area handbook series

Libya

a country study



Libya

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by Helen Chapin Metz

Research Completed

December 1987
On the cover: Beduins approaching a Libyan oasis

Fourth Edition, 1989; First Printing, 1989.

Copyright ®1989 United States Government as represented by

the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Libya: a country study.

(Area handbook series) (DA pam.; 550-85)

"Research completed September 1987."

Bibliography: pp. 305-324.

Includes index.

1. Libya. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. DT215.L533 1988 961'. 2 88-600480

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-85

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being

prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program. The

last page of this book lists the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Carol Migdalovitz

Acting Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

111

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- lowing individuals who wrote the 1979 edition of Libya: A Country

Study, which was edited by Harold D. Nelson: Robert Rinehart,

"Historical Setting"; David S. McMorris, "The Society and Its Environment"; Howard I. Blutstein, "The Economy"; William A.

Mussen, Jr., "Government and Politics"; and David R. Holmes

and Harold D. Nelson, "National Security." Their work provided

the organization and structure of the present volume, as well as substantial portions of the text. The authors are grateful to individuals in various government

agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, research

materials, and expertise to the production of this book, especially

Marius and Mary Jane Deeb and I. William Zartman. The authors

also wish to thank members of the Federal Research Division staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These

people include Thomas Collelo, the substantive reviewer of all the

textual material; Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and

served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; and Martha E. Hopkins, who edited the manuscript, with the assistance of Marilyn

L. Majeska, and managed book production. Mary Campbell Wild

performed final prepublication review. Also involved in preparing the text were editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton, Monica

Shimmin, and Izella Watson. Mary Bodnar of Communicators

Connections compiled the index. Malinda B. Neale of the Library

of Congress Composing Unit set the type, under the direction of

Peggy Pixley.

Invaluable graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto,

assisted by Sandra K. Cotugno. Carolina E. Forrester reviewed

the map drafts and Greenhorne and O'Mara, Inc., prepared the

final maps. Special thanks are owed to Kimberly A. Lord, who

designed the cover artwork and the illustrations on the title page

of each chapter.

The authors would like to thank several individuals who provided

research and operational support. Arvies J. Staton supplied information on ranks and insignia; Afaf S. McGowan obtained photographs; Robert S. Mason revised one of the chapters; Gwendolyn B. Batts typed manuscript drafts; and Cleophus Coleman transported

materials. Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the

many individuals and public and private agencies who allowed their

photographs to be used in this study.

v

Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile

,

XV

Introduction xxiii Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 LaVerle Berry

EARLY HISTORY 4

Tripolitania and the Phoenicians 5 Cyrenaica and the Greeks 6 Fezzan and the Garamentes 7 Libya and the Romans 8 ISLAM AND THE ARABS 10 Fatimids 13 Hilalians 14 Hafsids 15 Medieval Cyrenaica and Fezzan 16 OTTOMAN REGENCY 17 Pashas and Deys 18 Karamanlis 19 The Ottoman Revival 20

The Sanusi Order 21 ITALIAN COLONIALISM 23

Italian Rule and Arab Resistance 24

The Second Italo-Sanusi War 27 The Fourth Shore 29

WORLD WAR II AND INDEPENDENCE 31 The Desert War 32

Allied Administration 33

The United Nations and Libya 34

INDEPENDENT LIBYA 37

The September 1969 Coup 42

Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council . . 44

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 47

Petroleum Politics 50

Libya and Arab Unity 52

vii
Libyan Ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa 55

Relations with the United States and Western Europe . 56

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 61 LaVerle Berry

GEOGRAPHY 64

Regions 64

Climate and Hydrology 68

POPULATION 70

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 73 Peoples of Libya 73

Languages of Libya 79

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 81 Evolutionary Changes in a Traditional Society 81 The Revolution and Social Change 85

THE FAMILY, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND THE SEXES ... 91 Family and Household 91 The Traditional View of Men and Women 93

The New Society of the Revolutionary Era 95

RELIGIOUS LIFE 98 Tenets of Islam 100

Saints and Brotherhoods 102

The Sanusis 103

Islam in Revolutionary Libya 104

HEALTH AND WELFARE 107

Social Welfare 107

Medical Care 108

Housing 109

EDUCATION 110

Primary and Secondary Education 112 Higher Education 113

Chapter 3. The Economy 117 R. Thomas Lenaghan

THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 120

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 123

INDUSTRY 128

Hydrocarbons and Mining 128

Manufacturing and Construction 136

Energy 140

AGRICULTURE 141 Land Use and Irrigation 143

Crops and Livestock 146

Fishing and Forestry 147

viii
INCOME AND WEALTH 148

PUBLIC FINANCE AND BANKING 151 Budget, Expenditures, and Revenues 152

Balance of Payments 156

Foreign Aid and Investment 158

Banking, Credit, and Currency 160

FOREIGN TRADE 162

DOMESTIC TRADE AND TOURISM 163

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 164

Transportation 165

Telecommunications 168

Chapter 4. Politics and Government 171 Shawky S. Zeidan

INTERNAL POLITICS 175

National Executive and Legislative Evolution 177 The General People's Congress 178

Subnational Government and Administration 180

Summary and Trends in 1987 188

LAW AND THE JUDICIARY 192

Court Structure 194

Other Juridical Organs 196

Unions and Syndicates 197

OPPOSITION TO QADHAFI 198

Student Opposition 199

Military Opposition 200

Religious Opposition 201

Exiled Opposition 203

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 205

Third Universal Theory 208

The Cultural Revolution 210

The Green Book 212

FOREIGN RELATIONS 216

Arab Relations 217

Mediterranean Relations 219

Maghrib Relations 220

Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa 223

Relations with Western Europe and the United

States 226

Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 230

Multilateral Relations 231

Nuclear Development 234

IX
Chapter 5. National Security 237

Jean R. Tartter ORIGINS OF THE MODERN ARMED FORCES 241

THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP 243

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CONCERNS AND

OBJECTIVES 246

Libyan Security Concerns 246

Performance in Combat 247

THE ARMED FORCES 255

Organization of the Armed Forces 258

Conscription and the People's Militia 263

Women in the Armed Forces 266

Other Paramilitary Forces 268

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia of the Armed Forces . . 269

Defense Costs 269

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE 273

The Quest for New Sources of Arms 274

Military Cooperation with the Soviet Union 275

Western Restrictions on Arms Transactions 276

The Search for Nuclear Technology 279

ARMS PRODUCTION AND MILITARY

COOPERATION 280

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUPPORT FOR

INSURGENT GROUPS 281

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 284

The Police System 284

Incidence of Crime 286

Criminal Justice System 286

State of Internal Security 289

Appendix. Tables 293

Bibliography 305

Glossary 325

Index 333

List of Figures

1. Administrative Divisions (as of 1975) xxii

2. Libya in Antiquity 6

3. The Italian Conquest of Libya, 1921-31 28

4. Physical Features 66

5. Ethnic Groups 76

6. School System, 1987 114

7. Petroleum Industry Infrastructure, 1987 135

x
8. Nonpetroleum Resources 138

9. Land Use, 1987 143

10. Transportation System, 1985 166

11. Government Organization, June 1987 195

12. Balance of Power in North Africa, 1986 249

13. Libyan Intervention in Chad, 1980—Mid-1987 252

14. Principal Military Installations, 1987 254

15. Commissioned Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1987 270

16. Enlisted Personnel Ranks and Insignia, 1987 271

xi

Preface

Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic,

and military aspects of contemporary Libyan society. Sources of

information included scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of governments and international organizations, foreign and

domestic newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Relatively upto-date statistical data in the economic and social fields were unavailable, even from the United Nations and the World Bank. Chapter

bibliographies appear at the the end of the book; brief comments

on some of the more valuable sources suggested as possible fur- ther reading appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see

table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included.

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases follows a modified version of the system adopted by the United States Board on

Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic

Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN sys- tem. The modification is a significant one, however, in that diacritical markings and hyphens have been omitted. Moreover, some

geographical locations, such as the cities of Benghazi, Tobruk, and

Tripoli, are so well known by those conventional names that their

formal names—Banghazi, Tubruq, and Tarabulus—are not used.

Xlll

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Short Form: Libya.

Term for Nationals: Libyans.

Capital: Tripoli.

Geography

Size: About 1,760,000 square kilometers (excluding Aouzou Strip

claimed by Chad) consisting mainly of desert. Land boundaries

4,345 kilometers long and coastline 1,770 kilometers long. Twelvenautical-mile maritime claim, including disputed Gulf of Sidra.

xv
Topography: Main contrast between narrow enclaves of fertile lowlands along Mediterranean coast and vast expanse of arid, rocky

plains and sand seas to south. Coastal lowlands separated from one

another by predesert zone and backed by plateaus with steep, northfacing scarps; country's only true mountains, Tibesti Massif, rise in southern desert. Country has several saline lakes but no perennial watercourses. Less than 5 percent of territory economically

useful. Climate: Dominant climate influences Mediterranean Sea and

Sahara Desert. In coastal lowlands, where 80 percent of population lives, climate Mediterranean, with warm summers and mild

winters. Climate in desert interior characterized by very hot summers and extreme diurnal temperature ranges. Precipitation ranges

from light to negligible; less than 2 percent of country receives

enough rainfall for settled agriculture.

Society

Population: Approximately 3.63 million inhabitants according to 1984 census, including at least 260,000 aliens. Indigenous population was increasing at one of world's highest annual growth rates, estimated variously at between 3.4 percent and 4.5 percent.

Languages and Ethnic Groups: Official language Arabic. Government policy discourages use of other languages, but English used

extensively—even by government for some purposes—and ranks

as a second language. Italian and French also spoken, and small

minorities speak Berber dialects. Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims

of mixed Arab and Berber ancestry make up well over 90 percent

of indigenous population. Most of remainder Berbers, Tuareg, and

black Africans, and small but long-settled Greek and Maltese communities. Expatriates, imported under government contract to meet

labor shortages, largely citizens of other Muslim countries; many

technical and professional positions filled by East and West Europeans. Altogether, representatives of more than 100 nationalities

live in Libya.

Health: Number of medical doctors and dentists reportedly

increased sevenfold between 1970 and 1985, producing in case of

doctors ratio of 1 per 673 citizens. In 1985, about one-third of doctors Libyan natives, remainder expatriate foreigners. Number of

hospital beds tripled in same time period. Among major health hazards endemic in country in 1970s were typhoid and paratyphoid,

infectious hepatitis, leishmaniasis, rabies, meningitis, schistosomiasis, venereal diseases, and principal childhood ailments. Progress

xvi
included eradication of malaria and significant gains against tra- choma, tuberculosis, and leprosy. In 1985 infant mortality rate was

84 per 1 ,000. Life expectancy for men 56 years, for women 59 years. Literacy: In early 1980s, estimates of total literacy between 50 and

60 percent, about 70 percent for men and 35 percent for women,

but gap narrowing because of increased female school attendance.

Religion: Islam official religion; nearly entire population adheres

to Sunni branch of Islam.

Economy

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1986 GDP estimated at $US20

billion, $6,260 per capita. Petroleum contributed almost 40 percent; public services and administration 12 percent; construction

1 1 percent; transportation and communications 5 percent; manufacturing 5 percent; and agriculture 4 percent.

Petroleum: In early 1980s, estimated proven reserves were 32 bil- lion barrels, of which 7 billion barrels in offshore areas. In 1986

production averaged slightly over 1 million barrels per day, and

in 1987 declining. In 1986, Libya world's fifteenth largest producer

of petroleum.

Foreign Trade: In 1986 exports primarily petroleum worth US$5

billion, matched by imports primarily of manufactures and foodstuffs worth US$5 billion. Currency: Libyan dinar; in mid- 1987 LD1 equaled US$3.16.

Fiscal Year: Same as calendar year (see Glossary).

Transportation and Communications

Railroads: None.

Roads: Over 23,000 kilometers of paved roads in 1985. Ports: In 1986 Tobruk, Tripoli, Benghazi, and Qasr Ahmad, near Misratah, major ports. Five major oil export terminals As Sidra,

Burayqah, Ras al Unuf, Marsa al Hariqah, and Az Zuwaytinah;

future sixth terminal planned at Zuwarah in western Libya.

Airfields: Three international airports at Tripoli (Al Aziziyah air- port), Benghazi (Benina airport), and Sabha. Number of other

smaller airfields with permanent- surface runways. National carrier Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA).

Communications: Telecommunications system greatly improved

in late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1985 average of 1 telephone per xvn
100 persons. Also in 1985, completion of high-capacity cable sys- tem and submarine cable linking northern coastal strip with many

parts of south.

Government and Politics

Form: Jamahiriya (newly coined Arabic word, roughly translated

as "state of the masses," "people's power," or "people's authority"). In late 1987, de facto head of state and government and com- mander in chief of armed forces was Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi,

who led 1969 Revolution against Sanusi monarchy. Application

of his innovative and revolutionary Arab-socialist philosophy to Libyan nation has resulted in fundamental changes in political

representation, property ownership, legal system, and commercial

transactions.

Executive and Legislature: General People's Congress (GPC),

both an executive and legislative body that convenes several times

annually, primary formal instrument of government; membership

of more than 1,000 delegates drawn from subnational-level people's committees, people's congresses, and revolutionary committees. Leadership of GPC vested in General Secretariat headed by

secretary general, official chief of state. Cabinet functions performed

by national-level General People's Committee.

Subnational Governmental Divisions: After governorates

abolished in 1975, Libya divided into between seven and ten military districts (number varies with frequent reorganizations). Each

military district divided into several municipalities, subdivided into

villages or urban wards.

Legal System: Since 1969 Revolution, sharia (Islamic law) has

replaced other jurisprudence. Regular court system adjudicates personal, criminal, civil, and commercial law. People's courts, revolutionary courts, and military courts handle political transgressions

and threats against state. Political Parties: Political parties banned; mass organization

accomplished primarily through Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which

includes geographically and functionally based membership.

Foreign Relations: Libya under Qadhafi a staunch proponent of

pan-Arab unity, both in theory and in practice. Libyan regional

policy included an intractable opposition to Israel and support

of Palestinian cause. In 1980s Qadhafi made bid for worldwide

recognition and Third World leadership by espousing normative

philosophy known as Third Universal Theory, which rejects both

xvm
communist and capitalist models of government and calls instead

for nonalignment, "people's power," and "new economic order"

based on more equitable division of wealth between developed and

underdeveloped countries. In accordance with this ideology, Libya

has pursued activist and aggressive foreign policy, which includes

alleged support and sponsorship of numerous terrorist and guerrilla movements throughout world. Member of United Nations

(UN) and most of its specialized agencies, League of Arab States (Arab League), Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1986 military manpower estimated at over

90,000; components were army (over 70,000), air force (10,000),

and navy (6,500). Compulsory Military Service Statute of 1978

made all eligible males between ages of seventeen and thirty-five

subject to draft commitment of three years of active service in army

or four years in air force or navy. A 1984 statute mandated compulsory military training for all Libyans coming of age, whether

male or female, to achieve total mobilization of population in event

of national emergency. Law strengthened People's Militia (formerly

known as Popular Resistance Force) into 45,000-person paramilitary force. All forces were under control of Qadhafi in his role as commander in chief of military establishment.

Police: Civil force, under Secretariat of Interior, known after 1985

as People's Security Force (formerly known as Police at the Service of the People and the Revolution). Total number of personnel

not available 1987.

Major Tactical Military Units: In 1987 army composed of twenty

armored battalions, thirty mechanized infantry battalions, ten artil- lery battalions, two special forces groups comprising ten paratroop

battalions, and eight air defense battalions. Air force organized into one medium bomber squadron, three fighter-interceptor squadrons,

five forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency

squadron, nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades.

Although navy configured to carry out essentially coast guard role,

inventory included six Soviet-built submarines.

Major Equipment Suppliers: Between 1980 and 1985, Soviet

Union leading supplier of military equipment to Libya (US$4.6

billion) followed by Czechoslovakia (US$875 million), Italy

(US$850 million), France (US$725 million), and People's Republic

xix
of China (US$320 million). In early 1987, however, Soviet deliveries reportedly curtailed or cut off. Policy of refusing to ship arms

to Libya was agreed to in Tokyo Declaration on International Terrorism signed in 1986 by United States, Canada, the Federal

Republic of Germany (West Germany), Britain, Italy, France, and

Japan. In 1987, Libya turning to peripheral suppliers such as Greece, Brazil, and Yugoslavia.

Military Costs: According to Libyan figures, 1984 defense budget was LD340 million, which constituted 23.6 percent of total budget. In 1985, defense expenditures omitted from budget. According

to United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA),

Libyan cumulative arms purchases between 1981 and 1985 esti- mated at US$10.5 billion, with 1984 military spending estimated

at US$5.1 billion.

xx

XXII
Introduction

LIBYA'S INTERNATIONAL PROMINENCE in the mid- and

late 1980s was disproportionate to its geographic size or population. The domestic and international activities of its revolutionary

leader Muammar al Qadhafl, combined with the financial and eco- nomic power resulting from Libya's discovery and exploitation of

its significant petroleum resources, were primarily responsible for propelling Libya onto the world stage. By the 1980s, Qadhafi's

grip on power was so strong that press commentaries and academic

reports routinely used his name and that of his government interchangeably.

Until the Libyan Revolution in 1969, few Westerners had any

knowledge of Libya beyond an awareness of it as the site of desert

campaigns in World War II, such as Al Alamein, and the ruins

of ancient Cyrene and Tripoli. Early Libyan history was influenced

by numerous foreign conquerors, including the Phoenicians, the

Greeks, the Romans, and, most significantly, the Arabs, who estab- lished Islam in the late seventh and early eighth centuries. The

Arab conquest of North Africa left a lasting mark on the Berber

tribes that inhabited the area. North African Islam under various

caliphates took on a distinctive form that incorporated indigenous

religious practices, such as the veneration of holy men (see Religious Life, ch. 2). Under Ottoman Turkish rule in the nineteenth century, the

Sanusi Islamic religious order became a powerful force with political overtones, as the Sanusi lodges helped weld the rival beduin

tribes of Cyrenaica. In the twentieth century, when Italy sought

to conquer Cyrenaica and adjoining Tripolitania, the Sanusi move- ment constituted the major source of opposition to colonial rule. More advanced Italian weaponry prevailed, however, and Italy

gained control of the area following World War I, setting up a new

administrative system joining the two regions, together with the

southern region of Fezzan (see Italian Rule and Arab Resistance,

ch. 1). The Italians improved the infrastructure of the area, creating

roads, railroads, port facilities, and irrigation projects, but did lit- tle to train the inhabitants in administrative, technical, or agricultural skills. During World War II, a number of Cyrenaicans

determined that the best route for gaining independence would be

to support the Allied side; accordingly, they fought with the British in the desert war. This action, coupled with Italy's defeat, led

xxin
to a brief period of British administration of the former Italiancontrolled area after the war. Thereafter, under United Nations

auspices, King Idris of the Sanusi family proclaimed the United

Kingdom of Libya in 1951.

The new country faced severe economic problems as well as polit- ical difficulties resulting from its lack of national cohesion. Economically, Libya was handicapped by its largely desert terrain and

its sparse and unskilled population. To gain a major source of revenue as well as of military assistance, King Idris granted base

rights to Britain and the United States in 1953 and 1954, respectively. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities by Esso (later

Exxon) in 1959 brought about a substantial increase in national

income as well as growing Western influence. Meanwhile, in 1963,

King Idris sought to change Libya's unwieldy federal system by

creating a unitary state. The latter move encountered obstacles

because the three provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan

had little in common, and the majority of Libyans did not identify

with the monarchy or have nationalist feelings.

Both the discovery of oil and the increase in Western influence

proved to be divisive elements for the Libyan state. Revenues from

the oil industry benefited relatively few in Libyan society and led

to greater stratification between the small wealthy group and the

large poor one. Furthermore, King Idris's pro-Western constitutional monarchy had minimal associations with the Arab states. These two factors contributed to a rising dissatisfaction with the

monarchy. The discontent ultimately led to the seizure of power

by the Free Officers Movement in 1 969 while King Idris was abroad

for medical treatment.

The movement established a Revolutionary Command Council of twelve members, which formed a new government. Among

the members was Qadhafi, who served both as prime minister and

defense minister. Qadhafi was strongly influenced by the revolutionary ideas of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser and per- suaded his officer colleagues to adopt a program that reflected a number of Nasser's concepts.

The new government proclaimed as its watchwords "Freedom,

Socialism, and Unity." Freedom was to be achieved through a pro- gram that had a populist framework to allow maximum direct

citizen participation at the bottom, through "people's committees,"

whereas the structure was controlled at the top by handpicked mili- tary officers. Socialism was pursued through various domestic programs designed to develop Libya's infrastructure and promote

industrialization. Unity entailed Libya's announced intent to pursue an Arab and Islamic policy as well as attempts by Qadhafi at

xxiv
various times to achieve union with several Arab states. In line with its intended populist and socialist character, in 1977 the offi- cial name of the country was changed to "the Socialist People's

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. '

'

Qadhafi coined the termjamahiriya to mean "state of the masses,"

his interpretation of freedom. In theory, the power of the masses was to be exercised by the popular committees established at vari- ous levels and in different segments of the population—in localities, government ministries, businesses, and universities. In practice,

elections to such committees and the exercise of authority were "guided" by the General People's Committee, which replaced the

Council of Ministers (see The General People's Congress, ch. 4). Although technically appointed by the General People's Congress

at its annual meeting, the General People's Committee was in ef- fect selected by Qadhafi himself. Thus, the power to implement

or initiate measures was strictly limited, and popular participation

in government declined during the 1980s, leading Qadhafi to advocate the creation of a new political party to energize the socialist system.

To develop this political structure in the early period and to allow

himself more time to serve as theoretician for the new Libyan experiment in revolutionary socialism, Qadhafi resigned in 1974 from

any official government post, while remaining de facto head of state. In this capacity Qadhafi was referred to as "the leader," and he

produced three slim parts of The Green Book, setting forth his program and its justification. The Green Book assumed a position for the Libyans comparable to that of the "little red book" of Chairman Mao Zedong for the Chinese.

Qadhafi 's pursuit of socialism as set out in The Green Book entailed the development of Libya's infrastructure in transportation

and communications, utilities, and basic services (see Role of the

Government, ch. 3). To accomplish this development, revenues and manpower were necessary. Substantial domestic revenues

resulted from oil production in the years following the Revolution

and transformed Libya from a leading have-not state into a major

oil exporter. Because of Libya's severe shortage of manpower, particularly skilled labor, thousands of foreign workers were required.

These workers came mainly from other North African and from

sub-Saharan states. When oil revenues began to decline in the early

1980s, and in view of the internal security threat the laborers

represented, Qadhafi terminated the services of thousands of them

in the 1982-83 period, exacerbating Libya's relations with neighboring states.

xxv
Another part of Qadhafi's socialist scheme was the establishment

of industries and the improvement of agriculture through irrigation projects. A keystone of the latter was the Great Man-Made

River project, underway in 1987, to bring water from oases in the

south and southeast to the cities on the Mediterranean. The total estimated cost for the first two stages of the 1,900 kilometer-long

pipeline was US$5 billion. The third element of Libya's program was support for Arab

unity. In pursuit of this goal, Qadhafi capitalized on opportunities for union with various Arab states. At different times, such

unification attempts included unions with Egypt, Sudan, Syria,

Tunisia, and Morocco. These efforts were designed to strengthen

Qadhafi's personal leadership role in as well as Libya's position

in African and Middle Eastern politics, and to act as a counterbalance to neighboring states perceived as hostile. For example,

when Egypt was viewed as a threat, Qadhafi initiated a 1984 union

with Morocco, the only one of his unions that as of early 1988 had

achieved a semblance of implementation (1984-86).

Qadhafi also saw himself both as a leader of the Third World

and as a key instrument in furthering the spread of Islam, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. To these ends he sought unsuccessfully several times in the early 1980s to be elected chairman of the

Organization for African Unity and proposed a Sahelian empire

to include Libya and other African states whose populations contained significant percentages of Muslims. Qadhafi used Libya's

oil revenues both to spread Islam and to extend Libyan influence

in developing countries, especially in Africa, seeing this two-pronged

campaign as a means of countering colonialism and Western influ- ences (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). This policy resulted from

Qadhafi's advocacy in The Green Book of a stance that supported

"neither East nor West, '' indicating that Libya rejected both com- munism, with its atheistic ideology, and Western capitalism, with

its association with colonialism and "imperialism." This stance

led to a strong opposition to the Western powers, particularly the

United States, because of the latter's identification with Israel. Qadhafi's stand against colonialism led him to support dissident or revolutionary movements, particularly Muslim ones, that were

fighting against established regimes viewed as reactionary, e.g., the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Moro

National Liberation Front in the Philippines. In so doing, he provided weapons, funds, and training as deemed appropriate. Qadhafi

has also been charged with training and equipping terrorist groups

of various kinds, including Palestinians and the Irish Republican

Army, who have launched attacks against Westerners, including

xxvi
Americans (see International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent

Groups, ch. 5). In retaliation for such incidents, specifically the

bombing of a Berlin club in which Americans were killed or wounded and in which Libya was implicated, the United States launched air strikes in April 1 986 against targets in several Libyan

cities. This retaliation appeared to have served as a deterrent to Libyan terrorist activity in that as of early 1988 Libyan-sponsored

terrorist incidents had decreased markedly.

Qadhafi's avowed anticommunist stance was pragmatic, however. Although he refused to grant bases to the Soviet Union, he

viewed the latter as an excellent source of sophisticated weaponry.

He also relied upon the countries of Eastern Europe for military

and technical advisers and especially for assistance in the field of

internal security. He used severe measures, however, in suppressing domestic communism.

The major source of support for Qadhafi's domestic and for- eign programs has always been the army. Recognizing this, Qadhafi

took pains to see that military salaries and perquisites were gener- ous and that the armed forces were equipped with the latest military arms and technology. His purchases of weaponry, particularly

from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, were of such magnitude that Libya was unable to deploy all its equipment (see Foreign Military Assistance, ch. 5). Qadhafi also took precautions

against potential coups directed at him that might originate in the

military by using East European security personnel to protect himself and by frequently rotating individuals in key military positions.

In 1988 Qadhafi had had one of the longest tenures of office of

any African leader. But, in the course of his rule, opposition ele- ments within and outside Libya had increased. Internal opposition resulted partly from Qadhafi's socialist measures, which had

confiscated property belonging to wealthy citizens, partly from his

increasingly authoritarian style of rule, such as his imperious suppression of opposition among university students, and partly from

Qadhafi's military ventures abroad. In the mid- and latter 1980s,

Qadhafi's campaign against internal opposition elements had

become increasingly harsh, leading to the assassination of various

individuals in exile abroad as well as actual or potential dissidents

within Libya. Qadhafi's involvement in the ongoing war with Chad

and his support of rebel forces in Sudan also contributed to reported

rising discontent within the army.

In the realm of external opposition, Qadhafi's relations with the

moderate Arab states, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf states, were strained at best. He was also frequently at odds with his North African neighbors, whom he had antagonized xxvn
by supporting opposition elements or by direct military action.

Despite these sources of domestic and foreign opposition, foreign

observers doubted that Qadhafi would be ousted from his pivotal

position in the Libyan Jamahiriya, short of a successful military

coup.

February 3, 1988 Helen Chapin Metz

xxvm
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
An arch from Leptis Magna, built by the Romans in the early third century A.D.
UNTIL LIBYA ACHIEVED independence in 1951, its history was essentially that of tribes, regions, and cities, and of the empires of which it was a part. Derived from the name by which a

single Berber tribe was known to the ancient Egyptians, the name

Libya was subsequently applied by the Greeks to most of North

Africa and the term Libyan to all of its Berber inhabitants. Although

ancient in origin, these names were not used to designate the specific

territory of modern Libya and its people until the twentieth century, nor indeed was the whole area formed into a coherent politi- cal unit until then. Hence, despite the long and distinct histories

of its regions, modern Libya must be viewed as a new country still developing national consciousness and institutions.

Geography was the principal determinant in the separate historical development of Libya's three traditional regions—Tripolitania,

Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. Cut off from each other by formidable

deserts, each retained its separate identity into the 1960s. At the

heart of Tripolitania was its metropolis, Tripoli, for centuries a terminal for caravans plying the Saharan trade routes and a port

sheltering pirates and slave traders. Tripolitania' s cultural ties were

with the Maghrib (see Glossary), of which it was a part geographically and culturally and with which it shared a common history.

Tripolitanians developed their political consciousness in reaction

to foreign domination, and it was from Tripolitania that the stron- gest impulses came for the unification of modern Libya.

In contrast to Tripolitania, Cyrenaica historically was oriented

toward Egypt and the Mashriq (see Glossary). With the exception

of some of its coastal towns, Cyrenaica was left relatively untouched

by the political influence of the regimes that claimed it but were

unable to assert their authority in the hinterland. An element of

internal unity was brought to the region's tribal society in the

nineteenth century by a Muslim religious order, the Sanusi, and

many Cyrenaicans demonstrated a determination to retain their

regional autonomy even after Libyan independence and unification.

Fezzan was less involved with either the Maghrib or the Mashriq.

Its nomads traditionally looked for leadership to tribal dynasties

that controlled the oases astride the desert trade routes. Throughout its history, Fezzan maintained close relations with sub-Saharan

Africa as well as with the coast. The most significant milestones in Libya's history were the in- troduction of Islam and the Arabization of the country in the Middle

3
Libya: A Country Study

Ages, and, within the last two generations, national independence,

the discovery of petroleum, and the September 1969 Revolution

that brought Muammar al Qadhafi to power. The era since 1969

has brought many important changes. The Qadhafi regime has

made the first real attempt to unify Libya's diverse peoples and

to create a distinct Libyan state and identity. It has created new

political structures and made a determined effort at diversified eco- nomic development financed by oil revenues. The regime has also aspired to leadership in Arab and world affairs. As a consequence

of these developments, Libyan society has been subjected to a significant degree of government direction and supervision, much of

it at the behest of Qadhafi himself. Although the merits of the

regime and its policies were much debated by Libyans and foreigners alike, there was no question that Libya in the 1980s was a significantly different country from the one it had been only two or

three decades earlier. Early History

Archaeological evidence indicates that from at least the eighth

millennium B.C. Libya's coastal plain shared in a Neolithic culture,

skilled in the domestication of cattle and cultivation of crops, that was common to the whole Mediterranean littoral. To the south, in

what is now the Sahara Desert, nomadic hunters and herders roamed

a vast, well-watered savanna that abounded in game and provided

pastures for their stock. Their culture flourished until the region

began to desiccate after 2000 B.C. Scattering before the encroaching desert and invading horsemen, the savanna people migrated into

the Sudan (see Glossary) or were absorbed by the Berbers.

The origin of the Berbers is a mystery, the investigation of which

has produced an abundance of educated speculation but no solution. Archaeological and linguistic evidence strongly suggests southwestern Asia as the point from which the ancestors of the Berbers

may have begun their migration into North Africa early in the third

millennium B.C. Over the succeeding centuries they extended their

range from Egypt to the Niger Basin. Caucasians of predominantly

Mediterranean stock, the Berbers present a broad range of physical types and speak a variety of mutually unintelligible dialects that

belong to the Afro-Asiatic language family. They never developed

a sense of nationhood and have historically identified themselves

in terms of their tribe, clan, and family. Collectively, Berbers refer

to themselves simply as imazighan, to which has been attributed the

meaning "free men."

Inscriptions found in Egypt dating from the Old Kingdom (ca.

2700-2200 B.C.) are the earliest known recorded testimony of the

4
Historical Setting

Berber migration and also the earliest written documentation of

Libyan history. At least as early as this period, troublesome Berber

tribes, one of which was identified in Egyptian records as the Levu

(or "Libyans"), were raiding eastward as far as the Nile Delta and

attempting to settle there. During the Middle Kingdom (ca. 2200-

1700 B.C.) the Egyptian pharaohs succeeded in imposing their over- lordship on these eastern Berbers and exacted tribute from them.

Many Berbers served in the army of the pharaohs, and some rose

to positions of importance in the Egyptian state. One such Berber

officer seized control of Egypt in about 950 B.C. and, as Shishonk

I, ruled as pharaoh. His successors of the twenty- second and twentythird dynasties—the so-called Libyan dynasties (ca. 945-730 B.C.)

are also believed to have been Berbers.

Tripolitania and the Phoenicians

Enterprising Phoenician traders were active throughout the

Mediterranean area before the twelfth century B.C. The depots that they set up at safe harbors on the African coast to service, supply,

and shelter their ships were the links in a maritime chain reaching

from the Levant to Spain. Many North African cities and towns

originated as Phoenician trading posts, where the merchants of Tyre

(in present-day Lebanon) eventually developed commercial relations

with the Berber tribes and made treaties with them to ensure their

cooperation in the exploitation of raw materials. By the fifth century

B.C., Carthage, the greatest of the overseas Phoenician colonies,

had extended its hegemony across much of North Africa, where a

distinctive civilization, known as Punic, came into being. Punic set- tlements on the Libyan coast included Oea (Tripoli), Labdah (later

Leptis Magna), and Sabratah, in an area that came to be known

collectively as Tripolis, or "Three Cities" (see fig. 2). Governed by a mercantile oligarchy, Carthage and its dependencies cultivated good relations with the Berber tribes in the hinterland, but the city-state was essentially a maritime power whose

expansion along the western Mediterranean coast drew it into a confrontation with Rome in the third century B.C. Defeated in the long

Punic Wars (264-241 and 218-201 B.C.), Carthage was reduced

by Rome to the status of a small and vulnerable African state at the mercy of the Berbers. Fear of a Carthaginian revival, however,

led Rome to renew the war, and Carthage was destroyed in 146

B.C. Tripolitania was assigned to Rome's ally, the Berber king of

Numidia. A century later, Julius Caesar deposed the reigning

Numidian king, who had sided with Pompey (Roman general and

statesman, rival of Julius Caesar) in the Roman civil wars, and

annexed his extensive territory to Rome, organizing Tripolitania

as a Roman province.

5
Libya: A Country Study

Figure 2. Libya in Antiquity

The influence of Punic civilization on North Africa remained

deep-seated. The Berbers displayed a remarkable gift for cultural

assimilation, readily synthesizing Punic cults with their folk religion.

The Punic language was still spoken in the towns of Tripolitania

and by Berber farmers in the coastal countryside in the late Roman

period.

Cyrenaica and the Greeks

Like the Phoenicians, Minoan and Greek seafarers had for centuries probed the North African coast, which at the nearest point

lay 300 kilometers from Crete, but systematic Greek settlement

there began only in the seventh century B.C. during the great age

of Hellenic overseas colonization. According to tradition, emigrants

from the crowded island of Thera were commanded by the oracle

at Delphi to seek a new home in North Africa, where in 631 B.C.

they founded the city of Cyrene. The site to which Berber guides

had led them was in a fertile highland region about twenty kilo- meters inland from the sea at a place where, according to the

Berbers, a "hole in the heavens" would provide ample rainfall for the colony.

6
Historical Setting

Within 200 years of Cyrene's founding, four more important

Greek cities were established in the area: Barce (Al Marj); Euhesperides (later Berenice, present-day Benghazi); Teuchira (later

Arsinoe, present-day Tukrah); and Apollonia (Susah), the port of

Cyrene. Together with Cyrene, they were known as the Pentapolis

(Five Cities). Often in competition, they found cooperation difficult even when confronted by common enemies. From Cyrene, the

mother city and foremost of the five, derived the name of Cyrenaica

for the whole region.

The Greeks of the Pentapolis resisted encroachments by the Egyptians from the east as well as by the Carthaginians from the west,

but in 525 B.C. the army of Cambyses (son of Cyrus the Great,

King of Persia), fresh from the conquest of Egypt, overran

Cyrenaica, which for the next two centuries remained under Persian or Egyptian rule. Alexander the Great was greeted by the

Greeks when he entered Cyrenaica in 331 B.C. When Alexander

died in 323 B.C., his empire was divided among his Macedonian

generals. Egypt, with Cyrene, went to Ptolemy, a general under

Alexander who took over his African and Syrian possessions; the

other Greek city-states of the Pentapolis retained their autonomy.

However, the inability of the city-states to maintain stable governments led the Ptolemies to impose workable constitutions on them.

Later, a federation of the Pentapolis was formed that was customarily ruled by a king drawn from the Ptolemaic royal house. Ptolemy

Apion, the last Greek ruler, bequeathed Cyrenaica to Rome, which

formally annexed the region in 74 B.C. and joined it to Crete as a Roman province.

The economic and cultural development of the Pentapolis was

unaffected by the turmoil its political life generated. The region

grew rich from grain, wine, wool, and stockbreeding and from sil- phium, an herb that grew only in Cyrenaica and was regarded as an aphrodisiac. Cyrene became one of the greatest intellectual and

artistic centers of the Greek world, famous for its medical school,

learned academies, and architecture, which included some of the

finest examples of the Hellenistic style. The Cyrenaics, a school

of thinkers who expounded a doctrine of moral cheerfulness that

defined happiness as the sum of human pleasures, also made their

home there and took inspiration from the city's pleasant climate.

Fezzan and the Garamentes

Throughout the period of Punic and Greek colonization of the

coastal plain, the area known as Fezzan was dominated by the

Garamentes, a tribal people who entered the region sometime before

1000 B.C. In the desert they established a powerful kingdom

7
Libya: A Country Study

astride the trade route between the western Sudan and the Mediter- ranean coast. The Garamentes left numerous inscriptions in tifinagh,

the ancient Berber form of writing still used by the Tuareg. Beyond

these and the observations of Herodotus and other classical writers on their customs and dealings with the coastal settlements, little was known of this extraordinary and mysterious people until the

advent of modern archaeological methods.

The Garamentes' political power was limited to a chain of oases about 400 kilometers long in the Wadi Ajal, but from their capital

at Germa they controlled the desert caravan trade from Ghadamis

south to the Niger River, eastward to Egypt, and west to Mauretania (see Glossary). The Carthaginians employed them as carriers

of goods—gold and ivory purchased in exchange for salt —from

the western Sudan to their depots on the Mediterranean coast. The

Garamentes were also noted as horsebreeders and herders of longhorned cattle. They succeeded in irrigating portions of their arid

lands for cultivation by usingfoggares, vast underground networks

of stone-lined water channels. Their wealth and technical skill are

also attested to by the remains of their towns, which were built

of stone, and more than 50,000 of their pyramidal tombs. Rome

sent several punitive expeditions against the Garamentes before

concluding a lasting commercial and military alliance with them

late in the first century A.D.

Libya and the Romans

For more than 400 years, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were pros- perous Roman provinces and part of a cosmopolitan state whose

citizens shared a common language, legal system, and Roman identity. Roman ruins like those of Leptis Magna, extant in presentday Libya, attest to the vitality of the region, where populous cities and even smaller towns enjoyed the amenities of urban life —the

forum, markets, public entertainments, and baths—found in every corner of the Roman Empire. Merchants and artisans from many

parts of the Roman world established themselves in North Africa,

but the character of the cities of Tripolitania remained decidedly

Punic and, in Cyrenaica, Greek. Tripolitania was a major exporter

of olive oil, as well as being the entrepot for the gold and slaves

conveyed to the coast by the Garamentes, while Cyrenaica remained an important source of wines, drugs, and horses. The bulk of the

population in the countryside consisted of Berber farmers, who in

the west were thoroughly "Punicized" in language and customs.

Although the African provinces profited as much as any part of

the empire from the imposition of the Pax Romana, the region was

not without strife and threat of war. Only near the end of the first

8
Historical Setting

century A.D. did the army complete the pacification of the Sirtica, a desert refuge for the barbarian tribes that had impeded overland

communications between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. But for more

than two centuries thereafter commerce flowed safely between markets and ports along a well-maintained road system and sea lanes

policed by Roman forces who also guaranteed the security of set- tled areas against incursions by desert nomads. The vast territory was defended by one locally recruited legion (5,500 men) in

Cyrenaica and the elements of another in Tripolitania, reinforced

by tribal auxiliaries on the frontier. Although expeditions penetrated

deep into Fezzan, in general Rome sought to control only those

areas in the African provinces that were economically useful or could

be garrisoned with the manpower available.

Under the Ptolemies, Cyrenaica had become the home of a large

Jewish community, whose numbers were substantially increased

by tens of thousands ofJews deported there after the failure of the

rebellion against Roman rule in Palestine and the destruction of

Jerusalem in A.D. 70. Some of the refugees made their way into

the desert, where they became nomads and nurtured their fierce

hatred of Rome. They converted to Judaism many of the Berbers

with whom they mingled, and in some cases whole tribes were identified as Jewish. In 1 15 the Jews raised a major revolt in Cyrenaica

that quickly spread through Egypt back to Palestine. The uprising was put down by 118, but only after Jewish insurgents had laid

waste to Cyrenaica and sacked the city of Cyrene. Contemporary

observers counted the loss of life during those years at more than

200,000, and at least a century was required to restore Cyrenaica

to the order and prosperity that had meanwhile prevailed in

Tripolitania.

As part of his reorganization of the empire in 300, the Emperor

Diocletian separated the administration of Crete from Cyrenaica

and in the latter formed the new provinces of Upper Libya and

Lower Libya, using the term Libya for the first time as an administrative designation. With the definitive partition of the empire in

395, the Libyans were assigned to the eastern empire; Tripolitania was attached to the western empire.

By the beginning of the second century, Christianity had been

introduced among the Jewish community, and it soon gained converts in the towns and among slaves. Rome's African provinces were thoroughly Christianized by the end of the fourth century,

and inroads had been made as well among the Berber tribes in the

hinterland. From an early date, however, the churches in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica developed distinct characteristics that reflected

their differing cultural orientations. The former came under the

9
Libya: A Country Study

jurisdiction of the Latin patriarch, the bishop of Rome, and the

latter under that of the Coptic (Egyptian) patriarch of Alexandria.

In both areas, religious dissent became a vehicle for social revolt

at a time of political deterioration and economic depression.

Invited to North Africa by a rebellious Roman official, the Vandals, a Germanic tribe, crossed from Spain in 429. They seized

power and, under their leader, Gaiseric, established a kingdom that

made its capital at Carthage. Although the Roman Empire eventually recognized their overlordship in much of North Africa,

including Tripolitania, the Vandals confined their rule to the most

economically profitable areas. There they constituted an isolated

warrior caste, concerned with collecting taxes and exploiting the

land but leaving civil administration in Roman hands. From their

African base they conquered Sardinia and Corsica and launched

raids on Italy, sacking the city of Rome in 455. In time, however,

the Vandals lost much of their warlike spirit, and their kingdom

fell to the armies of Belisarius, the Byzantine general who in 533

began the reconquest of North Africa for the Roman Empire.

Effective Byzantine control in Tripolitania was restricted to the

coast, and even there the newly walled towns, strongholds, forti- fied farms, and watchtowers called attention to its tenuous nature. The region's prosperity had shrunk under Vandal domination, and

the old Roman political and social order, disrupted by the Vandals, could not be restored. In outlying areas neglected by the Vandals, the inhabitants had sought the protection of tribal chieftains

and, having grown accustomed to their autonomy, resisted reas- similation into the imperial system. Cyrenaica, which had remained an outpost of the Byzantine Empire during the Vandal period, also took on the characteristics of an armed camp. Unpopular Byzantine governors imposed burdensome taxation to meet military costs, but towns and public services —including the water system—were

left to decay. Byzantine rule in Africa did prolong the Roman ideal

of imperial unity there for another century and a half, however,

and prevented the ascendancy of the Berber nomads in the coastal

region.

Islam and the Arabs

By the time of his death in A.D. 632, the Prophet Muhammad

and his followers had brought most of the tribes and towns of the

Arabian Peninsula under the banner of the new monotheistic

religion of Islam (literally, "submission"), which was conceived

of as uniting the individual believer and society under the omnipotent will of Allah (God). Islamic rulers therefore exercised both

temporal and religious authority. Adherents of Islam, called

10
A view of the ancient ruins at Germa in the Fezzan

Courtesy Keith Daber

Muslims ("those who submit" to the will of God), collectively

formed the House of Islam (Dar al Islam).

Within a generation, Arab armies had carried Islam north and

east from Arabia and westward into North Africa. In 642 Amr ibn

al As, an Arab general under Caliph Umar I, conquered Cyrenaica,

establishing his headquarters at Barce. Two years later, he moved

into Tripolitania, where, by the end of the decade, the isolated

Byzantine garrisons on the coast were overrun and Arab control

of the region consolidated. Uqba ibn Nafi, an Arab general under

the ruling caliph, invaded Fezzan in 663, forcing the capitulation

of Germa. Stiff Berber resistance in Tripolitania had slowed the

Arab advance to the west, however, and efforts at permanent conquest were resumed only when it became apparent that the Maghrib

(see Glossary) could be opened up as a theater of operations in the

Muslim campaign against the Byzantine Empire. In 670 the Arabs

surged into the Roman province of Africa (transliterated Ifriqiya

in Arabic; present-day Tunisia), where Uqba founded the city of

Kairouan (present-day Al Qayrawan) as a military base for an

assault on Byzantine-held Carthage. Twice the Berber tribes compelled them to retreat into Tripolitania, but each time the Arabs,

employing recently converted Berber tribesmen recruited in

Tripolitania, returned in greater force, and in 693 they took

Carthage. The Arabs cautiously probed the western Maghrib and

in 710 invaded Morocco, carrying their conquests to the Atlantic.

11
Libya: A Country Study

In 7 1 2 they mounted an invasion of Spain and in three years had

subdued all but the mountainous regions in the extreme north. Muslim Spain (called Andalusia), the Maghrib (including Tripolitania),

and Cyrenaica were systematically organized under the political

and religious leadership of the Umayyad caliph of Damascus.

Arab rule in North Africa—as elsewhere in the Islamic world in

the eighth century—had as its ideal the establishment of political

and religious unity under a caliphate (the office of the Prophet's

successor as supreme earthly leader of Islam) governed in accord

with sharia (a legal system) administered by qadis (religious judges)

to which all other considerations, including tribal loyalties, were

subordinated. The sharia was based primarily on the Quran and

the hadith (see Glossary) and derived in part from Arab tribal and

market law.

Arab rule was easily imposed in the coastal farming areas and

on the towns, which prospered again under Arab patronage. Townsmen valued the security that permitted them to practice their commerce and trade in peace, while the Punicized farmers recognized

their affinity with the Semitic Arabs to whom they looked to protect their lands; in Cyrenaica, Monophysite adherents of the Coptic

Church had welcomed the Muslim Arabs as liberators from Byzantine oppression. Communal and representative Berber tribal

institutions, however, contrasted sharply and frequently clashed

with the personal and authoritarian government that the Arabs had

adopted under Byzantine influence. While the Arabs abhorred the

tribal Berbers as barbarians, the Berbers in the hinterland often saw the Arabs only as an arrogant and brutal soldiery bent on col- lecting taxes. The Arabs formed an urban elite in North Africa, where they

had come as conquerors and missionaries, not as colonists. Their

armies had traveled without women and married among the indig- enous population, transmitting Arab culture and Islamic religion over a period of time to the townspeople and farmers. Although

the nomadic tribes of the hinterland had stoutly resisted Arab

political domination, they rapidly accepted Islam. Once established

as Muslims, however, the Berbers, with their characteristic love

of independence and impassioned religious temperament, shaped

Islam in their own image, enthusiastically embracing schismatic

Muslim sects —often traditional folk religion barely distinguished

as Islam—as a way of breaking from Arab control.

One such sect, the Kharijites (seceders; literally, "those who

emerge from impropriety") surfaced in North Africa in the mideighth century, proclaiming its belief that any suitable Muslim can- didate could be elected caliph without regard to his race, station,

12
Historical Setting

or descent from the Prophet. The attack on the Arab monopoly

of the religious leadership of Islam was explicit in Kharijite doctrine, and Berbers across the Maghrib rose in revolt in the name

of religion against Arab domination. The rise of the Kharijites coincided with a period of turmoil in the Arab world during which the

Abbasid dynasty overthrew the Umayyads and relocated the

caliphate in Baghdad. In the wake of the revolt, Kharijite sectari- ans established a number of theocratic tribal kingdoms, most of

which had short and troubled histories. One such kingdom,

however, founded by the Bani Khattab, succeeded in putting down

roots in remote Fezzan, where the capital, Zawilah, developed into an important oasis trading center. After the Arab conquest, North Africa was governed by a suc- cession of amirs (commanders) who were subordinate to the caliph

in Damascus and, after 750, in Baghdad. In 800 the Abbasid caliph

Harun ar Rashid appointed as amir Ibrahim ibn Aghlab, who es- tablished a hereditary dynasty at Kairouan that ruled Ifriqiya and

Tripolitania as an autonomous state that was subject to the caliph's

spiritual jurisdiction and that nominally recognized him as its political suzerain. The Aghlabid amirs repaired the neglected Roman

irrigation system, rebuilding the region's prosperity and restoring

the vitality of its cities and towns with the agricultural surplus that was produced. At the top of the political and social hierarchy were

the bureaucracy, the military caste, and an Arab urban elite that

included merchants, scholars, and government officials who had come to Kairouan, Tunis, and Tripoli from many parts of the

Islamic world. Members of the large Jewish communities that also resided in those cities held office under the amirs and engaged in commerce and the crafts. Converts to Islam often retained the

positions of authority held traditionally by their families or class in Roman Africa, but a dwindling, Latin- speaking, Christian com- munity lingered on in the towns until the eleventh century. The

Aghlabids contested control of the central Mediterranean with the

Byzantine Empire and, after conquering Sicily, played an active

role in the internal politics of Italy.

Fatimids

By the seventh century, a conflict had developed between supporters of rival claimants to the caliphate that would split Islam

into two branches—the orthodox Sunni and the Shia—which con- tinued thereafter as the basic division among Muslims. The Shias

(from Shiat Alt, or Party of Ali) supported the claims of the direct

descendants of Ali, the fourth caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet

Muhammad, whereas the Sunnis favored that of Ali's rival, the

13
Libya: A Country Study

leader of a collateral branch of Muhammad's tribe, and the principle of election of the fittest from the ranks of the shurfa (see Glossary). The Shias had their greatest appeal among non-Arab

Muslims, who, like the Berbers, were scorned by the aristocratic

desert Arabs.

In the last decade of the ninth century, missionaries of the Ismaili

sect of Shia Islam converted the Kutama Berbers of the Kabylie

region to the militant brand of Shia Islam and led them on a cru- sade against the Sunni Aghlabids. Kairouan fell in 909, and the

next year the Kutama installed the Ismaili grandmaster from Syria,

Ubaidalla Said, as imam (see Glossary) of their movement and ruler over the territory they had conquered, which included Tripolitania.

Recognized by his Berber followers as the Mahdi ("the divinely

guided one" —see Glossary), the imam founded the Shia dynasty

of the Fatimids, named for Fatima, daughter of Muhammad and

wife of Ali, from whom the imam claimed descent.

Merchants of the coastal towns were the backbone of the Fatimid

state that was founded by religious enthusiasts and imposed by

Berber tribesmen. The slow but steady economic revival of Europe

created a demand for goods from the East for which Fatimid ports

in North Africa and Sicily were ideal distribution centers. Tripoli

thrived on the trade in slaves and gold brought from the Sudan

and on the sale of wool, leather, and salt shipped from its docks

to Italy in exchange for wood and iron goods.

For many years the Fatimids threatened Morocco with invasion,

but they eventually turned their armies eastward, where in the name

of religion the Berbers took their revenge on the Arabs. By 969

the Fatimids had completed the conquest of Egypt and moved their

capital to the new city that they founded at Cairo, where they

established a Shia caliphate to rival that of the Sunni caliph at Baghdad. They left the Maghrib to their Berber vassals, the Zirids, but

the Shia regime had already begun to crumble in Tripolitania as factions struggled indecisively for regional supremacy. The Zirids

neglected the economy, except to pillage it for their personal gain.

Agricultural production declined, and farmers and herdsmen

became brigands. Shifting patterns of trade gradually depressed

the once-thriving commerce of the towns. In an effort to hold the

support of the urban Arabs, in 1049 the Zirid amir defiantly rejected

the Shia creed, broke with the Fatimids, and initiated a Berber

return to Sunni orthodoxy.

Hilalians

In Cairo the Fatimid caliph reacted by inviting the Bani Hilal

and Bani Salim, beduin tribes from Arabia known collectively as

14
Historical Setting

the Hilalians, to migrate to the Maghrib and punish his rebellious

vassals, the Zirids. The Arab nomads spread across the region,

in the words of the historian Ibn Khaldun, like a "swarm of lo- custs," impoverishing it, destroying towns, and dramatically al- tering the face and culture of the countryside.

The Hilalian impact on Cyrenaica and Tripolitania was devastating in both economic and demographic terms. Tripoli was sacked,

and what litde remained of urban life in once- great cities like Cyrene was snuffed out, leaving only ruins. Over a long period of time,

Arabs displaced Berbers (many of whom joined the Hilalians) from

their traditional lands and converted farmland to pasturage. Land

was neglected, and the steppe was allowed to intrude into the coastal plain.

The number of Hilalians who moved westward out of Egypt has

been estimated as high as 200,000 families. The Bani Salim seem

to have stopped in Libya, while the Bani Hilal continued across

the Maghrib until they reached the Atlantic coast of Morocco and

completed the Arabization of the region, imposing their social

organization, values, and language on it. The process was particularly thorough in Cyrenaica, which is said to be more Arab than

any place in the Arab world except for the interior of Arabia.

The Norman rulers of southern Italy took advantage of the Zirids' distress in North Africa to invade Sicily in 1060 and bring it back

under Christian control. By 1 150 the Normans held a string of ports

and fortresses along the coast between Tunis and Tripoli, but their

interests in North Africa were commercial rather than political,

and no effort was made to extend the conquest inland.

Hafsids

The eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed the rise in Morocco

of two rival Berber tribal dynasties—the Almoravids and the Almohads, both founded by religious reformers—that dominated the

Maghrib and Muslim Spain for more than two hundred years. The

founder of the Almohad (literally, "one who proclaims" the oneness of God) movement was a member of the Sunni ulama (see

Glossary), Ibn Tumart (d. 1 130), who preached a doctrine of moral

regeneration through reaffirmation of monotheism. As judge and

political leader as well as spiritual director, Ibn Tumart gave the

Almohads a hierarchical and theocratic centralized government,

respecting but transcending the old tribal structure. His successor, the sultan Abdal Mumin (reigned 1130-63), subdued Morocco,

extended the Muslim frontier in Spain, and by 1160 had swept

eastward across the Maghrib and forced the withdrawal of the Normans from their strongholds in Ifriqiya and Tripolitania, which

were added to the Almohad empire.

15
Libya: A Country Study

Mumin proclaimed an Almohad caliphate at Cordova, giving

the sultan supreme religious as well as political authority within

his domains, but theology gradually gave way to dynastic politics as the motivating force behind the movement. The Almohads had

succeeded in unifying the Maghrib but, as its empire grew and

the Almohad power base shifted to Spain, the dynasty became more

remote from the Berber tribes that had launched it. By 1270 the

Almohads in Morocco had succumbed to tribal warfare and in Spain

to the steady advance of the Kingdom of Castile.

At the eastern end of the Almohad empire, the sultan left an autonomous viceroy whose office became hereditary in the line of

Muhammad ibn Abu Hafs (reigned 1207-21), a descendant of one

of Ibn Tumart's companions. With the demise of the Almohad

dynasty in Morocco, the Hafsids adopted the titles of caliph and

sultan and considered themselves the Almohads' legitimate successors, keeping alive the memory of Ibn Tumart and the ideal

of Maghribi unity from their capital in Tunis.

The Hafsids' political support and their realm's economy were

rooted in coastal towns like Tripoli, while the hinterland was given

up to the tribes that had made their nominal submission to the sul- tan. The Hafsids encouraged trade with Europe and forged close

links with Aragon and the Italian maritime states. Despite these

commercial ties, Hafsid relations with the European powers eventually deteriorated when the latter intrigued in the dynasty's

increasingly troubled and complex internal politics. Theocratic

republics, tribal states, and coastal enclaves seized by pirate captains defied the sultan's authority, and in 1460 Tripoli was declared an independent city-state by its merchant oligarchy.

During the Hafsid era, spanning more than 300 years, however,

the Maghrib and Muslim Spain had shared a common higher

culture—called Moorish—that transcended the rise and fall of

dynasties in creating new and unique forms of art, literature, and

architecture. Its influence spread from Spain as far as Tripolitania,

where Hafsid patronage had encouraged a flowering Arab creativity

and scholarship.

Medieval Cyrenaica and Fezzan

Cyrenaica lay outside the orbit of the Maghribi dynasties, its orientation on Egypt. From the time when Saladin displaced the

Fatimids in 1171 until the Ottoman occupation in 1517, Egypt was

ruled by a succession of Mamluk (caste of "slave-soldiers," in Egypt

often Kurds, Circassians, or Turks) dynasties that claimed suzer- ainty over Cyrenaica but exercised little more than nominal political control there. The beduin tribes of Baraqah, as Cyrenaica was

16
Part of an excavated Roman city at Sabratah, near Tripoli

Courtesy

United Nations 4 *»-

known to the Arabs, willingly accepted no authority other than that

of their own chieftains. In the fifteenth century, merchants from

Tripoli revived the markets in some towns, but Cyrenaica's main

source of income was from the pilgrims and caravans traveling between the Maghrib and Egypt, who purchased protection from the

beduins.

Turbulent chieftains of the Bani Khattab dominated Fezzan.

Their importance, like that of the Garamentes, derived from their

control of the oases on the trade route over which caravans carried

gold, ivory, and slaves from the western Sudan to markets on the

Mediterranean. In the thirteenth century the king of Bornu, a Muslim state in the Lake Chad Basin, invaded Fezzan from the south

and established a client regime that for a time commanded the trade

route. Fezzan was always a target for adventurers, one of whom,

the Moroccan Muhammad al Fazi, displaced the last of the Bani

Khattab early in the sixteenth century and founded a line at Marzuq

that remained as undisputed rulers of the region under Ottoman

suzerainty.

Ottoman Regency

Throughout the sixteenth century, Hapsburg Spain and the

Ottoman Turks were pitted in a struggle for supremacy in the

Mediterranean. Spanish forces had already occupied a number of

other North African ports when in 1510 they captured Tripoli,

17
Libya: A Country Study

destroyed the city, and constructed a fortified naval base from the

rubble. Tripoli was of only marginal importance to Spain, however,

and in 1524 the king-emperor Charles V entrusted its defense to the Knights of St. John of Malta.

Piracy, which for both Christians and Muslims was a dimension of the conflict between the opposing powers, lured adventurers

from around the Mediterranean to the Maghribi coastal towns and

islands. Among them was Khair ad Din, called Barbarossa, who

in 1510 seized Algiers on the pretext of defending it from the

Spaniards. Barbarossa subsequently recognized the suzerainty of

the Ottoman sultan over the territory that he controlled and was

in turn appointed the sultan's regent in the Maghrib. Using Algiers

as their base, Barbarossa and his successors consolidated Ottoman

authority in the central Maghrib, extended it to Tunisia and

Tripolitania, and threatened Morocco. In 1551 the knights were

driven out of Tripoli by the Turkish admiral, Sinan Pasha. In the

next year Draughut Pasha, a Turkish pirate captain named gover- nor by the sultan, restored order in the coastal towns and undertook the pacification of the Arab nomads in Tripolitania, although

he admitted the difficulty of subduing a people "who carry their

cities with them." Only in the 1580s did the rulers of Fezzan give

their allegiance to the sultan, but the Turks refrained from trying

to exercise any influence there. Ottoman authority was also absent in Cyrenaica, although a bey (commander) was stationed at Benghazi late in the next century to act as agent of the government in Tripoli.

Pashas and Deys

The Ottoman Maghrib was formally divided into three

regencies—at Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. After 1565 authority as regent in Tripoli was vested in a pasha (see Glossary) appointed

by the sultan. The regency was provided a corps ofjanissaries (see

Glossary), recruited from Turkish peasants who were committed

to a lifetime of military service. The corps was organized into companies, each commanded by a junior officer with the rank of dey

(literally, "maternal uncle"). It formed a self-governing military

guild, subject to its own laws, whose interests were protected by

the Divan, a council of senior officers that also advised the pasha.

In time the pasha's role was reduced to that of ceremonial head

of state and figurehead representative of Ottoman suzerainty, as

real power came to rest with the army.

Mutinies and coups were frequent, and generally the janissaries were loyal to whoever paid and fed them most regularly. In 1611

the deys staged a successful coup, forcing the pasha to appoint

18
Historical Setting

their leader, Suleiman Safar, as head of government—in which

capacity he and his successors continued to bear the title dey. At

various times the dey was also pasha-regent. His succession to office occurred generally amid intrigue and violence. The regency that

he governed was autonomous in internal affairs and, although

dependent on the sultan for fresh recruits to the corps ofjanissaries,

his government was left to pursue a virtually independent foreign

policy as well. Tripoli, which had 30,000 inhabitants at the end of the seven- teenth century, was the only city of any size in the regency. The

bulk of its residents were Moors, as city-dwelling Arabs were known.

Several hundred Turks and renegades formed a governing elite apart from the rest of the population. A larger component was the

khouloughlis (literally, "sons of servants"), offspring of Turkish sol- diers and Arab women who traditionally held high administrative

posts and provided officers for the spahis, the provincial cavalry

units that augmented the corps ofjanissaries. They identified themselves with local interests and were, in contrast to the Turks, re- spected by the Arabs. Regarded as a distinct caste, the khouloughlis

lived in their menshia, a lush oasis located just outside the walls of

the city. Jews and moriscos, descendants of Muslims expelled from

Spain in the sixteenth century, were active as merchants and crafts- men, some of the moriscos also achieving notoriety as pirates. A small

community of European traders clustered around the compounds

of the foreign consuls, whose principal task was to sue for the release of captives brought to Tripoli by the corsairs. European slaves and

larger numbers of enslaved blacks transported from the Sudan were

a ubiquitous feature of the life of the city.

Karamanlis

Lacking direction from the Porte (Ottoman government), Tripoli

lapsed into a period of military anarchy during which coup fol- lowed coup and few deys survived in office more than a year. In

1711 Ahmad Karamanli, a popular khouloughli cavalry officer, seized

Tripoli and then purchased his confirmation by the sultan as pasharegent with property confiscated from Turkish officials he had massacred during the coup. Although he continued to recognize nominal

Ottoman suzerainty, Ahmad (reigned 1711-45) created an independent hereditary monarchy in Tripoli with a government that was

essentially Arab in its composition. Intelligent and resourceful as well as ruthless, he increased his revenues from piracy, pursued an active foreign policy with European powers, used a loyal military establishment to win the allegiance of the tribes, and extended

his authority into Cyrenaica.

19
Libya: A Country Study

The Karamanli regime, however, declined under Ahmad's successors. Then in 1793, a Turkish officer, Ali Benghul, overthrew

the Karamanlis and restored Tripoli to Ottoman rule. With the

aid of the bey of Tunis, Yusuf ibn Ali Karamanli (reigned

1795-1832) returned to Tripoli and installed himself as pasha. A

throwback to the founder of the dynasty, he tamed the tribes and

defied both the Porte and British naval power to assist Napoleon

Bonaparte during his Egyptian campaign in 1799.

The effectiveness of Tripoli's corsairs had long since deteriorated,

but their reputation alone was enough to prompt European maritime states to pay the tribute extorted by the pasha to ensure safe passage of their shipping through Tripolitanian waters. American

merchant ships, no longer covered by British protection, were seized

by Barbary pirates in the years after United States independence,

and American crews were enslaved. In 1799 the United States agreed to pay Yusuf US$18,000 a year in return for a promise that

Tripoli-based corsairs would not molest American ships. Similar

agreements were made at the time with the rulers of Morocco,

Algiers, and Tunis.

In the years immediately after the Napoleonic wars, which ended

in 1815, the European powers forced an end to piracy and the payment of tribute in the Barbary states. Deprived of the basis of its economy, Tripoli was unable to pay for basic imports or to service

its foreign debt. When France and Britain pressed for payment of

debts on behalf of Tripoli's creditors, the Divan authorized extra- ordinary taxes to provide the needed revenue. The imposition of

the taxes provoked an outcry in the towns and among the tribes

that quickly degenerated into civil war. With the allegiance of the

country split among rival claimants to the throne, Yusuf abdicated

in favor of his son, Ali II (reigned 1832-35). In response to Ali's

appeal for assistance and out of fear of the European takeover in

Tripoli, the Ottoman Sultan Muhammad II sent Turkish troops,

ostensibly to put down the numerous rebellions against the pasha

and to restore order. But Ali was packed aboard a Turkish warship, which carried him into exile, while the sultan's troops reinstated Ottoman rule in Tripoli.

The Ottoman Revival

The administrative system imposed by the Turks was typical of

that found elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Tripolitania, as all three historic regions were collectively designated, became a Turkish

vilayet (province) under a wali (governor general) appointed by the

sultan. The province was composed of four sanjaks (subprovinces),

each administered by a mutasarrif (lieutenant governor)

20
Historical Setting

responsible to the governor general. These subprovinces were each

divided into about fifteen districts. Executive officers from the governor general downward were

Turks. The mutasarrif was in some cases assisted by an advisory

council and, at the lower levels, Turkish officials relied on aid and

counsel from the tribal shaykhs. Administrative districts below the

subprovincial level corresponded to the tribal areas that remained

the focus of the Arabs' identification.

Although the system was logical and appeared efficient on paper,

it was never consistently applied throughout the country. The Turks

encountered strong local opposition through the 1850s and showed

little interest in implementing Ottoman control over Fezzan and

the interior of Cyrenaica. In 1879 Cyrenaica was separated from

Tripolitania, its mutasarrif reporting thereafter directly to Constantinople (present-day Istanbul). After the 1908 reform of the Ottoman government, both were entitled to send representatives to the

Turkish parliament. In an effort to provide the country with a tax base, the Turks

attempted unsuccessfully to stimulate agriculture. However, in general, nineteenth-century Ottoman rule was characterized by cor- ruption, revolt, and repression. The region was a backwater

province in a decaying empire that had been dubbed the '' sick man

of Europe."

The Sanusi Order

Outside the towns, the ulama might often be replaced as the

spiritual guides of the people by wandering holy men known as marabouts (see Glossary), mystics and seers whose tradition

antedated Islam. Called "men of the soil," the marabouts of popular Islam were incorporated into intensely local cults of saints. They

had traditionally acted as arbiters in tribal disputes and, whenever

the authority of government waned in a particular locale, the people turned to the marabouts for political leadership as well as for

spiritual guidance. Islam had thus taken shape as a coexisting blend

of the scrupulous intellectualism of the ulama and the sometimes

frenzied emotionalism of the masses. The founder of the Sanusi religious order, Muhammad ibn Ali

as Sanusi (1787-1859), possessed both the popular appeal of a marabout and the prestige of a religious scholar. Early in his

spiritual formation, he had come under the influence of the Sufis, a school of mystics who had inspired an Islamic revival in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and incorporated their asceticism

into his own religious practices. Born near Oran in Algeria, he had

traveled widely, studying and teaching at some of the outstanding

21
Libya: A Country Study

Islamic centers of learning of his day, and his reputation as a scholar

and holy man had spread throughout North Africa. In 1830 he was honored as the Grand Sanusi (as Sanusi al Kabir) by the tribes

and towns of Tripolitania and Fezzan while passing through on

his way to Mecca.

Disturbed by division and dissension within Islam, he believed

that only a return to the purity of early Islam and its insistence on austerity in faith and morals could restore the religion to its rightful glory. On the basis of his perception of the state and needs

of Islam, the Grand Sanusi organized a religious order, founding

its first lodge (zawiya; pi., zawaayaa—see Glossary) near Mecca in

1837. Disagreement with the Turkish authorities, however, forced

his return to North Africa. He had originally intended to return

to Algeria, but the expansion of the French occupation there

determined that he settle in Cyrenaica, where the loose hold exercised by Turkish authorities permitted an atmosphere more congenial to his teaching. The tribesmen of the interior were

particularly receptive to his ideas, and in 1843 he founded the first Cyrenaican lodge at Al Bayda.

The Grand Sanusi did not tolerate fanaticism. He forbade the use of stimulants as well as the practice of voluntary poverty. Lodge

members were to eat and dress within the limits of religious law

and, instead of depending on alms, were required to earn their living

through work. No aids to contemplation, such as the processions,

gyrations, and mutilations employed by Sufi dervishes, were per- mitted. The Grand Sanusi accepted neither the wholly intuitive ways described by the Sufi mystics nor the rationality of

the orthodox ulama; rather, he attempted to adapt from both. The

beduins had shown no interest in the ecstatic practices of the Sufis

that were gaining adherents in the towns, but they were attracted

in great numbers to the Sanusis. The relative austerity of the Sanusi

message was especially suited to the character of the Cyrenaican

beduins, whose way of life had not changed markedly in the centuries since the Arabs had first accepted the Prophet's teachings.

The leaders of the Sanusi movement encouraged the beduins

to render to the Grand Sanusi a reverence that verged on veneration of him as a saint, an act forbidden in orthodox Islam. In fact,

the tribesmen regarded him as a marabout and, indeed, this was

the indispensable basis of their attachment to him. In no other way

could an outsider like Muhammad ibn Ali have won their allegiance.

The Sanusi order ultimately permitted its leaders to transform their

baraka (see Glossary) as holy men into a potent political force capable

of holding together a national movement.

22
Historical Setting

To the single lodge founded at Al Bayda in 1843 was eventually

added a network of lodges throughout Cyrenaica that bound

together the tribal system of the region. The lodge filled an important place in the lives of the tribesmen. Besides its obvious function as a religious center and conduit of baraka to the tribe, it was

also a school, caravansary, social and commercial center^ court of

law, and haven for the poor. It provided a place of high culture

and safety in the desert wilderness.

Before his death in 1859, the Grand Sanusi established the

order's center at Al Jaghbub, which lay at the intersection of the

pilgrimage route to Mecca and the main trade route between the

Sudan and the coast. There he founded a respected Islamic school, as well as a training center for lodge shaykhs. He hoped by this move to facilitate expanded Sanusi missionary activities in the Sahel

and in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Grand Sanusi' s son, Muhammad, succeeded him as the

order's leader. Because of his forceful personality and his outstanding organizational talents, Muhammad brought the order to the

peak of its influence and was recognized as the Mahdi. In 1895

the Mahdi moved the order's headquarters 650 kilometers south

from Al Jaghbub to the oasis of Al Kufrah. There he could better

supervise missionary activities that were threatened by the advance

of French colonialism in the Sudan, which he viewed in religious

terms as Christian intervention into Muslim territory. Although

the order had never used force in its missionary activities, the Mahdi

proclaimed a holy war (jihad—see Glossary) to resist French in- roads and brought the Sanusis into confrontation for the first time

with a European power. When the Mahdi died in 1902, he left 146 lodges in Africa and Arabia and had brought virtually all the

beduins of Cyrenaica under the order's influence. Under the aegis

of the order, the tribes of Cyrenaica owed loyalty to a single leader,

despite their otherwise extremely divisive rivalries and feuds. Thus

a loose umbrella organization forged these otherwise disparate ele- ments into a common unit bound by sentiment and loyalty.

Upon the Mahdi' s death he was succeeded by Ahmad ash Sharif,

who governed the order as regent for his young cousin, Muhammad Idris as Sanusi (later King Idris of Libya). Ahmad's campaign

against French forces was a failure and brought on the destruction

of many Sanusi missions in West Africa.

Italian Colonialism

Italy, which became a unified state only in 1860, was a late starter in the race for colonies. For the Italians, the marginal Turkish

provinces in Libya seemed to offer an obvious compensation for

23
Libya: A Country Study

their humiliating acquiescence to the establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia, a country coveted by Italy as a potential colony.

Italy intensified its long-standing commercial interests in Libya and,

in a series of diplomatic maneuvers, won from the major powers

their recognition of an Italian sphere of influence there. It was

assumed in European capitals that Italy would sooner or later seize

the opportunity to take political and military action in Libya as well. In September 1911 Italy engineered a crisis with Turkey charging that the Turks had committed a "hostile act" by arming Arab

tribesmen in Libya. When Turkey refused to respond to an ulti- matum calling for Italian military occupation to protect Italian inter- ests in the region, Italy declared war. After a preliminary naval

bombardment, Italian troops landed and captured Tripoli on

October 3, encountering only slight resistance. Italian forces also

occupied Tobruk, Al Khums, Darnah, and Benghazi.

In the ensuing months, the Italian expeditionary force, numbering 35,000, barely penetrated beyond its several beachheads.

The 5,000 Turkish troops defending the provinces at the time of

the invasion withdrew inland a few kilometers, where officers such

as Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) organized the Arab

tribes in a resistance to the Italians that took on the aspects of a holy war. But with war threatening in the Balkans, Turkey was

compelled to sue for peace with Italy. In accordance with the treaty

signed at Lausanne in October 1912, the sultan issued a decree

granting independence to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica while Italy

simultaneously announced its formal annexation of those territories. The sultan, in his role as caliph (leader of Islam), was to retain

his religious jurisdiction there and was permitted to appoint the

qadi of Tripoli, who supervised the sharia courts. But the Italians were unable to appreciate that no distinction was made between

civil and religious jurisdiction in Islamic law. Thus, through the

courts, the Turks kept open a channel of influence over their former

subjects and subverted Italian authority. Peace with Turkey meant

for Italy the beginning of a twenty-year colonial war in Libya.

Italian Rule and Arab Resistance

For many Arabs, Turkey's surrender in Libya was a betrayal

of Muslim interests to the infidels. The 1912 Treaty of Lausanne

was meaningless to the beduin tribesmen who continued their war

against the Italians, in some areas with the aid of Turkish troops

left behind in the withdrawal. Fighting in Cyrenaica was conducted

by Sanusi units under Ahmad ash Sharif, whose followers in Fezzan

and southern Tripolitania prevented Italian consolidation in those

areas as well. Lacking the unity imposed by the Sanusis, resistance

24
Historical Setting

in northern Tripolitania was isolated, and tribal rivalries made it less effective. Urban nationalists in Tripoli theorized about the possibility of establishing a Tripolitanian republic, perhaps associated with Italy, while Suleiman Baruni, a Berber and a former

member of the Turkish parliament, proclaimed an independent

but short-lived Berber state in the Gharyan region. For the beduins,

however, unencumbered by any sense of nationhood, the purpose

of the struggle against the colonial power was defending Islam and

the free life they had always enjoyed in their tribal territory.

In 1914 the Sanusis counterattacked in Fezzan, quickly wiping

out recent Italian gains there, and in April 1915 they inflicted heavy

casualties on an Italian column at Qasr Bu Hadi in the Sirtica. Captured rifles, artillery, and munitions fueled a subsequent Sanusi

strike into Tripolitania, but the success of the campaign was compromised by the traditional hostility that existed between the beduins

and the nationalists.

When Italy joined the Allied Powers in 1915, the first Italo-Sanusi war (1914-17) in Cyrenaica became part of the world war. Germany and Turkey sent arms and advisers to Ahmad, who aligned

the Sanusis with the Central Powers with the objective of tying down

Italian and British troops in North Africa. In 1916, however, Turkish officers led the Sanusis on a campaign into Egypt, where they were routed by British forces. Ahmad gave up Sanusi political and

military leadership to Idris and fled to Turkey aboard a German

submarine. The pro-British Idris opened negotiations with the Allies on behalf of Cyrenaica in 1917. The result was, in effect, a truce rather than a conclusive peace treaty, for neither the Italians nor

the Sanusis fully surrendered their claims and control in the region.

Britain and Italy recognized Idris as amir of interior Cyrenaica,

with the condition that Sanusi attacks on coastal towns and into

Egypt cease. Further consideration of Cyrenaica' s status was deferred until after the war. Although the victorious Allied Powers accepted Italy's sovereignty

in Libya, Italian forces there at the end of World War I were still confined to the coastal enclaves, sometimes under conditions of

siege. A campaign was initiated to consolidate and expand Italianheld territory in 1919, but the colonial policy pursued by the Italian

government was moderate and accommodating. Steps were taken

toward granting limited political rights to the people in occupied

areas. The provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were treated

as separate colonies, and Fezzan was organized as a military terri- tory. The Fundamental Law approved by the Italian parliament

in 1919 provided for provincial parliaments and for local advisory

councils appointed by the Italian governors and district executives

in the occupied areas.

25
Libya: A Country Study

The different settlements that Italy made in Tripolitania and

Cyrenaica, however, did illustrate graphically the dissimilarities

in the situations of the two provinces as they were perceived by

Italian authorities. In 1920 an accord was reached between Italy

and the Sanusi leaders that confirmed Idris as amir of Cyrenaica

and recognized his virtual independence in an immense area in

the interior that encompassed all the principal oases. Italy provided

a subsidy to the amir's government, and Sanusi shaykhs, holding

seats in the Cyrenaican parliament, participated in the government

of the entire province. Idris was also allowed to retain the Sanusi

army, although its units were to be stationed in "mixed camps"

with Italian forces. By this arrangement, the Italian government

officially accepted Idris as both secular and religious leader of the

Cyrenaican tribes, but in effect it did not extend his political power

beyond what he already exercised as head of the Sanusi order.

Clearly, the Rome government had not formulated a coherent

policy toward a country that had not been conquered and whose

people were dubious about the benefits of Italian rule. But because

the Italians never faced a credible, united opposition in Tripolitania,

they were not under comparable pressure there to yield the concessions they had made in Cyrenaica. Tripolitania lacked the leadership and organizational structure that Idris and the Sanusi order

gave to Cyrenaica. The most prominent Tripolitanian nationalist was Ramadan as Suwaythi, who had by turns cooperated with the

Italians, supported the Sanusis, and eventually fought against them

both. His rival, Baruni, who had acted during the war as Ottoman "governor" in Tripolitania with German backing, was mistrusted by the Arab nationalists. Tribal rivalries were intense, and

the aims of the beduin shaykhs and the nationalists were fundamentally different, the latter being concerned with forming a centralized republic while the former were interested primarily in creating

tribal states. A prominent pan-Arab nationalist, the Egyptian Abdar Rahman

Azzam, persuaded Suwaythi and Baruni to cooperate in demanding Italian recognition of an independent republic that was called

into being at Misratah in 1919. Talks with the Italians broke down

when the Misratah republic's governing body, the so-called Reform

Committee, claimed jurisdiction over Libya rather than over Tripolitania only. In 1920 delegates from both occupied and unoccupied zones convened the National Congress at Aziza. Claiming

to represent the "Tripolitanian Nation," they called for the withdrawal of the Italian forces. No nationalist movement, however, was able to rally the country behind it.

26
Historical Setting

Even delegates to the National Congress had been sharply divided on the degree of cooperation with Italy they would allow. Rival

delegations beat a path to Rome with their petitions for recognition. Meanwhile, Count Giuseppe Volpi, a vigorous and determined governor, gave decisive direction to Italian policy in Tripolitania with his advocacy of military pacification rather than

negotiation. The nationalists lost their most effective leaders when

Baruni defected to the Italians as a result of hostility between Arabs

and Berbers, which Volpi successfully exploited, and Suwaythi was

killed by his political rivals. In this situation, the Tripolitanian nationalists met with the

Sanusis at Surt early in 1922 and offered to accept Idris as amir

of Tripolitania. Idris had never sought any title other than the one

he held in Cyrenaica, and he was not anxious to extend either

his political influence or his religious leadership to northern

Tripolitania, where neither he nor the Sanusi order was widely

popular. He had always refused aid to Tripolitanian nationalists

and under the circumstances considered their offer to have been

made for reasons of expediency, that is, because there was no

alternative candidate for leadership apparent at the time. Idris' acceptance, as the nationalists understood, would draw sharp Italian disapproval and be the signal for the resumption of open warfare.

War with Italy, in any event, appeared likely sooner or later. For

several months, Idris pondered the nationalist appeal. For whatever

reason—perhaps to further the cause of total independence or perhaps out of a sense of religious obligation to resist the infidel

Idris accepted the amirate of all Libya in November and then, to avoid capture by the Italians, fled to Egypt, where he continued

to guide the Sanusi order.

The Second Italo-Sanusi War

Italian colonial policy was abruptly altered with the acces- sion to power of Mussolini's fascist government in October 1922.

Mussolini, the one-time critic of colonialism, wholeheartedly en- dorsed Volpi' s policy of military pacification and, although accurate

intelligence was lacking in Rome, he fully supported the decisions made in the field by army commanders. The 1923 Treaty

of Lausanne between the Allied Powers—including Italy—and

Ataturk's new government in Turkey made final the dismemberment of the old Ottoman Empire and provided conclusive international sanction for Italy's annexation of Libya.

