCO school

providing instruction in leadership techniques. Additional courses

for NCOs were offered at training centers specializing in armor,

artillery, engineering, and logistics. A branch of the infantry school

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trained Special Forces personnel in techniques of night patrol,

demolition, map reading, and hand-to-hand combat.

With the exception of a very limited number of officers commissioned from NCO ranks, officer candidates were selected from

applicants who were graduates of the country's secondary schools.

Until the early 1980s, the cadets attended a two-year course of in- struction at the Jordanian Military Academy, where they pursued

a program modeled on that of Sandhurst. In 1987, however, the

first graduates of the four-year program at Mutah Military University in the town of Mutah (also seen as Moata) south of Amman,

were commissioned as second lieutenants. The curriculum at Mutah

has been described as similar to that of the Citadel in Charleston,

South Carolina, a military college offering bachelor of arts and

bachelor of science degrees in a number of fields. Two general courses of advanced officer training were available, one at the Jordanian Staff College and the other at the War College,

both located near Amman. Both programs were one year in length.

The Staff College course was offered to senior captains, majors, and

lieutenant colonels. The War College course was offered to senior

lieutenant colonels, colonels, and brigadier generals. Virtually all officers attended the Staff College or its equivalent abroad. Both

institutions were affiliated with Mutah. Graduates of the Staff College were awarded bachelor of arts degrees in military science from

Mutah, and graduates of the War College earned masters degrees.

Many Jordanian officers also attended the United States Army

Command and General Staff College or the British Army Staff College. Both officers and NCOs also could attend more specialized

technical schools in the United States and Britain. Some training positions continued to be available at Sandhurst for selected army cadets. The training offered at Jordan's military schools was considered

to be of high quality. The schools attracted several hundred military officers and enlisted personnel annually from nearby Arab

countries (see Military Cooperation with Other Arab States, this ch.). The armed forces also administered a high school in Amman

and a number of schools in other areas of the country, particularly

at the more remote posts in the south, to educate children of mili- tary personnel. The schools were conducted on semimilitary lines

and provided some introductory training, but the curriculum was

comparable to that used in civilian schools and was coordinated

with the Ministry of Education.

People's Army and Reserves

In 1983 the Jordanian parliament approved a People's Army

Law requiring male and female students in high schools and colleges

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and males between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five who had not

undergone military service (including government employees and

farm workers) to become members of an auxiliary force called the

People's Army. Women between the ages of sixteen and forty-five

who were not students could volunteer for the program. Special

uniforms and insignia were worn. Training included weapons handling and indoctrination in patriotism, although some emphasis was placed on civil defense and rescue work and first aid in the event of natural disasters. Persons employed in vital areas of production were exempt. Instruction for members of the People's Army

was administered at secondary schools and colleges by visiting teams

of regular uniformed personnel, although annual refresher training was given at military camps. Exercises were carried out jointly

with regular military units. Women's training occurred in schoolyards under the supervision of female teachers. Islamic activists in parliament had opposed compulsory service for women and any

mixing of the sexes in training. The prime minister rejected the

criticism, however, noting that women had participated in the

Prophet Muhammad's conquests.

The original intention was to raise a people's militia of about

200,000 people comprising students and persons deferred from mili- tary service. By the close of 1986, however, the program had been

introduced in only one governorate, and no more than 10,000 in- dividuals had been enrolled. The Military Balance, 1989-90, published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic

Studies, estimated enrollment in the People's Army to be more

than 15,000 as of 1989. The People's Army was equipped with light

weapons obtained from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in- cluding the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle (the regular army continued

to use the United States M-16 as its basic infantry weapon).

A separate reserve program was maintained but was reported

to enjoy lower priority after the formation of the People's Army.

The estimated 30,000 army and 5,000 air force reservists were conscripts who, having completed their two years of service, remained on call for another five years. Reservists had assignments to fill in existing regular units if called up during a crisis. Mobilization

plans based on the development of separate reserve elements were

reportedly in abeyance because of the lack of funds for regular train- ing and equipment.

Military Relations with Other Countries

Given Jordan's limited resources and state of development, the

maintenance of its modern armed establishment has been possible

only with extensive reliance on foreign aid. The sources of military

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Jordan: A Country Study

assistance have shifted somewhat during the different periods of

the country's existence; however, until the 1980s, Jordan had looked

primarily to Britain and the United States for military materiel.

During the 1980s, France emerged as an increasingly important

supplier of combat aircraft, and the Soviet Union increasingly supplied air defense systems. To a great extent, major acquisitions

have been purchased on generous credit terms, with financing of

the military debt made possible by grants from other Arab countries.

From the time the amirate was created in 1921 , British aid took

the form of direct annual subsidies in conformance with a special

treaty relationship. Britain continued to underwrite the entire cost of the Arab Legion until early 1957, when the defense treaty was

dissolved by mutual consent. During the last years of the subsidy,

the annual payment for the legion was the equivalent of about

US$33.6 million. After 1957 a British-reinforced army brigade and

an RAF squadron remained in Jordan for a short period and contributed significantly to the preservation of political stability and

internal security. British aid, no longer part of a treaty commitment, eventually tapered off to a moderate level of military sales. American military aid began on a small scale in 1950, but in

1957 the United States became the kingdom's principal source of

assistance in meeting its national security needs. In the mid-1970s,

however, conditions imposed by the United States during lengthy

negotiations leading to the sale of Hawk SAMs initiated a period

of increasing strain in the relations between the two countries.

Hussein's growing independence in purchasing military materiel was facilitated in part by his strengthened ties to other Arab countries after Jordan joined them in opposing the United States- sponsored 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt.

During the Baghdad Summit of Arab leaders in that year, oil- producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf area, plus Libya and

Algeria, pledged to compensate Jordan in the form of US$1 .25 bil- lion annually for ten years for its rejection of the accords. Following the precipitous drop in oil prices, however, most countries

reneged on their commitments or made only partial payments. By

1984, it was estimated that Jordan was receiving only US$550 million annually, and only Saudi Arabia was current on its pledge.

When the Baghdad Summit commitments expired in 1988, Jor- dan continued to look to Saudi Arabia, which in that year supplied an estimated US$350 million in assistance.

Meeting Jordan's Equipment Needs in the 1980s

When problems were encountered with supply from the United

States, Jordan's preferred alternative source for weaponry has been

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Western Europe. Increasingly, however, Hussein has purchased

weapons from the Soviet Union, which has been willing to provide weapons at low prices and on attractive credit terms. According to ACDA, the Soviet Union was the largest single source of

Jordanian weapons imports between 1982 and 1986, supplying

weaponry valued at US$1 . 1 billion. France was second, with US$825

million. The United States was third, with US$725 million, followed

by Britain with US$575 million. The initial Soviet arms agreement,

concluded in 1981, was for US$360 million—partially underwritten by Iraq—and covering SA-8 vehicle-mounted SAMs and air defense artillery systems. This agreement was followed in 1984 by

a further purchase of US$300 million worth of SAMs and in 1985

by additional contracts for unspecified quantities of equipment, in- cluding the SA- 1 3 low-altitude SAM and the SA- 1 4 shoulder-fired

SAM (regarded as a substitute for the Stinger, which Hussein had

been unable to obtain from the United States).

France has actively promoted sales of military equipment to Jor- dan since the 1970s. In addition to the Mirage F-l, it has supplied Alouette helicopters and air-to-air missiles. Since 1980, France

has sold considerable quantities of munitions and artillery to Jor- dan and in 1988 won a major aircraft contract to supply the Mirage

2000 and to upgrade Mirage F-ls in Jordan's existing inventory.

Significant purchases from Britain included the Chieftain and Centurion tanks, plus Bulldog trainer aircraft. In 1985 a governmentsubsidized credit of US$350 million was extended by a consortium

of British banks for Jordanian purchases of ammunition, light transport, communications, avionics, and other equipment. In 1987 Spain

for the first time became a substantial supplier, receiving a Jordanian contract estimated at about US$90 million for twenty aircraft,

including transports and jet trainers. Military Cooperation with the United States United States military assistance to Jordan began on a small scale in 1950, but in 1957 the United States became Jordan's principal source of equipment following the termination of the British subsidy. A large-scale purchase of ground force equipment in 1965 was followed in 1967 by orders for F-l 04 Starfighter aircraft and

support gear. After the disastrous losses of military equipment during the June 1967 War, United States military aid, most of which

had been supplied on a credit basis, was shifted to grant form. Additional purchases of American hardware were made possible by

massive postwar financing from friendly Arab states. Although Jordanian forces played only a token role in the October

1973 War with Israel, Arab losses renewed Hussein's determination

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Jordan: A Country Study

to expand and modernize Jordan's military capabilities. An improved air defense system had the highest priority. After a study

of Jordan's air defense needs, the United States Department of

Defense recommended supplying Jordan a mixture of American

weapons, including the Improved Hawk SAM, the Vulcan 20mm

radar-guided antiaircraft gun, and the Redeye shoulder-fired missile. The proposal resulted in protracted negotiations in Washington between the United States Congress and the executive branch.

The Israeli Embassy in Washington and American Jewish organizations applied strong pressure on Congress to reject the sale, ar- guing that the twenty-one Hawk batteries Jordan wanted would

reinforce the Soviet-supplied SAM capability of Syria, making all of Israel vulnerable to the combined weapons coverage. Hussein

threatened publicly to withdraw the request and accept an offer of comparable missiles from the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as the

weapons were to be paid for by strongly anticommunist Saudi

Arabia, however, Hussein was obliged to reject Moscow's offer. Ultimately a compromise was reached under which the United

States would provide fourteen Improved Hawk batteries to be per- manently emplaced as defensive weapons in the Amman-Az Zarqa

area and at airfields and radar installations east and south of

Amman. Final agreement was reached on the US$540 million ar- rangement in September 1976.

Not only did the negotiations over the Hawk system prove humiliating to Hussein, but also the system as finally negotiated did

not fully meet Jordan's need because of the limited coverage af- forded by the missiles and their extreme vulnerability at fixed sites. Disagreement persisted over the scope and cost of other United

States weapons systems that Jordan could buy with funds underwritten by other Arab countries. In 1979 Jordan sought to acquire

moderate numbers of F-16 fighter aircraft and approximately 300

M-60 tanks. The United States delayed in responding because of a new policy designed to reduce the amount of weapons transfers

to Third World countries. A much reduced shipment of 100 M-60

tanks was eventually made available to Jordan but without important modern features such as night sights and advanced fire control. Hussein accordingly turned to Britain for Chieftain tanks and

modernization kits for Jordan's existing Centurion tanks, and to France for Mirage aircraft as substitutes for the F-16s.

In early 1984, President Ronald Reagan proposed selling 315

Stinger launchers and 1,600 missiles to Jordan but was forced to withdraw the proposal because of continued congressional opposition. Hussein's biting criticisms of American policy contributed

to the negative attitude in Congress. In 1985 the administration

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put before Congress a new package valued at US$1 .9 billion, which

would have included 40 F-16s or F-20 aircraft, 300 advanced air- to-air missiles, 72 Stingers, and 32 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. The most controversial feature of the package was a proposal

to upgrade the existing fixed Hawk batteries by converting them

to mobile units and adding six new mobile Hawk batteries.

Congress effectively blocked this transaction as well by setting

conditions on the Jordanian-Israeli peace process that Hussein was

unprepared to meet. In early 1986, the administration suspended

indefinitely its efforts to supply major systems to Jordan. Military

assistance has since been carried on at a pace adequate to sustain

existing readiness levels by providing selective upgrading of equipment, together with training, spare parts, and service, and help

in building up ammunition stocks. Close relationships continued

to be maintained with the Jordanian military in spite of differences over new equipment items. The United States and Jordan expanded

senior officer exchanges. The United States has supplied technical

assistance teams and instructor training programs, and has developed specialized training courses tailored to Jordanian needs. Joint

military exercises also have been held annually on Jordanian ter- ritory.

From 1950 through 1988, the United States furnished a total of about US$1.5 billion in military aid, US$878 million in loans

and US$631 million in grants. The grant program amounted to US$26.5 million in FY 1988. For FY 1989, the administration pro- posed US$48 million in military sales credits but Congress approved

only US$10 million. For FY 1990, the administration again re- quested US$48 million. The United States also planned to provide

funds for military training and education amounting to US$1.8

million in fiscal year 1989. This money would enable a total of 452

Jordanian military personnel to receive training or professional education in military colleges in the United States during FY 1989.

Military Cooperation with Other Arab States Jordan traditionally has considered that it shared responsibility

for the security of the Middle East, particularly that of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. For many years, Jordan has supplied these countries with advisers, mostly personnel in reserve

status who had completed their active duty. A total of 565 army

officers and 1,420 NCOs served in other Arab countries between

1970 and 1984. The loan of military personnel was regarded as a form of compensation to the Persian Gulf states that have provided

Jordan with subsidies over the years. Jordan also has acted as a

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Jordan: A Country Study

consultant to these countries in matters such as weapons selection

and organization of military forces. As of 1988, Jordanian personnel were serving in a training or operational capacity in Kuwait, North Yemen, Qatar, Oman, the

United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Many officers from these

countries, the majority Saudi Arabs, were undergoing training in

Jordan at Mutah Military University and the Jordanian Staff College. Between 1970 and 1984, more than 4,000 officers and 7,000

enlisted personnel from Arab states had attended military institu- tions in Jordan.

Jordan has supplied combat troops to assist Persian Gulf states confronting security threats. In 1975 Jordan deployed two squadrons of fighter aircraft and a Special Forces battalion to Oman at that country's request to help defeat an uprising supported by South

Yemen. Hussein offered to send a division to assist Saudi Arabia

when the main mosque in Mecca was seized by Islamic activists in 1979. Although the division was never sent, the incident alerted

Jordanian commanders to the problems of rapidly transporting a

large body of troops in a Middle East emergency. Jordan turned

to the United States for assistance in providing transport airplanes,

missiles, and special equipment to move and maintain a Jordanian rapid deployment force of two brigades (8,000 men) in the

event of a threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf area. When

the proposal became public in early 1983, it faced so many objections in Congress—where it was seen as a means to circumvent

curbs on military aid to Jordan—that it had to be abandoned. The

Israelis pointed out that there was no assurance that the new equipment would not be used against them. Finally, the Gulf states resented the public airing of their own security needs, and particularly the involvement of one of the superpowers in such planning.

