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HOW BEST TO IMPROVE OUR NATION’S 

AIRPORT PASSENGER SECURITY SYSTEM 

THROUGH COMMONSENSE SOLUTIONS 

(112–111) 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 29, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

VACANCY 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Chairman 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota, Vice Chair 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

VACANCY 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL 1 

Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 5 

Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 5 

PANEL 2 

Kenneth J. Dunlap, Global Director, Security and Travel Facilitation, International Air Transport Association .................................................................... 20 

Veda Shook, International President, Association of Flight Attendants ............ 20 

Charles Leocha, Director, Consumer Travel Alliance ........................................... 20 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Charles K. Edwards ................................................................................................. 32 

Stephen M. Lord ...................................................................................................... 38 

Kenneth J. Dunlap .................................................................................................. 50 

Veda Shook ............................................................................................................... 54 

Charles Leocha ......................................................................................................... 62 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. John L. Mica, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, 

request to submit: 

Majority investigative staff of the House Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, A Decade Later: A Call for TSA Reform (Nov. 16, 2011) .. 68 

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, TSA Management and Oversight at Honolulu International Airport (Sept. 2012) . 90 

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Insert offset folio 4 here 76978.004
viii 


Insert offset folio 5 here 76978.005
ix 


Insert offset folio 6 here 76978.006
x 


Insert offset folio 7 here 76978.007
(1) 

HOW BEST TO IMPROVE OUR NATION’S 

AIRPORT PASSENGER SECURITY SYSTEM 

THROUGH COMMONSENSE SOLUTIONS 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Petri 

(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. PETRI. The subcommittee will come to order. Today we will 

address an important issue that has a direct impact on the aviation 

industry: the Transportation Security Administration, or TSA, security policies. 

When established in 2001, the TSA became responsible for aviation passenger security screening, including the hiring, training, 

and oversight of screening personnel. Today’s hearing will look at 

the effect TSA policies have on the passenger experience and on 

aviation commerce. We will hear from Government, industry, labor, 

and consumer advocacy witnesses about the impact of TSA policies 

on the civil aviation system, and suggested comments on solutions 

to improve aviation security. 

The aviation industry plays a critical role in the United States 

economy, contributing roughly 5 percent to our gross domestic 

product, and providing safe transportation to 803 million passengers per year. According to estimates by the United States 

Travel Association, commercial aviation passenger travel contributed roughly $813 million to the United States tourism industry in 

2011. Therefore, any regulation or policy that impacts the aviation 

passenger experience, or the free flow of aviation commerce, directly impacts civil aviation and is of interest to this committee. 

Surveys conducted by consumer advocacy groups have discovered 

that the professionalism and efficiency of the airport screening 

process has a direct impact on the likelihood that passengers will 

travel by air. In fact, one survey showed that aviation passengers 

were more likely to take one or more additional trips each year if 

the security screening process were to be made more efficient and 

friendly. These additional trips could generate millions of dollars in 

additional revenue for the aviation industry and for our economy. 

The last decade, this subcommittee has heard from constituents, 

colleagues, and industry stakeholders about TSA’s impact on the 

passenger experience and on the civil aviation system. Concerns 

2 

about the imposition of passenger screening procedures, such as 

the enhanced pat-downs, the use of advanced imaging technology 

machines, the lack of clarity on alternative screening procedures. 

While TSA has developed alternative procedures for groups such 

as children under 12, active duty military personnel, the elderly, 

and persons with disabilities, there is concern from consumer advocates that passengers and some screeners are uncertain as to what 

these alternative procedures are. In addition, there are fears that 

both passengers and screeners may not always be aware of what 

the passenger’s rights are when going through the screening process. 

The past few years the TSA has started to move its approach 

from one-size-fits-all to a risk-based approach that attempts to 

focus screening efforts on high-risk passengers. This approach has 

resulted in the development of some new programs, such as Precheck, an expedited screening program for known travelers of certain airlines. Under the Pre-check program, passengers enjoy 

streamlined screening. This is a small step towards a risk-based 

approach, and TSA should do more. 

TSA and its 45,000 screeners are responsible for a complex and 

difficult job: ensuring the security of all aviation passengers. The 

TSA would be well-served in pursuing better partnerships with 

aviation stakeholders. TSA should also seek more input from a variety of groups on how the security process can be improved. 

Look forward to hearing the witnesses’ comments and suggestions to improve the aviation passenger experience, including areas 

where they believe TSA has made progress, and where progress 

still needs to be made. 

I am sure, by the way, that Members have noticed that the TSA 

itself has chosen not to participate in this hearing. If we want more 

Government stovepiping, separation from one sector and another, 

the TSA’s attitude and actions regarding this hearing achieve that 

end. But if we want better Government and coordination between 

different Government activities, Congress must be able to fulfill its 

oversight responsibilities. 

In the case of this subcommittee, the TSA’s operations and policies clearly impact civil aviation, including commerce, safety, airport operations, airlines, and passengers. Unfortunately, if they 

continue down this path of nontransparency and arrogance, the 

TSA will end up eliminating the very thing it is supposed to be protecting. Their absence today demonstrates why the public is so 

frustrated with the TSA. These people are public servants, and 

should reflect that in their attitude, rather than the arrogance that 

we see expressed on many occasions. 

I would like to thank all the witnesses for taking the time to appear before the subcommittee, and sharing their thoughts with us. 

And before we turn to witnesses for their statements, I would 

ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days 

to revise and extend their remarks, and include extraneous material for the record. 

[No response.] 

Mr. PETRI. Without objection, so ordered. And now, I would recognize my colleague, Mr. Peter DeFazio from Oregon, for any opening remarks. 

3 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just reflect that 

since I have been in Congress we have come a very long way on 

aviation security. My first term I got a briefing—and in those days 

the FAA was responsible for the oversight. But their employees 

weren’t authorized to carry weapons in order to test the system. So 

they would encase a .45-caliber handgun, which is a pretty big 

honking thing, in a piece of Lucite, stick it in a carry-on bag with 

no more than something like three or five articles of clothing, and 

some very large percentage of the time it wasn’t detected. 

You know, early on, I proposed an enhanced security bill. Introduced my first bill, I believe, in 1988 to enhance the security. Bill 

Lipinski and I, 4 years before 9/11, talked about federalizing the 

workforce in many airports. The security jobs were described as the 

lowest entry-level job in the airport. We had heard testimony saying that people looked forward, in St. Louis, in moving up to 

McDonald’s from being screeners. 

We have professionalized the workforce. There are opportunities 

for advancement, better training, but it is still a work in progress. 

TSA has blundered in terms of certain acquisitions of equipment— 

the puffers, most notably, and some other equipment that they 

have acquired and then immediately retired, or sometimes didn’t 

even put into use. And there is still some unevenness in terms of 

the training, and, with a large workforce, one can understand that. 

But we need a TSA that is more nimble, more responsive, that 

does a better job at acquiring technology to expedite the screening 

process, and isn’t focused on things that aren’t important, which 

undermines the confidence of the traveling public, but takes a ‘‘bigger picture’’ view. And I do welcome the move toward the Pre-check 

and the known employee identification. And yet I would observe 

that those systems are not yet quite perfect, and I will have some 

questions about that later. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Mica? 

Mr. MICA. First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting 

this important hearing. And the title of it, of course, deals with our 

effectiveness in accommodating passengers and also making certain 

that TSA is putting in place the very best security measures and 

focusing their attention on who poses a risk. 

Having been involved with TSA since its inception and one of the 

individuals responsible for its original creation, of course, I have 

been one of its strongest critics since it has sort of spun out of control. Just for the record, briefly, that spinning out of control, I 

think, occurred when it left the jurisdiction of this committee. It is 

very sad today that the administrator of TSA is stonewalling our 

committee, which created TSA, and refuses to communicate or 

work with our committee. He has done so, really, over his tenure. 

And I think that is part of the problem. 

He and others now are protecting one of the biggest bureaucracies that has ever expanded in the history of our Federal Government, from 16,500 screeners to approximately 3,000 when it— 

30,000 when it left the jurisdiction of this committee now to 66,000, 

I’m told, with more than 45,000 screeners, 14,000 administrative 

staff, 4,000 administrative staff within miles of here, making, on 

average, $105,000 a year. And then, with only 457 airports in the 

4 

country, you do the math of another 10,000 administrative personnel outside the jurisdiction here, just the overhead as far as 

management administrative costs has soared beyond belief. They 

don’t want to respond to us, they only want to expand the bureaucracy, it appears. 

The sad thing about it is the system doesn’t make us any safer. 

In fact, now the customers are at risk. We have had meltdowns in 

airport after airport—Honolulu, we have—and we will cite those— 

ask unanimous consent that we cite in the record some of the meltdowns: Honolulu, L.A., Newark, Fort Myers, Charlotte. The list 

goes on and on. It is actually the passengers at risk now from TSA 

having their personal effects pilfered. It is unfortunate. Even in my 

own hometown of Orlando, as featured on a national television expose of theft by TSA workers, the meltdowns are—their lack of 

ability to perform. 

We heard the chairman speak of their lack of experience, and 

other Members will address that, too. But this is our frontline of 

security, and it is a very weak line when the screeners now pose 

a risk to the flying public. So we have got to get this thing under 

control. 

Mr. DeFazio was very active when we started this. We wanted 

to create a risk-based system that went after people who posed a 

risk. Now we are shaking down grandmothers, veterans, people 

with disabilities, every day you get a new horrific story. So we have 

lost our focus. 

The purpose of putting it together, too—and when we had staff 

look at our pre-9/11 security efforts for aviation and transportation, 

we saw a scattered effort. We wanted it unified, and that is what 

we did in creating TSA, so you can connect the dots. The only thing 

that may save us is intelligence and information. So far we have 

been saved mostly by foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence 

information. Very little domestic. In almost every instance, TSA, 

where there has been an event, whether it was the diaper bomber, 

whether it was the shoe bomber, the mechanisms and protections 

that TSA put in place for screening failed. 