The second Italo-Sanusi war commenced early in 1923 with the

Italian occupation of Sanusi territory in the Benghazi area. Resistance in Cyrenaica was fierce from the outset, but northern

27
Libya: A Country Study

TUNISIA

Mediterranean Sea

Tripoli Ai Knums Darnah

,._Sorf

J a g h b u b I

DESERT ALGERIA >s^;/

'"FRENCH WEST AFRICA*

Kuirah I

- International boundary

] Territory held in 1921

1 Pacified 1922

1 Pacified 1923-24

ty---~--] Pacified 1925-28 WgM Pacified 1929-30

1 1 Pacified 1930

Graziani's wire barrier ^ Battle

50 100 200 Kilometers

I r1 H 1 50 100 200 Miles

\

t Aooz<

Oasis

Sarra j"-

Triangle \

CHAD FRENCH

EQUATORIAL

AFRICA

''A\\\\\i

j

Boundary representation

not necessarily ot/ffionfotive

..J /aNGLO-

^EGYPTIAN

SUDAN

Figure 3. The Italian Conquest of Libya, 1921-31

Tripolitania was subdued in 1923, and its southern region and

Fezzan were gradually pacified over the next several years. During the whole period, however, the principal Italian theater of operations was Cyrenaica (see fig. 3). In Idris' absence a hardy but aging shaykh, Umar al Mukhtar,

had overall command of Sanusi fighting forces in Cyrenaica, never numbering more than a few thousand organized in tribal units.

28
Historical Setting

Mukhtar, a veteran of many campaigns, was a master of desert

guerrilla tactics. Leading small, mobile bands, he attacked outposts,

ambushed troop columns, cut lines of supply and communication,

and then faded into the familiar terrain. Italian forces, under

Rudolfo Graziani's command after 1929, were largely composed

of Eritreans. Unable to fight a decisive battle with the Sanusis,

Graziani imposed an exhausting war of attrition, conducting unremitting search-and-destroy missions with armored columns and

air support against the oases and tribal camps that sheltered

Mukhtar' s men. Troops herded beduins into concentration camps,

blocked wells, and slaughtered livestock. In 1930 Graziani directed

construction of a barbed-wire barrier 9 meters wide and 1 . 5 meters

high stretching 320 kilometers from the coast south along the Egyptian frontier to cut Mukhtar off from his sanctuaries and sources

of supply across the border. The area around the barrier, constantly

patrolled by armor and aircraft, was designated a free-fire zone. The Italians' superior manpower and technology began to take their

toll on the Libyans, but Mukhtar fought on with his steadily dwindling numbers in a shrinking theater of operations, more from habit

than from conviction that the Italians could be dislodged from

Cyrenaica.

Al Kufrah, the last Sanusi stronghold, fell in 1931, and in September of that year Mukhtar was captured. After a summary court- martial, he was hanged before a crowd of 20,000 Arabs assembled

to witness the event. With the death of Mukhtar, Sanusi resistance

collapsed, and the Italian pacification of Libya was completed. Even

in defeat, Mukhtar remained a symbol of Arab defiance to colonial

domination, and he was revered as a national hero.

The Fourth Shore

Once pacification had been accomplished, fascist Italy endeavored

to convert Libya into an Italian province to be referred to popularly as Italy's Fourth Shore. In 1934 Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were divided into four provinces—Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi,

and Darnah—which were formally linked as a single colony known

as Libya, thus officially resurrecting the name that Diocletian had

applied nearly 1,500 years earlier. Fezzan, designated as South

Tripolitania, remained a military territory. A governor general,

called the first consul after 1937, was in overall direction of the

colony, assisted by the General Consultative Council, on which

Arabs were represented. Traditional tribal councils, formerly sanc- tioned by the Italian administration, were abolished, and all local

officials were thereafter appointed by the governor general. Administrative posts at all levels were held by Italians.

29
Libya: A Country Study

An accord with Britain and Egypt obtained the transfer of a corner of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, known as the Sarra Triangle, to Italian control in 1934. The next year, a French-Italian agree- ment was negotiated that relocated the 1,000-kilometer border

between Libya and Chad southward about 100 kilometers across

the Aouzou Strip (see Glossary), but this territorial concession to

Italy was never ratified by the French legislature. In 1939 Libya was incorporated into metropolitan Italy.

During the 1930s, impressive strides were made in improving

the country's economic and transportation infrastructure. Italy

invested capital and technology in public works projects, extension and modernization of cities, highway and railroad construction, expanded port facilities, and irrigation, but these measures were introduced to benefit the Italian-controlled modern sector of

the economy. Italian development policy after World War I had

called for capital-intensive "economic colonization" intended to promote the maximum exploitation of the resources available. One

of the initial Italian objectives in Libya, however, had been the

relief of overpopulation and unemployment in Italy through emigration to the undeveloped colony. With security established, systematic "demographic colonization" was encouraged by Mussolini's

government. A project initiated by Libya's governor, Italo Balbo,

brought the first 20,000 settlers—the ventimilli—to Libya in a sin- gle convoy in October 1938. More settlers followed in 1939, and

by 1940 there were approximately 110,000 Italians in Libya, constituting about 12 percent of the total population. Plans envisioned an Italian colony of 500,000 settlers by the 1960s. Libya's best land was allocated to the settlers to be brought under productive culti- vation, primarily in olive groves. Settlement was directed by a state corporation, the Libyan Colonization Society, which undertook land

reclamation and the building of model villages and offered a grubstake and credit facilities to the settlers it had sponsored.

The Italians made modern medical care available for the first time in Libya, improved sanitary conditions in the towns, and

undertook to replenish the herds and flocks that had been depleted

during the war. But, although Mussolini liked to refer to the Libyans

as "Muslim Italians," little more was accomplished that directly

improved the living standards of the Arab population. Beduin life was disrupted as tribal grazing lands—considered underutilized by

European standards but potentially fertile if reclaimed—were purchased or confiscated for distribution to Italian settlers. Complete

neglect of education for Arabs prevented the development of professional and technical training, creating a shortage of skilled workers,

technicians, and administrators that had not been alleviated in the

30
Historical Setting

late 1980s. Sanusi leaders were harried out of the country, lodges

broken up, and the order suppressed, although not extinguished.

World War II and Independence

As Europe prepared for war, Libyan nationalists at home and

in exile perceived that the best chance for liberation from colonial

domination lay in Italy's defeat in a larger conflict. Such an opportunity seemed to arise when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, but

Mussolini's defiance of the League of Nations and the feeble reac- tion of Britain and France dashed Libyan hopes for the time being. Planning for liberation resumed, however, with the outbreak

of war in Europe in September 1939. Libyan political leaders met

in Alexandria, Egypt, in October to resolve past differences in the

interest of future unity. Idris was accepted as leader of the nationalist cause by Tripolitanians as well as Cyrenaicans, with the proviso

that he designate an advisory committee with representatives from

both regions to assist him. Differences between the two groups were

too deep and long held, however, for the committee to work well. When Italy entered the war on the side of Germany on June

10, 1940, the Cyrenaican leaders, who for some months had been

in contact with British military officers in Egypt, immediately

declared their support for the Allies. In Tripolitania, where Italian

control was strongest, some opinion initially opposed cooperation

with Britain on the ground that if the Allies lost —which seemed

highly possible in 1940—retribution would be severe. But the

Cyrenaicans, with their long history of resistance to the Italians, were anxious to resume the conflict and reminded the timid

Tripolitanians that conditions in the country could be no worse

than they already were. Idris pointed out that it would be of little use to expect the British to support Libyan independence after the war if Libyans had not cooperated actively with them during the war.

Idris presided over a meeting of Libyan leaders hastily summoned

to Cairo in August 1940, at which formal arrangements for cooperation with British military authorities were initiated. Delegates to the conference expressed full confidence in Idris in a resolution and

granted him extensive powers to negotiate with the British for Libya's independence. The resolution stated further that Libyan

participation with British forces should be "under the banner of

the Sanusi Amirate" and that a "provisional Sanusi government"

should be established.

Although a number of Tripolitanian representatives agreed to participate, the resolution was essentially a Cyrenaican measure

adopted over the objections of the Tripolitanian nationalists. The

31
Libya: A Country Study

Tripolitanians, suspicious of the ties between Idris and the British,

held that a definite statement endorsing Libyan independence

should have been obtained from Britain before Idris committed

Libya to full-scale military cooperation. Also, although the Tripolitanians were reluctantly willing to accept Idris as their politi- cal chief, they rejected any religious connection with the Sanusi

order. Hence they objected to the use of the term Sanusi throughout the resolution in place of Libya or even Cyrenaica. These two

areas of objection—the extent of the commitment to Britain and

the role of the Sanusi order in an independent, united Libya

constituted the main elements of internal political dissension during the war and early postwar years.

British officials maintained that major postwar agreements or guarantees could not be undertaken while the war was still in progress. Although he endeavored from time to time to secure a more favorable British commitment, Idris generally accepted this position and counseled his followers to have patience. Clearly, many

of them were not enthusiastic about Libyan unity and would

have been satisfied with the promise of a Sanusi government in

Cyrenaica. After the August 1940 resolution, five Libyan battal- ions were organized by the British, recruited largely from Cyrenai- can veterans of the Italo-Sanusi wars. The Libyan Arab Force,

better known as the Sanusi Army, served with distinction under

British command through the campaigns of the desert war that

ended in the liberation of Cyrenaica.

In a speech in the House of Commons in January 1942, British

Foreign Minister Anthony Eden acknowledged and welcomed "the

contribution which Sayid Idris as Sanusi and his followers have

made and are making' ' to the Allied war effort. He added that the

British government was determined that the Sanusis in Cyrenaica

should "in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination."

No further commitment was made, and this statement, which made

no mention of an independent Libya, remained the official British

position during the war. The Desert War

North Africa was a major theater of operations in World War

II, and the war shifted three times across the face of Cyrenaica,

a region described by one German general as a "tactician's paradise and a quartermaster's hell" because there were no natural

defense positions between Al Agheila and Al Alamein to obstruct

the tanks that fought fluid battles in the desert like warships at sea, and there was only one major highway on the coast along which

to supply the quick-moving armies. The Italians invaded Egypt

32
Historical Setting

in September 1940, but the drive stalled at Sidi Barrani for want

of logistical support. British Empire forces of the Army of the Nile,

under General Archibald Wavell, counterattacked sharply in December, advancing as far as Tobruk by the end of the month.

In February 1941, the Italian Tenth Army surrendered, netting

Wavell 150,000 prisoners and leaving all of Cyrenaica in British

hands. At no time during the campaign did Wavell have more than

two full divisions at his disposal against as many as ten Italian

divisions. In March and April, Axis forces, stiffened by the arrival of the

German Afrika Korps commanded by Lieutenant General Erwin

Rommel, launched an offensive into Cyrenaica that cut off British

troops at Tobruk. The battle seesawed back and forth in the desert

as Rommel attempted to stabilize his lines along the Egyptian frontier before dealing with Tobruk in his rear, but in November British Eighth Army commander General Claude Auchinleck caught

him off balance with a thrust into Cyrenaica that succeeded in reliev- ing Tobruk, where the garrison had held out for seven months behind its defense perimeter. Auchinleck's offensive failed in its second

objective—cutting off Rommel from his line of retreat. Rommel pulled back in good order to Al Agheila, where his

troops refitted for a new offensive in January 1942 that was in- tended to take the Axis forces to the Suez Canal. Rommel's initial attack was devastating in its boldness and swiftness. Cyrenaica had

been retaken by June; Tobruk fell in a day. Rommel drove into

Egypt, but his offensive was halted at Al Alamein, 100 kilometers

from Alexandria. The opposing armies settled down into a stale- mate in the desert as British naval and air power interdicted German convoys and road transport, gradually starving Rommel of

supplies and reinforcements.

Late in October the Eighth Army, under the command of General Bernard Montgomery, broke through the Axis lines at Al

Alamein in a massive offensive that sent German and Italian forces

into a headlong retreat. The liberation of Cyrenaica was completed

for the second time in November. Tripoli fell to the British in January 1943, and by mid-February the last Axis troops had been driven

from Libya.

Allied Administration

Separate British military governments were established in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania and continued to function until Libya

achieved independence. Each was divided into several districts governed by civil affairs officers who reported to brigadiers at se- nior headquarters in Benghazi and Tripoli. British authority was

33
Libya: A Country Study

exercised under the Hague Convention, which conveyed legislative, administrative, and judicial power to an occupying country.

It was essentially a caretaker operation, the initial objective simply being to maintain peace and order and facilitate the war effort. British military officers and government emphatically stressed the

nonpolitical character of the occupation government.

The British administration began the training of a badly needed

Libyan civil service. Italian administrators continued to be employed in Tripoli, however. The Italian legal code remained in effect for the duration of the war. In the lightly populated Fezzan region, a French military administration formed a counterpart to the British

operation. With British approval, Free French forces moved north

from Chad to take control of the territory in January 1943. French

administration was directed by a staff stationed in Sabha, but it was largely exercised through Fezzan notables of the family of Sayf an Nasr. At the lower echelons, French troop commanders acted

in both military and civil capacities according to customary French

practice in the Algerian Sahara. In the west, Ghat was attached

to the French military region of southern Algeria and Ghadamis

to the French command of southern Tunisia—giving rise to Libyan

nationalist fears that French intentions might include the ultimate

detachment of Fezzan from Libya.

The United Nations and Libya

Disposition of Italian colonial holdings was a question that had

to be considered before the peace treaty officially ending the war

with Italy could be completed. Technically, Libya remained an

Italian possession administered by Britain and France, but at the

Potsdam Conference in 1945 the Allies—Britain, the Soviet Union,

and the United States—agreed that the Italian colonies seized during

the war should not be returned to Italy. Further consideration of

the question was delegated to the Allied Council of Foreign

Ministers, which included a French representative; although all council members initially favored some form of trusteeship, no for- mula could be devised for disposing of Libya. The United States suggested a trusteeship for the whole country under control of the

United Nations (UN), whose charter had become effective in

October 1945, to prepare it for self-government. The Soviet Union

proposed separate provincial trusteeships, claiming Tripolitania for

itself and assigning Fezzan to France and Cyrenaica to Britain.

France, seeing no end to the discussions, advocated the return of

the territory to Italy. To break the impasse, Britain finally recom- mended immediate independence for Libya.

34
Historical Setting

The peace treaty, in which Italy renounced all claims to its Afri- can possessions, was signed in February 1947 and became effec- tive in September. The language of the treaty was vague on the

subject of colonies, adding only that these territories should "remain

in their present state until their future is decided." This indefinite

proviso disappointed Libyan leaders, who had earlier been alarmed

at Italian diplomatic agitation for return of the colonies. Libyans were apprehensive that Italian hegemony might return in some

ostensibly nonpolitical guise if Italy were given responsibility for preparing the country for independence.

By mutual agreement the settlement of the Italian colonies was

postponed for a year after the treaty became effective, during which

time the Big Four (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the

United States) were to search for a solution. If none could be found,

the question was to be put before the UN General Assembly. A

four-power commission of investigation was appointed to ascertain what the Libyan people desired. Although the various regional

parties split over the question of the future status of their respective provinces, the majority of Libyans favored independence. The

commission, however, decided that the country was not ready for self-government. Other governments interested in the settlement

of the problem, notably Italy and Egypt, were consulted. In all cases, conflicting interests prevented any solution, and in due course

the Libyan question was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Idris had returned to Libya to a tumultuous welcome in 1944,

but he declined to take up residence there until satisfied that all constraints of foreign control not subject to his agreement had been

removed. At British urging, he resumed permanent residence in

Cyrenaica in 1947; in 1949, with British backing, he unilaterally

proclaimed Cyrenaica an independent amirate.

In the meantime, Britain and Italy had placed the Bevin-Sforza

plan (after Ernest Bevin and Carlo Sforza, foreign ministers of its respective sponsors) before the UN for its consideration. Under

this plan, Libya would come under UN trusteeship, and responsibility for administration in Tripolitania would be delegated to Italy,

in Cyrenaica to Britain, and in Fezzan to France. At the end of

ten years, Libya would become independent. Over Libyan protests, the plan was adopted by the UN Political Committee in May

1949, only to fall short by one vote of the two-thirds majority re- quired for adoption by the General Assembly. No further proposals were submitted, but protracted negotiations led to a compromise

solution that was embodied in a UN resolution in November 1949.

This resolution called for the establishment of a sovereign state

35
Libya: A Country Study

including all three historic regions of Libya by January 1952. A

UN commissioner and the so-called Council of Ten—composed

of a representative from each of the three provinces, one for the

Libyan minorities, and one each for Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan,

Britain, and the United States—were to guide Libya through the

period of transition to independence and to assist a Libyan national

assembly in drawing up a constitution. In the final analysis, indecision on the part of the major powers had precipitated the crea- tion of an independent state and forced the union of provinces

hitherto divided by geography and history.

The General Assembly named Adrian Pelt of the Netherlands

as commissioner for Libya. Severe problems confronted him and

his staff in preparing for independence an economically backward

and politically inexperienced country, almost totally lacking in

trained managerial and technical personnel, physicians, and

teachers. Of Libya's approximately 1 million inhabitants, at least 90 percent were illiterate. Libya's biggest source of income was

from scrap metal salvaged from the World War II battiefields. There were no known natural resources—even Libya's sand was inadequate for glassmaking—and it was obvious that the country would

be dependent on foreign economic aid for an indefinite period. Pelt

argued forcefully that Italian settlers should be encouraged to re- main in Libya, first, because the land they worked was private

property that could not be expropriated legally, and, second, be- cause their presence represented a long-term investment that was

essential to any further economic development in the country.

Historically, the administration of Libya had been united for

only a few years—and those under Italian rule. Many groups vied

for influence over the people but, although al1 parties desired

independence, there was no consensus as to what form of government was to be established. The social basis of political organization varied from region to region. In Cyrenaica and Fezzan, the

tribe was the chief focus of social identification, even in an urban

context. Idris had wide appeal in the former as head of the Sanusi

order, while in the latter the Sayf an Nasr clan commanded a fol- lowing as paramount tribal chieftains. In Tripolitania, by contrast,

loyalty that in a social context was reserved largely to the family

and kinship group could be transferred more easily to a political

party and its leader. Tripolitanians, following the lead of Bashir

as Sadawi's National Congress Party, pressed for a republican form

of government in a unitary state. Inasmuch as their region had

a significantly larger population and a relatively more advanced

economy than the other two, they expected that under a unitary

political system political power would gravitate automatically to

36
Historical Setting

Tripoli. Cyrenaicans, who had achieved a larger degree of cohesion under Sanusi leadership, feared the chaos they saw in Tripolitania and the threat of being swamped politically by the Tripolitanians in a unitary state. Guided by the National Front, endorsed

by Idris initially to advocate unilateral independence for Cyrenaica,

they backed formation of a federation with a weak central government that would permit local autonomy under Idris as amir. But

even in Cyrenaica a cleavage existed between an older generation

that thought instinctively in provincial terms and a younger generation—many of whom were influenced by their membership in

the Umar al Mukhtar Club, a political action group first formed

in 1942 with Idris' blessing but by 1947 tending toward republi- can and nationalist views—whose outlook reflected the rise of panArab political nationalism, already a strong force in the Middle

East and growing in Libya.

To implement the General Assembly's directive, Pelt approved

the appointment of the Preparatory Committee of Twenty-One to determine the composition of a national constitutional convention.

The committee included seven members from each province, nominated in Cyrenaica by Idris, in Fezzan by the Sayf an Nasr chieftains, and in Tripolitania by the grand mufti (chief religious judge)

of Tripoli, who also acted as its chairman. Nationalists objected

that the committee represented traditional regional interests and

could not reflect the will of the Libyan people as the General

Assembly had intended

The product of the committee's deliberations was the creation

of the National Constituent Assembly, in which each of the three

provinces was equally represented. Meeting for the first time in

November 1950, the assembly approved a federal system of government with a monarchy, despite dissent from Tripolitanian delegates,

and offered the throne to Idris. Committees of the assembly drafted a constitution, which was duly adopted in October 1951. Meanwhile, internal administrative authority had already been trans- ferred by British and French administrations to the regional

governments—and in Cyrenaica to the independent Sanusi amirate.

On December 24, 1951 , King Idris I proclaimed the independence

of the United Kingdom of Libya as a sovereign state. Independent Libya

Under the constitution of October 1951, the federal monarchy

of Libya was headed by King Idris as chief of state, with succession to his designated heirs. Substantial political power resided with

the king. The executive arm of the government consisted of a prime

minister and Council of Ministers designated by the king but also

37
Libya: A Country Study

responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of a bi- cameral legislature. The Senate, or upper house, consisted of eight

representatives from each of the three provinces. Half of the senators were nominated by the king, who also had the right to veto

legislation and to dissolve the lower house. Local autonomy in the

provinces was exercised through provincial governments and legis- latures. Benghazi and Tripoli served alternately as the national

capital.

Several factors, rooted in Libya's history, affected the political

development of the newly independent country. They reflected the

differing political orientations of the provinces and the ambiguities inherent in Libya's monarchy. First, after the first general elec- tions, which were held on February 19, 1952, political parties were

abolished. The National Congress Party, which had campaigned

against a federal form of government, was defeated throughout the

country. The party was outlawed, and Sadawi was deported.

Second, provincial ties continued to be more important than national ones, and the federal and provincial governments were constantly in dispute over their respective spheres of authority. A third

problem derived from the lack of a direct heir to the throne. To

remedy this situation, Idris in 1953 designated his sixty-year-old

brother to succeed him. When the original heir apparent died, the

king appointed his nephew, Prince Hasan ar Rida, his successor. In its foreign policy, Libya maintained a pro-Western stance and was recognized as belonging to the conservative traditionalist bloc

in the League of Arab States (Arab League), of which it became

a member in 1953. The same year Libya concluded a twenty-year

treaty of friendship and alliance with Britain under which the latter received military bases in exchange for financial and military as- sistance. The next year, Libya and the United States signed an agreement under which the United States also obtained military

base rights, subject to renewal in 1970, in return for economic aid

to Libya. The most important of the United States installations

in Libya was Wheelus Air Base, near Tripoli, considered a stra- tegically valuable installation in the 1950s and early 1960s. Reservations set aside in the desert were used by British and American

military aircraft based in Europe as practice firing ranges. Libya

forged close ties with France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, and established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955, but

declined a Soviet offer of economic aid.

As part of a broad assistance package, the UN Technical Assist- ance Board agreed to sponsor a technical aid program that emphasized the development of agriculture and education. Foreign powers,

notably Britain and the United States, provided development

38
aid. Steady economic improvement occurred, but the pace was slow,

and Libya remained a poor and underdeveloped country heavily

dependent on foreign aid. This situation changed suddenly and dramatically in June 1959

when research prospectors from Esso (later renamed Exxon) con- firmed the location of major petroleum deposits at Zaltan in

Cyrenaica. Further discoveries followed, and commercial development was quickly initiated by concession holders who returned 50

percent of their profits to the Libyan government in taxes. In the

petroleum market, Libya's advantages lay not only in the quantity but also in the high quality of its crude product. Libya's proximity and direct linkage to Europe by sea were further marketing

advantages. The discovery and exploitation of petroleum turned

the vast, sparsely populated, impoverished country into an independently wealthy nation with potential for extensive development and

thus constituted a major turning point in Libyan history (see

Hydrocarbons and Mining, ch. 3). As development of petroleum resources progressed in the early

1960s, Libya launched its first Five-Year Plan, 1963-68. One negative result of the new wealth from petroleum, however, was a decline

in agricultural production, largely through neglect. Internal Libyan politics continued to be stable, but the federal form of government had proven inefficient and cumbersome. In April 1963, Prime

Minister Muhi ad Din Fakini secured adoption by parliament of

39
Libya: A Country Study

a bill, endorsed by the king, that abolished the federal form of

government, establishing in its place a unitary, monarchical state with a dominant central government. By legislation, the historical

divisions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan were to be eliminated and the country divided into ten new provinces, each headed

by an appointed governor. The legislature revised the constitution

in 1963 to reflect the change from a federal to a unitary state. In regional affairs, Libya enjoyed the advantage of not having

aggravated boundary disputes with its neighbors. Libya was one

of the thirty founding members of the Organization of African Unity

(OAU), established in 1963, and in November 1964 participated

with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in forming a joint consultative

committee aimed at economic cooperation among North African

states. Although it supported Arab causes, including the Moroccan and Algerian independence movements, Libya took little active

part in the Arab-Israeli dispute or the tumultuous inter-Arab politics

of the 1950s and the early 1960s.

Nevertheless, the brand of Arab nationalism propounded by

Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser exercised an increasing influence,

particularly among the younger generation. In response to antiWestern agitation in 1964, Libya's essentially pro-Western government requested the evacuation of British and American bases before

the dates specified in the treaties. Most British forces were in fact withdrawn in 1966, although the evacuation of foreign military

installations, including Wheelus Air Base, was not completed until

March 1970.

The June 1967 War between Israel and its Arab neighbors

aroused a strong reaction in Libya, particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi, where dock and oil workers as well as students were involved

in violent demonstrations. The United States and British embassies and oil company offices were damaged in rioting. Members

of the small Jewish community were also attacked, prompting the

emigration of almost all remaining Libyan Jews. The government

restored order, but thereafter attempts to modernize the small and

ineffective Libyan armed forces and to reform the grossly ineffi- cient Libyan bureaucracy foundered upon conservative opposition

to the nature and pace of the proposed reforms.

Although Libya was clearly on record as supporting Arab causes

in general, the country did not play an important role in Arab politics. At the Arab summit conference held at Khartoum in September 1967, however, Libya, along with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,

agreed to provide generous subsidies from oil revenues to aid Egypt,

Syria, and Jordan, defeated in June by Israel. Also, Idris first broached the idea of taking collective action to increase the price

40
Wheelus Air Base, in the mid-1960s, before

the United States turned over control to the Qadhafi regime

Courtesy United States Air Force

of oil on the world market. Libya, nonetheless, continued its close

association with the West, while Idris' government steered an

essentially conservative course at home.

After the forming of the Libyan state in 1963, Idris' government

had tried—not very successfully—to promote a sense of Libyan

nationalism built around the institution of the monarchy. But Idris

himself was first and foremost a Cyrenaican, never at ease in

Tripolitania. His political interests were essentially Cyrenaican,

and he understood that whatever real power he had—and it was more considerable than what he derived from the constitution

lay in the loyalty he commanded as amir of Cyrenaica and head

of the Sanusi order. Idris' pro-Western sympathies and identification with the conservative Arab bloc were especially resented by

an increasingly politicized urban elite that favored nonalignment.

Aware of the potential of their country's natural wealth, many Libyans had also become conscious that its benefits reached very few

of the population. An ominous undercurrent of dissatisfaction with

corruption and malfeasance in the bureaucracy began to appear

as well, particularly among young officers of the armed forces who

were influenced by Nasser's Arab nationalist ideology.

Alienated from the most populous part of the country, from the

cities, and from a younger generation of Libyans, Idris spent more

41
Libya: A Country Study

and more time at his palace in Darnah, near the British military

base. In June 1969, the king left the country for rest and medical

treatment in Greece and Turkey, leaving Crown Prince Hasan ar Rida as regent.

The September 1969 Coup

On September 1 , 1969, in a daring coup d'etat, a group of about

seventy young army officers and enlisted men, mostly assigned to the Signal Corps, seized control of the government and in a stroke

abolished the Libyan monarchy. The coup was launched at Benghazi, and within two hours the takeover was completed. Army

units quickly rallied in support of the coup, and within a few days

firmly established military control in Tripoli and elsewhere throughout the country. Popular reception of the coup, especially by

younger people in the urban areas, was enthusiastic. Fears of

resistance in Cyrenaica and Fezzan proved unfounded. No deaths

or violent incidents related to the coup were reported.

The Free Officers Movement, which claimed credit for carry- ing out the coup, was headed by a twelve-member directorate that

designated itself the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This

body constituted the Libyan government after the coup. In its initial proclamation on September 1 , the RCC declared the country

to be a free and sovereign state called the Libyan Arab Republic,

which would proceed, with the help of God, "in the path of free- dom, unity, and social justice, guaranteeing the right of equality

to its citizens, and opening before them the doors of honorable

work." The rule of the Turks and Italians and the "reactionary"

regime just overthrown were characterized as belonging to "dark

ages," from which the Libyan people were called to move forward

as "free brothers" to a new age of prosperity, equality, and honor.

The RCC advised diplomatic representatives in Libya that the

revolutionary changes had not been directed from outside the country, that existing treaties and agreements would remain in effect,

and that foreign lives and property would be protected. Diplomatic

recognition of the new regime came quickly from countries throughout the world. United States recognition was officially extended on September 6. In view of the lack of internal resistance, it appeared that the

chief danger to the new regime lay in the possibility of a reaction

inspired by the absent King Idris or his designated heir, Hasan

ar Rida, who had been taken into custody at the time of the coup

along with other senior civil and military officials of the royal

government.

42
Historical Setting

Within days of the coup, however, Hasan publicly renounced

all rights to the throne, stated his support for the new regime, and

called on the people to accept it without violence. Idris, in an ex- change of messages with the RCC through Egypt's President

Nasser, dissociated himself from reported attempts to secure British intervention and disclaimed any intention of coming back to Libya. In return, he was assured by the RCC of the safety of his

family still in the country. At his own request and with Nasser's

approval, Idris took up residence once again in Egypt, where he

had spent his first exile and where he remained until his death in

1983.

On September 7, 1969, the RCC announced that it had ap- pointed a cabinet to conduct the government of the new republic.

An American-educated technician, Mahmud Sulayman al Maghrabi, who had been imprisoned since 1967 for his political

activities, was designated prime minister. He presided over the

eight-member Council of Ministers, of whom six, like Maghrabi,

were civilians and two—Adam Said Hawwaz and Musa Ahmad

were military officers. Neither of the officers was a member of the

RCC. The Council of Ministers was instructed to "implement the

state's general policy as drawn up by the RCC," leaving no doubt

where ultimate authority rested. The next day the RCC decided

to promote Captain Muammar al Qadhafi to colonel and to appoint him commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces. Although RCC spokesmen declined until January 1970 to reveal

any other names of RCC members, it was apparent from that date

onward that the head of the RCC and new de facto head of state was the ascetic, deeply religious, twenty-seven-year-old Colonel

Qadhafi.

Analysts were quick to point out the striking similarities between

the Libyan military coup of 1969 and that in Egypt under Nasser

in 1952, and it became clear that the Egyptian experience and the

charismatic figure of Nasser had formed the model for the Free

Officers Movement. As the RCC in the last months of 1969 moved

vigorously to institute domestic reforms, it proclaimed neutrality

in the confrontation between the superpowers and opposition to

all forms of colonialism and "imperialism." It also made clear

Libya's dedication to Arab unity and to the support of the Palestinian cause against Israel. The RCC reaffirmed the country's identity as part of the "Arab nation" and its state religion as Islam.

It abolished parliamentary institutions, all legislative functions being

assumed by the RCC, and continued the prohibition against political parties, in effect since 1952. The new regime categorically

rejected communism—in large part because it was atheistic—and

43
Libya: A Country Study

officially espoused an Arab interpretation of socialism that integrated

Islamic principles with social, economic, and political reform. Libya

had shifted, virtually overnight, from the camp of conservative Arab

traditionalist states to that of the radical nationalist states. Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council

Muammar al Qadhafi was born in a beduin tent in the desert near Surt in 1942. His family belongs to a small tribe of Arabized

Berbers, the Qadhafa, who are stockherders with holdings in the

Hun Oasis. As a boy, Qadhafi attended a Muslim elementary

school, during which time the major events occurring in the Arab

world—the Arab defeat in Palestine in 1948 and Nasser's rise to power in Egypt in 1952 —profoundly influenced him. He finished

his secondary school studies under a private tutor in Misratah, paying particular attention to the study of history.

Qadhafi formed the essential elements of his political philosophy

and his world view as a schoolboy. His education was entirely

Arabic and strongly Islamic, much of it under Egyptian teachers.

From this education and his desert background, Qadhafi derived

his devoutness and his austere, even puritanical, code of personal

conduct and morals. Essentially an Arab populist, Qadhafi held

family ties to be important and upheld the beduin code of egalitarian

simplicity and personal honor, distrusting sophisticated, axiomatically corrupt, urban politicians. Qadhafi' s ideology, fed by Radio

Cairo during his formative years, was an ideology of renascent Arab

nationalism on the Egyptian model, with Nasser as hero and the

Egyptian revolution as a guide.

In Libya, as in a number of other Arab countries, admission

to the military academy and a career as an army officer became

available to members of the lower economic strata only after in- dependence. A military career offered a new opportunity for higher

education, for upward economic and social mobility, and was for many the only available means of political action and rapid change.

For Qadhafi and many of his fellow officers, who were animated

by Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism as well as by an intense

hatred of Israel, a military career was a revolutionary vocation.

Qadhafi entered the Libyan military academy at Benghazi in

1961 and, along with most of his colleagues from the RCC, graduated in the 1965-66 period. After receiving his commission, he was

selected for several months of further training at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England. Qadhafi 's association with

the Free Officers Movement began during his days as a cadet. The

frustration and shame felt by Libyan officers who stood by helplessly at the time of Israel's swift and humiliating defeat of Arab

44
Historical Setting

armies on three fronts in 1967 fueled their determination to contribute to Arab unity by overthrowing the Libyan monarchy.

At the onset of RCC rule, Qadhafi and his associates insisted

that their government would not rest on individual leadership, but

rather on collegial decision making. However, Qadhafi' s ascetic

but colorful personality, striking appearance, energy, and intense

ideological style soon created an impression of Qadhafi as dictator

and the balance of the RCC as little more than his rubber stamp.

This impression was inaccurate and although some members were more pragmatic, less demonstrative, or less ascetic than Qadhafi,

the RCC showed a high degree of uniformity in political and eco- nomic outlook and in dedication. Fellow RCC members were loyal

to Qadhafi as group leader, observers believed, not because of

bureaucratic subservience to his dictatorial power, but because they were in basic agreement with him and with the revolutionary Arab

nationalist ideals that he articulated.

Although the RCC's principle of conducting executive operations through a predominantly civilian cabinet of technicianadministrators remained strong, circumstances and pressures

brought about modifications. The first major cabinet change

occurred soon after the first challenge to the regime. In December

1969, Adam Said Hawwaz, the minister of defense, and Musa

Ahmad, the minister of interior, were arrested and accused of planning a coup. In the new cabinet formed after the crisis, Qadhafi,

retaining his post as chairman of the RCC, also became prime

minister and defense minister. Major Abdel Salaam Jallud, generally regarded as second only to Qadhafi in the RCC, became deputy

prime minister and minister of interior. This cabinet totaled thir- teen members, of whom fWe were RCC officers. The regime was

challenged a second time in July 1970 when Abdullah Abid as Sanusi, a distant cousin of former King Idris, and members of the

Sayf an Nasr clan of Fezzan were accused of plotting to seize power

for themselves. After the plot was foiled, a substantial cabinet change

occurred, RCC officers for the first time forming a majority among

new ministers.

From the start, RCC spokesmen had indicated a serious intent

to bring the "defunct regime" to account. In 1971 and 1972 more

than 200 former government officials—including 7 prime ministers

and numerous cabinet ministers—as well as former King Idris and

members of the royal family, were brought to trial on charges of

treason and corruption. Many, who like Idris lived in exile, were

tried in absentia. Although a large percentage of those charged were

acquitted, sentences of up to fifteen years in prison and heavy fines were imposed on others. Five death sentences, all but one of them

45
Libya: A Country Study

in absentia, were pronounced, among them, one against Idris. Fatima, the former queen, and Hasan ar Rida were sentenced to

five and three years in prison, respectively.

Meanwhile, Qadhafi and the RCC had disbanded the Sanusi

order and officially downgraded its historical role in achieving

Libya's independence. They attacked regional and tribal differ- ences as obstructions in the path of social advancement and Arab

unity, dismissing traditional leaders and drawing administrative

boundaries across tribal groupings. A broad-based political party,

the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), was created in 1971 and modeled

after Egypt's Arab Socialist Union. Its intent was to raise the

political consciousness of Libyans and to aid the RCC in formulating public policy through debate in open forums. All other politi- cal parties were proscribed. Trade unions were incorporated into

the ASU and strikes forbidden. The press, already subject to censorship, was officially conscripted in 1972 as an agent of the Revolution. Italians and what remained of the Jewish community were

expelled from the country and their property confiscated.

After the September coup, United States forces proceeded deliberately with the planned withdrawal from Wheelus Air Base under

the agreement made with the previous regime. The last of the

American contingent turned the facility over to the Libyans on June

11, 1970, a date thereafter celebrated in Libya as a national holiday. As relations with the United States steadily deteriorated,

Qadhafi forged close links with the Soviet Union and other East

European countries, all the while maintaining Libya's stance as a nonaligned country and opposing the spread of communism in

the Arab world. Libya's army—sharply increased from the 6,000-

man pre-Revolutionary force that had been trained and equipped

by the British—was armed with Soviet-built armor and missiles

(see Foreign Military Assistance, ch. 5). As months passed, Qadhafi, caught up in his apocalyptic visions

of revolutionary pan-Arabism and Islam locked in mortal struggle

with what he termed the encircling, demonic forces of reaction,

imperialism, and Zionism, increasingly devoted attention to inter- national rather than internal affairs. As a result, routine administrative tasks fell to MajorJallud, who in 1972 became prime minister

in place of Qadhafi. Two years later Jallud assumed Qadhafi 's remaining administrative and protocol duties to allow Qadhafi to devote his time to revolutionary theorizing. Qadhafi remained com- mander in chief of the armed forces and effective head of state. The foreign press speculated about an eclipse of his authority and

personality within the RCC, but Qadhafi soon dispelled such theories by his measures to restructure Libyan society.

46
Historical Setting

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

The remaking of Libyan society that Qadhafi envisioned and

to which he devoted his energies after the early 1970s formally began

in 1973 with a so-called Cultural or Popular Revolution. The revolution was designed to combat bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of

public interest and participation in the subnational governmental

system, and problems of national political coordination. In an

attempt to instill revolutionary fervor into his compatriots and to involve large numbers of them in political affairs, Qadhafi urged

them to challenge traditional authority and to take over and run government organs themselves. The instrument for doing this was

the "people's committee." Within a few months, such committees were found all across Libya. They were functionally and geographically based and eventually became responsible for local and

regional administration.

People's committees were established in such widely divergent

organizations as universities, private business firms, government

bureaucracies, and the broadcast media. Geographically based committees were formed at the governorate, municipal, and zone

(lowest) levels. Seats on the people's committees at the zone level were filled by direct popular election; members so elected could

then be selected for service at higher levels. By mid- 1973 estimates

of the number of people's committees ranged above 2,000.

In the scope of their administrative and regulatory tasks and the

method of their members' selection, the people's committees embodied the concept of direct democracy that Qadhafi propounded

in the first volume of The Green Book, which appeared in 1976. The

same concept lay behind proposals to create a new political struc- ture composed of "people's congresses." The centerpiece of the

new system was the General People's Congress (GPC—see Glossary), a national representative body intended to replace the RCC.

The new political order took shape in March 1977 when the GPC,

at Qadhafi's behest, adopted the "Declaration of the Establishment

of the People's Authority" and proclaimed the Socialist People's

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The termjamahiriya is difficult to translate, but American scholar Lisa Anderson has suggested "peopledom" or "state of the masses" as a reasonable approximation of

Qadhafi 's concept that the people should govern themselves free of any constraints, especially those of the modern bureaucratic state. The GPC also adopted resolutions designating Qadhafi as its general

secretary and creating the General Secretariat of the GPC , comprising the remaining members of the defunct RCC. It also appointed the General People's Committee, which replaced the

47
Libya: A Country Study

Council of Ministers, its members now called secretaries rather than

ministers.

All legislative and executive authority was vested in the GPC.

This body, however, delegated most of its important authority to

its general secretary and General Secretariat and to the General

People's Committee. Qadhafi, as general secretary of the GPC,

remained the primary decision maker, just as he had been when

chairman of the RCC. In turn, all adults had the right and duty

to participate in the deliberations of their local Basic People's Congress (BPC), whose decisions were passed up to the GPC for consideration and implementation as national policy. The BPCs were

in theory the repository of ultimate political authority and decision making, being the embodiment of what Qadhafi termed direct

"people's power." The 1977 declaration and its accompanying reso- lutions amounted to a fundamental revision of the 1969 constitutional proclamation, especially with respect to the structure and

organization of the government at both national and subnational

levels. Continuing to revamp Libya's political and administrative struc- ture, Qadhafi introduced yet another element into the body politic.

Beginning in 1977, "revolutionary committees" (see Glossary) were

organized and assigned the task of "absolute revolutionary supervision of people's power"; that is, they were to guide the people's

committees, raise the general level of political consciousness and

devotion to revolutionary ideals, and guard against deviation and

opposition in the BPCs. Filled with politically astute zealots, the

ubiquitous revolutionary committees in 1979 assumed control of

BPC elections. Although they were not official government organs,

the revolutionary committees became another mainstay of the

domestic political scene. As with the people's committees and other

administrative innovations since the Revolution, the revolutionary committees fit the pattern of imposing a new element on the

existing subnational system of government rather than eliminating or consolidating already existing structures. By the late 1970s,

the result was an unnecessarily complex system of overlapping jurisdictions in which cooperation and coordination among different

elements were compromised by ill-defined grants of authority and

responsibility.

The changes in Libyan leadership since 1976 culminated in

March 1979, when the GPC declared that the "vesting of power

in the masses" and the "separation of the state from the revolution" were complete. Qadhafi relinquished his duties as general

secretary of the GPC, being known thereafter as "the leader" or "Leader of the Revolution." He remained supreme commander

48
Historical Setting

of the armed forces. His replacement was Abdallah Ubaydi, who

in effect had been prime minister since 1976. The RCC was for- mally dissolved and the government was again reorganized into

people's committees. A new General People's Committee (cabinet) was selected, each of its "secretaries" becoming head of a

specialized people's committee; the exceptions were the "secretariats" of petroleum, foreign affairs, and heavy industry, where

there were no people's committees. A proposal was also made to establish a "people's army" by substituting a national militia, being

formed in the late 1970s, for the national army. Although the idea

surfaced again in early 1982, it did not appear to be close to implementation (see Conscription and the People's Militia, ch. 5). Remaking of the economy was parallel with the attempt to remold

political and social institutions. Until the late 1970s, Libya's econ- omy was mixed, with a large role for private enterprise except in the fields of oil production and distribution, banking, and insur- ance. But according to volume two of Qadhafi' s The Green Book, which

appeared in 1978, private retail trade, rent, and wages were forms

of "exploitation" that should be abolished. Instead, workers' self- management committees and profit participation partnerships were

to function in public and private enterprises. A property law was

passed that forbade ownership of more than one private dwelling,

and Libyan workers took control of a large number of companies,

turning them into state-run enterprises. Retail and wholesale trading operations were replaced by state-owned "people's supermarkets," where Libyans in theory could purchase whatever they needed

at low prices (see Role of the Government, ch. 3). By 1981 the state had also restricted access to individual bank accounts to draw upon

privately held funds for government projects.

While measures such as these undoubtedly benefited poorer

Libyans, they created resentment and opposition among the newly

dispossessed. The latter joined those already alienated, some of

whom had begun to leave the country. By 1982 perhaps 50,000

to 100,000 Libyans had gone abroad; because many of the

emigrants were among the enterprising and better educated

Libyans, they represented a significant loss of managerial and technical expertise.

Some of the exiles formed active opposition groups. Although

the groups were generally ineffective, Qadhafi nevertheless in early

1979 warned opposition leaders to return home immediately or face "liquidation." A wave of assassinations of prominent Libyan exiles,

mostly in Western Europe, followed. Few opponents responded

to the 1979 call to "repentance" or to a similar one issued in

October 1982 in which Qadhafi once again threatened liquidation

49
Libya: A Country Study

of the recalcitrant, the GPC having already declared their personal

property forfeit. Internal opposition came from elements of the middle class who

opposed Qadhafi's economic reforms and from students and intel- lectuals who criticized his ideology. He also incurred the anger of

the Islamic community for his unorthodox interpretations of the

doctrine and traditions of Islam, his challenge to the authority of

the religious establishment, and his contention that the ideas in

The Green Book were compatible with and based upon Islam.

Endowed Islamic properties (habus—see Glossary) were nationalized as part of Qadhafi's economic reforms, and he urged "the

masses" to take over mosques.

The most serious challenges came from the armed forces, especially the officers' corps, and from the RCC. Perhaps the most

important one occurred in 1975 when Minister of Planning and

RCC member Major Umar Mihayshi and about thirty army

officers attempted a coup after disagreements over politico-economic

policies. The failure of the coup led to the flight of Mihayshi and

part of the country's technocratic elite. In a move that signaled a new intolerance of dissent, the regime executed twenty-two of

the accused army officers in 1977, the first such punishment in more

than twenty years. Further executions of dissident army officers were reported in 1979, and in August 1980 several hundred people were allegedly killed in the wake of an unsuccessful army revolt

centered in Tobruk.

Petroleum Politics

The economic base for Libya's Revolution has been its oil revenues. However, Libya's petroleum reserves were small compared with those of other major Arab petroleum-producing states. As a consequence, Libya was more ready to ration output in order

to conserve its natural wealth and less responsive to moderating

its price-rise demands than the other countries. Petroleum was seen both as a means of financing the economic and social development

of a woefully underdeveloped country and as a political weapon

to brandish in the Arab struggle against Israel. The increase in production that followed the 1969 Revolution was accompanied by Libyan demands for higher petroleum prices, a greater share of revenues, and more control over the development of the country's petroleum industry (see Hydrocarbons and

Mining, ch. 3). Foreign petroleum companies agreed to a price

hike of more than three times the going rate (from US$0.90 to US$3.45 per barrel) early in 1971 . In December the Libyan government suddenly nationalized the holdings of British Petroleum in

50
Historical Setting

Libya and withdrew funds amounting to approximately US$550

million invested in British banks as a result of a foreign policy dis- pute. British Petroleum rejected as inadequate a Libyan offer of

compensation, and the British treasury banned Libya from participation in the sterling area. In 1973 the Libyan government an- nounced the nationalization of a controlling interest in all other

petroleum companies operating in the country. This step gave Libya

control of about 60 percent of its domestic oil production by early

1974, a figure that subsequently rose to 70 percent. Total nationalization was out of the question, given the need for foreign expertise and funds in oil exploration, production, and distribution.

Insisting on the continued use of petroleum as leverage against

Israel and its supporters in the West, Libya strongly supported for- mation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) in 1973, and Libyan militancy was partially responsible

for OPEC measures to raise oil prices, impose embargoes, and gain

control of production. As a consequence of such policies, Libya's

oil production declined by half between 1970 and 1974, while revenues from oil exports more than quadrupled. Production con- tinued to fall, bottoming out at an eleven-year low in 1975 at a time when the government was preparing to invest large amounts

of petroleum revenues in other sectors of the economy. Thereafter,

output stabilized at about 2 million barrels per day. Production

and hence income declined yet again in the early 1980s because

of the high price of Libyan crude and because recession in the industrialized world reduced demand for oil from all sources. Libya's Five-Year Economic and Social Transformation Plan

(1976-80), announced in 1975, was programmed to pump US$20

billion into the development of a broad range of economic activities that would continue to provide income after Libya's petroleum

reserves had been exhausted. Agriculture was slated to receive the

largest share of aid in an effort to make Libya self-sufficient in food

and to help keep the rural population on the land (see Agriculture,

ch. 3). Industry, of which there was little before the Revolution,

also received a significant amount of funding in the first development plan as well as in the second, launched in 1981 (see Industry, ch. 3). Libya continued to be plagued with a shortage of skilled labor,

which had to be imported along with a broad range of consumer

goods, both paid for with petroleum income. This same oil revenue, however, made possible a substantial improvement in the lives of

virtually all Libyans. During the 1970s, the government succeeded

in making major improvements in the general welfare of its citizens. By the 1980s Libyans enjoyed much improved housing and

51
Libya: A Country Study

education, comprehensive social welfare services, and general stan- dards of health that were among the highest in Africa (see Education; Health and Welfare, ch. 2). Libya and Arab Unity

Qadhafi became the foremost exponent of Arab unity in the

1970s. Although all Arab governments endorsed the idea in principle, most observed that conditions were not right for putting it into practice or that unity would come only at the end of a long

process of historical evolution. But Qadhafi rejected these views.

As he conceived it, Arab unity was not an ideal but a realistic goal.

He agreed that achieving Arab unity was a process that required

sequential and intermediate stages of development, but the challenge

he posed to other Arab leaders was that the process had to begin

somewhere. Qadhafi expressed his determination to make a contribution to the process and offered Libya as the leavening agent

(see Arab Relations, ch. 4). Throughout 1970 Qadhafi consulted with Egyptian and Sudanese

leaders about how to achieve some form of union. Nasser died in

September 1970, but Egyptian participation in the unity talks con- tinued under his successor, President Anwar as Sadat. It was the

young Qadhafi, however, who moved to assume Nasser's mantle

as the ideological leader of Arab nationalism.

At the request of Syria's new head of state, Lieutenant General

Hafiz al Assad, the unity talks were expanded to include Syria.

After further meetings, Qadhafi, Sadat, and Assad simultaneously announced in April 1971 the formation of a federation of Libya,

Egypt, and Syria. The three heads of state signed a draft constitution in August that was overwhelmingly approved in referenda in

all three countries. Sadat was named the first president of a council of heads of state that was to be the governing body for the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR), which came into existence on

paper on January 1 , 1972. Broad plans were drawn up to provide

for a full-fledged merger affecting the legal systems, laws, employment, armed forces, and foreign policies of all three countries.

Agreement on specific measures, however, eluded the FAR leaders, and the federation never progressed beyond making symbolic

gestures of unity, such as the adoption of a common flag.

For Qadhafi, the FAR was a step on the road to achieving his

ultimate goal: the comprehensive union of the "Arab Nation."

Although he remained the federation's most ardent backer, Qadhafi was never satisfied with the approach taken by his Egyptian

and Syrian partners toward what he termed the "battle plan" for confrontation with Israel. Nonetheless, he initiated talks with Sadat

52
Historical Setting

on full political union between Egypt and Libya, which would merge

the neighboring countries into a single state within the framework

of the FAR.

At first glance, the proposed merger seemed like the mating of

a whale with a minnow. Egypt's population was 34 million, Libya's

under 2 million. But Libya's annual per capita income was four- teen times that of Egypt. Its fiscal reserves in 1972 were estimated

at more than the equivalent of US$2.5 billion—at least ten times

the amount held by Egypt.

Sadat pledged support for the project at the conclusion of a conference with Qadhafi in August 1972. Soon, however, real obstacles to the merger arose, including the serious personal disagreement

that developed between the two leaders over a timetable for the

union. Qadhafi called for immediate unification, the framing of a constitution to follow; Sadat insisted on step-by-step integration

and thorough preparation of the instruments of union. During 1973

Qadhafi went so far as to offer to resign as Libyan head of state

if his departure would placate Sadat, whose enthusiasm for the

merger had waned conspicuously. Qadhafi also organized a "holy

march" on Cairo by an estimated 30,000 Libyans to demonstrate

Libyan support for the merger, but to no avail. The September

1, 1973, date that Sadat had set for final action to be taken on the

merger passed without notice in Cairo, hardly a surprising development because many Egyptians as well as Libyans had come to oppose the project. Opposition stemmed from the historical

antipathy between Egyptians and Libyans and such factors as the

incompatibility of the two political systems, with Egypt being considerably more democratic than Libya as well as more secular in

orientation.

Qadhafi envisioned the combination of Libya's wealth and

Egypt's manpower and military capacity as the key element for the success of the Arab struggle against Israel. For example, to fur- ther this success, Libyan aircraft were secretly transferred to the

Egyptian air force and subsequently saw action in the October 1973

War. It was that war with Israel, however, that proved to be the

watershed in relations between the two Arab states. The joint

Egyptian-Syrian operation came as a surprise to Qadhafi, who had

been excluded from its planning by Sadat and Assad. The Libyan

leader castigated his erstwhile FAR partners for wasting resources

in fighting a war for limited objectives, and he was appalled by

Sadat's agreement to a cease-fire after the successful Israeli counteroffensive. He accused the Egyptian leader of cowardice and of

purposely sabotaging the federation. In response, Sadat revealed

that he had intervened in 1973 to prevent a planned Libyan

53
Libya: A Country Study

submarine attack on the S.S. Queen Elizabeth II while the British

liner was carrying a Jewish tourist group in the Mediterranean.

Thereafter, relations between the two leaders degenerated into a

series of charges and countercharges that effectively ended any talk of merger.

In the mid-1970s, Qadhafi undertook a major armaments program paid for by the higher post-1973 oil revenues. He wished to play a major role in Middle East affairs based on military strength

and increasing uneasiness with Sadat's policies. To acquire sophisticated weapons, Qadhafi turned to the Soviet Union, with which

his relations grew closer as Sadat leaned more and more toward

a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli problem. Mutual suspicion

between Sadat and Qadhafi, plus Egyptian charges of Libyan subversion, led to a brief but sharp shooting war along their common

frontier in July 1977. Egyptian forces advanced a short distance

into Libya before Algerian mediation ended the fighting. The conflict occasioned the departure from Libya of thousands of Egyptians employed in the petroleum industry, agriculture, commerce,

education, and the bureaucracy, causing disruption of Libyan eco- nomic activities and public services.

The major break between Egypt and Libya came over Sadat's

journey to Jerusalem the following November and the conclusion

of a separate peace with Israel in September 1978. Not only were

diplomatic relations between Egypt and Libya broken, but Libya

played a leading role in organizing the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in December 1977. The front's members were Libya,

Syria, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South

Yemen), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), all of

whom bitterly opposed Sadat's peace initiatives. Qadhafi favored

the isolation of Egypt as punishment, because he adamantly re- jected a peaceful solution with Israel. He subsequently toned down

his more extreme rhetoric in the interest of forging unity among

Arab states in opposing the policies of President Sadat and his successor, Husni Mubarak.

Qadhafi 's quest for unity on his western border was similarly

fruitless. A proposed union with Tunisia in 1974 was immediately

repudiated by Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's president. This inci- dent, together with Tunisian accusations of Libyan subversion and

a quarrel over demarcation of the continental shelf with its oil fields,

thoroughly soured relations. Then in early 1980 a group of dis- gruntled Tunisians staged an abortive revolt at Gafsa in central

Tunisia, disguised as a cross-border attack from Algeria. Bourguiba

accused Qadhafi of engineering the incident and suspended diplomatic relations with Tripoli. Qadhafi denied involvement, but re- lations between Tripoli and Tunis remained at low ebb.

54
Historical Setting

Having failed to achieve union with Egypt and Tunisia, Qadhafi

turned once again to Syria. In September 1980, Assad agreed to yet another merger with Libya. This attempt at a unified state came

at a time when both countries were diplomatically isolated. As part

of the agreement, Libya undertook to pay a debt of US$1 billion

that Syria owed the Soviet Union for weapons.

Ironically, this successful union with Syria confounded Qadhafi 's pan-Arab ambitions. When war broke out between Iran and Iraq

in September 1980, Libya and Syria were the only Arab states to give unqualified support to non-Arab Iran. At the same time, the war brought a break in Libya's relations with Iraq and Saudi

Arabia. Yet another obstacle arose in December 1981 when Qadhafi

had to contend with the first of two airline hijackings carried out

by Lebanese Shias seeking information about their leader, Imam

Musa Sadr, who had disappeared while on a visit to Libya in 1978.

Both hijackings ended without release of or news about Musa Sadr,

whose disappearance badly tarnished Libya's image among Shias

in Lebanon, Iran, and elsewhere.

Libyan Ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa

Qadhafi' s approach to sub-Saharan Africa revolved around several basic concerns: the attempt to increase Libyan influence in

Muslim or partly Muslim states, promotion of Islamic unity, and

support, often uncritical, for African liberation movements. One

of Qadhafi' s frequently stated goals was the creation of a Saharan

Islamic state, but critics accused him of being more interested in

empire than in fostering and promoting Islam. The aforementioned

objectives governed his relations with African states, and nowhere more so than in neighboring Chad and Sudan.

Libya had been deeply involved in Chad since the early 1970s.

Reasons for this involvement included tribal and religious affinities between northern Chad and southern Libya and a contested

common border dating back to the colonial period. In 1973 Libya

occupied the Aouzou Strip. The territory, which allegedly contains

significant deposits of uranium and other minerals, gave the Libyans

a solid foothold in Chad. From his Aouzou Strip base Qadhafi also gave moral and material aid to northern dissidents in the prolonged

Chadian civil war. In the late 1970s, these dissidents were led by

Goukouni Oueddei, the leader of the Tebu (see Peoples of Libya,

ch. 2). After failure in the 1970s of mediation efforts in which Libya was deeply involved, Qadhafi provided equipment and troops to Goukouni that enabled him to capture N'Djamena, Chad's capital,

in December 1980. In January the two leaders called for a merger

55
Libya: A Country Study

of their countries, but the outcry among a number of West African

states and from France, the former Chadian colonial power, was

so great that the proposal was dropped. Even within Goukouni's

own forces, there was considerable opposition to Libya's presence

and tactics. Under persistent international pressure, Libya's esti- mated 10,000 to 15,000 troops withdrew to the Aouzou Strip in

November 1981. Opposition forces under Hissein Habre subsequently drove Goukouni back north, leaving Habre in control of

N'Djamena, from which he pressed unsuccessfully for Libya's withdrawal from Aouzou.

During the 1970s, relations between Libya and Sudan went from

bad to worse. At the beginning of the decade, Qadhafi aided

Sudanese President Jaafar an Numayri against leftist plotters. But

by the mid-1970s, relations had turned hostile after Numayri

accused Libya of subversion and of responsibility for several coup

attempts. Thereafter, Sudan belonged to the camp of Qadhafi 's sworn opponents. In 1980 Numayri condemned the Libyan invasion of Chad, being especially fearful of Libyan meddling in Sudan's

troubled border province of Darfur. In early 1981 , Numayri called

for Libya's expulsion from the Arab League and for a joint effort to overthrow or kill Qadhafi. A few months later, he ordered Libyan

diplomats to leave Khartoum in the wake of a bombing of the

Chadian embassy linked to Libyan instigation.

Libyan intervention in Uganda in the 1970s constituted a special case. There Qadhafi was interested less in unity than in bolstering a friendly Islamic regime against both internal and external

opposition. Beginning in 1972, Qadhafi gave financial and military backing to Idi Amin Dada in return for Amin's disavowal of

Uganda's previously close relationship with Israel. Thereafter,

Qadhafi continued to back Amin, despite the wide condemnation

of Amin's brutal rule. In late 1978 and early 1979, when combined

Tanzanian-Ugandan forces drove Amin from power, Qadhafi unsuccessfully airlifted troops and supplies in Amin's defense, and

he granted the Ugandan leader temporary asylum in Tripoli.

Relations with the United States and Western Europe

In the 1970s and early 1980s, Libya was widely suspected of

financing international terrorist activities and political subversion

around the world. Recruits from various national liberation movements reportedly received training in Libya, and Libyan financing of Palestinian activities against Israel was openly acknowledged.

There were also allegations of Libyan assistance to such diverse

groups as Lebanese leftists, the Irish Republican Army, Muslim

rebels in the Philippines, and left-wing extremists in Europe and

56
Historical Setting

Japan. Some observers thought support was more verbal than

material. However, in 1981 the GPC declared Libyan support of

national liberation movements a matter of principle, an act that

lent credence to charges of support for terrorism.

Support for international terrorism was a major issue in Libya's

relations with the United States and Western Europe. The United

States, in particular, viewed Libya's diplomatic and material support for what Tripoli called "liberation movements" as aid and

comfort to international terrorists. In general, after the early 1970s

relations between the two countries went from bad to worse, even

while the United States continued to import Libyan crude.

Qadhafi opposed United States diplomatic initiatives and military presence in the Middle East. As a protest against Washington's policies in Iran, the United States embassy in Tripoli was

stormed and burned in December 1979. In the late 1970s, Washington blocked delivery to Libya of equipment judged of potential mili- tary value and in May 1981 ordered Libyan diplomatic personnel

to leave the United States to prevent assassination of anti-Qadhafi

Libyan dissidents. The most serious incident occurred in August

1981 when United States jets shot down two Libyan jet fighters

during naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra (see Relations with

the United States and Western Europe, ch. 4). That same month,

Libya signed an economic and political agreement with Ethiopia

and South Yemen, the so-called Tripartite Agreement, aimed at countering Western, and primarily American, interests in the

Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. After a series ofjoint consultations, however, the pact became largely a dead letter. Libya's income from oil came from sales to Western Europe as well as to the United States, and to ensure a steady supply of oil most European nations tried to remain on reasonable terms with

their Libyan supplier. Some protests arose over the wave of politi- cal assassinations of Libyan exiles in Europe in 1980, but only Brit- ain with its independent supply of oil took a strong stand on the

issue. Qadhafi's call that same year for compensation from Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Italy for destruction of Libyan property in World War II brought no

response, even when the Libyan leader threatened to seize property

if adequate compensation were not negotiated.

By the early 1980s, Libya was a country embroiled in controversy. Libyan ventures in Chad and elsewhere in North Africa

and the Middle East had earned a good deal of opprobrium for Qadhafi, who often pursued his goal of Arab and Islamic unity

and extended Libyan influence at what seemed any price. Indeed,

suspicion if not hostility were the usual response to Qadhafi 's initiatives in the Arab and Western world.

57
Libya: A Country Study

Domestically, the government had attempted to ensure a more

equitable distribution of wealth, a step that pleased many but by

no means all of its citizens. A new political system with new insti- tutions was also in place with the aim of involving as many citizens as possible in governing themselves. But overlapping jurisdictions

and responsibilities had led to confusion, and there were questions

as to the viability of the committee system of government. A siza- ble number of Libyans seemed uninterested in political participation, while others had gone into opposition, active or passive, at home and abroad. The country's oil revenues had been channeled

into agricultural and industrial projects that the regime hoped would

provide employment and lessen dependence upon imports and for- eign labor. Even in these areas, the results were less promising than

had been expected, and falling oil prices diminished the financial resources that could be devoted to continued economic and for- eign policy initiatives. The decline in oil revenues and consequent economic slowdown,

the continued reliance upon non-Libyan expertise, and the generally unfavorable state of foreign relations and persistent dissidence

in the military and society at large posed grave problems for the

Qadhafi regime in the early 1980s.

* * * Two of the best English-language sources on Libya are John

Wright's Libya, which covers Libyan history prior to the 1969 Revolution, and his Libya: A Modern History, devoted to the course of

the Revolution during the 1970s. Jamil M. Abu-Nasr's detailed

A History of the Maghrib views Libya in the larger context of regional

history but carries the narrative only up to 1951. The various works

of the archaeologist Richard G. Goodchild are of primary importance for the study of Libya in antiquity. Kathleen Freeman utilizes both fable and fact in her delightful and informative historical

essay on Cyrene in Greek City-States. For a treatment of the late medieval period, see Robert Brunschvig's La Berberie orientate sous

les Hajsides. Much material of value for an understanding of the

early Ottoman period in North Africa is found in Fernand Braudel's

classic The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age ofPhilip

II. Seton Dearden's A Nest of Corsairs is the well-documented but

fast-moving story of the Karamanli dynasty. Few works on modern

Libya compare in scholarly significance to Edward EvansPritchard's monograph The Sanusi of Cyrenaica. Claudio G. Segre's

Fourth Shore studies the colonial period from an Italian vantage point

and submits findings that call for a reassessment of the demographic

58
Historical Setting

colonization of Libya. Several of the essays in E. G. H. Joffe and

K. S. McLachlan, Social and Economic Development of Libya, cover important aspects of Libya in the present century. Lisa Anderson

examines the mistrust of the modern bureaucratic state that is so peculiarly Libyan and that characterizes Qadhafi's political

philosophy in The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya,

1830-1980. Richard B. Parker's North Africa offers an incisive over- view of contemporary Libya that emphasizes Qadhafi's role in determining state policies. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

59

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
A young Berber woman
LIBYAN SOCIETY IN the late 1980s was in a state of transition

from one set of structures and values to another. For nearly two

decades the country's leader, Muammar al Qadhafl, had sought

to transform Libya from an underdeveloped backwater into a modern socialist state compatible with the dictates of the Quran

and the heritage of Islam. The regime's policies and goals often

aroused controversy as the country moved away from the LibyanArab mold of the past in which heredity and patronage determined

social distinction and toward the new egalitarian society that was

the Qadhafi regime's ideal. The changes the society was undergoing were made possible in

large measure by petroleum wealth, which had converted the country from one of the world's poorest at the time of independence

in 1951 to one of the most prosperous. By the 1980s, most Libyans

enjoyed educational opportunities, health care, and housing that were among the best in Africa and the Middle East. Responsibility

for the care of the old and the needy had been largely shifted from

the extended family to a comprehensive system of social security.

Education and medical care were free, and when necessary the state subsidized housing and other necessities. Life expectancy, perhaps

the ultimate measure of living standards, had lengthened by ten years since 1960, and social mobility was much improved.

In 1984 the population reached 3.6 million and was growing at about 4 percent a year, one of the highest rates in the world. Unlike

its neighbors, the Libyan government welcomed this rate of growth,

which it hoped would eventually remedy the country's shortage

of labor. The population was overwhelmingly concentrated along

the Mediterranean coast, much of it around Benghazi and Tripoli.

Villagers and rural tribe members continued to migrate to cities and towns, seeking better-paying jobs in industry or in the service sector of the modern economy. The number of jobs far exceeded

the number of qualified Libyans; consequently, the population

included at least 260,000 expatriate workers who were essential for the functioning of the economy.

Roughly one-half of the population was under the age of fifteen. The prospects for future employment and a fruitful life were such

that Libyan youth for the most part were not the discontented lot found elsewhere in North Africa.

The status of women continued to undergo modification at the

behest of the Revolution's leaders. Especially in urban areas, women

63
Libya: A Country Study

in ever- greater numbers were entering schools and universities and

finding employment in professions newly opened to them. Although

tradition remained quite strong, the role of women was in the midst

of what was for Libya a remarkable transformation.

In spite of the gains of the Revolution, however, Libyan society was deeply divided. Little sense of national unity, identity, or purpose had developed, and the old ethnic and geographic divisions

among Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania were still very evident.

Alienation from the Qadhafi regime and its policies was widespread, a sentiment reinforced by shortages of consumer goods and by persistent exhortations to participate in governing the country. Whole

segments of the populace were so disaffected that they either did

not participate or did so only minimally, retreating into apathy

and private matters. Qadhafi 's campaign to discredit Islamic

authorities and creeds and to enlist young women in the armed

forces similarly offended Libyan sensitivities. Most foreign observers believed that the regime faced a difficult task in convincing the majority of Libyans of the need for further

social change. In the 1980s, Libyan society remained profoundly

conservative and resistant to the impulses for change that emanated

from its leaders. The wisdom of current social policies was being

questioned, and it was obvious that many Libyans were not enthusiastic about the course of action that the Revolutionary government had laid out. Geography

Regions

With an area of 1,760,000 square kilometers and a Mediterra- nean coastline of nearly 1,800 kilometers, Libya is fourth in size among the countries of Africa and fifteenth among the countries

of the world. Although the oil discoveries of the 1960s have brought

it immense petroleum wealth, at the time of its independence it was an extremely poor desert state whose only important physical

asset appeared to be its strategic location at the midpoint of Africa's

northern rim. It lay within easy reach of the major European nations

and linked the Arab countries of North Africa with those of the

Middle East, facts that throughout history had made its urban

centers bustling crossroads rather than isolated backwaters without

external social influences. Consequently, an immense social gap

developed between the cities, cosmopolitan and peopled largely by

foreigners, and the desert hinterland, where tribal chieftains ruled

in isolation and where social change was minimal.

64
The Society and Its Environment

The Mediterranean coast and the Sahara Desert are the country's most prominent natural features (see fig. 4). There are several

highlands but no true mountain ranges except in the largely empty

southern desert near the Chadian border, where the Tibesti Massif

rises to over 2,200 meters. A relatively narrow coastal strip and

highland steppes immediately south of it are the most productive

agricultural regions. Still farther south, a pastoral zone of sparse

grassland gives way to the vast Sahara Desert, a barren wasteland

of rocky plateaus and sand. It supports minimal human habitation, and agriculture is possible only in a few scattered oases. Between the productive lowland agricultural zones lies the Gulf

of Sidra, where along the coast a stretch of 500 kilometers of

wasteland desert extends northward to the sea. This barren zone, known as the Sirtica, has great historical significance. To its west,

the area known as Tripolitania has characteristics and a history

similar to those of nearby Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. It is considered with these states to constitute a supranational region called

the Maghrib (see Glossary). To the east, the area known histori- cally as Cyrenaica has been closely associated with the Arab states of the Middle East. In this sense, the Sirtica marks the dividing

point between the Maghrib and the Mashriq (see Glossary).

Along the shore of Tripolitania for more than 300 kilometers,

coastal oases alternate with sandy areas and lagoons. Inland from

these lies the Jifarah Plain, a triangular area of some 15,000 square

kilometers. About 120 kilometers inland the plain terminates in an escarpment that rises to form the Jabal (mountain) Nafusah,

a plateau with elevations of up to 1,000 meters. In Cyrenaica there are fewer coastal oases, and the Marj Plain

the lowland area corresponding to the Jifarah Plain of Tripolitania

covers a much smaller area. The lowlands form a crescent about

210 kilometers long between Benghazi and Darnah and extend

inland a maximum of 50 kilometers. Elsewhere along the Cyrenai- can coast, the precipice of an arid plateau reaches to the sea. Behind

the Marj Plain, the terrain rises abruptly to form Jabal al Akhdar

(Green Mountain), so called because of its leafy cover of pine,

juniper, cypress, and wild olive. It is a limestone plateau with maximum altitudes of about 900 meters. From Jabal al Akhdar,

Cyrenaica extends southward across a barren grazing belt that gives

way to the Sahara Desert, which extends still farther southwest

across the Chad frontier. Unlike Cyrenaica, Tripolitania does not

extend southward into the desert. The southwestern desert, known

as Fezzan, was administered separately during both the Italian

regime and the federal period of the Libyan monarchy. In 1969

the Revolutionary government officially changed the regional

65
Libya: A Country Study

-32

28

ALGERIA

-24

International boundary

|r \c* : r a :cpita Oasis

5C OC '50 200 Kilometers 200 Miles

Figure 4. Physical Features

66
The Society and Its Environment

20 24 Mediterranean

Sea

Gu/f of S/dro

A,

CHAD

pjH [Gulf of Bumbah

Al Jaghb

\

(

ub (

r

Tazirbu

Rahyanah

Sand Sea

NQ V

20

Al Kufrah

JABAL AL V"

UWAYNAfl

28

32-

28-

EGYPT

24-

SUDAN

20-

i

Boundary representation

not necessarily authoritative

67
Libya: A Country Study

designation of Tripolitania to Western Libya, of Cyrenaica to Eastern Libya, and of Fezzan to Southern Libya; however, the old names were intimately associated with the history of the area, and

during the 1970s they continued to be used frequently. Cyrenaica

comprises 51 percent, Fezzan 33 percent, and Tripolitania 16 per- cent of the country's area. Before Libya achieved independence, its name was seldom used

other than as a somewhat imprecise geographical expression. The

people preferred to be referred to as natives of one of the three constituent regions. The separateness of the regions is much more than

simply geographical and political, for they have evolved largely as

different socioeconomic entities—each with a culture, social struc- ture, and values different from the others. Cyrenaica became

Arabized at a somewhat earlier date than Tripolitania, and beduin

tribes dominated it. The residual strain of the indigenous Berber

inhabitants, however, still remains in Tripolitania. Fezzan has

remained a kind of North African outback, its oases peopled largely

by minority ethnic groups.

The border between Tripolitania and Tunisia is subject to countless crossings by legal and illegal migrants. No natural frontier

marks the border, and the ethnic composition, language, value sys- tems, and traditions of the two peoples are nearly identical. The

Cyrenaica region is contiguous with Egypt, and here, too, the

border is not naturally defined; illegal as well as legal crossings are frequent. In contrast, Fezzan 's borders with Algeria, Niger, and

Chad are seldom crossed because of the almost total emptiness of

the desert countryside.

Other factors, too, such as the traditional forms of land tenure,

have varied in the different regions. In the 1980s their degree of

separateness was still sufficiently pronounced to represent a significant obstacle to efforts toward achieving a fully unified Libya.

Climate and Hydrology

Within Libya as many as five different climatic zones have been

recognized, but the dominant climatic influences are Mediterra- nean and Saharan. In most of the coastal lowland, the climate is Mediterranean, with warm summers and mild winters. Rainfall

is scanty, and the dry climate results in a year-round 98-percent

visibility. The weather is cooler in the highlands, and frosts occur

at maximum elevations. In the desert interior the climate has very

hot summers and extreme diurnal temperature ranges.

Less than 2 percent of the national territory receives enough rainfall for settled agriculture, the heaviest precipitation occurring in

the Jabal al Akhdar zone of Cyrenaica, where annual rainfall of

68
The Society and Its Environment

400 to 600 millimeters is recorded. All other areas of the country

receive less than 400 millimeters, and in the Sahara 50 millimeters or less occurs. Rainfall is often erratic, and a pronounced drought

may extend over two seasons. For example, epic floods in 1945

left Tripoli under water for several days, but two years later an

unprecedentedly severe drought caused the loss of thousands of head

of cattle. Deficiency in rainfall is reflected in an absence of permanent

rivers or streams, and the approximately twenty perennial lakes are brackish or salty. In the 1980s, these circumstances severely

limited the country's agricultural potential as a basis for the sound

and varied economy Qadhafi sought to establish. The allocation

of limited water is considered of sufficient importance to warrant

the existence of the Secretariat of Dams and Water Resources, and

damaging a source of water can be penalized by a heavy fine or imprisonment.

The government has constructed a network of dams in wadis,

dry watercourses that become torrents after heavy rains. These dams

are used both as water reservoirs and for flood and erosion control. The wadis are heavily settled because soil in their bottoms

is often suitable for agriculture, and the high water table in their

vicinity makes them logical locations for digging wells. In many

wadis, however, the water table is declining at an alarming rate, particularly in areas of intensive agriculture and near urban centers. The government has expressed concern over this problem and

because of it has diverted water development projects, particularly

around Tripoli, to localities where the demand on underground

water resources is less intense. It has also undertaken extensive

reforestation projects (see Fishing and Forestry, ch. 3). There are also numerous springs, those best suited for future

development occurring along the scarp faces of the Jabal Nafusah

and the Jabal al Akhdar. The most talked-about of the water

resources, however, are the great subterranean aquifers of the

desert. The best known of these lies beneath Al Kufrah Oasis in

southeastern Cyrenaica, but an aquifer with even greater reputed

capacity is located near the oasis community of Sabha in the southwestern desert. In the late 1970s, wells were drilled at Al Kufrah

and at Sabha as part of a major agricultural development effort. An even larger undertaking is the so-called Great Man-Made River,

initiated in 1984 (see Land Use and Irrigation, ch. 3). It is intended

to tap the tremendous aquifers of the Al Kufrah, Sarir, and Sabha

oases and to carry the resulting water to the Mediterranean coast

for use in irrigation and industrial projects.

69
Libya: A Country Study

Population

As of 1987, the most recent census was that taken in July 1984,

but the only available data showed a provisional population figure

of 3.637 million inhabitants—one of the smallest totals on the Afri- can continent. Of these, an estimated 1.950 million were men, and

1.687 million women. Having slightly more men than women in

the population was characteristic of developing countries such as Libya where health practices and sanitation were fast improving

but where female mortality relating to childbirth and favoritism

toward male over female children caused a slight skewing of the

population profile. In addition, underreporting of females is fairly

common in many Muslim societies. The 1984 population total was an increase from the 2.29 million reported in 1973 and 1.54 million in 1964. Included in the census were at least 260,000 expatriate workers, but the total number of foreigners in Libya in 1984 was unavailable. This uncertainty was in keeping with a general lack of reliable, current, social

statistics for Libya in the 1980s, in marked contrast with the situation a decade earlier. The population was exceptionally young and was growing at a

rapid pace. Estimates placed those under the age of fifteen at up

to half the total population. Based on results of the 1984 census,

the United Nations (UN) placed the annual rate of increase for

the 1980-84 period at an extremely high 4.5 percent, but the Central Bank of Libya placed the figure at 3.9 percent annually for

nationals only. Official sources put the average annual growth rate

for the 1970-86 period at 4 percent, a figure that agreed with World

Bank (see Glossary) data; the bank projected that this rate would

prevail until the year 2000, when Libya's population would total 6 million.

This high rate of population increase reflected an official policy

of fostering rapid growth to meet labor needs and to fuel economic

development. It was also well above comparable rates in other

Maghribi states, which had instituted family planning programs

to contain their burgeoning numbers. Libya had no such national

program. On the contrary, the government offered incentives to encourage births and had improved health facilities to ensure infant

survivability. Libyan population policy thus emphasized growth

over restraint, large families over small ones, and an ever-expanding

population—luxuries Libya felt it could afford, given the vastness of its wealth in petroleum and area. According to UN estimates for the years 1980-85, life expectancy was fifty-six years for men and fifty-nine years for women,

a gain of more than ten years for each sex since 1960. The crude

70
The Society and Its Environment

birth rate was 46 per 1,000, down 7 percent since 1965, while the

crude death rate was 11 per 1,000, a decline of 40 percent over

20 years. The infant mortality rate had similarly declined from 140

deaths per 1,000 in 1965 to 92 in 1985, still high by Western stan- dards but not by those of North Africa.

The population was by no means distributed evenly across the

country. About 65 percent resided in Tripolitania, 30 percent in

Cyrenaica, and 5 percent in Fezzan, a breakdown that had not

changed appreciably for at least 30 years. Within the two north- ern geographic regions, the population was overwhelmingly concentrated along the Mediterranean littoral. Along the coast, the

density was estimated at more than fifty inhabitants per square

kilometer, whereas it fell to less than one per square kilometer in

the interior. The average for the country as a whole was usually

placed at two. In the 1980s, Libya was still predominantly a rural country, even though a large percentage of its people were concentrated in the

cities and nearby intensively cultivated agricultural zones of the

coastal plains. Under the impact of heavy and sustained country- to-town migration, the urban sector continued to grow rapidly, aver- aging 8 percent annually in the early 1980s. Reliable assessments

held the country to be about 40 percent urban as compared with

a 1964 figure of 27 percent. Some sources, such as the World Bank,

placed the rate of urbanization at more than 60 percent, but this figure was probably based on 1973 census data that reflected a radical change in the definition of urban population rather than an

unprecedented surge of rural inhabitants into cities and towns. In

spite of sizable internal migration into urban centers, particularly

Benghazi and Tripoli, Libya remained less urbanized than almost

any other Arab country. The government was concerned about

this continual drain from the countryside. Since the late 1970s, it had sponsored a number of farming schemes in the desert, designed

in part to encourage rural families to remain on the land rather

than to migrate to more densely populated areas. In the early 1980s, the urban concentrations of Tripoli and Benghazi dominated the country. These two cities and the neighboring coastal regions contained more than 90 percent of Libya's

population and nearly all of its urban centers, but they occupied

less than 10 percent of the land area. Several factors accounted for their dominance, such as higher rates of fertility, declining death

rates because of improved health and sanitation measures, and longterm internal migration.

As the capital of the country, Tripoli was the larger and more

important of the two cities. Greater Tripoli was composed of six

71
Libya: A Country Study

municipalities that stretched nearly 100 kilometers along the coast and about 50 inland. At the heart of this urban complex was the

city of Tripoli, the 1984 population of which was 990,000 and which

contained several distinct zones. The medina was the oldest quarter,

many of its buildings dating to the Ottoman era (see Ottoman

Regency, ch. 1). Here a traditionally structured Islamic society

composed of artisans, religious scholars and leaders, shopkeepers,

and merchants had survived into the mid-twentieth century. The

manufacture of traditional handicrafts, such as carpets, leather

goods, copper ware, and pottery, was centered in the medina.

The Italian city, constructed between 1911 and 1951 beyond the

medina, was designed for commercial and administrative purposes.

It featured wide avenues, piazzas, multistoried buildings, parks,

and residential areas where Italian colonials once lived. The Libyanbuilt modern sector reflected the needs of government, the impact

of large-scale internal migration, new industrialization, and oil income. Independence brought rapid rural-to-urban migration as a result of employment opportunities in construction, transportation, and municipal services, especially after the discovery of oil. This period also brought new government facilities, apartment

buildings, and the first public housing projects as well as such

industries as food-processing, textiles, and oil refining.

Metropolitan Tripoli sprawled in an arc around the harbor and

medina. In addition to its political, commercial, and residential struc- tures and functions, the city was a seat of learning and scholarship

centered in religious seminaries, technical colleges, and a university (see Education, this ch.). Planners hoped to channel future

growth east and west along the coast and to promote expansion

of surrounding towns in an effort to reduce urban density and to preserve contiguous agricultural zones. They also envisaged revitali- zation of the medina as they strove to preserve the city's architectural and cultural heritage in the midst of twentieth-century

urbanization.

