SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3528-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

JULE HANNAH, a/k/a 

JULE L. HANNA, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted May 6, 2024 – Decided August 9, 2024 

Before Judges DeAlmeida, Berdote Byrne, and 

Bishop-Thompson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 

18-03-0226.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public

Defender, of counsel and on the brief). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Bethany L. Deal, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3528-21

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

PER CURIAM 

Following a jury trial, defendant, Jule Hannah, was convicted of firstdegree murder (count one), and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon 

(count three). He was sentenced to forty-five years in prison, eighty-five percent 

of which was to be served without parole eligibility on count one. Defendant 

was also sentenced to ten years in prison with five years of parole ineligibility 

on count three, concurrent with the forty-five-year sentence for murder. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions: 

POINT I: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE 

PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL BY THE IMPROPER 

INTRODUCTION OF LAY OPINION TESTIMONY 

THAT DEFENDANT WALKED WITH THE SAME 

UNIQUE GAIT USED BY THE PERPETRATOR AS 

CAPTURED IN SURVEILLANCE VIDEO. U.S. 

Const. amends. V and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, [¶¶] 1, 9, 

and 10. (Not Raised Below) 

POINT II: WHERE EXPERT TESTIMONY ON 

HISTORICAL CELL SITE ANALYSIS WAS 

REQUIRED, THE INTRODUCTION OF 

UNRELIABLE LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY 

DENIED DEFENDANT HIS RIGHTS TO DUE 

PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL. U.S. Const. amends. 

V and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, [¶¶] 1, 9, and 10. 

POINT III: THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT 

TO VOIR DIRE A SLEEPING JUROR DEPRIVED 

DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR AND 
3 A-3528-21

IMPARTIAL JURY, AND REQUIRES THE 

REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTIONS. U.S. Const. 

amends. VI, VII, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, [¶¶] 9, 10. 

POINT IV: EVIDENCE DISCOVERED ON 

DEFENDANT'S CELL PHONE MUST BE 

SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE "WARRANT TO 

SEIZE" WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL GENERAL 

WARRANT THAT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY 

DESCRIBE THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED NOR 

PROVIDE ANY LIMITATION ON WHEN THE 

WARRANT COULD BE EXECUTED. U.S. Const. 

amends. IV and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, [¶] 7. 

POINT V: DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, 

VOLUNTARILY, AND INTELLIGENTLY GIVE HIS 

STATEMENT TO [THE POLICE]. 

POINT VI: EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S 

MOTOR-VEHICLE SUMMONSES AND VIDEO OF 

HIS 2011 STOP WERE NOT PROPERLY 

ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 

POINT VII: OFFICER IACOVONE’S TESTIMONY 

ABOUT DEFENDANT’S SISTER WAS HEARSAY 

AND VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION 

CLAUSE. 

We conclude the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to present 

lay person testimony regarding various cell phone records after he failed to 

qualify as an expert. We vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial on 

counts one and three. 
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I.

We discern the following facts from the record. On January 15, 2017, at 

approximately 8:30 a.m., Tina Acevedo was asleep in her home on Spruce Street 

in Bridgeton when she was awoken by a loud bang outside. She immediately 

jumped out of bed, looked out her bedroom window, and saw a man with a

distinct limp and a puffy jacket walking rapidly down the road, away from a car. 

She saw only the side of the man's face for a few seconds. She then noticed the 

car had crashed into her neighbor's tree and a man (later identified as Miguel 

Lopez, the victim) was slouched over the driver's seat, dead. Lopez had been 

shot four times, with the shots fired from the passenger seat of his vehicle. The 

Bridgeton Police Department (BPD) recovered four shell casings, all from the 

same firearm. Fingerprints were also found in the vehicle. A cigar butt with a 

plastic filter tip from the front passenger seat of the victim's vehicle was also 

recovered. The cigar butt was later determined to match defendant's DNA. 

