RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 21a0139p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MEMPHIS A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE; THE EQUITY 

ALLIANCE; FREE HEARTS; MEMPHIS AND WEST 

TENNESSEE AFL-CIO CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL; THE 

TENNESSEE STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP;

SEKOU FRANKLIN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

TRE HARGETT, in his official capacity as Secretary of 

State of the State of Tennessee; MARK GOINS, in his 

official capacity as Coordinator of Elections for the 

State of Tennessee; AMY P. WEIRICH, in her official 

capacity as District Attorney General for Shelby 

County, Tennessee, 

Defendants-Appellants.

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No. 20-6141

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 3:20-cv-00374—Eli J. Richardson, District Judge.

Argued: December 15, 2020

Decided and Filed: June 22, 2021

Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Matthew D. Cloutier, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Danielle Lang, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Matthew D. Cloutier, OFFICE OF THE 

TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Danielle Lang, 

Jonathan Diaz, Molly Danahy, Ravi Doshi, Caleb Jackson, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, 

>
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 2

Washington, D.C., Ezra D. Rosenberg, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 

UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. 

GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which READLER, J., joined. 

READLER, J. (pp. 14–18), delivered a separate concurring opinion. MOORE, J. (pp. 19–35), 

delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. This is the third time these parties have 

appeared before this panel in a Tennessee election law dispute. This time, defendants appeal the 

district court’s order granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of a 

law preventing first-time voters from voting by mail. We previously denied defendants’ motion 

to stay the injunction pending this appeal. However, after the benefit of full briefing and oral 

argument, we now vacate the preliminary injunction. 

I.

In the months prior to the November 2020 elections, there was increased attention placed 

on absentee voting due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Tennessee allows several categories of 

voters to vote absentee, including those who will be outside of their registered county during the 

election period, persons over 60, and those who are “hospitalized, ill or physically disabled, and 

because of such condition, . . . unable to appear at the [their] polling place on election day.” 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201. Tennessee has acknowledged that the latter category includes 

“persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19 or who are caretakers of persons with special 

vulnerability to COVID-19.” Fisher v. Hargett, 604 S.W.3d 381, 393 (Tenn. 2020).

First-time voters who register by mail or online, however, cannot vote absentee even if 

they fall into one of the approved categories, with limited exceptions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-

115(b)(7). These first-time voters must vote in person so that they can present a form of 

identification. Id. Tennessee claims this requirement is necessary to prevent fraudulent voting. 

Because individuals do not present a form of photo identification when registering to vote by 

mail, Tennessee argues that allowing first-time voters to vote by mail will lead to “ghost voting” 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 3

where the signatures on the voter’s registration and absentee ballot match but the state cannot 

verify the voter’s identity. 

On May 1, 2020, plaintiffs—two individuals registered to vote in Tennessee and five 

Tennessee organizations—brought this lawsuit challenging several Tennessee voting laws. 

Defendants are three Tennessee government officials involved in election enforcement. On June 

12, 2020, Plaintiffs amended their complaint and added a claim contesting Tennessee’s first-time 

voter restriction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-115(b)(7). That same day, they filed a motion for 

preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the enforcement of § 2-2-115(b)(7). 

On September 9, 2020, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 

injunction as to the first-time voter restriction and issued an order enjoining the enforcement of 

§ 2-2-115(b)(7). Defendants filed a motion to stay the injunction, and a motion for 

reconsideration. The district court denied both motions. 

Defendants then filed a notice of appeal, and a motion to stay the preliminary injunction 

in this court. We previously denied the motion to stay, and now consider the merits of the 

preliminary injunction. 

II.

When deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, courts must balance four 

factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the 

movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would 

cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the 

issuance of an injunction.” Am. Civil Liberties Union Fund of Mich. v. Livingston County, 

796 F.3d 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 818–19 (6th 

Cir. 2012)). “These factors are not prerequisites, but are factors that are to be balanced against 

each other.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 

2002). “[T]he party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief.” 

Livingston County, 796 F.3d at 642 (alteration in original) (quoting McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 

611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 4

Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 546 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n seeking a preliminary injunction, a federal 

plaintiff has the burden of establishing the likelihood of success on the merits.”).

Whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits is a question of law, 

which this court reviews de novo. Ammex, Inc. v. Wenk, 936 F.3d 355, 359−60 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Shimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc) (per curiam)). We review the “district court’s ultimate determination as to whether the 

four preliminary injunction factors weigh in favor of granting or denying preliminary injunctive 

relief” for abuse of discretion. Shimmel, 751 F.3d at 430. Under the abuse-of-discretion 

standard, we will reverse the district court “if it improperly applied the governing law, used an 

erroneous legal standard, or relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Id. We review the 

district court’s factual findings for clear error. Ammex, Inc., 936 F.3d at 360.

III.

“When a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional 

violation, ‘the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor.’” 

Shimmel, 751 F.3d at 430 (quoting Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012)). 

In addition to demonstrating a likelihood of success on the substantive claims, a plaintiff must 

also show a likelihood of success of establishing jurisdiction. Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. 

Mental Health, 900 F.3d 250, 256 n.4 (6th Cir. 2018). If a plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of 

jurisdiction, then the court will deny the preliminary injunction. Id. Here, defendants raise two 

jurisdictional challenges: standing and mootness. 

A.

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and 

controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

559–60 (1992). Standing is a core component of this “case-or-controversy requirement of 

Article III.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must show (1) an 

injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and (3) likely to be redressed 

by a favorable judicial decision. Id. at 560–61. A plaintiff asking for declaratory or injunctive 

relief must also “show actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm.” Grendell 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 5

v. Ohio Sup. Ct., 252 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Magaw, 

132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997)). An organization may have standing either in its own right, 

Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 624 (Cir. 2016), or it may have 

associational standing on behalf of its members “when its members would otherwise have 

standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s 

purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 

individual members in the lawsuit,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). If one party has standing, then identical claims brought by other 

parties to the same lawsuit are also justiciable. See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless, 837 F.3d at 

623.

Here, the district court found that one plaintiff, The Tennessee State Conference of the 

NAACP (“Tennessee NAACP”), had associational standing through a single member, Corey 

DeWayne Sweet, an individual resident of Tennessee. Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v.

Hargett, 485 F. Supp.3d 959, 978−79 (M.D. Tenn. 2020). Sweet submitted two declarations 

before the district court. His first declaration was signed on July 6, 2020 and was attached to 

plaintiffs’ reply to their motion for a preliminary injunction. Sweet stated that he was twenty 

years old, had never voted before, and registered to vote online in Shelby County, Tennessee in 

late May or early June of 2020. Sweet also said he “occasionally attend[s] events of the 

Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP” and was a student at Xavier University in 

Louisiana. DE 54-4, Sweet Dec. 1, Page ID 2300. At the time, Sweet was taking remote classes 

because of the COVID-19 pandemic and did not know whether he would return to in-person 

learning for the fall semester starting in August 2020. He wished to vote by mail in the 

upcoming Tennessee elections because he was concerned about the risk of exposure to COVID19 and because he could not afford to return to Tennessee to vote if he resumed in-person classes 

in Louisiana. 

The district court determined that plaintiffs had put forth a sufficient showing that Sweet 

was a Tennessee NAACP member, but it noted that the evidence was “far from strong.” 

Memphis A. Phillip Randolph, 485 F. Supp. 3d at 1006. The district court relied on Sweet’s first 

declaration, which stated that Sweet occasionally attends NAACP meetings, and on the fact that 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 6

defendants had not challenged Sweet’s membership in their motion to dismiss for lack of 

standing (filed after plaintiffs filed their motion for the preliminary injunction). Id. Thus, the 

district court accepted plaintiffs’ representation that Sweet was an NAACP member, but warned 

that plaintiffs “should advise the Court immediately if, contrary to the Court’s current 

understanding, Sweet is not actually a member of NAACP.” Id. at 978 n.10 (emphasis omitted). 

The next day, plaintiffs filed Sweet’s second declaration, in which Sweet stated that “I am a 

member of the Memphis Branch of the Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP.” DE 86-2, 

Sweet Dec. 2, Page ID 2670.

On appeal, defendants’ only challenge to plaintiffs’ Article III standing is whether 

plaintiffs demonstrated that Sweet is a member of the Tennessee NAACP. Defendants claim that 

neither of Sweet’s declarations demonstrate that he was a Tennessee NAACP member at the time 

the amended complaint was filed. According to defendants, Sweet’s use of the present tense in 

his second declaration only proves that he was a member when the declaration was filed, not that 

he was a member when the amended complaint was filed. 

