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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 22-CO-0783

DANA DIXON, APPELLANT,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. 

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(2015-CF2-008509)

(Hon. Juliet J. McKenna, Motion Judge)

(Submitted October 16, 2023 Decided November 22, 2023)

Adrian E. Madsen was on the brief for appellant.

Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, John P. 

Mannarino, Simran Dhillon and Chimnomnso N. Kalu, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before BECKWITH and ALIKHAN, Associate Judges, and THOMPSON, Senior 

Judge.

THOMPSON, Senior Judge: In November 2016, appellant Dana Dixon pled 

guilty to two counts of second-degree burglary, and the Superior Court sentenced 

him to consecutive terms of 36 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be 

followed by supervised release. In July 2022, through counsel, appellant filed a 

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b)(1) motion for reduction or amendment of his sentence. 
2

In opposing the motion, the government argued primarily that it was procedurally 

barred because it was filed more than 120 days after the sentence was imposed. 

Agreeing with the government, the Superior Court denied the motion. Appellant 

now challenges that ruling, contending that the Rule 35(b)(1) 120-day limit is 

subject to equitable tolling or else is a “third kind of limitation,” Dolan v. United 

States, 560 U.S. 605, 611 (2010), rather than a mandatory claim-processing rule, 

that left the trial court free to grant his motion. Unpersuaded by appellant’s 

arguments, we affirm. 

I. Background

After appellant’s June 29, 2015, indictment (on ten criminal counts related to 

a string of residential burglaries), he entered into an agreement with the 

government to plead guilty to two counts of burglary. At the time, he was serving 

sentences in Maryland for unrelated crimes, but on August 3, 2016, he was 

committed to the D.C. Jail pending disposition of his District of Columbia case. 

During the sentencing proceeding on November 16, 2016, the Superior Court judge 

(the Honorable Zoe Bush) explained to the parties, “[t]he [two 36-month] 

sentences are to run consecutive to any other sentence, consecutive to one 

another.” Appellant’s trial counsel stated, “he’s going to serve the Maryland 

sentence, technically, first.” The initial judgment and commitment order repeated 

that the sentences were “to be served consecutively to each other and any other 
3

[s]entence of [i]ncarceration,” but also stated that “the [s]entence is to com[m]ence 

as of 11/16/2016.” The sentencing transcript shows that this language was added 

at the request of defense counsel, who asked the court to include it to ensure that 

appellant would get time-served credit for any travel delay in returning him to 

Maryland custody, which counsel explained “sometimes messes up the [timeserved] calculation.” 

Following the sentencing hearing, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) contacted 

Judge Bush’s chambers and asked whether the clause “the [s]entence is to 

commence as of 11/16/2016” would make the District of Columbia sentence “run 

concurrent[ly]” with the Maryland sentence. Judge Bush scheduled a postdisposition status hearing so the BOP’s inquiry could be addressed. At the hearing, 

held on March 3, 2017, appellant’s counsel waived appellant’s presence and also 

requested that the court make the two District of Columbia sentences concurrent to 

the Maryland sentence. Counsel explained that she wanted to ensure that appellant 

received credit toward the District of Columbia sentences for the time appellant 

had served in the Maryland facility in the event his Maryland conviction was 

vacated on appeal. The court did not grant the request for a sentence modification, 

but it issued an amended judgment and commitment order that removed the 

reference to the date the sentence was to begin. Thus, the amended judgment and 

commitment order states that appellant’s sentences for the two burglary counts “are 
4

to be served consecutively to each other and any other [s]entence of 

[i]ncarceration.”