Acevedo provided BPD with video surveillance footage captured from her 

home's security system (the Spruce Street footage). The Spruce Street footage 

depicted what BPD believed to be a suspect walking with a distinctive limp 

requiring him to lift his left foot before taking each step. 
5 A-3528-21

Two days later, police brought in a potential suspect who wore a 

camouflage jacket and walked with a limp for questioning. He was ultimately 

released when BPD noticed the jacket was the wrong type and had no blood 

splatter on it, the suspect's limp affected the wrong leg, and no evidence 

connected him to the murder. 

Detective Kenneth Leyman (Leyman), who claimed he knew defendant 

from previous interactions, reviewed video footage of defendant unrelated to the 

crime, recorded on various dates at the Cumberland County courthouse, and 

footage from a traffic stop in 2011. The comparison of those videos, specifically 

defendant's distinctive limp, with the Spruce Street footage eventually led BPD 

to identify defendant as a potential suspect. 

As part of the investigation, BPD also obtained surveillance footage from 

various locations in South Jersey to retrace the victim's path the morning of 

January 15. From the accumulated surveillance footage, BPD learned the victim 

was with a friend at Caesar's Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City, on January 14 

until the early morning hours of January 15. At approximately 6:30 a.m., the 

victim left Atlantic City and drove east. About one hour later, at around 7:30 

a.m., the victim's vehicle was seen at Cacia's Bakery in Williamstown and 

thereafter headed south towards Bridgeton. Additional footage recovered from 
6 A-3528-21

739 Parvins Mill Road showed the victim proceeding down Parvins Mill Road 

and continuing southwest towards Bridgeton at 7:54 a.m. The victim's vehicle 

was then seen on surveillance footage from a drugstore at approximately 8:03 

a.m., continuing towards Bridgeton. Footage from a patrol car revealed the 

victim drove towards Bridgeton before turning onto Rosenhayn Avenue. A 

recording from 571 North Burlington Road and 181 North Burlington Road 

further captured the victim continuing southbound towards Bridgeton. A 

convenience store then placed the victim at the intersection of North Burlington 

Road and Commerce Street at approximately 8:20 a.m. BPD also recovered a 

recording of a phone call made by the victim's friend's father to the victim 

around this same time, which appeared to capture the voice of an unidentified 

second person in the car with the victim. 

Contemporaneously, BPD began an investigation into defendant. It 

learned of motor vehicle summonses issued by the Monroe Township Police 

Department (MPD) to defendant on the morning of the murder. The motor 

vehicle summons cited defendant for leaving the scene of a one-car accident and 

failing to report the accident in the vicinity of Williamstown-Franklinville Road 

and Tuckahoe Road that same morning. 
7 A-3528-21

James Burnett (Burnett), a paper delivery driver for the Williamstown 

area, drove past the accident and saw a vehicle on the side of the road. Burnett 

pulled over and contacted the MPD. While there, Burnett stated and later 

testified he encountered a bald, African American man who walked with a 

"slight limp." The man offered Burnett $100 for a ride to Bridgeton, but Burnett 

declined because he was still working and left to finish his delivery route. He 

testified at trial he did not have an opportunity to see the man's face. When 

Burnett returned to the scene of the accident approximately twenty-five minutes 

later, the man he encountered was gone. The only person present was MPD 

officer Carmen Iacovone (Iacovone), who, after speaking with Burnett and 

locating the owner of the car, defendant's sister, issued the motor vehicle 

summonses to defendant for leaving the scene of an accident and failing to report 

it. 

BPD also served a Communications Data Warrant (CDW) upon

defendant's cell phone provider for defendant's cell phone records on February 

8, 2017. Using the records, Leyman plotted the towers to which defendant's 

calls or texts connected between the time of his one-car accident on 

Franklinville-Williamstown Road to the homicide. Due to defendant's presence 

near the intersection of Williamstown-Franklinville Road and Tuckahoe Road 
8 A-3528-21

around the time the victim was at the nearby Cacia's Bakery, BPD theorized the 

victim picked up defendant on the side of the road after defendant crashed his 

vehicle as the victim drove south towards Bridgeton. 