While the evidence that Sweet is a Tennessee NAACP member is not definitive, the 

district court’s factual finding that Sweet was a member is not clearly erroneous. A factual 

finding is clearly erroneous when this court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed” after reviewing the full record. United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 

554, 594 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Ware, 282 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir. 2002)); see 

also United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873, 888 (6th Cir. 2010) (“To be clearly erroneous, . . . a 

decision must strike [this Court] as more than just maybe or probably wrong.” (alterations in 

original) (quoting United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1990)). There are several 

facts in the record that suggest Sweet was a member of the Tennessee NAACP when the 

amended complaint was filed. First, there is his initial declaration where he stated that he 

“occasionally attend[s] events” of the Tennessee NAACP. DE 54-4, Sweet Dec., Page ID 2300. 

Second, after being admonished by the district court to confirm Sweet’s membership, Sweet and 

his grandmother Gloria Jean Sweet-Love, the president of the Tennessee NAACP, both 

submitted declarations stating that he was a member. Defendants’ argument that Sweet’s use of 

the present tense in his second declaration negates its probative value as to the time of filing is 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 7

unpersuasive. While it would have been preferable for Sweet to say explicitly when he became a 

Tennessee NAACP member, the evidence that: (1) he said he “is a member” in September 2020 

and (2) had previously attended Tennessee NAACP events make it plausible that he was also a 

member in June 2020 when the amended complaint was filed. Although the record is sparse, the 

district court’s finding that Sweet was a member was not clearly erroneous. 

If Sweet was a member, then the Tennessee NAACP had associational standing to 

challenge the first-time voter restriction at the time the amended complaint was filed. If not for 

the first-time mail-in voter restriction, Sweet would likely have been eligible to vote by mail 

under a Tennessee state-court preliminary injunction in place at the time, which allowed “any 

qualified voter who determines it is impossible or unreasonable to vote in-person at a polling 

place due to the COVID-19 situation” to vote absentee. Fisher, 604 S.W.3d at 392 (quoting 

Temporary Inj. Order, Fisher v. Hargett, No. 20-453-III (Tenn. Ch. Ct., 20th Jud. Dist. Jun. 4, 

2020)). Thus, Sweet suffered an injury because the first-time voter restriction impeded his right 

to vote. Sweet’s injury was fairly traceable to the first-time voter restriction and could have been 

readily redressed by an injunction barring its enforcement. Additionally, the interests at stake, 

including protecting voting rights, are germane to the NAACP’s purpose, and neither the claim 

asserted nor the relief requested would require individual Tennessee NAACP members to 

participate in the lawsuit. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181. Accordingly, the district 

court properly concluded that the Tennessee NAACP, and by extension all plaintiffs, had shown 

a substantial likelihood of establishing associational standing through Sweet to challenge the 

first-time voter restriction.

Next, defendants claim that plaintiffs lack prudential standing to assert the rights of third 

parties. Generally, plaintiffs cannot establish standing based on the legal rights or interest of 

others. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004). There are some exceptions to this rule, 

“such as where a ‘close relationship’ exists between the party asserting the right and the party 

possessing it or where a ‘hindrance’ exists to the possessor’s ability to protect the right.” Fair 

Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–

30) (finding that an organization engaged in voter outreach did not have prudential standing to 

assert the rights of unidentified third-party voters). Here, plaintiffs are asserting the legal rights 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 8

of their members, such as Corey Sweet, not of unidentified third parties. There is no prudential 

standing bar when member-based organizations advocate for the rights of their members. See 

Sandusky Cnty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 

Defendants’ effort to analogize this case to Fair Elections Ohio fails, as does their claim that 

plaintiffs lack prudential standing. 

Finally, while it is widely accepted that a plaintiff must establish standing at the time the 

lawsuit commences, it is perhaps less clear whether the standing requirement persists. Recently, 

the Supreme Court has implied that in certain cases a plaintiff may have to maintain standing 

throughout the lawsuit. See Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 536–37 (2020) (per curiam) 

(dismissing a case for lack of both standing and ripeness after the plaintiffs’ basis for standing 

disappeared during the pendency of the action); Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 499 (2020) 

(noting that the plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing standing as of the time he brought this 

lawsuit and maintaining it thereafter”). The Supreme Court, however, has not explicitly 

overruled past precedent that confined the standing inquiry to the moment when the lawsuit was 

filed. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (“[T]he standing 

inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the 

outcome when the suit was filed.”). We need not resolve this tension here, however, because 

mootness poses another Article III jurisdictional bar to plaintiffs’ claim. See Arizonans for 

Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66–67 (1997) (“We may resolve the question whether 

there remains a live case or controversy . . . without first determining whether [plaintiffs have] 

standing to appeal because the former question, like the latter, goes to the Article III jurisdiction 

of this Court and the courts below, not the merits of the case.”); In re: 2016 Primary Election, 

836 F.3d 584, (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that this court has “discretion to address jurisdictional 

issues ‘in any sequence we wish’” (quoting Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (en banc))). 

B.

Under Article III, federal courts may only adjudicate “actual, ongoing controversies.” 

Mwasaru v. Napolitano, 619 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 

317 (1988)). An actual, ongoing controversy exists when there is a “genuine dispute[] between
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 9

adverse parties, where the relief requested would have a real impact on the legal interests of 

those parties.” Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 2006); see 

also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). “If ‘the issues 

presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,’ then 

the case is moot and the court has no jurisdiction.” Libertarian Party of Ohio, 462 F.3d at 584 

(quoting Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). “The mootness inquiry must 

be made at every stage of a case; thus, if a case becomes moot during an appeal, the judgment 

below must be vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss.” Id. (quoting 

McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). 

“The heavy burden of demonstrating mootness rests on the party claiming mootness.” Cleveland 

Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 531 (6th Cir. 2001).

Defendants argue that Sweet’s individual claim, and by extension the claim of all the 

plaintiffs, is now moot. When plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on June 12, 2020, Sweet 

was eligible to vote absentee based on a June 4, 2020 state-court injunction of the first-time voter 

law, which construed Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201(5) to permit “any qualified voter who 

determines it is impossible or unreasonable to vote in person at a polling place due to the 

COVID-19 situation” to vote absentee. Fisher, 604 S.W.3d at 392 (quoting Temporary Inj. 

Order, Fisher v. Hargett, No. 20-453-III (Tenn. Ch. Ct., 20th Jud. Dist. Jun. 4, 2020)). On 

August 5, 2020, the Tennessee Supreme Court vacated the June 4, 2020 injunction and imposed 

new, stricter guidelines. Fisher, 604 S.W.3d at 405. Under the new guidelines, § 2-6-201(5) 

only includes individuals who have a “special vulnerability to COVID-19 [or] are caretakers for 

persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19.” Id. at 393. 

After Fisher, Sweet no longer qualifies to cast an absentee ballot under Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 2-6-201. Sweet does not claim that he has a special vulnerability to COVID-19 or is a 

caretaker to someone who has a special vulnerability, only that he is concerned about the general 

risks of COVID-19. His concern that he may contract COVID-19, without more, is insufficient 

to meet the requirements the Tennessee Supreme Court articulated on August 5, 2020. 

Furthermore, Sweet does not appear to readily fit into any of the other categories of eligible 

absentee voters, particularly since he transferred to the University of Memphis in July 2020, so 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 10

there is no longer a possibility that he will be returning to Louisiana for school. 

Based on this updated information, it appears that Sweet no longer has an actual, ongoing 

stake in this litigation. Even if this court affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction and 

continued to enjoin the first-time voter restriction, Sweet would not be eligible to vote absentee 

because he does not fall into any of the approved categories under Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201 as 

interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Fisher. In his second declaration, Sweet stated 

that he might be eligible in the future if he becomes sick, is out of the county during the voting 

period, or is serving as a juror. Such speculation, however, does not make Sweet any more likely 

to be eligible to vote absentee than a general Tennessee voter and does not amount to an actual 

stake in this litigation. Simply put, the relief plaintiffs are requesting no longer has a real impact 

on Sweet’s legal interests. If the outcome of this case will not affect his legal interests, Sweet’s 

claim is moot. See Libertarian Party of Ohio, 462 F.3d at 584. And because the organizational 

plaintiffs relied entirely on Sweet to establish their legal interest in this case, they have not 

shown a substantial likelihood that they continue to have a legally cognizable interest. See

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“If [the 

association] has standing, it is only because at least one of [two identified members] has 

standing, and if the claims of both are moot, then [the association’s] claims are moot as well.” 

