a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on African Affairs, 

Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate

June 2003 FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE

Sustained Efforts 

Needed to Help 

Southern Africa 

Recover from Food 

Crisis

GAO-03-644
• Multiple factors contributed to the food crisis. Erratic weather 

reduced maize (corn) production. A poorly functioning agricultural 

sector caused food supply shortages. Government actionsincluding 

the sale of Malawi’s grain reserve and Zimbabwe’s land reform

further cut available food. Widespread poverty contributed to food 

insecurity and the HIV/AIDS epidemic exacerbated food shortages by 

reducing the labor force. 

• Food aid averted famine, but the overall response did not 

prevent widespread hunger. About 93 percent of the total cereal 

gapthe difference between domestic needs and productionwas 

met by the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period. However, 

food aid deliveries fell short in several countries, and vulnerable 

households had limited ability to purchase commercial maize.

Plan for Addressing Cereal Needs in the Six Countries 

67%

33%

14%

22%

48% Zimbabwe

Malawi, 5%

Mozambique

Zambia, 3%

Nongovernmental 

organizations

World 

Food 

Program

Swaziland, 8%

Lesotho

Commercial imports

Food aid

Total Cereala Requirements

8.5 Million Metric Tons

Commercial 

Import Needs 

by Country

Plan for 

Cereal Food 

Aid

Production and opening 

stock levels

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by WFP.

69%

14%

17%

Cereal gap 31%

a

Cereal includes maize and other grains suitable for food. 

• Slow donations, poor infrastructure, and concerns about 

biotech food were major obstacles to an effective response. 

Excluding the United States, most donors did not make sufficient, 

timely donations to the World Food Program. Poor transportation 

systems and storage facilities hampered efficient food delivery. 

Zambia rejected food aid because of concerns regarding biotech 

food; other countries required milling maize for the same reason. This 

compromised the food aid pipeline given the United States was the 

region’s key donor and its aid may contain biotech food. 

• Declining investments in agriculture and the HIV/AIDS 

epidemic pose challenges to emerging from crisis into 

sustained recovery. U.N. and U.S. officials cite the need to reverse 

declining trends in agricultural investments by international financing 

organizations, national governments, and donors. Without a strategy 

that integrates, among other things, agricultural development, the 

impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, food crises 

will recur.

The southern Africa food crisis 

threatened 15.3 million people in 

six countries (Lesotho, Malawi, 

Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, 

and Zimbabwe) with famine. GAO 

was asked to look at (1) factors 

that contributed to the crisis, (2) 

how well the populations’ needs 

were met, (3) obstacles to the food 

aid effort, and (4) challenges to 

emerging from crisis.

GAO recommends that the 

Secretaries of State and Agriculture 

and Administrator of the U.S. 

Agency for International 

Development 

• review issues related to biotech 

foods in emergency food aid—such 

as health, trade and environment 

concerns—in anticipation of future 

crises; and 

• work with international donors 

and national governments on a 

recovery strategy integrating, 

among others, agricultural 

development, HIV/AIDS, and 

natural disaster management. 

The Departments of State and 

Agriculture, USAID, and WFP 

generally agreed with our 

recommendations. Their technical 

comments were incorporated as 

appropriate. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-644.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Gootnick 

(202) 512-3149 (gootnickd@gao.gov). 

Highlights of GAO-03-644, a report to the 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee 

on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, United States Senate 

June 2003

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

Sustained Efforts Needed to Help 

Southern Africa Recover from Food 

Crisis 
Page i GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Multiple Factors Contributed to the Food Crisis 7

Food Needs Not Fully Met, but Famine Was Averted 13

Slow Donations, Poor Infrastructure, Concerns Associated with 

Biotech Food Were Major Obstacles to an Effective Response 23

Declining Support for Agricultural Sector and the HIV/AIDS 

Epidemic Pose Challenges to Emerging from Crisis into Sustained 

Recovery 33

Conclusions 44

Recommendations for Executive Action 45

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 45

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 48

Appendix II: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis 51

Appendix III: Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability Assessment 

Methods 53

Early Warning Systems 53

Assessment Systems 55

Appendix IV: U.S. Donations 58

Appendix V: Commercial Imports 60

Appendix VI: Nonfood Emergency Needs 63

Appendix VII: Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food Crisis 65

Modern Agricultural Biotechnology 65

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State 75

GAO Comments 80

Appendix IX: Comments from Department of Agriculture 82

GAO Comments 85

Appendix X: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International 

Development 86

GAO Comments 88

Appendix XI: Comment from the World Food Program 89

GAO Comments 92

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 93
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

GAO Contacts 93

Acknowledgments 93

Tables Table 1: Cereal Production by Country 9

Table 2: Frequency of Household Coping Strategies in Zambia 

(August through December 2002) 21

Table 3: Contributions to WFP and Their Timing 25

Table 4: U.S. Government Food Aid Response to the Southern 

Africa Crisis 59

Figures Figure 1: Population at Risk of Famine in the Affected Southern 

African Countries 6

Figure 2: Revised Estimate of the Cereal Gap in the Six Countries 

and Plan for Addressing the Deficit (March 2003) 14

Figure 3: Extent to Which Cereal Food Aid and Commercial 

Imports Met the Cereal Gap (April 1, 2002, through March 

31, 2003) 16

Figure 4: Extent to Which WFP Monthly Food Delivery Targets 

Were Met (July 2002 through March 2003) 18

Figure 5: Percent of WFP Total Planned Beneficiaries Who 

Received at Least Some Food Aid (July through 

December 2002) 20

Figure 6: Steps in the Logistics Process 27

Figure 7: The Transportation Network for Moving Food in the 

Region 28

Figure 8: Agricultural Lending by the World Bank, the African 

Development Bank, and the International Fund for 

Agricultural Development–1990 through 2000 35

Figure 9: World Bank Agricultural Sector Loans Approved for the 

Affected

Countries–1990 to 2002 36

Figure 10: Agricultural Spending as a Percentage of Total 

Government Spending– 1996/97 through 2001/02 (in 2003 

dollars) 37

Figure 11: USAID Bilateral Assistance in the Agricultural Sector to 

Four Countries–1998 to 2003 38

Figure 12: Examples of Existing Programs Related to Food 

Security 40

Figure 13: Projected Impact on GDP Due to HIV/AIDS 42

Figure 14: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis 52
Contents

Page iii GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 15: U.N. Nonfood Emergency Appeals and Contributions by 

Sector 63

Abbreviations

CFSAM Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission

C-SAFE Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency

EMOP Emergency Operations 

EWS early warning systems

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network

GIEWS Global Information Early Warning System

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute

IMF International Monetary Fund

NGO nongovernmental organization

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

SADC Southern African Development Community

UNAIDS Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

VAC vulnerability assessment committee

VAM vulnerability assessment mapping

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization

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Page 1 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

June 25, 2003 Lret

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on African Affairs

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Dear Senator Feingold:

The southern Africa region has been facing its worst food crisis in more 

than a decade. Approximately 15.3 million people (26 percent of the total 

population) in 6 countries—Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 

Zambia, and Zimbabwe—have experienced severe food shortages and the 

threat of famine. Avoiding famine has required substantial supplies of food 

from commercial imports1

 and a large international food aid effort. The 

United Nations began establishing emergency food aid operations in 

individual countries as early as November 2001. In July 2002, the United 

Nations appealed to international donors for $507 million to provide 1.2 

million metric tons of emergency food aid as part of a consolidated regional 

program for the April 2002-March 2003 crop year. However, food shortages 

continue and emergency operations have been extended through June 

2003.