As a consequence of its small population and work force, Libya

has had to import a large number of foreign workers. Expatriate

workers, most of them from nearby Arab countries, flowed into

Libya after the discovery of oil. There were about 17,000 of them

in 1964, but the total had risen to 64,000 by 1971 and to 223,000

in 1975, when foreign workers made up almost 33 percent of the

labor force. The official number of foreign workers in Libya in 1980 was 280,000, but private researchers argued persuasively that the true number was more than 500,000 because of underreporting

and illegal entry.

72
The Society and Its Environment

The most acute demand was for managerial and professional personnel. A large percentage of the expatriates were unskilled laborers,

who were widely distributed throughout the economy. On paper,

there was ample legislation to ensure that foreigners were given

employment only where qualified Libyans could not be found. But

the demand for labor of all kinds was such that the availability of

aliens made it possible for Libyans to select the choice positions

for themselves and leave the less desirable ones to foreigners.

In 1980 nonnationals were found mainly in construction work,

where they numbered almost 130,000 or 46 percent of those

employed in that industry, according to official statistics. Their

numbers in such work were expected to decline after the mid-1980s,

at the same time that ever-larger numbers of foreigners were

expected to fill jobs in manufacturing, where they constituted more

than 8 percent of the 1980 labor force. Significant numbers of

expatriates were found in agriculture (8 percent) and education (10

percent) as well. Few were employed in the petroleum sector,

however, only 3,000 or 1 percent of all foreign workers in 1980.

In 1983 there were more than 560,000 foreigners resident in

Libya, about 18 percent of the total population, according to the

Secretariat of Planning. By far the most numerous were Egyptians

(174,000) and Tunisians (73,600); the largest Western groups were

Italians (14,900) and British (10,700). During 1984, however, a

large portion of the foreign work force departed as a result of restric- tions on repatriation of earnings. In 1985, for reasons that appeared more political than economic, Libya expelled tens of thousands of

workers, including 20,000 Egyptians, 32,000 Tunisians, and several thousand from Mali and Niger. This exodus continued the following

year when some 25,000 Moroccans were forced to depart.

The number of resident foreigners thus declined drastically in

the mid-1980s. The exact dimensions of the decline as well as its impact upon the country, however, remained unclear. Minimum

estimates of the number of nonnationals still in Libya in 1987 ranged

upward of 200,000, a reasonable figure given Libya's dependence

upon imported labor for essential skills and services.

Ethnic Groups and Languages

Peoples of Libya

The present population of Libya is composed of several distinct

groups. By far the majority identify themselves as Arabs. Arab

invaders brought Arabic language and culture to Libya between

the seventh to the eleventh centuries, but intermarriage with Berbers

and other indigenous peoples over the centuries has produced so

73
Libya: A Country Study

mixed a strain that few Libyans can substantiate claims to pure

or even predominantly Arab ancestry. These Arabic-speaking Muslims of mixed Arab and Berber ancestry make up 90 percent of

the country's population. Berbers, other indigenous minority peoples, and black Africans make up most of the remainder, although

small scattered groups of Greeks, Muslim Cretans, Maltese, and

Armenians make up long-established communities in urban areas. Arabs

The successive waves of Arabs who arrived beginning in the

seventh century imposed Islam and the Arabic language along with

their political domination. Conversion to Islam was largely complete by 1300, but Arabic replaced the indigenous Berber dialects

more slowly. Initially, many Berbers fled into the desert, resisting

Islam and viewing it as a urban religion. In the eleventh century,

however, tribes of the beduin Bani (see Glossary) Hilal and Bani

Salim invaded first Cyrenaica and later Tripolitania and were generally effective in imposing their Islamic faith and nomadic way of

life. This beduin influx disrupted existing settlements and living

patterns; in many areas tribal life and organization were introduced

or strengthened. A further influx of Arabic-speaking peoples

occurred in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as a result of the upheavals accompanying the fall to the Christians of the last Muslim kingdom in Spain.

It is estimated that the total number of Arabs who arrived in North

Africa during the first two migrations did not exceed 700,000 and

that in the twelfth-century population of 6 or 7 million they constituted less than 10 percent of the total. Arab blood later received some reinforcement from Spain, but throughout North Africa Berber

background heavily outweighed Arab origin. Arabization of the

Berbers advanced more rapidly and completely in Libya than else- where in the Maghrib and by the mid-twentieth century relatively

few Berber speakers remained. By contrast, in Morocco and Algeria,

and to a lesser extent in Tunisia, Berbers who had yet to become

Arabized continued to form substantial ethnic minorities.

In the countryside traditional Arab life, including customary

dress, was still predominant at the time of Libyan independence

in 1951 . The subsequent discovery of petroleum and the new wealth

that resulted, the continuing urban migration, and the sometimes

extreme social changes of the Revolutionary era, however, have

made progressive inroads in traditional ways. For example, in the

cities, already to some extent Europeanized at the time of the Revolution in 1969, men and some younger women frequently wore Western clothing, but older women still dressed in the customary manner.

74
The Society and Its Environment

Among the beduin tribes of the desert, seasonal shifts to new

grazing lands in pursuit of rainfall and grass growth remained

widespread. Some tribes were seminomadic, following their herds

in summer but living in settled communities during the winter.

Most of the rural population was sedentary, living in nuclear farm

villages. But often the nomadic and the sedentary were mixed, some members of a clan or family residing in a village while younger

members of the same group followed their flocks on a seasonal basis. The distinction between individual tribes was at least as signifi- cant as the distinction between Arab and non-Arab. Tracing their

descent to ascribed common ancestors, various tribal groups have

formed kinship and quasi-political units bound by loyalties that

override all others. Although tribal ties remained important in some

areas, the Revolutionary government had taken various measures

to discourage the nomadic way of life that was basic to tribal exis- tence, and by the 1980s it appeared that tribal life was fast becoming a thing of the past.

Arab influence permeates the culture, among both the common

people and the social, political, economic, and intellectual elite. The cultural impact of the Italian colonial regime was superficial,

and Libya—unlike other North African countries, with their legacy

of French cultural domination—suffered no conflict of cultural identity. As a rule, those few Libyans achieving higher education obtained it not in Europe but in neighboring Arab countries.

Berbers

Part of what was once the dominant ethnic group throughout

North Africa, the Berbers of Libya today live principally in remote

mountain areas or in desert localities where successive waves of

Arab migration failed to reach or to which they retreated to escape

the invaders (see fig. 5). In the 1980s Berbers, or native speakers

of Berber dialects, constituted about 5 percent, or 135,000, of the

total population, although a substantially larger proportion is bilin- gual in Arabic and Berber. Berber place-names are still common

in some areas where Berber is no longer spoken. The language sur- vives most notably in the Jabal Nafusah highlands of Tripolitania

and in the Cyrenaican town of Awjilah. In the latter, the customs

of seclusion and concealment of women have been largely responsible for the persistence of the Berber tongue. Because it is used

largely in public life, most men have acquired Arabic, but it has

become a functional language for only a handful of modernized

young women.

By and large, cultural and linguistic, rather than physical,

distinctions separate Berber from Arab. The touchstone of

75
Libya: A Country Study

I 1 Uninhabited

Figure 5. Ethnic Groups

Berberhood is the use of the Berber language. A continuum of

related but not always mutually intelligible dialects, Berber is a member of the Afro-Asiatic language family. It is distantly related

to Arabic, but unlike Arabic it has not developed a written form

and as a consequence has no written literature.

Unlike the Arabs, who see themselves as a single nation, Berbers

do not conceive of a united Berberdom and have no name for themselves as a people. The name Berber has been attributed to them

by outsiders and is thought to derive from barbari, the term the

ancient Romans applied to them. Berbers identify with their families, clans, and tribe. Only when dealing with outsiders do they

identify with other groupings such as the Tuareg. Traditionally,

Berbers recognized private property, and the poor often worked

the lands of the rich. Otherwise, they were remarkably egalitarian.

76
The Society and Its Environment

A majority of the surviving Berbers belong to the Khariji sect of

Islam, which emphasizes the equality of believers to a greater extent than does the Maliki rite of Sunni Islam, which is followed by the

Arab population (see Religious Life, this ch.). A young Berber

sometimes visits Tunisia or Algeria to find a Khariji bride when

none is available in his own community.

Most of the remaining Berbers live in Tripolitania, and many

Arabs of the region still show traces of their mixed Berber ancestry. Their dwellings are clustered in groups made up of related families; households consist of nuclear families, however, and the land

is individually held. Berber enclaves also are scattered along the

coast and in a few desert oases. The traditional Berber economy

has struck a balance between farming and pastoralism, the majority

of the village or tribe remaining in one place throughout the year

while a minority accompanies the flock on its circuit of seasonal

pastures.

Berbers and Arabs in Libya live together in general amicability,

but quarrels between the two peoples occasionally erupted until recent times. A short-lived Berber state existed in Cyrenaica during 1911 and 1912. Elsewhere in the Maghrib during the 1980s,

substantial Berber minorities continued to play important economic

and political roles. In Libya their number was too small for them

to enjoy corresponding distinction as a group. Berber leaders, however, were in the forefront of the independence movement in

Tripolitania.

Tuareg

About 10,000 Tuareg nomads live scattered in the southwest

desert, wandering in the general vicinity of the oasis towns of Ghat

and Ghadamis. They claim close relationship with the much larger

Tuareg population in neighboring Algeria and with other Tuareg

elsewhere in the Sahara. Like other desert nomads, they formerly

earned their livelihood by raiding sedentary settlements, conducting long-distance trading, and extracting protection fees from

caravans and travelers. The ending of the caravan trade and pacification of the desert, however, have largely deprived this proud people of their livelihood and have reduced many to penury.

The Tuareg language, Tamasheq, is a Berber dialect, and the

Tuareg adhere to a form of Sunni Islam that incorporates nonor- thodox magical elements. Men—but not women—wear veils, and

the blue dye used in the veils and clothing of nobles frequently transfers to the skin, causing the Tuareg to be known as "blue men."

Marriage is monogynous, and Tuareg women enjoy high status; inheritance is through the female line, and as a general rule only

women can read and write.

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Libya: A Country Study

Black Africans

In southernmost Libya live about 2,600 Tebu, part of a larger

grouping of around 215,000 Tebu in northern Chad, Niger, and

Sudan. Their ethnic identity and cohesion are defined by language,

not social organization or geography, although all Tebu share many

cultural traits. Their language, Tebu, is a member of the NiloSaharan language family, not all dialects being mutually intelligi- ble. The basic social unit is the nuclear family, organized into

patrilineal clans. The Tebu economy is a combination of pastoralism, farming, and date cultivation. The Tebu are Muslim, their

Islam being strongly molded by Sanusi proselytizing in the nineteenth century (see The Sanusis, this ch.). Neighboring peoples

view them as tough, solitary, desert and mountain people.

A significant number of sub-Saharan Africans live in desert and

coastal communities, mixed with Arabs and Berbers. Most of them

are descended from former slaves—the last slave caravan is said

to have reached Fezzan in 1929—but some immigrated to Tripoli

during World War II. In recent years, waves of migrant workers

from Mali, Niger, Sudan, and other Sahelian countries have

arrived. A majority work as farmers or sharecroppers in Fezzan,

but some have migrated to urban centers, where they are occupied

in a variety of jobs considered menial by most Libyans.

Another distinct but numerically small group of blacks, the harathin (plowers, cultivators) have been in the Saharan oases for millennia. Their origins are obscure, but they appear to have been

subservient to the Tuareg or other Libyan overlords for at least the last millennium. As with other blacks, their status has traditionally been quite low. In Libya as a whole, dark-skinned people

are looked down upon, the degree of discrimination increasing with

the darkness of the skin.

Other Peoples

Jewish colonies were firmly established in both Cyrenaica and

Tripoli before the Christian era. The Jews lived amicably with the

Muslims until increasing pressure for a Jewish homeland after World War II caused violent anti-Jewish reactions throughout the

Arab world. During the late 1940s, most of the Jewish population

departed, many to take up residence in the new state of Israel. AntiJewish violence erupted in Tripoli in 1967, and in 1970 the Revolutionary government confiscated most remaining Jewish property,

subject to compensation in government bonds. In the 1970s fewer

than 100 members remained of a Jewish community that had numbered 35,000 in 1948.

78
A residual Italian community of nearly 30,000 continued to live in Libya during the 1960s, a majority in Tripoli and most of the

remainder on farms in the surrounding area. A 1960 law had dis- couraged foreign residents by prohibiting their acquisition of

additional land, and immediately after the 1969 Revolution a number of new restrictions were imposed upon them. In 1970 the

Revolutionary government issued a declaration that it would

"restore to the Libyan people" the properties taken by Italians

during the colonial period. Assurances of personal safety were given

to foreigners, but nearly all of the Italians departed immediately,

although some returned later. The European community in Libya in 1986 amounted to 40,000

persons, a decline of more than half from the levels of 1984-85.

Included in this figure were 100 to 300 Americans, most employed

in the oil industry.

Languages of Libya

All but a small minority of the Libyan people are native Arabicspeakers and thus consider themselves to be Arabs. Arabic, a

Semitic language, is the mother tongue of almost all peoples of

North Africa and the Middle East. Three levels of the language

are distinguishable: classical, the language of the Quran; modern

standard, the form used in the present-day press; and the regional

colloquial dialects. In Libya classical Arabic is used by religious

79
Libya: A Country Study

leaders; modern standard Arabic appears in formal and written

communication and sometimes in the schools. Many people learn

Quranic quotations without being able to speak the classical language.

In classical Arabic, as in other Semitic scripts, the text is read

from right to left, and only consonants are written. Vowel signs

and other diacritical marks appear sometimes in printed texts as aids to pronunciation. Modern standard is grammatically simpler

than classical and includes numerous words unknown to the Quran.

The spoken dialects of Tripolitania and Fezzan belong to the

Maghribi group, used throughout the Maghrib. They are mutually intelligible but differ considerably from dialects in the Middle

East. Dialects of Cyrenaica resemble those of Egypt and the Middle East. Urban dialects differ somewhat from those of the hinterland, and in the southern part of the country some Sudanese

influence exists. Arabs find great beauty and style in their language. It is a keystone of Arab nationalism and a symbol of Arab creativity. Libya

has played a leading part in the campaign to make Arabic an offi- cial language in the forums of the UN and other international or- ganizations. Yet although Arabic has a richness of sound and a

variety of vocabulary that make it a tongue for poets, its syntactic

complexity makes it one of the world's most complex written languages. Its intricate vocabulary also is not well suited as a medium

for technical and scientific expression. Even modern standard

Arabic contains little in the way of a technical vocabulary, in part

because many Arabs are purists about their language and resist the intrusion of foreign words.

These deficiencies of Arabic, coupled with a tradition in Arab

schools of learning by rote methods, have seriously interfered with

scientific and technical advancement. In Libya, as well as in the

other Maghribi countries where a similar problem exists, educators reluctantly recognize that preparation of suitable Arabic

vocabulary additions, textbooks, and syllabi are still a generation

or more away. In the meantime, scientific and technical subjects

in the Libyan universities are in large part taught by foreigners

employing foreign languages.

Under the colonial regime, Italian was the language of instruction in schools, but only a scattering of Muslim children attended

these institutions. As a consequence, the Italian language did not

take root in Libya to the extent that French did elsewhere in North

Africa. Nevertheless, the strong wave of nationalism accompanying the 1969 Revolution found expression in a campaign designed

to elevate the status of the Arabic language. An order was issued

80
The Society and Its Environment

requiring that all street signs, shop window notices, signboards,

and traffic tickets be written in Arabic. This element of Arabization reached its apogee in 1973, when a decree was passed requiring that passports of persons seeking to enter the country contain

the regular personal information in Arabic, a requirement that was

strictly enforced.

Despite the progress of Arabization during the 1970s, English

occupied an increasingly important place as the second language

of the country. It was taught from primary school onward, and

in the universities numerous scientific, technical, and medical

courses were conducted in English. A Tripoli shopkeeper or a hotel

doorman was unlikely to speak the language, but business people were accustomed to corresponding in it. The government also issued

at least some internal statistical documents and other publications

in a bilingual English-Arabic format. In 1986 Qadhafi announced

a policy of eliminating the teaching of English in favor of instruction in Russian at all levels. Whether this policy would actually

be carried out remained to be seen in 1987, but it seemed safe to assume that English would remain in wide use for the immediate

future if not longer.

Structure of Society

Well into the postindependence period, tradition and traditional

values dominated social life. Established religious and tribal practices found expression in the policies and personal style of King

Idris and his regime (see Independent Libya, ch. 1). The discovery of oil, however, released social forces that the traditional forms

could not contain. In terms of both expectation and way of life, the old order was permanently disturbed.

The various pressures of the colonial period, independence, and

the development of the oil industry did much to alter the bases of

urban society and to dissolve the tribal and village social structure. In particular, as the cash economy spread into the countryside,

rural people were lured out of their traditional groups and into the

modern sector. Values, too, began to change under the impact of

new prosperity and the arrival of large numbers of foreigners. Since

1969 the pace of change has greatly quickened. Yet, for all the new

wealth from petroleum and despite relentless government-inspired

efforts to remake Libyan society, the pace of social change was slow,

and the country remained one of the most conservative in the Arab

world.

Evolutionary Changes in a Traditional Society

To a great extent, the cities have been crucibles of social change

in modern Libya. The Sanusi brotherhood drew its strength from

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Libya: A Country Study

the tribal system of the desert, and the cities were marginal (see

The Sanusi Order, ch. 1). More recently, however, they have become centers of attraction, drawing people out of the tribal and

village systems and to some extent dissolving the bonds that held

these systems together. Before the arrival of the Europeans in the

1920s, urban centers had been organized around specific areas

referred to as quarters. A city was composed of several quarters,

each consisting of a number of families who had lived in that place

for several generations and had become bound by feelings of solidarity. Families of every economic standing resided in the same

quarter; the wealthy and the notable assumed leadership. Each

quarter had leaders who represented it before the city at large, and

to a great extent the quarter formed a small subsociety functioning at an intimate level in a manner that made it in some respects

similar to a country village.

Occupations had different levels of acceptability. Carpenters,

barbers, smiths of all kinds, plumbers, butchers, and mechanics were held in varying degrees of low esteem, with these kinds of

work frequently performed by minority-group members. The opprobrium that continued to attach to the occupations even after independence, despite the good pay frequendy obtainable, has been

attributed to the fact that such jobs did not originate in the pastoral and agrarian life that was the heritage of most of the population.

The arrival of the Europeans disturbed the traditional equilibrium

of urban life. Unaccustomed to the ways of life appropriate to tradi- tional housing, the newcomers built new cities along European lines,

with wide streets, private lawns, and separate houses. As growing

numbers of Libyans began to copy Europeans in dress and habits

and to use European mass-produced products, local artisans were

driven into reduced circumstances or out of business. Europeanstyle housing became popular among the well-to-do, and the old

quarters gradually became neighborhoods of the poor.

Urban migration, which began under the Italians, resulted in an infusion of progressively larger numbers of workers and laid

the basis for the modern working class. The attractions of city life, especially for the young and educated, were not exclusively material.

Of equal importance was the generally more stimulating urban en- vironment, particularly the opportunity to enjoy a wider range of

social, recreational, cultural, and educational experiences.

As urban migration continued to accelerate, housing shortages

destroyed what was left of quarter solidarity. The quarters were

flooded with migrants, and old family residences became tenements.

At the same time, squatter slums began to envelop the towns,

82
The Society and Its Environment

housing those the town centers could not accommodate. In place

of the old divisions based primarily on family background, income

became the basic determinant of differentiation between residential neighborhoods.

Italian hegemony altered the bases of social distinction somewhat, but the change was superficial and transitory; unlike the other

Maghribi countries, Libya did not receive a heavy infusion of

European culture. As a result, the Libyan urban elite did not suffer the same cultural estrangement from the mass of the people that

occurred elsewhere in North Africa. At the end of the colonial

period, vestiges of Italian influence dropped quickly, and Arab

Muslim culture began to reassert itself. Before independence rural Libyans looked upon their tribal,

village, and family leaders as the true sources of authority, and,

in this sense, as their social elite. Appointments to government positions were largely political matters, and most permanent government jobs were allocated through patronage. Local governments were controlled largely by traditional tribal leaders who were able

to dispense patronage and thus to perpetuate their influence in the

changing circumstances that attended the discovery of oil. The basic social units were the extended family, clan, and tribe. All three were the primary economic, educational, and welfareproviding units of their members. Individuals were expected to subordinate themselves and their interests to those units and to obey

the demands they made. The family was the most important focus

of attention and loyalty and source of security, followed by the tribe. In most cases, the most powerful family of a clan provided tribal leadership and determined the reputation and power of the tribe. Various criteria were used to evaluate individuals as well as families in the competition for preeminence. Lineage, wealth, and piety were among the most prominent. Throughout Libya's history, and

especially during the period of the monarchy, family prominence

and religious leadership became closely intertwined. Indeed, reli- gious leadership tended to reside within selected family groupings

throughout the country and to be passed successively from generation to generation. By the 1960s, local elites were still composed

of individuals or families who owed their status to these same

criteria. Local elites retained their position and legitimacy well into

the mid-1970s, by which time the Revolutionary government had

attempted to dislodge them, often without success. Rural social structures were tribally based, with the nomadic and

seminomadic tribesmen organized into highly segmented units, as exemplified by the Sanusi of Cyrenaica (see The Sanusis, this ch.).

Originally, tribe members had been nomads, some of the beduin

83
Libya: A Country Study

tracing their origins to the Arabian Peninsula. Pride in tribal membership remained strong, despite the fact that many nomads had

become sedentary. At the same time, tribally based social organization, values, and world view raised formidable obstacles to the

creation of a modern nation-state, because there were virtually no

integrative or unifying institutions or social customs on the national

level. In the mid-1970s, the nomads and seminomads who made up

most of the effective tribal population were rapidly dwindling in

numbers. Tent dwellers numbered an estimated 200,000 in 1973,

less than 10 percent of the population, as compared with about

320,000 nomads in 1964. Most of them lived in the extreme north

of the country.

By this time, the Revolutionary government had come to look

upon tribal organization and values as antithetical to its policies.

Even Qadhafi, despite his beduin roots, viewed tribes as anachronistic and as obstacles to modernization. Consequently, the government sought to break the links between the rural population and

its traditional leaders by focusing attention on a new elite—the

modernizers who represented the new leadership. The countryside was divided into zones that crossed old tribal boundaries, combining different tribes in a common zone and splitting tribes in a manner that weakened traditional institutions and the force of local kinship. The ancient ascriptive qualifications for leadership

lineage, piety, wealth—gave way to competence and education as determined by formal examination.

Tribal leaders, however, scoffed at efforts encouraging members

to drop tribal affiliations, and pride in tribal lineage remained

strong. This was remarkable in light of the fact that many tribes

had long ago shed their beduin trappings and had become agrarian

villagers. In effect, the government had brought about the abolition of the tribal system but not the memories of tribal allegiance.

According to a 1977 report, a survey of tribes had found that more

than three-fourths of the members canvassed were still proud of

their tribe and of their membership in it. Yet the attitude shown

was a generally mild one; there was little opposition to the new

programs and some recognition of the government's efforts on their

behalf.

The conversion of nomads into sedentary villagers was accompanied or followed by the selective depopulation of many villages, as a disproportionate number of men between fifteen and fortyfive left their herds, farms, and villages to seek urban employment.

Their defection was a decisive factor in a decline in agricultural

production during the 1970s. As a result, the Revolutionary

84
The Society and Its Environment

government adopted a variety of measures aimed at stemming the

migration. Of particular importance was an extremely ambitious

10-year agricultural land reclamation and farmer resettlement

scheme initiated in 1972; its aim was to reclaim 1 million hectares

of land and provide farms for tens of thousands of rural families.

The hold of tradition showed in Cyrenaica, however, where farmers chose to resettle only in projects located in their tribal areas, where they could preserve both tribal and territorial linkages.

Still, many of the most energetic and productive were leaving

the countryside to seek employment in cities, oil fields, or construction work or to become settlers in the new agricultural development schemes. In some cases entire farm villages considered by

the government to be no longer viable were abandoned and their

populations were moved elsewhere; thus, the social and political

influence of local leaders was ended forever. At the same time

modernization was coming to villages in the form of schools, hospitals, electric lights, and other twentieth-century features. In an in- creasing number of rural localities, former farm laborers who had

received titles to farms also owned a house in which electricity,

water, and modern appliances (including a radio and perhaps a

television set) made their residences almost indistinguishable from

those of prosperous urban dwellers.

The Revolution and Social Change

In their September 1969 Revolution, Qadhafi and the young

officers who provided most of his support aimed with idealistic fervor

at bringing to an end the social inequities that had marked both

the colonial periods and the monarchical regime. The new government that resulted was socialist, but Qadhafi stressed that it was

to be a kind of socialism inspired by the humanitarian values in- herent in Islam. It called for equitable distribution to reduce dis- parities between classes in a peaceful and affluent society, but in no sense was it to be a stage on the road to communism.

On the eve of the 1969 Revolution, the royal family and its most

eminent supporters and officeholders, drawn from a restricted cir- cle of wealthy and influential families, dominated Libyan society.

These constituted what may be termed the traditional sociopolitical establishment, which rested on patronage, clientage, and dependency. Beneath this top echelon was a small middle class. The

Libyan middle class had always been quite small, but it had

expanded significantly under the impact of oil wealth. In the

mid-1960s, it consisted of several distinct social groupings: salar- ied religious leaders and bureaucrats, old families engaged in importing and contracting, entrepreneurs in the oil business,

85
Libya: A Country Study

shopkeepers, self-employed merchants and artisans and prosper- ous farmers and beduins. Workers in small industrial workshops,

agricultural laborers, and peasant farmers, among others, composed the lower class. Most of the urban population consisted of the families of first- generation workers, small shopkeepers, and a horde of public

workers. Above them were thin layers of the newly rich and of old,

prosperous families. An urban working class, however, had largely

failed to develop, and the middle class was a feeble one that in no way resembled the counterpart element that had become a vital political force in many other countries of the Arab world.

At the top of the rural social structure, the shaykhs of the major

tribes ruled on the basis of inherited status. In the cities, corresponding roles were played by the heads of the wealthy families and by

religious figures. These leaders were jealous of their position and,

far from concerning themselves with furthering social progress, saw

modernization as a threat. In no way, however, did the leaders

present a united front. The development of the petroleum industry was accompanied

by profound technical and organizational changes and by the appearance of a younger elite whose outlook had been greatly affected

by technological advances: among their number were technocrats,

students, and young army officers. Not the least notable of the fac- tors that set this new element apart was age. The civilians of this group, as well as the military officers, were for the most part in

their thirties or younger, and their views had little in common with

those of the aging authorities who had long controlled a swollen

bureaucracy (11 percent of the 1969 labor force). More urbanized

and better educated than their elders, this new group entertained

hopes and aspirations that had been frustrated by the group sur- rounding King Idris. In particular, resentment had been aroused

by the arbitrariness, corruption, and inefficiency of Idris' government as well as by its questionable probity in the distribution of

oil-funded revenues. The young officers who formed the Free Officers Movement and

its political nucleus, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),

showed a great deal of dedication to the Revolutionary cause and

a high degree of uniformity in political and economic outlook (see

Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council, ch. 1). In

Libya, as in a number of other Arab countries, admission to the

military academy and careers as army officers were options available to members of the less privileged economic strata only after national independence was attained. A military career, offering new

opportunities for higher education and upward economic and

86
The Society and Its Environment

social mobility, was thus a greater attraction for young men from

poorer families than for those of the wealthy and the traditional

elite. These youthful revolutionaries came from quite modest social backgrounds, representing the oases and the interior as opposed

to the coastal cities, and the minor suppressed tribes as opposed

to the major aristocratic ones. The officers of the RCC—all captains and lieutenants—represented the forefront of a social revolution that saw the middle and

lower middle classes assert control over social and political prerogatives heretofore denied them. They quickly displaced the former

elite of the Idris era and became themselves the prime movers of

the Libyan state. Numbering only about a dozen men, they were

gradually joined by sympathetic civilian and military personnel in

constituting a new elite. By the late 1980s, this governing class consisted of Qadhafi and

the half-dozen remaining members of the Free Officers Movement,

government ministers and other high state officials and managers,

second-echelon officers of the Free Officers Movement, and top

officials and activists of local mass organizations and governing

councils. Civilian officials, also part of the political elite, usually were better educated than their military colleagues. Many of them

possessed college degrees, came from urban middle-class backgrounds, and were indispensable for the administrative functioning of government and the economy. Below this elite was the upper

middle class composed of educated technocrats, administrators, and

remnants of a wealthy commercial and entrepreneurial class. The

lower middle class contained small traders, teachers, successful

farmers, and low-level officials and bureaucrats. This new and small

revolutionary elite sought to restructure Libyan society. In broad

terms, the young officers set off to create an egalitarian society in

which class differences would be minimal and the country's oil wealth would be equally shared. Their aim was to curb the power

and wealth of the old elite and to build support among the middle

and lower middle classes from which they had come and with which

they identified. The policies they devised to remold society after 1969 entailed extension of state control over the national economy,

creation of a new political structure, and redistribution of wealth

and opportunity through such measures as minimum wage laws,

state employment, and the welfare state. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) created in 1971 was thus in- tended as a mass mobilization device (see Subnational Government

and Administration, ch. 4). Its aim was the peaceful abolition of

class differences to avoid the tragedy of a class struggle; the egalitarian nature of its composition was shown by a charter prescribing

87
Libya: A Country Study

that at all levels 50 percent of its members must be peasants and

laborers. At the heart of the cultural revolution of 1973 was the

establishment of people's committees (see The Popular Revolution

and People's Committee, ch. 4). These were made up of workinglevel leaders in business and government, who became the local

elites in the new society. That same year brought enactment of a law requiring that larger business firms share profits with their per- sonnel, appoint workers to their boards of directors, and establish

joint councils composed of workers and managers.

At the same time, the government launched a long-term campaign against a new privileged class pejoratively identified as "bourgeois bureaucrats." Multiple dismissals at this time included top

university administrators, hospital directors, and oil-industry offi- cials, as well as numerous lower ranking employees. However, in

1975, public administrators, including educational and public health

service, made up nearly 24 percent of the labor force—more than

twice the proportion at the time of the monarchy's demise. Late

in 1976, a newspaper editorial complained that the labor force still contained tens of thousands of administrators and supervisors

most of them in the public sector—while in other countries this element seldom exceeded 2 percent of the total. Having attacked the bureaucracy and concentrations of wealth

and privilege, the regime in the later 1970s dealt with the entre- preneurial middle class (see Role of Government, ch. 3). The first restrictions on private traders appeared as early as 1975, but the

real blows came a few years later. A 1978 law struck at much-prized

investments in private property by limiting ownership of houses

and apartments to one per nuclear family, although the government promised compensation to the dispossessed. New restrictions were placed on commercial and industrial establishments, foreign

trade became a monopoly of public corporations, workers assumed

control of major industrial and commercial enterprises, and pri- vate wholesale trade was abolished. Finally, state investments and

subsidies were shifted away from owners of small businesses.

Although the Libyan middle class was suppressed by the abovementioned restrictions in the late 1970s, it was not destroyed. In- deed, a significant number of its members adapted themselves to the social dictates of the Revolutionary regime by cooperation with

it or by recruitment into the modernizing state apparatus. Its ranks

still contained educated technocrats and administrators, without

whose talents the state could not function, as well as remnants of

the commercial and entrepreneurial class, some of them well-todo. A separate category of small traders, shopkeepers, and farmers could also be identified. They, too, sought careers in the state

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The Society and Its Environment

sector, although many of them continued to operate small busi- nesses alongside public enterprises. Those who could not adapt or who feared persecution fled abroad in significant numbers (see The

Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ch. 1). In contrast with the old regime, it was now possible for members of the middle and lower classes to seek and gain access to positions of influence and power. The former criteria of high family

or tribal status had given way to education to a considerable degree,

although patronage and loyalty continued to be rewarded as well. But, in general, social mobility was much improved, a product of

the revolutionary order that encouraged participation and leadership in such new institutions as the Basic People's Congresses and

the revolutionary committees (see Glossary; see also The Subnational Government and Administration, ch. 4). Only the highest

positions occupied by Qadhafi and a small number of his associ- ates were beyond the theoretical reach of the politically ambitious.

The core elite in the 1980s, which consisted of Qadhafi and the

few remaining military officers of the RCC, presented a signifi- cant contrast of its own with respect to the top political leadership

of the Idris era. This was the result of a commitment to national

unity and identity, as well as of common social background. Within

this small group, the deeply ingrained regional cleavages of the past,

particularly that between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, had almost

disappeared and were no longer of political significance. Similarly,

the ethnic distinction between Arab and Berber within the elite was

no longer important. The old urban-rural and center-periphery

oppositions, remained important, but they did not characterize the core elite itself. Rather, they differentiated the core elite from the

country's former rulers, because the Revolutionary leadership was

deeply rooted in the rural periphery, not the Mediterranean coastal centers. The rest of society, including government officials immediately

below Qadhafi, appeared to be a good deal less unified. Despite

the exertions of the core elite, a sense of national unity and identity had not yet developed in the late 1980s, and loyalty to region,

tribe, and family remained stronger than allegiance to the state. There was much alienation from the regime, often expressed in

terms of lethargy and passivity. Incessant pressures on the part of

the regime to enlist as many people as possible in running public

affairs had provoked much resentment and resistance. Many adults

did not participate, despite the exhortations and oversight of the

revolutionary committees, themselves a source of uncertainty and

anxiety.

All of these pressures applied to the educated middle class, esti- mated to number perhaps 50,000 out of a total population of 3.6

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Libya: A Country Study

million. Many were clearly alienated by the shortages of consumer

goods, the militarization of society, and the constant demands to participate actively in the institutions of the jamahiriya (see Glossary), sentiments that characterized other social classes as well. Like

their fellow citizens, the educated sought refuge in the affairs of

their families, demonstrating yet again the strength of traditional

values over revolutionary norms, or in foreign travel, especially

in Europe.

The country's youth were also pulled in opposite directions. By

the mid-1980s, the vast majority knew only the Revolutionary era and its achievements. Because these gains were significant, not sur- prisingly young people were among the most dedicated and visi- ble devotees of the Revolution and Qadhafi. They had benefited

most from increased educational opportunities, attempted reforms

of dowry payments, and the emancipation of young women (see

The Family, the Individual, and the Sexes, this ch.). Libyan youth

also enjoyed far more promising employment prospects than their

counterparts elsewhere in the Maghrib.

With few outlets such as recreation centers or movies for their

energies, a large number of youth were found in the revolutionary

committees, where they pursued their task of enforcing political

conformity and participation with a vigor that at times approached

fanaticism. Others kept watch over the state administration and

industry in an attempt to improve efficiency. Not all were so enthusiastic about revolutionary goals, however. For instance, there was

distaste for military training among students in schools and universities, especially when it presaged service in the armed forces. In

the 1980s, some of this disdain had resulted in demonstrations and

even in executions (see Opposition to Qadhafi, ch. 4). By the late 1980s, Libyan society clearly showed the impact of

almost two decades of attempts at restructuring. The country was

an army-dominated state under the influence of no particular class or group and was relatively free from the clash of competing

interests. Almost all sources of power in traditional life had been

eliminated or coopted. Unlike states such as Saudi Arabia that en- deavored to develop their societies within the framework of traditional political and economic systems, Libya had discarded most

of the traditional trappings and was using its great wealth to trans- form the country and its people.

With its highly egalitarian socialist regime, Libya differed considerably in its social structure from other oil-rich states. Salaries

and wages were high, and social services were extensive and free. There was much less accumulation of private wealth than in other

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The Society and Its Environment

oil states, and social distinction was discouraged as a matter of

deliberate public policy. But Libyan society was deeply divided,

and entire segments of the population were only superficially committed to the course that the revolutionary regime had outlined.

And while the old order was clearly yielding to the new, there was much doubt and unease about where society and state were headed.

The Family, the Individual, and the Sexes

Social life in Libya centered traditionally on the individual's family loyalty, which overrode other obligations. Ascribed status often

outweighed personal achievement in regulating social relationships,

and the individual's honor and dignity were tied to the good re- pute of the kin group, especially to that of its women.

Women have played a role secondary to that of men in most

aspects of life, and tradition has prescribed that they remain in the

home, often in seclusion. The status of women in the 1970s,

however, improved substantially, and the once-common seclusion

became less common. Nonetheless, to a considerable extent the two

sexes continued to constitute largely separate subsocieties, each with

its own values, attitudes, and perceptions of the other.

Family and Household

Libyans reckon kinship patrilineally, and the household is based on blood ties between men. A typical household consists of a man,

his wife, his single and married sons with their wives and children,

his unmarried daughters, and perhaps other relatives, such as a widowed or divorced mother or sister. At the death of the father,

each son ideally establishes his own household to begin the cycle

again. Because of the centrality of family life, it is assumed that

all persons will marry when they reach an appropriate age. Adult

status is customarily bestowed only on married men and, frequently,

only on fathers. In traditional North African society, family patriarchs ruled as absolute masters over their extended families, and in Libya the in- stitution seems to have survived somewhat more tenaciously than

elsewhere in the area. Despite the changes in urban and rural so- ciety brought about by the 1969 Revolution, the Revolutionary

government has repeatedly stated that the family is the core of

society.

The 1973 census, the last for which complete data were available in mid- 1987, showed that the typical household consisted of

five to six individuals and that about 1 2 percent of the households were made up of eight or more members. The pattern was about

the same as that reported from the 1964 census, and a 1978 Tripoli

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Libya: A Country Study

newspaper article called attention to the continued strength of the

extended family. Individuals subordinated their personal interests

to those of the family and considered themselves to be members

of a group whose importance outweighed their own. Loyalty to family, clan, and tribe outweighed loyalty to a profession or class and

inhibited the emergence of new leaders and a professional elite. Marriage is more a family than a personal affair and a civil contract rather than a religious act. Because the sexes generally were

unable to mix socially, young men and women enjoyed few ac- quaintances among the opposite sex. Parents arranged marriages

for their children, finding a mate either through their own social contacts or through a professional matchmaker. Unions between

the children of brothers were customarily preferred, or at least matches between close relatives or within the same tribe. One study,

however, showed that many marriages occurred outside these

bounds, the result of increased levels of education and internal

migration. Nomads, particularly the Tuareg, have always allowed

much more freedom of choice and courtship.

According to law, the affianced couple must have given their

consent to the marriage, but in practice the couple tends to take

little part in the arrangements. The contract establishes the terms

of the union and outlines appropriate recourse if they are broken.

The groom's family provides a dowry, which can amount to the

equivalent of US$10,000 in large cities. Accumulation of the requisite dowry may be one reason that males tend to be several years

older than females at the time of marriage.

Islamic law gives the husband far greater discretion and far greater leeway with respect to marriage than it gives the wife. For

example, the husband may take up to four wives at one time,

provided that he can treat them equally; a woman, however, can have only one husband at a time. Despite the legality of polygyny,

only 3 percent of marriages in the 1980s were polygynous, the same

as a decade earlier. A man can divorce his wife simply by repeating "I divorce thee" three times before witnesses; a woman can

initiate divorce proceedings only with great difficulty. Any chil- dren of the union belong to the husband's family and remain with

him after the divorce.

Both the monarchical and Revolutionary governments enacted

statutes improving the position of females with respect to marriage. The minimum age for marriage was set at sixteen for females

and at eighteen for males. Marriage by proxy has been forbidden,

and a 1972 law prescribes that a girl cannot be married against

her will or when she is under the age of sixteen. Should her father

forbid her marriage to a man whom she has chosen for herself,

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The Society and Its Environment

a girl who is a minor (under the age of twenty-one) may petition a court for permission to proceed with her marriage.

The Revolutionary government has enacted several statutes ex- panding women's rights and restricting somewhat those of men

in matters of divorce. Women received increased rights to seek

divorce or separation by either customary or legal means in cases of abandonment or mistreatment. Other laws prohibit a man from

taking a second spouse without first obtaining the approval of his

first wife and forbid a divorced man from marrying an alien woman,

even an Arab from another country. A companion law prohibits

men in the employ of the state from marrying non-Arab women.

Yet the child born abroad of a Libyan father is eligible for Libyan

citizenship irrespective of the mother's nationality, while a child

born to a Libyan mother would not be accorded automatic Libyan

citizenship.

In a society as tradition-bound as Libya's, the effects of these

new laws were problematic. Despite the backing of the regime and

Qadhafi's calls for still further modifications in favor of women,

the society reportedly was not yet ready to acknowledge the new

rights, and women were still hesitant in claiming them.

The Traditional View of Men and Women

The social setting of the family significantly affects the circumstances of a wife. Until the discovery of petroleum—and to a lesser degree until the 1969 Revolution—conservative attitudes and values

about women dominated society. By the 1980s, however, modifications in the traditional relationship between the sexes were becoming evident, and important changes were appearing in the

traditional role of women. These varied with the age, education,

and place of residence of the women.

In traditional society, beduin women—who did not wear the veil that symbolized the inferior and secluded status of women—played

a relatively open part in tribal life. Women in villages also frequently were unveiled and participated more actively in the affairs of their

community than did their urban counterparts. Their relative free- dom, however, did not ordinarily permit their exposure to outsiders.

A sociologist visiting a large oasis village as recently as the late 1960s

told of being unable to see the women of the community and of

being forced to canvass their opinions by means of messages passed

by their husbands. The extent to which the community was changing, however, was indicated by the considerable number of girls in secondary school and the ability of young women to find modernsector jobs—opportunities that had come into being only during

the 1960s.

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Libya: A Country Study

Urban women tended to be more sophisticated and socially

aware, but they were also more conservative in social relations and

dress. For example, unlike rural women, who moved freely in the

fields and villages, urban women walked in the street discreetly

in veiled pairs, avoiding public gathering places as well as social contact with men. Among the upper class urban families, women

fulfilled fewer and less important economic functions, and their

responsibilities were often limited to the household. Greater sex- ual segregation was imposed in the cities than in the countryside

because tribal life and life in farm villages made segregation virtually impossible.

While women remained in the home, men formed a society

organized into several recognizable groupings. These consisted of

such coteries as school classmates, village or family work associates, athletic clubs, or circles of friends meeting in cafes. In earlier

times, the group might have been a religious brotherhood.

Like most Arabs, Libyans valued men more highly than women. Girls' upbringing quickly impressed on them that they were

inferior to men and must cater to them; boys learned that they were

entitled to demand the care and concern of women. Men regarded

women as creatures apart, weaker than men in mind, body, and

spirit. They were considered more sensual, less disciplined, and

in need of protection from both their own impulses and the excesses of strange men. The honor of the men of the family, easily damaged and nearly

irreparable, depended on the conduct of their women. Wives, sis- ters, and daughters were expected to be circumspect, modest, and

decorous, with their virtue above reproach. The slightest implication of unavenged impropriety, especially if made public, could

irreparably destroy a family's honor. Female virginity before marriage and sexual fidelity thereafter were essential to honor's maintenance, and discovery of a transgression traditionally bound men

of the family to punish the offending woman.

A girl's parents were eager for her to marry at the earliest possible age in order to forestall any loss of her virginity. After marriage, the young bride went to the home of her bridegroom's family,

often in a village or neighborhood where she was a stranger and

into a household where she lived under the constant and sometimes

critical surveillance of her mother-in-law, a circumstance that fre- quently led to a great deal of friction. In traditional society, girls were married in their early teens to men considerably their senior.

A woman began to attain status and security in her husband's family

only if she produced boys. Mothers accordingly favored sons, and

in later life the relationship between mother and son often remained

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The Society and Its Environment

warm and intimate, whereas the father was a more distant figure.

Throughout their years of fertility, women were assumed to have an irrepressible sexual urge, and it was only after menopause that a supposed asexuality bestowed on them a measure of freedom and some of the respect accorded senior men. Old age was assumed

to commence with menopause, and the female became an azuz, or old woman.

The New Society of the Revolutionary Era The roles and status of women have been the subject of a great

deal of discussion and legal action in Libya, as they have in many

countries of the Middle East. Some observers suggested that the

regime made efforts on behalf of female emancipation because it viewed women as an essential source of labor in an economy chronically starved for workers. They also postulated that the government was interested in expanding its political base, hoping to curry

favor by championing female rights. Since independence, Libyan

leaders have been committed to improving the condition of women

but within the framework of Arabic and Islamic values. For this reason, the pace of change has been slow.

Nonetheless, by the 1980s relations within the family and between the sexes, along with all other aspects of Libyan life, had

begun to show notable change. As the mass media popularized new

ideas, new perceptions and practices appeared. Foreign settlers and

foreign workers frequently embodied ideas and values distinctively different from those traditional in the country. In particular, the

perceptions of Libyans in everyday contact with Europeans were

affected. The continued and accelerating process of urbanization has

broken old kinship ties and association with ancestral rural communities. At the same time, opportunities for upward social move- ment have increased, and petroleum wealth and the development

plans of the Revolutionary government have made many new kinds

of employment available—for the first time including jobs for women. Especially among the educated young, a growing sense of individualism has appeared. Many of these educated and in- creasingly independent young people prefer to set up their own

households at marriage rather than to live with their parents, and

they view polygyny with scorn. In addition, social security, free medical care, education, and other appurtenances of the welfare

state have lessened the dependence of the aged on their children

in village communities and have almost eliminated it in the cities (see Health and Welfare, this ch.).

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Libya: A Country Study

In the 1970s, female emancipation was in large measure a matter of age. One observer generalized that city women under the

age of thirty-five had discarded the traditional veil and were quite

likely to wear Western-style clothing. Those between the ages of

thirty-five and forty-five were increasingly ready to consider such

a change, but women over the age of forty-five appeared reluctant

to give up the protection their veils and customary dress afforded.

A decade later, veiling was uncommon among urban women, as

it had always been in rural areas. Women were also increasingly seen driving, shopping, or traveling without husbands or male companions.

Since the early 1960s, Libyan women have had the right to vote

and to participate in political life. They could also own and dispose

of property independently of their husbands, but all of these rights were exercised by only a few women before the 1969 Revolution.

Since then, the government has encouraged women to participate

in elections and national political institutions, but by 1987 only one woman had advanced as far as the national cabinet, as an as- sistant secretary for information and culture.

Women were also able to form their own associations, the first of which dated to 1955 in Benghazi. In 1970 several feminist organizations merged into the Women's General Union, which in 1977

became the Jamahiriya Women's Federation. Under Clause 5 of

the Constitutional Proclamation of December 11, 1969, women

had already been given equal status under the law with men. Subsequently, the women's movement has been active in such fields as adult education and hygiene. The movement has achieved only

limited influence, however, and its most active members have felt frustrated by their inability to gain either direct or indirect politi- cal influence.

Women had also made great gains in employment outside the

home, the result of improved access to education and of increased

acceptance of female paid employment. Once again, the government was the primary motivating force behind this phenomenon.

For example, the 1976-80 development plan called for employment

of a larger number of women "in those spheres which are suitable

for female labor," but the Libyan identification of what work was

suitable for women continued to be limited by tradition. According to the 1973 census, the participation rate for women (the percent of all women engaged in economic activity) was about 3 percent

as compared with 37 percent for men. The participation was some- what higher than the 2.7 percent registered in 1964, but it was considerably lower than that in other Maghrib countries and in most

of the Middle Eastern Arab states.

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The Society and Its Environment

In the 1980s, in spite of the gain registered by women during

the prior decade, females constituted only 7 percent of the national

labor force, according to one informed researcher. This represented

a 2 -percent increase over a 20-year period. Another source, however, considered these figures far too low. Reasoning from 1973

census figures and making allowances for full- and part-time,

seasonal, paid, and unpaid employment, these researchers argued

convincingly that women formed more than 20 percent of the total economically active Libyan population. For rural areas their figure was 46 percent, far higher than official census numbers for workers

who in most cases were not only unpaid but not even considered

as employed.

Among nonagricultural women, those who were educated and

skilled were overwhelmingly employed as teachers. The next highest

category of educated and skilled women was nurses and those found

in the health-care field. Other areas that were open to women in- cluded administrative and clerical work in banks, department stores, and government offices, and domestic services. Women were found

in ever larger numbers as nurses and midwives, but even so, Libyan health care facilities suffered from a chronic shortage of staff. By contrast, in clerical and secretarial jobs, the problem was not a shortage of labor but a deep-seated cultural bias against the inter- mingling of men and women in the workplace. During the 1970s,

the attraction of employment as domestics tended to decline, as educated and ambitious women turned to more lucrative occupations. To fill the gap, Libyan households sought to hire foreigners, particularly Egyptians and Tunisians.

Light industry, especially cottage-style, was yet another outlet

for female labor, a direct result of Libya's labor shortage. Despite

these employment outlets and gains, female participation in the

work force of the 1980s remained small, and many so-called "female

jobs" were filled by foreign women. Also, in spite of significant

increases in female enrollments in the educational system, including university level, few women were found, even as technicians,

in such traditionally male fields as medicine, engineering, and law.

Nonurban women constituted a quite significant if largely invisible proportion of the rural work force, as previously mentioned.

According to the 1973 census, there were only 14,000 economically active women out of a total of 200,000 rural females older

than age 10. In all likelihood, however, many women engaged in

agricultural or domestic tasks worked as unpaid members of family groups and hence were not regarded as gainfully employed,

accounting at least in part for the low census count. Estimates of

actual female rural employment in the mid-1970s, paid and

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Libya: A Country Study

unpaid, ranged upward of 86,000, as compared with 96,000 men

in the rural work force. In addition to agriculture, both rural and

nomadic women engaged in the weaving of rugs and carpets,

another sizable category of unpaid and unreported labor.

Beginning in 1970, the Revolutionary government passed a series of laws regulating female employment. Equal pay for equal work

and qualifications became a fundamental precept. Other statutes

strictly regulated the hours and conditions of work. Working

mothers enjoyed a range of benefits designed to encourage them

to continue working even after marriage and childbirth, including

cash bonuses for the first child and free day-care centers. A woman

could retire at age fifty-five, and she was entitled to a pension (see

Health and Welfare, this ch.). Recently, the regime has sought to introduce women into the armed forces (see Women in the Armed

Forces, ch. 5). In the early 1980s the so-called "Nuns of the Revolution" were created as a special police force attached to revolutionary committees. Then in 1984 a law mandating female

conscription that required all students in secondary schools and

above to participate in military training was passed. In addition,

young women were encouraged to attend female military academies, the first of which was established in 1979. These proposals

originated with Qadhafi, who hoped that they would help create a new image and role for the Libyan woman. Nonetheless, the concept of female training in the martial arts encountered such

widespread opposition that meaningful compliance seemed unlikely.

The status of women was thus an issue that was very much alive. There could be no doubt that the status of women had undergone

a remarkable transformation since the 1969 Revolution, but cul- tural norms were proving to be a powerful brake on the efforts of

the Qadhafi regime to force the pace of that transformation. And

despite the exertions and rhetoric of the government, men con- tinued to play the leading roles in family and society. As one observer pointed out, political and social institutions were each pulling

women in opposite directions. In the late 1980s, the outcome of

that contest was by no means a foregone conclusion.

Religious Life

Nearly all Libyans adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam, which

provides both a spiritual guide for individuals and a keystone for government policy. Its tenets stress a unity of religion and state rather than a separation or distinction between the two, and even

those Muslims who have ceased to believe fully in Islam retain

Islamic habits and attitudes. Since the 1969 coup, the Qadhafi

regime has explicitly endeavored to reaffirm Islamic values,

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The Society and Its Environment

enhance appreciation of Islamic culture, elevate the status of

Quranic law and, to a considerable degree, emphasize Quranic

practice in everyday Libyan life. In A.D. 610, Muhammad (the Prophet), a prosperous merchant

of the town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations said to have been granted him by God (Allah) through the

agency of the archangel Gabriel. The divine messages, received

during solitary visits into the desert, continued during the remainder

of his life. Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow

Meccans, his vigorous and continuing censure ultimately earning

him their bitter enmity. In 622 he and a group of his followers were

forced to flee to Yathrib, which became known as Medina (the city)

through its association with him. The hijra (flight, known in the

West as the hegira) marked the beginning of the Islamic era and

of Islam as a powerful historical force; the Muslim calendar begins

with the year 622. In Medina Muhammad continued his preaching, ultimately defeated his detractors in battle, and had consolidated the temporal as well as spiritual leadership of most Arabs

in his person before his death in 632.

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled his words that were regarded as coming directly from God in a document known

as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Other sayings and teachings of the Prophet, as well as the precedents of his personal behavior as recalled by those who had known him, became the hadith

(' 'sayings"). From these sources, the faithful have constructed the

Prophet's customary practice, or sunna, which they endeavor to emulate. Together, these documents form a comprehensive guide

to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the faithful in most Muslim countries.

In a short time, Islam was transformed from a small religious

community into a dynamic political and military authority. During the seventh century, Muslim conquerors reached Libya, and

by the eighth century most of the resistance mounted by the in- digenous Berbers had ended. The urban centers soon became substantially Islamic, but widespread conversion of the nomads of the

desert did not come until after large-scale invasions in the eleventh

century by beduin tribes from Arabia and Egypt.

A residue of pre-Islamic beliefs blended with the pure Islam of

the Arabs. Hence, popular Islam became an overlay of Quranic

ritual and principles upon the vestiges of earlier beliefs—prevalent

throughout North Africa—in jinns (spirits), the evil eye, rites to ensure good fortune, and cult veneration of local saints. The educated of the cities and towns served as the primary bearers and

guardians of the more austere brand of orthodox Islam.

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Libya: A Country Study

Tenets of Islam

The shahadah (profession of faith, or testimony) states succinctly

the central belief, "There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad

is his Prophet." The faithful repeat this simple profession on rit- ual occasions, and its recital designates the speaker as a Muslim.

The term Islam means submission to God, and the one who submits is a Muslim.

The God preached by Muhammad was previously known to his

countrymen, for Allah is the general Arabic term for the supreme

being rather than the name of a particular deity. Rather than in- troducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the pantheon of gods and spirits worshipped before his prophethood and

declared the omnipotence of God, the unique creator. Muhammad is the "Seal of the Prophets," the last of the prophetic line. His revelations are said to complete for all time the series of revelations that had been given earlier to Jews and Christians. God

is believed to have remained one and the same throughout time,

but humans are seen as having misunderstood or strayed from

God's true teachings until set aright by Muhammad. Prophets and

sages of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus

are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however,

reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christianity's deifi- cation of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels,

the Day ofJudgment, resurrection, and the eternal life of the soul. The duties of the Muslim form the "five pillars" of the faith. These are shahadah, salat (daily prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm

(fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage). The believer prays facing Mecca

at five specified times during the day. Whenever possible, men observe their prayers in congregation at a mosque under direction

of an imam, or prayer leader, and on Fridays are obliged to do

so. Women are permitted to attend public worship at the mosque,

where they are segregated from men, but their attendance tends

to be discouraged, and more frequently they pray in the seclusion

of their homes.

In the early days of Islam, a tax for charitable purposes was imposed on personal property in proportion to the owner's wealth;

the payment purified the remaining wealth and made it religiously legitimate. The collection of this tax and its distribution to the

needy were originally functions of the state. But with the breakdown of Muslim religiopolitical authority, alms became an individual responsibility. With the discovery of petroleum in Libya and

the establishment of a welfare society, almsgiving has been largely

replaced by public welfare and its significance diluted accordingly

(see Health and Welfare, this ch.).

100
A mosque in Tripoli

Courtesy United Nations

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Libya: A Country Study

Fasting is practiced during the ninth month of the Muslim cal- endar. Ramadan, the time during which the first revelations to Muhammad found in the Quran occurred. It is a period during

which most Muslims must abstain from food, drinking, smoking,

and sexual activity during the daylight hours. The well-to-do

accomplish little work during this period, and many businesses close or operate on reduced schedules. Because the months of the lunar

calendar revolve through the solar year. Ramadan occurs during

various seasons. In Libya, among the strictest of Muslim countries, cafes must remain closed during the day; they open their doors

after dark, and feasting takes place during the night.

Finally, at least once during their lifetime all Muslims should

make the hajj to the holy city of Mecca to participate in the special

rites that occur during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar.

Upon completion of this and certain other ritual assignments, the

returning pilgrim is entitled to the honorific ''al Haj," before his name.

In addition to prescribing specific duties, Islam imposes a code

of conduct entailing generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect for

others. Its proscribes adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol. .Although proscription

of alcohol is irregularly enforced in most Muslim countries, the

Libyan Revolutionary government has been strict in ensuring that

its prohibition be effective, even in the households of foreign

diplomats.

Muslims traditionally are subject to the sharia, or religious law,

which—as interpreted by religious courts —covers most aspects of

life. In Libya the Maliki school is followed. One of several schools

of Islamic law, it predominates throughout North Africa. The

sharia. which was developed by jurists from the Quran and from

the traditions of the Prophet, provides a complete pattern for human

conduct.

Saints and Brotherhoods

Islam as practiced in North Africa is interlaced with indigenous

Berber beliefs. .Although the orthodox faith preached the unique

and inimitable majesty and sanctity of God and the equality of

God's believers, an important element of North African Islam for centuries has been a belief in the coalescence of special spiritual

power in particular living human beings. The power is known as

baraka. a transferable quality of personal blessedness and spiritual

force said to lodge in certain individuals. Those whose claim to possess baraka can be substantiated—through performance of

apparent miracles, exemplary human insight, or genealogical

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The Society and Its Environment

connection with a recognized possessor—are viewed as saints. These

persons are known in the West as marabouts, a French transliteration of al murabitun (those who have made a religious retreat), and

the benefits of their baraka are believed to accrue to those ordinary

people who come in contact with them.

The cult of saints became widespread in rural areas; in urban

localities, Islam in its orthodox form continued to prevail. Saints were present in Tripolitania, but they were particularly numerous in Cyrenaica. Their baraka continued to reside in their tombs

after their deaths. The number of venerated tombs varied from

tribe to tribe, although there tended to be fewer among the camel

herders of the desert than among the sedentary and nomadic tribes

of the plateau area. In one village, a visitor in the late 1960s counted

sixteen still-venerated tombs.

Coteries of disciples frequently clustered around particular saints,

especially those who preached an original tariqa (devotional "way").

Brotherhoods of the followers of such mystical teachers appeared

in North Africa at least as early as the eleventh century and in some

cases became mass movements. The founder ruled an order of fol- lowers, who were organized under the frequently absolute authority

of a leader, or shaykh. The brotherhood was centered on a zawiya

(pi., zawaayaa—see Glossary).

Because of Islam's austere rational and intellectual qualities,

many people have felt drawn toward the more emotional and personal ways of knowing God practiced by mystical Islam, or Sufism.

Found in many parts of the Muslim world, Sufism endeavored to produce a personal experience of the divine through mystic and

ascetic discipline.

Sufi adherents gathered into brotherhoods, and Sufi cults became

extremely popular, particularly in rural areas. Sufi brotherhoods

exercised great influence and ultimately played an important part

in the religious revival that swept through North Africa during the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Libya, when the Ottoman

Empire proved unable to mount effective resistance to the encroachment of Christian missionaries, the work was taken over by Sufiinspired revivalist movements. Among these, the most forceful and

effective was that of the Sanusis, which extended into numerous

parts of North Africa.

The Sanusis

The Sanusi movement was a religious revival adapted to desert

life. Its zawaayaa could be found in Tripolitania and Fezzan,

but Sanusi influence was strongest in Cyrenaica. Rescuing the

region from unrest and anarchy, the Sanusi movement gave the

103
Libya: A Country Study

Cyrenaican tribal people a religious attachment and feelings of unity

and purpose.

The Sanusis formed a nucleus of resistance to the Italian colonial

regime (see Italian Colonialism, ch. 1). As the nationalism fostered

by unified resistance to the Italians gained adherents, however, the

religious fervor of devotion to the movement began to wane, particularly after the Italians destroyed Sanusi religious and educational centers during the 1930s. Nonetheless, King Idris, the

monarch of independent Libya, was the grandson of the founder

of the Sanusi movement, and his status as a Sanusi gave him the

unique ability to command respect from the disparate parts of his

kingdom.

Despite its momentary political prominence, the Sanusi move- ment never regained its strength as a religious force after its zawaayaa were destroyed by the Italians. A promised restoration never fully

took place, and the Idris regime used the Sanusi heritage as a means

of legitimizing political authority rather than of providing religious

leadership.

After unseating Idris in 1969, the Revolutionary government

placed restrictions on the operation of the remaining zawaayaa, appointed a supervisor for Sanusi properties, and merged the Sanusisponsored Islamic University with the University of Libya. The

movement was virtually banned, but in the 1980s occasional evidence of Sanusi activity was nonetheless reported.

Islam in Revolutionary Libya

Under the Revolutionary government, the role of orthodox Islam

in Libyan life has become progressively more important. Qadhafi

is a highly devout Muslim who has repeatedly expressed a desire

to exalt Islam and to restore it to its proper—i.e., central—place

in the life of the people. He believes that the purity of Islam has

been sullied through time, particularly by the influence of Europeans during and after the colonial period, and that its purity must

be restored—by such actions as the restoration of sharia to its proper

place as the basis of the Libyan legal system, the banning of "immodest" practices and dress, and the symbolic purification of major

urban mosques that took place in 1978.

Qadhafi also believes in the value of the Quran as a moral and

political guide for the contemporary world, as is evident from his

tract, The Green Book, published in the mid-1970s (see The Green Book, ch. 4). Qadhafi considers the first part of The Green Book to be a commentary on the implications of the Quranic injunction

that human affairs be managed by consultation. For him, this means

direct democracy, which is given "practical meaning" through the

104
The Society and Its Environment

creation of people's committees and popular congresses. Qadhafi

feels that, inasmuch as The Green Book is based solely on the Quran,

its provisions are universally applicable—at least among Muslims.

Soon after taking office, the Qadhafi government showed itself to be devoutly fundamentalist by closing bars and nightclubs, banning entertainment deemed provocative or immodest, and making use of the Muslim calendar mandatory. The intention of reestab- lishing sharia was announced, and Qadhafi personally assumed

chairmanship of a commission to study the problems involved. In

November 1973, a new legal code was issued that revised the entire

Libyan judicial system to conform to the sharia, and in 1977 the

General People's Congress (GPC—see Glossary) issued a state- ment that all future legal codes would be based on the Quran.

Among the laws enacted by the Qadhafi government a series of legal penalties prescribed during 1973 included the punishment

of armed robbery by amputation of a hand and a foot. The legislation contained qualifying clauses making its execution unlikely,

but its enactment had the effect of applying Quranic principles in

the modern era. Another act prescribed flogging for individuals

breaking the fast of Ramadan, and yet another called for eighty

lashes to be administered to both men and women guilty of fornication.

In the early 1970s, Islam played a major role in legitimizing

Qadhafi 's political and social reforms. By the end of the decade,

however, he had begun to attack the religious establishment and

several fundamental aspects of Sunni Islam. Qadhafi asserted that

the Quran should be the sole guide to Islamic governance, and he

believed in the ability of every Muslim to read and interpret it. He denigrated the roles of the ulama (see Glossary), imams, and

Islamic jurists and questioned the authenticity of the hadith, and

thereby the sunna, as a basis for Islamic law. The sharia itself, Qadhafi maintained, governed only such matters as properly fell within the sphere of religion; all other matters lay outside the purview of religious law. Finally, he called for a revision of the Muslim

calendar, saying it should date from the Prophet's death in 632, an event he felt was more momentous than the hijra ten years

earlier. These unorthodox views on the hadith, sharia, and the Islamic

era aroused a good deal of unease. They seemed to originate from

Qadhafi 's conviction that he possessed the transcendent ability to interpret the Quran and to adapt its message to modern life. Equally, they reinforced the view that he was a reformer but not

a literalist in matters of the Quran and Islamic tradition. On a practical level, however, several observers agreed that Qadhafi was less

105
Libya: A Country Study

motivated by religious convictions than by political calculations.

By espousing these views and by criticizing the ulama, he was using

religion to undermine a segment of the middle class that was nota- bly vocal in opposing his economic policies in the late 1970s. But

Qadhafi clearly considered himself an authority on the Quran and

Islam and was not afraid to challenge traditional religious authority.

He also was not prepared to tolerate dissent.

The Revolutionary government gave repeated evidence of its desire to establish Libya as a leader of the Islamic world. Moreover,

Qadhafi' s efforts to create an Arab nation through political union

with other Arab states were also based on a desire to create a great

Islamic nation. Indeed, Qadhafi drew little distinction between the

two.

The government took a leading role in supporting Islamic insti- tutions and in worldwide proselytizing on behalf of Islam. The Jihad

Fund, supported by a payroll tax, was established in 1970 to aid

the Palestinians in their struggle with Israel. The Faculty of Islamic

Studies and Arabic at the University of Benghazi was charged with

training Muslim intellectual leaders for the entire Islamic world,

and the Islamic Mission Society used public funds for the construction and repair of mosques and Islamic educational centers in cities as widely separated as Vienna and Bangkok. The Islamic Call Society (Ad Dawah) was organized with government support to propagate Islam abroad, particularly throughout Africa, and to pro- vide funds to Muslims everywhere.

Qadhafi has been forthright in his belief in the perfection of Islam

and his desire to propagate it. His commitment to the open propagation of Islam, among other reasons, has caused him to oppose

the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian-based fundamentalist move- ment that has used clandestine and sometimes subversive means

to spread Islam and to eliminate Western influences. Although the

brotherhood's activities in Libya were banned in the mid-1980s,

it was present in the country but maintained a low profile (see

Religious Opposition, ch. 4). In 1983 a member of the brotherhood was executed in Tripoli, and in 1986 a group of brotherhood

adherents was arrested after the murder of a high-ranking politi- cal official in Benghazi. Qadhafi has challenged the brotherhood

to establish itself openly in non-Muslim countries and has promised

its leaders that, if it does, he will support its activities. Qadhafi has stressed the universal applicability of Islam, but

he has also reaffirmed the special status assigned by the Prophet

to Christians. He has, however, likened them to misguided Muslims who have strayed from the correct path. Furthermore, he has

assumed leadership of a drive to free Africa of Christianity as well

as of the colonialism with which it has been associated.

106
A health care center in Benghazi

Courtesy United Nations

Health and Welfare

Social Welfare

A government advertisement appearing in an international publication in 1977 asserted that the Libyan social security legislation

of 1973 ranked among the most comprehensive in the world and

that it protected all citizens from many hazards associated with employment. The social security program instituted in 1957 had al- ready provided protection superior to that available in many or most developing countries, and in the 1980s the welfare available

to Libyans included much more than was provided under the social security law: work injury and sickness compensation and disability, retirement, and survivors' pensions. Workers employed by

foreign firms were entitled to the same social security benefits as workers employed by Libyan citizens. Subsidized food, inexpensive housing, free medical care and education, and profit-sharing were among the benefits that eased the

lives of all citizens. The government protected the employed in their

jobs and subsidized the underemployed and unemployed. In addition, there were nurseries to care for the children of working

mothers, orphanages for homeless children, and homes for the aged.

The welfare programs had reached even the oasis towns of the

desert, where they reportedly were received with considerable

107
Libya: A Country Study

satisfaction. The giving of alms to the poor remained one of the

pillars of the Islamic faith, but the extent of public welfare was such

that there was increasingly less place for private welfare. Nonetheless, the traditional Arab sense of family responsibility remained

strong, and provision for needy relatives was still a common

practice.

Medical Care

The number of physicians and surgeons in practice increased

fivefold between 1965 and 1974, and large increases were registered

in the number of dentists, medical, and paramedical personnel.

Further expansion and improvement followed over the next decade in response to large budgetary outlays, as the Revolutionary

regime continued to use its oil income to improve the health and

welfare of all Libyans. The number of doctors and dentists increased

from 783 in 1970 to 5,450 in 1985, producing in the case of doctors a ratio of 1 per 673 citizens. These doctors were attached to a comprehensive network of health care facilities that dispensed

free medical care. The number of hospital beds increased from 7,500

in 1970 to almost 20,000 by 1985, an improvement from 3.5 beds

to 5.3 beds per 1,000 citizens. During the same years, substantial

increases were also registered in the number of clinics and health

care centers. A large proportion of medical and paramedical personnel were

foreigners brought in under contract from other Arab countries

and from Eastern Europe. The major efforts to "Libyanize" health care professionals, however, were beginning to show results in the

mid-1980s. Libyan sources claimed that approximately 33 percent

of all doctors were nationals in 1985, as compared with only about

6 percent a decade earlier. In the field of nursing staff and technicians, the situation was considerably better—about 80 percent were

Libyan. Schools of nursing had been in existence since the early

1960s, and the faculties of medicine in the universities at Tripoli

and Benghazi included specialized institutes for nurses and technicians. The first medical school was not established until 1970,

and there was no school of dentistry until 1974. By 1978 a total of nearly 500 students was enrolled in medical studies at schools

in Benghazi and Tripoli, and the dental school in Benghazi had

graduated its first class of 23 students. In addition, some students were pursuing graduate medical studies abroad, but in the immediate future Libya was expected to continue to rely heavily on expatriate medical personnel.

Among the major health hazards endemic in the country

in the 1970s were typhoid and paratyphoid, infectious hepatitis,

108
The Society and Its Environment

leishmaniasis, rabies, meningitis, schistosomiasis, and venereal dis- eases. Also reported as having high incidence were various childhood diseases, such as whooping cough, mumps, measles, and

chicken pox. Cholera occurred intermittendy and, although malaria was regarded as having been eliminated in the 1960s, malaria suppressants were often recommended for use in desert oasis areas. By the early 1980s, it was claimed that most or all of these dis- eases were under control. A high rate of trachoma formerly left 10 percent or more of the population blinded or with critically

impaired vision, but by the late 1970s the disease appeared to have

been brought under control. The incidence of new cases of tuberculosis was reduced by nearly half between 1969 and 1976, and

twenty-two new centers for tuberculosis care were constructed

between 1970 and 1985. By the early 1980s, two rehabilitation centers for the handicapped had been built, one each in Benghazi

and Tripoli. These offered both medical and job-training services

and complemented the range of health care services available in

the country.

The streets of Tripoli and Benghazi were kept scrupulously clean,

and drinking water in these cities was of good quality. The government had made significant efforts to provide safe water. In sum- ming up accomplishments since 1970, officials listed almost 1,500

wells drilled and more than 900 reservoirs in service in 1985, in

addition to 9,000 kilometers of potable water networks and 44 desali- nation plants. Sewage disposal had also received considerable

attention, twenty-eight treatment plants having been built. Housing

Housing was one of the major concerns of the Revolutionary

government from the beginning, and the provision of adequate

housing for all Libyans by the 1980s remained a top priority. The

former regime had undertaken to build 100,000 units to relieve a critical housing shortage, but this project had proved an expensive fiasco and was abandoned after 1969. A survey at the time

of the Revolution found that 150,000 families lacked decent shelter,

the actual housing shortfall being placed at upward of 180,000

dwellings.

Both the public and private sectors were involved in housing construction during the 1970s. Private investment and contracting

accounted for a large portion of all construction until new property

ownership laws went into effect in 1978 that limited each family

to only one dwelling. Despite the decline of privately financed

undertakings, the housing sector constituted one of the most notable of the Revolution's achievements. By the late 1970s, the

109
Libya: A Country Study

hovels and tenements surrounding Benghazi and Tripoli had begun

to give way to modern apartment blocks with electricity and run- ning water that stretched ever farther into what had once been

groves and fields. These high-rise apartments became characteristic of the skylines of contemporary Benghazi, Tripoli, and other

urban areas. Between 1970 and 1986, the government invested some LD2.8

million (for value of the Libyan dinar (LD—see Glossary) in housing, which made possible the construction of 277,500 housing units,

according to official sources. To reach these targets, the regime

drew not only upon Libyan resources but also enlisted firms from

France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Spain,

Italy, Turkey, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Cuba.

Since 1984, budget allocations for housing have fallen in keeping

with a general decline in government spending. Many housing contracts have been suspended or canceled as a result, causing financial difficulties for foreign firms. A shortfall in new construction

also raised the prospect of overcrowding and the creation of new

shantytowns as the country's burgeoning population threatened to overwhelm the supply of housing.

Education

Under the monarchy, all Libyans were guaranteed the right to education. Primary and secondary schools were established all over

the country, and old Quranic schools that had been closed during

the struggle for independence were reactivated and new ones established, lending a heavy religious cast to Libyan education. The

educational program suffered from a limited curriculum, a lack

of qualified teachers—especially Libyan—and a tendency to learn

by rote rather than by reasoning, a characteristic of Arab education in general. School enrollments rose rapidly, particularly on

the primary level; vocational education was introduced; and the

first Libyan university was established in Benghazi in 1955. Also

under the monarchy, women began to receive formal education

in increasing numbers, rural and beduin children were brought

into the educational system for the first time, and an adult education program was established.

Total school enrollment rose from 34,000 on the eve of independence in 1951, to nearly 150,000 in 1962, to about 360,000 at the

time of the 1969 Revolution. During the 1970s, the training of

teachers was stressed in an effort to replace the Egyptian and other

expatriate personnel who made up the majority of the teaching

corps. Prefabricated school buildings were erected, and mobile class- rooms and classes held in tents became features of the desert oases.

110
Modern housing built on

the outskirts of Tripoli

In 1986 official sources placed total enrollments at more than

1,245,000 students, of whom 670,000 (54 percent) were males and

575,000 (46 percent) were females (see table 2, Appendix ). These

figures meant that one-third of the population was enrolled in some

form of educational endeavor. For the 1970-86 period, the government claimed nearly 32,000 primary, secondary, and vocational

classrooms had been constructed, while the number of teachers rose from nearly 19,000 to 79,000 (see table 3, Appendix). The added

space and increased number of new teachers greatly improved

student-teacher ratios at preprimary and primary levels; rising en- rollments in general secondary and technical education, however,

increased the density of students per classroom at those levels. At independence, the overall literacy rate among Libyans over

the age of ten did not exceed 20 percent. By 1977, with expanding

school opportunities, the rate had risen to 51 percent overall, or

73 percent for males and 31 percent for females. Relatively low

though it was, the rate for females had soared from the scanty 6

percent registered as recently as 1964. In the early 1980s, only

estimates of literacy were available—about 70 percent for men and

perhaps 35 percent for women.

In 1987 education was free at all levels, and university students

received substantial stipends. Attendance was compulsory between

the ages of six and fifteen years or until completion of the preparatory cycle of secondary school. The administrative or current

111
Libya: A Country Study

expenses budget for 1985 allocated 7.5 percent of the national

budget (LD90.4 million) to education through university level. Allocations for 1983 and 1984 were slightly less —about LD85

million—just under 6 percent of total administrative outlays.

From its inception, the Revolutionary regime placed great emphasis on education, continuing and expanding programs begun

under the monarchy. By the 1980s, the regime had made great

strides, but much remained to be done. The country still suffered

from a lack of qualified Libyan teachers, female attendance at the

secondary level and above was low, and attempts in the late 1970s

to close private schools and to integrate religious and secular

instruction had led to confusion. Perhaps most important were lagging enrollments in vocational and technical training. As recently

as 1977, fewer than 5,000 students were enrolled in 12 technical

high schools. Although unofficial estimates placed technical enroll- ments at nearly 17,000 by 1981, most doctors, dentists, and pharmacists in the early 1980s still came from abroad. Young Libyans

continued to shun technical training, preferring white collar employment because it was associated with social respect and high

status. As a consequence, there seemed to be no immediate prospect

for reducing the heavy reliance on expatriate workers to meet the

economy's increasing need for technical skills. A major source of disruption was the issue of compulsory military training for both male and female students. Beginning in 1981

,

weapons training formed part of the curriculum of secondary schools

and universities, part of a general military mobilization process

(see Conscription and the People's Militia, ch. 5). Both male and

female secondary students wore uniforms to classes and attended

daily military exercises; university students did not wear uniforms

but were required to attend training camps. In addition, girls were

officially encouraged to attend female military academies. These

measures were by no means popular, especially as they related to females, but in the mid-1980s it was too soon to assess their impact on female school attendance and on general educational

standards.

Primary and Secondary Education

In 1987 the school program consisted of six years of primary

school, three years of preparatory school (junior high), and three

years of secondary (high) school. A five-year primary teaching program could be elected upon completion of primary school. A technical high-school program (including industrial subjects or commerce and agriculture) and two-year and four-year programs for the training of primary- school teachers were among the offerings

112
The Society and Its Environment

at the secondary level (see fig. 6). In the mid-1970s, nearly onehalf of the primary, preparatory, and secondary enrollments were

in Tripoli and Benghazi, but by the late 1980s schools were well

distributed around the country, and boarding facilities for students

from remote areas were available at some schools at all academic

levels. The enrollment of girls in primary schools increased from 34

percent of the total in 1970 to nearly 47 percent in 1979. During

the same period, female enrollment in secondary schools was up

from 13 percent to 23 percent, and in vocational schools from 23

percent to 56 percent of total enrollment. However, the number

of girls attending school in some rural areas was well below the

national average, and a high female dropout rate suggested that

many parents sent their daughters to school only long enough to acquire basic skills to make them attractive marriage partners. During the early 1980s, a variety of courses was taught in primary and

secondary classes. English was introduced in the fifth primary grade

and continued thereafter. Islamic studies and Arabic were offered

at all levels of the curriculum, and several hours of classes each

week were reportedly devoted to Qadhafi's The Green Book.

Higher Education

The University of Libya was founded in Benghazi in 1955, with

a branch in Tripoli. In 1973 the two campuses became the universities of Benghazi and Tripoli, respectively, and in 1976 they were renamed Gar Yunis University and Al Fatah University, respectively. In 1981 a technical university specializing in engineering

and petroleum opened at Marsa al Burayqah. Enrollments were

projected at 1,700 students. In addition, there were technical

institutes at Birak, Hun, and Bani Walid. By the early 1980s,

schools of nuclear and electronic engineering and of pharmacy had

been established at Al Fatah University, while plans called for the

construction of an agricultural school at Al Bayda for 1,500 students.

Expansion of facilities for higher education was critical to meeting skilled personnel requirements. Technical education was being

emphasized in keeping with a trend toward more specialized facilities for both secondary and university studies. In 1982 the GPC

passed a resolution calling for the replacement of secondary schools

by specialized training institutes whose curricula would be closely

integrated with those of the universities and technical institutes. In 1985 the GPC called for a further expansion of vocational and

professional training centers and for measures to compel technically trained students to work in their fields of specialization.

Students were also expected to play a more active role in the

113
Libya: A Country Study

PREPARATORY SECONDARY

AGE 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 17 1! nun nil COMMERCE inAND rtlHIHIHZh

AGRICULTURE

INDUSTRIAL SECONDARY

PRIMARY [IHIHIHZHIHIHHIHIHIl EH

EH£}SEH

SCIENCES iCZHZh

PREPARATORY SECONDARY

TEACHER

L0HiHZ]S-EHZKI}OJ GENERAL

TEACHER TRAINING

UNIVERSITY

TRAINING SPECIALTY

AGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 17 18 PRIMARY PREPARATORY SECONDARY

Figure 6. School System, 1987

economy as the country attempted to overcome the shortage of

skilled manpower caused by the expulsion of foreign workers in

1985 (see Population, this ch.). In view of declining allocations for education in the mid-1980s, however, it was doubtful if these and

other goals would be met.

University enrollment figures for the 1980s were unavailable in

1987. However, they had risen without interruption since the 1950s,

and it seemed probable that this trend was continuing. About 3,000

students were enrolled in the University of Libya in 1969. By 1975

the figure was up to 12,000, and a 1980 total of 25,000 was projected. Female enrollments rose dramatically during this period,

from 9 percent of total enrollments in the 1970-71 period, to 20

percent in the 1978-79 period, to 24 percent in the early 1980s.

In the 1970s, many students went abroad for university and

graduate training; in 1978 about 3,000 were studying in the United

States alone. In the early 1980s, however, the government was no

longer willing to grant fellowships for study abroad, preferring to educate young Libyans at home for economic and political rea- sons. In 1985 Libyan students in Western countries were recalled

and their study grants terminated. Although precise information was lacking, many students were reportedly reluctant to interrupt

their programs and return home.

114
The Society and Its Environment

University students were restless and vocal but also somewhat

lacking in application and motivation. They played an active role

in university affairs through student committees, which debated

a wide range of administrative and educational matters and which

themselves became arenas for confrontation between radical and

moderate factions. University students were also among the few

groups to express open dissatisfaction with the Qadhafi government (see Student Opposition, ch. 4). One major source of ten- sion arose from the regime's constant intervention to control and

politicize education on all levels, whereas most Libyans regarded

education as the path to personal and social advancement, best left free of government meddling.