(citations omitted)); see also Pro. Helicopter Pilots Ass’n Local 102 v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 

No. 1:13-CV-164-WKW, 2013 WL 6837555, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 26, 2013) (“Because the 

[organization’s] associational standing hinges on the standing of its individual members, that 

later mooting of its members’ claims also moots [the organization’s] claims.”). 

Plaintiffs attempt to rely on this court’s past reasoning in Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. 

v. City of Parma to argue that their general claim remains justiciable even if Sweet’s claim is not. 

See Waskul, 900 F.3d at 257 (stating that Cleveland Branch “appear[s] to hold that even if a 

named member’s claims had become moot, the association retained standing because the named 

member had standing at the outset of the litigation.”). Plaintiffs and Waskul, however, conflate 

Cleveland Branch’s analysis of the standing redressability requirement with that case’s mootness 

analysis. Standing and mootness, albeit related, are distinct doctrines with separate tests to 

evaluate their existence at different times of the litigation. See Ohio Citizen Action v. City of 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 11

Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, 580 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Standing is determined at the time the complaint 

is filed.” (quoting Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2004))); McPherson, 119 F.3d at 

458 (“The mootness inquiry must be made at every stage of a case; thus, if a case becomes moot 

during an appeal, the judgment below must be vacated and the case remanded with instructions 

to dismiss.”). Thus, plaintiffs cannot rely on Cleveland Branch’s standing analysis to save their 

case if Sweet’s claim is now moot, given that Sweet is the only affected member plaintiffs have 

identified.1

The plaintiffs’ claim also does not fit into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 

exception to the mootness doctrine. This exception “applies when (1) the challenged action is 

too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and (2) there is a 

reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the controversy will recur.” 

Libertarian Party of Ohio, 462 F.3d at 584. “The party asserting that this exception applies 

bears the burden of establishing both prongs.” Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th 

Cir. 2005). The second prong is “somewhat relaxed in election cases.” Id. at 372. To be 

capable of repetition, “the chain of potential events does not have to be air-tight or even 

probable.” Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 716 (6th Cir. 2016). The challenged action, however, is 

not capable of repetition if it is based on a unique factual situation. See Libertarian Party of 

Ohio, 462 F.3d at 584.

Our holding in Libertarian Party of Ohio helps define what constitutes a “unique factual 

situation.” In that case, the Libertarian Party of Ohio (“LPO”) sued the Ohio Secretary of State 

after its petition to form a political party for the 2004 primary election was rejected for including 

an outdated version of Ohio’s election falsification notice. Id. at 582–83. LPO began 

distributing its petition in April 2001, but the Ohio legislature changed the election falsification 

1

In support of their opposition to defendants’ motion for reconsideration before the district court, plaintiffs 

also submitted a declaration from Dawn Harrington, the executive director of plaintiff organization Free Hearts. DE 

93, Harrington Dec., Page ID 2714–15. Harrington stated that Free Hearts member Myeisha Brown was eligible to 

vote in Tennessee and “intend[ed] to submit a voter registration form by mail before October 5 and request for an 

absentee ballot before October 27.” DE 93, Harrington Dec., Page ID 2714–15. At the time, however, Brown was 

in the custody of Davidson County, Tennessee, and was being held without bail until her court date set for 

November 16, 2020. Id. at Page 2715. Thus, Brown would be incarcerated for the November 2020 election period. 

Plaintiffs did not mention Brown in their appellee brief before this court, perhaps because Harrington’s declaration 

does not explain how Brown would qualify to vote absentee under Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201. Accordingly, 

plaintiffs cannot rely on Brown to demonstrate an actual legal interest.
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 12

notice in August 2001. Id. at 584. LPO did not update the notice after August 2001, so when it 

submitted its petition in November 2003 it was rejected for including the outdated version of the 

notice. Id. LPO challenged both the Ohio requirement that parties must strictly comply with 

election laws and the Ohio primary election petition process in general. Id. at 584–85. This 

court found that the second challenge to the petition process was capable of repetition, yet 

evading review, because even though the 2004 elections had ended, LPO could seek to 

participate in future Ohio primary elections. Id. In contrast, we found that the first challenge to 

Ohio’s strict compliance requirement was moot. Id. 584. This court explained that “[o]utside of 

this unique factual situation” where a requirement changed midway through the petition process, 

“there [was] not a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that the LPO or any other 

political group will be injured by Ohio’s requirement of strict compliance with election laws.” 

Id. at 584; see also Tigrett v. Cooper, 595 F. App’x 554, 557–58 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding the 

challenged action was not capable of repetition because it was based on a consolidated election 

that historically only occurred once every 40 to 50 years). 

Similarly, Sweet’s alleged injury and the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction 

are inextricably tied to the COVID-19 pandemic, a once-in-a-century crisis. In their 

memorandum in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction before the district court, 

plaintiffs recognized that “these are not ordinary times.” DE 43, Memorandum, Page ID 1681. 

While plaintiffs claimed that the first-time restriction burdened all first-time voters simply by 

making it more difficult for them to vote, plaintiffs’ central concerns related to the COVID-19 

pandemic. For example, plaintiffs argued that “Tennessee simply cannot ensure voters’ safety at 

the polls” and worried about the possible exposure to COVID-19 while waiting in line to vote. 

Id. at Page ID 1682. Sweet also stated that he was “particularly concerned that [he] could 

contract COVID-19 but be unable to vote absentee because of the first-time voter rule” and that 

he did not want to vote in person because of the risk of COVID-19. DE 86-2, Sweet Dec. 2, 

Page ID 2670–71. In its order granting the preliminary injunction, the district court also relied 

on the unique challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Memphis A. Phillip Randolph, 

485 F. Supp.3d at 982–83. Fortunately, because of advancements in COVID-19 vaccinations 

and treatment since this case began, the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to pose a serious threat 

during the next election cycle. Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 13

Reported to CDC, by State/Territory, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 

https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_dailytrendscases (June 15, 2021). There is not a 

reasonable expectation that Sweet, other members of the plaintiff organizations, or the public 

will face the same burdens as voters did in the fall of 2020. The unique factual situation of this 

case makes it one of the rare election cases where the challenged action is not capable of 

repetition. 

In sum, plaintiffs have not shown that there is a substantial likelihood that their claim 

remains justiciable because they no longer have an ongoing legal interest in the outcome of this 

case. Since plaintiffs have not established a substantial likelihood of success in demonstrating 

subject matter jurisdiction, they are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. See Waskul, 900 

F.3d at 256 n.4.

IV.

In conclusion, plaintiffs have failed to justify the continuing need for the preliminary 

injunction because plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there is a substantial likelihood that 

their claim remains justiciable. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s preliminary 

injunction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 14

_________________

CONCURRENCE

_________________

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge, concurring. With no live controversy between the 

parties, I agree that the preliminary injunction must be vacated. And should this dispute 

resurrect itself in some form, it seemingly would take little work to conclude that Tennessee’s 

“first-time voter law” easily passes constitutional muster.

In essence, the Tennessee law in question requires new Tennessee voters either to 

register to vote in person or, should they register to vote by mail or online, to vote in person the 

first time they vote in an election. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-115(b)(7). The law’s apparent 

impetus is to employ a safeguard that a new voter confirms her identity in person to Tennessee 

election officials at least once—either when registering or, alternatively, when voting for the 

first time. See id.

For matters involving election mechanics, we traditionally have employed the framework 

articulated in the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick line of cases. See Burdick v. Takushi, 

504 U.S. 428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). For reasons I (and many 

others) have previously explained, Anderson-Burdick does little to constrain a court’s 

decisionmaking process, and instead leaves federal judges to weigh standards entirely crafted 

by the judges themselves. Daunt v. Benson (Daunt I), 956 F.3d 396, 424 (6th Cir. 2020) 

(Readler, J., concurring) (“In sensitive policy-oriented cases, [Anderson-Burdick] affords far 

too much discretion to judges in resolving the dispute before them.”); Daunt v. Benson (Daunt 

II), --- F.3d. ---, 2021 WL 2154769, at *17 (6th Cir. May 27, 2021) (Readler, J., concurring) 

(“Anderson-Burdick’s hallmark is standardless standards.”); see, e.g., Graveline v. Benson, 

992 F.3d 524, 553 (6th Cir. 2021) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (“This case illustrates once again why 

applying Anderson-Burdick’s grant of discretion to the federal judiciary can lead to tension with 

the principles of federalism and separation of powers.”); Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 783 n.4 

(6th Cir. 2020) (suggesting that it can “take[] some legal gymnastics to quantify the ‘burden’ 

that the State’s disparate treatment places on [one’s] right to vote,” particularly when a 

generally applicable rule treats two groups differently but does not necessarily “burden” either 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 15

one); Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 443 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[t]he 

distinction between ‘severe burdens’ and ‘lesser’ ones is often murky” (quoting Buckley v. Am. 

Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 207 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring))). Unbridled judicial 

discretion of this kind rarely lends itself to consistent decisionmaking. Daunt I, 956 F.3d at 425 

(Readler, J., concurring) (“In the name of ‘flexibility,’ Anderson-Burdick risks trading precise 

rules and predictable outcomes for the imprecision and unpredictability of how the judicialassignment wheel turns.”). And that concern is especially troubling when the case at issue 

involves voting and elections. Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 Geo. 

Wash. L. Rev. 1836, 1859 (2013) (arguing that a test as “indeterminate” as Anderson-Burdick

“is arguably no test at all, and thus the federal constitutional law that is supposed to supervise 

the operation of a state’s electoral process has little objectivity or predictability”). After all, our 

circuit’s muscular embrace of Anderson-Burdick often means that “the permissibility of [a 

state’s] democratic choices in essence turns on how three ([sometimes] two) unelected judges 

pick and choose the ways in which a state may structure its government or elections.” Daunt II, 

2021 WL 2154769, at *20. Tellingly, other circuits have not followed our lead. See id. at *21–

*22 (observing that “we stand alone when compared to our sister circuits” in aggressively 

“deploying Anderson-Burdick”).

Nonetheless, were the Tennessee law at issue here to be measured by that framework, the 

district court, in the first instance, would be required to determine both the extent to which the 

law burdens the right to vote as well as Tennessee’s interests in the regulation, and then to 

weigh the two against one another. See Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 

2020) (per curiam). As the logic of Anderson-Burdick goes, if the burden is severe, strict 

scrutiny applies. Id. If, on the other hand, the law “impose[s] ‘reasonable nondiscriminatory 

restrictions’” on voters, rational basis applies and “‘the State’s important regulatory interests 

are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 

And under our Circuit’s precedents, if the burden falls somewhere in between, we weigh that 

burden against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 

imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it 

necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434). But see Daunt II, 2021 WL 2154769, at *22 (“Standing alone from 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 16

our sister circuits, we deem ‘most’ Anderson-Burdick cases to ‘fall in between’ the extremes of 

laws that impose severe burdens and no burdens at all, thereby subjecting a wide swath of state 

laws to the supposed ‘hard judgment[s]’ that the whims of Anderson-Burdick’s ‘flexible 

standard’ ‘demand.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 

429 (6th Cir. 2012))).

Tennessee’s interests in effectuating its electoral system plainly are sufficient to justify 

the registration law given the minimal burden the law imposes on Tennessee voters. As a 

starting point, the law is content neutral; its mandate applies regardless of a voter’s “particular 

viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.” Daunt I, 956 F.3d at 407 (quoting 

Citizens for Legis. Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916, 921 (6th Cir. 1998)). The law also does not 

“unfairly” restrict “the availability of a political opportunity” or ballot access. Anderson, 460 

U.S. at 793 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982)). There is no 

constitutional right to vote absentee. See Mays, 951 F.3d at 792; see also Common Cause Ind. 

v. Lawson, 977 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[A]s long as the state allows voting in person, 

there is no constitutional right to vote by mail.”); accord Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 

978 F.3d 603, 607 (8th Cir. 2020). Nor, to my knowledge, has any court recognized a 

constitutional right to register to vote by mail. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1 (providing State 

legislatures with authority to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections”). 

At most, there is a federal statutory requirement that states allow voters to register by mail, see 

52 U.S.C. § 20505, an obligation that Tennessee has honored, and that by all accounts leaves 

room for Tennessee to require a voter so registered to vote in person, if the person has not 

previously voted in the jurisdiction, see id. at § 20505(c)(1). Requiring voters to appear in

person at least once—either to register or to cast their first vote—may inconvenience some 

Tennesseans. But that burden, in view of the law’s general and nondiscriminatory application 

to Tennessee voters as a whole, is properly characterized as minimal. See Crawford v. Marion 

Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 206 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that the burden 

of a nondiscriminatory law is analyzed “categorically” under Anderson-Burdick, without 

consideration of “the peculiar circumstances of individual voters”); see also id. at 190 (plurality 

op.) (explaining that Burdick held that a reasonable, nondiscriminatory election law imposed a 

minimal burden despite preventing “a significant number of voters from participating in Hawaii 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 17

elections in a meaningful manner” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Luft v. 

Evers, 963 F.3d 665, 675 (7th Cir. 2020) (“One less-convenient feature does not an 

unconstitutional system make.”); Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 631 (6th Cir. 

2016) (“[B]roadly applicable and non-discriminatory laws are presumed to pass constitutional 

muster.”).

Plaintiffs respond that requiring someone to vote in person if they fail to register in 

person denies the voter the benefit of Tennessee’s absentee voter laws, infringing upon some 

aspect of the “right to vote.” See Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F.3d at 626 (“Though not a 

delineated right per se, the Supreme Court has readily acknowledged the general right to vote as 

‘implicit in our constitutional system.’” (citation omitted)). But a Tennessee voter can avoid 

§ 2-2-115(b)(7)’s “in person” voting requirement simply by registering in person. And inperson registration occurs virtually year-round, the lone significant limitation being that 

registration must occur at least 30 days before an election. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-109. At 

bottom, then, the law at issue merely imposes the “burden” to register in person—at any time, 

other than 30 days before an election. It is difficult to describe that burden as anything more 

than minimal. Cf. Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F.3d at 628–32 (holding that an Ohio law that 

decreased the early voting period to 29 days and eliminated same-day registration imposed a 

minimal burden given the variety of voting opportunities available). Truth be told, it is hard to 

think of a less burdensome requirement associated with the voting process.

This case, I acknowledge, arose at a difficult period in our nation’s history, during the 

height of the COVID-19 pandemic. But the law in question, it bears emphasizing, has been in 

existence for decades, see 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 839 (amending Tennessee Code § 2-2-115(b) 

to include the first-time voter law), and the pandemic is now subsiding, see Covid Data Tracker 

Weekly Review, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (June 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZS7CW2MP (“Compared with the highest peak on January 10, 2021 (251,834), the current 7-day 

average [of daily new cases] decreased 94.4% [(13,997)].”). And even when the law is viewed 

through the unique lens of 2020, voting laws need not be put aside due to issues not of the 

State’s making. See Thompson, 959 F.3d at 810 (“[W]e cannot hold private citizens’ decisions 

to stay home for their own safety against the State.”); see also Common Cause Ind., 977 F.3d at 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 18

664 (“[D]ifficulties attributable to the virus do not require change in electoral rules—not, at 

least, as a constitutional matter. That some people are unwilling to vote in person does not 

make an otherwise-valid system unconstitutional. It is for states to decide what sorts of 

adjustments would be prudent.”). Nor, it happily appears to be the case, was the pandemic a 

significant hindrance to voting in the Volunteer State. According to the Tennessee Secretary of 

State, Tennesseans cast more than three million votes in the November election, breaking the 

State’s previous record by more than 427,000 votes. See Tennessee Breaks Voter Turnout and 

Participation Records, Tenn. Sec’y of State (Nov. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/RCM3-WTJ9 

(stating that 3,045,401 Tennesseans cast ballots in the November 3, 2020 election). And a vast 

majority of the total votes—some 93 percent—were cast in person. See id; Early and Absentee 

Voters for the November 3, 2020 General Election, Tenn. Sec’y of State (Oct. 30, 2020), 

https://perma.cc/R5DF-3UUY (stating that 210,428 Tennesseans cast mail-in absentee ballots 

in the November 3, 2020 election).

