A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

MARCH 2013

For all those lost in Iraq

Each one lost is everyone’s loss you see

Each one lost is a vital part of you and me

 —Bruce Cockburn

CONTENTS

v

Foreword ..........................................................................vii

Preface ...............................................................................ix

1. OVERSIGHT IN A WAR ZONE ..............................1

SIGIR Audits .......................................................................1

SIGIR Inspections ...............................................................4

SIGIR Investigations ..........................................................6

Other SIGIR Oversight Work .............................................7

2. WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT .............

 EFFECT ............................................................................ 9

The Iraqi Interviews ........................................................10

The U.S. Senior Leader Interviews .................................20

The Congressional Interviews ........................................30

3. NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY ....37

Who Was in Charge? .......................................................38

Who Did the Work? .........................................................47

4. HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT ..................55

Major U.S. Funds .............................................................57

Smaller U.S. Funding Streams .........................................68

5. WHERE THE MONEY WENT....................................71

Planning To Spend ...........................................................71

Infrastructure ...................................................................75

Security and Rule of Law ................................................90

Governance ....................................................................105

Economy .........................................................................114

6. PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM ......................121

Responding to Deficiencies ..........................................122

A Plausible Solution ......................................................125

7. FINAL LESSONS ......................................................129

Afterword ......................................................................133

Appendix A: Draft USOCO Bill ......................................135

Appendix B: Tables ........................................................147

Acronyms .......................................................................155

Endnotes ........................................................................159

Sources for Figures .....................................................168

Sources for Tables.......................................................170

CONTENTS

vii

FOREWORD

To the Members of the United States Congress:

We commend to your attention Learning From Iraq: A Final 

Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

This important work brings together a wealth of information and 

analysis to identify important lessons learned from the rebuilding 

program in Iraq—lessons that could help improve significantly the 

U.S. approach to future stabilization and reconstruction operations 

(SROs). Drawing from numerous interviews with past and present 

Iraqi leaders, senior U.S. policymakers and practitioners, members 

of Congress, and others who were involved with Iraq, this report 

lays out in detail the enormous U.S. reconstruction effort, which 

completed thousands of projects and programs since 2003, but in 

which there were many lessons learned the hard way. 

Learning From Iraq describes at length the challenges 

encountered by the soldiers, diplomats, and other civilians who 

served in Iraq. The nine-year rebuilding program, the second 

largest SRO in U.S. history (after Afghanistan), expended about 

$60 billion in U.S. taxpayer dollars and billions more in Iraqi 

funds. Over $25 billion of that was committed to the training and 

equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces, with the balance funding 

everything from major infrastructure construction in the electricity 

and water sectors to local governance programs and small 

Provincial Reconstruction Team projects. 

We worked closely with Inspector General Bowen and 

his team during our time together in Iraq, and we found their 

oversight and reporting very useful in providing insights into 

the execution of our respective missions. While SIGIR’s 

audits, inspections, and investigations addressed the rebuilding 

program’s challenges, its lessons-learned reports, of which this is 

the ninth and last, also identified many of the important solutions 

that were developed. 

Of course, a lesson is not truly learned until it is incorporated 

in policies, practices, regulations, and, in some cases, laws. Now is 

the time to draw on the lessons from Iraq as we seek to improve 

the way the United States plans, executes, and oversees SROs. 

We salute the Inspector General as he completes his mission, 

and we thank the members of the SIGIR team for their superb 

contributions to the effort in Iraq. Indeed, they were among the 

hundreds of thousands of great Americans, Coalition country 

members, and Iraqis who served so courageously, skillfully, and 

selflessly to help provide a new opportunity to the citizens of the 

Land of the Two Rivers. It was the greatest of privileges for us to 

serve with all of them.

Respectfully submitted,

General David H. Petraeus Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker

United States Army (Retired)

FOREWORD

PREFACE

Construction offi cial briefs the Inspector General on the status of construction 

at the Nassiriya Prison during an on-site inspection in 2008.

Learning From Iraq: A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction culminates SIGIR’s nine-year mission overseeing Iraq’s reconstruction. It serves as a follow-up to our previous comprehensive review of the rebuilding eff ort, Hard Lessons: Th e Iraq Reconstruction Experience. 

Th is study provides much more than a recapitulation of what the 

reconstruction program accomplished and what my offi ce found in 

the interstices. While examining both of these issues and many more, Learning From Iraq importantly captures the eff ects of the rebuilding program as derived from 44 interviews with the recipients (the Iraqi leadership), the executors (U.S. senior leaders), and the providers (congressional members). Th ese interviews piece together an instructive picture of what was the largest stabilization and reconstruction operation ever undertaken by the United States (until recently overtaken by Afghanistan). 

Th e body of this report reveals countless details about the use 

of more than $60 billion in taxpayer dollars to support programs and projects in Iraq. It articulates numerous lessons derived from SIGIR’s 220 audits and 170 inspections, and it lists the varying consequences meted out from the 82 convictions achieved through our investigations. It urges and substantiates necessary reforms that could improve stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it highlights the fi nancial benefi ts accomplished by SIGIR’s work: more than 

$1.61 billion from audits and over $191 million from investigations. 

Since early 2004, my offi ce carried out an unprecedented mission 

under extraordinarily adverse circumstances. Hundreds of auditors, inspectors, and investigators served with SIGIR during that span, traveling across Iraq to answer a deceptively facile question: what 

happened to the billions of dollars expended to rebuild that country? 

Our work became increasingly more diffi cult as the security 

situation deteriorated, the eff ect of which forced our mission to 

become quite literally oversight under fi re. Th e collapse of order in Ira

caused an unacceptably high human toll: at least 719 people lost theilives while working on reconstruction-related activities. SIGIR suff erfrom this toll, with one auditor killed by indirect fi re in 2008 and fi ve 

others wounded the year before. 

In late 2003, the burgeoning rebuilding program required more 

oversight: that was the Congress’ s view. Th anks to the vigilant eff orts 
LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

x

of Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, Senator Susan Collins of 

Maine, and many others, the Congress created and undergirded an 

unprecedented inspector general office—the Coalition Provisional 

Authority Inspector General (later SIGIR)—with the power and 

resources sufficient to provide independent, cross-jurisdictional oversight. 

The CPA-IG came into being through a November 2003 

congressional act that also provided over $18.4 billion in taxpayer 

dollars for Iraq’s reconstruction. Total appropriations for the rebuilding 

of Iraq eventually would crest $60 billion. In late January 2004, the 

Secretaries of Defense and State appointed me to lead the mission of 

auditing and investigating the CPA’s programs and projects.

During my initial visit to Baghdad in early February 2004, I 

quickly became aware of the immense task before me. Walking the 

halls of the Republican Palace, a sprawling structure on the Tigris 

River constructed by Saddam Hussein and now housing the CPA, 

I overheard someone say: “We can’t do that anymore. There’s a new 

inspector general here.” That offhand remark augured an oversight 

mission imbued with challenges of a scope well beyond what anyone 

then could have imagined.

I made several more trips to Iraq that year—the total would 

eventually tally to 34—deploying teams of auditors and investigators 

and engaging with leadership to address the fraud, waste, and abuse 

that we were uncovering. Pursuant to a presidential decision, the 

CPA closed its doors in late June 2004, with the Department of 

State assuming formal control of the rebuilding program. Although 

sovereignty passed back to the Iraqis, the U.S.-led reconstruction effort 

was just ramping up. The delays inherent in contracting out a sum as 

large as $18.4 billion meant that the CPA actually spent very little of it. 

In mid-2004, the new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, 

assessed the troubled situation. He determined that about $3 billion 

should be reprogrammed to address the rapidly declining security 

situation. Thus began a stark shift away from the CPA’s large civic 

infrastructure strategy to a course aimed at improving the country’s 

military and police forces. This sea change in spending stemmed 

from the well-founded belief that Iraq’s rule-of-law system required 

immediate and substantial aid. Creating the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq bolstered the new approach, bringing 

Lieutenant General David Petraeus back to Iraq to lead it. Over 

the next eight years, MNSTC-I and its successors would oversee 

expenditures in excess of $24 billion to train, equip, and employ Iraq’s 

security forces. 

The earlier-than-expected end of the CPA triggered a statutory 

provision requiring my office to close by December 2004. Though 

barely having stood up, I now started to stand down. By October, my 

staff had dropped to 15, when the Congress acted again, passing a bill 

transforming the CPA-IG into SIGIR and expanding our mission to 

reach more of the rebuilding money. We reversed course and moved 

into an accelerated expansion mode.

In January 2005, SIGIR released a major audit exposing the 

vulnerabilities inherent in managing a multibillion-dollar rebuilding 

program in an unstable environment. The audit documented the poor 

controls over billions disbursed from the Development Fund for Iraq, 

which left that Iraqi money subject to fraud, waste, and abuse. Future 

SIGIR investigations revealed fraud in the use of the DFI, and people 

went to prison for it, but our subsequent audits showed that waste was 

the paramount problem. Ultimately, we estimate that the Iraq program 

wasted at least $8 billion.

In mid-2005, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad arrived to replace 

Ambassador Negroponte, who left to serve as the first Director of 

National Intelligence. Ambassador Khalilzad embraced SIGIR’s 

oversight work, partnering with us in a way that would generally 

continue for the remainder of our mission. He agreed with our view that 

the cost-plus design-build contracts then in place were inappropriate 

for the mission and too wasteful. Ambassador Khalilzad asked 

the Department of Defense, which controlled those contracts, to 

terminate them and implement fixed-cost vehicles in their place. The 

challenges encountered in pushing this policy exposed interagency 

weaknesses within the Iraq program’s ad hoc structure. Pursuant to a 

May 2004 presidential order, Defense managed the contracts, while 

State managed rebuilding policy. Given that the operators within these 

respective “stove-pipes” answered to different masters with different 

agendas, program and project discontinuities and disconnects became 

de rigueur. 

Seeking to remedy these palpable weaknesses, Ambassador 

Khalilzad created the Provincial Reconstruction Team program, similar 

to one he developed in Afghanistan, where he previously served as 
Ambassador. Th ough desultory at inception, the PRT program picked up speed in 2006 and, along with the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, eventually became a signifi cant innovative eff ort. 

SIGIR’s audits of the PRTs and the CERP exposed unsurprising weaknesses, but they also spotted eff ective progress achieved by both programs. We found that PRT success depended chiefl y on the performance of the PRT leader, while CERP success required limited project scopes and continuity of oversight. 

Worsening security problems ultimately swamped Ambassador 

Khalilzad’s plans. Oil and electricity outputs sagged, while al-Qaeda in Iraq expanded, fomenting Sunni-Shia confl icts. By the spring of 2007, when Ambassador Ryan Crocker arrived as the new Chief of Mission, Iraq was in the throes of a virtual civil war. Foreign fi ghters fl ooded 

the country, and improvised explosive devices wreaked daily death and havoc. As Ambassador Crocker put it, we very nearly lost Iraq. 

General Petraeus returned again to Iraq in early 2007 as 

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, to implement a new strategy called the “surge.” Th is comprehensive, multilayered approach entailed, among other things, a deeper engagement with restive Sunnis through reconciliation initiatives and the “Sons of Iraq” program, a stronger emphasis on CERP-funded local rebuilding projects that better met Iraqi needs, and the deployment of over 25,000 more troops into the country. While attacks and deaths initially spiked, the strategy succeeded in signifi cantly suppressing violence. 

Importantly, both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, like 

Ambassador Khalilzad before them, believed in the value of SIGIR’s oversight and teamed with us to target areas that most crucially needed it. SIGIR’s in-country presence rose to more than 40 auditors and inspectors and more than 10 investigators. Th ey worked out of the Republican Palace, which was subject to weekly, if not daily, rocket attacks.

By the fall of 2007, eff orts to secure the Iraqi people, pursue 

extremists, and foster reconciliation had combined to improve conditions substantially. Expanding the “Awakening” movement to all of Anbar province, and then to wherever Sunni insurgents or Shia militia existed, catalyzed reconciliation eff orts across the country. Th e 

Sons of Iraq program expended about $370 million in CERP funds to employ about 100,000 Sunni insurgents and some Shia militia, eff ectively removing them from the battlespace. A revised Iraqioriented reconstruction program, refl ected in the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq’s “Iraqi First” policy, fed economic potential into local towns and villages. CERP spending on reconstruction markedly increased, supporting a renewed “clear, hold, and build” program. Th e Embassy extended the reach of the PRT eff ort, implementing an “embedded PRT” initiative, which doubled the program’s capacity. A

of these infusions, expansions, and innovations strategically coalesced to roll back the deadly tide that had submerged Iraq.

Th roughout this period, SIGIR produced an average of six audits 

and at least six inspections per quarter. My Assistant Inspector Genefor Inspections implemented innovative practices to good eff ect. 

Each of his teams included auditors and engineers, with every report examining a project’s fi nancial and structural aspects. Th is produced propitious results, including the discovery by SIGIR engineers of project defects, the correction of which yielded savings of taxpayer dollars. Our audit teams addressed issues crucial to the maturing program such as how to transfer projects to Iraqi control and how Ira

should sustain them thereafter. 

In 2008, SIGIR’s investigative branch boosted production. 

Th anks to the leadership of a new and highly experienced Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, our case inventory burgeoned, 

with indictments and convictions increasing. Th ese positive results came about through several new programs, including coordinated eff orts to trace funds through special means and the building of better partnerships with domestic and international law-enforcement agenci

In 2009, we partnered with the Department of Justice to impleme

an unprecedented program dubbed the SIGIR Prosecutorial Initiativor SIGPRO. It involved hiring our own prosecutors and placing them within DoJ’s fraud section where they aggressively pursued SIGIR cases. SIGPRO proved a great success, yielding a rapid rise in prosecutions and many more convictions. SIGIR’s Investigations Directorate more than doubled its fi nancial results, indictments, and convictions in just over two years. 

Transition was the theme of 2010 and 2011. U.S. and Iraqi 

authorities focused on implementing the Security Agreement and the Security Framework Agreement. Th e former laid out a timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal, while the latter established a process for continuing bilateral cooperation on Iraq’s reconstruction and 
LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

xii

SIGIR most succeeded when it helped the relief and reconstruction 

mission improve. Our audits, inspections, and lessons-learned reports did 

that by identifying program challenges and offering recommendations 

for positive change. SIGIR’s reporting points to a crucial bottom line: 

the United States must reform its approach to planning, executing, and 

overseeing stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Respectfully submitted,

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Inspector General

SIGIR’s Average Quarterly 

Statistics, 2004–2013

Published Reports 

12.2

Indictments and 

Convictions

5.2

Congressional Testimonies

1.0 

Agency Costs

$6.8 Million

Financial Benefits

$50.1 Million

recovery needs. The overarching challenge at this juncture involved 

transmogrifying a support system largely sustained by Defense to 

one handled exclusively by State. SIGIR played a role in this process 

through audits of the Police Development Program, which revealed 

weaknesses in planning and coordination. From a taxpayer perspective, 

these reviews had good effect. State downsized the program to levels 

the Iraqis wanted, saving hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. 

Taken together, the following seven chapters of Learning From 

Iraq provide the most comprehensive picture of the reconstruction 

program yet produced. Chapter 1 synopsizes the prodigious work 

SIGIR’s auditors, investigators, and inspectors accomplished over the 

past nine years, providing best practices each directorate developed. The 

second chapter presents key primary source material on the effects of 

the rebuilding program drawn from interviews with Iraqis, U.S. senior 

leaders, and congressional members. They paint a telling tableau of a 

program fraught with challenge.

Chapters 3 and 4 describe the many ad hoc entities that managed 

the Iraq rebuilding program, denoting who did the actual work and 

detailing the varying funding streams that supported thousands of 

programs and projects. Chapter 5, the report’s lengthiest, thoroughly 

lays out where the $60 billion in U.S. funds for Iraq went, with 

extensive explications of how the money was used to rebuild the 

country’s infrastructure, security system, governance capacity, and 

economy, punctuated by project vignettes that provide brief but 

piquant looks into the program’s wide scope. The penultimate chapter 

frames a short history of attempted reforms that sought to respond to 

management problems encountered during the Iraq program. Learning 

From Iraq concludes with seven final lessons that SIGIR’s collective 

work points to and supports. 

These seven lessons and our substantial body of work stand as 

our legacy. We saved money through audits, improved construction 

through inspections, and punished criminals through investigations. As 

pleased as I am with the SIGIR teams that achieved these important 

results, I view our lessons-learned reports, of which this is the last, as 

equally important. 

Seven Final Lessons from Iraq

1. Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, 

and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during 

stabilization and reconstruction operations.

2. Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and 

focus first on small programs and projects.

3. Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, securing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) 

and agreements to sustain completed projects after their transfer.

4. Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information 

management systems that all SRO participants use.

5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation’s 

inception.

6. Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction 

Team program, that produced successes when used judiciously.

7. Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, and have backup plans ready to go. 
1

OVERSIGHT IN A WAR ZONE 1

When SIGIR began work in early 2004 as the Coalition Provisional 

Authority Inspector General, it was the only inspector general office 

within the U.S. government possessing oversight responsibilities 

encompassing several federal agencies. Over time, the Congress 

expanded SIGIR’s mission so that, by 2008, its mandate required 

reporting on all reconstruction funds regardless of provenance. 

During most of its nine-year lifespan, SIGIR maintained the 

largest on-the-ground presence of any U.S. auditing or investigative 

agency operating in Iraq. In 2008, the number of SIGIR personnel in 

country exceeded 50. Three operational directorates accomplished the 

oversight work: Audits, Inspections, and Investigations. They had these 

common objectives:

R to deter the misuse of taxpayer dollars through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse

R to promote improved economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 

Iraq reconstruction program

The Iraq reconstruction program provided a plethora of lessons about 

what happens when stabilization and reconstruction operations commence 

without sufficient systemic support in place. Among the most salient is 

the need to provide a robust in-country team of auditors, inspectors, and 

investigators from the operation’s outset. A substantial IG presence will 

deter or detect fraud, waste, and abuse, improving mission efficiency and 

effectiveness. Fraud is the intentional wrongdoing by persons seeking to 

enrich themselves. Waste is the product of poor planning and weak controls. 

Abuse is bad management. The absence of a strong oversight force early in 

the Iraq program allowed too much of each to occur. 

SIGIR Audits

Within a month of his appointment, the Inspector General completed 

2 trips to Iraq: 32 more would follow. The urgent oversight needs 

identified during those initial visits led him to deploy two teams of 

four auditors each to Baghdad, along with investigative support. Those 

teams were on the ground and working by mid-March 2004, with the 

agency’s first quarterly report to the Congress produced by the end of 

that month. 

SIGIR’s auditing presence in Iraq rapidly expanded from 2005 to 

2007. Buttressed by the development of innovative oversight practices, 

auditors focused on quickly producing performance reviews rather 

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2

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

than slow-moving ex post facto financial audits. By forming the Iraq 

Inspectors General Council, which met quarterly for seven years, the 

Inspector General emphasized coordination among executive branch 

audit and investigative agencies working in Iraq. This improved the 

planning and execution of oversight activities. 

At its peak in 2008, SIGIR had 35 auditors permanently stationed 

in Baghdad conducting audits to root out fraud, waste, and abuse. This 

in-country presence received steady support from audit managers based 

in Arlington, Virginia, who regularly traveled to Iraq to strengthen 

specific reviews. 

SIGIR’s audit plan sought to determine whether reconstruction 

managers effectively and efficiently oversaw programs and operations 

funded by the United States. Further, it aimed at promoting on-theground change through near-real-time reporting, producing audits at 

an average rate of six per quarter, usually within 90 to 120 days of an 

audit’s announcement. 

From 2004 to 2013, SIGIR published 220 audit reports covering 

a wide variety of reconstruction issues, including contingency 

contracting, the promotion of democracy, the transfer and sustainment 

TABLE 1.1

SIGIR Summary of Performance

As of March 2013 

Audits Cumulative

Reports Issued 220

Recommendations Issued 487

Potential Savings if Agencies Implement SIGIR Recommendations to:

Put Funds to Better Use ($ Millions) $973.62

Disallow Costs SIGIR Questioned ($ Millions) $640.68

Inspections

Project Assessments Issued 170

Limited On-site Assessments Issued 96

Aerial Assessments 923

Investigations

Investigations Initiated 637

Investigations Closed or Referred 562

Open (Active) Investigations 75

Arrests 41

Indictments 104

Convictions 82

Sentencings 68

Monetary Results ($ Millions) $191.2

Hotline Contacts

Email 413

Fax 19

Mail 30

Referrals 26

SIGIR Website 200

Telephone 84

Walk-in 112

Total Hotline Contacts 884

Other Products

Congressional Testimony 35

Lessons Learned Reports 9

Special Reports 3

Evaluation Reports 1

Quarterly Reports 35

Best Practices for SRO Audit Programs

1. Focus early audit attention on contracting, quality-assurance, and 

quality-control resources dedicated to programs and projects.

2. Develop a systematic approach to reporting on the sustainability 

of projects.

3. Develop an integrated database of contracts, grants, and projects 

to keep track of what is procured and delivered.

4. Develop close working relationships with senior reconstruction 

managers to encourage improved program implementation.

5. Ensure that implementing agencies develop program goals, with 

measurable milestones and outcomes.

6. Provide strong oversight of programs involving cash payments to 

host-country contractors or officials.

7. Develop expertise in grants management to improve oversight of 

State and USAID programs.
OVERSIGHT IN A WAR ZONE

3

of completed projects, contract award fees, the management of 

programs and projects, and the development of Iraq’s security forces. 

SIGIR’s audits questioned about $641 million in costs and identified 

an additional $974 million in funds to be put to better use—a 

combined potential financial benefit of $1.61 billion. As of September 

2012, the actual savings to the government from renegotiated contracts, 

refunds, and operational savings resulting from SIGIR findings had 

reached nearly $645 million (see Figure 1.1). 

Among others, SIGIR’s audits effected these positive changes within 

the Iraq program:

R In October 2005, a report examining contract award fees found 

that none of the contracts reviewed contained the required criteria 

for awarding fees. Subsequent actions by Defense remedied the 

deficiency. 

R In January and April 2006, three reports reviewed the transfer of 

completed construction projects to the GOI, finding that U.S. 

agencies had policies on asset transfer applicable at the local level, 

but none addressing the GOI ministries responsible for sustaining 

completed projects. The Congress responded by requiring U.S. 

agencies to certify that they had implemented an asset-transfer 

agreement that secured GOI commitments to maintaining U.S.-

funded infrastructure. 

R In January 2008, SIGIR issued a report on the Commander’s 

The Anham Contract: Oversight Was an Oversight

In September 2007, Defense awarded a 

$300 million contract to Anham, LLC, to operate 

and maintain two warehouse and distribution 

facilities, one near Baghdad International Airport 

and the other at the Port of Umm Qasr. Two 

years later, the contract had incurred obligations 

of approximately $119.1 million, with Anham 

subcontractors providing at least $55 million in 

supplies and services. 

A SIGIR audit found weak contract oversight 

practices that left the government vulnerable to 

improper overcharges:

R The Defense Contract Audit Agency failed to 

review Anham’s cost-estimating system. 

R The Defense Contract Management 

Agency recommended approval of Anham’s 

purchasing system, despite identifying 

significant gaps in documentation. 

R Contracting officer’s representatives failed to 

effectively review invoices. 

SIGIR questioned almost 40% of the costs it 

reviewed. These overbillings by an Anham subcontractor were especially egregious: 

R $900 for a control switch valued at $7.05 (a 

12,666% markup)

R $80 for a small segment of drain pipe valued 

at $1.41 (a 5,574% markup)

R $75 for a different piece of plumbing 

equipment also valued at $1.41 (a 5,219% 

markup)

R $3,000 for a circuit breaker valued at $94.47 

(a 3,076% markup)

SIGIR Audit 11-022

Anham billed the U.S. government $80 for this PVC plumbing 

elbow, 5,574% more than a competitor’s offer of $1.41.

R $4,500 for another kind of circuit breaker 

valued at $183.30 (a 2,355% markup)

SIGIR further found that there had been 

questionable competition practices, inappropriate 

bundling of subcontractor items, and close working relationships—with possible ownership affiliations—between Anham and its subcontractors.

In light of these many deficiencies, SIGIR 

questioned the entire contract and recommended 

that the U.S. military initiate a systematic review 

of billing practices on all Anham contracts in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. At the time of SIGIR’s review 

in 2011, Anham held about $3.9 billion in U.S. 

government contracts. That number has since 

increased.

Includes $387.00 million 

in funding for the 

Police Development 

Program, which is 

overseen by the 

Department of State 

Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs.

Potential Savings 

($1.61B total)

Actual Savings

$973.62

$640.68

$644.89 Includes $508.66 

million on the 

DynCorp 

police-training 

contract as a result 

of renegotiated 

price proposals, 

rejected invoices, 

refunds from the 

contractor, and 

operational savings.

Includes $113.40 million 

in questioned costs 

under a 2007 contract 

with Anham LLC to 

provide supplies 

and services.

Dollars Saved 

and 

Recovered 

Funds That 

Could Be Put 

to Better Use

Questioned 

Costs 

Potential and Actual Financial Accomplishments From SIGIR Audits

$ Millions

FIGURE 1.1

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more than $1.6 billion in 

potential savings and thus 

far have resulted in almost 

$645 million in actual 

savings.
LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

4

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Khan Bani Sa’ad Prison: Waste in the Desert

Years of neglect, war damage, and looting left 

Diyala province’s prisons in deplorable condition. 

In May 2004, the CPA awarded Parsons Delaware 

an $80 million task order to build the Khan Bani 

Sa’ad Prison, which would add 3,600 beds to the 

province’s correctional capacity. 

In February 2006, three months after the 

scheduled completion date, Parsons submitted 

notification that its new projected completion 

target was September 2008—a 990-day schedule slippage. In June 2006, the U.S. government 

terminated the contract for “failure to make 

sufficient progress on the project” and “massive 

cost overruns.” 

Still believing the prison was wanted by the 

Iraqi Ministry of Justice, reconstruction managers 

awarded three successor contracts to complete 

the work. In June 2007, the U.S. government terminated all work on the project for convenience, 

citing security issues. 

At the time of termination, the United States 

had spent almost $40 million, but no building 

was complete. Two months later, USACE unilaterally transferred the unfinished project to the 

GOI even though Ministry of Justice officials told 

USACE they did not plan to “complete, occupy, 

or provide security for” the poorly and partially 

constructed facility. 

SIGIR visited the site in June 2008, finding it 

neither secured nor occupied by the GOI. SIGIR’s 

assessment documented poor-quality workmanship by Parsons, including many potentially dangerous conditions. Several sections were recommended for demolition. The site still sits dormant 

in Diyala and apparently will never be used.

SIGIR PA-08-138 and Audit 08-019

The Khan Bani Sa’ad Prison was abandoned after the United 

States spent almost $40 million on it

Emergency Response Program, finding that an increasing amount 

of CERP funds was being spent on large projects rather than 

small-scale urgent projects, as required by CERP guidance. The 

Congress responded to SIGIR’s finding in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for FY 2009, setting a limit of $2 million for any 

CERP project. In the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization 

Act for FY 2011, the Congress acted further, requiring that program 

funds be used only for small-scale projects. 

Our audit findings identified a number of critical deficiencies in 

reconstruction planning, implementation, and oversight, making 

recommendations for improvement. These problems ranged from 

poor quality-control programs, ineffective quality-assurance programs, 

lack of sufficient in-country contracting officer representatives, 

inadequate invoice review procedures, and poor controls over funds 

such that vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse were significant. 

Departmental responses almost always concurred with SIGIR’s 

findings, usually agreeing to implement all recommended changes.

SIGIR Inspections

During his initial visits to Iraq in 2004, the Inspector General heard 

conflicting stories about U.S.-funded stabilization and reconstruction 

projects. On the one hand, U.S. agencies and private construction 

companies commonly reported construction projects as success stories. 

But many Iraqis and some U.S. military and civilian personnel privately 

registered strong complaints about the program. They pointed to 

unwanted projects and to equipment that was either too sophisticated 

for the Iraqis to use or of very poor quality.

SIGIR auditors began to discover inadequately designed projects, which 

were poorly constructed and unsustainable. With billions of taxpayer 

dollars at stake, the Inspector General took action to expand SIGIR’s 

oversight capacity. In June 2005, he created the Inspections Directorate to 

assess and report on reconstruction work by visiting project sites. 
OVERSIGHT IN A WAR ZONE

5

Over the next five years, inspection teams composed of experienced 

engineers and auditors traveled to sites all over Iraq. The Inspections 

Directorate selected projects for review from each reconstruction sector, 

covering large and small contractors, different geographical areas, each 

of the major U.S. agencies operating in country, and all funding sources. 

The selection criteria asked the following questions: 

R Was the request from a military commander or a State Department 

official?

R Was the project significant? 

R Was there a likelihood of fraud or waste? 

R Were there existing concerns about the project under consideration 

or its contractor? 

In assessing construction projects, SIGIR asked the following 

questions:

R Was the project properly designed?

R Was the project built according to contract specifications?

R Was an adequate contractor-managed quality-control program and 

government-managed quality-assurance program in place?

R Was sustainability considered and planned for?

R Was the project likely to meet contract objectives?

As the program matured, the Inspections Directorate added project 

sustainment inspections into the mix, examining whether a completed 

project was operating as intended and whether the Iraqis were 

sustaining it through effective operations and maintenance.

Unstable conditions in Iraq sometimes prevented SIGIR’s inspectors 

from conducting on-site assessments. Because of security threats, SIGIR had 

to cancel visits to 18 project sites between June 2005 and August 2008. In 

2008, General David Petraeus, the Multi-National Force-Iraq Commanding 

General, authorized SIGIR’s inspectors to travel under Defense Department 

authority, which subsequently ensured access and transport to all sites.

Best Practices for SRO Inspection Programs

1. Provide reconstruction officials with near real-time reporting.

2. Team engineers with auditors.

3. Report on complex technical topics in accessible language.

4. Execute inspections rapidly.

5. Visit project sites in person.

6. Visit as many projects as possible early in the program.

7. Always consider sustainability in assessing reconstruction projects.

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

Energy Health Military Security &

Justice

Transportation &

Communications

Water

705

116

325 363

516

65

Contract Value of Projects SIGIR Inspected, by Reconstruction Sector

$ Millions

FIGURE 1.2

SIGIR 

inspected a 

cross-section 

of projects 

collectively 

valued 

at nearly 

$2.1 billion.

0

3

6

9

12

15

Energy Health Military Security &

Justice

Transportation & 

Communications

Water

Major Deficiencies Minor Deficiencies No Deficiencies

Schools

Deficiencies for Projects SIGIR Assessed, by Reconstruction Sector 

FIGURE 1.3

Almost 40% of 

the projects 

had major 

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6

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

SIGIR’s inspections commonly identified deficiencies in design, 

construction, quality control, quality assurance, and sustainability. 

The Directorate referred these to the appropriate relief and 

reconstruction agencies for corrective action. Indicators of potential 

fraud were referred to investigators for analysis, investigation, and 

possible Department of Justice action. For example, in 2008, SIGIR’s 

inspectors at the Sarwaran Primary School and the Binaslawa Middle 

School discovered possible illegal activity by two Korean Army 

officers and a master sergeant who had authorized a contract requiring 

the use of prohibited Iranian parts. SIGIR’s inspectors referred the 

matter to SIGIR investigators, who carried out an inquiry that led 

to the three individuals eventually being convicted by a Korean 

military court.

SIGIR’s Inspections Directorate concluded operations in April 

2010, just as major U.S. construction projects were winding down and 

as Iraq was assuming control of the rebuilding program. In all, SIGIR 

issued 170 inspection reports covering projects valued at nearly 

$2.1 billion (see Figure 1.2). 

Of the 116 ongoing projects that SIGIR inspected, almost one-half 

did not meet contract specifications and had major deficiencies. Of 

the 54 completed projects that SIGIR inspected, more than threefourths had deficiencies, with 14 suffering major defects that, if left 

unaddressed, would place the survival of the project in jeopardy. In all, 

40% of the inspected projects had major deficiencies (see Figure 1.3).

SIGIR Investigations

SIGIR investigators served in Iraq from 2004 to 2013, frequently 

under fire. The inherent disorder of life in a war zone—coupled 

with the challenges of starting up a new organization—meant that 

substantial investigative results came gradually. The incremental nature 

of this progress stemmed in part from the unpredictable character of 

the criminal investigative process, which is less structured than the 

audit or inspection processes. 

But significant results did come, and their numbers stand as 

testimony supporting the need for robust oversight during SROs: 

104 indictments, 82 convictions, and over $191 million in courtordered fines, forfeitures, restitution payments, and other monetary 

penalties (see Figure 1.4). SIGIR’s investigative work also produced 

114 debarments and 98 suspensions of contractors and government 

personnel for fraud or other corrupt practices.

The Bloom-Stein Conspiracy: Life in a Free Fraud Zone

Following a whistleblower complaint, SIGIR auditors reviewed contracts that the CPA’s regional 

office in Hilla had awarded to a contractor, Philip 

Bloom, for construction work. The auditors found 

inflated charges, the circumvention of regulations, 

false claims, and improper payments. 

These fraud indicators caused the Inspector 

General to order a team of investigators to Hilla. 

It soon uncovered a sordid scheme involving bribery, money laundering, and the theft of millions 

of dollars of reconstruction money. 

At the center of the conspiracy was Robert 

Stein, a convicted felon, who served as the CPA’s 

comptroller in Hilla—a position entrusted with 

overseeing and disbursing hundreds of millions 

in reconstruction funds. From December 2003 

to December 2004, Stein used a rigged bidding 

process to award approximately 20 contracts, 

collectively valued at more than $8.6 million, to 

Bloom’s companies. In return, Bloom:

R provided bribes and kickbacks, expensive 

vehicles, business-class airline tickets, 

computers, jewelry, and other items

R laundered in excess of $2 million in cash stolen 

from the vault at CPA headquarters 

R used Romanian and Swiss bank accounts to 

send stolen funds to co-conspirators

SIGIR’s investigation led to eight convictions with 

combined sentencings totaling more than 26 

years:

R Stein received nine years in prison and 

forfeited $3.6 million.

R Bloom received 46 months in prison and 

forfeited $3.6 million. 

R U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Bruce 

Hopfengardner, a security advisor at the 

regional office, received 21 months in prison 

and forfeited $144,500. 

R Steven Merkes, a DoD operational support 

planner, received 12 months in prison. 

R Lieutenant Colonel Debra Harrison, the acting 

comptroller at the regional office, received 30 

months in prison and forfeited $366,340.

R William Driver, Harrison’s husband, received 

three years probation and six months of house 

arrest, and was ordered to pay $36,000 in 

restitution. 

R Colonel Curtis Whiteford, the second-mostsenior official in the office, received five years 

in prison and was ordered to pay $16,200 in 

restitution. 

R U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Michael 

Wheeler, the office’s Deputy Chief of Staff, 

received 42 months in prison and was ordered 

to pay $1,200 in restitution. 

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OVERSIGHT IN A WAR ZONE

7

Other SIGIR Oversight Work

Lessons Learned

In 2005, SIGIR developed a novel lessons-learned initiative to convert 

the findings derived from its oversight work into lessons for operators 

in theater. The initiative yielded nine reports, including this one. 

The first three reports focused on human capital management, 

contracting and procurement, and program and project management. 

Published in 2006 and 2007, they contributed to a number of helpful 

changes in U.S. reconstruction policy. SIGIR’s contracting report, 

for example, exposed the Defense Department’s weak contingency 

contracting resources, practices, and procedures. The Congress 

responded in these ways:

R The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act required 

Defense to develop policies and procedures that defined 

contingency contracting requirements, identified a deployable 

cadre of contracting experts, and provided training in contingency 

contracting. 

R The Congress further required contracting training for personnel 

outside the acquisition workforce because of the broad reach of 

contracting activities in Iraq, particularly regarding the CERP. 

R The Accountability in Government Contracting Act of 2007 

strengthened the federal acquisition workforce by establishing a 

contingency contracting corps and providing specific guidance to 

encourage accountability and limit fraud, waste, and abuse.

SIGIR’s report on program and project management helped 

the development of an updated Emergency Acquisitions Guide 

issued by the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of 

Federal Procurement Policy. The guide included a number of 

best practices that agencies should consider when planning for 

contingency operations.

In February 2009, SIGIR published its fourth lessons-learned 

0

50

100

150

200

250

Convictions

Sentencings

Indictments

FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 

(through 2/2013)

13 19

30

47

68

95

37

58

75

Funds Recovered ($ Millions)

Criminal Results

$0

$40

$80

$120

$160

$200

26

38

57

104

82

68

13

11

24

5

5 5

5 5

Funds Recovered

SIGIR Investigations Criminal Results and Funds Recovered, Cumulative to Date, 

by Fiscal Year

FIGURE 1.4

SIGIR investigations have 

produced 104 indictments, 

82 convictions, and 

$191.2 million in courtordered monetary penalties.

Best Practices for SRO Investigation Programs

1. Integrate law-enforcement efforts. Prior integrative planning must 

occur for law-enforcement agencies to function well together. 

2. Begin oversight early. As soon as the planning for an SRO begins, 

the relevant investigative entities should develop joint investigative 

programs. 

3. Deploy agents forward. A strong and widely noticed lawenforcement presence in theater will deter crime. 

4. Intervene with education. All government and contractor 

personnel operating in an SRO need fraud-awareness training. 

5. Use task forces. Investigative task forces improve the likelihood of 

success because pooled resources mitigate the lack of technical 

capacities in some law-enforcement offices. 

6. Hire investigators with fraud experience. Investigators should have 

backgrounds in contract fraud, financial transactions, and asset 

tracing. 

7. Dedicate specific prosecutors. SIGIR’s hiring of its own prosecutors 

produced outstanding results. 
LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

8

report—Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience—which 

provided a detailed primary-sourced narrative and analysis of the 

U.S. reconstruction program, presenting 13 lessons applicable to 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. After reviewing Hard 

Lessons, General David Petraeus concluded that the U.S. Central 

Command would apply 9 of the 13 lessons in Afghanistan. 

Building on Hard Lessons, SIGIR issued its fifth lessons learned 

report in February 2010, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. This study proposed an 

innovative solution to the question of who should be accountable for 

planning and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Learning From Iraq further fleshes out this proposal. SIGIR’s next 

three reports, published in 2011 and 2012, captured lessons from 

SIGIR’s inspections, auditing, and investigative activities.

Special Studies

To deepen insight into the Iraq reconstruction program, SIGIR 

accomplished these four focused studies:

R Review of Major U.S. Government Infrastructure Projects in Iraq: 

Nassiriya and Ifraz Water Treatment Plants (October 2010).

To accomplish this evaluation, SIGIR visited two major water 

treatment plants, one in southern Iraq and the other in the 

Kurdistan Region. The evaluation assessed the local populations’ 

perceptions of these plants, as well as the projects’ contributions 

to U.S. reconstruction goals. SIGIR concluded that the northern 

project was a success, while the one in southern Iraq fell far short 

of its goals.

R Reconstruction Leaders’ Perceptions of the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program in Iraq (April 2012). In this first Special Report, 

SIGIR surveyed U.S. Army and Marine Corps battalion commanders 

and civilian agency officials to obtain their views about the use of 

CERP funds in Iraq. Their revealing responses indicated weak 

interagency coordination on CERP projects. 

R The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (July 2012). In this second Special Report, SIGIR 

sought to account for the number of personnel killed while 

specifically engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The report 

concluded that at least 719 people (U.S., Iraqi., and third-country 

nationals) died working on reconstruction-related programs 

or projects.

R Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa 

Political District (February 2013). In this third Special Report, SIGIR 

took a deep look into one geographic area—Baghdad’s Rusafa 

Political District—to detail the collective U.S. investment. The 

report found that project tracking was very weak and thus the actual 

number of projects accomplished could not be precisely identified.

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9

WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT 2

The two most common questions asked about the Iraq reconstruction 

program are “What happened to the money?” and “What effect did it 

have?” This report answers both queries, as well as many more detailed 

ones, such as which sectors received the most money, how was the 

reconstruction program managed, and was anyone convicted for fraud. 

Answering “What happened to the money?” requires first answering 

“What money?” There were three primary sources of funding for the 

rebuilding program: Iraqi, U.S., and international. During the first 

year of reconstruction, the Coalition Provisional Authority obligated 

and expended money drawn from the Development Fund for Iraq. 

Comprising revenues from the sale of Iraq’s oil and gas assets, the DFI 

was established in 2003 as an Iraqi account at the Federal Reserve 

Bank of New York. The stream of revenue flowing into the DFI 

account previously funded the United Nations Oil For Food Program.

During its existence, the CPA controlled over $23.4 billion in Iraqi 

funds composed of $20.7 billion from the DFI and $2.7 billion in 

seized and vested assets. In 2003 and 2004, more than $10 billion in 

DFI cash was flown to Baghdad on U.S. military aircraft in the form 

of massive shrink-wrapped bundles of $100 bills stored on large pallets. 

This money was not managed particularly well, either by the CPA or 

its successors, as SIGIR audits revealed. Iraqi funding, including DFI 

expenditures and Iraqi capital budgets, amounts to the largest single 

tranche of spending on rebuilding efforts over the past nine years 

(about $146 billion).1

Funding from the United States constitutes the next largest 

tranche. Since the spring of 2003, the Congress appropriated just over 

$60 billion for Iraq’s reconstruction. Most of this money went into 

five funds:2

R the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund ($20.86 billion)

R the Iraq Security Forces Fund ($20.19 billion)

R the Economic Support Fund ($5.13 billion)

R the Commander’s Emergency Response Program ($4.12 billion)

R the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account 

($1.31 billion)

Deciding which of these funds provided the greatest benefit to 

Iraq is difficult to do, but each underperformed vis-a-vis expectations. 

Though the particular causes of the various shortfalls differ, security 

problems limited progress in every area. But the success of the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund in training and equipping the country’s police 

and military forces stands out.

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10

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

International funding, the third tranche of support for the program, 

was relatively muted. About $13.5 billion in grants and loans were 

promised in a multinational pact reached at Madrid in October 2003. 

These promises remained largely unfulfilled for years afterward. 

But this does not mean that the international community failed to 

help Iraq. A highly beneficial financial boon came through the Paris 

Club debt-forgiveness agreement of 2004.3

 Iraq’s total external debt 

at the end of 2003, estimated to be about $120 billion, significantly 

burdened the country’s disabled economy. Thanks to negotiations led 

by former-Secretary of State and Treasury James A. Baker III, the 

Paris Club, comprising 19 of the world’s largest economies, secured 

an agreement eventually canceling 80% of the Paris Club debt 

including $4.1 billion owed the United States and $12 billion owed 

Russia. The accord effectively amounted to a $32 billion gift to Iraq, 

with the potential of more to come, because the negotiations laid the 

groundwork for forgiveness of non-Paris Club debt.4

That answers the “What money?” question. Answering “What 

happened to that money?” has been SIGIR’s mission for the past nine 

years. The details summarized in this report’s succeeding chapters are 

pulled from the catalogue of our work: 220 audits, 170 inspections, 35 

quarterly reports, 35 Inspector General testimonies, 8 lessons-learned 

studies, and hundreds of investigations. But fully answering what 

happened requires exploring what effect the massive expenditures had 

upon Iraq, an enquiry that only now can truly begin to be meaningfully 

answered. Exploring the program’s effects is the crux of this chapter, 

which provides a body of new information culled from 44 interviews 

conducted by SIGIR with Iraqi leadership, U.S. senior leaders, and 

congressional members. 

The interviews, which took place between September 2012 and 

February 2013, flowed from several questions put to each interviewee 

and were largely conducted in person by the Inspector General. The 

answers, which are encapsulated below, provide a bounty of useful and 

occasionally eye-popping insights into the effects and outcomes of the 

rebuilding program and the lessons learned from it. 

The general belief across each group is that the relief and 

reconstruction program should have accomplished more, that 

too much was wasted, and that the lessons derived from the Iraq 

reconstruction experience should drive improvements to the U.S. 

approach to stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

The Iraqis

Securing and stabilizing a new democracy in Iraq and helping its 

economy grow were the foundational rationales behind the massive 

U.S. assistance effort. But only now, after the reconstruction program 

has largely come to an end, could more comprehensive assessments 

be drawn and final lessons derived. To be meaningful, the views 

of the people the program was designed to help must shape those 

assessments and lessons.

The Inspector General interviewed the following Iraqi leaders, with 

most of the engagements occurring in September 2012 in Baghdad:

R Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki 

R Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussain al-Shahristani 

R Speaker of the Council of Representatives Osama al-Nujaifi

R Minister of Finance Rafi al-Eissawi

R Minister of Justice Hassan al-Shimari

R Acting Minister of Interior Adnan al-Asadi

R Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud

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WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

11

R President of the Board of Supreme Audit and Acting Governor of 

the Central Bank of Iraq Abdul Basit Turki al-Sae’ed 

R Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi 

R Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari

R Former Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi 

R Former Minister of Housing, Interior, and Finance Baqir Jabr 

al-Zubeidi

R Former Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani

R Former Commissioner of Integrity Judge Raheem al-Ugaili

In Erbil, the Inspector General interviewed these officials from the 

Kurdistan Regional Government:

R Falah Mustafa Bakir, Minister of Foreign Affairs

R Qubad Talabani, Minister, Department of Coordination and 

Follow-up 

R Fuad M. Hussein, Chief of Staff to KRG President Massoud 

Barzani

What follows are concise summaries of what these senior Iraqi officials 

said, including relevant quotations that substantiate key points. The 

words speak for themselves, but these themes emerge: 

1. The United States failed to consult sufficiently with Iraqi authorities 

when planning the reconstruction program.

2. Corruption and poor security fundamentally impeded progress 

throughout the program.

3. The overall rebuilding effort had limited positive effects. 

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. After spending 23 years in exile, 

Prime Minister al-Maliki returned to Iraq in 2003, serving on the Iraqi 

Governing Council, assisting in the drafting of Iraq’s constitution, and 

participating in the implementation of de-Ba’athification reforms. In late 

2004, he helped frame a broad coalition of Shia parties into the United Iraqi 

Alliance. Running for Prime Minister under its banner in the 2005 general 

election, he emerged victorious. In 2010, Prime Minister al-Maliki earned 

a second four-year term, eventually prevailing after a highly contested and 

controversial election. 

The Prime Minister opened the interview with gratitude for the 

U.S. reconstruction effort but quickly descended into more dour tones, 

expressing his belief that the overall benefit to Iraq was small when 

compared with the size of the sums spent. He stated that “$55 billion 

could have brought great change in Iraq,” but the positive effects of 

those funds were too often “lost.” 

Several critical factors limited the progress of reconstruction, 

including poor American knowledge about what Iraq needed. 

According to the Prime Minister, U.S. officials too often “depended 

on others” (local subcontractors), who frequently turned out to be illinformed or dishonest. Thus, “there was misspending of money.” 

Exemplifying this misspending, the Prime Minister recalled a small 

school refurbishment project for which the school’s administrator 

requested $10,000, but the U.S. authorities insisted on providing 

$70,000—a needless waste. He also recollected that the United 

States built over a hundred healthcare centers at a cost far more than 

budgeted, while delivering much less than promised. 

The Prime Minister’s memory was on point: a SIGIR audit of 

the primary healthcare clinic program found that it ultimately cost 

$345 million—more than 40% over budget. Prime Minister alMaliki complained that the Basrah Children’s Hospital, a flagship 

project, was still not completely finished, despite expenditures that 

greatly outstripped the budget. Again, his observations were apt: a 

SIGIR audit of this project found it 200% over budget and four years 

behind schedule. 
12

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Despite his litany of complaints, the Prime Minister concluded 

the interview gratefully, observing that the reconstruction program 

contributed to an ultimately successful U.S. effort to establish 

democracy in Iraq. “This money and the blood that was shed 

here is part of the price [paid by] the United States of America in 

cooperation with Iraq to fight terrorism...and establish the Strategic 

Framework Agreement.” 

Deputy Prime Minister for Energy 

Affairs Hussain al-Shahristani. Deputy 

Prime Minister al-Shahristani, a Shia Arab, 

served as Deputy Speaker of the Council of 

Representatives in 2005. He became Minister 

of Oil in 2006. In 2010, the Prime Minister 

appointed him Deputy Prime Minister for 

Energy Affairs.

Deputy Prime Minister al-Shahristani’s 

assessment of the U.S. reconstruction program can be summed up in 

six words: well intentioned, poorly prepared, inadequately supervised.

After suffering through 25 years of Saddam’s brutal dictatorship, 

including 3 wars, 13 years of a harsh trade sanctions, and continuous 

infrastructure neglect, the Deputy Prime Minister observed that 

virtually any rebuilding project accomplished in 2003 should have 

met some minimal need in a then-decrepit Iraq. But all too few of the 

projects the United States undertook at that time met this standard. 

There were some successes, he said, including the Port of Umm 

Qasr and the Baghdad and Basrah airports, but “there were a 

lot of unsuccessful rehabilitation projects in the fields of electric 

power generation, water and sewage treatment, roads and bridges, 

telecommunications, institution strengthening, school construction, 

and health.” 

The Deputy Prime Minister listed these shortfalls of the rebuilding 

program: 

R failure to consult with the relevant Iraqi ministries on project 

selection

R inefficient and unsuccessful execution of projects

R poor contractor selection 

R award of contracts without review of a company’s experience or 

financial profile 

R use of unqualified contractors, many of which were simply shell 

companies that subcontracted work to others 

Speaker of the Council of Representatives Osama al-Nujaifi. Speaker 

al-Nujaifi, a Sunni Arab, is the leader of Iraq’s Council of Representatives (the 

National Parliament). After working in industry and agriculture for over 

a decade, he entered public service in 2005 as the Minister of Industry and 

Minerals. The following year, he was elected to the Council of Representatives as 

a member of the al-Iraqiya Party. He has been Speaker since 2010.

Regarding the U.S. rebuilding effort, Speaker al-Nujaifi stated that 

the more than $50 billion spent on the Iraq reconstruction program 

did not “achieve the purpose for which it was launched. Rather, it 

had unfavorable outcomes in general.” Given “the amounts that were 

allocated for the implementation,” there should have been “better 

outcomes and more acceptable results.”

Speaker al-Nujaifi criticized the CPA’s decisions to disband the 

army and impose a strict de-Ba’athification regime. “The decision to 

turn a work force of more than two million capable individuals into 

unemployed individuals because of two successive orders added 

more unemployment.” The American administration implementing 

the occupation “was responsible for this issue.” Going forward, “the best 

thing that the United States can do is invest in this work force through 

productive small or medium projects that would be of service to the 

society, helping it regain self-esteem and contributing to meeting basic 

needs, as well as creating economic stability in the country.”
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

13

Minister of Finance Rafi al-Eissawi.

Minister al-Eissawi, a Sunni Arab from 

Falluja in western Iraq, is an orthopedic surgeon. 

In 2005, he entered public life as a Minister 

of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 

2008, Prime Minister al-Maliki elevated him 

to Deputy Prime Minister. Subsequent to the 

2010 elections, Mr. al-Eissawi was named 

Minister of Finance.

Minister al-Eissawi criticized the rebuilding program’s planning, 

citing a series of miscalculations that severely reduced the impact of the 

overall U.S. reconstruction effort. 

Included in his bill of complaint were the following particulars:

R It was a mistake to launch a huge number of programs across 

numerous geographic and infrastructure sectors rather than devote 

resources to a finite number of worthy and well-focused projects. 

This critical error caused “thousands of projects” to be incomplete 

at the time they were transferred to the Government of Iraq, 

complicating efforts to finish them and substantially diminishing 

the impact of the overall reconstruction effort. 

R There exists limited tangible evidence of any positive effects 

from the rebuilding program. Citing his hometown of Falluja as 

an example, Minister al-Eissawi stated that the residents there 

gratefully remember the British presence from the 1920s because 

of the Euphrates River Bridge, which still stands as a testament to 

the British program. He distinguished that salutary legacy from the 

U.S. program, represented by the Falluja Wastewater Treatment 

Plant, which was constructed at great cost but to little effect, at 

least in the eyes of Fallujans. Though the plant is complete, it serves 

but a fraction of those intended. Minister al-Eissawi commented 

that U.S. rebuilding managers governed “in a vacuum, so they 

were responsible for everything,” to the exclusion, in his view, of 

meaningful Iraqi input. 

R Early failures to stem the growth of militias within ministries 

created polarizing power centers that divided employee loyalties, 

weakened government institutions, slowed ministry decision 

making, and transformed corruption into a political agenda. 

Although the militias were largely stamped out, the legacy of 

their divisiveness lives on in the form of party committees within 

ministries whose sole job is to ensure that contracts go to partycontrolled contractors. This kind of corruption is very difficult to 

suppress. 

R An overly stringent de-Ba’athification program led to the dismissal 

of many competent government bureaucrats, even though they 

had little actual connection to the Ba’ath Party beyond perfunctory 

membership, which was largely required during Saddam’s era as 

a prerequisite to entering government. This led to a post-CPA 

government populated by “amateur people.”

R The wholesale dissolution of the Iraq Army, followed by a 

replacement force that he believed was less “national” and more 

politicized.

R The CPA’s creation of the Iraqi Governing Council along sectarian 

lines, an error echoed, in his view, by the U.S. failure to support what 

Minister al-Eissawi called the “nonsectarian al-Iraqiya coalition” as 

it worked to form a government after winning a plurality of seats in 

the 2010 election.

Minister of Justice Hassan al-Shimari. Minister al-Shimari entered 

public service after the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. He was a member 

of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, helped establish the authorities of 

the Council of Representatives, and became Minister of Justice in late 2010. 

Declaring that the billions in U.S. reconstruction money had no 

tangible effect on Iraq, Minister al-Shimari said:
14

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

We always wondered why the U.S. Army was in charge of making the 

choice on projects and how the money was spent. It was always personal 

relationships that determined who got the projects and how much was spent. 

Those [Iraqis] who had personal relationships [with the Army] got the 

projects. 

The U.S. reconstruction program failed to meet its goals because of 

poor planning, indiscriminate priorities, and insufficient consultation 

with Iraqi authorities. “There was no real planning done, nor did they 

consult the Iraqis on what was really needed,” the Minister asserted, 

adding that U.S. officials seemed to prefer smaller projects that could 

escape close scrutiny. “They pursued projects built close to U.S. bases to 

build goodwill with the local population and enhance security in the 

process.” Consequently, many projects served U.S. short-term tactical 

goals rather than the longer-term needs of Iraq. 

The U.S. government was not solely to blame for poor outcomes. 

The Iraqis also lacked a clear set of reconstruction priorities. Further, 

the degraded security environment diminished the positive impact of 

reconstruction efforts. Focusing on one major infrastructure need, like 

electricity, would have been a better strategy than trying to improve 

every sector simultaneously. 

“If I were a government minister in 2004, I would have tried to give 

the Americans a vision,” he said. “That’s what was missing. Because 

there was no vision, there were no priorities.” 

Acting Minister of Interior Adnan alAsadi. After returning to Iraq in 2003, 

Minister al-Asadi was an alternate member 

of the Iraqi Governing Council. In 2004, he 

moved to the Ministry of Interior, serving 

first as Ministerial Deputy for Administrative 

Affairs, then for Administrative and Financial 

Affairs before rising to the level of Senior Deputy 

Minister in 2008, and since 2010, as Acting 

Minister. He is also a member of the Council of Representatives. 

The U.S. reconstruction program made three major mistakes: 

R overpayment of contractors and subcontractors such that projects 

ending up costing double or triple their actual worth 

R absence of meaningful cooperation and coordination between U.S. 

authorities and the GOI during project completion and transfer 

R tolerance of rampant corruption that occurred on both the Iraqi and 

U.S. sides

There is little visible evidence of the program’s effects, 

notwithstanding nine years of rebuilding activity and tens of billions 

in U.S. dollars expended. “With all the money the U.S. has spent, you 

can go into any city in Iraq and you cannot find one building or project 

[built by the U.S. government],” Minister al-Asadi observed. “You 

can fly in a helicopter around Baghdad or other cities, but you cannot 

point a finger at a single project that was built and completed by the 

United States.” 

The Minister cited three examples of project failure, including 

two buildings he tracked as acting minister: the Baghdad Police 

Academy and an office building constructed in the International Zone 

for processing weapons licenses. The roof at the processing facility 

leaked when it rained, requiring another contractor to install a new 

roof, doubling the structure’s cost. At the police academy, raw sewage 

leaked through ceilings, requiring replacement of all pipes and ceilings. 

SIGIR’s inspection of the Baghdad Police Academy substantiates 

Minister al-Asadi’s complaint.

In the third example, the Minister highlighted a shortfall that 

directly affected his work: a contract to provide the MOI with 

computer servers and software. He was told by U.S. officials that the 

already-paid-for materials were sitting at the U.S. Embassy, even 

though the project was ostensibly complete. 

The greatest example of poor U.S.-Iraqi coordination was the 

development of the multibillion-dollar Police Development Program 

in 2011, which carried overhead costs of around 80%. Minister alAsadi publicly decried the program, declaring that Iraq did not need it. 

After spending over a billion dollars and wasting about $200 million, 

the United States downsized the program by 90% to fit GOI desires.

Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud.Chief Justice al-Mahmoud, a Shia 

Arab, was named Minister of Justice in June 2003 and Chief Justice and 

head of the Higher Judicial Council in 2004. 
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

15

The Chief Justice expressed appreciation for U.S. reconstruction 

efforts, saying “we believe that history will judge those programs based 

on the achieved benefits gained by the Iraqi people... Among these 

projects, there were noticeable positive outcomes that will be left as 

clear proof for history.” U.S.-funded electricity and water-treatment 

plants helped meet Iraq’s needs, especially in areas of the country that 

previously lacked basic services. But, for the amount of funds spent, 

the results should have been greater than what was received. Moreover, 

the United States should have included the Central Bank of Iraq in 

overseeing the use of the Development Fund for Iraq.

These factors contributed to reconstruction shortfalls:

R Some contractors lacked the capacity to implement projects awarded 

to them.

R Some contractors lacked integrity.

R The absence of Iraqi input led to the failure in meeting goals set for 

project maintenance.

Support from the United States, especially the Department of 

Justice, enabled Iraq’s judiciary to become “completely independent.” 

The Chief Justice expressed satisfaction with support for the 

strengthened security arrangements established in the wake of an 

extended assassination campaign against members of the judicial 

branch. Looking to the future, the United States could have the biggest 

impact on Iraq’s growth and prosperity by continuing to assist in 

arming and training the Iraqi Security Forces and encouraging U.S. 

companies to invest in Iraq.

“Financial corruption” is the main cause for the unsettled conditions 

that continue to burden Iraq’s government. Recognizing that money 

laundering plagues the country, the Chief Justice acknowledged that no 

system was yet in place to deal effectively with the problem, and that 

the GOI had failed to “put the right person into the right position.” 

There exists an urgent need for greater transparency within the GOI, 

improved personnel decisions, and “more complete” oversight of 

financial transactions. Effecting these changes could reduce the level of 

corruption by 80%.

President of the Board of Supreme Audit and Acting Governor of 

the Central Bank of Iraq Dr. Abdul Basit Turki al-Sae’ed. Dr. Basit, 

a Sunni Arab, became BSA President in October 2004, after his predecessor 

was assassinated. He has since played an important role in the oversight of 

the GOI, supervising many politically sensitive audits. He was appointed 

Acting Governor of the CBI in October 2012. 

The U.S. reconstruction program inadvertently fostered a “triangle 

of political patronage,” involving political parties, government officials, 

and sectarian groups. This lethal axis fomented a brew of terrorism 
16

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

and corruption that poisoned the country. Dr. Basit asserted that the 

unrestrained growth of corruption allowed it to become an “institution 

unto itself in Iraq.” This substantially diminished the potential for 

reconstruction efforts to have a positive effect. 

The GOI institutions established by the United States to fight 

corruption are weak, with the Commission of Integrity having lost its 

impartiality and the IGs proving vulnerable to politicization. “If they 

keep working in this way, they will be eliminated.”

Several key operational weaknesses caused the rebuilding 

program to fall short of its goals, including poor record keeping, 

inadequate communication, ineffective consultation, and the 

absence of a coordinated set of reconstruction priorities. “The way 

that the Americans spent [reconstruction] money was sometimes 

undocumented and sometimes irresponsible,” Dr. Basit noted. 

Too many projects were awarded at inflated prices, while others 

were undertaken despite offering little benefit to Iraq. “Some projects 

were built without asking the Iraqis if it was proper to build such 

projects.” When the GOI assumed responsibility for these usually 

incomplete projects, it had little interest in providing funds to finish or 

maintain them.

Dr. Basit asserted that the Ministry of Finance never enforced a 

2005 agreement with the United States requiring the provision of all 

documentation related to reconstruction projects. A dearth of reliable 

data on the U.S. and Iraqi sides alike significantly impeded oversight of 

the rebuilding effort. 

Former Prime Minister Dr. Ayad Allawi.

Dr. Allawi served on the Iraqi Governing 

Council in 2003 and 2004. The Council elected 

him Prime Minister in May 2004, and he 

served in that post from June 2004 to May 

2005. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, Dr. 

Allawi’s al-Iraqiya party won a plurality of 

seats. Subsequent wrangling over the outcome left 

succession in doubt until December 2010, when 

the disputing parties came to an agreement that allowed Prime Minister 

al-Maliki to continue in office.

The reconstruction program in Iraq suffered from these weaknesses: 

R insufficient planning and unclear priorities

R poor oversight of projects

R grave insecurity and political instability

R unqualified contractors receiving contracts 

R corruption affecting the entire effort 

The most significant planning shortfall was the weak consultation 

and coordination between U.S. reconstruction managers and 

Iraqi leaders. Dr. Allawi tried to remedy this issue by creating the 

Construction Council in 2004 led by Deputy Prime Minister 

Barham Salih. It included the Planning Minister, the Housing and 

Construction Minister, the Electricity Minister, the Industry and 

Minerals Minister, and the Finance Minister. The Commission sought 

to address corruption by increasing the review of contracts. 

In Dr. Allawi’s view, the failure to address corruption early in the 

program “was one of the United States’ biggest mistakes.” Additionally, 

the politicized de-Ba’athification order and the dissolution of the army 

and related Iraqi security institutions at the beginning of the CPA were 

significant errors, complicating the remainder of the rebuilding program. 

On the positive side, there were a number of successful projects in 

the electricity and education sectors.

Former Prime Minister of Iraq Dr. Ibrahim 

al-Ja’afari. Dr. al-Ja’afari, a Shia Arab, served 

as Prime Minister from May 2005 to May 

2006. His tenure was marked by a period of 

intense unrest in Iraq, including the February 

2006 bombing of Shia al-Askari Mosque in 

Samarra, which many point to as a flashpoint 

in the Sunni-Shia violence that pervaded Iraq 

that year. 

Dr. al-Ja’afari said that American political support for the GOI 

was of “unique importance” to the success of democracy in Iraq—

even more important than military aid. However, he attributed Iraq’s 

many continuing economic problems to failures within the U.S. 

reconstruction program. For example, the country’s oil wealth was 

gravely mismanaged and thus subject to corrupt disposition such that 

the condition of the average Iraqi has improved little since 2003. This 
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

17

mismanagement contributed to substandard public services, including 

declines in the country’s once-admired educational and medical care 

systems, and a power-generating sector that remains unable to meet 

the country’s demand for electricity. 

Dr. al-Ja’afari observed that these weaknesses, together with the 

twin plagues of security and corruption, caused economic inequities 

and high unemployment, leaving the average Iraqi quite poor, despite 

the country’s growing oil wealth and visible progress in infrastructure 

restoration. Corruption in Iraq is now “routine.” 

Former Deputy Prime Minister Dr. 

Ahmed Chalabi. Dr. Chalabi, a Shia Arab, 

is a member of the Council of Representatives. 

He served as President of the Iraqi Governing 

Council in September 2003, as interim Minister 

of Oil during April–May 2005, and as Deputy 

Prime Minister from May 2005 to May 2006. 

In 2007, Prime Minister al-Maliki appointed 

him to lead the Prime Minister’s Services 

Committee to improve the provision of public services. He was elected to 

the CoR in 2010.

According to Dr. Chalabi, creating a regency to rule Iraq was “the 

first big mistake by the United States.” By August 2003, there was 

significant support for a sovereign government in Iraq. “The Coalition 

Provisional Authority failed in its role as the provisional government of 

Iraq in 2003–2004.” 

The United States reconstruction program managers did not consult 

adequately with Iraq in developing the rebuilding effort. “The U.S. 

personnel knew what to do and viewed all Iraqi ideas as useless, but the 

U.S. approach was wasteful, using design-build contracts to accomplish 

simple construction projects.” Offering an example of how too much 

money was paid under these contracts, Dr. Chalabi said: “a square meter 

of concrete should cost 4,000 Iraqi dinar. The United States paid 16,000.” 

The infrastructure reconstruction efforts provided limited benefits to Iraq.

Dr. Chalabi offered these lessons from the Iraq rebuilding programs:

R Ensure the existence of a coherent structure that is responsible for 

planning and executing relief and reconstruction operations before 

you start spending money. It was counterproductive in Iraq to spend 

so much development money without a sensible management 

structure in place.

R Ensure that strong oversight is in place from the beginning of 

stabilization and reconstruction operation or corruption will 

run rampant. Dr. Chalabi said that corruption in Iraq today is 

“very dangerous and everywhere present from the top levels of 

government to the bottom.” 

Dr. Chalabi said “significant amounts of GOI money are leaving 

the country under false pretenses.” He estimated that “15% of all GOI 

revenues are lost to money laundering.”

Former Minister of Housing, Interior, and 

Finance Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi. A member of 

the Council of Representatives, Mr. al-Zubeidi, 

a Shia Arab, joined Iraq’s first post-invasion 

cabinet in September 2003 as Minister of 

Housing and Reconstruction and went on to 

serve as the GOI’s Minister of Interior (2005–

2006) and Minister of Finance (2006–2010).

Mr. al-Zubeidi offered a generally positive 

assessment of the U.S. reconstruction program, saying that U.S. efforts 

in 2006–2007 had saved Iraq from becoming a failed state. 

Police training was especially important because, from a security 

perspective, the country started “from nothing” after the CPA 

disbanded the Iraqi Army. The United States provided critical 

training to the police through the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq, but the failure to arm them adequately proved 

a problem. Recalling a visit to Babylon in November 2005 with 

Ambassador Khalilzad, Mr. al-Zubeidi remembered that just a quarter 

of the Iraqi police present carried weapons. 

The two biggest challenges that daunted the reconstruction 

program were security and corruption. Poor security conditions 

constrained reconstruction efforts, especially when terrorists started 

targeting prime-contractor representatives at project sites. Killings or 

kidnappings would force work to stop. 

Mr. al-Zubeidi observed that “corruption today is worse than ever. 
18

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

It’s a disaster.” He expressed specific concerns about money laundering, 

calling it a major problem for the government. When asked what the 

United States could do to help Iraq, he suggested assistance on fighting 

money laundering as a crucial need and hoped that U.S. expertise in 

this area could help stem the illegal flight of money from Iraq.

Former Minister of Interior Jawad alBolani. Mr. al-Bolani, a Shia Arab, served in 

the Iraqi Governing Council and the Council 

of Representatives before being named Minister 

of Interior in June 2006, a post he held until 

December 2010. His tenure began during the 

most violent period of the post-war era, and he 

ended it as a failed candidate for Prime Minister.

Mr. al-Bolani recognized the sacrifices 

and resources expended during the reconstruction effort. He assigned 

blame for the shortcomings of U.S. programs on the Americans 

and the Iraqis. “U.S. reconstruction programs failed to implement 

important strategic projects, but they were able to accomplish small 

projects to create job opportunities for locals in some areas, avert 

attacks on U.S. forces by armed insurgents, and gain intelligence for 

U.S. forces.” 

U.S.-Iraqi cooperation accomplished some successes in the areas 

of training and security. Mr. al-Bolani offered the example of a U.S.-

funded passport systems program that continued to produce good 

results after the Ministry of Interior took control of the program. 

One of the biggest mistakes was assigning the CPA full governance 

authority over Iraq, with insufficient Iraqi inclusion. This policy 

contributed to a lack of oversight on money spent and a lack of followup on project execution.

The existence of militias, al-Qaeda gangs, and the reliance of 

Americans on certain Iraqi political parties caused the emergence 

of sectarian controversies that hindered Iraqi governance. Sectarian 

groups became embedded in most of the country’s ministries and 

institutions, impeding progress. Additionally, foreign interference in 

Iraq’s matters weakened the national political stance, resulting in a 

country that lacked a free political administration focused on the needs 

of the Iraqi people.

Former Commissioner of Integrity Judge 

Raheem al-Ugaili. Judge al-Ugaili was 

appointed in 1997 as a judge in the al-Karada 

district court in Baghdad and served there 

until he was appointed Acting Commissioner 

of the Commission on Public Integrity in 2004. 

He became Deputy Commissioner in May 

2005, and he was appointed by the Council 

of Ministers as the COI’s Commissioner in 

January 2008. He resigned that post in late 2011, apparently under pressure 

to do so, after releasing a controversial report on corruption in Iraq.

History will determine that the U.S. reconstruction program 

failed for two major reasons: (1) the U.S. government excluded Iraqis 

from the process of establishing reconstruction priorities, and (2) the 

reconstruction effort left very little visible impact on the ground. “Vast 

amounts of money were wasted without attaining actual intended 

results,” Judge al-Ugaili said. 

The reconstruction program failed to establish a governance 

system of reliable integrity. Sketching out a grim picture of Iraq’s 

anticorruption institutions in full retreat, the judge asserted that 

the level of kickbacks to GOI officials and the volume of money 

laundering continue to grow. 

The Commission of Integrity, he said, had been “totally kidnapped,” 

and was now operating under executive-branch control. The COI’s 

Investigations Department, once one of the strongest and most active 

within the Commission, had been “severely reduced,” and the number 

of corruption-related arrests in 2012 was 35% of the 2011 level. 

The GOI plans to reduce sharply or perhaps eliminate completely 

the system of inspectors general set in place by the United States in 

2004 to control corruption in the government. It has not filled an IG 

vacancy in over two years. 

Some in government whose job it was to fight corruption and 

other white-collar crimes became targets for criminal charges simply 

because they did their jobs. For example, the Judge noted that he 

has had at least 10 charges leveled against him, stemming from 

actions taken during his years at the COI. He claimed that most of 

the charges were related to routine decisions made in his capacity 

as Commissioner.
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

19

Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir. Between 

1996 and 1999, Minister Bakir served as 

a public relations officer for the Kurdistan 

Democratic Party and then entered public service 

with the KRG in 1999 as Deputy Minister of 

Agriculture and Irrigation. In 2002, he was 

named a senior advisor to Prime Minister 

Nechirvan Barzani, and two years later, he 

became Minister of State. He also served as the 

KRG’s liaison officer with the CPA in 2003. Minister Bakir established the 

KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, which he has led since its inception 

in 2006.

The lack of planning, coordination, and sufficient resources on the 

part of the U.S. government made the failure of the rebuilding program 

inevitable. “The biggest problem was that the White House, the 

Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the CIA were 

all carrying out different strategies. From the day after the invasion, 

they were not able to win the peace,” Minister Bakir observed. 

Another factor contributing to failure was the Americans’ poor grasp 

of Iraqi culture. “For example, men were searching Iraqi women and 

entering into private quarters of homes unannounced.” Minister Bakir 

contrasted the U.S. actions with those of Korean military forces, who 

studied Kurdish culture and used Kurdish expressions in their arrival 

statements. “The U.S. spent a lot of money, but that didn’t translate into 

making friends” in Iraq.

After relying on the Kurds in the months prior to the 2003 

invasion, the United States neglected them during the reconstruction 

period. The Kurdistan Region received less than 3% of all 

reconstruction dollars spent in Iraq. According to Minister Bakir, 

the United States looked at Erbil as little more than a transit point 

between Baghdad and Turkey. Though the Region offered a more 

stable and safer investment climate than southern Iraq, the KRG was 

not included in any high-level Washington meeting on investment 

and reconstruction opportunities. 

On the security front, Minister Bakir expressed what he said was 

a widely held concern within the KRG about the U.S. sale of F-16 

military aircraft to the GOI, asserting that there was grave concern 

that the aircraft would be “misused” against the Kurds.

Minister Qubad Talabani. Minister Talabani leads the Department of 

Coordination and Follow-up in the Kurdistan Regional Government’s 

Office of the Prime Minister. He is the son of Iraqi President Jalal 

Talabani. In 2003, he worked closely with the Office of Reconstruction and 

Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority.

The U.S. decision to devote modest amounts of reconstruction 

money to the Kurdistan Region, while spending heavily in nonKurdish provinces, constituted a fundamental strategic failure. “You 

think if you throw money at a problem, you can fix it. It was just not 

strategic thinking,” Minister Talabani said. His point is buttressed, 

to a certain extent, by SIGIR’s inspections work, which found most 

Kurdish projects in good order, while most non-Kurdish projects were 

below par.