On February 7, 2022, appellant was transferred from the Maryland 

Department of Corrections into federal custody to begin serving his District of 

Columbia sentences. That month, appellant wrote to Judge Bush, asking for 

assistance in requesting that the BOP do a “sentence computation” and stating that 

the court had “started [appellant’s] sentence] on th[e] day” of his guilty plea. In 

April 2022, appellant wrote a similar letter to Judge Juliet McKenna, who had 

assumed responsibility for the case, repeating that he was told by the judge at 

sentencing that his sentence was starting on that day and stating that he “thought 

[he] was going home on February the 7th 2022.” Through counsel appointed by 

the court to advise and assist appellant in the matter, appellant filed his July 10, 

2022, motion under Rule 35(b), requesting inter alia that the court suspend his 

sentence as to all but time served or modify his two District of Columbia sentences 

to run concurrently with each other. As noted above, the government opposed the 

motion, arguing that it was time-barred as it had been filed more than 120 days 

after the imposition of appellant’s sentence. By order dated September 16, 2022, 

the trial court denied appellant’s motion, relying on this court’s holding in Smith v. 

United States, 984 A.2d 196 (D.C. 2009), that Rule 35(b) is a mandatory claim-
5

processing rule that must be enforced when timely invoked by the government (as 

it was here). This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

The proper construction of court rules of procedure is a legal question that 

we review de novo. See Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 195 (D.C. 2013). 

Thus, we review de novo the Superior Court’s determination that it was required to 

dismiss appellant’s Rule 35(b) motion as time-barred.

In Smith, this court recognized that our precedent classifying Rule 35(b) as a 

jurisdictional rule had been “substantially undermined” by Supreme Court 

jurisprudence. 984 A.2d at 200. We held that Rule 35(b) is not a jurisdictional 

limitation on the Superior Court’s authority to act, but rather a claim-processing 

rule. Id. at 201. Quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per 

curiam), we recognized that “claim-processing rules [en]sure relief to a party 

properly raising them.” Id. at 199. But we also said that such rules “can be 

relaxed by the [c]ourt in the exercise of its discretion.” Id. at 200 (quoting Schacht 

v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970)).

In subsequent cases, we considered whether other claim-processing rules of 

this court and the Superior Court are subject to equitable tolling. In Mathis v. 

District of Columbia Housing Authority, 124 A.3d 1089, 1101-03 (D.C. 2015), we 

held that the D.C. App. R. 15 deadline for petitioning for a review of agency action 
6

was equitably tolled where the agency in question had provided the petitioner 

ambiguous or misleading advice about the right to judicial review. Similarly, in 

Brewer v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, 163 A.3d 799, 803 

(D.C. 2017), we held that a petition for review by the Superior Court could proceed 

where it was filed after the 30-day deadline of Super. Ct. Agency Rev. R. 1(a), but 

where the petitioner had been diligent in attempting to timely file the petition and 

the agency respondent had at least arguably waived the untimeliness of the 

petition.1

 

Both Mathis and Brewer were decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710 (2019).2

 There, the Supreme 

Court rejected the application of equitable tolling to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(f) 

(establishing a time limit for appealing from an order granting or denying classaction certification). Id. at 713. The Court explained that “[w]hether a rule 

 

1 But see Deloatch v. Sessoms-Deloatch, 229 A.3d 486, 490 n.6, 491, 493 

n.12 (D.C. 2020) (noting that this court has “taken a piecemeal approach to 

evaluating court-made rules in cases like Smith and Mathis” and that the Supreme 

Court had reserved the issue of whether mandatory claim-processing rules may be 

subject to equitable exceptions, but stating generally that “[w]hen a mandatory 

claim-processing rule is ‘properly invoked’ by a party, it ‘must be enforced’ by the 

court.” (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 19 

(2017)).

2 We previously declined the opportunity to address the implications of 

Nutraceutical Corp. in Accenture Sub, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 283 A.3d 130, 

136-37 (D.C. 2022) (holding instead that in any event equitable tolling would be 

inapplicable on the facts presented).
7

precludes equitable tolling turns . . . on whether the text of the rule leaves room for 

such flexibility.” Id. at 714. The Court held that Rule 23(f) is not subject to 

equitable tolling because the text of the rule uses mandatory language and because 

other rules explicitly bar courts from excusing the deadline in Rule 23(f) for good 

cause. Id. at 715 (“Where the pertinent rule or rules invoked show a clear intent to 

preclude tolling, courts are without authority to make exceptions merely because a 

litigant appears to have been diligent, reasonably mistaken, or otherwise 

deserving.”). We have no occasion here to revisit the rules at issue in Mathis and 

Brewer, but, following the lead of Nutraceutical Corp., we now hold for the 

reasons that follow that the 120-day limit of Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b) is a 

mandatory claim-processing rule that is not subject to equitable tolling.