During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, Jordan sided with

Iraq because of Hussein's desire to contain Iran's revolutionary

Islamic movement. The Jordanian port of Al Aqabah became an

important transshipment point for military supplies essential to the

Baghdad government's conduct of the war. In early 1982, Hussein announced that the Yarmuk Brigade, a force of 3,000, would

be raised to fight alongside Iraqi forces in the conflict against Iran. A number of recruiting offices were opened to seek volunteers. No

definite information was subsequently made available on the role

this force played in the fighting. As a reciprocal gesture, the Iraqis

transferred to Jordan on at least two occasions quantities of American and British armored equipment captured from Iran. Although Jordan had no significant defense industry, it was

reported in 1983 that components of the Chinese J-6 fighter aircraft,

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a variant of the Soviet MiG-19, were shipped to the King Faisal

Air Base at Al Jafr for assembly and subsequent delivery to Iraq.

The United States had assisted in the construction of an armor

rebuild facility suitable for work on the M-60, Chieftain, and Centurion tanks, and on armored personnel carriers and self-propelled

artillery. The capacity of the rebuild plant exceeded Jordan's own

needs with the expectation that orders for the rehabilitation of ar- mored equipment might be obtained from other Arab nations.

The Internal Security System

The concept of public order founded on the supremacy of law

has been stressed by Hussein throughout his reign as a prerequisite to internal stability and the achievement of national development goals. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,

public order has been successfully maintained through legally es- tablished instruments: comprehensive codes of law enforced by a

professional police force and an independent judiciary. The police

and the General Intelligence Department (GID), generally known

as the Mukhabarat from the Arabic name Dairat al Mukhabarat,

a civilian agency, exercised broad powers to monitor disruptive

segments of the population. The scope of police and GID powers

at times have become a source of contention from a human rights

standpoint, although in nonsecurity cases legal norms had been

generally observed by police and judicial authorities.

Police Forces

In 1989 primary responsibility for the routine maintenance of

law and order was exercised by the Public Security Force, the country's national police establishment. Centralized in time of peace

within the Public Security Directorate of the Ministry of Interior,

the police were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and under

the control of the army commander in the event of war. Traditionally, the police have been commanded by an officer with the

title of director general of public security, usually a senior army

general, who reported to the minister of interior. Officers assigned

to this important position were personally selected by Hussein on

the basis of their military record, leadership qualifications, and

loyalty to the crown. As of early 1989, the head of the police or- ganization was Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi al Majali, formerly

chief of the general staff. An outgrowth of the Arab Legion, the Public Security Force was

created by law in July 1956, when the legion was separated into

distinct police and army elements. During the twenty months of

martial law instituted by Hussein from April 1957 to November

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Jordan: A Country Study

1958, the police were again subordinated to army control. As

domestic and external threats to Hashimite rule were brought under

better control, a new law in July 1958 reestablished the separation

of the two security forces. The strength of the Public Security Force was estimated to be

about 4,000 personnel in the late 1980s. A considerable augmentation of the Desert Police Force was reported to be planned in

1988. The relatively large size of the force, combined with the army

support, testified to the importance of the internal security function.

The police were classified broadly according to areas of geographic

responsibility. The three major divisions were the metropolitan

(Amman), rural (small towns and villages), and desert contingents.

Police headquarters in Amman provided both an administrative control point for the countrywide system and an array of centralized

technical functions that supported police activities throughout the

kingdom. A reorganization of the Public Security Directorate an- nounced in 1987 reduced the previous five-tiered structure to only

three tiers. Below the central headquarters, with its overall responsibility for police, security, and law enforcement activities, were

ten regional directorates. Eight of the directorates corresponded

to the governorates, and one covered the city of Amman and its suburbs. The desert region was a separate directorate and was

patrolled by the Desert Police Force. Under the 1987 plan, the ten regions were to be subdivided into fifty-nine security centers, each

of which typically would be responsible for an area of five to ten square kilometers and serve 50,000 people.

Public Security Force missions included the usual tasks of maintenance of public order, protection of life and property, investigation of criminal activity, and apprehension of suspected offenders. In addition to these basic functions, special elements of the force

performed such duties as traffic control, licensing of vehicles and

certain business activities, enforcement of trade prohibitions and

zoning ordinances, locating missing persons, guarding shrines and

other public places, assisting customs and immigration officials in the performance of their duties, and operating the country's penal

institutions. In announcing the 1987 reorganization, the director

general of public security emphasized an increased social role for the police and strengthened police relations with the local community. He described the police as the conduit through which the public

could seek assistance from various government authorities in resolv- ing social problems.

Functionally, the responsibilities assigned to the police were car- ried out according to a tripartite division of responsibilities at the

headquarters level—administrative, judicial, and support operations.

266
Traffic policeman, Amman

Administrative police were charged with prevention of crime and

routine maintenance of security and public order. Criminal offenses were under the jurisdiction ofjudicial police, who conducted criminal investigations, apprehended suspects, and assisted the public

prosecutor's office in prosecuting accused offenders. Support police

performed budget, planning, training, public affairs, communications, and logistic functions. Insofar as was possible, regional

police activities throughout the country conformed to this division

of responsibilities. Modern communications facilities connecting

regional directorates with the headquarters in Amman provided

a direct link to specialized elements such as the Criminal Investigation Department's modern police laboratory, which also assisted

regional and local police in their investigations.

The Special Police Force within the Public Security Directorate

had principal responsibility for countering terrorism. As part of

its antiterrorism program, the Jordanian government cooperated

with various international bodies in sharing information and

resources. A multimillion dollar project to improve police communications, announced in 1988, was another element of the antiterrorist campaign. In connection with this project, the Special

Police Force had participated in bomb detection programs for dogs

and their handlers offered by the United States. The Desert Police

Force, which had responsibility for detecting and stopping drug

and gun smuggling, had also been greatly expanded.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Depending on their location, the police were armed with pistols,

rifles, nightsticks, or light automatic weapons. In Amman and the

larger towns, special crowd and riot control equipment and armored

vehicles were available. The police force was fully motorized, had

good communications facilities, and operated much on the pattern

of European law enforcement agencies. Police units in rural areas were assigned less modern equipment, and in the desert areas the

traditional system of camel-mounted desert patrols survived, supplemented by improved communications gear and four-wheel-drive

vehicles.

Police personnel have been recruited throughout the service's

existence through voluntary enlistments. The National Service Law

of 1976 ensured that most younger members of the force would

have had some military training before entering police work. Training for both officers and enlisted ranks was provided primarily by

the staff of the Royal Police Academy in Amman, but some recruits received their instruction at the separate Police Training School

in Az Zarqa. The school at Az Zarqa also welcomed large numbers of police trainees from friendly Arab countries. In addition

to courses in general and administrative police work, cadets at the

academy studied the country's legal system, underwent physical

training, and were instructed in the use of firearms and other police

equipment. Judicial training included courses in criminal investi- gation procedures, court operations, and the criminal code. As part

of efforts to improve the general education level of the Public Security Force, the government announced in 1987 that officer recruits

would be required to have university degrees and NCO recruits

would be required to be graduates of high schools or vocational

schools.

The first Arab country to admit women to its police establishment, Jordan opened a women's police academy in Amman in

1972. Before being assigned to positions in law enforcement, the

women recruits completed a four-month classroom course followed

by one month of practical training in the field. Assignment opportunities expanded steadily after the program began. Women served

primarily in the police laboratory, in budgeting and accounting,

public relations, licensing, and in prison operations. Some served

in street patrols and traffic control in Amman and in border security.

Ranks and insignia of the Public Security Force were identical

with those of the army, although job titles were necessarily differ- ent. Police uniforms in the Amman metropolitan area were dark

blue in winter and light tan in summer, resembling in style those

of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. Rural police wore an olive drab

uniform lighter in shade than that of the army but otherwise similar.

268
Desert policeman on a camel Desert policemen making coffee, Khawr Ramm

The Desert Police Force retained their traditional Arab garb. Police

pay scales were about the same as those of the army but differed

somewhat in the special allowances authorized. The conditions of

service were sufficiently favorable to attract and retain enough per- sonnel to staff the force fully.

General Intelligence Department

Internal security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters were the concern of the police, the armed forces, and the GID,

a civilian organization with principal responsibility for dealing with

perceived domestic and foreign threats to security. The GID cus- tomarily was headed by a high-ranking army officer answerable

directly to the prime minister and concurrently a close personal

adviser of Hussein.

The GID was a large organization, although its personnel

strength was not a matter of public knowledge. Its members were

almost invariably persons of proven loyalty to the monarchy and

of East Bank origin. It was generally regarded as an effective in- ternal security agency, alert to any evidence of activity that might

269
Jordan: A Country Study

have subversive implications. Although Jordan had been the tar- get of clandestine operations by other countries, the GID was not

known to have a covert branch that engaged in clandestine activity against its Arab neighbors or Israel. The GID was particularly

occupied with rooting out Palestinian militant groups and illegal or underground political organizations. It scrutinized activities in

the mosques and among student groups. A GID office was located

in each refugee camp. The GID's methods and oppressive tactics frequently have been the subject of criticism among Jordanians,

although some of its measures, such as checkpoints to monitor

domestic travelers, were less obtrusive during the 1980s than they

had been in the tense period following the 1970-71 conflict with

the PLO.

The widely employed system of identity documents facilitated GID control over the population. A passport was needed both for

travel and to obtain employment. Passports could only be obtained

by producing other identity documents issued by the Ministry of

Interior and had to be authorized by the GID. In addition, a certificate of good conduct from the GID was required for public sec- tor jobs, for many private sector jobs, and for study abroad. A

young person studying in a communist country might, on return- ing for a visit to Jordan, find his or her passport confiscated if the

GID harbored suspicions concerning the student's conduct abroad.

Furthermore, GID approval was required for public gatherings or

activities sponsored by private organizations.

The GID had authority under martial law to detain persons

without trial for indeterminate periods, often lasting from several

weeks to many months. Such security detainees normally were held

incommunicado for interrogation at GID headquarters in Amman.

According to the 1988 annual report of the human rights organization Amnesty International, various forms of torture or ill treat- ment were believed to have been inflicted at GID headquarters on

detainees or arrested persons later transferred to ordinary prisons

for trial by martial law courts. Criminal Justice

Until the nineteenth century, the only source of law considered

to be valid in controlling criminal activity in the region that was

to become Jordan was Islamic religious law, or sharia. This law

and its application had remained static for centuries, subject only

to interpretation by the ulama (pi.; sing, dim, religious scholars)

and enforcement by Muslim judges (qadis) in sharia courts. Temporal rulers could not, in theory, legislate rules to govern social

270
National Security

behavior; they could only hand down edicts to implement the immutable divine law. In the mid- 1800s, reforms of the system were instituted to en- hance Ottoman control of the area. Comprehensive codes of law

based on European models became the basis of a new legal sys- tem, and in 1858 a criminal code was adopted to support the re- form movement. The new code was based on French law, but in

effect it complemented sharia inasmuch as the French code was

modified to accommodate Muslim customs. For example, the

Ottoman criminal code imposed the payment of blood money in addition to imprisonment for acts of homicide or bodily injury,

and the death penalty for apostasy was retained.

When the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist after World War I and Britain became the mandatory power for Palestine and Transjordan, the Ottoman laws in force were supplemented by British

statutes. In Palestine the 1858 criminal code was replaced by a new

penal code and a code of criminal procedure patterned on those

used in British colonies. The Palestinian courts, staffed by British

and British-trained judges, used their power to apply English com- mon law, and decisions could be appealed to the judicial committee of the Privy Council in London. The influence of English law was weaker in Transjordan, however, where there were no British

judges, and common law was not applied in the courts. Instead,

the laws that dealt with criminal behavior retained the European

flavor of the Ottoman code of 1858.

When the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was proclaimed in

1949, the ancient Ottoman code had been largely modified at the

insistence of moderates who believed that the sharia provisions on

which it had been based should be supplemented by—and, if necessary, subordinated to—laws that could deal with modern problems.

The period of British tutelage did not significantly change the substantive law, but it had the effect of weakening the absolutist tra- ditions of sharia in the field of criminal jurisprudence. In the early

1950s, a committee of leading Muslim scholars and jurists of several

Arab countries convened with the purpose of drafting new codes

of criminal law and procedure to replace the 1858 Ottoman code,

which had been almost entirely amended during the century it had

been in force. In 1956 the Jordanian National Assembly adopted

a new criminal code and code of criminal procedure. Both were

based on the Syrian and Lebanese codes, which in turn were modeled on French counterparts.

Within the realm of criminal jurisprudence, Jordan retained only

nominal application of sharia. Although the codified laws were based on Islamic principles and customs, these were largely modified and

271
Jordan: A Country Study

extended along European lines in an effort to adapt to the requirements of a changing economy and culture.

Criminal Code

The criminal code adopted in 1956, which had been amended

many times, contained the bulk of the country's criminal law. In

addition, certain codified civil statutes also prescribed penalties for acts such as libel, adultery, and publication of material endangering the security of the kingdom. Individuals could not be punished

except for acts made criminal by virtue of penalties prescribed by

law. Other than where specified, a person also could not be punished

for committing a criminal act in the absence of criminal responsibility or intent, both of which were defined by the code. As a safeguard of personal liberty, the government had the burden of

proving both the defendant's commission of the act and the admissible intent of the defendant before guilt could be established.

The criminal code, in traditional French form, divided criminal offenses into three categories according to the severity of the

applicable punishments. In English common law these categories

equated roughly to felonies, misdemeanors, and minor violations.

Punishments for felonies ranged from death by hanging to imprisonment for periods ranging from three years to life. Punishments for misdemeanors included imprisonment for periods ranging from

three weeks to three years and a variety of fines. Minor violations

could be punished by imprisonment for less than three weeks, small

fines, or reprimands by the court. In cases involving misdemeanors

or minor violations, a judge also could invoke preventive measures

including detention for psychiatric examination, forfeiture of material goods, or closure of a place of business. The criminal code

provided for minimum penalties for all major infractions rather

than relying on the discretion of the courts. The death penalty was authorized for murder, arson of an in- habited building, assassination of the king (or attempts on his life), and a broad range of serious crimes defined as threats to the security of the state. These latter offenses included acts such as trea- son, espionage on behalf of an unfriendly foreign power, and armed

insurrection. The act of selling land in the West Bank to occupying Israeli authorities was considered high treason and therefore a capital offense. Some Palestinians had been sentenced in absentia to death under this decree but as of 1989 these sentences had

never been carried out. Executions were rare and politically sensitive in Jordan. Three death sentences for murder were carried out

in 1985, none in 1986, and only one in 1987. In the 1987 case,

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National Security

the assassin of a PLO Executive Committee member in the West

Bank was put to death.