Instead of focusing on where it was wise to work, reconstruction 

authorities looked at projects “as if they were going to happen in a 

vacuum.” Minister Talabani singled out the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program as a successful initiative, calling it “one of the things 

that worked,” because it funded tangible projects in areas where work 

could be done.

He cited inflexibility as a crucial systemic weakness within the 

reconstruction program. “There was usually a Plan A, but never a 

Plan B,” to rely on when things went wrong. Instead of adjusting to 

adversity when the program began to fail, the United States resorted to 

blank reassurances that “everything was fine.”
20

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Dr. Fuad Hussein. Dr. Hussein serves as 

Chief of Staff to KRG President Massoud 

Barzani. In 2003, he was appointed by Office 

of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 

Director Jay Garner as a member of the Iraqi 

Reconstruction and Development Council. 

He then became an advisor to the CPA’s 

Ministry of Education. From November 

2004 to February 2005, Dr. Hussein served 

as Senior Consultant to the Iraqi National 

Communications and Media Commission.

Dr. Hussein described two reconstructions programs in Iraq: one 

very large effort in the 15 provinces in the south, from which much 

money disappeared and few benefitted, and the other in the Kurdistan 

Region, which, though far smaller, was far more successful on a per 

capita basis. 

Two large wastewater treatment plants testify to the difference: 

the one in the south at Nassiriya cost $277 million and was widely 

viewed as a failure, while the other at Ifraz, near Erbil, cost $185 

million and was a huge success. Dr. Hussein attributed Ifraz’s success 

to the input of local residents, who were involved in the project from 

the start. The U.S. authorities simply poured money into the Nassiriya 

project without much consultation or coordination with local officials 

or residents. 

Dr. Hussein criticized the lack of coordination among the various 

U.S. government agencies involved in reconstruction, noting that the 

consequent discord diminished program effectiveness. “Not only was 

there no coordination between the Department of State, the Pentagon 

and the CPA, they were fighting each other. I had two advisors—one 

from the State Department, the other from the Defense Department; 

they didn’t talk to one another. The lack of local knowledge coupled 

with the U.S. decision to maintain total control over key ministries also 

proved to be damaging. “The policy was to control the Ministries of 

Oil, Interior, and Defense completely, but if you know nothing about 

the culture you’re trying to control, the result is chaos.” 

If the U.S. reconstruction authorities had begun in the Kurdistan 

Region, using it as an example of what was possible, many of the 

failures that occurred in the rest of Iraq could have been avoided. 

The U.S. Senior Leaders

The Department of Defense, Department of State, and United 

States Agency for International Development chiefly managed 

the reconstruction effort in Iraq, with the Departments of Justice, 

Treasury, and Agriculture making notable contributions. The Coalition 

Provisional Authority reported to the Department of Defense. 

SIGIR’s previous comprehensive report on Iraq’s reconstruction, 

Hard Lessons, was built upon interviews with those chiefly 

responsible for planning and managing the early and middle phases 

of the program. 

To capture the insights and understanding of those who led the 

later phases, the Inspector General interviewed the following U.S. 

senior leaders:

R Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

R Deputy Secretary of State William Burns

R Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides

R USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah

R Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Member of 

the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Dov Zakheim

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WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

21

R General David Petraeus

R General Raymond Odierno

R General Lloyd Austin III

R Lieutenant General Thomas Bostick

R Lieutenant General Robert Caslen

R Ambassador Ryan Crocker

R Ambassador Christopher Hill

R Ambassador James Jeffrey 

R Senior Deputy Assistant USAID Administrator Christopher 

Crowley

R USAID Mission Director Thomas Staal

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Secretary Panetta was sworn in on 

July 1, 2011, almost six months before the withdrawal of all U.S. ground 

forces from Iraq. He previously served as President Obama’s Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, as President Clinton’s Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget and White House Chief of Staff, and as a 

representative from California for 16 years. He was a member of the Iraq 

Study Group in 2006. 

The reconstruction program’s early phases revealed “a lack of 

thought” with regard to the initial rebuilding plan. From the Secretary’s 

perspective, there did not appear to be a sustained strategic vision of 

how reconstruction should be conducted following the invasion. “The 

U.S. military was in Iraq to fight a war. They were not USAID,” he 

said. “That’s not their role.” 

The decision to give battalion commanders control of reconstruction 

money under the auspices of the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program produced mixed results, with some commanders making 

good use of the money but others falling short in carrying out their 

duties. The number of convictions SIGIR secured stemming from the 

abuse of the CERP substantiates this point. 

Highlighting a singularly positive example of reconstruction 

leadership, the Secretary pointed to the work of General Peter 

Chiarelli, who served several tours in Iraq, including as Commander, 

Multi-National Corps-Iraq in 2006. General Chiarelli’s broad 

vision improved interagency coordination. Others, the Secretary 

said, sometimes had a limited understanding how the CERP could 

complement the overall rebuilding effort. 

Secretary Panetta emphasized the importance of military-civilian 

cooperation in Iraq, noting that when the senior U.S. military 

commander and the State Department’s Chief of Mission “served 

together, they created a strong force” that could persuade Prime 

Minister al-Maliki to back away from “bad decisions” and prevent him 

from “going off a cliff.” 

According to the Secretary, the inability to negotiate a basis 

for a continuing U.S. military presence in the post-2011 Strategic 

Framework Agreement left the United States without important 

leverage in Iraq. This weakened American capacity to push for greater 

change within the GOI. 

Deputy Secretary of State William Burns. 

Deputy Secretary Burns, a Career Ambassador, 

served as Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs from 2001 to 

2005, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 

from 2008 to 2011, and Deputy Secretary of 

State since 2011.

When we entered Iraq in 2003, the United 

States failed to establish a strong working 

relationship with the Iraqis. Deputy Secretary Burns said this greatly 6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH3DQHWWDWDONVWR86WURRSVLQ%DJKGDGLQ-XO\86),SKRWR
22

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

hindered the rebuilding program, both at the national and local levels. 

Further, advancing an ambitious reconstruction agenda amid a growing 

insurgency proved unwise. 

Early on, the United States poorly prioritized programs and projects, 

failing to make realistic evaluations as it forged forward while security 

conditions collapsed. Program managers tended to do too much too 

fast, pushing too much money out the door too quickly. 

A key lesson learned from Iraq is that the United States should not 

enter an SRO expecting to “do it all and do it our way.” We must share 

the burden better multilaterally and engage the host country constantly 

on what is truly needed. This is both a planning and an executory 

responsibility. Meeting immediate needs is where “we can best add 

value.” Starting small on the rebuilding front makes sense as a rule 

of thumb. 

In future SROs, the United States must balance better its national 

security interests with the host nation’s interests. In Iraq, the large 

U.S. footprint “wore out our welcome” rather quickly, with the 

CPA overreaching through out-sized plans and programs. A more 

modest approach could obviate this problem. The continual review of 

assumptions is also key to SRO success. Hard questions need to be 

regularly asked and answered. Otherwise, hard lessons will ensue.

When the military was present in Iraq (through 2011), it was 

reasonably possible to execute programs and projects across the country. 

After it departed, movement limitations set in. We should have then 

asked “what is it that really needs to be accomplished.” The Embassy 

tried to fill the security training void left by the military’s departure. 

But the military and the State Department operate differently with 

different responsibilities and goals. State is much more constrained in 

what it can do. 

Regarding interagency reform, Ambassador Burns cited State’s 

new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations led by Assistant 

Secretary Rick Barton as a good start. But a broader interagency 

capacity is needed to promote improved coordination among State, 

USAID, and the Pentagon.

Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides. Deputy Secretary Nides 

took office on January 3, 2011, after distinguished careers on Capitol Hill 

and in investment banking. Charged with overseeing the management 

at the State Department, he guided transition 

planning in Iraq from a predominantly military 

environment to one now run by State.

Many predicted that State would fail 

in executing the 2011 transition, Deputy 

Secretary Nides recalled, “but it did not. 

To the contrary, we achieved a successful 

transition from a military controlled 

environment to one managed by civilians and 

controlled exclusively by the Department of State.” 

There were difficult challenges: “The Embassy was too large 

after transition.” But State has been in the process of implementing 

reductions, and more will continue until it “achieves a normal Embassy 

presence by the end of 2013.”

“Consultation is key,” said the Deputy Secretary. “If the Iraqis don’t 

want it, don’t give it to them. This approach is not just good diplomacy; 

it saves taxpayer dollars.”

He said relations with Iraq substantially changed with the departure 

of the military. State moved toward “a more bilateral engagement like 

we have with other regional partners. It is important to give Iraq room 

to be completely sovereign while maintaining a strong diplomatic 

presence.”

Deputy Secretary Nides’ three most important lessons from Iraq:

1. Bigger is not better.

2. Plan more strategically (in five-year, not one-year, increments). 

3. Ensure good oversight (you need to keep asking hard questions or 

you will lose focus).

“Those in Iraq who developed and implemented the rebuilding 

program intended well, but good intentions don’t always produce good 

results. You have to have systems that work and strong oversight.” The 

Deputy Secretary concluded by noting that “SIGIR provided a good 

service in that regard, helping to save taxpayer dollars.”

USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah. Administrator Shah has led 

USAID since January 2010, in which capacity he has overseen the 

gradual drawdown of USAID’s operations in Iraq. He previously served 
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

23

as an Under Secretary at the Department of 

Agriculture. 

Administrator Shah offered several 

pertinent lessons drawn from USAID’s 

experience in Iraq: 

R Stabilization and reconstruction operations 

are civilian-military enterprises, and “we 

must do a lot better in planning them.” 

Defense, State, and USAID should develop joint planning 

mechanisms for future stability and reconstruction operations. These 

mechanisms must prepare for all scenarios: crisis and post-crisis. 

R Cost-sharing with the host country is key to gaining buy-in to 

a rebuilding program. The amount the Iraqis are contributing to 

cost sharing continues to grow, both in cash and participation. This 

development deepened Iraqi engagement on project sustainment.

R Addressing corruption is crucial. The Administrator emphasized 

the importance of focusing on fighting corruption credibly and 

consistently. 

Former Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) and member of the 

Commission on Wartime Contracting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan Dr. Dov Zakheim.

Dr. Zakheim was Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) as well as the Defense 

Department’s Chief Financial Officer from 

2001 to 2004. Later, he served as a member of 

the Commission on Wartime Contracting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, which formed in 2008 and presented its final report 

in August 2011.

The effects of the U.S. reconstruction program were “mixed.” Dr. 

Zakheim cited poor sustainability as a paramount weakness. “We built 

projects with the unstated assumption that our military would stay on, 

that it would be there to deal not just with the reduced security threat 

but also to keep the projects going that we built. That did not happen.” 

The departure of U.S. forces (in December of 2011) complicated the 

sustainability problem: their absence made the local environment 

more dangerous, making it harder for Iraqis to keep projects going. 

Moreover, the Iraqis had neither the technical knowledge nor 

the motivation to carry out the maintenance required to ensure 

project sustainability. 

The CERP morphed from its proper role as a tactical commander’s 

tool to finance quick-impact projects into a program that funded far 

larger ones, transforming the military into what Dr. Zakheim called 

“USAID in uniform.” This problematic development led to waste and 

poor project outcomes. Another mistake was permitting a vast but 

largely invisible number of subcontractors to work on reconstruction 

projects with little oversight or control. 

“What worked were projects that were thought through, were 

manageable, and had Iraqi buy-in. When we did consult (with 

the Iraqis), a project usually worked; when we didn’t, it didn’t.” As 

examples, Dr. Zakheim cited a 500 MW expansion of the Qudas 

power plant near Baghdad and smaller CERP projects. He criticized 

long-term design-build contracts with extension options that were “all 

but automatic.” He also criticized the use of undefinitized contracts 

(which authorize contractors to begin work before all contract terms 

have been settled) that were still undefinitized more than six months 

after the start of the reconstruction program. “If you can’t figure it out 

in six months, you’ll not figure it out at all.”

These are three biggest lessons learned from the Iraq experience:

R An empowered civilian agency is needed to deal effectively with 

SROs. USAID is ill-equipped for the mission. Its Office of 

Transition Initiatives has been suggested as an option, but its staff 

is too small. But USAID should establish a career path for those 

involved in contingency operations. It should be modeled on the 

military’s Special Operations Forces/Special Operations Command 

and lead to an office of deputy director of USAID for contingency 

operations.

R The military is a limited reconstruction partner. The CERP was an 

effective idea, but only when jobs are kept small and contracts short. 

Let the civilian agencies do most projects. 

R Subcontractors must be held more accountable. Acceptance of 

U.S. regulatory and legal jurisdiction must be made a contractual 

condition in all subcontracting work given to foreign subcontractors. 
24

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Dr. Zakheim supports establishing an independent office to plan 

for and oversee SROs, but to work it must not be “an orphan child.” 

To avert this requires ensuring support from the Departments of 

State, Defense, and other agencies. Creating assistant secretaries for 

stabilization operations at the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, 

Agriculture, and Commerce could ensure that support.

General David Petraeus. A 1974 graduate 

of the United States Military Academy at West 

Point, General Petraeus served in a variety of 

leadership positions during the U.S. engagement 

in Iraq. As Commander of the 101st Airborne 

Division, he led the division during the fight 

to Baghdad and then in northern Iraq during 

the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. From 

June 2004 to September 2005, he established 

and commanded the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq; from 

February 2007 to September 2008, he served as Commanding General, 

Multi-National Force-Iraq, implementing the “surge;” from October 2008 

to June 2010, he served as Commander, U.S. Central Command. He 

subsequently served as Commander of the NATO International Security 

Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and later as Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency.

The three big lessons General Petraeus took from Iraq are these:

R Ensure a comprehensive, detailed understanding of the target 

country before an SRO begins, including deep knowledge of 

political, economic, business, and cultural conditions, in addition 

to the security conditions. This knowledge must include a nuanced 

appreciation of governance and the rule of law at the national, 

provincial, district, and local levels. It is also crucial to understand 

how cultural factors, such as tribal loyalties, local customs, and 

national histories, influence governance and society. This array of 

knowledge is “imperative” to success in an SRO.

R Develop a comprehensive, civilian-military strategy and campaign 

plan, in consultation with host-nation leaders. The strategy must 

avoid policies that alienate populations or institutions, something 

that was missed early on in Iraq. “When you fire the military 

without giving those in it a future, or fire the first four tiers of 

Ba’athist Party membership, they will have no interest in helping 

you reach your goals. In fact, the opposite is true. Such actions only 

give them incentives to oppose what we were trying to do.” (In fact, 

one should ask of each contemplated operation or policy, “Will this 

action take more bad guys off the battlefield than it creates?” If the 

answer to that question is, “No,” then it should be reconsidered.)

R Implement a civilian-military campaign, using existing institutions 

wherever possible. Avoid creating new ad hoc institutions. If 

no existing institution fits, then find existing models and adapt 

organizations from them. Instead of creating a CPA element to 

oversee reconstruction, we should have used an existing U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers division or created one that could use an existing 

organization and be guided by USACE policies, regulations, and 

practices. Examples of good adaptation in Iraq were the USACE 

Gulf Region Division, the PRTs, the Joint Contracting Command, 

and SIGIR.

Unlike (until very late in) Afghanistan, the United States did “get it 

right” in Iraq within four years of intervening. He said the right resources, 

the right ideas, and the right organizational structures were eventually 

deployed; however, it was very costly, in blood and treasure, and it became 

a very manpower-intensive experience. The Iraq experience proved the 

value of oversight; SIGIR, the U.S. Army Audit Agency, and DoD 

Office of Inspector General made particularly important contributions. 

General Petraeus repeatedly requested inspections by outside agencies to 

assist with oversight of various programs.

The reconstruction program brought “colossal benefits to Iraq.” 

“Over time, we got the electricity infrastructure running and the oil 

industry working again, and, thanks to these efforts, the country began 

generating significant oil revenues.” Beyond those critical efforts, the 

program touched every aspect of Iraq’s society, from the economy to 

education to health care to governance. Perhaps most significantly, 

thanks to a very robust U.S.-led train-and-equip program, Iraq’s 

security forces were able progressively to take over the mission of 

securing the country, with some one million total Iraqi security force 

members in uniform by the departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011. 
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

25

Serious violence in Iraq had risen a bit since the departure of American 

military forces in late 2011, but it still remains 90%–95% lower than 

the levels of violence reached in 2006–2007, and it has not stopped 

the country from functioning and improving various segments of its 

economy, most significantly the oil sector.

General Raymond Odierno. A 1976 graduate of the United States 

Military Academy at West Point, General Odierno serves as Chief of 

Staff of the U.S. Army. He commanded the 4th Infantry Division during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom between March 2003 and April 2004; he served 

as Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, from November 

2006 to February 2008; and he served as Commanding General, MultiNational Force-Iraq, and the U.S. Forces-Iraq, from September 2008 

through September 2010.

With regard to reconstruction efforts, the United States made two 

poor assumptions during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

First, it underestimated the societal devastation that Iraq suffered 

during the 25 years of Saddam’s oppressive rule and thus miscalculated 

how incapacitated the country would be following the invasion. 

Second, the United States tried to execute a full-scale reconstruction 

program too early and consequently found itself working with a weak 

and uncertain Iraqi government in an insecure environment. “It would 

have been better to hold off spending large sums of money until 2008, 

2009, and 2010,” by which time the country had stabilized. 

Against the backdrop of this troubled start, General Odierno 

picked out the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the 

training of the Iraqi Security Forces as “good investments—successes 

when compared with some of the other programs.” The security force 

training programs did not start well, he said. But once the correct 

formula was developed, they worked very effectively. 

General Odierno strongly supports the use of the CERP for 

smaller-scale projects in future operations, describing the program 

as a “useful tool” for tactical and operational commanders that saves 

lives. But he recommended that Defense review the CERP program 

to understand its successes and see where it can be improved. He 

noted that the CERP should not be used to finance larger projects, 

and it should have a better training program to ensure its effective use 

in theater. 

Major lessons learned include these:

R Across all agencies, we must formalize what we have learned from 

the Iraq experience to include sustaining civil-military relations, 

training, planning, and sharing lessons. It is important that we not 

lose or forget what we have gained. Due to the complexity and 

uncertainty in the strategic environment, we must consider a more 

comprehensive whole-of-government approach going forward. 

R One of the most encouraging lessons is the tremendous adaptability 

that we exhibited in Iraq—our ability to “figure it out” while in 

contact. But we must develop greater flexibility and versatility in 

our post-conflict management systems. “We need a coherent civilmilitary structure in place before we begin Phase IV stabilization 

operations, which would allow for greater adaptability.” 

R Fully understand the conditions on the ground, including security, 

governance, and economic factors—as well as host-nation 

capacity—before embarking on reconstruction and recovery efforts. 

General Lloyd Austin III. A 1975 graduate 

of the United States Military Academy at 

West Point, General Austin is the Vice Chief 

of Staff of the Army. As of late February 2013, 

his nomination as Commanding General, 

U.S. Central Command was pending Senate 

confirmation. He commanded the 10th 

Mountain Division in Afghanistan before 

coming to Iraq, where he served as Commanding 

General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, during 2008–2009, and as the last 

Commanding General of U.S. Forces-Iraq during 2010–2011. 
26

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

General Austin recalled that, after the 2003 invasion:

The decision to disband the Iraqi Army alienated the Sunnis and 

contributed to the birth of the insurgency. Early on there was no coherent 

Iraqi government at the federal and local levels. Coalition forces sought to 

build local and state governments while at the same time trying to increase 

security and stand up the Iraqi Security Forces. In the beginning, there was 

no leadership and nonexistent Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi police were 

not respected. There was no Iraqi governmental structure. The country was 

ravaged by fighting. These factors combined to impede our ability to pursue 

reconstruction efforts.

Eventually, the reconstruction program made progress. “Now look 

at Iraq. There is cause for some optimism. The local governments are 

functioning. The country is pumping over three million barrels of oil 

each day. Electricity distribution has improved dramatically. All of 

these improvements are because of the U.S. program. It is not perfect. 

But it is much better [than when we began our efforts in 2003].”

Among the critical lessons learned, General Austin cited the need to 

develop a system for “effective interagency operations” as perhaps the 

most important. Initially, there was no coherent working relationship 

between Defense and State at a time when it was crucial that they 

work well together. 

“Phase IV was not thought through,” he said. “Each organization 

was working on its own projects” without any synchronization of 

effort. But, “as we progressed we were able to create systems and begin 

working together as an integrated team.”

Learning to use the CERP properly was an important lesson. The 

CERP “empowered the commander on the ground and helped to 

increase security. It gave the locals confidence to work on their own.” 

General Austin echoed a key lesson: you “must provide security in 

order to carry out reconstruction activities. You should not undertake 

major reconstruction work until security is established. It is difficult to 

get contracting done in dangerous areas.” 

Recognizing the importance of oversight to mission success, 

General Austin closed by noting that, “with the increase in the amount 

of money in Iraq, enhanced oversight was needed. SIGIR provided the 

necessary help in this area.” 

Lieutenant General Thomas Bostick.

A 1978 graduate of the United States 

Military Academy at West Point, Lieutenant 

General Bostick is the Chief of Engineers, 

United States Army. He served in Iraq 

as the first Commander of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division. 

In that capacity, he oversaw the start up of 

reconstruction operations. 

It was “a bad assumption” on the part of the United States to believe 

that post-invasion Iraq would provide a permissive environment 

within which large-scale reconstruction programs could proceed 

without hindrance. This mistake meant that a significant amount of 

reconstruction money had to be diverted to security programs, money 

that was lost to the rebuilding effort. 

Lieutenant General Bostick said the Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams provided a positive dimension to the rebuilding program 

through their efforts to involve local Iraqi officials in programs and 

projects. Some oil-sector projects were also a success, though they 

were not completed as quickly as hoped. Smaller water and electricity 

projects made positive contributions because Iraqis could see that 

these projects put people to work and delivered services. 

The top lessons from the Iraq program are:

R Develop a contingency Federal Acquisition Regulation to 

facilitate contracting during stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. 

R Do not rely on an “ad hoc team,” with limited contracting and 

rebuilding experience whose members serve short tours. 

R Put less emphasis on large infrastructure projects and more focus 

on smaller ones anchored at the local level.

R Choose the correct set of metrics to measure success. 

(Washington measured the success of reconstruction by the 

amount of money obligated and spent, which clashed directly 

with the need for what Lieutenant General Bostick called 

“strategic patience” in a contingency operation.)

R Include capacity development at all levels in the early stages of 

reconstruction effort.
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

27

Lieutenant General Robert Caslen. A 1975 graduate of the United 

States Military Academy at West Point, Lieutenant General Caslen 

served two tours in Afghanistan before coming to Iraq in 2008 to take 

command of the Multi-National Division-North. Following 15 months 

as Commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

at Fort Leavenworth, he was named the first Commander of the Office of 

Security Cooperation-Iraq in July 2011. As of February 2013, he was slated 

to be the next Superintendent of West Point.

Successful efforts to beat the insurgency in Iraq had a common 

thread: interagency and intergovernmental coordination and 

cooperation. But this kind of cooperation was too often missing, and 

the lessons drawn from it should serve as a basis for reforming the U.S. 

approach to stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

As a division commander, Lieutenant General Caslen partnered 

with local governors and provincial councils to build credible 

governance, providing security, essential services, and the rule of law. 

This consultative process yielded an array of benefits: it strengthened 

the credibility of U.S. commanders among the local population and its 

elected leadership, it helped U.S. commanders better understand the 

local Iraqi environment and culture, and it produced governance that was 

credible in the eyes of local Iraqis. These actions helped bring stability and 

improved security. “It was a true partnership. That’s why it worked.”

The Provincial Reconstruction Team program provided examples 

of agencies succeeding by partnering; but the degree of success within 

individual PRTs depended heavily on the personalities involved. That 

is, good leaders brought success. PRTs approached problems in a 

holistic manner, requiring military and civilian members to integrate 

strategies and cultures. When this happened, the PRTs achieved 

leverage with their Iraqi interlocutors in the provincial councils and 

decent project outcomes resulted. 

Recalling one coordination success, Lieutenant General Caslen cited 

a brigade commander in Diyala province who dedicated his artillery 

battalion to the local PRT to provide personnel for staff, coordination 

of programs and security, which added substantially to the team’s 

mobility—and thus its effectiveness—in a very unsettled area. “That 

was one of the best examples of integration I saw.” The PRT concept 

is “something we have to continue. That is one of the huge takeaways 

from this experience.”

In contrast, Defense’s Task Force for Business and Stability 

Operations was not sufficiently coordinated with local, provincial, or 

regional initiatives. According to General Caslen, the program was 

“dropped on local military commanders,” who had little idea how to 

integrate it into their areas of responsibility or into economic programs 

they were already developing. Although the TFBSO commendably 

sought to stimulate free enterprise and economic growth, it failed to 

integrate its ambitious initiatives into the ongoing work under his 

command. This is a “lesson learned for the future” that applies not just 

to military programs but to all future SROs. 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker.Ambassador 

Crocker, a Career Ambassador, served as 

Chief of Mission in Iraq from 2007 to 2009. 

He previously had two other assignments to 

Baghdad, first as a junior Foreign Service Officer 

at the U.S. Embassy in the late 1970s and later 

as the CPA’s Director of Governance for a short 

span in 2003. He was named Ambassador to 

Afghanistan in July 2011. On leave of absence 

as Dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas 

A&M University, Ambassador Crocker is the Kissinger Senior Fellow at 

Yale University.

The U.S. reconstruction programs in both Iraq and Afghanistan 

provide a number of significant lessons learned, the most notable 

of which is that major infrastructure projects in stabilization and 
28

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

reconstruction operations must be approached with extreme care and 

assiduous planning. Undertaking such in unstable zones presents what 

Ambassador Crocker termed “huge complications,” and the normal 

cost estimate for projects should be multiplied by a factor of ten to 

arrive at the true end price.

A major shortcoming of the Iraq program was the failure early on to 

obtain “genuine” Iraqi buy-in on major projects before U.S. funds were 

committed to building them. Although the Iraqis would occasionally 

give a “head-nod” to a project, they usually were not paying much 

attention because they were not footing the bill. Once work was 

completed, however, U.S. officials frequently found that there was no 

will on the Iraqi side to accept or maintain the projects. 

Ambassador Crocker took these lessons with him to Afghanistan, 

where the United States did a better job of securing local buy-in. But 

sustainment problems persisted there too. For example, there is no 

Afghan budget to maintain the new roads built with reconstruction 

money. “We’re already seeing them crumbling,” he said.

Operations and maintenance issues were especially complicated in 

Iraq. The U.S. program produced projects built to U.S. specifications, 

without taking into account Iraqi capacity to maintain them. The Iraqis 

erroneously assumed that the United States would be there to provide 

support. After transfer occurred, Iraq often found it impossible to 

sustain the projects. As a general rule, Ambassador Crocker said, when 

it comes to a major project “dumb it down.”

The Ambassador supports the idea of a unified contingency office to 

plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. But he said 

that such a structure must have a clear and concise chain of command to 

guard against the kind of State-Defense tensions that plagued the Iraq 

experience and obviate what Ambassador 

Crocker called “a second Rumsfeld era.”

Ambassador Christopher Hill. Ambassador 

Hill served as Chief of Mission in Iraq from 

April 2009 to August 2010. He previously 

served as Ambassador to Poland, the Republic 

of Macedonia, and the Republic of Korea. He is 

the Dean of the Korbel School of International 

Studies at the University of Denver.

The U.S. reconstruction program was much too large, well beyond the 

scale of anything State or USAID had ever done. Calling it the “largest 

ever foreign aid program,” Ambassador Hill emphasized the many 

differences between the Iraq rebuilding program and the post-World 

War II Marshall Plan for Europe’s reconstruction. The latter was chiefly 

loan-based, and the target countries provided a foundation on which U.S. 

funding could effectively build. In Iraq, the United States attempted to 

build an American-shaped reconstruction program on a fundamentally 

incompatible foundation with an entirely grant-based program. 

There was a bureaucratic clash of cultures in Iraq among U.S. 

government agencies; its ill effects weakened the reconstruction effort. 

For example, the State Department faced problems that arose when 

USAID programs, which are designed with maximum controls, 

sought to follow up on projects carried out through the military’s 

CERP program, implemented with less-developed controls. This 

particular collision of philosophies exemplified the many departmental 

differences that caused shortfalls in Iraq.

A Defense-State rebuilding rivalry, in part driven by spending rates, 

took a toll on the reconstruction effort. Ambassador Hill observed 

that, as U.S. forces prepared to leave Iraq and State positioned itself 

to assume responsibility for the complete U.S. mission there, the 

measurement of accomplishment became departmental “spend rates.” 

As a result, “State spent too much and took on too much.” 

Ambassador Hill stressed the need for what he called “a holistic 

approach” that should go well beyond simply an agglomeration of 

USAID, State, or military capacities. He supports forming a new 

office with clear responsibilities to manage SROs, modeled along 

the lines of USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams and 

possessing a broad mandate, interagency jurisdiction, and sufficient 

resources. Shortcomings in the State Department’s defunct Office of 

the Coordinator for Reconstruction Stabilization and its successor, 

the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, reveal that an 

integrated solution to managing SROs has yet to be established. 

These are the three paramount lessons from Iraq: 

R Don’t take on a program you don’t have the capacity to complete.

R Don’t ask institutions to do what they are incapable of doing.

R Set an exit date. 
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

29

Ambassador James Jeffrey. Ambassador 

Jeffrey, a Career Ambassador, served initially 

in Iraq in 2004 to bridge the transition from 

CPA to State and subsequently as Deputy 

Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Baghdad. 

He continued to focus on Iraq in subsequent 

assignments as the Secretary of State’s Senior 

Advisor on Iraq, as Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and 

as Deputy National Security Advisor. He returned to Iraq as Ambassador in 

2010, serving into 2012.

After U.S. forces removed Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq’s 

“government was totally non-functional.” The CPA had to rebuild 

not just power and water plants, but also the most basic elements of 

governance, recalled Ambassador Jeffrey. This was a scenario for which 

no plan existed.

Although the United States put tens of thousands of Iraqis to 

work through its reconstruction program, “the question can be asked 

whether this money spent by the United States was cost effective.” In 

the Ambassador’s view, “the U.S. reconstruction money used to build 

up Iraq was not effective. There were many development problems, and 

we didn’t get much in return for the $50 billion-plus that we spent.” 

The reasons were manifold. To begin with, there were questions 

as to whether the U.S. effort was a nation-building effort or a 

counterinsurgency program. Regardless of definition, Iraq required 

enormous assistance to recover not just from the war but also from 

Saddam’s 25 years of reckless neglect. “The money spent on improving 

health care was needed, including the money spent on hospitals. 

Money was needed to be spent on oil-field production, the electricity 

production and the grid, and drinking water.” 

Consultation with the Iraqis was a problem during the CPA period. 

“On most of this work, there was no Iraqi buy-in. There was never an 

impression that the Iraqis were included in any decision process.” 

Although “too much money was spent with too few results,” there 

were a number of positive effects: “Iraq ended up, nine years after the 

U.S. invasion, with: (1) more than 2.7 million barrels per day of oil 

being exported, (2) expanded availability of electricity and cell phones, 

and (3) a capable Iraqi military.” Moreover, “the United States defeated 

the insurgency and got Iraq on its feet. Overall, our efforts were a 

success.” 

The three biggest weaknesses in the Iraq program were these:

R not realizing how much work needed to be done to get the Iraqi 

government functioning

R not determining whether the United States was conducting a 

counterinsurgency or a nation-building program

R operating under U.S. contracting rules that were so “goofy” that they 

debilitated those trying to execute the program 

“What happened in Iraq was the military versus State and USAID, 

all of it occurring in the middle of an insurgency and nation-building 

mess. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was in USAID’s lane, placed 

in a very confusing role.” The military’s expansion into the rebuilding 

sectors perhaps went a bit too far: “The role of the U.S. military was to 

fight and secure the population. It [was not expected to have a] role in 

the reconstruction of Iraq. Its job was to defend the people. It did not 

have a plan for political or economic development.” 

Senior Deputy Assistant USAID 

Administrator Christopher Crowley. 

Mr. Crowley is USAID’s Senior Deputy 

Assistant Administrator for the Middle East. He 

served as USAID Mission Director in Iraq from 

2007 to 2010, longer than any other Mission 

Director. A Middle East specialist, with a career 

at USAID spanning 40 years, Mr. Crowley’s 

assignments included tours in Egypt, Syria, the 

West Bank, and Gaza.

Mr. Crowley said the failure to engage much earlier in effective 

capacity development programs was a “key gap” in the reconstruction 

effort. “We knew that the capacities of local governments and GOI 

ministries had been weakened over time, but the impact of Iraq’s 

isolation, the negative effects of Saddam’s rule, and the draining 

of good people from the country all made the task of capacity 

development much more difficult.” The GOI’s weak budget execution 

capacity was a key example. “We’d have teams go to a ministry to 
30

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

de-bottleneck a problem for them, but the real problem was that the 

people working the system didn’t even know the most basic steps of 

how to execute a budget.”

The $32 million project to implement the Iraq Financial 

Management Information System for the GOI failed because the 

Iraqis did not want it and thus had no interest in learning how to use 

it. In contrast, when USAID hired Arabic speakers—either local Iraqis 

or residents of other Middle East countries—to help implement ideas, 

projects succeeded because we were able more effectively to incorporate 

Iraqi priorities into programs.

The three principal lessons learned from the Iraq experience were these:

R Look beyond the title of a U.S. government department before 

assigning it an overseas mission. Some of these agencies sent people 

to Iraq who had no experience abroad at all, much less in the Middle 

East.

R Define what’s needed for sustainability from the start. 

R Find the right people before deploying them to a contingency 

operation and then keep them there. The one-year tour limit was an 

obstacle to sustainability and continuity.

USAID Mission Director Thomas Staal.

Mr. Staal’s career at USAID has spanned 25 

years, with many spent on Middle East issues. 

During 2003–2004, he served with the CPA in 

Basrah as USAID’s representative in southern 

Iraq. He then served as the head of USAID’s 

Middle East office. In 2012, he returned to 

Iraq as the USAID Mission Director, based in 

Baghdad.

According to Director Staal, the early U.S. reconstruction 

program was insufficiently planned. There was no strategic 

thinking about a longer and larger rebuilding program before the 

invasion. Although USAID had formulated a 3-year plan for Iraq’s 

reconstruction and rehabilitation, the official U.S. government 

position was that we would be out within six months. The goal was 

to repair as much as we could in that time and then leave. But that 

policy changed with the advent of the CPA, which developed an 

$18 billion reconstruction program, devised in the summer of 2003 

and approved by the Congress that fall. 

Leading the CPA’s effort was the Project Management Office. The 

projects requested for each ministry were put forward to the PMO 

by American ministerial advisors. The program “was not a plan; it 

was a wish list. Further, it had no capacity building, no real training 

initiatives. We didn’t come with a holistic approach.”

Another shortcoming was a lack of understanding among those 

leading the U.S. reconstruction program of what three major wars 

and a decade of international sanctions had done to the country’s 

infrastructure and to the spirit and psyche of the Iraqi people. “It 

wasn’t just the 2003 invasion that had subdued Iraq; it was the wars of 

repression waged by Saddam that had beaten down the people’s spirit.” 

The collective effect of these varying calamities left Iraq in need of 

much more help than was initially recognized. 

The U.S. government made the mistake of focusing on fixing 

everything rather than getting Iraqis involved in setting priorities on 

what most needed repair. “We said ‘let’s just get everything fixed’ and 

failed to do enough to develop capacities within the Iraqi society so 

that they could do a lot of these things themselves and then take them 

over and run them themselves.” 

The Congress

The fuel for the Iraq reconstruction program—billions in taxpayer 

dollars—came from decisions made and votes cast in the chambers of 

the U.S. Congress. Overseeing how these billions were used ultimately 

was executed in Senate and House committee rooms. 

SIGIR provided numerous testimonies over the past nine years 

to congressional committees, making a variety of recommendations 

for improvement, some of which found their way into law. As the 

authorizing body for the agencies that manage stabilization and 

reconstruction operations, the Congress possesses the ultimate 

constitutional responsibility for implementing reforms drawn from the 

lessons of Iraq. 

To obtain congressional insights and judgments about the Iraq 

program, the Inspector General interviewed:
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

31

R Senator John McCain

R Senator Susan Collins

R Senator Claire McCaskill

R Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon

R Representative Adam Smith

R Representative Stephen Lynch

R Representative Michael McCaul

R Representative Peter Welch

R Representative Jason Chaffetz

R Former Representative Christopher Shays

R Former Representative Bill Delahunt

R Former Representative Jim Marshall

Senator John McCain III (R-Arizona). 

Senator McCain is a member of three of 

SIGIR’s reporting committees: the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate 

Homeland Security and Government Affairs 

Committee, and the Senate Armed Services 

Committee. A Vietnam War hero, Senator 

McCain was a consistently strong supporter 

of the U.S. military mission in Iraq, strongly 

backing the troop surge in 2007 and making numerous trips to the country 

over the past nine years.

Senator McCain pointed to two crucial shortcomings that 

undercut the U.S. reconstruction program: inadequate program and 

project oversight and insufficient security. If those challenges had 

been resolved early, the reconstruction effort could have “made a lot 

of progress.” Instead, the program unfolded as security conditions 

deteriorated, aggravating an already weak management system and 

causing massive shortfalls and waste. 

The Defense and State Departments and the Congress all failed to 

fulfill their oversight responsibilities regarding Iraq’s reconstruction. 

Senator McCain recounted how he was “stunned” when, during one 

of his many visits to Iraq, a general told him that project oversight of a 

contractor’s work was being conducted by drone aircraft. 

Defense and State were unprepared to take on the challenges of so 

large an effort, and congressional oversight was “out the window” for a 

while. In the early phases of the program, the United States Congress 

appeared to have a “laissez faire” attitude toward the expenditure of 

U.S. tax dollars in Iraq. 

The paramount lesson from the Iraq rebuilding experience is the 

need for a complete overhaul of the U.S. approach to stabilization and 

reconstruction operations. Contingency contracting procedures were a 

particular weakness that such an overhaul should address. In addition, 

Senator McCain raised concerns about the failure of the government 

departments and agencies involved in SROs to conduct integrated 

operations and maintain accountability. He supports the idea of a 

consolidated office to plan, execute, and oversee future stabilization and 

reconstruction operations.

Finally, Senator McCain generously observed that the SIGIR team 

of auditors, investigators, and inspectors had provided a crucial public 

service, identifying areas in the rebuilding effort needing improvement 

and highlighting opportunities for saving taxpayer dollars. The lesson 

here, he stressed, is that an IG should be present on the ground in an 

SRO “as the situation first evolves.”

Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine). As 

a member of three of SIGIR’s reporting 

committees (Appropriations, Armed Services, 

and Homeland Security and Government 

Affairs), Senator Collins was the most consistent 

congressional supporter of oversight in Iraq 

during the past nine years, sponsoring legislation 

to strengthen SIGIR’s mandate, leading 

hearings on the Iraq program, and regularly 

meeting with the Inspector General and his staff. 

While the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq produced “some 

success,” many rebuilding projects failed to meet their goals because 

of poor planning, a deteriorating security situation, and weak program 

and project oversight. “The level of fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq was 

appalling.” Senator Collins was especially angry when she learned that 

some reconstruction money found its way into the hands of insurgent 

groups. The CERP was a program especially subject to fraud. The 

lesson there is that the CERP should have been limited to smallscale projects.
32

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

With regard to appropriations, Senator Collins initially favored a 

loan-based reconstruction program for Iraq, but President Bush had 

“no interest” in such and insisted on “no-strings-attached” funding. In 

retrospect, pursuing a program that included a loan-based component 

would have made economic sense for the U.S. taxpayer. 

Ensuring effective security and strong oversight are keys to success 

in a stabilization and reconstruction operation. Regarding oversight, 

the on-the-ground presence of SIGIR auditors, inspectors, and 

investigators was essential. The reason the special inspector general 

idea first surfaced was that the Congress was not getting the necessary 

oversight from departmental inspectors general. The decision to create 

SIGIR was a wise one.

Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri).

Senator McCaskill, a former prosecutor and 

State Auditor of Missouri, serves on two of 

SIGIR’s reporting committees: Armed Services 

and Homeland Security and Government 

Affairs. In 2007, she co-sponsored legislation 

for an independent, bipartisan Commission on 

Wartime Contracting, which offered numerous 

recommendations for reforming overseas 

contingency operations. Many of her proposals for contingency contracting 

reform became law with the passage of the FY 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act. 

According to Senator McCaskill, the vast majority of U.S. 

reconstruction funds in Iraq were wasted. While detailed research 

would be required to determine precisely which programs worked and 

which ones failed, it is likely the best program the United States ran in 

Iraq was one that paid its enemies to switch sides. (The Sons of Iraq 

Program spent $370 million in CERP funds to pay mostly Sunnis to 

stay off the battlefield and perform other work.5

)

A central cause of U.S. reconstruction program’s shortcomings was 

what Senator McCaskill called “an utter, abject failure” of the various 

U.S. agencies and departments to coordinate with each other. Instead, 

they worked at cross-purposes, creating “a circular firing squad” that 

guaranteed program failure. 

The CERP was initially a useful tool that enabled local commanders 

to fund projects quickly and effectively. The early projects were often 

“so simple and straightforward that they didn’t need a contracting 

officer.” Later, however, CERP projects grew too large, and the 

program “just got out of hand.”

These were the three most important lessons from the Iraq 

experience:

R Small projects are better than big ones, especially in unstable 

settings.

R Make realistic assessments about the sustainability of projects 

constructed as part a stabilization and reconstruction operation.

R Ensure strong accountability for those managing rebuilding 

programs and projects. The constant turnover in personnel produced 

a system where no one was held accountable for failure.

Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon 

(R-California). Representative McKeon is the 

Chairman of the House Committee on Armed 

Services, one of SIGIR’s reporting committees. 

He regularly traveled to Iraq over the past nine 

years.

Chairman McKeon said that the 

substantial U.S. investment in Iraq since 

2003 was successful in bringing improved 

security. But, “although we won the war, we have not won the peace.” 

The United States sacrificed a lot but dropped the ball by failing to 

protect our investment in Iraq.

Based on meetings with senior Iraqi officials, Chairman McKeon 

believed there had been an ongoing dialogue in 2011 between the 

United States and Iraq aimed at reaching an agreement to keep about 

20,000 U.S. troops in Iraq after December 2011. He was told that if 

the United States asked the Iraqis to permit such, the Iraqis would 

agree. Unfortunately, the negotiations did not succeed. An ongoing 

troop presence would have allowed the United States to exert more 

leverage over Iraq in 2012 and beyond. We have a large number of 

contractors performing missions that might have been performed at a 

lesser expense and with better effect by U.S. troops. 

The U.S. reconstruction program was initiated without sufficient 
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

33

planning or strategic direction. As a result, significant sums of U.S. tax 

dollars were wasted in Iraq. Chairman McKeon’s oversight trips to Iraq 

enabled him to visit a few reconstruction projects. At one project to 

rebuild a large electricity generation plant, the Iraqi chief engineer told 

him of the deteriorated condition of the plant, which the engineer had 

managed to keep going with a series of “patches.” He explained that, 

under Saddam Hussein’s rule, Iraqi officials would tell the leaders what 

they wanted to hear, rather than the truth, about issues such as the 

plant’s condition.

The effort led by the U.S. military to improve Iraq’s security forces 

produced the most lasting, positive impact of our reconstruction dollars. 

That impact could be lost, however, because of the withdrawal of U.S. 

troops. As the Chairman put it, we will be unable to influence the course of 

Iraq’s future, and the security forces may deteriorate, be misused, or both.

Representative Adam Smith 

(D-Washington). Representative Smith is the 

ranking member of the House Armed Services 

Committee, having served on the committee 

since 1997.He has maintained a strong interest 

in the oversight of the reconstruction program 

since its inception.

The funds for rebuilding Iraq’s 

infrastructure were, on the whole, not well 

spent. The United States went through a period in which its goal was 

to rebuild Iraq “from whole cloth,” and those involved in the effort 

failed to realize the serious problems that plagued the program. We 

tried to do too much “on the fly.”

Representative Smith cited as a success the U.S. ability to leverage 

the “Anbar Awakening,” noting that when program decision making 

became more locally driven, the rebuilding strategy became more 

successful. The United States did “an okay job” of reconstituting and 

training the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. 

The biggest mistake was the de-Ba’athification decision. While 

a move to diminish the Ba’athist influence and its grip on power 

was necessary, problems arose because too many highly-skilled, 

experienced people were excluded from office by the severe deBa’athification process. “The overarching problem” was the U.S. 

attempt to enforce a political structure on the Iraqis that had too little 

Iraqi input.

The biggest lesson from Iraq is that the U.S. government must 

develop better capabilities to respond to SROs. Bureaucratic rivalries 

between the State and Defense Departments hurt the program. You 

don’t have to wait until there is another SRO,” he added. “You can fix 

things in advance.” 

Representative Stephen Lynch 

(D-Massachusetts). Representative Lynch 

serves on one of SIGIR’s reporting committees 

(Oversight and Government Reform). He 

traveled to Iraq 14 times, visiting reconstruction 

sites with SIGIR’s inspectors.

Representative Lynch derived these 

lessons from the Iraq reconstruction 

program:

R Strong oversight must be present from the start of a stabilization and 

reconstruction operation. “We did not have that at the beginning.” 

SIGIR provided it later, but “a lot of money went out the door” 

before SIGIR arrived in Iraq in the spring of 2004. 

R An established coherent management structure is crucial to 

executing SROs effectively. “We did not have that in Iraq.” Instead, 

a number of temporary entities were created to fill the planning and 

execution gaps. 

R The CERP was a success when used properly. Battalion 

commanders that used CERP money to execute wisely targeted, 

quick-turn-around projects helped the mission succeed. Those 

who spent it on large-scale rebuilding efforts, like the Baghdad 

Enterprise Zone, missed the mark.

Emblematic of the oversight problem, Representative Lynch 

recalled a hearing in late 2004 involving the Defense Contract 

Auditing Agency, at which the DCAA Director was testifying. The 

Director stated, in response to a query from Representative Lynch, 

that DCAA had “no boots on the ground in Iraq” but was performing 

oversight from Virginia. Representative Lynch told him that was 
34

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

unacceptable; DCAA soon thereafter had auditors in Iraq. 

SIGIR succeeded because it had a significant on-the-ground 

presence. Representative Lynch recalled trips to Sadr City and the 

Rusafa Courthouse in Baghdad with SIGIR’s inspection teams. He 

also recalled a meeting with the GOI’s Council of Ministers in 2011 

at which a Sadrist pointed at him, saying “Congressman, you never 

told us democracy would be so hard.” For Representative Lynch, that 

criticism was a sign of progress. 

Representative Michael McCaul (R-Texas).

Representative McCaul was elected in 2004 and 

serves on one of SIGIR’s reporting committees, 

the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He also 

serves as Chairman of the Homeland Security 

Committee. He previously was Deputy Attorney 

General of Texas, Chief of Counter Terrorism 

and National Security in the U.S. Attorney’s 

office, Western District of Texas, and a federal 

prosecutor in the Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section in 

Washington, D.C.

The United States rebuilding program accomplished a lot. “For 

the most part, we can be proud of what our soldiers and diplomats 

achieved,” said Chairman McCaul. The comprehensive strategy that 

comprised the “surge” reached the goals that it set: a reduction in 

violence allowing the rebuilding program to move forward and the 

democracy to stabilize.

The most significant errors occurred during the CPA’s tenure:

R the de-Ba’athification order, which effectively fired about 30,000 

government employees

R the dissolution of the Army, which dismissed about 500,000 

members of Iraq’s military without pay or pension

There were significant areas of waste throughout the Iraq program 

that SIGIR identified; the causes of it serve as lessons learned for the 

next stabilization and reconstruction operation. One example cited 

by Chairman McCaul was $200 million spent on the construction of 

facilities for the Police Development Program that were never used for 

their intended purposes. 

Iraq has significant wealth from its oil reserves and growing exports. 

The U.S. reconstruction program built the foundation for the growth 

of that wealth. At the time of the departure of U.S. troops in 2011, 

Iraq was in a stable position, with a growing economy and a muchimproved security situation, enabling it to move forward as an ally of 

the United States in the Middle East. But many challenges remain.

Representative Peter Welch (D-Vermont). 

Representative Welch was first elected to 

represent Vermont in 2006, and developed 

a great interest in Iraq’s reconstruction from 

his membership on the House Oversight and 

Government Reform Committee. Previously, 

Mr. Welch served in Vermont’s State Senate.

The personnel system used to support work 

in Iraq weakened the program by allowing 

incessant turnover, which attenuated program management and project 

oversight. Further, the limitations imposed by the security situation 

prevented the effective execution of programs and projects. According 

to Representative Welch, Iraq teaches that security must be established 

before undertaking substantial reconstruction efforts during an SRO. 

With regard to the execution of stability and reconstruction 

operations, he said, “We should not have the military doing it. It is 

not their job. Some of the mistakes lie with Congress. We were not 

disciplined in directing what organization and structure we should 

have been using in Iraq.” 

Representative Welch emphasized the importance of SIGIR’s work, 

thanking the staff for its excellent productivity. Without the audits, 

investigations, and inspections that SIGIR executed, little would have been 

known of the challenges that persistently dogged the rebuilding of Iraq.

Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah). Representative Chaffetz was 

first elected in 2008 and serves on the House Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee. As Chairman of the Sub-Committee on National 

Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations, Mr. Chaffetz has 

held a number of hearings addressing Iraq’s reconstruction operations at 

which SIGIR has testified. 
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT

35

Some public works projects constructed 

during the Iraq program were effective 

and had a positive impact. Representative 

Chaffetz said, “they helped the country 

get back on its feet.” But too much 

reconstruction money was wasted on projects 

that failed for lack of sustainment because 

the United States did not sufficiently consult 

with the Iraqis. Once given control of projects, 

Iraq frequently had little interest in maintaining them chiefly because they 

were never consulted.

The top three lessons learned from the Iraq experience were:

R When entering stabilization and reconstruction operations, seek out 

trustworthy local partners and make sure they are actively engaged 

in the reconstruction process and “have skin in the game.” 

R Make certain that reconstruction programs during SROs have 

strong oversight. People will behave if they are watched. 

R Improve interagency coordination. This was a major weakness.

Representative Chaffetz believes the management systems for SROs 

must be reformed—a difficult task because Defense and State have 

conflicting agendas and a history of not communicating well with each 

other. This reflects the problem of “stove-piped” operations within U.S. 

departments and agencies involved in SROs.

Former Representative Christopher 

Shays (R-Connecticut). Mr. Shays served 

in the Congress from 1987 to 2008 and was a 

member of the House Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform, a SIGIR reporting 

committee. He traveled to Iraq over 20 times, 

more than any other Representative, and 

demonstrated a deep interest in SIGIR’s work, 

leading a number of hearings as Chair of the 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. He later served 

as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan from 2008 to 2011, before which SIGIR testified several times. 

Mr. Shays estimated that “close to half” of all reconstruction money 

for Iraq was wasted. He cited the cause as insufficient coordination 

between and among the U.S. government agencies that designed 

projects and the private civilian contractors that implemented them. 

“Contractors played an important role because they freed up the 

military to address their mission; they have to have a seat at the table 

during project planning,” he said. 

He named these as the top lessons from Iraq:

R U.S. agencies must bear a greater responsibility for the money they 

spend. Because funds for Iraq’s reconstruction were not directly linked 

to departmental budgets, agencies felt little ownership of the money 

and thus engaged in imprudent spending practices. 

R Public revenues must be raised (through taxes or fees) to pay for SROs; 

otherwise, there may be a perception that such operations are effectively 

without cost. If the public actually feels the burden of funding SROs, 

then there will be public pressure on the government to exercise greater 

spending discipline over the billions in tax dollars spent abroad. 

R Civilian contractors must be used more effectively. In Iraq, lax oversight 

and poor communication led to too much waste.

Former Representative Bill Delahunt 

(D-Massachusetts). Bill Delahunt is a former 

Representative from Massachusetts, who 

represented the 10th District from 1997 through 

2011. As a member of the House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, Mr. Delahunt demonstrated 

a consistent interest in and focus on Iraq’s 

reconstruction, conducting numerous hearings 

as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and International Organizations at which the Inspector General testified.

According to Mr. Delahunt, the failure to plan properly for the 

invasion’s aftermath caused disastrous results. “We should never go 

into combat operations again without doing the kind of planning 

that’s needed to deal with what comes next in Phase IV. The lack of 

preparation for dealing with post-invasion Iraq was a tragedy.” 

A key lesson is the need for a permanent planning agency designed 

specifically for contingency operations. Such an agency would integrate 
36

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. policy into an action plan, doing the kind of preparation and 

oversight necessary to succeed in an SRO. If such an entity existed 

10 years ago, then what happened in Iraq would have unfolded 

very differently. 

The biggest single concern for Mr. Delahunt is that the lessons of 

Iraq will go unlearned and unapplied. “We had hearing after hearing, 

but people didn’t listen. My concern is that people will look back and 

ask why we didn’t pay more attention. We continue to make mistakes. 

We’re missing an opportunity now; we should apply a lesson from Iraq 

by creating an office that would actually be primarily responsible for 

planning, executing, and overseeing SROs.” 

Mr. Delahunt said that SIGIR was “one of the success stories 

from Iraq.”

Former Representative Jim Marshall 

(D-Georgia). Mr. Marshall served in the 

Congress from 2003 to 2011, during which 

time he was a member of the House Armed 

Services Committee (one of SIGIR’s reporting 

committees) and traveled to Iraq many times. 

A decorated combat veteran of the Vietnam 

War, Mr. Marshall is a member of the U.S. 

Army Ranger Hall of Fame. He now serves as 

President and CEO of the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Mr. Marshall’s first exposure to the U.S. reconstruction plan in 

Iraq occurred in August 2003, when he traveled there on the first 

of more than 15 trips he would make to Iraq over the next 8 years. 

He accompanied Chairman Ike Skelton, and, during a meeting 

with Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator Paul Bremer, 

Commander of U.S. forces Lieutenant General Rick Sanchez, and 

Project Management Office Director Dave Nash, Mr. Marshall 

asked what plans the CPA had to address the security problems that 

inevitably would arise. The response he got was: “You cannot plan 

for that.” Incredulously, Mr. Marshall replied that they could “count 

on it” and expect that perhaps 25% of the reconstruction money 

would be spent on security and post-attack repairs. Events later 

proved his prognostication correct. 

Significant audit risk is acceptable when using CERP funds 

to accomplish projects that promote or secure tactical gains. The 

CERP helped commanders in Iraq to build relationships with locals, 

which reduced battlefield casualties. This truth should allow for a 

balancing of oversight rules when it comes to auditing the CERP in 

these situations. But it must not support large infrastructure projects. 

Auditors rightly challenged CERP’s use in Iraq for such purposes.

Like the CERP, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams suffered 

weaknesses from having been “built in flight.” For example, PRT 

managers should have recruited and relied more heavily on local 

nationals, which would have improved security and reduced costs. 

PRT personnel needed more training; the United States should 

have established an in-country “PRT University.” And more 

experienced leadership coupled with a more stable team of advisors 

could have built better local relationships and improved interagency 

operations. By contrast, the PRTs played a more effective role 

in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Marshall drew these lessons from the reconstruction program 

in Iraq:

1. Planners should expect everything to cost more than first estimates 

indicate.

2. The host government must credibly commit to providing project 

security, sustainment, and maintenance after project transfer.

3. Small projects are better than large; local projects are better than 

national.

4. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers should have had the 

reconstruction lead in Iraq from the start. It trains to operate in a 

contingency environment.

5. Implementing effective quality-assurance programs produces better 

results; that is, project oversight personnel who are present at the 

project site are crucial to project success.
37

3

Experience improved interagency coordination along the way. A 

necessary shift from an early focus on large infrastructure projects 

to a program centered on security and capacity-building bolstered 

interagency engagement because it required deeper involvement by 

government officials, as opposed to contractors. But these hard-won 

alliances, driven as they were by white-hot circumstances, have yet 

to yield the kind of systemic institutional reform within the U.S. 

government that would forestall future agency “stovepiping” during 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. The relatively limited 

transfer of lessons from Iraq to its contingency cousin in Afghanistan 

testifies to this truth. 

NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

The nine-year U.S.-led reconstruction effort in Iraq was extraordinarily 

difficult. Optimistic pre-war expectations for a limited humanitarian 

relief and recovery program quickly gave way to post-invasion realities 

that ultimately required a prolonged effort and the expenditure of 

tens of billions of dollars. The program faced an array of daunting 

challenges, pushing up costs in blood and treasure and pushing out 

the timeline for departure. Those challenges included a deteriorating 

security situation, conflicting departmental approaches, poor unity of 

command, weak unity of effort, and a parade of ad hoc management 

entities that came and went with little accountability. 

Reconstruction managers and contracting authorities faced 

complicated decisions, unprecedented challenges, and limiting 

restrictions as they planned, executed, and oversaw multifarious efforts 

to create a free, sovereign, and democratic Iraq. A succession of diverse, 

largely improvised entities ultimately managed more than $60 billion 

in U.S. appropriations and billions more in Iraqi funds to execute more 

than 90,000 contracting actions.6

When Iraq’s reconstruction began, the U.S. government relied 

on—in the words of former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld—“quickly 

assembled, ad hoc efforts”7

 to coordinate the resources of departments 

long used to working independently. The lead agencies—the 

Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development—sometimes coordinated but rarely 

integrated their operations: “stovepiping” is the apt descriptor. Early on, 

in particular, there were few effective mechanisms for unifying their 

diverse efforts. Figure 3.1 shows the many handoffs of reconstruction 

authority and program management that took place during the 

rebuilding effort.

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38

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Who Was in Charge?

The old cliché, money is power, could prove a useful touchstone in 

arriving at a first answer to this question. Defense controlled the 

contracting for the Iraq Security Forces Fund ($20.19 billion), the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program ($4.12 billion), and 

the bulk of contracting for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

($20.86 billion). Thus, it held decisive sway over $45 billion (87%) of 

the roughly $52 billion allocated to the five major rebuilding funds that 

supported Iraq’s reconstruction—most of which addressed security 

priorities through 2008 (see Figure 3.2).8

 In Iraq, if money was power, 

and power determined who was in charge, then Defense was in charge. 

Some say people are power. The formula plays out similarly. Defense’s 

presence in Iraq peaked at over 170,000 personnel supported by an even 

larger contractor contingent. True, they were predominantly combat 

troops, but the CERP put combat troops into the rebuilding business, and 

the ISFF put them into the security-training business. The CERP funded 

thousands of civil reconstruction projects, almost all overseen and executed 

by battalion commanders, and the ISFF paid for the training of Iraq’s 

security forces (army and police), overseen and executed chiefly by “greensuiters.” So if people are power, then in Iraq, Defense was in charge.9

In Washington, policy is power. In January 2003, thanks to the 

persuasive arguments of the Secretary of Defense, the President signed 

National Security Presidential Directive 24, putting Defense formally 

in the lead for post-war rebuilding. With the stroke of a pen, this 

ended what had been a fairly fervid interagency debate about postconflict strategy. If policy is power, then—again—Defense was in 

charge in Iraq, at least for the first year. 

Clarifying the answer to the “who’s in charge” question is crucial for 

future stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Three successive organizations bore responsibility for providing 

the U.S. reconstruction program with strategic oversight and tactical 

direction: the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, 

the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. Mission-Iraq. 

ORHA and the CPA both fell under the aegis of the Defense 

Department; the U.S. Mission-Iraq is a Department of State entity. 

Each organization developed successive, differentiated reconstruction 

strategies to respond to the evolving environments they faced in 

Iraq and to coordinate the work of multiple agencies and other 

implementing partners in country and back in Washington.10

CPA U.S. Mission-Iraq

IRMO (Iraq ReconstrucƟon Management Oĸce) 

Executive Program Authority 

PMO

ITAO (Iraq TransiƟon Assistance Oĸce) ISPO (Iraq Strategic Partnership Office)

PCO (Project & Contracting Office)

U.S. Program Implementers USACE GRD (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division) GRD (Gulf Region District) IAO*

 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

CPA (Coalition Provisional 

Authority)

*Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

*Middle East District Iraq Area Office USACE absorbs PCO

NSPD 36 establishes IRMO and PCO

CJTF-7* USF-I (U.S. Forces-Iraq) U.S. troops withdraw from Iraq

Recruited/trained the ISF

USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), Department of State Bureaus, and Other Civilian Agencies

ITAM/ISAM*

*Iraq Training & Advisory Mission/ 

 Iraq Security Assistance Mission 

ITAM/ISAM* OSC-I*

*Office of Security 

 Cooperation-Iraq 

U.S. Mission-Iraq absorbs ISPO

ORHA*

CJTF-7*

*Combined Joint 

 Task Force 7 

MNF-I (Multi-National Force-Iraq)

IRMO (Iraq Reconstruction Management Office) ITAO (Iraq Transition Assistance Office)

USACE GRD (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division)

MNC-I (Multi-National Corps-Iraq)

MNSTC-I (Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq)

Controlled operations with the ISF; absorbed by MNF-I 

Recruited/trained the ISF

GRD (Gulf Region District)

Temporary Program 

Management

Offices 

DoS Entities

DoD Entities

Iraq Reconstruction Program Execution, 2003–2012

FIGURE 3.1 Although State had executive authority over reconstruction by the second 

year, Defense implementers oversaw the majority of the work performed.
NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

39

ORHA—Initiating the Program 

(January 2003–April 2003)

On January 20, 2003, NSPD 24 consolidated responsibility for 

the reconstruction program under the Defense Department and 

established ORHA as its implementing authority. With no staff and 

barely integrated into Defense’s command structure, ORHA’s leader, 

retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, set out to build an organization 

from scratch just two months before the invasion.11

Lieutenant General Garner consulted experts and explored 

workaround solutions for staffing and contracting to gear up for 

what was expected to be a relatively short-term endeavor aimed at 

ameliorating expected humanitarian crises and potential man-made 

disasters, such as oil-field fires.12 He received few responses from 

U.S. agencies to his staffing requests, marking the first instance of 

inadequacy in U.S. attempts to provide civilian personnel for Iraq.13

ORHA moved into Baghdad in April 2003, lacking sufficient 

capacities for obtaining acquisition support. It worked with the 

Defense Contracting Command-Washington to award $108.2 million 

to execute the Iraqi Free Media Program and establish the Iraq 

Reconstruction Development Council, which sought to fold Iraqi 

leaders into project decision making. The Defense Department’s 

Office of Inspector General later determined that ORHA’s contracting 

practices circumvented proper procedures but cited a lack of contracting 

personnel and extreme time constraints as extenuating circumstances.14

USAID mobilized for humanitarian aid and disaster relief 

operations. From February through May 2003, it awarded eight major 

contracts, worth $1.3 billion, constituting the largest short-term burst 

of contracting in the agency’s history. After the invasion, its Office of 

Foreign Disaster Assistance moved a 65-person Disaster Assistance 

Response Team in from Kuwait—the largest ever deployed—with 

the Office of Transition Initiatives providing 24-hour support.15 The 

DART applied “creative contracting mechanisms,” including the 

issuance of cooperative agreements to non-governmental organizations 

up to a maximum of $4 million each.16

These early contracting actions provided a start to relief and 

reconstruction operations shortly after U.S. forces had prevailed in Iraq. 

But an enduring hangover from prewar disagreements on post-war 

strategy as well as controversial decisions about mission leadership 

hampered progress in mid-2003. The most controversial early 

decision, one that would affect the program’s entire trajectory, was the 

superseding of ORHA by the CPA in late April. 

Coalition Provisional Authority—Re-initiating the 

Program (April 2003–June 2004)

Two weeks after ORHA arrived in Baghdad, President Bush 

announced the appointment of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as the 

Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator.17 Concomitantly, the 

Congress created the IRRF, appropriating $2.475 billion, approximately 

74% of which was allocated to USAID.18 The allocation of IRRF 1 

reflected what many expected the post-invasion situation in Iraq to 

require: rapid relief efforts, minimal reconstruction, and some support 

for economic development.19

The Defense Department’s planning anticipated that Iraq would soon 

assume sovereignty through an elected interim government and then 

begin to shoulder the responsibility for rebuilding the country.Defense 

presumed that Iraq’s governance capacity could manage reconstruction 

programs and projects, but this projection proved off the mark.20

$0

$2

$4

$6

$8

$10

$12

$14

2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2006

Security Incidents

Annual Obligations

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

ISFF

IRRF

ESF

CERP

INCLE

Total Security Incidents 56,881

67,565

6,563

Annual Obligations, by Funding Source vs. Security Incidents, 2004–2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 3.2

Obligations 

for security 

programs 

generally 

rose and fell 

in proportion 

to security 

incidents.
40

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Trying To Bring Order

Ambassador Bremer arrived in May 2003 to find that neither the 

military nor the civilian leadership were responding effectively to the 

disintegration of Iraq’s government and the consequent loss of law and 

order. The CPA’s first two orders—de-Ba’athification and disbanding 

the Army—further complicated the chaos.21

In the summer of 2003, Defense opened the Head of Contracting 

Activity office in Baghdad to provide acquisition support to the CPA, 

starting with just three contracting officers to execute a rapidly growing 

backlog of contracts. The HCA expanded to 50 people within a year, 

but this represented just 50% of the personnel required to administer 

the thousands of contracting actions the CPA requested.22

The White House provided support by facilitating a Joint Manning 

Document, which determined that the CPA would need a staff of at 

least 1,200 people. Throughout its tenure, however, the CPA operated 

with about one-third fewer people than necessary, and turnover was 

constant. Moreover, the length of duty for various agencies ranged from 

3 to 18 months, with military and civilian rotations not synchronized.23

Attempting Iraq’s Recovery

The CPA sought to spur Iraq’s recovery through large infrastructure 

projects focused on the electricity and water sectors. Ambassador 

Bremer hoped these efforts would energize the economy and supply 

Iraqis with much-needed essential services.24

The CPA developed its program in haste, missing opportunities 

to integrate adequately the views of Iraqis—a fact borne out in this 

report—and alienating USAID, whose arguments for early capacitybuilding programs went largely unrecognized.25 By the fall of 2003, 

Iraqi and U.S. government leaders became increasingly impatient with 

the slow pace of recovery, prompting the United States to announce, 

on November 15, 2003, that sovereignty would transfer back to Iraq 

by June 30, 2004. This immediately increased pressure to amplify 

and accelerate the rebuilding program, but the CPA did not yet have 

IRRF 2 money to spend, and it would not until toward the end of 

its tenure.26

Establishing what would be the first of several ad hoc organizations 

to manage reconstruction, the CPA created the Program Management 

Office in the summer of 2003. Initially, USACE provided a handful 

of staff to support the new entity. Over the course of its 10-month 

lifespan, the PMO had only half of the 100 people it needed to 

manage the CPA’s programs.27

A Slow Start

Several issues limited the initiation of the IRRF 2 program. First, 

Washington concluded that the CPA’s spend plan lacked sufficient 

detail. The Office of Management and Budget thus withheld the 

allocation of some funds through the winter of 2004, pending more 

specific information, which slowed action on contracts then in the 

process of being competitively bid.28

Defense sent an acquisition assessment team to Baghdad to review 

the CPA’s practices and determine the resources necessary for effective 

IRRF contract administration. It found weaknesses in staffing and 

processes that SIGIR would echo in later audit findings. In response, 

the HCA took immediate steps to increase staff, create a management 

team to advise the PMO on contract requirements, establish a board 

for prioritizing contracts, develop an automated contracting data 

system, and end the unauthorized procurement of goods and services. 

But these changes were never fully realized. 29

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NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

41

In the spring of 2004, ongoing projects began to suffer as security 

deteriorated, with some seeing cost increases of up to 20%.30 At its 

end, 14 months after its creation, the CPA had barely begun to use the 

IRRF 2 for reconstruction. Ambassador Bremer funded most of the 

CPA’s early projects, as well as Iraqi government operations, from the 

Development Fund for Iraq. By April 2004, the HCA had awarded 

1,988 contracts, grants, and purchase and delivery orders—1,928 of 

which were funded by the DFI.31

U.S. Embassy—Re-evaluating the Program 

(June 2004–June 2005)

In May 2004, just after Coalition forces reorganized as the new 

Multi-National Force-Iraq, the President signed NSPD 36, assigning 

responsibility for Iraq’s reconstruction to State. On June 28, 2004, 

when the Iraqi Interim Government gained sovereignty, the U.S. 

Mission-Iraq, under new Ambassador John Negroponte, assumed the 

nominal lead of the rebuilding program.32

NSPD 36 established the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

to manage the reconstruction program’s strategic direction. Its senior 

advisors provided support and technical assistance to Iraqi ministers. 

Meanwhile, another ad hoc Defense entity called the Project and 

Contracting Office subsumed the PMO, and it took over managing 

most construction contracts.33

The ambiguities created by having two ad hoc reconstruction 

offices—IRMO and PCO—reporting to two different U.S. 

agencies—State and Defense—made it difficult to achieve unity of 

effort. A third ad hoc entity, the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq, took charge of ISF training and equipping. 

Meanwhile, USAID maintained control of its own programs. This 

diffusion of activities limited Ambassador Negroponte’s ability to 

integrate reconstruction activities, weakened management insight, and 

fed interagency tensions, all of which impeded progress.34

In the summer of 2004, Ambassador Negroponte ordered a review 

of reconstruction priorities, which led to the reprogramming of 

substantial IRRF 2 funds from the water and electricity sectors into 

the security and economic development sectors.35 This contributed to 

a “reconstruction gap”—the difference between the number of projects 

that the U.S. government told the Iraqis it would build and the 

number of projects that it would ultimately complete. The gap marred 

Iraqi expectations, attenuating their trust, but security problems 

demanded the change.36

A rising insurgency in Iraq required the revamping of reconstruction 

funding allocations. In May 2005, the Congress provided more than 

$700 million for the CERP and $5.49 billion for the new Iraq Security 

Forces Fund created chiefly to equip and train the ISF. Over the 

course of its life, the ISFF received $20.19 billion, nearly matching 

the IRRF.37

The U.S. Mission-Iraq began moving away from using expensive 

design-build contracts with large companies to direct contracting with 

Iraqi firms. But the PCO director cautioned against shifting large 

amounts of funding away from contracts that had been awarded under 

full and open competition. Hundreds of firms were active across the 

country, employing tens of thousands of foreign contractors and an 

estimated 180,000 Iraqis.38

Project management systems remained problematic. In mid-2005, 

the U.S. Mission-Iraq still could not match projects with the contracts 

that funded them, nor could it estimate how much they would cost 

to complete. Further, completed projects were failing after being 

turned over to Iraqis who could not properly maintain and operate the 

facilities.39 SIGIR reported on all of this, making recommendations 

for improvements.

U.S. Mission-Iraq—Executing the Program Amid 

Growing and Then Descending Violence 

(June 2005–August 2010)

The U.S. reconstruction strategy continued to evolve during the tenure 

of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who arrived in Baghdad in June 

2005.40 At that time, the U.S. government began to recognize that the 

GOI lacked sufficient capacity—both at the national and provincial 

levels—to manage the infrastructure projects provided through the 

IRRF.41 Reconstruction managers identified sustainment as a problem. 

Ambassador Khalilzad thus shifted the reconstruction effort’s focus to 

smaller projects at the local level designed to provide jobs and improve 

the delivery of services.42

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42

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Reaching Out to the Provinces

To extend capacity-building efforts beyond Baghdad, Ambassador 

Khalilzad deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams across Iraq, 

adapting a concept he developed during his time as Ambassador to 

Afghanistan. The PRT program established a novel system in which 

military and civilian personnel sought to work as an integrated team, 

rather than as a coordinative partnership. Its mission encompassed 

not only capacity-development efforts to support provincial and local 

governments but also projects that supported the counterinsurgency 

effort and stability operations. Although funded primarily from U.S. 

sources, PRT activities also received Coalition support, as well as help 

from nongovernmental organizations, donor nations, and the Iraqis.43

On November 11, 2005, the first PRT opened in Mosul.44 Originally 

conceived as a smaller two-phase program, the United States expanded 

and extended the effort to support the 2007 “surge.” By the time 

Ambassador Khalilzad’s replacement arrived in the spring of 2007, the 

United States led seven PRTs, with other Coalition nations leading 

another three.45

Minister of Finance

$150 M

Unsubstantiated

$400 M

Kurdistan Regional Government

$1.6 B

Ministries

$5.5 B

Disbursements 

for Ministries

$2.8 B

CPA Project 

Disbursements 

$3.0 B

CPA Project Disbursements 

$618.3 M

$8.0 B $8.0 8 0 B

$1.7 Ba

Palace Vault for Project Disbursements 

$836 M

Palace Vault

$217.7 Mb

Cash 

$10.2 B

Electronic Funds Transfer 

for Ministries and Projects 

$5.9 B

$4.7 Ba

$20.7 B

CPA’s Use of DFI Funds

5/28/2003–6/28/2004

DFI Funds 

Remaining as of 

6/28/2004

$8.0 B

Baghdad International Airport

Notes:

a

 Funds under CBI control.

b Funds under DoD control.