Our first step in considering whether Rule 35(b) is a mandatory claimprocessing rule is to look at the Rule’s text and its surrounding context to discern 

the drafter’s intent. See Nutraceutical Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 714. Rule 35(b)(1) 

states in full:

A motion to reduce a sentence may be made not later 

than 120 days after the sentence is imposed or probation 

is revoked, or not later than 120 days after receipt by the 

court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the 

judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or not later than 120 

days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme 

Court denying review of, or having the effect of 

upholding, a judgment of conviction or probation 

revocation. The court must decide a motion within a 

reasonable time.
8

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b)(1) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has treated 

language similar to the “may be made not later than” language of Rule 35(b)(1) as 

establishing an “unqualified bar” on procedural steps taken after the specified time. 

See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 650 (2010) (discussing the statute of 

repose established by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2), which states that certain private 

actions for violations of the securities laws “may be brought not later than” five 

years after the claimed violation). Thus, the 120-day limit described in Rule 

35(b)(1) is properly treated as mandatory rather than permissive (notwithstanding 

use of the word “may”). Moreover, in contrast to Rule 35(b), Rule 35(a) permits a 

sentencing court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time,” while restricting the 

correction of “a sentence imposed in an illegal manner” to the time constraints in 

subsection (b). Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).

Perhaps the most compelling support for construing Rule 35(b)(1) as a 

mandatory claim-processing rule is found in Super. Ct. Crim. R. 45. Rule 45(b)(1) 

provides “[w]hen an act must or may be done within a specified period, the court 

on its own may extend the time, or for good cause may do so on a party’s motion 

made.” But Rule 45(b)(2) specifically creates an exception for Rule 35: “The court 

may not extend the time to take any action under Rule 35, except as stated in that 

rule.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 45(b)(2). The exception stated in Rule 45(b)(2) is 

analogous to the “express carveout” included in Fed. R. App. P. 26(b) and 
9

discussed in Nutraceutical Corp., regarding Rule 23(f). See Nutraceutical Corp., 

139 S. Ct. at 715. Fed. R. App. P. 26(b) provides that “[f]or good cause, the court 

may extend the time prescribed by these rules,” but also states that “the court may 

not extend the time to file: (1) . . . a petition for permission to appeal.” In light of 

the exception in Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(1), the Supreme Court held that the 14-day 

deadline set by Rule 23(f) for filing a petition for permission to appeal a grant or 

denial of class certification “express[es] a clear intent to compel rigorous 

enforcement of Rule 23(f)’s deadline, even where good cause for equitable tolling 

might otherwise exist.” Id. at 715. Thus, the Court held, Rule 23(f) is “not subject 

to equitable tolling,” even where a petitioner has acted diligently. Id. at 714. 

Likewise, we hold, the 120-day limit of Rule 35(b) is an inflexible rule that is not 

subject to equitable tolling.3

 As a mandatory claim-processing rule, it is 

 

3 Even if Rule 35(b) were subject to equitable tolling, it is far from clear that 

the court would have abused its discretion in concluding in this case that equity did 

not “compel[] such a result.” Mathis, 124 A.3d at 1101. During the 2016 

sentencing proceeding, the court specifically referred to the four years appellant 

had left on his Maryland sentence and said it would require appellant to pay court 

costs by November 2027. The court observed that this would afford appellant a 

year to do so after being released from his two 36-month sentences, thus implying 

that 2026 – after four years of the Maryland sentence and a total of 72 months for 

the District of Columbia sentences – was the year when appellant would complete 

his sentences. 

We note, moreover, that appellant told the court in his letters that he thought 

he would go home when he was released from Maryland custody in February 

2022. Even counting from the August 2016 date when appellant was brought to 
10

“unalterable if properly raised by an opposing party.” Nutraceutical Corp., 139 S. 