Because of concerns over the nature and severity of this food crisis, you 

asked us to determine: (1) what factors contributed to the current crisis in 

southern Africa, (2) how well were the populations’ overall food needs met 

during the crisis period, (3) what were the major obstacles to the food aid 

effort, and (4) what are the challenges to emerging from the crisis into 

sustained recovery. 

To address these objectives, we met with and analyzed information from 

U.S. government officials at the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) and the Departments of State and Agriculture in Washington, D.C., 

and at U.S. missions in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, 

Zimbabwe, and South Africa. We also met with officials and reviewed 

information from the World Food Program (WFP), the Food and 

Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Fund for 

1

Depending on a country’s policies, commercial imports represent the private sector, the 

government, or both. In some cases governments subsidize private sector imports.
Page 2 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Agricultural Development (IFAD) at their headquarters in Rome and in the 

southern African countries we visited. In addition, we gathered information 

from and met with representatives of the World Bank and the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF), other U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGO), other donor governments, and host government ministries in 

Washington and at the country level in southern Africa. As part of our 

fieldwork, we observed WFP and NGO food aid distributions in Malawi, 

Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (App. I provides detailed information 

on our scope and methodology.) 

Results in Brief The primary factors that contributed to the food crisis were: (1) erratic 

weather, (2) a poorly functioning agricultural sector, (3) questionable 

government actions, (4) widespread poverty, and (5) the HIV/AIDS 

epidemic. Erratic weather patterns contributed to a reduction in southern 

Africa’s cereal2

 production by 29 percent on average.3 But this decline alone 

would not have caused a food crisis absent other conditions. Food stocks 

were depleted from previous poor harvests and farmers lacked access to 

agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. Government actions such as 

the sale of grain reserves in Malawi and disruptive land reform policies in 

Zimbabwe—which spurred a 75 percent drop in that country’s commercial 

maize (corn) production over the past 2 years—further reduced food 

supply. Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity in the region. 

HIV/AIDS, which has infected 13 percent to 33 percent of the population in 

the six countries, exacerbated the crisis by reducing both productivity and 

agricultural output and severely limiting the populations’ ability to cope 

with a bad harvest and high food prices. 

By the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period, approximately 93 

percent of the regional cereal gap4

 was met. Commercial cereal imports 

were reported as 1.72 million metric tons (MT), while the food aid effort 

achieved at least 0.73 million MT (60 percent of the planned amount). 

Provision of this food prevented large-scale famine and death. However, 

2

As used in this report, cereal refers to plants that yield grain suitable for food and includes 

maize, millet, sorghum, rice, and wheat. 

3

This figure reflects total production for these six countries in the 2001/02 season compared 

with average production over the previous 5 years.

4

Total cereal gap is calculated by estimating annual domestic cereal needs and subtracting 

the estimated harvest during the year plus cereal stocks at the beginning of the year.
Page 3 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

food did not reach the region early enough to avert widespread hunger, and 

many people resorted to rationing food, reducing expenditures on nonfood 

items, and selling household assets (such as tools and livestock). Success 

in filling the total cereal gap varied widely across the six affected countries. 

For example, Malawi more than eliminated its cereal gap, whereas 

Mozambique cut its gap by about 50 percent. According to currently 

available data, rates of acute malnutrition in the region have not 

deteriorated significantly.

The major obstacles to the food aid effort were (1) the lack of sufficient, 

timely food donations; (2) poor infrastructure in recipient countries; and 

(3) concerns associated with biotech food.5

 Although the United States 

made substantial, early donations, in aggregate, donor country 

commitments of food were 18 percent below WFP’s operational needs 

through the end of December. Moreover, given the lag in time between 

when food commitments were made and when food arrived in country, the 

shortfall in the first 6 months of the crisis period was much higher. Poor 

infrastructure—ports, rail, roads, and storage facilities—in recipient 

countries hampered efficient delivery of food aid, limited how quickly food 

could reach recipients, and ultimately prevented food from reaching some 

beneficiaries. Concerns about the health and environmental safety of food 

aid that might contain bioengineered products led Zambia to reject U.S.-

donated maize and most of the other countries to impose costly and timeconsuming processing requirements—which further reduced or delayed 

the food aid effort, increased costs, and complicated emergency 

operations. 

The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis into 

sustained recovery include (1) declining investment in the region’s 

agricultural sector, (2) the limited scope of existing programs related to 

food security,6

 and (3) the negative impact of HIV/AIDS. Recognizing that 

little progress has been made to address impediments to the transition 

from crisis to recovery, the U.N. Secretary-General and several other key 

5

Modern agricultural biotechnology employs scientific techniques, such as genetic 

engineering, to modify plants, animals, or microorganisms by introducing desired traits in 

them, including characteristics from unrelated species. For example, traits may be 

introduced to facilitate pest management and improve yield or nutritional value. In this 

report, we refer to foods derived from genetically modified plants as biotech foods. (See 

app. VII and our evaluation of agency comments.)

6

Food security is commonly defined as physical and economic access by all people at all 

times to enough food to meet their dietary needs for an active and healthy life.
Page 4 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

stakeholders have called for a more comprehensive, integrated approach to 

break the pattern of recurrent food crises in Africa. While the food outlook 

for the next crop year—April 2003 through March 2004—is better, food 

security conditions are still tenuous; and without sustained progress, 

recurring food crises may be difficult to avoid in the future.

This report makes recommendations to the Secretaries of State and 

Agriculture and the Administrator of USAID, to (1) undertake a 

comprehensive review of the issues pertaining to biotech foods in 

emergency food aid in anticipation of future food crises, and (2) work with 

international organizations, donors, national governments, and key 

stakeholders to develop a recovery strategy that integrates agricultural 

development, HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, among other 

things.