Documenting the DFI: Transparency and Accountability 101

During its 14-month regency, the 

Coalition Provisional Authority possessed 

authority over about $23.4 billion in Iraqi 

funds: $20.7 billion in Development Fund 

for Iraq money and $2.7 billion in Iraqi 

seized and vested assets. It directed DFI 

distributions totaling $14.1 billion, most 

of which went to Iraqi ministries and the 

Kurdistan Regional Government to pay 

salaries, pensions, and operating costs. It 

also spent about $2.4 billion in seized and 

vested assets by the time its mission ended 

on June 28, 2004.

When the CPA concluded operations, 

it had $6.6 billion in DFI funds on hand. 

The Administrator transferred almost all 

of it to the Central Bank of Iraq. Defense 

kept control over $217.7 million in cash 

in the Republican Palace vault. Later, the 

GOI provided Defense $2.8 billion in DFI 

funds to pay bills from contracts the CPA 

awarded prior to its dissolution. 

SIGIR audits made the following findings about the use of the DFI:

R Of the $14.1 billion used by the CPA, 

about $5.9 billion involved electronic 

fund transfer payments made for Iraqi 

ministry expenses and for a variety of 

items and services such as petroleum 

products, firearms and ammunition, 

vehicles, firefighting equipment, and 

military equipment. SIGIR found most 

of the required financial documents 

supporting payments for items and 

services purchased in 2003, but 

documents for payments made in 2004 

were largely missing. The largest portion 

of the DFI, more than $10 billion, was 

provided to the Iraqi ministries and 

the KRG in 2003 and 2004 to pay 

for salaries, pensions, and operating 

costs. SIGIR found poor controls, 

weak accountability, and limited 

documentation supporting the use of 

funds.

R Of the $2.8 billion in DFI provided to 

the Defense Department by the GOI, 

Defense could not produce documents 

supporting the use of approximately 

$1.7 billion, including $1.3 billion in fuel 

purchases. Instead of using the required 

receiving reports to document fuel 

purchases, Defense officials maintained 

a fuel delivery log book. When SIGIR 

audited these funds, the log book could 

not be found.

R Defense spent $193.3 million of the 

$217.7 million in cash that was in the 

Republican Palace vault, but it could 

not locate documentation supporting 

$119.4 million of these expenditures.

SIGIR Audits 06-036, 10-006, 10-014, 10-020, 12-001, 12-008 12-013, 13-003
NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

43

Surging Ahead

Throughout 2006, Iraq fell further into deadly chaos. The February 

2006 bombing of the “Golden Mosque” in Samarra eventually sparked 

a chain of retaliatory killings, kidnappings, mosque attacks, and street 

fighting. For the rest of the year and into the next, sectarian violence 

worsened, decimating mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad 

and spreading its lethal effects across the country.46

General David Petraeus assumed command of MNF-I in February 

2007, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker became Chief of Mission the 

following month. Together, they implemented a new comprehensive, 

civilian-military campaign plan that brought more than 25,000 

additional U.S. troops into Iraq and a smaller, but complementary, 

contingent of civilian personnel to staff “ePRTs” (PRTs embedded in 

brigade combat teams). The new strategy also focused on securing the 

people by locating with them, emphasized implementation of CERPfunded projects, and supported reconciliation with Sunni insurgents 

and Shia militia members (including funding the “Sons of Iraq” 

program to employ Sunnis and some Shia who might otherwise have 

continued to take up arms against the Coalition).47

The complementary leadership that General Petraeus and 

Ambassador Crocker brought to bear at this crucial moment achieved 

something that their respective institutions could not: integrated 

civilian-military operations. The new approach turned the tide, 

tamping down sectarian violence, relentlessly targeting Sunni insurgent 

leaders, and compelling Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army, 

to declare a cease-fire in August 2007. Al-Sadr’s forces ultimately 

would be defeated in April 2008 in the Battles of Basrah and Sadr 

City. By summer’s end, attacks had significantly decreased, and they 

would continue to do so for the balance of the year.48

In September 2007, the United States had more than 170,000 

combat personnel in Iraq as part of the counterinsurgency operation, 

with more than 171,000 contractors supporting the mission.49 There 

were 15 new “ePRTs” operating across Iraq, staffed chiefly by U.S. 

government civilians and overseen by the new Office of Provincial 

Affairs at the Embassy (see Figure 3.3). The ePRTs supported the 

counterinsurgency mission in unstable, yet strategically significant, 

areas such as Baghdad, Anbar, and Babylon provinces.50

Although the civilian surge provided much-needed personnel 

Building Capacity To Sustain Projects: Too Little, Too Late 

In the spring of 2003, Iraq’s governance capacity was shattered. Thirty years of centralized 

control had debilitated the government’s core 

functions, and post-invasion looting and the 

de-Ba’athification order aggravated matters. 

System failures became acutely apparent when 

Iraq could not maintain transferred facilities 

constructed by the United States. Although the 

Congress encouraged U.S. agencies receiving 

reconstruction funds to provide capacity-building support to the GOI, SIGIR found a dearth 

of efforts on this front during the rebuilding 

program’s early stages. 

Turnover of personnel across several interim 

Iraqi governments hampered efforts to assess 

GOI competencies and capacities. Exacerbating this weakness, U.S. agencies failed to share 

information garnered from GOI engagements in 

an integrated fashion. Without a clear understanding of Iraq’s abilities and needs, program 

managers initiated projects driven by parochial 

understandings and particular preferences.

Symptoms of this ad hoc approach lingered. 

For example, by 2007, the U.S. Mission had 

yet to designate a lead office to direct coordinated 

capacity-development efforts. Moreover, Embassy 

officials indicated that they lacked the legal 

authority to integrate interagency activities. Unity 

of effort was missing, weakening sustainment and 

putting reconstruction projects at risk.

SIGIR Audit 06-045

SIGIR’s inspection of the Hai 

Musalla Primary Healthcare 

Center revealed that U.S.-

funded equipment was not 

being used because Iraqi 

staffs had not been trained 

to operate it.

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44

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

for the dispersed capacity-building efforts that began to dominate 

reconstruction, the coordination of an expanding U.S. Mission-Iraq 

became much more complicated. As the organization chart for 2007 

visually reveals, it was difficult to manage funding and programs (see 

Figure 3.4). 

Three years of ISFF investment into training and equipping the 

ISF began to pay dividends.51 Iraqi forces played important security 

roles in the “surge.” By the same token, Iraqis began to take leadership 

in funding and managing reconstruction projects. At the end of 

2007, the GOI had drawn even with the United States in funding 

reconstruction, and, in 2008, Iraq provided more than $19 billion or 

almost four times the amount provided by the United States.52

During this period, SIGIR expressed concerns about the process 

for transferring completed projects to the GOI, citing the lack of a 

definitive bilateral asset-transfer agreement. The absence of such caused 

many projects to be unilaterally transferred to Iraqi control without 

formal acceptance, increasing the risk that the U.S. investment in Iraq 

would be wasted.53 Additionally, as the IRRF program closed out, 

the CERP increasingly served as a vehicle to finish ongoing IRRF 

projects,54 with new CERP projects growing larger in size—a trend 

that eventually became a serious problem.55

When the last “surge” brigade left Iraq in July 2008, the transfer of 

security responsibilities to Iraq was well underway, with the ISF in the lead 

in 10 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. The “surge” helped drop average daily security 

incidents to 2004 levels and reduced Iraqi civilian deaths by 75%.56

Preparing for Transition

In April 2009, Ambassador Christopher Hill inherited the mammoth 

challenge of preparing for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The 

November 2008 Security Agreement required all U.S. troops to leave 

Iraq by the end of 2011. After final withdrawal, the new Strategic 

Framework Agreement would drive U.S.-Iraq relations.57

In December 2009, President Obama announced that the U.S. 

combat mission in Iraq would conclude by August 31, 2010. On 

January 1, 2010, five major MNF-I command groups merged under 

a single command—the U.S. Forces-Iraq—which would manage 

the drawdown in coordination with State.58 The Iraq Training and 

Advisory Mission assumed responsibility for activities that had 

4 PRTs 5 PRTs 10 PRTs

15 ePRTs

7 PSTs

14 PRTs 15 PRTs

11 ePRTs 6 ePRTs

4 PSTs

15 PRTs 1 PRT

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team Footprint, 2005–2011

FIGURE 3.3

Slow to ramp up, the PRT program 

expanded to more than 30 teams 

by late 2007—half in the form of 

civilian-led teams embedded with 

military units. 

Private Security Contractors: Iraq Amok

Private security contractors provided protection in Iraq for U.S. government and contractor 

personnel, facilities, and property. These services included guarding bases and work sites, 

escorting individuals and convoys, and providing security advice and planning. In an October 

2008 report, SIGIR identified 77 companies 

that provided such services since 2003. But the 

number of personnel deployed by these companies was more difficult to pin down. 

In August 2008, the Congressional Budget 

Office estimated that number to be 25,000–

30,000. But an October 2008 Government 

Accountability Office report stated that complete 

and reliable data was unavailable, and thus it 

was impossible to determine the precise number.

The security contractor phenomenon brought 

serious problems. A September 2007 incident 

in Baghdad, involving State’s security contractor 

Blackwater, resulted in the deaths of 17 Iraqi 

civilians. This tragedy forced Defense and State 

to improve oversight of PSCs, producing, among 

other things, the following improvements:

R MNF-I established an Armed Contractor 

Oversight Division to monitor PSCs and serve 

as the prime point of contact on PSC policies. 

R MNF-I published comprehensive guidance 

for PSCs, assigning military units more 

responsibility for overseeing PSC missions, 

managing incidents, conducting investigations, 

and executing contract management. 

R A memorandum of agreement defined State 

and Defense authorities and responsibilities for 

overseeing PSC operations in Iraq. In addition 

to establishing common rules regarding the 

use of force, serious incident investigation, and 

report preparation, the agreement spelled out 

prudential control procedures for PSC missions, 

requiring liaison officers to monitor them. 

SIGIR Audit 09-005

Iraqi security forces stand guard at the April 2008 re-dedication 

ceremony at the newly refurbished King Faisal Bridge. Four years 

earlier, the bodies of four Blackwater security contractors were 

hung from the bridge. (USMC photo)
NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

45

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Organization Chart During 2007

Deputy Secretary 

of State

Defense Reconstruction 

Support Office 

(DRSO)

Secretary of the 

Army

U.S. Central 

Command

(CENTCOM)

Multi-National 

Force- Iraq (MNF-I)

Chief of Mission

(COM)

Bureau of Near

Eastern Affairs

 (NEA)

Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights, 

and Labor

 ( DRL ) Iraq 

Reconstruction 

Management 

Office

(IRMO)

U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Gulf / Region 

Divison – Project and 

Contracting Office

(USACE/GRD–PCO)

U.S. Agency for 

International 

Development (USAID)

Project and Contracting Office -

Washington

 (PCO-W)

Assistant Deputy 

Assistant Secretary 

– Army (Policy and 

Procurement) –

Iraq/Afghanistan

Secretary of 

the Air Force

Deputy Chief of Staff 

(Installation & 

Logistics)

U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers 

(USACE) - HQ

Corps of Engineers 

Transatlantic Program 

Center (CETAC)

Dept of Army

ASA (AL&T)

Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security (DS)

Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs

 (INL)

Bureau of Political and 

Military Affairs

 (PM)

Bureau of Population,

Refugees, and Migration

 (PRM )

Criminal 

Division 

ICITAP

OPDAT

U.S. Institute of 

Peace

Overseas 

Private 

Investment 

Corporation

 (OPIC)

Bureau for 

Democracy, 

Conflict & 

Humanitarian 

Assistance

(DCHA)

Bureau for Asia and 

the Near East

 (ANE)

Department of 

the Treasury

The Civil 

Engineer

Air Force Center for 

Environmental 

Excellence 

(AFCEE)

Multi-National Security 

Transition CommandIraq (MNSTC-I)

USAID Mission 

Director Iraq

Homeland Security 

(Iraq)

Northern 

District

Central 

District

Southern 

District

Joint Contracting 

Command Iraq /

Afghanistan

(JCC-I/A)

Line of Authority

Line of Significant Coordination

Department of 

Justice

Attorney General

Justice 

Attaché

United States 

Marshals Service

Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and 

Explosives

Regional Crimes 

Liaison Office

Secretary of State

Senior Advisor to the 

Secretary & 

Coordinator for Iraq

(S/I)

Secretary of Defense

USAID

DoS

Other

DoD

FIGURE 3.4

It was not always clear who was in 

charge of the reconstruction effort.
46

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

been under MNSTC-I, including police training conducted by 574 

international police advisors.59

The Iraq Security Assistance Mission took over administering 

the Foreign Military Sales program, with contracting support 

from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Among its many 

responsibilities over the two years leading up to the final troop 

withdrawal, the Defense Department was responsible for determining 

the disposition of more than 3 million pieces of U.S. military 

equipment, including items valued collectively at $1.1 billion that 

transferred to the GOI’s security forces.60

When USACE’s Gulf Region Division deactivated on October 23, 

2009, it reported having completed 4,697 U.S.-funded projects at a 

combined cost of $7.3 billion. Two smaller districts overseen by the 

USACE Transatlantic Division continued work in Iraq until April 10, 

2010, when operations merged into a single Gulf Region District.61

U.S. Mission-Iraq continued efforts to “right-size” U.S. EmbassyBaghdad operations and State’s presence in the provinces. Upon 

expiration of its authority in May 2010, the Iraq Transition Assistance 

Office transferred most program management responsibilities to the 

Iraq Strategic Partnership Office, a third successive ad hoc agency. 

ISPO continued oversight of construction projects and grants. 

Another ad hoc entity, the Office of Provincial Affairs, coordinated 

PRT/ PRDC projects and played an increasing support role in 

prioritizing and administering CERP projects through the PRTs.62

U.S. Embassy—Transitioning to Traditional 

Assistance (August 2010–October 2012)

In August 2010, the U.S. combat mission formally concluded, and 

Ambassador James Jeffrey returned to Iraq to take over as Chief of 

Mission.63 The slow march to full U.S. military withdrawal spanned 

15 months. The CERP in Iraq closed out in September 2011,64

and almost all of the $20 billion in ISFF was obligated when 

the final authority to obligate expired a year later.65 The Office of 

Security Cooperation-Iraq continued ISAM’s mission, coordinating 

continuing security assistance for the ISF with funding chiefly from 

the FMS program. Defense transferred its police training advisors to 

State’s new Police Development Program and prepared to hand off its 

limited counterterrorism and training support activities to OSC-I in 

October 2011.66

The PDP saw State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs resume responsibility for police training, a 

mission it had led early on in the reconstruction program. Although 

INL continued to execute and fund small anticorruption and 

rule-of-law efforts, most INCLE funds now supported the police 

development efforts.67

In October 2011, ITAM transferred full responsibility for police 

training to INL’s planned five-year, multibillion-dollar program. One 

year later, however, State scaled back the PDP dramatically because 

of an internal INL assessment and SIGIR audit findings. Slashing 

hundreds of millions of dollars from the program, State reduced the 

number of police advisors to 35—a tenth of the original requirement.68

The total number of personnel dropped when USACE’s Iraq 

Area Office subsumed GRD in March 2011, and the PRT program 

closed its doors that summer. But personnel numbers rose slightly in 

early 2012 as State prepared to operate at several Embassy satellite 

locations, OSC-I hubs, and training sites. As long-running USAID 

programs closed and the scope of U.S. involvement in Iraq narrowed 

86$PEDVVDGRU&KULVWRSKHU+LOOVHFRQGIURPULJKWDQG*2,RIÀFLDOVYLVLWWKH

4XGDV3RZHU3ODQWRQHRIWKHODUJHVW86IXQGHGSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQSURMHFWVLQ

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NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

47

through 2012, U.S. Mission-Iraq again moved to decrease civilian 

and contractor personnel. ISPO’s three remaining staff members 

transferred to U.S. Embassy sections when that office closed in 

August 2012.69

Ambassador Robert Beecroft took over as Chief of Mission 

in September 2012. State’s role in Iraq still transcended the 

traditional boundaries of diplomacy and development assistance, 

requiring Ambassador Beecroft to manage a sprawling mission of 

unprecedented size and unrivaled complexity amid a still-volatile 

Iraq. At the end of 2012, the Mission’s personnel totals still exceeded 

10,000, with programs coordinated out of 11 sites (see Figure 3.5).70

Who Did the Work?

As the Executive Agent for most reconstruction funding, the Defense 

Department directed programs covering more than 75% of U.S. funds 

allocated for Iraq’s reconstruction.71

USAID directed almost 15% of money in the five major funds. 

Its programs initially addressed the restoration of critical public 

services and then transitioned to capacity-development efforts in 

the governance and economy sectors funded by the IRRF 2 and 

the ESF.72

Although State bore responsibility for the strategic direction of the 

program starting in May 2004, it implemented less than 10% of the 

obligations from the five major funds. Approximately three-fourths of 

all State-led efforts addressed rule-of-law programs, supported by the 

INCLE, ISFF, and IRRF. The remainder provided technical support 

to Iraq’s ministries and funded projects to build capacity at the local 

level, mainly through the PRT/PRDC program.73

Department of Defense Programs

Construction Services

USACE, through its Gulf Region Division (activated in January 

2004), served as the primary construction manager of U.S.- and 

Iraqi-funded construction projects in every reconstruction sector. 

NSPD 36 authorized the establishment of the PCO a few months 

later to provide additional reconstruction management oversight. By 

December 4, 2005, GRD and PCO merged, and by October 14, 2006, 

GRD became the successor to PCO, which closed its Washington 

office several months later. USACE oversaw military construction 

services provided through Iraqi-funded FMS cases and implemented 

an additional $2.4 billion in DFI-funded projects contracted by the 

CPA, almost all of which supported contracts for the Task Forces to 

Restore Iraqi Oil and Iraqi Electricity. USACE implemented many 

types of U.S.-funded construction, including these:74

R IRRF and ESF projects overseen by ISPO and its predecessors

R projects funded through Defense allocations of the IRRF to 

USACE and through interagency agreements with other agencies 

to build or refurbish schools, hospitals, medical clinics, government 

buildings, water and waste supply and treatment facilities, oil 

and electrical infrastructure, police stations, border forts, prisons, 

courthouses, and much more

Anbar

Muthanna

Qadissiya

Najaf

Basrah

Erbil

Sulaymaniyah Tameem

Dahuk

Thi-Qar

Diyala

Kerbala

Missan

Ninewa

Salah Al-Din

Wassit Babylon

State-managed

Defense-managed

Erbil

Consulate

Support Center

Baghdad

Embassy

Landing Zone

Prosperity

Support Center

Baghdad

Military Attaché Annex

Tikrit

Besmaya

Taji

Basrah

Umm Qasr

State- and Defense-managed Sites in Iraq, as of 12/2012

FIGURE 3.5

U.S. programs were 

coordinated out of 

11 sites in Iraq 

during 2012.

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48

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

R “pseudo-FMS” projects funded by the ISFF to build and refurbish 

ISF bases and facilities

R INL-funded police training facilities and other projects to support 

the ISF

R at least $1.65 billion in Army Operations and Maintenance projects 

to build facilities and install security measures on bases occupied by 

U.S. military forces, such as overhead protection for dining halls and 

barracks facilities

As of September 2012, USACE reported completing more than 

5,000 projects since March 2003, funded by at least $8.27 billion of the 

major U.S. reconstructions funds (see Figure 3.6). It had 44 ongoing or 

planned projects with a collective contract value of $639.1 million, the 

majority of which were FMS cases.75

Rebuilding the ISF

Defense directed more than $25 billion in projects and programs to 

recruit, train, equip, and sustain MOI police forces and MOD military 

forces through September 2012.76 Prior to 2004, Combined Joint 

Task Force-7 led U.S. efforts to begin rebuilding the ISF, including 

initial projects utilizing Iraqi funds such as the DFI and CERP. When 

MNF-I assumed command and control of military operations in 

April 2004, its subordinate command MNSTC-I took over the role of 

rebuilding the ISF.77

Under MNSTC-I, these elements carried out programs:78 

R Coalition Military Assistance Training Team—CMATT 

supported the Ministry of Defense and Joint Headquarters 

Transition Team in building the ranks of Iraqi Army, Air Force, and 

Navy units throughout Iraq. 

R Civilian Police Assistance Training Team—CPATT 

coordinated with INL, DoJ, and IRMO to train, equip, organize, 

mentor, and develop MOI forces. 

R Coalition Air Force Transition Team—CAFTT worked to 

build Iraq’s military air capability, and coordinated with two other 

MNSTC-I teams assigned to work with the MOD and MOI 

to improve command and control and develop law-enforcement 

capacity. 

The Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

supported MNSTC-I’s contracting. In January 2010, ITAM subsumed 

MNSTC-I’s various CMATT and CPATT teams, continuing certain 

specialized teams to support Iraq’s security forces.79

Security Assistance Through the FMS Program

The FMS program facilitated contracting for the purchase of military 

equipment sales and construction services in Iraq since 2005. Through 

September 2012, the FMS program executed 496 separate cases valued 

at $12.79 billion—237 FMS cases funded by the GOI for about 

$9.44 billion and 259 pseudo-FMS cases funded by the United States 

through the ISFF for about $3.35 billion.80 Notable cases included the 

purchase of 140 M1A1 tanks, 36 F-16s and associated training, and a 

fleet of 35-meter and 60-meter coastal patrol boats.81

Supported first by the Multi-National Corps-Iraq with help from 

DSCA, the program transitioned to the responsibility of the Iraq 

Security Assistance Mission in January 2010. When the last U.S. 

combat troops left Iraq in December 2011, the Office of Security 

Cooperation-Iraq assumed responsibility for administering FMS cases 

as well as those funded through Foreign Military Financing. $0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

2003 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2011 2012

IRRF

ESF

CERP

INCLE

ISFF

Contract Amount of USACE-managed Projects, by Year of Award and Funding Source

$ Millions

FIGURE 3.6

USACE 

implemented 

nearly $8.27 

billion in projects 

sourced from 

the major 

reconstruction 

funds—more than 

69% provided by 

the IRRF.
NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

49

U.S. Agency for International 

Development Programs

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance supported Iraq 

reconstruction ahead of the invasion, using creative cooperative 

agreements with non-governmental organizations to get projects 

started quickly. By September 30, 2012, when OFDA ended its 

operations in Iraq, it had spent more than $450 million on its 

programs to provide humanitarian assistance, including $261 million 

in International Disaster Assistance Funds.82

USAID’s Bureau for the Middle East supported Iraq programs 

overseen by USAID Mission/Iraq, headquartered in Baghdad. 

Contractors, grantees, and United Nations implementing partners 

executed USAID’s project and program activities, with support over 

time from these five ad hoc entities: the CPA, IRMO, ITAO, ISPO, 

and GRD.

From February through May 2003, USAID awarded eight 

contracts under less than full and open competition to meet pressing 

requirements funded by IRRF 1 signed in mid-April 2003. The 

largest went to Bechtel National for the Restore Economically 

Critical Infrastructure Program. USAID received only $2.98 billion 

of the IRRF 2, predominantly for infrastructure projects, after its 

funding requests for capacity-building and democracy programs 

went ignored.83

During FY 2006–FY 2012, USAID programs received 

$2.92 billion from the Economic Support Fund and focused on 

capacity building, economic growth, and democracy and governance 

initiatives. As of September 2012, remaining USAID programs were 

valued at approximately $685 million.84

Figure 3.7 provides a snapshot of major USAID programs, 

including their funding sources and duration.

Department of State Programs

State had responsibility for civil reconstruction efforts in Iraq, 

including Defense-funded projects executed through the Project and 

Contracting Office and USACE’s Gulf Region Division. SIGIR 

affirmed that mandate in an October 2005 legal opinion prepared 

in response to a request from IRMO, the first ad hoc program 

management office to report to State. IRMO (and its ad hoc 

successors, ITAO and ISPO) provided overall strategic direction for 

the reconstruction program, while the PCO continued oversight of 

most construction contracts. 

Since 2003, the following State entities provided humanitarian 

relief and served as implementing partners for programs funded by 

almost every major U.S. reconstruction fund (see Appendix B for 

details):

R Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

R Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

R Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

R Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

R Office of Export Control Cooperation

State personnel working in Embassy sections provided advisory 

support to the Iraqi government. Expenses for the bureaus overseeing 

programs came out of State’s operating funds. State relied on the 

support of implementing partners for program and project execution 

through interagency agreements. For example, USACE provided 

technical construction expertise and program management for 

$618 million in PRT/PRDC projects funded through obligations of 

the ESF, and INL funded rule-of-law programs conducted by the 

Department of Justice.85

Other Civilian Agency Programs

From the earliest days of reconstruction, civilian detailees from U.S. 

agencies served ORHA, the CPA, and U.S. Mission-Iraq. Several 

major agencies established Attaché offices to support U.S. EmbassyBaghdad sections and oversee a variety of reconstruction programs (see 

Appendix B for details). The salaries and operating expenses for these 

offices were provided through the budgets of the agencies. Funding 

for most programs, however, was provided through interagency 

agreements with State and Defense using IRRF, ESF, CERP, and 

INCLE funds. These agencies included:
50

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Infrastructure Programs

Health & Education $40.7 M IRRF 1 / $17.4 M IRRF 2 / $22.8 M Other

Majority Source: IRRF 2

Majority Source: IRRF 1

Majority Source: ESF

Bechtel I $987.3 M IRRF 1 / $16.8 M Other

Bechtel II $1.18 B IRRF 2

Governance 

Programs

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Economy Programs

Economic Governance II $117.5 M IRRF 2 / $91.5 M ESF

Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program for Iraq (ARDI)

$8.4 M IRRF 1 / $92.0 M IRRF 2 Agribusiness (Inma) $179.8 M ESF

Private Sector Development (Izdihar) $107.4 M IRRF 2 / $32.8 M ESF

Provincial Economic Growth (Tijara) $20.0 M IRRF 2 / $172.5 M ESF 

Financial Sector Development $51.2 M ESF

Primary Health Care Project $72.9 M ESF

RISE-I $46.1 M IRRF 1 / 

$9.2 M IRRF 2

Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education 

(RISE-II) $51.8 M IRRF 2

LGP I $104.7 M IRRF 1 / $119.7 M IRRF 2 Governance Strengthening

$57.2 M ESF ($117 M ceiling)

Community Action Program (CAP) I $70.0 M IRRF 1 / $199.6 M IRRF 2

CAP II $4.0 M IRRF 2 / $143.1 M ESF 

CAP III $20.0 M IRRF 2 / $303.0 M ESF

Electoral Technical Assistance $49.1 M Other / $41.0 M IRRF 2 / $12.6 M ESF Elections Support Project

$25.0 M ESF 

Voter Education $114.6 M IRRF 2 

Community Stabilization Program $30.0 M IRRF 2 / $619.0 M ESF 

National Capacity Development (Tatweer) $35.0 M IRRF 2 / $304.4 M ESF 

Administrative Support Project 

(Tarabot) $82.3 M ESF Iraq Rapid Assistance Project (QRF) $161.8 M ESF 

Broadening Participation through Civil Society $75 M ESF 9/2012–10/2015 

Economic Governance I $43.5 M IRRF 1 / $32.1 M IRRF 2

Local Governance Program (LGP) II $110.4 M IRRF 2 / $256.6 M ESF 

LGP III $29.6 M IRRF 2 / $178.0 M ESF 

HSAD $80 M ESF 

9/2012–9/2017

Major USAID Programs, 2003–2012

FIGURE 3.7 As of September 2012, USAID had obligated 

at least $6.89 billion for programs in Iraq.
NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

51

R Department of Justice

R Department of Homeland Security

R Department of the Treasury

R Department of Transportation

R Department of Commerce

R Department of Agriculture

R Department of Health and Human Services

R Export-Import Bank

R Overseas Private Investment Corporation

R U.S. Institute of Peace

Contractors

Although U.S. government agencies managed the reconstruction 

program in Iraq, contractors performed the bulk of the work on the 

ground. Throughout the Iraq reconstruction effort, contractors trained 

police, constructed facilities, provided technical assistance to the Iraqi 

government, executed capacity-building programs, guarded critical 

infrastructure and reconstruction sites, and provided personal security 

and other support services for Iraqi, U.S., and Coalition entities. Many 

died doing so.86

Determining the number of contractor personnel in Iraq proved a 

challenge. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and 

USAID Administrator entered into a memorandum of understanding 

to identify roles and responsibilities and establish procedures for 

the coordination and movement of contractors. It designated the 

Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker as the 

database system for tracking all contractor information.87

To support accurate and timely contractor tracking, a SPOTgenerated letter of authorization was required for contractors receiving 

government support, which prompted a substantial increase in 

registered contract personnel. Not all contractors required government 

support, and agencies continued to use different systems to track 

personnel. Although the SPOT offered the most comprehensive 

picture of contractor and grantee personnel working in Iraq, it was far 

from complete.88

In August 2009, Defense reported that almost 174,000 contractor 

personnel were working in Iraq.89 By April 2011, according to SPOT 

data, that number had been cut in half, and it continued to drop in 

conjunction with the withdrawal of U.S. troops (see Figure 3.8).90

Contract Administration

Effectively implementing programs begins with strong acquisition 

support that prepares and conducts solicitations, writes contracts, and 

provides financial controls. SIGIR found that the lack of sufficient 

contracting personnel in Iraq weakened acquisition support, hampering 

project outcomes. 

As the volume of contracting actions mounted, an overwhelmed 

cadre of acquisition staff could not provide sufficiently detailed 

statements of work, resulting in contract changes, delays, and higher 

project costs. Contracting officers did not always check invoices 

against goods and services received, which created opportunities for 

fraud. Ultimately, SIGIR determined that contracting processes and 

personnel improved over time, but the U.S. government lacked the 

right regulations and sufficient personnel to support a large-scale 

stabilization and reconstruction operation.91

Defense designated the U.S. Army as Executive Agent for most of 

the major funds used in Iraq. The Army transitioned this contracting 

authority through six different organizations over the course of the 

program (see Figure 3.9).92 State controlled the ESF and INCLE, 

with contract administration provided through the State and USAID 

Offices of Acquisition.93

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

DoD

DoS

2011 2012

USAID

Other

U.S.-funded Contractor and Grantee Personnel in Iraq, 

as Reported by SPOT Database, by Quarter, 4/2011–10/2012

FIGURE 3.8

From April 2011 through the 

end of that year, when U.S. 

military forces departed Iraq, 

the number of contractors 

dropped nearly 88%.
52

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

The core IRRF 2 infrastructure program had two main components: 

design-build construction contracts and program-management 

contracts. The PMO planned for 12 design-build, cost-plus contracts 

to execute projects in six primary construction sectors (see Figure 3.10). 

In addition, the PMO planned for seven program-management 

contracts to support oversight—one to provide management of the 

entire program and six to provide supervisory management for the 

six sectors.94 USACE provided additional construction management 

and contracting support through GRD, which was activated in 

January 2004.95

Before the design-build contracts were competed in the spring of 

2004, the PMO requested and received approval in December 2003 

from the U.S. Air Force to execute “bridge” contracts through the 

Worldwide Environmental Restoration and Construction contract 

administered by AFCEE. By January 2004, AFCEE had awarded four 

task orders, totaling $191.1 million, predominantly to meet the urgent 

requirements for rebuilding New Iraqi Army facilities. By May 2004, 

AFCEE awarded 11 additional task orders totaling $290.1 million. 

However, SIGIR auditors found that some task orders were outside 

the scope of the WERC contract.96

USAID awarded a bridge contract in early January 2004: the 

$1.8 billion Bechtel II contract to provide engineering, procurement, 

and construction services as a follow-on to its IRRF 1 infrastructure 

contract. The PMO issued only four task orders under Bechtel II, 

amounting to $180 million of work, before the remaining 10 designbuild sector contracts and 7 program-management contracts were 

awarded in March 2004.97

Task orders for the IRRF 2 contracts awarded in March took 

several months to be issued, while contractors charged costs waiting for 

work.98 SIGIR audits reported on USAID and USACE contracting 

challenges that led to project delays and, ultimately, charges for 

overhead with no work being carried out.99

Indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity contracts facilitated 

quick start-up, allowing the scope of work to be defined as project 

requirements were definitized. These early contracts has provisions 

allowing the U.S. government to convert to firm-fixed pricing once 

a set percentage of design work had been completed, but SIGIR 

found that the government failed to exercise these options.100

The Cockerham Conspiracy: Contracting and Kickbacks

The Cockerham case was the most significant 

criminal conspiracy case uncovered during the Iraq 

reconstruction program. The investigation found 

widespread fraud that, by the end of 2012, led to 

the conviction of 22 individuals, the recovery of 

$67.7 million, and the suspension or debarment of 

57 companies and individuals. The Cockerham case 

was fraught with intrigue: one military officer who 

received bribes committed suicide after being caught; 

another key player was murdered.

Occurring at the principal supply hub for the Iraq 

reconstruction program located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, the criminal conspiracy arose from the actions 

of former U.S. Army Major John Cockerham. Between June 2004 and December 2005, Cockerham 

served as the base contracting officer responsible for 

soliciting and reviewing proposals for bottled-water 

contracts and other ongoing program-support needs 

for Iraq. 

Cockerham’s crimes were simple but lucrative: he 

received more than $9 million in kickbacks from companies or individuals in return for contract awards. He 

brought his wife, sister, and a niece into the conspiracy. Several other officers participated, including 

a lieutenant colonel who chaired the selection board 

for an annual $12 million contract to build and operate DoD warehouses in Iraq. 

The Cockerham Task Force drew agents from 

SIGIR, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the 

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s Major 

Procurement Fraud Unit, and other U.S. government 

investigative agencies to produce these and other 

convictions:

R Cockerham received 17.5 years in prison 

and was ordered to pay $9.6 million in 

restitution. 

R Melissa Cockerham, his wife, received 3 

years and 5 months in prison.

R Carolyn Blake, his sister, received 5 years and 

10 months in prison. 

R Nyree Pettaway, his niece, received 12 

months and 1 day in prison and was ordered 

to pay $5 million in restitution.

R Levonda Selph, the former lieutenant colonel 

who chaired the selection board, received 

12 months in prison and was ordered to pay 

a $5,000 fine and $9,000 in restitution.

R Derrick Shoemake, a former Army major 

who worked with Cockerham on contracts 

for the purchase of bottled water, received 

41 months in prison and was ordered to pay 

$181,900 in restitution and forfeit $68,100.

R Major Christopher Murray, a contracting 

specialist at Camp Arifjan, received 4 years 

and 9 months in prison and was ordered to 

pay $245,000 in restitution.

R Terry Hall, a contractor, received 39 months 

in prison and was ordered to forfeit 

$15.8 million, real estate, and a motorcycle.

R Tijani Saani, a former DoD civilian employee, 

received 110 months in prison and was 

ordered to pay a $1.6 million fine and 

$816,485 in restitution.

R Eddie Pressley, a former U.S. Army major and 

contracting official, received 12 years in prison 

and was ordered to forfeit $21 million, real 

estate, and several automobiles. 

R Eurica Pressley, his wife, received 6 years 

in prison and was ordered to forfeit 

$21 million, real estate, and several cars.

SIGIR Investigations

John Cockerham received more than $9 million in kickbacks for 

which he was convicted and sentenced to 17.5 years in jail.
NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY

53

Defense Contracting Command-Washington established initial contracting 

regulations and processes for ORHA; obtained waiver for three unwarranted military 

contracting officers assigned from the Defense Contract Management Agency to 

provide in-country contract administration

Provided services to MNF-I under FRAGO 09-668, 

consolidating all contracting of HCA, DCMA, and USACE; 

provided acquisition mentoring and training directly to 

Iraq’s ministries 

Served as Executive 

Agent for the Iraqi oil 

restoration mission and 

provided construction 

contracting services for 

projects funded by 

major reconstruction 

funding sources

Provided contract administration for 496 FMS cases, valued at 

$12.79 billion (237 cases funded by the GOI for $9.44 billion 

and 259 cases funded by $3.35 billion of the ISFF, as of 9/2012)

U.S. Air Force granted permission to use 

AFCEE’s Worldwide Environmental 

Restoration and Construction contract for 

IRRF 2 projects managed by the CPA under its 

PMO; some AFCEE contracts exceeded the 

scope of original approval

As Executive Agent for the CPA, U.S. Army’s 

HCA subsumed DCMA’s three contracting 

officers, growing to staff of 50 by end of 

2003; DFI funded 99% of all 

HCA-administered contracts

Executive Agent for CPA, IRRF, ISFF, and CERP 

 

 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

CENTCOM

Joint Theater 

Support 

Contracting 

Command

HCA (Head of the Contracting Activity) DCMA/

DCC-W JCC-I (Joint Contracting Command-Iraq) C-JTSCC ACC (Army Contract Command)

AFCEE (Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment) (formerly the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence)

DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency)

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 

Other DoD Contract Administration

ESF and INCLE Administration NEA-I (DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs-Iraq), with support from DoS and USAID Offices of Acquisition Management

ACC-Rock Island designated as the 

contract closeout entity for CENTCOM 

contracting in Iraq

DoS Entities

DoD Entities

Contracting Authorities for Major Iraq Reconstruction Funds, 2003–2012

FIGURE 3.9 The U.S. Army served as the Executive Agent responsible for 

contracting a majority of reconstruction funding. 

IRRF 2 Design-build Program Management Structure

FIGURE 3.10

Sector Program Management Office

Design-build Contracts

Iraq Power Alliance JV 

(Parsons) $55 M

Fluor/AMEC JV $500 M

Washington International $500 M

Perini Corporation $500 M

CH2M Hill and Parsons 

Water Infrastructure $55 M

Fluor/AMEC JV—2 contracts, 

$500 M each

Washington International & 

Black and Veatch $75 M

Berger/URS JV $15 M

Lucent Technologies 

World Services $75 M

Contrack/AICI/OIC/

Archirodon JV $325 M

Berger/URS JV $15 M

Parsons Delaware $500 M

Berger/URS JV $30 M

Parsons Delaware $500 M

Foster Wheeler $30 M

Parsons Iraq JV $800 M

KBR $1,200 M

PMO Services Contract

AECOM $50 M

The PMO had two tiers of support through the design-build 

program—AECOM’s contract to manage the prime contractors 

across all sectors and six prime contractors to manage 

construction in each sector.
54

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Moreover, SIGIR auditors found that the government failed to 

enforce deadlines for definitization, increasing costs and wasting 

money. Award fees to motivate contractor performance were also 

poorly managed; a SIGIR audit reported that failing contractors still 

received substantial fees. SIGIR also reported that poor oversight of 

contractor invoices caused waste and created vulnerabilities to fraud.101

Major Contracting Firms

A complete project-by-project accounting of funds, including contractor 

details, is not available through the U.S. government’s database of 

record—the Iraq Reconstruction Management System. However, for a 

list of selected major contractors and the cumulative amounts awarded 

to them from the IRRF, ISFF, and ESF, see Figure 3.11.102

36% 27% 60%

IRRF 

Total Obligations: $20.34B

Contractor

Cumulative Award 

Obligations

Bechtel Corporation

Fluor/AMEC, LLC

Parsons Global Services, Inc.

Parsons Iraq Joint Venture

URS Group, Inc.

Kellog Brown & Root Services, Inc. 

Symbion Power LLC

Environmental Chemical Corporation 

Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. 

Washington International/Black & Veatch

Iraqi Contractor (4389)

 2,465.1 

 973.7 

 697.1 

 575.4 

 541.9 

 485.6

 285.4 

Research Triangle Institute International 386.1 

 276.3 

 259.0 

 240.3 

 216.9 

ISFF 

Total Obligations: $19.57B

Contractor

Cumulative Award 

Obligations

AECOM Government Services, Inc.

Environmental Chemical Corporation

Raytheon Company

Tetra International, Inc.

American Equipment Company (AMERCO)

Iraqi Contractor (5300)

O'gara-Hess & Eisenhardt Armoring Company

Ohio Ordnance Works, Inc.

URS Group, Inc.

Versar, Inc.

Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc.

Navistar

1,522.1

816.3

405.9

403.1

391.7

372.1

283.4

281.2

249.0

219.0

214.8

206.4

ESF 

Total Obligations: $4.58B

Contractor

Cumulative Award 

Obligations

International Relief and Development, Inc.

Research Triangle Institute International

Louis Berger Group, Inc.

Management Systems International, Inc.

CHF International

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Bearing Point, Inc.

AECOM International Development, Inc.

ACDI/VOCA

University Research Company, LLC

Wamar International, Inc.

Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc.

 703.7 

 444.3 

 385.1 

 387.1 

 226.7 

 161.8 

 92.5 

 84.3 

 82.3 

 72.9 

 69.6 

 59.0 

Selected Major Contractors: IRRF, ISFF, and ESF

$ Millions

FIGURE 3.11 Because the U.S. government did not track all funding by project and 

contractor, a comprehensive list of awards cannot be compiled.
55

HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT 4

From 2003 through 2012, the United States provided $60.64 billion 

for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. As of September 2012, the 

United States had obligated at least $55.19 billion and expended at 

least $53.26 billion. 

During the nine-year Iraq rebuilding program, U.S. expenditures 

averaged more than $15 million per day. The expenditure rate generally 

decreased over time. In 2005, for example, the U.S. government spent 

more than $25 million per day; by 2012, the rate had dropped to less 

than $7 million (see Figure 4.1).103

More than 85% of the appropriations, amounting to $51.62 billion, 

went to these five major funds:

R Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund—With $20.86 billion, this 

was the largest fund. The Congress created it in 2003, allocating 

IRRF money to a variety of project sectors that covered activities 

ranging from security and law enforcement to infrastructure and 

health care. By virtue of decisions made early in the program, the 

Department of Defense controlled the contracting and expenditure 

of most of the IRRF. 

R Iraq Security Forces Fund—With $20.19 billion, the ISFF, 

created in 2005, supported the U.S. military’s efforts to develop 

Iraq’s security forces. These funds supported the training of Iraq’s 

police and soldiers, purchased enormous amounts of equipment, 

and provided mentoring in operations and maintenance. Defense 

controlled the fund. The Iraqis deemed it the most effective source of 

support from the reconstruction program.104

R Economic Support Fund—With $5.13 billion, the ESF, a 

long-standing account at State, served as the primary civilianimplemented funding stream. State and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development managed the obligation and expenditure 

of ESF money, which met a great many needs within the 

democracy, capacity-building, and economic-development areas. 

The ESF’s significance as a funding source grew as the rebuilding 

program matured.

R Commander’s Emergency Response Program—With 

$4.12 billion, the CERP provided military commanders across Iraq 

with a funding source to address urgent relief and reconstruction 

needs in areas such as water and wastewater, education, electricity, 

security, rule of law, and protective measures, including the Sons of 

Iraq program. The CERP’s importance diminished as the program 

evolved and security improved.

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

2003–

2004

2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2009 2011 2012–

9/30/2012

Average Daily Expenditure of U.S. Funds, by Year, 2003–2012

$ Millions

FIGURE 4.1

Expenditures 

averaged 

more than 

$15 million 

per day.
56

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

R International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement—With 

$1.31 billion, the INCLE, another State Department account, 

helped train Iraq’s police forces and supported rule-of-law programs. 

Its largest expenditures came later in the rebuilding effort for the 

Police Development Program.

The Congress made more than 80% of the dollars allocated to these 

five funds available through “supplemental appropriations,” that is, 

outside the perennial budgeting process (or “off book”).105 It also 

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Funding Sources

Total: $220.21

Iraqi

($145.81)

Non-U.S. 

International

($13.75)

U.S.

($60.64)

Total

Iraqi Funding

$145.81

Total U.S. Funding

$60.64

Total Non-U.S.

International 

Funding

$13.75

CPA Spending

Iraqi Capital Budgets

Bilateral

Multilateral

IRRF

ISFF

ESF

CERP

INCLE

Other

$19.80 $9.44

$4.31

$20.86

$20.19

$5.13

$4.12

$1.31

$9.02

$126.01

Cumulative U.S., Iraqi, and Non-U.S. International 

Support for Reconstruction, 2003–2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.2 TABLE 4.1 

U.S. Funding for Iraq Reconstruction, as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions 

Appropriated Obligated Expended

Major Funds

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1 and IRRF 2) 20,864 20,343 20,076 

Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) 20,194 19,569 18,762 

Economic Support Fund (ESF) 5,134 4,578 4,199 

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) 4,119 3,728 3,728 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 1,313 1,155 989 

Subtotal 51,624 49,373 47,754

Other Assistance Programs

Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee 

and Migration Assistance (ERMA) 1,501 1,494 1,339 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 850 

Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (NRRRF) 801 801 801 

Iraq Freedom Fund (Other Reconstruction Activities) 700 680 654 

P.L. 480 Food Aid (Title II and Non-Title II) 395 395 395 

International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and International Disaster and 

Famine Assistance (IDFA) 272 261 261 

Democracy Fund (DF) and Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) 266 266 262 

U.S. Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) 179 

Iraq Freedom Fund (TFBSO) 174 86 65 

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs 

(NADR) 163 62 62 

Department of Justice (DoJ) 133 121 119 

Child Survival and Health Programs Fund (CSH) 90 90 90 

Education and Cultural Exchange Programs 46 

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 27 27 10 

International Affairs Technical Assistance 16 16 14 

International Military Education and Training (IMET) 11 9 6 

U.S. Marshals Service 9 9 9 

Alhurra-Iraq Broadcasting 5 5 5 

Subtotal 5,638 4,323 4,093 

Reconstruction-related Operating Expenses 2,937 1,152 1,085 

Reconstruction Oversight 445 340 333 

Total 60,644 55,187 53,265 

The United States 

footed most of the 

ELOOGXULQJWKHÀUVW

ÀYH\HDUVEXW,UDT

has shouldered the 

burden since.
HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT

57

appropriated an additional $9.02 billion through several smaller 

funding streams. SIGIR classified these into three categories:106

R other assistance programs ($5.64 billion)

R reconstruction-related operating expenses ($2.94 billion)

R reconstruction oversight ($445 million) 

See Table 4.1 for a summary of U.S. appropriations supporting Iraq 

reconstruction, including the status of these funds through FY 2012.

Iraqi funds controlled by the CPA accounted for most of the 

money spent during the program’s first year, while U.S. funding chiefly 

supported rebuilding efforts from 2005 through 2007 (see Figure 4.2). 

Since 2008, Government of Iraq capital budgets funded most 

reconstruction activities. 

As of September 2012, about $220.21 billion had been made 

available for Iraq’s relief and reconstruction:107

R $145.81 billion in Iraqi funds: the Development Fund for Iraq, 

seized and vested assets, and Iraqi capital budgets (66% of the total)

R $60.64 billion in U.S. funding (28% of the total)

R $13.75 billion in international commitments of assistance and loans 

from non-U.S. sources (6% of the total) 

Major U.S. Funds

By September 2012, reconstruction managers had obligated 

$49.37 billion (96%) and expended $47.75 billion (93%) of the 

$51.62 billion appropriated to the five major U.S. funds. There remain 

$2.25 billion in unobligated funds and $1.62 billion in unexpended 

obligations (see Figure 4.3).108 Cumulative obligations for the five 

major funds through September 2012 are shown in Figure 4.4.

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

The IRRF was the first and the largest U.S. reconstruction fund for Iraq. 

The Congress appropriated money to the IRRF in two separate bills: 

R IRRF 1—The April 16, 2003, bill provided $2.48 billion for 

“humanitarian assistance” and “rehabilitation and reconstruction in 

Iraq.” The Congress identified 12 sectors for fund use, with the Office 

of Management and Budget apportioning the money. USAID 

received approximately 74% of IRRF 1.109

R IRRF 2—In November 2003, the Congress appropriated another 

$18.4 billion to the IRRF.110 Pursuant to the CPA’s request, 

the Congress allocated 70% of this new appropriation for large 

infrastructure projects, including electricity, water resources and 

sanitation, oil, transportation, telecommunications, and roads and 

bridges. The legislation imposed greater controls and more oversight, 

giving the CPA limited authority to make adjustments and creating 

IRRF ISFF ESF CERP INCLE

$0 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50

ISFF 

$0.81

ESF

$0.38

IRRF

$0.27

INCLE 

$0.17

Unexpended Obligations 

Total: $1.62

50%

23%

16%

10%

Appropriated

Obligated

Expended

Status of Five Major U.S. Funds, as of 9/30/2012 

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.3

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2006

IRRF

ISFF

ESF

INCLE

CERP

Cumulative Obligations from Five Major Funds, 1/2004–9/2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.4

The IRRF 

dominated 

funding in the 

early years, 

with the ISFF 

dominating 

funding in the 

middle years.

Almost $52 billion 

was provided 

through 

ÀYHPDMRU

U.S. funds.
58

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

the Office of the CPA Inspector General.111 A majority of the 

IRRF 2 was apportioned to Defense.112

The most active years for the IRRF were FY 2004 and FY 2005, with 

obligations averaging $25.9 million per day in 2004 and expenditures 

averaging $21.4 million per day in 2005. Reconstruction managers 

obligated 90% of the IRRF by March 2006, with 90% expended 

by June 2007 (see Figure 4.5). As of September 2012, total IRRF 

obligations equaled $20.34 billion, and total expenditures equaled 

$20.08 billion (see Table 4.2).113

FY

2003

FY

2004

FY

2005

FY

2006

FY

2007

FY

2008

FY

2009

FY

2010

FY

2011

FY

2012

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

Expended

Obligated

Appropriated

IRRF: Cumulative Appropriations, Obligations, and Expenditures, 

FY 2003–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.5

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

11/2003 6/2004 12/2004 6/2005 9/2008

(Congressional 

allocation)

(Final 

allocation)

Electricity

Water Resources and Sanitation

Security and Law Enforcement

Oil Infrastructure

Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, 

and Civil Society

Private Sector 

Employment Development

Other

IRRF 2 “Reprogrammings” by Sector, 11/2003–9/2008

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.6

TABLE 4.2

IRRF Obligations and Expenditures, by Appropriation

and IRRF Sector, as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions

Appropriation IRRF Sector Obligated Expended

IRRF 1 Subtotal 2,227.7 2,227.7 

IRRF 2 Security & Law 

Enforcement

 4,918.4 4,892.3 

Electric Sector 4,125.5 4,089.1 

Justice, Public Safety 

Infrastructure, & Civil 

Society

 2,310.0 2,218.3 

Water Resources 

& Sanitation

 1,965.0 1,961.4 

Oil Infrastructure 1,596.8 1,593.4 

Private Sector 

Development

 860.0 830.0 

Health Care 808.6 805.4 

Education, Refugees, 

Human Rights, 

Democracy, 

& Governance

 515.9 447.7 

Transportation & 

Telecommunications 

Projects

 469.8 469.8 

Roads, Bridges, 

& Construction

 280.9 280.7 

Administrative Expenses 219.5 217.9 

ISPO Capacity 

Development

 44.9 42.3 

Subtotal 18,115.3 17,848.4 

Total 20,343.0 20,076.0 

The $20.86 billion in 

IRRF funding initially 

supported mostly 

large infrastructure 

projects.

About $3 billion was reallocated to 

address the deteriorating security 

situation.
HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT

59

Changing priorities in Iraq caused by the rise in violence in 2004 

prompted numerous reprogrammings of funds. A key provision in 

the IRRF 2 legislation that enabled the reprogrammings permitted 

reallocation of up to 10% of any sector’s funding.114 During its life, 

the IRRF underwent over 250 reprogramming actions.115 The most 

significant occurred in December 2004, when $3 billion in funds for 

the electricity and water sectors shifted to the security, justice, and 

employment-development sectors (see Figure 4.6).116

Iraq Security Forces Fund 

From 2005 through 2011, the Congress appropriated $20.19 billion to 

the ISFF, enabling the Multi-National Force-Iraq and then the U.S. 

Forces-Iraq to help Iraq’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior 

grow, equip, and train the ISF.117 During each of its seven years of 

appropriations, the ISFF’s expenditures comprised at least one-third of 

all U.S. assistance to Iraq.118

The ISFF grew out of the impetus underlying IRRF 2’s 

reprogrammings. The fund’s implementer, the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq, prepared the first ISFF request, and 

MNSTC-I ensured that funding for ISF development remained 

consistent over the ensuing years.119 The shift in sourcing security 

spending from the IRRF to the ISFF exponentially expanded support 

to Iraq’s military and police forces, improving them greatly. The process 

was not without challenge. In 2005, the first ISFF appropriation of 

$5.49 billion severely strained the security assistance bureaucracy. 

The ISFF’s earlier years saw larger appropriations that annually 

averaged $4.68 billion from 2005 to 2007. From 2008 through 

2011, appropriations dropped to an average of $1.54 billion per year. 

During the seven-year period that the Congress funded the ISFF, 

supplemental appropriations were almost triple the size of regular 

appropriations—$14.84 billion versus $5.36 billion (see Figure 4.7 

and Appendix B).120

ISFF obligations and expenditures rose annually from 2005 to 

2009, each averaging almost $1 billion per quarter (see Figure 4.8). 

The obligation and expenditure rates thereafter slowed as the military 

focused on transition and departure. As of September 2012, military 

managers had obligated about $19.57 billion (97%) of the ISFF and 

expended about $18.76 billion.121 See Table 4.3 for a summary of 

cumulative ISFF obligations as of the end of FY 2012.

From FY 2005 through FY 2012, quarterly ISFF obligations 

averaged $652 million, and quarterly expenditures averaged 

$625 million. Obligations were highest in FY 2006, when they reached 

$13.1 million per day, with expenditures topping out at $10.4 million 

FY 2005

Supplemental Supplemental Regular Supplemental Regular Bridge Regular Supplemental Supplemental Supplemental

FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

Regular & Bridge Supplemental

Requested $7.70

Appropriated $5.36 (70%)

$15.20 

$14.84 (98%)

Total, FY 2005–FY 2011

ISFF: Regular, Bridge, and Supplemental Appropriations

$ Billions

P.L. 110-32

P.L. 112-10

P.L. 109-289

P.L. 110-161

P.L. 110-212 rescinded and 

re-appropriated FY 2009 

Bridge funding, extending 

the period of obligation by 

one additional year

P.L. 109-13

P.L. 109-234

P.L. 110-252

P.L. 110-28

FIGURE 4.7 Almost three-fourths of the ISFF was provided 

through supplemental appropriations.
60

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

per day in FY 2008.122 Similar to the other Iraq reconstruction funds, 

ISFF obligations demonstrated predictable cyclical propensities. A 

disproportionate share of obligations perennially occurred in the fiscal 

year’s final quarter (see Figure 4.9). This reflected the rush to commit 

and spend at fiscal year’s end.123

As of September 2012, $18.71 billion (93%) of the ISFF had been 

obligated to support the MOD and MOI in four major sub-activity 

groups: equipment and transportation, infrastructure, sustainment, 

and training. An additional $859 million (4%) was obligated to “related activities,” which supported programs benefiting both ministries, 

particularly through the ISFF “quick response fund.” The remaining 

funds—$625.4 million (3%)—expired.124

Almost $12.02 billion of the ISFF went to support the MOD, 

with more than 44% of those obligations spent on equipment and 

transportation.125 For the status on the ISFF by year of appropriation, as 

of the end of FY 2012, see Figure 4.10. 

When the U.S. military departed Iraq in December 2011, it transferred 

responsibility for administering the final tranche of the ISFF to the 

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.126 Although staffed by U.S. military 

personnel, OSC-I falls under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador to 

Iraq. This money chiefly supported the Foreign Military Sales program.

In FY 2012, the Foreign Military Financing program and INCLE 

functionally replaced the ISFF as U.S. security funding sources supporting 

Iraq.127 The FMF and INCLE are U.S. accounts used worldwide to 

provide civil and military security assistance. This transition fit within 

broader efforts to normalize Embassy operations.

TABLE 4.3

ISFF Obligations and Expenditures, by Ministry and Program, 

as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions

Obligated Expended

MOD Equipment and Transportation 5,327 5,227 

Infrastructure 3,075 2,972 

Sustainment 2,894 2,620 

Training and Operations 723 698 

Subtotal 12,018 11,518 

MOI Equipment and Transportation 2,026 1,945 

Infrastructure 1,347 1,260 

Sustainment 663 623 

Training and Operations 2,656 2,592 

Subtotal 6,692 6,420 

Related Activities 859 825 

Total 19,569 18,762 

FY

2005

FY

2006

FY

2007

FY

2008

FY

2009

FY

2010

FY

2011

FY

2012

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

Expended

Obligated

Appropriated

ISFF: Cumulative Appropriations, Obligations, and Expenditures, 

FY 2005–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.8

0RUH,6))PRQH\VXSSRUWHGWKHWUDLQLQJDQGHTXLSSLQJRIWKH,UDTL$UP\WKDQ

DQ\RWKHUVHUYLFHLQWKH,UDTL6HFXULW\)RUFHV*2,SKRWR

From FY 2005 

to FY 2009, ISFF 

obligations and 

expenditures 

each averaged 

almost $1 billion 

per quarter.
HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT

61

Economic Support Fund 

From FY 2006 through FY 2012, the Congress appropriated about 

$5.13 billion to the ESF to enable State and USAID to improve 

Iraq’s infrastructure, strengthen security, promote democracy, 

empower civil society, support capacity building, and promote 

economic development.128

Quarterly obligations from FY 2006 through FY 2012 averaged 

about $164 million, and quarterly expenditures averaged about 

$150 million. During the first two years of its use, almost 70% of the 

ESF was obligated and more than 50% was expended (Figure 4.11). 

Obligations were highest in FY 2007, averaging $6.2 million per day, 

and expenditures peaked at $4.5 million per day in FY 2008. As of 

September 2012, the United States had obligated about $4.58 billion 

Quarterly Obligations

Quarterly Expenditures

Average Obligations

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

Average Expenditures

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

ISFF: Obligation and Expenditure Rates, FY 2005–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.9

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 

P.L. 109-13

P.L. 110-252

P.L. 111-32

P.L. 111-212

P.L. 109-289

P.L. 109-234

P.L. 110-161

P.L. 110-28

P.L. 112-10

Unobligated ISFF Appropriations

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.10

Expired Funds

7KHÀUVWWKUHH

ÀVFDO\HDUV

accounted 

for nearly 70% 

of total ISFF 

appropriations.

A disproportionate share of ISFF obligations occurred in the 

IRXUWKTXDUWHURIHDFKÀVFDO\HDU
62

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

of the total appropriations and expended $4.20 billion.129

The $5.13 billion in ESF allocations for Iraq comprised about 

75% of the $6.89 billion in Administration requests. Most ESF 

money in Iraq was made available through the supplemental funding 

process, with the size of these requests and regular appropriations 

declining after 2007 (see Figure 4.12 and Appendix B).130

Supplemental appropriations in FY 2006 and FY 2007 were 

obligated more quickly than appropriations in later years. For 

example, in the fourth quarter of FY 2007, the United States 

obligated the ESF at a rate of nearly $15.7 million per day.131

Average expenditures across all years peaked at an average 

$6.7 million per day during the fourth quarter of FY 2008, 

as obligations of the FY 2006–FY 2007 appropriations were 

liquidated. See Figure 4.13 for the status of obligations, by year of 

appropriation.

As of September 2012, $379 million of obligated ESF funds 

remained unexpended. An additional $556 million remained 

unobligated, with $260 million expired. Expired funds cannot be 

obligated to new projects but can be used to modify existing ones. 

$296 million remains for new obligations.132 For the status of each 

ESF program as of the end of FY 2012, see Table 4.4.

FY 2006 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2007

$0

$1 

$2

$3 

$4

$5

$6

Expended Obligated

Appropriated

ESF: Cumulative Appropriations, Obligations, and Expenditures, 

FY 2006–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.11

ESF Spending: Low and Slow

A long-standing account at the Department of 

State, the ESF was the chief source of funding for 

non-military programs during the latter stages of 

the rebuilding effort. Its obligation and expenditure cadence in Iraq was lower and slower than 

other funds for two reasons:

R The fund has a two-year appropriation cycle. 

Its money remains available for deobligation 

and subsequent reobligation for a period of 

four years after the appropriation expires. This 

means that the end-of-fiscal-year pressures 

that pushed up spending rates for other funds 

did not affect the ESF. 

R State treats ESF funds as “obligated” when it 

executes an agreement to commit the money 

to a program. Contracts for specific projects come later. Other funds in Iraq treated 

money as “obligated” when it was put under 

contract. The ESF “obligation” practice 

obviated pressures to spend funds and led 

to slower expenditure rates. For example, a 

SIGIR audit showed that, in 2008, a party to 

an ESF agreement had yet to award contracts 

for 15% of 2006 ESF funds and 58% of 2007 

ESF funds.

SIGIR Audit 09-006

USACE expected to complete ESF-funded construction of the Missan Surgical Hospital by the end of 2012. (USACE photo)

8QGHUWKH(6)IXQGHG,QIUDVWUXFWXUH6HFXULW\3URJUDPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVXSSRUWHG

FRQVWUXFWLRQRIVHFXUHGFRUULGRUVWRSURWHFWRLOSLSHOLQHVIURPLQVXUJHQWDWWDFNV7KH

SURJUDPFRQWULEXWHGWRDQDOPRVWIROGLQFUHDVHLQQRUWKHUQH[SRUWVIURPWR

More than $5 

billion in ESF funds 

were provided to 

State and USAID 

to improve Iraq’s 

infrastructure, 

strengthen 

security, promote 

democracy, 

empower civil 

society, support 

capacity 

building, 

and promote 

economic 

development.
HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT

63

USAID implements most ESF programs worldwide. Given the 

reconstruction program’s early emphasis on infrastructure, generally 

outside of USAID’s métier, State executed special agreements to 

execute ESF in Iraq. 

As of September 2012, $4.58 billion of the ESF had been obligated 

as follows:133

R $2.90 billion (63%) for USAID projects 

R $1.14 billion (25%) for projects implemented by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers

R $536 million (12%) for projects implemented by State through 

the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the 

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, as well as U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad organizations 

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

$2.5

FY 2006

Regular Supplemental Supplemental Regular Supplemental Regular Regular Regular Regular Supplemental

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

P.L. 110-252

P.L. 110-252

P.L. 110-28

P.L. 109-234

P.L. 111-117 P.L. 111-32 P.L. 112-10 P.L. 112-74

P.L. 110-92, 

P.L. 110-137, 

P.L. 110-149, 

P.L. 110-161 P.L. 109-102

Regular Supplemental

Requested $2,083

Appropriated $1,309 (63%)

$4,807 

$3,826 (80%)

Total, FY 2006–FY 2012

ESF: Regular and Supplemental Appropriations

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.12

The largest tranche of ESF funding came in the FY 2007 

supplemental appropriation.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

$2.0

FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 

P.L. 111-117

P.L. 111-32 P.L. 112-10 P.L.112-74

(FY 2009)

P.L. 110-252

P.L. 110-252

(FY 2008)

P.L. 110-28

P.L. 109-234

P.L. 109-102

Expired Funds

P.L. 110-92, 

P.L. 110-137, 

P.L. 110-149, 

P.L. 110-161

Unobligated ESF Appropriations

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.13

ESF appropriations have remained 

consistent since nearly 60% of the total 

ZDVPDGHDYDLODEOHGXULQJWKHÀUVWWZR

ÀVFDO\HDUV

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

$2.5

$3.0

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Obligations

Expenditures

USAID

USACE 

DoS

ESF: Cumulative Obligations and Expenditures, by Agency, 

FY 2007–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.14

USAID accounted for 63% of 

the ESF obligations.
64

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

For details on ESF program obligations and expenditures, by agency, 

see Figure 4.14 and Chapter 3 of this report. For details on program 

and project activities, see Chapter 5 of this report.

Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

The CERP enabled U.S. military commanders to respond to urgent 

humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements. Established by 

the CPA in 2003 with $177 million in Iraqi funds from the DFI and 

seized and vested assets,134 the CERP addressed acute local needs that, 

in the judgment of U.S. military commanders, called for immediate 

action. 

On November 6, 2003, the first U.S. funding for the CERP 

provided $140 million.135 The Congress made 11 more appropriations 

to the CERP over the next seven years, amounting to $3.98 billion.136

In addition, the GOI provided $270 million in DFI funds for a joint 

U.S.-Iraqi program called I-CERP, under which the U.S. military 

implemented reconstruction projects through CERP processes 

using these Iraqi funds.137 From 2004 through 2011, the Congress 

appropriated $4.12 billion to the CERP for Iraq.138 The fund officially 

closed (for Iraq) on September 30, 2011. 

USF-I and its predecessors obligated and expended $3.73 billion 

of CERP funds.139 The remaining $391 million expired,140 but, under 

certain conditions, it could be used for other Defense activities, such as 

for CERP projects in Afghanistan.141

From FY 2004 through FY 2011, quarterly CERP obligations 

and expenditures both averaged $116 million. FY 2008 was the 

CERP’s most active year, with an average of $2.8 million obligated 

and expended each day. Ninety percent of total CERP funds used 

in Iraq had been obligated by December 31, 2008, and expended by 

December 31, 2009 (see Figure 4.15).142

From the military’s perspective, the advantage of CERP projects 

was their quick execution and highly visible results, which had 

counterinsurgency effects. The Defense Department’s Financial 

Management Regulation (FMR) and the Money as a Weapon System 

(MAAWS) manual provided CERP regulations.143

Throughout the CERP’s life, there were tensions between the 

need for centralized direction to ensure program results and the 

TABLE 4.4

ESF Obligations and Expenditures, by Implementing Agency 

and Program, as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions 

Agency Program Obligated Expended

USAID Community Stabilization Program 619 615 

Community Action Program 450 448 

Local Governance Program 435 434 

Tatweer National Capacity Development 309 309 

Inma Agribusiness Development 180 162 

Tijara Provincial Economic Growth 173 144 

PRT Quick Response Fund 162 161 

Democracy and Civil Society 88 71 

Economic Governance II, Policy and Regulatory Reforms 84 84 

Tarabot Administrative Reform 82 30 

Primary Health Care 73 13 

Governance Strengthening 57 10 

Financial Sector Development 51 24 

Elections Support 40 22 

Izdihar Private Sector Development 33 32 

Personnel Support 21 9 

Primary Education Strengthening 19 

Monitoring and Evaluation 14 10 

Harmonized Support for Agriculture 10 

Education, Health and Social Services 4 3 

Subtotal 2,904 2,579 

USACE/

GRD

PRT/PRDC Projects 618 591 

O&M Sustainment 276 275 

Infrastructure Security Protection 194 194 

Plant-Level Capacity Development & Technical Training 50 50 

Subtotal 1,138 1,110 

DoS/ 

Embassy

Democracy and Civil Society 177 172 

PRT Quick Response Fund 125 122 

Iraqi Refugees 95 95 

Ministerial Capacity Development 45 40 

Regime Crimes Liaison Office 33 29 

Targeted Development 60 52 

Ambassador's Fund 1 

Subtotal 536 510 

Total 4,578 4,199 
HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT

65

dispersed authorities necessary for quick execution. CERP projects 

sometimes duplicated the efforts of other U.S. agency programs.144

In 2006, the Congress expressed concerns that increasingly large 

project sizes indicated a shift away from the CERP’s intent. In 2007, 

the House Committee on Appropriations expressed similar concerns 

about the growth of high-dollar CERP projects.145 After the Congress 

put controls in place, obligations for large projects decreased to 15% 

of total obligations in FY 2008. The downward trend continued, 

and the percentage gradually decreased to zero for FY 2011 (see 

Figure 4.16).146

The Congress ended support for the CERP in Iraq in FY 2012, 

providing a limited extension of budget authority through 

November 18, 2011.147 Defense ended up reallocating most of the 

$100 million appropriated in FY 2011 for other purposes. Ultimately, 

it only obligated $44 million of this funding.148

CERP record keeping was inadequate. SIGIR could not provide a 

thorough accounting of the final disposition of all projects executed 

under the program. USF-I’s CERP project tracker—Defense’s only 

systemic database—was only updated through the end of the fiscal year 

in which the funds were appropriated. If a project was not completed 

during that fiscal year, there were no records in the system indicating 

FY

2007

FY

2006

FY

2005

FY

2004

FY

2008

FY

2009

FY

2010

FY

2011

FY

2012

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

Expended

Obligated

Appropriated

CERP: Cumulative Appropriations, Obligations, 

and Expenditures, FY 2004–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.15

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011

<$50,000

$50,000–$100,000

$100,000–$200,000

$200,000–$500,000

$500,000–$1,000,000

>$1,000,000

CERP Obligations, by Project Size, FY 2004–FY 2011

$ Millions

FIGURE 4.16

Strategic Drift in the CERP: Project Cost Up, CERP Stock Down

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

was a key innovation in Iraq. Formalized by a CPA 

order in the summer of 2003, the CERP provided 

about $4 billion in assistance to the rebuilding 

program over the next eight years. The program’s 

original intent aimed to support urgent small-scale 

projects that met local needs. Most of the early 

projects cost less than $25,000. 

As CERP matured, SIGIR found evidence of 

strategic drift. That is, it began to fund highercost projects far afield from the program’s 

mandate. SIGIR audits questioned using CERP 

money to fund multimillion-dollar infrastructure 

projects or to support civil capacity-development 

programs. CERP’s ethos had a counterinsurgency 

core; these capacity-building programs departed 

from it. The Congress acted at various points 

to rein in overreaches, but Defense never 

established a formal program office to oversee 

the program. Instead, it created a three-tier 

“oversight structure” comprising a CERP Steering 

Committee, a CERP Management Cell, and a 

CERP Working Group.

SIGIR Audit 11-020

The United States spent $4.2 million in CERP funds to build the 

Caravan Hotel at Baghdad International Airport.

From FY 2005 through 

FY 2007, one-third of the 

total CERP obligations 

went to projects costing 

more than $1 million 

each.

The Congress appropriated 

more than $4 billion to enable 

U.S. military commanders 

in Iraq to respond to urgent 

humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction 

requirements.
66

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

when it was eventually completed. 

The Army Budget Office prepared financial reports detailing the 

total number of outstanding projects and the sum of unliquidated 

obligations by fiscal year, but it did not track projects on an individual 

basis. SIGIR found that financial data maintained by the Army 

Budget Office and CERP project data reported by USF-I differed 

substantially. USF-I generally over-reported CERP obligations, while 

under-reporting CERP expenditures (see Table 4.5).149

No Defense Department office has a comprehensive picture of what 

the program actually accomplished in Iraq. The best available CERP 

data provides a rough approximation of actual activities. This renders 

suspect commander narratives, academic studies, and other analyses 

that claim success based on that data.

International Narcotics Control 

and Law Enforcement Affairs 

From FY 2006 through FY 2012, the Congress appropriated 

$1.31 billion to the INCLE for use in Iraq by State to support rule-oflaw activities.150 Although modest by comparison to the ISFF, CERP, 

TABLE 4.5

CERP Obligations and Expenditures, by Project Category, as of 12/31/2011

$ Millions

Project Category/Fiscal Year Obligated Expended

Status of Funds, by Project 

Category, According to the 

USF-I CERP Project Tracker

Water & Sanitation 673.8 227.8 

Protective Measures 490.6 268.1 

Electricity 444.7 134.5 

Education 428.8 180.1 

Transportation 386.1 150.0 

Civic Cleanup Activities 240.9 117.6 

Other Urgent Humanitarian or Reconstruction Projects 224.5 84.9 

Agriculture 208.5 76.2 

Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements 183.4 77.7 

Health Care 152.5 61.7 

Rule of Law & Governance 113.4 46.2 

Civic Infrastructure Repair 67.5 23.9 

Repair of Civic & Cultural Facilities 62.9 27.4 

Civic Support Vehicles 58.5 33.7 

Condolence Payments 50.8 35.5 

Telecommunications 39.6 10.2 

Temporary Contract Guards for Critical Infrastructure 35.6 35.3 

Battle Damage Repair 23.8 18.0 

Food Production & Distribution 21.2 8.2 

Non-FMR 5.8 

Detainee Payments 1.0 0.6 

Iraqi Hero Payments 0.7 0.7 

Subtotal 3,914.4 1,618.1 

Difference between ABO 

Financial Data and USF-I 

CERP Project Tracker, by 

Fiscal Year

2004 -5.8 133.6 

2005 -49.2 404.4 

2006 136.7 499.8 

2007 -181.5 324.2 

2008 -91.6 513.5 

2009 -9.5 116.2 

2010 14.2 118.0 

2011

Subtotal -186.6 2,109.7 

Total, According to ABO Financial Data 3,727.9 3,727.8 

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HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT

67

and ESF, appropriations to the INCLE became a significant portion 

of U.S. reconstruction funding after FY 2009.