Imprisonment for life was imposed for such felonies as lesser crimes against national security, homicide during commission of a misdemeanor or that resulted from torture, and the more seri- ous forms of theft. Shorter imprisonment was prescribed for these same offenses if mitigating circumstances warranted. Such punishment also was authorized for terrorist activity, membership in subversive organizations, counterfeiting, forgery of official documents,

and abduction.

Misdemeanors included such offenses as gambling in public

places, bribery, perjury, simple forgery, slander, embezzlement,

assault and battery, and disturbing the peace. The influence of

sharia was still evident in the imposition of prison sentences for desertion of a child, abortion, marrying a girl under the age of six- teen, openly ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad, and breaking the

fast of Ramadan. Sharia also was important in the criteria for justifiable homicide. No penalty was imposed for the immediate killing

of someone who defiled a person's or a family's honor.

Minor violations covered by the code included traffic violations,

seeking redress for a crime without recourse to civil authorities,

public drunkenness, and violations of administrative regulations

such as licensing and safe housing requirements. These infractions were punishable with or without proven intent. Most minor violations resulted in fines being assessed against the offender.

Incidence of Crime

Detailed criminal statistics were not customarily available but

fragmentary data has been released from time to time that provided limited information on the nature and scope of criminal activity in Jordan. According to a Jordanian submission to the

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), national

criminal statistics recorded 16,215 offenses for 1984. Although it was not clear what offenses constituted this total, the number of

cases in the following categories was supplied: ordinary theft (3,859

cases reported), aggravated theft (1,208 cases), breaking and entering (1 , 164 cases), car theft (1 78 cases), robbery and violent theft (44 cases), other forms of theft (2,473 cases), serious assaults (437),

homicide (70), and rape (24). Frauds numbered 276 and currency

or counterfeiting violations numbered 31. Only sixty-five drug

offenses were reported.

According to Interpol, the total number of criminal offenses

reported by Jordanian authorities constituted a rate of 630 crimes

per 100,000 people. This rate was far lower than that reported by

273
Jordan: A Country Study

most countries of Western Europe but was typical of some Middle

Eastern countries, and higher than many countries of the Third

World. The validity of this index was linked to the reliability of

the reports of criminal activity submitted to Interpol.

The Public Security Directorate released similar data for 1986.

In that year, 19,618 criminal offenses were reported. Under the

category of thefts and robberies, the directorate listed 4,269 violations. According to the directorate, most such crimes were committed by unemployed males and by low-paid laborers between

the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven. There were 549 offenses

listed as "moral" crimes, including rape, abduction, and various

forms of public misbehavior. A total of 348 cases of fraud and embezzlement were recorded, reflecting a rising trend attributed by

the police to poor economic conditions and financial difficulties of

individuals and companies. The sixty-four murders reported

represented a decline from eighty-one in the previous year. Generally, such crimes were the result of personal disputes, family

problems, and seeking revenge. Again, the perpetrators of homicides were predominantly in the eighteen to twenty-seven-year-old

age-group. The police reported that 71 deaths and 513 injuries had

resulted from guns fired in celebration or accidentally.

Procedures in Criminal Law

When the police believed that a person had committed a crime

or when someone was caught committing a criminal act, the sus- pect was taken to the nearest police station for registration and

interrogation. Usually a warrant was required for an arrest; however, in cases where delay would be harmful or when a person was apprehended in a criminal offense, the accused could be detained without a warrant of arrest for as long as forty-eight hours.

After forty-eight hours, a court order was required to continue detention of the suspect.

A warrant of arrest could be issued by a magistrate only if there were a presumption that the person had committed the offense for which he or she was charged and if there were reason to believe

that the accused intended to escape, destroy traces of the crime,

or induce witnesses to make false statements. A warrant also could

be issued for offenses against national security or other grave acts specified in the criminal code.

The police magistrate first informed the accused of the charges

and questioned the accused and any available witnesses to determine if there were a prima facie case against the detained person,

who had the right to counsel at this preliminary investigation. If the magistrate found evidence of guilt, the case was transmitted

274
National Security

to the local prosecutor for further investigation. A prosecutor was

attached to every magistrate's court and court of first instance (see

The Judiciary, ch. 4). The magistrate then could either issue an

arrest warrant to bind over the suspect for trial or release the sus- pect on bail. Release on bail was a matter of right when the maximum penalty prescribed for the offense was imprisonment not

exceeding one year and where the accused had an established resi- dence within the country and had not previously been convicted

of a felony or sentenced to more than three months in jail.

The right of habeas corpus was provided for under the Constitution, but in practice it had not afforded the same protection as in English common law. The police usually managed to establish

the need to detain suspects charged with serious offenses. Persons

could be detained pending investigation for fifteen days or longer

if the court approved a request by the public prosecutor for an extension. The power of detention had been used effectively by the

police to forestall disorder. For example, police occasionally dis- persed crowds before a disturbance merely by threatening to arrest those who disobeyed an order to leave the scene. On deciding that legal action against the accused was necessary,

the public prosecutor instituted a trial by issuing an indictment

to the appropriate court. The fourteen magistrates' courts handled

only those criminal offenses for which the maximum fine was not more than JD100 or the maximum prison sentence was not more

than one year. The seven courts of first instance tried cases involving

misdemeanors before two judges and major felonies before three

judges. Trials were open to the public except in certain cases, such

as those involving sexual offenses. The defendant had the right to legal counsel, but defendants often were unaware of this right and

failed to exercise it. The court appointed a lawyer for those who

could not afford one if the potential sentence was execution or life imprisonment. Defendants had the right of cross-examination and

were protected against self-incrimination. There was no jury sys- tem in Jordan. The judge, therefore, decided questions of fact, based

entirely on the weight of the evidence, as well as questions of the

interpretation and application of the criminal law.

Trials began with opening statements by the prosecutor and the

defense counsel, followed by an interrogation of the defendant by

the presiding judge. After examination of witnesses for the state and for the accused and the submission of documentary evidence,

closing arguments by the prosecutor and defense counsel completed

the presentation. Decisions were announced in open court and,

if the defendant were found guilty, sentence would be pronounced.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Either the public prosecutor or the defendant could appeal the deci- sion to the court of appeal and, ultimately, to the Court of Cassation.

Martial Law Courts

A state of martial law, in effect since 1967, gave the government

authority to detain individuals without charge and to adjudicate

specified crimes in the martial law courts. These courts consisted

of a panel of three military officers trained in the law. Designated

martial law crimes included espionage, bribery of public officials,

trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketing, and security

offenses. Security detainees could be held without charge or brought

before the martial law courts for trial. Detainees did not have the

right to communicate with their family or legal counsel.

Although the martial law courts were not bound to observe nor- mal rules of evidence or procedures, in practice these military courts observed the law of criminal procedure and defendants were given

most of the rights they were entitled to in civilian courts. Trials were held in public; defendants were represented by counsel and

could cross-examine witnesses. It was not customary to grant bail,

however, and there was no provision for habeas corpus. Normal

avenues of appeal were not open from decisions of the military

courts, but such court actions were subject to ratification by the

prime minister in his capacity as military governor. The prime

minister had the authority to increase, reduce, or annul sentences. Before acting, the prime minister received recommendations on

the fairness of a sentence by a legal adviser or the minister ofjustice.

In its annual report for 1988, Amnesty International asserted

that some proceedings in the martial law courts failed to meet in- ternational standards for fair trials. It noted that in some cases it appeared that confessions allegedly extracted under torture or ill treatment were accepted as evidence. The United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986

observed that the very quick trials and subsequent sentencing of

the Communist Party of Jordan leadership suggested that there were politically motivated exceptions to the norms of criminal proce- dures and rights in the martial law courts. Military courts also adjudicated all crimes committed by military

personnel, applying military regulations promulgated by the Ministry

of Defense pursuant to relevant laws. In these cases, the commanding officer of the armed forces was required to ratify the sentence. Penal System

The penal system, a responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, was administered by the Prisons Department of the Public Security

276
National Security

Directorate. The system was composed of roughly twenty-five

prisons and jails. All except Amman Central Prison—the system's

major institution—were under the management of regional police

chiefs and were sometimes referred to as police jails. In addition

to the Amman facility, area prisons were located at Irbid and at Al Jafr, east of Maan in the south-central desert region. The smaller

jails were located at or near regional and local police offices. Generally, convicted offenders with more than one year to serve were

transferred to the central prison in Amman, those with terms of

three months to one year were sent to regional prisons, and those

sentenced to three months or less were kept in local jails. Some

exceptions were made to this pattern in the case of Palestinian activists or other security prisoners who had been detained for long

periods of time in the Al Jafr facility, largely because of its re- moteness.

Penal institutions were used to detain persons awaiting trial as well as prisoners serving sentences. Convicted offenders were usually

housed separately from those yet to be tried. Major prisons had

separate sections for women prisoners, as did a few of the police

jails in the larger communities. A juvenile detention center in

Amman housed young offenders who had been convicted of criminal

offenses. When juveniles reached the age of nineteen, if they had

further time to serve, they were transferred to one of the larger

prisons for the remainder of their sentences.

All institutions operated in accordance with the provisions of the

Prison Law of 1953, as amended. This law provided for decent

treatment of prisoners and included comprehensive regulations

governing the facilities, care, and administration of the prison sys- tem. Jordan was one of the first Arab countries to recognize the

theory of rehabilitation, rather than retribution, as the basis for punishment of lawbreakers. This concept emphasized that crime was caused by human weakness resulting from poor social conditions rather than by willfulness and immorality. As such, the ap- proach was in many ways alien to the traditional Muslim custom

of personal revenge by the family of the victim, which demanded

that the culprit pay for his crime. Although Jordan's penal system was designed to provide punishments suited to bring about the re- habilitation of the wrongdoers, in practice these efforts were hampered by the lack of facilities and professionally trained staff. Some

effort was made to provide literacy and limited industrial training

classes to prisoners in Amman Central Prison, but few modern tech- niques of rehabilitation were found in other penal institutions.

According to the annual human rights reports of the United States Department of State, prison conditions were harsh but not

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Jordan: A Country Study

intentionally degrading. There appeared to be no discrimination

according to religion or social class in treatment of prisoners.

Crowded conditions in some prisons were relieved by a royal amnesty in 1985 that resulted in the release of more than 1,000 in- mates. In 1986, a new central prison, Juwaidah, was opened in Amman. It replaced the obsolete and cramped Al Mahatta pris- on, which was scheduled to be closed. In its 1988 report, Amnesty International cited a number of cases of apparent mistreatment in prisons, notably at Al Mahatta and

at the Az Zarqa military prison. The report also questioned the

authorities' motives in forcing four students and a writer convicted

in the martial law court of membership in illegal leftist organizations to serve their sentences under the harsh conditions found at Al Jafr.

* * * The general survey ofJordan by Arthur R. Day, East Bank/West

Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace, includes a chapter appraising the Jordanian military establishment, as well as a number of

observations relative to Jordan's internal security. The analysis by

Anthony H. Cordesman, Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Balance,

published in 1983, together with a supplement published in 1985,

provides assessments of the military and geostrategic situation of

Jordan. The analyses also present arguments for equipping Jor- danian forces with advanced weapons to enable the country to resist military pressure from neighboring powers. The problems Jordan

encountered with the United States in meeting its desire for these new weapons, especially in the area of air defense, are also reviewed

in detail. The Hashemite Arab Army, 1908-1979, by S.A. El-Edroos,

a Pakistani brigadier who served as adviser to the Jordan Arab

Army, is a thorough study of military operations and battles through

the October 1973 War. John Bagot Glubb's autobiography, A Soldier with the Arabs, provides detail on the evolution of the Arab Legion

and the fighting in 1948. Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to the Domestic Stability ofJordan by Robert B. Satloff reviews existing and

potential internal security problems, with emphasis on the Muslim Brotherhood.

The discussion of military strengths, formations, and equipment

in this chapter is based principally on estimates compiled in The

Military Balance, 1988-89, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

278
Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Schools, Students, and Teachers in the East Bank, 1986-87

3 Enrollment by Education Level and Sex, 1965 and 1985

4 Medical Care and Medical Personnel, 1987

5 Balance of Payments, 1983-87

6 Summary of Central Government Budget Financing, 1983-87

7 Central Government Expenditures, 1983-87

8 Domestic Revenue of the Central Government, 1983-87

9 Labor Force by Sector, 1987

10 Industrial Production of Selected Commodities, 1984-87

11 Agricultural Production and Cultivated Area, 1987

12 Imports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87

13 Exports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87

14 Principal Trade Partners, 1986-87

15 Major Army Equipment, 1988

16 Major Air Force Equipment, 1988

279

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

Table 2. Schools, Students, and Teachers in the East Bank, 1986-87

Category Number

Schools Coeducational 1,372 Male 1,017 Female 977

Total schools 3,366

Students Male . 479,682 Female 439,963

Total students '. 919,645 Teachers Female 23,612 Male 15,995 Total teachers 39,607

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 167.

281
Jordan: A Country Study

Table 3. Enrollment by Education Level and Sex, 1965 and 1985

(in percentages)

Level 1965 1985 Primary Male 100 98 Female 83 99 Both sexes 92 99

Preparatory- Male 52 80 Female 23 78 Both sexes 38 79 Secondary Male n.a. n.a. Female n.a. n.a. Both sexes 2 37

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Development Report, 1988, New York,

1988, 281.

282
Appendix

Table 4. Medical Care and Medical Personnel, 1987

Category 1987

Hospitals Government 14

Private .

.

21 Total hospitals 35*

Hospital beds Government 3,994

Private 1,563 Total hospital beds 5,557

Physicians Government 1,702

Private n.a. Nurses Government 434

Private n.a. Midwives Government 275

Private n.a. Pharmacists Government 96

Private n.a.

Dentists Government 110

Private n.a.

* Figures for 1981.

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 213-14; and "Jordan" in George Thomas Kurian (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Third World, 2, New York, 1987, 1029.

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Jordan: A Country Study

Table 5. Balance of Payments, 1983-87

(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1

1983 1984 1985 1986 2 1987 2

Net trade balance in goods and services -436.25 - 382.89 - 414.91 - 253.95 - 317.64 Net unrequited

transfers 3 + 294.93 +278.76 + 315.01 + 238.00 + 199.29 Current account

balance - 141.32 - 104.13 -99.90 - 15.95 - 118.35

Capital account

balance 4 + 156.76 +64.37 + 137.64 + 50.95 + 75.94

Overall balance 5 + 15.44 - 39.76 + 37.74 + 35.00 - 42.41 Net errors and

omissions +34.90 -29.54 - 19.25 - 16.72 + 5.86 Net reserves 6 -50.34 +69.30 - 18.49 - 18.28 +36.55

1 For value of the Jordanian dinar—see Glossary.

2 Preliminary figures.

3 Includes net private and net government unrequited transfers (i.e., worker remittances and foreign

aid, respectively). The combination of net trade in goods and services and net unrequited transfers gives the current account balance.