In 1976 students mounted violent protests in Benghazi and

Tripoli over compulsory military training. More recently, in March

1986 students of the faculties of English and French at Al Fatah

University successfully thwarted Qadhafi 's attempt to close their

departments and to destroy their libraries, part of the Arabization

campaign and another of Qadhafi 's steps to eliminate Western in- fluence. A compromise was worked out whereby the departmental libraries were spared, but both foreign languages were gradually

to be phased out of university curricula. After this incident, Qadhafi

announced that Russian would be substituted for English in Libyan

schools, a policy which, if implemented, was certain to cause both

practical and political difficulties.

* * *

Despite the attention Libya has received in the press and the

appearance of a few major works within the last decade, the litera- ture on Libyan society is relatively thin and uneven. The best and

most comprehensive general introduction is also the newest—Lillian Craig Harris's Libya: Qadhafi 's Revolution and the Modern State. Her

primary focus is political and economic, but Harris also discusses

the people, the social achievements of the Revolutionary government, and social disaffection. Richard Parker's North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development, gives another overview

of Libya in the early 1980s, although he, too, is primarily concerned

with politics and foreign affairs rather than with domestic affairs. John Wright's Libya: A Modern History, provides extensive cover- age of the independence period, being particularly valuable on social change during the 1970s.

There is a general dearth of current reliable social statistics for the 1980s, in contrast with the 1970s. The available data is often a decade or more old and in some cases is missing altogether. The

115
Libya: A Country Study

best available sources outside the country are the various publications of the United Nations and the World Bank. Much useful and

usually more current data can be found in the quarterly economic

reviews published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (London).

The situation is considerably better with respect to analyses of

social structure and values. Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer's

Political Development and Social Change in Libya and "Opposition to Change in Rural Libya" are concerned with the evolution of social structure since independence. Basing their conclusions on field sur- veys, these researchers document the resilience of traditional values

in shaping contemporary Libyan society, especially its elite structure. In "Libya: Personalistic Leadership of a Populist Revolution," Raymond Hinnebusch dissects the Revolutionary-era elite in a scholarly treatment that also shows how the ideals of the Revolution have affected elite formation. A series of essays covering

almost all aspects of society , in some cases since the nineteenth century, comes from Marius and Mary Jane Deeb, Libya Since the Revolution. Like El Fathaly and Palmer, the Deebs write on the basis

of first-hand experience, but unfortunately their data are largely

drawn from the early and mid-1970s. Mustafa Attir's "Ideology,

Value Changes, and Women's Social Position in Libyan Society,"

examines attitudes toward women and traces the evolution of fe- male rights and status over the last four decades. Ann Elizabeth

Mayer's "Islamic Resurgence or New Prophethood," details the

legal and theological reasoning and posturing that lie behind

Qadhafi's view of Islam and his challenge to the religious establishment. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibli- ography).

116
Chapter 3. The Economy
An oil rig in the Libyan desert
THE LIBYAN ECONOMY is unique in North Africa. Whereas

Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia all have large populations,

considerable agricultural potential, and well-established industrial

bases, Libya possesses few of these advantages. It does, however,

have abundant energy resources—primarily an attractive type of

light low-sulfur crude oil as well as some natural gas. Given the

country's small population (3.6 million in 1984) and considerable

petroleum-derived income, the Libyan economy has more in com- mon with those of the small oil-exporting Persian Gulf states than

with those of its North African neighbors.

Because of Libya's great dependence on oil revenues, the general

level of the Libyan economy is closely related to the health of the

petrochemical industry. Despite massive investment in agriculture

and nonpetroleum-related industry, the percentage of Libya's gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) derived from oil has re- mained fairly constant since the early 1970s, fluctuating between

50 and 60 percent until 1982, when declining oil revenues caused

it to drop below 50 percent. Since Muammar al Qadhafi and his

associates came to power in 1969, reducing Libya's dependence on oil has been the government's major economic policy objective.

Its inability to achieve this goal stems from ill-advised policy decisions as well as the many obstacles to economic diversification in a land lacking in both basic infrastructure and water resources.

Diversification is an important issue because at current rates of

production, Libyan oil reserves are not expected to last beyond the

second decade of che next century. Thus, the long-term health of

the Libyan economy hinges on developing a self-sustaining non- petroleum sector. Otherwise, once oil reserves are depleted, Libya

will become as poor as it was before its current oil boom.

Libya's postindependence economic progress can be divided into

four periods. The first period began with Libya's gaining of independence in 1951 , included the discovery of oil in 1957, and ended

in 1961. The second period dates from 1961, when oil exports

moved the country into the forefront of the world's economies. The

September 1, 1969, military coup d'etat marked the beginninng

of the third period, a period that saw Libya change from a Westernoriented capitalist country into a strongly nationalist, anti-Western,

socialist state. This period also witnessed the government's growing intervention in the economy, which was largely financed by

the booming oil revenues of the 1970s. Falling world oil prices in

119
Libya: A Country Study

the early 1980s ushered in the fourth phase of Libya's economic

development. The falling prices have dramatically reduced government revenue and caused a serious decline in economic activity.

The economic change between independence and the 1980s was

dramatic. In 1951, on the eve of independence, Libya, underdeveloped and backward, was characterized by the United Nations (UN)

as perhaps the world's poorest country. Experts predicted that the

country would have to be supported for years by international

grants-in-aid while it organized itself to try to live within its own

meager means. However, in less than 25 years, Libya had turned

into a rapidly developing country with accumulated net gold and

foreign-exchange reserves equivalent to upward of US$4 billion

and an estimated annual income from oil revenues of between US$6

and US$8 billion. Although Libya suffered few balance-of-payments

problems, it was beginning to be bothered by inflation. The country seemed to have adequate funds at its disposal, however.

Growth and Structure of the Economy

At the time of independence, the Libyan economy was based

mainly on agriculture, which was divided more or less evenly between field (including tree) crops and livestock products. Agriculture provided raw materials for much of the country's industrial

sector, exports, and trade; employed more than 70 percent of the

labor force; and contributed about 30 percent of the GDP, dependent on climatic conditions.

For the most part, agricultural resources were limited to two comparatively narrow stretches along the Mediterranean Sea and a few

desert oases. The cropland had been maltreated, and the pasture

had been overgrazed. Erosion was common, production methods

were primitive, and close to a quarter of the agricultural area was

held on a tribal basis and was being used inefficiently. Rainfall was

unpredictable, except that usually it was scarce and ill-timed. When

the rains did come, however, they were likely to be excessive.

Groundwater was in short supply in the agricultural areas. In some

locations it had been so excessively drawn upon that it had become

brackish or saline and was no longer suitable even for agriculture.

Because the country has no perennial rivers, there was only limited potential for irrigation and even less for hydroelectric power.

At the time of independence, the apparently abundant subterra- nean water supplies located in the Lower Sahara had not yet been

discovered. Even if officials had known about the water, its presence, while encouraging, would not have been very helpful in the short

term because of lack of development funds and inadequate trans- port and storage facilities. In 1986, although agriculture contributed

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a very small share to the GDP, it still provided employment opportunities for a large portion of the population and was therefore still important (see table 4, Appendix). Shortage of water was the main

drawback to expansion of cultivable land, but reclamation and irri- gation schemes and the introduction of modern farming techniques

held promise for the future.

At the time of independence, Libya possessed few minerals in quantities sufficient for commercial use, although iron ore was subsequently found in the Wadi ash Shati in the south-central part

of the country. In turn, because of the absence of coal and hydroelectric power, the country had little energy potential. In the modern

sense, Libya had practically no industry and, given the limitations

of the agricultural sector, could produce few exports to be exchanged

for the import commodities the country needed.

At independence, illiteracy was widespread, the level of skills was low, and technical and management expertise and organization were at a premium. (The lack of sufficient numbers of skilled Libyans in the labor force remained a problem in the 1980s; despite

large sums of money having been spent on training Libyans, the

government still relied on foreign workers.) A large part of the national life was lived under nomadic or seminomadic, rather than

settled, conditions. The high birthrate added to the country's poverty. The rapid population increase strained the agricultural econ- omy and resulted in the drift of excess unskilled laborers to urban

centers, but these centers, too, lacked sufficient adequately paid

employment.

In terms of resources, including human resources, the outlook

at independence was bleak. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s,

international and other foreign agencies—mainly the United States and Italy—continued to finance the gap between Libya's needs and

its domestic resources. The foreign community was not in a position, however, to undertake an across-the-board and sustained

development program to set the economy on a course of immediate self-sufficiency. During much of the 1950s, the country's administrative apparatus was unable even to utilize all the resources made

available from abroad.

During the decade after the discovery of petroleum, Libya be- came a classic example of a dual economy, in which two separate

economies (petroleum and nonpetroleum) operated side by side. For practical purposes, no connection existed between them except

that the petroleum companies employed limited quantities of

local labor and paid a portion of their profits to the government

in royalties and taxes. The financing and decisions affecting the

activities of the petroleum economy came not from the domestic

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Libya: A Country Study

nonpetroleum economy but rather from outside the country.

Although this sharp dichotomy was in the process of relaxation after 1965 —perhaps especially after 1967 —it appears not to have been

attacked conceptually, at least not with fervor, until after the 1969

change of government.

The laissez-faire arrangement came to an end with the military

coup d'etat of September 1, 1969. The previous government's per- sonnel and much of its administrative framework were scrapped,

and the oil companies were put on notice that they were overdue on large payments for unpaid taxes and royalties. In other respects

affecting the economy, the new government marked time, except

for its policy of "Libyanization" —the process of replacing for- eigners and foreign-owned firms in trade, government, and related

activities with Libyan citizens and firms. In mid- 1970, the government embarked on a program of progressive nationalization.

In addition to establishing at least a temporary veto power over

the activities of the oil companies, the nationalization program

included sequestration of all Italian assets, socialization (state ownership) of the banking and insurance system, Libyanization of all forms of trade, and steady substitution of Libyans for foreign

administrative and management personnel in resident foreign concerns—another aspect of Libyanization. In the petroleum sector, the government put a constantly increasing financial bite on

the companies. By the end of 1974, the government either had

nationalized companies or had become a participant in their concessions and their production and transportation facilities. The

regime thus had a larger share of the profits than under the previ- ous royalty and tax arrangements. However, despite varying

degrees of nationalization of foreign oil firms, in 1987 Libya was

still highly dependent on foreign companies for the expertise needed

in exploitation, marketing, and management of the oil fields and

installations that remained the primary basis of the country's eco- nomic activity.

After 1972 the government began supplementing its policy of

nationalization with an ambitious plan to modernize the economy,

modeled largely on neighboring Algeria's experience. The key component of this plan was an intensive effort to build industrial

capacity, placing a special emphasis on petroleum-related industry. The industrialization program had two major goals: the diversification of income sources and import substitution. In this latter respect, the plan met with some success, as several categories of

imports began to decline in the late 1970s. In 1981 , when oil prices started to fall and the worldwide oil market entered a period of glut, the present phase of independent

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The Economy

Libya's economic history began. The decline in oil prices has had

a tremendous effect on the Libyan economy. By 1985 Libyan oil revenues had fallen to their lowest level since the first Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price shock in 1973.

This fall in oil revenues, which constituted over 57 percent of the

total GDP in 1980 and from which, in some years, the government had derived over 80 percent of its revenue, caused a sharp

contraction in the Libyan economy. Real GDP fell by over 14 per- cent between 1980 and 1981 and was continuing to decline in late 1986. The negative trend in real GDP growth was not expected

to reverse itself soon. The decline in real GDP placed great strain on government

spending, reduced the level of imported goods available in Libyan

markets, and increased Libya's debt repayment problems—all of

which combined to lower living standards. The decline in oil reve- nues also caused the Libyan government to revise its somewhat

haphazard way of making economic policy decisions, because it no longer possessed the financial resources to achieve its many goals.

Thus, during the early and mid-1980s, development projects were

subjected to a more rigorous cost and benefit analysis than during

the easy money time of the 1970s. As of 1987, however, it was too

early to judge the effectiveness of the government's response to fall- ing oil revenues. Role of the Government

Mainly because of Libya's strategic role in World War II, the

Libyan government had come to depend on foreign patrons for

its financial needs. During the Italian occupation and in the immediate postwar period, first Italian and then United States and

British grants kept the Libyan administration solvent. After 1956

the need for direct foreign subsidies declined as the international

oil companies began to invest heavily in Libya—causing substantial capital inflows. During the 1960s, the investments of the previ- ous decade began to pay off, and the country experienced the fruits of rising oil wealth. This trend not only reduced the government's

need for foreign assistance, but also generated a huge increase in

taxable domestic income. However, Libyan physical and human

resource development continued to lag, necessitating sustained reli- ance on foreign technical assistance. This pattern of dependence on foreigners to perform crucial skilled functions, which subsequent

governments have been unable to eliminate, has made Libyans

acutely aware of their subordinate status in the world economy in

relation to the industrialized West.

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Libya: A Country Study

Consequently, the Qadhafi government has assigned high priority to the achievement of what it perceives as "true economic

independence." This theme has been one of Qadhafi 's staple arguments and underlies much of the post- 1969 Revolutionary government's economic policies. Qadhafi's other principal economic

objective has been to promote equity, which he equates with so- cialism. Because of Qadhafi's unique conception of the character

of the state, his distrust of the private sector, and his abhorrence

ofthe profit motive, he has maintained that it is only through massive state intervention that economic independence and equity can

be attained. Thus, the state has taken control of virtually all eco- nomic domains since Qadhafi came to power.

Soon after the revolution, a major Libyanization drive was ini- tiated, which involved the expulsion of the remaining Jewish and

Italian communities and the nationalization of the country's banks,

insurance, and petroleum-marketing companies. Other measures were enacted to restrict the activities of foreigners in commerce

and industry.

Throughout the 1970s, the government expanded its role to take

control of Libya's economic resources. The public Libyan Petroleum Company (LIPETCO) was supplanted in 1970 by the National

Oil Company (NOC), which became responsible for implementing policies decided upon in the Ministry of Petroleum before the

latter was dissolved in March 1986. Similarly, the government exer- cised effective control over water rights and created a large number of state-owned enterprises to oversee Libya's basic infrastructural

facilities, such as highways, communications, ports, airports, and

electric power stations. Public corporations were also created to run the state airline and to import certain restricted goods. The

public import company, the National Organization for Supply

Commodities (NOSC), was given a monopoly over the import and

sale of many basic consumer items. In 1975 the government became

the sole importer and retailer of motor vehicles. The domestic marketing of certain commodities and the provision of certain services were restricted to the public sector. By 1977 these included construction materials, livestock, fertilizers, fish fodder, insecticides,

insurance, banking, advertising, and publishing.

Since the late 1970s, the Libyan government has accelerated its assault on the private sector in a determined attempt to stamp out

what it identified as bourgeois exploitation. This renewed effort followed the codification of Qadhafi's economic theories in the sec- ond volume of his The Green Book, published in 1978 (see The Green Book, ch. 4). Many of the regime's most radical economic policies

began soon after that date. The first concrete manifestation of

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The Economy

Qadhafi' s new economic militancy occurred in 1978, when he out- lawed rental payments for property, changing all residential tenants

into instant owners. The private sector housing and real estate industry was thus eliminated, and the new owners were required

to pay monthly "mortgage" payments—usually amounting to about one-third of their former rent—directly to the government;

however, families making less than the equivalent of US$500 a month were exempted from this obligation.

Qadhafi initiated another major innovation in 1978 when, during a speech, he urged workers in both the public and private sec- tors to take control of the enterprises in which they worked by

following his dictum: "partners, not wage earners. " This new idea

went much further than an earlier law in 1973, which had merely

instituted mandatory profit-sharing. Now workers were urged to involve themselves in the day-to-day management of the enterprises

in which they worked. Within 3 months of this speech, workers

in 180 enterprises had formed "workers' committees" which, in

principle at least, ran these concerns. The most ambitious of the 1978 measures, however, was the

attempt to do away with all private commerce, retail as well as wholesale. In that year, the responsibilities of the NOSC were considerably enlarged because the state took over responsibility for the

importation of all goods and control over all foreign exchange transactions. In theory, all private commercial transactions became illegal as the state began to open centralized supermarkets run by local people's committees with the aim of undermining the numerous

neighborhood shops that previously had catered to the daily needs

of most Libyans. Eventually, there were 230 such state-run supermarkets in various parts of the country. Although no one expected

such a small number of stores to replace fully the thousands of pri- vate sector merchants, state planners hoped that the stores would

constitute enough of a market presence in each location to exert a downward pressure on private sector prices for competing goods.

The hostility of Qadhafi toward the private sector was based on

his view of merchants as nonproductive parasites; he ignored their

role as distributors. In fact, many state proclamations explicitly

stated that government policy was designed to do away with the

whole merchant class. One newspaper editorial emphasized that

"One of the goals of these consumer centers is to cut down on the

huge number of merchants who are a burden on productivity."

The only type of private sector enterprises that the government

did not actively seek to eliminate were small service-providing firms,

which were not viewed as inherently exploitative.

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Libya: A Country Study

By 1980 it was clear that Qadhafi 's assault on the private sector was not proceeding as fast as he had hoped. Even in a time of rela- tive wealth—oil revenues were nearing their peak and the state had

enough revenue to fix the prices of certain goods—the public sec- tor was unable to satisfy demand for many consumer items. The

unsatisfied demand left room for private sector activity at various

levels of legality. Continuing his attack on the private sector from

another angle, in 1980 Qadhafi demonetized all currency notes

above one dinar (for value of the Libyan dinar, LD, see Glossary).

His action was designed to encourage those holding large quantities of dinars to deposit them in the nationalized banks—thus in- creasing state control over private sector assets. Many individuals

with large cash holdings were reluctant to deposit their savings,

however, since withdrawals in excess of LD1,000 were prohibited.

They also feared that large deposits could be used against them

as evidence of their having engaged in illegal commercial transactions. The main result of the 1980 demonetization, therefore, was

a rise in conspicuous consumption, as individuals sought to transfer their savings into material goods, and an increased demand for black market foreign exchange, as persons sought ways to export

their dinars.

Most of the post- 197 7 economic policy innovations of the Qadhafi

government were designed to inhibit the private accumulation of

wealth and promote an equitable distribution of the national

income. The principal vehicles for fostering economic independence

in this period have been two five-year plans (1976-80 and 1981-85),

which were aimed at directing investment to areas that would contribute to economic autonomy (see table 5, Appendix). In the

1976-80 plan, agriculture and industry received the largest share

of investment, whereas the 1981-85 plan allocated more funds to industry and public works, with agriculture coming in third.

Most of the planned agricultural investment has been directed

to the development of oasis agriculture and irrigation. Ambitious

schemes were launched during the 1970s to use the underground

fossil water resources of the Tazirbu, Sarir, and Al Kufrah oases

to grow wheat and animal fodder crops (see fig. 4). Similarly, work

has begun on the Great Man-Made River (GMMR) scheme to tap desert aquifers to bring water to the coastal agricultural areas where shrinking aquifers and rising salinity threaten to lay waste

to historically productive agricultural lands.

Industrial investment has been concentrated on several largescale projects at industrial centers along the coast. Existing in- dustrial facilities are located at Marsa al Burayqah, Misratah, and

Ras al Unuf. Further expansion of these facilities as well as the

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The Economy

creation of new ones was a principal objective of the 1981-85 plan.

Most industrial projects were designed to create downstream

petrochemical employment, satisfy internal demand for processed

petroleum products, and take advantage of cheap energy to build

export-oriented manufacturing capacity.

The contrast in approaches between the relatively conservative

development plans, with their emphasis on investment and resource

mobilization, and Qadhafi's more radical "socialist" policies, which seem to sacrifice efficiency for equity, produced inherent tensions

in economic policy-making. In certain respects, the pursuit of equity

has hindered Libya's quest for economic independence by dis- couraging private sector growth.

The political climate of Libya in the mid-1980s placed numerous obstacles in the way of private sector development. The 1978

law requiring all enterprises to be run by workers' committees made

effective management almost impossible. Furthermore, since

workers' committees rarely accepted economic efficiency or profitability as valid objectives, many enterprises no longer had a clearly

defined role in the economy. The result of such policies has been

to stifle most dynamism in the private sector. Consequently, when

the government needed to ensure the accomplishment of key eco- nomic tasks, which it was incapable of doing for itself, it had no

choice but to turn to foreigners.

Those Libyans possessing managerial experience or engaged in performing key economic activities prior to 1978 became increasingly alienated by the subsequent directions of government policy; many even left the country. Thus, with a severely handicapped

domestic private sector and few competent Libyan managers, the

completion and operation of practically all key industrial projects

depended on foreign expertise. Furthermore, because the post- 1978

economic environment had provided little incentive for the training of Libyan managers, there was little likelihood of easily reversing

the shortage of indigenous managers.

Some foreign observers have suggested that the sharp drop in

oil revenues, which began in the early 1980s, may lead to a re- evaluation of many of Qadhafi's more radical socialist policies. Such

reassessment could reduce some of the private sector's problems

and actually contribute toward economic independence. There were some indications that this was indeed happening in the mid-1980s,

as many projects of doubtful economic value were postponed.

Because of declining revenues, the government has been unable

to finance much of its ambitious drive to replace the private sector. The expansion of the state-run supermarket system ended as funds grew tighter. By 1985 the stores were unable to supply most

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Libya: A Country Study

basic consumer items, thus failing to drive down private sector

prices. Similarly, the government was compelled to expel many

foreign workers who had been the mainstay of the economy. Between 1983 and 1987, the number of foreign workers in Libya fell drastically, going from more than 560,000 to about 200,000. This

decline was achieved primarily by cutting the number of unskilled

foreign laborers employed by the public sector to perform basic

service tasks—jobs that many Libyans could fill. Whether the in- creased demand for labor in the wake of these expulsions will result in a greater Libyanization of the work force, or merely in a rise in the number of unfilled jobs will depend largely on how much

the government relaxes its restrictions on private sector employment. In the mid-1980s, few public sector funds were available for hiring Libyans at the higher salaries they would require.

Industry

In 1984 industry, including the exploration, production, trans- port, and marketing of petroleum products (crude petroleum, natural gas, and condensates derived therefrom), contributed about

60 percent of GDP (at factor cost) and virtually 100 percent of exports. Industrial activities also occupied from 30 to 38 percent of

the total labor force in 1984.

Libyan industrial development has been heavily dependent on

the oil sector, both for investment revenue and for raw inputs.

Throughout the 1970s, the government implemented numerous

measures to increase its share of the profits from oil exploitation

and marketing. By the mid-1980s, the revenue accruing to foreign

oil companies engaged in lifting Libyan oil was taxed at a rate of

about 95 percent.

Hydrocarbons and Mining

Since the early 1960s, the petroleum industry has increasingly

dominated the whole economy, although in 1984 it provided direct

employment for fewer than 10,000 Libyans. The development of

the oil industry was remarkable, both in terms of its rapidity and

its proliferation. An exceptional combination of circumstances contributed to the development of the petroleum sector. Like Algerian

oil, Libyan crude oil, while having a rather high wax content, is lighter and easier to handle than crudes from most other petroleum areas. It also has a low sulfur content, which makes it easier on internal combustion engines and less of a pollution contributant than other crudes. For this reason, Libyan crudes had a receptive market in Europe from the start; furthermore, Libya is one-third closer to European markets than the oil ports of the eastern

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Libya: A Country Study

Mediterranean. When the Suez Canal was closed by the June 1967

War, forcing tankers from Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula

to go around the Cape of Good Hope, the advantages of Libyan

petroleum were enhanced. Moreover, the lay of the land itself, which allows the output of the wells to be piped directly and easily

to dockside totally over Libya's territory, assured steadiness of supply, which has not necessarily been the case for eastern Mediter- ranean pipeline outlets. In addition, Libya's petroleum development

benefited from the technology and experience acquired by the in- dustry in other parts of the petroleum world during the preceding

fifty years. Thus, by 1977 Libya was the seventh largest oil producer

in the world. However, Libya's position declined somewhat in the

early 1980s as OPEC production quotas were cut. By 1986 Libya was only the fifteenth largest producer of crude oil. For the petroleum industry, the military coup of 1969 did not

represent a rupture of continuity; it did, however, introduce a shift in government attitudes toward the purpose and function of the

foreign operating companies in line with its general nationalistsocialist political and socioeconomic orientation. It is therefore useful

to visualize Libya's petroleum development in terms of two periods,

dividing at September 1, 1969, with the earlier period serving to prepare for the later. Active exploration started in 1953 after oil was discovered in

neighboring Algeria. The first well was begun in 1956 in western

Fezzan, and the first oil was struck in 1957. Esso (subsequently

Exxon) made the first commercial strike in 1959, just as several

firms were planning to give up exploration. The first oil flowed

by pipeline from Esso's concession at Zaltan to its export facilities at Marsa al Burayqah in 1961 . The rush was on, with other companies entering Libya and additional discoveries being made. The

original major strikes were in the Sirtica Basin, one of the world's

largest oil fields, southeast of the Gulf of Sidra; in 1987 this area was still the source of the bulk of Libya's output. In 1969 a major

strike was made at Sarir, well to the southeast of the Sirtica Basin

fields, and minor fields were located in northwestern Tripolitania.

New deposits were found in the Ghadamis sedimentation basin (400

kilometers southwest of Tripoli) in 1974 and in offshore fields 30

kilometers northwest of Tripoli in 1977.

Since 1977 efforts to tap new deposits have concentrated on

Libya's offshore fields. The large Bouri field was due to be brought

on-stream by the NOC and AGIP (Azienda Generale Italiana

Petroli), a subsidiary of the Italian state oil company consortium,

in late 1987. Other offshore exploration ventures were launched

following the settlement of maritime boundary disputes with Tunisia

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The Economy

in 1982 and Malta in 1983. Libyan access to offshore deposits in

these formerly disputed areas was significant, because they may

contain as much as 7 billion barrels of oil. Petroleum production in 1985 was still governed by the Petroleum

Law of 1955, which was amended in 1961, 1965, and 1971. The

government, through the Ministry of Petroleum, preferred to grant

sizable concessions to a number of different foreign companies. To

induce rapid exploitation of deposits, the typical concession contract called for progressive nationalization of Libyan operations run by foreign companies over a span of ten years, with the Libyan

government's share starting as one-fourth and ending at threefourths. The government extracted most of its compensation in the

form of product sharing. When early concessions to several large

companies by Esso, which was the first to export Libyan crude in

1961, proved to be highly profitable, many independent oil companies from noncommunist countries set up similar operations in

Libya. In 1969 about thirty-three companies held concessions. Concessionary terms were somewhat tightened during the 1970s, as the post-Revolutionary government pursued a more active policy

of nationalization. The vehicle for this policy was the revamped

state NOC, which, as noted, was formed in 1970 from LIPETCO.

In July 1970, NOC 's jurisdiction was expanded by legislation that

nationalized the foreign-owned Esso, Shell, and Ente Nazionale

Idrocarburi (ENI) marketing subsidiaries, and a small local company, Petro Libya, and transferred their operations to NOC. These

operations included managing companies in the importing, dis- tributing, and selling of refined petroleum products at subsidized

prices in Libya. In 1971 the companies were merged into a single

countrywide marketing enterprise called the Brega Company, which

also marketed oil and gas abroad for the government.

The new government's nationalization campaign commenced

in December 1971 , when it nationalized the British Petroleum share

of the British Petroleum-Bunker Hunt Sarir field in retaliation for the British government's failure to intervene to prevent Iran from

taking possession of three small islands in the Persian Gulf belonging

to the United Arab Emirates. It was not until late 1974 that a compensation agreement was reached between British Petroleum and

the Libyan government over the settlement of these nationalized

assets. In December 1972, Libya moved against British Petroleum's

former partner Bunker Hunt and demanded a 50-percent participation in its operations. When Bunker Hunt refused, its assets were nationalized in June 1973 and turned over to one of NOCs subsidiaries, as had been done earlier with British Petroleum's

assets.

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Libya: A Country Study

In late 1972, a 50-percent participation had been agreed upon

with the Italian joint company, ENI-AGIP, and in early 1973 talks began with the Occidental Petroleum Corporation and with the

Oasis group. Occidental, accounting for about 15 percent of total production, was one of the major independent producers. In July

1973, it agreed to NOC's purchase of 51 percent of its assets. The

Oasis group, another major producer, was one-third owned by the

Continental Oil Company, one-third by Marathon Petroleum, and

one- sixth each by Amerada Petroleum Company and Shell. The

Oasis group agreed to Libyan 51 -percent participation in August

1973. On September 1, 1973, Libya unilaterally announced that

it was taking over 51 percent of the remaining oil companies, ex- cept for a few small operators.

Several foreign oil companies balked at the Libyan proposal but soon found that the government's policy was firm: agree to Libyan

participation or face nationalization. Shell refused to accept Libyan

participation in its share of the Oasis group, and its operations were

nationalized in March 1974. A month earlier, three other reluc- tant oil companies had been nationalized: Texaco, the California

Asiatic Company, and the Libyan-American Oil Company. They

finally received compensation for their assets in 1977.

Political events of the 1980s convinced many American-owned

companies of the advisability of selling off their Libyan operations.

In 1981 Exxon withdrew from Libya, pulling out its long-standing

subsidiary operations. Mobil followed suit in 1982, when it withdrew from its operations in the Ras al Unuf system. These withdrawals gave NOC an even greater share in the overall oil industry.

Another round of advancing nationalization was made possible in

1986, when United States President Ronald Reagan announced

on January 7 his intention to require American companies to divest

from their operations in Libya. It was unclear at that time, however,

whether the five companies involved would sell their shares to NOC

(probably at a substantial loss), or merely transfer them to European subsidiaries not affected by the president's sanctions. According to the latest estimates available in early 1987, NOC's share

of the total equity in Libyan petroleum operations stood at 70 percent, with two operating subsidiaries and at least a 50-percent share

in each major private concession.

Although NOC nominally had been under control of the Ministry

of Petroleum, foreign observers were uncertain what real control

the ministry had over the NOC. The ministry's dissolution in

March 1986 produced little comment, which seemed to indicate

that NOC was the principal instrument of government policy in

the oil sector and controlled about two-thirds of Libya's total oil production.

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The Economy

Since 1974 no new concessions have been granted, although the

Libyan government has negotiated production- sharing agreements

with existing concession holders to induce them to search for new

deposits, particularly in the offshore region bordering Tunisia where

the large Bouri field is located. These agreements have called for NOC to receive 81 percent of production if the discovery is off- shore and 85 percent if it is onshore.

Libyan price policy has largely been settled in meetings of OPEC

,

which it joined in 1962. Both the pre-Revolutionary and postRevolutionary governments have remained committed to OPEC

as an instrument for maximizing their total oil revenues. Petroleum

production (almost all of which was exported) declined during the

first half of the 1970s, as a result of both the OPEC and Libyan

policy of cutting production to influence price. During the late 1970s, production rose slightly, only to fall again in the 1980s when

OPEC reduced its members' production quotas in an attempt to halt the oil price slide. In March 1983, Libya accepted its OPEC

quota of 1 . 1 million barrels per day (bpd—see Glossary). This figure was revised downward again in November 1984, when it was set at 990,000 bpd. Libyan oil production in 1986 averaged slightly more than 1.1 million bpd, having regained the same production

it had in 1981. Generally, Libya has adhered to its OPEC quota.

In 1986 Libyan oil fields were served by a complicated network

of oil pipelines leading to the five principal export terminals at Marsa

al Burayqah, As Sidra, Ras al Unuf, Marsa al Hariqah, and Az

Zuwaytinah (see fig. 7). The Sidra terminal exported the largest

volume of oil, about 30 percent of the total in 1981 . A future sixth

terminal was planned at Zuwarah in western Libya. Pipelines to these terminals served more than one company, thus mixing differ- ent oil blends that were standardized for export. The share that an individual company received from exports was determined by

the amount and quality or the oil that entered the common pipeline. The share of the oil belonging to NOC was either sold di- rectly on the open market or sold back to its producing partner.

Libyan refining capacity increased dramatically in 1985, when the

export refinery at Ras al Unuf came on stream with a 220,000-bpd

capacity. Other refineries existed at Tobruk (20,000 bpd), Marsa

al Burayqah (11 ,000 bpd), and Az Zawiyah (1 16,000 bpd), giving

Libya an overall refining capacity in 1985 of 367,000 bpd.

Production of natural gas in Libya received a major boost in

1971, when a law was passed requiring the oil companies to store and liquify the natural gas condensate from their wells, rather than

burning it off as many had previously done. However, natural gas production has lagged far behind oil because the high costs of

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Libya: A Country Study

transport and liquefaction have made it a less attractive alternative. A large liquefaction plant was built at Marsa al Burayqah in

1968, but its export performance has been spotty. About 70 per- cent of Libya's natural gas production is consumed domestically.

Production stood at 12.35 billion cubic meters in 1984, down from

20.38 billion cubic meters in 1980. Total reserves of natural gas were estimated at 600 billion cubic meters in 1985.

According to information available in 1987, Libya's commercially usable mineral resources—apart from its hydrocarbons

were limited to a large iron-ore deposit in the Wadi ash Shati near Sabha in Fezzan (see fig. 8), and scattered, deposits of gypsum,

limestone, cement rock, salt, and building stone. There also were

small, widely scattered and currently noncommercial deposits of

phosphate rock, manganese, barite-celestite, sodium carbonate, sul- fur, and alum. Although much of the country had been photographed by the petroleum companies and large portions of it had

been mapped by the Italians, by British and American military

personnel, and by the United States Geological Survey (from 1954

to 1962) in search of water and minerals, the country is so large

that in early 1987 much of it still had not been mapped at scales suitable for definitive mineral inventory.

The Wadi ash Shati iron-ore deposit is apparently one of the

largest in the world. Suitable in considerable part for strip mining, it outcrops in or underlies roughly eighty square kilometers

of the valley. According to information in the mid-1980s, none of

it was high-grade ore. Preliminary estimates suggest that the amount

of 30 to 40 percent iron-content ore in the deposits totals anywhere

between 700 million and 2 billion tons. Because of the distances

and technical problems involved, profitable exploitation of the

deposits would depend on the construction of a proposed railroad

to the coast. Development of the deposits would allow Libya self- sufficiency in iron and steel, although probably at costs appreciably above those available on an import basis. In 1974 a state-owned

company, the General Iron and Steel Corporation, was formed to exploit the deposits. The government hoped that the planned iron

and steel manufacturing plant at Misratah, scheduled for completion in 1986, eventually would be able to exploit the Wadi ash Shati

deposits. But the commercial viability of using these deposits was

not assumed, since initial plans called for the Misratah works to be fed with imported iron-ore pellets.

Other scattered iron-ore deposits in northwestern Tripolitania

and northern Fezzan were apparently insufficient to be commercially exploitable under current conditions. Manganese was known

to exist in northwestern Tripolitania and, in combination with

134
135
Libya: A Country Study

the iron-ore deposits, at several locations in the Wadi ash Shati.

Known deposits, however, were not considered commercially exploitable.

Salt flats, formed by evaporation at lagoonal deposits near the

coast and in closed depressions in the desert interior, are widely

scattered through the northern part of the country. In some cases, especially along the Gulf of Sidra, they cover large areas. In the

1980s, about 11,000 tons of salt were produced annually. Evidences

of sulfur have been reported at scattered points in the salt flats of

the Sirtica Basin and in various parts of Fezzan; sulfur occurs in

pure form in Fezzan and is associated with sulfur springs in the

Sirtica Basin.

Sodium carbonate (trona) is formed as a crust at the edges and

bottoms of a number of dry lakes in Fezzan. Traditionally, about

100 metric tons a year were harvested and sent to market at Sabha.

Because sodium carbonate is used in petroleum refining, as well

as traditionally in soapmaking and water refining, production may

be increased as part of the government's development effort in

Fezzan.

Because of the government's interest in social welfare and its financial ability to support it, construction is bound to be a major

area of future economic development. Except for wood, the raw

materials needed for construction—stone, gravel, clay, limestone,

gypsum, and cheap fuel—are found in abundant quantities and

suitable commercial qualities adjacent to the major population and

production centers in both northern Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

In 1986 plans were announced for a new gypsum mine with a planned output of 200,000 to 300,000 tons a year. Several thousand tons of gypsum are mined annually and indicated reserves of gypsum total about 200 million tons. Manufacturing and Construction

Growth in Libyan industrial capacity began in force only after 1969. Earlier manufacturing efforts concentrated primarily on

processing domestic crops and livestock products and on handicraft

products. Before the revolution, 90 percent of Libya's manufacturing establishments were located in Benghazi or Tripoli, and 75

to 80 percent of these were owned by Italians. Nearly 90 percent

of the manufacturing establishments were private, and most employed fewer than 20 workers.

This situation started to change after 1969. After marking time

for almost a year, the new government opted for a restricted in- dustrial policy resembling the policies of Egypt and Algeria. In the

late 1970s, the industrial sector (including manufacturing) was

136
The Economy

planned by the government, which had assumed control over those

aspects of industrial production that were deemed sensitive or too

large for the domestic private sector. The new policy leaned heavily on freeing industry, including manufacturing, from dependence on foreign ownership or control. In what appeared to be in part

at least a function of its new policy, the government required local companies that engaged in trade to be Libyan and nationalized

the properties of Italians, who represented the bulk of the country's entrepreneurship and private sector. Before 1980 the government concentrated on developing light

processing and petrochemical industries. Processing of foodstuffs

continued to remain a high priority, and the largest number of

plants built during the 1970s were in this area. Other major

manufacturing projects during the decade included textile complexes, a new oil refinery, two petrochemical plants, a fertilizer factory, and an electrical cable plant. Gains in value added from

manufacturing over this period were impressive. In constant 1980

dollars, value added in manufacturing rose from US$196 million

to US$760 million in 1983. Still, in terms of contribution to GDP,

in 1983 manufacturing contributed only 4 percent of the total (see

table 6, Appendix.). In that year, an estimated 80,500 people

worked in the manufacturing sector, about 7 percent of the total labor force. Light industries—mainly food processing—continued

to comprise the largest share of total manufacturing capacity by

the early 1980s.

Encouraging the development of heavy industry became a high

priority for the government in the 1980s. The 1981-85 development plan called for the allocation of LD2.725 billion to heavy

industry—15 percent of the total development plan allocation and

second only to agriculture at 17 percent. However, as indicated

earlier, because expenditure under the development budget was

highly dependent on oil revenues, actual expenditures often failed to reach planned levels (see Public Finance and Banking, this ch.).

Thus, the government's drive to build heavy industrial capacity

in the 1980s has been hampered by declining revenues, and many

projects were running behind schedule.

Key heavy industrial developments under construction in the

1981-85 plan included an expansion of the ammonium/urea plant

at Marsa al Burayqah, a new ethylene unit at Ras al Unuf, and

the large iron and steel complex at Misratah. The Ras al Unuf

ethylene plant was completed in 1986, and the other two projects were nearing completion in early 1987.

Projects in the early stages of development in 1987 included a

fertilizer complex at Surt, an aluminum smelter and coke plant

137
Libya: A Country Study

FEZZAN

TAZIRBU ^

Al Kufrah

International boundary Minerals

National capital ± | ron Qre Water Pipelines Gypsum

Phase I (to be completed in 1989) Limestone Phase II (to be completed in 1990) Mn Manganese

Phase III (proposed) Sc Sodium Carbonate

100 KILOMETERS A Alum

100 MILES * Su,fur Boui

repr

Figure 8. Nonpetroleum Resources

at Zuwarah, and a further expansion of the Ras al Unuf petrochemical plant. However, all these projects were in serious jeopardy,

as a result of the 1986 decline in oil prices, and Libyan planners were re-evaluating the impact of industrial projects on the balance

of payments . During the period of high oil prices before 1981, the development of import-dependent heavy industry seemed feasible. Libya

enjoyed cheap energy costs in comparison to Europe and possessed the foreign exchange to pay for raw material imports. The

1980s decline in oil prices has reduced Libya's advantage in terms

of energy costs and greatly cut into its supply of foreign exchange.

Whereas in 1979 it may have been possible for the government

both to import industrial raw materials and subsidize food imports,

by 1987 it was becoming increasingly clear that the available

138
The Economy

foreign exchange was insufficient to accommodate both pro- grams.

This problem was obvious in existing industry during the

mid-1980s, when production and productive capacity ratios for selected manufacturers varied substantially from year to year, depending on whether imported raw materials were available. To

cite a dramatic example, in 1983 Libya had a productive capacity

of 18,000 washing machine units but produced only 4,533. As a

result of cutbacks in foreign exchange allocations in 1984, only 289

machines were produced (productive capacity remained unchanged); thus, used capacity decreased from about 25 percent to under 2 percent.

Used capacity in other manufacturing industries varied widely.

In 1984 oil refining operated at 36 percent of capacity, methanol

production at 84 percent, ammonia at 91 percent, and tractor production at 67 percent. The country's unused manufacturing

capacity could be traced not only to the scarcity of foreign exchange

but also to Libya's general shortage of labor.

The construction industry has played a prominent role in eco- nomic development, as one would expect in a country largely devoid of infrastructure before the mid-1960s. The construction

industry got its start as a result of foreign oil company investment

during the 1960s, but since 1969 it has grown in accordance with

the government construction projects called for in the successive

five-year plans.

In 1975 the government began to reorganize the construction

industry to make it more efficient. At that time, there were about

2,000 contractors, many of them small proprietorships or partnerships. The minister of housing was given the authority to merge

contracting firms into a smaller number of larger firms capable of

carrying out large construction projects. Firms with capital in excess of LD30,000 were converted into corporations, and the majority

shares were sold to the public or the government. Previously, the

government had set up several state-owned construction companies to build factories and to carry out civil engineering projects.

Among the firms were the National Industrial Contracting Company, the General Corporation for the Construction and Maintenance of Roads, and the General Corporation for Civil Works.

The many government-sponsored construction projects of the

1970s created a booming industry, so much so that by the end of

the decade Libya had become the world's leading per capita con- sumer of cement. This was a significant economic achievement,

particularly because the 1978 housing law effectively had eliminated

private residential construction. In 1986 construction supplied about

139
Libya: A Country Study

11 percent of GDP, second only to public services in the non- petroleum sector. The construction industry, however, was damaged more than

any other sector by the severe cutback in the number of foreign

workers in Libya in the mid-1980s. Between mid- 1983 and

mid- 1984, the number of construction workers dropped from

371,000 to 197,000, mainly because of the departure of foreign

workers. Nonetheless, construction remained the number one employer during 1984.

The cutbacks in development spending, together with the for- eign worker exodus, led to a decline in overall construction. As

an illustration, in 1985 the cement industry, which had been ex- panded during the building boom, was capable of producing 6 million tons a year, but domestic demand had dwindled to only 4.5

million tons. In addition to the construction decline, there has been a rapid

decline in another economic area, that of traditional handicrafts.

Rural artisans have taken up more lucrative employment, and

utilitarian handmade products have been replaced by factory-made

goods. In an effort to provide continuous employment for those

artisans who desire to continue their trades, the government has

set up several training centers and provided subsidies for raw materials. Most artisan production is purchased by the government for resale or export. The more popular craft items are carpets, pottery, leather goods, fabrics, and copperware.

Energy

With its substantial hydrocarbon resources and relatively small

(although increasing) needs, Libya traditionally has had large

energy surpluses. Estimates in 1983 put the amount of Libya's

excess energy supply at 94,196 tons of coal equivalent. All electric power was thermally generated by stations powered with natural

gas or petroleum. Total generating capacity in 1983 was estimated

to be 7,150 gigawatts per hour.

The General Electric Organization, part of the Secretariat of

Communications, was in charge of generating electricity. According to its data, domestic usage of electricity exceeded agricultural

and industrial usage. The data for 1977 suggested that most homes

had electrical power and also indicated the relatively small industrial base of the country. Many oil company installations, however,

maintained their own small plants.

Under the 1981-85 development plan, a total of LD779 million was allocated for electrical projects between 1982 and 1985. In addition, Libya has actively sought to develop a nuclear power

140
An instructor teaches students in an automotive repair class Courtesy United States Information Agency

generating facility for fear that its rising industrial power needs

might begin to cut into oil exports. In 1985 technical studies were under way for the construction of an 880-megawatt nuclear power

station near Surt. The Soviet Union had agreed to supply the two

440-megawatt reactor cores needed to power the plant. The total cost of the project was put at US$4.2 billion. According to the secre- tary for atomic energy, enough local uranium had been discovered

to fuel the plant, but studies were also being done on deposits in

the Aouzou Strip area in Libyan-occupied Chad (see fig. 3). In

1985 approximately 850 Libyans were undergoing training at the

Tajura nuclear research center near Tripoli, which was equipped

with a small 10-megawatt research reactor. Agriculture

The history of Libya's agricultural development has been closely related, although inversely, to the development of its oil industry. In 1958, before the era of oil wealth, agriculture supplied over 26 percent of GDP, and Libya actually exported food. Although

gross levels of agricultural production have remained relatively constant, increasing oil revenues have resulted in a decline in agriculture's overall share of national income. Thus, by 1962 agriculture was only responsible for 9 percent of GDP, and by 1978 this figure

had tumbled to a mere 2 percent. Even more striking than the

141
Libya: A Country Study

downward trend in agriculture's share of GDP was the rise in food

imports. In 1977 the value of food imports was more than thirty- seven times greater than it had been in 1958. Therefore, a large

part of the rising oil wealth between 1960 and 1979 was spent on

imported food products.

To some extent, these trends were neither surprising nor dis- turbing. Libya's comparatively strong agricultural position in 1958

masked an even greater level of general poverty. Agriculture during the 1950s was characterized by low levels of productivity and

income. The advent of oil wealth provided many peasants with opportunities to engage in less exacting and more remunerative work

in the urban areas, resulting in a huge rural migration to the ci- ties. In addition, Libya is not well endowed with agricultural

resources; over 94 percent of the land consists of agriculturally useless wasteland. The large number of people engaged in agricul- ture prior to 1960 reflected, therefore, not a thriving agricultural

economy but merely the absence of attractive alternatives.

The number of peasants who gave up farming to look for jobs

in the oil industry and in urban areas rose dramatically throughout the 1955-62 period. Another adverse effect on agricultural

production occurred during the 1961-63 period, when the government offered its citizens long-term loans to purchase land from

Italian settlers. This encouraged urban dwellers to purchase rural

lands for recreational purposes rather than as productive farms,

thereby inflating land values and contributing to a decline in

production.

Since 1962 Libyan governments have paid more attention to agricultural development. The government has given inducements

to absentee landlords to encourage them to put their lands to productive use and initiated high agricultural wage policies to stem the

rural-to-urban flow of labor. These policies met with some success. Production levels began to rise slightly, and many foreign

workers were attracted to the agricultural sector. Agricultural development became the cornerstone of the 1981-85 development

plan, which attached high priority to funding the GMMR project,

designed to bring water from the large desert oasis aquifers of Sarir

and Al Kufrah. Agricultural credit was provided by the National

Agricultural Bank, which in 1981 made almost 10,000 loans to farmers at an average of nearly LD1,500 each. The substantial amounts

of funds made available by this bank may have been a major rea- son why so many Libyans—nearly 20 percent of the labor force

in 1984—chose to remain in the agricultural sector (see table 4,

Appendix).

142
The Economy

Wm Cropland and pasture * National capital

J ESS Orchards, groves, International and vineyards boundary

S3 Mixed agriculture

Rangeland o 100 kilometers

I ffTEDl Open wetland ' '160 miles

I

Desert

1 i 1 L Figure 9. Land Use, 1987

Despite the greater attention to agriculture, however, in 1984

this sector only accounted for about 3.5 percent of GDP, and Libya

still imported over 1 million metric tons of cereals (up from 612,000

metric tons in 1974). Also in 1984, the average index of food production per capita indicated a decline of 6 percent from the period 1974

to 1976. On the average, about 70 percent of Libya's food needs were met by imports during the mid-1980s.

Land Use and Irrigation

Although statistics vary, only a very small percentage of Libyan

land is arable—probably under 2 percent of total land area (see

fig. 9). About 4 percent is suitable for grazing livestock and the

rest is agriculturally useless desert. Most arable land lies in two

places: the Jabal al Akhdar region around Benghazi, and the Jifarah

Plain near Tripoli (see fig. 4). The highest parts of the Jabal al

143
Libya: A Country Study

Akhdar receive between 400 and 600 millimeters of rain annually,

whereas the immediately adjacent area, sloping north to the Marj

Plain, receives between 200 and 400 millimeters. The central and

eastern parts of the Jifarah Plain and the nearby Jabal Nafusah

also average between 200 and 400 millimeters of rain annually.

The remaining Libyan coastal strip and the areas just to the south

of the sectors described average 100 to 200 millimeters of rain yearly.

In addition, the Jifarah Plain is endowed with an underground

aquifer that has made intensive well-driven irrigation possible.

Between these two areas and for a distance of about fifty kilometers

south, there is a narrow strip of land that has enough scrub vegetation to support livestock. Desert predominates south of this strip,

with only occasional oasis cultivation, such as at Al Kufrah, Sabha,

and Marzuq.

Studies published in the late 1970s indicated that at any given

time, about one-third of the total arable land remained fallow and

that as many as 45 percent of the farms were under 10 hectares.

The average farm size was about eleven hectares, although many

were fragmented into small, noncontiguous plots. Most farms in

the Jifarah Plain were irrigated by individual wells and electric

pumps, although in 1985 only about 1 percent of the arable land was irrigated.

Since coming to power in 1969, the Qadhafi government has

been very concerned with land reform. Shortly after the Revolution, the government confiscated all Italian-owned farms (about

38,000 hectares) and redistributed much of this land in smaller plots

to Libyans. The state retained some of the confiscated lands for

state farming ventures, but in general the government has not

sought to eliminate the private sector from agriculture as it has with commerce. It did, however, take the further step in 1971 of declaring

all uncultivated land to be state property. This measure was aimed

mainly at certain powerful conservative tribal groups in the Jabal

al Akhdar, who had laid claim to large tracts of land. Another law

passed in 1977 placed further restriction on tribal systems of land

ownership, emphasizing actual use as the deciding factor in determining land ownership. Since 1977 an individual family has been

allotted only enough land to satisfy its own requirements; this policy was designed to prevent the development of large-scale private sector farms and to end the practice of using fertile "tribal" lands for

grazing rather than cultivation.

Partly as a result of these policies as well as the dictates of Islamic

rules of inheritance, which stipulate that each son should receive an equal share of family land upon the father's death, in 1986

Libyan farms tended to be fragmented and too small to make

144
The Economy

efficient use of water. This problem was especially severe in the

long-settled Jifarah Plain, which has been Libya's single most

productive agricultural region.

The falling water tables in Libya's best agricultural lands caused

by overirrigation posed a severe long-term ecological threat to agriculture. The government began to recognize this in 1976, and

took measures to discourage citrus and tomato cultivation, both

of which required large amounts of water. However, the more strin- gent steps required to save the coastal water resources—principally

the regulation of irrigation and changing the land tenure system

to make it more water-efficient—conflicted with Qadhafl's concept

of economic equity, which favored intensive irrigated cultivation

of small plots for family use. The government's overall strategy for dealing with the impending ecological crisis has not been to reform the practices that brought

it about. Rather, the cornerstone of agricultural policy since 1983

has been to avert disaster by pumping large quantities of water

to the coast from the fossil reserves of the southern desert. This

project, the GMMR, was expected to cost US$15 billion for the

first two stages and has largely been spared from the cuts in development spending that have delayed many other projects in the

1980s.

The first phase of the GMMR, on which construction began in

1984, called for the construction of a 1,895-kilometer pipeline to carry water from the Sarir and Tazirbu regions to a holding tank

at Ajdabiya. From there the water will be pumped to Surt and

Benghazi for both agricultural and urban consumption. Planners

anticipated a total cost of about US$3.29 billion for this first phase

and a completion date sometime in 1989. The first stage is projected

to irrigate an area of 20,000 hectares for vegetables, and 50,000

hectares for cereals, and to enable the raising of some 100 head

of cattle. A second stage will connect the fossil reserves at Al Kufrah

to the system. It will also extend the pipelines from Ajdabiya to Tobruk. Planning for a possible third stage, which would link

Tripoli to the underground reserves of the western Fezzan region

and would extend the western coastal terminus from Surt to Tripoli, was also under way in 1987.

After completion of the second stage, the GMMR will be capable of delivering up to 5 million cubic meters of water a day.

According to estimates, this amount would be sufficient to irrigate

180,000 hectares in the Surt area, to provide pasture for 2 million

sheep and 200,000 cattle, and to supply industrial and domestic

needs in Benghazi and Tripoli. According to the project's American designers, the Al Kufrah and Sarir aquifers could sustain pumping at this rate for 50 to 100 years without depletion.

145
Libya: A Country Study

Despite planners' optimistic predictions about the benefits of the

GMMR, foreign observers doubt that it will resolve the difficulties facing agriculture. Whatever the size of the desert aquifers,

they are finite fossil reserves and will not last indefinitely. Furthermore, the major agricultural developments planned for the Surt

region will do nothing to stop the declining levels of productivity

in the Jifarah Plain. In fact, the choice of Surt as a site for massive

agricultural development may have been prompted more by

Qadhafi's family roots being there than its suitability for intensive

agricultural development. In addition, urban and industrial demand for water from the south is likely to increase as the population continues to grow and as various industrial projects begin

operations.

The GMMR's long-term impact on oasis cultivation in the south

is also likely to be negative. Many of Libya's showcase agricultural

projects are located in the southern oases that depend on the fossil aquifers that the GMMR will tap. Developments at Al Kufrah and

Sarir have used advanced irrigation technology to grow wheat and

fodder crops. The depletion of the fossil reserves on which these

projects depend means that they have little long-term viability.

Given the extremely high cost and low yields achieved as of the

early 1980s, a re-evaluation of the economic viability of these

projects may well occur. Crops and Livestock

In the 1980s, statistics on Libyan agricultural production con- tinued to vary widely. For example, figures compiled by the Central Bank of Libya generally exceeded those published by the UN

Food and Agriculture Organization by 10 to 100 percent. During

the 1980s, wheat and barley were the principal cereal crops, although millet was also grown in the southern oases. Both crops were cultivated throughout the country, in the coastal regions as well as in the desert oases. The optimum yield for wheat cultivation in Libya was thought to be about 5 tons per hectare, but by

the mid-1980s yields were only averaging about 0.5 ton per hectare. Citrus production declined to insignificant levels following

the government's water conservation measures of 1976. Other important crops were dates, olives, melons, onions, and potatoes.

Vegetables were grown in specialized farms near Tripoli. Tree crops

remained popular because many farmers combined olive, date,

apple, or almond raising with cereal production (see table 7, Appendix).

In the 1980s, livestock represented the largest income-producing

item in agricultural production, and the government has instituted

146
The Economy

numerous measures designed to make the country self-sufficient in meat, poultry, and dairy products. The numbers of sheep, cattle, and poultry were slowly increasing, while the herds of goats

and camels were decreasing. Sheep constituted the largest percentage of livestock, numbering some 6.3 million head in 1985. Sheep

and goats were used for meat, milk, and wool and were found all over the country. The largest flocks were in the Al Kufrah settle- ment project. Modern range-management practices and techniques were being used to prevent overgrazing of the land and to make

optimal use of the pastures. Thousands of hectares of pastureland

had been fenced along the coastal regions for use as cattle breeding stations as well as livestock-fattening pens.

Until the 1970s, cattle were used mainly for transport. During

the 1970s, the number of cattle—particularly dairy cattle

increased, as did milk and meat production. By 1985 there were

nearly 209,000 head of cattle in the country, and several fodder

plants were in various stages of completion as part of an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in animal feedstuff's. The General Dairy and

Dairy Products Company was created in 1974 to take over most

private dairies and to produce and market all dairy products. Pri- vate dairy farms were permitted to operate, but their milk had to be sold to the state company. The government also entered the

poultry business on a large scale, and independent farmers found

it difficult to compete against the large government poultry farms.

Fishing and Forestry

Although Libya possesses nearly 1,800 kilometers of coastline

and the second largest continental shelf in the Mediterranean, its waters are not particularly rich in the plankton needed to sustain

highly productive fishing waters. In 1977 Libya's fishing catch stood

at 4,803 tons. By 1981 it had risen to 6,418 tons—still one of the

smaller national catches in the Mediterranean. Most of Libya's

fishing fleet was located on the western half of its coastline, especially around Tripoli, because the country's eastern and central

coasts possessed less attractive fishing grounds. Estimates in 1979

put the number of fishing boats at 325, of which 13 were trawlers;

the rest were small and medium-sized boats. Approximately 1,000

to 1 ,200 people were thought to be professional fishermen in 1981

The government has been encouraging fishing activities and

attempting to stimulate a demand for fish. In 1986 a new fishing

port was under construction at Zuwarah, and numerous ice plants

have been built at several coastal sites. Agreements for joint

development of fishing have been signed with several countries,

including Tunisia and Spain.

147
Libya: A Country Study

Sponge fishing has been monopolized by Greek fishermen who

have been licensed by the Libyan government. A tiny percentage

of the harvest has been obtained by Libyans using small boats and

skin-diving equipment from the shallow waters inshore. The Greeks

have used modern equipment to exploit the deepwater beds where

the best sponges lie. In an experiment begun in 1977, the government has established freshwater fish farms in several inshore

locations.

For commercial purposes, the country has no forests. Although

the government designated more than 62,400 hectares as woodland or forest, most of this land is covered with scrub and minor

vegetation.

During the 1960s, the government actively pursued an afforesta- tion program; these activities were accelerated in the 1970s. An

estimated 213 million seedlings had been planted by 1977, about

33 million of which were fruit trees. Most of the reforestation has

been in western Libya. During reforestation efforts, scientist have

experimented with a petrochemical spray that is sufficiently porous

to allow the occasional rain to trickle and seep through, yet sturdy

enough to prevent the seedling from being blown away during one

of the country's frequent and severe sandstorms. The government's

long-term goals for the massive planting program include the growth

of enough trees to meet its domestic lumber needs, which in the

past had been met by imports. Short-term goals include soil conservation and reclamation, and the creation of windbreaks for crops

and settlements.

Income and Wealth

The declining oil prices of the 1980s reversed the previous

decade's trend of sustained growth in national income. In real terms, GDP grew every year from 1972 to 1980. Since 1980,

however, there has been a constant decline. A turning point for the economy occurred in 1981, as real GDP dropped a staggering

18 percent. Preliminary figures for 1984 estimated that, in constant 1980 terms, the GDP was LD7.5 billion, a level comparable

to that of 1975-76. The rate of growth in real GDP has exhibited

widespread fluctuations since 1970. In two years during the

mid-1970s (1974 and 1976), real GDP grew at an annual rate of over 18 percent. Apart from these two dramatic years, real GDP

grew at an unspectacular average rate of 0.9 percent from 1970

to 1984.

Per capita changes in gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) have largely paralleled changes in GDP. In general, however,

GNP growth has not kept pace with population expansion, resulting

148
Farmers plant seedlings to stem the advance of the desert Courtesy United States Information Agency

in an overall rate of growth in GNP per capita of -1.1 percent from

1965 to 1984. Nevertheless, in 1984 dollars, Libya's GNP per capita was US$8,520—roughly equivalent to that of Britain's GNP.

The breakdown of the GDP by contributing sectors changed

greatly in the 1960s as the oil wealth began to flow. Whereas in

the pre-petroleum period agriculture contributed between 25 and

30 percent of GDP, by 1962 it was down to 10 percent. In the same

year, only one year after Libya became a petroleum exporter, oil exports accounted for over 23 percent of GDP.

By 1968 the contribution of petroleum products to GDP had risen

to about 60 percent. All other sectors except construction decreased

in relative terms between 1962 and 1968; agriculture declined to 3 percent of the total and manufacturing to about 2 percent. In 1971 the contrast between the petroleum sector and the rest of the

economy had become even greater. Petroleum had come to account

for some 70 percent of GDP, construction 5 percent, agriculture

2 percent, and manufacturing 1 percent. The rest of the economy

taken together apparently contributed only about 20 percent of

GDP. What these percentages reflected was not an absolute decline

in the nonpetroleum sector as a whole but rather the extraordinary relative growth of the petroleum sector. Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, there were few major

changes in the composition of GDP. In most years, petroleum

149
Libya: A Country Study

products accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of GDP. Since

1982, however, declining oil revenues have reduced the petroleum

sector's share of GDP. Transportation and construction have

accounted for relatively large shares, which is not surprising given

the heavy investment effort in infrastructure. The consistently low

contributions of agriculture and industry to GDP were disappointing, given the large amount of development spending in those areas. About the only component of GDP to exhibit a steady growth has

been the public service sector, which rose from 5 percent in 1978

to 12 percent in 1984 . The burgeoning of the public sector reflected the strong bias against private sector growth that developed over

this same period.

An income study of selected households in Tripoli and Benghazi

in the early 1970s indicated the existence of a large middle class. Only 1.5 percent of households in Benghazi and 2.3 percent in

Tripoli had monthly incomes below LD25. About 7.2 and 5 percent, respectively, of the households in these cities had monthly

incomes of over LD300; the vast majority—between 50 and 60

percent—had monthly incomes between LD50 and LD100.

During the 1970s, the usual dichotomy between rural and urban

incomes was lessened in Libya. The fringe benefits and free social

services that the government brought to the rural areas helped to increase disposable income. Many urban residents retained ties to their families in rural areas and remitted part of their earnings.

Farm income generally rose because of increased demand for

agricultural products and because of improvements being made

in agriculture by the government. Agricultural wage rates were

relatively high, reflecting the shortage of labor. Wage rates paid on state-owned farms were higher than on private farms; private

farmers tended to hire lower paid foreign agricultural workers,

mainly from Egypt.

Since 1978 salaries have been limited to an annual maximum

of LD1 0,000. The construction industry probably paid the highest

wages despite the popular conception that oil industry wages were

the highest. The oil industry, however, provided more job security.

The true effect on income of the radical measures put into effect in 1978 remained unclear in early 1987. The resolution outlawing

rental income did increase the disposable incomes of renters, who

in 1978 comprised an estimated one-third of the population. It also eliminated a major income source for landlords and removed what

had been the main area of private investment. Although landlords were allowed to continue renting to those in need of short-term

accommodation, the 1978 policies severely diminished the economic

150
The Economy

power of wealthy, large-scale property owners who had been a potent force in politics.

The effect of the law requiring worker participation in management has been less clear-cut. Whereas the 1973 profit-sharing

requirement probably increased worker incomes by requiring pri- vate and public firms to distribute one-quarter of their profits to workers, the 1978 extension may have hurt workers by undermining the profitability of the enterprises in which they worked. Indeed,

many owners liquidated their businesses rather than face losing

control of them.

Overall, the generous public attempts to supply subsidized social services, education, and medical care, when combined with the more sporadic availability of subsidized basic consumer items, have

increased disposable incomes and caused a general rise in the stan- dard of living for most people when compared to pre- 1969 Libya.

To a large extent, these policies depended on stable, plentiful oil revenues. The degree to which living standards and income levels can be maintained, given the drop in oil revenues during the 1980s, was not clear in 1987. To a certain extent, at least in the first few

years of falling revenues, the government avoided cutting back on

consumption by making small cuts in development spending and

drawing down on its reserves. This latter policy was especially dramatic, and Libya's total foreign-exchange reserve position declined

by 75 percent between 1980 and 1984.

Price information on Libya should be viewed with caution

because it rarely has been clear whether price indexes are based on official controlled prices, which may or may not be effective

at different times, or on private, noncontrolled prices. Probably

the most accurate measure of inflation in the economy is the aver- age annual percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator. By

this measure, during the period 1965 to 1973, inflation progressed

at a rate of 9.4 percent a year. From 1973 to 1984, the rate increased

to 10.8 percent a year. Although these rates were slightly higher

than the average inflation rate of industrial market economies, they were less than the average rate of other high-income, low-population

oil exporters. Libya's rate of inflation from 1965 to 1984, therefore, was modest in comparison to the inflation rates of some of

its counterparts in the Persian Gulf.

Public Finance and Banking

As of early 1985, the public sector consisted of the central government, the municipalities, and the state organizations and agencies.

(Before 1975 the public sector included the provinces, but these were abolished as political units in that year.) Municipalities had

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Libya: A Country Study

their own sources of revenue, but most of their budgets were cov- ered by transfers from the central government. Of the numerous

public entities, some were profitable and contributed surpluses to the treasury, but others required transfers from the central government to meet their expenses. On a consolidated basis, the public

enterprises had an overall surplus of LD25 million. However, in

both 1983 and 1984, public enterprises operated at a net loss. Budget, Expenditures, and Revenues

The first budget surplus in Libya's history occurred in 1966 when

oil revenues began to increase spectacularly. Budget methodology

and fiscal policy under the monarchy in the 1960s had tended to follow a 1959 World Bank (see Glossary) mission's recommendations, as modified by the progressive influence of rising nationalism and the unforeseen growth of the petroleum industry. Increased

integration of the provincial fiscal administrations with the central administration was effectively achieved by the conversion of

the monarchy from a federal to a unitary form of government in

1 963 . The assurance of large future oil revenues enabled the government to introduce, also in 1963, a sizable development plan and

a corresponding administrative apparatus. The plan legislation

included a provision that not less than 70 percent of all future

petroleum revenues should be allocated to the financing of

development.

During the monarchy, the government's budget was organized

by the Ministry of Finance, discussed and sanctioned by the parliament, and signed into law by the king. It consisted of a current

expenses budget and (after 1962) a development expenditures

budget. After the June 1967 War, a supplement was added to finance enlarged national defense outlays and annual subsidies to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

Under the Revolutionary government, the budget was divided

into an annual administrative expenses budget, an annual development expenditures budget, and a special expenditures budget.

Beginning in 1982, the government also listed certain key imports

under a new commodity budget. Until 1974 the fiscal year (FY

see Glossary) had begun in April, but since January 1974 the fis- cal year has been concurrent with the Gregorian calendar year. New procedures for developing the budget were initiated in FY

1978. Initial proposals for the administrative budget started at the

municipal level; the proposals were forwarded to an appropriate

secretariat for consolidation and subsequent submission to the

Secretariat of the Treasury, which reviewed and forwarded the

proposals to the General People's Congress (GPC—see Glossary)

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The Economy

for final approval. The development budget was prepared initially

by the organizations that would implement the specific project; the

proposals were then sent to the Secretariat of Planning for revi- sions and submission to the GPC. The special expenditures and

commodity budgets have not been in the formal budget, but they

have been approved during the fiscal year by the GPC.

Special expenditures usually have included grants, loans, subsidies, and the purchase of equipment for national defense. The

total generally has not been made available to the public because

of the defense-related expenditures, but some partial expenditures

for special items have been released on occasion. As much as 80

percent of the administrative budget has been spent by the central

government—the rest being divided between the municipalities and

public enterprises in years when they ran at a net loss. In the

mid-1980s, however, municipal allocations were increasing at the

expense of central governmental expenditures. In 1983 and 1984,

central allocations under the administrative budget were just under

50 percent of the total, whereas the municipalities spent just over 50 percent. By 1985 the municipal share of the total administrative budget allocations had risen to 71.5 percent, whereas the central government took only the remaining 28.5 percent.

Before the 1969 Revolution, the government spent more funds on the administrative budget than on investments. Since 1969,

however, development expenditures have been much higher than

administrative expenditures because of the government's policy of

using oil revenues to build for the future. The development budget

generally has covered economic and social projects, but it also has

included working capital for public sector corporations and some

lending and operating expenditures. The annual development

budget has usually corresponded to a certain percentage of the total amount projected to be spent by the current development plan.

All budgets have been amended frequently during the course of

any year; the amendments generally reflect increases for specific

projects or purposes or cover the increased costs of imported items

for development projects.

Planned expenditures under both the administrative and development budgets increased rapidly during the 1970s. By FY 1980, the

administrative budget had increased by almost five times its level in FY 1974, moving from LD192.9 million to LD950 million. The

development budget, over the same time period, increased its planned expenditures by slightly less than a factor of four, from

LD740 million to LD2.53 billion. During the 1980s, growth leveled

off. The administrative budget increased by only 14 percent between

FY 1981 and FY 1984, and allocations to the development

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Libya: A Country Study

budget, which has always been the largest component of total government spending, actually decreased almost 30 percent. Data

available for the commodity budget indicate that LD1.56 billion

and LD1.67 billion were spent in FY 1983 and FY 1984, respectively.

By far the largest item in the FY 1984 administrative budget was for defense spending, which accounted for 24 percent of the

total (see Defense Costs, ch. 5). The next largest item was for education at only 6 percent of the total budget. Under the development budget, the biggest items traditionally have been agriculture,

heavy industry, oil and gas extraction, and communications and

shipping. The relative levels of expenditures among these four items

usually depended on the guiding philosophy behind the particular

development plan in force when actual budget allocations were made. Thus, in FY 1974 and 1975, heavy industry and oil extrac- tion received the most funding. From 1976 through 1979, the lar- gest percentages went to agriculture, including irrigation. During

the 1980s, heavy industry and, to an increasing extent since 1982,

communications and shipping occupied the leading positions in the

development budget. Since 1983 the commodity budget has mainly

been used to subsidize imports of basic foods, raw materials and

parts for light industries, and key engineering projects, principally

the GMMR (see Land Use and Irrigation, this ch.).

The government funded these budgets in a simple, if unusual, manner. All nonpetroleum revenues were assigned to cover administrative budget expenditures. Any gap between revenues and

expenditures was met by transferring some of the petroleum

revenue, a practice that ensured that the administrative budget was

always in balance. In FY 1984, for example, 20 percent of the

administrative budget was covered by oil revenues. After the

administrative budget had been balanced, the remaining oil revenue was used to fund the development budget. In practice, this system

meant that, while allocations under the adminstrative budget were

almost always assured of being funded, expenditures under the

development budget could diverge greatly from planned levels depending upon variations in oil revenues. Although actual development budget expenditure data—as opposed to allocation data—are hard to come by, Central Bank

figures for 1981 and 1982 indicated that the difference between

planned and actual expenditures under the development budget

could be quite large. For instance, in FY 1981 actual expenditures

reached 96 percent of the planned levels, but in FY 1982 they only

accounted for 62 percent of the official target. Thus, allocation

figures for the development budget must be viewed with skepticism

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The Economy

and, despite their impressive theoretical allocations, various development projects were often held up for lack of funds.

The petroleum industry, through payments of taxes, royalties,

profits, and fees, has accounted for as much as 80 percent of the

government's revenues. The NOC has also paid royalties and taxes, and since 1974 its contributions have assumed greater importance

as its production and exports have increased (see Hydrocarbons

and Mining, this ch.). Royalties paid by the oil companies have

been based on volume of production and a posted price. Taxes have

been based on a theoretical profit determined by multiplying the

export volume by the posted price and subtracting royalty payments

and operating costs. The royalty and tax rates have periodically

been revised upward or downward depending upon the world

market. By law, 15 percent of the oil revenues must be set aside

as reserves. Nonpetroleum revenues have consisted of profits from other

government enterprises, import duties, income taxes, and miscellaneous taxes and fees. In addition to the regular customs duties,

two 5 -percent taxes have been levied on all imports, the funds being

earmarked specifically for municipalities and for charities. Direct

taxes—mostly income taxes—have brought in only about 5 per- cent of total revenue. All income was taxed, the rate depending

on the source. In the late 1970s, there were separate taxes for income

from rental property, agricultural activities, commerce, industry,

and trades. There was also a professional income tax (the first year's

earnings of a career were tax exempt), a personal income tax, and

a general income tax, which was levied on all persons and companies and included all income—even that subject to one of the special income taxes. The general income tax was very progressive

and was designed to prevent capital accumulation. The tax brackets

in effect in late 1976, for example, worked out so that a taxpayer

with total income of LD192,000 would retain only LD72,000 and

only 10 percent of all additional income over the LD192, 000 level. In 1987 Libya's tax structure continued to be based on laws dating from the 1970s or before.

The administration of the tax structure was altered with the intro- duction of the Administrative Contracts Regulations in 1980 and

Law No. 5 of 1981, which provided for some tax exemption for foreign companies. Until 1981, all private companies were subject to a company tax, with petroleum companies subject to a special petroleum tax on their profits. Although in the past Libya had

not appeared to encourage new foreign investment, a number of

incentives in the form of tax exemptions were built into the 1981

law to encourage such investments.

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Libya: A Country Study

Balance of Payments

The government's balance-of-payments statement, which has

been prepared annually by the Central Bank, has provided a short- hand presentation of Libya's economic relations with the rest of

the world. Although balance-of-payments statements generally may

be arranged in different ways to meet different requirements, they

frequently have been presented in terms of a current account that

included the exchange of goods and services and transfers (donations); a capital account that reflected movement of direct investment, government borrowing and lending, and trade financing;

and a reserves account showing whether monetary institutions have on balance acquired or paid out foreign currencies in the other

accounts. The Libyan payments balance has been presented according to that formula (see table 8, Appendix).

The balance-of-payments statements issued between 1960 and

1977 spelled out in dramatic fashion Libya's meteoric transition

from poverty to wealth. In 1960 exports (mostly agricultural)

reached their then-customary total of less than the equivalent of

US$10 million. Imports totaled US$177 million. The result was

an unfavorable trade balance, to which was added a negative

balance on the service account. The combination was barely offset by a large item for oil company investment and by sizable grant

aid from Britain, the UN, the United States, and Italy. Capital

movements were minimally favorable on balance.

By 1963 the payments picture was already changing rapidly.

Although imports had increased appreciably, exports had out- stripped them, providing a solidly favorable trade balance for the

first time in the country's history. Government services and investment income (mainly oil company profits) were approximately in

balance, but other services (mainly expenditures abroad by the oil companies connected with their Libyan operations) were increasing rapidly, and goods and services showed a small debit balance.

This was just about offset by transfers (gifts and contributions from

abroad), and the total current account was in balance. The capital

account showed a credit, and the exchange reserves rose by US$27

million.

The upward trend continued throughout the 1970s except for

1973, 1975, and 1978, when the overall balance of payments was

in deficit. The balance of payments has been heavily dependent on oil exports and public sector imports, and in each of those three

years increases in imports relative to exports pushed the overall

balance into deficit. Nevertheless, Libya recorded its largest balanceof-payments surplus in 1980, when it reported a net gain in for- eign reserves of over US$6.7 billion.

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The Economy

Since 1980, however, declining oil export revenues have pushed

the overall balance into a sustained deficit, as net changes in reserves

for 1981 through 1984 were all negative. In general, Libya's trade

balance has remained solidly positive because oil revenues, even

in the 1980s, have been sufficient to cover imports of merchandise. The principal drain on Libya's balance of payments and the source of much of its external payments difficulties during the early

and mid-1980s have been the large deficits Libya has experienced

in its trade in services. The major components of this "invisible

trade" were payments to foreign consultants and contractors, as well as to the resident foreign workers in Libya, who customarily

remitted large portions of their salaries to their home countries.

In response to its deteriorating balance-of-payments situation in

the 1980s, Libya has used several strategies. Foremost has been

the drawing down on its substantial reserves of foreign exchange

built up during the 1970s. Thus, other than for gold reserves (which

have remained fairly stable), Libya's total foreign exchange reserves (including Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)—see Glossary, and its deposits with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—see Glossary) declined from US$13.1 billion in 1980 to US$9 billion in 1981,

US$7 billion in 1982, US$5.2 billion in 1983, and US$3.6 billion

in 1984. Despite this drastic decline, in 1984 Libya's reserves still afforded it an estimated 5.3 months of import coverage, a figure

well above the average for comparable high-income oil exporters.

Libya has also taken steps to reduce remittances by foreign

workers. In the 1982-83 period, foreigners comprised about 47 per- cent of total productive manpower. In 1984, however, the government reduced from 90 to 75 percent the wages that foreign workers were permitted to repatriate. This action, combined with the worsening economic climate in Libya, sparked a flight of foreign

workers. The total number dropped from 560,000 in 1983 to perhaps 300,000 in mid-1984. In 1985 the government resorted

to coercion, forcibly expelling many remaining workers. In August

and September, more than 30,000 Tunisians and about 20,000

Egyptians were expelled. Smaller numbers of workers from

Mauritania, Mali, and Niger were also forced to leave. By 1986

further expulsions had dropped the number of foreigners working

in Libya to fewer than 200,000.

The final method used by the government to reduce its service

trade deficit has been to delay payments to contractors and to induce

them to accept barter arrangements. By late 1986, Libya had fallen more than US$2 billion behind in its payments to contractors. In an effort to meet its obligations without disbursing its valuable for- eign exchange, Libya has encouraged its creditors to accept oil

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Libya: A Country Study

rather than hard currency in return for their services. Although

many debts were settled this way from 1982 through 1985, the sharp

drop in oil prices in early 1986 ended such arrangements. At that

point, the Libyans refused to adjust their prices to world market

levels—resulting in a 30-percent overvaluation of their oil in rela- tion to its price on the open market.

Stringent exchange controls have been in effect since the 1969

coup d'etat in an effort to stem capital outflows resulting from

private sector pessimism about investment opportunities in an

avowedly socialist-nationalist-revolutionary state. The exchange

controls were administered by the Central Bank. Since 1979 almost

all imports have been under the control of sixty-two public corporations, and import licenses no longer have been issued to private

companies. The only imports not directly under state control have

been made by contractors, but all imports from Israel and South

Africa have been prohibited.

Since the 1969 coup, residents have been allowed specific amounts

of foreign exchange each year for personal commitments abroad

(excluding family remittances), foreign education, overseas travel

(pilgrims to Mecca were allowed an additional sum), and business

travel. In addition, the government specified that travel fares must

be paid in Libyan currency. Temporary residents could take out no more foreign currency and travelers' checks than they had

declared to customs officials on their entry into the country.

For practical purposes, most gainfully employed nonresidents were allowed to maintain nonresident accounts in local banks into

which could be deposited the compensation for their gainful employment and interest accrued on such deposits. Withdrawals for remit- tance abroad might be drawn against such deposits up to 75 percent

of net salary each month. Foreign contractors working in Libya

under their own names had to maintain "special resident accounts,"

into which the funds with which they entered the country and the

proceeds of their professional activities in Libya had to be deposited

and against which withdrawals might be made with approval of

the Central Bank. Profits and dividends could be transferred freely.

Blocked accounts could be withdrawn for local or foreign use up

to limited amounts during the first five years' duration of such

account; after five years the deposit could be withdrawn in full. Foreign Aid and Investment

Since 1985 direct foreign investment has not been permitted in

Libya. Until 1984 Libya had had a negative direct investment

balance for every year since 1971, indicating that Libyan investment overseas far outstripped foreign investment in Libya.

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The Economy

Existing foreign investment was concentrated in the petroleum sector. In 1986 the United States ordered all American companies

to liquidate their Libyan investments. It was not clear at that time,

however, whether this action would result in a decline in the overall level of foreign investment in Libya, or whether the affected

companies would merely transfer their Libyan investments to non- American subsidiaries.

Libyan investment abroad was made through the Libyan Arab

Foreign Bank (LAFB) and the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment

Company (LAFICO). Libyan investments have been particularly

high in Italy, the best known being LAFICO's 15 percent share

in Fiat, which it finally sold in September 1986. Other significant

Libyan investments in Italy have included the LAFB's 1986

acquisition of 70 percent of the ailing Tamoil petroleum distribution company and the acquisition of 50 percent of LAFICO' s Chempetrol. Chempetrol supplied about half of Italy's methanol imports

in 1986. Libyan assets in the United States were frozen in early

1986, but the action had little impact because of the negligible funds

involved. At the time of the freeze, the Central Bank held only

about 10 percent of its assets in the United States. Libya has also given and received foreign aid. On the receipt

side, Libya consistentiy has sought to barter oil for long-term technical assistance agreements. During the 1970s, many cooperation

agreements were conducted on this basis—particularly with East

European nations. Yugoslavia, in particular, has been instrumental

in providing Libya with timely aid. Yugoslav contractors were

granted about 1 1 percent of the total volume of projects under the

1976-80 development plan in return for oil and some Libyan financing of several projects in Yugoslavia. In 1986, because of payment

arrears on civil works contracts, Yugoslavia agreed to accept

increased oil shipments valued at US$20 million. Much of Libya's

debt for the military assistance it received from the Soviet Union

has similarly been paid for with oil. In 1985 foreign observers esti- mated that Libya was sending 125,000 bpd of oil to Moscow to cover its arrears. By 1984 Libyan assistance to other countries had fallen dramatically from levels at the beginning of the decade. Libyan foreign

aid allocations peaked in 1980 at US$376 million. They declined

in 1981 to US$262 million before dropping sharply in 1982 to only

US$43 million. A recovery occurred in 1983, as Libyan funds ear- marked for foreign aid rose again to US$142 million, only to plummet in 1984 to US$17 million. This latter figure represented only

.06 percent of GNP, well below the OPEC average for foreign

assistance of 1.16 percent.

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Libya: A Country Study

Libyan bilateral assistance programs have concentrated on countries where Libya has substantial strategic interests. Many of these

countries are located in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa.