The Congress allocated INCLE to 12 programs in four areas: 

criminal justice, corrections, counternarcotics, and program 

development and support. The criminal justice sector received the 

majority of obligations through FY 2012 (see Table 4.6).151

In February 2010, the Administration requested $832 million 

and received $765 million in FY 2010 supplemental and FY 2011 

regular appropriations for the INCLE to prepare for the transition 

of police-training responsibility from Defense to State.152 The two 

appropriations accounted for nearly 60% of the cumulative funding 

appropriated from FY 2006 through FY 2012.153

From November 2005 through September 2012, INCLE quarterly 

obligations averaged $41 million, while quarterly expenditures 

averaged $35 million. FY 2011 was the INCLE’s most active year, 

with $1.6 million obligated and $1.5 million expended each day. 

As of September 2012, at least $1.16 billion of the total INCLE 

appropriations had been obligated and $989 million had been 

expended (see Figure 4.17).154

The Administration’s proposed uses of the INCLE in Iraq evolved. 

TABLE 4.6

INCLE Obligations and Expenditures, by Sector and Program, 

as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions

Sector Program Obligated Expended

Criminal Justice Police Advisors 710.2 620.6 

Courts 109.3 86.1 

Public Integrity 31.7 25.9 

Rule of Law Advisors 26.1 18.9 

Major Crimes Task Force 13.5 11.9 

Justice Integration 6.8 6.3 

Justice Programs 9.5 4.7 

Legal Framework 2.5 2.5 

Subtotal 909.6 777.0 

Corrections Construction 83.7 83.3 

Advisors 98.2 81.6 

Corrections 13.2 10.9 

Subtotal 195.1 175.8 

Other Program Development & 

Support 47.3 35.8 

Counternarcotics Counternarcotics 3.5 0.2 

Total 1,155.4 988.8 

FY 2006 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2007

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

$1.4

Expended

Obligated

Appropriated

INCLE: Cumulative Appropriations, Obligations, and Expenditures, 

FY 2006–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.17

&DGHWVDUHWUDLQHGDWWKH%DJKGDG3ROLFH$FDGHP\

More than half 

of the total INCLE 

appropriations 

came in FY 2010 

to help State 

prepare for 

its new Police 

Development 

Program. 
68

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

FY 2006

Regular Supplemental Regular Supplemental Regular Supplemental Regular Supplemental Regular Regular Regular Supplemental

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

$900

$1,000

Request ($517 million)

Appropriation ($650 million) 

Regular Supplemental

Requested $1,798

Appropriated $316 (18%)

$1,004

$996 (99%)

Total, FY 2006–FY 2012

INCLE: Regular and Supplemental Appropriations

$ Millions

FIGURE 4.18

P.L. 

109-102

P.L. 

109-234

P.L. 

110-5 P.L. 

110-128

P.L. 

110-161

P.L. 

110-252 P.L. 

111-8 P.L. 

111-32

P.L. 

111-117

P.L. 

111-212

P.L. 

112-10

P.L. 

112-74

The Congress responded much more positively to supplemental 

requests than to regular requests for INCLE funding.

Early requests focused on corrections, but later they shifted to judicial 

capacity building and security.155 Requests to support the transition 

of police training responsibility to State began with the FY 2009 

supplemental appropriation and increased in FY 2010–FY 2011 

(see Figure 4.18 and Appendix B).156

Flow of the Major Funds

The Congress allocated almost all U.S. funding for relief and 

reconstruction initially to DoD, USAID, and DoS. The agencies passed 

on some of these funds to others to implement programs in Iraq. 

Defense and State transferred amounts ranging from a few thousand 

dollars to more than a billion through interagency agreements, which 

allowed the legal transfer of funds to programs run by other U.S. 

government agencies or United Nations organizations. Figure 4.19 

shows how appropriations flowed first to the agencies and then to four 

broad reconstruction areas. 

Smaller U.S. Funding Streams

Other Assistance Programs

The Congress provided about 85% of appropriations for Iraq’s 

reconstruction through the five major funds addressed above. Several 

smaller funding streams also proved crucial to the program. Almost 

$5.64 billion was made available through these smaller funds, 

including $1.50 billion for the Migration and Refugee Assistance and 

Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance funds.157

Curiously, the FMF program received $850 million, but none was 

obligated or expended as of the end of FY 2012.158 See Appendix B 

for details on all other assistance programs, including the total amount 

appropriated by fiscal year. For a brief description of selected programs, 

see Table 4.7. 

Operating Expenses

Since 2003, the Congress made at least $2.94 billion available for 

reconstruction-related operating expenses. This included expenses 

totaling $908 million incurred by the CPA in FY 2004. Other 
HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT

69

entities that reported substantial operating expenses were the Project 

and Contracting Office ($830 million), OSC-I ($524 million), and 

USAID ($446 million.)159 For more detail, including total amounts 

appropriated by fiscal year and agency, refer to Appendix B.

Oversight Expenses

The Congress made at least $445 million available for reconstruction 

oversight since 2003. This included $246 million for SIGIR’s work during 

FY 2004 through FY 2013 (yearly average of about $25 million).160 Other 

agencies reporting oversight expenses included the Defense Contract 

Audit Agency ($111 million), Department of State Office of Inspector 

General ($35 million), USAID OIG ($29 million), and the Department 

of Defense OIG ($26 million).161 While SIGIR funding data covers the 

entire cost of doing business, including personnel costs, the funding data 

for the other oversight agencies does not. Total oversight expenses were 

under-reported. For more details, including total amounts appropriated by 

fiscal year and agency, refer to Appendix B.

TABLE 4.7

Selected Other Assistance Programs, by Implementing Agency 

Fund (Amount Appropriated) Purpose

Department of Defense 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

($850 million)

First made available to Iraq in FY 2012 when the Congress made no new ISFF appropriations; FMF is intended to support the continued development of the Iraqi military.

Natural Resources Risk Remediation 

Fund (NRRRF) ($801 million)

NRRRF was used for early reconstruction of the oil sector. USACE reported that all 

funds were fully expended as of September 30, 2008.

Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF)

($700 million)

The IFF was established by P.L. 108-11 to fund additional expenses for ongoing military operations in Iraq and elsewhere. It allows the Secretary of Defense to transfer 

funds to finance combat, stability operations, force reconstitution, and other warrelated costs. Once funds are transferred, they “take on the characteristics” and are 

subject to the same rules and restrictions as the receiving fund or account.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, 

and Civic Aid (OHDACA)

($27 million)

OHDACA provides basic humanitarian aid and services to populations in need. 

According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees OHDACA, 

these funds build indigenous capabilities and cooperative relationships with allies and 

potential partners and improve access to areas not otherwise available to U.S. forces.

Department of State 

Migration and Refugee Assistance 

(MRA) and Emergency Refugee and 

Migration Assistance (ERMA)

($1,501 million)

MRA and ERMA are administered by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and used to fund contributions to international organizations that benefit Iraqi 

refugees, internally displaced persons, and other conflict victims; funding is also provided to non-governmental organizations that fill gaps in the multilateral response.

Democracy Fund and Human Rights 

Democracy Fund

($266 million)

The Democracy Fund is allocated by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor to support democracy-promotion programs of organizations such as the 

National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute.

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, 

Demining, and Related Programs 

(NADR) ($163 million)

NADR supports security and humanitarian-related initiatives, including 

humanitarian demining, antiterrorism, and small-arms destruction.

International Military Education and 

Training (IMET)

($11 million)

IMET is intended to strengthen alliances and promote military professionalism 

through training and education for students from allied and friendly nations. 

The program is administered jointly with DoD.

Educational and Cultural Exchange 

Programs (ECA) ($46 million)

ECA supports education, democracy, civil society, and cultural heritage activities in 

Iraq through educational and cultural exchanges.

U.S. Agency for International 

Development 

International Disaster Assistance 

(IDA) and International Disaster and 

Famine Assistance (IDFA)

($272 million)

The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is responsible for IDA and IDFA. 

These funds allow the U.S. government to respond to disasters in foreign countries 

through famine relief, cash food aid, and related programs.

P.L. 480 Food Aid (Title II and 

Non-Title II) ($395 million)

P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid, or Food for Peace, provides for the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to meet food needs in other countries.

Child Survival and Health (CSH)

($90 million)

USAID’s Bureau of Global Health is responsible for CSH, which funds maternal, 

newborn, and child health programs implemented by voluntary organizations and 

NGOs.

U.S. Treasury 

International Affairs Technical 

Assistance ($16 million)

The Department of the Treasury is responsible for International Affairs Technical Assistance, which is funded in Iraq by State under a reimbursable agreement. Technical 

Assistance advisors work with foreign governments to improve their financial systems. 

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70

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

IRRF

CERP

INCLE

ESF

ISFF

$20.9

$4.1

$1.3

$5.1

$20.2

Governance

Security

Economy

Infrastructure

$8.3

$27.3

$1.8

$11.9

DoD

$39.8

USAID

$5.8

Other $1.0

DoS

$2.7

Flow of Major U.S. Reconstruction Funds to Agencies and Reconstruction Areas

$ Billions

FIGURE 4.19
71

WHERE THE MONEY WENT 5

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Planning To Spend 

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Department 

of Defense and National Security Council officials began exploring 

preliminary plans for the possible invasion of Iraq. Hard Lessons: 

The Iraq Reconstruction Experience covers much of what happened 

regarding reconstruction planning during this period. As detailed there, 

significant differences unfolded among the departments about the 

appropriate post-war rebuilding strategy.162

The prevailing preference among Defense Department planners 

was to “liberate and leave.” That is, Coalition forces would topple 

the Saddam Hussein regime, stabilize the country, transfer power 

to an interim governing authority, and allow the Iraqis to manage 

the country’s recovery and pay for its relief and reconstruction. 

Policymakers viewed this general strategy as having worked reasonably 

well in Afghanistan. Defense sought to replicate it in Iraq.163

Defense planners expected to provide some post-conflict 

humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The April 2003 

$2.475 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund appropriation 

embodied this provision. No one at Defense planned for a lengthy 

occupation or a large relief and reconstruction program. The program 

in place in the early spring of 2003 anticipated a limited U.S.-funded 

rebuilding effort, a quick transfer of sovereignty, and the departure of 

U.S. troops from Iraq by September.164

As Hard Lessons recounts, planners from the Department of 

State and the U.S. Agency for International Development had a 

less sanguine view. They envisioned a protracted U.S. involvement, 

requiring the considerable commitment of U.S. resources. To that end, 

USAID’s Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq concluded that the “complete 

reconstruction [of Iraq’s] economic and institutional capacity...will 

require years of public investment.” The January 2003 National Security 

Presidential Directive 24 largely ended the pre-war debate, putting the 

Department of Defense in charge of managing post-war Iraq.165

NSPD 24 created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance, which would operate under Defense Department auspices, 

charging it to plan relief and reconstruction programs. Retired Army 
72

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner led ORHA for its short life. When 

Garner subsequently told Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that the 

United States might need to spend “billions of dollars” to rebuild Iraq, 

the Secretary responded, “if you think we’re going to spend a billion 

dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken.”166

Shortly after Saddam fell, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

came into play. Its initial $2.475 billion supported rebuilding in the 

following areas:167

R water/sanitation infrastructure

R feeding and food distribution

R relief efforts for refugees, internally displaced persons, and vulnerable 

individuals, including assistance for families of innocent Iraqi 

civilians who suffered losses as a result of military operations

R electricity

R health care

R telecommunications

R economic and financial policy

R education

R transportation

R governance and the rule of law

R humanitarian demining

R agriculture

Lieutenant General Garner never employed these funds. The 

creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority truncated his tenure 

in late April 2003. This leadership change marked a major policy shift: 

“occupy and rebuild” replaced “liberate and leave,” a development 

not yet fully in focus and certainly not then embraced by Defense. 

The CPA quickly formulated an ambitious program for the country’s 

large-scale recovery, relief, and reconstruction. This new plan was 

substantially larger than any previously anticipated.168

On September 17, 2003, less than six months after Saddam was 

deposed, President Bush asked the Congress for $20.3 billion for the 

relief and reconstruction of Iraq, stating that these funds were “essential 

to secure the transition to self-government and to create conditions 

for economic growth and investment.”169 After brief debate, the 

Congress provided more than 90% of the request,170 and thus began an 

unprecedented nine-year rebuilding campaign, for which congressional 

appropriations eventually would top $60 billion. 

You Break It, You Own It?

When Coalition forces entered Iraq, they found the country in 

much worse condition than pre-war planners anticipated. Indeed, it 

is not a stretch to say that Iraq was broken before the invasion. But 

already decrepit conditions severely worsened in April and May 2003, 

aggravated by looting, insecurity, and a couple of arguably errant 

decisions by the CPA. 

Immediately following the invasion, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

teams quickly assessed Iraq’s civil infrastructure, finding it in grievous 

disrepair. The Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War left pockets of 

weakness, which the invasion aggravated. United Nations sanctions 

imposed in the 1990s, effecting as they did an international trade 

embargo, constrained Iraq’s access to spare parts, limiting the 

country’s capacity to sustain and maintain its infrastructure. Saddam’s 

neglect, corruption, and mismanagement exacerbated every shortfall. 

It soon became clear in mid-2003 that a much larger investment 

was required.171

The widespread looting following the invasion devastated the 

country’s infrastructure. Looters ransacked government buildings, 

stole munitions from military depots, robbed and destroyed banks, 

ravaged oil-sector facilities, ripped apart electrical systems, and 

incapacitated most of Iraq’s 192 state-owned enterprises. This 

indiscriminate pillaging caused billions of dollars in damage, 

provided weapons for insurgents, and destroyed hopes that 

Iraq’s public institutions and critical infrastructure could quickly 

resume operations.172

What the looters did to Iraq’s government buildings, some argue 

the CPA did to its government’s bureaucracy. CPA Order 1, issued 

on May 16, 2003, banned members of Saddam’s Ba’ath Party above 

certain levels from serving in Iraq’s public sector. Lieutenant General 

Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq from 

June 2003 to June 2004, later stated that this order “essentially ... 

eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation. 

Organizations involving justice, defense, interior, communications, 
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

73

schools, universities, and hospitals were all either completely shut 

down or severely crippled because anybody with any experience was 

now out of a job.”173

A growing insurgency followed the looting, fueled in part by CPA 

Order 2, which, among other things, abolished Iraq’s Ministry of 

Defense and disbanded the army, putting 500,000 men out of work 

without pay or pension. As General Petraeus told SIGIR, this action 

“created tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of additional 

enemies of the Coalition.”174

In mid-2003, Iraq had no capacity for self-government, no 

functioning security forces, an almost useless electricity system, 

virtually no oil exports, and no ongoing revenue stream to pay the 

costs of rebuilding.175 Iraq was broken; the United States “owned it.”

Defining and Redefining: Moving Goals 

and Benchmarks

Pre-war planning identified areas that would need post-war relief and 

reconstruction. But reconstruction managers did not define specific 

goals, objectives, measures, and metrics until very late in the planning 

process. The relevant documents included:

R USAID’s Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq—This February 2003 

paper established a set of milestones, ranging from 60 days to 

18 months after the fall of Saddam and reaching many sectors, 

including health, water and sanitation, electricity, transportation, 

telecommunications, and agriculture/rural development.176

R ORHA’s A Unified Mission Plan for Post-Hostilities Iraq—This 

April 2003 paper defined the desired “end state” as “a stable 

Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact, and a broad-based 

government that renounces WMD development and use and no 

longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors.” It set forth 

benchmarks that defined the desired end state.177

R CPA’s Achieving the Vision—This July 2003 plan defined the 

desired end state as “a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that 

provides effective and representative government for the Iraqi 

people, is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a 

growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer 

poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.” The 

CPA’s program focused on these four general areas:178

- Security—establishing a secure and safe environment

- Essential services—restoring basic services to an acceptable 

standard

- Economy—creating the conditions for economic growth

- Governance—enabling the transition to transparent and 

inclusive democratic governance

Obligations and Expenditures: 

An Incomplete Story

The November 2003 law appropriating $18.4 billion for the 

IRRF established the requirement that agencies report quarterly 

to the Congress on their use of U.S. funds on a “project-byproject” basis.179 The departments involved in reconstruction 

attempted to meet this requirement; but, as of the end of 2012, 

no reliably complete source of information existed showing what 

U.S reconstruction funds accomplished. SIGIR issued numerous 

reports documenting the limitations of the applicable data systems, 

but little improvement occurred. Thus, the full story on the use 

of billions of U.S. dollars for reconstructing Iraq will forever 

remain incomplete.

For the past nine years, SIGIR provided comprehensive reports 

to the Congress every quarter. In so doing, SIGIR gathered 

a mountain of data on the use of reconstruction funds. This 

chapter draws from SIGIR’s 35 Quarterly and Semiannual Reports 

and our independent audit analyses of agency reconstruction 

data, classifying U.S.-funded programs into four categories 

that correspond to the CPA’s four core areas. Because of the 

questionable quality, accuracy, and completeness of the project 

records, SIGIR often had to make a judgment call when assigning 

costs to programs and projects. Moreover, their effects are based 

largely on what the agencies reported to SIGIR. 

Table 5.1 shows how much the United States obligated and 

expended from the five major U.S. reconstruction funds in each of 

these areas through September 2012.
74

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

TABLE 5.1

Obligations and Expenditures of Major U.S. Reconstruction 

Funds, by Area of Use, as of 9/30/2012

$ Billions

Area Sector Obligated Expended

Security and 

Rule of Law

Ministry of Defense Support 14.41 13.90 

Ministry of Interior Support 9.73 9.35 

Related Activities 1.12 1.08 

Justice 0.77 0.68 

Infrastructure Security 0.67 0.63 

Corrections 0.53 0.46 

Anticorruption 0.07 0.06 

Subtotal 27.30 26.16 

Infrastructure Electricity 5.45 5.36 

Water and Sanitation 2.78 2.71 

Oil and Gas 1.76 1.76 

Transportation and Communications 1.31 1.25 

General Infrastructure 0.58 0.58 

Subtotal 11.88 11.66 

Governance Public Services 3.06 2.55 

Capacity Development 2.45 2.27 

Democracy and Civil Society 1.91 1.82 

Humanitarian Relief 0.89 0.84 

Subtotal 8.32 7.48 

Economy Private Sector Development 0.98 0.87 

Economic Governance 0.84 0.78 

Subtotal 1.82 1.65 

Total 49.32 46.96 

Accounting for Project Costs: Caveat Lector

The Congress mandated U.S. agencies to 

submit quarterly reports detailing how they 

used reconstruction funds on a project-byproject basis. It also required that SIGIR’s 

quarterly reports include “a project-by-project 

and program-by-program accounting of the 

costs incurred to date for the reconstruction 

of Iraq.”

Using data reported by the State and Defense Departments, USAID, and other agencies, 

SIGIR has consistently accounted for obligations 

and expenditures at the program level.

But pinning down the costs of specific 

projects has been more difficult. Among the 

problems are these:

R No commonly understood and applied 

definition of “project”—A single record 

in a database might represent the entire 

turnkey cost of completing a facility, the 

cost of building just one component or 

phase of the facility, the cost of work that 

was unsatisfactory and had to be redone by 

another contractor, or the cost of similar work 

performed at multiple facilities. 

R Inaccurate and incomplete cost data—

SIGIR identified numerous cases in which the 

costs reported for individual projects did not 

match across databases and internal agency 

records. In the case of the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System (the $50 million system 

developed to support the project-by-project 

reporting requirement), the recorded costs 

are the estimated contract values, not the 

actual expenditures. In another database, 

SIGIR found multiple instances where the total 

amount expended for a contract was reported 

as the amount expended for each individual 

project funded by that contract, resulting in a 

dramatic overreporting of project costs.

R Missing data—15% of the IRRF obligations 

were not accounted for in agency databases. 

SIGIR could not determine if the missing 

obligation and expenditure data resulted from 

data-entry problems or something more, such 

as fraud. Resolving this issue would entail a 

close review of every IRRF-funded contract, a 

task that exceeded SIGIR’s resources.

Because of these deficiencies in record 

keeping, the disposition of billions of dollars for projects remains unknown because 

the U.S. government agencies involved in 

the relief and reconstruction effort did not 

maintain project information in any uniform 

or comprehensive manner.

SIGIR Audit 13-006

The Falluja Waste Water Treatment System project, on 

which the United States spent $100 million in U.S. funds, 

is not listed as a single project in the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System. Instead, IRMS has 49 separate 

records, including records for project activities funded from 

the IRRF, CERP, and ESF. (U.S. Army photo)
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

75

2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005

$0

$2

$4

$6

$8

$10

$12

Expended

Obligated

Infrastructure: Cumulative Obligations and Expenditures, FY 2004–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.1

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2009

Average Slippage in Completion of USACE Infrastructure 

Projects Valued at More than $1 Million, by Year of Award, 

2004–2011

Days

FIGURE 5.3

90% of the 

money for 

infrastructure 

projects was 

obligated 

before the end 

of 2006.

Infrastructure

Three wars, international sanctions, massive looting, and Saddam’s 

reckless neglect devastated Iraq’s capacity to provide essential 

services.180 A senior official told SIGIR that the “invasion seemed to 

have occurred just as the condition of the entire infrastructure teetered 

on the edge of the cliff of disaster.”181

The CPA made the delivery of basic services a major priority, setting 

these goals:182

R reconstituting the power infrastructure

R improving water-resource management

R ensuring food security

R improving health care—quality and access

R rehabilitating key transport infrastructure

R improving education and housing—quality and access

R reconstructing the telecommunications system

The early phase of reconstruction spending emphasized large capital 

projects.183 Almost $1.64 billion (66%) of the IRRF 1 appropriation 

was spent on large projects: $1.1 billion executed by USAID and 

$518 million by Defense.184

Over the next nine years, the amount allocated to programs 

to repair and develop Iraq’s critical infrastructure sectors grew to 

$12.32 billion. As of September 2012, the United States had obligated 

$11.88 billion had and spent $11.66 billion. Almost 70% of this money 

was obligated within the first two years of the reconstruction effort, 

and more than 85% of the total obligations came from the IRRF (see 

Figures 5.1 and 5.2).185

Escalating violence in Iraq severely affected the rebuilding program. 

Attacks on contractors caused high rates of worker absenteeism, 

disrupted logistics, delayed countless projects, escalated security and 

project costs, and forced projects to shut down (see Figure 5.3).186

Project management personnel commonly could not visit work 

sites because of dangerous conditions, diminishing oversight and 

causing poor results. The U.S. government awarded contracts and task 

orders containing unrealistic cost estimates and impossible-to-meet 

completion dates, leading to a parade of change orders that scaled 

down projects, foreshortened outcomes, and contributed to a trove of 

complaints that SIGIR heard from Iraqis about the transfer of semicomplete projects.187

Electricity

During the 1980s, average electricity production from Iraq’s power 

plants increased from about 1,200 megawatts to 3,100 MW, generally 

FIGURE 5.2

ESF 

$0.31

CERP 

$1.40

IRRF 

$10.17

Infrastructure: 

Cumulative Obligations, 

by Fund, as of 9/30/2012

$ Billions
76

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

keeping pace with rising demand. During the 1991 Gulf War, air 

attacks severely damaged Iraq’s electricity infrastructure, causing 

production to drop below 2,200 MW.188

Supplies could not to meet the country’s demand during the 

1990s. Although repairs to the system boosted average production to 

more than 3,600 MW by 2002, the 2003 invasion, postwar looting, 

and insurgent sabotage quickly drove levels down, hitting a low of 

711 MW in mid-April 2003.189

Increasing Iraq’s electricity production became a paramount 

priority. CPA and Iraqi officials recognized that rebuilding the 

power sector was key to reviving Iraq’s economy, energizing the 

infrastructure, improving well-being, and gaining local support for the 

Coalition’s presence.190

In July 2003, the CPA established the goals of increasing generating 

capacity to 4,000 MW by October 2003, to 5,000 MW by January 

2004, to 7,000 MW by 2005, and to 14,000 MW by 2009.191

That same month, the CPA made a more ambitious prediction: 

electricity supply would be back to prewar levels of 4,400 MW by 

October 2003.192

To reach these goals, USACE deployed Task Force Restore Iraqi 

Electricity, which used three contractors—Perini Corporation, Fluor 

International, and Washington Group—for numerous projects to 

repair electrical infrastructure across the country. Working under its 

IRRF 1 contract with USAID, Bechtel supported the push, assessing 

power facilities and making numerous repairs. This collective effort 

achieved temporary success: on October 6, 2003, Iraq produced more 

than 4,500 MW of electricity. But the grid was fragile, and it could 

not hold the increase. Outputs quickly fell, with the promised level of 

6,000 MW not sustainably reached until 2009.193

In November 2003, the CPA developed a list of 110 high-priority 

generation, transmission, and distribution projects. To support them, 

the Congress allocated $5.56 billion—30% of the entire IRRF 2 

funding. Each of the three RIE contracting firms eventually won a 

$500 million IRRF 2 contract from Defense to help rebuild Iraq’s 

electricity sector. 194 Separately, USAID awarded Bechtel another 

contract, valued at $1.8 billion and funded by the IRRF 2.195

In all, the U.S. government obligated more than $5.45 billion and 

expended more than $5.36 billion through September 2012 to increase 

electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, including the 

rehabilitation of power plants and transmission lines, the construction 

of new substations, and the training of Iraqis.196 Almost 76% of the 

funding came from the IRRF 2. That share would have been higher 

but for a $1.3 billion reduction effected by reprogrammings that 

moved funds to meet security needs.197

The United States completed the last IRRF-funded electricity 

project in April 2011, involving the construction of a $29.1 million 

substation in Ramadi. Seven other electricity projects finished after 

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WHERE THE MONEY WENT

77

that required $21.7 million in ESF funds.198

The largest electricity sector undertakings rehabilitated and 

expanded power plants. In 2003, thermal plants provided most of Iraq’s 

electricity. But U.S. investment focused on providing combustionturbine facilities, which are both more technologically advanced than 

thermal plants and easier to construct.199

By the beginning of 2008, output from combustion-turbine units 

accounted for the largest share of the power supply.200 Table 5.2 lists 

some of the largest U.S.-funded electricity projects. 

In 2009, after the completion of most U.S.-funded electricitygeneration projects, production from Iraq’s government-run power 

plants averaged about 4,780 MW, 30% more than in 2004. Production 

at these plants grew by an additional 400 MW over the next three years, 

averaging roughly 5,175 MW during the first nine months of 2012.201

Cumulative supply on Iraq’s grid in 2012, drawn from all sources, 

averaged about 8,400 MW, which was 3,225 MW higher than the total 

output from government power plants (see Figure 5.4).202 Two-thirds of 

the increase from 2004 to 2012 came from these other sources:

R Private power plants in the Kurdistan Region—The Kurdistan 

Regional Government turned to independent power producers 

to build and operate power plants in the Region’s three provinces. 

These facilities collectively produced 1,950 MW in the late summer 

of 2012, almost all of which the Region consumed. The GOI’s 

Ministry of Electricity considered making similar arrangements, 

even soliciting bids from independent power producers, but it 

TABLE 5.2

Major U.S.-funded Electricity Projects

$ Millions

Completion Date

Project Name Province Contractor Name Contract Award Date Original Actual Fund U.S. Cost

Kirkuk Substation Combustion Turbines Tameem Bechtel National, Inc. 2/7/2003 10/31/2005 11/29/2005 IRRF 1 205.2

Baghdad South New Generation Ph II; Equipment Baghdad Bechtel National, Inc. 1/5/2004 10/1/2004 8/14/2006 IRRF 2 189.4

Qudas Gas Turbine Expansion Baghdad Uruk-Baghdad Joint Venture 8/31/2006 9/13/2007 5/4/2009 IRRF 2 169.5

Baghdad Distribution Substations Baghdad Bechtel National, Inc. 3/1/2004 6/15/2005 2/28/2006 IRRF 2 137.2

Buzurgan New Power Generation Missan Fluor/AMEC, LLC 3/25/2005 6/1/2006 6/15/2005 IRRF 2 125.1

Khor Az Zubair Power Generation Basrah Fluor/AMEC, LLC 9/14/2004 12/29/2005 1/6/2006 IRRF 2 110.9

Power Plant Maintenance Program Various Bechtel National, Inc. 3/4/2004 12/31/2004 3/22/2007 IRRF 2 92.7

Doura Power Plant Units 5 and 6 Baghdad Bechtel National, Inc. 2/7/2003 4/30/2004 6/15/2005 IRRF 1 90.8

Mansuria Natural Gas Development for Power Generation Various Bechtel National, Inc. 6/23/2004 7/6/2005 1/31/2006 IRRF 2 62.7

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Imports

Privately Owned 

Power Plants 

Government 

Power Plants 

Estimated Demand

Average Electricity Supply on Grid vs. Estimated Demand, 2000–2012

Megawatts

FIGURE 5.4

The largest supply increases 

since 2003 came from privately 

owned plants, but supply could 

not catch up with demand.
78

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

subsequently canceled the plan.203

R Powerships in Basrah—In 2010, the first of two floating 

“powerships” owned by a Turkish company docked in Basrah. By 

2012, they produced an average of about 220 MW. (The two Basrah 

powerships and the Kurdish private power plants provided about 

one-fourth of the country’s electricity in 2012).204

R Imports—In 2004, Iraq imported 136 MW of electricity. By 2012, 

imports increased to about 1,000 MW (12% of Iraq’s total supply), 

almost all of which came from Iran.205

Although the total supply of electricity more than doubled from 

2004 through 2012, estimated demand increased at an even faster 

pace. The causes for this rocketing rise included a modernizing 

infrastructure, a post-sanctions flood of energy-consuming products, 

and the ineffective enforcement of electricity fees.206

The gap between supply and demand meant that Iraqis continued 

to endure power outages. Most households supplemented the public 

supply with power from “backyard” or neighborhood generators. 

According to a 2011 survey, the government-run grid provided 

households about 7.6 hours of electricity per day, with 9 out of 10 

relying on off-grid generators to fill the gap. Respondents who 

used both public and private sources said they had an average of 

Shock and Audit: Inspecting an Electricity Plant

SIGIR assessed two large electricity projects 

in 2007. The projects planned to restore and 

expand generating capacity at the Qudas 

Power Plant in Baghdad. SIGIR inspections 

produced a number of “good news stories,” 

and this was one, at least with regard to 

execution. The two projects were adequately 

designed and properly completed or 

progressing satisfactorily. 

The Qudas work was an important part of 

the rebuilding program’s strategic commitment to improve Iraq’s electricity production. 

It involved the installation or rehabilitation 

of combustion turbines. These units run best 

when fueled by natural gas, of which Iraq has 

enormous reserves. 

The country’s gas infrastructure in 2003 was 

vastly underdeveloped. Thus, there was no 

choice but to burn crude oil or low-grade fuel 

oil in the combustion turbines at the Qudas 

plant. But this reduced the generating units’ 

capacity, increased downtime, and limited 

long-term productivity. By late 2011, a solution appeared to be in the offing. The Ministry 

of Oil signed an agreement with Royal Dutch 

Shell to form a joint venture to capture and 

make productive use of natural gas from Iraq’s 

southern fields. This opened the door to more 

efficient power plants, assuming the Ministries of Oil and Electricity could learn to work 

well together.

SIGIR PA-07-101 and PA-07-104

The United States spent more than $250 million restoring 

the Qudas Power Plant under several different projects. 

(USACE photo)

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WHERE THE MONEY WENT

79

14.6 hours of electricity per day. Almost 80% rated electricity service 

as “bad” or “very bad.” 207 In June 2010, when temperatures exceeded 

120 degrees Fahrenheit in southern Iraq, the shortages of electricity 

and potable water spurred violent protests, forcing the Minister of 

Electricity’s resignation.208

As of September 2012, the GOI’s Ministry of Electricity had 41 

power plants under construction. These new plants could increase 

generating capacity to 22,000 MW by the end of 2015. Assuming no 

delays, the International Energy Agency estimated that Iraq’s gridbased electricity generation would catch up to peak demand by 2015.209

Water and Sanitation

In the early 1990s, Iraq had a well-developed water and sanitation sector: 

95% of the urban population and 75% of the rural had access to potable 

water. Sewerage and wastewater coverage was high, particularly in urban 

areas, where 75% of the population had a sewer or septic tank connection. 

Public-health indicators were good, with minimal water- and sanitationrelated diseases.210

But by 2003, this sector had experienced a devastating decline. Water 

distribution lines deteriorated from age, and the corroded system allowed 

contaminants in, causing a sharp rise in disease rates. The United Nations 

$FFHVVWRPRGHUQVHZHUIDFLOLWLHVUHPDLQVDSUREOHPIRUPDQ\,UDTLIDPLOLHV

Evaluating Water: Contracts in Contrast

The CPA’s two largest water projects—among 

the very largest in the Iraq program—were the 

$277 million Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant 

in Thi-Qar province in southern Iraq and the 

$185 million Ifraz Water Treatment Plant near 

the Kurdistan Region’s capital city, Erbil. 

The Nassiriya plant aimed to serve 550,000 

people in five surrounding cities, while the Ifraz 

would serve 600,000 in Erbil. In 2010, after the 

two projects were complete and under Iraqi 

control, SIGIR visited both to evaluate their 

effects. SIGIR evaluators met with local and 

national Iraqi government officials and commissioned a public opinion poll to obtain the local 

Iraqis’ views. 

A remarkable contrast emerged. Both contracts were executed well, but the operations 

and maintenance of the Nassiriya plant was 

much worse than at Ifraz. The former plant had 

begun to suffer breakdowns shortly after its 

transfer to Iraqi control. But the Kurdish water 

authorities expanded Ifraz, which was perhaps 

the most successful of all large infrastructure 

projects accomplished in Iraq. 

SIGIR EV-10-002

The Ifraz plant 

functioned at nearly 

100% of capacity; 

88% of the people 

serviced by the plant 

were satisfied with 

water availability; 

and 85% were 

satisfied with the 

water quality.

The Nassiriya plant produced 

water at 61% of capacity 

(a number that fell to 20% 

during frequent electricity 

shortages); 67% of the people 

serviced by the plant said 

they were dissatisfied with 

the service; and 95% were 

dissatisfied with the water 

quality. 

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80

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Danger and Waste at the Mosul Dam

The Mosul Dam, completed in 1984, lies on the 

Tigris River in northern Iraq. The soils beneath 

the dam are subject to erosion. Their movement created potentially threatening cavities 

beneath the dam’s structural support. Reports 

in the Iraqi press said the deficiencies at the 

dam presented a potential danger. 

Since the 1980s, the Iraqi Ministry of Water 

Resources implemented remediation measures 

at the dam, including a continuous grouting 

program to fill sub-surface cavities. In 2005, 

the U.S. government partnered with the 

GOI to initiate improvements, executing 21 

contracts worth a combined $27 million to 

mitigate the dam’s deficiencies. 

SIGIR inspectors visited the dam in 2007, 

finding that the project was poorly designed 

and inadequately executed. Equally troubling, 

the team found no dedicated monitor for the 

project. 

The inspection concluded that approximately $19.4 million worth of equipment and 

materials for implementing improvements 

to the grouting operations was not being 

used. To its credit, the U.S. Mission responded 

quickly by following up on these problems, 

adding new investment and oversight to help 

remedy the issues SIGIR uncovered.

SIGIR PA-07-105

The Mosul Dam supplies drinking water, irrigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power to the surrounding region. (IRMO photo)

Children’s Fund estimated that 25% of all children’s deaths in Iraq in 2002 

were caused by waterborne bacteria.211

In light of this grave public health crisis, the CPA requested 

$3.71 billion from the Congress to restore and expand Iraq’s water and 

sanitation infrastructure. In November 2003, the Congress exceeded that 

request, allocating $4.33 billion in IRRF 2 money for the water sector,212

making it the second-highest infrastructure priority behind electricity.213

The CPA’s strategic plan outlined these water and sanitation 

sector goals:214

R Increase potable water access to 90% of Iraqis. 

R Increase sewerage access to 15% of Iraqis.

R Reduce water distribution network losses from 60% to 40%. 

The Department of State later determined these goals to be 

unrealistic because there was no baseline data on Iraq’s water and 

sanitation infrastructure. Moreover, the country lacked a metering 

system to measure results.215 State changed its water-sector metrics 

from the percentage of Iraqis with access to water and sanitation to the 

estimated number of Iraqi people who would benefit from water and 

sanitation projects. The new end-state goal was to provide an additional 

8.4 million people with access to potable water and an additional 

5.3 million with access to sewerage services.216

The water sector’s plans suffered a severe setback because of 

funding reductions implemented in the 2004–2005 reprogrammings. 

By mid-2005, the IRRF 2 allocation to the sector was half the 

original number ($2.15 billion, down from $4.33 billion).217 The 

U.S. government now planned to use $1.5 billion to fund projects 

to increase potable water access, while using the remainder to build 

sewerage systems, improve irrigation, and repair the 149-mile 

Sweetwater Canal.218 

Between February 2003 and September 2012, the U.S. 

government obligated $2.78 billion and expended $2.71 billion to 

rehabilitate and improve Iraq’s water and sanitation sector. More than 

60% of the obligations supported projects to produce and distribute 

potable water.219 The IRRF funded three-quarters of the projects.

The emphasis on large infrastructure at the beginning of the program 

resulted in the obligation of 90% of the funding by September 2006.220

Water projects included some of the costliest U.S.-funded 

reconstruction efforts in the entire program, including the Nassiriya and 

Ifraz Water Treatment Plants and the Falluja Waste Water Treatment 

System, with a combined U.S. cost of $545 million.221 See Table 5.3 for 

a list of major U.S.-funded water and sanitation projects. 
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

81

TABLE 5.3

Major U.S.-funded Water and Sanitation Projects

$ Millions

Completion Date

Project Name Province Contractor Name Contract Award Date Original Actual Fund U.S. Cost

Nassiriya Water Supply Thi-Qar Fluor/AMEC, LLC 4/21/2004 12/13/2007 9/11/2007 IRRF 2 259.9 

Erbil - Ifraz Water Project Erbil Fluor/AMEC, LLC 4/21/2004 10/1/2005 7/20/2006 IRRF 2 185.3 

Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant Anbar Fluor/AMEC, LLC; Various 6/26/2004 1/1/2006 5/2/2011 IRRF 2, ESF, CERP 99.8 

Nassiriya Drainage Pump Station Thi-Qar Washington International Black & Veatch 11/14/2004 12/31/2006 2/28/2007 IRRF 2 73.9 

Sadr City R3 Water Treatment Plant Baghdad Bechtel, Washington International, Inc./

Black & Veatch 1/5/2004 10/31/2005 12/31/2008 IRRF 2 65.8

Rural Water Supply Project Implementation Multiple Bechtel National, Inc. 6/13/2004 11/1/2005 9/15/2006 IRRF 2 62.0 

Basrah Sewer Project Basrah Fluor/AMEC, LLC 6/15/2004 4/7/2006 10/30/2006 IRRF 2 50.5 

Balad Rooz Water Treatment Plant Diyala Fluor/AMEC, LLC 4/30/2004 10/1/2005 5/31/2006 IRRF 2 40.0 

Eastern Euphrates Drain Muthanna Ministry of Water Resources 8/29/2006 1/29/2009 12/31/2010 IRRF 2 38.4 

In March 2010, the State Department reported it had achieved 

its 2006 water and sanitation targets, saying that U.S.-funded water 

projects generated almost a quarter of the potable water produced in 

Iraq each day, servicing 8.7 million people; U.S.-funded sanitation 

projects processed 1.2 million cubic meters of wastewater per day, 

servicing 5.3 million people.222 But State pointed out that the lack of 

water metering in Iraq made it difficult to assess how much water was 

reaching the intended users.223

After the United States turned over the large water projects to Iraqi 

control, reconstruction officials discovered that, in many cases, the Iraqis 

were not operating these projects properly. Shortfalls included equipment 

theft, badly trained staff, poor operations and maintenance practices, and 

inadequate supplies of electricity and treatment chemicals.224

In response, the U.S. government set aside $116 million in ESF 

funding in 2006 to create a program to “assist the Iraqi people in 

the proper operation and maintenance of 40-plus selected U.S.-

government-supported water and wastewater facilities.” This Water 

Sector Supply Program provided facility assessments, technical 

assistance, spare parts, and repair services.225

In March 2011, the United Nations reported that, while Iraq had 

the second-highest amount of available water per capita in the Middle 

East, its water quality was poor, violating Iraq National Standards 

and World Health Organization guidelines.226 In a separate survey 

conducted that same year, about two-thirds of the households said 

they relied on the public water supply as their main source for drinking 

water, with a quarter of them noting that they had access to potable 

water less than two hours per day and just 38% rating drinking water 

as “good” or “very good.”227
82

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Euphrates 

River

outfall

force main

GOI-funded sewer networks and 

25,259 house connections for 

5 collection areas

Opened in May 2011, the WWTP ran initially on 

generator power but is now connected to the Anbar 

essential services electrical line, which provides 20 hours 

of power per day. State awarded a $1 million operations 

and maintenance grant in September to train plant 

operators on the use of purification chemicals.

Highway 10 was the only road from 

Baghdad to the project sites. Contractors 

traversed a gauntlet of sniper-fire positions 

and roadblocks through terrorist 

strongholds. At the height of insurgent 

activity, the U.S. military required all dump 

trucks to be emptied and reloaded at 

checkpoints to search for IEDs.

U.S.-funded sewer networks 

and 9,116 house connections 

for 3 collection areas

Portion of the original project 

completed by the GOI for 

approximately

3 pump stations

3 trunk lines

$87 million

GOI Components:

25,259

house connections

Falluja Waste Water Treatment System: 

A Case Study in Wartime Contracting

2004 

Initial 

Estimate 

2011 

Snapshot

% Change 

from 2004

% Change 

from 2004

2014 

Estimated 

Completion

Cost $35 M $108 M 209% $195 M 457%

18 88 389% 114 533%

Residents Served 100,000

(estimated) 62%

38,400

(58,300 target) 120%

220,000

(estimated)

Contracts/Grants 1 42 4,200% 42+ GOI 4,200%

Months to 

Completion

Before:

Sewage in the streets in 2004

After:

Completed WWTP in 2011

The Falluja Waste Water Treatment System

was meant to rid Falluja’s city streets of raw 

sewage, alleviate contamination of potable 

water sources, and reduce instances of illness 

and death linked to poor sanitation. The project 

was undertaken in 2006 when the city was 

wracked with violence. Limited planning, a 

minimal understanding of site conditions, an 

unskilled workforce, and no clear idea about 

how much the system would cost burdened 

the project. Violence became so prevalent that 

trenches and pipes laid by U.S. contractors were 

regularly blown up. Several times, the U.S. 

military had to stop construction until security 

conditions improved. 

Other adversities included:

R On-site progress assessments could not be 

performed. 

R The original task order required Fluor/AMEC to 

complete the system in 18 months, but because 

of security delays, construction did not begin 

until early 2005. 

R The shift of $2.2 billion out of the water sector 

occurred just as more money was needed for the 

project. 

R The choice of a more complicated plant design 

and the lack of reliable power from the grid 

caused delays and increased costs. 

R The mid-2005 shift from large design-build 

contracts to smaller contracts carried out by Iraqi 

contractors caused delays.

SIGIR Audit 12-007, PA-08-144 to 148

U.S.-funded Expandable 

“Backbone” System to be 

completed at a cost of

Wastewater 

Treatment Plant

(WWTP)

3 pump stations

4 trunk lines

9,116

house connections

$108 million*

U.S.-completed Components:

3

4

*Includes $8.0 million in DFI funding.
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

83

Oil and Gas

Iraq has the world’s third-largest proven reserves of crude oil, estimated 

in 2010 at just over 143 billion barrels.228 Recent discoveries indicate 

that the number may be much higher. Iraq’s ability to extract these 

reserves varied significantly over time (see Figure 5.5). 

After peaking at 3.5 million barrels per day in 1979, the country’s 

crude oil production plummeted to 1.0 MBPD in 1981, rebounded 

to 2.9 MBPD in 1989, but then hit a low of 0.3 MBPD in 1991 

following the 1991 Gulf War. Lingering damage from that conflict 

along with international sanctions kept oil production low through 

1996. Output recovered thereafter, though erratically. During the twomonth period before the March 2003 invasion, oil production jumped 

to just over 2.5 MBPD.229

Iraq’s extraordinary petroleum riches led to the pre-war 

presumption that revenues from their sale would finance the country’s 

reconstruction. To ensure this, U.S. planners deemed a rapid postinvasion restoration of the oil sector as critical to achieving the 

Coalition’s strategic goals.230

In February 2003, the Department of the Army developed a 

program to restore Iraq’s oil infrastructure so that it could reach 

pre-war production and export levels: 2.5 MBPD and 2.1 MBPD, 

respectively.231 On March 8, 2003, USACE awarded Kellogg Brown 

0

1

2

3

4

Crude Oil Production, 1970–2012

Million Barrels per Day

FIGURE 5.5

Saddam Hussein 

becomes president

7/1979

Iraq invades Kuwait

8/1990

Nationalization of Iraq 

Petroleum Company

6/1972

Gulf War

1/1991–2/1991

Iraq’s first petroleum licensing round 

6/2009

Iraq’s second petroleum licensing round

12/2009

Arab OPEC

Oil Embargo

10/1973–3/1974

Operation Iraqi Freedom

3/2003

Iran/Iraq War 9/1980–8/1988 Oil for Food Program 

12/1996–11/2003

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Crude oil production climbed from 2003 to 2012, 

but had yet to reach its 1979 peak.

Al-Fatah Pipe Dream

During the 2003 invasion, Coalition forces 

bombed al-Fatah Bridge in north-central Iraq, 

severing the 15 oil and gas pipelines it carried 

across the Tigris River. This damage cut off oil 

flows to the Bajii refinery, Iraq’s largest. Repairing the pipelines was crucial to the recovery of 

Iraq’s oil sector.

Originally estimated at $5 million, the alFatah project planned to repair the bridge and 

the pipelines. But the CPA and the Ministry of 

Oil decided instead to use horizontal directional drilling to re-route the pipelines under the 

river, which increased the estimated project 

costs to $28 million. 

An initial study of the geological conditions 

beneath the river produced a recommendation against drilling because of the sandy soil. 

But horizontal drilling work pressed ahead 

anyway, with tens of millions of dollars wasted 

on churning sand, as attempt after attempt to 

drill failed to make headway. The $75.7 million in DFI funds allocated to the project was 

spent accomplishing just 28% of the project’s scope. Ultimately, the drilling plan was 

abandoned, with the bridge and its pipelines 

repaired under a new $29.7 million IRRF-funded 

contract that the U.S. government awarded 

to Parsons Iraq Joint Venture. Because of the 

nature of the original contract, the government was unable to recover any of the money 

wasted on this project.

SIGIR SA-05-001

Coalition bombing damaged al-Fatah Bridge in 2003.
84

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

South

North

Crude Oil Exports, North vs. South, 2004–2012

MBPD

FIGURE 5.6

& Root a non-competitive contract with a $7 billion ceiling to restore 

and operate Iraq’s oil infrastructure. It was the largest reconstruction 

contract for Iraq’s rebuilding and the largest known sole-source 

contract in U.S. history.232

After the invasion, USACE surveyed Iraq’s oil infrastructure, 

estimating that combat operations and the looting that followed 

caused $1.4 billion in damage: $457 million from military action and 

$943 million from post-war depredations. Moreover, years of neglect 

during the Saddam era had left major pieces of the infrastructure in 

need of urgent maintenance. Repairing the oil system to a level that 

could support the CPA’s production and export goals would require at 

least $1.7 billion.233

In July 2003, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the CPA initiated a 

plan that anticipated executing 226 projects costing $1.14 billion. 

Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil worked to restore the damaged oil 

infrastructure and revive Iraq’s oil production and export capacity.234

The task force’s efforts helped the CPA meet initial production 

goals by September 2003. But by mid-2004, production and export 

levels dropped to below pre-war levels, due to a combination of 

focused insurgent attacks on oil pipelines, failing infrastructure, and 

a general deterioration of the security situation. Between December 

2004 and May 2005, production flat-lined at about 2.1 MBPD, with 

exports hovering between 1.4 MBPD and 1.6 MBPD. These declines 

occurred notwithstanding that through June 2005 the U.S. government 

had obligated nearly $1.2 billion to restore and sustain Iraq’s crude oil 

production and export levels.235

Between 2003 and 2007, more than 400 attacks hit Iraq’s pipelines, 

refineries, and workers. Corruption troubled the oil sector as well, 

including the smuggling or diversion of refined products, which 

contributed to decreased exports. 236 In early 2007, Iraq suffered a 

post-2003 production low, but levels began to rise later that year, as the 

Coalition strategy to repress attacks on oil facilities took effect. By 

July 2007, output stood at 2.1 MBPD. Exports resumed growth 

too, reaching 1.98 MBPD by November 2007.237

The Infrastructure Security Program’s Pipeline Exclusion Zone, a 

project designed to secure pipeline corridors, helped reduce attacks. It 

protected the crucial pipelines linking Iraq’s northern oil fields to the 

Turkish port at Ceyhan.238

The U.S. government obligated and expended $1.76 billion for 

projects to restore, build, and protect facilities in Iraq’s oil and gas sector 

and to provide technical training for Ministry of Oil employees. All of 

the U.S. funding came from the IRRF, with the majority of obligations 

occurring during the first two years of the reconstruction program.239

See Table 5.4 for a list of major U.S.-funded projects.

By late 2012, Iraq’s oil exports topped 2.62 MBPD, a rise of nearly 

45% from early 2009, and averaged about 2.42 MBPD for the year 

$GULOOLQJULJRSHUDWHVLQDO5XPDLODRLOÀHOGZHVWRI%DVUDKLQ%3SKRWR

Since 2004, 

most crude oil 

exports came 

from the large 

VRXWKHUQÀHOGV
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

85

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

$7

$8

2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2004

Oil Receipts, Monthly Average by Year, 2003–2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.7

Oil receipts 

have grown 

steadily since 

2009.

(see Figure 5.6).240 The rise in exports, coupled with oil price increases, 

generated large increases in Iraq’s national income, with oil receipts 

more than doubling from 2009 to 2012 (see Figure 5.7).241

In 2009, the Ministry of Oil launched the first of four bidding 

rounds for rights to develop the country’s petroleum reserves, which 

the ministry had revised upward from 115 billion to 143 billion barrels 

in late 2010. By the completion of the fourth round in mid-2012, 

the GOI had entered into contracts with international oil companies 

for the development of 17 fields: 13 for crude oil development and 

4 for natural gas.242

Despite gains in production and exports, an array of problems still 

burdened Iraq’s oil and gas sector. For example, pipeline bottlenecks 

limited export volume, and the new single-point mooring systems 

supporting off-shore exports sometimes operated at just 50% of 

capacity. At the end of 2012, Iraq needed more pipelines and storage 

facilities to realize its vast potential.243

Tensions between the GOI in Baghdad and leaders of the Kurdistan 

Regional Government also limited oil exports, with KRG leaders 

reducing the flow of the Region’s oil into the northern pipeline to 

Ceyhan in 2012 because of disputes over reimbursement payments 

6LQJOHSRLQWPRRULQJVWDWLRQRIIDO)DZ/HLJKWRQ2IIVKRUHSKRWR

TABLE 5.4

Major U.S.-funded Oil and Gas Projects

$ Millions

Completion Date

Project Name Province Contractor Name Contract Award Date Original Actual Fund U.S. Cost

Restore Natural Gas Liquid and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Plants Basrah Kellogg Brown and Root 5/2/2004 12/31/2005 5/29/2007 IRRF 1 146.7

Well Logging Basrah Parsons Iraq Joint Venture 10/27/2005 6/1/2006 9/25/2006 IRRF 2 88.1

Restore Gas and Oil Separation Plants Basrah Kellogg Brown and Root 5/2/2004 4/1/2006 12/31/2006 IRRF 1 84.5

Project West Qurna 8 Basrah Kellogg Brown and Root 5/2/2004 NA NA IRRF 1 82.3

Al Fatah and Kirkuk Pipeline Crossings Tameem Parsons Iraq Joint Venture 11/19/2004 NA 4/1/2006 IRRF 2 65.7

Al-Basrah Oil Terminal Basrah Parsons Iraq Joint Venture 3/11/2005 12/31/2006 7/27/2007 IRRF 2 64.0

Qarmat Ali Pressure Maintenance and Pipeline Replacement Basrah Parsons Iraq Joint Venture 4/7/2005 1/1/2006 NA IRRF 2 31.2
86

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

TABLE 5.5

Major U.S.-funded Transportation and Communications Projects

$ Millions

Completion Date

Project Name Province Contractor Name Contract Award Date Original Actual Fund U.S. Cost

Advanced First Responder Network Multiple Lucent Technologies, Inc. 9/26/2004 6/30/2005 1/15/2006 IRRF 1 & 2, ISFF 198.0

Digital Microwave Radio Communications Network Multiple Volpe Center, Mafeks International, LLC 2/20/2006 9/2009 9/2011 IRRF 2, ESF 48.0

Consolidated Fiber Network Multiple Bechtel National, Inc. 1/5/2004 3/31/2006 6/30/2006 IRRF 2 47.0

Al-Mamoon Exchange and Communications Center Baghdad Alfa Consult, The Kufan Group 7/31/2005 2/13/2007 6/30/2011 IRRF 2 32.4

Telecom Subscriber Service Multiple Bechtel National, Inc. 2/7/2003 3/13/2004 3/13/2004 IRRF 1 32.3

Airport Administration Multiple Skylink Air and Logistical Support 3/21/2003 1/31/2005 1/31/2005 IRRF 2 27.2

Communications Based Train Control System Multiple Volpe Center, Mafeks International, LLC 3/31/2005 9/30/2010 3/2011 IRRF 2 17.3

Umm Qasr Dredging Phase 2 Basrah Bechtel National, Inc. 2/7/2003 10/31/2005 10/22/2003 IRRF 1 15.9

New Radar for Basrah International Airport Basrah CDM/CAPE 9/27/2006 11/30/2008 2/1/2009 IRRF 2 15.0

from Baghdad. These tensions dimmed prospects for parliamentary 

agreement on the long-delayed hydrocarbon laws necessary to improve 

governance over the oil and gas sector. The absence of this legislation 

leaves elementary issues unresolved, such as which government entities 

have the right to export Iraqi oil.244

Transportation and Communications

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Iraqi government invested heavily in 

the country’s transportation infrastructure. Iraq had two international 

and three domestic airports, six cargo ports, more than 40,000 

kilometers of roads, and almost 2,500 kilometers of rail lines. The 1991 

Gulf War damaged much of this infrastructure. Saddam’s neglect, 

international sanctions, the 2003 invasion, and post-war looting further 

devastated the system.245

United Nations sanctions prevented Iraqi Airways from resuming 

commercial airline service between 1991 and 2000. Iraq had only 

minimal aviation capacity up to 2003. When the Coalition invaded, 

no Iraqi airport could support commercial air operations because the 

country lacked avionics support systems.246 Iraq’s ports also suffered. 

Submerged wreckage and poor dredging made the import and export 

of goods by sea very challenging.247

The country’s communications systems were equally debilitated after 

1990. By 2003, Iraq had just 833,000 landline connections and 80,000 

mobile phone subscribers, supporting a population of 27 million. The 

invasion aggravated matters, destroying 12 of Baghdad’s 38 telephone 

exchanges along with all of Iraq’s international switching and satelliteearth stations. Post-war looting inflicted further damage, causing 

telephone access to become virtually nonexistent.248

The United Nations and the World Bank estimated in 2003 that 

the transportation and communications sector required $3.38 billion 

of investment.249 The CPA planned to rehabilitate and restore strategic 

transportation and telecommunications sectors to pre-war levels and 

introduce advanced technologies. Specifically, it called for re-opening 

Iraqi airspace and airports, repairing the broken telephone networks, 

and developing new mobile phone services.250

As of September 2012, the U.S. government had obligated 

$1.31 billion and expended $1.25 billion on projects to repair and 

improve Iraq’s transportation and communication capabilities. Almost 

70% of the funds came from the two IRRF appropriations. More 

than one-half of the obligations occurred by July 2005 and more 

than 90% by September 2007. No new obligations occurred after 
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

87

July 2011.251 Table 5.5 lists major projects in the transportation and 

telecommunications sector.

Transportation

More than $853 million (65%) of the major U.S. reconstruction 

funds obligated in this sector supported transportation projects to 

rehabilitate and improve Iraq’s railways, roads, airports, and ports. 

The five largest transportation projects, all funded with the IRRF and 

costing $94 million, improved Iraq’s airport operations and railway 

communications, and reopened the Port of Umm Qasr.252 The U.S. 

government used CERP funding for thousands of transportationrelated projects, including several multimillion-dollar undertakings, 

such as the $5.4 million effort to provide solar street lighting for the 

city of Falluja and $4.2 million project to construct the Baghdad 

International Airport Caravan Hotel.253

Civil Aviation

In August 2003, Iraq’s airspace re-opened. But, by October 2003, 

Iraq’s two international airports were only handling Coalition and 

non-commercial charter flights. Early U.S. government-funded 

aviation projects focused on rehabilitating runways and terminals, 

providing power generation, and improving avionics and radars. In 

August 2004, Iraqi Airways flights between Amman, Jordan, and 

Baghdad began.254

By January 2012, all of Iraq’s civil aviation assets, including six 

airports and six aviation towers previously operated by the U.S. 

government, were under GOI control.255 More than 20 airlines 

Baghdad Railway Station: A Train Station on Time

The Baghdad Railway Station, the center for 

all rail service in Iraq, contains the offices for 

the Ministry of Transportation and the Iraq 

Republic Railway. Iraq monitors, controls, and 

coordinates all national train movements from 

this station. 

According to a 2004 estimate by the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office, Iraq’s 

economy was losing $17.5 million per week 

because of the country’s inability to transport 

goods by rail. The U.S. government spent 

$6 million to renovate the Baghdad Railway 

Station. The project worked. 

A SIGIR Inspection team visited the station in 

May 2006, concluding that the project’s results 

were consistent with the contract’s objectives. 

The Iraq Republic Railway now had work 

spaces that offered a much safer and healthier 

environment for its employees and visitors, and 

the station’s structures and utility systems had 

been modernized to sufficiently support the 

railway’s services and operations.

SIGIR PA-06-057

The United States spent $6 million modernizing the Baghdad 

Railway Station. (USACE photo)

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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

provided service to Iraq throughout 2012. Of note, in April of that 

year, the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority announced the resumption 

of commercial air service between Iraq and Kuwait for the first time 

since 1990.256

Railroads

The U.S. government spent about $200 million to provide railroad 

equipment and rehabilitate more than 200 railway stations across 

Iraq.257 In 2009, efforts to improve Iraq’s railway system resulted in the 

first successful rail trip from the western Syrian seaport of Tartous to 

Umm Qasr port via Baghdad.258

The most significant work in this sector entailed two major 

undertakings, the $17.3 million Communications-Based Train Control 

and the $48 million Digital Microwave Radio Communications 

Network, which together significantly upgraded Iraq’s antiquated 

system of dispatching, controlling, and tracking trains. Both projects 

were completed in 2011, providing the country with a state-of-the-art 

train control system allowing dispatchers to manage rail movements 

across the country via data and voice methods.259

Roads and Bridges

Reconstruction managers obligated nearly 40% of all transportation 

funding to improve Iraq’s systems of roads and bridges. The CERP 

and the IRRF supported more than 1,500 projects to repair and 

repave village roads and bridges throughout Iraq. While there 

were several multimillion-dollar projects, the vast majority of the 

individual transportation projects were relatively inexpensive (less 

than $200,000).260

Ports

The United States obligated more than $130 million on projects to 

dredge and upgrade the Port of Umm Qasr, Iraq’s only deepwater port. 

Three of the projects, valued at more than $43 million, removed more 

than one million cubic meters of silt and debris from the port, opening 

Umm Qasr for regular commercial traffic.261

Communications

The United States obligated more than $350 million on projects to 

rehabilitate and upgrade Iraq’s communications networks.262 The three 

largest projects consumed the majority of this funding.

R The Advanced First Responder Network improved public safety 

by increasing the communications capabilities between the Ministry 

of Interior’s first responders and Iraqi citizens. The project provided 

infrastructure and equipment, including more than 30,000 firstresponder radios. By the time the Iraqis took control of the system in 

June 2006, the U.S. government had expended $198 million on it.263

R USAID managed the $47.0 million project to build a 

Consolidated Fiber Network, which improved Iraq’s voice 

transmission network. The project, completed in June 2006, 

employed 1,000 Iraqis. However, a USAID audit found insufficient 

documentation to verify that the project met the end-user and 

employment goals.264

R The $32.4 million al-Mamoon Exchange and Communications 

Center was designed to serve as the telecommunications hub for 

the Ministry of Communications. The seven-story office building 

included state-of-the-art equipment to improve radio transmissions, 

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89

Responding to First Responders: Emergency Action Leads to Success

In March 2004, USACE awarded a contract for 

an Advanced First Responder Network. By the 

time this $214 million project was completed, 

in May 2006, the government had spent 

$192 million in U.S. funds. 

SIGIR audited the AFRN project in July 

2006, identifying significant deficiencies: the 

project failed to produce a reliable nationwide 

first-responder communication system, and 

the network’s command and control system 

did not provide an effective means for 

dispatching and directing first responders. A 

follow-up audit in April 2007 found that the 

contractor had remedied the deficiencies. The 

operational effectiveness of the AFRN system 

had greatly improved, as demonstrated by its 

increasing use by Iraqi citizens.

There was more wrong with the AFRN 

project than just poor performance. On 

September 21, 2012, the Department of 

Justice announced that, as a result of a 

whistleblower suit, the contractor had agreed 

to pay the United States $4.2 million to 

settle False Claims Act allegations alleging 

that, between January and July 2005, it had 

submitted misleading testing certifications 

to the Army in connection with the design, 

construction, and modernization of the AFRN.

SIGIR Audit 07-002

The Advanced First Responder Network improved 

communications capabilities during emergencies, such as the 

October 2010 attack on the Syriac Catholic church in Baghdad. cellular and landline telephone communications, and high-speed (Ankawa photo)

Internet service in Baghdad. Originally awarded in 2006, this project 

encountered contracting problems and sabotage during construction, 

delaying its completion until June 2011 and increasing its originally 

planned cost by more than 60%.265

Of the more than 300 CERP-funded communications projects, 

the five most expensive collectively cost $6.9 million. These projects 

rehabilitated Baghdad International Airport’s communications 

building, constructed radio towers, and provided satellite service for 

mobile phones.266

By November 2004, the number of landline customers served in Iraq 

exceeded the pre-war level of 833,000, and, by the following month, the 

number of mobile phone subscribers surpassed landline customers.267

As of mid-2005, nearly 1 million new landlines had been installed and 

more than 2.4 million new mobile telephone subscriptions initiated.268

By mid-2011, Iraq’s mobile phone users topped 23 million (see Figure 

5.8).269 Despite these improvements, Iraq’s telecommunications sector 

remained one of the least developed in the Middle East.270 2002 2005 2009 2010 2011 2003 2004 2006 2008 2007

0

5

10

15

20

25

Landline Subscribers

Mobile Subscribers

Landline and Mobile Phone Subscribers, 2002–2011

Millions

FIGURE 5.8

The number of mobile phone 

subscribers skyrocketed after 2003.

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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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Security and Rule of Law 

The CPA designated security as a core area of emphasis. It listed the 

following priorities as necessary for progress:271

R developing and training Iraq’s security forces

R developing national security and civilian oversight mechanisms

R ensuring border security

R building the justice system and improving the penal system

R ensuring that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction

As the security situation worsened in 2003, the United States 

allocated an initial $3.24 billion from the IRRF 2 for “security and law 

enforcement” and an additional $1.32 billion for justice and related 

programs.272 Because of contracting delays, the CPA could not access 

these IRRF 2 funds until the late spring of 2004, after Iraq’s meager 

security forces had failed in their first major venture into the field.273

The security challenges associated with post-war rehabilitation 

went far beyond the wave of looting that immediately followed 

Saddam’s fall. They were seeded by long-standing sectarian and ethnic 

differences, the democratic ascent of Iraq’s majority Shia population, 

and a Sunni-fomented insurgency. Sunni-Shia divisions erupted 

into violence after the 2003 invasion, gravely complicating the 

rebuilding of Iraq’s security apparatus and impeding implementation 

of the rule of law.274

Aggravating matters, the Arab-Kurd ethnic divide widened over the 

course of the program, as the three northern Kurdish provinces formed 

a semiautonomous regional government, maintained independent 

security forces, and pursued an expansive agenda regarding claims over 

hydrocarbon resources and territory. See Figure 5.9 for the boundaries 

still in dispute between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan 

Regional Government.275

Over the first half of 2004, Iraq destabilized by the week, with 

security incidents averaging 75 per day.276 When sovereignty 

transferred to the Interim Iraqi Government in June 2004, Iraq was 

far from secure. Moreover, just 6% of its police forces had adequate 

training, and the Army was weak. Rising violence threatened the 

state.277 The U.S. government responded by establishing the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq and reprogramming 

roughly $3 billion in IRRF 2 allocations from the water, electricity, and 

other large infrastructure sectors to increase funding for security, ruleof-law, and related programs.278

In May 2005, the Congress appropriated an initial tranche of 

$5.39 billion to the new Iraq Security Forces Fund for MNSTC-I’s 

use. The ISFF bolstered the training and equipping of Iraq’s Ministry 

of Defense and Interior forces.279 Creating the new fund was crucial 

because, from mid-2004 through mid-2005, lethal security incidents 

became commonplace, averaging more than 90 per day.280 They 

continued to rise through 2006, peaking in 2007 at 185 per day (see 

Figure 5.9). The task of establishing Iraqi forces capable of providing 

internal security and protecting the country faced extraordinary 

challenges in 2006 and early 2007, when Iraq slipped into a state of 

virtual civil war (see Figure 5.9). 

In response, U.S. investment in the sector massively increased, 

helping security program managers develop an ISF that could 
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

91

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350 Iraqi Security Forces

U.S. Military

Contractors

Coalition Military (Non-U.S.)

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

Iraqi Civilian Fatalities

Security Incidents

Uprisings in Baghdad, 

Falluja, and Najaf

Iraqi Elections 

Constitutional 

Referendum

Samarra Mosque 

Bombing 

Parliamentary 

Elections

Provincial 

Elections 

National 

Elections

Monthly Security Force and Contractor Fatalities

Monthly Security Incidents and Civilian Fatalities

U.S. Surge (>150,000 Troops)

Anbar Awakening Council Formed 

President Bush 

Announces 

U.S. Surge 

Muqtada al-Sadr Declares Cease-fire

Civil Conflict

2/22/2006−5/2/2007

Transfer of Provincial Iraqi Control

7/2006−12/2009

Insurgency

1/1/2004−2/21/2006

> 50 incidents 20–50 incidents 10–20 incidents 2–10 incidents 0–2 incidents Sunni Shia

PIC transfer 

before 2007

PIC transfer 

2007−2008

PIC transfer 

2008−2009

Did not

PIC

Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province

Security Incidents, Fatalities, and Transfer of Security Control in Iraq, 1/2004–12/2010

FIGURE 5.9

Disputed Internal

Boundaries and 

the Green Line

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

The Samarra Mosque bombing in February 2006 marked the 

start of the bloodiest period of the reconstruction program, 

which eventually precipitated the “surge” in 2007.
92

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2009 2011 2012

Security and Rule of Law: Expenditures, by Year, 2004–2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.10

The United States 

invested heavily in ISF 

development during 

2005–2008 to enable Iraq 

to assume security control 

in 2009.

support the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in 2007 (see Figure 5.10). 

The “surge” of more than 25,000 U.S. troops into the country 

complemented increases in the pace of ISF training, a renewed tactical 

rebuilding emphasis, and the creation of the Sons of Iraq program. 

Funded with Commander’s Emergency Response Program money, 

the SOI effort paid for 100,000 mostly Sunni men to work with the 

Coalition rather than fight it. While investments in the SOI and in 

Iraq’s military and police forces paid off, support for anticorruption and 

other rule-of-law efforts—so crucial to the long-term stabilization of 

Iraq—proved less robust and thus less successful.281

By early 2008, levels of violence had significantly diminished.282 The 

improved security stemmed from several factors, including the surge in 

troops, the deployment of competent ISF personnel, the success of the 

SOI program,283 and an August 2007 cease-fire declared by Muqtada 

al-Sadr, who controlled the violent Mahdi Army, a Shia militia.284

These improvements permitted U.S. military authorities to resume the 

transfer of regional security responsibilities to Iraqi control.285

Despite substantial surge-driven salutary developments in the 

security sector, Iraq was still a dangerous place in early 2009.286 Thus, 

the ISF continued to receive substantial training and equipping from 

the United States over the next four years. This investment paid off. 

By 2012, the number of daily security incidents amounted to a tiny 

fraction of 2007 levels. But targeted attacks on security personnel, 

assassinations of government and tribal leaders, and occasional masscasualty bombings continued to inflict terror.287

The ethnic divide between Kurdish and Arab populations worsened 

in 2011 and 2012 as the KRG pressed claims to exploit hydrocarbon 

resources in disputed areas. In Kirkuk, the Kurds looked ready to fight 

in the spring of 2011, deploying Peshmerga militia to advance its 

claims. Baghdad pushed back, sending armed troops to the city; but, 

with U.S. intervention, conflict was averted.288

Establishing a secure and safe environment in Iraq and enforcing 

the rule of law proved to be daunting, lengthy, and expensive tasks, 

consuming about half of the funds the United States poured into the 

reconstruction effort. From 2003 to 2012, the United States obligated 

$27.30 billion and expended $26.16 billion in this reconstruction 

area. Almost 72% of all obligations came from the ISFF (see 

Figure 5.11).289

The United States obligated almost 80% of security and rule-of-law 

funding by January 2009 (see Figure 5.12). Nearly 70% of these funds 

had been expended by that time, averaging $3.48 billion per year. The 

money chiefly went to rebuild security infrastructure, train and equip 

the ISF, and field them in the counterinsurgency fight. After 2008, U.S. 

expenditures fell to an average of $2.20 billion per year, with spending 

focused on large equipment purchases, specialized training programs, 

,UDTL6HFXULW\)RUFHVSDVVLQUHYLHZDWDSDUDGHLQ-DQXDU\*2,SKRWR

FIGURE 5.11

INCLE

$1.16

IRRF

$5.67

ISFF

$19.57

ESF

$0.23

CERP

$0.68

Security and Rule of Law: 

Cumulative Obligations, 

by Fund, as of 9/30/2012

$ Billions
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

93

2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

Expended

Obligated

Security and Rule of Law: Cumulative Obligations and Expenditures, 

FY 2004–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.12

Almost 80% of 

all funding for 

security and 

rule-of-law 

programs was 

obligated prior to 

January 2009.