We received written comments on a draft of our report from the 

Departments of State and Agriculture, USAID, and WFP, which we have 

reprinted in appendixes VIII, IX, X, and XI, respectively. These agencies 

generally agreed with our overall conclusions and recommendations while 

expressing technical concerns on specific points, primarily issues related 

to biotech food. Their technical comments, along with those received from 

FAO, IMF, and the World Bank, have been incorporated into the report as 

appropriate. 

Background In 1991/92, drought caused massive crop failure, threatening 18 million 

people in 10 southern African countries with famine. Because of a similar 

reduced maize crop after the 2001/02 crop cycle,7

 several early warning 

systems predicted an impending food crisis that would run through the 

beginning of the following harvest in April 2003. (App. II provides a timeline 

of the crisis period, and app. III provides information on early warning 

systems.)

7

The maize crop cycle in southern Africa runs roughly from mid-November (when crops are 

planted) through mid-April (when crops are harvested).
Page 5 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Regional and national assessments of the crisis conducted by WFP, FAO, 

and others estimated that 15.3 million people8

 in the region were at risk of 

starvation. (Fig. 1 shows the population at risk of famine in each of the six 

affected countries.) 

8

Three assessments of the southern Africa food crisis were conducted between April 2002 

and March 2003. The first round was a series of national Crop and Food Supply Assessment 

Mission (CFSAM) reports published in May 2002, which estimated that 12.8 million 

individuals would be at risk of starvation at the peak of the crisis. The second round, 

published in September 2002 as Emergency Food Security Assessment Reports, increased 

the at-risk estimate to 14.4 million people at the peak of the crisis. The third round of 

assessments, published in January 2003, increased the estimate to 15.3 million people.
Page 6 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 1: Population at Risk of Famine in the Affected Southern African Countries

In July 2002, WFP initiated the Southern Africa Crisis Response Emergency 

Operation (EMOP) for providing food aid to the six countries on a regional 

basis. Prior to this consolidation, WFP had been delivering food to the 

individual country emergency operating programs. WFP’s objectives in the 

southern Africa food crisis were to prevent severe food shortages, 

safeguard the nutritional well-being of vulnerable segments of the 

population, preserve human assets, and prevent migration out of affected 

areas.

Source: GAO and MapArt.

Angola

DRC

Madagascar

Swaziland

South Africa

300,000

Zambia

2.8 million

Zimbabwe

7.2 million

Mozambique

650,000

28%

52%

28%

3%

31%

Lesotho

34%

760,000

Malawi

Tanzania

3.6 million

Namibia

Botswana

(Number): Number of people 

 affected by the food crisis

 Percent of country's population 

 affected by the food crisis
Page 7 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

As the major food aid donor in the southern Africa crisis, the U.S. 

government has a significant role in the relief effort. Through USAID’s 

Food for Peace Office and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and 

USDA, the U.S. government has worked to support the EMOP and address 

the crisis. In February 2002, in an effort to avert famine, the United States 

began authorizing food aid shipments to the region. As of March 18, 2003, 

the U.S. government had provided approximately $275 million in food aid 

and $13 million for bilateral nonfood-related assistance such as agriculture, 

health, shelter, and sanitation. (See app. IV for additional information on 

the U.S. contributions.)

WFP, the United States, and other countries partner with nongovernmental 

organizations to distribute food aid at the regional and village level. In 

addition, many of these organizations also provide nonfood emergency 

assistance and long-term development aid.9

Much of the population in each of the affected countries works in the 

agricultural sector. The percentage of labor force engaged in agriculture 

ranges from 66 percent in Zimbabwe to 86 percent in Lesotho and Malawi. 

Many of these farmers rely on maize (corn) as the primary staple crop. 

Unlike root crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes—which are common 

but less popular staples in the region—maize is relatively fragile, requiring 

more fertilizer and differing amounts of water during the growing season. 

Multiple Factors 

Contributed to the 

Food Crisis

The immediate factor contributing to the food crisis was the erratic 

weather patterns that disrupted the normal growing cycle, causing maize 

production in southern Africa to drop from a 5-year average of about 7.3 

million MT to about 5.2 million MT in 2002. The dramatic reduction in 

available maize can also be linked to a weak agricultural sector and 

government actions, such as Malawi’s decision to sell off its strategic grain 

reserve and Zimbabwe’s fast-tracked land reform. In addition, much of the 

region’s population had limited access to food because of widespread 

poverty. The HIV/AIDS epidemic further exacerbated the population’s 

access to basic commodities by decreasing household food production and 

income and increasing consumption requirements. 

9

Nongovernmental organizations are nonprofit, private entities funded by private, 

governmental, and international organizations. NGOs are WFP's principal implementing 

partners in providing emergency food assistance. 
Page 8 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Erratic Weather Patterns 

Played a Key Role in 

Reducing Maize Production

Erratic weather patterns between December 2001 and May 2002 reduced 

the harvests in five of the six affected countries, except Mozambique, when 

compared with 5-year averages. Drought-like conditions gripped parts of 

Malawi, southern Mozambique, Swaziland, southern Zambia, and 

Zimbabwe in the middle of the growing season (see app. II for timeline). 

This water deficit at a crucial point in the growing season severely stressed 

crops and caused many hectares10 to wilt. In addition, parts of Zambia 

suffered high rainfall mid-season, flooding the still-growing crops. 

Similarly, in Malawi, after the mid-season dry spells wilted some crops, the 

country received heavy rains that hampered the harvesting and drying of 

what crops remained, and in some cases, caused them to rot. Lesotho also 

experienced prolonged rains late in the season as well as an additional lateseason frost that damaged crops across large parts of the country and 

drastically reduced production. 

Regional Cereal Production 

Dropped by 29 Percent 

Regional food supplies have been limited due to poor cereal harvests in five 

out of the six affected countries. (See table 1.) Mozambique was the one 

exception: Its 2001/02 cereal harvest was actually above average. However, 

due to transportation constraints, Mozambique’s production surpluses 

could not be supplied to the southern part of the country where cereal 

harvests were lower.

10One hectare equals 2.47 acres.
Page 9 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Table 1: Cereal Production by Country 

Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) Reports, September 2002 

through January 2003. 

a

Represents average production for the harvests in 1997 through 2001.

b

Estimated.

Poorly Functioning 

Agricultural Sector 

Negatively Affected Food 

Supply

In addition to poor weather conditions, weaknesses in the agricultural 

sector contributed to a poor harvest. According to IFAD, these weaknesses 

included the following:

• Declining soil fertility reduced crop yields. In Lesotho, average 

maize and sorghum yields have declined by more than 60 percent since 

the mid-1970s. According to FAO, declining soil fertility is a primary 

cause of this trend and is leading to a crop production catastrophe in 

that country.