Throughout the 1970s, Libyan aid projects were mainly concentrated in Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. Since 1980, with the general

decline in foreign assistance allocations, promises of Libyan aid

to sub-Saharan Africa have not always lived up to the expectations

they created and have resulted in discontent on the part of recipient

states. Banking, Credit, and Currency

As a result of its World War II association, Libya became a member of the British sterling bloc when independence was established

in 1951. Shortly after independence, a national currency was

created: the Libyan pound, as it was then known, divided into 100

piastres (of 10 milliemes each), having a par value of US$2.80.

The currency unit remained tied to sterling until the sterling devaluation of November 1967, when the Libyan pound failed to devalue

and the direct link with sterling was terminated. Libya continued

as a member of the sterling bloc, however, until it was expelled

by the British in the aftermath of the Libyan nationalization of Brit- ish Petroleum's assets in Libya in December 1971 (see Hydrocarbons and Mining, this ch.). Effective September 1, 1971, the

currency unit was changed from the Libyan pound to the Libyan

dinar (LD), divided into 1,000 dirhams, with no change in its par

value. In the late 1980s, the currency was still sometimes referred

to as the pound, and merchants sometimes quoted prices in piastres. The new currency comes in banknotes of 250 and 500 dirhams

and 1,5, and 10 dinars, as well as subsidiary coins of 1, 5, 10,

20, 50, and 100 dirhams.

In the general revaluation of gold, which also took place in

December 1971, Libyan currency retained its existing parity with

gold. As a consequence, the dollar value of the dinar rose from

US$2.80 to US$3.04, where it was kept until 1974 when it moved

to LD1 equal to US$3.3778. The dinar was maintained at this rate

until March 1986, when the government switched from a fixed dollar rate to a floating rate linked to the SDR. This move resulted

in a 10-percent decline in the value of the dinar.

During the years immediately after independence, an international commission acted in lieu of a bank of issue, and the several

currencies serving as legal tender in various parts of the country were replaced by the new Libyan currency. Pursuant to legislation of 1955 (amended in 1958), the National Bank of Libya was

established in 1956 to replace the commission and to perform some

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The Economy

of the functions of a central bank under the aegis of the Ministry

of Finance. The commercial banks for the most part were branches

of major international banking institutions. In the main, they were engaged in providing short-term international and domestic commercial credit. In 1963 the Central Bank of Libya replaced the National Bank

of Libya. The government gave the new bank sole right of cur- rency issue and made it responsible for maintaining monetary sta- bility and the external value of the Libyan currency and for regulating currency and credit. The bank could also make advances

to the central government up to 10 percent of estimated current

revenues. The commercial banks were required to maintain liquidity

ratios and reserves in the Central Bank against deposits as prescribed

by the Central Bank. Until 1970 the Central Bank also carried out

commercial operations, but in that year the National Commercial

Bank was founded to take over the commercial division of the Central Bank and the operations of two small foreign banks.

The military government that took power in 1969 viewed the

banking sector as a primary object of its general program of Libyanization. In November 1969, the new government required that all banks in the country be Libyan controlled, and it bought out the

51 -percent control of the commercial banks that had not already

converted to Libyan control. In July 1970, the government took

100-percent control of four of the major banks with foreign minority

ownership. In December 1970, the government purchased outright

all banks that still had some foreign minority participation and,

by a process of merging, reduced the number of commercial banks

to five. Libyan citizens were permitted to purchase minority

interests in the banks.

In addition to the National Commercial Bank, commercial banks

in operation in 1987 included the Jamahiriya Bank, known as the

Jumhuriya Bank until its present name was adopted in 1977. It operated nearly thirty branches throughout the country. Other commercial banks included the Sahara Bank, formerly the Banco di

Sicilia, and the Umma Bank, the successor to the Banco di Roma.

The Wahda Bank was formed in 1970 from the merger of five other

banks.

In addition to the state-owned commercial banks, Libya was home to the National Agricultural Bank, the Industrial and Real

Estate Bank of Libya, LAFICO, and LAFB. The agricultural bank

was a specialized institution established in 1957 to provide interest- free production loans to farmers. It also made medium-term loans

for up to five years for machinery and materials and long-term loans

for up to fifteen years for land reclamation projects, irrigation, and

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Libya: A Country Study

agricultural construction. The agricultural bank purchased produce

from farmers at a guaranteed profit and sold them supplies at subsidized prices. The bank has a good record; in the past, about 90

percent of all loans have been repaid.

The Industrial and Real Estate Bank of Libya was both a development bank, providing industrial credits, and a home finance

agency, making housing loans. Most of its loans were for home

purchases. LAFICO was created in 1972 as a joint effort of the

five commercial banks, the insurance industry, and other government agencies to promote housing, industry, commerce, and

tourism. It also made investments outside Libya. In early 1972,

the government established LAFB as a wholly owned subsidiary

of the Central Bank, but not subject to the Central Bank's legislation, regulations, or exchange control. It engaged in financial and

banking operations outside the country and acted as the foreign

agent for the government and Libyan commercial banks. Its main

purposes were to encourage regional development—particularly of

countries friendly to Libya, to become active in international financial markets, and to serve as a vehicle for Libyan assistance to other

countries. By 1978 LAFB had set up a worldwide chain of eighteen subsidiaries and affiliates in which it held anywhere from 7 to 51 percent of the equity. In 1985 LAFB had total worldwide

assets of US$2.9 billion. The insurance industry was also nationalized. In December 1970,

insurance companies were required to have 60-percent government

participation, and in 1971 they were totally taken over and merged

into two companies. Credit has generally been plentiful, although

the Central Bank's credit policy was to support the government's

development effort. This meant that at times, such as in 1977, the

Central Bank limited credit to the private sector and directed it instead to state entities. This has also been done to halt the rapid

growth in the money supply and the inflationary rate. The largest

percentage of loans made by the banking system has been for housing and commerce. In 1975 the government declared interest to be usury and prohibited it, but commissions for services rendered

remained legal, and banks could charge commissions. Such commissions generally have been kept low on items such as construction loans. In practice, Libyan banks still charged interest on loans

and paid interest on deposits. In 1985 the prime lending rate stood

at 7.5 percent, while deposit and lending rates were set at 5.5 and

7.0 percent, respectively.

Foreign Trade

By the mid-1980s, the government conducted virtually all for- eign trade either directly or through public corporations. Import

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The Economy

licenses were no longer issued to the private, sector. The foreign

exchange needed to purchase imports has been allocated by the

commodity budget since its inception in 1982. Exports consisted

almost entirely of hydrocarbons. Between 1978 and 1985, crude

oil exports accounted for between 85 to 99 percent of total annual

exports. Exports of other hydrocarbons, mainly methanol and

liquefied natural gas, were irregular and depended on bilateral sup- ply agreements of limited duration.

The balance of trade has consistently been in Libya's favor since

1963, when oil exports first reached significant levels. Whereas during the 1970s exports kept ahead of imports by a wide margin, since

1981 this has not been true. For example, during 1982 Libya's trade

balance showed a surplus of only LD2 billion, the smallest surplus

since the mid-1960s. Only a drastic cut in imports kept the trade

balance as a surplus after 1981. In 1985 exports stood at LD3.2

billion, while imports totaled LD1.4 billion. The decline in Libya's trade position after 1981 was largely the

result of falling oil prices and decreasing volumes of oil exports.

The oil price decline resulted from factors beyond Libya's control,

but much of the decline in export volume resulted from Libya's

decision to stay generally within its OPEC production quotas. These

quotas were reduced in the early and mid-1980s as OPEC tried

to use its market power to reverse the falling price trend.

The composition of imports was more varied than that of exports.

Figures for 1981 indicated that the largest percentage of imports,

by value, was the category of machinery and transport equipment.

Manufactured goods, principally metal manufactures and iron and

steel, came second, followed by foodstuffs. The percentage of foodstuffs in the import bill has been rising steadily since disposable

incomes began rising.

The direction of trade has undergone a significant change since

the mid-1970s (see table 9, Appendix). Whereas during much of

the mid- to late- 1970s the United States was Libya's leading export

market, American trade restrictions had reduced Libya's trade with

the United States to zero by 1983. Italy remained Libya's most

important trading partner in the mid-1980s, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). These two countries

together supplied about 30 percent of Libya's imports and bought

slightly under 50 percent of its exports in 1984.

Domestic Trade and Tourism

The development of internal trade has been severely restricted

by government actions during the late 1970s that were aimed at curbing the activities of private sector merchants (see Role of the

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Libya: A Country Study

Government, this ch.). In general, domestic trade remained in a

state of limbo in the mid-1980s. Government policy was extremely

hostile to private trade, but because of declining oil revenues the

government was unable to keep up with the demand for most goods,

subsidized or not. Reports that the state-run supermarkets were

experiencing supply problems proliferated during 1985 and 1986.

Shopping was said to be a major daily activity that demanded time

and perseverance. The confusion reigning in the retail sector in

1985 pushed the government to announce the opening of yet another

chain of state-run shops—the " green market" (as suq alkhadhra)—to

sell subsidized goods. It was unclear, however, how much of a force

these shops would be, or whether they would receive the funds

necessary to sell goods at subsidized prices.

Beyond the urban areas, rural markets were held every Tuesday and Friday. Most farmers bought and sold in local markets,

rarely traveling to distant ones. Although Libya officially adhered

to the metric system, everyday practice continued to favor Arabic

measures. A common measure used in wholesale trade was the

marta, equivalent to about sixteen kilograms.

The government's imprint on other areas of domestic trade was

strong. Storage facilities for agricultural commodities and general

goods, including perishables, were provided by a state-owned

storage and refrigeration company. Moreover, all advertising was

done through the only advertising firm in the country, the

government-owned General Company for Distribution, Publication, and Advertisement.

A potential source of income for Libya is tourism. Libya's warm

and pleasant climate in coastal areas, together with the presence

of a large number of Greek and Roman ruins (particularly at Leptis

Magna or Labdah, east of Tripoli), would seem to indicate at least a modest potential for tourist development. In April 1972, however,

Qadhafi publicly declared that he opposed public investment in

the tourist industry. Despite this pronouncement, by the late 1970s

several tourist complexes were planned both on the coast and in

the interior. The number of tourists visiting Libya at that time was

in the 300,000 a year range. Most came from other Arab countries. Because of the prohibitions against alcohol, the lack of nightlife, and the strained political climate, foreign observers doubted

that the tourist industry would expand.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Although the transportation and communications sector was a

relatively unimportant contributor to GDP (5.2 percent in 1984),

it absorbed a large share of the annual development budgets. In

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The Economy

1982 actual expenditure on transportation and communications

(including shipping) comprised 17.5 percent of total development

budget expenditure. Much of this expenditure was oil- sector-related

in that it was designed to lessen oil transport costs and to facilitate access to hydrocarbon development sites. Transportation

Libya's transportation network has been considerably expanded

since 1978 (see fig. 10). At that time, Libya had only about 8,800

kilometers of roads, of which perhaps one-half were paved. However, by 1985 Libya possessed between 23,000 and 25,600 kilo- meters of paved roads. Surfaced roads existed between the north

and the southern oases of Al Kufrah, Marzuq, and Sabha. These

roads have done much to end the isolation of these remote settle- ments. In particular, the agricultural projects underway in the desert oases have benefited from the more efficient crop marketing made

possible by these roads. The National General Company for Roads

oversaw all new construction and maintenance.

The number of vehicles in Libya steadily increased in the 1970s

and early 1980s. By 1985 there were 313,0(X) automobiles and trucks

in the country, as well as about 70,000 buses. The ratio of automobile ownership to population was on a par with that of many West

European countries. Urban and interurban bus routes were maintained by the state-owned General Corporation for Public Transport.

As of 1985, Libya had no railroads; however, discussions had

been held with China over the possibility of technical assistance

in railway construction. Plans existed for a possible rail link between

the Tunisian rail system and Tripoli. Another possible project

envisioned transporting iron-ore deposits in the Fezzan to the Misratah iron and steel works via rail. Given Libya's financial constraints in the mid-1980s, however, prospects for these projects were

not bright.

Libya has had a long history of port congestion. In 1977 the aver- age waiting time for ships to be unloaded in Tripoli harbor was

twenty-four days. Consequentiy, since the mid-1970s, port improvements have been a top priority for the government. These improvements raised Libya's total dry cargo handling capacity from 10.5

million tons in 1976 to 13.7 million tons in 1980. In 1985 major

cargo-handling ports were located at Tripoli, Benghazi, Tobruk,

and Qasr Ahmad (near Misratah). Projects underway at Tripoli

in 1985 were designed to raise the port's handling capacity to 12.5

million tons a year. Similar construction projects at the Benghazi

port envisioned expanding its capacity to 3.5 million tons a year.

165
Libya: A Country Study

Figure 10. Transportation System, 1985

166
The Economy

167
Libya: A Country Study

Qasr Ahmad was equipped to handle about 1.5 million tons a year. Plans for a new port facility also were being formulated in 1985

to provide logistical support to the Bouri offshore oil field, which was then coming into production.

In the mid-1970s, Libya embarked on an ambitious program

of ship acquisition to build up its merchant fleet. However, it failed to take into account world competition and, by 1977, as much as 70 percent of its total tonnage was idle —the largest such proportion in the world at that time. Libya has since sold a number of

its tankers and in 1985 owned fourteen oil tankers and eighteen

cargo ships.

Civil aviation in Libya in 1987 was the responsibility of the

Secretariat of Communications, which operated all airports, and

the Civil Aviation Institute, which trained all personnel. The three

international airports in 1985 were located at Tripoli (Al Aziziyah),

Benghazi (Benina), and Sabha. Smaller airfields were located at Marsa al Burayqah, Tobruk, Ghat, Ghadamis, Al Kufrah, and

several other locations. Most civil air personnel went abroad for

training. Britain suspended its air traffic control training program

for Libyans in 1985, but Pakistan subsequently agreed to train about

seventy-eight Libyan air-traffic controllers.

The national air carrier, Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), was nationalized in 1973. Possessing only a dozen aircraft in 1977, it grew

rapidly, expanding its fleet to twenty-five aircraft in 1985. The main

aircraft in service were manufactured by Boeing, Hawker Siddeley,

Caravelle, and Fokker. In 1980, LAA carried 1.17 million passengers. A new carrier called United African Airlines (UAA) was

created in 1985 in association with LAA.

Telecommunications

In 1987 Libya had a modern telecommunications system that

provided high-quality service between the country's main population centers. All telecommunications activities were carried out by

the General Post, Telephone, and Telegraph Organization, a subsidiary of the Secretariat of Communications. In 1975 a micro- wave system connecting radio, telephone, and television signals

along the coast was established; it was superseded in 1985 by a US$25 million high-capacity cable system and a submarine cable

that linked the whole coastal strip with parts of the south all the

way to the Chadian border. The transmission systems included

microwave radio relay, coaxial cable, submarine cable, tropospheric

scatter, and satellites. The system was capable of serving approximately 10 million telephone subscribers, including those along the

densely populated Mediterranean coast.

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The Economy

Telecommunications in Libya were greatly improved in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The interior of the country was served by

various systems. Radio relay and coaxial cable extended to numerous points and a domestic satellite system was constructed to serve

areas not fully integrated into the ground-based networks. The number of telephone lines increased from 90,000 in 1978 to 215,000

in 1985 —an average of 1 telephone for every 100 citizens. Switching was predominantly automatic.

International telecommunications links, like the domestic routes, were linked via multiple transmission systems. Submarine cables

extended from Tripoli to Marseilles, France, and Catania, Italy,

providing telephone and telegraph circuits between Libya and

Western Europe. A satellite ground-station complex located near Tripoli operated through the Atlantic Ocean and Indian

Ocean satellites of the International Telecommunications Satellite (INTELSAT) Organization. Additionally, Libya was a member of the regional Arab Satellite (ARABSAT) Organization.

Radio broadcast transmissions were made by five high-power

and numerous low-power AM stations for domestic service and

by a high-power transmitter located at Sabratah, near Tripoli, for

international shortwave service. FM broadcasting was expanded

to reach most of the country.

* * * Many studies on the economy of Libya since the revolution tend

to emphasize the political aspects of Libyan economic policy, giving scant attention to the economic ramifications of governmental

policy choices. A major exception to this rule are the works ofJ. A.

Allan, who has written several excellent analytical pieces on the

Libyan economy. Allan's Libya, the Experience of Oil remains the principal source on the economy before 1980. Allan presents a useful

summary of the problems facing Libyan agriculture in his chapter

"Capital Has Not Substituted for Water in Agriculture," to be

found in J. A. Allan (ed.), Libya Since Independence. Another good

summary of the economy can be found in the chapter by Stace Birks

and Clive Sinclair in Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay (eds.),

North Africa. In addition to these analytical works, much information can be culled from the Economist Intelligence Unit's Quarterly

Economic Review series on Libya, various issues of Middle East Eco- nomic Digest, and Africa Research Bulletin. The best source of government statistics is the Central Bank of Libya, Annual Report series, for various years. (For complete citations and further information,

see Bibliography.)

169

Chapter 4. Government and Politics
The national emblem of Libya
SWEEPING AND FUNDAMENTAL changes were introduced

in Libya after Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi and his Free Officers

Movement overthrew the Sanusi monarchy on September 1, 1969,

and proclaimed the "Green Revolution." Because of the many

radical and experimental policies that Qadhafi has tried to implement in Libya, he has been described frequently as a mercurial

and quixotic leader. But while Qadhafi' s policy making has been

unpredictable, it has not been random or capricious. Rather, Qahafi's political behavior has been dictated by his own elaborate and

evolving normative political ideology, which he set forth in his three- volume The Green Book.

The essence of Qadhafi 's philosophy is the Third Universal Theory, so-called because it is intended to be an alternative to capitalism and Marxism. The theory calls for the institution in Libya of

what Qadhafi calls "direct democracy." In a direct democracy,

as envisaged by Qadhafi, citizens govern themselves through grass- roots activism without the mediation or intervention of state insti- tutions or other organizational hierarchies in the military, tribes,

ulama, or intelligentsia. In an effort to implement direct democracy,

Qadhafi altered or dismantled governmental and social structures. He launched a Cultural Revolution in 1973, instituted "people's

power" in 1975, and proclaimed that Libya was a "state of the

masses" in 1977. Finally, to emphasize his policy of decentralization, Qadhafi relinquished his own formal governmental position

in 1979 and insisted he be referred to simply as "Leader of the

Revolution."

The striking innovation in the Libyan political system since Qadhafi came to power resulted from his desire to replace subnational traditional leaders with administrators with the skills needed to modernize the country. The changes were also ostensibly intended

to foster egalitarianism, mass mobilization, revolutionary commitment, public participation, and self-determination among Libyan

citizens. From a pragmatic perspective, however, the changes served

primarily to undermine the authority of traditional or alternate elite groups that posed a potential challenge to Qadhafi 's leadership.

It is ironic, then, that the changes intended to enfranchise the

citizenry have instead served primarily to bolster Qadhafi 's per- sonal power by diminishing governmental checks and balances on

his executive power and eliminating all other power bases. In 1987 there was little doubt that Qadhafi remained the country's

173
Libya: A Country Study

strongman, the fulcrum of power, and the single most important

figure in Libya.

Although Qadhafi in theory advocated dismantling the struc- ture of government, in reality Libya in 1987 had an elaborate and

complex bureaucratic structure because the new organizations Qadhafi created had been superimposed upon existing institutions.

In 1987 the primary formal instrument of government was the

General People's Congress (GPC), both an executive and legislative body, which convened three times annually. The GPC was

headed by a small General Secretariat composed primarily of members of the former Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which was abolished in 1977. A General People's Committee performed

the function of a cabinet, replacing the old Council of Ministers.

Subnational representation and participation were accomplished

through four roughly parallel and overlapping structures: people's

committees that were organized at the basic (urban ward or rural

village) and municipal levels; Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the only

authorized political mass organization; Basic Popular Congress

(BPC); and revolutionary committees (see Glossary), organized both

geographically and functionally. The lines of authority and responsibility among these four bodies were unclear, which occasionally

caused intense competition and rivalry within the government.

Moreover, in 1987 there were indications that Qadhafi intended

to introduce a fifth similar organizational structure in the form of a new political party.

On the international level, Libya sought to foster pan-Arabism

and Islamic and Third World solidarity. Initially, Libya advocated

positive neutrality, but, for pragmatic reasons, soon gravitated

toward a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Concurrently,

Libya's interpretation of the North-South dimension of global

politics emphasized the division between industrialized, resource- consuming nations and underdeveloped resource producers, a

division that, in Qadhafi' s view, overshadowed the East-West

dichotomy. Libya under Qadhafi played a leading role in the efforts among producing countries to gain full control of petroleum production and to use that production for internal development and as a political weapon with which to reward friendly nations and punish opponents.

Qadhafi is hostile toward the United States and other Western

countries because these countries generally support Israel. Because

of its anti-Western stance, the Libyan regime gained a reputation

for conducting unconventional, belligerent, and aggressive foreign

relations. There were frequent and widespread allegations that

Libya sponsored transnational terrorist activities, supported dozens

174
Government and Politics

of insurrectionary movements worldwide, and assassinated exiled

opponents. Just as Libya's domestic policies had resulted in a sit- uation contrary to what Qadhafi claimed he desired, so too had

its foreign policy. Qadhafi's maverick foreign policy not only

angered Western countries, but it also alienated many of Libya's

erstwhile or potential allies in the Third World that were the

intended audience of the Third Universal Theory.

Because of the precipitous decline of the oil revenues that had

funded Qadhafi 's foreign and domestic policies, the dizzying pace

of internal change, and the country's image as an international

pariah, the regime's viability and durability were questioned.

Nevertheless, in late 1987, most foreign observers doubted that a coup d'etat was imminent.

Internal Politics

Until 1951 Libya was under foreign domination. In November

1949 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a sovereign Libyan state comprising three historically diverse regions: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica,

and Fezzan. The UN commissioner for Libya, Adrian Pelt, suggested the formation of a preparatory committee of twenty-one Libyans (seven from each region) to initiate the framing of a

constitution. The committee created the National Constituent

Assembly, which first met in November 1950 and subsequently

formed committees to draft a constitution. On October 7, 1951,

the new constitution was promulgated, and on December 24, King

Idris proclaimed Libya's sovereignty and independence (see The

United Nations and Libya, ch. 1). The constitution established Libya as a monarchy; succession was to pass to Idris 's designated heirs. Because of its historically distinct regions, the new country was organized as a federation, each region becoming a province and maintaining its own

autonomous administration and legislature. Benghazi and Tripoli

alternated as the federation's capital. As do many European parliamentary systems, the constitution provided for an executive

branch—the Council of Ministers (or cabinet)—headed by a

minister and responsible to the lower house, or Chamber of

Deputies, of the bicameral legislature. The number of deputies was

55, later increased to 103. The upper house, or Senate, comprised

twenty-four members, eight from each province. The king held

considerable executive authority; he formally appointed the Council of Ministers and half of the senators and had the right to veto

legislation and dissolve the lower house (see Independent Libya,

ch. 1).

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Libya: A Country Study

The king endorsed legislation, passed in April 1963, that produced a major constitutional revision; the federal form was replaced

by a unitary structure that emphasized centralized national authority. Provincial boundaries were erased, and ten smaller governorates

(muhafazat; sing., muhafazah) were created, each headed by a gover- nor appointed by the central government. The constitution was

also modified to provide for the extension of suffrage to women

and for the royal appointment of all senators. Also, whereas the

1951 constitution had vested sovereignty in the nation and declared

the nation to be the source of all power, the 1963 revision proclaimed

that sovereignty belonged only to God (Allah) and that it was given

as a sacred trust to the state, which was the source of all power.

The 1951 constitution, as amended in 1963, remained in effect until September 1, 1969. At that time a group of military officers

and men headed by Captain (later Colonel) Qadhafi overthrew the

monarchy and proclaimed a republic instead (see The September

1969 Coup, ch. 1). The supreme organ of the Revolutionary

regime, the RCC, replaced the existing constitution with the Constitutional Proclamation of December 11, 1969, which was to be

superseded by a new constitution at some future, unspecified date.

Meanwhile, existing laws, decrees, and regulations not in conflict

with the December proclamation remained in effect. The proclamation confirmed the RCC as the supreme authority, officially re- named the country the Libyan Arab Republic, and provided for a system of government (see National Executive and Legislative

Evolution, this ch.). It vested sovereignty in the people, made Islam

the state religion, and declared Arabic the official language. Education and health care were specified as constitutional rights.

The December 1969 proclamation declared the Libyan people

to be part of the Arab nation, dedicated to "the realization of

socialism through the application of social justice which forbids any

form of exploitation . . . [The state's] aim is to eliminate peacefully the disparities between social class[es]." Furthermore, the 1969

proclamation charged the state with endeavoring "to liberate the

national economy from dependence and foreign influence." Public ownership was proclaimed the basis of social development and

self-sufficient productivity, but nonexploitive private property would

be protected, and inheritance would be governed by the Islamic

sharia (see Glossary). Freedom of opinion was guaranteed "within

the limits of public interest and the principles of the Revolution."

On the same day that the RCC issued the December 1969 proclamation, it also issued the Decision on the Protection of the Revolution. The decision established the death penalty for anyone

attempting to overthrow the Revolutionary regime and stipulated

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Government and Politics

imprisonment for "anyone who commits an act of aggression"

against the new government. Aggressive acts were defined as propagandizing against the regime, arousing class hatred among

the people, spreading false rumors about political and economic

conditions in the country, and demonstrating or striking against

the government.

On March 2, 1977, in a novel approach to democratic government, Libya adopted a provision known as the Declaration of the

Establishment of the People's Authority. The declaration changed

the official name of the country to the Socialist People's Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya (sometimes seen as Jamahiriyah). The word

jamahiriya is derived from the Arabic word "jamahir," meaning

"masses." Qadhafi coined the word jamahiriya; it has no official translation but unofficially has been translated as a "state of the

masses," "people's authority," or "people's power." According

to Qadhafi, thejamahiriya system was to be "a state run by the people without a government," and it heralded the dawn of a new, more advanced stage in humanity's political evolution, just as the

phase of republics represented an advancement over the age of

monarchies.

National Executive and Legislative Evolution

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)

The Constitutional Proclamation of December 11, 1969, designated the RCC as the supreme executive and legislative authority

in Libya. The RCC itself was a collegial body in which issues and

policies were debated until enough consensus developed to establish a unified position. As the RCC's chairman, however, Qadhafi was the dominant figure in the Revolutionary government.

Although he lacked absolute authority to impose his will on his RCC

colleagues, they generally deferred to him as the primary leader

and spokesman.

The RCC appointed the members of the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers was responsible collectively to the RCC,

which could dismiss the prime minister individually or accept the

resignation of other ministers. The prime minister's resignation

automatically caused the resignation of the entire Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers also was charged with executing

general policy in accordance with RCC decisions. When these

decisions required new laws, the Council of Ministers drafted legislation for the RCC's consideration. Promulgation was by RCC

decree.

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Libya: A Country Study

After 1969 numerous cabinet shuffles occurred, sometimes in

reaction to dissension within the Council of Ministers and threats

against the RCC and at other times in attempts to balance or modify

the mix of civilian and military members of the cabinet. Qadhafi

became prime minister in January 1970, but by 1972 he increasingly left routine administrative tasks to another RCC member,

Major Abdel Salaam Jallud (also seen as Jalloud), in order to devote

himself to revolutionary theory (see Political Ideology, this ch.).

In July 1972, Jallud assumed the position of prime minister. At

the time there was speculation in the foreign press that the new

Council of Ministers' composition indicated dissension within the

RCC and the diminishing of Qadhafi' s authority; these notions

proved erroneous, however, at least regarding the latter point. Qadhafi retained the positions of chairman of the RCC, commander

in chief of the armed forces, and president of the mass political

organization, the ASU, and he personally administered the oath

of office to Jallud.

Qadhafi' s continuing dedication to revolutionary theorizing led

to an April 1974 decree relieving him of his other political, administrative, and protocol duties so that he might devote all of his time

to his primary interest. Jallud assumed the functions Qadhafi relin- quished; he had already been performing many of them unofficially. Despite the fact that Qadhafi retained the position of

commander in chief of the armed forces, speculation again arose

that his power and authority were waning. Instead, the RCC decree

appeared only to have formalized a division of labor between Qadhafi 's theoretical interests and Jallud 's practical political and

administrative interests—a division that had existed informally for some time.

The General People's Congress

The executive system comprising the RCC and the Council of

Ministers continued to operate into 1977, with occasional cabinet

shuffles. In late 1976, Qadhafi emerged from relative isolation to resume leadership of the RCC. On the seventh anniversary of the

Revolution, September 1, 1976, Qadhafi introduced a plan to reor- ganize the Libyan state. The plan's primary feature was a proposal

that a new representative body (the GPC) replace the RCC as the

supreme instrument of government. A five-member General Secretariat was created to stand at the apex of the CjPC. The details

of the plan were included in the draft Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority, adopted by the GPC in extraordinary session on March 2, 1977. The declaration included several

basic points: the change in the country's name to the Socialist

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Government and Politics

People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the establishment of popular

direct authority through a system culminating in the GPC, and

the assignment of responsibility for defending the homeland to every

man and woman through general military training.

The GPC also adopted resolutions that designated Qadhafi as

its secretary general; created the General Secretariat of the GPC,

which comprised the remaining members of the defunct RCC; and

appointed the General People's Committee, which replaced the

Council of Ministers, its members now called secretaries rather than

ministers (see fig. 11). For symbolic reasons, initially no secretary

of defense was appointed within the General People's Committee,

defense having become the responsibility of all citizens. Since its formation the GPC has met in ordinary session annually, usually for about two weeks in November or December.

Delegates numbered over 1,000, somewhat more than 60 percent

of whom were leaders of the ASU basic and municipal popular congresses (see Subnational Government and Administration, this ch.).

Other delegates included the members of the General Secretariat

of the GPC and the General People's Committee, leaders of the

geographically based zone and municipal people's committees, and

representatives from functionally based organizations.

With the RCC and the Council of Ministers abolished, all executive and legislative authority technically was vested in the

GPC. The GPC, however, formally delegated most of its important authority to its general secretary and General Secretariat and

to the General People's Committee. In its December 1978 session,

the GPC authorized the General People's Committee to appoint

ambassadors, and the secretary of foreign affairs was authorized

to receive the credentials of foreign diplomats. The General People's Committee, in accordance with conditions established at the

GPC's December 1978 session and on recommendation of the secre- tary of the Internal Security Authority, awards and cancels

Libyan citizenship. The GPC retains the power to select the president and judges of the Supreme Court, the governor and deputy

governor of the Central Bank of Libya, the attorney general, and

other high officials. The suggestions and advice of the GPC General

Secretariat and the General People's Committee probably are decisive regarding such appointments, however. The General Secretariat appoints the members of the General People's Committee.

The GPC has the formal power to declare war, ratify treaties

with other countries, and consider general policy plans and their

implementation. In these and other functions, however, it is again

subject to the advice of the General People's Committee and the

supervision of the general secretary and General Secretariat, which

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Libya: A Country Study

make the final decisions. Yet it would be inaccurate to dismiss the

GPC as a mere rubber stamp. It has functioned as a clearinghouse

and sounding board, receiving the views of the masses (through

lower level representative congresses, committees, and functional

organizations) and transmitting them to the General Secretariat

and General People's Committee. Conversely, it transmits the decisions of the national leadership to the masses, encouraging mass

participation in the political system and lending legitimacy to General Secretariat decisions and policies through advice and formal

approval. Qadhafi served as secretary general of the GPC until

March 1979, at which time he once again formally resigned from

all his positions to devote himself to revolutionary action and, in

his words, to ensure the "separation of the state from the Revolution."

Subnational Government and Administration

Because of continuing historical and tribal divisiveness, the fed- eration was replaced with a unitary system in 1963, and the three

subnational provinces were replaced by ten governorates (see fig. 1). The governorates were subdivided into districts (mutasarrifiyat\ sing.

,

mutasarrifiyah) , each of which was further subdivided into subdistricts (mudiriyat; sing., mudiriyah). Executive heads of these geographical units included the governor (muhaafiz), district chief

(mutasarrif) , and subdistrict chief (mudir), respectively. Large cities,

such as Tripoli and Benghazi, were organized as municipalities,

headed by mayors, and subdivided into wards.

All subnational executive administrators were appointed by royal

authority on recommendation of the minister of interior and

approved by the Council of Ministers. Their appointment fre- quently was based on tribal and subtribal considerations as well

as family prestige derived from the family's historical importance,

religious standing and leadership, and wealth. Thus, much of the

historical divisiveness that the switch from a federal to a unitary

system was designed to overcome was perpetuated in the frequent

appointment of members of regional and local elite families as subnational administrators.

Interested in minimizing tribal and regional differences and in

encouraging mass participation in the political system, the RCC

began modifying the subnational government structure soon after the 1969 Revolution. Laws implemented in 1970 and 1971 established the Ministry of Local Government (which assumed some

of the duties formerly exercised by the Ministry of Interior), gave

local authorities more power to implement policies of the central

(national) government, and redesignated some of the names and

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Government and Politics

boundaries of the ten governorates. Selection of chief executives

in the governorates, districts, subdistricts, and municipalities

remained within the purview of the central government, appointments being made by the RCC on the recommendation of the

minister of interior. Lower level administrators were required to meet standardized civil service qualifications.

For the most part, subnational government continued to function as a hierarchical system of administrative links with the central government rather than as a vehicle for popular representation

or participation. The RCC as a whole and Qadhafi in particular

remained highly critical of inefficient bureaucracy, the lack of com- mitment to the Revolution displayed by many civil servants and

other subnational government functionaries, and the reluctance or

inability of the population to participate in the political system.

Between 1971 and 1987, subnational government and administration were developed in five major stages in order to correct these

deficiencies.

The Arab Socialist Union

The 1971 creation of the ASU, an imitation of the Egyptian counterpart of the same name, marked the first stage in the drive to modify subnational government. The ASU was envisioned as the

direct link between the people and the government (and particularly the RCC). Its purpose was to provide the masses with a sys- tem that allowed for participation and representation (thus fostering

national unity), commitment to the Revolution, and loyalty to the

RCC) but that could be carefully directed by the RCC. Resolutions passed by ASU organs required RCC decrees or orders for implementation, and the RCC could annul any ASU decision at any level and dissolve any ASU organ. As chairman of the RCC,

Qadhafi became president of the ASU.

The ASU was organized on three tiers: at the basic (or local)

level, the governorate level, and the national level. Membership

was based on both geography (or residence) and function (work

places, universities, and government bureaucracies). ASU units

at both the basic and governorate level were composed of two ele- ments, the conference and the committee. All local and functional

ASU members within a basic area constituted the Basic Conference. The Basic Committee, which functioned as the conference's

executive, comprised ten members elected by and from the conference. The committee in turn elected its own secretariat and

appointed special subcommittees to investigate matters and suggest policies of local interest. The Governorate Conference consisted of two or more representatives elected from each basic unit,

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Libya: A Country Study

the number of representatives depending on the size of the basic

unit's membership. The Governorate Committee consisted of

twenty members elected by and from conference members. The

committee also elected its secretariat and appointed research subcommittees. ASU university units were equivalent to, and organized

in the same manner as, ASU governorate units.

The ASU unit at the national level was the National Congress

(sometimes seen as National Conference), an early version of the

GPC. It comprised ten, fourteen, or twenty representatives from

each ASU governorate unit (depending on the size of the membership of that unit). The National Congress also included members of the RCC and Council of Ministers and delegates from

functional organizations.

From its inception, Libyan officials stressed that the ASU was

not a political party; rather, it was a mass organization that formed an activist alliance comprising members of various social forces

within the population (laborers, farmers, soldiers, women, and so forth) that were committed to the principles of the Revolution.

Emphasis was placed on "toilers," or workers—initially farmers

and laborers—who were to constitute at least half of the membership of all ASU units at all levels. The worker category was later expanded to include—along with farmers and laborers—professionals, artisans, employees, traders, and students. Intellectuals and

nonexploitive capitalists were considered workers at one time but were later excluded. Membership in the ASU was open to anyone

from the worker categories who was over eighteen years of age,

in good legal standing, of sound mental health, and not a member

of the former royal family or associated with the defunct monarchical government. Exceptions in these cases could be granted by

the RCC. By the time of the first ASU National Congress in 1972,

membership was reported to include over 300,000 of some 1 million eligible persons.

A second stage in subnational government revision occurred with

the passage of several laws in 1972. Through these laws the districts and subdistricts were abolished, reducing administrative subdivisions to the governorate and the municipality. (Municipalities

could be subdivided into branches and other units, but these were

secondary, created only when needed on a municipal council's

recommendation to the prime minister.) Certain ministerial pre- rogatives in administration, finance, and local civil service matters were transferred to the governors and mayors. The functions

of the Ministry of Municipalities were reabsorbed by the Ministry

of Interior, and the prime minister supervised a system of representative councils at the governorate and municipal levels, councils

that were influenced significantly by the ASU.

182
A busy street in Benghazi

Courtesy Keith Daber

Governorate and municipal councils were concerned primarily

with implementing national policies and drafting plans and regulations pertaining to the provision of regular and emergency health,

education, social welfare, and transportation services, as well as with undertaking development and agricultural improvement

projects. A governorate had primary authority over these functions

when they crossed municipal boundaries.

Governorate councils comprised both appointed and elected seats. The prime minister appointed ASU members, upon the governor's

advice and the ASU's recommendation, to fill ten seats. The popular elections to fill the other seats were supervised by the ASU.

The councils also included the area directors of health, education,

and other services. Municipal councils were composed of six appointed ASU members, other members of the ASU who were elect- ed through ASU-supervised popular elections, and municipal

service administrators. All council decisions were sent to the prime

minister, who could reject them. If the council persisted, the matter would be sent to the Council of Ministers for final review. The

prime minister also was empowered to dissolve councils.

The Cultural Revolution and People's Committees

Bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of public participation con- tinued to plague the subnational governmental system. Not only

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Libya: A Country Study

did the ASU organization appear too complex to foster public in- volvement by the politically unsophisticated masses, but there was

the additional problem of poor coordination between the ASU and

subnational administrators. In large part to correct these problems,

Qadhafi proclaimed the Cultural Revolution on April 15, 1973.

The institutional linchpin of the Cultural Revolution was the people's committee, which also was the primary component of the third

stage in the development of subnational administration.

Similar in structure to the ASU, people's committees were both

functionally and geographically based. Functionally based people's

committees were established in universities, schools, private busi- ness firms (including foreign-owned oil companies), farms, public

utilities, banks, government organs, the broadcast media, and at harbor and airport facilities. Geographically based people's committees were formed at the governorate, municipal, and zone levels (municipalities being composed of several zones). Direct popular

elections filled the seats on the people's committees at the zone level. The zone-level committees selected representatives who collectively

formed the Municipal People's Committee; municipal people's

committees in turn selected representatives to form the governorate

people's committees. Any citizen of at least nineteen years of age was permitted to vote and to run for committee membership, but

there were no standardized rules governing the formation of the

people's committees, at least at the beginning. This resulted in considerable confusion, particularly when multiple people's committees formed in the same place began denouncing each other. In such instances, new RCC-sanctioned elections had to be called. The deadline for the formation of people's committees was August

1973. Estimates of the number of committees in existence by that

time vary from approximately 1,000 to more than 2,000.

According to Qadhafi, people's committees were to be the primary instrument of the Revolution. They were to decide what and

who conformed to the principles of the Revolution, a task that

included the purging of government officials (up to the rank of

undersecretary) and private executives and managers. Thousands

of functionaries were dismissed, demoted, or transferred. In rare

cases, executives and other functionaries were promoted. Such

actions severely disrupted the orderly operation of countless government offices and private enterprises, so much so that by the fall of 1973 the press and the RCC were publicly criticizing the zeal

with which committees substituted unqualified replacements for experienced persons. At no time did the RCC lose control of the

situation, however; on occasion it reversed people's committee

actions, dismissed individual committee members, and even

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dissolved whole committees, sanctioning new elections in the

process. In a positive sense, the people's committees provided the masses with still more opportunities to participate in the governmental system, and the purges resulted in the replacement of critics (both real and imagined) of the Qadhafi regime by militants who

felt more closely linked to the RCC and the Revolution.

The people's committees originally were seen as an experiment,

but by October 1973 a new law had formalized their existence and

set their term of membership at three years. More significantly,

the law transferred the authority and functions of municipal and

governorate councils to the people's committees at the same levels. The chairmen of the governorate people's committees became the

governors; the chairmen of the municipal people's committees

became mayors.

During 1974 doubts increased regarding the operation of the people's committees. The Libyan press warned of the danger inher- ent in the creation of a new bureaucratic class. In early September, an RCC spokesman publicly accused the committee system of degenerating into anarchy and rashness and of deviating from the path

of true democracy. New elections for all levels of people's committees were held from September 14 to October 3; some of the

existing committees were reelected.

At the 1974 National Congress, Qadhafi stated that the complexity of administrative machinery limited mass interest in political participation, and he called for the removal of obstacles between

the people and the government. He believed that policy planning

should be centralized but that execution should be decentralized.

The congress responded by recommending the abolition of governorates. It also stressed the primacy of the people's committees in administrative affairs and the ASU's supervisory authority over

the committees.

In February 1975, the RCC issued a law that abolished the governorates and their service directorates; however, twelve years later many sources continued to refer to the governorates as though they

still existed. A separate Ministry of Municipalities reemerged from

the Ministry of Interior. Direction of the services previously administered by the governorate directorates—education, health, housing, social services, labor, agricultural services, communications,

financial services, and economy—was transferred to nine newly

created control bureaus. Each control bureau was located in the

appropriate ministry, and the ministry became responsible for deliv- ery of the service to the country as a whole. Another RCC law,

issued on April 7 , formally established the municipality as the sole administrative and geographical subdivision within Libya. It further

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Libya: A Country Study

stipulated that each municipality would be subdivided into quarters,

each quarter to have its own people's committee. The municipal

people's committee would comprise representatives from the quarters' committees.

The Basic People's Congress

The blurred lines of responsibility dividing the ASU (as the organization charged with mobilizing the masses) and the people's committees (charged with being the primary administrative instrument

of the Revolution) led to minimal cooperation and even conflict

between the two systems. Political participation by the population

as a whole was lacking, and administration was inefficient. Qadhafi decided that if coordination and cooperation between the ASU

and the people's committees were to be increased, and if organized

functional groups (especially labor) were to be brought further into an integrated participatory system, still another innovation was

required. The fourth stage in modifying subnational government

and administration involved a reorganization of the ASU, an- nounced by Qadhafi on April 28, 1975.

Membership in the reorganized ASU was open to all Libyans

(except convicted criminals and the mentally ill) as well as to all Arabs living outside Libya. At the lowest geographic level, the submunicipal zone, the population formed the BPC, all citizens within

the jurisdiction of a given BPC automatically becoming members

of it. By 1987 over 2,000 BPCs had been created. The BPC was

headed by an executive or leadership committee of ten members,

directed by a secretary (sometimes referred to as a chairman). The

leadership committee's function was strictly administrative

announcing congress meetings, preparing minutes, and setting the

agenda. Qadhafi noted that the leadership committees would be

selected rather than elected, the results of elections not having been

entirely satisfactory in the past. Press reports later announced,

however, that ASU elections at all levels were held between November 9 and December 3, 1975 (the term "election" possibly having

been used in the broadest sense to include some less direct selec- tion process). Each municipal district was composed of several

BPCs. The Tripoli ASU municipal district, for example, comprised

forty-four BPCs in 1975. Members of the leadership committees

of all BPCs within a given municipal district formed the Municipal

Popular Congress. A leadership committee of twenty members was

selected by that congress.

Leadership committee chairmen from the BPCs and the

Municipal Popular Congress were delegates to the highest ASU

organ, the National Congress, which met in 1972 and 1974. Also

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Government and Politics

represented at the municipal congresses and the National Congress were delegates from professional groups and organized labor, a

modification in the old form of ASU functional representation based on work places. The April 1975 ASU reorganization announce- ment stipulated that the national representative organ was to be

called the National General Congress. A November 13 decree in- cluded formal provisions for the new congress, the first session of

which was held in January 1976. By the time of its September 1976

session, the national representative body had become the GPC,

which had transcended the old ASU National Congress in formal

power and purpose.

With the 1975 reorganization of the ASU, the roles of the people's committees and the ASU's BPCs were demarcated, at least

theoretically. People's committees were responsible for political matters, and they debated both domestic and foreign policies as presented by the national leadership in the form of a standard

agenda. In terms of authority, the political organ was superior to the administrative, the ASU having been assigned supervisory and

guidance functions over the people's committees. The GPC, embodying the will of the lower municipal and basic popular congresses, was the highest legislative and executive authority in the country.

The Revolutionary Committees

Appearance of revolutionary committees in late 1977 marked

a further evolution of the political system. In response to Qadhafl's

promptings, revolutionary committees sprang up in offices, schools,

businesses, and in the armed forces. Carefully selected, they were

estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 members in 1985. These supposedly

spontaneous groups, made up of zealous, mostly youthful individuals with modest education, functioned as the watchdogs of the

regime and guides for the people's committees and popular congresses. As such, their role was to raise popular awareness, to pre- vent deviation from officially sanctioned ideology, and to combat

tribalism, regionalism, self-doubt, apathy, reactionaries, foreign

ideologies, and counterrevolutionaries. The formation of the revolutionary committees was a consequence of Qadhafl's impatience with

the progress of the revolution, his obsession with achieving direct

popular democracy, and his antipathy toward bureaucracy.

The introduction of the revolutionary committees added still another layer to the political system, thus increasing its complexity. The revolutionary committees sent delegates to the GPC. Under

Qadhafl's direct command and with his backing, they became so powerful that they frequently intimidated other GPC delegates.

Reports of their heavy-handedness and extremism abound. In the

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Libya: A Country Study

1980s, the "corruption trials" in revolutionary courts in which a defendant had no legal counsel and no right of appeal were widely

criticized both at home and abroad (see Law and the Judiciary,

this ch.). The infamous "hit squads," composed of elements of

the revolutionary committees, pursued Qadhafl's opponents overseas, assassinating a number of them. Violent clashes occurred

between revolutionary committees and the officially recognized or

legitimate people's groups and the armed forces. It became clear

by the mid-1980s that the revolutionary committees had frequently

stifled freedom of expression. Regardless of Qadhafl's intentions,

they had clearly "undermined any meaningful popular participation in the political process," as Lillian Craig Harris, an authority on Libya, observed.

Summary and Trends in 1987

Despite the fact that Qadhafi has established an elaborate and

complex system of overlapping institutions to foster public representation and "direct democracy," the Libyan regime in 1987 was

still controlled by a small group of powerful men. Although no offi- cial leadership hierarchy delineated the relative power of these top

leaders, Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi was de facto chief of state without holding such a title. He remained the primary decision

maker and continued to act as the supreme commander of the armed

forces, the Leader of the Revolution, and its founding father and

foremost theoretician. Dr. Miftah al Usta Umar, secretary of the

General People's Congress, theoretically served as the chief of state. Abdel Salaam Jallud continued to be identified as Libya's number two man, despite doubts raised by his three-month stay in Syria.

His return to Libya in early March 1987, however, indicated that rumors of a rift with Qadhafi were exaggerated.

The most recent government shuffle, taking place in early March

1987, entailed the replacement ofJadallah Azzuz at Talhi as secre- tary general of the General People's Committee (a position cor- responding to prime minister). His successor, Umar al Muntasir,

who served previously as secretary of industries, was little known

outside Libya. The Libyan news agency JANA announced that

Talhi had replaced Kamal Hassan Mansur as secretary of foreign

liaison (corresponding to foreign minister).

Outside the formal government or cabinet structure, the most

important figures of the Libyan regime, in addition to Jallud,

included Armed Forces Chief of Staff Abu Bakr Yunis, Inspector

General of the Armed Forces Mustafa Kharrubi, and Colonel

Khuwayldi al Hamidi, head of the "shock force" of the revolutionary committees tasked with suppressing political dissent.

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Government and Politics

All of these men were among the twelve founders of the Free Officers

Movement, whose members seized power in September 1969. And,

following the purges in the aftermath of a 1975 coup attempt, they were the only original members of the original twelve Free Officers

Movement who remained in power. The cohesion of this inner core has continued with little or no sign of conflict or dissension.

Prominent among the revolutionary committees' young radicals was Musa Kusa, who was in charge of the International Revolutionary Committee (sometimes called the Libyan World Center

for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reaction, and

Fascism). Qadhafi's cousin, Ahmad Qadhafadam, played a prominent role in actions against "stray dogs," i.e., Libyans opposed

to Qadhafi who were outside the country and were targets for assas- sination. Finally, Khalifa Hunaysh headed the presidential guard,

a group that protected Qadhafi.

The regime faced tumultuous internal crises in 1987. The military establishment was disgruntled and demoralized by the war in

Chad, economic problems were exacerbated by the world oil glut,

and disputes among certain key regime figures threatened to erode

Qadhafi's personal power base (see Growth and Structure of the

Economy, ch. 3; State of Internal Security, ch. 5). A rift between

Colonel Hassan Ishkal (also seen as Eshkal), military commander

of the oil-rich central region and a long-time friend of Qadhafi,

and Hunaysh, culminated in Ishkal' s death under mysterious cir- cumstances in Tripoli on November 24, 1986. Although the facts were not definitively established, foreign observers believed that

Ishkal, who was Qadhafi's cousin, was killed by supporters of

Hunaysh. Significantly, both men were members of Qadhafi's

tribe—the Qadhafadam—upon which Qadhafi has relied increasingly in recent years. But after the daily newspaperJamahiriyah vehemently criticized the Qadhafadam tribe, the Libyan leader decided

to distance himself from his kin. Foreign observers believed that

unless intratribal conflicts were kept within manageable limits, yet

another crucial base of Qadhafi's support would be eroded. The

question arose as to how many domestic interest groups the regime

could afford to alienate before it was left with no support.

Unlike many leaders, who, when confronted by mounting threats

to regime stability, adopted a conservative and cautious approach

to consolidate their grip on power, Qadhafi met threats with fur- ther changes. Qadhafi had often launched new domestic or for- eign political initiatives to distract attention from domestic crises,

and in view of this record, further political change came as no surprise. On November 3, 1986, Az Zahf al Akhdar (The Green March),

the mouthpiece of the revolutionary committees, carried a long

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Libya: A Country Study

article, probably written by Qadhafi, which surprisingly argued

the urgent need to form a new political party. In an astonishing

assertion, the article indicated that such a new political party would

replace the people's congresses. According to the article, the people's congresses should be "crushed" because of "exploitation,

stealing, monopoly, haughtiness, domination, favoritism, tribal- ism, reactionism, and corruption" among the masses, which they

represented. The statement was apparently motivated by recognition of the need to purge the GPC and the people's congresses of

elements who voiced their opposition to some of Qadhafi's policies.

In the opinion of informed observers, Qadhafi's practical political decision making contradicted his political theories. For ideological reasons, he genuinely wanted the masses to evolve into a

self-governing polity. For pragmatic reasons, however, he vetoed

popular policies with which he disagreed, using the rationale that

he was protecting the people from "opportunists" and "counterrevolutionaries." However, such paternalistic intervention contra- vened the very political process Qadhafi advocated by preventing

the masses from reaching the stage of true self-reliance, Qadhafi's

ostensible goal.

Despite these shortcomings, however, it seemed clear that the

basic goal of direct democracy had been achieved to some extent. Certainly, most Libyans were better represented than they had been

under the monarchy. By the late 1980s, there were many opportunities for the populace to participate in the political process and

to influence the planning and regulations that affected their daily

life. On occasion, the populace have succeeded in revising or changing national policy. For example, faced with the strong opposition

of the 1 984 GPC , Qadhafi conceded that military training of women

would not require women to move away from home. In addition,

"people's power" did provide for some genuine debate and consultation on most local and many regional matters. Thejamahiriya

system gave people experience in the exercise of responsibility that

had largely been denied them in the past, if only because Qadhafi,

whether or not by choice, did not wield absolute dictatorial power.

Qadhafi's power and his ability to veto citizens' wishes was cir- cumscribed to some extent by the General Secretariat, which

challenged his views. Moreover, Qadhafi's frequent resignations did not gain him many concessions from his colleagues. As

Raymond Hinnebusch pointed out, the fact that Qadhafi felt the

need to resort to such measures or threats indicated that policy decisions were taken by a majority vote and that Qadhafi could be

defied.

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Government and Politics

Although popular participation and self- representation in Libya's

government have increased, there are clearly limits to how much

control citizens can ultimately exert over their government. On

the one hand, Qadhafi has set limits to the extent of dissent he will permit. Qadhafi created the revolutionary committees specifically to counteract growing people's power. And, just as the Chinese

Cultural Revolution degenerated into chaos because of the excesses of the Red Guards, Libya's own Cultural Revolution, in its quest

to remold society according to Qadhafi 's idiosyncratic vision of a pure Islam, may culminate in similar disruptions and upheavals.

As of late 1987, however, the Libyan case had been far less radical, with markedly less violence. On the other hand, the implementation of the direct democracy is predicated on the assumption of

sustained political interest and sound judgment that may be unrealistic for many of the citizenry. For example, women's participation in the political system was still at a low level in 1987, despite

official encouragement of their participation. Nevertheless, as a unique type of direct popular democracy, thejamahiriya experiment was not likely to be of more than fleeting interest for policy makers,

political theorists, and, those concerned with Third World development. Lillian Craig Harris suggested that although Qadhafi 's Uto- pian and simplistic The Green Book will not survive his tenure, the

fact that he has so radically changed the Libyan political order indi- cates that at least some vestiges of his philosophy will endure indefinitely.

Although the ideal of greater public participation in government

through direct democracy had appeal as a theory, Qadhafi has not

been able to implement it practically; therefore, Libya's extremely

complicated and inefficient system of government was unlikely to be emulated. One reason for the incredible, and growing, complexity of the Libyan political system was that new structures were

frequently superimposed on already existing ones without the elimination or even simplification of the existing structures. As a result of blurred lines of authority and responsibility, problems of cooperation and coordination between different parts of institutions have

arisen. In the late 1970s, for instance, there were tensions between

the ASU and the popular committees. Later, in the 1980s, fric- tion developed between the revolutionary committees on the one hand and the army and people's congresses on the other. In view

of the extremely rapid pace of political and socioeconomic change,

it seemed evident that thejamahiriya system needed time to mature.

Qadhafi 's revolutionary transformations have outpaced government institution-building and the citizen's political absorptive

capacity, causing widespread reaction and rejection of his plans.

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Libya: A Country Study

The GPC in 1977 rejected Qadhafi's plan to dismantle the government (the presidency, the cabinet, and other political and administrative structures). The 1983 GPC called for more moderate changes

at a slower rate. Similarly, the 1984 GPC rejected Qadhafi's

proposals to enlist women in the armed forces, to revise the law

to give women equal rights in divorce, and to abolish elementary

schools in favor of parental tutoring. As of April 1987, the second

and third of these proposals appeared to have been put aside while

a compromise was worked out regarding the highly controversial

issue of women's military training in locations far from their homes.

The preceding examples underline the resilience of traditions and

traditional culture, including Islamic values and teachings (see Religious Life, ch. 2). Much to Qadhafi's chagrin, various aspects of

traditional culture have proved to be too deeply rooted to permit

the elite to sweep them aside easily. Therefore, Qadhafi's impatience at what he considers an unduly slow pace of change will probably continue for a long time. From this standpoint, the whole

edifice of political and socioeconomic change wrought by the Libyan revolutionary elite under the guidance of Qadhafi still appears

rather fragile. The post-Qadhafi era may go in directions very differ- ent from, and at odds with, at least some of the basic ideological

features espoused by the previous elite. The real challenge facing

Qadhafi was whether he could transform his revolution from above

into a truly broad-based and popular mass revolution.

Law and the Judiciary

During the period of the Ottoman Empire, a dual judicial sys- tem that distinguished between religious and secular matters developed in Libya and other subject countries. For Muslims, the

majority of cases—those involving personal status, such as marriage and inheritance—fell within the jurisdiction of religious courts,

which applied the Maliki interpretation of Islamic law—the sharia

(see Islam and the Arabs, ch. 1; Tenets of Islam, ch. 2). The courts were organized into both original jurisdiction and appellate levels and each was directed by a qadi (see Glossary), an Islamic reli- gious judge. Secular matters—those involving civil, criminal, and

commercial law—were tried in a separate court system. Laws cover- ing secular matters reflected Western influence in general and the

Napoleonic Code in particular. Non-Muslims were not under

sharia. For example, the Jewish minority was subject to its own

religious courts. Europeans were subject to their national laws

through consular courts, the European nations having secured capitulary rights from the Turks.

192
Government and Politics The colonial powers that ruled Libya after the disintegration of

the Ottoman Empire maintained the dual judicial structure. After

Libya achieved independence, however, an attempt was made to merge the religious and secular legal systems. The merger, in 1954,

involved the subordination of Islamic law to secular law. Popular

opposition, however, caused the reestablishment of the separate

religious and secular jurisdictions in 1958.

The 1969 constitutional proclamation provided little guidance

for the post-Revolutionary judiciary. Equality before the law and

presumption of innocence were stipulated, and inheritance was made subject to sharia. The RCC was given the power to annul

or reduce legal sentences by decree and to declare general amnesties. Also stipulated was the independence of judges in the exercise of their duties, subject to law and conscience. It was the RCC,

however, that promulgated laws.

Judicial independence and the due process of law were respected

during the first decade of the post-Revolutionary regime, except

when political crimes were involved. After 1979, however, the sit- uation deteriorated in direct proportion to the growth of the revolutionary committees (see The Revolutionary Committees, this ch.).

Qadhafi and other RCC members believed that the separation

of state and religion, and thus of secular and religious law, was

artificial—that it violated the Quran and relegated sharia to a secon- dary status. Two post-Revolutionary bodies dealt with this situation. The Legislative Review and Amendment Committee, composed

of Libyan legal experts, was created in October 1971 to make exist- ing laws conform to sharia. The ultimate aim was for Islam to per- meate the entire legal system, not only in personal matters, but

also in civil, criminal, and commercial law. The Higher Council

for National Guidance was created the next year (see Political Ideology, this ch.). Among its philosophical and educational duties was

the presentation of Islamic moral and spiritual values in such a way that they would be viable in contemporary Libyan society.

Application of Islamic legal tenets to contemporary law and

society presented certain difficulties. There was, for example, the

question of the proper contemporary meaning of traditional Islamic

physical punishments, such as the severance of a hand for the crime

of theft. Debates arose over whether severance should mean actual

amputation or merely impeding the hand from future crime by

removing need and temptation. The most literal interpretations were adopted, but their actual imposition as legal punishment was

very much restricted by exemptions and qualifications, also based on Islamic tenets. A thief s hand would not be amputated, for example, if he truly repented of his crime or if he had committed the

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Libya: A Country Study

theft to feed a starving family. Indeed, numerous observers have

reported that the more extreme physical punishments are rarely,

if ever, performed.

Court Structure

With the acceptance of the primacy of Islamic law, the dual

religious-secular court structure was no longer necessary. In November 1973, the religious judicial system of qadi courts was abolished.

The secular court system was retained to administer justice, but

its jurisdiction now included religious matters. Secular jurisprudence had to conform to sharia, which remained the basis for reli- gious jurisprudence. In 1987 the court system had four levels: summary courts (sometimes referred to as partial courts), courts

of first instance, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court (see fig. 1 1). Summary courts were located in most small towns. Each consisted of a single judge who heard cases involving misdemeanors.

Misdemeanors were disputes involving amounts up to Libyan dinar

(LD) 100 (for value of the Libyan dinar—see Glossary). Most decisions were final, but in cases where the dispute involved more than

LD20 the decision could be appealed.

The primary court was the court of first instance. One court of

first instance was located in each area that formerly had constituted a governorate before the governorates as such were abolished

in 1975. Courts of first instance heard appeals from summary courts and had original jurisdiction over all matters in which amounts

of more than LD100 were involved. A panel of three judges, rul- ing by majority decision, heard civil, criminal, and commercial

cases and applied sharia to personal or religious matters that were

formerly handled by the qadi courts. The three courts of appeals sat at Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sabha.

A three-judge panel, again ruling by majority decision, served in

each court and heard appeals from the courts of first instance. Original jurisdiction applied to cases involving felonies and high crimes.

Sharia judges who formerly sat in the Sharia Court of Appeals were

assigned to the regular courts of appeals and continue to specialize in sharia appellate cases. The Supreme Court was located in Tripoli and comprised five chambers: civil and commercial, criminal, administrative, constitutional, and sharia. A five-judge panel sat in each chamber, the

majority establishing the decision. The court was the final appellate body for cases emanating from lower courts. It could also inter- pret constitutional matters. However, it no longer had cassation or annulment power over the decisions of the lower courts, as it did before the 1969 Revolution. Because there was a large pool of

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Government and Politics

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Libya: A Country Study

Supreme Court justices from which the panel was drawn at a given

time, the total number of justices was not fixed. All justices and

the president (also seen as chairman) of the court were appointed

by the GPC; most likely the General Secretariat made the actual

selections. Before its abolition, the RCC made Supreme Court ap- pointments.

Other Juridical Organs

Some bodies involved in the administration or the enforcement

ofjustice were situated outside the regular court system. For example, the Supreme Council ofJudicial Authorities was an administrative body that coordinated and supervised the various courts.

It also established the salaries and seniority rules forjudges, whom

it could transfer or retire. The Council of State, much like the

French Conseil d'Etat, delivered advisory legal opinions for government bodies regarding draft legislation and other actions or regulations it was contemplating, as well as contract negotiations in

which it might be involved. It also included an administrative court

to provide relief in civil cases involving arbitrary or otherwise unfair

administrative decisions.

The People's Court

In 1971 a people's court was established to try members of the

former royal family, the prime ministers and other officials of the

monarchical regime, people accused of rigging elections in behalf

of that regime, and journalists and editors accused of corrupting

public opinion before the Revolution. A member of the RCC pre- sided over the court, which also included one representative each

from the armed forces, the Islamic University, the Supreme Court,

and the police. Trials and retrials continued at least as late as 1975,

when former King Idris was sentenced to death in absentia. An

amnesty for some of those sentenced in 1971 was granted by the

RCC in 1976.

With matters pertaining to the former monarchical regime

having been resolved, it appeared that several people's courts were being used in the late 1970s to try crimes against the postRevolutionary state. In January 1977, a new people's court was

formed to try political detainees. The Decision on the Protection

of the Revolution, issued December 11, 1969, generally defined

crimes against the state as those involving attempted forcible over- throw of the ruling regime or otherwise rallying opposition to it. Such crimes may be referred to a people's court, but plots and conspiracies against the state are usually referred to special military courts created on an ad hoc basis for that purpose. The military

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Government and Politics

courts and the people's courts have been criticized for violating

the legal rights of defendants in political cases (see Criminal Justice

System, ch. 5). The Revolutionary Courts

In the early 1980s, a separate and parallel judicial system emerged

that abrogated many procedures and rights ensured by the traditional court system. With the regime's blessing and encouragement,

revolutionary committee members established revolutionary courts

that held public, often televised, trials of those charged with crimes

against the Revolution. A law promulgated in 1981 prohibited pri- vate legal practice and made all lawyers employees of the Secretariat

ofJustice. In these courts, the accepted norms—such as due process, the right to legal representation, and right of appeal—were fre- quently violated. According to Amnesty International, Libya held

seventy-seven political prisoners in 1985, of whom about eighteen were held without trial or remained in detention after having been

acquitted. Others allegedly died under torture while in the cus- tody of members of the revolutionary committees. Libya also sanc- tioned murder of political opponents abroad, a policy reaffirmed on March 2, 1985, by the GPC.

Unions and Syndicates

Immediately after the Revolution, the role that labor unions,

professional syndicates, and other organized interest groups would

play in the new society was in doubt. Regarding labor unions, for

example, Qadhafi stated in a November 4, 1969, speech in Tripoli: "There will be no labor unions .... Laborers and the Revolution are an indivisible entity. There may be certain labor

organizations, but only for ordinary administrative duties." On

November 30, however, Qadhafi stated in an interview that there was no thought of abolishing labor unions and student organizations, but they must "truly represent their groups with a revolutionary spirit. We do not accept intermediaries between the

Revolution and its working forces."

After the Revolution, most pre-Revolutionary interest groups were

abolished and new ones created. Functioning within the framework

of the ASU at first, and the GPC after 1976, the new interest groups

lacked autonomy and played an insignificant political role. In January 1976, the ASU National Congress emphasized that political

activity was to be solely within the purview of popular congresses.

After 1976 labor unions and other associations performed only

administrative duties pertaining to the occupations or nonpolitical activities of their members. Strikes have been prohibited since

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Libya: A Country Study

1972. In Qadhafi 's ideology, workers should be transformed into

partners; to work for wages is a form of slavery. Therefore, he urged

workers to take over companies, factories, and schools and to set up people's committees to manage production and decide priorities. In theory, this system would make labor unions unnecessary.

In fact, however, unions continued to exist. In the mid-1980s,

there were some 275,000 members belonging to 18 trade unions,

which together formed the Tripoli-based National Trade Union

Federation. In addition, separate syndicates existed for teachers,

engineers, physicians, lawyers, and other professionals. Other

groups represented women and students. The GPC included components of all these units. Although Libyan interest groups did not

have a real political role similar to that such groups play in the

Western tradition, their responsibilities included contributing to the Cultural Revolution, raising the revolutionary consciousness

of their members, and mobilizing support for national leaders and

their policies.

Before the Revolution of 1969, organized labor played a signifi- cant role in opposing the monarchy. Yet the union movement was

too young to be established firmly, and it had no connection with

the military group that overthrew the king. Consequently, unions

and most other interest groups have not resisted the limitations imposed within the post-Revolutionary framework and the concomitant lack of a real political role. Students have proved an exception,

however. Early post-Revolutionary enthusiasm for the RCC quickly

changed to opposition as a significant number of students reacted

against restrictions on the autonomy of student leaders (see Student Opposition, this ch.).

Opposition to Qadhafi

It was not surprising that opposition arose to the rapid radical

changes ushered in by the Qadhafi regime. The wealthy, the

privileged, and the traditional tribal and religious elites resented

their post-Revolutionary loss of power. The ranks of the opposition also grew to include sections of the armed forces, university

students, intellectuals and technocrats, and even some of the new

political and tribal leaders who clashed with the core elite for one

reason or another.

For its part, the Revolutionary regime made it clear from the outset that it would brook no opposition. Opposition from political

parties or other interest groups was viewed as harmful to national

unity. Speaking in October 1969, Qadhafi stated that Libya needed

"national unity free of party activities and division" and that "he

who engages in party activities commits treason." The December

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1969 Decision on the Protection of the Revolution, the Penal Code,

and Law No. 71 of 1972 rendered political party activities a crime

and formed a strict legal injunction against unauthorized political

activity, particularly if such activity should physically threaten the

state. Insulting the Constitution or popular authorities and joining a nonpolitical international society without permission were

both punishable by imprisonment. Attempting to change the

government or the Constitution through force, propagandizing theories or principles aimed at such action, and forming an illegal group were crimes punishable by death. One of the basic points of the

Cultural Revolution, declared in April 1973, called for the repres- sion of communism and conservatism. Also to be repressed were

capitalism, atheism, and the secretive Muslim Brotherhood (see

Glossary).

Despite legal strictures and physical attempts to nullify opposition, there has been resistance to the Revolutionary regime. The

discovery of a plot involving two cabinet ministers (lieutenant

colonels who were not RCC members) was announced in December 1969. A second plot, allegedly based in Fezzan and involving

a distant cousin of former King Idris, was discovered in July 1970.

Participation of foreign mercenaries was alleged in both cases (see

Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council, ch. 1). Other

resistance has been encountered from traditional tribal leaders who

have not welcomed their own displacement by modernizing technocrats, government administrators, people's committees, and

popular congresses. Numerous technocrats and other elements of

the urban population opposed Qadhafi 's emphasis on religion.

Traditional Islamic religious leaders also opposed Qadhafi'

approach to Islam because its uniquely personal and fundamentalist nature superseded their intermediary position and interpretive function. As in many other developing countries, aspects of

the modernization process—such as education and mass communications—also result in impatience and dissatisfaction with the rul- ing regime. Increased education and exposure to the mass media

were intended to inculcate Libyan citizens with patriotism and

loyalty to the regime; however, through education and the media,

Libyans also were informed of standards of living and political free- doms enjoyed elsewhere in the world. Exposure to the media created

rising expectations that probably increased demands on the government rather than increasing support for it through propaganda.

Student Opposition

As previously noted, students have been the source of the most

visible opposition to the Qadhafi regime. They initially appeared

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to support the Revolution. Friction soon developed, however, when

it became clear that student organizations would lose their autonomy within the ASU or GPC framework. The Revolution, nonetheless, continued to have student supporters, and many of the first people's committees formed in the wake of the 1973 Cultural Revolution were established at universities. Those committees radically

altered curricula, dismissed professors and deans, and terminated

the school term early so that students could join volunteer projects

and receive military training. Seventeen years after the Qadhafiled coup, students as a whole remained divided between supporters

and critics of the Revolutionary regime.

A particularly serious incident occurred in January 1976 when

students at the University of Benghazi protested government inter- ference in student union elections. Elected students who were not

ASU members were considered officially unacceptable by the

authorities. Security forces moved onto the campus, and violence

resulted. Reports that several students were shot and killed in the

incident were adamantly denied by the government. Nonetheless,

sympathizers organized more protests. Qadhafi and Jallud, speaking on April 6 at Tripoli University, called on revolutionaries there

to drive out the opposition. Some clashes occurred as the newly

formed people's committee undertook the purging of nonrevolutionaries. The school was finally closed temporarily and then

renamed Al Fatah University. Since that time, there have been

intermittent reports of student rebelliousness. In April 1984, for

instance, two students at Al Fatah University were publicly hanged.

Apparently in revenge, two revolutionary committee members were found murdered on campus. According to Amnesty International,

two more students died in 1985, allegedly under torture while in

the custody of the revolutionary committees.

Military Opposition

The military remained the most serious threat to the Qadhafi

regime. By March 1987, there were signs of disaffection among

the officers. In part, this was the result of mounting casualties and

setbacks in the Chad war. Such discontent was illustrated by the

defection to Egypt in early March of six air force personnel, including a lieutenant colonel. Upon landing at Abu Simbel airfield in

Upper Egypt, the airmen denounced Qadhafi's rule and requested

asylum.

Qadhafi's calls for a people's army that would eventually replace

the professional military evidently disturbed the armed forces. Furthermore, the revolutionary committees often increased their power

at the military's expense. In addition, the military resented the

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revolutionary committees' interference in national security affairs.

It was reported, for example, that brief armed clashes between the

two groups took place when certain missile positions were unable

to respond to the United States air attacks in April 1986 because

revolutionary committee members who were supposed to man them

could not be found.

That Qadhafi had entrusted the revolutionary committees with

the vital mission of manning air defense positions underscored the extent to which he has deployed them to counterbalance the power

of the armed forces. It indicated that Qadhafi had learned one vital lesson from the often-turbulent Middle East politics, namely that

the military has masterminded most coups d'etat. In measure to

forestall possible coup attempts, military commanders were fre- quently rotated or forced into early retirement. In 1984, for example, about seventy senior officers were obliged to retire. Despite

such precautions, the military had managed to stage most of the

attempts against Qadhafi since 1976. Most experts believed that

the military was the group most likely to topple Qadhafi.

Religious Opposition

In April 1973, Qadhafi launched the five-point Cultural Revolution (see Political Ideology, this ch.). Among the points was the

replacement of existing laws by sharia. In a speech on April 28,

he asked University of Benghazi law students to help revise the

legal codes and repeatedly emphasized the principle of the primacy of Islamic law over other jurisprudence. The traditional reli- gious establishment gave initial support to Qadhafi' s restoration

of Islamic jurisprudence, but it soon started to oppose his actions,

accusing him of pretensions.

First, Qadhafi challenged the traditional role of the ulama (Islamic

jurists or scholars) as expert interpreters of the Quran. Because

the Quran is written in Arabic, argued Qadhafi, anyone who knows

Arabic can understand it. As did Martin Luther's Protestantism,

Qadhafl's interpretation of Islam recognizes no need for intermediaries between God and humans.

Furthermore, Qadhafi in effect arrogated a new role to himself

that of a mujtahid, a Muslim jurist who renders decisions based on

the opinions of one of the four legal schools of Islam. In this case, Qadhafi sought to reinterpret the Quran in light of modern conditions and current needs. His insistence on the necessity to sweep

aside virtually the entire body of Islamic commentary and learning, including the hadith (the Prophet Muhammad's sayings), and

to limit the legitimate sources of legislation to the Quran alone has

caused misgivings throughout the Islamic world.

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Moreover, Qadhafl's interpretation of Islam was considered radical. He considered the Quran to be the only source of sharia and

community. As did other Muslim reformers, Quran saw deviation from "true" Islamic teachings as the cause of the weakness

of Islamic lands, including Libya. Like them, he also called for a return to the source, the Quran. But unlike most other reformers, Qadhafi excluded the hadith and the sunna (the lifestyle and

deeds of the Prophet) as reliable sources of legislation. By questioning the authenticity of the hadith, Qadhafi has in effect dis- missed the entire edifice of traditionalfikh (Islamic jurisprudence).

As one scholar, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, put it, "discrediting the

hadith entails rejection of by far the greater part of Islamic law."

In essence, Qadhafi rejected taqlid (obedience to received authority, i.e. , the revelation of God to the Prophet Muhammad) in favor

of ijtihad (the right to interpretation).

In 1977 Qadhafi took yet another unprecedented, no less controversial step, altering the Muslim calendar. Instead of starting

from the date of the Prophet's migration to Medina, the year began

with the date of the Prophet's death. Shocked by Qadhafi 's radical reinterpretation of Islam, the ulama accused him of heresy.

Characteristically, however, the Libyan leader was undaunted.

The confrontation with the ulama began in the mid-1970s, when

they criticized some aspects of Qadhafl's increasingly idiosyncratic

and radical ideology. In 1977, for example, the grand mufti (chief

religious judge) of Libya criticized the sequestration of private

property, which resulted from the new law prohibiting the ownership of more than one house.

The clergy were upset because, in effect, The Green Book was dis- placing sharia as the blueprint for Libya's political and social development. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Third Universal Theory

is purportedly a relevant model for non-Muslim Third World countries, the theory's reliance on Islamic precepts had to be diluted

(see The Third Universal Theory, this ch.).

Accusing the ulama of siding with the upper classes, in February 1978 Qadhafi warned them against interfering in the regime's

socialist policies. A few months later, some mosques were seized

and their imams (prayer leaders) replaced by more compliant ones. To undermine further the legitimacy of the religious leaders,

Qadhafi blamed the grand mufti for failing to declare a jihad (see

Glossary) against the Italians during the 1930s. Qadhafl's relentless attacks on the traditional religious establishment succeeded in

eroding its hitherto lofty status, thereby removing a powerful center of opposition to regime-sponsored changes.

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Government and Politics

Apart from conflicts with the traditional religious hierarchy,

Qadhafi had a longstanding conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood

and other fundamentalist groups, whose membership went into exile or underground during Qadhafi 's tenure. In March 1987, it was

reported that nine Muslim dissidents, members of a little-known

group called Holy War, were executed for plotting to assassinate

Soviet advisers. A revolutionary committee member was assassi- nated in Benghazi in October 1986 by the hitherto unknown Hizballah (Party of God). As a result, the revolutionary committees

began to monitor more closely than before the activities of the

mosques, the imams, and the fundamentalists. The country's fortyeight Islamic institutes reportedly were closed in late 1986, apparently to stem the tide of religious, particularly fundamentalist,

opposition.

Exiled Opposition

Over twenty opposition groups exist outside Libya. The most

important in 1987 was the National Front for the Salvation of Libya

(NFSL), formed in October 1981, and led by Muhammad Yusuf

al Magariaf, formerly Libyan ambassador to India. The NFSL was

based in Sudan until the fall of the Numayri regime in 1985, after which its operations were dispersed. The NFSL rejected military

and dictatorial rule and called for a democratic regime with constitutional guarantees, free elections, free press, and separation of

powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The

group published a bimonthly newsletter, Al Inqadh (Salvation).

The NFSL claimed responsibility for the daring attack on Qadhafi' s headquarters at Bab al Aziziyah on May 8, 1984. Although

the coup attempt failed and Qadhafi escaped unscathed, dissident

groups claimed that some eighty Libyans, Cubans, and East Germans perished. According to various sources, the United States Central Intelligence Agency trained and supported the NFSL before

and after the May 8 operation. Domestically, some 2,000 people were arrested and 8 were hanged publicly. The NFSL also organized the April 1 984 demonstration in London in which a Brit- ish policewoman was killed by a Libyan diplomat, leading to the

breaking of diplomatic relations between Tripoli and London.

Another opposition group, the Libyan Liberation Organization,

based in Cairo, was formed in 1982. In 1987 it was led by Abdul

Hamid Bakkush, a prime minister during the Idris monarchy. In

mid-November 1984, Libyan officials were greatly embarrassed

by their premature claims of responsibility for the assassination of

Bakkush. In fact, the entire operation was elaborately stagemanaged by the Egyptian security forces, who produced a very

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Libya: A Country Study

much alive Bakkush on television along with members of the fourman hit squad, which reportedly consisted of two British citizens

and two Maltese.

Al Burkan (The Volcano), a highly secretive and violent organization that emerged in 1984, has been responsible for the assassination of many Libyan officials overseas. For instance, it claimed

responsibility for the death of the Libyan ambassador in Rome in

January 1984, and, a year later, for the assassination of the Libyan

Information Bureau chief, also in Rome. A Libyan businessman

with close ties to Qadhafi was shot dead on June 21 , 1984, in Athens

during the visit of Abdul Salaam Turayki, Libya's secretary of for- eign liaison.

Less well-known opposition groups outside Libya were the Libyan Constitutional Union, the pro-Iraqi Libyan National Movement, the Libyan National Democratic Grouping led by Mahmud

Sulayman al Maghrabi, Libya's first post-Revolutionary prime

minister, and Al Haq, a rightist pro-monarchy group.

The opposition groups outside Libya remained disunited and

largely ineffective. Divided ideologically into such groups as Baathists (see Glossary), socialists, monarchists, liberals, and Islamic

fundamentalists, they agreed only on the necessity of overthrowing the Qadhafi regime. An initial step toward coordination was

taken in January 1987 when eight opposition groups, including

the Libyan National Movement, the Libyan National Struggle

Movement, and the Libyan Liberation Organization, agreed to form a working group headed by Major Abd al Munim al Huni,

a former RCC member who has been living in Cairo since the 1975

coup attempt that was led by another RCC member, Umar

Muhayshi. Some observers speculated that because Huni appeared

to be acceptable to all opposition groups and in view of his close

ties to the military, he may well be the man most likely to succeed

Qadhafi. If the Iranian experience offered any insights, the hallmark

of the post-Qadhafi era would be a bloody power struggle between

erstwhile coalition groups of diverse ideological beliefs. By early

1987, it was by no means clear which faction might emerge as the

ultimate victor, should Qadhafi be toppled. It must be kept in mind,

however, that the Libyan leader has outlasted many of his ene- mies, both foreign and domestic.

To deal with outside opposition, the Libyan regime continued

its controversial policy of physical liquidation of opponents. On

March 2, 1985, the GPC reiterated its approval of the policy of

"the pursuit and physical liquidation of the stray dogs." During

the 1985 wave of violence, a number of Libyans living abroad were

killed or wounded. Among the casualties were former ambassador

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Government and Politics

Izzedin Ghadamsi, seriously wounded in Vienna on February 28;

businessman Ahmad Barrani, killed in Cyprus on April 2; another

businessman, Yusuf Agila, wounded in Athens on October 6; and

Gibril Denali, a thirty-year-old student living in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) as a political refugee, assassinated

in Bonn on April 6. The liquidation policy continued into 1987

when Muhammad Salim Fuhaymah, a prominent Libyan dissi- dent, was assassinated in Athens on January 7. The physical liquidation policy has drawn universal condemnation. However, the impact of the policy, should not be exaggerated.

During 1984, there were 4 assassinations of Libyans abroad and

between 20 and 120 executions internally. Scholar Lillian Craig

Harris, writing in late 1986, stated that since 1980 twenty antiQadhafi Libyans had been assassinated abroad.

Political Ideology

In the late 1980s, Qadhafi continued to perceive himself as a revolutionary leader. Qadhafi has always claimed that the September 1969 overthrow of the monarchy was a popular revolution, not

merely a military coup d'etat. In fact, only a few military officers

and enlisted men took part in the September revolution. Qadhafi

reconciled the apparent inconsistency by stressing that the

military—and more specifically the Free Officers Movement, whose

members took part in the coup and subsequently formed the

RCC—shared the humble origins of the people and represented

their demands. Qadhafi depicted the military as the vanguard elite of the people, a concept adopted from Marxist-Leninist ideology.

But although Qadhafi wanted to be recognized as a revolutionary

leader and justified military domination of Libya with the concept

of the vanguard elite, he excoriated communism as well as capitalism.