MOD

MOI

Related Activities

Corrections

Justice

Anticorruption

Infrastructure Security

$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14 $16

ISFF IRRF INCLE CERP ESF

Security and Rule of Law: Expenditures, by Sector, 

FY 2004–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.13

Most of the money was 

spent to train, equip, and 

support the ISF.

and sustainment initiatives designed to support the maturing ISF.290

Almost 93% of all U.S. outlays for security and rule-of-law programs 

went to rebuilding the Iraq’s military and police forces, border guards, 

and facilities protections units. The remaining $1.83 billion went to 

justice and corrections programs to rebuild Iraq’s courts and prisons 

and to provide infrastructure security (see Figure 5.13).291

Rebuilding the ISF

As of September 2012, the United States had obligated $25.26 billion 

and expended $24.33 billion on training, equipping, and sustaining the 

ISF and providing infrastructure for the MOD and MOI. More than 

57% of those expenditures went to MOD activities, while the MOI 

received 38%. Expenditures on “related activities,” benefiting both the 

MOD and MOI, accounted for just over 4%. More than one-third 

of the expenditures funded equipment and transportation for the ISF, 

while 24% was spent on infrastructure, 23% on training, and 13% on 

sustainment activities (see Figure 5.14).292

After disbanding the Iraqi Army in 2003, the CPA sought 

to establish modest police forces using Iraqi funding from the 

Development Fund for Iraq and limited U.S. funding from IRRF 1.293

It authorized new programs like the CERP and Commander’s 

Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program to help U.S. 

commanders respond to the urgent humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction requirements of local populations.294

The Iraqi military and police forces expanded rapidly from 2004 

to 2006, adapting to the counterinsurgency mission. Their training 

accounted for more than 40% of U.S.-funded security expenditures 

during this period. Importantly, these programs supported ISF 

counterinsurgency training, with graduates moving out to field 

operations under the control of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq.295

Parts of the growing force structure constituted a conflation of 

Training

Infrastructure

Equipment

Related Activities

Sustainment MOD MOI

Both Ministries

$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10

Expenditures To Rebuild the ISF, by Subactivity, FY 2004–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.14

More than one-third 

of ISF expenditures 

funded equipment and 

transportation,with most of 

it supporting the MOD.
94

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

2005 2006 2007 2008

MOI trained

Iraqi Security Forces, 2005–2008

MOD trained

FIGURE 5.15

To complement 

the U.S. surge, a 

recruiting push 

resulted in a 71% 

increase in total 

ISF personnel 

from the 

beginning of 2007 

through 2008.

previously autonomous militias, many of them sectarian-based and 

sometimes attendant to an immediate commander’s interests rather 

than the security institution itself.296 These strains became most 

prevalent within the MOI. Tribal and community leaders frequently 

vetted police recruits, a process rife with politicization and patronage.297

On the other hand, the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq effectively oversaw the recruiting of trainees for the 

Iraqi Army, creating a diverse force not tied to a particular area, sect, 

ethnicity, or tribal group.298

Equipment became a priority from mid-2006 through the end of 

2007 as the tempo of counterinsurgency operations increased. The 

United States spent $2.03 billion on equipment during this span, 

amounting to about one-fourth of the equipment purchases made 

throughout the entire program. But meeting the ISF’s requirements 

became problematic when loose accountability undercut equipment 

provision.299 Moreover, the GOI commonly reported that it did not 

have enough of the necessary equipment to manage Iraq’s challenging 

security environment.300

As the “surge” ramped up in 2007, the ISF began to meet broad 

Coalition targets on training and equipping,301 with many IA units 

becoming capable of operating independently and controlling 

their own areas of responsibility.302 ISF force strength grew 

through aggressive recruiting, including an initiative by the 

Prime Minister to overfill counterinsurgency units and increase 

the number of IA battalions.303

The ISF reportedly had a trained and equipped strength of 

more than 560,000 in December 2008, as transition of security 

authority to the GOI approached (see Figure 5.15). The Defense 

Department reported that 175 (of 179) MOD battalions were 

“conducting operations,” as were 57 of 64 National Police units 

assessed.304 But all were still dependent on the Coalition for 

intelligence, logistics, and sustainment.305

The security sector program managers emphasized infrastructure 

spending as well, which totaled almost $5.9 billion. Most of the 

spending ($4.2 billion) occurred during 2004–2008, when bases, forts, 

police stations, and training facilities were built or rehabilitated to 

support the expanding ISF. Building up the security infrastructure 

became haphazard during violent periods, which inevitably slowed 

completion rates.306

After 2009, the U.S. government focused expenditures on equipping, 

training, and sustaining the MOD as it transitioned from a force with 

an internally focused mission to one capable of providing defense 

against external threats.307 The broad range of equipment purchases in 

2009–2010, totaling $2.29 billion, focused on acquiring artillery, armor, 

and heavy wheeled equipment to support the this evolution. Similarly, 

the $1.83 billion expended during this period on training reflected an 

increased operational tempo for police forces under the MOI’s aegis.308

By late 2011, Iraq reported that its combined security strength 

amounted to more than 930,000 trained security forces, 70% of which 

belonged to the MOI (see Table 5.6). 

MOD Support

As of September 2012, the U.S. government expended approximately 

$13.90 billion to equip and train personnel, construct critical 

infrastructure, and provide sustainment and logistics support for Iraq’s 

Ministry of Defense.309

MOD Equipment and Transportation

Early in the program, equipment and transportation purchases 

embraced a wide range of items necessary to meet ISF force-
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

95

TABLE 5.6

Iraqi Security Forces, as of 12/31/2011

Service Assigned Personnel

Ministry of Defense Iraqi Army 200,000

Training and Support 68,000

Air Force 5,053

Navy 3,650

Army Air Corps 2,400

Total MOD 279,103

Ministry of Interior Iraqi Police 325,000

Training and Support 89,800

Facilities Protection Service 95,000

Department of Border 

Enforcement

60,000

Iraqi Federal Police 45,000

Oil Police 35,000

Total MOI 649,800

Counter-Terrorism Force 4,200

Total 933,103

In 2006, the Commander of the Multi-National 

Force-Iraq cited logistics and sustainment as 

the keys to the Iraqi Security Forces assuming 

the lead in provincial security. A 2006 SIGIR 

review of ISF preparations to assume logistics 

operations found significant challenges, 

including incomplete planning for transitioning 

from U.S. to GOI management and operations.

With weak ministerial capacity at both 

the MOD and MOI, the United States had to 

develop the ministries’ logistics and sustainment capabilities. This effort—part of the 

formidable challenge of changing Iraq’s “use 

it till it breaks” culture—entailed awarding an 

enormous Global Maintenance and Supply 

Services contract. 

In examining the contract’s ISFF task orders 

that supported the Iraqi Army, SIGIR found 

that three of them, totaling $628.2 million, 

had been modified 161 times, which added 

$420 million to the contract’s cost. SIGIR also 

found that:

R Documentation did not support contractor 

costs. 

R Financial data on purchases did not 

reconcile. 

R The MOD refused to accept responsibility 

for maintenance and supply operations, 

causing Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq to extend the period of 

contractor performance at U.S. expense.

Although the task orders provided 

significant logistics support to the Iraqi Army, 

the effort fell well short of achieving the goal 

of training Iraqi Army personnel to perform 

maintenance functions and operate a supply 

system. “Use it till it breaks” lives on.

The Depot Distribution Central Operation storage facilities at Camp Taji was completed in November 2010. (USACE photo)

generation requirements.310 These included outfitting infantry, 

intelligence, artillery, armored, and bomb-disposal units. After 2009, 

half of all MOD-directed expenditures purchased equipment.311

The GOI also procured equipment through the FMS program 

and made direct purchases outside of the program. The Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency administered these procurements—

predominantly for the Ministry of Defense—which included the 

purchase of heavy mechanized equipment and artillery, training 

and cargo aircraft, and marine assets (such as patrol boats), together 

with related training and sustainment contracts. One of the most 

important cases delivered 140 M1A1 tanks by August 2012 at a cost 

of $810 million. Two others bought 36 F-16 fighter aircraft, with 

base development and pilot and maintenance personnel training well 

underway in 2012.312

In an unusual innovation, the FMS program in Iraq used U.S. 

funds (from the Iraq Security Forces Fund) for procurements, calling 

them “pseudo-FMS” cases. From 2005 through 2012, these pseudoFMS cases purchased aircraft, naval vessels, police vehicles, tanks, and 

armored personnel carriers. Peak expenditures, amounting to almost 

$800 million, occurred in the fourth quarter of FY 2009, purchasing 

helicopters, vehicles, weapons, and spare parts through these cases.313

Through September 2012, the FMS program in Iraq provided 496 

separate cases valued at $12.79 billion—237 FMS cases funded by the 

GOI for about $9.44 billion and 259 pseudo-FMS cases funded by the 

United States through the ISFF for about $3.35 billion. An additional 

74 cases, with an estimated value of $10.23 billion and all funded by 

the GOI, were in various stages of request and approval at the end of 

FY 2012 (see Figure 5.16).314 

SIGIR Audits 06-032 and 09-014

Logistics and Sustainment: Breaking “Use It Till It Breaks”
96

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Current and Prospective FMS Cases, as of 9/30/2012

$ Billions

GOI Has Requested; 

U.S. Response in Process

47 cases

GOI Developing a Request

27 cases

Implemented or 

Received Final U.S. Approval

237 cases

“Psuedo-FMS” 

(ISFF-funded ) cases

$0 259 cases

$5

$10

$15

$20

$9.44

$3.35

$6.99

$3.24

Total: $23.02

FIGURE 5.16

At least 74 GOI-funded 

cases, valued at more 

than $10.2 billion, awaited 

processing or approval at 

the end of 2012.

MOD Infrastructure

The United States initially met the infrastructure needs of the 

MOD through large outlays of the IRRF, with more than $1 billion 

expended to renovate or construct military bases. ISFF expenditures on 

infrastructure through the end of FY 2008 amounted to an additional 

$2.2 billion. But spending fell sharply thereafter when the Congress 

prohibited the use of ISFF money for new infrastructure projects. 

As of September 2012, the United States had expended a combined 

total of nearly $4.05 billion to renovate, expand, and construct MOD 

bases.315 See Table 5.7 for selected projects.

MOD Training

Military program managers spent a total of $1.32 billion to train 

MOD forces, with more than $850 million of that amount expended 

by the end of 2008. The build-up of personnel boosted MOD’s 

cumulative force to more than 200,000.316 But, as with the police, the 

number of troops reporting for duty fell continually fell below desired 

levels, with AWOL rates exceeding 3% per month.317

As MOD forces rapidly expanded, senior non-commissioned 

officer and commissioned officer positions became difficult to fill, 

with vacancy rates of 30% or more persisting into 2008.318 By the end 

of that year, thanks to a new program to recruit and train officers and 

NCOs from the Saddam era, almost 100,000 more senior personnel 

(85% of whom were NCOs) were brought into the Iraqi Army.319 As 

the January 2009 transfer of security authority approached, the United 

States embedded 183 Military Transition Teams at all levels of the 

Iraqi military to assist units in achieving full capability.320

After 2009, ISF training comprised a stable, albeit smaller, portion of 

overall U.S. expenditures. Blanket training orders funded by the ISFF 

(administered as pseudo-FMS cases) for Iraq’s Army, Navy, and Air 

Force complemented a wide range of GOI-funded training activities 

procured through the FMS program.321 86),LQVWUXFWRUVWUDLQ,UDTL$UP\VROGLHUVWRPDQHXYHU0$WDQNVSXUFKDVHGE\WKH

0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQVHWKURXJKWKH86DGPLQLVWHUHG)06SURJUDP86$UP\SKRWR

7KHUHQRYDWHG,UDTL0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQVHKHDGTXDUWHUVLQ%DJKGDG
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

97

TABLE 5.7

Major U.S.-funded Security Construction Projects

$ Millions

Completion Date

Project Name Province Contractor Name Contract Award Date Original Actual Fund U.S. Cost

Taji National Maintenance Depot Project Baghdad AECOM Government Services 12/31/2007 12/31/2009 12/31/2009 ISFF 220.0

Baghdad Police Academy Baghdad Parsons Delaware, Inc., Laguna Construction, Others 5/6/2004 1/1/2005 Various IRRF 2, ISFF 137.6

Tallil Military Base Thi-Qar Weston Solutions, Inc. 4/14/2004 3/31/2005 1/29/2006 ISFF 119.5

Camp India Facilities at Falluja Anbar Environmental Chemical Corporation 11/7/2004 5/1/2005 3/31/2008 IRRF 2 83.4

Military Base at Kirkuk Tameem Environmental Chemical Corporation 4/15/2004 1/15/2005 3/15/2006 IRRF 2 73.6

Al-Rasheed Brigade Base Baghdad Tetra Tech Inc 12/17/2004 11/21/2005 7/2006 IRRF 2 64.0

Renovate Base at Habbaniyah Anbar Environmental Chemical Corporation 7/23/2005 8/1/2005 4/30/2007 IRRF 2 63.5

Renovate An Numaniyah Military Base, Phase 1B Wassit Environmental Chemical Corporation 4/22/2004 1/15/2005 6/30/2005 ISFF 57.4

Federal Police Sustainment Brigade Baghdad Areebel Engineering & Logistics 9/27/2008 10/19/2010 Ongoing ISFF 47.7

Renovate Ministry of Defense Headquarters Baghdad Laguna Construction Co. 3/26/2004 4/30/2005 5/31/2005 IRRF 2 31.5

MOD Sustainment

From 2005 through 2008, the United States expended nearly 

$1.4 billion to sustain the MOD. These expenses included operations 

and maintenance services, contractor-delivered logistics support, and 

life support. The MOD did not have a logistics and sustainment 

capability when it assumed full security authority in 2009, and an 

additonal $1.2 billion in U.S. expenditures, spent from 2009 to 

2012, closed that gap. To ameliorate its logistical problems, the GOI 

procured sustainment contracts from U.S. providers.322

MOD Weaknesses

While significantly more advanced than the MOI at the time of 

the U.S. troop departure, Iraq’s MOD lacked critical capabilities 

in logistics, intelligence, and operational sustainment. Weaknesses 

in counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities at the tactical, 

operational, and cross-ministry levels impeded collaboration and 

information sharing throughout the national security framework.323

At the end of 2012, Iraq had no fixed-wing combat-air capability to 

defend its airspace and only a small fleet of littoral patrol vessels to 

guard its coastline and the vital infrastructure that supports oil exports. 

MOI Support

The United States expended $9.35 billion to train, staff, and equip 

Iraq’s police forces.324 The CPA and then State, through its Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, initially 

managed support for the MOI. 

With the stand-up of MNSTC-I in late 2004, Defense Department ,UDTLVROGLHUVFRQGXFWRSHUDWLRQVDVSDUWRIDOLYHÀUHH[HUFLVHXQGHU86),

VXSHUYLVLRQLQQRUWKHUQ,UDTRQ)HEUXDU\86),SKRWR
98

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Iraq Special Operations Force: Special Results but Spurious Control 

As the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, 

the Secretary of Defense directed the formation of a new Iraqi counterterrorism capability, the Iraq Special Operations Force. Army 

Rangers and Navy SEALS took on the training 

mission, funded in part with $237 million in 

U.S. rebuilding money. 

In a review of the program, SIGIR auditors 

determined that the ISOF could conduct independent operations and maintain equipment 

and facilities. The program succeeded; the ISOF 

played important roles during the “Surge,” 

providing a force of more than 4,100 expertly 

capable soldiers deployed throughout Iraq. 

One flaw uncovered in SIGIR’s review: USF-I 

did not account separately for funds used 

to equip and provide infrastructure for ISOF 

training, so the total costs of the program 

remained unknown. The ultimate success of 

the ISOF is in the hands of the GOI, with the 

most troubling development being the move 

of ISOF control from the MOD to the Office of 

the Prime Minister.

SIGIR Audit 11-004

Iraqi Special Forces commandos in Basrah prepare an 

assault after being dropped off by Iraqi Army helicopters 

during a joint military exercise in April 2011. (USF-I photo)

military organizations in Iraq assumed responsibility for the program 

from State, assigning INL to oversee contracts for the policeadvisor portion the program. When U.S. troops withdrew in 2011, 

responsibility for the program transitioned back to INL, which runs 

the continuing effort through the Police Development Program.325

MOI Equipment, Infrastructure, and Sustainment

The United States obligated $2.03 billion for MOI equipment. By 

the time Iraq assumed responsibility for security in 2009, the United 

States had expended most of the sector’s funding. About $1.0 billion 

purchased uniforms and personal body armor, and $500 million 

bought M117 Armored Security Vehicles and support.326

The MOI received obligations of $1.43 billion in infrastructure 

support, which supported the construction of training centers, police 

stations, and border forts, some of which SIGIR inspected and 

reported on. Selected projects are included in Table 5.7. Obligations 

to cover life support and other sustainment costs for the MOI totaled 

$660 million.327

MOI Training

The United States obligated $5.61 billion and expended $5.44 billion 

on MOI training.328 Unlike the MOD, which completely rebuilt its 

force structure, the MOI’s force-base came from the prior regime. But 

the situation was chaotic in the summer of 2003. Only small numbers 

of police reported regularly for duty, and under-funded training plans, 

aggravated by the CPA’s use of threats to try to get police to return 

to duty, produced few results.329 Some security personnel, like the 

Facilities Protection Service, appeared to be little more than a mask for 

various sectarian and militia elements within ministries.330

In May 2004, NSPD 36 assigned the mission of organizing, 

training, and equipping Iraq’s security forces (including the police) to 

the U.S. Central Command, which established MNSTC-I to oversee 

the mission. INL awarded a large multiyear police-training contract 

in early 2004 to provide police-training advisors for the U.S. program. 

Although other U.S. agencies and other nations provided additional 

advisory support, the contract engaged the largest contingent of 

trainers. State managed the contract for the advisors, providing 

logistical support, even after Defense took over MOI training in mid2004. SIGIR auditors determined that INL lacked sufficient personnel 

to adequately oversee the contract, concluding that $2.5 billion was 

vulnerable to waste and fraud.331

MNSTC-I assumed police-training duties in June 2004. The 

already-operational Civilian Police Assistance Training Team became 

a subordinate command to MNSTC-I. Additional U.S. military 

units provided police training at the local level. The Iraq Training and 

Advisory Mission subsumed MNSTC-I and its subordinate units.332

In 2006, Iraqi instructors assumed responsibility for providing 

most of the academic training for the MOI. MNSTC-I continued 

to advise and assist at the police training centers, with police training 

teams supporting police stations. The GOI assumed responsibility for 

all academic training and most of the advanced training courses by 

December 2008, with U.S. military and police advisors continuing to 

provide advice and quality control.333

The number of recruits usually exceeded the capacity of the policetraining program, which put a constant strain on the training cycle. 

The “recruit-to-train” mode prioritized basic training over training 

for senior personnel in a rush to get police into the field during the 
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

99

6,*,5REVHUYHGDULRWUHVSRQVHH[HUFLVHGXULQJDYLVLWWRDQ,UDTLSROLFHWUDLQLQJ

FHQWHULQ$SULO

insurgency.334 Expansion of the Baghdad Police College, which 

received $96.5 million in IRRF and ISFF funds, increased police 

training rates in early 2008, reducing bottlenecks.335

Police forces under the MOI’s aegis in 2008 totaled approximately 

400,000.336 Facilities Protection Service personnel were formally 

integrated into the MOI over time, but they served directly under the 

ministries whose facilities they were assigned to protect. The core police 

forces—the Iraqi Police, the National Police, and the Department of 

Border Enforcement—usually incorporated militias that had agreed to be 

“integrated.”337 “Ghost employees” (those who received paychecks but did 

not work) and attrition were significant problems among their ranks.338

Many police elements within the MOI suffered from corruption 

and sectarianism, but these afflictions particularly affected the 

National Police. The NP received priority training and equipping from 

MNSTC-I, but its force structure had been pieced together from 

Saddam-era commando units and Shia militias.339 Accused of frequent 

human-rights abuses,340 the NP underwent extensive “re-bluing” 

(retraining and sifting out) during 2006–2008.341

In 2010, when the State Department began planning to take 

over police training, the actual capabilities of the Iraqi police were 

still unknown. A SIGIR review of the program in October 2010 

determined that no formal assessments of capabilities had ever 

been made, as was required. State’s original plans for the Police 

Development Program envisioned an ambitious $2.09 billion effort.342

In response to SIGIR audits, the findings of an INL review, and the 

desires of the MOI, State significantly reduced the scope of the PDP, 

implementing a new program (called PDP 2) in 2012. PDP 2 focuses 

on, among other things, antiterrorism and organized crime, forensic 

evidence analysis, information technology, and border security.343

MOI Weaknesses

In September 2012, some MOI police forces failed to meet 

minimum operational standards. Only the Federal Police and the 

Oil Police were assessed as operationally capable. The Iraqi Police, 

Department of Border Enforcement, and Port of Entry services 

demonstrated improving technical skills, but MOI security forces 

generally suffered from funding gaps, weak command and control, 

and a poor logistics system.344

Audits Save Dollars: Downsizing the Police Development Program

In 2009, U.S. officials began planning the 

transfer of responsibilities for managing 

the support to Iraq’s police forces from the 

Department of Defense to the Department of 

State. As originally conceived, State’s Police 

Development Program was to be a five-year, 

multibillion-dollar effort—the largest single 

State Department program worldwide—involving 350 police advisors at three hub locations 

across Iraq. In an October 2010 audit report, 

SIGIR expressed concerns about a variety of 

planning shortfalls, including the failure to 

execute a comprehensive assessment of the 

police forces’ capabilities. 

A follow-up audit found that only 12% of 

program funds would be used to pay for advising, mentoring, and developing Iraqi police, 

with the other 88% funding security and life 

support. Moreover, the Senior Deputy Minister 

of Interior told SIGIR that he had serious doubts 

about the efficacy of the PDP. He said that Iraq 

did not need it as it was then conceived.

In 2012, State downsized the program to 35 

police advisors, one-tenth the original number. 

This substantially reduced program costs, but 

not before at least $206 million was spent on 

facilities that would never be used for their 

intended purpose.

SIGIR Audits 11-003, 12-006, and 12-020

INL spent more than $100 million renovating facilities at 

former Forward Operating Base Shield, which was to be 

the main PDP basing area, before terminating construction, 

removing all advisors from the site, and turning the 

property over to the GOI.
100

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

6,*,5FRQGXFWHGSURMHFWVXUYH\VRIERUGHUIRUWVORFDWHGDORQJWKH,UDT,UDQERUGHU

Infrastructure Security

Obligations for infrastructure security activities totaled almost 

$670 million, with 55% ($370 million) supporting the CERP-funded 

Sons of Iraq program.345 Throughout the SOI effort, which began in 

June 2007, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq awarded contracts to sheiks 

and other local leaders to provide security at checkpoints, buildings, 

neighborhoods, and other key locations. The program aimed to convert 

former insurgents and passive supporters into participants in the U.S. 

counterinsurgency effort, thereby reducing overall levels of violence.346

The ESF-funded Infrastructure Security Protection program 

addressed facilities protection. Three U.S. entities coordinated the 

effort—the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, and Energy Fusion Cell. Initiated in 2006, the program 

sought to reduce the incidents of insurgent damage to the oil 

pipeline system, electrical distribution system, and other important 

infrastructure throughout Iraq.347

Rule-of-law Programs

As of September 2012, the United States had obligated at least 

$1.37 billion and expended $1.20 billion for rule-of-law programs in 

Iraq. The majority of rule-of law funding (57%) was spent on justice 

programs, predominantly to expand the capacity of Iraq’s courts. 

Training for the Iraqi Corrections Service and funding for prison 

construction accounted for 38% of spending, while 5% was expended 

on anticorruption programs. The IRRF provided support for more 

than 57% of all rule-of-law activities early in the reconstruction 

program (see Figure 5.17).348

Pre-war planning efforts placed considerable emphasis on 

establishing the rule of law in Iraq. In 2002, working groups specifically 

addressed the needs of rule-of-law institutions and the fight against 

institutionalized corruption that infected the government.349

As the CPA stood up, it incorporated rule-of-law and anticorruption 

edicts into the process for Iraq’s growth as an open and democratic 

society.350 But these goals never received the funding to realize the 

necessary organizational capacity.351 Subsequent U.S. programs 

assigned individual agencies with responsibilities for various aspects 

Sons of Iraq: Work, Don’t Fight

Insurgent attacks in 2006 spiked, particularly 

in western Iraq. While Sunni tribes supported 

the growth of al-Qaeda in Iraq—the chief 

catalyst of renewed violence—attacks began 

to hit local citizens, particularly in Anbar 

province. This caused some Sunni leaders to 

seek cooperation with Coalition forces in what 

came to be called the “Anbar Awakening.” 

DoD credited these leaders with helping to 

improve security in tribal areas.

To advance the Awakening, Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq began to award CERP contracts 

in June 2007 chiefly to employ Sunnis. The 

leaders agreed to keep their people off the 

battlefield in exchange for CERP-funded jobs 

providing security for buildings, checkpoints, 

and neighborhoods.

This effort, known as the “Sons of Iraq” 

program, entailed approximately 780 separate 

agreements calling for the stationing of almost 

100,000 in 9 provinces across Iraq. The sheer 

number of agreements and personnel involved 

made this the largest CERP program in Iraq. 

SIGIR noted in its review of the SOI program 

that the contracting process, which spent 

$370 million in CERP funds, was far from 

transparent. Financial controls were weak, 

program managers could not tell whether SOI 

members received their U.S.-funded salaries, 

and Defense was unable to provide any 

evaluations of the program’s outcomes.

SIGIR Audit 11-010

Anbar

4,678

Muthanna

Qadissiya

1,858

Najaf

Basrah

Erbil

Tameem Sulaymaniyah

8,811

Dahuk

Thi-Qar

Diyala

8,688

Kerbala

Missan

Ninewa

1,255

Salah Al-Din

10,101

Wassit

1,139 Babylon

7,455

Baghdad

51,135

1–5,000

5,000–10,000

>10,000
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

101

of the rule-of-law programs, but none had charge of coordinating the 

disparate efforts.352

Beginning in 2003, judges became targets of frequent assassination 

attempts, with 49 judges murdered by 2012.353 Iraq continues to 

struggle to protect its judges from terrorist activity, and their security 

personnel still do not carry firearms because the MOI has yet to grant 

them weapon permits. The court system contends with human rights 

issues, including reported acts of torture and retaliatory prosecutions by 

police and military authorities. Judges have expressed frustration over a 

lack of legal tools available to confront abuses by security forces.354

Justice Programs

Immediately after the fall of Saddam, legal and law-enforcement 

experts from the United States and other Coalition countries assessed 

the status of the Iraqi judicial system, finding it in a state of chaos.355

Iraq’s court system received the largest portion of rule-of-law funding, 

with nearly $771.8 million obligated as of September 2012, for 

construction and non-construction projects. Of the $681.1 million 

expended, the IRRF funded more than half.356

IRRF expenditures supported the construction and upgrade of 

court facilities, as well as the building of witness protection sites across 

the country. Most rule-of-law money obligated from 2003 to 2005 

funded infrastructure projects under a design-build contract awarded 

to Parsons Delaware; but the United States terminated that contract 

after court-related projects suffered significant deficiencies and cost 

overruns. The largest construction project was the $21.5 million 

Anbar Judicial Complex completed in June 2009. The United States 

contributed $12.8 million from the IRRF to the project, which a 

SIGIR inspection found to be successful.357 Table 5.8 includes major 

U.S.-funded judicial facilities. 

Soft reconstruction projects included training by the U.S. Marshals 

Service, witness protection, court-staff training, and computer 

instruction, as well as instruction in technical investigative methods 

and the development of standard operating procedures for security 

search techniques. The IRRF funded several capacity-development 

programs through the Justice Integration Project, Major Crimes Task 

Force, and the Public International Law and Policy Group. Important 

equipment purchases included armored cars and vehicles for judges 

and witnesses, security equipment, and furniture for courthouses and 

judicial complexes.358

INCLE and ESF funds supported these rule-of-law programs:359 

R Judicial outreach—From 2003 to 2012, INL funded DoJ’s Office 

of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training 

with about $24 million to deploy criminal prosecutors to Iraq as 

Resident Legal Advisors to assist and mentor officials in the Higher 

Judicial Council and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.

R Judicial development—INL provided about $81 million for 

training on forensic evidence and training for judicial investigators, 

the Regime Crimes Liaison Office, improved access to justice and 

treatment of juveniles in detention, review of the Iraqi Criminal 

Penal Code, and efforts to enhance judicial independence.

R Court administration—INL spent about $33 million to increase 

the effectiveness of the administration of the Iraqi court system. 

R Judicial security—INL provided $60 million for judicial 

security, including mentorship and technical support by the U.S. 

Marshals Service. 

FIGURE 5.17

Justice

$681.1

Anticorruption

$57.3

Corrections

$461.6

IRRF

$703.1

INCLE

$368.2

ESF

$28.5

CERP

$100.2

Expenditures for 

Rule-of-law Activities 

from Major Funds, 

as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions

By Fund

By Sector

7KH86FRQVWUXFWHG6KDWWDO$UDE&RXUWKRXVHLQ%DVUDKSURYLQFHZDV

FRPSOHWHGLQ-XQH23$SKRWR
102

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

TABLE 5.8

Major U.S.-funded Judicial and Corrections Construction Projects

$ Millions

Completion Date

Project Name Province Contractor Name Contract Award Date Original Actual Fund U.S. Cost

Nassiriya Prison Thi-Qar Parsons Delaware, Inc., al-Bare'a Engineering, 

al-Basheer Company 5/11/2004 11/2/2005 3/29/2010 IRRF 2, INCLE 68.1

Khan Bani Sa’ad Prison Diyala Parsons Delaware, Inc., al-Bare'a Engineering Co 5/11/2004 3/31/2006 5/29/2007 IRRF 2 38.3

Chamchamal Correctional Facility Sulaymaniyah Chroo Group, Ltd. 11/1/2007 1/23/2009 3/18/2009 ESF 28.7

Iraqi Special Tribunal Court Baghdad Parsons Delaware, Inc. 8/19/2004 4/27/2005 4/15/2005 IRRF 2 19.3 

Fort Suse Prison Sulaymaniyah Daban Company 9/10/2007 8/18/2009 3/8/2010 INCLE 13.4

Anbar Rule of Law Complex Anbar ALMCO Limited 4/25/2008 5/15/2009 6/15/2009 IRRF 2 12.8

Rusafa Courthouse & 

Witness Security Baghdad Tama Company 8/20/2006 4/28/2008 8/28/2008 IRRF 2 12.5 

New Basrah Courthouse Basrah Al-Dayer United Co. 6/9/2006 3/1/2008 9/25/2008 IRRF 2 11.0 

Central Court, Karkh Baghdad Al-Juthoor Contracting Co. 4/27/2005 8/14/2006 8/12/2007 IRRF 2 10.4 

Judicial Education & 

Development Institute Baghdad Al-Barih General Contracting 9/13/2008 6/5/2009 9/25/2010 INCLE 10.0

Corrections

USACE spent at least $165 million to build prisons. The first two major 

projects—construction of the Khan Bani Sa’ad and Nassiriya correctional 

facilities—were awarded to Parsons Delaware in May 2004. USACE 

eventually terminated both for default after a combined expenditure of 

$62 million. Parsons failed to make sufficient progress on the projects, to 

adhere to the construction schedule, and to control costs.360

Another contractor completed the Nassiriya prison in 2010, spending an 

additional $37 million. But the Khan Bani Sa’ad facility remains unfinished, 

even after the expenditure of an additional $7.2 million, resulting in a 

waste of almost $40 million. The third-most expensive prison-construction 

project—the $28.7 million Chamchamal Correctional Facility—finished 

on schedule in 2009 (but without a permanent power source).361

Table 5.8 includes major U.S.-funded prison construction projects. 

According to the International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program, U.S. projects added more than 6,000 beds to the 

Iraqi prison system.362

Anticorruption Drumbeat, but Downbeat Results

Corruption daunted Iraq in the Saddam era, 

and it continued to dog the country after 

his fall. A 2006 SIGIR audit urged reforms 

to programs to help Iraq fight its corruption 

problem, warning that other reconstruction 

priorities had diluted efforts to reduce GOI 

graft. But one year later, SIGIR found corruption getting worse. The Embassy eventually 

recognized the need to design and implement 

a comprehensive, integrated anticorruption 

strategy and began to advance such in 2008. 

Two subsequent SIGIR reports found 

encouraging signs of progress, including 

the appointment of a senior official as the 

Coordinator for Anticorruption Initiatives 

at the Embassy. However, the effort lacked 

metrics and baseline data for assessing the 

program’s impact on reducing corruption. 

Further, State failed to move aggressively to 

secure the necessary funding to support a 

large and effective anticorruption program.

SIGIR Audits 06-021, 07-007, 08-008, 08-016, and 08-023

GOI officials attend a COI seminar on transparency and 

accountability in May 2012. (GOI photo)
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

103

Rampant overcrowding burdened the Iraqi prison system. U.S. 

officials cited the inability of the GOI to process detainees as the 

primary reason; it often took months to check whether a detainee 

had an outstanding warrant. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice, which 

administers Iraq’s corrections officers, controlled 22 prisons, while 

the MOI ran more than 1,200 small jails. Thus, the ministry with the 

necessary skills (the MOJ) lacked the required facilities to manage the 

many incarcerations associated with its cases.363

INL provided more than $125 million for ICITAP activities 

to reconstitute the Iraqi Corrections Service. ICITAP managed 

corrections training and assistance programs through the end of 2011. 

In January 2012, it began a $1.6 million Pre-trial Detentions Program, 

but the Iraqi government soon decided to forbid non-Iraqis from 

assessing its pretrial detention facilities. Thus, INL ended the program 

in June 2012.364

Anticorruption

Corruption was the rule in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. It continued 

into the chaotic conditions of the early post-conflict years, draining 

resources from GOI programs. In 2006, Prime Minister alMaliki referred to corruption as “a second insurgency.”365

Since 2003, the GOI’s income from crude oil sales rapidly increased 

as did the magnitude of graft. Between 2004 and 2007, corruption’s 

costs were estimated at $18 billion. In a 2005 review, Iraq’s Board of 

Supreme Audit concluded $1.3 billion had been lost due to corruption 

in a series of MOD contracts.366

A 2012 BSA audit concluded that, of the roughly $1 billion 

transferred out of Iraq each week via currency auctions conducted 

by the Central Bank of Iraq, up to $800 million was laundered 

money transferred illegally under false pretenses. Calculated 

cumulatively over the course of a year, this presents the 

possibility that up to $40 billion was leaving the country annually 

because of corruption.367

Early on, U.S. reconstruction authorities identified corruption 

as an important issue that threatened the goal of establishing an 

environment of trust and confidence within the Iraqi government. But 

they devoted relatively modest resources to combat the problem.368

The CPA Administrator authorized a budget of $35 million to 

implement the comprehensive reform of Iraq’s anticorruption system. 

A total of $20 million of this came from the Development Fund for 

Iraq, with $15 million from IRRF 2. The varying initiatives called for 

drafting new legislation and the anchoring of anticorruption power in 

these three specific institutions:369

R The Commission on Public Integrity. Established in January 2004, 

the CPI ostensibly was to be the primary agent in the fight against 

corruption. The CPA charged it to investigate allegations against 

GOI officials and, if warranted, forwards them to the Central 

Criminal Court of Iraq for prosecution.370

The CPI enjoyed a productive start. In its first 18 months, it filed 

541 cases against GOI officials, including 42 against ministers or 

7KHPLOOLRQ&KDPFKDPDO&RUUHFWLRQDO)DFLOLW\ZDVFRPSOHWHGLQ0DUFK
104

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

other high-ranking individuals. But the backlash was swift and 

severe. The GOI shielded many of the accused from prosecution 

by the use of a Saddam-era law, and, when cases did go to trial, the 

accused frequently were acquitted. The CCC-I’s conviction rate 

during 2004–2007 was only 8%. To worse effect, 31 CPI employees 

were assassinated from 2004 to 2007. In August 2007, the CPI 

Commissioner fled to the United States, where he received political 

asylum. Efforts thereafter to revive investigative activity proved 

mostly unsuccessful, and the CPI (now known as the Commission of 

Integrity) is currently a marginally effective force.371

R Inspectors General. Thirteen days after establishing the CPI, CPA 

Administrator Bremer signed an order creating a novel system of 

inspectors general in Iraq. Most were placed within GOI ministries 

for five-year terms with the power to audit ministry records 

and activities, conduct administrative investigations, and pursue 

allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse. The IGs were to report specific 

findings to their ministers and issue annual reports.372

The system faced challenges from the start. Although the 2004 

order creating the IGs noted they could only be effective if provided 

adequate resources, few were forthcoming. On the day before the 

CPA’s closure, Ambassador Bremer provided $11 million to fund the 

new system. In 2005, the DoD OIG Investigations and Evaluations 

Directorate trained and advised IGs in the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, continuing that work at least through 2008. And in 2007, 

the Department of State appointed a consultant to the IGs, who was 

responsible for training, mentoring, and advising the other ministries; 

but the position had no budget. SIGIR also provided IG training.373

Aside from inadequate funding, the IGs suffered an image 

problem that reduced their effectiveness. Created by the United 

States and inserted into a GOI that had no understanding of their 

mission, the IGs came to be seen as obstructers and even spies for 

the “U.S. occupiers.” The GOI decided in early 2012 to eliminate 

some IGs at smaller ministries, and the Joint Anticorruption 

Council, a body responsible to the Council of Ministers, declared 

that all remaining IGs would periodically face an evaluation board 

comprising representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister, 

CoM, COI, and BSA.374 The system’s future is very much in doubt.

R Board of Supreme Audit. In April 2004, the CPA issued an order to 

reconstitute the BSA, an agency first established during the British 

administration of Iraq in the 1920s. U.S. funding for the agency was 

limited. But the BSA prospered chiefly because it is well led and 

is recognized as the oldest and most authoritative anticorruption 

institution in the country. The BSA’s role is similar to that of the 

Government Accountability Office in the United States. It is the 

GOI auditing agency with oversight of all public contracts.375

As of September 2012, the United States had obligated 

$67.7 million for U.S. anticorruption efforts in Iraq, just under half 

funded by the INCLE ($31.8 million) with the remainder coming 

from the IRRF ($36.0 million). Despite this support for the fight 

against corruption, apparently little changed between 2003 and 

2012.376 As depicted in Figure 5.18, Iraq has been consistently 

perceived as being among the most corrupt countries in the world.

0

2

4

6

8

10

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Finland Finland Iceland Finland 

Iceland

New Zealand

Denmark 

Finland 

New Zealand 

Denmark

New Zealand

Sweden

New Zealand Denmark New Zealand

New Zealand

Singapore

(113) (129) (137) (160)

(133)

Bangladesh

(145)

Bangladesh

Haiti (158)

Bangladesh

Chad (163)

Haiti

(179)

Myanmar

Somalia

(180)

Somalia (180)

Somalia

(178)

Somalia

(182)

Somalia, 

Somalia

North Korea(174)

New Zealand

Denmark

Finland

(178) (176) (175) (175) (175) (169)

North Korea

 Afghanistan, 

Median

Iraq 

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, Iraq vs. Other Countries, 

2003–2012 Most Corrupt (Rank) Index Score Least Corrupt 

FIGURE 5.18

Iraq has consistently ranked among the world’s most corrupt countries.
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

105

Governance

For almost three decades prior to the 2003 invasion, Iraq suffered 

under a highly centralized government dominated by Saddam 

Hussein’s repressive rule.377 Presidential “elections” carried out by 

Saddam’s dictatorial regime reflected its culture of corruption, with 

outcomes never in question. In 2002, for example, Saddam was reelected with 100% of the vote.378

In 2003, prewar planners anticipated a rapid transfer of power to 

a new Iraqi government after Saddam’s removal, with a hoped-for 

minimal disruption in government services. This calculation proved off 

the mark. Postwar looting and the exodus of government bureaucrats 

from public service—both voluntary and involuntary—caused a 

complete collapse in governance capacities. The country’s broken 

system required a virtually complete reconstruction, literally and 

figuratively.379

The CPA established these goals for developing governance in Iraq:380

R a constitution drafted and approved by Iraqis

R institutions and processes to conduct free and fair elections

R measures to improve the effectiveness of elected officials and 

strengthening local government systems

R effective and fair justice systems

R respect for the rule of law and human rights

R creation of a vibrant civil society

Although the CPA laid the predicate for the eventual 

accomplishment of much of this, it realized little of it during its 

14-month tenure.381

Through September 2012, the U.S. government obligated 

$8.32 billion and expended $7.48 billion to provide humanitarian 

relief, support democratic institutions, build government capacity, and 

grow public services in Iraq.382

Early funding focused on programs and projects to restore public 

services, promote democracy, and build civil society. By early 2007, 

the U.S. government had obligated nearly half of the money for 

governance programs, including more than $1.7 billion to improve 

Iraq’s public services (see Figure 5.19). At the same time, the 

,UDTLFLYLOLDQVDQG86VROGLHUVSXOOGRZQDVWDWXHRI6DGGDP+XVVHLQLQGRZQWRZQ%DJKGDGRQ$SULO

V\PEROLFDOO\PDUNLQJWKHHQGRIKLVUHJLPH$3SKRWR

2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005

$0

$2

$4

$6

$8

$10

Expended

Obligated

Governance: Cumulative Obligations and Expenditures, FY 2004–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.19

Half of the 

expenditures 

occurred by the 

end of 2007.
106

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. strategy shifted toward capacity development. Funding for 

governance came from three sources—the IRRF, ESF, and CERP (see 

Figure 5.20). Responsible for about 44% of this reconstruction area’s 

total obligations and expenditures, USAID served as the principal U.S. 

agency leading governance reforms in Iraq.383

Democracy and Civil Society

As of September 2012, the U.S. government had obligated $1.91 billion 

and expended $1.82 billion to strengthen democratic governance and 

civil society in Iraq.384 More than half of the funding came from the 

IRRF, with the remainder from the ESF.385 USAID was responsible 

for more than $1.6 billion (84%) of the total obligations.386

Constitution and Elections

In November 2003, the CPA announced it would pass sovereignty to 

an interim Iraqi government by the end of June 2004. Among others, 

two important actions took place before that event:387

R an interim constitution (called the Transitional Administrative Law) 

was approved

R local caucuses elected leaders for the Iraqi Transitional National 

Assembly

The Transitional Administrative Law, signed on March 8, 2004, 

required the Transitional National Assembly, eventually elected on 

January 30, 2005, to draft a new constitution by August 15, 2005, and 

put it to a referendum on October 15, 2005.388

The U.S. government shaped the development of the new Iraqi 

constitution and implemented countless projects to support elections in 

Iraq through USAID’s Elections and Political Process Strengthening 

program. Initially funded by $156 million from the IRRF, three 

organizations implemented the program: the National Democratic 

Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the International 

Foundation for Electoral Systems.389

State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor awarded 

12 grants, collectively worth nearly $250 million, to two USAID 

implementing partners (IRI and NDI) to promote democracybuilding activities in Iraq. The grants supported efforts such as political 

training, women’s political participation, and election assistance.390

The Constitutional Drafting Committee began work on drafting 

a permanent Iraqi constitution in late June 2005. The United 

Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq oversaw the process, with Iraqis 

CERP

$1.31

ESF

$3.45

IRRF

$3.57

Governance: Cumulative 

Obligations, by Fund, 

as of 9/30/2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.20

Governance Timeline

FIGURE 5.21

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

3/20/2003

U.S.-led

Coalition

invades Iraq.

5/16/2003

CPA Order 1

outlaws

Ba’ath Party.

5/22/2003

UNSCR 1483

recognizes

USA/UK as

occupying

authorities. 

3/16/2006

CoR holds first 

meeting. 

4/22/2006

President Jalal Talabani

names Nuri al-Maliki 

(a Shia compromise 

candidate) as 

Prime Minister.

11/5/2006

Saddam Hussein found 

guilty of crimes against 

humanity and sentenced 

to death by hanging. 

12/30/2006

Iraqi government 

executes Saddam 

Hussein.

8/1/2007

Iraqi Accord Front, a Sunni political party, withdraws from ruling 

coalition, citing insufficient security authority and Prime Minister’s 

failure to release prisoners and act against Shia militias. 

10/16/2003

UNCSR 1511 authorizes the Multi-National 

Forces-Iraq and calls for the Iraqi Governing 

Council to propose plan for drafting Iraqi 

constitution by 12/15/2003.

12/13/2003

Saddam Hussein 

captured near

Tikrit. 

3/8/2004

Transitional Administrative 

Law adopted by the IGC.

6/28/2004

Iraq regains sovereignty; 

authority transferred 

from the CPA to Iraqi 

Interim Government. 

1/30/2005

Elections held for 

provincial councils

and an interim

assembly to draft

a constitution. 

10/15/2005

Constitution

approved in

national

referendum. 

12/15/2005

Elections held

for Council of

Representatives.

,QWKHÀUVWVHYHQ\HDUVDIWHUWKHGRZQIDOORI6DGGDP

Hussein, Iraq held six successful major electoral events.
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

107

accomplishing the actual drafting in what became a very politically 

charged atmosphere.391

NDI and IRI contributed as well through a $20.5 million program that 

provided international constitutional experts who shared their expertise, 

facilitated public input, and provided administrative support. The drafting 

committee ostensibly completed its work by August 15, but changes to 

the document continued right up to the eve of its approval in October.392

Influential Sunni Arab political groups and others, including the 

Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, criticized the process as well 

as the document’s substance. Notwithstanding resistance, especially 

from Sunnis, Iraqis approved the constitution in a relatively peaceful 

referendum on October 15, 2005. Notably, the new law of the land 

accorded the Kurdistan Region substantial autonomy, but left these 

critical issues for later resolution:393

R clarification of the relationships between and among the local, 

provincial, and federal governments, especially regarding the 

governance authority of local councils394

R the distribution of territory and mineral interests in Kirkuk and 

surrounding areas395

Political imbroglios aside, the peaceable execution of multiple 

democratic elections in Iraq is a reconstruction success story. USAID 

provided substantial support to the Independent High Electoral 

Commission’s administration of six electoral events: the referendum 

on the draft constitution, two parliamentary elections, two provincial 

elections, and the election of the KRG President (see Figure 5.21).396

Financial support came primarily from USAID’s Electoral Technical 

Assistance Program, which provided about $103 million.397 The 

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UHIHUHQGXPRQWKHQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQ86$,'SKRWR

2009 2010 2011 2012

7/5/2009

KRG holds

parliamentary and 

presidential elections. 

3/7/2010

Elections held

for Iraq’s CoR.

1/31/2009

Provincial elections held 

in 14 of 18 provinces.

6/1/2010

Chief Justice certifies 

election results.

12/27/2011

President Talabani and 

CoR Speaker al-Nujaifi 

agree to prepare for a 

national conference. 

11/11/2010

CoR convenes; al-Iraqiya’s 

Osama al-Nujaifi elected 

Speaker; President 

Talabani elected to 

second term.

11/25/2010

President Talabani

asks PM al-Maliki to 

form a new government 

within 30 days. 

12/21/2010

PM al-Maliki announces 

new government, 

leaving 11 posts unfilled; 

CoR endorses. 

4/4/2012

National reconciliation 

conference postponed.

4/1/2012

KRG halts oil exports, 

alleging GOI failure to pay 

$1.5 billion on oil-field 

development costs. 

9/30/2012

CoR forms special 

committee to work toward 

compromise package of 

Hydrocarbon Laws. 

5/3/2012

Opponents of Prime Minister call 

for al-Maliki to enact reforms or risk 

being replaced. 

6/13/2012

President Talabani 

releases letter stating 

there are not enough 

votes to hold a 

no-confidence vote on 

the Prime Minister.
108

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

program included administrative guidance, professional mentoring, and 

technical training for the IHEC.398

Election support is expensive. In preparation for the January 2010 

parliamentary election, USAID expended $42 million in developing 

information and communication systems to tally election results and 

update voter registration records.399 In September 2011, USAID 

extended its agreement with IHEC to continue the Electoral Training 

Assistance Program through 2014.400

In March 2012, USAID’s Inspector General conducted a review 

of the Electoral Technical Assistance Program, finding it impossible 

to measure the effects of program’s activities. For example, USAID 

failed to use a performance management plan to define elections 

assistance delivery and measure what it achieved. UNAMI also 

provided significant support to IHEC, and thus, in the absence of a 

performance management plan, USAID’s Inspector General could not 

determine which organization achieved which results.401

Similarly, a SIGIR audit found that DRL could not measure the 

impact of the grants it awarded for democracy-building activities, 

concluding that only 41% of grant funds were spent on direct program 

activities, with the remaining spent on security and overhead costs.402

Community Development

The United States implemented a series of programs aimed at fostering 

what the CPA called a “vibrant civil society.” One of the largest was 

USAID’s three-phase, $740 million Community Action Program, 

which lasted from May 2003 to September 2012.403 The program 

fostered civic development, improved government responsiveness to 

local needs, and assisted civilian war victims.404 In late 2012, USAID 

announced a successor to the CAP program, a three-year, $75 million 

initiative called Broadening Participation through Civil Society. This 

program focuses on strengthening Iraq’s continuing growth as a 

parliamentary democracy by encouraging greater citizen-participation 

in Iraq’s social and political development.405

It is difficult to measure accurately the effects of the USAID 

programs established to encourage the spread of democratic principles 

in Iraq. These efforts trained tens of thousands of civil servants on 

improving government responsiveness and sought to open the eyes of 

countless citizens to the benefits of living in a free democracy. But no 

meaningful metrics were established to assess the results of these 

activities. Perhaps the problem lies in the nature of the program 

itself: how do you empirically capture the effects of civics training on 

the ability of a person to be a better citizen?406

Capacity Development

From May 2003 through September 2012, the U.S. government 

obligated $2.45 billion and expended $2.27 billion to increase Iraq’s 

capacity for governance through targeted capacity-development programs 

and projects executed at the national, regional, and local levels. The ESF 

served as the primary funding source for these efforts, contributing more 

than three-fourths of the money.407

Nearly one-fourth of all funding for capacity development (about $550 

million) was obligated in the fourth quarter of 2007. Total obligations 

had been relatively flat during the preceding year, but, in May 2007, the 

Congress required that the GOI demonstrate satisfactory progress toward 

18 benchmarks before releasing any new ESF funding. In July 2007, the 

President signed a waiver to this requirement for $642.5 million, which 

was then released for new obligations.408 This coincided with the mid2007 surge of civilian personnel deployed to stem sectarian violence by 

focusing on neighborhood reconstruction (through the PRT program).409

National Programs

Two programs established in 2006 focused on national capacity 

development in Iraq: the Department of State’s $45 million Ministerial 

Capacity Development program and USAID’s $339.4 million 

National Capacity Development program, or Tatweer (Arabic for 

“development”).410

The MCD effort focused on strengthening the central government by 

increasing ministry effectiveness and improving GOI budget execution.411

Despite these efforts, budget execution remained a persistent problem. 

For example, while the GOI executed the majority of its operational 

budget in 2010, the rate of execution for capital budgets remained low, 

with 13 ministries spending less than half their capital budgets and three 

ministries with expenditure rates below 20%.412
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

109

Tatweer sought to create a national training center to develop the 

Iraqi Civil Service. USAID abandoned this goal after U.S. officials 

determined that the GOI lacked the capacity to manage it. Tatweer

then shifted focus to training 76,000 GOI personnel on the basic 

skills of administrative governance. In 2008, the program’s emphasis 

moved to a “train the trainers” approach, seeking to inculcate a 

culture of professionalism and continual education within the 

GOI’s public sector. According to a USAID-sponsored evaluation 

of Tatweer, “soft impacts”—such as organizational culture changes, 

the embrace of modern techniques, and systemic improvements—

were not achieved because top-level managers in ministries failed to 

implement reforms.413

In June 2011, USAID created a four-year, $156.7 million 

Administrative Reform Project, called Tarabot, or “linkages” in Arabic, 

as a follow-on to Tatweer. Tarabot sought to strengthen federal, 

provincial, and local governments’ capacities to manage public-policy 

decision making and government resources.414

Local and Provincial Programs

USAID’s single-largest development initiative in Iraq was the Local 

Governance Program. Begun in April 2003 and lasting through June 

2011, this $807 million effort aimed to improve the management and 

administration of local, municipal, and provincial governments.415

The LGP executed projects in communications, conflict resolution, 

leadership skills, and political analysis, among other things. 416

Evaluations executed toward the end of the effort raised concerns 

about the program’s longer-term effects because of the failure by 

Iraq’s central government to devolve power to the provincial and 

local governments. To remedy this weakness, in late 2011, USAID 

began a five-year, $117 million Governance Strengthening Project to 

follow upon the work of the LGP, but aimed chiefly at bolstering the 

decentralization of power in Iraq.417

The Provincial Reconstruction Team program was perhaps the 

most innovative and, where it worked, the most integrated capacitybuilding initiative in Iraq. Among other things, PRTs helped local 

and provincial government officials identify rebuilding needs and 

then tried to meet some of them with available resources. The 

PRTs supported capacity-building efforts targeted at city and 

provincial governments to improve their ability to deliver essential 

services to the citizenry. Further, they worked with Iraqi Provincial 

Reconstruction Development Councils, which were groups of 

local officials and community leaders in the 15 southern provinces 

empowered to make decisions about local reconstruction priorities. 

The PRDCs served as a training ground in program and project 

management for local government officials. They were supposed 

to ensure the sustainment of U.S.-funded projects—a calling that 

produced mixed results.418

As of September 2012, the United States had obligated about 

$618 million and expended about $590 million for PRDC projects 

that supported programs in the water and sanitation, electricity, 

education, and other reconstruction sectors.419 The two largest PRDC 

projects were the Erbil Emergency Hospital (nearly $13 million) 

in northern Iraq and the Missan Surgical Hospital (more than 

$16 million) in southern Iraq. The Erbil Emergency Hospital was 

completed in less than two years—fast by reconstruction program 

standards.420 But the Missan Surgical Hospital, a project started in 

September 2007 with a required completion date of September 2009, 

remained unfinished as of October 2012. As of September 2012, the 

State Department still managed $42.7 million in PRDC projects.421

The PRTs chiefly used money from the State Department’s Quick 

Response Fund to help provincial governments accomplish short-term 

projects. State created the QRF in August 2007 to provide a flexible 

means for supporting short-term, high-impact projects.422 It modeled 

the program on the CERP, hoping that it would prove a “flexible tool 

to quickly execute programs that will improve the local community.” 

State shared program implementation with USAID.423

PRTs provided QRF funds through grants, microgrants, direct 

procurements, and micropurchase agreements to and with local 

government officials and community-based groups, such as nonprofit 

organizations, business and professional associations, charities, and 

educational institutions. SIGIR audits of the QRF found serious 

recordkeeping deficiencies with State’s project management processes, 

including indications of potential fraud, but USAID’s implementation 

met standards.424 As of September 2012, the ESF had funded 

$287 million in QRF projects.425
110

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Public Services

After the 2003 invasion, the Iraqi government had difficulty 

providing basic public services to its citizens.426 Schools and hospitals 

were destroyed, damaged, or closed because they lacked essential 

supplies; uncollected trash piled up in the streets; sewage spewed in 

many places.427

As of September 2012, United States had obligated $3.06 billion 

and expended $2.55 billion to help the GOI rebuild its capacity to 

provide public services. More than three-quarters of the funding came 

from the IRRF and CERP, with the ESF providing the balance. At 

just over $1 billion, health care received the largest portion of the 

funding (33%), followed by civic cleanup and infrastructure repair at 

$977 million (32%), education at $789 million (26%), and public safety 

at $296 million (10%). More than one-third of the total obligations 

occurred by mid-2005.428

Health

In the 1970s, Iraq had one of the better healthcare systems in the 

Middle East, with access available to 97% of urban and 79% of rural 

populations. Over the next 30 years, a combination of wars, sanctions, 

and reckless neglect by Saddam’s regime caused the Iraqi health system 

to fall into a grave state of dysfunction.429 In 2003, USAID described 

Iraq’s health care as very poor, reaching only part of the population, and 

“particularly weak” with respect to maternal and child care and health 

information systems.430

USAID’s broad goal for postwar Iraq was to ensure that all Iraqis 

received basic health care. To accomplish this, it set milestones with 

expected dates of completion, though they tended, in retrospect, to be a 

bit optimistic. For example, USAID planned on basic health services to 

be available to 25% of the entire population and 50% of mothers and 

children within 60 days of the invasion.431 The CPA’s plans superseded 

USAID’s. They included restoring basic health services to 95%–100% 

of prewar levels by October 2003 and enhancing primary care, 

prevention, and wellness services by January 2004.432

From May 2003 to September 2012, the U.S. government obligated 

about $1 billion and expended $934 million for health projects, both 

construction and non-construction.433 Brick-and-mortar projects 

included the construction or rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics 

throughout Iraq. The $362 million Primary Healthcare Center 

(PHC) program, the single-largest IRRF-funded activity within the 

health sector, aimed to build 150 clinics. A SIGIR review found the 

program gravely deficient in execution.434 Table 5.9 lists of some of 

the largest healthcare construction projects (including projects funded 

under the PRDC program discussed in the Capacity Development 

subsection above).

U.S.-funded non-construction projects provided medical supplies 

and equipment for newly constructed or rehabilitated hospitals and 

clinics and training for medical personnel. USACE funded two 

projects worth more than $53 million to supply medical equipment 

to the PHCs, including x-ray machines and dental chairs; but this 

equipment was largely never used, as revealed in SIGIR reporting.435

From late 2009 through 2010, USAID’s $5 million Health 

Promotion Program in Iraq helped the Ministry of Health design, 

Basrah Children’s Hospital: Still Patiently Waiting, 

Patients Still Waiting

The largest individual healthcare construction 

project was the Basrah Children’s Hospital, 

which USAID awarded to Bechtel in 2004 for 

$50 million. The project would eventually cost 

$165 million. The hospital was envisioned as a 

94-bed, “state-of-the-art” pediatric oncology hospital that would serve southern Iraq. 

During the planning stages, USAID and Project 

HOPE signed a memorandum of understanding, providing that the U.S government would 

be responsible for construction of the hospital, 

while Project HOPE would be responsible for 

installing advanced medical equipment and 

training medical staff. 

Work moved slowly. Deteriorating security, 

bad site conditions, and poor contractor performance pushed up costs and pushed out the 

completion date. By 2008, the contractor had 

been terminated, and new funding poured in. 

Construction was completed in 2010, and the 

hospital opened for limited treatment in October 

of that year. But in late 2012, USACE still had 

several ongoing ESF-funded projects for equipment procurement, installation, and training.

SIGIR Audit 06-026 and PA-08-160

U.S. soldiers look over the grounds of the Basrah Children’s 

Hospital under construction in May 2009. (U.S. Army photo)
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

111

Safe at Home in Erbil: A Perfect Project

The $3.7 million Erbil Orphanage and Senior 

Citizen Assisted Living Center project involved 

the demolition of an existing orphanage, 

which people in Erbil said was “like a prison,” 

and the construction of a new first-of-its-kind 

complex to provide a safe and clean living 

environment for 345 destitute orphans and 

60 senior citizens. The contractor engaged 

local officials and incorporated their suggestions into the facility’s design, which included 

ramps, motion-activated automatic doors, and 

other features to accommodate children and 

seniors with physical limitations. 

The contractor also included, at his own 

expense, a geotechnical study of the soil to 

determine the allowable soil-bearing capacity. USACE provided diligent on-site qualityassurance support, including identifying and 

reporting construction deficiencies and following up with the contractor to ensure corrective 

actions had been taken. 

SIGIR visited the facility in July 2009, five 

months after it had been turned over to 

the KRG, and found it fully functioning and 

in immaculate condition. The contractor’s 

quality of work—including spiral staircases, 

decorative ceramic tiles, and floor-to-ceiling 

glass exterior wall—was the best SIGIR ever 

observed in Iraq. 

The KRG’s Ministry of Social Affairs contributed to the success of this project by providing 

commercial-grade furniture for the living areas 

and appliances for the kitchen. The facility’s 

exterior included a children’s playground and 

swimming pool. The contractor, ministry, and 

USACE personnel agreed that the safe security 

environment significantly contributed to the 

overall success of this project.

SIGIR PA-09-178

The quality of work at the U.S.-funded project in Erbil 

was the best SIGIR ever observed.

implement, and evaluate programs to improve public awareness of 

health issues, such as malnutrition.436 In 2011, USAID started the 

four-year, $72.9 million Primary Health Care Project in Iraq, seeking 

to strengthen the delivery of primary healthcare services across 

the country.437

State and USAID reported that U.S.-funded projects resulted in the 

vaccination of millions of children against measles, mumps, and rubella. 

In addition, by 2011, the national infant-mortality rate had decreased by 

68% since 2003.438

Civic Cleanup and Infrastructure Repairs

Military commanders used CERP funds to promote quickimpact, high-visibility projects aimed at reducing the high level of 

unemployment among young, non-skilled Iraqis and improving local 

perceptions of the Coalition. As of September 2012, the military 

had obligated $317.8 million and expended $291.6 million on civic 

cleanup and infrastructure repair projects throughout Iraq. Of the 

obligated amount, $204.1 million (64%) funded cleanup projects, while 

$113.6 million (36%) supported infrastructure repairs.439

In May 2006, as the security situation deteriorated, USAID 

collaborated with the U.S. military to establish a program to 

complement counterinsurgency operations in strategic cities. 

USAID initially used $30 million in IRRF funding for this “focused 

stabilization” effort.440 Soon $619 million in ESF funding followed, 

and this effort evolved into what became the four-year Community 

TABLE 5.9

Major U.S.-funded Healthcare Construction Projects

$ Millions

Completion Date

Project Name Province Contractor Name Contract Award Date Original Actual Fund U.S. Cost

Primary Health Care Centers Multiple Parsons Delaware, Inc., Others 3/25/2004 12/26/2005 10/1/2008 IRRF 2 361.5

Basrah Children's Hospital Basrah Bechtel National, Inc. 8/3/2004 12/31/2005 10/21/2010 IRRF 2 103.9

Missan Surgical Hospital Missan Eastern Deffaf Al-Nahraen 9/20/2007 5/19/2009 N/A ESF 16.0

Erbil Emergency Hospital Erbil Tigris Engineering Consultancy Electric 7/28/2008 12/4/2009 5/31/2010 ESF 12.9

Ba’quba General Hospital Diyala Liqaa al-Mustakbal Co. 11/24/2007 12/2/2008 12/26/2010 ESF 8.0
112

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Stabilization Program. The program supported the U.S. military’s 

efforts to roll back the insurgency by creating initiatives that reduced 

incentives for violence by at-risk youth.441

This “non-lethal counterinsurgency program” sought to stem the 

accelerating violence in Iraq by generating employment, rehabilitating 

infrastructure, and stimulating local businesses.442 According to 

USAID, the CSP operated in 17 “insurgency-affected” cities, directly 

employed more than 47,000 individuals on a long-term basis, provided 

vocational training to more than 41,000, helped place more than 

9,900 vocational training graduates into apprenticeship programs, 

approved a total of $77.4 million in grants to more than 10,250 

business owners, and enrolled nearly 339,000 Iraqi youth in soccer, arts, 

and life-skills programs.443

Two reviews of the CSP revealed mixed results. The USAID 

Inspector General was unable to establish a causal relationship between 

CSP initiatives and a reduction in violence in the strategic cities where 

it operated. In addition, the USAID OIG could not substantiate 

CSP’s claims regarding employment generated by the program. More 

disturbingly, the inspector general found evidence that potentially 

millions of dollars in CSP funds had been diverted to insurgents.444

Education

Until the 1980s, Iraq’s education system was among the best in the 

Middle East, producing high literacy rates. But Saddam’s despotism, a 

debilitating war, and consequent restrictive sanctions sunk the system. 

By 2003, school attendance had dropped significantly, with literacy 

among girls at 45% and 80% of the 30,000 primary schools in poor 

condition. A UN and World Bank report said restoring the Iraqi 

education system to 1980s levels would take $4.8 billion.445

Iraq’s “greatest challenges in education are related to improving 

the curriculum, materials and supplies, and quality of teaching,” said 

USAID’s Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq. Following upon this, the CPA 

established goals to revise textbooks and rehabilitate 1,000 schools by 

October 2003, initiate curriculum reform, and ensure the availability of 

school supplies by January 2004.446

USAID awarded the largest IRRF-funded education project, 

a $48.3 million contract to provide supply kits to primary school 

children and teachers throughout Iraq.447 The project reportedly 

procured and delivered more than 500,000 school kits to Iraqi school 

children in over 2,200 schools by December 2005.448 Additional 

USAID contracts rehabilitated schools across the country; by early 

2006, USAID had supported the construction or rehabilitation of 

2,943 schools.449

From 2004 through 2010, USF-I reported the completion of 

3,493 CERP-funded projects in the education sector.450 CERP-funded 

school projects, primarily costing less than $500,000, supported such 

things as refurbishments, installing new air conditioning units, and 

restoring utilities.451

By September 2010, USACE reported that it had completed more 

than 1,100 education projects.452 The largest project was the $5.4 million 

Primary Healthcare Centers: If You Build It (or Not), We Will Pay You

oversight, led to the contractors’ termination, 

a drop in the number of PHCs to be delivered to 133, and a $102 million increase in 

costs. Tens of millions more were spent, but 

SIGIR’s reviews indicated that the construction, installation of equipment, and necessary 

training were not adequately completed for a 

significant number of PHCs. Operational and 

sustainability issues persisted, which required 

an additional $16.5 million to correct deficiencies at 17 PHCs long after program closure.

SIGIR Audit 09-015, PA-06-042–046, PA-08-133, PA-08-134, PA-08-157, PA-08-158

The CPA awarded a $243 million task order 

in 2004 to construct and equip 150 primary 

healthcare centers across Iraq by December 

2005. In March 2006, citing little progress, 

the US. government terminated the task order 

“for convenience” and reduced the number 

of PHCs to 142. SIGIR reviewed the PHC program, concluding that $186 million had been 

spent with only six PHCs accepted by USACE 

as complete. 

After contract termination, USACE was 

responsible for assessing the condition of the 

partially constructed PHCs, estimating costs 

and completion dates, and awarding firmfixed-price contracts to Iraqi contractors to 

complete them. These additional contracts 

added $57 million to the PHC program. 

In September 2006, USACE predicted half 

of the PHCs would be completed by the end 

of 2006 and the remainder by early 2007. 

Actual completion dates slipped significantly. 

Nine PHCs were not completed due to security, including one partially constructed PHC 

that was bombed twice within two months.

Poor performance by follow-on contractors, 

along with weak U.S. government program SIGIR inspects a poorly constructed block wall, one of many 

deficiencies that SIGIR identified at PHCs throughout the country.
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

113

Baghdad Academy of Health and Science, which provided a new 

training facility for healthcare providers.453

U.S. government assistance in the education sector transitioned in 

2009 from construction and rehabilitation to capacity development.454

State and USAID funded workshops to train Iraqi professionals in 

the field of student advising and career development, provided books, 

equipment, and distance-learning technology, and expanded the 

Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program for Iraq.455

By 2011, Iraq’s primary school enrollment had increased 27% since 

2002, more than 33,000 teachers had been trained, and 8.6 million new 

textbooks had been purchased to modernize the curriculum.456

As of September 2012, the U.S. government had obligated 

$788.9 million and expended $379.4 million to rebuild Iraq’s school 

infrastructure and curriculum. Of this amount, the CERP accounted for 

more than three-fourths of the expenditures, with the remainder coming 

from the IRRF.457

Despite this notable investment, the Education Committee of Iraq’s 

Council of Representatives estimated in 2011 that 5 million Iraqis 

were illiterate. The Minister of Education called this “appalling” and 

attributed it to overcrowding of classrooms and the poor quality of 

teachers.458 At the end of September 2012, USAID launched a new 

five-year $89.1 million Primary Education Strengthening Project, called 

Ajyal (Arabic for “generations”), with the goal of strengthening the 

GOI’s ability to deliver quality primary education through improved 

teacher skills.459

Humanitarian Relief

Prewar planning efforts centered on avoiding humanitarian disasters 

and prioritizing food relief in case of shortages following military 

operations. With decades of relevant experience, USAID was tapped 

to develop programs to prevent or minimize acts of reprisal and 

maximize high-visibility projects that could earn the goodwill of the 

Iraqi people.460

Though the 2003 invasion did not produce the expected 

humanitarian crises, the ensuing chaos brought by criminal conduct 

and the insurgency did cause the destruction of numerous facilities and 

the displacement of as many as 2 million Iraqis.461

In 2003, USAID established an IRRF-funded program to help Iraqi 

civilians injured by Coalition Forces. Carried out as part of USAID’s 

Community Action Program, this program (later renamed the Marla 

Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund in May 2005) provided wheelchairs 

and prosthetics to those with disabilities and rehabilitated local 

schools and hospitals.462 By September 2012, the fund had expended 

nearly $30 million, which USAID reported had assisted millions of 

Iraqi civilians. Marla Fund activities generated goodwill from local 

communities; however, USAID warned that Iraq may be ill-prepared 

to sustain these activities once U.S. funding ceased.463

As of September 2012, the U.S. government had obligated 

$893.8 million and expended $840.8 million from three major U.S. 

reconstruction funding sources—the IRRF, CERP, and ESF—on 

projects and programs to support humanitarian relief. The IRRF 

provided $608.9 million for this sector, while the CERP contributed 

$189.9 million, and the ESF provided $95 million.464

However, these three major funds accounted for less than one-third 

of the total U.S. obligations for humanitarian relief. About $2.15 

billion came from the Migration and Refugee Assistance, Emergency 

Refugee & Migration Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, 

and P.L. 480 funds (see Figure 5.22).465

The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration developed humanitarian programs for Iraq utilizing its 

international and non-governmental partners to assist the needs 

of displaced Iraqis and facilitate their return and reintegration to 

Iraq.466 As of September 2012, PRM had obligated $1.6 billion to 

support Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons. Since 2006, 

more than 936,000 IDPs and refugees had returned to their place 

of origin.467

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance contributed more 

than $450 million toward humanitarian assistance programs in 

Iraq. Of this amount, OFDA expended $261 million to distribute 

essential emergency relief supplies, provide emergency shelter, 

improve access to water and sanitation services, and support 

livelihood and economic recovery opportunities.468 USAID 

obligated and expended $395 million in funding from the “Food for 

Peace” program, combating hunger and malnutrition through the 

donation of U.S. agricultural commodities.469

CERP

$189.9

ESF

$95.0

IRRF

$608.9

MRA/ERMA

$ 1,494.4 

IDA/IDFA

$260.9

P.L. 480 Food Aid

$394.7

Humanitarian Relief 

Obligations, by Fund 

Type, as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions

Major Funds

FIGURE 5.22
114

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Economy

From 1991 to 1999, Iraq’s annual gross domestic product averaged 

under $20 billion—roughly one-quarter of the 1990 peak level of 

nearly $75 billion. Crude oil production, which had reached a record 

3.5 million barrels per day in July 1990, was about 1 MBPD below

that level on the eve of the 2003 invasion. Iraq’s banks, isolated by 

sanctions for a decade, no longer functioned as traditional lending 

institutions and had become cash troughs for Saddam and his cronies. 

More than half of all working-age Iraqis were either unemployed or 

under-employed.470

The events of March and April 2003 aggravated these conditions. 

When post-invasion looting ended, just two of the 170 Rafidain 

Bank branches remained open for business, the Central Bank vault 

had been largely cleaned out, and most of Iraq’s 190-odd state-owned 

enterprises, the heart of the country’s non-oil industrial sector that 

provided employment and income for 12% of Iraq’s workforce, had 

shut down. Iraq’s economy was on its knees.471

The CPA set a broad initial goal for rebuilding Iraq’s non-oil 

economy: create conditions for growth.

472 But the CPA faced a 

significant structural obstacle: Iraq had a long-standing command 

economy, driven by an entirely state-owned oil and gas sector. 

Converting this centrally controlled system into one anchored by 

free and open markets was too ambitious for the CPA’s time-limited 

missions. Instead, it sought to “set the Iraqi economy on the path for 

sustained growth and establish strong momentum toward an open 

economy.”473

The CPA set these three initial tasks to put free-market foundations 

in place:474

R Build financial market structures—This included legislation to 

reform the Central Bank of Iraq as an independent body, arming it 

with powers to oversee the nation’s commercial banking system and 

conduct monetary policy free from political interference. Market 

reform included national budget reform, the issuing of new bank 

notes, and a restructuring of the commercial banking system. 

R Promote private business—This entailed streamlining bureaucratic 

codes and regulations, reducing restrictions on capital investment, 

and generating credit programs to provide small and medium-sized 

enterprises access to capital.

R Determine the future of the state-owned enterprises—This 

required conducting a limited privatization or leasing of competitive 

SOEs, then assessing the potentialfor selling the remaining large 

ones to private-sector buyers. 

The CPA pursued several other policy initiatives to reform the 

economy, including plans to phase out a program that provided a 

basket of subsidized food items for every Iraqi, to build a new social 

safety net, and to design a national trust fund fed by a percentage of 

the country’s oil revenues that would flow to Iraqi nationals—either 

directly as cash payments or indirectly via government programs. A 

planned trade stimulus initiative would end tariffs, create trade credits, 

and liberalize Iraq’s transportation and telecom sectors consistent with 

World Trade Organization conditions.475

The United Nations and the World Bank estimated that Iraq’s 

SOEs would require $356 million in technical assistance and 

capacity-building support from 2004 through 2007 to become viable 

entities. They further concluded $81 million in technical assistance 

and capital investments would be required to restore the financial 

sector, while $340 million would be required to boost Iraq’s overall 

investment climate.476

The country’s long-neglected agricultural sector, which employed 

20% of the country’s workforce but contributed only 8% of the GDP, 

would need more than $2 billion to upgrade irrigation systems and 

another $1 billion for fertilizers, seed, and other farm-level inputs.477

From 2003 through September 2012, the United States obligated 

$1.82 billion to revive the country’s non-oil economy—less than 

4% of the $49.37 billion in total obligations from the five major 

reconstruction funds. Just over half of this amount came from 

the IRRF, slightly less than a third came from the ESF, and the 

remaining 14% came from the CERP (see Figure 5.23). The United 

States divided the funds between supporting the goals of improving 

economic governance and fostering private-sector development. 