4 Consists of net government borrowing as well as long- and short-term net private investment.

5 Consists of the current and capital account balances combined.

6 Includes reserves held by the Central Bank, commercial banks, and other financial institutions, as well as International Monetary Fund reserves. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 362-63.

284
Appendix

Table 6. Summary of Central Government Budget Financing, 1983-87

(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Revenue

Domestic revenue . . . 400.6 415.0 440.8 514.4 549.7 Foreign assistance . . . 197.0 106.1 187.8 143.7 134.0

Internal borrowing 28.8 25.5 35.3 74.8 149.3

if, ft 1 99 9 1 fi9 A 1 ft ftQ Q Other revenue 2 2.3 9.6 18.4 12.8 14.6 Total revenues 705.5 678.4 844.8 3 905.4 3 937.5 Expenditure

, . , 453.7 488.1 542.5 570.5 604.5

Capital budget . 251.6 232.7 263.2 410.8 404.2

Total expenditures . . . 705.3 720.8 805.7 981.3 1,008.7

Deficit or surplus + .2 -42.4 + 39.1 - 75.9 -71.3

1 For value of the Jordanian dinar—see Glossary.

2 Principal of loans repaid to the central government.

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 312.

285
Jordan: A Country Study

Table 7. Central Government Expenditures, 1983-87

(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 2

Current budget

. . . . 168.0 168.0 190.2 209.0 209.0

. . . . 32.6 33.5 39.3 47.0 50.4 128.4 154.6 171.3 158.2 174.5

15.3 14.3 15.2 16.7 18.1

. . . . 80.0 82.7 89.7 98.6 110.2 Transportation and

communications 11.7 16.3 17.1 18.6 19.1 Other 17.7 18.7 19.8 22.5 23.4 Total current expenditures . . . 453.7 488.1 542.6 570.6 604.7

Capital budget

88.8 86.2 99.0 225.7 189.0

. . . , 130.6 122.5 144.4 162.9 178.4 Transportation and

communications 20.2 12.7 7.1 8.1 12.0

6.9 5.1 5.5 6.5 10.1 Other 5.1 6.2 7.2 7.6 14.7 Total capital expenditures .... . . . . 251.6 232.7 263.2 410.8 404.2 TOTAL . , . 705.3 720.8 805.8 981.4 1,008.9

1 For value of the Jordanian dinar—see Glossary.

2 Preliminary estimate. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 315-16.

286
Appendix

Table 8. Domestic Revenue of the Central Government, 1983-87

(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1

Revenue Source 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Tax revenues

121 118 118 112 105 35 37 46 52 61 68 73 71 71 85

1 9 1 7

1 / ID 1 A 1$ ID

9**7 94. R 9^0 ZDU 94.Q ZOO

A C. Z.A A O A O 10 12 13 12 17 56 61 67 60 65 294 305 317 309 331 Nontax revenues

23 33 38 46 48

59 36 44 40 49 Other 24 40 41 120 123 Total nontax revenues 3 107 110 124 205 219

401 415 441 514 550

1 For value of the Jordanian dinar—see Glossary.

2 Preliminary figures.

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 313.

Table 9. Labor Force by Sector, 1987

(in thousands of workers)

Sector Number

Agriculture 37.7 Construction 53.4

Financial and business services 16.9 Mining and manufacturing 53.6

Social services and military personnel 242.5 Trade 49.7 Transportation and communications 47.1

Utilities 8.5 Total active labor force 509.3 *

* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. Total excludes foreign guest workers. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 69.

287
Jordan: A Country Study

Table 10. Industrial Production of Selected Commodities, 1984-87

Commodity Unit 1984 1985 1986 1987 Phosphstcs (dry) 1,000 tons 6,120 6,067 6,249 6,841 Potash 1,000 tons 486 908 1,104 1,203 1,000 tons 541 511 551 1^656 Cement 1,000 tons 1,994 2,022 1,837 2,472

1,000 tons 2,272 2,182 2,083 2,229

1,000 tons 112 136 126 219

1,000 liters 7,573 5,638 5,321 4,851 1,000 batteries 50 50 55 55

tons 5,027 3,905 3,731 4,378

1,000 tons 12 8 28 27 1,000 tons 15 21 means negligible. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 123-24.

Table 11. Agricultural Production and Cultivated Area, 1987

(in thousands of tons and by thousands of hectares)

Crop Harvest Area

Field Crops

Wheat 79.8 84.3 Barley 33.0 51.1

Lentils 5.2 5.1 Vetch 1.3 1.5 Chick peas 1.2 1.6 Corn 3.0 0.5 Onions 21.6 0.8 Garlic 2.0 0.4 Tobacco 29.1 3.0 Clover 9.1 0.6 Vegetables Tomatoes 236.8 6.0 Squash 34.3 2.2 Eggplants 56.6 2.5 Cucumbers 64.9 1.3 Potatoes 61.7 2.4

Fruits Olives 20.4 38.1 Grapes 18.6 5.4 Citrus fruit 118.4 5.6 Melons 41.1 5.1 Figs 1.3 0.6 Almonds 1.1 0.5 Peaches 1.4 0.7 Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 80, 84, 93.

288
Appendix

Table 12. Imports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87

(in millions of Jordanian dinars) *

Commodity 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

21.6 5.9 8.6 2.9 3.6 Meat 24.6 23.0 33.2 24.3 27.0 Dairy products 15.5 16.8 17.9 17.0 15.8 Wheat and flour 32.8 39.1 28.2 15.8 28.7 Sugar 6.5 5.2 3.6 8.7 9.3

Fruit*! ^ nrl vpcrpt^nlps 32 3 27.8 25.4 25.4 16.5

. . . 205.5 204.0 192.6 92.8 118.6 Other crude materials 31.4 29.9 33.1 28.6 28.5 57.8 79.9 67.6 74.9 91.7

40.7 37.1 41.8 41.9 51.1 32.0 30.1 29.2 26.1 29.5 167.0 122.8 112.8 103.2 103.0 Transportation equipment 95.0 93.0 94.6 73.4 83.3 Miscellaneous manufacturing . . . 92.3 95.9 105.2 79.9 87.7 Other 218.3 260.8 280.6 235.3 221.2 TOTAL 1,103.3 1,071.3 1,074.4 850.2 915.5

* For value of the Jordanian dinar—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 349-50.

Table 13. Exports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87

(in millions of Jordanian dinars) *

Commodity 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

7.6 8.4 7.5 8.5 5.2 Vegetables 17.6 18.6 16.6 13.3 14.8 Olive oil 1.0 0.9 0.1 1.4 0.2 51.6 69.6 66.1 64.8 61.0 Potash 0.1 14.9 30.9 31.4 28.0

20.7 44.0 30.6 29.1 30.1 Other chemical products 16.1 23.6 20.4 15.4 39.8 Cement 2.9 7.1 4.0 10.5 Machinery and transportation

2.0 2.0 2.0 1.4 2.5

2.1 5.1 10.0 3.31 1.2 9.2 23.4 18.5 7.3 9.9 Other 32.1 47.7 45.5 45.7 35.6 TOTAL 160.1 261.1 255.3 225.6 248.8

- - - means negligible.

* For value of the Jordanian dinar—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 347-48.

289
Jordan: A Country Study

Tables 14. Principal Trade Partners, 1986 and 1987

(in thousands of Jordanian dinars) *

Country 1986 1987 Exports China 7,570 10,044 Egypt 3,9791 3,448

India 34,126 22,034

Iraq 42,458 59,865

Italy 7,099 9,266 Kuwait 8,813 8,614

Pakistan 3,456 10,253 Saudi Arabia 27,817 26,204 Imports

Britain 68,786 58,303

Iraq 80,274 99,401

Italy 50,220 46,647 Japan 66,642 55,664 Saudi Arabia 49,670 76,761 Turkey 27,467 35,021 United States 75,529 93,389 West Germany 65,114 70,504

* For value of the Jordanian dinar—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Jordan, No.

3, 1988, Appendix 2.

290
Appendix

Table 15. Major Army Equipment, 1988

Type and Description Country of Origin

In Inventory Tanks M-60A1/A3 United States Khalid (Chieftain) Britain Tariq (Centurion) -do- M-47, M-48A5 United States Armored personnel carriers M-113 United States Saracen Britain EE- 11 Urutu Brazil

218 270

291 200 (in storage)

1,20034

n.a. Reconnaissance vehicles Ferret scout car . . . Britain 140 Towed artillery 105mm M-101A1 United States 155mm M-114 . . . M-44

M-59

203mm M-115 . . .

Self-propelled artillery 155mm M-109A2 . 203mm MHO

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do- -do36

38

20

174 (in storage)

10824 Mortars 107mm and 120mm -doAntitank weapons

-do- 330

Apilas 112mm rocket launcher .... France n.a. BGM-71A TOW missile 330 -do- 310 LAW-80 n.a.

Antiaircraft guns 20mm M-163 Vulcan 23mm self-propelled ZSU-23- 40mm self-propelled M-42 .

United States Soviet Union

United States Surface-to-air missiles SA-7 B2 shoulder-fired Soviet Union

SA-8 -do- SA-13 -do- SA-14 shoulder-fired -do- Redeye United States

10036 264

n.a.20

20

n.a. n.a. Naval vessels Coastal patrol craft, 8 ton -do- 5 Vosper coastal patrol craft, 95 ton Britain 3 (ordered)

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1988-89, London, 1988, 104; and

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1988-89, London, 1988, 332.

291
Jordan: A Country Study

Table 16. Major Air Force Equipment, 1988

Type and Description Country of Origin

In Inventory Fighter-bombers

F-5E/F United States

Fighter-Interceptors Mirage F-l France Mirage 2000 -doJet fighter conversion training F-5A/B United States Transports C-130 Hercules United States CASA C-212A Spain An- 12 Cub Soviet Union

Helicopters

Bell AH-IS Cobra, with TOW missiles . United States Sikorsky S-76 -doAerospatiale Alouette III France

Aerospatiale SA-342L Gazelle -do- Hughes 500D United States Training

CASA C-101 Aviojet Spain

CASA C-212 Aviocar Spain BAe Bulldog Britain Piper (12 Warrior-II and 6 Seneca-II) . . United States

59

3520 (ordered 1988)

20

24

18

5

8

Strategic air defense Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile United States 126

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1988-89, London, 1988, 105; and

Aviation Advisory Services, International Air Forces and Military Aircraft Directory, Essex, United Kingdom, 1988.

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Chapter 4

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305

Glossary

dinar—Basic currency unit consisting of 1 ,000 fils; created in 1950

as replacement for the Palestinian pound. Dinar's value was

established at parity with the British pound sterling, or a value

of US$2.80 equal to JD1 . Jordan, as a member of the sterling area, maintained parity with the British pound until 1967 when

the British devalued their currency. Jordan did not follow the

pound, retaining the dinar at US$2.80 equal to JD1 through

1972. When United States currency was devalued in 1973, the

dinar was unlinked from the dollar, since which time the rate has fluctuated. Beginning in February 1975, the dinar was

pegged to the special drawing right (SDRq.v.). According

to International Monetary Fund (IMFq.v.) data, the aver- age conversion rate of the dinar for trade and other purposes was US$3.04 in 1987, US$2. 10 in 1988, and US$1.54 in 1989.

East Bank—The area east of the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and

the series of wadis from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Roughly the former Amirate of Transjordan.

GDP (gross domestic product)—A value measure of the flow of

domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a

period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods

for final consumption and for intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggre- gated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated,

the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that

deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been

made.

GNP (gross national product)—GDP (q.v.) plus the net income

or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP

is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and ser- vices by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices,

which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often

calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

imam—A word used in several senses. In general use and lowercased, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such

it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- cient education to carry out this function. It is also used figuratively by many Sunni (q. v. ) Muslims to mean the leader of the

Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) Muslims, the word is

307
Jordan: A Country Study

usually upper-cased and takes on many complex and controversial meanings; in general, however, it indicates that particular

descendant of the Party of Ali who is believed to have been

God's designated repository of the spiritual authority inher- ent in that line. The identity of this individual and the means

of ascertaining his identity have been the major issues causing

divisions among Shias.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q. v. ) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members

(including industrialized and developing countries) when they

experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- quently carry conditions that require substantial internal

economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

Palestinian—Narrowly, a citizen of the British mandated territory

of Palestine (1922-48). Generally, a Muslim or Christian native or descendant of a native of the region between the Egyptian

Sinai and Lebanon and west of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf

of Aqaba line who identifies himself primarily as a Palestinian.

sharia—Body of Islamic law. Courts applying this law are known

as sharia courts. sharif (Arabic pi., ashraf) —An individual who claims to be and is accepted as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through

his daughter Fatima.

shaykh—Leader or chief. Word used to mean either a political

leader or a learned religious leader. Also used as an honorific.

Frequently spelled sheikh or sheik.

Shia (also Shiite, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) —A member of

the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. Shias supported

the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliph- ate and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue

they divided from the Sunnis (q. v.) in the first great schism

within Islam, Later schisms have produced further divisions

among the Shias over the identity and number of Imams (q. v.). Shias revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be in hiding.

special drawing right(s) (SDR)—a monetary unit of the Inter- national Monetary Fund (IMF

q. v. ) based on a basket of inter- national currencies consisting of the United States dollar, the

German deutschmark, the Japanese yen, the British pound ster- ling, and the French franc.

308

)
Glossary

Sunni (from sunna, orthodox)—A member of the larger of the two

great divisions of Islam. Sunnis supported the traditional

method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad

line. On this issue they divided from the Shia (q. v.) Muslims

in the first great schism within Islam.

Transjordanian—Narrowly, a citizen of the Amirate of Transjordan

(1921-46). Generally, a Muslim or Christian native of the

region east of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqaba line

and within the approximate boundaries of the contemporary

state of Jordan, that is, of the East Bank (q.v.).

West Bank—The area west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea,

which was annexed by Jordan in 1950. Area has been under

Israeli occupation since the June 1967 War. In July 1988, King

Hussein renounced Jordan's claim to the West Bank.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but

administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much

easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage

the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- tions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group,

member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q.v.).