The wellsprings of Qadhafi 's political thought are the Quran and

Nasserism. As an ardent admirer of Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser,

Qadhafi has never wavered in the conviction that he is Nasser's

legitimate heir. As such, he felt compelled to advance Nasser's struggle for Arab unity and socialism. Qadhafi was influenced by Nasser's theory of the concentric Islamic, Arab, and African circles of

influence. Unlike Nasser, however, Qadhafi developed a brand

of socialism that he believed to be consonant with Islamic principles.

Qadhafi expanded Nasser's political thought by emphasizing the

Islamic bases of socialism in that the Quran condemns class domination and exploitation. Qadhafi stated that although Islam

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Libya: A Country Study

"cannot be described as socialism in its modern sense, it strives

to a certain extent to dissolve the differences among classes."

According to Qadhafi, "almsgiving is the nucleus of the socialist

spirit in Islam." Socialism in Libya was to mean "social justice."

Work, production, and resources were all to be shared fairly, and

extreme disparities between rich and poor were to be eliminated.

But social hierarchy, as provided for in the Quran, would remain,

and class harmony, not class warfare, would be the result. Qadhafi

stressed that this socialism, inherent in Islam, was not merely a

stage toward communism, as the Marxist theorists would argue.

For Qadhafi as for Nasser, Arab nationalism took primacy over

pan-Islamism. Both leaders can be described as secularists, although

Qadhafi increasingly emphasized the Islamic roots of his ideology.

Yet, his main interest undoubtedly lay in the secular rather than

the sacred world. Revolution, the propagation of The Green Book, mass mobilization, and liberation remained his obsessions. "I love

the people, all the people," he proclaimed in a 1986 interview with

a French television newscaster published inJeune Afrique. "I would

like the people to vanquish the government, the armies, the police,

the parties, and the parliaments," he said in explanation of his

notion of direct democracy in which people rule themselves without

the mediation of traditional governmental institutions. "I am the

prophet of the revolution and not the prophet of Allah," Qadhafi

declared in the same interview, "for what interests me in this cen- tury is that The Green Book become the bible of the modern world."

The secular basis of Qadhafi 's philosophy was emphasized fur- ther by the Libyan adoption of the Baath Party slogan of unity,

freedom, and socialism. These ideals were embodied in the first revolutionary pronouncement of September 1, 1969, and reiterated

in the Constitutional Proclamation of December 11, 1969. They

were afterward refined and modified in response to practical Libyan considerations. The ideal of freedom included the freedom of

the nation and its citizens from foreign oppression. Freedom was

considered to have been achieved by the Revolution and the subsequent negotiations that quickly ended the existence of foreign

military bases in Libya. The ideal of freedom also encompassed

freedom from want of the basic necessities of life and freedom from

poverty, disease, and ignorance. In this regard, the ideal of free- dom called for the ideal of socialism.

Libyan socialism has succeeded to the extent that social welfare

programs have been subsidized by oil revenues. By all accounts,

the Qadhafi regime has succeeded to an impressive degree in fulfilling basic human material needs (see Health and Welfare, ch. 2). Libya has also been relatively successful in achieving economic

206
Gamal Abdul Nasser ofEgypt (top

)

was the ideological mentor of

Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi

(bottom

)

Nasser photo

Courtesy Embassy of Egypt
Libya: A Country Study

egalitarianism. To Qadhafi, such equality entails abolishing the

conventional employer-employee relationship. Wage labor is re- garded as a form of slavery. Similarly, to prevent landlord-tenant

relationships, no person may own more than one house. Furthermore, because domestic servants are considered "a type of slave,"

the residents of a house should perform their own household work.

To achieve economic justice, the slogans of "partners, not wageearners" and "those who produce, consume" have been proclaimed

and, to a significant degree, established.

The Libyan revolutionary ideal of unity was Arab unity, the cause

for which Qadhafi was the undisputed champion after the death

of Nasser. Qadhafi believed that, through unity, Arabs had achieved

greatness during the Middle Ages, when Arab accomplishments

in the arts and sciences had overshadowed European counterparts.

He further believed that foreign oppression and colonial domination ended Arab unity; until it was restored, the Arab world would

suffer injustice and humiliation, as it had when Palestine was lost. Qadhafi believed that the ideal of unity should be realized through

practical steps, initial combinations of Arab states providing the

nucleus for some form of ultimate unity. Toward this end he ini- tiated unity schemes between Libya and several other countries,

but, as of 1987, none of the schemes had been successful (see Foreign Relations, this ch.). At the 1972 National Congress, Qadhafi

likened the role of Libya in unifying the Arab nation to that of

Prussia in unifying Germany and to that of Piedmont in unifying

Italy.

Although most Arab leaders share or sympathize with Qadhafi'

ideology of Arab unity, most consider as naive his ardent conviction that unity can be accomplished. Despite his transnational orientation, Qadhafi is parochial in his outlook. His beduin background,

obviously a critical factor shaping his personality, inculcated a set of values and modes of behavior often at odds with prevailing inter- national norms. Therefore, he has been awkward at diplomatic giveand-take in comparison to other Arab leaders. For Qadhafi, no- madic life is preferable to urban ways because of its simplicity, per- vasive sense of egalitarianism, and puritanism unpolluted by

modern, largely alien, cultural influences.

Third Universal Theory

In the early 1970s, Qadhafi began to synthesize and expand his

ideas of Arab unity, independence, economic egalitarianism, and

cultural authenticity into the Third Universal Theory. The importance of this new theory to the regime was shown by the creation

of the Higher Council for National Guidance on September 10,

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Government and Politics

1972. The council comprised the RCC chairman; the ASU secre- tary general; the minister of education; the minister of information and culture; the minister of youth and social affairs; the minister

of planning, the University of Libya's president; the administrative chairmen of religious endowments; the Muslim Call Society

chairman, and the ASU secretary of thought and culture.

The Higher Council for National Guidance was created to dis- seminate and implement Qadhafi 's Third Universal Theory (also seen as the Third International Theory or simply the Third Theory). The Third Universal Theory was predicated on the belief that

the two dominant socio-politico-economic ideologies—capitalism

and communism—had been proved invalid. According to the the- ory, capitalism placed the good of a few individuals ahead of that

of the community as a whole; communism so emphasized the community that individual development was stifled. Nations constituting

what is commonly referred to as the Third World were caught

between proponents of the two ideologies: the United States and

the Soviet Union, both of which, according to Qadhafi, were "imperialist states which seek to achieve their ambitions by extending

their zones of influence."

Qadhafi proclaimed that the Third Universal Theory, because

it was based on the Quran, predated capitalism and communism.

Furthermore, it offered an alternative. It rejected the class exploitation of capitalism and the class warfare of communism, finding

that, in practice at least, systems based on both ideologies were dominated by a small elite. According to the Third Universal Theory, classes were an artificial colonial import. Far from building

a system that rested on some form of class relations, the theory

sought to eliminate class differences. It embodied the Islamic principle of consultation (shura), by which community or even national

affairs would be conducted through mutual consultation in which

the views of all citizens were exchanged. This principle was

manifested later in Libya in the creation of people's committees

and popular congresses (see Subnational Government and Administration, this ch.).

The Third Universal Theory was an attempt to establish a

philosophical grounding, based on Islam, for positive neutrality on the part of Third World nations. Under the theory, Third World

states could coexist with the United States and the Soviet Union,

and they could enter into agreements with them for their own purposes. But Third World states in general and Arab states in particular should not fall under the dominance of either of the two

ideological, imperialist superpowers. In dividing the world between

the two superpowers and their supposed prey, the Third Universal

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Libya: A Country Study

Theory anticipated much of what has come to be called the NorthSouth interpretation of international relations, whereby the world

is divided into natural-resource-consuming nations (the industrialized North) and the natural-resource-producing nations (the

underdeveloped South). Indeed, Qadhafi has championed this in- terpretation of international relations (see Foreign Relations, this ch.). Guided by this viewpoint, Libya has been a strong supporter

of national liberation movements against colonial regimes, even though the terrorist tactics used by some groups have tarnished

Libya's international reputation and led to economic sanctions and

to military attacks in mid- 1986.

Central to the Third Universal Theory are the concepts of religion

and nationalism as embodied in Islam. Qadhafi believes that religion

and nationalism have been the "two paramount drives that moved

forward the evolutionary process. They constitute man's history

as they have formed nations, peoples, wars." In short, Qadhafi

believes that religion determines human actions and interactions.

The atheism of the communists is another reason Qadhafi finds

their ideology invalid. According to Qadhafi, communists cannot

be trusted because they fear no ultimate judgment and thus may

break their word if they consider it beneficial in any particular case. Islam, as the essence of monotheism, is the true religion that encompasses Jews, Christians, and Muslims, all of whom followed God's

prophets. The differences among these religions exist not because

of the prophets' teachings but because of differences among their

followers.

According to Qadhafi, if religion is basic to the individual, nationalism is basic to the society. The Quran refers to tribes and

nations that are inherent in the universe. A person belongs to a

nationality upon birth. Only later does he or she become a conscious member of a religion. Thus, Qadhafi faults those who deny

the validity of nationality. His concept of nationality, therefore,

relates to his concept of Arab unity. In this regard, Qadhafi adheres to the traditional, secularly based

view of Arab nationalism propounded by such thinkers as Michel

Aflaq, a founder and key political philosopher of the Baath Party,

and Nasser. For Qadhafi, nationalism takes precedence over reli- gion. In a wide-ranging speech before the GPC meeting in Sabha

on March 2, 1987, Qadhafi denounced Islamic fundamentalism

as "nonsense" and stated that "no banner should be hoisted over

the Arab homeland except the banner of pan-Arabism.

The Cultural Revolution

Qadhafi was evidently disappointed with the failure of the Libyan populace to embrace and practice the principles of the Third

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Government and Politics

Universal Theory. Characteristically impatient, by 1973 Qadhafi

had grown critical of the people's lack of revolutionary commitment. He complained of the general refusal to fill positions in the

military or to take jobs in the countryside (for which foreign workers

had to be recruited), of students who wished to study only in the

United States, and of an increase in the crime rate. Perhaps worst

of all to Qadhafi was the apathy and reluctance with which a significant portion of the Libyan people greeted the impending Libyan

merger with Egypt scheduled for September of 1973. He contended

that such attitudes threatened the revolutionary advances antici- pated when the monarchy was overthrown. That action had

changed the form of government, but if other fundamental social,

economic, and political changes were to be accomplished, the people

would have to be rededicated to the Revolution. Thus in an April

15, 1973, speech at Zuwarah, Qadhafi proclaimed the Cultural

Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution comprised five points: the annulment

of all existing laws promulgated by the previous monarchical re- gime and their replacement by laws based on sharia; the repres- sion of communism and conservatism by purging all political

deviates—those who opposed or resisted the Revolution, such as communists, atheists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, advocates of capitalism, and agents of Western propaganda; the distri- bution of arms to the people so that a popular resistance would

protect the Revolution; administrative reform to end excessive

bureaucracy, dereliction of duty, and bribery; and the promotion

of Islamic thought by rejecting any ideas that were not in keeping

with it, especially ideas imported from other countries and cultures. People's committees were established nationwide to enforce these

policies and to control the Revolution from below (see Subnational

Government and Administration, this ch.). If the people refused

to participate in the popular Revolution, Qadhafi threatened to resign, a tactic he had used on several occasions.

In May 1973, Qadhafi discussed the Cultural Revolution with

foreign reporters and tried to stress its dissimilarity from the Chinese

Cultural Revolution. According to Qadhafi, the Libyan Cultural

Revolution—unlike the Chinese Cultural Revolution—did not

introduce something new, but rather marked the return to the Arab

and Islamic heritage. It represented a quest for authenticity in that

it tried to forge or unearth linkages to the religio-cultural foundations of society.

Several experts agree that Libya's Cultural Revolution struck a responsive chord in the Libyan psyche, similar to that struck by

the rejection of Westernization in Iran. To a significant extent,

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Libya: A Country Study

Qadhafi's insistence on a foreign policy independent of either super- power, his hostility toward Israel and its supporters, his search for an alternate model based on indigenous Muslim values, and his

criticism of bureaucracy and consumerism were shared by the Libyan people. Qadhafi did not appear odd in the Libyan context,

despite his image in the foreign media. Instead, as expert Lisa

Anderson stated, he was "an uncanny reflection of the average

Libyan.

The Green Book

Qadhafi spelled out his prescriptions for the Libyan Cultural

Revolution in The Green Book, which grew eventually to comprise

three slim volumes. Many foreign observers who had compared

Libya's Cultural Revolution to the Chinese Cultural Revolution,

naturally compared The Green Book to Mao's "little red book." Like

Mao's red book, The Green Book has been widely distributed both

inside and outside the country. Both are written in a simple, understandable style with many memorable slogans. In size, both are rather modest, but their impact cannot be exaggerated. In a sense, The Green Book has vied with the Quran as the basis for Libya's

development, much as the little red book attempted to supplant

the Confucian system of thought.

The Green Book, Part I

In April 1974, Qadhafi relinquished his governmental duties to devote full time to ideological concerns and mass organization. A

year later, he announced the reorganization of the ASU to include

popular congresses, topped by the GPC. In March 1977, the GPC

became, at least formally, the primary instrument of government

in Libya. The reorganization of the ASU and the elevation of the

GPC were carried out in conjunction with Qadhafi's political theories found in his work, The Green Book, Part I: The Solution of the Problem of Democracy. The Green Book begins with the premise that

all contemporary political systems are merely the result of the struggle for power between instruments of governing. Those instruments

of governing—parliaments, electoral systems, referenda, party

government—are all undemocratic, divisive, or both. Parliaments

are based on indirect democracy or representation. Representation is based on separate constituencies; deputies represent their

constituencies, often against the interests of other constituencies.

Thus, the total national interest is never represented, and the

problem of indirect (and consequently unrepresentative) democracy

is compounded by the problem of divisiveness. Moreover, an elec- toral system in which the majority vote wins all representation

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Government and Politics

means that as much as 49 percent of the electorate is unrepresented.

(A win by a plurality can have the result that an even greater per- centage of the electorate is unrepresented; electoral schemes to pro- mote proportional representation increase the overall representative

nature of the system, but small minorities are still left unrepresented.) Qadhafi also believes referenda are undemocratic because

they force the electorate to answer simply yes or no to complex

issues without being able to express fully their will. He says that

because parties represent specific interests or classes, multiparty

political systems are inherently factionalized. In contrast, a singleparty political system has the disadvantage of institutionalizing the

dominance of a single interest or class. Qadhafi believes that political systems have used these kinds of

indirect or representative instruments because direct democracy,

in which all participate in the study and debate of issues and poli- cies confronting the nation, ordinarily is impossible to implement

in contemporary times. Populations have grown too large for direct

democracy, which remained only an ideal until the formulation

of the concepts of people's committees and popular congresses.

Most observers would conclude that these organizations, like congresses or parliaments in other nations, obviously involve some

degree of delegation and representation. Qadhafi, however, believes that with their creation contemporary direct democracy has

been achieved in Libya. Qadhafi bases this conviction on the fact that the people's committees and popular congresses are theoretically responsible not only for the creation of legislation, but also

its implementation at the grass-roots level. Moreover, they have

a much larger total membership as a percentage of the national

population than legislative bodies in other countries. In many ways, Qadhafi 's political ideology is part of the radical

strain of Western democratic thought associated primarily with

Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For, as scholar Sami Hajjar noted, Qadhafi 's notions of popular sovereignty are quite similar to the

Rousseauian concept of general will. Both hold that sovereignty

is inalienable, indivisible, and infallible. Both believe in equality

and in direct popular rule. Thus, concludes Qadhafi, "the out- dated definition of democracy—democracy is the supervision of

the government by the people—becomes obsolete. It will be replaced

by the true definition: democracy is the supervision of the people

by the people."

The Green Book, Part II

Qadhafi begins The Green Book, Part II: The Solution of the Eco- nomic Problem: "Socialism ," published during 1977, with a brief

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Libya: A Country Study

examination of the relationship between workers (producers) and

employers (owners). He recognizes that the lot of the worker has

improved dramatically since the Industrial Revolution. The worker

has gained fixed working hours, overtime pay, different kinds of

leave, profit sharing, participation in management, job security,

and the right to strike. Drastic changes have also occurred in ownership, including the transference of private ownership to the state (see Income and Wealth, ch. 3). Despite these significant changes, however, the basic relationship between the producer, who is a wage earner, and the owner,

who pays the wages, is still one of slavery. Even where the state owns the enterprise and the income derived from it reverts to the

community, the plight of the wage earner, who contributes to the

productive process for someone else's benefit, remains the same.

Qadhafi's solution to the problem is to abolish the wage system.

Rather than contributing to the productive process for the owner's

benefit, or profit, the actual producer should be a partner in the

process, sharing equally in what is produced or in the income

derived from what is produced.

Qadhafi believes that a person cannot be free "if somebody else controls what he needs" to lead a comfortable life. Thus, each per- son must fully possess a house, a vehicle, and an income. Individuals

cannot be wage earners because someone else would then control

their income. They cannot have an extra house to rent, for in rent- ing property they would be controlling a primary need of some- one else. According to Qadhafi, "The legitimate purpose of the

individual's economic activity is solely to satisfy his [material]

needs' '

; it is not to create a surplus in order to gain a profit. Qadhafi

maintains that profit and money will eventually disappear as basic

human needs are met. The only provision for a differentiation in

wealth is social reward, in which the society allocates to an individual a certain share of its wealth equivalent to the value of some special

service rendered.

The 1969 constitutional proclamation recognized both public

ownership ("the basis of the development of society") and private

ownership (so long as it was nonexploitive). The application of

Qadhafi's new views on ownership began some months after publication of Part II of The Green Book. In May 1978, a law was passed

giving each citizen the right to own one house or a piece of land on which to build a house. Ownership of more than one house was

prohibited, as was the collection of rent. On September 1 , the ninth

anniversary of the September Revolution, Qadhafi called on workers

to "free the wage earners from slavery" and to become partners

in the productive process by taking over "the public and private

214
Government and Politics means of production." The takeover of scores of firms followed;

presumably the firms were to be controlled by the new people's

committees. Still another aspect of the drive against exploitation was Qadhafi' s late-autumn ban on commercial retail activity. The

Libyan leader advised retailers to enter productive occupations in agriculture or construction (see The Revolution and Social Change,

ch. 2). However, the immediate practical result of these changes, was economic chaos and a significant decrease in production (see

Income and Wealth, ch. 3). With regard to land, Qadhafi rejects the idea of private ownership. Drawing a distinction between ownership and use, he argues

that land is the collective property of all the people. Every person

and his heirs have the right to use the land to satisfy their basic

needs. The land belongs to those who till it. To hire farm hands

is forbidden because it would be exploitive.

The Green Book, Part III

In The Green Book, Part III: The Social Basis of the Third Universal

Theory, published in 1978, Qadhafi reiterates and elaborates his

view of nationalism and briefly discusses a few other subjects.

Qadhafi argues that whereas Marx maintained that class struggle

is the crucial variable accounting for change, it is nationalism that

is "the real constant dynamic force of history." Qadhafi draws a sharp distinction between a state and a nation or nation- state. A

state "embraces several nationalisms," and sooner or later will dis- integrate as various national movements clamor for independence

or self-determination. A nation-state, consists of a group of people with a prolonged shared history, a common heritage, and "a

sense of belonging to a common destiny." Ideally, "Each nation

should have one religion," Qadhafi writes, to avoid the potential

for conflicts. He believes that national unity is threatened by the

resurgence of tribal or sectarian identities. Qadhafi points to the

Lebanese civil war as an illustration of the triumph of sectarianism over nationalism. Part III of The Green Book also contains a discussion of such topics

as the role of women, minorities, and education. "There is no differ- ence in human rights between men and women," Qadhafi declares. But a woman has "a natural role" that is different from the male's,

namely motherhood. Children should be raised by their mothers,

not sent to nurseries. Furthermore, a woman, who "is created beautiful and gentle," should not be forced by economic necessity or by a misguided call for equality to do a man's work, such as "carrying heavy weights."

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Libya: A Country Study

With regard to minorities, Qadhafi distinguishes between two

types. One type belongs to a nation that provides it with a social

framework, but also threatens to encroach on its social rights; the

other type has no nation, forms its own social framework, and is destined eventually to constitute a nation by virtue of a sense of

solidarity.

Qadhafi also gives his radical views of education. Qadhafi con- demns formal education as "an act of dictatorship destructive to freedom because it deprives people of their free choice, creativity,

and brilliance." He proposes that "all methods of education prevailing in the world should be destroyed" and replaced with a system

where "knowledge about everything is available to each person in

the manner that suits them."

Foreign Relations

Paralleling the swift and fundamental domestic transformations

Qadhafi initiated upon coming to power in 1969 were equally radical

and controversial foreign policy changes. King Idris had been proWestern, quiescent if not passive, and scarcely interested in panArab issues. Qadhafi, in contrast, was markedly anti-Western,

highly activist, and a strong advocate of Arab unity. Although

Qadhafi' s internal policies could be ignored or tolerated by the rest of the world, regardless of their radicalism, his foreign policies

elicited strong resentment and widespread condemnation from

many quarters. Even the so-called "progressive" or revolutionary regimes in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria that supported some of

Qadhafi 's policies opposed his maladroit diplomacy, rhetorical

excess, and provocative tactics. Allegations of Qadhafi 's involvement in subversive activities were numerous (see International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent

Groups, ch. 5). Over the years, Libya has been accused of subversion by several Arab countries, including Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia,

Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. For example, Libyan agents

reportedly planned on several occasions to disrupt the pilgrimage

at Mecca in Saudi Arabia. And for many years Libya supported

the mostly Christian rebels in southern Sudan, who are led by John

Garang, as against the central government in Khartoum. Many

observers linked Libya's lack of restraint in foreign affairs with its oil wealth, which paid for foreign adventures while keeping the

domestic population content. By disregarding the rules of the international political game,

Libya became so ostracized and isolated that when the United States bombed Libyan cities in April 1986, only a few countries con- demned the action strongly. Potential friends in the Arab world

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Government and Politics

were already alienated by the constantly changing pattern of Libyan alliances.

Nevertheless, Libya was subject to certain practical limitations.

Its oil revenues were dependent on the world market and subject

to inflationary pressures. Although well armed, Libya's military was undermanned, unable in most cases to support foreign policy

initiatives by force. Libyan foreign policy was not so erratic and

disjointed as it appeared, however. Instead, it was consistent with,

and in large part based on, the initially proclaimed ideals of the

Revolution and the developments that followed (see Political Ideology, this ch.).

Libyan foreign policy grew from the historical legacy of colonial domination, Nasser's philosophy, and the creation of Israel. Qadhafi's concept of foreign relations has been influenced by his

desire to promote Libya's role regionally and internationally and

to see Libya play a leading role in countering Israel. For example,

Qadhafi advocates Arab unity not only for ideological reasons, but

because of his conviction that a unified Arab nation would be capable of defeating Israel militarily.

Qadhafi's worldwide support of revolutionary and insurgent

movements evolved in part from the sponsorship and funding he

provided to Palestinian organizations that fought against Israel. Moreover, Qadhafi's antipathy toward imperialism derives both

from Libya's struggle against Italian colonialism and from the per- ceived creation of Israel by the United States and European powers.

And, although Qadhafi espouses nonalignment, he has advocated

a close Arab relationship with the Soviet Union as a means of

obtaining arms to defeat Israel and excoriated the United States because of its support of Israel. Libyan foreign policy is not, however, dictated entirely by opposition to Israel. Libya's activism in Africa and the Mediterranean

basin is motivated by a desire to be a regional power. In the 1980s,

Libya's reckless and adventurous intervention in the Third World

was driven by Qadhafi's desire to disseminate his Third Universal Theory and his personal aspirations for worldwide recognition.

Arab Relations

Qadhafi has been a leading proponent of Arab unity (qawmiya),

calling for a union that would stretch from the Persian Gulf to the

Atlantic Ocean. He believes that the members of such a union would

have complementary resources: oil and other minerals, manpower,

and space for population expansion. Apparently, Qadhafi views

this union as taking the form of a strong federation, similar to those

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Libya: A Country Study

of the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than as a unitary state. Qadhafi has said that ' 'it is ironic to see that Americans

and Soviets, who are not of the same origin, have come together

to create united federations, while the Arabs, who are of the same

race and religion, have so far failed to realize the most cherished

goal of the present Arab generation." Whether each Arab country's borders are considered sacrosanct or "natural" in some historical sense, over time, particularistic nationalisms have proved too powerful to be superseded by Arab unity.

Pursuing unity on a step-by-step basis, Qadhafi has sponsored

or joined ill-fated mergers with Egypt, Syria, and, most recently,

Morocco. He also has called on Sudan, Algeria, and other countries to participate in unity schemes. Since 1969 there have been

seven unity attempts, all except one initiated by Libya. Less than

four months after Qadhafi' s coup d'etat, Libya joined Egypt and

Sudan in signing on December 27, 1969, the Tripoli Charter, which

called for the formation of a "flexible federation." OnJanuary 1, 1972, the Federation of Arab Republics, consisting of Egypt, Syria,

and Libya came into existence. Yet another merger, accepted in

principle in August 1972, between Egypt and Libya theoretically

took effect on September 1, 1973. The union failed, however,

because of disagreements over the timing and objectives of war and

diplomatic alternatives to the conflict with Israel. In early 1974, a merger of Libya and Tunisia was proclaimed, only to be repudiated two days later by President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. Looking once again toward the Mashriq (see Glossary), Qadhafi and

President Hafiz al Assad of Syria proclaimed a unity of their two

countries on September 10, 1980. In 1987, however, the unity provisions existed only on paper because neither side was willing to surrender its sovereignty.

Turning his attention to his weak neighbor to the south, Qadhafi

in 1981 proposed a merger plan with Chad. Goukouni Oueddei,

then in power in N'Djamena, rejected the proposal and this merger

plan, like all previous plans, failed to materialize. Since then,

Libya's involvement in the Chadian civil war has deepened (see

Invasion of Chad, ch. 5). Obsessed by the goal of pan-Arab unity, Qadhafi tirelessly, albeit thus far ineffectively, continued to seek partners. On August 13,

1984, a marriage of convenience between Libya and Morocco was consummated with the signing of the Oujda Treaty. At the time

of the treaty, Qadhafi was at odds with all the Arab states except

Syria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South

Yemen), so the agreement signaled an end to Libyan isolation and

revived Qadhafi' s ambitions of pan-Arab leadership. The treaty

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Government and Politics

also restored Qadhafi's hope of extending the union to include

Algeria and Tunisia as well as Syria. Such a scheme, he thought,

could be the nucleus of a more complete pan-Arab union. Not sur- prisingly, dissolution of this union came as abruptly as its formation. The visit of Shimon Peres, Israel's prime minister, to Morocco

in July 1986 provided the main reason for the estrangement (also see Maghrib Relations, this ch.).

Despite the failure of unification attempts, Qadhafi condemns

Arab leaders who for various reasons opposed such schemes.

Because they worked against his purported goal of achieving unity,

Qadhafi's resorts to subversion, threats, and meddling in the inter- nal affairs of others proved unsuccessful and costly. Qadhafi's

methods have alienated potential cooperators, frightened possible

Arab union candidates, and, in the last analysis, isolated Libya

in regional affairs. With ambitions of their own, and with differ- ing agendas and priorities, Arab governments have learned, at best, to tolerate the Libyan leader. Many resent his self-appointed role as philosopher-leader of all Arabs. Few, if any, are by temperament given to impetuousness; therefore, they oppose Qadhafi's sudden radical policy shifts. Nevertheless, the pan-Arab thesis

championed by Qadhafi, that strength increases with unity, is still valid. It is also widely shared as a goal among Arabs, notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties. Mediterranean Relations

The Mediterranean basin is an area of major importance to Libyan military and political policy. Soon after the revolution, Libya

called for the conversion of the Mediterranean Sea into a neutral

"sea of peace" through the removal from the area of all foreign

naval fleets and military installations, particularly North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) bases. Libya repeated the call at the

1973 Algiers conference of the Nonaligned Movement, and other

countries, including neighboring Tunisia and Algeria, have supported the idea.

The keystone to Libya's Mediterranean neutralization policy is Malta. During the Anglo-Maltese negotiations in 1972 covering

British bases on the island, Libya offered economic assistance to Malta if it would exact a pledge that the bases would not be used

again to fly supply missions to Israel (as they had been used during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis and the June 1967 War). The rul- ing Labour Party government of Maltese Prime Minister Dom

Mintoff negotiated such an agreement, and Libyan-Maltese eco- nomic relations began to expand. Libya encouraged immigration

by Maltese workers, and Malta provided technical training for

Libyans.

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Libya: A Country Study

Libyan-Maltese relations, on the whole, have been cordial. In

the 1980s, Libya generally perceived Malta's foreign policy as positive and friendly. Nevertheless, the issue of maritime boundaries

between the two countries remained an irritant. It was finally

resolved in mid- 1985 when the International Court of Justice at The Hague ruled in favor of Libya. As a result of this decision,

Malta lost eighteen nautical miles to its southern neighbor.

While pursuing relations with Malta, Libya continued to develop

its overall Mediterranean policy. In mid- 1975, Libya and Turkey

concluded several cooperative agreements and decided to establish a joint ministerial committee. Plans were formulated to increase

the number of Turkish workers in Libya from 6,000 to 60,000 by

the end of 1976. The wave of expulsions of foreign workers in the

fall of 1985, was evidently politically motivated as some 130,000

people—primarily Egyptians, Tunisians, and Mauritanians—were

expelled. Some 50,000 Turkish workers remained in Libya,

however, alongside 15,000 workers from the Republic of Korea

(South Korea) despite the obvious closeness of those two countries

to the West generally and the United States in particular.

Libyan relations with Cyprus and Greece have been largely harmonious. Late in 1973, Libya established diplomatic relations with

Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios, then president of Cyprus, visited

Libya in June 1975, where he recognized the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the

Palestinian Arabs. In early 1976 and again in mid- 1977, Greece

and Libya signed economic and technical cooperation pacts. They

also agreed to establish a joint ministerial committee.

Maghrib Relations

Although some analysts classify Libya as part of the Maghrib

(see Glossary), only the province of Tripolitania shares a common

history and culture with other Maghribi countries (see Islam and

the Arabs, ch. 1). The lack of a Maghribi heritage, together with

the Revolutionary government's predilection for Mashriq affairs,

in 1970 caused Libya to withdraw from the Permanent Maghrib

Consultative Committee, an organization founded by the Maghribi

states to foster the eventual development of an economic community. Nonetheless, Libya pursued an active foreign policy toward

the Maghrib, a policy that usually revolved around the issues of

Arab unity and the Western Sahara dispute.

During a December 1972 visit to Tunisia, Qadhafi publicly called for its merger with Libya. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba

rejected the idea and chided Qadhafi for his youthful naivete. In

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Government and Politics

January 1974, only a few months after the failure of the LibyanEgyptian merger, Qadhafi pursued a new unification plan during

a meeting with Bourguiba at Jerba. Bourguiba first accepted the

proposed Arab Islamic Republic, but then reversed his decision.

He later stated that he had agreed only to the concept of eventual

Maghribi unification, not to any specific bilateral union at the time.

Relations subsequently deteriorated and became more strained in

1975, when Tunisia supported the partition of the Western Sahara

territory by Morocco and Mauritania.

In March 1976, Libya began expelling several thousand Tunisian workers. Later the same month, Tunisian authorities an- nounced the discovery of a plot aimed at high government officials (perhaps even Bourguiba) and alleged that Libya was involved,

despite Qadhafi 's denials. Tunisia later accused Libya of providing military training to opponents of the Bourguiba regime. Now

and then, Tunisia (as well as other neighboring countries) has protested against alleged Libyan subversion attempts. In 1976, for in- stance, Tunisia charged Libya with attempting to assassinate Prime

Minister Hedi Nouira. And in February 1980, Libya was accused

of instigating the abortive uprising by Tunisian insurgents in the

town of Gafsa in central Tunisia, a charge that Libya promptly

denied. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed.

As Tunisia's economic and political difficulties grew in the 1980s, . dissent became more vocal, particularly in the poorer southern

region, paving the way for increasing the links between the Jamahiriya and the Tunisian dissidents. Two issues caused problems

for the Libyan-Tunisian relationship. The first, concerning maritime boundaries between the two North African countries, was set- tled by an International Court of Justice ruling in favor of Libya

in 1982. The Court reaffirmed its ruling in 1985, at which time

it rejected Tunisia's appeal for reconsideration. The second problem

resulted from the expulsion from Libya in August 1985, of 40,000

Tunisian workers, part of the downturn in the Libyan economy

as a result of shrinking oil revenues. The expulsions were also partially based on political considerations because Qadhafi has considered expulsions a political weapon with which to threaten

uncooperative governments. In retaliation, Tunisia expelled 300

Libyans, including 30 diplomats.

In the early months of 1987, there were signs of improvement

in Libyan-Tunisian relations. In March, Major Khuwayldi al Hamidi spent three days in Tunisia as official guest of the government and met with President Habib Bourguiba, Prime Minister

Rachid Sfar, and other high-ranking officials.

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Libya: A Country Study

Libya's closest Maghribi bilateral relationship has been with

neighboring Algeria. Both countries share similar revolutionary

Arab ideologies, state-controlled economic systems, and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil policies, and

both have undertaken Third World leadership initiatives. Furthermore, both countries have comparable relations with the United

States and the Soviet Union. Algeria has concentrated on internal

development, however, whereas Libya has pursued internal development and external activities almost equally. The two countries'

bilateral ties were strained by Libya's 1974 attempt to merge with

Tunisia, Algeria preferring to have its borders shared by relatively

weak states rather than by states that have been strengthened and

enlarged through unification.

Although Libya and Algeria have been allies on the Western

Sahara issue, differences in their positions became increasingly

pronounced in late 1978. Both countries originally had pressed for Spanish evacuation from the area and supported the local independence group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia

el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular por la Liberation de

Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro—Polisario) toward this end. Algeria

wanted the area to become an independent state. Libya felt Arab

unity would be better served if the area merged with a larger state, preferably Mauritania, with which it had close relations at the time.

(Libya had been the first country to recognize independent Mauritania; Mauritania was the first country to recognize Libya's Revolutionary regime.) Libya opposed the forceful repression of Western

Saharan nationalism, however, and when Morocco and Mauritania decided to partition the area by force (Morocco obtaining the

larger share), Libya joined Algeria in supporting Polisario's struggle

against the two partitioning countries. Together with Algeria and

thirty- six other countries, Libya has recognized the Saharan Arab

Democratic Republic (SADR), formed in Algeria in 1976. Libya

also supported the SADR's bid for membership in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), along with twenty-five other Afri- can states. Libyan-Moroccan relations have, on the whole, been unfriendly.

A wide gulf separates moderate, monarchist, pro-Western Morocco

from the revolutionary, pro-Soviet Jamahiriya. Rabat has often

protested Tripoli's attempts at subversion, for example, during the

1971 military coup attempt. Morocco's foreign policy goals have

usually been at odds with those of Libya. Qadhafi, for instance,

denounced Moroccan assistance to the government of Zaire when

rebels staged an invasion from neighboring Angola. In an abrupt

about-face, however, Morocco signed the Oujda Treaty in August

1984, which called for unity with Libya.

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Government and Politics

For Morocco's King Hassan II, the union restored the regional

Maghribi balance of power, which had tilted in favor of Algeria,

Morocco's main rival and the primary supporter of the Polisario.

Algeria consistently supported the right of Western Saharans to self-determination in the SADR. The SADR was proclaimed on

February 27, 1976, one day after the Spanish withdrawal. King

Hassan put forward his country's claims over the former Spanishruled territory, led 350,000 of his citizens in 1975 on a peaceful

* 'Green March" to key areas in the Saharan territory, and subsequently occupied the former Spanish colony. In view of their sharp ideological differences, the accord between

Qadhafi and King Hassan was evidently the result of expediency.

The king expected to persuade the Libyan leader to cease supporting

the Polisario and wanted access to Libyan oil. For his part, Qadhafi

regarded Morocco as a source of human resources and support.

Apparently, Qadhafi stopped his support of the Polisario, albeit

only temporarily.

Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa

Libya's very active interest in sub-Saharan Africa has been

directed toward isolating Israel diplomatically, liberating African

countries under colonial or apartheid regimes, providing economic

aid to developing African countries, and propagating Islam. During 1972 and 1973, through bilateral relations and membership

in the OAU, Libya and other Arab states successfully reversed

Israel's formerly strong diplomatic position in Africa. Qadhafi drew

a parallel between Israeli occupation of Arab territory and colonialism in Africa and frequently offered significant economic assistance

to countries that would sever ties with Israel. By November 1973,

twenty-seven African governments had broken relations with Israel,

many declaring their support for the PLO in the process. Libya also has supported numerous black African independence

movements, although the extent and nature of the support have

not always been clear. Libyan support apparently was significant

for Angola (where aid was first extended to Holden Roberto's

National Front for the Liberation of Angola, and only later to Agostinho Neto's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which

defeated Roberto's group in a civil war), Guinea-Bissau, and

Mozambique in their struggles against Portuguese colonialism.

Libya continued to contribute funds to liberation efforts throughout 1978. Some sources report that nationalist guerrillas of both

Zimbabwe and Namibia have received direct Libyan aid.

For some time, Libya has had a special, if not always smooth,

relationship with Uganda. Libya supported the government of Idi

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Libya: A Country Study

Amin in exchange for Uganda's severance of relations with Israel. (A particularly close bilateral relationship had existed between Israel and the Ugandan regime Amin overthrew in 1971.) Libya came

to Uganda's assistance in 1972, and again in 1978, when it air- lifted troops and supplies, thus demonstrating a certain degree of

logistical capability. The aid proved militarily futile, however, as Libyan troops were routed quickly. For a brief period, the deposed

Idi Amin found asylum in Tripoli.

Sudan

Libya's relations with Sudan, like relations with virtually all other

Arab and African countries, fluctuated. Initially, Libya supported

Sudanese President Jaafar an Numayri against an unsuccessful

leftist coup attempt in 1971 . Libya turned over two of the top communist plotters to the Sudanese authorities, who executed them

shortly afterward. However, a year later Sudan accused Libya of

involvement in three successive coup attempts and severed diplomatic relations. Relations began improving by the fall of 1977, as Numayri and Sudanese opposition leaders began a reconciliation.

In February 1978, Libya and Sudan agreed to resume relations

but relations soon became strained after Qadhafi condemned

Sudanese support for President Anwar al Sadat of Egypt and for the Camp David accords of September 1978.

Libya was particularly annoyed by the steadily improving rela- tions between Sudan and Egypt during the closing years of the

Numayri regime, which culminated eventually in an EgyptianSudanese integration charter that provided Egypt with an air base

in Sudan that could serve as a counterweight to Libyan regional

power. Feeling threatened by the Cairo-Khartoum alliance and its alignment with the West, in August 1981 Qadhafi formed the

Tripartite Alliance with Ethiopia and the PDRY (South Yemen),

each of which was aligned closely with the Soviet Union.

After Numayri' s fall from power in April 1985, Sudanese-Libyan

relations improved. Qadhafi ended his aid to the Christian and animist,

southern-based, Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by

Garang and welcomed the incoming government of General Sawar

Dhahab. InJuly 1985, a military protocol was signed between the two

countries, and Qadhafi was the first head of state to visit the new

Khartoum government. Qadhafi then strongly supported Sudanese

opposition leader Sadiq al Mahdi, who became prime minister on May 6, 1986. Nonetheless, the initial euphoria was subsequentiy

replaced by Sudan's search for a truly neutral regional and global

stance. With regard to the Chadian conflict, for instance, Mahdi's government declared its neutrality and asked that Libyan forces

224
Government and Politics

be withdrawn from Sudanese territory. Prime Minister Mahdi's

attempts to mediate the Libyan-Chadian conflict have so far proved

unsuccessful, although delegations from the warring factions have

met several times during 1986 and 1987, under Sudanese aegis.

Chad

In 1975 Libya occupied and subsequently annexed the Aouzou

Strip, a 70,000-square-kilometer area of northern Chad adjacent

to the southern Libyan border. Qadhafi's move was motivated by

personal and territorial ambitions, tribal and ethnic affinities between the people of northern Chad and those of southern Libya,

and, most important, the presence in the area of uranium deposits

needed for atomic energy development.

Libyan claims to the area were based on a 1935 border dispute

and settlement between France (which then controlled Chad) and

Italy (which then controlled Libya). The French parliament never

ratified the settlement, however, and both France and Chad recog- nized the boundary that was proclaimed upon Chadian independence.

Qadhafi became entangled in factional rivalries among the var- ious Chadian groups. In the late 1970s, it appeared as though

Libyan ambitions were being achieved. Goukouni Oueddei, a member of the Tebu Muslim tribe in northern Chad, was installed as president in April 1979 with Libyan support. In January 1981, the

two countries announced their intention to unite.

Goukouni' s overthrow in 1983 led to further Libyan involvement in Chad. From his Libyan exile, Goukouni reorganized his

forces and occupied the strategic northern town of Faya Largeau.

As the conflict drew in other players, particularly France, Chad

was in effect a partitioned country. With French help, the

N'Djamena government of Hissein Habre controlled the southern

part of Chad. The area north of the sixteenth parallel, however, was controlled by Goukouni and his Libyan backers. According

to the terms of a September 1984 treaty, France withdrew its forces

from Chad. Libya, however, decided to keep its troops there, and

skirmishes and fighting continued intermittently.

The stalemate in Chad ended in early 1987 when the Habre forces

inflicted a series of military defeats on the Libyans and their Chadian

allies, at Fada, Ouadi Doum, and Faya Largeau (see Invasion of

Chad, ch. 5). The press engaged in considerable speculation on

the repercussions of these humiliations on Qadhafi and his regime.

It was reported that Goukouni was being kept forcibly in Tripoli,

and that, as a result of some disagreements with the Libyan leader,

he was wounded by a Libyan soldier. Qadhafi's position had clearly

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been weakened by these developments, and the long-term fighting in Chad aroused discontent in the Libyan army as well. Relations with Western Europe and the United States

During the 1980s, Libyan relations with Western Europe and

the United States have been generally strained. In the preceding

decade, however, relations were relatively cooperative. Although

the new regime required the closing of British and American military bases in Libya in 1970, its strident anticommunism pleased

the Western powers. This policy orientation was confirmed in 1971

when Libya supported Sudanese President Numayri against an unsuccessful leftist coup attempt. And at the 1973 conference of the

Nonaligned Movement in Algiers, Qadhafi challenged the validity of Fidel Castro's credentials as a nonaligned leader.

Qadhafi believed that most West European nations had repudiated their imperialist legacy by the 1970s, a conviction that paved

the way for increased trade, if not for cordial political relations.

Libyan ties with Western Europe were for the most part commercial. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, was a major

purchaser of Libya's petroleum exports. Libya also purchased some

military equipment from Western Europe, notably from France.

Libya developed extensive commercial relationships with Italy and

Britain. Commercial ties prospered for pragmatic reasons even as Qadhafi denounced the European Economic Community's trade

relations with Israel and with NATO bases in the Mediterranean.

On only several occasions have Libyan political considerations over- ridden the economic imperative, as in 1973 when Libya joined the

Arab oil boycott that adversely affected several West European

nations. For their part, the West European nations have likewise

continued to trade with Libya despite proved Libyan involvement

in terrorism on the continent.

France

Libya developed particularly close relations with France after the June 1967 War, when France relaxed its arms embargo on nonfront-line Middle East combatants and agreed to sell weapons

to the Libyans. In 1974 Libya and France signed an agreement

whereby Libya exchanged a guaranteed oil supply for technical

assistance and financial cooperation. By 1976, however, Libya

began criticizing France as an "arms merchant" because of its will- ingness to sell weapons to both sides in the Middle East conflict. Libya later criticized France for its willingness to sell arms to Egypt.

Far more serious was Libya's dissatisfaction with French military

intervention in the Western Sahara, Chad, and Zaire. In 1978

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Qadhafi noted that although economic relations were good, politi- cal relations were not, and he accused France of having reverted

to a colonialist policy that former French president Charles de

Gaulle had earlier abandoned.

In the 1980s, Libyan-French discord centered on the situation

in Chad. As mentioned, the two countries found themselves supporting opposite sides in the Chadian civil war. In late 1987, there were some French troops in Chad, but French policy did not per- mit its forces to cross the sixteenth parallel. Thus, direct clashes

with Libyan soldiers seemed unlikely.

Italy

Italy was one of Libya's major trading partners in the late 1970s.

Relations with Italy, however, have been somewhat mercurial. In

1973 Libyan aircraft strafed an Italian combat vessel patrolling an

area in the Mediterranean where an earlier dispute had led to the

detention of Italian fishing trawlers. Libya officially apologized for the strafing incident and relations improved in 1974 with Jallud's

visit to Italy and the conclusion of several commercial and technical agreements. However, there were three more incidents involving

Italian fishing boats operating near the Libyan coast in December

1975. Earlier that year, British press reports alleged that Libya was

funding radical Italian political groups.

Despite these frictions, relations improved in 1975 because agree- ment was reached regarding compensation for property lost when

Italians left Libya under pressure after the 1969 Revolution. A

major commercial transaction was completed in December 1976;

Libya purchased more than 9 percent of the stock of the Fiat Company, placing two representatives on Fiat's fifteen-member board

of directors in the process. Increasing pressures were brought on

Fiat, Italy's largest privately owned firm, by the Italian government and Western interests to buy back Libyan-owned stock shares,

which by 1986 amounted to a 15.2-percent share in the firm. The

Libyan government-owned Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company agreed to divest itself of the stock in September 1986, presumably to generate revenue of over US$3 billion to compensate for lower

Libyan oil revenues.

Britain

Britain's relations with post-Revolutionary Libya were strained

because of the close political, economic, and military relationship

the British had cultivated with King Idris. After Qadhafi came to power, Britain suspended sales of military equipment, and Libya

nationalized British Petroleum's interests, ostensibly in retribution

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for perceived British complicity in the Iranian occupation of three

Persian Gulf islands. Libya supported Malta during that country's

negotiations regarding British military base leases. Libya also

allegedly supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Nevertheless, in an October 1978 address in Tripoli, Qadhafi stated that

there were no differences so severe as to preclude the establishment

of good relations with Britain.

However, British-Libyan relations deteriorated markedly during the 1980s. A critical point was reached in 1984 when a British

policewoman was killed by a gunman inside the Libyan People's

Bureau (embassy) in London. This incident led to the breaking

of diplomatic relations. Further discord followed the arrest of six British citizens in Libya, evidently in retaliation for the arrest of

four Libyans in Manchester on charges stemming from March 1984

bombings in London and Manchester. Relations plummeted when

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher permitted United States air- craft to use British bases on April 15, 1986, for a strike on Libyan

cities. United States In the 1980s, Qadhafi came to regard the United States as the

leader of Western imperialism and capitalism. He vigorously con- demned several United States policies—including military and eco- nomic support for Israel and support for a political settlement in the Middle East; resistance to the establishment of a new world

economic order between resource producers and consumers; and

support for relatively conservative, Western-oriented countries of

the Third World, particularly Arab and African states. Since the

Revolution, United States-Libyan relations have been limited to relatively modest commercial and trade agreements (see Foreign

Trade, ch. 3). Libya has attempted to influence the United States through

American oil companies operating within Libyan boundaries. Constant pressure on the companies concerning pricing and government participation eventually resulted in the Libyan state's assumption of a controlling interest in some firms and nationalization of others. The United States was the primary target of the

oil boycott that Libya and other Arab states invoked after the

October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

In addition to conflicts caused by Libyan oil policies, the United

States and Libya have disagreements over Libyan claims to ter- ritorial waters. Since 1973 Libya has considered the Gulf of Sidra

as territorial waters. Beyond that, Libya claimed another twelve

nautical miles (approximately twenty kilometers) of territorial

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waters. The United States refused to recognize Libya's claim, and

this refusal became a recurrent cause for contention between the

two countries. Under President Jimmy Carter, the United States armed forces were ordered not to challenge Libyan claims by

penetrating into the claimed territory, even though relations deteriorated when, on December 2, 1979, the United States embassy

in Tripoli was burned by demonstrators apparently influenced by

the takeover of the United States embassy in Tehran. President

Ronald Reagan's administration, however, was determined to assert the principle of free passage in international waters. In 1981 President Reagan began taking action against Libya.

On May 6, 1981, the Reagan administration ordered the clos- ing of the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington, and twenty- seven Libyan diplomats were expelled from the United States

for supporting international terrorism. Then, on August 19,

1981, two Libyan Su-22 fighters were shot down by United States F- 14 jets during naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra. In December President Reagan called on the approximately 1,500 American citizens still living in Libya to leave or face legal action. In

March 1982, oil imports from Libya were embargoed and technology transfer banned. In January 1986, Libyan assets in the

United States were frozen as part of a series of economic sanctions

against Libya.

United States- Libyan tensions erupted in April 1986. On April 5, Libyan agents planted a bomb in a Berlin nightclub frequented

by United States service personnel. The explosion killed 2 people,

1 an American serviceman, and injured 204 others. In retaliation, on April 15, the United States launched air strikes on Tripoli and

Benghazi. As a result, a number of Libyan civilians were killed. Observers speculated that the attack was intended to kill the Libyan

leader himself (see Encounters with the United States, ch. 5). The air strikes were certainly intended to encourage the Libyan

military to overthrow Qadhafi. However, the air strikes were

opposed by virtually all segments of the population, who rallied

behind their leader. Moreover, not only did Qadhafi thrive on the

public attention but his determination to stand up to a superpower

threat appeared to have enhanced his stature. Even the major opposition group abroad, the NFSL, denounced the use of force by for- eign powers in dealing with Libya, as did the London-based Libyan

Constitutional Union. In 1987, a year after the raid, it was still unclear whether the raids had succeeded in countering terrorism.

Observers were not certain whether Libya had actually adopted

a new policy with regard to supporting terrorism, which seemed

to have diminished considerably, or merely learned how to avoid

leaving fingerprints.

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Libya: A Country Study

Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

During the early years of Qadhafi's regime, Libya pursued a genuinely nonaligned policy. Qadhafi perceived Soviet imperialism to be as great a threat to Libya in the politico-economic sphere

as Western hegemony. Furthermore, communism's atheism was

antithetical to Qadhafi's religious beliefs. Qadhafi approved of the

1972 Egyptian expulsion of Soviet advisers and condemned the

fifteen-year Iraqi-Soviet friendship pact signed the same year. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, anticipating potential benefits

from cultivating the newly established regime in Tripoli, quickly

extended recognition three days after the coup. Notwithstanding

the RCC's suppression of local communist elements and its stri- dent anticommunist rhetoric, the Soviets viewed with satisfaction

the regime's gradually increasing anti-Western orientation. After

it was obliged to withdraw Soviet personnel from Egypt in 1972,

the Soviet Union's interest in Libya heightened significantly. When

the Western powers stopped selling arms to Libya in 1974, the first Soviet arms sale to Qadhafi was concluded in December of that year. A major arms deal was concluded between Libya and the Soviet

Union in 1975, costly enough that it apparently necessitated reductions in spending on social welfare and economic development.

However, Libya denied reports in the Egyptian press and elsewhere

that the agreement granted the Soviet Union military bases on

Libyan territory. As of 1987, these denials appeared to have been

truthful, although reportedly around 3,500 Soviet and East European military advisers were stationed in Libya (see Foreign Military Assistance, ch. 5). Libya's arms purchases, which by 1987

had far exceeded the needs of its small armed forces, led some

observers to conclude that Libya was serving as an entrepot for

weapons destined for other points in Africa in which the Soviet

Union was involved. But Libya's military debt to Moscow, esti- mated in 1986 at US$4 to US$6 billion, continued to be a source

of difficulty in bilateral relations.

Libya also has negotiated numerous economic, commercial, and

cultural agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Agreements involving the exchange of Libyan oil for technical expertise and equipment have been made with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (East

Germany), and Yugoslavia. East European countries also have contributed a significant number of medical personnel to Libya's health care program (see Medical Care, ch. 2). In addition, the East Germans have played a key role in the late 1970s and 1980s in Libya's

domestic intelligence field. Libya also has economic agreements

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Government and Politics

with Romania but ties have been strained because of the latter'

relatively cordial relationship with Israel. Libyan-Soviet relations improved during the 1980s because both

countries opposed the American-sponsored Middle East peace

process. The Soviet Union was opposed primarily because of its lack of a role in the negotiations, but Libya considered the 1978

Camp David accords as a betrayal of long-standing Arab and Palestinian aspirations. In view of the wide ideological gulf and policy

differences between the two nations, the Soviet-Libyan relationship has been based primarily on mutual self-interest. Libya needed

a source of arms and a counterbalance to the growing United States- Egyptian alliance. For the Soviet Union, Libya was an important

source of hard currency (it was estimated that Libyan weapons purchases in 1980 represented 10 percent of Soviet hard-currency earnings), an irritant to its Western superpower rival, and a potentially

useful destabilizer of the regional status quo.

Although the Libyan-Soviet relationship continued to be close

in the 1980s, Qadhafi was far too independent to be a submissive

protege, despite his dependence on Moscow for military hardware.

Instead, he insisted on following his own vision in domestic and

international affairs. Many of his beliefs conflicted with Soviet doctrines. For example, Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory conflicted

with the Marxist tenets of class warfare and the vanguard role of

the proletariat.

The lack of effective Soviet support to Libya during and after the United States raid in April 1986 underlined Moscow's reluc- tance to risk a confrontation with Washington by supporting

Qadhafi too strongly. It was reported that the Soviets withheld vital intelligence information from Libya during the confrontation in

the Gulf of Sidra. Moscow, however, reportedly was embarrassed

by the ineffectiveness of Libya's Soviet-supplied air defenses.

Multilateral Relations

The United Nations

Libya actively used regional and international organizations in

pursuit of its foreign policies. Indeed, independent Libya was established in large part by UN actions. A member of the UN and most

of its specialized agencies, Libya frequently brought such matters

as colonialism and racism in Africa, Western imperialism, and

North-South economic relations before the General Assembly.

Libya also used the UN as a forum in which to attack Zionism

and the state of Israel. Libyan pressure was a primary factor in

the acceptance of the PLO's representation of the Palestinian Arabs

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Libya: A Country Study

at the UN. Libya took an active part in UN affairs. For example,

in November 1975, Qadhafi called for the abolition of the veto right

held by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The following year, the Libyan press singled out United States' use of the veto for special criticism. Also in November 1975, the

Libyan agriculture minister demanded the expulsion of the United

States and Israel from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. In March 1978, Libya took strong exception to the posting

of UN peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon after the Israeli invasion of that area. The Libyan position, according to a GPC

communique, was that "any acceptance of UN forces in the land

adjacent to our occupied Palestinian land . . . [would mean] accep- tance of the Zionist presence and the bestowing of legitimacy on it.

The Organization of African Unity

Libya has used the OAU to advocate the same policies it has

espoused in the UN. During the early 1970s, Libyan diplomacy,

including offers of economic assistance, resulted in most OAU members' severing diplomatic relations with Israel. Qadhafi has long

condemned the apartheid policies of white regimes in Africa. In

a 1973 message to all OAU members, he compared Zionist imperialism (i.e., continued Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory taken

in the June 1967 War) with the policies of Portugal, Southern

Rhodesia—now Zimbabwe—and South Africa. He demanded that

members boycott a coming OAU meeting and that OAU headquarters be removed from Addis Ababa if Ethiopia (then under

the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie) did not break relations with

Israel. His demand was ignored; many OAU members, both Arab

and African, saw it as a clumsy attempt to politicize the organization. Such differences notwithstanding, Libya has been a major

supporter of African independence movements within and outside

the OAU framework.

At the February 1978 OAU ministerial council meeting in

Tripoli, Libya (already a member of the OAU Liberation Committee) was made a member of a new military committee. Other

members of the new committee included the front-line countries

against colonialism in southern Africa: Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. The committee's purpose was to obtain and provide sophisticated weaponry for the black African

national liberation movements. It was at the ministerial council

meeting that Qadhafi called for the inclusion of several West

European island possessions in the African liberation movement.

Qadhafi did not fare as well in the OAU in the 1980s. In 1981

the organization approved Qadhafi as the host of the next OAU

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Government and Politics

conference. Qadhafi's bid was frustrated twice, however. First,

Morocco and its allies boycotted the Tripoli meeting because of

the SADR's attendance. Then, in November 1982, the conference

lacked a quorum when many delegations boycotted it because of

the controversy surrounding the Qadhafi-sponsored Chadian

representation. Qadhafi's third attempt to become OAU chairman

in 1983 also failed when delegations wary of Qadhafi's unpredictable and extremist policies selected Ethiopia for the next confer- ence site and chairman. Still, Qadhafi is usually supported by the more radical states such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and

Ethiopia.

At the 1986 conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Harare,

Zimbabwe, the Libyan position was endorsed when the conference,

which included many OAU countries, denounced the United States bombings of April 1986. At the same conference, however,

Qadhafi's denunciation of the whole stance of nonalignment caused

great embarrassment to the conference hosts and failed to win any

real conference support.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

Libya joined OPEC in 1962. Since the Revolution, Libya has

played a prominent role in negotiations with the multinational oil companies, succeeding in significantly increasing the producers' revenues from oil production. Libya also has lobbied, without notable success, for the investment of petroleum profits in Third World

nations rather than in industrialized countries.

Libya has pursued the same general policies within the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), of which

it is a founding member. In 1972 Libya recommended an amendment to the OAPEC membership eligibility requirements, changing the stipulation that oil be "the major and basic source" to merely "an important source" of a country's national income. As

a result of the adoption of that amendment, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt

joined OAPEC later in the year. Libya has been an advocate of

the use of oil as a political weapon; it enthusiastically backed

OAPEC 's oil embargo of the United States and the Netherlands,

as well as the production reduction affecting most other West

European countries after the October 1973 War. Libya unsuccessfully resisted OAPEC 's decision to remove the embargo in March

1974.

Other Multilateral Organizations

Libya is a member of several other regional and international

groups, including the League of Arab States (Arab League), the

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Islamic Conference, the Arab-African Development Bank, and the

Islamic Development Bank. As a leading member of the Third

World movement, it has been a strong proponent of the establishment of a new world economic order between North and South.

Nuclear Development

Qadhafi' s stance on nuclear weapons has been contradictory.

Unconfirmed but persistent press reports beginning soon after the

1969 Revolution indicated that Libya wanted to purchase a nuclear

weapon or the components for such a device. According to one

report, Qadhafi sent his deputy, Jallud, to Beijing (formerly Peking)

in an unsuccessful attempt to purchase tactical nuclear weapons.

Qadhafi has voiced his concern over the Israeli nuclear capability

and publicly expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, in 1975 Libya reaffirmed its commitment to the 1968

Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed originally

by the monarchy in 1968 (see Foreign Military Assistance, ch. 5). Qadhafi also stated in interviews in 1981 and 1984 that Libya was

only interested in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and

he scoffed at the idea of "an Islamic bomb."

There is no doubt, however, that Libya has undertaken extensive bilateral negotiations to secure nuclear research facilities and

power plants, and many Libyan students in nuclear energy fields have been sent to United States, West European, and East European universities to further their studies. According to the terms

of a 1974 nuclear cooperation treaty with Argentina, Libya was

provided with equipment and technical training. Argentina agreed

to send senior geologists to Libya to advise on uranium prospecting and uranium enrichment. One alleged reason Libya occupied

the Aouzou Strip in Chad in 1975 was that the area was thought

to be rich in uranium deposits. Libya and India agreed in July

1978 to cooperate in the peaceful application of nuclear energy,

in line with India's "atoms for peace" policy. Libya also contributed

money to Pakistan's nuclear effort. France agreed in 1976 to build a nuclear research plant in Libya designed to power a water desalination plant.

Libya's main partner in the nuclear field, however, has been

the Soviet Union. A small (ten megawatt) Soviet-supplied reactor began operation in Tajura (outside Tripoli) in 1981. Three years

later, a research center was opened at the same site; aided by Soviet

staff, it continued to operate in 1987. In early 1986, however, a plan for the construction of nine 440-megawatt nuclear power plants was suspended indefinitely.

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Government and Politics

In the 1970s, relatively few scholarly books were published about

Libya. For a study of the early years of the Libyan Revolution,

Ruth First's Libya: The Elusive Revolution is perhaps the single most

authoritative source. Henry Pierre Habib's Politics and Government

of Revolutionary Libya, though likewise dated, contains useful information, although it is biased favorably toward the regime. In the

early 1980s, several important books filled the vacuum of information on Libya. Libyan Sandstorm by John K. Cooley, published

in 1982, provides an entertaining yet meticulously researched journalistic account of the activities of the Qadhafi regime. Qaddafi and

the United States Since 1969 by P. Edward Haley, published in 1984,

provides a comprehensive and detailed description of Libyan for- eign policy, particularly insofar as it affects United States interests. In 1986 and 1987, as Libya became more newsworthy, a spate

of new books were published on the topic. Among these, Libya:

Qadhafi s Revolution and the Modern State by Lillian Craig Harris provides an excellent general overview of the situation in Libya. Qaddafi

and the Libyan Revolution by David Blundy and Andrew Lycett is a highly critical and well documented probe of Libyan-sponsored

terrorism. Jonathan Bearman's Qadhafi 's Libya is a sympathetic yet

informative analysis of the Libyan Revolution. The Making ofa Pariah

State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi by Martin Sicker

concentrates on Libyan foreign relations. The State and Social Trans- formation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 by Lisa Anderson looks

at Libya in a larger historical context. Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice by Mohamed A. El-Khawas focuses on Qadhafi 's thought. With regard to the latter topic, the English language translation of Qadhafi 's three-volume The Green Book is widely available.

Likewise, as a primary research source, an English language ver- sion of the Libyan newspaper Az Zahf al Akhdar is available.

Because of the rapid pace of political change in Libya, books

soon become outdated, and to obtain recent information on the

subject one must rely on news media, in which Libya is well covered. For further detail, one must turn to specialized periodicals

such as Africa Confidential, African Economic Digest, Africa Research Bulletin, Middle East Economic Digest, the Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Reports on Libya, and the chapters on Libya in the annual Middle

East Contemporary Survey. French-language sources include Le Monde

Afrique and Jeune Afrique. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

235

Chapter 5. National Security
A Libyan surface-to-surface missile supplied by the Soviet Union
BEFORE THE COUP that brought Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi

to power in 1969, Libyan national security clearly meant protection of the reign of King Idris and of the national development

goals his regime had adopted. Insurance against potential exter- nal threats was sought through various compacts with Western

powers—principally the Libyan-United Kingdom Treaty of Friendship of 1953, which granted the British continued use of their World

War II Al Adem (Al Adam) Air Base near Tobruk (Tubruq). A

similar treaty in 1954 perpetuated use of Wheelus Air Base, near

Tripoli, by the United States Air Force. Meanwhile, the monarchy

devoted its own resources to the business of warding off domestic

threats—largely arising from its faction-ridden army.

After Idris was deposed, Qadhafi insisted on the early termination of the treaties that gave Britain and the United States permission to maintain forces on Libyan soil. The country's energies were

turned to the cause of pan-Arabism and to supporting fellow Arab

countries in their conflict with Israel. The armed forces were doubled in size but, until 1973, the expansion was grounded on a reasonable balance that took into account the country's available resources and the fact that its neighbors were neither aggressive nor naturally hostile. Qadhafi became frustrated over Egypt's failure to consult with Libya in prosecuting the 1973 war against Israel and the fading of his pan-Arabist ambitions in the failure of the

unions concluded with Egypt and Syria and later Tunisia. New

revenues derived from the escalating price of oil were now available, and the Soviet Union was prepared to supply arms that

Western powers had vetoed. For Moscow, the appeal was, first, the commercial one of a cash customer and, second, the potential

of Libya as a new client state in the Mediterranean area, following the Soviet 1972 expulsion from Egypt.

Only gradually did the extent of Qadhafi's arms appetite become

apparent. To Libya's existing fleet of Mirage aircraft from France,

large numbers of Soviet fighters were added, including the up-todate MiG-25. Although Libya had only 7 percent of the population of France, Libya's inventory of over 500 combat aircraft was

roughly equivalent to that of France. A force of 3,000 tanks was

purchased, although only one-third could be deployed with active

units. Its hitherto inconsequential navy was outfitted with submarines and high-speed missile boats. Because voluntary enlistments were wholly inadequate to man the new equipment, conscription was introduced in 1978.

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Libya: A Country Study

Because the inflated arsenal could not be justified by any per- ceived threat to the nation's borders, there was initial speculation

that Libya was becoming a Soviet surrogate in Africa, stockpiling

modern weapons for future adventures on that continent. This

notion, however, was contradicted by Libya's evident determination to employ its newly purchased arms as it saw fit. Its alignment with Moscow, although based on parallel interests, was a

limited one that did not extend to Soviet bases on Libyan soil. In the decade between 1973 and 1983, arms acquisitions amounted

to US$28 billion, of which US$20 billion worth had originated with

the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But the quantity and sophistication of the new weaponry outstripped the ability of the limited

skilled personnel to employ it. In spite of a multitude of foreign

technical advisers and trainers, a shortage of qualified personnel

needed to operate and maintain the military hardware persisted.

Moreover, the wide range of models and countries of manufacture has created logistics and maintenance problems.

The Libyan armed forces have not, in fact, thus far played a

significant role in Qadhafi's declared objective of the destruction

of Israel by united Arab might because Libya's direct involvement

in the Arab-Israeli wars has been negligible. Nonetheless, Qadhafi

often has been a divisive element in the Middle East. Libya's acknowledged sponsorship of terrorism for the purpose

of "liquidating" exiled opponents of the regime and of punishing

moderate Arabs and others regarded as opposing the primary purpose of defeating Israel has brought it into conflict with the West

and particularly the United States. Hostile encounters with United

States military, especially the American retaliatory bombing attack

of 1986, demonstrated serious weaknesses in Libya's threat per- ception and defense posture. The incidents, however, caused many

African and Middle Eastern countries briefly to band together in

public support of Libya and in condemnation of the United States. By early 1987, some observers believed that Qadhafi's hold on

the Libyan public had waned, owing to his radical and sometimes

bizarre policies in the name of the Libyan Revolution. Yet opposition groups, consisting mostly of Libyan exiles, have been ineffective. The main threat to Qadhafi's continued rule came from the

army itself. Numerous plots and coup attempts have been uncovered, most of which have not seriously threatened Qadhafi's authority. Distrustful of the professional military, Qadhafi often shifted

senior officers from one post to another to prevent the officer corps

from closing ranks. In addition, he entrusted his personal security

to a handpicked detachment from his own region. A comprehensive internal security system involving police, secret service, and

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National Security

local revolutionary committees was alert to any indications of dis- loyalty or conspiracies. Any form of dissent from the policies of

the government was deemed contrary to the Revolution and subject to severe punitive measures. Origins of the Modern Armed Forces

The roots of the contemporary Libyan army can be traced to the Libyan Arab Force (popularly known as the Sanusi Army) of

World War II. Shortly after Italy entered the war, a number of

Libyan leaders living in exile in Egypt called on their compatriots

to organize themselves into military units and join the British in the war against the Axis powers. Five battalions, which were ini- tially designed for guerrilla warfare in the Jabal al Akhdar region

of Cyrenaica, were established under British command. Because

the high mobility of the desert campaigns required a considerable

degree of technical and mechanical expertise, the Libyan forces were used primarily as auxiliaries, guarding military installations

and prisoners. One battalion, however, participated in the fighting at Tobruk.

After Britain succeeded in occupying the Libyan territories, the

need for the British-trained and -equipped Sanusi troops appeared

to be over. The Sanusi Army was reluctant to disband, however,

and the majority of its members arranged to be transferred to the

local police force in Cyrenaica under the British military administration. When Libya gained its independence in 1951, veterans

of the original Sanusi Army formed the nucleus of the Royal Libyan Army.

Until the discovery and exploitation of oil, beginning in the late 1950s, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. Limited available natural resources and a small population provided

little basis for viable defensive strength, and the new state was

militarily insignificant during its early years. King Idris deliberately divided the security forces into a regular army and a variety

of armed police forces. The primary mission of the armed police was to counterbalance dissidents within the faction-torn armed

forces and thus preclude a coup against the monarchy.

With substantial British assistance, the army was slowly enlarged,

and by September 1969 its strength was estimated at roughly

6,500—about half the size of the armed police. The police forces,

composed mainly of conservative tribal elements that the king considered more reliable than the regular army, were extremely diverse.

They ranged from several lightly armed territorial forces to the

mobile National Security Force, which was equipped with helicopters and armored cars. Units of the prestigious Cyrenaican Defense

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Libya: A Country Study

Force, assisted and advised by British military specialists, were gar- risoned at several places in Cyrenaica.

The small naval and air components were not developed until

later. The navy was established in November 1962, and the air force was formed in August 1963. Consisting initially of only a few

aircraft and two pilots, by 1967 the air force had increased to about

250 American-trained personnel and a few jet trainers and pistonengine transports. After the June 1967 War, demand for more

sophisticated aircraft resulted in the purchase of ten American F-5

fighter-bombers in 1968 and 1969. Throughout this early period,

the British were influential in the development of the Libyan navy,

which, however, grew extremely slowly and even by the time of

Qadhafi's coup in 1969 consisted of just over 200 men.

Partly because of the limited resources in trained personnel locally

and partly because the monarchy was suspicious of the professional

military, the idea of purchasing a sophisticated air defense missile

system and training a few specialists in its operation gained popularity among the king's nonmilitary advisers. In 1968 the government

entered into a contract with Britain for the installation of an air

defense system to be delivered over five years at a cost of almost

US$300 million. Under the contract, the British agreed to supply

a complex antiaircraft missile system and radar detection and control

equipment and to train Libyans to operate them. The high priority assigned to this project and the unprecedented expense involved were reflected in an accompanying decision to postpone the introduction of the monarchy's second five-year development plan until

April 1969. Idris, however, was unwilling to disrupt the balance

between the army and the police by providing the military element

with tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, recognizing

that such equipment could be employed against his regime as easily as against a hostile external force. Ironically, when Qadhafi and

his Free Officers Movement mounted their overthrow of the monarchy, the ostensibly reliable police did not interfere.

Assuming power after the 1969 coup, the new Qadhafi regime

integrated major elements of the police into the army. Although

he canceled the British air defense project, Qadhafi began to build

up the country's military strength through large equipment purchases from foreign suppliers. In 1970 the government contracted

to buy 110 Mirage jet fighters from France. Thereafter, the air

force grew rapidly and became an important component of the

armed forces. Similar purchases provided tanks and artillery for the army and vessels for the navy.

Within a year after the coup, the size of the military establishment was estimated at about 22,000 men—over three times the

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figure immediately before the coup. Although this increase followed a major recruitment effort, it was primarily the result of the merger

of the regular army with most of the former National Security Force

and the Cyrenaican Defense Force, which between them had comprised about 14,000 troops. In 1971 the government announced the creation of the Popular

Resistance Force, a militia that was under the operational control

of the chief of staff of the Libyan armed forces. Initially, the primary

mission of the force was to guard government buildings, oil instal- lations, and other important facilities in the event of war or internal disorders.

Less than a year after the 1969 coup, Qadhafi and his fellow

Free Officers assumed control of British and United States bases

in Libya and began to sever military supply links with those countries. France, politically less objectionable to Qadhafi, became the

leading source of arms but, in 1974, Libya reached agreement with

the Soviet Union for the purchase of equipment on a scale well

in excess of France's production capacity, even if France had not

been deterred by Qadhafi 's increasingly radical and irrational

behavior. Tremendous quantities of modern Soviet armaments were

delivered beginning in 1975, and the flow was continuing in 1987. In spite of the fact that thousands of advisers from the Soviet Union

and other communist countries helped with manning, maintenance,

and training in the use of the new equipment, the sheer quantity

overwhelmed the ability of the Libyan armed forces to introduce

it into operational units.

Prodigious importation of new weapons systems was accompanied by a rapid buildup of manpower. When voluntary enlistments

proved inadequate, the government invoked a conscription law call- ing for three to four years service for all males between the ages

of seventeen and thirty-five. Consequently, the armed forces more

than doubled in strength between 1974, when the first arms agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded, and 1986, when the

total manpower of the three services was estimated at over 90,000.

In addition to creating the most highly mechanized army among

the Arab nations, by the late 1980s Qadhafi had procured a fleet of submarines, corvettes, and missile boats that constituted a significant new naval force in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union

had also supplied Libya with modern fighter aircraft, a bomber

and transport force, and a sophisticated air defense system.

The Military Leadership

The group of junior officers who seized power in 1969 wanted

to introduce a radical form of Arab and Islamic socialism. The

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Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) of Qadhafi and eleven

other officers assumed formal responsibility for drawing up general

policies. The initial civilian cabinet was frustrated by the RCC's

insistence on reviewing all of its decisions. After its resignation, a new cabinet in January 1970 had Qadhafi as prime minister,

Major Abdul Salaam Jallud as deputy prime minister, and other

RCC members in key ministerial positions.

Although the RCC always spoke with one voice and Qadhafi

and his associates generally succeeded in instilling a spirit of unity

and discipline among the military, there was internal dissent. Differ- ences came into the open in 1975 because of disagreement over

the priority being given to armament purchases over domestic social needs in the use of oil revenues. As a result, the minister of planning was dismissed, and others left their posts. By late 1975, only

five of the original twelve members were still serving on the RCC.

Officially phased out in 1977, the RCC was succeeded by the

General Secretariat of the General People's Congress (GPC). At

first this new policy-setting body was little more than the RCC

under a new name. In the reorganization of 1979, however, when

Qadhafi relinquished his position as secretary general, Jallud was

replaced by a civilian as deputy secretary general and the other

three military members of the General Secretariat were likewise

replaced by civilians. They continued to serve as senior policy

advisers to Qadhafi, although their public role was curtailed. In 1987, the most senior positions of the military hierarchy were

held by members of the original RCC. Qadhafi retained the title of supreme commander of the armed forces. General Abu Bakr

Yunis Jabir was commander in chief of the armed forces. Major

Khuwayldi al Hamidi was chief of the general staff and headed

the People's Militia or People's Army (formerly the Popular

Resistance Force.) Colonel (formerly General) Mustafa al Kharrubi was inspector general of the armed forces and commandant of the

navy and air force. Major Jallud held no military position, but he

headed the revolutionary committees and was acknowledged to be

Qadhafi 's second in command.

In the course of the post-coup reorganization of the military into a single unified command, the RCC retired or fired—for political reasons—the entire leadership of generals and colonels along with

a number of officers of lesser rank identified with the Idris regime.

Qadhafi and the other RCC members maintained that the former

military leaders had been involved extensively in various forms of

corruption, particularly in arms-procurement contracts. In addition, the former high command had been largely in agreement with

the monarchy's position on such issues as the continued presence

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of British and United States military bases on Libyan territory and

the country's rather limited involvement in the Arab-Israeli

disputes.

The former military leadership was also believed to have toler- ated and in many instances to have profited personally from a

recruitment and promotion system that awarded high posts to indi- vidual tribal leaders and members of influential families. Senior

officers were chosen not on the basis of military qualities or experience, but rather because of personal loyalty or political favors

provided to King Idris or in recognition of their political and reli- gious conservatism. These factors, which had brought the senior

officers their initial commissions and subsequent promotions, caused

much of the low morale among junior officers and contributed to the eventual overthrow of the monarchy.

Unlike the former military leaders, many of whom were from

the middle and upper classes, and by virtue of their social status could just as easily have chosen higher education or the bureaucracy

as routes to advancement, most of the RCC officers were from the

lower strata of society. For them, the most logical source of upward

mobility under the monarchy had been the military. Of the original RCC members, most of whom were in their mid-twenties at the time of the 1969 uprising, approximately half were from tribal or peasant backgrounds. They reflected the country's three traditional geographic divisions, with roughly one-third coming from

each of the major regions—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.

In political outlook, the military leadership that rose to power

after 1969 has been described as both soldier-revolutionary and

ardent pan-Arabist. In published interviews, the senior officers,

particularly Qadhafi, recalled that their identification with the goal

of regional Arab unity and the adoption of a more militant posture

toward Israel dated from their secondary school years, when their

hero was Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser.

The new military leaders frequently emphasized their passionate commitment to the moral tenets of Islam and to their own concept of Islamic socialism. Qadhafi and the other senior military

figures became the dominant influence group in the country,

representing both the modernizing and the traditional aspects of

national life. On the one hand, they have been committed to modernization, reflected in their acquiring technical military equipment

and sophisticated weaponry and training personnel to operate and

maintain them. Commitment to modernization also was demonstrated by their continuing emphasis on improving the literacy rate and on the development of technical skills and training. On the

other hand, many of the top officers, including Qadhafi, have

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remained proud of their desert backgrounds, their religious convictions, their social relationships, and their traditional belief in the overall primacy of Arab and Islamic attitudes and values. One

important exception to emphasis on traditional values has been

Qadhafi 's desire for a role for women in the armed forces, a proposal

that was rejected by the normally obedient GPC.

International Military Concerns and Objectives

Libyan Security Concerns

In little more than a decade, Qadhafi effected a transformation

of Libya into a militarized nation. The armed forces were rapidly

expanded, acquiring greatly enhanced firepower and mobility. The

able-bodied civilian population was formed in well-equipped militia

units. Libya's new military establishment and arsenal have enabled

Qadhafi to project his radical vision and ambitions beyond the country's borders. In spite of frequently irrational and inconsistent

behavior, he has advanced Libya to the forefront of politics in North

Africa and thrown its weight against peaceful settlement in the

Middle East. As affirmed by Qadhafi's public statements, his primary purpose in the Libyan arms buildup is destruction of Israel. The armed

forces, however, have not been shaped to confront Israel directly nor has Qadhafi been eager to commit Libya to battle with Israel in alliance with other Arab powers. To a limited extent, he has

used his arms inventory as a stockpile, supplying weapons selec- tively to those countries and groups most opposed to Israel's exis- tence. His rhetoric has been devoted to appeals to develop a combined Arab and Islamic force strong enough to wage a successful "holy war" against Israel. In 1987 most observers doubted that either the Libyans or the

Soviets viewed the stored Soviet equipment as an arms depot

prepositioned for eventual use by Soviet forces in action in North

Africa. The materiel has been purchased outright by Libya at a considerable sacrifice to the country's economy. In spite of large

numbers of Soviet advisers and support personnel, the unused

equipment reportedly has not been maintained in an adequate state of readiness to be employed at short notice. Anticipated use by the

Soviet forces presupposes close cooperation and approval by Qadhafi

of Soviet operations in North Africa, but other evidence suggested

that he was far from willing to agree to a more active Soviet role in the area. The traditional mission of Libyan armed forces has been to protect Libya's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Normally,

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the limited capability of neighboring states to threaten Libya's

borders would not justify a primed and powerful defense arm (see

fig. 12). Qadhafl, however, has inflamed relations with all of his neighbors on one or more occasions. In the late 1980s, the military remained ready for possible open conflict with Egypt, whose

moderate policy toward Israel Qadhafl viewed as a provocation.

Libya's buildup of naval and air strength helped to protect the country's exposed Mediterranean coastline against attack and gave

Qadhafl a tangible means for enforcing Libya's claim to the Gulf

of Sidra and its natural resources as Libyan territorial waters. Moreover, submarines and fast-attack craft with missiles gave Libya

a potential striking power that even major naval forces in the

Mediterranean were forced to heed.

Libya's arms buildup and demonstrated mobility provided the

indispensable underpinning to Qadhafl' s efforts to play a leading

role in African politics by extending his influence, particularly to the Sahelian nations to the south. Libyan involvement has taken

the form of subversion, military assistance, and direct military inter- vention aimed at winning other countries to support Qadhafi's radical policies or supplanting existing governments with others more

amenable to him. Libya's efforts to dominate the Sahel presented

a more imminent threat because of the military weakness, poverty,

and unstable governments in the area. In addition, territorial claims

have been advanced against Chad, Niger, and Algeria.

Performance in Combat

Although never tested in large-scale actions, the Libyan armed

forces have been involved in low-level hostilities on a number of

occasions. A sharp series of border clashes occurred with Egypt

in 1977, and Libyan forces were flown into Uganda in 1978 in an

unsuccessful effort to defend the regime of Idi Amin Dada against

invading Tanzanian forces. In addition, the Libyans have conducted

a series of campaigns in northern Chad since 1980. In brief engagements in 1981 and 1986, they proved to be outmatched against

United States air power.

