Filed 8/30/24 In re N.C. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re N.C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B334904

(Super. Ct. No. 23JV00048)

(Santa Barbara County)

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY 

CHILD WELFARE SERVICES,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.C. et al.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

A.C. (Father) and S.O. (Mother) appeal from the juvenile 

court’s order terminating parental rights to their minor son, N.C. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26.) They contend the court failed to 

ensure that Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services (CWS) 

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
2

complied with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child 

Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related 

provisions of California law (§ 224.2). We agree, and remand for 

further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

N.C. was born in June 2022. He was placed in foster care

eight months later. Prior to the detention hearing a CWS social 

worker asked Mother, who has six siblings, if her family had any 

Indian ancestry. She said that it did not, but thought that 

Father’s family might. Father, who has 12 siblings, denied any 

such ancestry to another social worker. 

In February 2023, Mother filed a Parental Notification of 

Indian Status (ICWA-020) form indicating that she had no Indian 

ancestry. She again denied such ancestry when asked by county 

counsel at the detention hearing. No similar inquiry was made of 

the maternal grandmother, who was present at the hearing. 

The juvenile court ordered N.C. detained at the conclusion 

of the hearing. Later that month, N.C.’s maternal grandmother 

and one of his maternal aunts told a CWS social worker that

their family had no Indian ancestry. CWS knew that N.C. lived

with one of his maternal uncles, but the social worker did not ask 

him about the family’s Indian ancestry. CWS also knew that 

N.C. had at least four other maternal aunts and uncles and one 

maternal great-grandmother, but the social worker did not ask 

them about their ancestry. 

The paternal grandmother told the social worker that her 

family had Cherokee ancestry, but that she was not a registered 

member of the tribe; the last time anyone from the family had 

contacted the tribe they were told they were not eligible for 

membership. The social worker made one attempt to contact the 
3

paternal grandfather regarding his family’s ancestry, but he was 

unavailable. She was able to contact a paternal uncle, who 

denied any Indian ancestry. The record does not indicate that 

the social worker made any additional attempts to contact the 

paternal grandfather or that she attempted to contact any of 

Father’s 11 other siblings. CWS nonetheless advised the juvenile 

court there was no reason to believe N.C. had Indian ancestry. 

A maternal second cousin accompanied Mother to the 

jurisdictional hearing in March. N.C. was declared a dependent 

of the juvenile court at the conclusion of that hearing and 

removed from Mother’s care. The court ordered that Mother be 

provided with reunification services. Services for Father were 

bypassed due to his incarceration. 

In August, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma told CWS 

that N.C. was not an Indian child, as defined by ICWA. The 

following month, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee 

Indians and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians said that N.C. 

was neither a member of nor eligible for membership in their 

respective tribes. 

At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found 

that ICWA did not apply. The court also found that Mother had 

not complied with her case plan. It terminated reunification 

services and set the matter for a selection and implementation 

hearing. At that hearing the court found clear and convincing 

evidence that N.C. would be adopted, and terminated Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights. 

DISCUSSION

Mother and Father contend the case should be remanded 

for compliance with ICWA’s inquiry requirements. We agree.
4

For purposes of ICWA, an “Indian child” is a child who 

either is a “member of an Indian tribe” or “is eligible for 

membership in an Indian tribe” because they are the biological 

child of a tribe member. (25 U.S.C § 1903; see also § 224.1, subd. 

(a) [adopting federal definition].) There is an “affirmative and 

continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an 

Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (a))—a duty that rests with the 

juvenile court and child services agency, not the child’s parents or 

family members (In re Dezi C. (Aug. 19, 2024, S275578) __ 

Cal.5th __, __ (Dezi C.) [slip opn. at p. 11]). This duty “can be 

divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of 

further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (In

re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566; see Dezi C., at pp. __-__ 

[slip opn. at pp. 12-15].)

At issue here are the child services agency’s duties of initial 

and further inquiry. The former requires CWS to “ask[] the child, 

parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family 

members, [and any] others who have an interest in the child . . . 

whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. 

(b).) Extended family members include the child’s grandparents, 

stepparents, aunts and uncles, siblings, siblings-in-law, first and 

second cousins, and nieces and nephews. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); 

§ 224.1, subd. (c).)