Based on this information, BPD sought to seize "cellular device(s) 

belonging to and/or in the possession of" defendant. The warrant was issued on 

February 13, and defendant's cell phone was seized nine days later on February 

22, when Leyman pulled over a vehicle with defendant in the passenger seat. 

Defendant read the seizure order and asked Leyman why the warrant referenced 

murder. As Leyman stood beside defendant, he detected the odor of marijuana 

coming from inside the vehicle. A search warrant was issued the next day for 

the vehicle, which uncovered drugs. The following day, February 24, BPD 

executed a search warrant at defendant's residence. A gun cleaning kit was 

found in the backyard, but no gun was ever recovered. 

Defendant was taken to BPD headquarters for questioning, but no charges 

were brought against him at that time. Leyman began the interview by reading 

defendant his Miranda1 rights. He asked defendant, "[u]nderstanding those 

rights, [are] you ok talking to us about this today?" Defendant responded, 

"About this weed?", to which Leyman responded in the affirmative. After 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
9 A-3528-21

discussing the drugs, Leyman informed defendant he is "not a drug cop, [and 

does not] do drug work . . . ." Leyman explained BPD was investigating a 

separate case and had defendant's "whole timeline of events," how defendant ran 

into a ditch in Monroe Township and then "end[ed] up on the South side . . . ." 

Leyman then showed defendant the victim's picture. Defendant denied ever 

meeting the victim or being in his car. Defendant stated he did not "know what 

[Leyman was] talking about" and that he was going to "get [himself] a lawyer 

for whatever" Leyman was questioning him about. Leyman stopped questioning 

him about the murder, returned to the drugs, and the interview concluded shortly 

thereafter. 

On March 14, 2018, a Cumberland County grand jury indicted defendant 

for (1) first-degree murder contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(a)(2) (count one); (2) second-degree possession of a weapon for an 

unlawful purpose contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count two); (3) seconddegree unlawful possession of a weapon contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) 

(count three); and (4) second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted 

person contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (count four) in relation to the murder 

of Miguel Lopez on January 15, 2017. 
10 A-3528-21

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement to Leyman and

any evidence obtained from the seizure of his cell phone on February 22. The 

trial court denied defendant's motion and held the contents of his statement 

would be admissible, subject to any necessary redactions. 

The State moved pre-trial to admit, among other things, testimony from 

Detective Anthony Calabrese (Calabrese) stating he was familiar with 

defendant, that defendant walked with a distinctive limp, and identifying 

defendant as the suspect depicted in the Spruce Street footage based on a review 

of the unrelated footage of defendant. The State also moved to admit previously 

recorded surveillance and police body worn camera/mobile video recorder 

footage depicting defendant, the testimony of Iacovone, and the motor vehicle 

summonses issued to defendant in Monroe Township on January 15, 2017. 

The trial court denied the State's motion regarding Calabrese's testimony 

but granted the remaining portions of its motion. It determined Calabrese's 

opinion that the Spruce Street footage depicted defendant because of the 

similarities in the gait was impermissible lay opinion testimony and the issue 

was a question of fact within the jury's purview. The court specifically ruled 

Calabrese could not testify that he identified defendant from the Spruce Street 

footage but permitted the State to elicit testimony regarding how it came to 
11 A-3528-21

identify defendant as a suspect because of the distinctive limp. It was also 

allowed to illicit testimony regarding the motor vehicle summonses. 

The State also moved pre-trial to qualify Leyman as an expert on historical 

cell site data, which was denied. The court stated: "[S]ome things make sense 

to anybody who reads them. When a call is made, . . . and what tower it hit on 

at a certain time, that's contained in here and any juror could understand that." 

Nevertheless, the court permitted Leyman "to provide only lay witness 

testimony regarding his review, interpretation, and plotting of the location of 

cell towers on a map from . . . defendant's historical cell site data records." 