The cause of the hostilities between Egypt and Libya was never

clearly established, although the attacks were probably initiated by

Egypt as punishment for Libyan interference and a warning against

the Soviet-backed arms buildup. After border violations alleged

by both sides, fighting escalated on July 19, 1977, with an artillery

duel, and, two days later, a drive along the coast by Egyptian armor and infantry during which the Libyan army was engaged. Egypt

claimed successful surprise air strikes against the Libyan air base

at Al Adem (Gamal Abdul Nasser Air Base) just south of Tobruk,

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Libya: A Country Study

destroying aircraft on the ground; surface-to-air missile batteries

and radar stations were also knocked out. When the Egyptians withdrew on July 24, most foreign analysts

agreed that the Egyptian units had prevailed, although Libyan

forces reacted better than had been expected. The Qadhafi regime

nevertheless hailed the encounter as a victory, citing the clash as justification for further purchases of modern armaments.

In the case of Uganda, Qadhafi had befriended the despotic ruler

Idi Amin as a fellow Muslim and potential ally of the Arab cause

in Africa. Libya had intervened on Amin's behalf during his first confrontation with neighboring Tanzania in 1972 by airlifting a contingent of four hundred troops into the country. During the

invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops and Ugandan exiles in

1978, a new Libyan force estimated at 2,000 to 2,500 was sent,

assisting in the defense of Entebbe and the capital of Kampala by

covering road junctions with armored equipment. Inexperienced,

undisciplined, and in unfamiliar forested terrain, the Libyan troops were quickly routed in attacks by foot soldiers. As many as 600

Libyans were estimated to have been killed during the Ugandan

operation, and the defeated remainder were hurriedly withdrawn.

The troops reputedly were led to believe they were being airlifted into Uganda for training exercises with Ugandan units. They were

totally unprepared for actual combat and, having little motivation

to fight, often tried to flee. Invasion of Chad

Libya's involvement in Chad dates to the early 1970s, when

Qadhafi began supporting the antigovernment rebels of the Front

for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT). Libyan intervention has resulted in de facto control over the northern part of

the country and three phases of open hostilities—in 1980-81, 1983,

and late 1986—when incursions were launched to the south of Chad.

During the first two phases, the Libyan units acquitted themselves more professionally than in their previous encounters with Egypt

and in Uganda. In mounting the 1980 incursion, they successfully

traversed hundreds of miles of desert tracks with armored vehicles

and carried out air operations under harsh climatic conditions. They

also gained valuable experience in logistics and maintenance of

modern military forces over lengthy supply lines. Libya's 1980 intervention in Chad was on behalf of President

Goukouni Oueddei against the French-backed forces of Hissein

Habre, who at the time also enjoyed Libyan support. Qadhafi's

actions were portrayed as support for the Chadian northern groups

of Islamic, and to some extent Arab, culture, but his objective was

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Libya: A Country Study

the creation of a Libyan sphere of influence in Chad. Even before

1980, Libyan forces had moved freely in northern areas of the country, operating from the 100-kilometer-wide Aouzou Strip (see Glossary), which Libya had occupied by 1973 (see fig. 13). In June 1980, an offensive by Habre's forces resulted in the capture of Faya Largeau, the key center of northern Chad. Beginning

in October of that year, Libyan troops airlifted to the Aouzou Strip

operated in conjunction with Goukouni's forces to drive Habre

back. Faya Largeau was then used as an assembly point for tanks,

artillery, and armored vehicles that moved south against the capital of N'Djamena.

An attack spearheaded by Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks, and

reportedly coordinated by advisers from the Soviet Union and the

German Democratic Republic, brought the fall of the capital in

mid-December. The Libyan force, numbering between 7,000 and

9,000 men of regular units and the paramilitary Islamic Pan-African

Legion, 60 tanks, and other armored vehicles, had been ferried across 1,100 kilometers of desert from Libya's southern border,

partly by airlift and tank transporters and partly under their own

power. The border itself was 1 ,000 to 1 , 100 kilometers from Libya's

main bases on the Mediterranean coast. Under increasingly insistent pressure from other African countries and from political factions in Chad, the Libyans withdrew

in November 1981 . Upon their return to Libya, Qadhafi announced

that his troops had killed over 3,000 of the "enemy" while losing

300 themselves; other estimates of Libyan casualties were considerably higher.

Without military support from Libya, Goukouni's forces were

unable to stop the advance of Habre's Armed Forces of the North

(FAN), which overran the capital in June 1982. The second Libyan

intervention in favor of Goukouni occurred between June and

August 1983, with the distinction that Goukouni was now the head

of a rebel faction against the legally constituted government of

Habre. To make the 1983 phase of the Chadian war appear purely

indigenous, the Libyans recruited, trained, and armed Chadian

dissidents under Goukouni's nominal command. Supplemented by

heavy artillery, the insurgents began well but were soundly defeated

in July by Chadian government forces, bolstered by French and

United States military supplies and a token force of Zairian troops.

Qadhafi called for a Libyan intervention in force. A sustained air bombardment was launched against Faya Largeau after its recapture by Habre on July 30, using Su-22 fighters and Mirage F-ls

from the Aouzou air base, along with Tu-22 bombers from Sabha.

Within ten days, a large ground force had been assembled east and

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west of Faya Largeau by first ferrying men, armor, and artillery

by air to Sabha, Al Kufrah, and the Aouzou airfield, and then by

shorter range transport planes to the area of conflict. The fresh

Libyan forces attacked the Faya Largeau oasis on August 10, driving the Chadian government units out. The subsequent intervention of 3,000 French troops ended the

Libyan successes and led to a de facto division of the country, with

Libya maintaining control of all the territory north of the sixteenth

parallel. Under an agreement for mutual withdrawal from Chad,

French troops withdrew by early November 1984, but the Libyans

secretly dispersed and hid their units. In December 1986, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Chadian government troops were moved into the Tibesti Massif region of

northwestern Chad to support Goukouni's forces, most of whom

had rebelled against the Libyans after Goukouni grew disillu- sioned with his Libyan backers in late 1986. Combined Goukouni

and Habre forces then reportedly routed a 1,000-man Libyan

garrison at Fada, claiming to have captured or destroyed a large

number of tanks.

In March 1987, the main Libyan air base of Ouadi Doum was

captured by Chadian forces. Although strongly defended by mine

fields, 5,000 troops, tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft, the Libyan base was overcome by a smaller Chadian attacking force

equipped with trucks mounted with machine guns and antitank

weapons. Two days later, the Libyans evacuated their main base

of Faya Largeau, 150 kilometers farther south, which was in danger

of being encircled. Observers estimated that in the Chadian victories in the first 3 months of 1987 more than 3,000 Libyan soldiers

had been killed or captured or had deserted. Large numbers of

tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft,

and helicopters were captured or destroyed. In some cases, Libya

sent its own aircraft to bomb abandoned Libyan equipment to deny

its use to the Chadians. It was reported that in many cases Libyan

soldiers had been killed while fleeing to avoid battle. At Ouadi

Doum, panicked Libyans had suffered high casualties running

through their own mine fields. These military actions left Habre in virtual control of Chad and

in a position to threaten the expulsion of Libya from the Aouzou

Strip. The full effect of these stunning defeats had yet to be assessed

as of May 1987. It was clear, however, that they had affected the

perception of Libya as a significant regional military power. They

also cast renewed doubt on the competence and determination of

Libyan fighting men, especially in engagements beyond the country's borders to which they evidently felt no personal commitment.

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Libya: A Country Study

Figure 13. Libyan Intervention in Chad, 1980-Mid-1987

Encounters with the United States In 1973 Qadhafi claimed the Gulf of Sidra to be within Libyan

territorial waters by drawing a straight line between a point near Benghazi and the western headland of the gulf at Misratah (see

fig. 14). His claim was not generally accepted, although only the

United States presented a direct challenge by declaring that its ships

would continue to regard all areas beyond a distance of twelve nautical miles from the coast as international waters. On several occasions, Libyan fighter planes harassed United States planes from

carriers maneuvering in the area. When the United States Sixth

Fleet began exercises in August 1981, Libyan fighter planes were

assembled from elsewhere in the country to fly patrols near the

American ships. On August 19, two Su-22 fighter-bombers were

intercepted by two F-14 Tomcat fighters from the aircraft carrier

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Nimitz. While trying to escort the Libyans out of the exercise area, one of the American planes was the target of an air-to-air Atoll

missile but was able to evade it. Both Libyan planes were then shot

down with Sidewinder missiles launched by the Tomcats. The two

Libyan pilots managed to eject and were rescued from the sea. The

ease with which the American planes disposed of their attackers

demonstrated that the earlier generation Su-22 and its Atoll missile could not prevail against more sophisticated United States equipment.

Tensions between the two countries mounted after the hijacking of a TWA airliner at Beirut in July 1985 and bombing attacks

at American airline counters at Rome and Vienna in December

of that year. Qadhafi was implicated in these actions through his

patronage of the alleged perpetrator, the Palestinian terrorist Abu

Nidal (see International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent

Groups, this ch.). The Libyans also began installing batteries of

SA-5 missiles acquired from the Soviet Union in late 1985, along

with associated radar, to augment their air defense capabilities.

United States naval vessels continued to challenge Qadhafi 's claim

to the Gulf of Sidra, periodically crossing the line of Libyan ter- ritorial claim, which he came to refer to as the "line of death" (see

%. 14).

Three carrier task forces of the Sixth Fleet with 225 aircraft assembled off the Libyan coast for maneuvers in March 1986. On March

24, six SA-5s were launched from the new missile base at Surt

against American aircraft. None was hit, however, because the

SA-5, with a range of 240 kilometers, could threaten high-altitude

reconnaissance aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra but was relatively

ineffective against high-performance jet fighters. Subsequently, the

missile site was put out of action by carrier-based A-6 Intruders

firing High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), that homed

in on the Libyans' radar guidance signals. A second strike followed

the next day to knock out a replacement radar unit. Although Soviet

technicians were believed to be present to oversee the installation

and operation of the SA-5 batteries, none was reported injured

in the exchanges.

At the same time, a French-built Combattante-class missile attack

craft was destroyed when it approached United States Navy ships

protecting the aircraft carriers. The Libyan vessel was hit by two

Harpoon missiles launched from an A-7 Corsair aircraft. The most

serious loss for the Libyans was one of the eight Soviet-supplied

Nanuchka-class missile corvettes in an attack by two A-6s shortly

after midnight on March 26. A total of five attacks was carried

out on Libyan ships.

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Libya: A Country Study

Figure 14. Principal Military Installations, 1987

Ten days later, on April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded in a discotheque in Berlin frequented by United States service personnel.

Of the 200 injured, 63 were American soldiers; one soldier and

one civilian were killed. Messages intercepted by the United States,

including one from the Libyan mission in East Berlin, furnished

what the United States government described as evidence of Libyan

involvement in the bombing, which was probably carried out by

the Abu Nidal organization.

On April 15, the United States retaliated by attacking military

installations in Benghazi and Tripoli. Eighteen FB-111 bombers,

supported by four EF-1 1 1 electronic countermeasures aircraft, left England, refueling several times en route, and struck the Tripoli

airport, a frogman training center at the naval academy, and the

nearby Al Aziziyah barracks, where Qadhafi often resided. The

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aircraft carriers Coral Sea and America launched twenty-four A-6

and F/A-18 Hornet strike aircraft against radar and antiaircraft

sites at Benghazi before hitting the Benina military airfield and the

Jamahiriya barracks. A number of casualties also occurred in

residential areas of Benghazi and several Western embassies were damaged.

Several transport aircraft and some Soviet-built MiG-23 fight- ers and helicopters were destroyed on the ground at the two airfields. The only loss among the American attackers was one FB-1 1

that failed to return to its base in England. Although retaliation

for the Berlin bombing had been anticipated, Libyan air defenses

seemed almost wholly unprepared for the attack. In fact, it was

reported that antiaircraft fire had not begun until after the American planes had passed over their targets at Tripoli. It was reported

that some Libyan soldiers abandoned their posts in fright and confusion and officers were slow to give orders. Also, Libyan fighters

failed to get airborne to challenge the attacking bombers.

The Armed Forces

The military has been among the most representative institu- tions in the country, drawing its membership from all strata of soci- ety. The integration of the different forces, organized before 1969

under separate commands, and the disarming of the Cyrenaican

tribes were generally regarded as significant first steps toward estab- lishing national unity. According to some authorities, these steps

will eventually break down tribal, regional, and parochial tendencies.

Until the early 1980s, service pay, special commissaries, and

related benefits placed the average soldier in a privileged position

relative to the population as a whole. Military leaders nevertheless sought to avoid the public display of material ostentation with

which many officers under the earlier monarchy had been associated. Most of the senior officers were noted for their austere,

almost puritanical, personal habits. For more than a decade after the coup, the rank of colonel, which Qadhafi assumed after taking

power, acted as a ceiling on grade level. Although the rank of general was subsequently adopted by some service chiefs, it was an- nounced in mid- 1986 that the rank of colonel would again be the

highest in the armed forces. Observers noted, for example, that

Kharrubi was being referred to as colonel instead of general. The

ranks of many other officers may also have been reduced, in some

cases as a result of dissatisfaction with their responses to the American raid a few months earlier. In his public conduct, Qadhafi was the archetype of the ascetic

behavior that characterized senior Libyan officers in the early days

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Libya: A Country Study

of the Revolution. He cultivated an image of incorruptibility and

of simple personal habits, promoting the idea that military service was a patriotic obligation for which little material reward should

be expected. In general, the morale of the military was high as a result of

Qadhafi's extravagant modernization program, which was accompanied by new weapons systems, opportunities for training abroad

for younger officers, and major construction projects. Moreover,

experience gained in operations in Chad enabled the military to address some of the deficiencies revealed in the clashes with Egypt

and in Uganda.

In spite of the historical importance of the military in the over- throw of the monarchy and its participation in the government during the first decade under Qadhafi, underlying tensions between

civil and military authorities became visible during the early 1980s.

Although there was little discernible dissension among the most

senior military figures, whose fortunes were closely linked with

Qadhafi, there reportedly was disgruntlement among more junior

officers, who rejected the adventurist policies that had needlessly

provoked the hostility of Libya's Arab neighbors. The economic

austerity arising from the drop in oil revenues and Qadhafi's bizarre

economic theories contributed to the disaffection. As a result of

budget stringencies, military pay was often two or three months

in arrears, commissary stocks were little better than the meager

supplies in government-run shops, and military construction projects were scaled back sharply.

On numerous occasions, Qadhafi declared that ultimately the

traditional military establishment should "wither away," to be

replaced by an armed citizenry. This eventuality conformed with

the Third Universal Theory in that the populace would then be

directly involved in assuring their own security (see Political Ideology, ch. 4). Accordingly, all members of society must be prepared

to function as soldiers. Although Qadhafi seemed to treat the dis- appearance of the professional military more as a theoretical goal

than an imminent reality, his remarks added to the deteriorating

morale of the officer corps. Qadhafi and knowledgeable observers recognized that only the

army represented a separate source of power that could threaten

to overturn the existing regime. A government journal warned in

1982 that "armies believe the power to bear arms is by proxy for the masses and they thus create dictatorial classes which monopolize the weapons and crush the masses with them." This was fol- lowed by an extraordinary campaign unleashed against the military

in 1983. The ideological weekly of the revolutionary committees,

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Az Zahfal Akhdar, branded officers as reactionaries, guilty of cor- ruption, smuggling, and smoking hashish. These fascists "must

be immediately removed," said the editor, because they "mock

the people and get drunk with the bourgeoisie." Although these

views could not have been published without official sanction,

Qadhafi refrained from associating himself fully with them. He said

the army was not corrupt and that the officers with a bourgeois

orientation were only remnants from the traditional royal army.

Although Az Zahf al Akhdar moderated its charges following

Qadhafi 's intervention, its campaign, focusing on the luxurious

cars, dwellings, and working quarters of the officers, was resumed

in 1984. Assuming that Qadhafi could muzzle these denunciations

of the military if he chose, he may have failed to do so because

of suspicions of military disloyalty and a desire to deflate the prestige of the military establishment as a potential competing politi- cal force. Thus, in spite of his dependence on the armed forces to execute his wide-ranging ambitions, Qadhafi may feel constrained

to seek some balance by giving freer rein to the revolutionary committees and by strengthening the People's Militia.

The revolutionary committees introduced into work places and

communities were not at first extended to the military (see The

Revolutionary Committees, ch. 4). When they were later imposed,

there were complaints that they were controlled by officers with

insufficient revolutionary zeal. After the early 1980s, however, a paramilitary wing of the revolutionary committees, the revolutionary guards, became entrenched within the armed forces. They

served as a parallel channel of control, a means of ideological indoctrination in the barracks, and an apparatus for monitoring suspicious behavior. The revolutionary guards reportedly held the keys

to ammunition stockpiles at the main military bases, doling ammunition out in small quantities as needed by the regular forces. The influence of the revolutionary guards increased after a coup

attempt in May 1985 (see State of Internal Security, this ch.). The

guards, assisted by the revolutionary committees, set up roadblocks

and arrested thousands of individuals suspected of being implicated.

The revolutionary guards were believed to be no more that 1,000

to 2,000 strong, but they were outfitted with light tanks, armored

cars and personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, and SA-8

antiaircraft missiles. Most had been recruited from Qadhafi 's own

tribal group in the Surt region.

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

(ACDA) estimated that Libya spent US$1.8 billion on arms purchases in 1984. Accordingly, if the ACDA figure of US$5.2 bil- lion in total defense expenditures in 1984 is accepted, true defense

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Libya: A Country Study

costs exclusive of new weapons acquisitions would still be about

US$3.4 billion or several times the officially acknowledged rate of

spending. This would include such items as pay and benefits, military construction, fuel, maintenance, and the cost of the Chadian

campaign.

Organization of the Armed Forces

The Army

In 1987 the army—by far the largest and most developed branch

of the military forces—was still organized tactically in battalion for- mations. These included twenty tank battalions, thirty mechanized

infantry battalions, ten artillery battalions, and two special forces

groups comprising ten paratroop battalions. Air defense was organized into two antiaircraft battalions and six surface-to-air missile

battalions. Two surface-to-surface missile brigades were equipped

with free rocket over ground (FROG) and Scud missiles acquired

from the Soviet Union.

Although the pattern of equipment purchases and the creation

of divisional headquarters units suggested that a transition to a more

integrated structure of mobile armored and mechanized infantry was contemplated, by early 1987 the shift to such an organizational

form had not yet occurred. During specific deployments, as in

Chad, units were brought together on an ad hoc basis. If the tank

and mechanized battalions were to be consolidated into a more unified command structure, this would most likely be designed for planning territorial defense rather than for desert combat operations;

the system existing in 1987 of independent battalions afforded more

flexibility for desert combat.

In early 1987, the Libyan army was well outfitted with modern

armaments, including rocket systems, armored vehicles for its infantry and artillery, engineering equipment, up-to-date Soviet infantry weapons, sophisticated fire-control systems, flame throwers and

chemical munitions, and antitank guided missiles. Libya's more

than 3,000 tanks gave it the tenth largest tank force in the world.

Its range of tracked and wheeled armor, tank transporters, and

air transport ensured it the necessary mobility to bring its forces

to bear rapidly against any threat to its territorial integrity and en- abled it to intervene in ventures far beyond its borders (see table

10, Appendix).

The army was nevertheless confronted by grave deficiencies. The

high technological level of its equipment demanded a corresponding level of technical competence in operation and maintenance

that the army lacked. Maintenance and repair problems were

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National Security

exacerbated by the diversity of arms sources—British, American,

French, Soviet, Italian, and Brazilian. The numerous foreign

advisers and technicians were insufficient to overcome low stan- dards of support and logistics. To judge from the ability the Libyans

demonstrated in Chad to sustain modern combat operations over extended supply lines, some progress was being made in correct- ing these problems.

The pattern of troop concentrations could not be determined precisely from published sources. Some troops were at the operational

sites, including Tripoli, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Surt, Benghazi,

Darnah, and Tobruk, that were established at strategic points along

the Mediterranean coast during World War II (see fig. 14). Others were at inland sites at desert oases, such as Sabha, and farther south,

at Al Kufrah, which became the main base for operations in Chad.

Areas adjacent to the Egyptian border, particularly along lines of

movement, were also well defended. Many army units were scat- tered throughout populated areas, owing in part to their responsibility for training People's Militia units.

Few details were available on army training. The military academy at Benghazi, established before independence with British assis- tance, offered its cadets courses in higher education and military

subjects to prepare them for active duty as junior officers. Qadhafi

and other members of the RCC attended the institution, but it was

closed after the coup. Later a military academy opened at Tripoli.

In 1985 a military engineering college (at an unspecified location) to provide training in all technical military specialities was

proposed. The college was to have a four-year program leading

to a bachelor's degree. At about the same time, the establishment

of a reserves college with a one-year program leading to the rank

of second lieutenant in the reserves was announced. Admission

would be contingent on the attainment of a university degree or

its equivalent and a demonstration of '

' adherence to the great Fatah

revolution." Because Libya is not known to have an active reserve program, it remained unclear how the graduates of this institu- tion would be used.

The Navy

The navy has always been the stepchild of the Libyan armed

forces, although its Soviet- supplied submarines and fast-attack craft with missiles have endowed it with the potential for inflicting

damage on other naval powers in the Mediterranean. The enor- mous firepower available to small vessels armed with missiles and

sophisticated electronic guidance systems has enabled Qadhafi to assemble a modern flotilla at relatively low cost and with few

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Libya: A Country Study

personnel. The navy consisted of no more than 200 officers and

men when the first warship was delivered to the Idris regime in

1966. Under Qadhafi, naval personnel had increased to 6,500 by

1 986 and was expected to rise still further to meet the staffing needs

of additional ships on order.

Traditionally, the navy's primary mission has been to defend

the coast and to assist the other services in maintaining internal

security and public order. After the previously separate customs

and harbor police were joined with the navy in a single command

under the Ministry of Defense in 1970, the mission was extended

to include responsibilities for curbing smuggling and for enforcing customs laws. The rapid naval buildup that occurred during

the 1970s was intended to enforce Qadhafi' s claim of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra with its sponging and fishing grounds as well as potential unexploited mineral wealth. The navy could also

deter landings or raids aimed against the country's oil fields and

vulnerable oil transport network. The purpose of acquiring amphibious ships for landing infantry and tanks was less obvious. One

explanation might be to present a threat to Egyptian forces near

the border with Libya. The Egyptians' sole land supply route is the coastal road from Alexandria.

The navy has always been dependent on foreign sources for

equipment, spare parts, and training. In 1972 a British naval advisory mission that had assisted in the development of the Libyan

navy since its founding was terminated. Training was shifted to Greece and to Egypt and later to the Soviet Union. The initial ship

orders, placed with British yards, were for patrol boats and corvettes. The largest surface ship in the Libyan navy, a frigate of

about 1,500 tons with a crew of 130, was ordered just before the

1969 coup and delivered in 1973. Later, high-speed patrol boats

and corvettes equipped with surface-to-surface missiles were purchased from France, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Between 1976

and 1983, six Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines were delivered. Each

required a crew of seventy-five; in addition, twelve Soviet advisers were reportedly assigned to each vessel. (For an inventory of ships

of the Libyan fleet, see table 11, Appendix).

Little information was available on the navy's organizational

structure, but Tripoli was known to be the site of the naval com- mand headquarters and of the principal naval base. Other bases were located in the ports of Benghazi, Darnah, Tobruk, and Marsa

al Burayqah. A repair base was located at Al Khums east of Tripoli,

and a submarine base was under construction at Ras al Hilal.

As of early 1987, the Libyan navy had faced no hostile actions

except for the encounter with the American fleet in March 1986

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Sailors of Libya's growing navy

in which one missile boat and a corvette were destroyed and others

possibly damaged. Earlier, it was reported that the small Libyan

vessels were experiencing difficulty in obeying Qadhafi's order to remain at sea to avoid the risk of being bombed in port by American planes. The fleet reported breakdowns of engines and electronic

failures as well as shortages of food and fuel. By early 1987 it was considered probable that the Libyan navy

was overextended, having carried out a rapid buildup without suffi- cient trained personnel. More than one-third of the entire naval

complement of 6,500 would be required to supply a single crew

for each of the ships in commission in 1986. In addition, personnel would have to be found to staff a number of other vessels on

order. Aggravating the problem of reaching a satisfactory level of

operation, training, and maintenance was the need to become

familiar with a variety of modern weapons systems from numerous supplier countries, among them Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

The Air Force

Last of the military services to be established, the air force has

been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground crews

to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry (see

table 12, Appendix). As a result, in spite of the significant inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of early

1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly and

261
Libya: A Country Study

have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air engagements. However, the considerable air transport fleet has apparently been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although the

air force has been extensively used in support of Libyan ground

units in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a

decisive role. At the time of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the roster of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men. A recruit- ment drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a tenfold increase

in the force by 1978. As of 1986, its strength was estimated at 10,000.

The country's burgeoning inventory of air force weapons

accounted for a considerable share of Libya's procurement efforts. The hundreds of aircraft acquired since 1969 included American

helicopters and transports (although deliveries of United States planes were blocked in 1975), later-model French close-air-support

fighters, and up-to-date fighter interceptors from the Soviet Union.

Of the combat aircraft, the United States Department of State esti- mated in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage, including most

of the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. According to another

report, the Mirage aircraft were so neglected that only half were

in flying condition, the others being cannibalized for spare parts.

Pilots from Syria and other countries reportedly helped fly the

Libyan planes, and instructors, technical personnel, and maintenance teams included Soviets, Pakistanis, and Yugoslavs.

With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one medium

bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five forward

ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, nine

helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying

SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles. (The three SA-5 launch sites were operated by army units.)

The air force's primary installation was the huge Uqba ibn Nafi

Air Base (the former Wheelus Air Base) near Tripoli. It had excel- lent operational features and contained the service's headquarters

and a large share of its major training facilities. Both MiG fight- ers and Tu-22 bombers were located there. A large air base at a

site near Benghazi shared with the civil airport also had some MiG

squadrons. Most of the Mirages were located at Gamal Abdul

Nasser Air Base. Two airfields not far from the Egyptian border,

at Al Kufrah Oasis and at Jabal al Uwaynat in the far south, were among the Libyan installations attacked by Egyptian air crews during the 1977 border clash. The Soviets have constructed another

base in central Libya at the new army headquarters site of Al Jufrah near Hun with a runway of over 4,000 meters.

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National Security

An air force academy established at Az Zawiyah near Misratah

in 1975 was reportedly staffed mainly by Yugoslavs. Institutions

referred to as "secondary colleges," possibly technical training

schools, were opened at Sabha and at Uqba ibn Nafi Air Base in

1978. Basic pilot training was conducted on Italian-manufactured

SF-260 planes before the students moved on to the Soko G-2AE

Galebs (Yugoslav) and the Aero L-39 Albatros (Czechoslovak) at Az Zawiyah. Additional training took place outside Libya. Several hundred Libyan students were reportedly undergoing instruction with the Dassault firm in France in 1 983 as part of the Mirage

contract. This was at a time of confrontation between French and

Libyan forces in Chad.

Information on training programs conducted by the Soviet Union

was scanty but in light of the sophisticated weapons in the air force

inventory, it could be assumed that much time and effort were

invested in producing even a limited number of combat-ready

crews, backed up by ground support personnel. Soviet specialists

reportedly accompanied the Libyans during the 1980 incursion into

Chad and possibly were directly involved in missions of the Tu-22

bombers.

The performance of the Libyan air force in emergency conditions cannot have been reassuring to Qadhafi. Libyan pilots have

reportedly experienced difficulty in finding and identifying aircraft they have been ordered to intercept. They have been reluctant to

fly at night for fear of being unable to locate their bases. To some

extent, these problems may reflect outdated navigation and radar

aids in their combat aircraft, which are mostly older, stripped-down

versions of Soviet designs. The two Su-22 fighters were handicapped in their engagement with carrier-based American F-14s

in 1981 because the equipment, instruments, and air-to-air missiles were outmoded in comparison with those of their adversaries.

In spite of Qadhafi's express warning that his air force would repel

the United States fleet in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, his planes did

not seriously challenge the American naval units. In addition,

Libyan planes did not take off to meet the American fighter-bombers

that attacked targets at Benghazi and Tripoli in April 1986; con- sequently many planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground.

In Chad it was reported that many Libyan bombing raids were

carried out at excessively high altitudes when met with antiaircraft

fire. Conscription and the People's Militia

The concept of universal military service is embodied in Statute

3 for 1984, approved by the GPC in March 1984. This law declared

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Libya: A Country Study

that all Libyans coming of age, whether male or female, were to receive regular military training, as long as they were physically

able. Military studies were to be among the basic subjects of the

educational curriculum at all stages above the elementary level. Military studies and training in regular military establishments of

"specialized cadres in warfare" were to be restricted for the present

to males.

The statute provided for Libya to be divided into defense regions,

the responsibility for defending each region being that of its inhabitants. Defense regions were to regard themselves as strategic reserves for each other. The new law did not supersede the provisions of the Compulsory Military Service Statute of 1978, which

made all males between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five subject to a draft commitment of three years of active service in the

army or four years in the navy or air force. Students could defer

service until completion of their studies. The actual application of

conscription laws in 1987 was not entirely clear. In one case, a young

man called up for two years' service was required to serve six years. In 1986, of 936,000 men in the 15 to 59 age category, about 550,000 were fit for military service. About 39,000 Libyans reach military

age each year; many, however, lack the basic education needed

to absorb training in the use and servicing of modern weaponry.

The implementing regulations for the 1 984 statute stipulated that

all secondary schools and equivalent institutions were to be assigned

to various military units (see Education, ch. 2). Each student was

to devote two days each month to training with the nearest military element having a specialization approximating that of the unit

to which the student had been assigned. One month each year was

to be spent with the student's original military unit.

Members of all government and business enterprises as well as

artisans, professionals, and farmers, were also to train for two days

a month and one month a year. At some factories, the military

commitment was more onerous. When the work day finished at 2:00 P.M., employees were obliged to spend three to four hours

with their military units five days each week. Such periods of intensive training continued for six months or more at intervals of every

few years. To a considerable extent, the new law merely reinforced a program in existence for some years to mobilize the entire population

of physically fit students and working people into local militia units

centered on schools, communities, and work places. The number

of individuals organized into paramilitary units has been estimated

at 45,000 but may have increased with the application of the new

law. In 1987 the People's Militia was headed by Major Khuwayldi

264
Military and People's Militia units on parade in Tripoli

265
Libya: A Country Study

al Hamidi, one of the original members of the RCC. The militia

units reportedly were generously equipped with arms, transport,

and uniforms. In November 1985, it was announced that the first contingent of "armed people" trained as paratroopers had made

a demonstration drop.

In early 1986, Western reporters were shown military training

at a high school in Tripoli at which a minimum of two out of thirty- six class hours a week were devoted to military studies. In addition, one of three summer months was spent at a military camp.

Graduates either entered the army directly or went on to college.

Those entering college had to continue reserve training at their

former high schools. The weekly lessons included hand-grenade

throwing, signals and codes, and machine-gun maintenance. High

schools concentrated on designated specialties, which in the case of the institution visited was the operation of the Soviet truckmounted Katyusha rocket launcher.

The mission of the People's Militia was territorial defense, and

it was to function under the leadership of local military commanders.

Qadhafi contended that it was the People's Militia that met the

Egyptian incursions during the border clash of 1977, although the

Egyptians insisted that their successful raids had been contested

by regular army units. The militia forces are not known to have

faced any other test that would permit an appraisal of their perfor- mance in home defense or as auxiliaries to the regular army. There was some evidence that local commanders had not responded energetically to their responsibility for training and supervising militia

units.

Women in the Armed Forces

Qadhafi has persistently sought to usher in a policy of direct participation by women in national defense. His efforts, which have

been resisted by conservative elements of Libyan society and apparently by most young women as well, derived from his argument

that women of the Arab world live in a subjugated state and must

be liberated from oppression and feudalism. Qadhafi viewed practices governing a woman's role in society and her legal rights as disrespectful, reactionary, and contrary to the Quran (see The

Traditional View of Men and Women, ch. 2). Speaking at a rally in Tripoli in 1978, Qadhafi said that the goal

of a totally armed people would be fully realized "when all Libyans—men and women—have been trained in an organized,

modern fashion. " Addressing in the same speech the political and

religious problems that a full-fledged military role for women

presented in Islamic Libya, Qadhafi declared that this "is not

against religion, not against marriage, not against ethics."

266
Women have played a significant role in Qadhafi's military build-up

Shortly thereafter, it was announced that women were to be conscripted along with men, but this plan apparently was not fully

implemented. A women's army college opened in Tripoli in 1979,

training volunteers aged thirteen to seventeen in basic military subjects and the use of various weapons. A total of 7,000 students had

passed through the academy by 1983. Some female pilots and naval

recruits had reportedly also been enlisted. Nevertheless, the notion

of women as soldiers remained unpopular. Some observers believed

that many of the students had been coerced into entering the academy. The institution was closed in November 1983, reportedly after students ripped down fences to escape and return to their homes.

Nonetheless, the new legislation introduced in February 1984

covering universal military service specifically included women.

When the GPC took the almost unprecedented step of rejecting

the proposal, Qadhafi saw this as evidence of lingering reactionary attitudes in a society that had not wholeheartedly accepted the

Revolution. "Spontaneous demonstrations" of young women

demanding the right to engage in military service were organized.

In a speech on March 12, 1984, Qadhafi announced that popular

demand made it necessary to introduce compulsory military ser- vice for all in spite of the GPC's action. After the Libyan retreat from Chad in March 1987, there were indications that women had

served there in administrative positions.

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Libya: A Country Study

The women's military academy was not reopened, however, and no immediate steps were taken to institute full-time military ser- vice for women. Training was apparently to remain an adjunct

to high school and university studies. Even so, there was evidence

that the program was not being resolutely enforced. As late as April

1986, the Libyan press mentioned complaints over the delays and

haphazard nature of the training programs at the Zlitan Women

Teachers' Institute, apparently owing to the indifference of local military authorities.

Other Paramilitary Forces

In about 1980, Qadhafi introduced the Islamic Pan-African

Legion, a body of mercenaries recruited primarily among dissi- dents from Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Mali, and Chad. West African

states with Muslim populations have also been the source of some

personnel. Believed to consist of about 7,000 individuals, the force

has received training from experienced Palestinian and Syrian

instructors. Some of those recruited to the legion were said to have

been forcibly impressed from among nationals of neighboring countries who migrated to Libya in search of work.

According to The Military Balance, published by the International

Institute for Strategic Studies, the force was organized into one

armored, one infantry, and one paratroop/commando brigade. It has been supplied with T-54 and T-55 tanks, armored personnel

carriers, and EE-9 armored cars. The Islamic Pan-African Legion was reported to have been committed during the fighting in Chad

in 1980 and was praised by Qadhafi for its success there. However,

it was believed that many of the troops who fled the Chadian attacks

of March 1987 were members of the Islamic Pan-African Legion.

In an effort to realize Qadhafi 's vision of a united Arab military

force, plans for the creation of an Arab legion have been announced

from time to time. The goal, according to the Libyan press, would

be to assemble an army of 1 million men and women fighters to prepare for the great Arab battle—"the battle of liberating Palestine, of toppling the reactionary regimes, of annihilating the borders,

gates, and barriers between the countries of the Arab homeland,

and of creating the single Arab Jamahiriya from the ocean to the

gulf." In March 1985, it was announced that the National Command of the Revolutionary Forces Command in the Arab Nation

had been formed with Qadhafi at its head. A number of smaller

radical Arab groups from Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, Iraq, the Persian Gulf states, and Jordan were represented at the inaugural meeting. Syrian Baath Party and radical Palestinian factions were also present. Each of these movements was expected to earmark 10

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National Security

percent of its forces for service under the new command. As of April

1987, there was no information confirming the existence of such

a militia. Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia of the Armed Forces

When the army and navy were formed, the uniforms adopted

by each service reflected British military and naval tradition. Modifications have occurred over the intervening years, however, and

in early 1987 Libyan uniforms were similar to those worn by military personnel of a number of Middle Eastern Arab countries.

The standard field uniform for Libyan paratroopers (Army com- mandos) is a two-piece camouflage uniform made of water-repellent

cotton. The shirt is similar in design to the United States Army

fatigue shirt. The shirt and trousers are camouflaged in blue-green,

light green, and dark brown. The standard headgear for paratroopers

is a sky-blue beret. The uniforms of the air force, however, continued to resemble in both style and color the uniforms of the United

States Air Force, which served as a model when the Libyan air arm was established.

Originally the rank structure of all three services was similar to that of the British armed forces, but some modifications were introduced in light of the small size of the Libyan military establishment. In early 1979, the system prescribed by law still included

nine officer grades and five enlisted ranks; there were no warrant

officer equivalents (see figs. 15 and 16). Although three general

officer grades continued to be authorized, they have been

used rarely since 1 969 . Promoted to the grade of colonel (aqid) after assuming power, Qadhafi has maintained a ceiling on the grade

level of his officers corps in keeping with his desire to avoid the ostentatious public image the generals of the monarchy

had conveyed. In January 1976, the Arab Socialist Union's National

Congress attempted to promote Qadhafi to major general. The

Libyan leader stated that he would accept the honor as an expression of gratitude from his compatriots but would retain the title of colonel because it had become an accepted and traditional part

of his name.

Defense Costs

The pattern of defense spending has been difficult to appraise

with any exactitude since the mid-1970s, when government restric- tions on the publication of military information were imposed.

Detailed budgets, once available, have not been disclosed since the

mid-1970s. Total amounts allocated to defense in the national budget were available, but apportionments to individual service

269
Libya: A Country Study

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National Security

27
Libya: A Country Study

components or specific programs were impossible to ascertain.

Moreover, the figures published for the defense budget clearly fell far short of actual expenditures. In all likelihood, many military

outlays were hidden under other budget items or obscured by

manipulation of prices or exchange rates. The value of imported

military equipment alone has generally been far in excess of the

allocations to defense as recorded in the budget. The massive purchases from the Soviet Union, estimated at over US$1 billion annually since the mid-1970s, do not appear in the budget either as payments or amortization of military credit. Increased spending for military improvements and other defense

needs was made possible by the vast revenues from petroleum

particularly after the government nationalized the industry. Even

during the monarchy, a doubling of military expenditures between

1964 and 1968 demonstrated that this new source of revenue

permitted an upgrading of the military that was previously unattainable. Nonetheless, defense expenditures under the monarchy

continued to be relatively modest. As one specialist wrote just before

the 1969 coup, "thus far Libya has avoided succumbing to the lure

of the arms race or procurement of nonessential prestige military

forces.

'

Within a few years after the assumption of power by the Qadhafi

regime, defense spending accelerated dramatically. It continued

to rise nearly every year, although at a somewhat reduced rate after 1978. Arms imports ordinarily formed more than half of total defense expenditures. However, some slackening in the value of

imported equipment has occurred since 1982. This is attributed

in part to the saturation of the Libyan defense forces and in part

to financial strains on the government arising from the sharp decline

in oil prices.

The limited official data published by Libya offer a completely

different picture from the estimates compiled by non-Libyan

sources. In the administrative budget for 1984, the amount shown

for the armed forces is LD340 million (for value of the Libyan dinar,

see Glossary), which constituted 23.6 percent of the budget. This

represented a substantial increase over the LD300 million shown

for 1983, composing 19.7 percent of the administrative budget.

Defense expenditures were omitted from the budget published for 1985, and no explanation was supplied of the component items in

the ostensible disbursements for defense in 1983 or 1984.

According to estimates compiled by ACDA, Libyan military

expenditures rose eightfold between 1973 and 1979, when a peak

of US$3 billion annually was reached. Spending then remained

fairly level until a new upswing in spending began by 1983. By

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National Security

1984, annual outlays on defense were estimated at US$5.1 billion. The 1979 figure represented 12.4 percent of gross national product

(GNP), whereas the 1984 figure represented 17.8 percent of GNP

and an exceptionally high 40 percent of total government expenditures. On the basis of the ACDA estimate, military spending

would have amounted to US$1,360 per capita in 1984. This compared to a figure of US$34 per capita for Africa as a whole and

was about twice the level of average per capita spending on defense

of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Only

Israel, Saudi Arabia, and several smaller states of the Arabian

Peninsula had military outlays on a scale comparable to those of

Libya.

Foreign Military Assistance

Because of a relatively low level of technical and industrial

development—apart from the petroleum sector—since independence Libya has been forced to rely on foreign sources of assistance

in its efforts to establish a credible military posture. During the

eighteen years of the monarchy, the Idris government turned to the West for help in forging a national military system. In the

process, the government entered into a number of treaties and other

agreements of a military nature, particularly with Britain and the

United States. One of the most important of these agreements was

the Treaty of Friendship concluded in 1953 by Britain and Libya

that included reciprocal pledges of assistance in case of an armed

conflict. The treaty, which was to have remained in force for twenty

years, granted the British continued rights to the use of military

bases along the Mediterranean coast in exchange for extensive mili- tary supplies and training assistance.

Similar arrangements concluded with the United States a year

later granted the use of Wheelus Air Base in exchange for military

assistance grants and the purchase of excess stocks of American

weapons. United States military aid was devoted mainly to the orga- nization and development of the Libyan air force. Many of the

personnel recruited to that new branch received American training, and most of the aircraft acquired during its early years were

provided by the United States. Since the mid-1970s, arms deliveries to Libya have originated

predominantly in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. According to ACDA, these sources accounted for 60 percent

of total military imports between 1981 and 1985. Such sources

included the Soviet Union (US$4.6 billion), Czechoslovakia (US$875

million), People's Republic of China (US$320 million), and Poland

(US$300 million). Major Western sources were France (mostly

273
Libya: A Country Study

naval craft previously ordered) at US$725 million and Italy, which

provided supplies amounting to US$850 million. The Federal

Republic of Germany (West Germany) was the only other significant West European source, furnishing US$180 million worth of

equipment. Such other suppliers as Brazil and Yugoslavia accounted

for a further US$2.6 billion. The Quest for New Sources of Arms

After the young officers led by Qadhafi deposed the Idris regime,

it was almost inevitable that their government would look for new

sources of military equipment. One of the many causes of the coup was the monarchy's unwillingness to involve Libya militarily in

the Arab-Israeli conflict. To have continued to rely solely on Britain and the United States for arms would have invited domestic

and Arab criticism inasmuch as both countries were regarded as

hostile to the interests of the Arab world because of their support

for Israel. The Libyans therefore cancelled the treaty with Britain

and, in March 1970, the British evacuated their bases near Tobruk

and Benghazi. United States operational and maintenance support

of the Libyan air force ended the following June when American

personnel evacuated Wheelus Air Base. Overall American military assistance between 1958 and 1970 had amounted to US$17.4

million in grant aid and US$43.4 million in sales. In 1970 the Libyan government announced that it had contracted

for the purchase of French weapons systems, notably Mirage

fighters, valued at US$400 million. Using facilities that were for- merly part of Wheelus Air Base, French instructors engaged in the

training of Libyan pilots and ground crews to operate and maintain the Mirages. The choice of France as an alternative arms supplier was a logical one for Libya. Not only was France increasingly

dependent upon Libyan oil supplies, but its policy toward the ArabIsraeli dispute was acceptable to Qadhafi.

Failing in its efforts to acquire medium tanks from either France

or Britain, Qadhafi turned to the Soviet Union. Moscow had

quickly recognized the new Libyan regime and responded with

equal speed to the request for weapons. In July 1970, the first Soviet

military vehicles, including 30 medium tanks and 100 armored per- sonnel carriers, arrived in Libya.

Apart from France, however, during the early 1970s neighboring Egypt had the greatest influence on Qadhafi 's drive to upgrade

his defense forces. Egypt had supported the coup by positioning

Egyptian units at strategic points throughout Libya to help pre- vent any attempt by royalist forces to stage a countercoup. By 1972 an estimated 2,000 Egyptian soldiers were serving in the country

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as instructors. Training was also provided for both officers and

enlisted personnel at installations in Egypt. After the military academy at Benghazi closed, a number of Libyans were trained at the

Egyptian military academy.

The October 1973 War, which drew sharp criticism from Qadhafi

over the Egyptian military effort and the willingness of President

Anwar Sadat to accept a disengagement agreement with Israel,

produced a rift between the two North African neighbors. Egypt

withdrew from Libya all Egyptian pilots and two vessels it had lent the Libyan navy. Cooperation in air defense was also terminated

as Egypt withdrew surface-to-air missiles it had provided earlier

and halted work on the air defenses it had been developing to protect Tripoli, Benghazi, and Tobruk.

Libya then turned to Pakistan for help. A small Pakistani advisory contingent that had been giving training on helicopters and

transport aircraft was expanded to about 600—including 40 pilots.

Small numbers of Italian, French, and Yugoslav instructors were

also introduced for training.

Military Cooperation with the Soviet Union

Because of Libya's forcing the evacuation from Libya of British

and United States military personnel in 1970, the Libyans were

rebuffed in a renewed effort to obtain military equipment from the

West, except for limited British help with the developing navy.

Therefore, Libya turned elsewhere for aid. In December 1974,

Libya disclosed a large-scale arms purchase agreement with the

Soviet Union, involving Tu-22 bombers, MiG-23 fighters, helicopters, T-62 tanks, and antitank and antiaircraft missiles. A second

agreement in May 1975 heralded an even greater flow of Soviet arms and military advisers to Libya throughout the 1970s. Included

in the agreement were submarines, of which a total of six were eventually transferred. Subsequent agreements followed in 1977, 1978,

and 1980. The value of these transactions was estimated at over US$20 billion between 1973 and 1985.

The new round of arms purchases in 1978, precipitated by the

clashes with Egypt in the preceding year, included the MiG-25 Foxbat in its fighter, reconnaissance, and training configurations. This

sale to Libya was the first recorded time the Soviet Union furnished

the MiG-25 to any country not participating in the Warsaw Pact. Deliveries of sophisticated military hardware were accompanied

by Soviet and East European technicians estimated by the United

States Department of State to have numbered 2,600 in 1984. In

late 1985, these technicians were augmented by a considerable number of specialists to install and help operate the new

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Libya: A Country Study

SA-5 missiles. Approximately 7,600 Libyan military personnel had

received training in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe by 1984.

Deliveries of modern Soviet armaments continued during the

early 1980s, although they tapered off markedly between 1983

(US$2.9 billion) and 1985 (US$1 .3 billion), according to estimates

compiled by ACDA. Libya was the first non-Warsaw Pact recipient

of Haze antisubmarine helicopters. Natya-class minesweepers and

Nanuchka-class fast-missile corvettes helped expand the navy. The

three batteries of SA-5 missile launchers, including early warning

and surveillance radar, delivered toward the close of 1985 failed

in their purpose of deterring maneuvers by United States naval

elements in the Gulf of Sidra. Nonetheless, when Jallud visited

Moscow several months later, it was officially announced that the

Soviets had agreed to a new request for aid. Included were an improved version of the SA-5, new monitoring and early warning

radar, antijamming devices, Mi-24 helicopters, and additional gunboats and fighter planes. By early 1987, major arms shipments

reportedly had been cut off, either because of Qadhafi's failure to make promised oil deliveries or because of Soviet disillusionment over Libyan performance against United States planes and the

abandonment of vast amounts of modern equipment in Chad.

The massive Libyan purchases brought the Soviet Union eco- nomic gains and enabled the Soviets to extend their strategic influ- ence farther into the Mediterranean while appearing to reward the

anti-imperialist and Arab unity stance of the Libyan regime.

Nevertheless, Qadhafi's increasingly undependable behavior, his

estrangement from other Arab and African nations, and his set- backs in employing modern Soviet weaponry apparently made the

Soviets skeptical of Qadhafi and reluctant to be closely identified

with him. Although in 1984 the two countries issued a joint declaration in principle to enter into a treaty of friendship and cooperation and confirmed their intention in 1986, such an agreement,

which would obligate the Soviet Union to come to Qadhafi's aid

if attacked, had not been concluded by early 1987.

As of early 1987, Qadhafi had refrained from granting the Soviets

permanent shore facilities or air bases on Libyan territory. However, Soviet combatant ships had paid frequent port calls, and anti- submarine planes of the Soviet naval aviation branch had

occasionally been rotated to Libyan airfields. Western Restrictions on Arms Transactions

Libya's radicalism, its reckless ventures beyond its borders, and

its links to terrorists caused among Western countries a growing

reluctance to supply Libya with lethal equipment, a reluctance

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A Soviet-supplied Su-22 fighter of the Libyan Air Force

Courtesy United States Department of Defense

amounting to formal or de facto embargoes by most Western arms

manufacturers. A policy of refusing to ship arms to Libya was

reaffirmed in the Tokyo Declaration on International Terrorism

in May 1986, signed by the governments of Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the United States. Libya

has nonetheless continued to look to non-Soviet suppliers, turning

to such peripheral sources as Yugoslavia, Greece, and Brazil.

United States restrictions on military sales date from the mid1970s when the delivery of eight C-130 Lockheed cargo planes

ordered in 1972 was blocked out of fear that they would be used

for military ventures in Uganda. In 1978 spare parts were banned

for the C-130s Libya already had on hand, and an export license was refused for two Boeing 727s. Qadhafi angrily rejected accusations against Libya of supporting international terrorism, describing

the American attitude as "both puerile and unworthy of a great

power." He denied that Libya financed terrorism and asserted that

the aircraft carriers of the United States Sixth Fleet were engaged

in "terrorism" by their very presence in the Mediterranean. Having

initially rejected a permit for the export of 400 trucks manufactured by the Oshkosh Company, the United States government

relented after receiving written guarantees that the trucks would

be used solely for agricultural purposes. However, upon their deliv- ery in 1979, the trucks were converted to military transporters by

Canadian mechanics using Austrian equipment.

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Libya: A Country Study

After Libya canceled the treaties with Britain and the United

States, France became its main alternative arms supplier. Support

for the Mirage fighters by Dassault, a French manufacturer, consisted of both pilot and ground crew training in Libya and France

and periodic major overhauls of planes at the Dassault plant.

However, the strained relations between the two countries over Chad brought an end to this support. Reportedly, France held

discussions concerning the more advanced Mirage 2000 in return

for Libyan compliance with its 1983 withdrawal agreement from

Chad, but Libya's continued involvement there ruled out any

sale. The only major French arms transfer was the US$600 million sale of ten Combattante fast-attack craft with missiles, the last of which was delivered in 1984 under a contract negotiated six years

earlier. Libya was involved in a series of significant transactions with

Italy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978 the Italian aircraft

company Siai-Marchetti secured a contract to supply SF-260 light aircraft intended for training and reconnaissance. The G-222 mili- tary transport plane assembled by Aeritalia was also supplied to the Libyans. The Italian firm of Oto Melara received orders for a large number of Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzers. Over

a three-year period, a complete renovation of a British-built frigate was carried out in a Genoa shipyard. Four corvettes of the Assad

type were contracted for in 1974, but the last of these vessels was

not delivered until 1982. Both the frigate and the corvettes were

fitted with Otomat missiles.

An arms-supply relationship with Brazil began in 1977 with a Libyan order for several hundred armored cars at a cost of over US$100 million. A contract in 1981 for US$250 million covered

purchases of additional armored cars, rockets, bombs, and missile

launchers. Negotiations were interrupted after Brazil's 1983 sei- zure of four transiting Libyan aircraft loaded with weapons for

Nicaragua. Resumption of negotiations in 1986 was expected to lead to Brazilian sale of EMB-312 Tucano trainer aircraft,

EMB-121 Xingu transports, and additional Cascavel and Urutu

armored vehicles. In late 1985, Libya signed an agreement with Greece covering

the sale of US$500 million in equipment, including the Artemis-30

antiaircraft gun and the Steyr armored personnel carrier, manufactured in Greece under license from Austria. Yugoslavia was reported

to be supplying a number of Galeb jet trainer aircraft in addition

to those already in service, as well as Koncar-class missile boats

to be armed with Soviet-designed Styx missiles.

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The Search for Nuclear Technology

In 1975 Libya had ratified the United Nations (UN) Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by the Idris regime in 1969. In 1980 an agreement was reached with the International Atomic

Energy Agency placing all of Libya's nuclear installations under

international inspection. Despite these steps, in the mid- and late 1970s, Qadhafi repeatedly proclaimed his country's determination

to acquire nuclear weapons, primarily because he was convinced

that his archenemy, Israel, had achieved such a military capability.

Qadhafi sought help in obtaining nuclear technology from a number of countries, including the People's Republic of China. Among

these efforts, the cooperation with Pakistan launched in 1977 seemed

for a time to be producing material results. Libya appeared to be

providing financial assistance and, later, deliveries of uranium "yellow cake" originating in Niger in the hope of eventually being compensated by weapons from Pakistan. However, in an interview with an Indian newspaper in March 1986, Qadhafi declared that Libya

would never help Pakistan acquire an atomic bomb. He said: "We

consider nuclear weapons production a great mistake against

humanity."

A 10-megawatt nuclear research reactor supplied by the Soviet

Union in 1979 was installed at a research center at Tajura near

Tripoli staffed by 750 Libyan specialists and technicians. Many

students were sent abroad; a group of 200 was studying in the

United States until early 1983 when the United States proscribed

training Libyans in nuclear science. Libya planned to buy a power

station from the Soviet Union, but, dissatisfied with the technology involved, negotiated with the Belgian firm of Belgonucleaire

to take over the engineering contract and supply much of the needed

equipment. After the United States objected, fearing use of the

equipment in weapons development, Belgium decided in 1984 to refuse the US$1 billion contract. Shortly thereafter, Moscow's com- mitment to construct an 880-megawatt power station to be located

in the Surt region was reaffirmed. It was to cost over US$4 bil- lion, with repayment to stretch over 15 to 18 years. Libya had a theoretical capability of delivering nuclear weapons

in the form of Scud and FROG missiles and missiles delivered by

medium-range Tu-22 bombers. Suspicions that Libya was seeking to acquire a medium-range missile capability were aroused in

1980 when it was revealed that the West German firm, Orbital

Transport-und-Raketen Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG), had built a rocket-testing base in the Libyan desert. OTRAG, which had

earlier been forced to give up a testing site in Zaire, claimed that

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Libya: A Country Study

it was working on a nonmilitary rocket to enable Third World countries to launch satellites cheaply.

Arms Production and Military Cooperation

During the 1970s some efforts were launched toward greater self- reliance in military materiel, but little has resulted from these ini- tiatives. Although Libya has supplied weapons and equipment to other governments in direct pursuit of its foreign policy, these

weapons have been from Soviet-supplied stocks in the vast Libyan

inventory. In 1978 Yugoslavia agreed to build a large plant in Libya

to manufacture ammunition and spare parts for Soviet weapons.

In early 1987, the extent to which this commitment was implemented was unknown, but even repair and maintenance workshops

have remained wholly inadequate to service the Soviet- supplied

equipment and must be operated largely by foreign technicians.

A plan to assemble in Libya some of the SF-260 training planes

acquired from Italy did not materialize. Consequently, Libya's

manufacturing capacity remains limited to the production of basic

quartermaster items, uniforms, and some small arms and ammunition.

In addition to supplying arms to dissident and rebel forces in

several countries of Africa and other parts of the world, Libya

assisted friendly regimes with surplus equipment, but generally not on a consistent or long-term basis. In the two years after the Tripartite Agreement was signed with Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) in August 1981 , Libyan

aid to Ethiopia in the form of weapons and financial backing

amounted to half of all Libya's international aid. Libya and Syria

have somewhat parallel aims in the Middle East, and Libya has

financed much of Syria's arms acquired directly from the Soviet

Union. Among African nations, Benin and Ghana have been

recipients of weapons and materiel, in part in recognition for vot- ing with Libya in international forums and in part because Libya

has been permitted to use them as transit and recruitment points

for its activities in other countries of Africa. In late 1984, a five-year cooperation agreement was entered into

with Malta under which Libya was to provide a military training

team and helicopters and would consign some of its naval units

for maintenance in Maltese shipyards. A military agreement was

also concluded with Sudan in 1985 after the government ofJaafar an Numayri was overthrown by a group less hostile to Libya. Libya

pledged to supply a quantity of trucks, trailers, and spares for Soviet

equipment already in the Sudanese inventory. In return, the

Libyans reportedly were permitted to set up a base in the western

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region of Darfur where several hundred Libyan troops joined with

Chadian insurgents fighting to topple the Chadian government.

Although Sudan later claimed that it was severing these new ties with Libya, as of late 1986 Libya reportedly had not fully evacuated Sudanese territory. In spite of Libya's and Iran's differing goals and mutual suspicions, Libya supported the Iranian Revolution and, unlike other

Arab regimes (apart from Syria), backed Iran in its war against

Iraq. Qadhafi has provided the Tehran government with T-55

tanks, antitank and antiaircraft artillery, ammunition, and Scud

missiles.

International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent Groups

Since Qadhafi' s rise to power, Libya has chronically employed

terrorism and revolutionary groups as primary instruments for fulfilling its international ambitions. The main targets of terrorist activity have been Libyan dissidents living abroad and prominent

political figures of moderate Arab and African countries. Qadhafi

has openly declared that "the Revolution has destroyed those who

oppose it inside the country and now it must pursue the rest abroad." A concerted drive to assassinate anti-Qadhafi exiles

resulted in the murder of eleven Libyan dissidents in 1980 and 1981

A further five attacks were sponsored by Libya in 1985. Plots were

allegedly uncovered against President Habre of Chad in 1984 and

President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire in 1985. Earlier, there was

evidence that Libyan agents had targeted Arab moderates, including

Presidents Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak of Egypt, Jaafar an Numayri of Sudan, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, King Hussein

of Jordan, and King Hassan II of Morocco.

Qadhafi has endeavored to undermine moderate Arab governments judged not to be militant enough in their attitude toward

Israel or to be too closely tied to the West. Sudan under Numayri

was a priority target because it cooperated with the West and with

Egypt. Arms and funds were funneled to Sudanese rebels based

in Ethiopia in their guerrilla warfare against the central government. In early 1983, Libya was accused of having masterminded

a coup attempt that miscarried badly. The coup plan called for Libyan planes to bomb public buildings in the capital of Khartoum

while dissidents took over the center of the city. When the plan

became known and Egyptian and United States aircraft were

deployed at Numayri's request, Qadhafi called a halt to the operation. However, in 1984, a plane believed to be Libyan attempted

to destroy a radio station at Umm Durman, Sudan, that was broadcasting condemnations of Qadhafi 's policies.

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Libya: A Country Study

Since late 1980, Qadhafi has aided the Somali National Salvation Front, an insurgent group operating out of Ethiopia. He has

kindled unrest in North Africa in the case of Algeria by providing

money and a base to dissidents, such as former president Ahmed

Ben Bella, and in Tunisia by recruiting dissidents from the large

numbers of Tunisian workers in Libya to conduct raids and

sabotage.

In addition to repeated interventions in Chad in his efforts to impose a leadership that would be amenable to Libyan influence,

Qadhafi has been accused of providing arms and training to Tuareg

tribesmen at a camp at Sabha. His goal has been to stir up the

Tuareg into demanding a union carved out of existing Sahelian

states, a union that would be under Libyan influence.

Libya has contributed to Niger's fears by its annexation of a strip

of territory on Niger's northern border and its backing of a coup

attempt against the president of Niger in 1976. Relations with other

African countries—including Senegal, Gambia, Togo, Burkina

Faso, and Zaire—have been embittered by Qadhafi 's plotting and

support for radical dissidents.

Beginning in the 1980s, Qadhafi extended his activities into Latin

America and Asia. Arms and money allegedly have been made

available to insurgents in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as

to the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia. In South Asia, Libya

has been involved with opponents of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi

governments and in Southeast Asia has provided help to Muslim

minorities, notably the Moro separatists on Mindanao in the

Philippines.

In the Middle East, Qadhafi has been motivated by the aim of

destroying Israel and of punishing those Arab elements willing to compromise in the interest of regional peace. The smaller, more

radical factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have

received training and arms from Libya as well as financing for their

activities. According to the United States Department of State,

Libya's contribution in 1981 alone amounted to nearly US$100

million. In 1985 attention was focused on Qadhafi 's links with the

Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal Organization, more formally known

as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, and with the Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. The Abu Nidal

Organization was believed responsible for the shooting of the Israeli ambassador in London, the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner, and

attacks on the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports. The Department of State charged

that millions of dollars in Libyan funds had gone to the Abu Nidal

Organization, that its top figures were resident in Libya, and that

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Libya: A Country Study

Libya had provided training and travel documents to its teams

mounting terrorist attacks. Although other Middle Eastern states such as Syria and Iran remained involved in terrorism, the Department of State maintained that Libya had become the most active,

especially against American and European travelers. The affinity of Qadhafi for the Abu Nidal Organization and other

radical Palestinian factions is explained by the bitter enmity they

share for the main Arafat wing of the PLO, and by their rejection

of any form of negotiations with Israel. Terrorist attacks of the kind

they have successfully launched serve Qadhafi 's purpose by fur- ther elevating tensions in the Middle East and blighting the

prospects of peace initiatives. Public Order and Internal Security

The Police System

Throughout its pre-Revolutionary history, the mission and operating concepts underlying the Libyan police system were the same

as those in many other Muslim societies. The traditional concept

of police or shurtah was a broad one. Because the shurtah were used

from time to time by the government in power to undertake new

conquests, security force commanders often had full-sized armies

at their disposal. Domestically, however, the shurtah were primarily

responsible for suppressing dissidence and insurrections as well as performing other internal security duties. The latter duties typically embraced the kinds of administrative and judicial functions

often required of urban and rural police, such as the prevention

of crime, investigation and arrest of criminals, and maintenance

of public order. Some of these concepts have survived in presentday Libya; others have been altered in response to the changing

needs of the society.

Shortly after the 1969 coup, military officers were temporarily

integrated into key police positions to guard against a countercoup.

A complete reorganization of the police followed over the next three

years. An early step in the process of stripping the police of paramilitary status was the consolidation of the regional police forces into a unified organization under the Ministry of Interior. In 1971 new

separate agencies to handle civil defense and fire protection were

provided for by law. Ministerial decrees established other units,

such as the Central Traffic Department, the Central Department

for Criminal Investigation, the Arab International Criminal Police

Bureau, the Ports Security Department, the Identity Investigation,

and the Police Training Department. A special police law promulgated by the RCC in January 1972 spelled out the new functions

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of the police force, which was formally redesignated the Police at the Service of the People and the Revolution. The police were

specifically charged with responsibility for "the administration

of prisons, civil defense activities, passport and nationality affairs,

identity card affairs, and other functions set forth by laws and

regulations."

Individual police units were under the jurisdiction of regional

security directorates throughout the country, with primary responsibility for enforcing the laws and administering the police falling

under the minister of interior and his deputy. A special Police Affairs

Council—composed of the deputy minister as chairman, the directors of the central police department, the regional chiefs, and a legal

adviser—was empowered to coordinate activities of various police

branches and to issue decrees on police matters.

Police ranks followed closely those of the armed forces. An officer candidate had to be a Libyan citizen at least twenty years of age, of good conduct and behavior, in good physical condition, and not

married to a foreigner. He also had to be a graduate of the police

academy. Police work was considered a prestigious occupation, and

its attractive working conditions and benefits reportedly produced

well-qualified applicants who underwent stiff competition for vacancies. However, standards may have deteriorated as more lucrative opportunities in the oil industry and in government became

available for those with sufficient education. In a counterpart to the media attacks on the professional military in 1983, the official Libyan press targeted the police as lacking revolutionary zeal. The press demanded greater direct

responsibility for the masses in protecting the people's security.

Articles recalled that the police were descended from the mobile

forces of the Idris regime, headed by "fascist, bourgeois officers"

who had suppressed all manifestations of discontent with the royalist

system. Police officials were accused of engaging in licentious behavior, of drinking liquor, and of carrying on illegal businesses. They

were charged with being "feudalistic" in their behavior, of being

ill educated because many lacked a high-school diploma, and often

unfit for duty because of advancing age. Declaring that "security is the responsibility of the people as a whole in the same way as the defense of the homeland is," Qadhafi

announced in 1985 that the police would henceforward be known

as the People's Security Force. Whether this name change accomplished much seemed doubtful; the official press complained that

all that had happened was that signs over the police stations now

read "People's Security Station."

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Libya: A Country Study

Incidence of Crime

The Qadhafi regime has regarded crime as an anomaly in conflict with its revolutionary goals inasmuch as all Libyans are expected to contribute to the common good of society and its social,

political, and economic advancement. During an earlier phase of

his rule, Qadhafi deplored a pattern of increasingly unlawful behavior that included an unacceptable incidence of theft, violence, and

traffic accidents. He had hoped to follow the British model of police

officers enforcing public order with "a notebook, a pencil or a map

to guide people, but not a gun or a stick." Instead, he lamented,

he was obliged to depend on an armed police force because "the

Third World will need another 500 years to understand that a policeman, even unarmed, must be respected."

Because meaningful data had not been available for many years, no up-to-date assessment of the extent and nature of criminal activity could be made in 1987. When last reported, statistics showed

a high incidence of property theft and relatively fewer violent crimes,

such as rape, manslaughter, and murder. A significant number

of convictions were under the category of "crimes against freedom,

honor, and the public," which could range from public drunkenness to student demonstrations and more serious political offenses. To judge from reports in the official press in the mid-1980s, the

nation's economic strains were reflected in a growing number of

cases of smuggling, illegal deposit of money abroad, bribery, and

misappropriation of funds by public officials. Corruption in government has been an abiding concern. In 1975

a tough new law made the acceptance of a bribe by a public offi- cial punishable by up to ten years in prison plus fines set at twice

the amount of the bribe. A person proffering a bribe could receive

up to five years in prison plus fines of up to LD500. According

to press reports, verdicts handed down by people's courts involved

relatively moderate jail sentences of one to two years but harsh fines of LD50,000 and more. An official found guilty of paying unearned

overtime salaries to relatives and friends, however, was condemned

to a ten-year prison term.

Criminal Justice System

The Libyan system of criminal justice has been heavily influenced

by Islamic law, particularly since Qadhafi's proclamation of the

Popular Revolution on April 15, 1973. On that date, the Libyan

leader announced that all existing laws formulated by the monarchy were to be replaced by the sharia, the sacred law of Islam. Some

amendments to bring the criminal code into conformity with Islam

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had been made before this proclamation. In October 1972, the

government enacted a law providing for the amputation of the right

hands of convicted thieves. (As a modern note to this traditional

Islamic punishment, the government gave assurances that amputation would be performed at a hospital under sanitary conditions

with an anesthetic.) In practice, this penalty has not been com- monly imposed.

Qadhafi's proclamation involved a reorientation of Libya's entire

criminal code, because, according to the 1954 code, no act was a crime unless defined as such by law. Yet the code also specified

that nothing in the criminal code affected the individual rights

provided for in Islamic sharia. The two provisions were basically

incompatible because the 1954 code identified crimes in decreasing order of seriousness as felonies, misdemeanors, and contraventions, assigning maximum sentences to each, whereas under the

sharia an act could be—depending upon the circumstances

mandatory, commendable, permissible, reprehensible, or forbidden.

Efforts to align the criminal code's three categories of offense

with the five classifications embodied in the sharia involved Libyan

legal and religious scholars in an extensive and slow-moving process

to minimize the obvious contradictions in the two systems. Changes

in the code's provisions were announced from time to time, but

the basic philosophical issues had not been completely resolved by

1973.

Amendments to the criminal code after 1973 addressed both

moral issues related to Islamic beliefs and purely secular matters,

notably those concerning state security. In official legal announce- ments in 1973 and 1974, lashings and imprisonment of adulterers,

imprisonment of homosexuals for up to five years, and floggings

for those transgressing the fast of Ramadan were issued as laws

"in line with positive Islamic legislation." Another law provided

forty lashes for any Muslim who drank or served alcoholic beverages. For alcoholic-related offenses, non-Muslims could receive fines or imprisonment, and fines and jail terms were set for possession

of or trafficking in liquor.

In August 1975, following a major coup attempt, the criminal

code was further revised to strengthen state security. Such actions

as "scheming" with foreigners to harm Libya's military or politi- cal position, facilitating war against the state, revealing state or defense secrets, infiltration into military reservations, and posses- sion of means of espionage were made subject to harsh penalties,

including life imprisonment and hanging. Punishments for public

servants were stiffer than for ordinary citizens.

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Libya: A Country Study

An increasing number of acts have brought the threat of execution. A 1975 law provided that membership in a political party

opposing the principles of the 1969 Revolution could result in death. In 1977 economic crimes, such as damaging oil installations or stockpiles of basic commodities, were added. Qadhafi's repeated calls for abolition of the death sentence have not been translated into

legislative action.

The Libyan criminal justice system under the Qadhafi-led

government has been characterized by many repressive features.

Victims reported torture and beatings during interrogation as a matter of practice, and long jail sentences for political nonconformity. Other irregularities included bypassing the regular court sys- tem by special tribunals and holding show trials. The international

human rights organization, Amnesty International, has repeatedly

reported evidence of grave violations of civil rights and of Libyan

law. Most of Amnesty International's inquiries and appeals to Libya

to free political prisoners, to abandon torture to extract confessions,

and to commute death penalties have gone unanswered.

An account by Amnesty International in 1977 cited twenty-six

executions (the first death penalties that had been carried out in

twenty-three years), large numbers of Libyans who had been held

in detention for up to four years without court action, trials that were "anything but fair and impartial," and defendants who were

deprived of their basic legal rights under Libyan law. When it was

pointed out to Libyan authorities that they were failing to conform

to UN agreements Libya had ratified—the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights—the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs replied that there were currently no political prisoners in Libyan prisons and that

all means of defense and safeguards of justice were provided for

accused persons. In 1978 Amnesty International asserted that the

people's court system violated the UN agreements because the courts were composed largely of government representatives rather

than members of an impartial judiciary. Moreover, all trials in people's courts were held in secret and no appeals were permitted.

A further report by Amnesty International described a new series of breaches of judicial norms between 1982 and 1984. It cited

the trial in 1982 of twenty-five individuals on charges of membership in an illegal organization (the Baath—Arab Socialist

Resurrection—Party). The accused were acquitted because their

confessions were obtained through torture. In violation of Libyan

law, they were retried in 1983 before a revolutionary court headed

by a captain in the special security branch and received severe sentences, including death penalties in three cases. In 1984, eight people

288
National Security

were hanged publicly following decisions of basic people's congresses

in their localities that they were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an international Islamic movement banned by Qadhafi as an illegal political party. In the same year, two students were hanged

before thousands of their fellow students at Al Fatah University

in Tripoli. No explanation was given of the charges or of the judicial proceedings, although the students were possibly tried before

the student revolutionary committee. Amnesty International has

been unsuccessful in gaining its representatives admission to trials and has not received replies to most of its inquiries and appeals.

The penal system was a responsibility of the Secretariat of Interior

and was administered by a department of the police administration. Three institutions—the Central Prison at Tripoli, Kuwayfiyah Prison at Benghazi, and Jdeida Prison outside Tripoli—were known to exist, and smaller facilities in less populated centers were assumed to be part of the system. Qadhafi granted permission for

visits by Amnesty International to several prisons in the late 1970s,

but the necessary arrangements were never made by Libyan

authorities. Subsequent efforts to inspect living conditions of political prisoners have been unsuccessful.

According to a report submitted by Libya to the UN, the pri- son system was reorganized under Law No. 47 in 1975. According to the report, the thrust of this law was to change the prisons

from institutions of "punishment and terror" to ones where inmates were afforded education and training as part of a program to rehabilitate offenders. The law envisaged a series of increasingly less restrictive penal facilities in which inmates could earn moves upward through a hierarchy of prisons by good behavior and an appropriate attitude. As of 1987 the extent to which these objectives

had been realized had not been made public.

State of Internal Security

In the late 1980s, many segments of Libyan society deeply re- sented the authoritarian nature of the Libyan government under

Qadhafi. The extent of silent opposition could not be assessed with

certainty but has been estimated at more than 50 percent by outside observers. Dissent was hard to measure because all news media

were strictly controlled to serve as instruments of the state, and

no forms of association were permitted without the endorsement

of the regime. Citizens were fearful of voicing discontent or utter- ing critical opinions that might be reported by a widespread in- former network. Punishment for open dissent was arbitrary and

could be extraordinarily severe.

289
Libya: A Country Study

Internal security mechanisms reaching into every corner of Libyan society, and fears of harsh retribution have successfully prevented antipathy to Qadhafi's actions from reaching a stage of public

demonstrations or open questioning. As many as 50,000 Libyans

mostly from the more prosperous classes—have taken up residence

abroad, but the opposition groups that have sprung up among the

exiles have not presented a convincing threat to the regime (see

The Opposition to Qadhafi, ch. 4). Numerous attempts have been launched to overturn Qadhafi's

rule. In most instances, these attempts have originated among mili- tary officers who have access to weapons and the necessary communications and organizational networks. In no case, however,

did they appear to come near to achieving their goal. The effec- tiveness of the internal security apparatus and the infiltration of

officers loyal to Qadhafi have frustrated most plots before they could

develop sufficiently to have a chance of success. Among the reported coup attempts, possibly the most widespread was uncovered among disaffected officers of the RCC in 1975. A

large number of personnel were tried in secret by a military court,

with many sentenced to death and hundreds condemned to long

prison terms. An undisclosed number of officers and civilians were

arrested in an abortive coup in January 1983; five officers were

executed, including the deputy commander of the People's Militia.

A coup attempt, reportedly involving bloody fighting in front of

the fortified barracks where Qadhafl resides in a Tripoli suburb,

occurred in May 1984. According to the United States Department

of State, over 5,000 were arrested, many tortured, and perhaps more than 100 executed. A leading opposition group, the National

Front for the Salvation of Libya, took credit for this failed operation, although Qadhafl blamed the Muslim Brotherhood.

Another reported plot in March 1985 was said to have been foiled when it was infiltrated by persons loyal to Qadhafi. Some sixty mili- tary officers, disgruntled over the country's economic mismanagement and extravagance, were said to have been arrested.

A further instance of disaffection occurred in November 1985.

Colonel Hassan Ishkal, a senior officer and military governor of

Surt, was reportedly summarily executed after being summoned

to Qadhafi's headquarters. It was believed that he had broken with

Qadhafi over the interference of revolutionary guards in the military and over Qadhafi's adventurist foreign policies.

Because of these coup attempts, protective security surrounding Qadhafi was carried to unusual lengths. His travel plans were

concealed and changed abruptly, his patterns of residence were dis- guised, and he moved about in a heavily armored convoy. His

290
National Security

personal bodyguard was composed of a Presidential Guard, drawn

from his own tribal group. Moreover, there were reports that

Qadhafi constantly moved senior military officers from one com- mand to another so that no officer could develop a unified com- mand capable of threatening the regime.

The major instrument used by Qadhafi to detect and avert coup

attempts was an extensive internal security apparatus. As of early

1987, details of the salient features of the security organization were

generally lacking. The system installed in the early 1970s with Egyptian help was modeled on its Egyptian counterpart and was once

described as "composed of several overlapping but autonomously

directed intelligence machines." As it further evolved, internal security functioned on several levels, beginning with Qadhafi 's per- sonal bodyguard unit (reportedly given technical assistance by East German advisers). The secret service and, at a lower level, the police were constantly on the alert for suspicious conduct, as were the

revolutionary committees and the basic people's congresses. The

committees constituted an effective informer network and may also act independently of other security agencies when authorized and

encouraged by Qadhafi. This multilayered complex assured tight

control over the activity of individuals in virtually every community.

* * * Although published data on the Libyan armed forces is limited

and often contradictory, some details can be found in the article on Libya by Gwynne Dyer in the compendium World Armies. Additionally, assessments of Libyan military capabilities in relation to other armies of the Middle East are available in The Middle East

Military Balance (ed. Mark Heller). A number of aspects of the role of military power in Qadhafi 's regime are treated in Richard B. Parker's North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns. Reports

by the United States Department of State, The Libyan Problem (1983)

and Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression (1986) summarize

much of what is known of Libya's attempts to subvert other governments, to assassinate its opponents in exile, and to support international terrorism. Libyan relations with the Soviet Union are analyzed in Lisa Anderson's "Qadhafi and the Kremlin." Events

in Chad and other developments involving the Libyan military are reviewed in the monthly Africa Research Bulletin and in Keesing's Contemporary Archives. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

291

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Educational Enrollment, Selected Academic Years, 1975-86

3 Number of Teachers, Selected Academic Years, 1975-86

4 Economically Active Population by Sector of Employment,

1984

5 Allocations of Development Plans, 1976-80 and 1981-85

6 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1978-84

7 Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities, 1981-84

8 Balance of Payments

9 Direction of Trade, 1978-84

10 Major Army Equipment, 1986

11 Major Navy Equipment, 1986

12 Major Air Force Equipment, 1986

293

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2

) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

295
Libya: A Country Study

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296
Appendix

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297
Libya: A Country Study

Table 4. Economically Active Population by Sector of Employment, 1984

Number

Sector Employed Percentage 197,000 21.2

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 171,500 18.5

, , 80,000 8.6 69,000 7.4

fiR 000 7.3 60,000 6.5 Public utilities 22,500 2.4 19,000 2.0 Other 1 240,000 25.9 Total 927,000 100.0 2 Total (Libyans) 664,000 71.6 263,000 28.4

1 Includes education and health.

2 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Libya, Annual Report, 1984. Tripoli,

n.d., 39.

Table 5. Allocations of Development Plans, 1976-80 and 1981-85

(value in millions of Libyan dinars) 1

1976-80 1981-85

Sector Value Percentage Value Percentage Agriculture 1,476 16.0 3,100 17.9 Industry (light and heavy) 1,205 13.0 4,008 23.1 Public works 2 1,131 12.2 3,305 19.1 Transportation and communications 930 10.0 2,204 12.7 Education 522 5.6 100 0.6 Health 276 3.0 621 3.6 Other 3,710 40.1 3,952 22.9 Total 9,250 100.0 3 17,290 100.0 3

1 For value of the Libyan dinar—see Glossary.

2 Figure for 1981-85 includes all allocations for utilities and electricity.

3 Percentages may not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Stace Birks and Clive Sinclair, "Libya: Problems of a Rentier State," in Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay, eds., North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development, New York, 1984, 243; and from Central Bank of Libya, Annual Report, 1984, Tripoli, n.d., 55, 60.

298
Appendix

Table 6. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1978-84

(in percentages)

Sector 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Agriculture 2 2 2 2 3 3 4

12 10 9 10 13 11 11

1 1 1 1 1 Oil and gas, mining 52 60 65 54 49 47 40

Public service and administration . . . 8 7 5 7 9 10 12 Transportation and communications . 5 4 3 4 5 5 5 Other, including manufacturing .... 18 15 13 20 17 20 26

Total 100 * 100 * 100 * 100 * 100 * 100 * 100

* Percentages may not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Libya, Annual Report, 1984, Tripoli,

n.d., 31.

Table 7. Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities, 1981-84

Commodity Unit 1981 1982 1983 1984 * Barley thousands of metric tons 120.0 99.6 202.4 86.9

-do- 7.0 7.0 8.4 9.5 Eggs . . . millions 290.0 320.0 547.8 614.0

metric tons 195.0 730.9 781.4 819.

Meat -do- 66.0 68.0 93.3 103.5 Milk -do- 112.0 115.2 139.8 145.0

-do- 155.3 138.1 147.9 148.9 kilograms 487.8 329.5 487.5 n.a. metric tons 739.8 730.9 781.4 819.9 Wheat -do- 123.1 183.4 208.9 183.6

n.a. —not available.

* Preliminary figures. Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Libya, Annual Report, 1984, Tripoli,

n.d., 33.

299
Libya: A Country Study

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300
Appendix

Table 9. Direction of Trade, 1978-84

(in percentages)

Country 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Exports

1 7 1 i n\J.t:a O Q 4 9 9 ft 9 1 France 3 6 3.6 2.7 2.8 4.0 6.9 8.1

Italy 16 2 18.5 15.3 18.5 19.4 21.8 27.5 Spain 6 3 4.8 5.1 7.4 7.6 7.9 10.5

9 n 1 i i .j A A.

. o O.J o.o United States 37.5 33.5 33.0 30.3 3.5 0.0 0.0 West Germany .... 16.0 18.3 19.1 18.3 20.9 20.0 21.8 Other 16.7 18.9 22.9 17.4 34.6 34.1 23.4 Total exports . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 nports

7.1 7.4 7.5 6.8 6.2 4.6 4.1 8.3 9.0 7.5 6.5 5.7 3.7 2.6

Italy 24.1 26.6 28.6 30.6 28.8 23.4 20.6 Japan 7.5 7.5 5.9 7.6 3.8 3.8 2.6 United States 6.3 6.5 5.7 5.8 4.0 2.1 2.5 West Germany .... 12.8 16.3 14.1 10.6 15.8 9.4 10.0 Other 33.9 26.7 30.7 32.1 35.7 53.0 57.6 Total imports . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Sources: Based on information from The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Libya, London, 1983; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Eco- nomic Review of Libya, London, 1985; and Middle East Economic Digest, Quarterly Economic Review of Libya, Tunisia, Malta: Annual Supplement 1984, London, 1984.