All things considered, a court should have little trouble, in a future case, finding that 

Tennessee’s law operates safely within constitutional parameters.
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 19

_________________

DISSENT

_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Haphazardly wielding the law 

and the facts, today’s majority misapplies our mootness jurisprudence and vacates a lawful 

preliminary injunction. As to the law, the majority closes its eyes to the myriad election cases 

that we have held to fall within the rule for controversies that are “capable of repetition, yet 

evading review,” Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2005), and rewrites a case 

that it disagrees with. In so doing, the majority damages future plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate 

through the judicial process the constitutional right to vote. As for the facts, the majority 

compounds its legal error with a dim view of the record, ignoring the evidence suggesting that 

many Tennessee voters—likely Plaintiffs’ own members—will find themselves once again 

qualified to vote absentee by mail in the next election cycle but barred from doing so by 

Tennessee Code § 2-2-115(b)(7). Because I would hold that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a 

substantial likelihood that their case is justiciable and that their constitutional claim will 

ultimately succeed, I must dissent.

I.

Defendants argue that we should vacate the district court’s preliminary injunction of 

Tennessee Code § 2-2-115(b)(7), which requires first-time, mail-registered voters in Tennessee 

to vote in person even if they would otherwise qualify to vote absentee by mail, because there is 

a substantial likelihood that this case is nonjusticiable. Specifically, Defendants contend that 

this case is nonjusticiable because (1) Corey DeWayne Sweet was not a member of the 

Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP (“Tennessee NAACP”) at the time that Plaintiffs 

filed their complaint such that they lacked standing to sue or (2) this case became moot when 

Sweet lost eligibility to vote absentee by mail. The majority properly rejects the first of these 

arguments. But in adopting Defendants’ second argument as its own, the majority defies 

Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent. I would hold Plaintiffs’ claim to be justiciable and 

reach the merits.
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 20

The judicial power of federal courts extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. 

Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, a (somewhat nebulous) limitation that gives rise to the justiciability 

doctrines of standing and mootness, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), 

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). Together, these complementary doctrines ensure that the 

federal courts “only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 

317 (1988). Standing does so by focusing on the initiation of the lawsuit, asking whether the 

plaintiff, at the time they filed their complaint, had a “personal stake in the outcome.” City of 

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 

(1962)); see Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 191–92. Once the plaintiff has overcome the 

standing hurdle, mootness doctrine comes into play, ensuring that the plaintiff maintains their 

personal stake in the outcome throughout the pendency of the case. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 

568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013). Thus, mootness has sometimes been referred to as “the doctrine of 

standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the 

commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” 

U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, 

Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)).1

That shorthand description of mootness as “standing set in a time frame” can be 

misleading. Although standing requires a showing that the plaintiff has suffered an “actual or 

imminent” injury that is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and is 

“likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision,” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180–81, 

190, the threshold for mootness is more relaxed: “a case becomes moot only when subsequent 

events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be 

expected to recur and ‘interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the 

effects of the alleged violation.’” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P, 263 F.3d at 530–31 (emphases 

1The majority suggests that there is some doubt as to whether a plaintiff must “maintain standing 

throughout the lawsuit” or whether the standing inquiry is “confined . . . to the moment when the lawsuit was filed.” 

Maj. Op. at 8. But if standing had to be maintained throughout the pendency of a lawsuit, there would be no need 

for a mootness doctrine at all. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190–91. We would simply ask whether events 

occurring after the complaint was filed negated any of the elements of standing. Our cases are clear that we assess a 

plaintiff’s standing to sue as of the time that they filed their complaint. See Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of 

Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[S]tanding does not have to be maintained throughout all stages of 

litigation. Instead, it is to be determined as of the time the complaint is filed.”); Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 

473, 490 (6th Cir. 2017) (same). Until that binding precedent is overruled, we must follow it.
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 21

added) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). In maintaining 

this doctrinal distinction between standing and mootness, courts minimize the risk of “sunk 

costs to the judicial system” resulting from mooted cases, Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 

191–92 & n.5, and ensure the courts’ ability to vindicate constitutional rights where the 

personal stake at issue is too fleeting to last the duration of a lengthy court process, see Roe v. 

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).

With the above principles in mind, I agree with the majority that Plaintiffs have 

demonstrated a likelihood of establishing standing at the time that they filed their complaint. 

See Online Merchants Guild v. Cameron, 995 F.3d 540, 547 (6th Cir. 2021) (“To succeed on 

the merits, a party must first reach the merits, and to do so it must establish standing.”). As the 

majority explains, it was not clear error for the district court to rule that Sweet was likely a 

member of the Tennessee NAACP when Plaintiffs filed their operative complaint on June 12, 

2020. Because Sweet—a first-time, mail-registered voter who at the time qualified to vote 

absentee by mail under a state-court injunction—was prevented from voting absentee by mail 

by § 2-2-115(b)(7), he would have standing to challenge the constitutionality of that law in his 

own right. Accordingly, the Tennessee NAACP likely has associational standing to do so on 

Sweet’s behalf. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181 (“An association has standing to 

bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in 

their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the 

claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 

lawsuit.”).

I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s mootness analysis, which is wholly 

untethered from our jurisprudence. To reiterate, asking whether a case has become moot is not 

the same thing as asking whether the plaintiff would have standing if they filed their suit today. 

See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190–91; Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 530–

31. For example, as relevant here, a case is not moot when the complained-of conduct is 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review,” even if intervening events have rendered the 

likelihood of the injury recurring too speculative for standing purposes. Honig, 484 U.S. at 318 

(quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)); see Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 22

(“[T]here are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) 

harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to 

overcome mootness.”). Under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” rule, a case is not 

moot so long as “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior 

to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same 

complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Lawrence, 430 F.3d at 371 

(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). This is a forgiving standard: a 

“reasonable expectation” does not require a showing “that a recurrence of the dispute [is] more 

probable than not.” Honig, 484 U.S. at 318 n.6. Indeed, “the chain of potential events does not 

have to be air-tight or even probable to support the court’s finding of non-mootness. Instead, it 

is sufficient that [the plaintiffs] possibly could have found [themselves] once again in the same 

situation [they] faced when [the] suit was filed.” Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 716 (6th Cir. 

2016).

To illustrate just how forgiving the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” rule can 

be when properly applied, consider first a case from outside the election context. In Honig, the 

Supreme Court considered a suit brought by two students, John Doe and Jack Smith, under 

what is now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“the Act”), 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1400 et seq., which grants substantive and procedural educational rights to persons with 

disabilities through the age of 21 by conditioning federal funding upon compliance. Honig, 

484 U.S. at 308–09. For example, the Act provided the “right to a free appropriate public 

education,” required that covered students not be removed from a “regular classroom setting” 

unless “education in regular classes . . . cannot be achieved satisfactorily,” and included a “stayput” provision designed to allow a student to remain in their “current educational placement” 

while challenging proposed changes to the student’s placement through a hearing process. Id.

at 309–12 (alteration in the original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(1), 1412(5), 1415(e)(5)). The 

students brought suit against various San Francisco Unified School District (“SFUSD”) 

officials, among others, to challenge the district’s failure to adhere to the Act’s “stay-put” 

provision during disciplinary proceedings for “disruptive behavior” related to their disabilities. 

Id. at 312–16. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, seven years had 

passed and Doe was 24 years old and Smith was 20. Id. at 318, 322. Faced with the suggestion 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 23

that the case was moot, the Court agreed as to Doe—because the Act’s protections apply only 

through the age of 21 and Doe was 24, his case was not “capable of repetition.” Id. at 318. The 

Court reached the opposite conclusion as to 20-year-old Smith, despite the fact that Smith was 

no longer enrolled at SFUSD or any other California public school and his counsel could not 

represent that Smith had any intention to reenroll before his eligibility expired. Id. at 318–19 & 

n.6. The Court reasoned that there was still a reasonable expectation that Smith would “again 

be wronged in a similar way” if he reenrolled, engaged in similarly disruptive behavior, and 

school officials chose again unilaterally to exclude Smith from his educational setting during 

disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 323 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111).