• Restricted access to agricultural inputs such as seeds and 

fertilizer limited harvests. In Zambia, important inputs such as seeds 

and fertilizer were not available until December 2001 or January 2002, 

resulting in late plantings. These crops were at a crucial stage of 

development when the rains ceased in early 2002, causing crop failure. 

• Incomplete market development impaired farmers’ ability to sell 

crops. In Malawi, market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s eliminated 

price controls and removed government food grain monopolies. While 

these liberalizing reforms increased the availability of seeds and 

fertilizer, small farmers still lack access to credit.

In metric tons 

2001/02 season 5-year averagea

Percentage

change

Lesotho 121,500 171,000b -29%

Malawi 1,772, 000 2,081,000 -15%

Mozambique 1,767,000 1,678,000 5%

Swaziland 70,000 90,000 -22%

Zambia 738,000 1,095,000 -33%

Zimbabwe 705,840 2,164,000 -67%

Total 5,174,340 7,279,000 -29%
Page 10 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Recent Government Actions 

Further Reduced the Food 

Supply

The food supply has been constrained further by certain government 

actions, the most damaging of which were the sale of grain reserves in 

Malawi and fast-tracked land reform in Zimbabwe.

Sale of Malawi’s Grain Reserve 

Hindered Stable Food Supplies 

Between July 2000 and August 2001, the National Food Reserve Agency of 

Malawi sold the 167,000 MT of maize it had purchased and stored as food 

reserves for the country. Despite several audits, it is still uncertain where 

the proceeds of the sale went. While the sold reserves did not cause the 

Malawi food crisis, their absence jeopardized the population’s food 

security. Had the government retained 60,000 MT of maize in accordance 

with its own policy to ensure adequate food supplies or an equivalent 

amount of currency to purchase new stocks, it could have been used to 

help ease food shortages in the early stage of the crisis, when a 

considerable number of people are reported to have died,11 and to fill 

almost one-quarter of the country’s cereal gap while emergency response 

operations were ramping up.

An investigation by Malawi’s National Audit Office in May 2002 concluded 

that the National Food Reserve Agency lost money in every area of 

handling maize because of poor financial management. Another 

investigation, conducted by Malawi’s Anti-Corruption Bureau in mid-2002, 

found that poor management of the grain reserve allowed companies and 

individuals to take advantage of the maize shortage to increase prices 

beyond the reach of a large sector of the community. The mismanagement 

cost the Malawian government more than K 2.9 billion (about $40 million).12

Zimbabwe’s Land Reform 

Decimated Production and 

Strained Region’s Supply

After years of trying to redistribute the country’s arable land, the 

government of Zimbabwe fast-tracked its land reform and resettlement 

policy in 2000 with the aim of acquiring all commercial farms no later than 

August 8, 2002. The campaign was characterized by the forced expulsion of 

landowners and farm laborers. To date, there remain more than a million 

11According to a study by the international NGO ActionAid between January and April 2002, 

at least 500 to 1,000 people died of hunger and hunger-related diseases in southern and 

central Malawi. WFP reported that more than 70 people died in the village of Gwengwe 

during that time—all victims of the district’s severe food crisis. The Commissioner of 

Malawi’s Department of Disaster Preparedness for Relief and Rehabilitation told us that his 

agency estimated 1,200 people died from hunger-related causes between December 2001 

and June 2002.

12Based on 2001 year-end exchange rate: US$1=Malawi K 72.2.
Page 11 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

internally displaced farm laborers. While the government did acquire these 

farms, it did not maintain them to ensure continued productivity. As a 

result, the land seizure destabilized the country’s economy, leading to a 75 

percent drop in commercial maize production over the past 2 years and 

turning Zimbabwe from a net exporter of grain to a net importer. Because 

Zimbabwe now cannot grow enough food to feed its own population, it has 

strained the cereal supply for the entire region. 

According to the State Department, the country’s gross domestic product 

fell by more than 20 percent and inflation soared to more than 269 percent 

between 1998 and 2002, coinciding with fast-tracked land reform. At the 

same time, unemployment rose by more than 25 percent as dismantling of 

commercial farms left many rural farm workers without a source of income 

and, therefore, a way to purchase food when their subsistence crops failed. 

In addition, government-imposed price controls on basic commodities have 

caused shortages of everything from bread, milk, sugar, and wheat flour to 

fuel and electricity.

Widespread Poverty 

Contributed to Food 

Insecurity

The six nations affected by the food crisis are generally low-income 

countries. The percentage of population subsisting on less than $1 per day 

range from 36 percent in Zimbabwe to 64 percent in Zambia. This 

widespread poverty and lack of productive assets (e.g., livestock and farm 

machinery) contribute to food insecurity in the region. In addition, the 

region is currently facing serious economic problems that further increase 

the population’s food insecurity. For example, in recent years, the dramatic 

collapse in the economy of Zimbabwe and a decline in the mining industry 

in South Africa and Zambia have removed sources of employment for many 

individuals in the region. The region’s food insecurity is associated with 

high rates of chronic malnutrition in the under-5 population—ranging from 

30 percent in Swaziland to 59 percent in Zambia.

HIV/AIDS Epidemic 

Exacerbated Food 

Shortages 

The HIV/AIDS epidemic has strained already-diminished food supplies by 

decreasing affected households’ food production and increasing nutritional 

requirements. In addition, the epidemic limits households’ access to food 

by decreasing income and increasing household expenses. According to 

the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), adult HIV/AIDS 

infection rates in 2001 were approximately 31 percent for Lesotho, 15 

percent for Malawi, 13 percent for Mozambique, 33 percent for Swaziland, 

22 percent for Zambia, and 34 percent for Zimbabwe. Infection rates are 
Page 12 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

higher among women, who generally account for 70 percent of the 

agricultural labor force and 80 percent of food production in Africa. 

HIV/AIDS Reduces Food 

Supplies

HIV/AIDS has decreased household food production by attacking people in 

their most productive working years, thus reducing the labor force. Around 

three-fourths of HIV/AIDS cases in southern Africa are among adults 

between the ages of 20 and 40. The percentage of agricultural labor force 

lost due to HIV/AIDS deaths by 2000 was nearly 6 percent for Malawi and 10 

percent for Zimbabwe. Recent studies on specific rural areas show, for 

example, that each adult death in Zambia was associated with a 16 percent 

reduction in the amount of land planted by the household, and 72 percent 

of households affected by chronic illness in selected rural areas of Malawi 

experienced an agricultural production decrease.13 In addition, a person 

infected with HIV/AIDS requires up to 50 percent more protein and 15 

percent more calories than a noninfected person. These extra needs put a 

further strain on the already limited food supplies.