Ct. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant argues in the alternative that Rule 35(b) is a “third kind” of 

limitation such as the Supreme Court described in Dolan, one that is “legally 

enforceable but does not deprive a judge or other public official the power to take 

the action to which the deadline applies if the deadline is missed.” 560 U.S. at 

611. Dolan concerned the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, which provided

that the final determination of a victim’s losses was to be made no more than 90 

days after sentencing. Id. at 613. At Dolan’s sentencing hearing, the district court 

acknowledged that restitution was required but left the matter open pending receipt 

of additional information as to the appropriate amount. Id. at 608. Thereafter, the 

district court did not enter the restitution order until after expiration of the 90-day 

deadline. Id. at 609. The Supreme Court held that a sentencing court that misses

the deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution, at least where it 

makes clear prior to the deadline’s expiration that it will order restitution at some 

point in the future. Id. at 608. The Court reasoned that the Restitution Act did not 

 

the D.C. Jail to be held pending trial in the District, February 2022 was months 

short of the 72 months’ imprisonment appellant was required to serve for his 

burglary convictions. His July 2022 Rule 35(b) motion was actually (and 

explicitly) a motion for a reduction of his sentences to time served, not a motion 

premised on a miscommunication or misunderstanding about whether his District 

and Maryland sentences were to run concurrently.
11

specify a consequence for noncompliance with the timing provisions and that

denying a victim restitution because of a missed hearing deadline would defeat the 

purpose of the Act to assure that crime victims receive full restitution. Id. at 611, 

615.

As far as we have been able to determine, every appellate court that has 

applied Dolan has done so in the context of a court’s or agency decisionmaker’s

failure to meet a deadline imposed on it by statute or court rule.4

 See, e.g., Jacobs 

Project Mgmt. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 64 F.4th 123, 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2023) 

(citing Dolan and holding that the Department of the Interior retained 

jurisdiction to issue a disputed order even after the statutory 180-day investigative 

deadline in 41 U.S.C. § 4712 had passed); Transp. Div. of the Int’l Ass’n of Sheet 

Metal, Air, Rail & Transp. Workers v. Fed. Ry. Admin., 10 F.4th 869, 873-74 (D.C. 

Cir. 2021) (citing Dolan and holding that although the relevant statute used

language suggesting the deadline for agency action was mandatory, the agency’s 

failure to satisfy a timing requirement did not require vacating its rule); United 

States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 700-02 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Dolan and 

reasoning that precluding forfeiture because of the district court’s failure to meet a 

 

4 As one district court put it, “[i]n Dolan, . . . the issue was not whether one 

of the parties had waived a claim but rather what consequences resulted from the 

court’s untimely scheduling of a mandatory hearing.” United States v. DeCicco, 

439 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2020). 
12

deadline imposed by Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 32.2 could hurt the individuals forfeiture 

was intended to benefit); Solis-Chavez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 

2011) (citing Dolan and holding that although the district court entered its judicial 

recommendation against deportation (“JRAD”) about a month outside the 30-day 

post-sentencing window, the record confirmed that the judge had unequivocally 

indicated her intent to retain jurisdiction for the express purpose of considering a 

JRAD, so the recommendation was valid); United States v. Martin, 662 F.3d 301, 

309-10 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Dolan and declining to vacate the district court’s 

“tardy forfeiture orders” because the relevant version of Fed. R. Crim. 

Pro. 32.2(b)(3) established merely a time-related directive).

By contrast, appellant’s filing of his Rule 35(b) motion beyond the 120-day 

deadline does not raise the question of the court’s power to act when the court has 

missed a deadline. For that reason, Dolan is not apposite. The government is

correct that Dolan “did not disturb the Supreme Court’s prior holdings concerning 

[mandatory] claim-processing rules.” 
13

III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Rule 35(b) motion as time 

barred. Rule 35(b) is a mandatory claim-processing rule. Therefore, as the 

government objected to the motion as untimely, the trial court did not err in 

denying the motion as procedurally barred.

So ordered.