309

Index

Abbasids, 12 Abdul Hamid II (sultan), 18, 20 Abdul Huda family, 197 Abdullah (king ofJordan), xxi, 3-4, 29, 194; accepts UN partition plan (1947),

28; as amir, 26, 92; becomes king of Jordan (1948), xxi, 29; early career of, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25; as leader of Arab

forces (1948), 28; role in formation of Arab League by, 27 Abraham (Ibrahim), 5, 107 Abu Ammar. See Arafat, Yasir Abu Bakr, 12, 105 Abu Daud. Daud Auda, Muhammad

Abu Musa: leads Al Fatah Uprising, 205, 207; role in Al Fatah of, 205 Abu Nidal, 205, 207 Abu Nidal faction, 181, 232 Abu Nuwar, Ali, 32, 33, 34 Abu Talib, Fathi, 242 ACDA. See United States Achaemenid Empire, 7 Afghanistan, 55, 56

Africa, 174

agreements: Arab Solidarity Agreement

(1957), 32-33; armistice (1949), 28-29;

for arms with Soviet Union, 261; be- tween Britain and Transjordan, 26-27;

cease-fire in Jordanian civil war, 42-43; Hadda Agreement (1925), 67; between

Jordanian government and PLO, xxvi, 41 ; Jordanian-Palestinian peace frame- work (1985), 201; long-term trade, 160;

for Saudi Arabia and Jordan border,

37; Sykes-Picot (1916), 21; trade, 173-74

Agricultural Credit Corporation, 174

agricultural sector: development policy

for, 169; economic performance of, 130, 166; factors limiting potential of, xxiv, 168-69; foreign guest workers in, 166; incentives and subsidies in, 169; introduction of, 5; irrigation in, 166;

livestock production in, 170; production in, 167

air bases, 227, 248-49

aircraft assembly industry, 264-65

airfields, 158

air force. See Royal Jordanian Air Force

airline, 157-58

airports, 158 AJNDB. See Arab Jordanian Nationalist Democratic Bloc (AJNDB)

Al Ahd (The Covenant Society), 18 Al Aqabah (port) (see also entrepot status; Iraq), xxiv, xxix, 155, 156-57, 213, 264 Al Aqabah Ports Corporation, 157 Al Aqabah Railway Corporation, 155 Al Aqabah Thermal Power Station, 154 Alexander the Great, 7 ALF. See Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

Al Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement) (see also Palestine Liberation Organization), 37, 40; ALF aligns with, 206; composition and objectives

of, 203, 205; demands government

overthrow, 43; as guerrilla group, 203; representation on PNC Executive Committee of, 208

Al Fatah Revolutionary Council, 205 Al Fatah Uprising, 205

Al Fatat (The Young Arabs), 18

Algeria, 131 Al Ghawr. &<? Jordan Valley Al Ghor. See Jordan Valley

Algiers Arab summit (1988), xxvii Alia (queen of Jordan), 196

Ali (caliph), 12, 105

Allenby, Edmund, 22 Al Mafraq air base, 227, 248-49

Al Mufti family, 197 Al Wahdah Dam, 165 Amirate of Transjordan (see also Abdullah (king ofJordan)): administration of, 26; Arab Army (Al Jaysh al Arabi) of, 234; established (1921), 3, 26; police units and military force in, 233; population composition of, 65 Amman (see also Philadelphia): history of, 92; population composition in, 92-

93 Amman Arab summit (1981), 4, 56 Amman Central Prison, 277-78 Amman Financial Market, 139, 174, 175-76 Ammon, 6 311
Jordan: A Country Study

Amnesty International, 270, 276, 278

Amorites, 5 Anatolia, 5 Anglo-Jordanian Agreement (1948), 33, 218 Anti-Communist Law (1957), 197

antiterrorism program, 267 Antoun, Richard, 87 AOPEC . See Arab Organization of Petro- leum Exporting Countries (AOPEC)

Arab Air Cargo, 158 Arab Army (Al Jaysh al Arabi). See Amirate of Transjordan; Arab Legion

Arab Bank, 174, 176 Arab Company for Maritime Transport, 138 Arab Constitutional Alignment, 59 Arab Constitutionalist Party, 197 Arab Cooperation Council (1989), xxv,

173, 214, 219, 227 Arabia as Roman province, 9 Arabian Peninsula, 10 Arabic language, 12, 65, 79; dialects of, 80; of Semitic origin, 80-81; three forms of, 80 Arab International Hotels, 138 Arab Investment Company, 138 Arab Islamic Coalition, xxix

Arab-Israeli wars: in 1948, xxi, 235-36;

effect of, 224; June 1967, or Six-Day

War, xxii, 3-4, 38, 66, 216, 236-38,

247; October 1973, 45-46, 216, 225,

238, 247, 261-62 Arab Jordanian Nationalist Democratic

Bloc (AJNDB), xxix, xxx Arab Land Bank, 176 Arab League. See League of Arab States (Arab League)

Arab Legion (see also Jordan Arab Army),

3, 27; air force unit of, 236; in ArabIsraeli war (1948), 235-36; composition and role in Jordan of, 30, 31, 234; development of support for, 252;

effect of Transjordan Frontier Force

on, 235; invades Israel (1948), 28; Public Security Force as outgrowth of, 265; recruitment for, 252; strength- ening of, 235; subsidy from Britain for, xxi, 251-52, 260; Transjordan police and reserve force in, 26 Arab Legion Air Force (see also Royal Jor- danian Air Force), 247 Arab Liberation Front (ALF), 206

Arab National Party, 59 Arab nations: foreign relations with, 212-15; military cooperation with, 263-65; reject Camp David Accords,

53; trade relations with, 173 Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (AOPEC), 131 Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing

Company, 138, 152 Arab Potash Company, 149, 161 Arab revival, 17 Arab Revolt, 3, 21, 22 Arab Satellite Organization (Arabsat), 159 Arabs in Jordan, 76-77 Arab Solidarity Agreement (1957), 32-33, 34 Arab Union, 35 Arab Wings, 158

Arafat, Yasir: addresses UN General Assembly, 47; as chairman of PNC Executive Committee, 203, 208; as commander of PLA, 42; endorses Sad- dam Husayn, xxx; as leader of Al

Fatah, 37, 203; as leader of PLO, 40; opposition to, 205, 233; relations with King Hussein of, xxvi, 60, 199-201;

visits Egypt (1983), 213 Aramaic language, 7 Arif, Abd as Salaam, 35 armed forces (see also Jordan Arab Army):

compared to Syrian and Israeli, 226; devotion to King Hussein of, 252;

Palestinians in, 253, 254; pay scales and

benefits of, 255-56; as protection for monarchy, 238; public services by,

241; ranks and insignia of, 256; recruit- ment policy of, 251; relative size of, 251 Armed Forces General Command staff, 242-43 Armenians in Jordan, 78 armor rebuild facility, 265

army. See Arab Legion; Jordan Arab Army

Asia Minor Agreement. See Sykes-Picot

Agreement

Assad, Hafiz al, 4; objection to Hussein's

proposals (1979), 54; relations with Jor- dan of, 50-51 As Saiqa, 206, 207

assassinations: of Abdullah, king ofJor- dan, xxi, 29-30, 229; attempted, 229,

232; claims of Black September for, 312
Index

198; of Faisal (Iraq), 35; of Majali (1958), 36; of Sadat (1981), 61; of Tal, 44

Assyria, 7 austerity program, xxiv, xxviii, 137, 141 Ayatollah Khomeini. ^Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi

Ayyubid Sultanate, 13 Azraq ash Shishan air base, 248 Az Zarqa affair, 34 Az Zarqa River, 68

Babylon, 7 Badran, Mudar, xxvi, xxix, 49-50, 60, 187 Badran family, 197 Baghdad Conference (summit) (1978), 53, 131, 188, 212-13, 250, 260 Baghdad Pact (see also Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)), 31, 32 Baghdad summit (1990), xxvii Bahai religion, xxvi, 114

Bahrain, 215

balance of payments, xxviii, 127, 131, 251

Balfour Declaration (1917), 3; opposition

to, 23; provisions of, 22 banking system, xxiv, 127, 129, 133, 174-76; disbursement of West Bank aid funds, 202 Banna, Sabri Khalil al. See Abu Nidal Barhoum, Mohammad, 102 Bashan, 6

Battle of Hattin (1187), 13 Battle of Uhud (636), 10 beduins (see also tribalism): in army and

Arab Legion, 85, 252; effect of changing circumstances on, 82-83; honor

(ird) among, 82; importance of tribal- ism among, 76, 81-86; in Jordan, 30; nomadic and seminomadic, 75, 81-82;

support for monarchy by, 196, 235,

240, 252

Begin, Menachem, 53, 59 Begin administration (Israel), 5 Bernadotte, Folke, 28

Bevin, Ernest, 27

black market, xxiv, 137 Black September faction, 44, 181, 198, 232, 233

border: with Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, 67, 226, 227; with Israel (de jure),

xxii, 66, 224; between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, 37

border dispute: with Israel, 31, 32, 66;

Syria-Israel, 37 Brezhnev, Leonid, 47, 52

Britain: defeats Turks (1918), 23; eco- nomic assistance from, 260; mandate

for Palestine and Iraq of, 3, 23, 24-25,

235; Middle East policy of (1916), 20-22; military presence (1924), 234;

relations of Jordan with, 29-32, 174, 218; role in Palestine Mandate deci- sions of, 20-25; role in Transjordan of, 26-28; sells military equipment, 260, 262; withdraws all troops from Jordan

(1957), 33

British Army Staff College, 257

British Bank of the Middle East, 176 budget deficit, 141

buffer zone, 3 Bunche, Ralph, 28 Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs (see also Ministry of Occupied Territories), 49-50, 188 Bush, George, xxix Byzantine Empire, 10, 13

cabinet. See Council of Ministers Cairo-Amman Bank, 176 Cairo Conference (1964), 36 Cairo summit (1973), 45 Cairo summit (1976), 49 camel herding, 81 Camp David Accords (1978), xxii, 4, 53, 199; effect on PLO of, xxvi; Hussein's

alternative to, 54; process for, 53, 210, 216 Canaan, 5, 6

canal, 165, 168

capital flows, 127, 130, 133, 136, 175

Carter, Jimmy, 52, 53

Catholic Church: Greek, 113; Roman,

113

censorship, 219 CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

Central Bank of Jordan, 135, 140, 174

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO),

31

charitable organizations, 121-22 Chase Manhattan Bank, 176 Chelhod, Joseph, 84

chemical industry, xxiv, 151 China, People's Republic of, 161, 173 313
Jordan: A Country Study

Christianity: in Byzantine Empire, 10; Jordanians practicing, xxvi, 77-78,

104; as religious minority, 112

Christian sects: Catholic, 112-13; Eastern Orthodox, 112; Protestant, 113-14; re- ligious courts for, 191

Churchill, Winston, 25

Circassians: among political elite, 197; in Jordan, 16, 78-79, 92, 231 Citibank, 176

civil courts, 191

civil servants, 187-88

civil war: in Lebanon, 51; with PLO

guerrillas (1970-71), xxii, 42, 193, 198-99, 215-16, 233

class structure. See social structure

climate, 71-72

colleges, 116-17 commodity distribution, 140 communism, 34, 197, 206, 207, 231-32 Communist Party ofJordan (Al Hizb ash Shuyui al Urduni), 197, 231-32 community colleges, 116-17

conscription system, xxviii, 236; after re- form, 254-55; emergency act for (1966), 254

Constantinople, 10, 13 Constitution: Jordan (1952), 30; amendments in 1974, 1976, and 1984, 182-

83, 190; electoral system under, 189;

legislative powers and responsibilities

of, 188-89; powers and functions of government under, 183; powers of king

under, 185, 187, 241; provision for in- struments for internal security in, 265; provisions related to religion in, 103,

112, 182; right of habeas corpus under, 275

constitution: Transjordan (1928), xxi, 26

constitution: Transjordan (1946), 27, 29

construction sector, 130

consulting services industry, 127 consumption: government, 130; private, 130

contraception, 73-74

corruption, xxviii Council of Ministers, 183, 241 coups d'etat: attempt in Jordan (1957), 240; in Egypt (1952), 31; in Iran

(1979), 55; in Iraq (1958), 35 Court of Appeal, 191-92 Court of Cassation (supreme court), 191-92, 276

courts of first instance, 191, 275

court system (see also civil courts; courts of first instance; magistrates' courts; re- ligious courts; special courts), 191-92, 275-76

crime, 273-74

criminal code, 271-73

criminal law procedures, 274-76

Crusade, First, 13 crusaders, 13

cultural influence: of Palestinians, 76; of Western countries, 93

cultural tradition, Arab-Islamic, 65

currency, 133; devaluation and depreci- ation of, 134, 136-37

current account. See balance of payments

Cyrus II (king of Persia), 7

dam, 165 Damascus Protocol, 20 Daud, Muhammad, 42 Daud Auda, Muhammad, 44 David (king), 6 Dead Sea, 66, 71, 161

debt: external, xxiv, 128, 135-36; inter- nal, 142; military, 251, 260

Decapolis, 9 defense burden, 128

defense spending. See spending, govern- ment

defense strategy, 249-50

deflation, 134 Democratic Bloc, xxvi Democratic Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (DFLP), 205, 207, 233 Democratic Unity and Justice Party, xxix Department of Social Affairs, 121 Desert Highway, 154-55

Desert Mobile Force, 235

Desert Police Force, 266, 267, 269

desert region, xxiv, 67-68, 71, 168-69 DFLP. See Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)

Dina Abdul Hamid al Aun, 194

disease, 119-20

divorce, 97 drainage network, 68

drought, 168, 169 Druze religion, xxvi, 79, 114

Dulles, John Foster, 34 314
Index

East Bank, 3; conflict ofJews and Seleucids in, 9; conversion to Islam in, 10,

12; decline in importance of, 13; eth- nic groups in, 77; neolithic culture set- dements in, 5; under Ottoman rule, 16; population composition, volume, and

density of, 65, 72, 74-75; refugees in, 38; rift with West Bank of, 34

Eastern Europe, 117 Eastern Orthodox Church, 112 East Ghor Canal, 165, 168

ecclesiastical courts, 191-92 economic assistance (see also military as- sistance): from Arab League nations,

xxiv, 39, 58, 260; from Arab oil- producing countries, xxiv, xxvii, 131, 212-13, 215, 250, 260, 261; from

Britain, 31-33, 35, 39, 58, 218; depen- dence on, 259-60; estimates of require- ments for (1991), xxxi; from European