HIV/AIDS Decreases Access to 

Food

HIV/AIDS has lowered household incomes, making it more difficult to 

access what food is available. Recent studies estimate that GDP growth in 

southern Africa is currently around 1 percent to 2 percent lower due to 

HIV/AIDS.14 For the six affected countries, 1 percent of GDP in 2001 

amounted to around $200 million. Recent studies in the region also show 

large monetary impacts at the household level. For example, in Zambia, 

HIV/AIDS-affected households reported annual income levels of 30 percent 

to 35 percent less due to the disease. In Zimbabwe, households with 

orphans had 42 percent less income per capita than households without 

orphans. In addition, medical care and funeral expenses are significant: In 

Zambia, 42 percent of households with chronically ill members reported 

unusually high health care expenses compared with 14 percent of 

households without chronically ill members, while in Zimbabwe, funeral 

costs can be as much as twice the annual per capita poverty line.

13A 1992 study in Malawi found that a person infected with HIV/AIDS was estimated to work 

only 9.7 years out of a potential 25.3 years.

14To estimate this reduction, most studies rely on simulations of projected income growth in 

a case with HIV/AIDS and in a (hypothetical) case without HIV/AIDS. The results of these 

studies vary, primarily due to assumptions about how HIV/AIDS affects savings and 

investment rates and the skill composition of the labor force.
Page 13 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Food Needs Not Fully 

Met, but Famine Was 

Averted

By the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period, approximately 93 

percent of the regional cereal gap appeared to have been met.15

Commercial cereal imports were reported as 1.72 million MT, while the 

food aid effort achieved at least 0.73 million MT (60 percent of the planned 

food aid amount). The commercial cereal imports and food aid prevented 

large-scale famine and death but did not reach parts of the region early 

enough throughout most of the crisis period to avert widespread hunger. 

Many people resorted to coping mechanisms, such as rationing their food 

intake, reducing their expenditures on nonfood items, and selling 

household assets to obtain food. The limited data available on nutritional 

status generally do not show a significant impact on acute malnutrition in 

the countries of the region. In addition to problems with timely delivery of 

food, U.N. agencies were only able to fund about 25 percent of urgent, 

nonfood emergency humanitarian needs. 

Approximately 93 Percent 

of the Cereal Gap Met 

during the Crisis Period

The May/June 2002 FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessments (CFSAM) 

for each of the six countries estimated the cereal gap for the region at 4.1 

million MT or 43 percent of domestic requirements for the April 1, 2002, 

through March 31, 2003, period. However, by the end of March 2003, the 

cereal gap had been revised downward substantially—-to 2.6 million MT or 

31 percent of domestic requirements.16 Based on the plan that evolved from 

the CFSAMs, the cereal deficit was to be offset by a combination of 

commercial imports and emergency food aid. The assessments identified 

an emergency cereals need of 1.2 million MT for the crop year, and this 

amount was adopted as a goal in the United Nations’ July 2002 emergency 

appeal for food aid for the region. Although later analyses projected more 

people at risk of famine, the goal for emergency cereals needs was not 

15The Vulnerability Assessment Committees, WFP, and others collected, analyzed, and 

reported considerable information on the cereal gap. However, complete data were 

unavailable because the VACs found it difficult to gather information on food aid provided 

by nongovernmental organizations. 

16The May/June 2002 FAO/WFP CFSAM initially determined the annual cereal deficit for 

each country based on estimates of domestic cereal consumption and stock requirements 

and production. Subsequent VAC and other assessments revised these estimates, resulting 

in changes to cereal deficit estimates. A requirement to replenish 473,000 MT of cereal 

stocks by the end of the crop year was dropped, estimates of cereal production and opening 

stocks were revised upward by 539,000 MT, and estimates of domestic consumption needs 

were lowered by 425,000 MT; the latter revision was partly due to reduced population 

figures for Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Page 14 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

increased. As shown in figure 2, if the emergency goal of 1.2 million MT 

were fully met, the estimated need for commercial cereal imports would be 

1.4 million MT.17

Figure 2: Revised Estimate of the Cereal Gap in the Six Countries and Plan for 

Addressing the Deficit (March 2003)

Figure 3 indicates the extent to which food aid and commercial imports 

helped offset the cereal gap in each country and the region over the April 1, 

2002, to March 31, 2003, period. As the figure shows, the region as a whole 

met at least 93 percent of its need. In two countries—Malawi and Zambia—

food aid and commercial imports combined considerably exceeded the 

cereal gap, while the other four had unmet gaps ranging from between 9 

percent to 50 percent. However, the numbers reported by the Vulnerability 

17Given that the U.N. regional emergency food aid appeal used the original CFSAM 

emergency food aid targets, we derived the annual commercial import requirement by 

subtracting planned emergency food aid from the March 2003 revised cereal deficit, as 

provided to us by WFP.
Page 15 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Assessment Committees (VAC), WFP, and others do not allow us to 

precisely define total food aid and commercial import levels. The figures 

are estimates and should be interpreted with caution. Food aid figures 

probably underestimate actual values because it was difficult for the VACs 

and WFP to collect comprehensive food aid data from NGOs. Thus, total 

NGO contributions could be considerably higher. Regarding commercial 

imports, some countries had experienced a considerable amount of 

informal trade in cereals, but the VACs and WFP did not always have 

access to reliable figures on informal trade. In the case of Zimbabwe, 

commercial imports may be exaggerated, since the VAC expressed 

skepticism about the data that were reported. According to some 

observers, Zimbabwe’s price controls may have encouraged a substantial 

outflow of cereals to neighboring countries where controls did not exist. 

Thus, the gap in Zimbabwe may have been much greater than shown in the 

figure.
Page 16 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 3: Extent to Which Cereal Food Aid and Commercial Imports Met the Cereal 

Gap (April 1, 2002, through March 31, 2003)

The data in figure 3 do not address the extent to which different parts of a 

country were served. Although Zambia appears to have offset its cereal gap 

by a large amount, the January VAC assessment reported serious cereal 

supply problems at local markets in rural areas.18 In addition, Malawi, 

which offset its cereal gap to an even greater extent, reported maize to be 

available in most markets, but vulnerable households had limited ability to 

pay for the food. (See app. V for additional information on commercial 

imports.)

18According to WFP, private traders operate primarily in urban markets. Sales are limited in 

rural markets due to low purchasing power among rural populations.

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by WFP and USAID.

Malawi

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Lesotho

Swaziland

Mozambique

Regiontotal

Percentage of gap filled by commercial imports

Percentage of gap filled by food aid

160

Percentage

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
Page 17 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Food Aid Did Not Reach the 

Region Early Enough to 

Avert Widespread Hunger

The overall commercial cereal imports and food aid averted widespread 

famine, according to WFP, USAID, and other observers in the region. 