Although defendant's counsel continued to preserve its objection to the 

use of the testimony, the State and defendant's counsel agreed to the admission 

of the cell phone records and agreed to limit Leyman's testimony to "provid[ing] 

only lay witness testimony regarding his review, interpretation, and plotting of 

the location of cell towers on a map from the defendant's historical cell site data 

records." No testimony was permitted "concerning the azimuth of any antenna 

or any cell tower sector accessed by any call within the defendant's call detail 

records." The State was also prohibited from eliciting testimony "regarding the 

location of cell towers upon the termination of calls within the defendant's call 

detail records without further order from the [c]ourt." The court ordered "[o]nly 
12 A-3528-21

when the same cell tower was utilized for a cell phone call's origination and 

termination may the State provide evidence and testimony of the cell tower 

indicated at call termination within the defendant's call detail records." 

At trial, Leyman testified extensively as to BPD's investigation into the 

victim's murder and the subsequent arrest of defendant. Leyman explained how 

he retraced the victim's path on the morning of the murder and how BPD used 

surveillance footage from various locations to determine the victim's course of 

travel. Leyman also explained BPD theorized defendant's involvement based 

on the Spruce Street footage's depiction of the suspect walking with a distinctive 

limp affecting his left leg. This led BPD to identify defendant as a suspect and 

inquire into his cell phone records. Leyman further determined that the site of 

defendant's car accident on Williamstown-Franklinville Road was directly 

between Cacia's Bakery and Parvins Mill Road, consistent with the victim's path 

southwest towards Bridgeton. 

Leyman also testified as to the defendant's cell phone records. He 

compared the time and location of the towers to which defendant's cell phone 

connected with the victim’s established course of travel from the surveillance

footage. He also explained cell site data helped eliminate another potential 

suspect whose fingerprints were found in the victim's vehicle because that 
13 A-3528-21

suspect's cell phone connected to towers removed from the crime scene. Based 

on the records, between 7:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. on January 15, defendant's cell 

phone connected to cell towers progressively closer to Bridgeton as the victim 

travelled in that direction. 

On cross-examination, Leyman confirmed, however, he did not know 

anything about the towers: he did not know their radii, the strength of reception, 

and could not account for any other variables that could explain why defendant's 

cell phone connected to those towers and not other nearby towers. 

When Leyman began testifying, the court interjected to instruct the jury 

that although the State 

can show you those locations and how far apart they

are[,] that evidence does not establish where that phone 

was at . . . that time that [the] call connected . . . . [J]ust 

because there is a cell tower somewhere proximate to 

something else doesn't mean that the phone was located 

[at] any particular spot within any particular distance 

from that tower . . . . So all you know is that a call 

connected at a certain time at that location and there 

was something else that happened somewhere around 

there. That doesn't mean that that phone was in any 

particular spot at the time that that phone call was made. 

At the trial's conclusion, the court reiterated this instruction and added the jury 

needed to rely on additional evidence in connection with the historic cell site 

data to determine defendant's location. The court added, when evaluating the 
14 A-3528-21

information contained in the records, the jury "may not conclude . . . the cell 

phone changed position or moved in any particular location" when the phone 

switched from one tower to another. 

After an eight-day trial, defendant was found guilty of each indicted 

offense on July 2, 2021. He was sentenced to forty-five years in prison, eightyfive percent of which was to be served without parole eligibility, for count one, 

which merged with count two. Defendant was also sentenced to ten years in 

prison with five years of parole ineligibility on count three, concurrent with the 

forty-five-year sentence for murder. This appeal followed. 

II. 

We review evidentiary rulings made by the trial court for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Allen, 254 N.J. 530, 543 (2023). We will not supplant the 

trial court's judgment with our own unless the trial court's "'ruling is "so wide of 

the mark" that it constitutes "a clear error in judgment."'" Ibid. (quoting State 

v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021)). The trial court's legal conclusions and its 

understanding of the consequences flowing from established facts, however, are 

subject to de novo review. State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) 

(quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)). 
15 A-3528-21

III. 