The United States obligated half of the $1.82 billion by the end 

of 2005, with more than 90% obligated by the end of 2010 (see 

Figure 5.24).478

CERP

$255.6

ESF

$591.1

IRRF

$970.6

Economy: 

Cumulative Obligations, 

by Fund, as of 9/30/2012

$ Millions

FIGURE 5.23
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

115

Private-sector Development

Financial Sector 

In the late spring and summer of 2003, the CPA moved to reform 

Iraq’s banking sector. It suspended Saddam-era banking laws that had 

given the Ministry of Finance the exclusive right to authorize loans to 

government ministries. The Central Bank of Iraq was re-established as 

an independent body and given control over monetary and credit policy. 

It also took over responsibilities for supervising commercial banks.479

With Iraq’s banking system effectively incapable of issuing 

commercial credit, the CPA established a new bank—the Trade Bank 

of Iraq—authorizing an initial capitalization of $100 million to finance 

business dealings, including imports and exports.480

In its first seven years, the TBI issued letters of credit valued at 

more than $45 billion. It financed important infrastructure projects 

and led banking sector modernization efforts.481 Although the TBI 

was considered a success story, in June 2011, Prime Minister al-Maliki 

accused TBI chairman Hussein al-Uzri of “financial violations” and 

announced an investigation into the bank’s actions. Al-Uzri fled the 

country, and al-Maliki replaced him with an executive from the stateowned Rafidain Bank, Hamida al-Jaf.482

Several U.S. reconstruction programs subsequently were 

implemented to strengthen the CPA’s reforms. For example, the fiveyear $53 million, ESF-funded Financial Development Program, which 

USAID began in July 2010, drew on the knowledge of experts from the 

CBI, private-sector banks, and university business schools to strengthen 

private-sector bank capacity, improve the quality and availability of 

finance and business education, and establish new institutions such as 

a credit bureau, a bank training institute, and a retail payments system.483

Under the leadership of former United Nations economist Sinan 

al-Shabibi, the CBI’s monetary policies created the stability required for 

economic growth.484 The CBI failed, however, to implement effective 

oversight policies to control the commercial banking sector. GOI 

anticorruption officials believed that banking industry involvement in 

money laundering had become widespread. A 2012 audit conducted by the 

Board of Supreme Audit confirmed this, estimating that as much as 80% 

of all money transferred out of Iraq involved money-laundered funds.485

The findings triggered a warrant for Governor al-Shabibi’s arrest 

while he was out of the country. He had yet to return by early 2013. 

Meanwhile, the CBI’s independence diminished following apparently 

successful efforts to transfer control over the CBI from the Council of 

Representatives to the Council of Ministers.486

Transforming Iraq’s antiquated state-dominated banking sector 

proved difficult. As of mid-2012, Iraq’s private banks continued to 

account for less than 15% of Iraq’s banking activity. A 2011 survey 

conducted by USAID indicated that only 1.4% of all Iraqis had 

accounts in private banks. Private banks also remained cautious, 

preferring to hoard cash rather than issue new loans.487 For a 

comparison cash-to-deposit ratios of Iraq private banks and their 

international counterparts, see Table 5.10.

The two large state-owned Rasheed and Rafidain banks remained 

2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

Expended

Obligated

Economy: Cumulative Obligations and Expenditures, 

FY 2004–FY 2012

$ Billions

FIGURE 5.24

Half of the funds 

to rebuild Iraq’s 

non-oil economy 

were obligated 

by the end of 

2005.

7KH7UDGH%DQNRI,UDTOHG

HIIRUWVWRPRGHUQL]HWKH

EDQNLQJVHFWRU

TABLE 5.10

International and Iraqi Bank Comparison 

of Cash-to-deposit Ratios, 2009

Private Bank Cash/Deposits

Standard Chartered 6.2%

JPMorgan Chase 2.7%

Arab Bank, PLC 23.2%

Average of 21 Iraqi Private Banks 84.8%
116

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

,QZRUNHUVDWDVWDWHRZQHGHQWHUSULVHLQ1DMDIVHZJDUPHQWVLQFOXGLQJ

XQLIRUPVIRUWKH,UDT$UP\7)%62SKRWR

the country’s largest financial institutions; both resisted U.S.-led 

efforts to restructure and reform. As a result, they continued to work 

inefficiently and carry large debt loads that prevented them from being 

a significant lending source.488

State-owned Enterprise Reform

During the decade of sanctions before the 2003 war, Iraq’s Stateowned Enterprises met a broad range of industrial and consumer needs 

for a people cut off from the world around it. Moreover, they employed 

hundreds of thousands of workers. But damage from the 2003 invasion 

and the looting that followed left most SOEs idle.489

The United States authorized $100 million in FY 2007 and 

FY 2008 to revitalize Iraq’s SOEs. This money went to the Task Force 

for Business and Stability Operations, established by the Defense 

Department in June 2006 to help revitalize Iraq’s economy. Between 

FY 2007 and FY 2010, a total of $174 million in Iraq Freedom Fund 

money was appropriated for the TFBSO. The group reported that, as 

of December 31, 2010, one month prior to its dissolution, TFBSO had 

obligated less than half ($85.7 million) of these funds and expended 

just $65.1 million for reindustrialization projects.490

In early 2012, U.S. Mission Iraq provided a $1 million grant to 

support a project that would value the assets of SOEs as an early 

step toward possible privatization.491 As of September 2012, a small 

number of SOEs had become viable thanks to the input of foreign 

capital, but they remained the exception. Most SOEs survived only 

because of substantial GOI subsidies that in 2012 amounted to around 

3% of GDP. They functioned much as a welfare program, distributing 

paychecks to the estimated 600,000 Iraqis on SOE payrolls, many of 

whom perform no actual work.492

Promoting Private Business

The U.S. reconstruction effort supported the growth of Iraq’s nascent 

private business sector in several specific areas, providing:493

R direct assistance to would-be entrepreneurs in the form of 

microgrants, business development services, and training

R targeted reform of an administrative environment that under three 

decades of Saddam’s control had made it deliberately difficult for 

businesses to function

R support to revive the banking sector as an efficient provider of 

capital to fuel the growth of private business

R promotion of free trade, including an initiative to prepare Iraq for 

entry into the WTO (Figure 5.25 shows factors in Iraq affecting 

international trade.)

The $140.2 million USAID Private Sector Development Program 

named Izdihar, or “prosperity” in Arabic, ran from 2004 to 2008, 

supporting the growth of micro, small, and medium enterprises 

by providing entrepreneurs with operational and capital grants in 

addition to training and other technical assistance. This program 

aimed to create a more market-friendly environment for privatesector-led economic growth.494

Izdihar was followed in 2008 by USAID’s Provincial Economic 

Growth Program called Tijara, or “trade” in Arabic, a $192.5 million 

effort with similar goals. Both programs included job creation as an 

important objective, with a component of Tijara assistance directed 

toward developing capacity within small-business development centers 

to address youth unemployment.495

Izdihar and Tijara produced a national network of 12 microfinance 
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

117

institutions that provided access to affordable capital, especially for 

those unable to meet the stringent requirements for commercial bank 

loans. Collectively under the Tijara program, USAID reported these 

institutions dispensed nearly 350,000 loans ranging from $500 to 

$25,000 for business start-ups. The smaller Izdihar program issued 

more than $17 million in loans and grants and established Iraq’s first 

microfinance institutions.496

A USAID evaluation of Tijara praised the program’s efforts to 

assist small-business development, singling out projects directed at 

youth development as especially effective. However, it concluded 

that results on a second program goal—to integrate Iraq “into the 

global economy”—were “less positive.” Factors contributing to poor 

outcomes, included sclerotic customs procedures and a lack of interest 

on the part of the GOI’s Ministry of Trade.497

Programs to reduce the level of bureaucracy and promote trade 

had marginal results. The World Bank’s 2013 global ranking of 

185 countries according to their ease of doing business placed Iraq 

165th overall (see Figure 5.26). It was 177th in ease of starting a 

business. Iraq’s placement constituted the second and third worst 

rankings respectively among all Middle East and North Africa 

nations. Efforts to promote free trade produced similarly poor results, 

with Iraq finishing last among Arab World nations in six separate 

categories, according to the World Bank study Doing Business in the 

Arab World 2012.

498

Agriculture

The first U.S. reconstruction contract to boost Iraq’s farming sector 

supported a three-year $101 million Agricultural Reconstruction and 

Development Program. USAID awarded it in October 2003 to identify 

where resources should be used and to build capacity in the sector.499

4

5

8

10 10

5

5

9

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

UAE

Sudan

Iraq

$613

$615

$630

$2,050

$3,550

$755

$686

$635

$2,900

$3,650

10

7

27

32

80

UAE

Oman

Yemen

Sudan

Iraq

12

7

15

46

83

UAE

Egypt

Jordan

Sudan

Iraq

Bureaucracy

Documents Needed for Import Documents Needed for Export

Time

Days To Execute Import Days To Execute Export

Cost

Cost To Import (per container) Cost To Export (per container)

UAE

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Iraq

Factors Affecting International Trade in Iraq

FIGURE 5.25

Trading with Iraq 

can be arduous 

and expensive.

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118

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

A five-year follow-on agribusiness program, providing nearly 

$180 million and known as Inma, or “growth” in Arabic, began in 

mid-2007 and ended in late 2012. Its program goals included boosting 

productivity to enable Iraq to become more food self-sufficient and 

lowering production and marketing costs. During 2006–2008, more 

than $37 million in CERP money was spent on agricultural renewal 

programs, including projects to revive Iraq’s date palm trees, formerly 

renowned for producing the world’s most prized dates.500

Efforts to expand and upgrade Iraq’s irrigation system yielded 

modest results. By late 2012, about 30% of Iraq’s wheat-growing 

areas remained without irrigation, a reality that required the 

GOI to import about 3 million tons of wheat to meet demand in 

2012. Much of the acreage under irrigation depended on age-old 

techniques and obsolete equipment.501

USAID claimed Inma programs led to $142 million in commodity 

sales and created nearly 15,000 jobs. But, as the agency launched an 

$80 million follow-on program in the fall of 2012, it noted the sector 

continued to labor under significant inefficiencies, a result of outdated, 

inefficient, or inappropriate policies. For example, without protective 

tariffs, domestic farm producers continued to be swamped by cheaper 

and higher-quality imports, a development that weakened the 

agricultural sector. As a result, in 2012, 80% of Iraq’s food needs were 

met by imports.502

A May 2010 USAID evaluation concluded Inma fell short of its full 

potential due to several shortcomings, including an overly complex, 

top-down management structure and an overly academic approach to 

activities that were developed in a “self-reflective vacuum” rather than 

in response to needs on the ground.503

Economic Governance

Institutional and Regulatory Reform

The United States obligated $285.6 million in IRRF and ESF funds 

to support USAID’s Economic Governance program. Just under 

$77 million was obligated for the first phase, which began in July 2003, 

aiming to stimulate Iraq’s long-dormant international trade, boost 

employment, and generate a broad-based prosperity.504

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

New Zealand Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore

Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

Turkey

Iran

Iraq

Congo Congo Congo Congo

Central 

African 

Republic

Central 

African 

Republic

Central 

African 

Republic

Chad

Worst Best Relative Ranking

World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” Rankings, Iraq vs. Selected Countries, 2006–2013

FIGURE 5.26

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KDUYHVW86$,'SKRWR
WHERE THE MONEY WENT

119

The CPA approved 38 specific projects under the program but 

an audit carried out by the USAID OIG near the end of the first 

year found the program had been slowed by security problems and a 

“unique” management structure. Among those dampened projects was 

an ambitious effort to introduce a sophisticated budget control system 

into the Ministry of Finance.505

The $222.2 million Economic Governance II program ran from 

September 2004 to September 2009, promoting an open, modern, 

mixed-market economy by improving economic governance and 

encouraging private sector growth. It targeted seven specific areas, 

including tax, fiscal, commercial law and institutional reform.506

Economic Governance II embraced 398 specific projects. A USAID 

OIG audit found the agency’s failure to establish an effective system to 

monitor the projects weakened overall program management.507

CERP-funded Projects

Between early 2004 and 2010, the U.S. government expended nearly 

$110 million from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

on more than 5,700 projects related to the improvement of Iraq’s 

economy. The expenditure amounted to a small fraction of CERP’s 

$3.73 billion expenditures, and only a handful of the projects exceeded 

$1 million. The majority of them were under $10,000, with some 

budgeted at only a few hundred dollars.508

Among the largest projects, $2.9 million was disbursed in April 

2008 for construction of a large farmer’s market located on a major 

highway in central Iraq. Construction of the market, initially estimated 

to take two months, required 18 months to complete. More typical was 

a $2,500 microgrant issued for a carpentry shop.509

Iraq’s Economy in 2012

Iraq enjoyed a strong economic performance in 2012 because of its 

prospering oil sector. The country’s GDP grew at 10.2%, nearly double 

the average among the Middle East and North Africa nations. With 

core inflation at just over 5% and interest rates at 6% for the third 

straight year, important fundamentals were in place for further growth. 

For 2013, the IMF projected Iraq’s GDP would grow at a rate of 

14.7%, one of the world’s highest.510

Iraq’s economy in 2012 was dominated by the oil sector. About 98% 

of the country’s foreign exchange earnings come directly from the sale 

of crude oil. Because the oil sector provides only 1% of the country’s 

jobs, unemployment—estimated to be well above the official rate of 

15%–18%—is a significant problem.511

The precise impact of the $1.8 billion the United States spent to 

revive the non-oil sectors of Iraq’s economy is difficult to assess because 

there was little follow-up documentation available to measure its 

effectiveness. More than nine years after the start of the reconstruction 

program, Iraq is still far from having a vibrant, market-based private 

sector. A March 2011 IMF review of Iraq’s economy projected Iraq’s 

non-oil economy would produce just over 1.6% of the country’s exports 

The Iraq Financial Management System: Transparency Intercepted

The CPA concluded in 2003 that the GOI’s 

financial management system provided limited 

insight into ministerial budgets. This left them 

vulnerable to fraud, waste, and the misappropriation of funds. 

It resolved to develop a high-tech electronic 

solution—the Iraq Financial Management 

Information System—and enlisted USAID 

to manage the project. USAID awarded a 

contract to develop and implement the IFMIS, 

with a September 2005 completion date.

Development of the IFMIS was driven by 

U.S. reconstruction policy decisions, CPA 

guidance, and contractor work plans, without 

any attempt to identify ministry requirements. 

The GOI resisted using a program it never approved and sensed was being forced upon it. 

In May 2007, the project was disrupted 

when one of the contractor’s consultants 

and four security guards were kidnapped 

from the Ministry of Finance. The four guards 

were subsequently killed; the consultant was 

held hostage until December 2009. One 

month after the kidnapping, the Embassy 

suspended the IFMIS program because of 

security issues and a lack of GOI support. In 

2012, after the expenditure of $32.6 million, 

the IFMIS remained incomplete and unused. 

SIGIR learned in early 2012 that another firm 

was working with the Ministry of Finance to 

develop a new prototype system that would 

use much of the IFMIS data.

SIGIR Audits 08-001 and 08-007

The contractor’s May 2005 change-management strategy 

for transitioning from a manual to an automated FMS.
120

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

in 2012.512 Fundamental structural impediments—vis-à-vis an entirely 

state-owned oil sector afflicted by corruption—make it unlikely that 

Iraq’s non-oil economy will see much near-term expansion. 

Corruption and debt payments reduced the amount of GOI capital 

budgets available to support initiatives to broaden the economy beyond 

oil. More than two decades after Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi forces 

to invade neighboring Kuwait in August 1990, the GOI continued to 

pay compensation equivalent to 5% of its oil revenues to those who 

suffered personal or property loss as a result of the military action. 

According to the United Nations Compensation Commission, the 

GOI had paid almost $40 billion in claims as of January 2013. A total 

of $12.34 billion in approved claims still remained to be paid, mainly 

to Kuwait petroleum industry entities.513 Figure 5.27 shows the status 

of Iraq’s payment of the UN-mandated international claim.

Status of Processing and Payment of International Claims 

Against Iraq, as of 1/2013

$ Billions

$352.53 Compensation Sought

$52.38 Compensation Awarded

$39.99 Compensation Paid

$12.34 Compensation Outstanding

FIGURE 5.27

By October 

2012, Iraq 

had paid 

nearly threequarters 

of U.N.-

mandated 

claims 

related to 

Saddam’s 

1990 invasion 

of Kuwait.
121

PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM 6

The Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency 

for International Development share responsibilities for responding to 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. None of the three, however, 

clearly has charge of planning, executing, or overseeing them. Duties 

are diffused among the three agencies. Processes for SRO management 

remain opaque or undefined.

In Iraq, no U.S. government office possessed sufficient authority to 

lead the reconstruction program. The U.S. approach amounted to an 

adhocracy, which failed to coalesce into a coherent whole. Some lessons 

learned were applied along the way, but those were temporary fixes.

The Iraq reconstruction program’s improvised nature, its constant 

personnel turnover, and its shifting management regimes forced U.S. 

strategy to change speed and course continually, wasting resources 

along the way and exposing taxpayer dollars to fraud and abuse. 

Management and funding gaps caused hundreds of projects to fall 

short of promised results, leaving a legacy of bitter dissatisfaction 

among many Iraqis. 

As the difficulties in carrying out reconstruction operations in Iraq 

became apparent, the United States implemented a variety of strategies 

to remedy weaknesses, but a permanent solution never emerged. The 

current fix, embodied by the Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict 

and Stabilization Operations, has limited resources and a conflictprevention focus. It probably will not bring about the kind of largescale interagency integration for SROs required for future success. 

No reform effort to date has optimized the government’s ability 

to manage SROs. As things stand, the U.S. government is not much 

better prepared for the next stabilization operation than it was in 

2003. True, there are many more hands experienced in the field, 

but no structure exists to integrate them. Contingency contracting 

has undergone reform, but not in a comprehensive fashion. Various 

agencies have preparations in place, but no locus exists for integrative 

SRO planning. The Congress created the Global Security Contingency 

Fund, a good “interagency” idea, but one that remains untested. No 

integrated data system exists for tracking rebuilding projects. The list 

of current shortfalls, cumulatively imposing a strategic national security 

weakness, goes on.

Despite this grim litany, there is a path that could lead to the 

effective applications of Iraq’s lessons. A wise approach to SRO 

reform would aim at producing a unified system that plans and 

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122

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

executes operations integratively, averts significant waste, increases the 

likelihood of tactical success, and better protects U.S. national security 

interests. Such a reform would concentrate the SRO mission into a 

single structure, pulling the scattered pieces of the current inchoate 

system under a single roof. That structure, which could be called the 

U.S. Office for Contingency Operations, would have a clear mandate 

and sufficient capacity to command and carry out stabilization and 

reconstruction operations. Importantly, this organization would be held 

accountable for results. See Appendix A for a draft USOCO bill. 

The Coalition Provisional Authority had neither the time nor 

the resources to plan effectively for what quickly became the largest 

rebuilding program in history, one much larger than originally 

envisioned. The United States anticipated spending about $2 billion on 

reconstruction, with Iraq shouldering the remaining costs. But, by the 

end of 2003, planned U.S. expenditures had increased about ninefold 

and, by the end of 2012, expenditures were more than 25 times higher 

than originally anticipated. 

Many of the challenges faced by the CPA were beyond its control, 

most notably the collapse in security. Nevertheless, a well-developed 

contingency rebuilding plan, implemented by an already-established 

interagency management office, could have brought a more robust 

capacity to bear on the many problems that erupted in Iraq in 2003–

2004 and thereafter. Moreover, such an entity would have been better 

prepared to make timely and effective adjustments as events unfolded. 

If USOCO had existed at the outset of the Iraq program, the 

United States might have avoided wasting billions of taxpayer dollars. 

Furthermore, the unity of effort that USOCO presumably could have 

applied would have ensured better effect from the massive outlays 

in Iraq. Ultimately, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance, the CPA, and the entire adhocracy became necessary 

because no established structure existed in 2003 to manage SROs. 

That void still largely exists. 

Responding to Deficiencies

When faced with problems in Iraq’s reconstruction, the Congress 

acted to ameliorate them by taking incremental steps that provided 

guidance on specific issues. For example, the Congress required the 

following:

R creation of a database of information on the integrity of persons 

awarded contracts514

R linking contract award fees to outcomes515

R ensuring that asset-transfer agreements, with commitments to 

maintain U.S.-funded infrastructure, be implemented before certain 

funds are used516

R making funds for civilian assistance available in a manner that uses 

Iraqi entities517

R an end to “contracting with the enemy” in Iraq or Afghanistan 

(including at the subcontractor level)518

R ensuring that Defense, State, and USAID have the capability to 

collect and report data on contract support for overseas contingency 

operations519

R that Defense, State, and USAID contracts discourage 

subcontracting more than 70% of the total cost of work performed520

(or excessive “tiering” of subcontractors)521

R that Defense, State, and USAID assess and plan to mitigate 

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123

PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM

operational and political risks associated with contractor 

performance of critical functions522

R designation of a “lead Inspector General” in SROs to oversee and 

report on them523

R that Defense, State, and USAID have suspension and debarment 

officials who are independent of their respective agencies’ acquisition 

offices524

R that Defense, State, and USAID assess whether the host country 

wanted proposed capital projects (and could sustain them) before 

obligating funds for them525

Two Steps Forward and One Step Back: State’s 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

In July 2004, the Administration began implementing reforms 

addressing evident SRO-management problems. Pursuant to a 

National Security Council decision, the Secretary of State created 

the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

within State.526

In December 2004, the Congress authorized S/CRS to monitor 

unstable situations worldwide, catalogue U.S. government nonmilitary 

SRO resources and capabilities, determine appropriate civilian efforts 

to respond, coordinate the development of interagency contingency 

plans, and train civilians to perform stabilization and reconstruction 

activities.527 S/CRS was supposed to solve the “who’s in charge” 

question regarding SROs. It did not. 

From the outset, the organization struggled to find its footing. First, 

it failed to receive the funding necessary to succeed. Then it found 

itself marginalized within State’s turf-conscious bureaucracy. Moreover, 

S/ CRS concentrated on an arguably peripheral task—putting together 

a corps of civilian responders—rather than engaging in Iraq. 

In 2012, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations 

supplanted and absorbed S/CRS, as prescribed by the State 

Department’s December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review.528 Notwithstanding its difficult history, 

S/ CRS- cum-CSO comprises a valuable set of resources; however, its 

current direction and resourcing means that it is not the comprehensive 

solution to resolving SRO planning and execution problems.

CERP in Iraq: Congress as the Program Office 

A CERP-funded project in Iraq renovated the electrical 

distribution grid in the northeast Baghdad neighborhood 

known as Muhalla 312 at a cost of $11.7 million. 

The multibillion-dollar Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program began modestly in July 2003, 

expanded greatly in 2005, and served as a 

significant reconstruction funding source through 

2010. SIGIR uncovered weaknesses along the way.

The Congress responded to these weaknesses, 

taking a series of steps over the years to rein in the 

program. For example, in 2008 the Committees 

on Appropriations directed Defense to “establish 

minimum guidelines for commanders to follow 

in monitoring project status and performance 

indicators to assess the impact of CERP projects,” 

and to improve reporting on the CERP.532

It further imposed a limit of $2 million on 

the amount of U.S. CERP funds that could be 

contributed to any project in Iraq. The Congress 

required the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense to certify that any project funded from 

CERP at a level of $1 million or more addressed 

the urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

requirements of the Iraqi people.533

In the Conference Report on the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the 

Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to 

review the CERP and assess “the process for 

generating and justifying [the] CERP budget; 

the existing management and oversight of 

CERP funds and contracts ... and coordination 

with the host government on CERP projects, 

including procedures for ensuring the 

sustainment” of CERP projects.534

Revolution at the Pentagon: 

Defense Directive 3000.05

In November 2005, the Secretary of Defense issued Defense 

Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, 

and Reconstruction Operations, committing the military to developing 

and expanding its stabilization capabilities.529 This fundamentally 

transformed the Pentagon’s approach to post-conflict operations, 

adding stabilization operations to the Army’s existing duties to execute 

offensive and defensive operations. 

The directive stated that stability operations are a “core U.S. 

military mission” that should be given priority comparable to combat 

operations.530 In 2009, Defense reissued Directive 3000.05 as an 

instruction to make permanent the military’s responsibility to be ready 

to support civilian agencies in stability operations.531
124

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Despite repeatedly recognizing the centrality of a “civilian lead” for 

SROs, Defense made limited progress in integrating the relevant 

civilian agencies into its approach. It generally conceives of SRO 

work as an aspect of counterinsurgency operations. The civilian 

agencies see post-conflict contingencies as predominantly relief and 

reconstruction endeavors. Creating USOCO could provide a platform 

for the development of an integrated interagency understanding, a 

cultural rapprochement, and a common terminology applicable to 

future SROs.

Reaching for More Reform: NSPD 44

In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security 

Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning 

Reconstruction and Stabilization, stating that “reconstruction and 

stabilization are more closely tied to foreign policy leadership and 

diplomacy than to military operations.”535 Through this order, the 

President sought to set in motion a process for improving the 

coordination, planning, and implementation of U.S. government 

stabilization and reconstruction missions. 

Although a sensible response to observed organizational weaknesses, 

the President’s directive foundered on the shoals of competing 

interagency interests. For example, NSPD 44 charged the Secretary 

of State with leading the development of a strong stability and 

reconstruction response mechanism and ordered State and Defense 

to “integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with 

military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”536 This did 

not happen.

State’s S/CRS played no role in Iraq (and it only intermittently 

deployed small numbers of personnel to Afghanistan).537 Despite 

the White House’s reform impetus, State and Defense failed to 

integrate civilian SRO systems with military capabilities. State’s role in 

managing the reconstruction of Iraq ebbed and flowed in cycles driven 

by the personalities involved, with State frequently on the losing end of 

arguments, notwithstanding the President’s directive.

Authority Is Not Action: RSCMA 

and Dual Key Approaches

The 2009 National Defense Authorization Act enacted the 

Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 

2008.538 Elaborating on S/CRS’s original mandate, the RSCMA 

assigned chief responsibility for planning and managing the civilian 

response to overseas contingencies to State through S/CRS. Though 

RSCMA provided S/CRS ample authority, the Administration did 

not implement very many of its provisions. For example, it failed 

to nominate a coordinator for Senate confirmation, indicating an 

apparent lack of confidence in and commitment to S/CRS’s capacities 

or future.

In a notable effort to promote “jointness,” Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton in 2009 suggesting “a new model of shared responsibility and 

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PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM

pooled resources for cross-cutting security challenges.” The proposal 

envisioned a pooled-funding mechanism, requiring joint approval 

by Defense and State for support of SRO efforts in security, capacity 

development, stabilization, and conflict prevention.539 The “Global 

Security Contingency Fund,” adopted in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, sought to realize this vision. 

As of January 2013, while Nigeria, Philippines, Bangladesh, Libya, 

Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia had been designated as possible 

recipients of assistance, programs to employ the fund were still 

being developed. 

Reform but Not Integration: State’s Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review 

In its inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, State proposed several new structural reforms to improve 

SRO management. Along with creating CSO, the QDDR’s 

recommendations included:540

R expanding joint civil-military training programs for senior State 

personnel 

R evaluating success in interagency assignments when making 

promotions into State’s senior ranks541

The Review called upon CSO to expand the Civilian Response 

Corps542 and to “enhance” the Civilian Reserve Corps.543 It charged 

CSO with coordinating State’s efforts in conflict prevention, managing 

the rapid deployment of civilian responders, and serving as State’s 

institutional locus for developing SRO policy and operational 

capacities.544 It left opaque CSO’s relations with other agencies, 

including USAID, noting that the bureau would be “working closely 

with [USAID] senior leadership.”545

CSO became operational in April 2012, led by a highly qualified 

assistant secretary, Rick Barton, who possessed the broad mandate 

of acting as the Secretary of State’s senior adviser on “conflict and 

instability.”546 In September 2012, CSO reported that it had “obligated 

$30 million of programming to top-priority countries, expanded the 

contracting capabilities of the U.S. government in places facing crisis, 

and provided fresh talent and customized initiatives to embassies 

in need.”547 It expended 80% of its effort in four areas: Syria, the 

northern tier of Central America, Kenya, and Burma. The balance was 

spread among more than 15 other countries, including Afghanistan, 

El Salvador, Libya, Somalia, and South Sudan.548

Notwithstanding its merits, the CSO solution is incomplete. 

Establishing it was a step toward better coordination, but the new 

bureau provides little impetus toward true interagency integration on 

SROs. While CSO advances State’s thinking and practice about SRO 

management within the Department, it does not ultimately resolve 

existing interagency disconnects. “Stovepiping” continues.

A Plausible Solution 

In recent years, the United States pursued an SRO management 

strategy dubbed “whole of government.” This simultaneously elliptical 

and glib term has yet to generate an operational structure that is either 

comprehensive or coherent. Whole-of-government’s core flaw is that 

everyone is partly in charge, ensuring that no one is fully in charge. 

In 2007, the Interagency Management System became the chief 

coordinative mechanism for addressing SRO issues on a whole-ofgovernment basis. A National Security Council committee chaired by 

the director of S/CRS, the IMS ostensibly provided guidance on issues 

bubbling up from the Iraq and Afghanistan SROs. But, in truth, it had 

limited effect on the actual execution of operations in either theater 

and is now nonoperational. 

Advantages of an Integrated SRO Management Office 

Creating USOCO would knock down stovepipes. Further, it would 

allow Defense, State, and USAID to focus on their core competencies 

while working closely with USOCO on the post-conflict 

reconstruction mission. See Appendix A for a draft USOCO bill.

USOCO would provide these immediate benefits:

R Planning and managing SROs would move from being an 

additional duty at several departments (State, Defense, USAID, 
126

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

continues in Afghanistan because operational responsibilities for 

executing stabilization operations remain diffused across too many 

agencies.550 Consolidating existing systems under one roof would 

induce unity of effort and produce significant savings. 

To ensure operational agility and low overhead, USOCO would 

scale its size according to the needs of the mission at hand. When 

no SRO is ongoing, USOCO’s permanent staff would engage in 

formulating plans and conducting exercises to prepare for future 

activities. The truth, however, is that the United States has been 

engaged in some form of SRO almost every year since 1980. Given 

that history, USOCO should expect no fallow time.

A Solution on the Table: The Elements 

of an Effective SRO Reform Bill 

SROs do not fit easily into any of the “3 Ds”: defense, diplomacy, and 

development. They are executed during unsettled periods, occurring 

between the termination of full-blown conflict and the implementation 

of long-term development. Thus, legislation creating USOCO must 

define SROs precisely. Stabilization and reconstruction operations 

could usefully be described in law as providing a combination of 

security, reconstruction, relief, and development services provided to 

unstable fragile or failing states (see Appendix A).

Clarifying USOCO’s Operational Space. The best institutional 

analogue to USOCO is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Statutorily, USOCO’s operational engagement could roughly mirror 

the approach defined under the Stafford Act, which governs FEMA. 

USOCO’s enabling statute could draw from the Stafford Act’s 

paradigm by tying its operational authority—and the availability of 

emergency funds—to a Presidential declaration.551 In the event of an 

SRO, the President would issue a declaration specifying the SRO’s 

commencement, activating USOCO’s access to SRO funds, and 

outlining the SRO’s geographical and operational parameters. During 

the life of the operation, the USOCO Director’s relationship with the 

Ambassador would be similar to the kind of relationship the USAID 

Administrator has with the Ambassador. USOCO programs and 

projects would harmonize with the State Department’s foreign policy 

and development goals. 

Institutional Changes That USOCO Would Quickly Implement

USOCO would provide the integrated nexus 

for developing SRO solutions by taking these 

actions:

R Draft doctrine. USOCO would develop clearcut SRO doctrine, with the National Security 

Council defining requirements and identifying 

implementing mechanisms. 

R Integrate planning. USOCO would bring 

together all relevant agencies to develop 

integrated contingency plans for SROs. 

R Rationalize budgeting. The National Security 

Council and Office of Management and Budget 

would work with USOCO to develop realistic 

budget requirements for potential contingencies. 

R Incentivize personnel. Existing federal personnel 

regulations would be adjusted to provide stronger 

incentives that rewarded civilian employees for 

accepting temporary deployments in support of 

SROs. 

R Consolidate training. Existing SRO training 

initiatives would be consolidated into an 

interagency training center with a joint curriculum 

modeled on the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command’s Interagency Fellowship Program. 

R Reform contracting. USOCO would implement 

new contingency contracting procedures 

and prescribe a new “Contingency Federal 

Acquisition Regulation” for use across SROs 

by all agencies, which would improve contract 

management in theater and ensure a more 

accountable program. 

R Coordinate with contractors. USOCO would 

provide contractors with a single point of 

contact, simplifying reporting responsibilities and 

improving coordination. 

R Anticipate international involvement. 

USOCO would develop curricula, programs, and 

systems that anticipate international participation 

in future contingency operations. 

R Integrate information technology. USOCO 

would develop a single interoperable IT system 

capable of tracking all relief and reconstruction 

projects in theater. 

R Ensure oversight. USOCO’s structure would 

include an independent Special Inspector General 

for Overseas Contingency Operations who would 

provide effective oversight through audits and 

investigations of all funds used during the SRO. 

Treasury, and Justice) to the primary duty of one agency (USOCO).

R Providing an institutional home for the management of SROs 

would ensure that lessons learned from Iraq become lessons applied 

to future operations.

R The civilian-led office would mitigate the perception that U.S. 

assistance programs have become militarized.

R The proposed structure would eliminate redundancies and save 

taxpayer dollars.

From a fiscal perspective, USOCO makes sense. The cost of 

running the office would be easily covered by the waste averted 

through improved SRO planning.549 As the Commission on Wartime 

Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan reported, unacceptable waste 
127

PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM

USOCO staff would embed within the combatant command 

overseeing the affected theater to ensure close coordination with 

military units on SRO activities. When the need for reconstruction 

support to an overseas contingency operation no longer exists, the 

President would issue a declaration terminating the SRO. USOCO 

would then transfer remaining programs and projects to the 

appropriate entity, presumably the host nation or State/USAID. 

Defining USOCO Leadership and Reporting Requirements.

The President would appoint the USOCO Director, who would have 

Under Secretary rank with the authority to convene meetings with 

the Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense. The Director would 

operate under the general supervision of the Secretary of State and

the Secretary of Defense. This dual-reporting scheme, though rare 

in government, reflects SIGIR’s reporting scheme, which worked 

effectively in the oversight of Iraq’s reconstruction. Both Departments 

have a major role in SROs; thus, both should have a major say in their 

planning and execution. 

Additionally, the Director would report to the National Security 

Advisor so that USOCO’s engagement is woven into the policy 

decision-making process. The office would have robust reporting 

responsibilities to the Congress. Within 30 days after the end of 

each fiscal-year quarter, the director would submit to the appropriate 

committees of the Congress a comprehensive report summarizing 

USOCO’s activities and expenditures for that quarter. Each 

quarterly report would include a detailed statement of all obligations, 

expenditures, and revenues associated with any ongoing stabilization 

and reconstruction operations. 

Consolidating SRO Structures under USOCO. Current SRO 

lines of responsibility, accountability, and oversight are poorly defined. 

To remedy this predicament, USOCO’s enabling legislation would 

consolidate certain aspects of existing agency offices responsible for 

discrete SRO components. The long-term benefits of developing 

an integrated SRO management office decidedly outweigh any 

near-term restructuring costs, which would be partially offset 

through consolidation. 

Institutionalizing Oversight: Special Inspector General for 

Overseas Contingency Operations. An independent inspector 

general office would be an integral part of this reform. A new inspector 

general within USOCO would have the authority to oversee all 

accounts, spending, and activities related to an SRO regardless of the 

implementing agency. This would ensure the uninterrupted supervision 

of U.S. expenditures made during stabilization and reconstruction 

operations, not merely those made by USOCO. The Commission 

on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan recommended the 

creation of just such a permanent inspector general for contingency 

operations with broad authority extending beyond SRO activities.552

Other Statutory Powers. USOCO’s enabling act should empower 

its director to take the following actions: 

R Issue contingency acquisition regulations for use in stabilization and 

reconstruction emergencies.

R Prepare information and financial management systems for use in 

SROs. 

R Establish an interagency training, preparation, and evaluation 

framework for all personnel supporting SROs. 

R Establish a Stabilization and Reconstruction Reserve Fund that 

USOCO would administer during a presidentially declared SRO. 

Arguing for USOCO

Key stakeholders in the U.S. interagency community generally agree 

on the need for robust SRO reform, but dispute continues as to the 

shape such reform should take. State is pressing ahead with the CSO 

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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

With the Iraq experience fresh in mind, circumstances are ripe for 

bold reform. Implementing USOCO could be the means by which the 

hard lessons from Iraq are turned into best practices for future SROs. 

Consolidating existing resources and structures under USOCO would 

achieve money-saving management efficiencies that would avert waste 

and produce real financial savings. Moreover, integrating the planning, 

management, and execution of SROs would ensure that the next time 

the United States undertakes such an operation, those deployed to 

execute the mission will have the mandate, expertise, and resources 

to succeed. 

The bottom line is that creating USOCO would dramatically 

improve the bottom line of our SRO balance sheet, significantly 

increase the likelihood of success in future SROs, better protect U.S. 

national security interests abroad, and strengthen the stewardship of 

scarce taxpayer dollars in the next stabilization and reconstruction 

operation. The need for such reform is great: that next operation may 

soon be upon us. 

solution, but its mandate does not indicate that it will be operating 

aggressively on an interagency level to plan and execute SROs. Others 

argue for creating an independent USAID and giving it the full SRO 

mission. Some support a quasi-independent SRO management entity. 

In discussions with SIGIR, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and former 

National Security Advisor Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft 

endorsed the idea of an independent SRO office like USOCO. So 

did Senator John McCain, former Congressman Bill Delahunt, and 

former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Dov Zakheim. 

Dr. Zakheim’s views carry special weight because he also served on 

the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Ambassador James Dobbins expressed support for creating a USOCOlike entity, but believes it could best operate within USAID. Former 

CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni likes the concept, 

but advocates embedding it within Defense as a combatant-command 

analogue. Housing a new SRO office within State, USAID, or Defense, 

however, leaves unresolved the stovepiping and agency-bias issues. 
129

FINAL LESSONS

7

The foregoing litany of data, interviews, analyses, and history provides a 

substantial and sound basis from which to derive lessons about the Iraq 

reconstruction program. The Iraqis, the recipients of the United States’ 

extraordinary reconstruction largesse, largely lament the lost potential 

that the massive amounts of U.S. aid promised. U.S. senior leaders 

firmly grasp the shortfalls faced in Iraq, absorbing them as lessons 

learned and recognizing the need for improving the U.S. approach to 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. Congressional members 

acknowledged missed opportunities for more oversight but expressed 

approval of varying innovations elicited during the effort and anticipate 

reifying reform proposals that could strengthen future operations. 

This final report from SIGIR, standing as it does upon our prior 

work and girded by the insightful interviews in Chapter 2, provides a 

solid foundation on which to base seven final lessons learned from Iraq. 

1. Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, 

and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during 

stabilization and reconstruction operations.

This lesson suggests a solution to a problem recognized by virtually 

everyone possessing at least a passing familiarity with the Iraq 

program: the current system for managing SROs is inadequate. SIGIR 

previously proposed the creation of the U.S. Office for Contingency 

Operations, whose mission would be the one set forth by this lesson. 

That proposal is reiterated here because no sustainable alternative 

has yet evolved from the agencies. Among others, Senator John 

McCain, former Representative Bill Delahunt, and Dr. Dov Zakheim, 

the former Defense Comptroller and Commission on Wartime 

Contracting member, believe creating such an office would strengthen 

the protection of U.S. national security interests. Ambassador Ryan 

Crocker does as well. Importantly, USOCO would provide clarity 

about who is responsible for planning and executing rebuilding 

activities, truly resolving the dual systemic weaknesses of the Iraq 

program: the lack of unity of command and poor unity of effort. 

Ambassador Christopher Hill noted that the “bureaucratic clash” of 

agency cultures weakened the rebuilding program. Ambitious though 

this proposal may be, the Congress could make it happen. Stabilization 

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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

and reconstruction operations will recur, and the current system for 

their execution is inchoate, at best. The United States is not sufficiently 

structured or prepared for the next SRO. As former Representative 

Delahunt said, creating USOCO or something like it would establish 

a firm planning locus to ensure that it is. Chairman Buck McKeon 

soberly observed that, in Iraq, “we won the war, but we have not won 

the peace.” This is a cri de coeur for reforming the U.S. approach to 

SROs. 

2. Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and 

focus first on small programs and projects.

Grasping this lesson requires defining what “establishing sufficient 

security” means. It is not an absolute. Rather, the injunction anticipates 

that reconstruction decisions will be made along a spectrum of possible 

security conditions. The bottom line in making rebuilding choices is: 

the more unstable the situation, the smaller the project should be. As 

Deputy Secretary of State William Burns said, advancing an ambitious 

rebuilding agenda amid insecure conditions is unwise, but in Iraq, 

enormous projects pressed forward despite an ever-more-aggravated 

security environment—a costly mistake, as General Raymond 

Odierno observed. Limited projects executed in less than perfectly 

stable conditions can have a counterinsurgency effect. But they must 

be sized to the situation and wisely targeted to meet local needs. The 

best CERP projects in Iraq, as General Lloyd Austin acknowledged, 

followed these guidelines. Finally, poor security conditions commonly 

signal a weak rule-of-law system. The United States underinvested 

in strengthening Iraq’s capacity to enforce the rule of law, and this 

contributed to breakdowns that permitted corruption to metastasize 

within the Government of Iraq. Iraq’s top oversight official, Dr. Abdul 

Basit Turki al-Sae’ed, believes that corruption in Iraq has “become an 

institution unto itself.” Indeed, “corruption today is worse than ever,” 

said Baqir al-Zubeidi, a member of the Council of Representatives and 

former Minister of Finance and Interior.

3. Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project 

selection, securing commitments to share costs (possibly 

through loans) and agreements to sustain completed projects 

after their transfer.

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority did engage with Iraqis 

about reconstruction choices. But the common chorus coming 

from virtually all Iraqi leaders interviewed for this report complains 

that consultations by the CPA and its successors were inadequate, 

causing the construction of projects that Iraq did not need or want. 

Ambassador James Jeffrey noted this concern, stating that “there was 

never an impression that the Iraqis were included in any decision 

process” about programs and projects. Ambassador Crocker also 

said that the United States frequently failed to secure “genuine” Iraqi 

buy-in. An important caveat: it may be difficult to distinguish a want 

from a need during an SRO. Notwithstanding that truth, the Iraq 

experience demands a concrete rule: defer to and fully engage with 

the host nation’s authorities when selecting programs and projects. As 

USAID Mission Director Christopher Crowley said, you must define 

what is needed for sustainability at the program’s start. The program’s 

history foists forward two other rules on this score: do not build 

above a country’s capacity, and secure commitments to share costs and 

sustain projects. USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah highlighted the 

benefits that cost sharing eventually produced in Iraq, which included 

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FINAL LESSONS

131

greater buy-in and improved sustainment. In an era of severe domestic 

economic constraint, sharing SRO costs where possible is not just a 

good idea, it is a requirement.

4. Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information 

management systems that all SRO participants use.

Interagency conflicts pervaded the Iraq program. In Senator Claire 

McCaskill’s vivid metaphor, these conflicts sometimes amounted 

to a “circular firing squad.” Good coordination was the exception, 

usually achieved by the serendipitous convergence of complementary 

personalities from different agencies. Serendipity, however, is not a 

strategy; systematic planning is. As suggested by Lieutenant General 

Thomas Bostick, who was present at the beginning and the end of the 

rebuilding program, creating a uniform set of contingency contracting 

regulations would lend coherence and bring efficiency to SRO 

contracting. In Iraq, each agency used its own amended version of the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation, leading to a wide and waste-inducing 

divergence of practice. Similarly, asynchronous personnel assignments 

created interagency friction as reconstruction team members from 

participating agencies arrived and departed on vastly varying 

deployment schedules. Finally, SIGIR’s oversight was made especially 

difficult by the fact that no single database contained all of the 

programs and projects accomplished in Iraq. The Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System, designed to capture this data, was used by some 

agencies but not by others. SIGIR found IRMS to contain only a 

portion of the projects ostensibly accomplished. The fact is we do not 

know all of what we built. If created, USOCO would ensure integrated 

planning on contracting, personnel, and information management 

systems, among other things.

5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation’s 

inception.

As Senator Susan Collins said, SIGIR was created in late 2003 

because the Congress was not receiving the oversight it needed 

from departmental inspectors general. Eventually, SIGIR had over 

50 investigators, auditors, and inspectors on the ground in country, 

and they produced work at a very high rate under quite dangerous 

conditions. Representative Peter Welch acknowledged the need for 

this robust presence, noting that without it, the Congress would have 

been unaware of the challenges the rebuilding program faced. Further, 

General David Petraeus said that “the Iraq experience proved the value 

of oversight.” And General Austin said SIGIR provided the “necessary 

help” that was needed to track the increased appropriations for Iraq’s 

reconstruction. The key structural aspects that helped make SIGIR 

successful were its strong multijurisdictional mandate, exceptional 

employment provisions, powerful audit and investigative powers, and 

sufficient resources. 

6. Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the 

Provincial Reconstruction Team program, that produced 

successes when used judiciously.

As General Petraeus said, there were a number of notable successes 

in the Iraq program. Interior Ministers al-Zubeidi and al-Bolani 

complimented the crucial contributions provided by the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq. General Odierno 

identified the training of the Iraqi Security Forces and the CERP as 

“good investments, successes when compared with some of the other 

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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

in April 2003, when the program apparently, though not yet expressly, 

moved from a “liberate and leave” approach to one of “occupy and 

rebuild.” Rather than effecting a rapid transfer of sovereignty, as 

in Afghanistan, Iraq saw the creation of the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, whose mandate reached, with United Nations’ sanction, 

to the complete governance of the country and whose reconstruction 

program grew to a level several orders of magnitude larger than 

the one approved by the President at the March 10, 2003, National 

Security Council principals’ meeting. Swamped by systemic and 

security problems, the CPA never achieved the capacity to reach 

many of its goals. The rebuilding program then devolved into 

a series of perennial re-evaluations and reprogrammings that 

drove “off-budget” supplemental requests. In retrospect, the Iraq 

reconstruction experience looks like nine one-year programs rather 

than a nine-year program. There are reasons: the volatile security 

situation, the constant rotation of U.S. personnel, the quandaries 

of war-zone contracting, and the ebb and flow of sectarianism in 

Iraq, among others. But, as General Petraeus observed, developing 

a comprehensive understanding of the society, culture, governance, 

and institutions of the host country is crucial to an SRO’s success. 

This fits with what Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides said 

when listing his biggest lessons from Iraq: you must “plan more 

strategically (in five-year, not one-year, increments).” And as Kurdish 

Minister Qubad Talabani said of the Iraq program, there “was 

usually a Plan A but never a Plan B.” All useful and instructive—but 

how and where to do the necessary planning with regard to future 

SROs remains an open question.

programs.” Indeed, CERP and the PRT program both achieved 

significant progress when wisely managed. Lieutenant General Robert 

Caslen stated that the PRTs are “something we have to continue. That 

is one of the huge takeaways from this experience.” The agencies and 

the Congress should study these and other programs that worked 

in Iraq with an eye toward preserving their best aspects for use in 

future SROs.

7. Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated 

fashion, and have backup plans ready to go. 

As Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted, the Iraq program’s early 

phases revealed “a lack of thought” with regard to planning. This was 

perhaps symptomatic of the significant shift in strategy that occurred 

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133

AFTERWORD

The Congress created SIGIR as a temporary organization to oversee 

and report on Iraq’s reconstruction. Its mission was without precedent 

in U.S. history. I have had the rare and very great pleasure of leading 

this modest federal agency from its inception. We have accomplished 

much during our tenure, including:

R 35 Quarterly Reports to the U.S. Congress

R 220 audits, with over $1.61 billion in financial benefits

R 170 inspections

R 82 convictions, with over $191 million in financial results

R 9 lessons-learned reports

R 3 special reports and 1 evaluation

R 35 congressional testimonies

R 34 IG trips to Iraq

Hundreds of thousands served in Iraq carrying out an ambitious and 

challenging program to secure and rebuild that country, and hundreds 

served with SIGIR to oversee and report on those efforts. Ours was 

a special calling executed in accord with the core values I set for the 

organization: professionalism, productivity, and perseverance. 

I thank President Bush and Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell 

for their faith in selecting and appointing me to lead this mission. I 

thank President Obama and Secretaries Rice, Gates, Clinton, and 

Panetta for their support of SIGIR over the years. I thank Generals 

Sanchez, Casey, Petraeus, Odierno, and Austin, as well as Ambassadors 

Bremer, Negroponte, Khalilzad, Crocker, Hill, Jeffrey, and Beecroft 

for their interest in and patience with our work. I thank our reporting 

committees in the Congress for sustainment and follow-through. 

I thank all of those who faithfully served alongside me at SIGIR 

as we carried out our ever-challenging but ever-rewarding mission: 

oversight under fire. I am especially grateful for the long hours and 

hard work put in by my writing and production staff, led by Executive 

Editor Bill Maly, his Deputy Karen Burchard, and Christine BathZachery, Leland Bettis, Michael Diakiwsky, Bradley Larson, Tyler 

Marshall, Kevin O’Connor, Claudia Smith, Bonnie Stephens, 

and Gwendolyn Toops. Learning From Iraq succeeds because of 

their collective commitment to excellence. I also thank my SIGIR 

leadership team for its many contributions to this final report: Deputy 

Inspector General Glenn Furbish, Chief of Staff Paul Cooksey, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits Jim Shafer, Assistant Inspector 

General for Investigations Dan Willkens, Assistant Inspector General 

for Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg, Assistant Inspector General 

for Management and Administration Christopher Williams, General 

Counsel Michael Mobbs, Director of Operations Karl Tool, Executive 

Assistant Dena Nevarez, and Special Assistant to the Inspector 

General Sahar Salem. Finally, and most of all, I thank my wife, 

Adriana, and my children for much love. 
LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

134
135

APPENDIX A: A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE UNITED STATES OFFICE 

FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 

States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Integration Act of 2013’’.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Findings and purposes.

Sec. 4. Construction; severability.

Sec. 5. Effective date.

TITLE I—UNITED STATES OFFICE FOR CONTINGENCY 

OPERATIONS: ESTABLISHMENT, FUNCTIONS, AND 

PERSONNEL

Sec. 101. Establishment of the United States Office for Contingency 

Operations.

Sec. 102. Responsibilities of the Director, Deputy Director, Inspector 

General, and other offices.

Sec. 103 Personnel system.

TITLE II—PREPARING AND EXECUTING STABILITY AND 

RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

Sec. 201. Sole control.

Sec. 202. Relation to Department of State and United States Agency for 

International Development.

Sec. 203. Relation to Department of Defense combatant commands 

performing military missions.

Sec. 204. Stabilization Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Sec. 205. Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund.

TITLE III—RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INSPECTOR 

GENERAL 

Sec. 301. Inspector General.

TITLE IV—RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES

Sec. 401. Responsibilities of other agencies for monitoring and evaluation 

requirements.

Sec. 402. Transition of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Sec. 403. Sense of Congress.

TITLE V—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 501. Authorization of appropriations.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act, the following definitions apply:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—

The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—

(A) the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign 

Affairs, and Oversight and Government Reform of the House 

of Representatives; and 

(B) the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign 

Relations, and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

of the Senate.

(2) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means the Director of the 

United States Office for Contingency Operations.

(3) FUNCTIONS.—The term ‘‘functions’’ includes authorities, 

powers, rights, privileges, immunities, programs, projects, activities, 

duties, and responsibilities.

(4) IMMINENT STABILIZATION AND 

RECONSTRUCTION OPERATION.—The term 

‘‘imminent stabilization and reconstruction operation’’ is a 

condition in a foreign country which the Director believes may 

require in the immediate future a response from the United States 

and with respect to which preparation for a stabilization and 

reconstruction operation is necessary.

(5) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term ‘‘intelligence 

community’’ has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of 

the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(6) OFFICE.—The term ‘‘Office’’ means the United States Office for 

Contingency Operations.

(7) PERSONNEL.—The term ‘‘personnel’’ means officers and 

employees of an Executive agency, except that the term does not 

include members of the Armed Forces.

(8) POTENTIAL STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATION.—The term ‘‘potential stabilization and 

reconstruction operation’’ is a possible condition in a foreign country which in the determination of the Director may require in 

the immediate future a response from the United States and with 

respect to which preparation for a stabilization and reconstruction 

operation is advisable.

(9) STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION EMERGENCY.—The term ‘stabilization and reconstruction emergency’’ 

is a stabilization and reconstruction operation which is the subject 

of a Presidential declaration pursuant to section 103.

(10) STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 

OPERATION.—The term ‘‘stabilization and reconstruction 

operation’’—

(A) means a circumstance in which a combination of security, 

reconstruction, relief, and development services, including 

assistance for the development of military and security forces 

and the provision of infrastructure and essential services 

(including services that might be provided under the authority 

of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

(22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.; relating to the Economic Support 

Fund)), should, in the national interest of the United States, be 

provided on the territory of an unstable foreign country;

(B) does not include a circumstance in which such services should 

be provided primarily due to a natural disaster (other than a 

natural disaster of cataclysmic proportions); and

(C) does not include intelligence activities.

(11) COVERED CONTRACT.—The term ‘covered contract’ 

means a contract entered into by any department or agency, with 

any public or private sector entity, in any geographic area with 

regard to a stabilization or reconstruction operation or where the 

Inspector General of the United States Office for Contingency 

Operations is exercising its special audit or investigative authority 

for the performance of any of the following:

‘‘(A) To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of such area.

‘‘(B) To establish or reestablish a political or governmental 

institution of such area.

‘‘(C) To provide products or services to the local population of the 

area.

(12) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United States’’, when used 

in a geographic sense, means any State of the United States, the 

District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 

Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth 

of the Northern Mariana Islands, any possession of the United 

States, and any waters within the jurisdiction of the United States.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

(1) Responsibilities for overseas stability and reconstruction 

operations are divided among several agencies. As a result, lines of 

responsibility and accountability are not well-defined.

(2) Despite the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization within the Department of State, 
APPENDIX A: DRAFT USOCO BILL

137

the reaffirmation of the Coordinator’s mandate by the National 

Security Presidential Directive 44, its codification with title XVI 

of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2009, the issuance of the Department of Defense 

Directive 3000.05, and the creation of the Bureau of Conflict and 

Stabilization by the Department of State, serious imbalances and 

insufficient interagency coordination remain.

(3) The United States Government has not effectively or efficiently 

managed stabilization and reconstruction operations during recent 

decades.

(4) Based on recent history, the United States will likely continue to 

find its involvement necessary in stabilization and reconstruction 

operations in foreign countries in the wake of violence or 

cataclysmic disaster.

(5) The United States has not adequately applied the lessons of its 

recent experiences in stabilization and reconstruction operations, 

and despite efforts to improve its performance is not yet organized 

institutionally to respond appropriately to the need to perform 

stabilization and reconstruction operations in foreign countries.

(6) The failure to learn the lessons of past stabilization and 

reconstruction operations will lead to further inefficiencies, 

resulting in greater human and financial costs.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are to—

(1) protect the national security interests of the United States by 

providing an effective means to plan for and execute stabilization 

and reconstruction operations in foreign countries;

(2) provide for unity of command, and thus achieve unity of effort, 

in the planning and execution of stabilization and reconstruction 

operations;

(3) provide accountability for resources dedicated to stabilization and 

reconstruction operations;

(4) maximize the efficient use of resources, which would lead 

to budget savings, eliminated redundancy in functions, 

and improvement in the management of stabilization and 

reconstruction operations; and

(5) establish an entity to plan for stabilization and reconstruction 

operations across the relevant agencies, including the Department 

of Defense, Department of State, and United States Agency for 

International Development, and, when directed by the President, 

coordinate and execute such operations, eventually returning 

responsibility for such operations to other agencies of the United 

States Government as the situation becomes normalized.

SEC. 4. CONSTRUCTION; SEVERABILITY.

Any provision of this Act held to be invalid or unenforceable by its terms, 

or as applied to any person or circumstance, shall be construed so as to 

give it the maximum effect permitted by law, unless such holding shall be 

one of utter invalidity or unenforceability, in which event such provision 

shall be deemed severable from this Act and shall not affect the remainder 

thereof, or the application of such provision to other persons not similarly 

situated or to other, dissimilar circumstances.

SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act.

TITLE I—UNITED STATES OFFICE FOR 

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: ESTABLISHMENT, 

FUNCTIONS, AND PERSONNEL

SEC. 101. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

OFFICE FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

There is established as an independent entity the United States Office for 

Contingency Operations, which shall report to the Department of State 

and the Department of Defense.

SEC. 102. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR, DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR, INSPECTOR GENERAL, AND OTHER 

OFFICES.

(a) DIRECTOR.—
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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Office shall be headed by a Director, who 

shall be—

(A) appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 

consent of the Senate; and

(B) compensated at the rate of basic pay for level II of the 

Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, United 

States Code.

(2) SUPERVISION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall report directly to, and 

be under the general supervision of, the Secretary of State 

and the Secretary of Defense. Such supervision may not be 

delegated.

(B) INFORMATION SHARING.—The Director shall report 

to the National Security Advisor keeping the Advisor fully 

and continually informed of the activities of the Office.

(3) FUNCTIONS.—The functions of the Director shall include the 

following:

(A) Monitoring, in coordination with relevant offices and 

bureaus of the Department of Defense, the Department 

of State, and the United States Agency for International 

Development, political and economic instability worldwide in 

order to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and 

international assistance for the stabilization and reconstruction 

of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or in transition from, 

conflict or civil strife.

(B) Assessing the various types of stabilization and reconstruction 

crises that could occur and cataloging and monitoring the 

military and non-military resources, capabilities, and functions 

of agencies that are available to address such crises.

(C) Pre-intervention assessment and planning and postintervention evaluation of strategies to achieve US interests 

and objectives through such activities as demobilization, 

disarmament, capacity building, rebuilding of civil society, 

policing and security sector reform, and monitoring and 

strengthening respect for human rights that commonly arise in 

stabilization and reconstruction crises.

(D) Developing, in coordination with all relevant agencies, 

stabilization plans and procedures to mobilize and deploy 

civilian and military personnel to conduct stabilization and 

reconstruction operations.

(E) Coordinating with counterparts in foreign governments 

and international and nongovernmental organizations on 

stabilization and reconstruction operations to improve 

effectiveness and avoid duplication.

(F) Aiding the President, as the President may request, in 

preparing such rules and regulations as the President 

prescribes, for the planning, coordination, and execution of 

stabilization and reconstruction operations.

(G) Advising the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 

Defense, as the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense 

may request, on any matters pertaining to the planning, 

coordination, and execution of stabilization and reconstruction 

operations.

(H) Planning and conducting, in cooperation with the Secretary 

of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 

International Development, the Secretary of Defense, and 

commanders of unified combatant commands or specified 

combatant commands, a series of exercises to test and evaluate 

doctrine relating to stabilization and reconstruction operations 

and procedures to be used in such operations.

(I) Executing, administering, and enforcing laws, rules, and 

regulations relating to the preparation, coordination, and 

execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

(J) Administering such funds as may be appropriated or otherwise 

made available for the preparation, coordination and execution 

of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

(K) Planning for the use of contractors who will be involved in 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

(L) Prescribing standards and policies for project and financial 

reporting for all agencies involved in stabilization and 

reconstruction operations under the direction of the Office 

to ensure that all activities undertaken by such agencies are 

appropriately tracked and accounted for.

(M) Establishing an interagency training, preparation, and 

evaluation framework for all personnel deployed, or who may 
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139

be deployed, in support of stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. Such training and preparation shall be developed 

and administered in partnership with such universities, 

colleges, or other institutions (whether public, private, or 

governmental) as the Director may determine and which agree 

to participate.

(4) RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR FOR 

ASSESSMENT, MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

REQUIREMENTS.—

 (A) Assessment.—The Director shall draw upon all sources 

of information and intelligence within the government to 

develop a common understanding of the causes of the conflict 

and the salient impediments to stabilization as a guide to 

subsequent planning. 

(B) Monitoring.—The Director shall establish, in coordination 

with the agencies involved in the SRO, measures for 

determining whether the programs and activities they are 

implementing are achieving US objectives. The Director 

shall have the authority to direct up to 5% of the amount 

of program expenditures for assessment, monitoring and 

evaluation purposes.

(C) EVALUATIONS.—The Director shall plan and conduct 

evaluations of the impact of stabilization and reconstruction 

operations carried out by the Office.

(D) REPORTS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the 

end of each fiscal-year quarter, the Director shall submit 

to the appropriate congressional committees a report 

summarizing all stabilization and reconstruction operations 

that are taking place under the supervision of the Director 

during the period of each such quarter and, to the extent 

possible, the period from the end of each such quarter to 

the time of the submission of each such report. Each such 

report shall include, for the period covered by each such 

report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, 

and revenues associated with such stabilization and 

reconstruction operations, including the following:

 (I) Obligations and expenditures of appropriated 

funds.

(II) A project-by-project and program-by-program 

accounting of the costs incurred to date for the 

stabilization and reconstruction operation that 

are taking place, together with the estimate of any 

department or agency that is undertaking a project 

in or for the stabilization and reconstruction of such 

country, as applicable, of the costs to complete each 

project and each program.

(III) Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds 

provided by foreign countries or international 

organizations, and any obligations or expenditures of 

such revenues.

(IV) Revenues attributable to or consisting of 

foreign assets seized or frozen, and any obligations or 

expenditures of such revenues.

(V) An analysis on the impact of stabilization and 

reconstruction operations overseen by the Office, 

including an analysis of civil-military coordination with 

respect to the Office.

(ii) FORM.—Each report under this subsection may 

include a classified annex if the Director determines 

such is appropriate.

(iii) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing 

in this paragraph shall be construed to authorize the 

public disclosure of information that is specifically 

prohibited from disclosure by any other provision 

of law, specifically required by Executive order to be 

protected from disclosure in the interest of national 

defense or national security or in the conduct of foreign 

affairs, or a part of an ongoing criminal investigation.

(b) DEPUTY DIRECTOR.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There shall be within the Office a Deputy 

Director, who shall be—

(A) appointed by the President; and

(B) compensated at the rate of basic pay for level III of the Execu-
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tive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States 

Code.

(2) FUNCTIONS.—The Deputy Director shall perform such 

functions as the Director may from time to time prescribe, 

and shall act as Director during the absence or disability of the 

Director or in the event of a vacancy in the Office of the Director. 

(d) FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT.—

(1) DECLARATION.—The President may, if the President 

finds that the circumstances and national security interests 

of the United States so require, declare that a stabilization 

and reconstruction emergency exists and shall determine the 

geographic extent and the date of the commencement of 

such emergency. The President may amend the declaration as 

circumstances warrant.

(2) TERMINATION.—If the President determines that a 

stabilization and reconstruction emergency declared under 

paragraph (1) is or will no longer be in existence, the President 

may terminate, immediately or prospectively, a prior declaration 

that such an emergency exists.

(3) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.—Declarations 

under this subsection shall be published in the Federal Register.

(e) AUTHORITIES OF OFFICE FOLLOWING PRESIDENTIAL 

DECLARATION.—If the President declares a stabilization and 

reconstruction emergency pursuant to subsection (d), the President may 

delegate to the Director the authority to coordinate all Federal efforts 

with respect to such stabilization and reconstruction emergency, including 

the authority to direct any Federal agency to support such efforts, with or 

without reimbursement.

SEC. 104. PERSONNEL SYSTEM.

(a) PERSONNEL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director may select, appoint, and employ 

such personnel as may be necessary for carrying out the duties 

of the Office, subject to the provisions of title 5, United States 

Code, governing appointments in the excepted service, and the 

provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such 

title, relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, 

and may exercise the authorities of subsections (b) through (i) of 

section 3161 of title 5, United States Code (to the same extent 

and in the same manner as those authorities may be exercised by 

an organization described in subsection (a) of such section). In 

exercising the employment authorities under subsection (b) of 

such section 3161, paragraph (2) of such subsection (relating to 

periods of appointments) shall not apply.

(2) SUBDIVISIONS OF OFFICE; DELEGATION OF 

FUNCTIONS.—The Director may establish bureaus, offices, 

divisions, and other units within the Office. The Director may 

from time to time make provision for the performance of any 

function of the Director by any officer or employee, or office, 

division, or other unit of the Office.

(3) REEMPLOYMENT AUTHORITIES.—The provisions of 

section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, shall apply with 

respect to the Office. For purposes of the preceding sentence, such 

provisions shall be applied—

(A) by substituting ‘‘the United States Office for Contingency 

Operations’’ for ‘‘the Department of Defense’’ each place it 

appears;

(B) by substituting ‘‘the Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011’’ for ‘‘the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 

(Public Law 108–136)’’ in paragraph (2)(A) thereof; and

(C) by substituting ‘‘the Director of the United States Office for 

Contingency Operations’’ for ‘‘the Secretary’’ in paragraph (4) 

thereof.

(b) INTERIM OFFICERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may authorize any persons who, 

immediately prior to the effective date of this Act, held positions 

in the Executive Branch of the Government, to act as Director, 

Deputy Director, Associate Director, and Inspector General 
APPENDIX A: DRAFT USOCO BILL

141

of the Office until such positions are for the first time filled in 

accordance with the provisions of this Act .

(2) COMPENSATION.—The President may authorize any such 

person described in paragraph (1) to receive the compensation 

attached to the Office in respect of which such person so serves, in 

lieu of other compensation from the United States.

(c) CONTRACTING SERVICES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director may obtain services of experts 

and consultants as authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United 

States Code.

(2) ASSISTANCE.—To the extent and in such amounts as may be 

provided in advance by appropriations Acts, the Inspector General 

may enter into contracts and other arrangements for audits, 

studies, analyses, and other services with public agencies and with 

private persons, and make such payments as may be necessary to 

carry out the duties of the Inspector General.

(d) INCENTIVIZING EXPERTISE IN PERSONNEL 

TASKED FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 

OPERATIONS.—

(1) STUDY.—The Director shall commission a study to measure 

the effectiveness of personnel in stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. The study shall seek to identify the most appropriate 

qualifications for personnel and incentive strategies for agencies 

to effectively recruit and deploy employees to support stabilization 

and reconstruction operations.

 (2) The Office shall apply preferences promoting the employment of 

veterans and the use of veteran-owned businesses. 

(3) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

that, in the selection and appointment of any individual for a 

position both within the Office and other agencies in support 

of stabilization and reconstruction operations, due consideration 

should be given to such individual’s expertise in such operations 

and interagency experience and qualifications.

TITLE II—PREPARING AND EXECUTING STABILITY 

AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

SEC. 201. SOLE CONTROL.

The Director shall have primary management responsibilities over 

relief and reconstruction activities conducted during a stabilization and 

reconstruction emergency declared by the President.

SEC. 202. RELATION TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT.

(a) COORDINATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall, to the greatest degree 

practicable, coordinate with the Secretary of State and the 

Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development 

regarding the Office’s plans for relief and reconstruction activities 

conducted during stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

The Director shall give the greatest possible weight to the views 

of the Secretary and the Administrator on matters within 

their jurisdiction. During a declaration under section 103 of 

a stabilization and reconstruction emergency, the Director 

shall work closely with the Secretary and the Administrator in 

planning, executing, and transitioning operations relevant to their 

respective jurisdictions.

(2) IN-COUNTRY.—During a stabilization and reconstruction 

emergency, the Director shall work closely with the Chief 

of Mission, or with the most senior Department of State or 

Agency for International Development officials responsible for 

the country in which such emergency exists, to ensure that the 

actions of the Office and all the agencies involved support the 

attainment of US interests and objectives and do not conflict 

with the foreign or development policies of the United States.

(b) DETAILING.—The heads of the various departments and agencies 

of the United States Government (other than the Secretary of Defense) 
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shall provide for the detail on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis 

of such civilian personnel as may be agreed between such heads and the 

Director for the purposes of carrying out this Act. The heads of such 

departments and agencies shall provide for appropriate recognition and 

career progress for individuals who are so detailed upon their return from 

such details.

SEC. 203. RELATION TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

COMBATANT COMMANDS PERFORMING MILITARY

MISSIONS.

(a) COORDINATION WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND 

COMBATANT COMMANDS.—To the greatest degree practicable, the 

Director shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and commanders 

of unified and specified combatant commands established under section 

161 of title 10, United States Code, regarding the relief and reconstruction 

plans of the Office for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

(b) STAFF COORDINATION.—The Director shall detail personnel 

of the Office to serve on the staff of a combatant command to assist 

in planning when a military operation will involve likely Armed 

Forces interaction with non-combatant populations, so that plans for a 

stabilization and reconstruction operation related to a military operation—

(1) complement the work of military planners; and

(2) as provided in subsection (c), ease interaction between civilian 

direct-hire employees and contractors in support of the 

stabilization and reconstruction operation and the Armed Forces.

(c) LIMITATIONS.—

(1) DIRECTOR.—The authority of the Director shall not extend 

to small-scale programs (other than economic development 

programs of more than a de minimis amount) designated by the 

Secretary of Defense as necessary to promote a safe operating 

environment for the Armed Forces or other friendly forces.

(2) MILITARY ORDER.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed 

as permitting the Director or any of the personnel of the Office 

(other than a member of the Armed Forces assigned to the Office 

under subsection (e)) to issue a military order.

(d) SUPPORT.—

(1) ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.—The commanders of combatant 

commands shall provide assistance, to the greatest degree 

practicable, to the Director and the personnel of the Office as they 

carry out their responsibilities.

(2) PERSONNEL.—The Secretary of Defense shall provide for 

the detail or assignment, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable 

basis, to the staff of the Office of such Department of Defense 

personnel between the Secretary and the Director as necessary to 

carry out the duties of the Office.

SEC. 204. STABILIZATION FEDERAL ACQUISITION 

REGULATION.

(a) REQUIREMENT TO PRESCRIBE STABILIZATION 

FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.—The Director, 

in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget, shall prescribe a Stabilization Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

The Regulation shall apply, under such circumstances as the Director 

prescribes, in lieu of the Federal Acquisition Regulation with respect 

to contracts intended for use in or with respect to stabilization and 

reconstruction emergencies or in imminent or potential stabilization and 

reconstruction operations.

(b) PREFERENCE TO CERTAIN CONTRACTS.—It is the sense of 

Congress that the Stabilization Federal Acquisition Regulation required 

by subsection (a) should include provisions requiring an agency to give 

a preference to contracts that appropriately, efficiently, and sustainably 

implement programs and projects undertaken in support of a stabilization 

and reconstruction operation.

(c) DEADLINE.—The Director shall prescribe the Stabilization Federal 

Acquisition Regulation required by subsection (a) by the date occurring 

one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. If the Director does 

not prescribe the Regulation by that date, the Director shall submit to 

Congress a statement explaining why the deadline was not met.
APPENDIX A: DRAFT USOCO BILL

143

reconstruction operation is taking place, other foreign government 

partners, international organizations, and local nongovernmental 

organizations throughout the planning, implementation, and particularly 

during the transition stages of such operations to facilitate long term 

capacity building and sustainability of initiatives.

TITLE III—RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL

SEC. 301. INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There shall be within the Office an Office of the 

Inspector General, the head of which shall be the Inspector General of the 

United States Office for Contingency Operations (in this Act referred to 

as the ‘‘Inspector General’’), who shall be appointed as provided in section 

3(a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).

(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONAL 

AUTHORITIES.—The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) 

is amended—

(1) in section 12— 

(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘, or the United States Office 

for Contingency Operations’’ after ‘‘the Director of the Federal 

Housing Finance Agency’’; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ‘‘the United States Office for 

Contingency Operations,’’ after ‘‘the Federal Housing Finance

(2) in section 8J, by striking ‘‘8E or 8F’’ and inserting ‘‘8E, 8F, or 8M’’; 

(3) by inserting after section 8L the following new section:

‘‘SEC. 8M. SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE 

FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

‘‘(a) SPECIAL AUDIT AND INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—When directed by the President, or 

otherwise provided by law, and in addition to the other duties and 

responsibilities specified in this Act, the Inspector General of the 

United States Office for Contingency Operations—shall, with 

SEC. 205. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There is established in the Treasury of the United 

States a fund, to be known as the ‘‘Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Emergency Reserve Fund,’’ to be administered by the Director at the 

direction of the President and with the consent of the Secretary of State 

and the Secretary of Defense for the following purposes with respect to a 

stabilization and reconstruction operation.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—

(1) PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTION.—At the time the President 

directs the Director to carry out or support an activity described 

in subsection (a), the President shall transmit to appropriate 

congressional committees a written notification of such direction.