We also have reports—and we will include those in the record— 

of the constant failure every week, everyday items that could pose 

a threat, do get by TSA. The equipment that they put in place also 

fails to detect even tests that we have imposed on the system and 

on a daily—almost a daily basis, a threat. 

So, we have this huge bureaucracy, we have the flying public 

dramatically inconvenienced, almost violating, I think, their civil 

rights, and a system that is very poor. And we have, finally, missed 

the mark as far as targeting those who pose a risk and focusing 

on those individuals, rather than the general flying public. So, done 

a lot of damage, and I think we can turn it around. 

The provisions that everyone helped with that we put on the end 

of the FAA bill that now require TSA to accept opt-out applications 

is in effect, and airports are now opting out. We had seven—we 

had five original that we set up that had private screening under 

Federal supervision that, as an evaluation, clearly stated after we 

had them in operation for some time, that private screening under 

Federal supervision performed statistically significantly better. So 

5 

we do have a mechanism to get us back to our original intent, 

which was to take TSA apart after the threats of 9/11. 

We need to be closing down TSA as we know it, and instituting 

a safer, more secure, less bureaucratic, and more effective system. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. And those—the documents to which you 

referred will be made a part of the record. 

[Please see pp. 68–139 for the reports that Hon. John L. Mica 

submitted for the record.] 

And I would like to welcome the first panel: Mr.—the Honorable 

John Pistole, administrator of TSA, in absentia, was invited, but 

we will check at some point with the Office of Management and 

Budget and others, and see what the policy of this Administration 

is, so far as whether people should be testifying on related questions before this Congress, or if the Administration’s policy is not 

to cooperate and to stovepipe. Or, if they are worried about committees of jurisdiction, if we coordinate with the committee of jurisdiction, as we have done in this instance, and has indicated that they 

would like TSA to accommodate us, if that should be the policy 

going forward. 

But in any event, it is not acceptable to not get input from the 

TSA on a hearing on its activities that affect a vital part of the jurisdiction of this committee, which is aviation. And the fact is, of 

course, we all work for the public. And I talk to my constituents, 

they all assume that somehow we are accountable for the security 

that is going on in the airport. And, ultimately, it certainly does 

affect the operation of airlines, and they have to do a lot of work 

to try to accommodate and work with airport administrators to 

make sure that, one way or another, they make extra people and 

gates available for security when there is high frequency, to make 

sure people don’t miss their flights because of the TSA problems, 

which were rampant at the beginning, and are, thankfully, much 

better now. 

But, in any event, we also would recognize the Honorable 

Charles K. Edwards, acting inspector general, Department of 

Homeland Security, and Stephen Lord, director of homeland security and justice issues for the Government Accountability Office. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much, and we will begin with Mr. 

Edwards. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, ACTING INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND 

STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning, Chairman Petri, Chairman Mica, 

Mr. DeFazio, and members of this subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the effect of Transportation Security 

Administration’s security policies on aviation consumers. Today I 

will discuss the results of two audits and two investigations involving TSA. 

In our examinations of TSA’s programs, we found themes of inconsistent and insufficient oversight, policy implementation, and 

employee accountability that have the potential to adversely affect 

the airline consumer experience. The first audit that I will discuss 

6 

is our report regarding check baggage screening at Honolulu International Airport. 

In December 2010 a confidential source notified TSA officials and 

provided video evidence showing some transportation security officers failing to follow required screening procedures in Honolulu, 

and clearing bags for transport without screening. As a result of 

this audit, we found five areas that needed improvement. 

First, TSA had a fragmented process for developing and evaluating changes to its baggage screening procedures. 

Second, there was a limited direct supervision of those screeners 

who did not follow proper procedures. Screening managers and supervisors were not regularly present in performing all required responsibilities. 

Third, TSA’s directives and procedures did not include clear guidance on direct supervision of screening operations. 

Fourth, TSA management did not provide sufficient staff or more 

efficient equipment needed for screening operations. For example, 

officials at Honolulu requested automated equipment in August 

2008, and TSA headquarters added the request to an unfunded requirements list at the same time new and used equipment was 

stored in a warehouse, awaiting delivery to airports for more than 

1 year. 

Fifth, and finally, TSA allowed various levels of screening and intervals of mitigation that TSOs could misinterpret as meaning that 

screening was not always possible or needed. 

We made four recommendations in our report, and TSA concurred with and planned to address all four. 

The second audit that I will discuss is our May 2012 report regarding TSA’s efforts to identify and track security breaches at our 

Nation’s airports. TSA does not comprehensively track and gather 

information about all security breaches and, therefore, cannot use 

the information to monitor trends or generally improve security. 

The agency also does not provide the necessary guidance and 

oversight to ensure that all breaches are consistently reported, 

tracked, and corrected. As a result, TSA does not have a complete 

understanding of breaches occurring at the Nation’s airports, and 

misses opportunities to prevent, minimize, respond to, and take 

corrective action against security breaches. The agency agreed with 

our report recommendations, and identified actions to resolve these 

issues. 

Finally, I will discuss two of our investigations pertaining to allegations of TSA employee misconduct and criminal acts. The vast 

majority of TSA employees are dedicated civil servants focused on 

protecting the Nation. However, allegations of misconduct by a 

small percentage of those working directly for and with the American public cannot be ignored. 

Recent media coverage of criminal misconduct of TSA employees 

may affect the perception of safety and security of airline passengers. The first example involves a case of theft by a TSO at the 

Orlando International Airport. The investigation revealed that, 

over a 3-year period from 2008 through 2011, the TSO had stolen 

more than 80 laptop computers, cell phones, iPods, estimated at 

$80,000, from passenger luggage, while ostensibly performing his 

duties at the airport. In August 2011, the TSO pleaded guilty to 

7 

Federal charges of embezzlement and theft and in January 2012 

was sentenced to 2 years’ probation. 

The second example is of a case of theft by a TSA screener at 

Newark Liberty International Airport. The investigation established that from October 2009 through September 2010 property 

and currency totaling as much as $30,000 were stolen from passengers as they underwent checkpoint screening. When we confronted the TSO with evidence, he admitted his guilt. The TSO was 

subsequently sentenced in U.S. district court for 30 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised release and ordered to forfeit $24,150. 

In conclusion, our audits and investigations highlight various aspects of TSA’s oversight policy implementation and employee accountability that could affect the actual and perceived safety and 

security of the traveling public. Although TSA has made efforts to 

improve transportation security and to carry out our recommendations, TSA still faces challenges and must continue to work toward 

accomplishing its vital mission to protect the Nation and ensure 

free movement of people and commerce. 

Chairman Petri, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I welcome any questions that you or the Members may have. Thank 

you. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

Mr. Lord? 

Mr. LORD. Chairman Petri, Chairman Mica, Representative 

DeFazio, thanks for inviting me here today to discuss my body of 

work on TSA and our new report on the TSA complaints process. 

I think this is an important report, as I think it shows how TSA 

could better mine the complaints data to enhance the screening 

process and passengers’ experience, which is the theme of today’s 

hearing. 

To be fair, though, I would first like to recognize that TSA faces 

a difficult task. They are simultaneously trying to enhance security, respect passengers’ privacy, and maintain passenger throughput. Sometimes that is complicated to achieve simultaneously. 

I would now like to highlight the key points from our new complaints report. We essentially looked at two issues: how does TSA 

collect and utilize the passenger complaints data; and, two, how 

does it inform passengers who are interested in making complaints 

about the process? 

Regarding the data, it is interesting. TSA collects thousands of 

complaints each year through five central mechanisms. However, 

because the mechanisms all categorize the complaints differently, 

it is difficult to do a rollup to discern overall patterns and trends 

and identify what is really going on at the strategic level. 

In terms of numbers, we noted that TSA received over 39,000 

complaints through a single mechanism known as the TSA Contact 

Center. That is its primary mechanism for collecting complaints. 

Almost half, or 17,000 complaints, were related to the pat-down 

process. 

However, as noted in our report, this does not reflect the full 

story because, again, there are different mechanisms for collecting 

complaints. And at the ones they use at the local airport level, the 

8 

TSA employees have a lot of discretion in how they identify and 

document these complaints. 

For example—just a quick example—we found comment cards 

were used in varying ways at six airports we contacted. At two airports, they were on display, customers could fill them out if they 

had a complaint. At another two airports, they were available, but 

only on request. And at the other two airports we contacted, they 

weren’t available at all. 

We also found that TSA uses several methods to inform passengers about how you actually do make a complaint if you have 

a concern you want to share with TSA. This includes signs, stickers, and the customer comment cards I mentioned. But what we 

noted is there is a lot of inconsistency across airports on how the 

passengers are informed about the process. Thus, we made what I 

believe are four important recommendations to improve the process. 

First of all, we think TSA needs to clarify their policies for their 

own employees on how to collect and document complaints. We 

think they need to do more analysis of the good data they are collecting to reveal what the patterns and trends are, what they need 

to be focused on. We thought it was also appropriate for them to 

designate a focal point, someone I refer to as a Complaint Czar, to 

oversee the revamped process and ensure that new policies are 

being implemented consistently. And we think they also should 

take additional steps to better notify passengers about if you do 

have a complaint, how do you make it. 

The good news in all this is that TSA agreed with all our recommendations. They are already taking steps to implement some 

of them. 