1. Testimony regarding defendant's limp. 

N.J.R.E. 701 permits a lay witness to testify in the form of an opinion or 

inference if the testimony "(a) is rationally based on the witness' perception; and 

(b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or determining a fact in 

issue." Allen, 254 N.J. at 543-44. An "investigator who has carefully reviewed 

a video a sufficient number of times prior to trial can . . . satisfy the . . . 

'perception' and 'personal knowledge' requirements as to what [a] video depicts." 

State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 601 (2023). Such a witness, however, "may not 

provide opinions or comment on reasonably disputed facts." Allen, 254 N.J. at

546 (quoting Watson, 254 N.J. at 600-01). 

Whether the Spruce Street footage depicted a suspect with a distinctive 

limp or someone stumbling as he fled the scene was a highly disputed factual 

issue at trial. The trial court prohibited the State from admitting testimony 

identifying defendant as the person recorded in the Spruce Street footage. 

Leyman testified the video footage reviewed of the suspect demonstrated a gait 

similar to that of defendant, who was known to BPD, from unrelated video 

footage. 
16 A-3528-21

We do not discern any abuse of discretion. Testimony may be elicited to 

explain the role of the video in relation to the subsequent criminal investigation 

conducted by police. Allen, 254 N.J. at 548. BPD identified defendant as a 

potential suspect based on what it believed the Spruce Street footage depicted: 

a suspect with a distinctive limp to his left leg fleeing the crime scene. In line 

with this interpretation, BPD searched for individuals matching that description 

and eliminated a different suspect with a distinguishable limp. 

Moreover, the trial court properly charged the jury as to the limited use of 

Leyman's testimony. At the conclusion of Leyman's testimony on that day of 

trial, the court instructed the jury that Leyman's testimony was limited to why 

BPD focused on defendant as a suspect. It explicitly stated the jury "may not 

use this testimony to conclude that the person in the prevailing footage is 

[defendant]. That is an independent question of fact you must decide for 

yourself." 

That same instruction was given again at the trial's conclusion. The 

instructions' timing, specificity, and explanation comport with our caselaw. See 

State v. Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. 490, 505-07 (App. Div. 2019). We do not find 

Leyman's statements sufficient to make the possibility of injustice "real," or 

"raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it 
17 A-3528-21

otherwise might not have reached." State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 527 (2020) 

(quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). 

2. Cell Phone Testimony. 

Recently, in State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023), the Supreme Court 

addressed expert testimony and the use of historical cell site data analysis in the 

context of N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703. Burney does not apply retroactively 

because it involves the application of the net opinion rule and does not set forth 

a new rule. See State v. Chirokovskcic, 373 N.J. Super. 125, 130 (App. Div. 

2004) (If a decision does not announce a new rule of law, retroactivity is not at 

issue, the reason being new rules tend to "disrupt[] a practice long accepted and 

widely relied upon . . . and therefore have the potential to create confusion and 

disruption if applied retroactively." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 

Nevertheless, we find Burney's reasoning instructive and are guided by its 

rationale in our consideration of this issue. 

In Burney, the FBI special agent, who was qualified as an expert, testified 

that based on his training and experience, a one-mile radius for a cell tower was 

a "good approximation regarding the coverage area." The Court concluded the 

"'rule of thumb' testimony constitute[d] an improper net opinion because it was 

unsupported by any factual evidence or other data." Id. at 25. The Court also 
18 A-3528-21

noted its prior rulings "that when an expert grounds testimony in personal views, 

rather than objective facts, the net opinion rule requires the exclusion of such 

unsupported views." Id. at 23. Significantly, the Court did not find analysis of 

historical cell site data inherently unreliable and expressly noted expert 

testimony need not necessarily "consider all of the factors" discussed in its 

summary of law and the agent's testimony. Id. at 25. Rather, "because the 

testimony was based on nothing more than . . . [the agent's] personal experience, 

the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear [the] testimony." Ibid. The 

Court did not state whether expert testimony was necessary to address historical 

cell site data. 