(2) ACTIVITIES IN A COUNTRY.—Not less than 15 days before 

carrying out or supporting an activity described in subsection 

(a), the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees information related to the budget, implementation 

timeline (including milestones), and transition strategy with 

respect to such activity and the stabilization or reconstruction 

operation at issue.

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

authorized to the appropriated to the fund established under subsection 

(a) such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes specified in 

such subsection. Such sums—

(1) shall be available until expended;

(2) shall not be made available for obligation or expenditure until the 

President declares a stabilization and reconstruction emergency 

pursuant to section 103; and

(3) shall be in addition to any other funds made available for such 

purposes.

SEC. 206. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that, to the extent possible, the Director 

and staff should partner with the country in which a stabilization and 
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nongovernmental entities; and

‘‘(E) the maintenance of records on the use of such funds to 

facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such 

funds.

‘‘(2) SYSTEMS, PROCEDURES, AND CONTROLS.—The 

Inspector General of the United States Office for Contingency 

Operations shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems, 

procedures, and controls as such Inspector General considers 

appropriate to discharge the duty under paragraph (1).

‘‘(c) PERSONNEL AUTHORITY.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Inspector General of the United States 

Office for Contingency Operations may select, appoint, and 

employ such officers and employees as may be necessary for 

carrying out the functions, powers, and duties of the Office, 

subject to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing 

appointments in the excepted service, and the provisions of 

chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title, relating 

to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

‘‘(2) EMPLOYMENT AUTHORITY.—The Inspector General 

of the United States Office for Contingency Operations may 

exercise the authorities of subsections (b) through (i) of section 

3161 of title 5, United States Code (without regard to subsection 

(a) of that section). In exercising the employment authorities 

under subsection (b) of section 3161 of title 5, United States 

Code, as provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, 

paragraph (2) of such subsection (b) (relating to periods of 

appointments) shall not apply.

‘‘(3) EXEMPTION.—Section 6(a)(7) shall not apply with respect 

to the Inspector General of the United States Office for 

Contingency Operations.

‘‘(4) REPORTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THIS ACT.— In 

addition to reports otherwise required to be submitted under this 

subsection, the Inspector General of the United States Office 

for Contingency Operations— may issue periodic reports of a 

similar nature to the quarterly reports submitted under paragraph 

(1) with respect to activities subject to the special audit and 

investigative authority of such Inspector General under subsection 

(a).

regard to the reconstruction and stabilization operations under the 

supervision of the Director have audit and investigative authority 

over all accounts, spending, programs, projects, and activities 

undertaken with respect to such reconstruction and stabilization 

operations of agencies of the United States Government without 

regard to the agency carrying out such operations.

‘‘(3) ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS.—In any case in 

which the Inspector General of the United States Office for 

Contingency Operations is exercising or preparing to exercise 

special audit and investigative authority under this subsection, 

the head of any department or agency undertaking or preparing 

to undertake the activities described in paragraph (2) shall 

provide such Inspector General with appropriate and adequate 

office space within the offices of such department or agency 

or at appropriate locations of that department or agency 

overseas, together with such equipment, office supplies, and 

communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the 

operation of such offices, and shall provide necessary maintenance 

services for such offices and the equipment and facilities located 

therein.

‘‘(b) ADDITIONAL DUTIES.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—It shall be the duty of the Inspector General 

of the United States Office for Contingency Operations to 

conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the 

treatment, handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated 

or otherwise made available for activities to be carried out by or 

under the direction or supervision of the Director of the United 

States Office for Contingency Operations, or for activities subject 

to the special audit and investigative authority of such Inspector 

General under subsection (a), and of the programs, operations, 

and contracts carried out utilizing such funds, including—

‘‘(A) the oversight and accounting of the obligation and 

expenditure of such funds;

‘‘(B) the monitoring and review of activities funded by such funds;

‘‘(C) the monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds;

‘‘(D) the monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and 

associated information between and among departments, 

agencies, and entities of the United States, and private and 
APPENDIX A: DRAFT USOCO BILL

145

(1) on-going evaluations of the impact of agency activities on the 

stabilization and reconstruction operation , using the measures 

developed by the Director in consultation with the agencies 

involved, , including an assessment of interagency coordination in 

support of such operation;

(2) any information the Director requests, including reports, 

evaluations, analyses, or assessments, to permit the Director to 

satisfy the quarterly reporting requirement under section 103(a)

(4); and

(3) an identification, within each such agency, of all current and 

former employees skilled in crisis response, including employees 

employed by contract, and information regarding each such 

agency’s authority mechanisms to reassign or reemploy such 

skilled personnel and mobilize rapidly associated resources in 

response to such operation. 

TITLE V—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 501. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to 

carry out this Act for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2016. Any amounts 

appropriated to carry out this Act shall remain available until expended.

‘‘(6) FORM OF SUBMISSION.—Each report under this 

subsection may include a classified annex if the Inspector General 

of the United States Office for Contingency Operations considers 

it necessary.

‘‘(7) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.—

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the 

public disclosure of information that is—

‘‘(A) specifically prohibited from disclosure by any other provision 

of law;

‘‘(B) specifically required by Executive order to be protected 

from disclosure in the interest of national defense or national 

security or in the conduct of foreign affairs; or

‘‘(C) a part of an ongoing criminal investigation.

TITLE IV—RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER 

AGENCIES

SEC. 401. RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES 

FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS.

The head of any agency under the authority of the Director in support of 

a stabilization and reconstruction operation pursuant to section 103 shall 

submit to the Director—
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147

APPENDIX B: TABLES

TABLE B.1

Department of State Programs

Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)

Since 2003, INL has operated programs to train and equip Iraq’s police, including reestablishing a police academy in Baghdad and 

funding international police trainers through the Department of Justice (DoJ). INL’s rule-of-law programs have built capacity in the 

Iraqi judiciary, provided rule-of-law advisors, and funded initiatives such as the Iraqi Justice Integration Project, Major Crimes Task 

Force, and courthouse security upgrades. INL’s Anti-Corruption Coordination Office (ACCO) has coordinated many of these efforts,

including funding of initiatives by UNDP and UNODC to help Iraq implement a national anticorruption strategy that will help it to 

comply with its commitments under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (ratified in 2008), to train IGs, assist COI with 

financial investigations, and work with the Kurdistan Regional Government on budget execution. More than $21 million in ACCO 

programs remained ongoing as of September 30, 2012, including funding for DoJ’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance 

and Training (OPDAT) anti-money-laundering program. Since September 2010, INL has funded the Financial Crimes Training Program,

implemented by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), with $1.9 million of the INCLE. The program 

(expected to run through October 2013) funds an OTA resident advisor, who provides training assistance to enhance the COI’s capacity 

to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute government corruption and related serious financial crimes. The two-year, $1.5 million, 

ESF-funded English as a Second Language Project (Tumooh) was implemented by UNDP through September 2013. INL also supported 

the Iraqi Corrections Service with training programs and other initiatives, including funding $16.8 million for the DoJ’s International 

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which ended in September 2012 and transitioned its work to UNODC.

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Most programs supported internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Iraq and refugees living in Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and 

Egypt. PRM assisted Iraqi refugees and Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders who elected to receive refugee benefits to resettle in the 

United States. Humanitarian initiatives have addressed agriculture and food security, economic recovery and market systems, water 

and sanitation, and hygiene. PRM worked in coordination with USAID’s OFDA. As of September 30, 2012, more than 73,000 refugees 

had resettled in the United States through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program since FY 2007. 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) DRL administered foreign assistance programs intended to support Iraqi governance, human rights, and civil society under the strategic 

goal of governing justly and democratically. They were aimed at providing greater public accountability and freedom of expression, 

as well as religious freedom. DRL grant projects supported war widows, strengthened human rights prosecution, supported women’s

political and economic empowerment, assessed knowledge and attitudes regarding gender-based violence, and supported freedom of 

the press and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community.

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs The bureau served as the principal link between DoS and DoD to facilitate U.S./Coalition military operations with a mission to use 

diplomacy and military power to foster a stable and secure international environment receptive to American values and interests. 

Funded by DoS’s NADR account, the Bureau’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has managed the Conventional Weapons 

Destruction (CWD) program in Iraq since 2003, working on clearance and safe disposal of landmines, unexploded ordnance, and excess 

conventional weapons and munitions. As of September 30, 2012, approximately $22 million in NADR-funded contracts were ongoing, 

employing 609 program personnel (98% Iraqi) and 177 security contractors.

Office of Export Control Cooperation The office assisted the GOI in developing trade control systems; helped to ensure those systems met existing international standards; 

and built capacity to detect, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms. 

During FY 2009–FY 2012, the $4 million Export Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) program worked with GOI to deploy 

TRACKER software system to improve ability to control exports of sensitive items.
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TABLE B.2

Other Civilian Agency Programs

Department of 

Justice (DoJ)

The Office of the Justice Attaché coordinated a number of anticorruption, rule-of-law, and corrections programs via the OPDAT 

program, the FBI Legal Attaché, and the ICITAP program. DoJ supported the Iraqi Corrections Service from 2003 through 2011 to build 

30 prisons that house 20,000 inmates and employ more than 12,000 staff. DoJ’s Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) addressed complex 

crimes and terrorist activity. The International Contract Corruption Task Force; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. 

Marshals; Regime Crimes Liaison Office; and Drug Enforcement Agency each played supporting roles.

Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS)

The DHS Attaché coordinated services to assess operations and security for borders and ports of entry (land, sea, and air) and provided 

infrastructure protection, terrorist financing investigations, and naturalization services to U.S. military members. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement officials advised and mentored primarily Iraq’s Federal Information and Investigations Agency and Customs 

Police on the issues of human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, and financial crimes. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provided nonintrusive inspections equipment to GOI customs inspectors. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) worked with the GOI to improve port security 

and with the Department of Transportation (DoT) Attaché to bring the Port of Umm Qasr into compliance with the International Ship 

and Port Facility Security Code. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service has interviewed Iraqi refugee applicants who have worked 

for the U.S. government, U.S. military, or a U.S.-affiliated media or non-governmental organization to determine whether they qualify 

for consideration for resettlement in the United States.

Department of 

the Treasury 

The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) conducted activities to develop modern financial, budgetary, banking, and 

taxation policies and provide limited assistance to Iraq’s Commission on Integrity. OTA’s Economic Crimes Team shifted from working 

with the Central Bank of Iraq on anti-money-laundering activities to support the COI with case management and modern financial 

analysis. The Revenue Team worked on a series of reforms to broaden Iraq’s tax base and formulate filing requirements and penalties 

for non-compliance. The Banking Team assisted the GOI with restructuring state-owned banks and automating data systems. The Budget 

Team worked with Iraq’s Ministry of Finance and other GOI entities on budget planning and execution. These other Treasury offices also 

supported work in Iraq: the Office of International Affairs, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Financial Management Service, 

Internal Revenue Service, and Office of the General Counsel.

Department of 

Transportation (DoT)

The Office of Transportation Attaché at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad worked with the GOI—in particular, the Ministry of Transportation—on 

reforming and modernizing its transportation regulations and infrastructure to bring them into line with international norms, thereby 

improving Iraqi access to global markets. Staff included the Senior Aviation Advisor and Maritime/Ports Advisor. DoT supported delivery 

of the $17.3 million U.S.-funded Computer Based Train Control System and training and certification of Iraq’s air-traffic controllers. 

Department of 

Commerce

Commerce once had a staff of six in Baghdad, but one was killed, and several of the Iraqi employees resigned because they were 

threatened. Commerce has worked to assist U.S. businesses to gain entry to and succeed in the Iraqi market. Commerce compiled due 

diligence reports for U.S. firms on potential Iraqi partners and worked with small and medium enterprises based in the United States to 

assess their suitability for the Iraqi market and assist them to obtain the information and licensing. Commerce facilitated advocacy cases 

to gain contracts for firms when it served the U.S. national interest. 

Department of 

Agriculture (USDA)

The Office of Agricultural Affairs (OAA) at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad performed outreach to farmers through the PRT program from 2009

to 2011, then transitioned to engagement with senior officials at the Ministry of Agriculture to offer policy advice and assist in resolving 

issues that arose after implementation of new import regulations. The USDA has sponsored training under the Cochran and Borlaug

Fellowship programs, and OAA has supported veterinary medicine initiatives.

Department of 

Health and Human Services

Although one of the five agencies authorized apportionments of the IRRF, the department did not receive any. The department’s $1

million SAMHSA mental health and substance-abuse prevention program for Iraq provided outreach services in 2011 and 2012.

Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) Since commencement of work in Iraq in July 2010, the Ex-Im Bank provided more than $45.1 million in loans, guarantees, or insurance 

policies for at least four U.S. companies providing services in Iraq. 

Overseas Private 

Investment Corporation (OPIC)

OPIC facilitated U.S. private investment in Iraq by offering political risk insurance, investment guarantees, and direct loans. It focused on 

stimulating economic development in Iraq by sponsoring lending facilities (such as the Iraq Middle Market Development Foundation, 

funded by $330,000) that have provided loans to credit-worthy businesses and Iraqi private-sector institutions, and providing Iraqi 

limited liability corporations funding to support small-and-medium-enterprise and microfinance portfolios in Iraq. 

U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) USIP undertook peacekeeping efforts in Iraq with $10 million provided by the IRRF 2. DRL provided funding for USIP’s work to support 

formation of the Iraqi Constitution and address women’s issues. 
149

APPENDIX B: TABLES

TABLE B.3 

U.S. Appropriated Funds 

$ Millions 

P.L. 108-7, 

P.L. 108-11

P.L. 108-106, 

P.L. 108-287 P.L. 109-13

P.L. 109-102, 

P.L. 109-148, 

P.L. 109-234

P.L. 109-289, 

P.L. 110-5, 

P.L. 110-28

P.L. 110-92, 

P.L. 110-116, 

P.L. 110-137, 

P.L. 110-149, 

P.L. 110-161, 

P.L. 110-252

P.L. 110-252, 

P.L. 111-32

P.L. 111-117, 

P.L. 111-118, 

P.L. 111-212 P.L. 112-10 P.L. 112-74

FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Total 

Appropriated Obligated Expended Expired

Major Funds

Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund 

(IRRF 1 and IRRF 2)

 2,475 18,389 20,864 20,343 20,076 504 

Iraq Security Forces Fund 

(ISFF) 5,490 3,007 5,542 3,000 1,000 1,000 1,155 20,194 19,569 18,762 625 

Economic Support Fund 

(ESF) 1,469 1,554 562 542 383 326 299 5,134 4,578 4,199 260 

Commander's Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) 140 718 708 750 767 747 245 44 4,119 3,728 3,728 391 

International Narcotics 

Control and Law 

Enforcement (INCLE)

 91 170 85 20 702 115 130 1,313 1,155 989 

Subtotal 2,475 18,529 6,208 5,276 8,016 4,414 2,309 2,330 1,639 429 51,624 49,373 47,754 1,781

Other Assistance Programs

Migration and Refugee 

Assistance (MRA) and 

Emergency Refugee & 

Migration Assistance (ERMA)

 40 78 278 260 316 280 249 1,501 1,494 1,339 

Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) 850 850 

Natural Resources Risk 

Remediation Fund (NRRRF) 801 801 801 801 

Iraq Freedom Fund (Other 

Reconstruction Activities) 700 700 680 654 

P.L. 480 Food Aid 

(Title II and Non-Title II) 368 3 24 395 395 395 

International Disaster 

Assistance (IDA) and 

International Disaster and 

Famine Assistance (IDFA)

 24 7 45 85 51 42 17 272 261 261 

Democracy Fund (DF) and 

Human Rights & Democracy 

Fund (HRDF)

 190 75 1 266 266 262 

U.S. Contributions to 

International Organizations 

(CIO)

 38 30 33 33 44 179 

Iraq Freedom Fund (TFBSO) 50 50 74 174 86 65 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 

Related Programs (NADR)

 19 16 36 30 30 32 163 62 62 

Continued on the next page
150

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

P.L. 108-7, 

P.L. 108-11

P.L. 108-106, 

P.L. 108-287 P.L. 109-13

P.L. 109-102, 

P.L. 109-148, 

P.L. 109-234

P.L. 109-289, 

P.L. 110-5, 

P.L. 110-28

P.L. 110-92, 

P.L. 110-116, 

P.L. 110-137, 

P.L. 110-149, 

P.L. 110-161, 

P.L. 110-252

P.L. 110-252, 

P.L. 111-32

P.L. 111-117, 

P.L. 111-118, 

P.L. 111-212 P.L. 112-10 P.L. 112-74

FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Total 

Appropriated Obligated Expended Expired

Department of Justice (DoJ) 37 6 11 23 26 8 9 10 4 133 121 119 

Child Survival and Health 

Programs Fund (CSH) 90 90 90 90 

Education and Cultural 

Exchange Programs 7 5 7 7 7 8 5 46 

Overseas Humanitarian, 

Disaster and Civic Aid 

(OHDACA)

 9 15 3 27 27 10 

International Affairs 

Technical Assistance 13 3 16 16 14 

International Military 

Education and Training 

(IMET)

 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 9 6 

U.S. Marshals Service 1 3 2 2 1 9 9 9 

Alhurra-Iraq Broadcasting 5 5 5 5 

Subtotal 2,069 21 20 34 416 602 468 440 380 1,187 5,638 4,323 4,093 

Reconstruction-Related 

Operating Expenses

Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) 908 908 832 799 

Project and Contracting 

Office (PCO) 200 630 830 

Office of Security 

Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) 524 524 

USAID Operating Expenses 

(USAID OE) 21 38 24 79 37 41 48 52 51 54 446 320 286 

DoD OSC-I Support 129 129 

Iraq Freedom Fund 

(PRT Administrative Costs) 100 100 

Subtotal 21 946 24 279 767 41 48 52 180 578 2,937 1,152 1,085 

Reconstruction Oversight

Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 75 24 35 3 44 23 22 20 245 229 222 

Defense Contract Audit 

Agency (DCAA) 16 14 14 13 24 30 111 111 111 

DoS Office of the Inspector 

General (DoS OIG) 1 3 4 6 7 5 9 35 

USAID Office of the Inspector 

General (USAID OIG) 4 2 3 3 7 4 7 29 

DoD Office of the Inspector 

General (DoD OIG) 5 21 26 

Subtotal 4 77 3 46 55 48 67 61 57 29 445 340 333 

Total 4,569 19,573 6,255 5,634 9,255 5,104 2,892 2,883 2,256 2,223 60,644 55,187 53,265 1,781 
151

APPENDIX B: TABLES

TABLE B.4

ISFF: Requests, Justifications, Appropriations, and Earmarks, FY 2005–FY 2011

$ Billions

Request Administration's Budget Justification Appropriation Congressional Earmarks and Restrictions

FY 2005 

Supplemental 

$5.70

Provide assistance to the ISF to enable independent counterinsurgency operations and 

a secure environment; build institutional logistics and training capacity; help field and 

increase capabilities of security and support forces; improve equipment, sustainment, 

and command and control; and provide Quick Response Funding

P.L. 109-13 

$5.49 

Expired 9/30/2006

Provides $5.70, of which $0.21 is transferred to the Army O&M account to reimburse 

for costs incurred to train and equip the ISF; provides broad transfer authority to other 

accounts or agencies to fulfill purpose and provide for contributions to ISFF from 

other governments and international organizations (both requiring notification and 

continuing into future FYs)

FY 2006 

Supplemental 

$3.70

Continue current train-and-equip program, build operational units’ capabilities and 

readiness, and develop institutional logistics and administrative functions

P.L. 109-234 

$3.01 

Expired 9/30/2007

Conference agreement notes that it would not have been possible for the full 

request to be fully obligated and expended in the remaining months of FY 2006 and 

that “the reduction is taken without prejudice”; conference report urges DoD and 

Administration to seek support for the ISF from regional countries

FY 2007 

Regular 

$1.70 Joint regular and supplemental appropriations request to build and sustain ISF 

institutional capability and generate a professional and capable ISF; reorient ISF to 

quell sectarian violence; provide MOD logistics capabilities, combat support units, 

mobility/force protection, and equipment; provide MOI with embedded U.S. advisors

P.L. 109-289 

$1.70 

Expired 9/30/2008

Conference report directs DoD to provide comprehensive financial plans for the ISF 

FY 2007 

Supplemental 

$3.80

P.L. 110-28 

$3.84 

Expired 9/30/2008

Includes funding to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militias; requires OMB to 

submit cost-to-complete reports on a project-by-project basis and an estimated total 

cost to train and equip the ISF

FY 2008 

Regular 

$2.00

Continue ministerial development and advisory functions to enhance Iraqi air and 

naval capabilities; develop IED defeat capabilities; standardize weapons and vehicle 

fleets; support logistics development, primarily at Taji

P.L. 110-161 

$1.50 

Expired 9/30/2009

Includes standard appropriation language for ISFF

FY 2008 

Supplemental 

$1.00

Includes additional FY 2008 appropriation to support adding 100,000 ISF personnel 

“required for Iraq to concurrently secure its borders and conduct COIN operations,” as 

well as to hold areas recently cleared as U.S. forces increasingly assume an overwatch 

mission

P.L. 110-252 

$1.50 

Expired 9/30/2009

Prohibits ISFF to be “utilized for the provision of salaries, wages, or bonuses to 

personnel of the Iraqi Security Forces”

FY 2009 

Bridge 

$2.00

Enable the GOI to improve its ability to manage Iraqi security institutions and increase 

the operational independence of the ISF; support ministerial development, logistics 

and sustainment capacity, equipment replenishment, and equipment for enabler units

P.L. 110-252 

$0.00 

Expired 9/30/2009

Appropriates $1.00, which is later rescinded by P.L. 111-32; FY 2009 bridge funding is 

under a separate heading of the same name as the FY 2008 supplemental funding; 

(the FY 2009 NDAA prohibits ISFF spending on new infrastructure)

FY 2009 

Supplemental 

$0.00

Request to extend the period of obligation for FY 2009 bridge funding through 

9/30/2010 (no new funding)

P.L. 111-32 

$1.00 

Expired 9/30/2010

Rescinds $1.00 in FY 2009 bridge funding and appropriates the same amount to 

remain available until 9/30/2010; does not include authority to transfer ISFF to other 

accounts or agencies; provided in FY 2005–FY 2008; sets limits on “investment unit 

cost” of purchased items

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

$1.00

Strengthen the ISF “to fulfill their vital role” and ensure “no degradation in progress;”

focus on MOD sustainment, including transfer of U.S. equipment, modernization of 

mechanized division, improved asset management, and aircraft sustainment; support 

MOI training and advisory activities

P.L. 111-212 

$1.00 

Expired 9/30/2011

Includes standard appropriation language for ISFF (without authority to transfer 

funds to other accounts or agencies); conference report directs DoD to submit 

monthly commitment, obligation, and expenditure data to the congressional 

committees no later than 30 days after each month

FY 2011 

Regular 

$2.00

Achieve “minimum essential capability” prior to U.S. withdrawal; focus on remaining 

MOD equipment requirements, including divisional-level ISR and signal capabilities 

and full organizational communications and armored transport; continued training of 

defense forces and equipping and sustaining the police

P.L. 112-10 

$1.16 

Expired 9/30/2012

If funds are used for the purchase of any item or service for Iraqi Security Forces, the 

funds may not cover more than 80% of the cost of the item or service; obligations 

cannot exceed $1.00 until the GOI adequately builds the logistics and maintenance 

capacity of the ISF, develops the institutional capacity to manage such forces 

independently, and develops a culture of sustainment for equipment provided by the 

United States or acquired with United States assistance.
152

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

TABLE B.5

ESF: Requests, Justifications, Appropriations, and Earmarks, FY 2006–FY 2012

$ Millions

Request Administration’s Budget Justification Appropriation Congressional Earmarks and Restrictions

FY 2006 

Regular 

$360

Develop economic governance programs and new training; enhance employment 

centers; continue work in legal, fiscal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks for 

private sector; continue agriculture and water resources programs.

P.L. 109-102 

$60 

Expired 9/30/2007 

Not less than $56 shall be made available for democracy, governance and rule-of-law 

programs in Iraq; Conference Report provided $28 for IRI and $28 for NDI; $5 to be 

transferred to the IRRF to support the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund. 

FY 2006 

Supplemental 

$1,489

$675 for PRTs to improve local government capacity, enhance security, and promote 

development; $287 to secure infrastructure; $355 to sustain U.S.-funded projects; $125 

to increase MOF and CBI capacity, transparency, and accountability; $37 for RCLO; $10 

for democracy promotion.

P.L. 109-234 

$1,409 

Expired 9/30/2007

$50 for CAP (of which $5 to be transferred to the Marla Fund); $50 to promote 

democracy, rule of law, and reconciliation (including $10 for IRI, $10 for NDI, and $10 for 

the International Foundation for Electoral Systems). $1,485 was appropriated; P.L.110-

161 later rescinded $76.

FY 2007 

Supplemental 

$2,072

Reform key sectors of the economy, including agriculture; increase commercial lending 

and microfinance; provide business development services; help ministries execute 

budgets; support GOI in improving economic governance; engage political parties, civil 

society organizations, and national political institutions; support independent media, 

national reconciliation, and women’s and human rights.

P.L. 110-28 

$1,554 

Expired 9/30/2008

Funds conditional on certification that Iraq was meeting benchmarks, including 

legislation related to de-Ba'athification, hydrocarbons, and semi-autonomous regions, 

as well as a constitutional review, reduced sectarian violence, improved ISF, and 

implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan; Conference Report allocations include: 

PRTs ($620), CSP ($354), CAP ($95, of which $5 was for the Marla Fund), LGP ($90), and 

the COM fund ($57).

FY 2008 

Regular 

$298

Stabilize strategic Iraqi cities through rehabilitation of community infrastructure, job 

training and vocational education, youth programs, and microloans; improve local and 

provincial governance through PRT projects directed, while continuing governance 

reforms at the national level.

P.L. 110-92, 

P.L. 110-137, 

P.L. 110-149 

$123 

Expired 12/31/2007

Series of Continuing Appropriations extends FY 2007 budget authority through 

11/16/2007 (P.L. 110-92), 12/14/2007 (P.L. 110-137), and ultimately 12/31/2007 (P.L. 110-

149).

P.L. 110-161 

$15 

Expired 9/30/2008

Provides $10 through the Middle East Partnership Initiative to rescue scholars in Iraq and 

$5 to the Marla Fund.

FY 2008 

Supplemental 

$797

Support PRTs; secure infrastructure; generate employment and finance business; 

improve Iraqi ability to sustain projects and execute budgets; fund democracy and 

governance programs ahead of elections and Kirkuk referendum; reform GOI economic 

policies; establish business capital fund.

P.L. 110-252 

$424 

Expired 9/30/2009

Makes funds for most programs conditional on GOI dollar-for-dollar matching; prohibits 

funds for prison construction; makes PRT funding conditional on submission of a DoS 

report detailing plans to wind down and close out PRTs, anticipated costs for PRT 

programming and security, and anticipated placement and costs for future consulates. 

FY 2009 regular appropriations—referred to as bridge funding—become available on 

10/1/2008. FY 2009 

Regular 

$300

Train local leaders in good governance, project implementation, and conflict resolution; 

build ministry capacity in financial management, budgeting, and procurement; support 

political parties and CoR functions; foster civil society and independent media; promote 

macroeconomic reforms, agriculture, and microfinance.

P.L. 110-252 

$103 

Expired 9/30/2009

FY 2009 

Supplemental 

$449

Support elections, civil society, independent media, and political institutions ($112); 

fund LGP ($55) and CAP ($35) to strengthen local governments; support ministerial 

capacity development ($60), Marla Fund ($3.5), and Iraqi widows ($5); promote policy, 

legal, and regulatory reforms ($50); fund PEG ($27.5) to support business development; 

support agriculture ($43).

P.L. 111-32 

$439 

Expired 9/30/2010

Funds conditional on GOI matching; Conference Report allocations included allocations 

to CAP ($50), Democracy and Civil Society ($118), Iraq Cultural Antiquities ($2), Marla 

Fund ($10), the COM’s discretionary fund ($15), and Widows’ Assistance ($5); conferees 

directed greater clarification of democracy and governance programs and expressed 

concern for women and minorities.

FY 2010 

Regular 

$416

Support ministerial capacity (Tatweer) and local government capacity (PRTs and CAP); 

foster civil society and independent media; reintegrate Iraqi refugees and IDPs; provide 

anticorruption and election support; promote sustainable, diversified economic 

growth; pursue economic, legal, and regulatory reforms; build the capacity of economic 

institutions.

P.L. 111-117 

$383 

Expired 9/30/2011

Conference Report allocations included: Democracy and Civil Society ($126), CSP ($50), 

MCD ($50), Iraqi Minorities ($10), and Marla Fund ($5); conferees expressed belief that 

the GOI should fund future ministerial capacity development and directed DoS and 

USAID to consult with the Congress on the process for assessing the benefits versus 

security costs of work in Iraq.

FY 2011 

Regular 

$383

Promote conflict mitigation (QRF); assist in legislative drafting, budget analysis and 

execution, and constituent relations; support community groups in promoting stability, 

providing assistance, and generating employment; provide technical assistance to the 

health care, education, and social services sectors; support agriculture, microcredit, and 

public financial management; promote sound macroeconomic and monetary policies.

P.L. 112-10 

$326 

Expired 9/30/2012

The full-year continuing appropriation for Foreign Operations was made late in the 

fiscal year and was not accompanied by a committee report; according to DoS, the FY 

2011 allocation was the same as its FY 2012 request: $326; DoS submitted a spend plan 

to the Congress on 7/5/2011.

FY 2012 

Regular 

$326

Institutionalize electoral systems that meet international standards; improve 

professionalism, outreach, and responsiveness of political parties, CoR, and provincial 

councils; clarify role of federal government; increase capacity and effectiveness of civil 

society, media, and anticorruption institutions; pursue community conflict prevention 

and reconciliation; improve rule of law and promote human rights; provide technical 

assistance to health and education sectors; support the Marla Fund; promote economic 

growth and job creation.

P.L. 112-74 

$299 

Expires 9/30/2013

Funds conditional on GOI matching; as Iraqi oil revenue increases, the Conference 

Report assumes development and security costs currently funded by the Department of 

State and USAID will shift toward Iraqi responsibility; recommends, at the determination 

of the Chief of Mission, $10 for stabilization programs in Iraq; funds shall not be used for 

cultural programs or for costs usually associated with Department of State operations.
153

APPENDIX B: TABLES

TABLE B.6

INCLE: Requests, Justifications, Appropriations, and Earmarks, FY 2006–FY 2012

$ Millions 

Request Administration’s Budget Justification Appropriation Congressional Earmarks and Restrictions

FY 2006 

Regular 

$26.47

Provide bilateral technical assistance to the MOI and MOJ; assign 

up to five senior advisors to advise on police, border enforcement, 

prosecutors, courts, and prisons; provide advanced and specialized 

training programs; maintain logistics and transportation support

P.L. 109-102 

$0.00

Conference report provides $99.7 for “other programs,” with the 

expectation that DoS will give programs in Iraq the highest priority 

with either FY 2006 INCLE funds or prior year unobligated funds; 

INL reported no appropriations received.

FY 2006 

Supplemental 

$107.70

$100 for construction and renovation of correctional facilities; $7.7 for 

the protection of Iraqi judges

P.L. 109-234 

$91.40

Expired 9/30/2008

FY 2007 

Regular 

$254.60

Strengthen human rights enforcement; promote integration of 

police, courts and prisons; develop anticorruption laws; develop 

legal assistance centers; provide courthouse security enhancements 

and protection for Iraqi judges; fund corrections advisors and INL 

administration and oversight costs

P.L. 110-5

$20.05

Expired 9/30/2009

FY 2007 

Supplemental 

$200.00

Promote judicial security by protecting judges, witnesses, court staff, 

and facilities; train and mentor judges, prosecutors, and judicial 

investigators; integrate various components of the judicial system; 

support anticorruption efforts; construct additional jail/prison beds

P.L. 110-28 

$150.00

Expired 9/30/2008

Funds cannot be used for prison construction.

FY 2008 

Regular 

$75.80

Support programs in development of the criminal justice system, public 

integrity, justice and rule of law; provide administrative oversight

P.L. 110-161 

$0.00

House Appropriations Committee recommends no funding for 

Iraq; no funding ultimately provided.

FY 2008 

Supplemental 

$159.00

Expand judicial and court security, judicial capacity, justice integration, 

and anticorruption assistance to the provinces; continue to expand 

detention facilities

P.L. 110-252 

$85.00

Expired 9/30/2009

Funds cannot be used for prison construction.

FY 2009 

Regular 

$75.00

Provide training, advice, and support to the courts/judiciary and Iraqi 

Corrections Service; maintain administrative oversight

P.L. 111-8 

$0.00

Senate Appropriations Committee recommends $25; no funding 

ultimately provided.

FY 2009 

Supplemental 

$20.00

$9 for judicial training, security, and court administration; $5 for 

subject matter experts to work on police transition planning; $3 for 

rule of law advisors; $3 for program support and oversight

P.L. 111-32 

$20.00

Expired 9/30/2010

Funds are subject to a form of GOI “matching.”

FY 2010 

Regular 

$52.00

Provide training, advising, and support to the courts/judiciary and 

corrections; address problems of corruption and illegal drugs; engage 

Iraqi law enforcement development and reform efforts; provide 

administrative oversight

P.L. 111-117 

$52.00

Expired 9/30/2011

Funds may not be used for new construction.

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

$517.40

Fund start-up costs for the police program, including base camp 

and aviation facility upgrades, security infrastructure, and aircraft 

procurement

P.L. 111-212 

$650.00

Expired 9/30/2012

$450 for one-time start up costs and limited operational costs of 

the Iraqi police program; $200 for implementation, management, 

security, communications, and other expenses related to the Iraqi 

police program.

FY 2011 

Regular 

$314.56

Hire police advisors and managers, contract personnel, and staff 

to develop and implement the police program; provide advanced 

training, capacity building, and standardized procedures for the 

judiciary; continue the deployment of rule-of-law advisors

P.L. 112-10 

$114.56

Expired 9/30/2012

FY 2012 

Regular 

$1,000.00

Support the Police Development Program, including approximately 190 

advisors and an instructor development program, training at regional 

and national Iraqi academies, capacity-building work in the justice 

sector by addressing judicial and courthouse security, administrative 

processes, and investigative practices; funds will also pay for Embassyprovided security and life support, aviation, and other transportation 

operations and maintenance, and personnel recruitment and training.

P.L. 112-74 

$129.60

Expires 9/30/2013
LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

154
155

Acronym Definition

COI Commission of Integrity (previously known as Commission on 

Public Integrity)

COIN counterinsurgency

COM Chief of Mission

CoM Council of Ministers

CoR Council of Representatives

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CPA-IG Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General

CPATT Civilian Police Assistance Training Team

CPI Commission on Public Integrity

CRS Congressional Research Service

CSH Child Survival and Health Programs Fund

CSO Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (State)

CSP Community Stabilization Program

CWC Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan

CWD Conventional Weapons Destruction program

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team

DCAA U.S. Defense Contract Audit Agency

DCC-W Defense Contracting Command-Washington

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

Defense Department of Defense

DF Democracy Fund

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DFI Development Fund for Iraq

DoD Department of Defense

DoD OIG Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Continued next column

ACRONYMS

Acronym Definition

ABO U.S. Army Budget Office

ACC Army Contract Command

ACCO Anti-Corruption Coordination Office (INL)

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (formerly 

the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence)

AFRN Advanced First Responder Network

Ajyal Arabic for “generations” (Education Strengthening Project, 

USAID)

AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq

ARDI Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program for Iraq

BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors

BSA Board of Supreme Audit

C-JTSCC CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command

CAFTT Coalition Air Force Transition Team

CAP Community Action Program

CBI Central Bank of Iraq

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CCC-I Central Criminal Court of Iraq

CEFMS Corps of Engineers Financial Management System

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CENTCOM OIG U.S. Central Command Office of Inspector General

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CIGIE Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency

CIO Contributions to International Organizations

CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force 7

CMATT Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Continued next column
156

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Acronym Definition

IFC International Finance Corporation

IFF Iraq Freedom Fund

IFMIS Iraq Financial Management Information System

IG inspector general

IGC Iraqi Governing Council

IHEC Independent High Electoral Commission

IMET International Military Education and Training

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMS Interagency Management System

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (INL)

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State)

Inma Arabic for “growth” (Agribusiness Program, USAID)

IRI International Republican Institute

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

ISAM Iraq Security Assistance Mission

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund

ISOF Iraq Special Operations Force

ISP Infrastructure Security Protection Program

ISPO Iraq Strategic Partnership Office

ITAM Iraq Training and Advisory Mission

ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office

ITAO/ESD Iraq Transition Assistance Office/Electric Services Division

Izdihar Arabic for “prosperity” (Private Sector Development Program, 

USAID)

JCC-I Joint Contracting Command-Iraq

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

KBR Kellogg Brown & Root

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government

LGP Local Governance Program

LPG liquefied petroleum gas

MAAWS Money as a Weapon System

MBPD million barrels per day

MCD Ministerial Capacity Development

MCTF Major Crimes Task Force

Continued next column

Acronym Definition

DoJ Department of Justice

DoL Department of Labor

DoS Department of State

DoT Department of Transportation

DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (State)

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

ECA Education and Cultural Exchange programs (State)

EIA Energy Information Agency

ERMA Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance fund

ESF Economic Support Fund

EXBS Export Controls and Related Border Security

Ex-Im Export-Import Bank

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FMF Foreign Military Financing

FMR Financial Management Regulation

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FY fiscal year

GAO Government Accountability Office

GDP gross domestic product

GOI Government of Iraq

GRD Gulf Region Division (also Gulf Region District)

H.R. House Resolution

HCA Head of Contracting Activity 

HJC Higher Judicial Council

HRDF Human Rights and Democracy Fund

HSAD Arabic for “harvest” (Harmonized Support for Agricultural 

Research in the Dry Areas, USAID)

IA Iraqi Army

IAO Iraq Area Office (USACE Middle East District)

ICAA Iraq Civil Aviation Authority

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

IDA International Disaster Assistance

IDFA International Disaster and Famine Assistance

IDIQ indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity

IDP internally displaced person

IED improvised explosice device

Continued next column
157

ACRONYMS

Acronym Definition

OUSD(C) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

P.L. public law

PCIE President’s Council for Integrity and Efficiency

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

PDP Police Development Program

PEZ pipeline exclusion zone

PHC primary healthcare center

PIC Provincial Iraqi Control

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (State)

PMO Program Management Office

PRDC Provincial Reconstruction Development Council

PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (State)

PRT provincial reconstruction team

PSC private security contractor

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (State)

QRF Quick Response Fund

RAMCC Regional Air Movement Control Center

RCLO Regime Crimes Liaison Office

RIE Restore Iraqi Electricity (USACE task force)

RISE Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education 

(USAID)

RSCMA Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act

S. Senate bill

S/CRS Department of State Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SIGPRO SIGIR Prosectutorial Initiative

SIV Special Immigrant Visa

SOE state-owned enterprise

SOI Sons of Iraq

SPOT Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker

SRO stabilization and reconstruction operation

State Department of State

TAL Transitional Administrative Law

Tarabot Arabic for “linkages” (Administrative Reform Project, USAID)

Continued next column

Acronym Definition

MIM Ministry of Industry and Minerals

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOE Ministry of Electricity

MOF Ministry of Finance

MOI Ministry of Interior

MOJ Ministry of Justice

MoPDC Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation

MRA Migration and Refugee Assistance fund

MW megawatt

NADR Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCO non-commissioned officer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NDI National Democratic Institute

NEA-I Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs-Iraq (State)

NGO non-governmental organization

NP National Police

NRRRF Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OAA Office of Agricultural Affairs

O&M operations and maintenance

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPA Office of Provincial Affairs (U.S. Embassy-Baghdad)

OPDAT Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Assistance 

Training (DoJ)

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation

ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

OSC-I Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq

OTA Office of Technical Assistance (Treasury)

OUSD(AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Aquisitions, 

Technology & Logistics)

Continued next column
158

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Acronym Definition

USA U.S. Army

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID OIG U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector 

General

U.S.C. U.S. Code

USCG United States Coast Guard

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USF-I U.S. Forces-Iraq

USG U.S. government

USIP U.S. Institute of Peace

USMC United States Marine Corps

USOCO U.S. Office for Contingency Operations

USTDA U.S. Trade and Development Agency

WERC Worldwide Environmental Restoration and Construction 

(AFCEE contract)

WHO World Health Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

WWTP wastewater treatment plant

Acronym Definition

Tatweer Arabic for “development” (National Capacity Development 

Program, USAID)

TBI Trade Bank of Iraq

TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations

Tijara Arabic for “trade” (Provincial Economic Growth Program, USAID)

TNA Transitional National Assembly

Treasury Department of the Treasury

Tumooh Arabic for “ambition” (English as a Second Language Project, State)

UN United Nations

UNAMI United Nations Assistance Misison in Iraq

UNCC United Nations Claims Commission

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

Continued next column
159

 1. GOI, CoR, “Federal Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 

2012,” Articles 1, 2, 36, 2/23/2012, and “Federal 

Public Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2011,” Article 

2, 2/23/2011; GOI, MOF, information provided to 

SIGIR, 6/27/2011; “GOI Budget” (as approved by 

TNA and written into law December 2005); GOI, 

Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly, 

“The State General Budget for 2005,” 2005; GOI, 

MoPDC, “Indicators of the Investment Budget for 

Year 2010,” Table 17, 2011; GOI, “Budget Revenues 

and Expenses 2003, July–December,” 2003; SIGIR, 

Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United 

States Congress, 3/30/2004–4/30/2011; U.S. Treasury, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/4/2008 and 4/9/2009.

 2. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 3/30/2004–10/30/2012; 

CEFMS, ISFF Funds Execution Reports, 10/1/2007 

and 1/8/2008; DFAS, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

1/9/2008–4/10/2009; DoD, Secretary of the Army 

Updates, 8/31/2007 and 9/30/2007; DoS, response 

to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007, and Section 2207 

Reports, 10/2004–10/2008; GRD, Program Review 

Board, 3/3/2007, and responses to SIGIR data calls, 

4/5/2008–7/18/2009; INL, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 1/4/2008–10/16/2012; IRMO, Weekly Status 

Reports, 4/17/2007 and 6/26/2007; IRMS, ESF Cost to 

Complete Reports, 7/5/2007–1/5/2009, and USF-I CERP 

Category Report, 9/20/2010; ITAO, Essential Indicators 

Reports, 10/2/2007–5/14/2009, and responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 10/10/2007–3/29/2009; NEA-I, responses to 

SIGIR data calls, 1/6/2010–10/2/2012; OMB, Section 

2207 Reports, 1/2004–7/2004; OSD, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 7/9/2008–10/2/2012; DoD, Secretary of the 

Army Finance Reports, 12/31/2006–7/8/2007; U.S. 

Treasury, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/6/2007–

4/2/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 7/6/2009–10/1/2012; USACE, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 4/7/2007–10/1/2012; USAID, 

Activities Report, 7/12/2007, and responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 4/6/2007–4/2/2012; USTDA, responses to 

SIGIR data calls, 10/1/2007–4/2/2009.

 3. Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for 

Congress, “Iraq: Paris Club Debt Relief,” 1/19/2005, 

p. 1.

 4. Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for 

Congress, “Iraq: Paris Club Debt Relief,” 1/19/2005, 

pp. 1–5.

 5. SIGIR Audit 11-010, “Sons of Iraq Program: Results 

Are Uncertain and Financial Controls Were Weak,” 

1/28/2011, p. 2.

 6. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting 

and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 35, and Quarterly Reports 

to the United States Congress, 10/30/2011, p. 35, and 

10/30/2012, p. 16.

 7. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, cited in SIGIR, Hard 

Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 2/2009, 

p. 326.

 8. For sources of funding data and authority, see 

endnote 2.

 9. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2010, p. 2.

 10. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and 

Project Management, 3/2007, p. 8.

 11. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 33–34.

 12. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 42–44.

 13. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 26, 49, Iraq Reconstruction: 

Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 

20–21, and Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program 

and Project Management, 3/2007, pp. 24–25.

 14. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 26, 49, Iraq Reconstruction: 

Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 

20–21, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and 

Project Management, 3/2007, pp. 24–25, and Audit 11-

007, “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report 

on Apportionments, Expenditures, and Canceled 

Funds,” 1/25/2011, summary.

 15. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and 

Project Management, 3/2007, pp. 24–25, Hard Lessons: 

The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 2/2009, p. 26, 

and Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and 

Procurement, 7/2006, p. 29.

 16. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting 

and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 29.

 17. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 63–64.

 18. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting 

and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 27, and Audit 11-007, 

“Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report 

on Apportionments, Expenditures, and Canceled 

Funds,” 1/25/2011, p. 4.

. 19. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and 

Project Management, 3/2007, p. 9.

 20. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 64, 69, 73–77.

 21. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 64, 69, 73–77.

 22. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting 

and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 21.

 23. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 82–83, and Iraq 

Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital 

Management, 1/2006, pp. 8–12. See also Section 

3161 in U.S. Code, Title 5, “Employment and 

Compensation of Employees,” which allows hiring for 

temporary services under such circumstances.

 24. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 100–101, 326.

 25. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 100–101, 326, and Iraq 

Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and 

Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 65–66. USAID received $3 

billion of the IRRF 2—one-third of what it requested. 

Most funding went to Bechtel II for a second 

Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 

Program. USAID also issued five democracy-building 

grants to support elections and five cooperative 

agreements under the CAP. OTI got more funding 

under IRRF 2 than IRRF 1 as demands for democracy 

and civic-involvement programs increased.

 26. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 327–328, and Iraq 

Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and 

Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 46–49. Reconstruction plans 

that had just been developed on a two-year timetable 

now had to shift, and the rush began to prepare Iraq’s 

government to stand on its own in seven months.

 27. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and 

Project Management, 3/2007, p. 52.

 28. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 108.

 29. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting 

and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 48–49.

 30. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting 

and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 63–64.

 31. SIGIR Audit 04-013, “CPA’s Contracting Processes 

Leading Up to and Including Contract Award,” 

7/27/2004, p. i.

ENDNOTES
160

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 32. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program 

and Project Management, 3/2007, pp. 81–82, 

and Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 165.

 33. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program 

and Project Management, 3/2007, p. 82.

 34. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 157, 166. 

 35. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 42, 

46, and Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 167.

 36. SIGIR Testimony 05-003, “Statement of Stuart 

W. Bowen, Jr., before the United States House 

of Representatives Committee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations,” 10/18/2005, and Audit 05-029, 

“Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund Activities,” p. iii. 

 37. P.L. 109-13. For the sources of funding data, see 

endnote 2.

 38. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 176–177, 231.

 39. SIGIR Audit 05-028, “GRD-PCO Management 

of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to 

the Iraqi Government,” 1/24/2006, Audit 

06-006, “Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer 

of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Projects to the Iraqi Government,” 4/29/2006, 

Audit 06-007, “U.S. Agency for International 

Development Management of the Transfer of 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects 

to the Iraqi Government,” 4/29/2006, and Audit 

06-010, “Review of the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq Reconciliation of 

the Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund,” 

4/28/2006.

 40. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 330.

 41. SIGIR Audit 05-022, “Managing Sustainment 

for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Programs,” 10/24/2005.

 42. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction

Experience, 2/2009, p. 330.

 43. SIGIR Audit 07-014, “Status of the Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in 

Iraq,” 7/25/2007, p. 1, and Hard Lessons: The Iraq 

Reconstruction Experience, 2/2009, pp. 240–241.

 44. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 241.

 45. SIGIR Audit 09-013, “Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams’ Performance Measurement Process 

Has Improved,” 1/28/2009, p. 2, and Quarterly 

and Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 7/30/2009–1/30/2012.

 46. UN Security Council, press release, “Iraq’s 

Political Transition Increasingly Threatened by 

Inter-Sectarian Violence, Special Representative 

Tells Security Council,” 3/15/2006.

 47. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 295–296, 299, 306.

 48. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2011, p. 66; Babak 

Rahimi, “The Future of Moqtada al-Sadr’s New 

Jaysh al-Mahdi,” USMA Combating Terrorism 

Center, 1/15/2009.

 49. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2010, p. 2.

 50. SIGIR Audit 07-015, “Review of the Effectiveness 

of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program 

in Iraq,” 10/18/2007.

 51. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 330–331.

 52. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2008, p. 2.

 53. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2008, p. 4.

 54. SIGIR Testimony 07-017T, “Statement of Stuart 

W. Bowen, Jr., before the Subcommittee on State, 

Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 

House Committee on Appropriations,” 

10/30/2007, p. 5.

 55. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2008, pp. 36–38.

 56. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2008, p. 5.

 57. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2009, p. 6.

 58. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2010, p. 31.

 59. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2009, pp. 54–62, 

and 10/30/2009, pp. 36–39.

 60. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2009, pp. 54–62, 

10/30/2009, pp. 36–39, and 1/30/2010, pp. 31–33.

 61. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 1/30/2010, p. 33, 

and 4/30/2010, p. 60. USACE had 75 military 

personnel and 290 contractor personnel 

working among its two districts.

 62. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 10/30/2009, pp. 35–36, 

and 7/30/2010, pp. 41–44.

 63. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 4.

 64. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2011, p. 6.

 65. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 18.

 66. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2012, pp. 37, 47–48.

 67. SIGIR Audit 13-001, “Sustaining the Progress 

Achieved by U.S. Rule of Law Programs in Iraq 

Remains Questionable,” 10/25/2012.

 68. SIGIR Audit 13-001, “Sustaining the Progress 

Achieved by U.S. Rule of Law Programs in Iraq 

Remains Questionable,” 10/4/2012, Audit 12-

020, “Iraq Police Development Program: Lack 

of Iraqi Support and Security Problems Raise 

Questions about the Continued Viability of the 

Program,” 7/30/2012, and Quarterly Report to 

the United States Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 32.

 69. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 4/30/2011–10/30/2012. 

USAID’s implementing contractor staffs were 

not always reported in SPOT data received 

by SIGIR. In one quarter, for example, SIGIR 

received direct reporting from USAID that 

indicated the SPOT system did not account for 

approximately 1,700 contractor staff.

 70. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 2, 4.

 71. For the sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 72. For the sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 73. For the sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 74. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 1/30/2010, p. 33, 

and 10/30/2012, pp. 55–58, and Audit 13-003, 

“Development Fund for Iraq: U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers Has Missing Receiving Reports and 

Open Task Orders,” 10/26/2012; IRMS, Global 

Benchmark, 9/3/2012.

 75. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 55–58; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

11/20/2012.

76. For the sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 77. SIGIR Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles 

and Responsibilities of U.S. Government 

Organizations Conducting IRRF-funded 

Reconstruction Activities,” 7/26/2007.

 78. SIGIR Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles 

and Responsibilities of U.S. Government 

Organizations Conducting IRRF-funded 

Reconstruction Activities,” 7/26/2007.

 79. SIGIR Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles 

and Responsibilities of U.S. Government 

Organizations Conducting IRRF-funded 

Reconstruction Activities,” 7/26/2007, and 

Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United 

States Congress, 1/30/2010, p. 24.

 80. OSC-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012. 

81. OSC-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 82. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 29, and 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

10/30/2012, p. 48.

 83. SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Canceled 

Funds,” 1/25/2011; USAID, Bureau for the 

Middle East, Office of Iraq and Arabian 

Peninsula Affairs, information provided to 

SIGIR Audits, 10/23/2012.

 84. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 38.

 85. NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012; USACE, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

and 10/1/2012.

 86. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, 10/30/2009, pp. 40–41, and 

Special Report No. 2, “The Human Toll of 

Reconstruction or Stabilization during Iraqi 

Freedom,” 7/2012.

 87. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2009, pp. 46–47.

 88. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2009, pp. 46–47.

 89. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2009, p. 40.

 90. DoD, OUSD(AT&L), SPOT Program Support, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/2011–10/2012. 

USAID’s implementing contractor staffs were 

not always reported in SPOT data received 

by SIGIR. In one quarter, for example, SIGIR 

received direct reporting from USAID that 

indicated the SPOT system did not account for 

approximately 1,700 contractor staff.

 91. See, for example, SIGIR Audit 07-016, “Interim 

Review of DynCorp International, LLC, 

Spending under Its Contract for the Iraqi 

Police Training Program,” and SIGIR’s Iraq 

Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and 

Procurement. 

 92. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 54.

 93. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 109, 

and Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles 

and Responsibilities of U.S. Government 

Organizations Conducting IRRF-funded 

Reconstruction Activities,” 7/26/2007.

 94. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 57–62.

 95. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program 

and Project Management, 3/2007, pp. 53–55.

 96. SIGIR Audit 04-004, “Task Orders Awarded 

by the Air Force Center for Environmental 

Excellence in Support of the Coalition 

Provisional Authority,” 7/28/2004, p. 5. 

AFCEE was called the Air Force Center for 

Environmental Excellence during the tenure of 

the PMO.

 97. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 66. For 

more on contract management and the costs 

incurred on Phase I and II contracts, including 

lessons learned, see SIGIR Audit 07-009, 

“Review of Bechtel’s Spending under Its Phase II 

Iraq Reconstruction Contract.”

 98. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 56, 63. 

Indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) 

contracts “provide for an indefinite quantity, 

within stated maximum and minimum limits, 

of specific supplies or services” to be furnished 

within an unspecified time period. Under these 

contracts, task orders are issued on either a costreimbursement (e.g., cost-plus) or fixed- price 

basis. Under fixed-price task orders, “payment 

is made to the contractor on the basis of preestablished prices.” Under cost-reimbursement 

task orders, the U.S. government reimburses 

the contractor for all allowable, allocable, and 

reasonable contract costs. Cost-reimbursement 

contracts are typically used in risky situations 

when the U.S. government is unable to provide 

sufficient information for offerors to accurately 

determine a competitive price.

 99. SIGIR Audit 07-009, “Review of Bechtel’s 

Spending under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction 
ENDNOTES

161

Contract,” 7/24/2007, and Audit 08-010, 

“Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq 

Reconstruction Contract W914NS-04-D-0006,” 

1/28/2008.

 100. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 62.

 101. SIGIR Audit 06-028, “Review of Administrative 

Task orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” 

10/23/2006, Audit 07-009, “Review of Bechtel’s 

Spending under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction 

Contract,” 7/24/2007, Audit 08-010, “Outcome, 

Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction 

Contract W914NS-04-D-0006,” 1/28/2008, and 

Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and 

Procurement, 7/2006. 

 102. SIGIR Audit 13-006, “Government Agencies 

Cannot Fully Identify Projects Financed with 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds,” 3/2013. 

103. P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2010, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 66, and responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 10/2/2012; 

USACE, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 

and 10/1/2012.

 104. GOI, Former Minister of Housing, Finance, 

and Interior Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi, meeting 

with SIGIR, 9/19/2012, and Former Minister of 

Interior Jawad al-Bolani, meeting with SIGIR, 

9/19/2012. 

 105. P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-11; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-

13; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 

110-149; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 110-28; 

P.L. 110-5; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-212; 

P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-8; P.L. 112-10; P.L. 112-74.

 106. P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2010, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 66, and responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 10/2/2012; 

USACE, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 

and 10/1/2012.

 107. P.L. 108-7; P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; 

P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 

109-34; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; 

P.L. 110-116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 

110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; 

P.L. 111-118; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; 

ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

BBG, response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; 

DCAA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; 

DoJ, Justice Management Division, response 

to SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2012, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 6-6; OUSD(C), 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 

10/2/2012; USACE, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/6/2008 and 10/1/2012; GOI, CoR, 

“Federal Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2012,” 

Articles 1, 2, and 36, 2/23/2012, and “Federal 

Public Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2011,” 

Article 2, 2/23/2011; GOI, MOF, information 

provided to SIGIR, 6/27/2011; “GOI Budget” 

(as approved by TNA and written into law 

December 2005); GOI, Presidency of the 

Iraqi Interim National Assembly, “The State 

General Budget for 2005,” 2005; GOI, MoPDC, 

“Indicators of the Investment Budget for Year 

2010,” Table 17, 2011; GOI, “Budget Revenues 

and Expenses 2003, July–December,” 2003; 

SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 3/30/2004–4/30/2011; 

U.S. Treasury, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

1/4/2008 and 4/9/2009. NEA-I, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 4/5/2011, 4/7/2011, 

and 7/12/2011; World Bank, “World Bank 

Operations in Iraq,” 12/31/2011; Embassy of 

Japan in Iraq, press release, “Provision of Yen 

Loan to Iraq,” 5/29/2012.

 108. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; 

ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

CENTCOM OIG, information provided to 

SIGIR audits, 1/14/2013; NEA-I, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012; USACE, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

10/1/2012; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; OUSD(C), response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-

11; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 

109-289; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-161; 

P.L. 110-252; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-5; P.L. 110-92; 

P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-8; 

P.L. 112-10; P.L. 112-74.

 109. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, p. 27, and 

Audit 11-007, “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund 1: Report on Apportionments, 

Expenditures, and Cancelled Funds,” 1/25/2011, 

p. 4.

 110. CPA, info memo, Chief of Staff to CPA Staff, 

“President’s Supplemental–CPA Program 

Management Office,” unclassified, 9/9/2003.

 111. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 103.

 112. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 105, and Iraq 

Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and 

Procurement, 7/2006, p. 25. In June 2003, 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army-ATL 

established a contracting cell in Iraq, called the 

Head of Contracting Activity (HCA), to execute 

contracting for the IRRF 2. For a discussion 

of the challenges of contracting the IRRF, 

see SIGIR’s Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement.

 113. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

9/20/2012; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report 

on Apportionments, Expenditures, and 

Cancelled Funds,” 12/28/2010, and Quarterly 

and Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 3/30/2004–10/30/2012.

 114. P.L. 108-106.

 115. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2006, p. 5.

 116. Conference Report 109-494, to accompany H.R. 

4939, 6/8/2006, p. 99.

 117. P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110- 

28; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 

111-212; P.L. 112-10.

 118. P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 
162

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2010, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 66, and responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 10/2/2012; 

USACE, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 

and 10/1/2012.

 119. MNSTC-I, former Deputy J5, SIGIR interview, 

7/24/2008; OMB, “FY 2005 Emergency 

Supplemental Request,” 2/14/2005, pp. 25–26.

 120. The total for regular appropriations includes 

FY 2009 “bridge” funding, which was 

forward-funded in the FY 2008 supplemental 

appropriations. DoD, “FY 2005 Supplemental 

Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and 

Operation Unified Assistance,” 2/2005, pp. 

78-79; DoD, “FY 2006 Supplemental Request for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF),” 2/2006, pp. 60–61; 

DoD, “Amendment to FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request for the Global War on 

Terror,” 3/2007, p. 5; DoD, “FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request for the Global War on 

Terror,” 2/2007, pp. 38–49; DoD, “FY 2008 

Global War on Terror Request,” 2/2007, pp. 

34-40; DoD, “FY 2008 Global War on Terror 

Amendment, Department of Defense,” 10/2007, 

pp. 26–27; DoD, “FY 2009 Global War on Terror 

Bridge Request,” 5/2008, pp. 15–16; DoD, “FY 

2009 Supplemental Request,” 4/2009, pp. 41–43; 

DoD, “FY 2011 Budget Request Overview,” 

2/2010, pp. 6-8–6-9; P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; 

P.L. 109-252; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-

161; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10.

 121. OUSD(C), response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual 

Reports to the United States Congress, 3/30/2004–

10/30/2012.

 122. OUSD(C), response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual 

Reports to the United States Congress, 3/30/2004–

10/30/2012.

 123. OUSD(C), response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012; P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-

252; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 

111-32; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10.

 124. OUSD(C), response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual 

Reports to the United States Congress, 3/30/2004–

10/30/2012.

 125. OUSD(C), response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual 

Reports to the United States Congress, 3/30/2004–

10/30/2012.

 126. P.L. 112-10; SIGIR Audit 12-016, “Interim Report 

on Spend Plans for Fiscal Years 2011−2012 Iraq 

Security Forces Fund,” 4/2012; OSC-I, response 

to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2012. The Congress 

originally appropriated $1.50 billion to the ISFF 

in FY 2011 against the Administration’s request 

of $2.00 billion, but DoD later requested and 

received Congressional approval to reprogram 

$345 million of the ISFF to meet DoD needs 

in Afghanistan and other mission areas, thus 

reducing FY 2011 ISFF budget authority to 

$1.145 billion.

 127. SIGIR Audit 12-018, “Status of Fiscal Years 

2011–2012 Iraq Security Forces Fund,” 

7/27/2012, p. 3.

 128. P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-

92; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 112-10; P.L. 

112-74.

 129. NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012; USACE, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 

7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly 

and Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 3/30/2004–10/30/2012.

 130. P.L. 109-102; House Report 109-265, to 

accompany H.R. 3057, 11/2/2005, p. 86; P.L. 

109-234; House Report 109-494, to accompany 

H.R. 4939, 6/8/2006, pp. 95–96; P.L. 110-28; 

House Report 110-107, to accompany H.R. 1591, 

4/24/2007, pp. 202–204; P.L. 110-92; P.L.110-137; 

P.L. 110-149; P.L.110-161; House Appropriations 

Committee, “Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2008, Committee Print: Division J—

Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs Act, 2008,” 1/30/2008, 

pp. 2177–2178, 2208; P.L. 110-252; Senate 

Explanatory Statement, to accompany H.R. 

2642, 6/26/2008; P.L. 111-32; Conference Report 

111-151, to accompany H.R. 2346, 6/12/2009, 

pp. 127–129; P.L. 111-117; Conference Report 

111-366, to accompany H.R. 3288, 12/8/2009, 

pp. 1466, 1470; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2006,” 

p. 448; House Document 109-90, “Request for 

FY 2006 Budget Amendments,” 2/28/2006, p. 

26; DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional 

Budget Justification, FY 2008,” pp. 48, 128–129, 

138, 490; DoS and USAID, “Supplemental 

Appropriations Justification, FY 2008,” p. 

38; DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional 

Budget Justification, FY 2009,” pp. 543–544; 

DoS and USAID, “Supplemental Justification, 

FY 2009,” pp. 40–43; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, Annex: 

Regional Perspectives, FY 2010,” pp. 421–426; 

DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional Budget 

Justification, Annex: Regional Perspectives, FY 

2011,” pp. 471–477; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, Annex: 

Regional Perspectives, FY 2012,” pp. 522–528; 

USAID, “USAID Awards Community 

Stabilization Program in Iraq,” 8/11/2006.

 131. In the fourth quarter of FY 2008, the rate 

of obligation exceeded $6.2 million per day 

on average and dropped to approximately 

$2.2 million per day on average in the fourth 

quarters of FY 2009 and FY 2010. The average 

obligation rate for the first three fiscal year 

quarters of FY 2006–FY 2011 was $1.2 million 

per day.

 132. NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

and 10/1/2012; USACE, response to SIGIR data 

call, 10/1/2012.

 133. NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

and 10/1/2012; USACE, response to SIGIR 

data call, 10/1/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly and 

Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2007–4/30/2011. 

 134. SIGIR Audit 05-014, “Management of 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

for Fiscal Year 2004,” 10/13/2005, p. 2.

 135. P.L. 108-106.

 136. ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

CENTCOM OIG, information provided to 

SIGIR Audits, 1/14/2013.

 137. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to 

the United States Congress, 1/30/2011, Insert, 

and Audit 11-021, “Management of the Iraq 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

Needs to Be Improved (Interim Report),” 

7/29/2011, pp. 1–2.

 138. ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

CENTCOM OIG, information provided to 

SIGIR Audits, 1/14/2013.

 139. ABO, responses to SIGIR data call, 7/14/2011 

and 7/15/2011; P.L. 112-10.

 140. ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

CENTCOM OIG, information provided to 

SIGIR Audits, 1/14/2013.

 141. ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

CENTCOM OIG, information provided to 

SIGIR Audits, 1/14/2013.

 142. ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

CENTCOM OIG, information provided to 

SIGIR audits, 1/14/2013; SIGIR, Quarterly 

and Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 3/30/2004–10/30/2012.

 143. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2011, Insert.

 144. GOI officials, SIGIR interviews, 9/2012–11/2012. 

 145. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2011, Insert.

 146. ABO, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2010, 

10/8/2010, 12/6/2010, 12/22/2010, 4/5/2011, 

4/18/2011, 7/5/2011, 7/14/2011, 10/18/2011, and 

1/18/2012; USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

1/3/2012.

 147. P.L. 112-36, Section 117; U.S. House of 

Representatives, 112th Congress, H.R. 2219, 

“Making Appropriations for the Department of 

Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 

30, 2012, and for Other Purposes,” 7/8/2011, Sec. 

9005; House Report 112-110 to accompany H.R. 

2219, 6/16/2011, p. 298.

 148. ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

CENTCOM OIG, information provided to 

SIGIR Audits, 1/14/2013.

 149. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2011, p. 27.

 150. P.L. 109-102; P.L.109-234; P.L.110-5; P.L.110-28; 

P.L.110-161; P.L.110-252; P.L.111-8; P.L.111-32; 

P.L.111-117; P.L.111-212; P.L.112-10; P.L.112-74.

 151. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012.

 152. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2012.

 153. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012.

 154. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012.

 155. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data 

call, 10/1/2012.

 156. PRM, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012.

 157. P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2012, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 66, and responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 10/2/2012; 

USACE, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 

and 10/1/2012.

 158. OSC-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 159. P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 
ENDNOTES

163

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2012, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 66, and responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 10/2/2012; 

USACE, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 

and 10/1/2012.

 160. This $246 million includes FY 2013 funding and 

does not match the SIGIR total listed in the “U.S. 

Appropriated Funds” table, which only accounts 

for funds through FY 2012.

 161. P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2012, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 66, and responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 10/2/2012; 

USACE, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 

and 10/1/2012.

 162. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 3–45.

 163. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 8–12.

 164. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 8–12.

 165. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 19, 33–34.

 166. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 42.

 167. P.L. 108-11.

 168. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 63–64.

 169. President George W. Bush, request for 2004 

supplemental appropriations for ongoing 

military and intelligence operations in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and elsewhere, 9/17/2003.

 170. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 103.

 171. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 55.

 172. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 59–60, 86, 90.

 173. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 73–74.

 174. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 75–77.

 175. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 70.

 176. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 20–24.

 177. ORHA, A Unified Mission Plan for PostHostilities Iraq, draft, 4/2003.

 178. CPA, Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward 

the CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, 7/23/2003, and 

Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty 

to the Iraqi People, working document as of 

10/1/2003. 

 179. P.L. 108-106.

 180. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs 

Assessment,” 10/2003, pp. vi, 4.

 181. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 94.

 182. CPA, Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward the 

CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, 7/23/2003.

 183. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Inspections of U.S.-funded Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Projects, 12/2011, p. 1.

 184. SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” pp. 4, 13–14. Note: The $1.1 billion in 

USAID expenditures does not include any of the 

$202 million in costs that USAID incurred prior 

to enactment of P.L. 108-11 and for which it was 

reimbursed with IRRF 1 funds.

 185. For sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 186. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 179–192.

 187. GAO Report No. 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. 

Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved 

Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained 

Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” 9/2005; 

SIGIR Evaluation EV-10-002, “Review of Major 

U.S. Government Infrastructure Projects in 

Iraq: Nassiriya and Ifraz Water Treatment 

Plants,” 10/28/2010.

 188. EIA, International Energy Annual 2006; UN/

World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” 

10/2003, p. 28.

 189. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 65; EIA, International 

Energy Annual 2006; GOI, MOE data; UN/

World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” 

10/2003, p. 28.

 190. GAO Report No. 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: 

Resource, Security, Governance, Essential 

Services, and Oversight Issues,” 6/2004, pp. 4, 

85.

 191. CPA, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 

“Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq” 12/29/2006, pp. 

46–47, and Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward 

the CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, 7/23/2003.

 192. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 149–150.

 193. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 149–151; ITAO/

ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 

6/1/2006−6/30/2011; DoS, Iraq Status Reports, 

10/25/2006, slide 11, and 5/9/2007, slide 11.

 194. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 114, 151.

 195. Bechtel Corporation, press release, “USAID 

Awards Bechtel National Iraq Infrastructure II 

Contract,” 1/6/2004.

 196. For sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 197. SIGIR Audit 07-009, “Review of Bechtel’s 

Spending under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction 

Contract,” 7/24/2007, p. 52.

 198. USACE, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

11/20/2012.

 199. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 146, and Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, 4/30/2009, p. 71.

 200. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2009, p. 71; ITAO/ESD, Electric 

Daily Performance Reports, 6/1/2006−6/30/2011.

 201. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 

6/1/2006−6/30/2011; DoS, Iraq Status Reports, 

10/25/2006, slide 11, and 5/9/2007, slide 11; 

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/22/2012, 4/13/2012, 7/3/2012, and 

10/1/2012; GOI, NMC, “Status of the Ministry 

of Electricity,” selected reports, 9/1/2012–

9/30/2012.

 202. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/22/2012, 4/13/2012, 7/3/2012, and 

10/1/2012; GOI, NMC, “Status of the Ministry 

of Electricity,” selected reports, 9/1/2012–

9/30/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual 

Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2012, 

p. 74.

 203. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 10/30/2009, pp. 

62–63, 4/30/2011, p. 116, 7/30/2011, p. 97, and 

10/30/2012, p. 69.

 204. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 

6/1/2006−6/30/2011; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/22/2012, 

4/13/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; GOI, NMC, 

“Status of the Ministry of Electricity,” selected 

reports, 9/1/2012–9/30/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly 

and Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 7/30/2010, p. 72, and 10/30/2012, p. 69.

 205. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 

6/1/2006−6/30/2011; DoS, Iraq Status Reports, 

10/25/2006, slide 11, and 5/9/2007, slide 11; 

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/22/2012, 4/13/2012, 7/3/2012, and 

10/1/2012; GOI, NMC, “Status of the Ministry 

of Electricity,” selected reports, 9/1/2012–

9/30/2012.

 206. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010, pp. 101–102.

 207. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 10/30/2009, pp. 64–65, 

and 1/30/2012, p. 74.

 208. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2010, pp. 11, 73.

 209. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 69–70.

 210. UNICEF, “Iraq Watching Briefs: Water and 

Environmental Sanitation,” 7/2003, pp. 2, 7–8.

 211. UNICEF, “Iraq Watching Briefs: Water and 

Environmental Sanitation,” 7/2003, Executive 

Summary.

 212. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2006, p. 31.

 213. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 187.

 214. CPA, “CPA Strategic Plan—Essential Services, 

Endstate,” 4/23/2004, p. 20.

 215. GAO Report No. 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. 

Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved 

Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained 

Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” 9/2005, 

pp. 13-14.

 216. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2007, pp. 54–55.

 217. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 170.

 218. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 187.

 219. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2012; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 
164

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012. 

For funding sources, see endnote 2.

 220. For funding sources, see endnote 2.

 221. SIGIR EV-10-002, “Review of Major U.S. 

Government Infrastructure Projects in Iraq: 

Nassiriya and Ifraz Water Treatment Plants,” 

10/2010, p. 1 and Audit 12-007, “Falluja Waste 

Water Treatment System: A Case Study in 

Wartime Contracting,” 10/30/2011, p. 1.

 222. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2010, pp. 70–71.

 223. GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. 

Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved 

Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained 

Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” 9/2005, p. 

14.

 224. GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. 

Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved 

Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained 

Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” 9/2005, p. 

25.

 225. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2006, p. 49; DoS, Section 2207 

Report, Appendix III, Economic Support Fund 

(ESF), 1/2008, pp. III-1, III-8–III-9.

 226. UN, Inter-Agency Information and Analysis 

Unit, “Water in Iraq Factsheet,” 3/2011.

 227. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2012, p. 76.

 228. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 90.

 229. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 136; EIA, “World Crude 

Oil Production, 1960-2008,” www.eia.doe.gov, 

accessed 12/30/2009, and International Energy 

Statistics, Iraq, www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/

iedindex3.cfm?tid=50&pid=53&aid=1&cid=

r5,&syid=2002&eyid=2003&freq=M&unit=

TBPD, accessed 1/18/2013; GOI, Ministry of 

Oil, “Domestic Consumption,” www.oil.gov.

iq, accessed 1/4/2013; GAO Report GAO-07-

677, “Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan 

Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s Oil and Electricity 

Sectors,” 5/2007, p. 8.

 230. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 28.

 231. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program 

and Project Management, 3/2007, p. 29.

 232. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 29.

 233. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 95.

 234. SIGIR PA-06-080, “Al Basrah Oil Terminal, 

Basrah, Iraq,” 4/26/2007, p. 6, and Hard Lessons: 

The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 2/2009, pp. 

139–140.

 235. GAO Report GAO-05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: 

Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” 

pp. 15–16. For sources of funding data, see 

endnote 2. 

 236. SIGIR PA-08-137, “Kirkuk to Baiji Pipeline 

Exclusion Zone–Phase 3, Kirkuk, Iraq,” 

7/24/2008, p. 3.