If the initial inquiry leads to information that gives the 

juvenile court or CWS “reason to believe” the child is or may be 

an Indian child, the court or agency “shall make further inquiry 

regarding the possible Indian status of the child . . . as soon as 

practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This requires CWS to: “(1) 

interview[] the parents and extended family members[,] (2) 

contact[] the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State 
5

Department of Social Services[,] and (3) contact[] tribes the child 

may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have 

information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a 

tribe.” (Dezi C., supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [slip opn. at p. 14]; see

§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).) 

A non-Indian parent has standing to challenge whether

ICWA’s inquiry requirements were met on appeal. (In re

Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 339.) We review such a 

challenge for substantial evidence. (In re J.K. (2022) 83 

Cal.App.5th 498, 504.) 

Here, we conclude substantial evidence does not support 

that CWS and the juvenile court made the requisite initial 

inquiries of the maternal side of N.C.’s family. Mother, the 

maternal grandmother, and a maternal aunt all denied that their 

family had Indian ancestry. But ICWA’s initial inquiry 

requirements were not met simply because these family members 

denied Indian ancestry. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 

554.) CWS knew of at least five more maternal aunts and uncles, 

plus at least one maternal second cousin, but the record does not 

indicate that these relatives were asked about their ancestry. 

Nor did CWS inquire whether the maternal grandfather had 

Indian ancestry. (In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1069 

[error for CWS to fail to ask extended family members about 

Indian ancestry], disapproved on another point by Dezi C., supra, 

__ Cal.5th at p. __, fn. 18 [slip opn. at p. 46]; see also Dezi C., at p. 

__ [slip opn. at pp. 25-26] [“an adequate initial inquiry that 

reaches beyond parents to extended family members and others 

facilitates the discovery of Indian identity, and maximizes the 

chances that potential Indian children are discovered and tribes 

are notified”].) We thus cannot say that the agency made the
6

required “meaningful effort to locate and interview extended 

family members” about N.C.’s possible Indian ancestry. (In re

K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709; cf. Dezi C., at p. __ [slip opn. 

at p. 27] [“ ‘those people who are reasonably available to help the 

agency with its investigation into whether the child has any 

potential Indian ancestry should be asked’ ”].) A “conditional 

reversal is [accordingly] warranted in order to develop the record 

and cure the inadequacy” of CWS’s initial inquiry. (Dezi C., at p. 

__ [slip opn. at p. 34].)

We also cannot say that substantial evidence supports the 

conclusion that CWS complied with its duty of further inquiry for 

the paternal side of N.C.’s family. When the paternal 

grandmother said that her family had Cherokee ancestry, CWS 

correctly contacted the BIA and relevant tribes to determine if 

N.C. was eligible for membership. But CWS was also required to 

interview other relatives about the family’s Indian ancestry. 

(Dezi C., supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [slip opn. at p. 14]; see § 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2)(A).) Father indicated that he has 12 siblings and that 

the paternal grandfather is still alive, but the record indicates 

that social workers only spoke with one of Father’s siblings and 

made a single attempt to contact the grandfather. Because other 

family members could have provided additional information 

about the family’s ancestry (In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 566-567; In re K.R., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 707-708; cf. 

Dezi C., supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [slip opn. at p. 28] [criticizing 

agency for failing to interview “readily available” family 

members]), a conditional reversal is required on this issue as well

(In re J.K., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 511-512; cf. Dezi C., at p. 

__ [slip opn. at p. 31] [discussing general need for conditional 

reversal to cure ICWA inquiry errors]).
7

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s and 

Father’s respective parental rights to N.C., entered February 1, 

2024, is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

compliance with the initial inquiry (for the maternal side of 

N.C.’s family) and further inquiry (for the paternal side of N.C.’s 

family) requirements of ICWA and related California law. After 

these inquiries have been made, the court shall make ICWA

findings at a noticed hearing. If the court finds ICWA

inapplicable, it shall reinstate its February 2024 order 

terminating parental rights. If the court concludes that ICWA 

does apply, however, it shall conduct further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion, including a new section 366.26 

hearing that conforms with all relevant provisions of ICWA and 

the Welfare and Institutions Code.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.
Gustavo Lavayen, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant B.J. (Father).

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant K.A.J. (Mother).

Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Adam Crawford, 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.