The “reasonable expectation” identified as sufficient to overcome a mootness challenge 

in Honig is just as speculative as it sounds. As Justice Scalia argued in a vehement dissent, 

there was simply no indication that Smith had any intention to reenroll in a California 

public school—not even Smith’s counsel could represent that Smith had any intention to 

reenroll—beyond the fact that Smith had continued to pursue his lawsuit. Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., 

dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Scalia opined, it seemed “quite unlikely” that, even if Smith 

reenrolled, his school would choose to place Smith in a similar environment that could not 

adequately deal with his behavior, given that the Act required schools “to provide an 

‘appropriate’ education in ‘the least restrictive environment.’” Id. at 338–39 (Scalia, J., 

dissenting). Add to that the uncertainty that Smith would again face discipline for his behavior 

or that school officials would exclude him from his educational placement during disciplinary 

proceedings, and Justice Scalia saw no “demonstrated probability” that the case would recur as 

to Smith. Id. at 336–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet the majority rejected Justice Scalia’s 

attack, observing that the Court has “found controversies capable of repetition based on 

expectations that, while reasonable, were hardly demonstrably probable.” Id. at 318 n.6. The 

majority explained that the mootness inquiry turns on “whether the controversy was capable of 

repetition and not, as the dissent seem[ed] to insist, whether the claimant had demonstrated that 

a recurrence of the dispute was more probable than not.” Id. That was not the case for Doe, 

who was incapable of availing himself of the benefits of the Act because of his age, id. at 318, 

but was the case for Smith, who could reasonably be expected to reenroll and face similar 

wrongs under the Act if he did so, id. at 318–20 & n.6.
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 24

Now consider another illustration from this court, which has acknowledged that the 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review” rule is even more forgiving in the context of 

election cases. In Lawrence, we considered a lawsuit claiming that an Ohio law requiring 

independent candidates to file a candidacy statement and nominating petition “by 4:00 p.m. on 

the day before the primary election immediately preceding the general election at which the 

candidacy is to be voted on by the voters” violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

430 F.3d at 370. The plaintiffs were David Lawrence, who sought to run as an independent 

congressional candidate in the 2004 general election but failed to provide a nominating petition 

until about three months after the March 1, 2004 deadline had passed, and Yifat Shilo, who 

wanted to vote for Lawrence. Id. By the time the case reached us on appeal, the 2004 election 

had already taken place, an intervening event that the defendants argued mooted the case. Id. 

We disagreed. Applying the two-prong approach for determining whether a controversy is 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review,” we noted that “[c]hallenges to election laws are one 

of the quintessential categories of cases which usually fit [the first] prong because litigation has 

only a few months before the remedy sought is rendered impossible by the occurrence of the 

relevant election.” Id. at 371. Turning to the second prong, we acknowledged that the analysis 

was “more complex because there [was] no evidence in the record addressing whether 

Lawrence plan[ned] to run for office or Shilo plan[ned] to vote for an independent candidate in 

a future election.” Id. We held, however, that there was still a reasonable expectation that the 

controversy would recur with respect to either plaintiff because Lawrence was still “capable” of 

running in a future election and Shilo might wish to vote for an independent candidate in the 

future. Id. In the alternative, we held that “[e]ven if the court could not reasonably expect that 

the controversy would recur with respect to Lawrence or Shilo, the fact that the controversy 

almost invariably will recur with respect to some future potential candidate or voter in Ohio is 

sufficient to meet the second prong because it is somewhat relaxed in election cases.” Id. at 

372. In doing so, we recognized that courts usually require a reasonable expectation that the 

controversy will recur between the same parties but explained that “[c]ourts have applied the 

capable of repetition yet evading review exception to hear challenges to election laws even 

when the nature of the law made it clear that the plaintiff would not suffer the same harm in the 

future.” Id. (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein,
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 25

405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972); Honig, 484 U.S. at 335–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Thus, the 

harm that Lawrence and Shilo suffered was “capable of repetition, yet evading review” because, 

if the Ohio law remained in place, future candidates and future voters could “suffer the same 

harm.” Id.

Returning to the case before us today and with Honig and Lawrence in mind, I would 

hold that the there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs’ case remains justiciable under the 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review” rule. The first prong is uncontroversial: the period 

between elections is too short for a plaintiff to litigate fully a challenge of Tennessee’s firsttime voter requirement before the next election takes place, at which point they will have 

irredeemably lost their ability to vote absentee by mail in that election. See Lawrence, 430 F.3d 

at 371. The second prong is apparently more controversial, though it should not be. The 

majority holds that there is a substantial likelihood that this case is moot because Sweet is no 

longer eligible to vote absentee and there is no reasonable expectation that he will regain that 

eligibility in the future. Maj. Op. at 9–10. That holding suffers from three fatal flaws. First, 

Lawrence directs us in an election case to look beyond the parties before us and ask whether the 

harm could reasonably be expected to recur as to future voters. That is a certainty here. 

Second, even if we ignored Lawrence, and limited our inquiry to whether the controversy could 

reasonably be expected to recur between the “same complaining part[ies],” Weinstein, 423 U.S. 

at 149, the proper focus would be on the Tennessee NAACP, which, unlike Sweet, is a party to 

this case. Considering the Tennessee NAACP’s over 10,000 members and its regular voter 

registration activities, I have no difficulty concluding that there is a reasonable expectation that 

this controversy will recur with respect to a Tennessee NAACP member in the future. Third, 

even if we artificially limited the inquiry to Sweet, there would still be a reasonable 

expectation that he will regain eligibility to vote absentee by mail but be prevented from doing 

so under § 2-2-115(b)(7).

The majority’s first mistake is the easiest to address. With Lawrence in hand, the second 

prong should have required little more analysis than the first. Under Lawrence, whether or not 

this controversy could reasonably be expected to recur with regard to Sweet is inconsequential 

because Plaintiffs’ asserted injury is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” as to future 
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voters. 430 F.3d at 372. If Tennessee’s first-time voter requirement remains in place, it is a 

certainty that future voters who would otherwise qualify to vote absentee by mail will be forced 

to vote in person instead (if at all), which is the very injury that the majority holds to be 

sufficiently cognizable to demonstrate a likelihood of establishing standing as to Sweet and the 

Tennessee NAACP. Thus, Defendants’ argument that this case is not “capable of repetition, yet 

evading review” fails because it ignores the reasonable expectation—indeed, the certainty—that 

first-time voters who would otherwise qualify to vote absentee in future Tennessee elections 

will “suffer the same harm,” id., that gave the Tennessee NAACP standing through Sweet. The 

majority all but ignores Lawrence, which cannot be reconciled with today’s holding.

Turning to the majority’s second error, I will, for the sake of argument only, pretend that 

this is not an election case, and that the controversy must reasonably be expected to recur as to 

the “same complaining part[ies].” Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149. To begin with an obvious, but 

necessary point, it is the Tennessee NAACP that is a party to this case, not Sweet. To be sure, 

it is Sweet’s interests that served as the predicate for establishing the Tennessee NAACP’s 

associational standing, but our caselaw rejects the proposition that an organizational plaintiff’s 

case is necessarily moot when a member who serves as a basis for the organization’s 

associational standing would lose their personal stake in the outcome of the case.

To accomplish its sleight of hand—analyzing the justiciability of Sweet’s hypothetical 

claim, not the Tennessee NAACP’s real one—the majority rewrites the case that has already 

rejected its foundational premise. In Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., we considered a suit 

brought by the Cleveland Branch of the NAACP (“Cleveland NAACP”) challenging the City of 

Parma’s discriminatory hiring practices. 263 F.3d at 516–17. We held that the organizational 

plaintiff had associational standing to sue on behalf of Artis Tomblin, who was a member of the 

Cleveland NAACP when it filed its complaint and wanted to pursue employment with the city 

as a police officer or fireman but had not learned of various employment opportunities due to 

the city’s hiring practices. Id. at 526. But by the time that the case reached this court, Tomblin 

was no longer a member of the Cleveland NAACP and no longer expressed “a present concrete 

interest in obtaining employment in Parma.” Id. at 523, 529. We nevertheless held that the 

case was not moot, pointing out that the challenged practices remained in place and could 
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reasonably be expected to recur with regard to future applicants, without regard to whether 

Tomblin was among them. Id. at 530–32. Our approach prompted a fervent dissent by Judge 

Boggs, who insisted—as the majority does here—that the Cleveland NAACP’s actual case 

became moot when Tomblin’s hypothetical one would have. Id. at 539–41. Today, however, 

under the majority’s revisionist history, Judge Boggs’s dissent is erroneously believed to be the 

controlling opinion from Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., not the majority opinion. A dissent 

does not become law by fiat of a new majority.