Community (EC), 133; foreign, 127, 130-31, 134, 136, 142; from Iraq

(1978), 53, 56; from Jordan to Iraq,

56; from multilateral organizations,

131; proportion of revenue from, xxv; from Qatar and Abu Dhabi, 39; from

United States, 34-35, 131, 168, 215,

218; used for development planning, 142-43; to West Bank Palestinians,

xxvii, 57; from West Germany, 39 economic development, 129 economic performance, 127-29, 181-82,

223-24, 250 economic planning. See Five-Year Plans economic policy (see also austerity pro- gram; import substitution): austerity measures of, xxiv, xxxviii, 137, 141; for industry and manufacture, 149-53; of

self-sufficiency, xxiv, 47-48, 128; for subsidies, 140-41 economy: effect of West Bank loss (1967)

on, 128; government role in, xxiv, 137-41, 174; recession in, 181-82 Edom, 6 Edomites, 6 education (see also students): for children of military personnel, 257; effect of modern, 101-3, 110; government

spending for, 114; students studying

abroad, 117, 231 education system (see also community

colleges; literacy; military training;

schools; universities), 66; in Amirate of

Transjordan, 114-15; effect of upgraded, xxiii, 76; opportunities for females

in, 100, 102-3; universities and community colleges in, 116-17

Egypt: Arab ostracism of (1978-79),

xxvii, 4; attacked by Britain (1956), 32; attacks Israel (1948), 28; attacks Israel (1973), 45; conflict with Hittites of, 5-6; forms United Arab Republic with Syria, 35; military alliance with Jordan of

(1967), 38; ostracized from Arab League

(1978), 53, 56; payments to Jordan

(1957), 32-33; relations ofJordan with,

xxvii, 53-54, 133, 212-14, 226-27; as republic (1952), 31; trade relations with, 173 Egyptian Free Officers movement, 31 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 34 Eisenhower Doctrine, 34

Elat as ancient port, 6

elections, 1989-90, xxv, xxviii-xxix

electoral system, 189-90

electricity: delivery of, 153-54; demand

for, 153; hydroelectric station for, 154 Encouragement of Investment Law (1984), 140 endogamy, 82, 86, 96-97

engineering industries, 129, 152

entrepot status, xxiv, xxviii, xxx, 127, 133, 264 Enver Pasha, 18 Eshkol, Levi, 38, 40 European Community (EC): economic as- sistance from, 133; imports from, 218 exchange rate system, xxiv, 137, 176

exports: changes in composition of, 172-73; development of industries for, xxiv; economic performance of, 58, 170; of food supplies, 167-68; incentives for, xxv; to Iraq, 213; to Persian Gulf countries, 215; of phosphates, 127, 160, 215;

as proportion of GDP, 130; reexports of

entrepot products, xxiv, xxviii, xxx, 127, 133, 264

Fahmi, Ismail, 46

Faisal I (son of Hussein Ali Al Hashimi),

18, 20-23; as king of Iraq, 25, 194

Faisal II (king of Iraq), 35

Faisal (king of Saudi Arabia), 45

family planning, 73 family structure: allocation of household 315
Jordan: A Country Study

space in, 98; honor (ird) in, 99; house- hold in, 95-96, 98-99; individual subordinate in, 96

Fatimids, 12, 13 fedayeen. See guerrillas Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- many, West

fertility rates, 73-75, 92

fertilizer industry, 160-61

Fifteen-Point Political Program. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

financial sector, 174-77

firms: semipublic, xxiv, 138; state-owned, 149

fiscal policy (see also budget deficit; reve- nues; spending, government; tax poli- cy), 129; revenue and taxation of, 142; spending estimates in, 141-42

Five-Year Plans: for 1980-85, 139, 143;

for 1986-90, 142-44, 148

Ford, Gerald R., 47

foreign aid. See economic assistance foreign policy, 209-18

France: mandate for Syria and Lebanon

of, 23; protection of Catholics by, 16;

selling of military aircraft and equip- ment to Jordan by, 218, 248, 260-62

Free Officers, 230

freight companies, 155

Gardiner, Antoinette, 194 Gaza Strip, 188 GDP. See gross domestic product (GDP)

General Intelligence Department (GID),

or Dairat al Mukhabarat, xxviii, 182-83, 196, 197-98; methods of control of, 270; responsibilities of, 269-70;

secret police (Mukhabarat), 182, 196, 197-98

General Syrian Congress, 25 Geneva Conference on the Middle East

(1977), 50, 52 geographic location, 3, 59, 66, 127 Germany, West: broken relations with, 36-37; proposed new loans from, xxiv; trade relations with, 174

Ghassanids, 10 GID. General Intelligence Department

(GID), or Dairat al Mukhabarat

Gilead, 6, 7 Glubb, John Bagot (Glubb Pasha), 26-27,

32, 235, 236, 252

GNP. See gross national product (GNP)

Golan Heights, 5, 45, 225 government: criticism of (1989), xxv,

xxviii-xxix; executive power of, 183-

88; judicial power of, 183, 191-93;

legislative power of, 183, 188-90 government administration: central, 193; governorates or provinces of, 183, 192;

local, 192-93 government intervention: in economic activity, xxiv, 137-41; in financial sector, 174; in media activities, 219-20

governorates. See government administration Greek Catholic Church, 113 Greek Orthodox Church, 112 Greek people, 7 Grindlays Bank, 176

gross domestic product (GDP), 127-30

gross national product (GNP), 127 Gubser, Peter, 79, 81

guerrilla organizations, 37, 40, 198-209

guerrillas (see also Black September): Al

Fatah as organization of, 37, 40; arms and funds for, 40; fedayeen as another name for, xxii, 37, 40, 232; offensive

in Jordan by, 41-42; Palestinian, 4, 38, 197; of PLO, 40, 203; repelling of Is- raeli attackers (1968) by, 40-41; Syri- an assistance during civil war to, 42 Gulf Cooperation Council, 214 Gulf crisis and war (1990-91): effect on

Jordan of, xxx-xxxi; role of King Hussein in, xxix-xxx Gulf of Aqaba, 38, 66, 67

Habash, George, 40, 205-6, 207 Hadda Agreement (1925), 67

hadith, 104

hajj (see also Id al Adha), 107-8

Hajj Amin al Husayni, 29-30

Halaby, Elizabeth (see also Nur al Hussein (queen of Jordan)), 196

hamula or clan, 86-87 Hasan (crown prince), xxiv, 146, 181, 196, 242 Hashim, Ibrahim, 34 Hashim family, 197 Hashimite branch (Quraysh tribe), 3,4,

18, 20 Hashimite family, 194, 196 Hashimite kingdoms, 35 316
Index

Hasmonean Dynasty, 9 Hawatmah, Naif, 205, 207

health care program: discrimination in provision of, 121; family planning

aspect of, 73; health facilities in, 119;

hospitals in, 119; personnel in, 118-19;

physicians in, 118 Hedjaz-Jordan Railway (see also Hijaz

Railway), 155

Hellenistic culture, 7, 9 Herod (king of Judah), 9 Herzl, Theodor, 17

Hiatt, Joseph, 82-83, 84 High Court of Justice, 192 Higher Council for Science and Technology, 151 HigherJordanian-Palestinian Committee

(1982), 60

highlands, 68, 71 High Tribunal (High Council, or Su- preme Council), 192

Hijab, Nadia, 102

Hijaz, 20, 21 Hijaz Railway, 16, 155

Hittite people, 5 hoarding, 140 honor (ird) concept: among beduins, 82;

in family, 99-100 House of Islam (Dar al Islam), 10 Housing Bank, 174 human rights, 277-78 Husayn, Saddam, xxiii, xxix, xxx, 213 Hussein ibn Ali Al Hashimi, 18, 20-24

Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi (king of Jordan). See Hussein (king of Jordan)

Hussein (king ofJordan), xxii, 4, 29-30; advocacy of UN Resolution 242 by, 39; agreements with PLO of, xxvi, 42-43;

assassination attempts against, 223, 229; attitude toward Palestinians of, 57-58; biography of, 194, 196; control by (1989), 181, 193; criticism of, xxviii-xxix; forms military alliance with Egypt, 38; government role after June

1967 War, 38; opposition to, xxvii, 33,

35, 111-12, 229, 231-22, 232-33; plan

for Arab federation, 45; plan for Jor- danian National Union, 44; political in- stability of regime of (1980s), 181-82;

position on Camp David peace process

of, 53, 210, 216; proposes strike force (1980s), 217; pro-Western position of,

xxii; relations with Arafat and PLO of, xxvi-xxvii, 46-48, 50, 60, 186, 199-

202, 205-6, 213-14, 232-33; relations with beduins of, 84-86, 181, 240; re- lations with Egypt of, xxvii, 53-54, 61;

relations with PFLP, PFLP-GC, and

DFLP of, 205; relations with PLO of, 37; relations with Saddam Husayn of, xxiii, xxix; relations with Syria of, xxvii, 50-56; relations with United

States of, 215-17; relinquishes sover- eignty over West Bank, xxvii, xxviii, 181, 188, 210, 233; reorganization by,

48; requests assistance from Iraq

(1958), 35; role in Arab politics of, 4-5;

role in Persian Gulf War (1990-91), xxix-xxx; seeks to disarm refugee camps, 41; stresses self-sufficiency, xxiv, 47-48, 128; supports Iraq in Iran-Iraq War, xxiii, 56, 111, 213, 264; supports shah of Iran, 111 Hussein-McMahon correspondence, 21-22

Hussein Thermal Power Station, 153 Hyksos people, 5

Id al Adha, 108

Id al Fitr, 108 imam, 109 immigrants in Jordan (see also refugees),

79, 90, 147

imports, 127; barriers to entry of, xxiv, 149-50; changes in composition of, 172-73; cost of, 134; dependence on,

128, 134; excess over exports of, 130; of food supplies, 167-68; higher duties

for, 137, 140; of oil, xxx, 134, 154, 161-62, 174; revenues from, 142; subsidies for, 150; from United States and

Western Europe, 170 import substitution, xxiv, 150

India, 161, 173

Indonesia, 173

Industrial Development Bank, 174

industrial policy. See economic policy

inflation, 101, 134, 140, 146, 181

infrastructure (see also airports; canal; dam; port facilities; railroad system):

development in Transjordan of, 26; loss with seizure of West Bank (1967), 128; underdevelopment of, 154

insurance industry, xxiv, 127, 133 317
Jordan: A Country Study

interest rate regulation, 140

International Committee of the Red

Cross, 219

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), 273

International Monetary Fund (IMF),

xxiv, xxviii International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 159

Interpol. See International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

intifadah. See Palestinian uprising {intifadah) investment: domestic, 130, 139; foreign

direct, 127, 133, 140; ofJordanian capital abroad, 133

Iran: overthrow of shah in, 4; relations with, 218; support in Iran-Iraq War

for, 4

Iranian Revolution, 55

Iran-Iraq War, 4, 56, 60-61, 129, 157;

effect on Jordan of, xxiv; Hussein supports Iraq in, xxiii, xxvii, 56, 111, 213, 264; Iraqi fighting units after, 226

Iraq: British mandate for, 23; coup d'etat

in, 35-36; economic assistance from,

53, 56, 131; forces invade Israel (1948),

28; gives military equipment to Jordan,

213; invades Kuwait (1990), xxviii, xxix, xxx; military strength after Iran- Iraq War, 226; proclaims independence

(1919), 25; relations with, xxvii, 56, 136, 212-14, 226; support in Iran-Iraq War for, 4; trade relations with, 129,

133, 157, 162, 173

Iraqi-Jordanian Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation

(1981), 56

Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Company (IJLTC), 155

irrigation system, 166, 168-69

Islam {see also Muslims; Shia Islam; Sunni Islam): as established religion, 103; Jordanians practicing, 77; preparation

for, 10; in social life, 109; split into two

branches, 12; spread of, 10, 106; as way

of life, 104

Islamic banks, 176-77

Islamic courts. See sharia courts Islamic Investment House, 177

Islamic law (sharia). See sharia (Islamic Law)

Islamic Liberation Party, 197

Islamic revival {see also Muslim Brotherhood), 110-12, 225, 226, 230

Israel {see also Arab-Israeli wars; Caza

Strip; West Bank): accepts UN Resolution 242 , 40; annexes Golan Heights,

5; attacked by Syria and Egypt, 45, 225; bombs PLO Tunisian headquarters (1985), 201 ; border incidents with Jordan of, 31-32; buys U.S. aircraft, 60; defeats Jordan (1967), 38; establish- ment of (1948), 3, 28; foreign policy of (1981-82), 5; influence of ancient, 6; invaded by Arab forces (1948), 28; invades and occupies Lebanon (1982), 59-60; Likud government of, 4; mili- tary forces of, 224; perspective on

Palestinians of, 39-40; PLO and Al

Fatah raids against, 37; PNC reso- lutions related to (1987), 207; recognition by West Germany of, 36-37;

relations ofJordan with, 209-10, 212;

retaliation against Jordan by, 31, 32,

37, 40-41 ; seizes West Bank (1967), 4; as threat, xxvii-xxviii, xxxi, 224-25

Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 225

Israeli-occupied territories. See Gaza. Strip; West Bank

Israelites: conquer Canaan, 66; deportation of, 7

Italy, 174

Jabal Ramm (peak), 68 Jamiat al Arabiyah al Fatat (The Young

Arab Society). See Al Fatat (The Young

Arabs)

Japan, xxiv, 173, 218

Jardanah, Basil, xxxi

Jarring, Gunnar, 41, 42 Jerusalem {see also Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem): captured by crusaders, 13; occupation by Arab armies (638), 10; under Ottoman Empire, 13; partition

after June 1967 War, 66; reunified

(1967), 4; seized by Romans, 9; Trans- jordan control of, 3 Jerusalem, East, xxii Jesus (Isa), 107 Jewish kingdoms {see also Judah (Judea)), 6 Jewish people, 7 Jibril, Ahmad, 205-6

jihad, 108

Eric Johnston Plan, 31 318
Index

Joint Syrian-Jordanian Economic Committee, 173 Jordan: annexes West Bank (1950), 3, 29; East and West Bank elections in (1949), 29; official name of, 29; peace agree- ment with PLO (1985), xxvi; role in 1973 attack on Israel of, 45; Roman

ruins in, 9-10 Jordan Arab Army, 32, 33, 42; accepts National Guard members, 252-53; al- legiance of, 223, 229-30; beduin- dominated, 85, 181, 240; formation from Arab Legion of, 236; in October

1973 War, 238; organization of, 243;

Palestinians in, 240, 253; quality of, xxvii; reform (1976), 254; role in June

1967 Arab-Israeli War of, 236-38; size

of, 241 Jordan Cement Factories Company, 138, 149 Jordan Ceramic Company, 138 Jordan Fertilizer Industries Company,