I would now like to briefly discuss TSA’s efforts to move to a 

more risk-based approach. That is one of the themes of today’s 

hearing, as well. I would like to briefly note their efforts to move 

to a more risk-based process through the so-called Pre-check program. They hope to have this program rolled out at 35 airports by 

the end of the year. I think this is a noteworthy effort. Essentially, 

what they are trying to do is find that elusive needle by shrinking 

the haystack, you know, only focus resources on higher risk passengers. But it is in the early stages of implementation. I can’t 

really comment on how effectively it is being done. We plan to look 

at that next year, as part of our regular audit program. 

In closing, I would like to look at this at a more strategic level. 

I think TSA, if they really want to enhance the process and address 

passengers’ concerns, they need to make the process more selective, 

more effective, more efficient. There are various ways to do that. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to responding to any questions you may have. Thank you. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. And thank you both for your testimony. 

I am curious to know whether the Inspector General’s Office or the 

Accountability Office—do you liaise with, or does TSA do it, with 

other people who are concerned about security in other countries 

to figure out, as part of best practices, what they are doing to see 

if we can improve security and lower costs and the intrusiveness 

of the process? And—or are we basically just throwing people at 

the problem here, and then expecting to see that they operate as 

9 

nicely as possible, but not thinking that strategically about the 

whole thing? 

And the second question is whether TSA itself is trying different 

techniques at different airports, possibly, or—to see if there are 

ways of doing its job better and more efficiently? Or is it basically 

one-size-fits-all and, again, just throwing resources at the problem 

and hoping that we don’t have a disaster that will cause us to reexamine the whole thing from top to bottom, as we did after 9/11? 

Would either of you care to respond to those concerns? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Chairman. I very recently met with 

Chairman Issa. We have done a lot of work on different pieces of 

work that TSA is doing, different audits and inspections. But we 

have not looked at the holistic approach at TSA itself. So, after 

meeting with Chairman Issa, we are in the process of doing an 

audit, looking at TSA staffing and the different approaches it is 

taking. It is still in the early stages of it, but I plan to look at it 

this year, sir. 

Mr. LORD. I would like to add that I think TSA could learn a lot 

from our foreign partners. In fact, they have an office, an Office of 

Global Strategies, which is basically an office established to liaise 

with our foreign partners. I think that we can learn from how other 

countries conduct screening and—as well as, you know, mitigate 

risks they are concerned about. 

In terms of ways we can do better, the one-size-fits-all, I think 

TSA is trying to move away from that. That is why they are using 

the so-called Pre-check program. Again, they want to focus more 

screening resources on higher risk passengers, and expedite screening for the lower risk passengers. They have also recently relaxed 

screening requirements for the elderly, people 75 years and older, 

and children, people who are 12 years or younger. So we think that 

is a step in the right direction, that is an example of how they are 

using risk-based screening more effectively. 

Obviously, these people are not exempt totally from the screening 

process. I believe it is important to have an element of unpredictability in it and, you know, allow TSA to, you know, periodically 

screen people, even those that think they are not going to be subject to screening. 

Mr. PETRI. We will probably get better answers on this from the 

second panel, on the relationship between the airline industry and 

the resources that they can make available for the security process 

and TSA. But I would be interested if either of you could offer any 

insight as to how—if—it seems to most of the people on our 

panel—certainly to Chairman Mica in his opening statement—that 

there is a lot of—to be gained by emphasizing intelligence and information outside of just sort of inspecting each person who happens to walk through the door from top to bottom, and hoping that 

that will actually solve the problem. 

Do you have any sense at all as to how much both coordinating 

with foreign governments and domestic—other law enforcement 

agencies and—emphasis is being placed on intelligence and information so that you can credibly—you can cover up that you have 

got it through intelligence by having an inspector and pretending 

the inspector discovered it? 

10 

But to just rely on the inspector is almost—we all—everyone on 

this panel is inspected 50 or 100 times a year, and we forget to 

take our little ditty bag out, or we leave something in, and it is 

never—it rarely—once in a while stuff is found, but a lot of times 

it isn’t. And other things that look suspicious are awards that happened—have lead in them and don’t show up and things, so it is 

a very inefficient process, inspecting every individual that walks 

through the door, especially when many of them are inspected 50 

or 100 times a year at what cost to the taxpayer, and what yield 

to the—except inefficiency—to the whole—could you care—comment on—— 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Chairman. TSA has a very difficult 

job of protecting the Nation’s transportation security system, and 

to ensure that people and commerce get through safely among all 

the threats that come in every day. 

I can come by at a setting that is not public and talk to you 

about the intelligence efforts. We also coordinate with law enforcement intelligence partners, and I can come and talk to you privately, or to your staff, and give you more information about the 

TSA’s strategy of what we know and what we are working with 

TSA about. 

Mr. LORD. I think, to answer your original question, I don’t think 

you can do it through screening alone. I think Chairman Mica is 

correct in noting it has to be fused with good intelligence. In fact, 

if you look at two of the most recent successes which we can discuss publicly—the disrupted air cargo plot in Yemen in October 

2010 and a plot earlier this year, they disrupted a plot, another 

planned undergarment attack—that was due to good intelligence, 

and that was due to foreign intelligence. 

So, you can’t—you have to figure out a way to better fuse the 

intel streams with the screening process. If you are just relying on 

screening alone, a lot of people would argue that is too late. So I 

think these recent disruptions underscore the importance of having 

good intel-sharing partnerships with a foreign government. So I 

think that is a real important point. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you, and thank you for sharing your review of some of the procedures and what is taking place with TSA, 

their effectiveness and passenger screening problems. 

They have come up now with a proposal for a new risk-based 

screening system, and they have tried several other things. I know 

after the Chechen bombing, the two women that took down those 

planes, we—knowing that our system was flawed, that we put in 

behavior detection systems. Did you all look at the behavior detection? 

Mr. LORD. Yes. We issued a report in May 2010. We made 11 recommendations to TSA to improve that program—— 

Mr. MICA. And, as I recall, that—— 

Mr. LORD [continuing]. That was—— 

Mr. MICA [continuing]. Said that something like 21 known terrorists had gone through airports, TSA, 18 times. That meant some 

went through multiple times. I mean I don’t know if that is a right 

figure. Is that correct? 

Mr. LORD. That is fairly close, yes. 

11 

Mr. MICA. OK. 

Mr. LORD. We noted, as part of our discussion of developing better performance measures, that TSA perhaps could look at the 

video tapes of known—people who are convicted of supporting—— 

Mr. MICA. Right. 

Mr. LORD [continuing]. Terrorist-related activities—study their 

behaviors, and see if they were admitting any so-called—— 

Mr. MICA. Well, I went up to Boston to look at what they had 

set up there, and it was a—it was almost a joke. They were interviewing everyone. And I have also been to Israel most recently. If 

you get an update, which Napolitano and Pistole got, to look at 

their screening and—of course, they chose the most bureaucratic, 

least effective, most intrusive means of screening in the Boston— 

and I think they did it in Detroit. Is the Detroit behavior detection 

review over? 

Mr. LORD. We are currently in the process of reviewing the socalled assessor—— 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. LORD. It is the new variant of the behavior detection program. I believe the IG is also looking at this, or some variant of 

it. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Edwards? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Chairman, we are both doing an investigation, 

and also doing an audit on the behavior detection, and also looking 

at the program. So the report is being drafted right now, and I 

should have it out by the second quarter. And before we publish 

it, I will be glad to come by and brief you, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Well, we would like to get the results of that. 

The other problem we have is for—it is over 10 years now, and 

I think I have put in law at least 3 times that they should develop 

a biometric identification. We still have nothing for pilots. We required that it be—the license be durable, have a picture of the 

pilot, and have the ability to contain biometric information. And, 

as I reported a couple of years ago, when they first produced it 

under the law, it was plastic, which was durable, it had some biometric capabilities, but very limited. I don’t know who ripped off 

their procurement officer, but any credit card had more capability 

than what they produced. And then the only picture of a pilot on 

the photograph—on the card, ID card, was Wilbur and Orville 

Wright. 

Is that still the case? Have they produced a pilot identification? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. MICA. Not that you are aware of? 

Mr. LORD. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. MICA. And they haven’t settled on biometric. There is two 

components to biometric. One is—would be your fingerprints or 

thumb prints. The other would be iris. And I think they have settled on the thumb, but we—do we have a resolution on iris, yet? 

Do you know, Mr. Lord, Mr. Edwards? 

Mr. EDWARDS. No, sir. I don’t. 

Mr. LORD. I don’t know—— 

Mr. MICA. I don’t think so. And see, that is the problem, because 

they continually, day after day, week after week, month after 

12 

month, screen Members of Congress. Now, some of them may pose 

a risk, I have to provide that caveat. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MICA. But Federal judges, people with top security clearances are all screened, because they don’t know who those people 

are until you have an ID that can truly tell who that person is. We 

have other agencies who have IDs—is that true, Mr. Lord—that 

have biometric measures that—— 

Mr. LORD. Yes, yes. The Department of Defense uses a common 

access card—— 

Mr. MICA. Yes, yes. 

Mr. LORD [continuing]. Across its entire community. 

Mr. MICA. And we are now, 10 years later, three mandates in 

law, and they still do not. 

So, you really—and what scares me with these pre-clearance programs and—they had CLEAR program and other programs, which 

are fine, because they are sort of Mickey Mouse operations, they 

send them through the same flawed screening process, but if you 

actually knew who the person was, the pilot actually will have the 

controls of the plane. Mr.—it is kind of scary to think about this, 

but Mr. Cravaack is a pilot, and he actually controls the—a plane 

and can do whatever he wants with the plane, and professional pilots are going through this, flight attendants, other people, mechanics, et cetera. 