However, because food supplies to the region were less than planned 

during the July through December period, far fewer people received food 

aid than expected. Many people in vulnerable areas went without meals 

and resorted to other coping mechanisms as well. Limited data available on 

nutritional status generally do not show a significant impact on acute 

malnutrition.

Food Supplies from World Food 

Program

Between July and December 2002, WFP distributed only 48 percent of the 

cereal it planned to provide to beneficiaries during that period. While 

Malawi and Swaziland received 87 percent and 76 percent, respectively, of 

their planned deliveries, the other four countries fell below the 40 percent 

mark.

In addition to cereal, WFP planned to provide several other foods 

(principally pulses, vegetable oil, and corn/soya blend) for added nutrition 

as well as to meet the special needs of some of its recipients. WFP realized 

only 17 percent of its planned distribution of these foods for July through 

December 2002. WFP deliveries in three countries—Mozambique, Zambia, 

and Zimbabwe—each represented less than 10 percent of its plans (1 

percent in the case of Zambia). In Malawi, which had the best performance, 

WFP achieved 40 percent of its planned distribution.

Figure 4 shows WFP’s monthly performance in achieving its plans for 

delivery of cereals and noncereal commodities in the region. In general, 

WFP’s performance gradually improved between July and December. It 

improved substantially in January, achieving 97 percent for cereals and 74 

percent for noncereals. Deliveries declined during the next 2 months, to a 

low in March of 81 percent for cereal and 53 percent for noncereals. 
Page 18 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 4: Extent to Which WFP Monthly Food Delivery Targets Were Met (July 2002 

through March 2003)

Food Supplies from 

Nongovernmental Organizations

Independent of WFP’s program, NGOs were to provide about 402,000 MT of 

cereals, or one-third of the emergency cereal need for the region. NGOs 

obtained or financed food for their efforts from donor countries as well as 

other voluntary contributions. The United States funded a World Vision 

program that provided 19,710 MT of cereal food aid to Zimbabwe. In 

addition, the United States contracted with an NGO consortium, called CSAFE (Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency), to 

deliver food into the region. According to U.S. officials, the program was 

part of a longer-term strategy that targeted the most vulnerable populations 

that the WFP program might miss. USAID, which began discussions withCSAFE members (CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision) in July 

2002, did not approve a program for the consortium until January 15, 
Page 19 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

2003.

19 However, under a November pre-authorization agreement, C-SAFE

began delivering food into the region in late December 2002. As of the end 

of March 2003, the consortium had delivered about 57,000 MT of cereal 

food aid to Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (See app. IV for additional 

information on C-SAFE.) Data provided to us by WFP indicate NGOs 

provided at least another 16,200 MT of cereals food aid into the region. 

Beneficiaries Fewer than 

Intended

Between July and December 2002, WFP averaged only 3.9 million 

beneficiaries per month, compared with a planned average of 10.4 million 

people per month (for both cereal and noncereal food aid).20 Figure 5 

shows how the shortfall in food aid during the July through December 2002 

period affected WFP beneficiary levels in each country. In four of the six 

countries, fewer than 45 percent of planned beneficiaries were served.

19The USAID-approved program authorized 160,000 MT of food aid to be provided during 

fiscal year 2003 to three of the six countries. The program did not establish a target amount 

of food aid to be distributed by the end of March 2003.

20On average for the 6-month period, WFP planned to assist 8 million people through largescale general food and food-for-work distributions. This aid would go to families living in 

rural areas affected by adverse weather and whose coping strategies were depleted because 

of stress factors, including the increased burden of caring for family members affected by 

HIV/AIDs. WFP also planned to provide supplementary support to another 2.4 million 

people during the period, such as malnourished children, school-age children, and 

expectant and/or nursing women who had needs above and beyond the levels needed to 

qualify for general food and food-for-work assistance.
Page 20 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 5: Percent of WFP Total Planned Beneficiaries Who Received at Least Some 

Food Aid (July through December 2002)

Note: According to USAID officials, Malawi and Swaziland did better than the other countries, at least 

in part because they placed fewer or no restrictions on biotech food aid.

In addition, many people who did receive food aid did not receive a full 

ration.21 For example, WFP officials in Malawi told us that during 

November they were only able to provide cereal to many of their 

beneficiaries. Beans and vegetable oil were unavailable to provide a 

balanced diet.

Reduced Food Intake, Other 

Coping Strategies

Studies show that people in vulnerable communities reduced food intake 

as their major coping strategy, and this approach has increased since the 

crisis began. For example, as of December 2002, more than 60 percent of 

the population in all regions of Malawi reduced the amount of food and 

number of meals they ate, according to the VAC. 

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) identified other 

coping strategies including reducing expenditures on nonfood items, 

selling or trading household assets to get food (e.g., sale of livestock), 

increasing consumption of wild foods, migrating to find work or food, 

21According to WFP, the food baskets were incomplete largely because of when pledged 

resources arrived as well as donor preferences for in-kind contributions of certain 

commodities. Beans, oils, and corn/soya blend are often under-resourced.
Page 21 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

stealing, and resorting to prostitution. Table 2 shows the extent to which 

surveyed households in Zambia relied on reduced food consumption and 

other coping strategies from between August and December 2002.

Table 2: Frequency of Household Coping Strategies in Zambia (August through 

December 2002)

Source: Zambia National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, Zambia Emergency Food Security Assessment (Lusaka, Zambia: 

January 2003).

Nutritional Impacts Mixed Between 1999 and 2001, acute malnutrition rates in countries of the region 

for children under 5 years of age were between 1.2 percent and 6.4 percent. 

Some assessments conducted between May and October 2002 found an 

increase in acute malnutrition rates compared with earlier studies but did 

not find rates consistent with a severe food crisis, which would be 10 

percent to 15 percent. However, these studies did not exclude possible 

pockets of severe malnutrition or hunger-related deaths in the region. Also, 

adult malnutrition and malnutrition in urban areas were not surveyed.22

More recent assessments (December 2002 through January 2003) of acute 

malnutrition for children under age 5 in select districts of Malawi, 

Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia found rates generally ranging 

between 2 percent and 8 percent. However, the rate was 11.2 percent in one 

province of Mozambique.