Read faithfully, Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. establishes that even where a complaining 

party must show that a controversy could reasonably be expected to recur as to itself in order to 

establish that its case is justiciable, an organizational plaintiff can do so without reference to an 

individual member who served as the basis for its associational standing. That reading is 

harmonious with our broader mootness precedent, under which we ask whether the Tennessee 

NAACP “possibly could have found [itself] once again in the same situation [it] faced when 

this suit was filed.” Barry, 834 F.3d at 716. There is simply no doubt that it is possible—that 

there is a “reasonable expectation,” Honig, 484 U.S. at 319–20 (quoting Murphy, 455 U.S. at 

482)—that the Tennessee NAACP will find itself with members who are prevented from voting 

absentee by mail by § 2-2-115(b)(7). The Tennessee NAACP has over 10,000 members across 

the state and “[v]oter engagement has been a key aspect of [the] Tennessee NAACP’s work 

since its founding.” R. 78-1 (Sweet-Love Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 17) (Page ID #2522). Among the 

organization’s voter engagement activities are voter-registration drives at colleges and high 

schools, and Gloria Sweet-Love, the president of the Tennessee NAACP, submitted a 

declaration stating that “[m]any young people that [the] Tennessee NAACP registers are 

college students or future college students that would be eligible to vote absentee under 

Tennessee’s Eligibility Criteria, even before the recent Chancery Court ruling permitting 

essentially all Tennessee voters to request to vote by mail.” Id. at ¶ 20 (Page ID #2523); see

Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201(1)–(2) (allowing Tennessee voters to vote absentee by mail if they 

will be outside the county where they are registered during the voting period or if they are 

students enrolled in-state but outside of their county of registration). It takes no great leap of 

inference to conclude that some of those students who register to vote for the first time through 

a Tennessee NAACP registration drive will themselves be a Tennessee NAACP member, and 
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thus will be in the same position that Sweet was in at the time that Plaintiffs filed their amended 

complaint on June 12, 2020. Thus, the controversy is “capable of repetition, yet evading 

review.”

Turning, finally, to the third error in the majority’s mootness analysis, I will indulge for 

the moment the majority’s demonstrably false premise that the likelihood of this case remaining 

justiciable depends entirely on whether Sweet’s hypothetical case—and only Sweet’s 

hypothetical case—would itself be moot. Even accepting that premise, I would dissent, because 

Defendants have failed to convince me that Sweet’s own case would be moot.

The majority concludes that Sweet’s own case would have become moot once he no 

longer qualified to vote absentee by mail, which occurred on August 5, 2020, when the 

Tennessee Supreme Court vacated a temporary injunction in effect when Plaintiffs filed their 

amended complaint, which had allowed any Tennessee voter to vote absentee by mail if they 

determined that it was “impossible or unreasonable” to vote in person because of COVID-19. 

Fisher v. Hargett, 604 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Tenn. 2020). Although I agree that Sweet no longer 

presently qualified to vote absentee by mail after that ruling, with or without § 2-2-115(b)(7), 

I would nevertheless conclude that there is a reasonable expectation that Sweet would again in 

the future be harmed by the rule, such that his case would fall within the “capable of repetition, 

yet evading review” rule. First, there is no indication that Sweet voted in the November 3, 2020 

General Election, and thus we must assume that he still qualifies as a first-time voter, especially 

since he elected not to vote in the August 2020 primary election due to concerns over COVID19. R. 86-2 (Sweet Decl. II at ¶ 6) (Page ID #2670). Although Plaintiffs’ counsel was unable 

to represent at oral argument whether Sweet voted in November (which would mean he was no 

longer a first-time voter subject to § 2-2-115(b)(7)), that does not prevent this case from 

remaining justiciable any more than in Honig, where the case remained justiciable despite 

counsel for Smith’s inability to represent whether Smith wished to reenroll. See 484 U.S. at 

318 n.6. Next, it is entirely possible that Sweet will regain his eligibility to vote absentee by 

mail. For example, he may choose to return to school at Xavier University in Louisiana, in 

which case he would likely qualify to vote absentee by mail in future elections under Tennessee 

Code § 2-6-201(1), which allows those who will be away from the county where they are 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 29

registered during the voting period to vote absentee by mail. Sweet could also qualify to vote 

absentee by mail if he were travelling, id., sick, id. § 2-6-201(5)(C), or serving on a jury, id.

§ 2-6-201(4). The majority derides these possibilities as “speculation,” Maj. Op. at 10, but in 

Friends of the Earth, the Supreme Court explained that the possibility that a harm will recur 

“may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” 

528 U.S. at 190. I think this such a case. At the very least, Sweet’s previous enrollment at 

Xavier University separates him from “a general Tennessee voter,” Maj. Op. at 10, and supports 

a reasonable expectation that Sweet will qualify to vote absentee by mail in the future. Sweet 

spent his freshman and sophomore years at Xavier University and it is reasonable to expect that 

he would wish to return if and when classes went back to in person. See R. 86-2 (Sweet Decl. 

II at ¶¶ 2–3) (Page ID #2669). Even if it is not probable that Sweet will take that path, it is 

reasonable to expect that he will (or that he will otherwise regain eligibility to vote absentee by 

mail), and thus it is reasonable to expect that Sweet will find himself in the same position that 

he found himself in at the beginning of the case: qualified to vote absentee by mail, but unable 

to do so because of § 2-2-115(b)(7).

The balance of the majority opinion relies on the proposition that this case is not 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review” because it is based on a “unique factual situation,” 

i.e., COVID-19. Maj. Op. at 11–13. Because COVID-19 is a “once-in-a-century crisis,” id. at 

12, the majority explains, we need not worry that we will face a similar case again. Indeed, 

according to the majority “because of advancements in COVID-19 vaccinations and treatment 

since this case began, the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to pose a serious threat during the 

next election cycle. There is not a reasonable expectation that Sweet, other members of the 

plaintiff organizations, or the public will face the same burdens as voters did in the fall of 

2020.” Id. at 12–13 (citation omitted). I do not share the majority’s willingness to declare a 

premature end to the COVID-19 pandemic, let alone to turn that into a reason to hold that this 

case is likely nonjusticiable, especially when not even Defendants have argued that as a basis 

for vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction.

To be sure, recent advancements in COVID-19 vaccinations and treatment are worthy of 

celebration, and there is good reason to be optimistic that better days are ahead of us given the 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 30

significant decline in case numbers across the country. But it is one thing to be optimistic that 

we will be free of COVID-19 before the next election cycle, and it is quite another thing to turn 

that hope into a fundamental premise upon which to vacate a lawfully entered preliminary 

injunction. As Dr. Rochelle P. Walensky, Director of the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, testified before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions just 

last month:

While COVID-19 cases have recently decreased, COVID-19 transmission 

remains widespread across the nation. We are hopeful. We have made significant 

progress in getting shots in arms. But, given that many people around the country 

are not yet fully vaccinated and given the threat of variants, we must remain 

cautious.

An Update from Federal Officials on Efforts to Combat COVID-19: Hearing Before the 

S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 117th Cong., at 2 (May 11, 2021) 

(written testimony of Dr. Rochelle P. Walensky) (available at 

https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Walensky1.pdf). Things are looking brighter, but 

we are not out of the COVID-19 woods just yet.

The bottom line is that Article III judges should not be in the business of declaring an 

end to the COVID-19 pandemic: we “do not have the background, competence, and expertise to 

assess public health.” Bill & Ted’s Riviera, Inc. v. Cuomo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 238, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 

2020). Words cloaked in our robes carry real weight, and I am loath to minimize a disease that 

has killed about 600,000 Americans and over 3,800,000 persons worldwide. See United States 

COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 

https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days; WHO Coronavirus 

(COVID-19) Dashboard, World Health Org., https://covid19.who.int/. I hope that the majority 

is right, and that COVID-19 will be a distant memory by the next election cycle. Certainly, our 

recent progress against the disease is a testament to American ingenuity and scientific 

achievement. But the thing about a “once-in-a-century crisis,” Maj. Op. at 12, is that it is hard 

to know how it will develop over the coming months and years, particularly when COVID-19 

has defied expectations to this point and with new variants and seasonal surges threatening to 

undo hard-won progress. At the very least, COVID-19 is “capable” of continuing to burden 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 31

this country through the next general election, and thus it is reasonable to expect that Sweet and 

voters like him will find themselves in a similar position to the one that they found themselves 

in on November 2, 2020. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 318–20 & n.6. Even if that possibility is 

improbable, it is enough to make this case “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. At 

least until we are certain that COVID-19 will not be a significant threat during the next election 

cycle, the majority’s threadbare proclamations are not enough to moot this case.

In sum, there is a substantial likelihood that this case was and remains justiciable. 

Accordingly, I think it likely that we would reach the merits, to which I turn now.

II.

Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim is straightforward: Tennessee Code § 2-2-115(b)(7) 

burdens their members’ fundamental right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments. The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ claim should be reviewed under the balancing 

test set forth by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and 

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). Under the Anderson-Burdick standard, “the 

rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to 

which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Burdick, 504 

U.S. at 434. At one extreme, where “States impose severe restrictions on the right to vote, such 

as poll taxes or limiting access to the ballot, strict scrutiny applies.” Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 

775, 784 (6th Cir. 2020). At the other extreme, where a state “imposes only ‘reasonable, 

nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights of voters, ‘the 

State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” 

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). If a case falls somewhere 

between these two extremes—because the burden on the right to vote is moderate—“the 

Anderson-Burdick framework departs from the traditional tiers of scrutiny and creates its own 

test.” Mays, 951 F.3d at 784. In such cases, the court must weigh

“the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the 

First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against 

“the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 

imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests 

make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”
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Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). “Only where the State’s 

interests outweigh the burden on the plaintiff’s right to vote do voting restrictions not offend the 

[First Amendment].” Mays, 951 F.3d at 784.

The district court held that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because § 2-2-

115(b)(7) is likely a moderate burden on the right to vote, and that burden outweighs the state’s 

asserted interests. Defendants challenge that ruling at both steps. First, Defendants argue that 

the district court erred in concluding that § 2-2-115(b)(7) places a moderate burden on the right 

to vote, triggering heightened scrutiny. Instead, Defendants argue that the statute places only a 

minimal burden on the right to vote, because it does not prohibit Tennessee voters from voting 

in person, either early or on election day, such that rational basis review should apply. Second, 

Defendants argue that even if heightened scrutiny is applicable, the district court erred in its 

balancing of the burden § 2-2-115(b)(7) places on the right to vote against the state’s asserted 

interests.

The first of Defendant’s arguments is effectively foreclosed by this court’s precedent. 

As Defendants recognize, this court “must evaluate the burden on disparately treated voters 

considering all available opportunities to vote.” Mays, 951 F.3d at 785. Thus, in Obama for 

America v. Husted, we affirmed an injunction that enjoined the enforcement of an Ohio law that 

prevented some voters from casting early (in-person) ballots during the three days before the 

election. 697 F.3d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2012). Despite the fact that voters who could not cast an 

early ballot during those three days were free to vote early and in person before that time or on 

election day, the court concluded that the burden was moderate because the plaintiffs “did not 

need to show that they were legally prohibited from voting, but only that ‘burdened voters have 

few alternate means of access to the ballot.’” Id. at 431 (quoting Citizens for Legislative Choice 

v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916, 921 (6th Cir. 1998)). The same reasoning applies here. Many if not 

most Tennessee voters qualify to vote absentee by mail because they cannot vote in person, or 

would have great difficulty doing so. See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201. For those 

voters, the burden caused by § 2-2-115(b)(7) is severe if it will be their first time voting, 

because there are “few alternate means of access to the ballot” aside from voting absentee by 

mail. Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 431 (quoting Miller, 144 F.3d at 921). Nevertheless, the 
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 33

burden is reduced for other voters, who will be merely inconvenienced by the rule—for 

example, if they qualify to vote absentee by mail only because they are over 60, Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 2-6-201(5)(A)—suggesting that strict scrutiny is inappropriate. Thus, this case—like 

most cases—involves a moderate burden that triggers the flexible standard from AndersonBurdick. See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429.2

Because the burden here is moderate, we must weigh the burden against “‘the precise 

interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking 

into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 

rights.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). On appeal, Defendants 

identify two such interests: (1) combatting voter fraud and (2) complying with the Help 

America Vote Act.

As to the first of these justifications, there is a legitimate question as to whether 

preventing voter fraud was a “precise interest[] put forward by the State as justification[] for the 

burden imposed by its rule.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 

Indeed, the district court specifically remarked on the fact that Defendants did not put the voterfraud justification forward below. Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 485 F. Supp. 

3d 959, 998–99 (M.D. Tenn. 2020). Although Defendants generally alluded to the fact that 

mail voting limits their ability to confirm a voter’s identify, which in turn makes it more 

difficult to prevent voter fraud—the eerie spectre of “ghost voting,” as Defendants term it—this 

was not in the context of their arguments regarding the justifications for § 2-2-115(b)(7). See

R. 46-1 (Goins Decl. at ¶ 11) (Page ID #1827). To the contrary, Defendants argued below that 

“the provisions of . . . § 2-2-115(7) [sic] do nothing more than implement Congress’s intent as 

reflected in both the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20505(c) and 

Section 303(b) of the [HAVA] (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 21083).” R. 46 (Opposition at 23) 

2Defendants’ argument relies on McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 

809 (1969), for the proposition that rational basis review must apply because there is no constitutional right to vote 

absentee. However, as Plaintiffs note, that case came before the Supreme Court established the Anderson-Burdick

framework and has separately been undercut by cases declining to follow it. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 

524, 528–29 (1974); Am. Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 795 (1974).
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 34

(Page ID #1787) (emphasis added).3 If, in fact, that is the “only” justification for § 2-2-

115(b)(7), it follows that voter fraud is not a justification for § 2-2-115(b)(7). These days, the 

magic words “voter fraud” can get a state a long way in voting rights litigation—but magic 

words work only if they are invoked, and Defendants seem to have failed to invoke “voter 

fraud” below.

In any case, even assuming (without deciding) that Defendants articulated voter fraud as 

a justification for § 2-2-115(b)(7), that interest would fail to warrant the burden it imposes 

given the alternatives available to Tennessee (which it has since implemented). To the extent 

that § 2-2-115(b)(7) combats voter fraud, it does so by granting Tennessee an opportunity, at 

least the first time a voter votes in an election, to confirm that their voter registration matches 

their identification. See generally R. 46-1 (Goins Decl.) (Page ID #1823–35). But Defendants

have failed to explain why other available options—which would allow a first time voter to 

vote absentee by mail—would be any less effective. See Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst., 

485 F. Supp. 3d at 999 n.37 (noting that even if Defendants had raised voter fraud as a 

justification, “they would have encountered difficulties at [the next step] of the AndersonBurdick analysis, because they have not explained how requiring first-time, mail-registered 

voters to submit the required identification in person when voting helps prevent fraudulent 

voting to any greater extent than requiring the submission of such identification with mailed-in 

ballots.”). For example, after the district court issued its preliminary injunction, Tennessee 

implemented a new policy, requiring that at least some first-time absentee voters mail in proof 

of identification along with their ballots.4 This approach satisfies Tennessee’s interest in 

confirming a match between the registration information and the voter’s identification, while

allowing even first-time voters to vote absentee by mail if they qualify to do so. Even if having 

the voter come in person to present their identification might be more effective—say, because it 

would be possible to compare a driver’s license photo to the voter presenting it—the difference 

would be marginal, and insufficient to outweigh the potentially severe burden that § 2-2-

115(b)(7) imposes on first time voters.

3On appeal, Defendants no longer insist that the statute is necessary to comply with the NVRA.

4

Information for First-Time Voters Who Registered by Mail, Tenn. Sec’y of State, 

https://sos.tn.gov/products/elections/information-first-time-voters-who-registered-mail (last accessed May 7, 2021).
No. 20-6141 Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett Page 35

As for Defendant’s second justification—that § 2-2-115(b)(7) is necessary to comply 

with HAVA—they at least presented that argument to the district court. The argument, 

however, is meritless because HAVA does not require first-time voters who registered to vote 

by mail to vote in person the first time that they vote. See 52 U.S.C. § 21083(b) (allowing first 

time voters to vote by mail if they submit identification with their mail ballot, exempting voters 

who registered by mail but submitted a copy of their registration with that identification).

Thus, Tennessee Code § 2-2-115(b)(7) is likely unconstitutional under AndersonBurdick because Defendants’ justifications for the rule fail to outweigh the burdens it imposes. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim is likely justiciable, the district court 

correctly concluded that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.

III.

That leaves the remaining preliminary injunction factors. With no election looming, this 

is an ordinary constitutional case where likelihood of success on the merits is determinative. 

See Online Merchants Guild, 995 F.3d at 560; cf. Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 

977 F.3d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 2020). “When constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, 

irreparable injury is presumed.” Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 436. And although Tennessee has 

“a strong interest in [its] ability to enforce state election law requirements, the public has a 

strong interest in exercising the fundamental political right to vote.” Id. at 436–37 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Insofar as § 2-2-115(b)(7) is likely unconstitutional, the 

equities and the public interest favor upholding the district court’s preliminary injunction.

IV.

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it preliminarily enjoined the 

enforcement of § 2-2-115(b)(7). There is a substantial likelihood that this case remains 

justiciable, there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits, and, 

accordingly, the equities favor preliminary relief. Thus, I dissent.