The screening of the employees is another complete bizarre kabuki dance. And I think it is still the same way. They screen some 

of the employees at some of these programs. They get behind 

screening and they have chemicals that could blow up a plane, they 

have everything that you couldn’t bring through. They have saws, 

knives, weapons—or not weapons, but all kinds of instruments that 

you could not bring through screening. So we have to have information about people, we have to know something about their background, then we have to know who they are and focus on people 

who pose a risk. But until you have an ID that can tell you who 

that person is, everything that they do with these programs, to me, 

is, again, sort of a sham. 

So, maybe I am off base, Mr. Lord. 

Mr. LORD. Yes, if TSA was here I presume they would report 

they are considering adding additional workers, make them eligible 

for their Pre-check program, such as Federal workers, such as myself with security clearances, Members of Congress with security 

clearance—— 

Mr. MICA. I am not looking for just me, but you have military, 

too, that they are shaking down—— 

Mr. LORD. Yes, military. 

Mr. MICA. You have whole—there are millions of people with 

clearances that they don’t need to be wasting their time on. In fact, 

they dilute our effectiveness, because they are wasting time. The 

most recent offense was just, I guess, a few days ago. One of the 

congressman’s nieces was wearing a sundress, and they—17 years 

old. And in the process, they pulled down the sundress. Very embarrassing, on tape. Now I think there is a Federal probe of this. 

But a TSA agent who cannot look at a 17-year-old girl in a sundress and say that she doesn’t pose a risk, or put her through— 

13 

again, we do have multihundred thousand-dollar pieces of equipment now at almost every airport and other screening techniques 

without subjecting the traveling public and an innocent young lady 

to this kind of embarrassment. It has gotten beyond the pale. 

Again, I will yield back. Mr. Petri, I thank you. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the chairman. Gentlemen, it is good to have 

you all with us today. 

My personal dealings with TSA have been consistently favorable 

and pleasant. Some of my constituents report otherwise. Of course, 

you have personal inconvenience on the one hand, personal safety 

on the other. And one would conclude that safety should trump inconvenience in most cases, but it would be preferable if we could 

accommodate both those issues. And hopefully that will be done. 

Mr. Edwards, does TSA need to focus more on customer service 

in providing passengers with a more—strike that—with a less intrusive experience? If so, what is the agency doing to that end? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, sir. TSA is working with liaisons at 

various airports. TSA is trying to improve the customer experience. 

But it still has long ways, because it needs to address the breaches 

and the comprehensive issues that are still faced with various airports. 

I totally agree with you that they do need to work with—let the 

customers know. Because I think, ultimately, the safety of a passenger is the most important thing. But you need to work with the 

customers, let them know if there is long waits, why it is taking 

so long. 

And we also—by the way, we make sure—not to get off point— 

we also have red team testing, which is classified, but we do that 

every year to ensure that the screening process is secure. And then 

we discuss the results of such things at a classified setting. And 

TSA does listen to us and make improvements on it. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. Mr. Lord, as I have mentioned, I 

have been the beneficiary of constituent complaints. Now, I don’t 

know whether these would be isolated or whether they would be 

general run of the mill. Having said that, is it your belief that some 

of the TSA screening procedures and treatment of passengers 

causes airline passengers to deter from flying? 

Mr. LORD. You know, that is a very difficult issue to measure. 

We have heard that anecdotally, but—I assume that is likely to 

occur in some cases, but from a—since I am from GAO, I always 

like to look at the data empirically. And I haven’t really seen the 

data, but we have definitely heard reports that would support that 

view. 

Mr. COBLE. You may not know this, Mr. Lord, but do you have 

a figure, the total number of complaints that have been forthcoming? That may be difficult to—— 

Mr. LORD. Actually, that is a very good question, because when 

we started our customer complaints job, that was one of the first 

questions I asked my team. I said, ‘‘I would like to know how many 

complaints are made each year to TSA.’’ And what we quickly 

found is we can’t really answer that, because they have different 

offices that are, you know, diligently collecting complaint data, but 

it is all done through a decentralized process, and they all use difVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:57 Feb 08, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\AV\11-29-~1\76978.TXT JEAN
14 

ferent buckets to put the complaints in, so you can’t do an overall 

rollup to really figure out what is going on on an overall basis. 

Their primary mechanism, though, I can report, is the TSA Contact Center. Over 3 years they received 39,000 complaints. And almost half of them, about 17,000, were related to the pat-down process. The next two most frequent categories were customer service 

and screening. And, somewhat surprisingly, complaints about the 

whole body imagers, that ranked a distant fourth, and was a much 

lower level. 

So, there is some selective data you can look at that clearly 

shows—it is more than anecdotes—that customers are concerned 

about the pat-downs and customer service. But again, that is only 

one of five mechanisms they have. And that is why we recommended that TSA figure out a way to roll all this data up at a 

higher level, so it is easier to figure out what is going on. 

Mr. COBLE. I got you. Thank you both again for your presence 

today. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To both the panelists, 

I am having a hard time understanding how hard it would be to 

have a standardized national system for reporting security 

breaches, or how hard it would be to have a standardized national 

system with categories of complaints. I mean I don’t get it. That 

seems pretty routine to me. I mean what is the barrier? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, thank you, sir. On the breaches, well, clearly 

they don’t have a clear definition. To me, a breach is a breach. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Mr. EDWARDS. But they don’t have a clear definition. In one system it is defined differently. And the system to capture breaches, 

there are 33 different categories. And then they have a management directive which talks about breaches as something different. 

So, one of the recommendations we have made is come up with a 

clear definition. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Mr. EDWARDS. If somebody bypasses or does not go through 

screening and enters a sterile area, it is a breach. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Not whether the intent was mal or not. It is still 

a breach. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Mr. EDWARDS. And so, when we—and they don’t have a comprehensive mechanism to track that. It is captured at the local 

level, and then when it is sent up to their parent system, or to the 

Transportation Security office in Reston, it still—you know, they 

don’t have all the data. Some of them don’t report it, so they are 

not able to make decisions on corrective action or look at trends. 

So one of the recommendations we have made, out of the two, is 

to come up with a system that will capture that. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. And again, it doesn’t seem too difficult. And, 

Mr. Lord, on the complaints, that seems really routine. 

Mr. LORD. Yes. You can make the same argument on a complaint. I think it is a matter of—people are very diligent, working 

hard in their own little stovepipe. But when we came in and took 

15 

a couple steps back, we quickly figured out everybody was measuring it a little differently. And once we explained, well, this is 

going to make it really difficult to figure out what is going on on 

an overall basis, they quickly recognized they could be doing it better. 

So, I think that just underscores the importance of sometimes 

just bringing in an outside party to take a look at what is going 

on in your shop. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. That is good. Now, I want to—I know you are 

in the preliminary stages on Pre-check, but I want to put sort of 

a basic premise to you. 

We have, it seems to me, a kind of bizarre system. You contact 

the airline, you give them your—I have a global entry card. You 

give them your global entry information. And then they attempt to 

encrypt that into your boarding pass. The last seven times I have 

tried, they have failed to do that. But I have recently read that now 

there are apps where you can read your barcode and see whether 

or not you have been cleared, which seems to me is problematic, 

both because it doesn’t work a lot of the times, and it is also problematic because it is a security issue. 

So, I don’t know what a trusted traveler card looks like, but I 

know what a global entry card looks like. Pretty darn hard to counterfeit. Why don’t we just have readers at that point, and you say, 

‘‘Here is my boarding pass,’’ which doesn’t have encryption in the 

barcode, ‘‘But here is my global entry card. You can see now that 

I am a low-risk person because I went through the background 

check, et cetera, et cetera,’’ and they could read it. 

But they say, ‘‘Oh, we can’t read those cards.’’ Well, you can 

read—I mean I can come into the country without talking to a customs agent. I mean a border agent, with the card. But I can’t get 

on an airplane? I mean this seems really bureaucratic and stupid. 

No offense. 

Mr. LORD. TSA, if they were here, they would wholeheartedly 

agree, I assume, that they need to take additional steps to protect 

that type of information. In fact, that is one of the reasons they are 

rolling out this boarding pass scanning technology. It is to help authenticate the documents. It is currently being pilot tested in San 

Juan, Dulles, and Houston, I believe. 

But, anyway, they recognize that as a potential vulnerability. We 

will be looking at that as part of our upcoming—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But I am just saying why not eliminate that step? 

Why not just have a standard boarding pass, and the key—if you 

want to stand in that line, and they can either let you go through, 

or decide to randomly screen you—is to show them the card which 

proves you are who you say you are, and that you have had a thorough background check, and you are cleared. Since, I mean, what 

is more of a threat: getting on to an airplane, or coming into the 

United States of America without having to talk to a border patrol 

agent? 

I mean this is nuts. I mean TSA is inventing a whole new thing 

when all they need to do is read the damn cards. 

Mr. LORD. Yes. We will be taking a closer look at that in our upcoming reviews. I will—we will be able to get back to you at a later 

date on that. 

16 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Cravaack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thanks, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

being here today. 

Got a quick question for you, just in regards to—as passengers, 

when they are going through TSA security. One of the things that 

I keep on hearing is—and, quite frankly, experiencing myself in an 

airport where actually I was dealing with a supervisor after I was 

asking some questions about protocol and procedures, threatened to 

get the police on me and everything else, even though I am just 

asking simple questions about the procedures that I had to personally undergo as a citizen of the United States. 

Now, I think what people are very upset about is that when they 

go through security, they give up their personal rights and freedoms to be able to go through the security, and that when they 

think that their freedoms and securities are breached, they don’t 

have anybody to talk to. There is no real advocate for the passenger there that is able to listen to them and, you know what, not 

just give them lip service, but to give them followup, as well. 

So, could any—could you gentlemen comment on that? 