Coping Strategy

Percent of households

engaged in each

Reduced number of meals 78

Reduced amount at meal times 72

Skipped food for an entire day 58

Reduced expenditures on alcohol and tobacco 57

Increased consumption of wild foods 38

Reduced expenditures on non-food items 34

Above-normal livestock sales 32

Borrowed from friends and relatives 30

Borrowed from nonfamily members 27

Borrowed from money lenders 5

22The Malawian VAC’s July-August household survey found that adults were eating less than 

children and thus might experience a more rapid decline in nutritional status.
Page 22 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

According to a recent internal U.S. government report, anecdotal evidence 

from the field in late 2002 indicates that in certain districts in Zimbabwe, 

children were being admitted to some health care facilities in increasing 

numbers for malnutrition. At one facility, three to five children were 

reported to have died of malnutrition during each month of 2002. More 

formal nutrition surveys within the country have demonstrated acute 

malnutrition rates of 6.4 percent and 7.3 percent in May and August 2002, 

respectively. Results from a nutrition survey conducted in early 2003 are 

still pending. 

Nonfood Emergency Needs 

Severely Underfunded 

In addition to requesting $507 million for emergency food aid for July 2002 

through March 2003, U.N. agencies also requested $143.7 million23 to 

address urgent and related humanitarian needs that increased people’s 

vulnerability to famine for the July 2002 through June 2003 period. As of 

April 9, 2003, less than 25 percent of the total identified requirements had 

been funded, according to an April 22 U.N. southern Africa humanitarian 

crisis update. Principal objectives of the request were to: 

• prevent, contain, and address the outbreak of disease through enhanced 

health and nutritional surveillance; 

• address the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS and seek to prevent 

new infections;

• ensure an adequate and timely provision of agricultural inputs for the 

next planting season as well as emergency veterinary inputs; 

• maintain the capacity for planning recovery efforts in food selfsufficiency, education, and health services; and 

• prevent marginal populations from falling into a downward spiral that 

could lead to prolonged dependency in the future.

A longer-term objective was to phase out emergency humanitarian 

assistance and move toward a development agenda focused on poverty 

reduction, HIV/AIDS prevention and control, and support for food security 

23The initial request for nonfood needs was for $104 million. However, specific requests for 

some countries and sectors were revised upward or downward during the year. As of early 

April 2003, the overall request was for $143.7 million.
Page 23 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

by increasing food production and strengthening foreign exchange 

earnings. (For additional information on nonfood emergency needs, see 

app. VI.)

Slow Donations, Poor 

Infrastructure, 

Concerns Associated 

with Biotech Food 

Were Major Obstacles 

to an Effective 

Response

Major obstacles to the food aid effort’s success were the lack of sufficient, 

timely food donations; poor infrastructure in recipient countries; and 

concerns associated with biotech food. Although the United States made 

substantial, early donations, aggregate commitments from donor countries 

were 18 percent below what WFP needed for the July through December 

period. The shortfall was actually higher given the lag in time between 

when food is committed and when it arrives in-country. Poor infrastructure 

in recipient countries and related logistical constraints impeded efficient 

delivery of food aid and in some cases prevented food from reaching 

beneficiaries. Concerns over biotech food led Zambia to reject U.S.-

donated maize and other countries to impose costly processing 

requirements. These actions reduced or delayed food aid, increased costs, 

and complicated the logistics of the emergency operation. 

Lack of Sufficient, Timely 

Donations Contributed to 

Food Aid Shortfalls

By the end of June 2002, the United States had delivered more than 41,000 

MT of food aid to ocean ports in the southern African region. U.S. deliveries 

to these ports between July and December 2002 represented approximately 

50 percent of the food WFP needed to arrive in-country during that period. 

(See app. IV for additional information on U.S. food aid donations.) 

Nonetheless, in aggregate, donors did not make sufficient, timely donations 

to WFP. 

WFP needed about 855,000 tons of food (cereals and noncereals) to arrive 

in the six countries from July through December 2002 to support its 

planned food distributions. During that period, donors advised WFP that 

they would contribute about 701,000 tons—a shortfall of 18 percent. 

However, the shortfall was actually greater because of the considerable lag 

time between when WFP was advised in writing that a contribution would 

be made and when food arrived in a beneficiary country. WFP officials 

estimate that in-kind contributions take 3 to 5 months from the time donors 

confirm the contribution to the arrival of food aid at its final distribution 
Page 24 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

sites.24 However, according to WFP officials, when contributions are made 

in cash and procurement is done within the region, the process can be 

reduced to 1 to 3 months. 

Table 3 shows the countries that gave the most to WFP’s regional 

emergency food aid operation and when they advised WFP of their 

intended donations. Some of the major donors, including the United States 

and the United Kingdom, gave large amounts early to the crisis. Others, 

including the European Union, South Africa, and Japan, waited several 

months or longer before confirming what they would contribute.

24According to USAID officials, depending on the availability of commodities and shipping, 

as well as need in an affected country, USAID in-kind contributions can be provided in as 

short a time as 6 weeks.
Page 25 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Table 3: Contributions to WFP and Their Timing

Source: GAO analysis based on WFP data.

a

A confirmed donation (in kind or in cash) is when a donor has notified WFP in writing of what it will 

donate.

b

There were 29 other donors, some of which were private or multilateral entities. Together, they 

accounted for 4.1 percent of all donations, with an individual range from 0.001 percent to 0.7 percent. 

WFP acknowledged that the early months of the regional EMOP would 

indeed have benefited from more rapid mobilization of resources. At the 

same time, WFP said, as of mid-May 2003, the operation had been 93 

percent resourced, by 41 institutional donors--which represented an 

unusually supportive response.

Poor Infrastructure 

Hampered Efficient Food 

Delivery

The flow chart shown in figure 6 illustrates WFP’s logistics process of 

delivering food, from the time it is shipped by suppliers to the time food is 

actually distributed to the recipients at the village level.25 Food aid 

Food in metric tons

Cumulative Confirmed Donationsa

 to WFP’s Southern Africa Regional EMOP by End of March 2003

Jul 2002 Aug 2002 Sep 2002 Oct 2002 Nov 2002 Dec 2002 Mar 2003

United States 194,350 197,550 248,403 248,403 326,553 326,553 326,553

European Union 139,854 139,854 139,854 179,531

South Africa 100,000

United Kingdom 62,515 65,385 65,385 65,231 65,231 65,231 70,231

Japan 35,295 35,450 54,386 56,662

Algeria 31,000

Germany 6,113 14,539 15,344 15,344 24,256 22,775

Australia 6,185 14,335 14,597 14,597 18,098 18,248

Finland 4,075 6,149 8,377 8,377 14,575 14,934

Canada 1,661 1,661 6,779 6,697 6,697 12,573 12,573

OPEC 12,411

Netherlands 1,097 10,797 10,797 10,797 10,797 10,797 10,625

All othersb 7,133 12,961 12,789 14,471 14,471 35,097 36,549

Total 266,756 304,727 379,176 559,066 637,371 701,420 892,092

25In addition, NGOs that were directly funded by the U.S. government carried out a similar 

operation.
Page 26 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

commodities are either purchased by WFP regionally or shipped to the 

region through one of five ports of entry: Beira, Nacala, and Maputo in 

Mozambique; Durban in South Africa; or Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. (See 

fig. 7 for a map of the transportation network.) From these points of entry, 

food is transported by truck or rail to intermediate storage facilities, or 

transshipment points, which are strategically located in various districts 

within the country to streamline the flow of deliveries. From these strategic 

locations, food is then transported to extended delivery points—storage 

facilities generally located at the district level—from which the food aid 

allocations for each final distribution site are dispatched. WFP manages 

this process, including transporting the food to the extended delivery 

points. Wherever possible, nongovernmental organizations that are 

designated as the implementing partners are responsible for the secondary 

transport of food from the extended delivery points to the final distribution 

points. 
Page 27 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 6: Steps in the Logistics Process