In the present matter, the State attempted to qualify Leyman as an expert, 

which the trial court denied. Nevertheless, Leyman was allowed to present 

essentially the same testimony regarding his review of defendant's historical cell 

site data and the cell site data of another potential suspect to demonstrate where 

each individual's phone may have been in relation to the victim on the night of 

the murder. 

We conclude the trial court erred when it allowed lay testimony regarding 

the cell site data analysis. Having already ruled Leyman was not qualified as an 

expert, the court nevertheless allowed Leyman to testify as to the possible
19 A-3528-21

locations of the cell phone at issue, a seminal issue in the case. Leyman was 

allowed to testify "regarding his review, interpretation, and plotting of the 

location of cell towers on a map from . . . defendant's historical cell site [data] 

records." If the records are as clear as the trial court stated, then Leyman's 

testimony does not aid the jury, Watson, 254 N.J. at 592 (quoting State v. Higgs, 

253 N.J. 333, 363 (2023)), and his testimony comments on yet another 

reasonably disputed fact: whether defendant was in the victim's car at the time 

of the shooting, id. at 602. On at least two occasions, Leyman testified the 

location of certain cell towers was consistent with the victim's known location. 

In all but explicit words, Leyman opined, because defendant's cell phone 

connected to towers consistent with the general path of the victim's course of 

travel, defendant was in the car with the victim within an hour of the shooting. 

From the limited evidence proffered at trial, the strongest evidence placing 

defendant in the victim's car during the murder was Leyman's cell site data 

analysis of defendant's cell phone records. 

Although the trial court provided limiting instructions on the use of the 

historic cell site data testimony, those instructions were insufficient to overcome 

the likely inference created by Leyman's testimony in this case of largely 

circumstantial evidence. No witness was able to identify defendant as the man 
20 A-3528-21

fleeing from Lopez's car, and no firearm was ever recovered. The only physical 

evidence linking defendant to the victim was his DNA on the cigar butt found 

in the victim's car. This is not a case where the admission of the historical cell 

site data testimony constitutes harmless error because of the other evidence 

adduced at trial. See Burney, 255 N.J. at 32 (Solomon, dissenting) ("the sheer 

volume of competent evidence against defendant . . . leads to the inescapable 

conclusion that defendant was convicted in a fair trial, and any error was 

harmless.") 

3. Defendant’s Constitutional Arguments. 

We find no merit to defendant's constitutional arguments and no reversible 

error. With respect to the alleged general warrant for his cell phone, defendant 

fails to identify what harm must be remedied for the alleged unconstitutional 

actions. "[T]he principal remedy for a violation of the constitutional right to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence 

seized." State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 620 (2019) (quoting State v. Bryant, 227 

N.J. 60, 71 (2016)). The record does not reveal any information from 

defendant's cell phone was admitted at trial. His cell phone records were 

obtained separately pursuant to a CDW before his cell phone was seized. 

Defendant's claim that we should reverse the denial of his motion to suppress 
21 A-3528-21

and vacate the convictions for "an evidentiary hearing . . . to assess the degree 

to which the phone records were tainted" does not follow. The cell phone 

records admitted at trial were obtained from defendant's cell phone provider 

prior to the seizure order, not as a result of the seizure of his phone. 

Defendant's Miranda argument similarly fails to identify any reversible 

error. His reliance upon our decision in State v. Sims, 466 N.J. Super. 346 (App. 

Div. 2021), is unavailing. The Supreme Court has since reversed our decision,

State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 197 (2022), and "reaffirmed [the rule] that police 

are not required to advise an interrogee that he or she is a suspect of a particular 

crime when administering Miranda warnings," State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 

489, 515 (App. Div. 2022). BPD read defendant his Miranda rights prior to 

questioning him, and defendant knowingly waived them. 

Defendant's Confrontation Clause, sleeping juror, and N.J.R.E. 404(b) 

arguments do not warrant further discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e). We reverse as to count one and count three of defendant's conviction, 

vacate the sentence, and remand to the trial court for a new trial.