Mr. LORD. Well, in our complaints report, the very last section, 

we describe TSA’s—they just established this new passenger advocate program. They just started to roll it out. And they designed 

it to help provide an independent means to address passengers’ 

complaints. Because, right now, as we pointed out in our report, it 

is a relatively closed system. The people investigating complaints 

report to the same—they are in the same supervisory chain as the 

people they are investigating in airports, and that raises some 

independence issues. 

But under this new advocate program, they are going to be able 

to report separately to the Office of the Ombudsman at TSA headquarters, so that may help address the issue you are concerned 

about. They will tend to be more of an advocate, I believe, if it is 

implemented properly, but—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. But who is the passenger’s advocate right there, 

when they feel, right then, that their personal liberties are being 

invaded? 

Mr. LORD. They will have someone who is designated as a passenger advocate. It will be a collateral duty, in most instances, but 

they are going to have someone specially trained to help ensure 

these—you know, these things you keep reading about don’t occur 

with such frequency. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Yes. And the other aspect of it is somebody that 

can make a command decision. That is the other aspect. 

And I can go with you offline and tell you personally what happened to me and my 9-year-old son—he is going to be nine on Saturday—but what exactly happened to him and me, as a parent, 

concerned about that issue. And there was no one listening. And 

I am talking to the individual as a passenger, as a father, and this 

person didn’t try to assist me, didn’t care about my particular concerns. And then, even more so, elevated it to the point where they 

started threatening law enforcement. That is—what do I do? What 

does the average American citizen do when they are up against 

17 

that? That is absolutely uncalled for and, quite frankly, exactly the 

opposite of what we have been hearing that TSA is all about. 

Mr. LORD. No, I agree with you. There are incidents that occur 

like that. And I think passengers need mechanisms where they 

can, you know, file a complaint and have it addressed promptly and 

independently. 

So, hopefully, you know, you will see more consistency in that 

area, now that our report has been out. But, you know, it is a difficult situation. I agree. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. It is. 

Mr. LORD. So—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. It is that. I am—Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed that Mr. Pistole is not here today. I did want to address 

some concerns about—and I don’t know if you gentlemen can address this in regards to security within the shadow of the aircraft, 

and how that is being addressed. And also, I was hoping to get 

more information on what we are doing to ensure that our troops 

that are in uniform, traveling on orders with their ID, are being 

treated with the respect and dignity that they deserve when traveling our Nation’s airlines. Can you—either of you two gentlemen— 

comment on that? 

Mr. EDWARDS. I can take your questions back, sir. And if we 

have not done any work, I will try to get the answers for you. And 

also, for complaints, it may not help right away, but we also have 

a hotline, 1–800 number, and we also have a web portal that we 

can take the information and then make sure it gets to the right 

person and ensure that actions are taken. And what happened 

shouldn’t have happened, and we can at least make sure that it 

doesn’t happen in the future. 

Mr. LORD. And I can take the second part of the question. In 

terms of members of the service in uniform, as long as they have 

a common access card, they are eligible for the Pre-check process, 

if it is established at a particular airport. That allows them to be 

subject to expedited screening. I think that is a good thing. That 

is another example of how TSA is moving to a risk-based screening 

process, again, shrinking the haystack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Right. 

Mr. LORD. Don’t spend so much time worrying about people we 

know—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Yes. 

Mr. LORD [continuing]. A lot about, we think are good security 

risks. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Excellent. Thank you, gentlemen, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Ribble. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of 

you for coming this morning. Very disappointed that TSA was unwilling to come. I understand how uncomfortable these hearings 

can be for them, especially since we are talking a lot about complaints today. But part of their job is to let the American people 

know what they are doing. And part of our job is to hold Government agencies accountable for what they do. And so it is especially 

disappointing. But thank you for coming today. 

18 

The bulk of my questions, I believe, will be going to you, Mr. 

Lord. However, Mr. Edwards, if you have anything to add, please 

feel free to do so. 

Mr. Lord, you mentioned in your testimony that you were concerned because it appeared like there was a lot of discretion available from airport to airport by TSA agents on how they logged complaints. My question is, what about—what other discretion did you 

see on how they do their job? Do they have discretion? 

Mr. LORD. They—well, from an audit standpoint, you always like 

to see consistency in anything you are looking at. And, in terms of 

their screening protocols, they are very detailed. I believe there is 

more consistency in the way they try to screen. But the complaint 

process is what we focus on. 

In this report, we saw great variation, which concerned us. Not 

only—again, they were always documenting the complaints 

through comment cards and logging them in, but they weren’t 

sharing these with their headquarters offices. So the headquarters—from a headquarters standpoint, you really don’t know 

what is going on in the field, you know, if you are collecting information, yet not sharing it with your headquarters offices. So that 

concerned us, as well. There was inconsistency in that area, as 

well. 

So, if I had to come up with a single word to describe our report, 

it was inconsistent application. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Yes. And that discretion, though, you didn’t observe 

discretion available to individual screeners as it related to someone 

that they—well, let me go back. 

Are they required to follow very, very specific screening requirements on every single passenger, or is there discretion there? 

Mr. LORD. The protocols are fairly detailed. And, from a security 

standpoint, as a manager, you want to ensure your screening workforce is implementing them consistently. Obviously, we all know, 

sometimes there are lapses, it doesn’t occur at all or it is done inconsistently. But, from a security standpoint, if you see—I mean 

the screening protocols are sensitive security information—they are 

not public information, but I can assure you they are very detailed, 

not only for passengers, but for the cargo carried in the belly of the 

aircraft and for the checked baggage. They are very detailed. But 

on a complaint side, it was a little more undefined at the local 

level. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Yes, and I am not here trying to beat up on any Federal employee trying to do their job. Quite frankly, I fly mainly out 

of Appleton, Wisconsin, or Green Bay, Wisconsin, and I have found 

the TSA agents there to be highly professional and doing a very 

good job. Now, obviously, as a Member of Congress, I have a bit 

of notoriety. I don’t know whether or not I am getting different 

treatment than anyone else does. However, I travel at a lot of airports, and I can say that I have observed inconsistency in their 

process from airport to airport. 

So, regarding this issue of inconsistency, not just on complaints— 

but we could just stay focused on the complaint issue—who is in 

charge of making sure that the inconsistency is—if there is inconsistency from airport to airport, how much say do the airports 

have? How much say do the airlines have? How much say does the 

19 

TSA have? How much say do passengers have? Who is the boss 

here? 

Mr. LORD. Well, again, that is another good point we highlighted 

in our report. And one of our key recommendations was essentially 

appoint a Complaint—for lack of a better term, a Complaint Czar. 

We didn’t use that term in our report—— 

Mr. RIBBLE. Right. 

Mr. LORD [continuing]. But that is how I refer to it, someone to 

oversee the process across the entire population of airports, make 

sure the new policies are being implemented effectively, all the 

data streaming in, they are measuring it the same way. Because, 

again, as our report said, who cares if you have data coming in if 

it is not measured—you can’t make heads or tails of it? 

So that was a key recommendation. We said, ‘‘Assign a focal 

point.’’ For lack of a better term, I will use ‘‘Complaint Czar.’’ But 

we think that will add consistency to the process. 

Mr. RIBBLE. And, Mr. Edwards, I just turn my comments toward 

you a little bit. If you could, talk to us about the relationship between the passengers, airlines, and TSA. It seems to me that our 

transportation economy is pretty significant and very important to 

the overall U.S. economy. Ultimately, passengers will make choices 

based on treatment, whether it is treated by airlines or treated by 

Government. They may choose to go to different forms of transportation—and, in fact, they are. 

How do we protect our airlines and protect security, given that 

TSA doesn’t seem to be responsive to either? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, thank you, sir. As I mentioned earlier, that 

TSA has a monumental task of ensuring that we keep the transportation system secure to ensure that people and commerce move 

freely. And there are emerging threats every day. 

So, on one hand, TSA needs to ensure that passenger safety is 

not jeopardized. At the same time, people wait time should also not 

increase. So TSA needs to work with airlines. You know, they do 

have liaisons, so they need—and they need to ensure that the 

stakeholder meetings within the airports continue and share information. 

And also, you know, we have—when we do our audits and inspections, we provide recommendations. And when we find things 

that TSA needs to work on, we don’t just wait until the report is 

published, just because the report needs to get published. Well before the report is published, we meet with them and tell them, 

‘‘Look. Here are the things that we are finding that you need to 

work on that’’—because I am not looking always to tell a bad news 

story. If they can—if I can find something earlier on and let them 

know, ‘‘This is what I am finding systemically that you need to 

work on,’’ and ‘‘Fix it by the time my report comes out’’—so there 

is a good working relationship over there, as well. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, request permission for 1 more 

minute. Thank you. 

And then I just wanted to talk, Mr. Lord, on the pre-program, 

this new pre-screening program that they have. It seems to me 

that security is one issue, customer satisfaction is another. And as 

a pre-screened passenger, I have noticed a great deal of inconsistency in pre-program, in that it is not reliable to me. I don’t know 

20 

ahead of time, even though I have been pre-screened, I don’t know 

that I will actually be effectively pre-screened once I arrive at the 

airport. And so I can’t really plan on how long the line will be, or 

how much time it will take. I have to act as if I am not prescreened. And so, therefore, I have more frustration with the program, and less satisfaction with the program on a program that 

was designed to increase satisfaction. 

Mr. LORD. Yes, we have heard that complaint from multiple 

sources. 

Mr. RIBBLE. I imagine you have. 

Mr. LORD. I can assure you—and I think you are right, because 

it doesn’t really offer the advantage of cutting your wait time if you 

still have to get to the airport at the same time. I mean what is 

the advantage of the program? 

I believe TSA is cognizant of this. They are going to take steps 

to make it more permanent. But this is something we are going to 

look at in our upcoming review of the Pre-check program. Obviously, to me, that is a major selling point: you don’t have to get 

to the airport as early. But when you arrive, and the Pre-check line 

is closed for that particular day, you have to—you wonder. What 

is—I mean what is the advantage of the program? 