149 Jordanian Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party), 32, 231 Jordanian Democratic Unity Party, xxix Jordanian Highlands, 68 Jordanian Military Academy, 257 Jordanian National Union, 44, 49

Jordanians: Christians among Arab, 77;

distinction between Arab and Palestinian, 76-77; as officials of government,

181 Jordanian Staff College, 257, 264

Jordanian-Syrian dam project, 165 Jordanian-Syrian Land Transport Company, 155 Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and In- vestment, 177 Jordan-Kuwait Bank, 176 Jordan Medical Association, 118 Jordan National Bank, 176 Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, 149, 160 Jordan Radio and Television, 220 Jordan Refinery Company, 138 Jordan region: Muslims in, 12; under Ot- toman rule, 13 Jordan River, 31, 36, 68 Jordan River valley, 5, 66, 68, 71, 168-69, 227 Jordan Technology Group, xxiv, 151 Jordan Telecommunications Corporation

(TCC), 158 Jordan University of Science and Technology, 116 Joshua, 6

Journalists' Association, 219 Judah Qudea), 6-7, 9 Judaism, 9 Judas (Judah) Maccabaeus, 9 June 1967, or Six-Day War, xxii, 3-4, 38; border with Israel after, 66; damage to Jordan from, 216, 247; economic as- sistance after, 216; partition ofJerusa- lem after, 66; role ofJordan Arab Army

in, 236-38

jury system, 275

Khalid ibn al Walid, 10 khamsin wind, 72 Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi, 55, 111 King Abdullah Air Base, 248 King Abdullah Airport, 158 King-Crane Commission, 23 King Faisal Air Base, 248 King Hussein Air Base (Al Mafraq), 248 King Talal Dam, 165

kinship {see also hamula or clan; family

structure), 82, 86-87, 95-97

Kitchener, H. H., 20-21 Kurds in Jordan, 79 Kurian, George T., 115 Kuwait, 131, 173; economic assistance from, xxvii; Iraq invades (1990), xxviii, xxix; relations with, 212, 214

labor force {see also labor unions; remittances): demand for skilled and educated, xxiii, 144-46; education of, xxiii, 127; export of, xxiii, xxiv, xxviii, 58,

73, 93-94, 100, 127, 144-47, 166, 215, 250; foreign guest workers in, 58, 144-47, 166; government employment

of, xxv, 129-30, 187-88; in manufacturing, 148; motivation for migration

in, 76; predicted underemployment in, 147; shortages in, 102, 146-47; unemployment in, xxviii, 66, 102, 134, 145-47, 181; women in, 98, 101-3, 147 labor unions, xxix Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), 66, 227; formed by Jordan River, 68; Israeli 319
Jordan: A Country Study

plan for water from, 36 land ownership: reform for, 166; tenure

of, 166 Land Settlement Court, 192

languages: Arabic, 12, 65, 79-81; Aramaic, 7, 12; area of Semitic, 5; Greek,

12 Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 13

law. See sharia (Islamic law); tribal law Lawrence, T. E., 21, 23, 25 Layne, Linda, 85-86 League of Arab States (Arab League):

Arab League Council of, 28; Collective Security Pact of, 30; formation of

(1945), 27; membership in, 219; lack of recognition of West Bank annexation

(1950), 29; ostracizes Egypt (1978),

xxvii, 53; result of 1967 conference of, 39 League of Nations, 23, 25 Lebanon: effect of civil war in, xxiv, 51; expulsion of PLO from, xxvi, 200;

forces invade Israel (1948), 28; French mandate for, 23; invaded by Israel, 5; Israel invades and occupies part of

(1982), 59-60; PLO forced to go to, 233; United States troops in (1958), 36

legal system {see also criminal code): new,

271; sharia law under, 12, 16, 104-5,

191, 270-71

Libya, xxvii, 131, 215

lineages, 87 Lisan Peninsula, 71

literacy, 115

livestock, 170 Lloyd George, David, 22

loans: from commercial banks, 136; from

multilateral organizations, 135-36; from United States, 39

luzum, 87

Macedonia, 7 McMahon, Henry, 21

magistrates' courts, 275

Majali, Abdul Hadi al, 265

Majali family, 197

Majali, Habis al, 42

Majali, Hazza al, 31-32, 36

Majali tribe, 90

malnutrition, 121 Mamluks, 13 manufacturing sector: chemical and fertilizer production in, 151; consumer

goods in, 151; GDP contributions of, 147; growth of, 130; partially or wholly state-owned firms in, 149 marriage {see also divorce; endogamy;

polygyny), 82, 96-97, 100

martial law, xxii, xxv, xxviii, 182, 241, 276

martial law courts, 276 Marxism-Leninism, 205

media, 219-20

medical equipment companies, 152 Mediterranean Sea, 71 Mehmed V (sultan), 18 merchant marine, 157 Mesopotamia, 7 Middle East: Arabic language as force for unity in, 65; Geneva Conference on

(1977), 50, 52; UN Resolution 242

(1967) for, xxvi-xxvii, 39, 46, 50, 60, 201, 216; UN Resolution 338 for, xxvii, 46, 50, 201, 216

migration, 75, 92-95

military assistance: from Britain, 218,

260; dependence on, 259-60; from

United States, 39, 131, 260

military equipment: purchases from

France of, 218; purchases from Soviet Union of, 218; purchases from United

States of, 224

military power: of Israel, 224-25; of Syria, 226

military regions, 242

military service. See conscription system

military training: for air force, 248-49; army basic and advanced, 256-57; of

foreign nationals, xxviii; quality of

schools for, 257; in United States, 263

militia. See People's Army

millet system, 16, 106 mining sector {see also phosphate industry;

potash industry), 130

Ministry of Communications, 158

Ministry of Culture and Information, 219

Ministry of Defense, 242; General Directorate of Conscription and Mobilization

of, 254; Public Security Force under, 265

Ministry of Education, 115, 257

Ministry of Finance, 141 Ministry of Health, 118 Ministry of Higher Education, 117 Ministry of Interior, xxviii, 192, 270; 320
Index

Public Security Directorate of, 265, 266, 267, 274, 276-77

Ministry of Labor, 147 Ministry of Occupied Territories, 188 Ministry of Planning, 101 Ministry of Religious Endowments and

Islamic Affairs, 230

Ministry of Supply, 140-41

Ministry of Transportation, 155, 157 minority groups, 231 Moab, 6 Modern Standard Arabic, 80 monetary policy, 146

monetization, 175 Morocco, 215

mortality rate, 72, 121 Moses (Musa), 6, 107 Muawiyah (caliph), 12, 105 Mubarak, Husni, xxvii, 61, 213-14

muezzin, 107 Mufti, Said al, 33-34, 197 Muhammad Ali (pasha of Egypt), 16 Muhammad (prince of Jordan), 196 Muhammad (prophet) {see also hadith; sunna), 10, 12, 104-5, 106-7, 196 Mukhabarat. See General Intelligence

Department (GID) or Dairat al Mukhabarat

multilateral organizations {see also Inter- national Monetary Fund (IMF)): eco- nomic assistance from, 131 ; loans from, 135-36 Muna al Hussein (princess), 194 Muragha, Said Musa. See Abu Musa

Muslim Brotherhood, xxv-xxvi, xxix, 4, 55, 111, 197-98, 230 Muslims, 10; duties of, 107; religious courts for, 191; Sunni and Shia branches, 12, 105-7 Mutah (Moata) Military University, 257, 264 Mutah University, 116

Nabataean people, 7, 9 Nabulsi, Sulayman, 32-33

Naif (prince in Jordan), 30

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 31, 32; attempts

to destabilize Hussein, 226; leads summit discussing water distribution

(1964), 36; role in 1967 War of, 37-38

National Alliance, 206

National Assembly, 188-90, 200

National Charter (Mithaq al Watani),

xxvi, xxix National Consultative Council (NCC),

58-59, 190 National Front Party (Communist Party

of Jordan), 32 National Guard, 236, 252

nationalism: of Arab revival, 17-18, 20; of Arabs in Jordan, 31 ; of Palestinians, 91; of Turks, 18; of Zionism, 17 National Jordanian Movement, 197 National Maritime Company, 157

national police. See Public Security Force

national security policy, 223-25, 229

National Service Law (1976), 254, 268

National Socialist Party, 32

National Unity program. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

natural gas, xxiii, 154, 164

natural resources, xxiii, 160-64

naval force, 241 NCC. See National Consultative Council (NCC)

Nebuchadnezzar, 7 Negev Desert, 36 Neo-Babylonian Empire, 7 neolithic culture, 5 news agency (PETRA), 220

newspapers, 219

Nixon, Richard M., 45 nomads. See beduins North Yemen. See Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)

Nur al Hussein (queen of Jordan), 196

Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, 24-25 October 1973 War, 46, 216, 225, 238,

247, 261-62

officer corps, 253, 257

oil industry {see also oil refining; shale oil deposits), xxiii, 161-62, 164

oil price downturn, xxiv, xxviii, 4, 58, 93, 128-29, 145, 260

oil refining, 138, 149, 161-62 Oman, 214, 264 Organic Law: 1928 (Transjordan), xxi, 26, 27 Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) {see also Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (AOPEC)), 162 321
Jordan: A Country Study

Ottoman Decentralization Party, 18 Ottoman Empire {see also Sublime Porte), administrative divisions of, 13, 16; con- quers area, 3; opposition of Arabs to, 18 Ottoman Turks, 13

Outre Jourdain (Beyond Jordan), 13

packaging and container industry, 152-53

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah. See Iran

Pakistan, 173

Palestine, 3; Arab rebellion (1936-39),

235; as British mandate, 23; derivation of name of, 6; under Ottoman Empire,

13; PLO declaration for independent,

181; proposed United Nations partition

of, 27-28; strategic geographic location

of, 22; under Sykes-Picot Agreement,

21-22

Palestine Central Committee (PCC), 207

Palestine Communist Party, 197, 206, 207

Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), 42, 49, 209

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), 206

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

{see also guerrillas; Palestine Central Committee (PCC)), 36, 37; administration of, 208; agreements with Hussein

of, 42-43; bombing of Tunisian headquarters of, 201; in civil war (1970-71),

198; declaration of Rabat summit relat- ed to, 47; effect on nationalism of, 91; expulsion from Lebanon of (1982), 200;

Fifteen-Point Political Program of, 207;

guerrilla groups accepting policy of, 206; lack of support from Hussein for (1966), 37; National Unity Program of, 207; opposition ofJordan and Syria to, 51; Palestine Liberation Army of, 42, 209; Palestine Martyrs' Works Society (SAMED), 209; Palestine National Fund of, 208; Palestinian National Charter of, 207; Palestininan Armed

Struggle Command of, 209; peace agreement with Jordanian government

(1985), xxvi-xxvii; peace agreement

with Jordanian government of (1970),

41; recruitment in refugee camps by,

197, 203; relations with Jordan of, 223;

response to endorsement of Saddam

Husayn, xxx; role in administering aid funds to occupied territory, 188; role in 1989 elections of, xxv

Palestine Mandate: exclusion of Jews

from Transjordan section of, 25; objective of administration of, 24-25;

opposition to, 23; partition of, 3; relin- quished by British (1948), 235; subdivision of (1921), xxi, 25; terms of, 23

Palestine National Council (PNC) {see also Palestine Central Committee (PCC)),

48-49, 201; declares independent state of Palestine, 202; Executive Committee of, 203, 208; meets in Jordan (1984),

xxvi; as representative of Palestinian di- aspora, 206-7; resolutions related to Is- rael (1987), 207

Palestine National Fund. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Palestine National Liberation Movement.

See Al Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement)

Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS),

208-9

Palestinian Armed Struggle Command,

209

Palestinian National Charter. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Palestinians: anti-American sentiment of, 216; in attack against Israel (1973), 45; citizenship in Jordan of, 189, 197; cre- ate a state within Lebanon (1970-75),

51; defined, 65; differences in political identity of, 91; differing views of problem of, 39-40; in East Bank, 65; economic assistance from Jordan to, 57; as guerrillas (fedayeen), xxii, 37, 225, 232; human and economic capital of, 90-91, 253, 254; integration of and dis- crimination against, xxiii, 233; in Jor- dan (1953), 31; Jordanian alternative

for problem of, 54; in Jordanian army,

240; Majali tribe as, 90; National Guidance Committee of, 54; national- ism of, 91; opposition to absolutist monarchy by, 198; place in social struc- ture of, 77; position of King Hussein

toward, 48; reasons for lack of assimilation of, 76; in refugee camps, 182;

role in government of, 181, 188; role in Jordanian society of, 197; working

abroad, 93-94 322
Index

Palestinian uprising (intifadah) , xxvii, 66, 92, 223, 233 Pan-Arabism, 91 paper and cardboard production, 152-53

Peake, F. G. (Peake Pasha), 26, 27, 234

penal system, 276-78

People's Army, 257, 259

People's Army Law (1983), 257

Peraea, 7 Peres, Shimon, 212

Persia, 7 Persian Gulf states, 56

Petra Bank, 176 PETRA (news agency), 220

Petra (Sela), 9 PFLP. See Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

PFLP-GC. See Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

pharmaceutical industry, xxiv, 152

Philadelphia, 7, 9

Philistines, 6 phosphate production and export, xxiii, 127, 160, 215

pilgrims, Muslim, 16

pipeline: oil, 162; proposals for water, 165-66

plateau country, 68 PLF. See Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

PNC. See Palestine National Council (PNC)

police. See Public Security Force

Police Training School, 268

political groups: appearance of, (1989-

90), xxix

political organizations, 44, 58; Democratic Bloc as, xxvi; restrictions on activities of, 231

political parties, 59; xxix; banned, xxv;

in exile, 197

political structure: Islamic opposition to, 111-12; role of kinship in, 87-88; role of tribalism in, 82-86

political system: elite in, 193-97; National Charter principles for, xxvi; repression

and dissent in, 197-98

polygyny, 97 Pompey, 9 Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- tine-General Command (PFLP-GC),

205, 207, 223, 233

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) (see also Jordanian Democratic Unity Party), xxix, 40, 207; air- plane high-jacking campaign of, 42 Popular Struggle Front (PSF), 206, 207

population: age distribution in, 72-73;

concentration of, xxiii, 227; of East and West Bank combined (1950), 90; of East Bank (1988), 65; effect of size of, xxiii; growth of, xxiv-xxv, 72, 134, 147; ofJordan (1953), 30-31, 128; no- madic and seminomadic, 75; Palestin- ians in, xxiii; ratio of beduins to total, 83; of Transjordan (1921), 65

port facilities, 67, 155, 156-57

potash industry, xxiii, 161

price system: levels in, 134, 140-41; price setting in, 140-41

Prince Hasan Air Base, 248

Prison Law (1953), 277

Prisons Department. See Ministry of Interior, Public Security Directorate prison system, 276-78

private sector, 138-39

privatization, 159

protectionism, 149-50

Protestant denominations, 113-14 PSF. See Popular Struggle Front (PSF)