 237. NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 6/4/2010, 

7/6/2010, 1/11/2011, 4/5/2011, 7/7/2011, 

10/17/2011, and 1/6/2012; GOI, Ministry of Oil, 

“Crude Oil Exports,” www.oil.gov.iq, accessed 

1/4/2013.

 238. SIGIR PA-08-137, “Kirkuk to Baiji Pipeline 

Exclusion Zone–Phase 3, Kirkuk, Iraq,” 

7/24/2008, pp. 22–23.

 239. For sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 240. GOI, Ministry of Oil, “Crude Oil Exports,” 

www.oil.gov.iq, accessed 1/4/2013, and “Iraqi 

Oil Exports for September Elevate to 2.6 

Million Barrels per Day,” 10/13/2012, www.

oil.gov.iq/moo/feeds.php?lang=en&page_

name=new&id=491, accessed 10/13/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 6/4/2010, 

7/6/2010, 1/11/2011, 4/5/2011, 7/7/2011, 

10/17/2011, and 1/6/2012.

 241. U.S. Treasury, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

4/10/2009, 2/25/2010, 4/12/2011, 1/10/2012, and 

10/16/2012.

 242. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 90, 

4/30/2012, p. 88, and 7/30/2012, p. 95.

 243. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report 

to the United States Congress, 1/30/2012, pp. 

86–87; Ambassador James Jeffrey, information 

provided to SIGIR, 10/23/2012.

 244. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 60, 83.

 245. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs 

Assessment,” 10/2003, p. 23; SIGIR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2006, 

p. 38, and PA-06-057, “Baghdad Railway Station 

Rehabilitation, Baghdad, Iraq,” 7/25/2006, p. 4.

 246. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2009, p. 70; UN/World Bank, 

“Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” 10/2003, p. 24.

 247. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 1/5/2004, p. 74.

 248. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs 

Assessment,” 10/2003, p. 26; SIGIR, Hard 

Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 

2/2009, p. 65.

 249. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2006, p. 38.

 250. CPA, Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward the 

CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, 7/18/2003, pp. 15–16, 

18.

 251. For funding sources, see endnote 2.

 252. USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010, 

and Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; OSD, response 

to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009.

 253. USACE, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

11/20/2012; IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 

9/20/2010.

 254. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 10/14/2003, p. 7; CPA, 

“An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments 

2003–2004,” p. 37.

 255. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 10/30/2011, p. 84, and 

1/30/2012, pp. 90–91.

 256. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2012, p. 90.

 257. IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; NEA-I, 

response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012.

 258. DoS, “Civil Capacity Development in Iraq,” 

7/2011, p. 10.

 259. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to 

the United States Congress, 1/30/2012, p. 91; 

IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2012; DoS, “Civil 

Capacity Development in Iraq,” 7/2011, p. 10.

 260. IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010.

 261. USAID, “Bechtel, USAID, and the Iraq 

Infrastructure Reconstruction Program: 

Accomplishments and Challenges,” p. 4; IRMS, 

Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010.

 262. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012.

 263. SIGIR, Audit 07-002, “Status of the Advanced 

First Responder Network,” 4/25/2007, pp. 1, 2, 4.

 264. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2007, pp. 108–109, 

and Audit 07-009, “Review of Bechtel’s Spending 

Under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction 

Contract,” 7/24/2007, p. 61.

 265. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 4/30/2010, p. 75, and 

7/30/2011, p. 101.

 266. USACE, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

11/20/2012.

 267. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2005, p. 83.

 268. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 22.

 269. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2012, p. 90.

 270. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 85.

 271. CPA, Achieving the Vision to Restore Full 

Sovereignty to the Iraqi People, working 

document as of 10/1/2003.

 272. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 104.

 273. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 133–135. Many elements 

of the New Iraqi Army proved unwilling or 

unable to fight when Sunni insurgents and 

Shia militia separately attacked Coalition and 

Iraqi troops at cities across the country in April 

2004. High rates of desertion, mutiny under 

fire, and collapsing units were exacerbated 

when “trained” ISF joined those attacking 

Coalition troops and their former security force 

colleagues. 

 274. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 60–61, 74.

 275. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 4, 5, 13, 73–74, 131, 133, 

189, 205–206, 254. The “Green Line” on the first 

map in the figure denotes the boundary beyond 

which Iraqi forces retreated during the Gulf War 

in 1991.

 276. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 95, and 

1/30/2011, p. 66.

 277. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 135.

 278. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 170.

 279. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 199.

 280. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 

2/2006–9/2009; DoL, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 11/25/2009, 1/5/2010, 4/12/2010, 7/7/2010, 

and 1/14/2011; Brookings Institution, Iraq 

Index, 12/30/2010, pp. 12, 14; SIGIR, Quarterly 

and Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2009, 10/30/2009, and 1/30/2010; 

GOI, response to SIGIR data call, 12/21/2009; 

USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

 281. SIGIR Audit 11-010, “Sons of Iraq Program: 

Results Are Uncertain and Financial Controls 

Were Weak,” 1/28/2011.

 282. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 95.

 283. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 95.

 284. The Mahdi Army, a militia created by Shiite 

cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, had filled the security 

vacuum left by the disbanded Iraqi Army and 

police. Between 2004 and 2007, the Mahdi Army 

repeatedly attacked Coalition and ISF as well as 

rival Shia militia. A ceasefire declared by al-Sadr 

from August 2007 is credited with reducing 

violence against the ISF. In March 2008 the IA 

launched successful operations against Mahdi 

Army forces in Sadr City and in Basrah.

 285. National Security Council, “National Strategy 

for Victory in Iraq,” 11/2005, p. 2. 

 286. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 7.

 287. SIGIR Special Report No. 2, “The Human Toll 

of Reconstruction or Stabilization Operations 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 7/2012, p. 6. 

288. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 60–61, 74. 

 289. DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; IRMS, 

USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; NEA-I, 

responses to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012 and 

9/25/2012; OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012; USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/1/2012.

 290. For the sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 291. DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; IRMS, 

USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; NEA-I, 

responses to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012 and 

9/25/2012; OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012; USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/1/2012.

 292. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012; 

INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; 

IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010.

 293. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 79–81.

 294. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 81.
ENDNOTES

165

 295. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 197; NEA-I, response to 

SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; OSD, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 296. USIP, “Iraq’s Interior Ministry: The Key to Police 

Reform,” 9/2009.

 297. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 201.

 298. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 201.

 299. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 198, 200–201. 

In response to a SIGIR audit, MNSTC-I 

implemented a tracking system for equipment 

provided to the ISF, but was apparently unable 

to consistently collect physical records on 

equipment that was issued.

 300. GOI, Prime Minister, meeting with SIGIR, 

9/16/2012; OSC-I Chief, meeting with SIGIR, 

9/21/2012.

 301. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 1/2007, “Selected 

Metrics,” p. 10.

 302. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 7/2006, p. I-3.

 303. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 1/2007, p. I-2.

 304. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 

3/2009, p. 34.

 305. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 1/30/2009, pp. 43–47.

 306. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 130; SIGIR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2006, 

p. 21.

 307. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010 p. 74.

 308. DSCA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012.

 309. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 310. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 10/2005, p. I-13.

 311. DSCA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012.

 312. DSCA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012.

 313. DSCA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012.

 314. OSC-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012.

 315. P.L. 110-252; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

9/20/2012; OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012.

 316. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 97.

 317. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 99.

 318. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 99.

 319. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 1/30/2009, p. 49.

 320. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 

9/2008, p. 51.

 321. DSCA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012.

 322. DSCA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2012.

 323. DoS, Remarks of James F. Jeffrey, U.S. 

Ambassador to Iraq before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, “Iraq: The Challenging 

Transition to a Civilian Mission,” 2/1/2011.

 324. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012.

 325. SIGIR Audit 06-029, “Review of DynCorp 

International, LLC, Contract Number S 

LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, for 

the Iraqi Police Training Program Support,” 

1/30/2007, and Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, 10/30/2011, pp. 2–3.

 326. For the sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 327. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 328. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 329. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 126–127.

 330. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 127.

 331. SIGIR Audit 11-008, “Interim Report: Action 

Needed To Address Missing Iraq Transaction 

Data,” 1/28/2011, p. 2. From 2005 to 2007, SIGIR 

found inadequate INL staffing and contract 

oversight of the DynCorp contract, prompting 

INL to completely reconcile invoicing and 

reconceived its invoicing process. In 2010, 

SIGIR found that the $2.5 billion obligated 

under the DynCorp contract was vulnerable 

to waste and fraud. Further, SIGIR concluded 

that State’s in-country contracting officers had 

failed to perform adequate invoice reviews, 

and they did not ensure costs were allowable 

and supported, that property was controlled, 

that leases protected U.S. interests, and that the 

government received services in accord with the 

contract.

 332. Defense also provided U.S. military personnel, 

life support, and security that benefit the 

program at costs that are significant but that are 

not readily available. See SIGIR, Audit 11-003, 

“Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program 

Developed Sizeable Force, but Capabilities Are 

Unknown,” 10/25/2010.

 333. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 100.

 334. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008, p. 100.

 335. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2008 p. 100. However, SIGIR 

Project Assessments found serious weaknesses 

in contractor oversight of construction. For 

more details, see SIGIR PA-08-154 to 156, 

“Report on Plumbing Repairs at the Baghdad 

Police College, Baghdad, Iraq,” 1/22/2009, and 

PA-06-78.2 & 79.2, “Baghdad Police College,” 

1/29/2007.

 336. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2007, p. 60, and 4/30/2008, p. 97.

 337. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 201.

 338. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 1/30/2007, p. 86, and 4/30/2008, pp. 

98–99, and Audit 08-15, “Interim Analysis of 

Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by 

the Department of Defense Report, Measuring 

Stability and Security in Iraq,” 5/25/2008.

 339. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 201.

 340. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 202.

 341. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2007, pp. 86–87, 

4/30/2008, p. 100, and 7/30/2008, p. 86.

 342. SIGIR Audit 12-020, “Iraq Police Development 

Program: Lack of Iraqi Support and Security 

Problems Raise Questions about the Continued 

Viability of the Program,” 7/30/2012. 

 343. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 7/30/2012, p. 36, and 

10/30/2012, pp. 32–33.

 344. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 77. 

 345. IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2012; USACE, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012.

 346. SIGIR Audit 11-010, “Sons of Iraq Program: 

Results Are Uncertain and Financial Controls 

Were Weak,” 1/28/2011.

 347. SIGIR PA-08-137, “Kirkuk to Baiji Pipeline 

Exclusion Zone–Phase 3, Kirkuk, Iraq,” 

7/24/2008.Through this program, U.S. personnel 

developed the concept of a Pipeline Exclusion 

Zone to secure pipeline corridors against 

attacks, which were slowing the flow of oil 

through Iraq’s pipeline to Ceyhan, Turkey. 

The idea worked. In the first 11 months after 

the start of the Kirkuk-to-Baiji PEZ in July 

2007, northern crude oil exports increased 

by 91.3 million barrels, or $8.13 billion. ISP 

personnel credited the PEZ as the single-largest 

contributing factor to the dramatic rise in these 

exports. It was almost three years before the first 

attacks on the PEZ-protected pipelines were 

reported.

 348. For sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 349. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 6–7.

 350. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 96.

 351. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 159.

 352. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 206.

 353. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 7/30/2012, p. 87.

 354. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 77.

 355. SIGIR, Audit 13-001, “Sustaining the Progress 

Achieved by U.S. Rule of Law Programs in Iraq 

Remains Questionable,” 10/25/2012.

 356. DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; IRMS, 

USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; NEA-I, 

responses to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012 and 

9/25/2012.

 357. SIGIR, Audit 08-019 “Outcome, Cost, and 

Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract 

with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” 7/28/2008, p. iv, 

and PA-08-152, “Anbar Rule of Law/Judicial 

Complex, Ramadi, Iraq,” pp. i–iii, 4.

 358. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 4/2005, pp. I-27–I-29, 

7/2005, Appendix I, pp. 16–20, 25–27, 7/2006, pp. 

I-19–I-20, I-30–I-31, and 4/2007, pp. I-17–I-19.

 359. SIGIR Audit 13-001, “Sustaining the Progress 

Achieved by U.S. Rule of Law Programs in Iraq 

Remains Questionable,” 10/25/2012.

 360. SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and 

Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract 

with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” 7/28/2008; 

USACE, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

11/20/2012.

 361. SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and 

Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract 

with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” 7/28/2008, and 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

4/30/2009, p. 61; USACE, information provided 

to SIGIR Audits, 11/20/2012.

 362. SIGIR Audit 13-001, “Sustaining the Progress 

Achieved by U.S. Rule of Law Programs in Iraq 

Remains Questionable,” 10/25/2012, p. 21.

 363. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010, pp. 16–17.

 364. SIGIR Audit 13-001, “Sustaining the Progress 

Achieved by U.S. Rule of Law Programs in Iraq 

Remains Questionable,” 10/25/2012.

 365. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 210–211.

 366. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 213, and Quarterly and 

Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 

1/30/2012, p. 97.

 367. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 3. 

 368. SIGIR Audit, 06-021, “Joint Survey of the U.S. 

Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program, 

7/28/2006, p. i, and Hard Lessons: The Iraq 

Reconstruction Experience, 2/2009, p. 207.

 369. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 211–212.

 370. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 212.

 371. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 212–214.

 372. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 214.

 373. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 215.

 374. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 214; GOI, MIM IG, 

interview with SIGIR, 6/3/2012.

 375. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 211, 215.

 376. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012.

 377. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 115.

 378. USAID, “Evaluation of USAID/Iraq’s 

Assistance to the Independent High Electoral 

Commission,” 7/5/2010, p. 5.

 379. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 60, 115.

 380. CPA, “Achieving the Vision,” 7/23/2003, pp. 4–5.

 381. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction

Experience, 2/2009, p. 159.

 382. For funding sources, see endnote 2.

 383. USAID, Bureau for the Middle East, Office of 
166

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, information 

provided to SIGIR Audits, 9/30/2012. For 

sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 384. For funding sources, see endnote 2.

 385. NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012, 

9/25/2012, and 10/2/2012.

 386. SIGIR Audit 09-001, “Opportunities to Enhance 

U.S. Democracy-Building Strategy for Iraq,” 

10/22/2008, p. 1.

 387. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 121.

 388. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 121, 154.

 389. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 206; USAID, “Monitoring 

and Evaluation Performance Program, Phase 

II, Final Report for Political Process Assistance 

Review,” 12/13/2005, p. 2.

 390. SIGIR Audit 10-012, “Department of State Grant 

Management: Limited Oversight of Costs and 

Impact of International Republican Institute 

and National Democratic Institute Democracy 

Grants,” 1/26/2010, pp. 1–2, 24.

 391. UNAMI, “UNAMI Focus, Voice of the 

Mission, Mid-year Issue,” 7/2006, p. 2, United 

States Institute of Peace, Special Report 

155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II, An 

Opportunity Lost,” 11/2005, pp. 2, 6, 8; DoS 

OIG ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule of Law 

Programs, Embassy Baghdad,” 10/2005, p. 10; 

International Business & Technical Consultants, 

Inc., “Monitoring and Evaluation Performance 

Program, Phase II (MEPP II): Final Report for 

Political Process Assistance Review,” 12/13/2005.

 392. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2010, p. 4, and 10/30/2011, pp. 89, 

92, and Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 119; USIP, “Iraq’s 

Constitutional Process II, An Opportunity 

Lost,” Special Report 155, 11/2005, p. 8.

 393. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2010, p. 4, and 10/30/2011, p. 

89, and Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 119; USIP, “Iraq’s 

Constitutional Process II, An Opportunity 

Lost,” Special Report 155, 11/2005, p. 8.

 394. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2008, p. 5.

 395. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2008, p. 5.

 396. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2012, p. 47; USAID OIG Audit 

E-267-12-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s 

Electoral Technical Assistance Program,” 

3/22/2012, p. 27.

 397. USAID OIG Audit E-267-12-003-P, “Audit of 

USAID/Iraq’s Electoral Technical Assistance 

Program,” 3/22/2012, p. 1.

 398. USAID, “Evaluation of USAID/Iraq’s Assistance 

to the Independent High Electoral Commission, 

IFES Electoral Support and Out of Country 

Voting Programs,” 7/5/2010, pp. 14, 16, 21.

 399. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2009, p. 77.

 400. USAID OIG Audit E-267-12-003, “Audit of 

USAID/Iraq’s Electoral Technical Assistance 

Program,” 3/22/2012, p. 1.

 401. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2012, p. 47; USAID OIG Audit 

E-267-12-003, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electoral 

Technical Assistance Program,” 3/22/2012, p. 1.

 402. SIGIR Audit 10-012, “Department of State Grant 

Management: Limited Oversight of Costs and 

Impact of International Republican Institute 

and National Democratic Institute Democracy 

Grants,” 1/26/2010, p. 5.

 403. CPA, Achieving the Vision, 7/23/2003, pp. 4–5; 

USAID, Bureau for the Middle East, Office of 

Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, information 

provided to SIGIR Audits, 9/30/2012.

 404. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2012, p. 57.

 405. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 43.

 406. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 238, and Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, 4/30/2010, p. 82.

 407. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2010, p. 81. For funding sources, 

see endnote 2.

 408. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2007, pp. 35–36. For 

funding sources, see endnote 2.

 409. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 295.

 410. USAID, Bureau for the Middle East, Office of 

Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, information 

provided to SIGIR Audits, 9/30/2012; NEA-I, 

response to SIGIR data call, 9/28/2011; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 7/3/2012, and 

10/1/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual 

Report to the United States Congress, 1/30/2011, 

p. 81.

 411. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2010, pp. 81–82.

 412. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2012, p. 67.

 413. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2011, pp. 63–64.

 414. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2011, p. 45, and 4/30/2012, p. 46.

 415. USAID, Bureau for the Middle East, Office of 

Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, information 

provided to SIGIR Audits, 9/30/2012; SIGIR 

Audit 09-003, “Cost, Outcome, and Oversight 

of Local Governance Program Contracts with 

Research Triangle Institute,” 10/21/2008, p. 1.

 416. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2005, p. 84.

 417. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2011, pp. 45–46, and 10/30/2012, 

p. 45.

 418. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 240–241, 271, and 

Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United 

States Congress, 7/30/2006, p. 50, and 1/30/2008, 

p. 49.

 419. USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012.

 420. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 4/30/2011, p. 75, and 

7/30/2012, pp. 33–34; IRMS, Global Benchmark, 

9/3/2010; USACE, information provided to 

SIGIR audits, 11/20/2012.

 421. SIGIR PA-08-165 & 167, “Missan Surgical 

Hospital, Al Amarah, Iraq,” 7/16/2009, pp. 

7–8, and Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 56.

 422. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2010, p. 30.

 423. SIGIR Audit 09-011, “Opportunities to Improve 

Management of the Quick Response Fund,” 

1/29/2009, pp. i, 1.

 424. SIGIR Audit 12-016, “Interim Review of State 

Department’s Progress in Implementing SIGIR 

Recommendations Addressing Quick Response 

Fund Management Controls,” 4/30/2012, 

pp. 1–2, and 11-011, “Quick Response Fund: 

Management Controls Have Improved But 

Earlier Projects Need Attention,” p. 6. 

 425. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 426. USAID OIG Audit E-267-06-003-P, “Audit of 

USAID/Iraq’s Local Governance Activities,” 

7/10/2006, p. 2.

 427. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs 

Assessment,” 10/2003, pp. viii, 21–22, 62–63; 

USAID OIG Audit E-266-04-001-P, “Audit 

of USAID’s Results Data for Its Education 

Activities in Iraq,” 3/19/2004, pp. 6, 20; SIGIR 

PA 08-144-148, “Falluja Waste Water Treatment 

System, Falluja, Iraq,” 10/27/2008, p. 2.

 428. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/20/2012 

and 10/2/2012; USACE, response to SIGIR data 

call, 10/1/2012. For funding sources, see endnote 

2.

 429. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs 

Assessment,” 10/2003, p. 16; SIGIR PA 08-160, 

“Basrah Children’s Hospital, Basrah, Iraq,” 

7/28/2009, p.1.

 430. USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, 2/19/2003, 

p. 4.

 431. USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, 2/19/2003, 

p. 4.

 432. CPA, Achieving the Vision, 7/23/2003, p. 17.

 433. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012 

and 10/2/2012.

 434. SIGIR Audit 09-015, “Construction of Primary 

Healthcare Centers Reported Essentially 

Complete, but Operational Issues Remain,” 

4/29/2009, p. i.

 435. SIGIR Audit 09-015, “Construction of Primary 

Healthcare Centers Reported Essentially 

Complete, but Operational Issues Remain,” 

4/29/2009, p. i, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, 10/30/2009, p. 78, and PA08-133, “Heet Primary Healthcare Center, 

Heet, Iraq,” 1/23/2009, pp. ii–iii; IRMS, Global 

Benchmark, 9/3/2010.

 436. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2010, p. 89.

 437. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 45; USAID, Bureau 

for Middle East, Office of Iraq and Arabian 

Peninsula Affairs, information provided to 

SIGIR audits, 9/30/2012.

 438. DoS/USAID, “Civil Capacity Development in 

Iraq,” 7/14/2011, p. 7.

 439. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 237; IRMS, USF-I CERP 

Category Report, 9/20/2010.

 440. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 281–282, 295.

 441. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2011, p. 23.

 442. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 281, and Quarterly and 

Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 

7/30/2011, p. 23; USAID, Bureau for Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR audits, 

9/30/2012.

 443. USAID Iraq, Fact Sheet, “Accomplishments in 

Iraq,” 10/14/2009.

 444. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2011, pp. 26–27.

 445. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs 

Assessment,” 10/2003, pp. 14–16; USAID, Vision 

for Post-Conflict Iraq, 2/19/2003, p. 11; USAID 

OIG, Audit Report E-267-06-001-P, “Audit 

of USAID/Iraq’s Basic Education Activities,” 

12/20/2005, p. 2.

 446. CPA, Achieving the Vision, 7/13/2003, p. 18; 

USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, 2/19/2003, 

p. 11.

 447. IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010.

 448. USAID OIG Audit E-267-06-001-P, “Audit 

of USAID/Iraq’s Basic Education Activities,” 

12/20/2005, p. 8.

 449. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2006, p. 54.

 450. SIGIR Audit 11-012, “Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program Obligations are Uncertain,” 

1/31/2011, p. 6.

 451. SIGIR Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2006, p. 54, and PA-08-141, 

“Al Iqitadar School, Anbar Province, Iraq,” 

1/26/2009, pp. 1, 3; IRMS, Global Benchmark, 

9/3/2010.

 452. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 111.

 453. IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

Gulf Region Division, Central District, Iraq, 

“News,” 12/2006, pp. 4–5.

 454. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2010, p. 74.

 455. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 1/30/2010, p. 74, and 

10/30/2010, p. 111.

 456. DoS, “Civil Capacity Development in Iraq,” p. 4.

 457. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call 10/2/2012.

 458. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 7/30/2011, p. 102.
ENDNOTES

167

 459. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 43.

 460. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 10, 11, 18–20, 325, 341.

 461. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 55, and Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 65.

 462. USAID OIG Audit E-267-08-002-P, “Audit 

of USAID/Iraq’s Management of the Marla 

Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund,” 4/3/2008, 

pp. 3, 12; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

9/20/2012.

 463. USAID OIG Audit E-267-08-002-P, “Audit 

of USAID/Iraq’s Management of the Marla 

Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund,” 4/3/2008, pp. 

1, 3; “USAID/Iraq Community Action Program 

III, End of Project Performance Evaluation,” 

8/2012, p. xi; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

9/20/2012.

 464. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010, 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012 

and 10/1/2012, DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/5/2007, and USAID, response to SIGIR data 

call, 7/8/2010.

 465. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 22–23.

 466. DoS, Section 2207 Report, 1/2004, p. 93; SIGIR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

10/30/2012, p. 36.

 467. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 36; USAID, “Iraq – 

Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2012,” 10/21/2011, p. 1.

 468. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2011, p. 49, and 10/30/2012, p. 

48.

 469. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, pp. 22–23; USDA, “Food 

Aid Programs,” www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/

foodaid/title%201/pl480ofst.html, accessed 

1/2/2013.

 470. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 5–6, 30–31, 92, 136; 

SIGIR analysis of open-source documents.

 471. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 86, 90.

 472. CPA, Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward the 

CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, Working Draft, 

7/23/2003, p. 2.

 473. CPA, A Vision for Iraq, 7/11/2003, p. 3.

 474. CPA, Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward the 

CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, Working Draft, 

7/23/2003, pp. 4, 28–30.

 475. CPA, Achieving the Vision: Taking Forward the

CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq, Working Draft, 

7/23/2003, pp. 29–30.

 476. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs 

Assessment,” 10/2003, p. 72.

 477. UN/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, 

10/2003, pp. 36, 71.

 478. For sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 479. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 92; GOI, CBI, “About 

the CBI,” www.cbi.iq/index.php?pid=The CBI, 

accessed 1/29/2013.

 480. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

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 481. Trade Bank of Iraq, “2011 Financial Highlights,” 

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financial_highlights/, accessed 12/7/2012, and 

“Achievements,” www.tbiraq.com/en/newsand-achievements/achievements/, accessed 

12/7/2012.

 482. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2011, p. 92.

 483. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 7/30/2011, p. 92, and 

4/30/2012, p. 48; USAID, “Economic Growth 

and Trade,” 10/23/2012, www.usaid.gov/wherewe-work/middle-east/iraq/economic-growthand-trade, accessed 12/9/2012, and responses to 

SIGIR data call, 12/26/2011 and 12/27/2011.

 484. SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2011, p. 72, and 10/30/2012, 

p. 79; UN, “8th UNCTAD Debt Management 

Conference 14–16 November 2011, List of 

Contributors,” p. 2, r0.unctad.org/dmfas/docs/

DMconf2011/Contributors_list.pdf, accessed 

2/1/2013.

 485. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 3.

 486. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 3.

 487. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2011, pp. 91–92, and 

7/30/2012, pp. 92–93, 100.

 488. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 7/30/2011, pp. 91–92, 

and 7/30/2012, p. 100; International Bank, Iraq 

country representative, information provided to 

SIGIR, 11/1/2012.

 489. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, pp. 5, 90.

 490. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 98; TFBSO, response to 

SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

 491. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 4/30/2012, p. 91. 

 492. World Bank, Iraq privatization specialist, 

meeting with SIGIR, 10/10/2012, and 

information provided to SIGIR, 1/4/2013; SIGIR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

4/30/2012, p. 109.

 493. USAID, “Fact Sheet: Accomplishments in 

Iraq,” 10/14/2009, pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/

PDACN488.pdf, accessed 1/18/2009, “Capacity 

Building Programs, Administrative Reform 

Project,” 4/15/2012, iraq.usaid.gov/node/36, 

accessed 12/11/2012, and “Izdihar: Progress 

Highlights, Key Accomplishments as of 14 

March 2008,” 3/14/2008, izdihar-iraq.com/

progress.html, accessed 12/11/2012; SIGIR, 

Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United 

States Congress, 7/30/2011, p. 92.

 494. USAID, “Izdihar: Progress Highlights, Key 

Accomplishments as of 14 March 2008,” 

3/14/2008, izdihar-iraq.com/progress.html, 

accessed 12/11/2012, and Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012.

 495. USAID, “Fact Sheet: Provincial Economic 

Growth Program,” 11/2011, www.krgmopdcc.

com/dcc/resources/PDF/1.%20Tijara%20

Provincial%20Economic%20Growth%20

Fact%20Sheet%20Nov%202011.pdf, accessed 

1/18/2013.

 496. USAID, “Izdihar: Progress Highlights, Key 

Accomplishments as of 14 March 2008,” 

3/14/2008, izdihar-iraq.com/progress.html, 

accessed 1/18/2013; SIGIR, Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, 4/30/2012, p. 49; 

CIA, The World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html, 

accessed 12/11/2012.

 497. USAID, “Tijara Provincial Economic Growth 

Program Midterm Evaluation, Final Report,” 

7/2011, pp. 29–31.

 498. World Bank, IFC, “Doing Business: Economy 

Rankings,” 2012, www.doingbusiness.org/

ranking, accessed 12/11/2012, and Doing 

Business in the Arab World 2012, p. 64.

 499. DAI, “Agricultural Reconstruction 

and Development Program for IRAQ 

(ARDI),” dai.com/our-work/projects/

iraq%E2%80%94agriculture-reconstructionand-development-program-iraq-ardi, accessed 

1/13/2013; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

9/30/2012.

 500. USAID, “USAID-Inma Agribusiness Program,” 

iraq.usaid.gov/node/166, accessed 1/18/2013, 

and Bureau for the Middle East, Office of Iraq 

and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, information 

provided to SIGIR Audits, 10/23/2012; SIGIR 

Audit 08-006, “Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program in Iraq Funds Many LargeScale Projects,” 1/25/2008, pp. 2, 7.

501. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, USDA team meetings 

with SIGIR, 2/4/2012 and 5/31/2012.

 502. USAID, “USAID-Inma Agribusiness Program,” 

iraq.usaid.gov/node/96, accessed 1/30/2013; 

SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, 10/30/2012, p. 43.

 503. USAID, “Inma Agribusiness Program 

Evaluation, Final Draft,” 5/6/2010, p. 25.

 504. USAID, Bureau for the Middle East, Office of 

Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, information 

provided to SIGIR Audits, 9/30/2012.

 505. USAID, “Fact Sheet, Accomplishments in Iraq,” 

10/14/2009, p. 4; USAID OIG Audit E-266-04-

004, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Economic Reform 

Program,” pp. 5–8.

 506. USAID OIG Audit E-267-09-004-P, “Audit 

of USAID/Iraq’s Economic Governance II 

Program,” 6/3/2009, p. 3; SIGIR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2011, 

p. 79.

 507. USAID OIG Audit E-267-09-004-P, “Audit 

of USAID/Iraq’s Economic Governance II 

Program,” 6/3/2009, pp. 1–8.

 508. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010.

 509. IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

CENTCOM, press release, “Central Euphrates 

Farmers’ Market Open for Business,” 6/17/2009.

510. IMF, World Economic Outlook 2012, p. 81, 

and Iraq Program Note, 10/5/2012; GOI, 

CBI, “Economic Data,” www.cbi.iq/index.

php?pid=Home, accessed 1/13/2013.

 511. IMF, Country Report No. 11/75, “Iraq: Second 

Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, 

Request for Waiver of Applicability, Extension 

of the Arrangement and Rephrasing of Access,” 

3/2011, p. 22; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual 

Reports to the United States Congress, 7/30/2012, 

p. 93, and 10/30/2012, p. 84.

 512. IMF, Country Report No. 11/75, “Iraq: Second 

Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, 

Request for Waiver of Applicability, Extension 

of the Arrangement and Rephrasing of Access,” 

3/2011, p. 22.

 513. UN, UNCC, “Status of Processing and Payment 

Claims,” 10/25/2012, www.uncc.ch/status.htm, 

accessed 2/18/2013.

 514. P.L. 110-417, Section 872.

 515. P.L. 109-364, Section 814. In P.L. 110-417, 

Section 867, this provision was linked to nonDefense award and incentive fees as well.

 516. P.L. 110-252, Section 1402(a).

 517. P.L. 111-32, Section 1106.

 518. P.L. 112-81, Sections 841 and 842.

 519. P.L. 112-239, Section 844.

 520. P.L. 112-239, Section 802.

 521. P.L. 110-417, Section 866.

 522. P.L. 112-239, Section 846.

 523. P.L. 112-239, Section 848.

 524. P.L. 112-239, Section 861; House Report 112-705, 

p. 811.

 525. P.L. 112-239, Section 1273; House Report 112-

705, pp. 912–913.

 526. DoS, “About S/CRS,” 2001-2009.state.gov/s/crs/

c12936.htm, accessed 11/27/2012. 

 527. P.L. 108-447, Section 408.

 528. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010.

 529. DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support 

for Stability, Security, Transition and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,”11/28/2005. 

 530. DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support 

for Stability, Security, Transition and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,”11/28/2005. 

 531. DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability 

Operations,” 9/16/2009. 

 532. Explanatory Statement related to P. L. 110-

252, printed in Congressional Record (daily 

edition) at H3969, 5/15/2008. The matter under 

consideration was the House amendment to 

the Senate amendment to H.R. 2642, which 

was eventually enacted into law without further 

amendment. 

 533. P.L. 110-417, Section 1214; SIGIR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2008, 

p. 206.

 534. House Report 111-288 (Conference Report 
168

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010); P.L. 111-

84, Section 1222; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, 10/30/2010, p. 173.

 535. Dane F. Smith, Jr., An Expanded Mandate for 

Peace Building: The State Department Role 

in Peace Diplomacy, Reconstruction, and 

Stabilization, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 4/30/2009, p. 

39.

 536. USA, Headquarters, Field Manual 3–07, Stability 

Operations, 10/2008, p. 13.

 537. SIGIR, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the 

Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations, 2/2010, pp. 6–7. 

 538. P.L. 110-417. It is similar to an earlier bill, S. 613, 

introduced by Senator Richard Lugar and thenSenator Joseph Biden, which was reported by 

the Senate Foreign Relations committee but did 

not go further, and to H.R. 1084, introduced by 

Reps. Farr and Saxton, which passed the House 

on 3/5/2008.

 539. OSD, memorandum for the Secretary of State, 

“Options for Remodeling Security Sector 

Assistance Authorities,” 12/15/2009. 

 540. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010.

 541. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010. “[O]ne of the elements for 

consideration in selecting Deputy Chiefs of 

Mission or Chiefs of Mission must be how well 

candidates have worked with the interagency 

or managed multi-agency missions in previous 

postings.”

 542. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010, pp. 135–136.

 543. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010, p. xiv.

 544. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010, p. 136.

 545. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010, pp. 135–136.

 546. DoS, Leading Through Civilian Power: The 

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, 12/2010, pp. 134−135.

 547. CSO, “Newsletter–September,” 9/14/2012, www.

state.gov/j/cso/releases/other/197922.htm, 

accessed 11/28/2012.

 548. CSO, “Newsletter–September,” 9/14/2012, www.

state.gov/j/cso/releases/other/197922.htm, 

accessed 11/28/2012.

 549. SIGIR estimates that an office with a standing 

capacity of 200 staff would cost approximately 

$30 mil lion annually. Waste resulting 

from management failures in Iraq alone is 

approximately $4 billion–$5 billion (SIGIR 

estimate).

 550. Todd Moss, “Too Big to Succeed? Why 

(W)Hole-of-Government Cannot Work for U.S. 

Development Policy,” Global Development: Views 

from the Center, 10/5/2010, blogs.cgdev.org/

globaldevelopment/2010/10/too-big-to-succeedwhy-whole-of-government-cannot-work-for-u-sdevelopment-policy.php, accessed 2/7/2013.

 551. FEMA Publication 592, “Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 

P.L. 93–288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5207, 

and Related Authorities,” 6/2007.

 552. CWC, “At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance 

on Contractors in Contingency Operations,” 

2/24/2011, Appendix A. 

Sources for Figures

 1.1 SIGIR Audits Directorate data.

 1.2 SIGIR Inspections Directorate data.

 1.3 SIGIR Inspections Directorate data.

 1.4 SIGIR Investigations Directorate data.

 3.1 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 2004–2012.

 3.2 USF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/4/2011, 

4/8/2011, 7/1/2011, 10/5/2011, 10/7/2011, and 

12/21/2011; refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 3.3 GAO Audit 09-86R, “Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 10/1/2008, pp. 

4–5; DoS, Iraq Status Report, 8/9/2005, slide 29; 

SIGIR Audit 07-014, “Status of the Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Progress Expansion 

in Iraq,” 7/28/2007, p. 2; SIGIR Audit 09-013, 

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Performance 

Measurement Has Improved,” 1/28/2009, p. 2; 

SIGIR Audit 09-020, “Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams: Developing a Cost-tracking System Will 

Enhance Decision-making,” 4/28/2009, p. 2; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/6/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, OPA, PRT 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2010; SIGIR, 

Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United 

States Congress, 1/30/2008, p. 81, 1/30/2010, 

p. 36, 4/30/2010, p. 82, 7/30/2010, pp. 42–43, 

10/30/2010, p. 52, 1/30/2011, p. 42, 7/30/2011, pp. 

2–3, and 1/30/2012, p. 37.

 3.4 SIGIR Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles 

and Responsibilities of U.S. Government 

Organizations Conducting IRRF-Funded 

Reconstruction Activities,” 7/26/2007, p. i.

 3.5 GAO Testimony GAO-12-856T, statement of 

Michael J. Courts, Acting Director International 

Affairs and Trade, “Mission Iraq: State and 

DoD Face Challenges in Finalizing Support and 

Security Capabilities,” 6/28/2012, p. 3.

 3.6 USAID, Bureau for the Middle East, Office of 

Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, information 

provided to SIGIR Audits, 9/30/2012.

 3.7 USACE, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

11/20/2012.

 3.8 DoD, OUSD(AT&L), SPOT Program Support, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/2011–10/2012.

 3.9 DSCA, Historical Facts Book, 9/30/2011, www.

dsca.osd.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/

Historical%20Facts%20Book%20-%2030%20

September%202011.pdf, accessed 12/28/2012; 

Major Jared L. Ware, Program Manager, 

Foreign Military Sales Construction, MNSTC-I, 

“Foreign Military Sales Construction in Iraq,” 

DISAM Journal, 11/2009, pp. 154–158, www.

disam.dsca.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Vol%20

31_3/Ware.pdf, accessed 12/28/2012; OSC-I, 

response to SIGIR data call, 7/15/2012; Larry 

D. McCaskill, “ACC-RI Now Responsible for 

Closing Out Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 

12/9/2011, www.army.mil, accessed 12/28/2012; 

SIGIR Audit 12-005, “U.S. Central Command 

Contracting Command Had Few Contract 

Terminations That Resulted in Wasted Funds 

in Iraq,” 10/28/2011, and Iraq Reconstruction: 

Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, 

7/2006, pp. 21–22, 36, 51, 53. Under the WERC 

contract, 27 prequalified construction firms 

were available to perform construction task 

orders, with a potential contracting capacity of 

$10 billion.

 3.10 SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement, 7/2006, pp. 57–62.

 3.11 CEFMS, ESF, IRRF: Construction, IRRF: Nonconstruction, ISFF: Construction, 4/1/2011, 

7/9/2011, 10/6/2011 and 10/2/2012; USAID, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/22/2010, 

12/29/2011, 1/3/2012, and 10/2/2012.

 4.1 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2005–10/30/2012. 

 4.2 P.L. 108-7; P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; 

P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 

109-34; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; 

P.L. 110-116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 

110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; 

P.L. 111-118; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; 

ABO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; 

BBG, response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; 

DCAA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; 

DoJ, Justice Management Division, response 

to SIGIR data call, 10/9/2012; PM, response to 

SIGIR data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance,” 

Summary Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, 

“Executive Budget Summary Function 150 

& Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/9/2012; ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; OMB, response to SIGIR data call, 

6/21/2010; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/16/2012; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 

Grants [Greenbook],” 2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, 

“Office of Technical Assistance Overview,” 

12/30/2005; TFBSO, response to SIGIR data 

call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/12/2009, 4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 

10/15/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 

1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2012, 

10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 

9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, 

and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), “United States 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 

Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 6-6; OUSD(C), 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 and 

10/2/2012; USACE, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/6/2008 and 10/1/2012; GOI, CoR, 

“Federal Budget Law for the Fiscal Year/2012, 

articles 1, 2, 36, 2/23/2012, and “Federal Public 

Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2011,” 2/23/2011, 

Article 2; GOI, MOF, information provided to 

SIGIR, 6/27/2011; “GOI Budget” (as approved 

by TNA and written into law December 2005); 

GOI, Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National 

Assembly, “The State General Budget for 

2005,” 2005; GOI, MoPDC, “Indicators of the 

Investment Budget for Year 2010,” Table 17, 

2011; GOI, “Budget Revenues and Expenses 

2003, July–December,” 2003; SIGIR, Quarterly 

and Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 3/30/2004–4/30/2011; U.S. Treasury, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/4/2008 and 

4/9/2009. NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

4/5/2011, 4/7/2011, and 7/12/2011; World Bank, 

“World Bank Operations in Iraq,” 12/31/2011; 

Embassy of Japan in Iraq, press release, 

“Provision of Yen Loan to Iraq,” 5/29/2012.

 4.3 P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 109-

13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; P.L. 

109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-116; 

P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 110-

252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; P.L. 

111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; INL, response 

to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; ABO, response 

to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; CENTCOM 

OIG, information provided to SIGIR audits, 

1/14/2013; NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 

10/2/2012; USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 

10/1/2012; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to 

SIGIR data calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 

7/3/2012, 10/1/2012; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010; OUSD(C), response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012.

 4.4 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 3/30/2004–10/30/2012; 

CEFMS, ISFF Funds Execution Reports, 

10/1/2007 and 1/8/2008; DFAS, responses to 

SIGIR data calls, 1/9/2008–4/10/2009; DoD, 

Secretary of the Army Updates, 8/31/2007 

and 9/30/2007; DoS, response to SIGIR data 

call, 4/5/2007, and Section 2207 Reports, 

10/2004–10/2008; GRD, Program Review 

Board, 3/3/2007, and responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 4/5/2008–7/18/2009; INL, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 1/4/2008–10/16/2012; 

IRMO, Weekly Status Reports, 4/17/2007 and 

6/26/2007; IRMS, ESF Cost to Complete Reports, 

7/5/2007–1/5/2009, and USF-I CERP Category 

Report, 9/20/2010; ITAO, Essential Indicators 

Reports, 10/2/2007–5/14/2009, and responses 
ENDNOTES

169

to SIGIR data calls, 10/10/2007–3/29/2009; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

1/6/2010–10/2/2012; OMB, Section 2207 Reports, 

1/2004–7/2004; OSD, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 7/9/2008–10/2/2012; DoD, Secretary of the 

Army Finance Reports, 12/31/2006–7/8/2007; 

U.S. Treasury, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

4/6/2007–4/2/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/6/2009–

10/1/2012; USACE, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 4/7/2007–10/1/2012; USAID, Activities 

Report, 7/12/2007, and responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 4/6/2007–4/2/2012; USTDA, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/1/2007–4/2/2009; P.L. 

108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-102; 

P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-5; P.L. 110-

28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 

110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-8; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 

111-117; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10; P.L. 112-74.

 4.5 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.6 SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, 2/2009, p. 170; SIGIR Audit 11-013, 

“Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 2: Report 

on Apportionments, Expenditures, and Status at 

End of Fiscal Year 2010,” 4/22/2011, p. 16.

 4.7 OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 4/18/2011; 

DoD, “FY 2005 Supplemental Request for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation 

Unified Assistance,” 2/2005, pp. 78–79; 

DoD, “FY 2006 Supplemental Request for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF),” 2/2006, pp. 60–61; 

DoD, “Amendment to FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request for the Global War on 

Terror,” 3/2007, p. 5; DoD, “FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request for the Global War on 

Terror,” 2/2007, pp. 38–49; DoD, “FY 2008 

Global War on Terror Request,” 2/2007, pp. 

34–40; DoD, “FY 2008 Global War on Terror 

Amendment, Department of Defense,” 10/2007, 

pp. 26–27; DoD, “FY 2009 Global War on Terror 

Bridge Request,” 5/2008, pp. 15–16; DoD, “FY 

2009 Supplemental Request,” 4/2009, pp. 41–43; 

DoD, “FY 2011 Budget Request Overview,” 

2/2010, pp. 6-8–6-9; P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; 

P.L. 109-252; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 

110-28; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 112-10; 

House Report 109-234, to accompany H.R. 4939, 

6/8/2006, pp. 83–84; House Report 109-676, 

to accompany H.R. 5631, 9/25/2006, p. 365; 

House Report 110-107, to accompany H.R. 1591, 

4/24/2007, p. 131; Senate Report 111-188, to 

accompany H.R. 4899, 5/14/2010, p. 25.

 4.8 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.9 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.10 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.11 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.12 P.L. 109-102; House Report 109-265, to 

accompany H.R. 3057, 11/2/2005, p. 86; P.L. 

109-234; House Report 109-494, to accompany 

H.R. 4939, 6/8/2006, pp. 95–96; P.L. 110-28; 

House Report 110-107, to accompany H.R. 1591, 

4/24/2007, pp. 202–204; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-137; 

P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-161; House Appropriations 

Committee, “Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2008, Committee Print: Division J—

Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs Act, 2008,” 1/30/2008, 

pp. 2177–2178, 2208; P.L. 110-252; Senate 

Explanatory Statement, to accompany H.R. 

2642, 6/26/2008; P.L. 111-32; Conference Report 

111-151, to accompany H.R. 2346, 6/12/2009, 

pp. 127–129; P.L. 111-117; Conference Report 

111-366, to accompany H.R. 3288, 12/8/2009, 

pp. 1466, 1470; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2006,” 

p. 448; House Document 109-90, “Request for 

FY 2006 Budget Amendments,” 2/28/2006, p. 

26; DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional 

Budget Justification, FY 2008,” pp. 48, 128–129, 

138, 490; DoS and USAID, “Supplemental 

Appropriations Justification, FY 2008,” p. 

38; DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional 

Budget Justification, FY 2009,” pp. 542–544; 

DoS and USAID, “Supplemental Justification, 

FY 2009,” pp. 40–43; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, Annex: 

Regional Perspectives, FY 2010,” pp. 421–426; 

DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional Budget 

Justification, Annex: Regional Perspectives, FY 

2011,” pp. 471–477; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, Annex: 

Regional Perspectives, FY 2012,” pp. 522–528; 

USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 7/7/2011; 

USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 7/5/2011; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/12/2011, 

4/15/2011, 6/24/2011, 6/27/2011, 7/7/2011, 

and 7/8/2011; SIGIR Audit 07-005, “Fact 

Sheet on Sources and Uses of U.S. Funding 

Provided in Fiscal Year 2006 for Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction,” 7/27/2007, p. 13.

 4.13 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.14 NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012; USACE, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

and 10/1/2012.

 4.15 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.16 ABO, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2010, 

10/8/2010, 12/6/2010, 12/22/2010, 4/5/2011, 

4/18/2011, 7/5/2011, 7/14/2011, 10/18/2011, and 

1/18/2012; USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

1/3/2012.

 4.17 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 4.18 DoS, “Congressional Budget Justification: 

Foreign Operations, FY 2006,” 2/15/2005, p. 449; 

DoS, “Supplemental Budget Justification, FY 

2006,” 2/16/2006; P.L. 109-234; House Report 

109-494, to Accompany H.R. 4939, “Making 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 

2006, and for Other Purposes,” 6/8/2006, p. 

36; DoS, “Congressional Budget Justification: 

Foreign Operations, FY 2007,” 2/13/2006; 

DoS, “Congressional Budget Justification: 

Foreign Operations, FY 2007,” 2/13/2006, p. 

460; P.L. 110-5; INL, response to SIGIR data 

call, 7/2/2010; DoS, “FY 2007 Global War on 

Terror (GWOT) Supplemental,” 2/14/2007, 

pp. 132–133; P.L. 110-28; Conference Report 

110-107, to accompany H.R. 1591, “Making 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 

the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2007, and 

for Other Purposes,” 4/24/2007, p. 206; DoS, 

“Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign 

Operations, FY 2008,” 2/13/2007, p. 75; House 

Report 109-265, to accompany H.R. 3057, 

“Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, 

Export Financing, and Related Programs for the 

Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, and for 

Other Purposes,” 11/2/2005, pp. 97–98; House 

Report 110-197, to accompany H.R. 2764, “State, 

Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Appropriations Bill, 2008,” 6/18/2007, p. 105; 

P.L. 110-161; DoS, “FY 2008 Global War on 

Terror (GWOT) Emergency,” 2/13/2007, p. 139; 

P.L. 110-252; Senate Explanatory Statement to 

accompany H.R. 2642, “Making Appropriations 

for Military Construction, the Department 

of Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies for 

the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008, 

and for Other Purposes,” 6/26/2008; DoS, 

“Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign 

Operations, FY 2009,” 2/2008, pp. 54, 542; 

Senate Report 110-425, to accompany S. 3288, 

“Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 

2009,” 7/18/2008, pp. 53–54; P.L. 111-8; DoS and 

USAID, “FY 2009 Supplemental Justification,” 

5/13/2009, pp. 40–42; P.L. 111-32; House 

Report 111-151, to accompany H.R. 2346, 

“Making Supplemental Appropriations for the 

Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, and 

for Other Purposes,” 6/12/2009, p. 131; DoS, 

‘‘Guidelines for Government of Iraq Financial 

Participation in United States GovernmentFunded Civilian Foreign Assistance Programs 

and Projects,’’ 4/9/2009; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, FY 

2010,” 5/28/2009, p. 47; P.L. 111-117; Conference 

Report 111-366, to accompany H.R. 3288, 

“Departments of Transportation and Housing 

and Urban Development, and Related Agencies 

Appropriations Act, 2010,” 12/8/2009, pp. 1483–

1484; DoS and USAID, “Supplemental Budget 

Justification, FY 2010,” 3/2010, pp. 31–32; P.L. 

111-212; Senate Report 111-188, to accompany 

H.R. 4899, “Making Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations for Disaster and Relief and 

Summer Jobs for the Fiscal Year Ending 

September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes,” 

pp. 64–65; DoS, “Congressional Budget 

Justification: Foreign Operations, FY 2011,” 

3/10/2010, pp. 471–476; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, FY 

2012,” 4/8/2011, p. 188.

 4.19 DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; IRMS, 

USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

and 10/1/2012; U.S. Treasury, response to 

SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; USTDA, response to 

SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; USACE, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; USAID, response 

to SIGIR data call, 7/8/2010; OSD, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 4/10/2009 and 10/2/2012; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/20/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012. 

Figure does not account for unobligated funds, 

including $521 million of the IRRF, $625 million 

of the ISFF, $556 million of the ESF, $391 million 

of the CERP, and $157 million of the INCLE.

 5.1 For sources of funding data, see endnote 2. 

 5.2 IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; 

USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; 

USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 7/8/2010.

 5.3 USACE, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

11/20/2012.

 5.4 EIA, International Energy Annual 2006; ITAO/

ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 

6/1/2006-6/30/2011; DoS, Iraq Status Reports, 

10/25/2006, slide 11, and 5/9/2007, slide 11; 

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 1/22/2012, 4/13/2012, 7/3/2012, and 

10/1/2012; GOI, NMC, “Status of the Ministry 

of Electricity,” selected reports, 9/1/2012–

9/30/2012, nmc.gov.iq/default.aspx, accessed 

various dates.

 5.5 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 

“World Crude Oil Production, 1960-2008,” 

www.eia.doe.gov, accessed 12/30/2009; GOI, 

Ministry of Oil, “Domestic Consumption,” 

www.oil.gov.iq, accessed 1/4/2013.

 5.6 NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/6/2010, 

1/11/2011, 4/5/2011, 7/7/2011, 10/17/2011, and 

1/6/2012; GOI, Ministry of Oil, “Crude Oil 

Exports,” www.oil.gov.iq, accessed 1/30/2013.

 5.7 U.S. Treasury, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

4/10/2009, 2/25/2010, 4/12/2011, 1/10/2012, and 

10/16/2012.

 5.8 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 7/30/2006, p. 81, 

4/30/2007, p. 69, 4/30/2008, p. 135, 4/30/2009, p. 

81, 1/30/2010, p. 63, 7/30/2010, p. 101, 10/30/2010, 

p. 22, and 1/30/2012, p. 90.

 5.9 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to 

the United States Congress, 7/30/2008, p. 93, and 

1/30/2011, p. 66.

 5.10 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 5.11 DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; IRMS, 

USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; OSD, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012; USACE, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; NEA-I, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/20/2012 and 

9/25/2012.

 5.12 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 5.13 Refer to sources for Figure 4.4.

 5.14 NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2012; 

INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; 
170

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010.

 5.15 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 

2005–2008. 

 5.16 DSCA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2012.

 5.17 INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; 

IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; 

NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012 

and 9/25/2012.

 5.18 Transparency International, Corruption 

Perception Index, www.transparency.org/

research/cpi/overview, accessed 2/1/2013. Note: 

In its 2012 report, Transparency International 

revised the methodology used to construct its 

Corruption Perception Index. In doing so, it 

changed the index scale from 0–10 to 0–100. 

To show how Iraq’s ranking relative to other 

countries has changed from year to year, SIGIR 

converted the 2012 data to the scale used in 

previous years. The absolute scores shown for 

2012 should not be compared with scores in 

previous years.

 5.19 For sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 5.20 DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; 

IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

and 10/1/2012; USACE, response to SIGIR data 

call, 10/1/2012; USAID, response to SIGIR data 

call, 7/8/2010; NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 

and 10/2/2012.

 5.21 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 2004–2012.

 5.22 DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; 

IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

USAID, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/8/2010 

and 10/15/2012; NEA-I, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 10/6/2010, 9/20/2012, 10/1/2012, 

10/10/2012.

 5.23 IRMS, USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; 

U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/2/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 

7/8/2010; NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data call, 

9/20/2012, 9/25/2012, and 10/2/2012.

 5.24 For sources of funding data, see endnote 2.

 5.25 The World Bank, IFC, Doing Business in the 

Arab World 2012, p. 64.

 5.26 World Bank, “Doing Business: Economy 

Rankings,” www.doingbusiness.org/rankings, 

accessed 1/16/2013.

 5.27 UNCC, “Status of Processing and Payment of 

Claims,” 10/25/2012, www.uncc.ch/status.htm, 

accessed 12/20/2012.

Sources for Tables

 1.1 SIGIR data.

 4.1 P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to SIGIR 

data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to SIGIR 

data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional Budget 

Justification: Foreign Assistance,” Summary 

Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, “Executive 

Budget Summary Function 150 & Other 

International Programs, Fiscal Year 2013,” p. 173; 

DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 7/9/2012; ECA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 4/14/2010; OMB, 

response to SIGIR data call, 6/21/2010; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; USAID, 

“U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook],” 

2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, “Office of Technical 

Assistance Overview,” 12/30/2005; TFBSO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR 

Audit 11-007, “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund 1: Report on Apportionments, 

Expenditures, and Cancelled Funds,” 12/28/2010; 

USAID, responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/12/2009, 

4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 10/15/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 

7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; NEA-I, responses to 

SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2012, 10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 

9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 

10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), 

“United States Department of Defense Fiscal 

Year 2012 Budget Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 

66, and responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 

and 10/2/2012; USACE, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/6/2008 and 10/1/2012.

 4.2 NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/20/2012; 

OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; 

DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; 

USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; 

U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR data 

call, 7/8/2010; SIGIR Audit 11-007, “Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1: Report on 

Apportionments, Expenditures, and Cancelled 

Funds,” 12/28/2010.

 4.3 OUSD(C), response to SIGIR data call, 

10/2/2012.

 4.4 NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, and 10/2/2012; USACE, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/1/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

and 10/1/2012.

 4.5 ABO, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2010, 

10/8/2010, 12/6/2010, 12/22/2010, 4/5/2011, 

4/18/2011, 7/5/2011, 7/14/2011, 10/18/2011, and 

1/18/2012; USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

1/3/2012.

 4.6 INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012.

 4.7 DoS, “Executive Budget Summary Function 

150 and Other Internal Programs, Fiscal Year 

2013,” p. 173; OSC-I Chief, meeting with SIGIR, 

9/21/2012; NRRRF: USACE, GRD, response to 

SIGIR data call, 10/6/2008; IFF: OSD, responses 

to SIGIR data calls, 10/2/2009 and 4/14/2010; 

OHDACA: DSCA, “Overseas Humanitarian, 

Disaster, and Civic Aid: Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 

Estimates,” 5/2009; OSD, response to SIGIR 

data call, 4/15/2010; MRA and ERMA: DoS, 

PRM, response to SIGIR data call, 4/14/2010; 

Democracy Fund: DoS, DRL, responses to 

SIGIR data call, 4/2/2010 and 4/9/2010; NADR:

USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 

[Greenbook],” 2008; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 

2010,” 5/2009, pp. 49, 55; IMET: DoS, “Foreign 

Operations Congressional Budget Justification, 

Fiscal Year 2010,” 5/2009, p. 88; DoS, response 

to SIGIR data call, 3/17/2010; ECA: NEA-I, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; DoS, 

ECA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/14/2010; 

IDA/IDFA: USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/14/2010; P.L. 480: USDA, Foreign Agricultural 

Service, “Fact Sheet: Food Assistance,” 4/2009; 

NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2010; 

CSH: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 

4/2/2010; International Affairs Technical 

Assistance: U.S. Treasury, OTA, “Office of 

Technical Assistance Overview,” 12/30/2005; 

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data 

call, 10/3/2009.

 5.1 DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; IRMS, 

USF-I CERP Category Report, 9/20/2010; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 7/3/2012, 

10/1/2012; U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR 

data call, 4/2/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR 

data call, 4/2/2009; USACE, response to SIGIR 

data call, 10/1/2012; USAID, response to SIGIR 

data call, 7/8/2010; OSD, responses to SIGIR 

data calls, 4/10/2009 and 10/2/2012; NEA-I, 

responses to SIGIR data calls, 9/28/2011, 

9/20/2012, 9/25/2012, 10/1/2012, 10/2/2012.

 5.2 IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012; SIGIR Audit 07-009, “Review of 

Bechtel’s Spending under Its Phase II Iraq 

Reconstruction Contract,” 7/24/2007.

 5.3 IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012; SIGIR Audit 07-009, “Review of 

Bechtel’s Spending under Its Phase II Iraq 

Reconstruction Contract,” 7/24/2007, Audit 08-

018, “Review of Outcome, Cost, and Oversight 

of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

FluorAMEC, LLC, 7/15/2008, PA-08-143, “Sadr 

City R3 Water Treatment Plant,” 10/29/2008, 

and Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2008, p. 128.

 5.4 IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012; SIGIR PA-05-10, “Al Fatah Pipe 

River Crossing,” 3/7/2006, and Audit 09-008, 

“Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraq Oil 

Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown & 

Root Services, Inc.,” 1/13/2009.

 5.5 IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012, and response to SIGIR data call, 

7/12/2012; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012; SIGIR Audit 07-002, “Status of 

the Advanced First Responder Network,” 

4/25/2007, Audit 07-009, “Review of Bechtel’s 

Spending under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction 

Contract,” 7/24/2007, and Quarterly and 

Semiannual Reports to the United States 

Congress, 7/30/2010, p. 79, and 1/30/2012, p. 91.

 5.6 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the 

United States Congress, 1/30/2012, p. 68.

 5.7 IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012; SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, 

Cost, and Oversight of the Security and 

Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” 

7/28/2008, Audit 09-027, “Developing a Depot 

Maintenance Capability at Taji Hampered by 

Numerous Problems,” 7/30/2009, Audit 10-001, 

“Iraqi Security Forces Facilities: Environmental 

Chemical Corporation Projects Achieved 

Results, but with Significant Cost Increases and 

Schedule Delays,” 10/22/2009, PA-06-087 and 

PA-06-088, “Tallil Military Base Camp Ur,” 

4/25/2007, PA-07-098, “Al Rasheed Brigade 

Set,” 7/17/2007, PA-07-102, “Ministry of Defense 

Headquarters Building,” 7/17/2007.

 5.8 IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012; SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, 

Cost, and Oversight of the Security and 

Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” 

7/28/2008, PA-08-152, “Anbar Rule of Law/

Judicial Complex, Ramadi, Iraq,” 1/27/2009, and 

PA-09-177, “Renovate and Expand Chamchamal 

Correctional Facility, Chamchamal, Iraq,” 

10/22/2009.

 5.9 IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010; USACE, 

information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012, and response to SIGIR data call, 

7/12/2012; USAID, Bureau for the Middle 

East, Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula 

Affairs, information provided to SIGIR Audits, 

10/23/2012; SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management 
ENDNOTES

171

of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction 

Projects,” 4/29/2006, Audit 06-026, “Review of 

the U.S. Agency for International Development’s 

Management of the Basrah Children’s Hospital 

Project,” 7/31/2006, Audit 09-015, “Construction 

of Primary Healthcare Centers Reported 

Essentially Complete, but Operational Issues 

Remain,” 4/29/2009, Audit 10-015, “Health 

Center Sustainment Contract Resulted in Some 

Repairs, but Iraqi Maintenance Capability Was 

Not Achieved,” 4/29/2010, PA-08-165 & 167, 

“Missan Surgical Hospital under the Economic 

Support Fund, Al Amarah, Iraq,” 7/16/2009, and 

Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United 

States Congress, 7/30/2012, pp. 33–34.

 5.10 Bank financial statements provided to USAID, 

Private Banking Industry Survey, Iraq Financial 

Development Project, 4/2011, p. 45. Cash/

Deposits measures the ability of a bank to meet 

sudden demands by depositors to withdraw 

funds. The near one-to-one relationship is 

strongly indicative of a system that is not 

performing its role as financial intermediary. 

In banking environments where there is a 

responsive, active interbank market (and a 

Central Bank willing to serve as lender of last 

resort), the Cash/Deposits ratio is normally 

extremely low. JPMorgan Chase data is current 

as of 2/24/2010.

 B.1 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2004–10/30/2012.

 B.2 SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the 

United States Congress, 7/30/2004–10/30/2012; 

USACE, information provided to SIGIR audits, 

11/20/2012.

 B.3 P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 

109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-34; 

P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-

116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-61; P.L. 

110-252; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 111-117; P.L. 111-118; 

P.L. 111-212; P.L. 112-10, P.L. 112-74; ABO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2012; BBG, 

response to SIGIR data call, 3/7/2011; DCAA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2011; DoJ, 

Justice Management Division, response to SIGIR 

data call, 10/9/2012; DoS, PM, response to SIGIR 

data call, 7/6/2011; DoS, “Congressional Budget 

Justification: Foreign Assistance,” Summary 

Tables, FY 2009–FY 2011; DoS, “Executive 

Budget Summary Function 150 & Other 

International Programs, Fiscal Year 2013,” p. 173; 

DRL, response to SIGIR data call, 7/9/2012; ECA, 

response to SIGIR data call, 4/14/2010; OMB, 

response to SIGIR data call, 6/21/2010; INL, 

response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2012; USAID, 

“U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook],” 

2008; U.S. Treasury, OTA, “Office of Technical 

Assistance Overview,” 12/30/2005; TFBSO, 

response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011; SIGIR 

Audit 11-007, “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund 1: Report on Apportionments, 

Expenditures, and Cancelled Funds,” 12/28/2010; 

USAID, responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/12/2009, 

4/8/2009, 10/2/2012, and 10/15/2012; U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/3/2009, 10/5/2011, 1/4/2012, 4/3/2012, 

7/3/2012, and 10/1/2012; NEA-I, responses to 

SIGIR data calls, 10/4/2012, 10/6/2010, 4/15/2011, 

9/28/2011, 9/20/2012, 9/27/2012, 9/25/2012, 

10/1/2012, 10/2/2012, and 10/10/2012; OUSD(C), 

“United States Department of Defense Fiscal 

Year 2012 Budget Request,” Overview, 2/2012, p. 

66, and responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/14/2010 

and 10/2/2012; USACE, responses to SIGIR data 

calls, 10/6/2008 and 10/1/2012.

 B.4 OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 4/18/2011; 

DoD, “FY 2005 Supplemental Request for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation 

Unified Assistance,” 2/2005, pp. 78–79; 

DoD, “FY 2006 Supplemental Request for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF),” 2/2006, pp. 60–61; 

DoD, “Amendment to FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request for the Global War on 

Terror,” 3/2007, p. 5; DoD, “FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request for the Global War on 

Terror,” 2/2007, pp. 38–49; DoD, “FY 2008 

Global War on Terror Request,” 2/2007, pp. 

34–40; DoD, “FY 2008 Global War on Terror 

Amendment, Department of Defense,” 10/2007, 

pp. 26–27; DoD, “FY 2009 Global War on Terror 

Bridge Request,” 5/2008, pp. 15–16; DoD, “FY 

2009 Supplemental Request,” 4/2009, pp. 41–43; 

DoD, “FY 2011 Budget Request Overview,” 

2/2010, pp. 6-8–6-9; P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; 

P.L. 109-252; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 

110-28; P.L. 111-212; P.L. 111-32; P.L. 112-10; 

House Report 109-234, to accompany H.R. 4939, 

6/8/2006, pp. 83–84; House Report 109-676, 

to accompany H.R. 5631, 9/25/2006, p. 365; 

House Report 110-107, to accompany H.R. 1591, 

4/24/2007, p. 131; Senate Report 111-188, to 

accompany H.R. 4899, 5/14/2010, p. 25.

 B.5 P.L. 109-102; House Report 109-265, to 

accompany H.R. 3057, 11/2/2005, p. 86; P.L. 

109-234; House Report 109-494, to accompany 

H.R. 4939, 6/8/2006, pp. 95–96; P.L. 110-28; 

House Report 110-107, to accompany H.R. 1591, 

4/24/2007, pp. 202–204; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-137; 

P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-161; House Appropriations 

Committee, “Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2008, Committee Print: Division J—

Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs Act, 2008,” 1/30/2008, 

pp. 2177–2178, 2208; P.L. 110-252; Senate 

Explanatory Statement, to accompany H.R. 

2642, 6/26/2008; P.L. 111-32; Conference Report 

111-151, to accompany H.R. 2346, 6/12/2009, 

pp. 127–129; P.L. 111-117; Conference Report 

111-366, to accompany H.R. 3288, 12/8/2009, 

pp. 1466, 1470; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2006,” 

p. 448; House Document 109-90, “Request for 

FY 2006 Budget Amendments,” 2/28/2006, p. 

26; DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional 

Budget Justification, FY 2008,” pp. 48, 128–129, 

138, 490; DoS and USAID, “Supplemental 

Appropriations Justification, FY 2008,” p. 

38; DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional 

Budget Justification, FY 2009,” pp. 542–544; 

DoS and USAID, “Supplemental Justification, 

FY 2009,” pp. 40–43; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, Annex: 

Regional Perspectives, FY 2010,” pp. 421–426; 

DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional Budget 

Justification, Annex: Regional Perspectives, FY 

2011,” pp. 471–477; DoS, “Foreign Operations 

Congressional Budget Justification, Annex: 

Regional Perspectives, FY 2012,” pp. 522–528; 

USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 7/7/2011; 

USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 7/5/2011; 

DoS, NEA-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 

4/12/2011, 4/15/2011, 6/24/2011, 6/27/2011, 

7/7/2011, and 7/8/2011; SIGIR Audit 07-005, 

“Fact Sheet on Sources and Uses of U.S. Funding 

Provided in Fiscal Year 2006 for Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction,” 7/27/2007, p. 13.

 B.6 DoS, “Congressional Budget Justification: 

Foreign Operations, FY 2006,” 2/15/2005, p. 449; 

DoS, “Supplemental Budget Justification, FY 

2006,” 2/16/2006; P.L. 109-234; House Report 

109-494, to Accompany H.R. 4939, “Making 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 

the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, 

and for Other Purposes,” 6/8/2006, p. 36; 

DoS, “Congressional Budget Justification: 

Foreign Operations, FY 2007,” 2/13/2006; DoS, 

“Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign 

Operations, FY 2007,” 2/13/2006, p. 460; P.L. 

110-5; INL, response to SIGIR data call, 7/2/2010; 

DoS, “FY 2007 Global War on Terror (GWOT) 

Supplemental,” 2/14/2007, pp. 132–133; P.L. 110-

28; Conference Report 110-107, to accompany 

H.R. 1591, “Making Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending 

September 30, 2007, and for Other Purposes,” 

4/24/2007, p. 206; DoS, “Congressional Budget 

Justification: Foreign Operations, FY 2008,” 

2/13/2007, p. 75; House Report 109-265, to 

accompany H.R. 3057, “Making Appropriations 

for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 

and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year 

Ending September 30, 2006, and for Other 

Purposes,” 11/2/2005, pp. 97–98; House Report 

110-197, to accompany H.R. 2764, “State, 

Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Appropriations Bill, 2008,” 6/18/2007, p. 105; 

P.L. 110-161; DoS, “FY 2008 Global War on 

Terror (GWOT) Emergency,” 2/13/2007, p. 139; 

P.L. 110-252; Senate Explanatory Statement to 

accompany H.R. 2642, “Making Appropriations 

for Military Construction, the Department 

of Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies for 

the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008, 

and for Other Purposes,” 6/26/2008; DoS, 

“Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign 

Operations, FY 2009,” 2/2008, pp. 54, 542; 

Senate Report 110-425, to accompany S. 3288, 

“Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 

2009,” 7/18/2008, pp. 53–54; P.L. 111-8; DoS and 

USAID, “FY 2009 Supplemental Justification,” 

5/13/2009, pp. 40–42; P.L. 111-32; House 

Report 111-151, to accompany H.R. 2346, 

“Making Supplemental Appropriations for the 

Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, and 

for Other Purposes,” 6/12/2009, p. 131; DoS, 

‘‘Guidelines for Government of Iraq Financial 

Participation in United States GovernmentFunded Civilian Foreign Assistance Programs 

and Projects,’’ 4/9/2009; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, FY 

2010,” 5/28/2009, p. 47; P.L. 111-117; Conference 

Report 111-366, to accompany H.R. 3288, 

“Departments of Transportation and Housing 

and Urban Development, and Related Agencies 

Appropriations Act, 2010,” 12/8/2009, pp. 1483–

1484; DoS and USAID, “Supplemental Budget 

Justification, FY 2010,” 3/2010, pp. 31–32; P.L. 

111-212; Senate Report 111-188, to accompany 

H.R. 4899, “Making Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations for Disaster and Relief and 

Summer Jobs for the Fiscal Year Ending 

September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes,” 

pp. 64–65; DoS, “Congressional Budget 

Justification: Foreign Operations, FY 2011,” 

3/10/2010, pp. 471–476; DoS, “Congressional 

Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, 

FY 2012,” 4/8/2011, p. 188.

A FINAL REPORT FROM 

THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

www.sigir.mil

SIGIR’s work was crucial in Iraq, providing the Congress with a steady stream of 

reliable reporting on the rebuilding program and helping to protect the taxpayer’s 

interests. Learning From Iraq now provides us a key history of the reconstruction 

eff ort, with many important lessons for reforming stabilization and reconstruction 

operations that, if heeded, could greatly improve the protection of our vital national 

security interests. 

—Senator Susan M. Collins

All interested in what happened to our rebuilding money in Iraq ought to read 

Learning From Iraq. It answers that question and many more, including what reforms 

the United States should consider to improve its system for planning and executing 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. SIGIR has done good work in Iraq 

for nine years, and this fi nal report eff ectively brings all of that work together in an 

accessible and readable format. 

—Jim Marshall, President and CEO of the 

U.S. Institute of Peace and former Congressman from Georgia

I commend Learning From Iraq to all, but especially to those working to improve 

the U.S. approach to stabilization and reconstruction operations. SIGIR amply 

demonstrates in this comprehensive study that reconstruction, as an element of stability 

operations, is both important and very diffi cult to get right. Th is hard-won truth should 

be carefully considered before the United States again engages in an SRO.

—Ambassador James F. Jeff rey, Ambassador to Iraq, 2010–2012

As the last Commanding General of U.S. Forces-Iraq, I worked closely with Stuart 

Bowen and his SIGIR team, fi nding their reports on Iraq’s reconstruction timely, 

reliable, and useful. We faced and overcame a lot of challenges during the rebuilding 

program, learning lessons along the way. Now, with Learning From Iraq, SIGIR 

captures many of those lessons, which should help guide the reform of how the United 

States plans and executes future stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

—General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commanding General, U.S. Central Command

Learning From Iraq, SIGIR’s fi nal lessons learned study, captures in detail what 

happened in Iraq and suggests how we can apply the lessons learned from our 10-year 

reconstruction program toward improving future stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. As the Chief of the Offi ce of Security Cooperation-Iraq, I relied on the 

professional reporting produced by Stuart Bowen and his SIGIR team. Th is book is a 

must-read for those interested in 21st century national security matters. 

—Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Chief, Offi ce of Security Cooperation-Iraq, 

2011–2013

A fascinating study that highlights in the most graphic manner the important, indeed 

critical, role that an independent Inspector General can play in ensuring that the 

American taxpayer has a better understanding of how and in what way reconstruction 

funds are being spent. Th ose who argue for a permanent offi ce for contingency 

operations can draw considerable ammunition from this report. 

—Dr. Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 

2001–2004, and member of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, 2008–2011 

Stuart Bowen has written the most comprehensive and defi nitive review of the eff orts 

to rebuild Iraq. It is the fi nest accounting of our decade of involvement. Learning 

From  Iraq is a must-read for all current and future political, military, and diplomatic 

leaders who need to understand the complexity and scale of stabilization and 

reconstruction operations. 

—General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Retired), 

former Commanding General, U.S. Central Command

Cover photo courtesy of the U.S. Department of State