Mr. RIBBLE. Or, I have been told, ‘‘Well, you are pre-screened, 

but you are not pre-screened today.’’ 

Mr. LORD. Yes. 

Mr. RIBBLE. ‘‘Your number didn’t come up.’’ It is a crazy system. 

Mr. LORD. Yes, yes. 

Mr. RIBBLE. It just really is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Yes, you miss a lot of planes that way, 

if you rely on the system, and that is not really helping very much. 

Well, we thank you very much for your testimony, and we will 

turn to the second panel. 

The second panel consists of Mr. Ken Dunlap, who is global director of security and travel facilitation of the International Air 

Transport Association, or IATA; Ms. Veda Shook, who is international president of the Association of Flight Attendants; and Mr. 

Charles Leocha, who is the director of the Consumer Travel Alliance. 

We thank you all for the effort that went into your prepared 

statements, and would invite you to summarize them in 5 minutes 

or so, beginning with Mr. Ken Dunlap. 

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH J. DUNLAP, GLOBAL DIRECTOR, SECURITY AND TRAVEL FACILITATION, INTERNATIONAL AIR 

TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; VEDA SHOOK, INTERNATIONAL 

PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS; AND 

CHARLES LEOCHA, DIRECTOR, CONSUMER TRAVEL ALLIANCE 

Mr. DUNLAP. Chairman Petri, Congressman DeFazio, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for the 

opportunity to invite IATA to testify on the future of aviation passenger screening. IATA’s 240 member airlines criss-cross the globe 

every day, safely carrying passengers and cargo to their destinations. In 2011 alone, airlines carried more than 2.8 billion passengers. And I know you have heard this all before, but the numVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:57 Feb 08, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\AV\11-29-~1\76978.TXT JEAN
21 

ber is expected to grow globally, with nearly 6 billion passengers 

carried by the year 2030. 

With this projected growth will come the need for improved infrastructure, and perhaps most importantly, next-generation passenger screening based on a new paradigm. Here in the United 

States, we are seeing encouraging signs that the one-size-fits-all 

approach to passenger screening is being re-evaluated. Secretary 

Napolitano and Administrator Pistole have begun an important 

move to risk-based passenger screening. Examples are TSA’s voluntary Pre-check program, new procedures for individuals 12 and 

under, 75 and older, and also airline crewmembers. 

In parallel, the airline industry has committed itself to developing a new risk-based security screening checkpoint. At this point 

I would like to pause and acknowledge both Secretary Napolitano 

and Secretary General of the Council of the International Civil 

Aviation Organization, Raymond Benjamin, for their vision and 

support of this industry initiative. 

IATA is working with public and private partners around the 

world to modernize and improve the passenger screening experience through the Checkpoint of the Future program. Over the last 

3 years, the program has evolved into an industry-led and IATAsupported initiative. That means that airports, security equipment 

manufacturers, Interpol, universities, governments, and airlines 

are working together to make a new checkpoint a reality. And we 

can put numbers behind our collaboration. 

Our advisory group, which provides oversight, has 16 key senior 

executives from every corner of aviation. They guide 110 experts 

who are working to assemble the technology, policy, and procedures 

needed for a checkpoint of the future, and all of these individuals 

are volunteering their time to this effort. To date, the team has developed a concept definition and blueprints to take us through a 

checkpoint that evolves from today to 2014, to 2017, and 2020. 

And, in addition, our stakeholders are developing an airport testing 

program. 

We have concluded component trials this year with our airport 

partners in Geneva, Heathrow, and Amsterdam, and we have a 

dozen new trials planned for the year 2013. And we certainly hope 

that we can bring several of these to airports in the United States. 

So, you are probably wondering, ‘‘What does a checkpoint in the 

future look like?’’ With a view towards the near term, the checkpoint of the future in 2014 focuses on integrating new procedures 

to facilitate risk-based screening and decisionmaking. The 2017 

checkpoint of the future, or our medium-term vision, is focused on 

updated technologies and processes to increase the security value 

of the checkpoint, to include biometrics. From 2020 and beyond, it 

is envisioned that the passengers will be able to walk through the 

security checkpoint without interruption. 

And allow me to spend just a few moments more on one other 

aspect of risk-based security, and that is changing our mindset to 

focus on outcome-based requirements supported by global standards. Our chances of raising the bar on security are much better 

by focusing efforts on delivering results, rather than on replicating 

processes and procedures that may work better in one jurisdiction 

or one airport, rather than another. The United Kingdom is at the 

22 

forefront of developing such an approach. I hope that it will be the 

basis for setting a global standard which others could benefit from. 

Chairman Petri, members of the committee, thank you again for 

the opportunity to speak to you today about the future of aviation 

security. I ought to applaud your commitment to improving security and making the experience more enjoyable for our passengers. 

Certainly the future of flight is bright, and your collaboration is 

vital to our continued successes in industry. Thank you. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

Ms. Shook? 

Ms. SHOOK. Good morning. Thank you. And thank you, Chairman Petri and Congressman DeFazio and members of the committee, for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing. 

And just briefly, I wanted to acknowledge that today the skies 

are absolutely safer today than they were before 9/11 and before 

the onset of TSA. I am safer, as a crewmember. Our passengers are 

safer. You are all safer. Our country is safer. 

As a flight attendant, I do have a unique perspective to airport 

security screening. Our Nation’s flight attendants are required to 

pass through the security checkpoints every time we go to work, 

sometimes multiple times a day. Before 9/11, passenger and baggage screening was conducted by private screening companies 

under contract to airlines, which created a myriad of screening experiences, to put it mildly. We could never be certain if our shoes, 

our jewelry, our hair clip, if any of that would trigger the detector. 

Would the airport screener want to search our bags, or would we 

speed through the checkpoint? 

I personally recall one specific incident where I was passing 

through security in Portland, Oregon, where a man was ahead of 

me in the line and he had a big knife on his hip, what I—well, it 

was a big knife to me. And then, you know, he passed through. And 

I said to him after I passed through security, ‘‘That was a big knife. 

I am surprised it didn’t alarm.’’ And he chuckled and pulled two 

more smaller knives out of his pocket and a pocket full of change 

out of the other one and said, ‘‘Oh, it happens a lot.’’ 

Well, today that kind of thing would rarely happen, would rarely 

happen. And so, I think it is important that we can thank our 

TSOs and the TSA for its diligence, and also the uniformity that 

is present at our security checkpoints today. 

We remember all too well the inconsistent security policies, passenger confusion, frequent language barriers of pre-9/11 screening. 

A federalized workforce creates consistency, can quickly communicate and adapt to emerging threats, with a greater ability to 

relay critical information across the system, or to a pinpointed location in times of emergency or crisis. A federalized workforce allows 

for efficient resolution through a central organization. Our airports 

and airplanes are much safer today, given TSA’s access to intelligence data, driving that real-time security-based risk assessment. 

This is an important tool unavailable to private screening companies that could compromise the safety and security of passengers 

and crew, and we believe that any return to a bottom-line-driven 

system that puts security second to profits would be reckless and 

an unjustified regression from the TSA’s mission to protect our 

23 

skies. This is no way says that we don’t need to be cost-conscious, 

because we all recognize that we do need to do that. 

Flight attendants understand the need for and support this layered approach to passenger screening, and the expansion of screening alternatives for our most trusted travelers. Over 4 million passengers have been pre-screened and qualified for Pre-check, which 

we have heard about a bit before today. Also other screening programs that we have heard about, such as children under the age 

of 12, like my daughter seated behind me today, and those travelers over 75. And also we have heard about the common access 

cards for our servicemembers. So these are very good examples to 

recognize passengers that fall into the low-risk category. 

Another wonderful example, from my perspective, is the known 

crewmember program that the TSA has initiated. That is cost-effective, creates shorter lines, thus improving the passenger experience. Our first flight attendants began to go through the program 

this October. Flight attendants from many carriers, as well as pilots, are passing through this program. It has been a tremendous 

success. Millions of—there have been millions of pass-throughs 

through the checkpoints. In fact, over 2 million known crewmember 

screenings since its onset, which are 2 million fewer crewmembers 

with their bags that could not have to cut to the front of the line, 

the passenger queue, creating any potential bottlenecks. 

But the screening process is just one component of the passenger 

experience. For more than a decade, AFA has called for the adoption of reasonable and uniform limits for carry-on baggage. And a 

number of carry-on bags at security screenings, if we could reduce 

or standardize the size of that, we would have a better experience. 

With all of our work with the TSA, and with my own extensive 

traveling experience, I can say with certainty that there are more 

bags per person and larger bags per person since the airlines have 

began charging for checked bags. This has absolutely had an operational impact at the security checkpoints. And once—you know, I 

am on board, working on the flight, as well. It is an issue, securitywise, for us to be able to have our situational awareness. But it is 

important to recognize the effect of the passenger experience with 

regards to increased bags and increased size of the bags at the security checkpoint. 

Too, the global alliances, code share agreements, competing frequent travel programs, all of this, how does that all align? We want 

to make sure that the passenger experience, including the rules of 

carry-on baggage, are understood and comprehensive, and fall in 

line, whether you are traveling from Moscow, Idaho, or Moscow, 

Russia, that you can have somewhat of a consistency of approach. 

By the way, reducing the number of carry-on bags, it is estimated that savings in the savings of going through the checkpoints 

would be hundreds of millions of dollars. 

So, just to close out, I want to recognize that, thanks to the TSA 

passenger screening experience is better today by far, than it was 

before 9/11. This not only provides a standardized positive passenger experience with the federalized workforce. TSA also ensures 

that our Nation continues to have a chain mail security layer of 

protection, as opposed to a patchwork quilt of privatized independent contractors. Protecting our skies is a difficult job with a 

24 

massive responsibility, but a job that the TSA, as a key partner in 

the fabric of our Nation’s aviation security, is well-equipped to handle. 