Ptolemaic Dynasty, 7 Ptolemy Philadelphus, 9 Public Security Force (see also Desert

Police Force), xxviii; control in peace and war for, 265; duties and responsibilities of, 266-67; geographic organization of, 266-67; judicial, administrative, and support for police of, 266-67;

as outgrowth of Arab Legion, 265; ranks and insignia of, 268-69; recruit- ment for, 268; size of, 266 pumping station H5 air base, 248, 249

qadis (religious judges), 12, 191 Qasim, Abd al Karim, 35 Qassim family, 197 Qatar, 131, 215 Queen Alia International Airport, 158 Quran, 12, 104, 107, 109 Quraysh of Mecca, 12 Quraysh tribe, 18 323
Jordan: A Country Study

Rabat Summit (1974), 46-47, 91, 189, 199, 210

radio broadcasting, 220 Rafldayn Bank, 176

railroad system, 16, 155-56

rainfall, 71, 164, 168 Ramadan (see also Id al Fitr), 107-8 Reagan, Ronald, 57, 59, 262 Reagan Plan, 59-60, 212, 216-17

recession, 181-82 Red Cross. See International Committee

of the Red Cross Red Sea, 66

refugee camps: established after 1948

Arab-Israeli War, 29, 76; established

after June 1967 War, 76; GID representation in, 270; guerrilla recruitment

in, 203; maintained by UNRWA, 219; militance in, 40, 91-92; political re- cruitment in, 197; population of East Bank, 90; role of Palestinian Armed

Struggle Command in, 209

refugees: impoverished, 233; from Iraq and Kuwait (1990-91), xxx; problem

of, 40; from West Bank, 38, 90-92, 147

religion (see also Christianity; Druze

religion; millet system; Shia Islam; Sunni Islam), 103-9

religious courts, 191

religious minorities, 112-14

religious sects, 114

remittances, 58, 93-94, 127, 130-31, 215,

250; decline in, 134, 136, 147; revenues from, 145-47; used for development

planning, 142-43

reserves, international, 134-35, 136

revenues: from economic assistance, xxv; from imports, 142; from remittances,

58, 93-94, 127, 130-31, 215, 250

Rifai, Abd al Munim, 41

Rifai, Samir ar, 196-97

Rifai, Zaid ar, 48, 49, 137, 187, 190, 196

rift valleys, 67-68, 71

riots: in 1986, xxv, 231, 232; in 1989,

182, 190, 196 road system, 154-55

Robins, Philip, 145 Roman Catholic Church, 113 Roman Empire: absorption ofJudah into, 9; administrative division of, 10 Royal Jordanian Air Academy, 248-49

Royal Jordanian Air Force: organization

of, 248; semi-autonomous nature of,

242-43; size of, 241 Royal Jordanian Airlines, 139, 157-58 Royal Police Academy, 268

Russia, 16

Sadat, Anwar as, 46, 53; signs Camp

David Accords, xxiii; visits Jerusalem,

52, 199

Saladin, 13 Salah ad Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub. See Saladin SAMED. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Samuel, Herbert, 25 San Remo Conference (1920), 23, 25 Sassanian Empire, 10 Saudi Arabia: boundary with, 67; eco- nomic assistance from, xxiv, xxvii, 131, 250, 260; forces invade Israel (1948),

28; Jordanians in, 93-94; oil sales by,

162; payments to Jordan (1957), 32-33;

relations with, xxx-xxxi, 173-74, 212, 214

Saul (king), 6

schools: for police training, 268; religious, 114-15; of UNRWA, 115 Seccombe, Ian J., 145

security, internal. See General Intelligence Department (GID)

Seleucids, 9 Selim I (Ottoman sultan), 13 Seljuk Turks, 12-13 seminomads. See beduins

semisedentary groups. See beduins

Semitic language, 5, 7 Semitic nomads (see also Amorites):

Amorites as, 5; habiru (Hebrews) as, 5 service sector, xxiv, 127, 129, 133

Shakir, Ash Sharif Zaid ibn, xxvi, 187,

190, 196, 242

Shakir family, 196

shale oil deposits, 154, 164 Shalmaneser (king of Assyria), 7 Shami, Senteny, 74 Shamir, Yitzhak, 212

shammal wind, 72

Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, 196

Sharaf, Layla, 86, 196 Sharaf family, 196

sharia courts (see also qadis (religious judges)), 191, 270

sharia (Islamic law), 12, 16, 104-5, 191, 324
Index

270-72, 273; enforcement under Ottoman

rule of, 16 Sharon, Ariel, 5, 54

Shia Islam, 12, 105; Ismaili branch of, 114; in minority in Jordan, xxvi, 231

Shia Muslims: Jordanians as, 104; Shi- shans as, 79, 114

Shia radicals, 4

Shiat Ali (Party of Ali), 105 Shishans (Chechens) in Jordan, xxvi, 79

Shukairi, Ahmad. See Shuqayri, Ahmad

Shuqayri, Ahmad, 36-37

Sinai Peninsula: Egyptian military build- up in, 37-38; as home of Israelites, 6

Social Security Corporation, 122

Social Security Law (1978), 122

social services, 122

social structure (see also endogamy; hamula or clan; kinship; marriage; tribal- ism; villages): changing relations in, 100; class structure and distinctions in, 77, 93; elite in, 31; fragmentation of, 65; mobility in, 76, 95; status in, 95;

in Transjordan, 81; tribalism as ele- ment of, 76, 81-86; in villages, 86-90

social welfare, 121-22 Solomon (king), 6 Southern Ghawr, 68

Soviet Union: invades Afghanistan, 55,

56; Jordanians studying in, 117; rela- tions with, 218; sells air defense systems and other equipment, 260, 261; supports proposed UN partition of Palestine (1947), 27

Spain, 261

Special Council, 192

special courts, 191-92

Special Police Force. See Ministry of Interior, Public Security Directorate spending, government: cuts in, 137; for defense (1988), 250-51 ; for defense and

national security, xxvii, 128, 250; for education, 114; for social security, housing, and welfare, 122 standard of living, 117-22, 128, 134

Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, 54-55, 56

stock exchange. See Amman Financial Market

Strait of Tiran, 38, 40

students, 231 Sublime Porte, 16

subsidies, 140-41; for imports, 150; requirement to reduce, xxiv Suez Canal, 20, 22, 40

sunna, 104 Sunni Islam (see also hadith; hajj; imam;

jihad; Ramadan; sunna), 12, 65, 105; Circassians practicing, 16, 78; as mainstream form in Jordan, xxvi, 231; ratio of those adhering to, 103; tenets of, 106

Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 21-22

Syria: after war in Lebanon, 61; as ally, 50-51, 225; attacks Israel (1973), 45;

financial support for As Saiqa, 206;

forces invade Israel (1948), 28; French mandate for, 23; joint ventures with,

138; Jordanian uneasiness toward, 226; military aid to fedayeen (1970), 42, 226; occupied by Arabs by 640, 10; opposition to Jordanian military training

(1980), 226; in and out of United Arab

Republic, 35, 36; payments to Jordan

(1957), 32-33; proclaims independence

(1919), 25; relations with Iraq of, 56;

relations with Jordan of, xxvii, 50-56,

173, 214; as Roman province, 9; supports Iran, 4; takes side in Lebanon, 51 Syrian-Jordanian Marine Transport

Company, 157 Syrian (or North Arabian) Desert, 67

Tal, Wasfi at, 36, 43-44

Talal (prince (later king) ofJordan), xxixxii, 30, 194 Tal family, 197 Talhuni, Bahjat at, 36 Taminian, Lucine, 74

Tapline. See Trans-Arabian Pipeline

(Tapline)

tax policy, 142 TCC. See Jordan Telecommunications

Corporation (TCC)

telecommunications system, 158-60

television broadcasting, 220

terrorism: by Black September, 44, 198; of extreme PLO groups, 201; by

fedayeen, 37; by Jordanian and Palestinian political groups, 198; Special

Police Force role for countering, 267; Syrian-sponsored, 226, 232

Thailand, 160, 173 Thatcher, Margaret, 218

thermal power stations, 153-54 325
Jordan: A Country Study

TJFF. See Transjordan Frontier Force

topography, 67-68, 71 tourism industry, xxxi

trade policy {see also entrepot status; exports; imports; import substitution; protectionism): to alter composition and direction of, 170, 172; barter agree- ments with Iraq, 162; entrepot status

in, xxiv, xxviii, xxx, 127, 133, 264; for imports, 137, 149-50; for transit to and

from Iraq, 129, 133

trade unions. See labor unions

trading partners, 173-74

Trajan (emperor of Rome), 9 Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), 162

transfer payments. See economic assis- tance; remittances Transjordan {see also Amirate of Transjordan; Jordan): exclusion of Jewish

settlement in (1922), 25; forces invade

Israel (1948), 28; granted independence

(1946), 194; under Palestine Mandate,

xxi, 25; Palestinian Arabs in, 29; preparation for independence of, 26;

treaties and agreements with Britain of, 26-27

Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF), 26, 234-35

Transjordanians. See Jordanians

transportation system, xxiv, xxviii, 154-58, 162, 213

treaties, 16; between Britain and Transjordan, 26-27; related to religious af- filiation, 16 Treaty of London (1946), xxi, 27 Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Is- rael (1979), 4, 53, 111, 199

treaty with Egypt and Syria (1957), 236

tribalism, 76, 79; forces related to decline

in, 85; foundation for, 82; importance

in social and political structure of, xxiii, 83-86; in Transjordan, 81

tribal kingdoms, 6

tribal law, 16, 193

tribesmen, Arab, 18 Truman, Harry, 29

Tunisia, 201 Tunis summit (1979), 54 Turkey, 174

Umar (caliph), 12, 105 Umayyad Dynasty, 12

unemployment, 66, 102, 118, 134, 181 Unionist Democratic Association, 197 United Arab Command, 36, 37 United Arab Emirates, 131, 173, 215 United Arab Kingdom (proposed), 45 United Arab Republic (UAR), 35, 36 United Nations (UN): Emergency Force (UNEF) of, 38; membership in, 219; PLO observer status in, 208; recognizes

PLO, 47; Relief and Works Agency

(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 29, 73, 90, 115, 122,

131, 219; resolution to partition Palestine Mandate, 3; sanctions against Iraq

(1990), xxix; Security Council Resolution 242, xxvi-xxvii, 39, 46, 50, 60, 201, 216; Security Council Resolution

338, xxvii, 46, 50, 201, 216; Special

Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP),

27; Truce Supervision OrganizationPalestine (UNSTOP), 28 United States: Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency (ACDA), 251, 261; Congress opposes military sales to Jor- dan, 247-48, 250, 262-63, 264; Department of State, 277; diminished aid and arms sales of, 217; economic as- sistance from, 34-35, 131, 168, 215-16;

Eric Johnston water distribution plan

of, 31; imports from, 170; Jordanians

studying in, 117; loans from, 39; mili- tary assistance from, 39, 215-16, 217, 261-63; military training and technical assistance from, 263; Point Four program in Jordan of, 29; political sup- port from, 215; relations with, 51-52,

60-61, 215-17; sells military equipment and aircraft to Jordan, 52, 247, 261-63;

supports proposed UN partition of

Palestine (1947), 27; trade relations with, 174 United States Army Command and

General Staff College, 257

universities {see also community colleges), 116, 231, 257

University of Jordan, 116, 231 UNRWA. See United Nations (UN)

UNSCOP. See United Nations (UN)

UNSTOP. See United Nations (UN)

urban centers: population concentrations

in, 65, 74-75; rise of modern, 92-93 Uthman (caliph), 12, 105

utilities industry, 130 326
Index

veterans' rights, 254

veterinary medicine industry, 152

villages, 86-90, 193

Wadi al Arabah (Wadi al Jayb), 68 Wadi al Arabah Dam, 165 wages, 146 Wahhabi sectarians, 25, 26, 234 War College, 257

wars: Arab-Israeli, xxi, xxii, 3-4, 38, 46, 66, 216, 224-25, 235-38, 247, 261-62;

civil (1970-71), xxii, 42, 193, 198-99,

215-16, 233; civil, Lebanon, 51; Gulf

(1991), xxix-xxxi; Iran-Iraq, 4 water demand, xxiv-xxv, 118, 127, 164 water distribution: Israeli plan for, 36; proposal for Lebanon and Syria for, 36; proposed plan by Iraq for, 56; United

States plan for, 31 water resources, xxiv-xxv, 164-66, 168- 69 Weizmann, Chaim, 23 West Bank: annexed by Jordan (1950),

3, 29, 66; economic assistance to Pales- tinians in, xxvii; elections (1976), 199; expanding Israeli settlements in, 4, 59;

Israel assaults villages in (1966), 37; Is- raeli plans to retain, 53-54; Jordan

relinquishes sovereignty over (1988),

xxvii, xxviii, 181, 188, 210, 233; neolithic culture in, 5; Palestinian Arabs

in, 29; pan-Arab aid funds for oc- cupied, 188, 202; PLO territorial claims to, 47; seizure by Israel (1967),

xxii, 4, 38, 128, 166 Western Europe: imports from, 170; Jor- danians studying in, 117

WHO. See World Health Organization

(WHO)

Wilson, Rodney, 172 Wilson, Woodrow, 23 winds (khamsin; shammal), 72 women: in armed forces, 255; effect of social changes on, 100-101; enfranchise- ment of (1973), 189; honor concept for, 99-100; in labor force, 98, 101-3, 147; Palestinian position on role of, xxiii; in police organization, 268; practicing traditional health remedies, 120; proposals for motivation to work, 102;

religious practices of, 110-11; role in family of, 96-99, 100; role in social structure of, 95; targeted for health

care, 121; as volunteers in People's

Army, 259 worker remittances. See remittances World Bank, xxiv, 131 World Health Organization (WHO), 118

Writers' Association, 219

Yarmuk Brigade, 56, 264 Yarmuk River, 68, 154, 165, 227 Yarmuk University, 116, 231 Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen),

214, 219 Young Turks, 18, 20

Yugoslavia, 160

Zayadin, Yaqub, 232

Zionist Congress, First, 17 Zionist General Council, 28

Zionist Organization, 17, 23

Zionists, 17, 22

327

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