301
Libya: A Country Study

Table 10. Major Army Equipment, 1986

Type

Estimated number

in Inventory Country of Origin Tanks T-54 (100mm gun) T-55 (100mm gun)

T-62 (115mm gun) T-72 (120mm gun)

Armored Vehicles BRDM-2 reconnaissance BMP personnel carrier BTR-50/-60 personnel carrier OT-62/-64 personnel carrier EE-9 reconnaissance EE- 11 personnel carrier Howitzers and Guns D-74 122mm field gun M-46 130mm field gun M-101 105mm howitzer M-1938, D-30 122mm howitzer M-1974 122mm howitzer, self-propelled M-1973 152mm howitzer, self-propelled Palmaris 155mm howitzer, self-propelled

n.a. 2,200

n.a. 160

250 800

700 400

n.a. 100

60 360

60

330

12048 200

Soviet Union

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do- Brazil

-do-

-doSoviet Union

-do- United States Soviet Union

-do-

-doItaly Mortars 81mm, 120mm, 160mm, 240mm

Multiple Rocket Launchers BM-21/RM-70 122mm

M-51 130mm

Surface-to-Surface Missiles FROG-7 Scud-B

Antitank Guided Missiles

Vigilant Milan AT-3 Sagger

Surface-to-Air Missiles SA-7

Crotale

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 103.

450

600

48

70

n.a. 3,000

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a. Soviet Union

-do-

-doBritain France

Soviet Union

-do- France

302
Appendix

Table 11. Major Navy Equipment, 1986

Number in Country of Type Inventory Origin Frigates Vosper with Otomat and Aspide missiles ... 1 Britain Koni-class with SS-N-2C missiles 1 Soviet Union

Submarines

Foxtrot class 6 -do- Mala class submersible 2 Yugoslavia

Corvettes Wadi/Assad class with Otomat missiles 4 Italy Nanuchka II with SS-N-2C missiles 3 Soviet Union

Fast-Attack Craft La Combattante II with Otomat missiles ... 9 France Osa II with Styx missiles 12 Soviet Union

Susah class 3 Britain Coastal Patrol Boats Gharyan and Benina classes 8 -do- Landing Ships PS- 700 2 France

Polnochniy 3 Poland Minesweepers

Natya 7 Soviet Union

Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 103.

303
Libya: A Country Study

Table 12. Major Air Force Equipment, 1986

Number in Country of Type Inventory Origin Bombers Tu-22 Blinder 7 Soviet Union

Interceptors 32 France MiG-23 Flogger 135 Soviet Union

MiG-25 Foxbat 55 -do- Ground Attack

63 France

14 -do- MiG-23 Flogger 54 Soviet Union

Su-20/-22 Fitter 50 -do- Counterinsurgency

30 Yugoslavia Transport An-26 Curl 20 Soviet Union

11-76 Candid 15 -do- C-130H Hercules 7 United States Boeing 707 2 -do- C-140Jetstar 2 -do- G-222 17 Italy Helicopters Mi-24 Hind , . 30 Soviet Union

30 -do- SA-321 Super Frelon 8 France CH-47C Chinook 19 United States Mi-8 Hip 12 Soviet Union

AB-212 2 Italy SA-316B Alouette III 10 France AB-47 9 Italy Trainers MiG-25 Foxbat 5 Soviet Union

MiG-23 Flogger 14 -do- G-2 Galeb 61 Yugoslavia L-39 Albatros 100 Czechoslovakia SF-260 120 Italy CM-170 Magister 12 France

Source: Based on information from International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 103-104.

304
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Libya: A Country Study

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324
Glossary

al—Arabic definite article "the"; connotes family or group to which an individual belongs or region of origin.

amir—Title of an independent chieftain. Literally, "commander."

Also seen as emir. Aouzou Strip—A rectangle of territory in northern Chad 100 kilo- meters wide and 1,000 kilometers long, paralleling Libya's

southern border. Libya first occupied the strip in 1975 and

annexed it in 1976. It is said to contain valuable minerals,

including uranium.

ASU—Arab Socialist Union. The mass organization created in 1971

to provide a framework for popular participation and representation within the political system. Reorganized in 1975 to in- clude the local-level Basic People's Congresses (BPCs) and the

intermediate-level Municipal Popular Congresses (MPCs), both

of which send delegates to the national General People's Congress (GPC

q. v.); organization was disbanded in January

1976. Not to be confused with the Egyptian political organization of the same name.

bani—Arabic for a tribe, people, or nation; plural of ibn, son of

a person

baraka—Quality of blessedness or grace found characteristically in

marabouts (q.v.) and other divinely favored persons. Also,

charisma that endows the blessed with a special capacity to rule. barrels per day—Production of crude oil and petroleum products

is frequently measured in barrels per day and often abbreviated bpd or bd. A barrel is a volume measure of 42 United

States gallons. Conversion of barrels to tons depends on the

density of the specific product. About 7.3 barrels of average

crude oil weigh one ton. Light products such as gasoline and

kerosene would average close to eight barrels per ton. Baathist—a member of the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection)

Party, a pan-Arab party established in Damascus in the 1940s

by Michel Aflaq and Salah ad Din al Bitar.

caliph—In Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad's successor

as spiritual and temporal leader of the Islamic community.

Literally, "successor."

Cultural Revolution—The program proclaimed by Muammar al Qadhafi on April 15, 1973. Comprising five "points" or policies, it aimed at effacing foreign cultural influence and reviving Libya's Arab and Islamic heritage.

325
Libya: A Country Study

Cyrenaica—Largest of Libya's three historic regions, occupying

the eastern half of the country. Name derived from the ancient

Greek city-state, Cyrene; in Arabic known as Barqu.

dey—Originally a junior officer commanding a company ofjanissaries (q.v.). After 1611 the title of the head of government in

Tripolitania (q.v.). Literally, "maternal uncle."

divan—Council of senior military officers during the Ottoman

period.

Fezzan—One of Libya's three historic regions, located in the southwestern part of the country.

Free Officers Movement—Secret organization of junior Libyan

army officers and enlisted men responsible for carrying out the

September 1, 1969, coup against the monarchy.

FROLINAT—Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad (Front for the National Liberation of Chad). Muslim insurgent movement

supported by Libya.

FY—fiscal year. Since 1974 the calendar year; before that date the

fiscal year commenced on April 1. GDP—Gross Domestic Product. A value measure of the flow of

domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a

period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods

for final consumption and investment are included because the

values of primary and intermediate production are assumed

to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated

and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and

subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the

result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made.

See also GNP.

General People's Committee—Name given the cabinet (formerly

the Council of Ministers) in March 1977.

GNP—Gross National Product. The gross domestic product (q.v.)

plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with for- eign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the out- put of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated

at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies.

Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments,

GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

GPC—General People's Congress. Body combining executive and

legislative functions that became the formal supreme organ of

government in March 1977.

The Green Book—Muammar al Qadhafi's ideological testament, containing his political, economic, and social thought, revolutionary

326
Glossary

precepts, and definition of "Arab socialism." The first volume was published in 1975, the second in 1977, and the third in

1978.

habus—Islamic religious endowment or trust (usually real estate)

used to support mosques, schools, and charitable works. Sometimes seen as habous or hubus; occurs as waqfoutside the Maghrib

hadith—Literally, "speech, prophetic tradition." Islamic writings containing the sayings and teachings of the Prophet

Muhammad as recalled by those who knew him during his life. ibn—Literally, "son of"; used before or as part of proper name

to indicate patrilineal descent. Also seen as bin or ben. imam—In general, an Islamic leader who is a recognized authority on Islamic theology and law; also the prayer leader of a mosque. The term is used to designate the leader of the Islamic

community in a particular locale. IMF—International Monetary Fund. Established along with the

World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- ing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members

(including industrialized and developing countries) when they

experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

jamahiriya—Newly coined Arabic word having no official translation but unofficially translated to mean "state of the masses,"

"people's authority," or "people's power." On March 2, 1977,

Libya officially became the Socialist People's Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya.

janissaries—Members of an elite Ottoman military corps; in

Tripolitania (q.v.), recruited from among Turkish peasants

committed to a life of service. From the Turkishyeniceri, or "new

soldier."

jihad—According to Islamic doctrine, the permanent struggle to establish the law of God on earth, often interpreted to mean

"holy war."

khouloughlis—In Tripolitania (q.v.), a distinct caste of mixed Turkish and Arab parentage. Literally, "sons of servants" or "sons

of slaves." Adjectival form is khoulougli. Various transliterations are found.

LD—Libyan dinar. Unit of currency since September 1, 1971,

replacing the Libyan pound. In mid- 1987 LD1 was valued at US$3.16; reciprocal exchange rate approximately LD0.32 per

327
Libya: A Country Study

US$1. The rate of exchange has been stable since February

1973. The Libyan dinar is divided into 1,000 dirhams.

Maghrib—The western Islamic world (northwest Africa); distinguished from the Mashriq (q.v.), or eastern Islamic world

(the Middle East). Traditionally includes Morocco, Algeria,

Tunisia, and Tripolitania (q.v.). Literally, "the time or place

of the sunset—the west." For its Arab conquerors, the region was the "island of the west" (jazirat al maghrjib), the land between

the "sea of sand" (Sahara) and the Mediterranean Sea. Also

transliterated as Maghreb.

Mahdi—According to Islamic tradition, the messianic guide who

will rise up to lead the faithful to salvation in anticipation of

the last day. Historically a religious leader who is recognized

as the Mahdi of tradition by his followers and assumes a messianic role in order to unify Islam and institute a reign of vir- tue. Literally, the "enlightened" or "divinely guided one."

marabout—In North Africa a holy man and teacher venerated

locally and believed to be touched by divine grace, or baraka

(q.v.), which sometimes conferred the right to rule as well. Fre- quently called upon to arbitrate tribal disputes, the marabout was not usually a member of the ulama (q.v.). Transliteration

of al murabitun (those who have made a religious retreat).

Mashriq—Eastern Islamic world, as distinct from the Maghrib

(q.v.). Also transliterated as Machrek.

Mauretania—Classical name for ancient Berber kingdom in northwest Africa; name also of Roman province that succeeded it. Cited in some sources as Mauritania but not to be confused

with the modern Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

medina—Arabic for town or city; used in North Africa to refer to the old center part of a city.

Moor—In Tripolitania (q.v.), an urban Arab during the dynastic

and Ottoman periods. The term Arab was reserved specifically

for the beduins.

Moorish—Refers specifically to the cultural attributes common to Muslim Spain and the Maghrib after the twelfth century,

moriscos—Spanish Muslims.

muhafazaat (sing., muhafazah)—Governorates into which Libya's

three traditional regions were divided in 1 963 . Each was headed

by a governor (muhafiz). The muhafazaat were abolished in 1975.

Muslim Brotherhood—A fundamentalist Sunni organization that

has challenged secular governments, particularly in Egypt and

Syria. Historically, it has used forced in pursuing Islamization

but in the mid-1980s it participated in the political process in

Egypt.

328
Glossary

OAPEC—Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Coordinates petroleum policies of major oil-producing Arab

states. In early 1987 membership included Algeria, Bahrain,

Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and

the United Arab Emirates.

OAU—Organization of African Unity. As of 1987, Libya was one

of many African states belonging to the organization.

OPEC—Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Coordinates petroleum policies of thirteen major oil-producing countries. In early 1987 members included Algeria, Ecuador,

Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.

pasha—Ottoman provincial governor or military commander. In

Tripolitania (q.v.), the title of the regent representing the sul- tan (q.v.).

POLISARIO —Frente Popular por la Liberation de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of

Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro). Western Sahara independence movement.

qadi (pi., qadis)—Islamic judge who presides over sharia (q.v.) court. Quran—Islamic scriptures believed by Muslims to be God's

(Allah's) revelation to the Prophet Muhammad. Derived from

the Arabic verb qaraa (to recite or to read). Commonly written

as Koran. RCC—Revolutionary Command Council. Supreme organ of the

revolutionary regime from September 1969 to 1977.

Revolutionary Committees—Unofficial watchdog organizations

whose members tended to be zealots devoted to Muammar al Qadhafi and his teachings. First instituted in November 1977

to supervise the Basic People's Congresses and to fight

bureaucracy, they have steadily grown more powerful. For

example, their members play a large role in selecting delegates

to the GPC (q.v.).

shahadah—Literally, "testimony." Islamic profession of faith: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is His

Prophet."

sharia—Traditional code of Islamic law, both civil and criminal,

based in part on the Quran (q. v.). Also drawn from the hadith

(q.v.); the consensus of Islamic belief (ijma; i.e., consensus of

the authorities on a legal question); and analogy (qiyas; i.e., an elaboration of the intent of law).

shaykh—Tribal leader; also seen as sheik or sheikh.

329
Libya: A Country Study

Shia—The smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. Literally,

"party" from Shiat Ali (Party of Ali). Adherents are referred

to as Shias; adjectival form is Shia. According to the Shias,

Islamic leadership should belong to a descendant of the House

of Ali, not an elected caliph (q.v.) shurfa (sing., sharif) —In strict usage, descendants of the Prophet

Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima; broadly, persons

or groups having noble status. Also transliterated as ashraf. Singular form is used as a title. the Sudan—Geographical region stretching across Africa from Cape

Verde on the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea between 8° and

16° north latitude; characterized by savanna and semiarid

steppe. Term derived from Arabic bilad as sudan (literally,

"country of the blacks"). Not to be confused with the Republic of Sudan.

sultan—Title of the Almoravid, Hafsid, and Ottoman overlords

of Libya. Secular title for a high Muslim ruler (see also caliph), sunna—Body of customs and practices based on the Prophet

Muhammad's words and deeds as found in the Quran (q.v.)

and the hadith (q.v.), which serve as guides to proper behavior

for Muslims.

Sunni—The larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunni

consider themselves the orthodox adherents of the sunna (q.v.).

suq—Traditional North African bazaarlike open-air market.

Third Universal Theory—Major tenet of Muammar al Qadhafi's

revolutionary ideology, which purports to offer nonaligned

states what is regarded as the Third World political, economic,

and social alternatives to Western capitalism and East European communism. Frequently seen as the Third International

Theory, or the Third Theory.

Tripolitania—Most populous of Libya's three historic regions, situ- ated in the northwestern part of the country. Name derived

from Tripolis (Three Cities).

ulama—Collective term for Muslim religious scholars (sing., alim)

learned in the Quran (q. v. ) and responsible for interpreting and

elaborating on the sharia (q. v. ). Derived from Arabic verb alama

(to know).

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but

330
Glossary

administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest devloping countries on much easier

terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage

the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- tions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group,

member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF

q. v.). zawiya (pi. zawaayad)—In North Africa, a lodge containing mosque

and quarters for the brothers of a religious order.

331

Index

Abbasid dynasty, 13 Abdal Mumin, 15 Abu Nidal, 253, 254, 282 Abu Nidal Organization, 282-84 Abu Simbel airfield, 200 ACDA. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Addis Ababa, 232 Al Adem Air Base, 239

Administrative Contracts Regulations, 155

Aeritalia, 278 Aero L-39 Albatros, 263

Aflaq, Michel, 210

Africa, 5, 106, 230, 240, 247, 250, 273, 280

Al Agheila, 33 Aghlab, Ibrahim ibn, 13 Aghlabid amirs, 13 Agila, Yusuf, 204 AGIP. See Azienda Generale Italiana

Petroli agriculture, 51, 141-43; crops, 146;

dairies, 147; exports, 156; investment

in, 126; irrigation, xxvi, 144, 145-46;

livestock, 146-47; resources, 142; share of gross domestic product, 120-21 Ahmad, Musa, 43, 45

aid (Libyan) to other countries, 159-60

aircraft, MiG fighter planes, 239, 262, 275; Mirage aircraft, 239, 242, 250,

262, 274, 278; SF-260 light aircraft, 278; SF-260 planes, 263; SF-260 train- ing planes, 280; Su-22 fighters, 229,

250, 252, 263; Tu-22 bombers, 262, 263, 275, 279; Tu-26 bombers, 250; Tucano trainer aircraft, 278

air force, xix, 261-63; development of, 242; equipment, 262; and foreign aid, 262-63; manpower, 262; performance,

263; training, 263

airports, xvii, 168

Ajdabiya, 145 Al Alamein, xxiii, 33 Alexander the Great, 7 Alexandria, 31, 260

Algeria, 21, 22, 54, 65, 219; and Arab

unity, 54; Arabization, 74; and the

economy, 40, 119, 122, 136; and Fez- zan border, 68; and petroleum, 128,

130; proposed merger with, 218-19; re- lations with, 216, 222, 247

Algerian Sahara, 34

Algiers, 18, 20, 226

Ali (son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad),

13-14

Ali Benghul, 20

Ali II, 20

Allah (God), 10, 99, 100

Allied Council of Foreign Ministers, 34

Allied Powers, 25, 27, 31 Almohads, 15 Almoravids, 15 Amerada Petroleum Company, 132

America, 255 Amin, Idi, 56, 223-24, 247

amirs, 13 Amnesty International, 200, 288-89

Andalusia (Muslim Spain), 12, 15 Anderson, Lisa, 212 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 30

Angola, 222, 223, 232, 233 Aouzou Strip: and Chadian war, xv, 55,

56, 224-25, 251; and uranium deposits, 141, 234, 248-51

Apollonia, 7 aquifers, 69, 126 Arab-African Development Bank, 234 Arab culture, 248 Arab Islamic Republic (proposed), 221

Arab-Israeli dispute, 43, 46, 50, 52, 53,

56, 106, 174, 217, 231, 232, 240, 246,

247, 274, 282 Arab League. See League of Arab States "Arab Nation," 52 Arab nationalism, 40, 41, 44, 206, 210; and Arabic language, 80 Arab Satellite (ARABSAT), 169 Arab Socialist Union (ASU), xviii, 46, 174, 179, 181-83, 191, 209; Basic Committee, 181; Basic Conference,

181; election of delegates, 186; election of members, 183; Governorate Conference, 181-82; and The Green Book, 212; National Congress (1972), 182, 186-87,

208; National Congress (1974), 185, 333
Libya: A Country Study

186-87; National Congress (1976), 197, 269; reorganization, 186-87, 212; and

social change, 87-88 Arab unity, xxiv-xxv, xxvi, 43, 52-55,

57, 174, 208, 210, 222, 245; and the Maghrib, 220-21; pursuit of, by

Muammar al Qadhafi, 205, 208, 217-19; and tribal differences, 46; and

united military force, 268-69; and War

of June 1967, 44-45

Arabia, 14, 15, 99 Arabian Peninsula, 10, 130

Arabization, 3-4, 15, 68, 74; of education, 115; linguistic, 81 Arabs: arrival of, in North Africa, 73-75; conquest of North Africa, xxiii, 10-12 ARABSAT. See Arab Satellite Arafat, Yasir, 284

Argentina, 234 armed forces {see also air force, army,

navy, People's Militia), xix, 43, 239-72; and Arab-Israeli dispute, 240; budget, xx, 257, 269-73; compulsory

military training, xix; conscription, 243, 263-64; development of, 241-43;

distrust of, 256-57; equipment acquisition, xix-xx, 230, 239-40, 244, 257-58, 261-62, 276-78; execution of

dissidents in, 50; expansion of, 242-43, 246-47; expenditures as percentage of

gross national product, 273; foreign bases in Libya, 226, 230, 239-40 {see also Britain, United States); leadership,

243-46, 255-56; modernization, 245; morale, 256; paramilitary forces, 268-69; performance in combat,

247-48; rank structure, 269; and social mobility, 4; traditional mission, 246-47; uniforms, 269; and women,

246, 266-68 Armed Forces of the North (FAN), 250 Armenia, 74 arms production, 280-81 army, xix, xxvii, 46, 49, 191, 258-59;

bases, 259; deficiencies, 258-59; equip- ment, 258; foreign advisers, 259; and

social mobility, 86-87; training, 259

Arsinoe, 7 Artemis-30 antiaircraft gun, 278

As, Umar ibn al, 11 Asia, 282

Assad, Hafiz al, 52, 53, 55, 218

assassinations, xxvii, 197, 203, 204-5, 281

ASU. See Arab Socialist Union

Atatiirk (Mustafa Kemal), 27 Athens, 205

Atlantic Ocean, 11, 12, 169

Atoll missile, 253

Auchinleck, Claude, 33

Austria, 277, 278

aviation, 168

Awjilah, 75 Axis forces, 33, 241 Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP), 130

Aziza, 26 Al Aziziyah, 254 Azzam, Abdar Rahman, 26

Baathists, 204, 210, 288; slogan of, 206 Bab al Aziziyah, 203 Baghdad, 13 Bakkush, Abdul Hamid, 203-4

Balbo, Italo, 30

Balkans, 24 Banco di Roma, 161 Banco di Sicilia, 161 Bangladesh, 282 Bani Hilal, 14-15, 74 Bani Khattab, 13, 17 Bani Salim, 14-15, 74 Bani Walid, 113

banks, 160-62; commercial, 161; credit

policy, 162; and interest on loans, 162; nationalization of, 161

baraka, 22, 23, 102-3 Baraqah, 16

barbari, 76 Barbarossa (Khair ad Din), 18 Barce (Al Marj), 7, 11 Barrani, Ahmad, 205

Baruni, Suleiman, 25, 26, 27 Basic People's Congress (BPC), 48, 174, 186-87 Al Bayda, 22, 23, 113 beduin tribes, xxiii, 13, 14-15, 16, 26, 30, 74, 113; conflicts among, 189; distinc- tion between, 75; migration to Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, 74; pride in tribal lineage, 83-84; resistance of, to Italian

rule, 24-25

Beijing (formerly Peking), 234

Beirut, 253 Belgium, 279

Belgonucleaire, 279 334
Index

Belisarius, 10

Bella, Ahmed Ben, 282

Benghazi, 7, 24, 29, 44, 96, 203, 252; air- port at, 168; and armed forces, 259,

260, 274-75; as capital, 38, 175; and

Coup of September 1, 1969, 42; courts, 194; and Great Man-Made River, 145; housing, 110; and Italian rule, 27, 29; and manufacturing, 136; and monarchy, 38; and Ottoman rule, 18; population, 42; ports, 165; school

enrollment, 113; and urbanization, 71; U.S. air strike on, 229, 254-55; and

War of June 1967, 40

Benin, 280 Benina airfield, 255

Berbers, xvi, 3, 6, 9, 14, 75-77; ancient

writing, 8; and Islam, 12-13, 74, 99,

102; Kutama, 14; language, 75-76; ori- gin of, 4-5; "Punicized," 8; resistance

of, to Arabs, 13; tribal dynasties, 15 Berenice, 7 Berlin, xxvii, 229, 254

Bevin, Ernest, 35

Bevin-Sforza plan, 35 Big Four, 35

Birak, 113

black Africans, xvi, 78

Boeing, 168 Boeing 727s, 277

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 20 Bornu, 17 Botswana, 232

Bourguiba, Habib, 54, 218, 220-21, 281 Bouri field, 130, 133 BPC. See Basic People's Congress

Brazil, as source of military equipment,

259, 274, 277, 278 Brega Company, 131

Britain, 20, 30, 134, 168, 204; administration, xxiv, 33-34; aid from, 156; and

air defense project, 242; Army of the

Nile, 33; and Council of Ten, 36; and

development of the armed forces, 241-42; Eighth Army, 33; evacuation

of military bases, 40, 274, 275; gross national product, 149; and independence, 31-32; military advisers, 239; and military aid, 273; military bases, xxiv, 38, 239, 243, 245, 273; policy of

refusing to ship arms to Libya, xx, 277;

protests against terrorism, 57; relations with, 203, 226, 227-28; Royal Military

Academy, 44; as source of military

equipment, 259, 261, 278; sterling bloc, 160; and United Nations, 35

British Petroleum, 50-51, 131, 227

British Petroleum-Bunker Hunt Sarir

field, 131 budget, 152-55; administrative, 152-54;

allocations, 154; development of, 152-54; special, 152-53 Bunker Hunt, 131 Al Burkan (The Volcano), 204

Burkina Faso, 282

Byzantine Empire, 10, 11, 12, 13

C-130 Lockheed cargo planes, 277

Caesar, Julius, 5 Cairo, 14, 53, 203, 204

calendar, Gregorian, 152; Muslim, alter- ation of, 202

caliphate, 12 Cambyses, 7 Camp David accords, 224, 231 Canada, policy of refusing to ship arms

to Libya, xx, 277 Cape of Good Hope, 130

capitalism, 209

Caravelle, 168

Carter, Jimmy, 229

Carthage, xxiii, 5, 8, 10, 11 Cascavel armored vehicles, 278

Castro, Fidel, 226

Catania: telecommunications link, 169

Central Bank of Libya, 161, 179; assets in United States, 158; balance-of- payments statement, 156; credit policy, 158; foreign exchange controls, 158; population estimate, 70; statistics on

agicultural production, 146 Chad, xxv, 34, 57, 189, 233, 247, 256,

258, 259, 268, 278, 282; border, 30,

168; Chadian war, xxvii, 55-56, 200, 224-26, 248, 263, 276; and Fezzan

border, 68; Libyan aid to, 160; mineral deposits in Aouzou Strip, 141, 234, 248-51; proposed merger with, 218; and Sahara Desert, 65; Tebu in, 78 Chadian war, 55, 218, 227 Chamber of Deputies, 38, 175 Charles V, 18 China, xix-xx, 273; and nuclear technol- ogy, 279; Red Guards, 191 335
Libya: A Country Study

Chinese Cultural Revolution, 191, 211, 212

Christianity, 9-10, 13, 15, 103, 106; and

Islam, 106; Protestantism, 201

citizenship, 93

Civil Aviation Institute, 168

climate, xvi, 68-69

Colombia, 282

colonialism, xxvi, 231, 232 Combattante fast-attack craft, 278 communications, xvii-xviii, 168-69;

radio, 169; telephone system, 168-69 communism, xxvi, xxvii, 43, 199, 209,

210, 230 Compulsory Military Service Statute of

1978, xix, 264

constitution, 37-38, 175-76, 199

Constitution of October 1951, 37-38

Constitutional Proclamation of December

11, 1969, 96, 176, 205, 206

construction industry, 136, 139-40

Continental Oil Company, 132 Coptic Church, 10, 12

Coral Sea, 255

corruption, 285

Corsair aircraft, 253

Council of Ministers, xxv; and monarchy,

37, 175, 180; replacement of, by General People's Congress, 48, 179; and

Revolutionary government, 43,

177-78, 183 Council of State, 196 Council of Ten, 36 Coup of September 1, 1969, 42-44, 189, 242; and petroleum industry, 130

courts, 194-97; appeals courts, 194; courts of first instance, 194; military

courts, 196-97; people's court, 196-97;

religious court, 192-95; revolutionary

courts, 197; secular courts, 192; sum- mary courts, 194; Supreme Court, 194-96

Crete, 6, 9, 74 Crotale missiles, 262 Cuba, 110, 203

cult of saints, 103

Cultural Revolution of 1973, 47-50,

173, 183-86, 191, 199, 210-12; five points of, 211; proclamation of, 211; and sharia, 201-2; and social change, 88

currency, xvii, 160-61 Cyprus, 205, 220

Cyrenaica, xxiii, 3, 19, 245; ancient period, 6-7; and the armed forces, 241-42; Berbers in, 77; British administration of, 33-34; conquest of, by

Arabs, 11-12; construction materials, 136; and Coup of September 1, 1969,

42; dialects, 80; geography, 65-66;

Hilalian impact on, 15; and Italian

rule, 24-29; Jews in, 78; medieval,

16-17; and national unity, 40, 41; and

Ottoman rule, 19, 21; petroleum

deposits in, 39; population, 71; Roman

Empire, 8-9; and Sanusi order, 22, 23, 103-4; and United Nations, 34-37; during World War II, 32-33

Cyrenaican Defense Force, 242, 243

Cyrenaics, 7 Cyrene, 6-7

Czechoslovakia, 230; as source of military

equipment, 263, 273

Damascus, 13 Dar al Islam, 13 Darfur, 281 Darnah, 24, 29, 42, 259, 260

Dassault, 263, 278 Ad Dawah (Islamic Call Society), 106 de Gaulle, Charles, 227

Decision on the Protection of the Revolution, 176-77, 196, 199

Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority, 47, 177, 178-79

Delphi, 6 democracy, 212-13

Denali, Gibril, 205

dey, 18-19 Dhahab, Sawar, 224

Diocletian, Emperor, 9, 29

direct democracy, 190 Divan, 18

divorce, 92, 93 domestic trade, 163-64 Draughut Pasha, 18 drought, 69

East-West dichotomy, 174

Eastern Europe, xvi, 46, 234; medical

personnel, 108; military advisers, 230;

military training, 275-76; relations with, 230-31; as source of military

equipment, xxvii, 178-79, 240 336
Index

Eastern Libya. See Cyrenaica

ecology, 145 economy, xvii, 49, 119-69; and agriculture, 141-43; balance of payments,

156-58; and decline in petroleum

revenues, 119-20, 123, 127; demonetization, 126; development of, 119-20; development of petroleum

sector, 128-29; foreign exchange,

138-39, 158; foreign exchange

reserves, 156-57; foreign investment

in, 155, 158-59; government restric- tions on private sector, 124-28; government role in, 119-21, 123-28,

141-42, 143; industrial development,

128; investment abroad, 159;

Libyanization of, 122-24; petroleum

and nonpetroleum, 121-22; and

petroleum reserves, 119; planned and

actual expenditures, 154-55; public

sector, 151-55; rate of inflation, 151;

structure of, 120-23; wages, 150 Eden, Anthony, 32

education, 111-15, 216; Arabization of, 115; budget, 112; compulsory, 111; English language, 113, 115; enrollment,

110-11; literacy rate, xvii, 111; primary

and secondary, 112-13; Russian lan- guage, 115; and study abroad, 114;

technical, 112; university, 111-15 EE-9 armored cars, 268 EF-111 electronic countermeasures air- craft, 254

Egypt, xxvi, 7, 8, 25, 29, 31, 33, 35, 99, 216, 230, 256, 268, 281, 282; air strikes against Libyan air base, 247-48; alli- ance with Sudan, 224; and Arab unity, 52-55, 218; border, 259, 260, 262; and

Council of Ten, 36; and Cyrenaican

border, 68; defection of Libyan air force personnel to, 200; economy, 119; and

exile groups, 203; exile of King Idris

I in, 43; expulsion of Egyptian workers,

73, 157; expulsion of Soviets from, 239; federation with, 52-54, 211; foreign workers in Libya, 97, 220; industrial

policy, 136; medieval, 15, 16-17; Middle Kingdom, 5; military advisers, 260;

military aid from, 274-75; and Muslim

Brotherhood, 106; Old Kingdom, 4-5; and Organization of Petroleum Export- ing Countries, 233; proposed merger

with, xxvi, 218, 221; relations with,

247; and Sarra Triangle, 30; and

teacher training, 110; War of June

1967, 40, 44-45, 239; and World War

II, 32-33, 241

El Al Airline, 282

El Salvador, 282

elections, 183, 184, 185

electric power, 140-41

elite: criteria for evaluating, 83; ethnic

distinctions within, 89; and military

leadership, 245; and monarchy, 85; and

Revolutionary government, 87; as sub- national administrators, 180

energy, 140-41 ENI. See Ente Nazionale Idrocarbuno Ente Nazionale Idrocarbuno (ENI), 131 Ente Nazionale Idrocarbuno-Azienda

Generale Italiana Petroli (ENI-AGIP),

132

Eritreans, 29 Esso (later Exxon), xxiv, 39, 130

Ethiopia, 31, 57, 224, 233, 280, 282

ethnic groups, xvi, 73-79

Euhesperides (later Berenice, present-day

Benghazi), 7 Europe, 19-20, 23, 24, 56, 79; influence

of, on traditional life, 82; petroleum

market, 128-30; and terrorism against

travelers, 284 European Economic Community, 226

Europeanization, 74, 82

exile groups, 49, 203

exports, 163 Exxon (formerly Esso), 132

F-14 jets, 229, 263; Tomcat fighters, 252, 253 F/A-18 Hornet strike aircraft, 255

Fada, 225

Fakini, Muhi ad Din, 39 FAN. See Armed Forces of the North FAR. See Federation of Arab Republics Fatah Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal

Organization), 282-84

Al Fatah University (formerly Tripoli

University), 113, 200

Fatima, 14 Fatima, Queen, 46

Fatimids, 13-14, 16 Faya Largeau, 225, 250-51

Fazi, Muhammad al, 17 FB-111 bombers, 254, 255 337
Libya: A Country Study

Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- many), 57, 205, 226; investment in housing, 110; and nuclear technology,

279; policy of refusing to ship arms to Libya, xx, 277; as source of military

equipment, 274; trade with, 163 Federation of Arab Republics (FAR),

52-53, 218

Fezzan, xxiii, 3, 22, 45, 175, 245; ancient

period, 7-8; conquest of, by Arabs, 1 1

;

and Coup of September 1, 1969, 42; di- alects, 80; and Great Man-Made

River, 145; and Italian rule, 24, 25, 28, 29; and Kharijites, 13; medieval,

16-17; mineral resources in, 134-36; and national unity, 40; and Ottoman

rule, 18, 21; petroleum in, 130; population, 71; and Sanusi order, 103; separateness of, 65-66; sub-Saharan

Africans in, 78; and United Nations, 34-37

Fiat Company, 227

fikh, 202

fishing, 147-48

Five-Year Economic and Social Transfor- mation Plan (1976-80), 51, 126-27

Five-Year Plan (1963-68), 39

Five-Year Plan (1981-85), 126-27, 137

floods, 69

joggares, 8 Fokker, 168

foreign aid, 38-39, 123 foreign relations, xviii, xviii-xix,

174-75, 216-34; Arab countries, 217-19; Algeria, 216, 222, 247; Brit- ain, 203, 226, 227-28; Eastern Europe, 230-31; Egypt, 247; France, 38, 226-27; Italy, 227; Maghrib, 220-23;

Malta, 219-20; Mediterranean countries, 219-20; Morocco, 216, 222-23;

Soviet Union, 38, 46, 174, 222, 230-31; sub-Saharan Africa, 223-24; Sudan, 224-25; Syria, 216; United

Nations, 231-32; United States, 42, 56-57, 174, 222, 226, 228-29;

Western Europe, 57, 226-28

foreign workers, 72-73, 97, 127-28, 220;

in agriculture, 142; in construction,

140; dependence on, 123; domestic, 97; expulsion of, 73, 128, 157; remittances

by, and trade deficit, 157-58

foreigners: and social change, 95

forests, 148

Foxbat, 275

Foxtrot-class submarines, 260

France, 20, 23, 253; and Chadian war,

56, 225, 250, 251; and colonialism,

23, 24; Conseil d'Etat, 196; and

Council of Ten, 35; and Fezzan, 34; investment in housing, 110; military

aid from, 275; policy of refusing to ship arms to Libya, xx, 277; relations with, 38, 226-27; as source of military

equipment, xix, 240, 242, 243, 259,

260, 261, 263, 273, 274, 278; telecom- munications link, 169; territorial concession from, to Italy, 30

Free French forces, 34

Free Officers Movement, xxiv, 42, 44, 86, 189, 205, 242, 243 "Freedom, Socialism, and Unity,"

xxiv-xxv

Frente Popular por la Liberation de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro

Polisario, 222, 223 FROLINAT. See Front for the National

Liberation of Chad

Front for the National Liberation of Chad

(FROLINAT), 248 Fuhaymah, Muhammad Salim, 205 Fundamental Law, 25

Gafsa, 54, 221

Gaiseric, 10 Gamal Abdul Nasser Air Base (formerly Al Adem Air Base), 247, 262 Gambia, 282 Gar Yunis University (formerly University of Libya at Benghazi), 113 Garamentes, 7-8, 11 Garang, John, 216, 224

General Company for Distribution, Publication, and Advertisement, 164 General Consultative Council, 29 General Corporation for Civil Works, 139 General Corporation for Public Transport, 165 General Corporation for the Construction and Maintenance of Roads, 139 General Dairy and Dairy Products Company, 147 General Electric Organization, 140 General Iron and Steel Corporation, 134 General People's Committee, xviii, xxv, 47-48, 49, 174, 179 338
Index

General People's Congress (GPC), xviii, xxv, 47, 48, 174, 246, 263; and the budget, 152-53; and conscription of women, 267; General Secretariat, xviii, 47, 48, 174, 190, 244; and The Green Book, 212; and labor unions, 197; and

legal codes, 104; and Muammar al Qadhafi, 192; and revolutionary committees, 187; role of, in government,

178-80; and Supreme Court justices, 194-96; and training institutes, 113 General Post, Telephone, and Telegraph

Organization, 168 Genoa, 278

geography, xv-xvi, 64-68 Germa, 8, 11 German Democratic Republic (East Ger- many), 203, 230, 250 Germany, 208; Afrika Korps, 33; and

first Italo-Sanusi War, 25; World War

II, 31, 33 Ghadamis, 8; airport at, 168; sedimentation basin, 130 Ghadamsi, Izzedin, 205 Ghana, 280 Gharyan region, 25 Ghat, 34; airport at, 168 GMMR. See Great Man-Made River Goukouni Oueddei, 218, 225 government, national (see also Qadhafi,

Muammar al), xviii, 172-92; alienation from, 89-90; formation of, 36-37; and

Islam, 102, 104-6; opposition to, xxvii-xxviii, 50, 198-205; and Sanusis, 104 government, subnational, xviii, 174, 180-87; attempts to correct deficiencies

in, 181-87

governorate councils, 183 GPC. See General People's Congress

grand mufti, 202 Grand Sanusi, 22

Graziani, Rudolfo, 29 Great Man-Made River (GMMR), xxvi, 69, 126, 142, 145-46

Greece, xvi, xxiii, 6-7, 8, 38, 42, 74, 164; and military advisers, 260; pacts with, 220; as source of military equipment,

277, 278

Green Book, The, xxv, xxvi, 47, 49, 50, 104-5, 113, 124, 191, 206, 212-16; dis- placement of sharia, 202; Part I: The

Solution of the Problem of Democracy,

212-13; Part II: The Solution of the Economic Problem: ' 'Socialism, " 213-15; Part

III: The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory, 215-16

' 'Green March," 223 "green market," 164 "Green Revolution," 173

gross domestic product (GDP), 119-21;

agriculture, 141-42, 143; decline of, 123 Guatemala, 282

Guinea-Bissau, 223 Gulf of Sidra, xv, 65, 130; salt flats along, 136; and territorial waters dispute with United States, xv, 136, 228-29, 247,

252, 253, 260, 263; United States downing of Libyan jet fighters over, 57, 229, 231; United States maneuvers in, 276 gypsum mine, 136

Habre, Hissein, 56, 225, 250-51, 281

habus, 50

hadith, 201, 202

Hafs, Muhammad ibn Abu, 16

Hafsids, 15-16 Hague, The, 220, 221 Hague Convention, 34

"al Haj," 102

hajj, 102 Hamidi, Khuwayldi al, 188, 221, 244, 264-66

Al Haq, 204

Harare, 233

harathin, 78 HARM. See High-Speed Anti-Radiation

Missiles Harpoon missiles, 253

Harris, Lillian Craig, 191, 205 Hassan II, King, 223, 281 Hawker Siddeley, 168 Hawwaz, Adam Said, 43, 45 Haze antisubmarine helicopters, 276

health care, xvi-xvii, 108-9; infant mortality rate, 71; medical personnel, xvi, 108; sanitation, 109

hegira, 99

Herodotus, 8 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), 253 Higher Council for National Guidance, 208-9 339
Libya: A Country Study

highjackings (airline), 55

hijra (hegira), 99

Hilalians, 14-15 Hinnebusch, Raymond, 190

Hizballah (Party of God), 203 Holy War, 203 House of Islam, 1

housing, 109-10; nationalization of, 125 Hun, 113, 262 Hun Oasis, 44 Hunaysh, Khalifa, 189 Hungary, 230 Huni, Abd al Munim al, 204

Hussein, King, 281 hydrology, 68-69

Idris I, King, xxiv, 216, 227, 274, 279;

alienation from, 41-42; and the armed

forces, 239, 241-42; and the budget,

152; and constitutional revision, 176; and Coup of September 1 , 1969, 42-43,

198; death sentence of, in absentia, 45-46, 196; designated heir of, 38; and

the elite, 89; exile of, in Egypt, 43; and

foreign policy, 216; and independence,

35, 37, 75; military aid to, 273; and

military leadership, 244-45; and nationalism, 41; and petroleum revenues, 40-41, 86; and Sanusis, 36, 103; and

society, 81

Ifriqiya, 11, 13, 15

ijtihad, 202 imam, 14

imazighan, 4

imperialism, 43, 46

imports, 163 incomes, 155; agriculture, 149; construction, 149-50; gross domestic product

(GDP), 148-50; gross national product

(GNP), 148-49; industry, 149; petro- leum products, xxv, 149-50; public

service sector, 150; rental, 150 independence, xxiv, 31-32, 34-37, 175; proclamation of, 37

India, 203, 234

Indian Ocean, 57, 169

Industrial and Real Estate Bank of Libya,

161, 162

industrialization, 122

industry, 51; and balance of payments,

138-39; heavy, 137; investment in, 126-27; nationalization of, 136-37;

percentage of gross domestic product,

128, 137; productive capacity ratios, 139 Al Inqadh (Salvation), 203

insurance industry, 162 INTELSAT. See International Telecommunications Satellite International Atomic Energy Agency, 279

International Court of Justice, 220, 221

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 288

International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 268

International Revolutionary Committee,

189

International Telecommunications Satellite (INTELSAT), 169

Intruder, 253, 255 IRA. See Irish Republican Army

Iran, 55, 131, 228; tankers, 130; and ter- rorism, 284; and Westernization, 211

Iranian Revolution, 281

Iraq, 55, 216, 230, 233, 268, 281; tankers, 130

Irish Republican Army (IRA), xxvixxvii, 58, 228

iron ore, 134-36

irrigation, 144, 145-46

Ishkal, Hassan, 189

Islam, xxiii, xxvi, 21, 43-44, 56, 63, 248; almsgiving, 100, 108; and Arab-Israeli dispute, 46; and Berbers, 77, 102-3;

calendar, 99, 105; and criminal justice, 286-87; and cult of saints, 103; duties, 100; fasting, 102; Fatimids, 13-14; his- tory of, 98-99; Islamic unity, 55, 57; Kharijites, 12-13, 77; and marriage,

92; Muammar al Qadhafi's unorthodox

interpretation of, 50, 200-3; North

African, 102-3; and political goals, 104-6; religious courts, 192-94; rules of inheritance, 144; Sanusis, xviii, xxiii, 3, 21-23, 25-27, 29, 31-32, 36-37, 41, 46, 78, 81-82, 103-4; Shia, 13-14; and

socialism, 205-6; spread of, in North

Africa, 10-12, 74; Sufism, 102; Sunni,

xvii, 13-14; tenets of, 100-102; and

Third Universal Theory, 208-10;

values of, 85; and women, 100, 266

Islamic Call Society (Ad Dawah), 106

Islamic Conference, 234

Islamic Development Bank, 234

Islamic law. See sharia 340
Index

Islamic Pan-African Legion, 250, 268

Islamic socialism, 245

Islamic University, 104, 196

Ismaili sect, 14

Israel, xviii, xxvi, 40, 51, 78, 217, 219,

224, 273; Arab-Israeli dispute, 43, 46,

50, 52, 53, 56, 106, 174, 217, 231, 232, 240, 246, 247, 274, 282; attempts to

isolate, 223, 226; Egyptian agreement

with, 275; "holy war" against, 246; and June 1967 War, 40; nuclear capability of, 234; and October 1973 War,

228

Italian language, 80

Italo-Sanusi War, first (1914-17), 25; sec- ond (1923-31), 27-29

Italy, 15, 23-30, 36, 38, 42, 57, 79, 134, 202, 208, 226, 277; aid from, 121, 123, 156; colonial rule, xxiii, xxiii-xxiv, 23-24, 29-30, 217; cultural impact of, 75; expulsion of Italians, 46, 124; Fourth Shore, 29-31; influence of, on

social status, 83; investment in housing, 110; Libyan investment in, 159; and manufacturing, 136; military aid from, 275; and military cooperation,

280; nationalization of Italian assets, 122, 137; peace treaty, 35; policy of

refusing to ship arms to Libya, xx; re- lations with, 227; and Sanusi order,

104; settlers from, 30, 36, 142; as source of military equipment, xix, 259,

260, 261, 263, 278; telecommunications

link, 169; Tenth Army, 33; trade with, 163; urbanization under, 82

Jabal al Akhdar, 65, 143-44, 241; rainfall in, 68

Jabal al Uwaynat, 262

Jabal Nafusah, 65, 75

Jabir, Abu Bakr Yunis, 244

Al Jaghbub, 23

Jallud, Abdel Salaam, 45, 46, 178, 188, 227, 234, 244, 276; and student opposition, 200

jamahiriya, xxv, 177, 190 Jamahiriya Bank (formerly Jumhuriya

Bank), 161 Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA), 188 Jamahiriya Women's Federation, 96

Jamahiriyah (newspaper), 189 JANA. See Jamahiriya News Agency

janissaries, 18-19 Japan, 57, 277; refusal to ship arms to Libya, xx

Jerba, 221 Jerusalem, 8, 54

Jeune Afrique, 206

Jews, 8, 9, 13, 19, 40, 54, 78; expulsion

of, 46, 124; religious courts, 192

Jifarah Plain, 65, 143-44, 145, 146

jihad, 23 Jihad Fund, 106 Jordan, xxvii, 40, 216, 268; relations with, xxvii Judaism, 9

judicial system, xviii, 192-93; breaches

of judicial norms, 288; colonial rule, 192; courts, 194-97; criminal code, 287-88; criminal justice, 286-89; death

penalty, 288-89; judges, 194-96; Penal Code, 199; penal system, 289; people's

courts, 288; political prisoners, 197, 288-89; prohibition of private legal practice, 197; Supreme Council ofJudicial Authorities, 196; Supreme Court,

179, 194-96

Al Jufrah, 262 Jumhuriya Bank, 161 jumhuriya (republic), 177 June 1967 War, 40, 44, 219, 226

Kairouan (Al Qayrawan), 11, 13, 14 Karamanli, Ahmad, 19-20 Karamanli, Yusuf ibn Ali, 20 Katyusha rocket launcher, truck mounted, 266 Kemal, Mustafa (Ataturk), 24 Khair ad Din (Barbarossa), 18 Khaldun, Ibn, 15 Kharrubi, Mustafa al, 188, 244 Khartoum, 40, 216, 224, 281

khouloughlis, 19 Al Khums, 24, 260

Knights of St. John of Malta, 16 Koncar-class missile boats, 278

Al Kufrah, 23, 29, 126, 142, 145, 146, 251, 259; airport at, 168; livestock in, 147 Al Kufrah Oasis, 69, 262 Kusa, Musa, 189 Kutama Berbers, 14 Kuwait, 40 341
Libya: A Country Study

LAA. See Libyan Arab Airlines Labdah (Leptis Magna), 8, 164

labor force (see also foreign workers), 51

,

63, 121; manpower shortage, xxv, 73, 114; nationalization of, 128; public administrators in, 88; rural-to-urban flow

of, 142; women in, 97

labor unions, 197-98 LAFB. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank

LAFICO. See Libyan Arab Foreign In- vestment Company

land tenure, 68

land use, 143-45

landownership, 144, 215; restriction on

tribal systems of, 14 language families: Afro-Asiatic, 4, 76; Nilo-Saharan, 78; Semitic, 79

languages, xvi, 79-81; Arabic, 74, 79-81;

Arabic, levels of, 79-80; Berber, 75-76;

English, 81; French, 80; Italian, 80; Russian, 81; Tamasheq, 77 Latin America, 282 Law No. 5 (1981), 155 Law No. 47, 289 Law No. 71 (1972), 199 "Leader of the Revolution" (Muammar

al Qadhafi), 48, 173 League of Arab States, xix, 38, 56, 233 League of Nations, 31 Lebanese Shias, 55 Lebanon, 5, 56, 268; civil war in, 215

Leptis Magna, 8, 164

Levant, 5 Levu, 5 Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), 168 Libyan Arab Force, 32, 241 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB), 159, 161, 162 Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO), 15, 161, 162, 227 Libyan Arab Republic, 42, 176 Libyan Armed Forces, 43 Libyan Colonization Society, 30 Libyan Constitutional Union, 204, 229 Libyan dynasties, 5 Libyan Information Bureau, 204 Libyan Liberation Organization, 203-4 Libyan National Democratic Grouping,

204 Libyan National Movement, 204 Libyan National Organization, 205 Libyan National Struggle Movement, 204

Libyan People's Bureau (embassy), in London, 228; in United States, 229

Libyan Petroleum Company (LIPETCO),

124 Libyan Revolution. See Coup of September 1, 1969. Libyan World Center for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reaction, and Fascism, 189

Libyanization: of economy, 122-24; of

the work force, 128 LIPETCO. See Libyan Petroleum

Company

"little red book," xxv, 212 Lockheed, 277 London, 203, 228, 229, 282 Lower Libya, 9 Luther, Martin, 201

Mi-24 helicopters, 276

Magariaf, Muhammad Yusuf al, 203 Maghrabi, Mahmud Sulayman al, 43, 204 Maghrib, 3, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 65, 83; Berbers in, 77; proposed unification of, 221 Maghribi dynasties, 16 Mahdi, 23 Mahdi, Sadiq al, 224-25

Makarios, Archbishop, 220

Mali, 157, 268; expulsion of Mali

workers, 73 Maliki school, 192 Malta, xvi, 74, 130, 204, 228, 280; rela- tions with, 219-20 Mamluk dynasties, 16 Manchester, 228 Mansur, Kamal Hassan, 188 manufacturing industry, 136-39 Mao Zedong, xxv, 212 marabouts, 21, 103 Marathon Petroleum, 132 Al Marj, 7 Marsa al Burayqah, 113, 126, 130, 133, 137, 260; airport at, 168 Marsa al Hariqah, 133

Marseille: telecommunications link, 169

Marxist-Leninist ideology, 205 Marxist tenets, 231 Marzuq, 17 Mashriq, 3, 218 342
Index

Mauritania, 157, 221, 222; foreign

workers, 220; Libyan aid to, 160 Mayer, Ann Elizabeth, 202 Mecca, 22, 23, 99, 100, 102, 216 Medina, 72, 99 Mediterranean coast, 5, 8, 64-65, 69, 168, 247; and fishing, 147 Mediterranean littoral, 4 Mediterranean Sea, xvi, xxv, 54, 57, 219, 250; attacks on Italian fishing boats in, 227; climatic influence of, 68; fishing, 147

menshia, 19 Middle East, 57, 64, 95, 201, 226, 240,

246, 280, 282-83; Arabization of, 3; di- alects, 80; intervention in, 54; peace

process, 228, 231; and terrorism, 284 Middle Kingdom, 5 military aid, 230-31, 250, 273-74, 274-75

Military Balance, The, 268

military training, 264-66; compulsory,

112, 115; and women, 267-68 Mindanao, 282

Ministry of Defense, 260

Ministry of Finance, 152, 161 Ministry of Interior, 182, 185, 284

Ministry of Municipalities, 182, 185 Ministry of Petroleum, 124, 131, 132 Minoa, 6

minorities, 216

Mintoff, Dom, 219

Misratah, 26, 29, 44, 126, 134, 252, 259

missiles, FROG, 279; SA-2, 262; SA-3,

262; SA-5; 253, 276; SA-8 antiaircraft, 257; SA-5 launch sites, 262; Scud missiles, 258, 279; Sidewinder missiles, 253; Styx, 278

Mobil, 132 modernization: of rural areas, 85 monarchy (see also Idris I, King) 37-42, 203 Montgomery, Bernard, 33 Moorish culture, 16 Moors, 19

moriscos, 1

Moro National Liberation Front, xxvi Morocco, xxvi, 11, 12, 14, 20, 40, 65, 119, 221, 281; Arabization of, 74; and

Berber dynasties, 15; economic cooperation with, 40; expulsion of Moroccan

workers, 73; and Organization of Afri- can Unity, 233; proposed merger with,

xxvi, 218-19; relations with, 216, 222-23 Moscow, 276 mosques, 202 Movement for the Liberation of Angola,

223 Mozambique, 223, 232, 233 Mubarak, Husni, 54, 281

mudir, 180

mudiriyat (subdistricts), 180

muhaafiz (governor), 180 Muhammad, Prophet, 10, 13, 22, 99, 105, 201, 202; and tenets of Islam, 100 Muhammad (later Muhammad al Mahdi), 23 Muhayshi, Umar, 50, 204

mujtahid, 201 Mukhtar, Umar al, 28-29

municipal councils, 183 Municipal People's Committee, 184 Municipal Popular Congress, 186 Muntasir, Umar al, 188

al murabitun, 103 Muslim Brotherhood, 106, 199, 203, 211, 289, 290 Muslim Call Society, 209 Muslim Spain (Andalusia), 12, 15, 16 Muslims. See Islam

Mussolini, Benito, 27, 30, 31

mutasarrif, 20-21, 181

mutasarrifiyat (districts), 180

Nafi, Uqba ibn, 11 Namibia, 223 Nanuchka-class missile corvette, 253 Napoleonic Code, 192

Nasr, Sayf an (family), 45

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, xxiv, 40, 41, 43,

44, 205-6, 208, 210, 217

National Agricultural Bank, 142, 161 National Bank of Libya, 160, 161 National Command of the Revolutionary

Forces Command in the Arab Nation, 268

National Commercial Bank, 161 National Congress at Aziza (1920), 26-27

National Congress Party, 36, 37 National Constituent Assembly, 37, 175 National Front, 37 National Front for the Liberation of Angola, 223 343
Libya: A Country Study

National Front for the Salvation of Libya

(NFSL) 20, 229, 290

National General Company for Roads,

165 National General Congress (formerly

Arab Socialist Union National Congress), 187 National Industrial Contracting Company, 139

National Oil Company (NOC), 124, 130, 131, 132, 133 National Organization for Supply Commodities (NOSC), 124, 125

national security (see armed forces) National Security Force, 241, 243

National Trade Union Federation, 198

national unity, xxiv, 89, 215

nationalism, 41; and the Third Universal Theory, 208-10

nationalization, 49, 50, 51; of the eco- nomy, 122, 124-28 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization natural resources: manganese, 134; minerals, 121, 134-36; natural gas, 133-34; salt flats, 136; sodium car- bonate, 136

Natya-class minesweepers, 276

navy, xix, 259-61, 275; dependence of, on foreigners, 260; development of, 242; headquarters, 260; mission of, 260; modernization of, 243; personnel, 260, 261 N'Djamena, 55, 56, 218, 225, 250

Neolithic period, 4 Netherlands, 233

Neto, Agostinho, 223

neutrality, 43, 209 NFSL. See National Front for the Salvation of Libya.

Nicaragua, 278

Niger, 157, 247, 279, 282; expulsion of Niger workers, 73; and Fezzan border,

68; Libyan aid to, 160; Tebu in, 78 Niger Basin, 4 Niger River, 8

Nile Delta, 5 Nimitz, 253 NOC. See National Oil Company

nomads, 12, 15, 18, 83-84; and attempt

to discourage nomadic life, 75; conversion of, to Islam, 99 Nonaligned Movement, 219, 226, 233

Normans, 15 North Africa, xxvii, 4, 5-6, 8, 10, 15, 22, 25, 40, 57, 63, 64, 75, 83, 102, 246,

282; Arab conquest of, xxiii, 10-12; Arab migration to, 74; Arab rule in, 12-13; Arabs as urban elite in, 12; early

religious beliefs, 99; economy, 119; and

Islam, 102-3; relations with, xxviixxviii; and traditional society, 91; workers from, xxv; in World War II, 32-33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 219, 226, 273 North-South dimension, 174, 210, 231, 234 NOSC. See National Organization for Supply Commodities

Nouira, Hadi, 221 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

nuclear technology, 234, 279-80; studies

for power plant, 141 Numayri, Jaafar an, 56, 203, 224, 226, 280, 281 Numidia, 5

OAPEC. See Organization of Arab

Petroleum Exporting Countries Oasis group, 132 OAU. See Organization of African Unity

Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 132 October 1973 War, 53, 233, 275 Oea (now Tripoli), 5 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries Oran, 21 Orbital Transport-und-Raketen Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG), 279

Organization of African Unity (OAU),

xxvi, 40, 222, 223, 232-33; Liberation Committee, 232

Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), xix, 233 Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC), xix, 51, 130, 133, 159, 222, 233 Oshkosh Company, 277 Oto Melara, 278 OTRAG. See Orbital Transport-und- Raketen Aktiengesellschaft

Ottoman Empire, 27, 103 344
Index

Ottoman rule, xxiii, 16, 17-18, 18-21;

dual judicial system, 192 Ouadi Doum, 225, 251 Oueddei, Goukouni, 55-56, 248, 250, 251 Oujda Treaty, 218, 222

Pakistan, 36, 168, 282; and military aid, 262, 275; and nuclear technology, 279

Palestine, xviii, 8, 44, 56, 208, 253, 268,

269; aid to, 106; and terrorism, xxvi-xxvii

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),

54, 220, 223, 231-32, 282, 284

Palestinian Arabs, 220, 232

Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 278

pan-Arabism. See Arab unity

pan-Islamism, 206

Party of Ali, 13 Party of God (Hizballah), 203

pasha, 18-19

Pasha, Enver, 24 Pax Romana, 8

Pelt, Adrian, 36, 37, 175 Penal Code, 199

Pentapolis (Five Cities), 7 people's committees, 47, 184-86, 191, 211; and social change, 88

people's congresses, 190, 191

people's courts: trials in absentia in, 196-97

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

(South Yemen), 54, 57, 218, 224, 280

People's Militia (formerly Popular

Resistance Force), xix, 257, 259, 264-66, 290

"people's power," 48, 173, 190

People's Security Force (formerly Police

at the Service of the People and the Revolution), xix, 285

Peres, Shimon, 219 Permanent Maghrib Consultative Committee, 220

Persian Gulf, 131 Persian Gulf states, xxvii, 119, 151, 268;

relations with, xxvii Petro Libya, 131 petroleum, xvii, 39, 57-58; agreements

with concession holders, 133; Arab boycott, 226, 228; and balance of pay- ments, 156-57; barter of, for technical

assistance, 159; concessions to foreign

companies, 131; decline in revenues

from, 122-23, 127-28; development,

128-31; discovery of, xxiii, xxiv, 121,

130; and the European market, 128-30;

nationalization of production of, 132; and nonpetroleum economy, 121-22;

offshore fields, 130-31; pipelines, 133; and political goals, 50-52; price policy, 133; refining capacity, 133; reserves, 119; royalties and taxes, 155; and social change, 86 Petroleum Law of 1955, 131

Philippines, xxvi, 56, 282

Phoenicians, xxiii, 5, 6 Piedmont, 208

piracy, 16, 18, 19-20 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization Poland, 230; as source of military equip- ment, 273

police, xix, 240, 241, 242, 284-85; press

attacks on, 285; rank structure, 285

Police Affairs Council, 285

political parties, xviii, 43, 46; abolition

of, 38 Pompey, 5 Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, xxvi Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine—General Command, 282 Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro

Polisario, 222 Popular Resistance Force, 243 Popular Revolution (1973), 286

population, xvi, 63, 70-73; birth rate, 71; pattern, 71 Porte, the, 19-20

ports, xvii, 165-68

Portugal, 223, 232 Potsdam Conference (1945), 34

Preparatory Committee of Twenty-One,

37

Presidential Guard, 291

press, 46, 189-90, 206, 257, 285

private sector: attempt to eliminate, 125-26; and nonexploitive private property, 214-15

Prussia, 208

Ptolemy, 7 Ptolemy Apion, 7 Punic, 5-6, 7, 8 Punic Wars (264-41 and 218-201 B.C.), 5 345
Libya: A Country Study

Qadhafadam, Ahmad, 189 Qadhafadam (tribe), 189

Qadhafi, Muammar al, xviii, xxiv-xxviii, 43, 44-47, 69; abolition of tribal sys- tem, 84; alienation of Arab govern- ments from, 219; and Arab Socialist Union, 186; and Arab unity, 52-55; and armed forces, xix; asceticism of, 255-56; and the constitution, 176; coup

attempts against, 50, 201, 203, 240,

257, 290; and criminal justice, 286-89; and the Cultural Revolution, 184, 210-12; and defense spending, 272; and direct democracy, 192; and distrust of the armed forces, 256-57; and eco- nomic independence, 124; and the elite, 89; and foreign military bases, 239-40; and foreign relations, 216-34; and

growth of Libyan military, 242-43;

hostility of, toward private sector, 125-26; internal opposition to, xvii, 198-203; and Islam, 98-99, 104-6; and

the judicial system, 193; and labor unions, 197-98; and land reform, 144;

as "Leader of the Revolution," 48, 173; and Libyan rise to prominence,

xxiii; and militarization, 246-47; and

military cooperation with the Soviet Union, 276; military opposition to, 201-3; and national unity, 4; and the navy, 259-61; and nuclear development, 234; and nuclear technology,

279; opposition to, xxvii-xxviii, 49-50, 198- 205, 240; and Organization of African Unity, 233; and paramilitary

forces, 268; and people's committees,

184-86; philosophy of, 173-75; and

police, 285; political ideology of, 205-8;

quest of, for Third World leadership,

xxvi, 233; religious opposition to, 199, 201-3; and Revolutionary Command

Council, xxiv, 44-46; and revolution- ary committees, 187-88; and revolu- tionary elite, 87; role of, in government, 177-78, 188; and social change, 63-64, 85; and status of women, 93, 98; student opposition to, 115, 199- 200; and sub-Saharan Africa, 55-56; and terrorism, 281-84; and

Third Universal Theory, 208-10; and women in the armed forces, 266-67; and youth, 90

qadi, 12, 194

Qasr Ahmad, 165-66 Qasr Bu Hadi, 25

qawmiya, 217-19

Al Qayrawan, 13 Quran, 12, 63, 99, 104-5; and The Green

Book, 212; influence of, on Muammar

al Qadhafi, 205-6; interpretation of, 201-2; language of, 79-81; and sharia, 193-94; and socialism, 205-6; and

Third Universal Theory, 209

Rabat, 222

racial discrimination, 78, 231 Radio Cairo, 44

railroad (planned), 165

rainfall, 68-69, 120, 144 Ramadan, 102 Ras al Hilal, 260 Ras al Unuf, 126, 132, 133, 137, 138 Rashid, Harun ar, 13 RCC. See Revolutionary Command

Council Reagan, Ronald, 229 Reform Committee, 26

religion (see also Christianity, Islam, Judaism) xvii, 98-99, 210, 215; courts, 192-93; and the Third Universal Theory, 210

Republic of Korea (South Korea): foreign

workers, 220; housing, 110 Revolution of 1969 (see also Coup of Sep- tember 1, 1969) 85, 96, 178, 198, 214, 228,233; and foreigners in Libya, 79 Revolutionary Command Council

(RCC), xxiv, 42, 44-46, 174, 177-78,

209, 230, 259, 266; and the Arab Socialist Union, 181; and the constitution, 176; and Council of Ministers, 177-78; and Coup of September 1, 1969, 42-44; and courts, 196; and the judicial sys- tem, 193; and military leadership, 244-45; and Muammar al Qadhafi, 44-46; and people's committees,

184-86; and police, 284-85; and social change, 86-87

revolutionary committees, 48, 187-88,

191, 241; and the armed forces, 257;

military opposition to, 200-1

revolutionary guards: and the armed

forces, 257

Rida, Prince Hasan ar, 38, 42, 42-43, 46 Roberto, Holden, 223 346
Index

Roman Empire, xxiii, 8-9, 164 Romania, 231 Rome, 5, 10, 282 Rommel, Erwin, 33

Sabha, 34, 69, 136, 251, 259, 263, 282;

airport at, 168; courts, 194

Sabratah, 5, 169

Sadat, Anwar as, 52, 53-54, 224, 275, 281 Sadawi, Bashir as, 37, 38 SADR. See Saharan Arab Democratic

Republic

Sadr, Imam Musa, 55

Safar, Suleiman, 19 Sahara Bank (formerly Banco di Sicilia), 161 Sahara Desert, xvi, 4, 65; climatic in- fluence of, 68 Saharan Arab Democratic Republic

(SADR), 222, 233 Saharan Islamic state (proposed), 55

Sahel, 23, 247

Said, Ubaidalla, 14

Saladin, 16

salat (daily prayer), 100

Sandhurst, 44

sanjaks (subprovinces), 20

Sanusi, Abdullah Abid as, 45

Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali as, 21-23

Sanusi, Muhammad Idris as (later King

Idris I), 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31-32, 35 Sanusi Army (Libyan Arab Force), 241

Sanusis, xviii, xxiii, 21-23, 46, 103-4; among Tebu, 78; and first Italo-Sanusi war, 25, 26, 27; King Idris I as head

of, 36-37, 41; resistance of, to colonial

rule, xxiii; and second Italo-Sanusi war,

29; and tribal system, 81-82; and

World War II, 31-32

Sarir, 69, 126, 130, 142, 145, 146

Sarra Triangle, 30

Saudi Arabia, xxvii, 40, 55, 90, 216, 273;

relations with, xxvii sawm (fasting), 100 Sayf an Nasr, 34, 37 Scud missiles, 258, 279

secret service, 240

Secretariat of Communications, 140, 168 Secretariat of Dams and Water

Resources, 69

Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, 288

Secretariat of Interior, xix, 289

Secretariat of Planning, 153

Secretariat of the Treasury, 152

Secretary of the Internal Security Authority, 179

security, internal, 240-41, 284-91; and

crime, 286; and protection of Muammar al Qadhafi, 290-91; repression of dissent, 289-90; threat to, from for- eign workers, xxv

Seko, Mobutu Sese, 281

Selassie, Haile, 232

Senate, 38, 175

Senegal, 282

Sfar, Rachid, 221

Sforza, Carlo, 35

shahadah, 100

sharia, 12, 24, 102, 192; applications to contemporary law, 193-94; as basis of

legal system, 104; and criminal justice, 286-87; and judicial system, 105; Maliki school, 102; Qadhafi interpretation of, 201-2

Sharia Court of Appeals, 194

Sharif, Ahmad ash, 23, 24, 25

Shell, 131, 132 Shia caliphate, 14 Shia Islam, 14

Shiat Ali (Party of Ali), 13 Shishonk I, 5

shura (principle of consultation), 209

shurfa, 14

shurtah, 284

Siai-Marchetti, 278

Sicily, 14, 15

Sidi Barrani, 33 As Sidr, 133

Signal Corps, 42 Sinan Pasha, 18

Sirtica, 9, 25, 65

Sirtica Basin, 130

slaves, 19

socialism (see also The Green Book), xxiv, xxv, xxv-xxvi, 85, 176, 205-8, 213-15; and declining oil revenues, 127

Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, xv, xxv, 47-50

society: divorce, 92, 93; dowry, 92; elite, 83-87, 89, 180, 245; family, 91-93;

marriage, 92, 94-95; middle class, 85-89; patrilineal kinship, 91; poly- gyny, 92; and social change, 63-64,

85-91, 95; social mobility in, 89; social 347
Libya: A Country Study

welfare, 107-8; status of occupations in, 82; structure of, 81-85, 86; tribal basis

of, 83-84; units in, 83; young elite, 86; and youth, 90 Soko G-2AE Galebs, 263 Somali National Salvation Front, 282 South Africa, 232 South Korea. See Republic of Korea

South Yemen. See People's Democratic

Republic of Yemen

Southeast Asia, 282 Southern Libya. See Fezzan

Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), 232

Soviet Union, 203, 217, 218, 247; and Big Four, 35; military advisers from, 230, 253, 260; military aid from, 159, 250,

262; and military training, 263; and

nuclear technology, 234, 279; and Pots- dam Conference, 34; relations with, 38, 46, 174, 222, 230-31; as source of mili- tary equipment, xix-xx, xxvii, 54-55,

239-40, 243, 246, 253, 258, 259, 260, 261, 272, 273, 274, 275-76, 280; and

Third Universal Theory, 209

spahis, 19 Spain, 5, 12, 17, 18; fishing agreements

with, 147; investment in housing, 110 SPLA. See Sudanese People's Liberation Army

S.S. Queen Elizabeth II, 54

standard of living, 151

Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, 54

Steyr armored personnel carrier, 278

student opposition, 115, 199-200

sub-Saharan Africa, xxv, 23, 55-56, 78, 223, 232 Sudan, xxvi, xxvii, 4, 8, 17, 19, 23, 52, 203, 216, 268; alliance with Egypt, 224;

ancient, 14; and Arab unity, 52, 218;

military agreement with, 281-82; pro- posed merger with, xxvi, 218; Tebu in, 78 Sudanese Pople's Liberation Army

(SPLA), 224 Suez Canal, 33, 130 Suez Canal crisis, 219

Sufi, 21, 22

sulfur, 136

sunna, 202 Sunni Aghlabids, 14 Sunni caliph, 14 Sunni Islam, 13-14, 77, 105

Sunni ulama, 15 Supreme Council ofJudicial Authorities, 196

as suq al khadra (green market), 164

Surt, 27, 137, 145-46, 253, 259, 279

Susah, 7 Suwaythi, Ramadan as, 26

Syria, xxvi, 40, 54, 239; military aid to, 262, 280; and OAPEC, 233; and October 1973 War, 53; proposed merger

with, xxvi, 52, 55, 218, 218-19, 239;

relations with, 216; and terrorism, 284

Syrian Baath Party, 205, 268

Tanks, T-54, 250, 268; T-55, 250, 268, 281; T-62, 275

Tajura, 234

Talhi, Jadallah Azzuz at, 188 Tamasheq, 77 Tanzania, 56, 232, 247

taqlid, 202

tariqa, 103

taxation: of foreign petroleum companies,

155; income tax, 155; structure of, 155 Tazirbu, 126, 145 Tebu, 55, 78 Tebu Muslim tribe, 225

terrorism, xix, xxvi-xxvii, 174-75, 240, 281-84; attacks on airports in Rome

and Vienna, 282; bombing of Berlin night club, 229, 254; and expulsion of Libyan diplomats from the United

States, 229; hijacking of TWA airliner, 253; against Libyan exiles, 281 ; and re- lations with the United States and

Western Europe, 56-57; and Western

restrictions on sale of military equip- ment, 276-77

Teuchira (later Arsinoe, present-day

Tukrah), 7 Texaco, 132 Thatcher, Margaret, 228 Third Universal Theory, xviii-xix, 173, 175, 202, 208-10, 217, 231, 256 Third World, xviii, xxvi, 174, 175, 202, 209, 222, 228, 233, 234; alienation of, 175; and crime, 286; intervention in, 217; neutrality, 209; and nuclear tech- nology, 280 "Three Cities," 5 Tibesti Massif, xvi, 65, 251

tifinagh, 8 348
Index

Tobruk, 24, 33, 133, 165, 239, 241, 247, 259, 260, 275; airport at, 168 Togo, 282 Tokyo Declaration on International Terrorism, 277 topography, xvi tourism, 164

trade, xvii, 162-63; deficit, 157-58; re- strictions, 88. See also economy.

trade unions, 46

traditional handicrafts, 140 Trans World Airlines (TWA), 253, 282

transportation, xvii, 164-68; civil aviation, 68; merchant fleet, 168; motor vehicles, 165; ports, 165-68

Treaty of Friendship (1953), 273 Treaty of Lausanne (1912), 24 Treaty of Lausanne (1923), 27 Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 234, 279

Tripartite Alliance, 224, 280

Tripoli, xv, 3, 15, 29, 54, 203, 224, 225, 228, 239, 266, 275, 289; agriculture, 145, 146; air base at, xvii, 239, 262;

airport at, 168; ancient period, xxiii,

5, 14; army base at, xvii, 259; British administration, 34; burning of United

States embassy in, 229; as capital, 38, 175; capture of, by Italy, 24; and Coup

of September 1, 1969, 42; courts, 194; harbor, 165; housing, 110; Jews in, 78; and June 1967 War, 40; liberation of, 33; and manufacturing, 136; navy com- mand headquarters at, 260; Organization of African Unity conference at, 232-33; Ottoman rule, 17, 18, 19-20;

population, 63; school enrollment, 113; telecommunications link, 169; United

States air strike on, 229, 254-55; ur- banization, 71-72

Tripoli Charter, 218

Tripoli University (later Al Fatah University), 200

Tripolis (Three Cities), 5 Tripolitania, 3, 20-21, 22, 36-37, 40, 41, 245; and Almohad empire, 15; ancient

period, 5-6; Berbers in, 77; British ad- ministration of, 33; conquest of, by

Arabs, 11-12; dialects, 80; geography, 65-66; Hilalian impact on, 15; and in- dependence, 31, 32, 36-37; and Islam,

12; and Italian rule, 24-29; and

Maghrib, 220; mineral resources,

134-36; and Moorish culture, 16; and

national unity, 40, 41; and Ottoman

rule, 18, 20-21; and petroleum, 130; and piracy, 20; population, 71; and

Revolutionary Command Council

membership, 245; Roman rule, 8-10; and Sanusi order, 103; and Tunisian

border, 68; and United Nations, 34,

35; and World War II, 31, 32 "Tripolitanian Nation," 26 Tuareg, xvi, 8, 76, 77, 282; and marriage, 92 Tumart, Ibn, 15 Tunis, 15, 16, 18, 20, 54

Tunisia, xxvi, 18, 24, 34, 65, 219, 268; Arabization, 74; domestics, 97; econ- omy, 119; expulsion of Tunisian

workers, 73, 157; fishing agreements,

147; foreign workers, 220, 221; and in- surgent groups, 282; and Organization

of Arab Unity, 40; and petroleum, 130; proposed merger with, xxvi, 54-55,

218, 218-19, 220-21, 222, 239; rela- tions with, 216, 221; and Tripolitanian border, 68 Turayki, Abdul Salaam, 204

Turkey, 24, 25, 38, 42; foreign workers,

220; housing, 110 TWA. See Trans World Airlines Tyre. See Lebanon

UAA. See United African Airlines Ubaydi, Abdallah, 49 Uganda, 56, 223-24, 256, 277; invasion

of, by Tanzania, 247, 248 ulama, 21, 22, 201 Umar, Miftah al Usta, 188 Umar al Mukhtar, 28-29 Umar al Mukhtar Club, 37 Umayyad caliph of Damascus, 12 Umayyads, 13 Umm Durman, 281 Umma Bank (formerly Banco di Roma),

161 UN. ^ United Nations United African Airlines (UAA), 168 United Arab Emirates, 131 United Kingdom of Libya, xxiv, 37 United Nations, xix, 34-37, 231-32; aid from, 156; and the economy, 120; Food

and Agriculture Organization, 146, 232; General Assembly, 175; and 349
Libya: A Country Study

human rights, 288-89; peacekeeping

forces, 232; population estimates, 70-71; report to, on prisons, 289; Security Council, 232; Technical Assistance Board, 38-39 United Nations General Assembly,

34-37, 175 United Nations Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

United States, xxvi, xxvi-xxvii, 35, 36, 42, 134, 218; aid from, 121, 123, 156; air

strike on Benghazi and Tripoli, xxvii, 201, 216-17, 233, 263; and Chadian

war, 209; embassy, storming of, 57; evacuation of military bases, 274, 275;

freeze of Libyan assets, 159; hostile en- counters with, 240, 247, 252-55, 260; Libyan students in, 114, 211, 234; liq- uidation of investments in Libya, 159; maneuvers in Gulf of Sidra, 229, 276;

military aid from, 273; military bases, xxiv, 38, 40, 46, 239, 243, 245, 273, 274; and nuclear technology, 279; and

piracy, 22; policy of refusing to ship arms to Libya, xx, 277; relations with,

42, 56-57, 174, 222, 226, 228-29; as source of military equipment, 259; territorial waters dispute with, 228-29; ter- rorism against, 56-57, 240, 284; and

Third Universal Theory, 209; trade

with, 163; workers in Libya, 79 United States Air Force, 269 United States Arms Control and Disar- mament Agency, 257, 273, 276 United States Central Intelligence

Agency, 203 United States Department of State, 262, 282 United States Geological Survey, 134 United States Sixth Fleet, 252-53, 277

Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 288

University of Benghazi, 106, 200

University of Libya, 113, 209 Upper Egypt, 200 Upper Libya, 9 Uqba ibn Nafi Air Base (formerly Wheelus

Air Base), 262, 263 uranium, 234, 279 urban social structure, 86

urbanization, 71-71, 82-83; attempts to stem, 85; and kinship ties, 95

Urutu armored vehicles, 278

Vandal period, 10

ventimilli, 30 Vienna, 205, 282

vilayet (province), 20 Volcano, The (Al Burkan), 204

Volpi, Count Giuseppe, 27

Wadi Ajal, 8 Wadi ash Shati, 121, 134

wadis, 69 Wahda Bank, 161

wali (governor general), 20 Warsaw Pact, 275, 276 Washington, 229

water resources, 69, 126 water supply, 120 Wavell, Archibald, 33 West Africa, 23 Western Europe, xvi, 232, 233, 234; re- lations with, 226-28; telecommunications link, 169 Western Libya. See Tripolitania Western Sahara, 220, 221, 222, 223, 226 Western world, xxvi, 56-57, 174, 175, 266; secular courts, 192 Wheelus Air Base, 38, 46, 239, 273, 274 women: in the armed forces, 98, 266-68; and compulsory military training, 112, 190; and conscription, 264; and education, 110, 113; emancipation of, 96; equality for, 96; and feminist organizations, 96; and Islam, 100; in the labor

force, 95, 96, 97-98; literacy rate of, 111; and marriage, 92-93; military

training of, 190; participation of, in political system, 191; role of, 215; status

of, 63-64, 91, 95-98; status of, among

Tuareg, 77; suffrage, 96, 176; and

traditional dress, 96; in traditional society, 93-95; and university enroll- ment, 114 Women's General Union. See Jamahiriya

Women's Federation

workers, 214; in Arab Socialist Union,

182; and employers, relationship be- tween, 214; participation of, in management, 151, 198 "workers' committees," 125 World Bank, 152; population estimate, 70 350
Index

World War I, 30 World War II, xxiii, 32-33, 241

Xingu transports, 278

Yathrib. See Medina

Yugoslavia, 230; military aid from, 262, 275; as source of military equipment,

261, 263, 274, 277, 278; technical as- sistance from, 159

Yunis, Abu Bakr, 188

Az Zahf al Akhdar (The Green March),

189-90, 257

Zaire, 222, 226, 279, 281, 282

zakat (almsgiving), 100

Zaltan, 39 Zambia, 232

Zawilah, 13

zawiya, 22, 103 Az Zawiyah, 133, 259, 263 Zimbabwe, 223, 233 Zionism {see also Israel), 46, 231-32

Zirids, 14, 15

Zlitan Women Teachers' Institute, 268 Zuwarah, 133, 138, 147, 211 Az Zuwaytinah, 133

351
Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-174 Guinea

550-98 Albania 550-82 Guyana

550-44 Algeria 550-151 Honduras

550-59 Angola 550-165 Hungary

550-73 Argentina 550-21 India 550-169 Australia 550-154 Indian Ocean

550-176 Austria 550-39 Indonesia 550-175 Bangladesh 550-68 Iran 550-170 Belgium 550-31 Iraq 550-66 Bolivia 550-25 Israel 550-20 Brazil 550-182 Italy 550-168 Bulgaria 550-69 Ivory Coast 550-61 Burma 550-30 Japan

550-50 Cambodia 550-34 Jordan

550-166 Cameroon 550-56 Kenya

550-159 Chad 550-81 Korea, North

550-77 Chile 550-41 Korea, South 550-60 China 550-58 Laos 550-26 Colombia 550-24 Lebanon

550-33 Commonwealth Caribbean, 550-38 Liberia

Islands of the 550-91 Congo 550-85 Libya 550-90 Costa Rica 550-172 Malawi

550-152 Cuba 550-45 Malaysia 550-22 Cyprus 550-161 Mauritania 550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-79 Mexico

550-52 Ecuador 550-49 Morocco

550-43 Egypt 550-64 Mozambique

550-150 El Salvador 550-88 Nicaragua 550-28 Ethiopia 550-157 Nigeria 550-167 Finland 550-94 Oceania

550-155 Germany, East 550-48 Pakistan 550-173 Germany, Fed. Rep. of 550-46 Panama

550-153 Ghana 550-156 Paraguay

550-87 Greece 550-185 Persian Gulf States 550-78 Guatemala 550-42 Peru
550-72

550-162

550-181 550-160

550-51

Philippines Poland

Portugal

Romania

Saudi Arabia 550-70 550-180

550-184

550-86

550-93

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Somalia

South Africa 550-95 550-179

550-96

550-27

550-47

Soviet Union

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Syria

550-62

550-53 550-89 550-80 550-74

Tanzania

Thailand

Tunisia Turkey

Uganda

550-97

550-71 550-32 550-183 550-99

Uruguay

Venezuela Vietnam

Yemens, The

Yugoslavia 550-67

550-75

550-171

Zaire Zambia

Zimbabwe

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