Thank you. Happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

Mr. Leocha. 

Mr. LEOCHA. Yes. Thank you, Chairman Petri and Mr. DeFazio, 

for giving us a seat at this hearing. I am glad that I got an aisle 

seat, too. 

Ms. SHOOK. I am in the middle. 

Mr. LEOCHA. I will present recommendations that take into account three significant changes in the security landscape since 9/ 

11. 

Number one, our terrorism watch list capabilities have improved 

dramatically. Every American traveler is now screened for every 

single flight. For all intents and purposes, we all should be considered members of Pre-check. 

Two, all cockpits have been hardened, locked, and fortified. Even 

a .44 Magnum shot will not penetrate a cockpit door. 

Three, passengers now are aware of the possibility of having 

their plane used as a missile. They are not going to allow any terrorist to take over an aircraft. 

My name is Charlie Leocha. I am the director of the Consumer 

Travel Alliance. I have also been appointed to the Department of 

Transportation’s passenger protection committee by Secretary 

LaHood, and to TSA’s consumer advocacy subcommittee by Administrator Pistole. 

To much of the flying public, TSA, frankly speaking, is a 

boogeyman. Checkpoints, intimidating screeners, strip-search machines and pat-downs with no probable cause are dreaded. Newspaper editors report vitriolic reactions to stories about TSA from 

the public. Comments go through the roof. A recent story on Huffington Post by Christopher Elliot, our ombudsman, generated more 

than 1,000 comments, a record for his columns. 

Worse, TSA has become the butt of countless jokes. Even President Obama joked about TSA pat-downs in the State of the Union 

Address. And last Friday night I watched the Capitol Steps, a popular comedy group here in DC, and they performed a parody about 

how good the Government is at anticipated terrorist events after 

they occur. 

TSA is set up like a Maginot Line. This defensive system became 

the poster child about generals fighting the last war. Plus, it consumed such a large budget that other facets of the defense were 

underfunded. Today, TSA finds itself in almost an identical position: defending against old threats, in some cases threats that no 

longer exist. In addition, the focus on passenger screening has reduced funding to secure the vulnerable back ends of U.S. airports. 

The futility of searches at airports—it is best demonstrated by 

looking at the problems of drugs and weapons in our prison systems. Even our best efforts at Federal and State maximum security 

prisons fail. If maximum security prisons can’t do it, it is folly to 

expect TSA to effectively interdict weapons and explosives from 

dedicated, trained terrorists. 

25 

Here are some of our recommendations. The rest are included in 

the written testimony. 

Number one, revise the forbidden items list. Focus on explosives. 

Pocket knives, box cutters, tools, and so on are no threat, and cannot be used to break in to the cockpit. 

Two, decommission all whole-body scanners and go back to metal 

detectors for primary screening. Radiation effects are not documented. And half of the privacy protection software does not function. And this is according to TSA, itself. These machines have not 

proven to be better than metal detectors. In fact, some consider 

them to be worse. They take more space and they move slower. 

Number three, dress TSA security screeners in nonthreatening 

uniforms. Perhaps pastel polo shirts. They are security assistants. 

They are not law enforcement officers. Their job is to make sure 

that the traveling public is safe, not to force citizens into submission. Get rid of the starched shirts, the badges, and the bling. 

Four, the terrorist watch list already covers all travelers. All 

names are checked every time we fly. The new world of total passenger intelligence screening, combined with big data, makes the 

current invasive and intrusive TSA searches unnecessary. A metal 

detector will do. If a terrorist does make it to an airport with bomb 

materials intent on taking down a plane, more than a dozen layers 

of intelligence have failed. 

Years from now, when historians look back at our current TSA 

experience, they will ask, ‘‘What the heck were they thinking?’’ 

Just like our over-reactions, such as the internment of the Japanese during World War II, or McCarthyism in the fifties, subjecting 

the flying public to TSA’s invasive searches seems unnecessary, unwise, and un-American. 

I welcome any questions. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony. And, 

Mr. Leocha, I wish I could cosign it. I think it is quite wise. 

Mr. LEOCHA. Thank you. 

Mr. PETRI. And I know you have thought a lot about it and had 

a lot of discussions on it. And I hope it has an impact. And your 

working on the advisory committee probably is a great help in that 

regard. 

Mr. LEOCHA. We are. And in regard to the advisory committee, 

part of the recommendations which we sent forward up to Administrator Pistole really focused on customer service, to treat passengers with a smile, to give us their customer—to improve the 

customer training, and so on. And one of the surprising things, to 

me, is I am kind of surprised that we didn’t have any TSA people 

here. Because when I sit in these meetings, I am TSA’d to death. 

I have got, like, eight TSA people sitting there offering lots of different suggestions. 

But you know, whenever we ask—specifically asked in the committee for the TSA customer service training, and we are specifically told, ‘‘Oh, that is classified,’’ I mean, I just think that it is 

kind of sad that we are classifying everything, so that the people 

who are paying the bills and the committee members who have to 

pass legislation are not told the full stories. 

Mr. PETRI. Well, you know, there is an old saying that a fish rots 

from the head. And the TSA’s attitude toward this committee and 

26 

probably—certainly doesn’t counter the tone that is—they are setting at the top probably is reflected in some of the problems we 

have with the attitudes of the TSA inspectors and the way they 

are—have you run into some difficulties with—we have had some 

reports of difficulties between local law enforcement people and 

their jurisdiction at airports and TSA, even. 

Mr. LEOCHA. I haven’t heard any specific complaints. We do 

know that there has to be some sort of relationship between TSA 

and law enforcement, since TSA specifically is not a law enforcement operation. 

Mr. PETRI. Right. 

Mr. LEOCHA. So, once TSA brings law enforcement in, then it 

is—from the reports that we have gotten is that, basically, they 

don’t come in in a very helpful manner. They are coming in, basically, on the side of TSA. And some of the reactions are similar to 

what your—one of your panel members or the members of the committee mentioned when going through the checkpoints with his 

son. And when you have a problem, you have got a problem. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Dunlap, I did have one question for you, and that 

is that, as you know, the House earlier—and the Senate—we finally took up and passed the bill that the Senate had worked on, 

which modification of the bill we had passed earlier, and it went 

to the President—he signed it, I believe, last week—having to do 

with the European Union’s emission trading scheme and their overreaching under established international aviation rules. 

And my question is, is there anything further that we in Congress can do at this time, or any recommendation you have as to 

what could be done to protect the U.S. air carriers from this sort 

of effort by the European Union? 

Mr. DUNLAP. Mr. Chairman, on part of this, with most of my 

portfolio being involved with security, I know that there are people 

more qualified than I from the industry that can specifically talk 

about environmental issues, and provide some very strong recommendations to this committee on that particular issue. And I am 

more than happy to get that input to you. 

I would say, in general, to address the broader topic, we certainly 

would continue to encourage both the TSA and DHS to continue 

working with international partners to make sure that things such 

as best practices for aviation security are shared, to make sure that 

intelligence is shared. And we also think that this is probably best 

done through formal processes and procedures. And as you put 

these procedures together, we think it is very important to have 

the industry involved. And we would be willing participants in this 

dialogue. 

And, frankly, over the last several years, we have seen better 

outreach by the TSA. We have seen greater cooperation between 

TSA and their international partners. And we specifically think 

that the outreach that TSA has done, and the commitments they 

have made to the International Civil Aviation Organization have 

immeasurably increased security. 

So, that is what I could tell you from a security side. And we will 

get more input to you, sir, from other parts of the industry and the 

organization on specifically the EUETS. 

27 

Mr. PETRI. And I think in your statement and testimony you referred to ground-breaking or innovative efforts being done in the 

UK to attempt to do a better, more efficient, and effective job in 

the security area. Could you expand on that a little bit? Are they 

incorporating in it any of the concerns that Mr. Leocha and others 

have mentioned? Or is it a parallel but not responsive approach to 

his concerns? 

Mr. DUNLAP. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, what they are trying 

to do is put in an over-arching umbrella framework that has legislative and regulatory options to address many of those types of 

issues that Mr. Leocha had talked about. And that is based on the 

fact that you can really have two regulatory systems. 

One is very prescriptive, and it says, ‘‘You use this machine this 

way, and you conduct these procedures the same way every time, 

every way, regardless of the airport, regardless of the airline, regardless of whether you are dealing with a flight attendant, a passenger, or a pilot.’’ And that doesn’t necessarily lend itself to the 

risk-based approaches that we have been talking about. What really does is an outcome-focused risk-based security framework, and 

that is what the UK is piloting right now. 

And what it says is a Government or a legislature should figure 

out what the outcome is. So, for instance, if the outcome is we don’t 

want bombs on aircraft, then whether you are talking about an airport, an airline, or our employees, that they should be allowed, 

under strict supervision, to figure out what is the most effective 

way to get that objective attained. And we think that allows for 

things like a checkpoint of the future. 

We think it allows for a future where you are not going to have 

passenger complaints talking about how they were treated at 

checkpoints. And I think, most importantly, Mr Petri, what it will 

do is it will increase the overall level of security, and we will be 

able to find those threats that we know that are on the horizon 

that the current system that we have is going to have a great deal 

of trouble handling. 

Ms. SHOOK. May I just say—and thank you for that—I just—as 

a citizen, I also want to be mindful that, while it is important that 

we have these systems to prevent any kind of threats, that we are 

mindful of our civil liberties. And obviously, I know that we all 

share that concern, to be able to find that balance to make sure 

that, you know, our skies are safe as we are traveling, but also that 

individuals—you know, that we can protect the civil liberties. I 

don’t know the last time anyone here has been over in England, 

but, you know, you are definitely on camera everywhere you go. 

And I think that it is also—just on somewhat of an aside—just 

on the optics of travel, it is a good example of what is, if you fly 

out of the UK, on the differing standards—for example, on the 311. 

So there is just—it can be a different level. So you can leave the 

U.S. and have one experience when you fly overseas, and then have 

a different level of, you know, what you can bring on when you are 

traveling back, because—so I just wanted to make those two points. 

Mr. PETRI. Yes? 

Mr. LEOCHA. I just wanted to add one other thing, in terms of 

the lessons that we learned from our foreign partners. 

28 

One of the things that our foreign partners do not have that we 

do have is our terrorist watch center. And we have an amazing intelligence system right now which allows us to screen every single 

American flying. And they don’t do that in Europe. They can’t do 

that in Europe. They have to cross so many different borders, it 

just would be impossible. 

So, we have a benefit where we basically pre-screen all of our 

passengers today. We are doing it right now. And—but nobody 

seems to be taking that into account, even though it is costing, you 

know, billions of dollars to perform. And I think it is important 

that, when we look at our entire operation, we take—you know, we 

can step back and we can say that probably 90 percent or 95 or 

98 percent of our passengers are pre-checked. They are not a 

threat. And we always know it is the 1 percent, it is a small number. 

But we also know that you don’t find them at the very last 

minute; you find them through constant vigilance and through intelligence and through good police work, and working together with 

foreign countries. And that is where we have gotten far, far better. 

And I don’t think that we give real credit to those people, and what 

a great job they are doing in keeping us safe. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Ribble? 

Mr. RIBBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the 

panel for being here today. I want to start with Mr. Dunlap. 

You mentioned in your testimony—you talk about the operational test and evaluation program. And you cite some partners 

in Europe at Geneva, Heathrow, and Amsterdam. Why are there 

no U.S. airports participating? 

Mr. DUNLAP. So, Congressman, let me first start by saying the 

TSA and the Department have been great supporters of our initiative. But, frankly, I think there also has to be a realization that 

an initiative of this magnitude has to prove itself. 

And so, what we have done over the past year is assembled the 

expertise, put the good ideas on paper, assembled the blueprints, 

and have enough credibility where we can not only prove to the 

Heathrows, the Genevas, and the Amsterdams of the world, but 

also Los Angeles and Newark and New York, that what we have 

is a credible program. And I am very pleased to note that Gina 

Marie Lindsey, from Los Angeles World Airports, is one of our 

board members. 

So, we are building that critical mass. And we really believe that 

what we do have now, whether it is a 2014 near-term checkpoint, 

2017 intermediate, or 2020 long range, is something that there is 

a great deal of credibility built around it, and a great deal of momentum behind it. And I do believe that, based on the administrator’s support, that we can get an airport. But it would always help 

if the Congress could also encourage TSA and DHS to do the same 

thing. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Yes, it is unfortunate that we are allowing Europe 

to lead in this regard. And I have flown through both Heathrow 

and Amsterdam on numbers of occasions. These are large airports, 

sophisticated airports. So it is just disappointing. 

Ms. Shook, is it—am I pronouncing that correctly? 

Ms. SHOOK. Yes. 

29 

Mr. RIBBLE. Is this your daughter back here with you? 

Ms. SHOOK. This is my daughter, Isabelle. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Well, Isabelle, welcome to the Congress today. It is 

nice to have you here. 

My question for you—and I want to—for full disclosure, my 

daughter-in-law is a flight attendant for Southwest Airlines. 

Ms. SHOOK. I did not know that, great. 

Mr. RIBBLE. I am well aware of some of the work that they do, 

and I appreciate the work that flight attendants do. 

However, in your testimony you state, ‘‘A federalized workforce 

creates consistency. And, thus, greater security throughout our Nation’s airports is a key component of a multilayered aviation security system.’’ Under that basis, should we not federalize flight attendants? 

Ms. SHOOK. I think that there is—I think it is a great question, 

so thank you for that. I have never been posed that question. 

Mr. RIBBLE. If Federalization was a solution, then—or—— 

Ms. SHOOK. Well, I mean—— 

Mr. RIBBLE. Or are you good at your job because you are airline 

and the industry trains you, teaches you, holds you accountable? Is 

it the system that you are in, rather than Federalization that 

worked? And could not we have done the exact same thing with 

checkpoints? 

Ms. SHOOK. So we do have the same—we have a standardized 

training that, you know, we have to go through. Obviously, through 

an initial training, we have our annual recurrent training, we obviously have the, you know, sensitive bulletins and all that. But my 

job, working for an individual airline, is different than what the 

checkpoint is that you go through. 

So, for example, if I—you know, it is mentioned that I am a 

flight attendant for Alaska Airlines. If someone chooses to fly Alaska Airlines over a competitor, they are doing that for a reason. 

However, that passenger would expect, if they are checking in to 

Seattle, flying to Washington, DC, and when they fly back home to 

Seattle, that they would have a consistency in what that experience 

would be like in passing through the security checkpoints. 

So, while I can appreciate what you are saying, you know, with 

a question on should we have federalized flight attendants, you 

know, we do have that standardized national training and, you 

know, to make sure that we got that layer. But I feel very strongly 

that it is important to have a federalized workforce with the TSA 

to be able to have that access to that real-time data that can be 

passed immediately. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Yes. Well, I can tell you, as a passenger—and I fly 

a lot, just about every weekend, I know that I have now gotten on 

and off airplanes about 150 times this year—that I feel very safe 

getting on an airplane, not because of the Federalization of the security system, but because of the high level of training and capability of the pilots and flight attendants that are—and the maintenance workers that are not Federal employees, doing their job just 

as well, under a highly regulated industry. And so, just a comment 

there. 

And then—— 

Ms. SHOOK. Let me just say—— 

30 

Mr. RIBBLE. Sure. 

Ms. SHOOK. Let me just respond to that. Thank you. I appreciate 

that. But I think it is a layer, right? So they are all layers. So certainly the flight attendants, you know, are the last line of defense 

in our Nation’s aviation security, should all the other measures 

fail. You know, pilots, we have got two pilots for a reason, should 

something catastrophic happen to one. Two engines for a reason. 

So we need to have this layered approach to security. 

But I feel much more comfortable knowing that the workforce 

that is the TSA, in my experience with extensive travel, having a 

pre-TSA world for security checkpoints and a post-TSA world for 

security checkpoints, night and day. Night and day, in my own personal experience. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Sure, and I am sure—and I would say that there is 

a lot of differences in my own experience, as well. I was a 100,000- 

mile flier prior to coming to Congress in my business world. However, a lot of the changes would have happened spontaneously, anyway, as a result of 9/11, outside of Federalization. Otherwise, under 

that policy, or to that—under that mindset, we should just federalize the entire industry. 

Mr. Leocha, some of the stuff I agree with you and some of the 

stuff I don’t. One of the concerns I do have with your recommendation, number one, is the use of having knives or box cutters or the 

dismissal of those on airplanes because we now secure pilot doors. 

It is nice to secure pilot doors, but I would prefer that the passenger sitting next to me doesn’t have a box cutter. And I would 

tell you that my daughter-in-law would have no ability to escape 

out of an airborne aircraft. If someone with a box cutter is walking 

around New York City, I can run away, as could she. But you can’t 

run away from an airplane. How do you respond to that? 

Mr. LEOCHA. Well, obviously, all of my friends and people that 

I talk with don’t agree with me on everything I say. So that is my 

first response. 

But basically, we are in a situation—if we are on the Metro 

and—or you are on a bus in Fort Worth, I mean, who knows who 

is carrying what? You—I just think that, at this point, the reason 

that we have TSA is to keep our planes from being used as missiles. And secondly, now, it is to keep explosives off the aircraft. 

Those are the main things we are looking for. 

And when we first came through and we set up TSA, we didn’t 

have hardened cockpits and we didn’t have the levels of intelligence 

that we have today. So it was really a different world. And we set 

up TSA to deal with that world. But right now, you are right. I 

mean you could say that you don’t want to have someone sitting 

next to you on an airplane with a knife. Then again, you don’t want 

to be sitting next to someone on the Metro with a knife, or on a 

bus with a knife, or on a ferry boat. I guess you could dive overboard. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Yes. 

Mr. LEOCHA. But, I mean, it is just that right now that is not 

a threat that we are looking after. And I don’t think that there has 

ever been a report—I think we—at a roundtable once we talked 

about this—there has never been a report of a knife fight on an airplane before 9/11 or since. 

31 

Mr. RIBBLE. Yes. 

Mr. LEOCHA. It is just—I mean we can’t protect against everything. And everything we protect against costs us. Once again, 

when we put it out across the country, it is an incredibly big effort. 

It is very invasive. And I don’t think it is really necessary. 

Mr. RIBBLE. I want to—yes, go ahead. I will give you the final 

word. 

Ms. SHOOK. Well, I used to take my knife to work, OK? So I miss 

the days where I could cut up a mango as a fresh snack. I miss 

traveling with my Leatherman. I am much more thankful to know 

that I don’t have a knife, but then nobody else has a knife on the 

plane. So, while I miss that aspect of being able to travel with that, 

I feel much more confident to know that that potential threat does 

not exist. 

Mr. RIBBLE. All right. Thank you very much. 

Ms. SHOOK. So I concur with your sister-in-law. Thank you. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. As you know, being from Wisconsin, we 

used to have an airline called Midwest Express that put knives in 

front of every passenger on every plane for years, and who never 

really had any particular problem when they were provided by the 

airline, let alone having to screen against them. So we have to get 

sort of real about some of this stuff. 

In any event, we thank you very much for your testimony, for 

your response to our questions. And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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