Note: The flow chart does not reflect the additional step of milling. In addition, the chart does not show 

monitoring of the flow of food deliveries throughout the process to ensure proper receipt and 

dispatches of food.

Suppliers 

of food 

commodities

Points of entry 

(ports of Beira, 

Maputo, Nacala, Dar es 

Salaam, Durban)

Transshipment point

Extended 

delivery points

Final distribution 

points

Primary transport

Secondary transport

Village 

(beneficiaries)

1

2

3

4

5

6

Sources: GAO and MapArt, based on World Food Program information; all photos GAO, except primary transport, WFP.
Page 28 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 7: The Transportation Network for Moving Food in the Region

Lake

Malawi

Maseru

Capitals

Other ports

Countries in food crisis

Countries with transport routes to countries in food crisis

Adjacent countries

Ports not in use

Mbabane

Lilongwe

Harare

Lusaka

Luanda

Windhoek

Cape Town

Gaborone

Pretoria

Victoria

Falls

Mbeya

Intermediate cities

De Aar

Blantyre

Luderitz

Dar es 

Salaam

Maputo

Durban

Walvis

Bay

East London

Port Elizabeth

Beira

Nacala

Ports in use

River Bas

Zambezi

in

MOZAMBIQUE

ZAMBIA

SWAZILAND

LESOTHO

ZIMBABWE

MALAWI

NAMIBIA

SOUTH

AFRICA

TANZANIA

ANGOLA

BOTSWANA

CONGO

0 500 miles

Parallel scale at 0o

 0o

Derailment 

showing problems 

with the Nacala 

railway tracks in 

Mozambique 

Limited trucking 

capacity

Poor roads

From the port, 

food is moved 

overland by rail or 

road

Nacala railway 

tracks with new 

locomotives in 

operation

Road routes in use

Rail routes in use

Road routes not in use

Rail routes not in use

Source: Map: GAO and MapArt, based on World Food Program information; Photos: GAO, except Nacala railway, WFP.

Mozambique

Channel
Page 29 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Long-standing weaknesses in transportation infrastructure across the 

region hampered timely delivery of food aid where it was needed. Much of 

the transportation infrastructure (including ports, railways, and roads) had 

deteriorated since the 1991/92 drought. For example, the port of Maputo, 

which is ideally situated for moving food commodities to landlocked 

countries, such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe, cannot be used optimally 

because of the lack of adequate port warehouse and storage facilities. 

However, even when ports are full, there is a limit to the amount of food 

that can be transported over land to landlocked countries, like Zambia, due 

to rail and trucking capacity and other logistical considerations.

According to WFP officials, the port of Nacala was in better condition than 

the port of Maputo. But its rail system—the sole transport link between 

Malawi and the nearest port in Mozambique and the shortest, cheapest 

route into Malawi and eastern Zambia—was in such poor condition it had 

to be fixed during the crisis. In late 2002, the United Kingdom and Canada 

gave WFP $6.4 million and $256,000, respectively, to rehabilitate a 48-milelong track on the Nacala railway and to lease locomotives and wagons. 

While these locomotives and ongoing repairs to the rail corridor 

represented a major breakthrough, unexpected setbacks continued to mire 

operations. For example, in Malawi, heavy rains in January 2003 

completely destroyed one bridge on the Nacala rail line, thus impeding the 

movement of commodities for at least 10 days. In late summer 2002, a 

donation of 200 trucks from the government of Norway and the 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies helped 

ease access to places that are particularly hard to reach. However, many 

village roads in these countries routinely become impassable when the 

rainy season (September to March) begins, thus isolating beneficiaries 

from food deliveries. 
Page 30 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Recipient Country Concerns 

about Biotech Food 

Compromised Food 

Pipeline

In the middle of 2002, Zambia and Zimbabwe debated whether to accept 

U.S.-donated maize26 based on concerns that it might contain biotech 

products that could adversely affect (1) the health of food aid recipients, 

(2) the countries’ agricultural biodiversity,27 and (3) their ability to export 

agricultural commodities.28 Despite some earlier concerns over U.S. 

biotech food aid and Zimbabwe’s objections to biotech whole kernel maize 

dating back to the middle of 2001,29 the United States and international 

agencies did not have a ready alternative to biotech food aid in the 

southern Africa crisis.30 The United States was only partly successful in its 

efforts to persuade southern African country governments to allow 

26Crop varieties developed through the application of biotechnology to agriculture were first 

marketed in the United States in 1994. Because the U.S. grain handling system typically 

combines biotech and conventional maize varieties (for efficiency purposes), all U.S. food 

aid corn shipments possibly contained biotech maize. In 2002, roughly 35 percent of U.S. 

food aid could be considered as having varying degrees of biotech content. See appendix VII 

for further discussion.

27Whole kernel maize, unlike its processed counterpart, has the possibility, if planted, of 

introducing engineered genes into conventional maize plants. 

28There is no worldwide, harmonized approach to assessing the safety of biotech foods and 

regulating their trade. Given the novelty of agricultural biotech products, many countries 

especially developing countries have no approval process for these products at all. The 

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international environmental treaty, will regulate 

transboundary movements of living genetically modified organisms after it is ratified by 50 

countries, which may occur in late 2003. Countries that ratify the protocol may establish 

their own national systems for assessing and regulating biotech foods.

29In 1999, media in Orissa, India, claimed the United States had dumped biotech food aid 

commodities on developing countries because European and Japanese markets would not 

buy them. In 2000, Sudanese politicians accused the NGO community of distributing biotech 

food aid and poisoning the Sudanese people. In 2001, the Ugandan government raised 

concerns about a program to distribute corn/soya blend rations to 60,000 people living with 

HIV/AIDS. In 2001, the Bolivian government seized biotech food aid following a decree 

forbidding imports of products derived from biotech crops. According to USDA, in each of 

these instances, USDA and/or USAID addressed the recipient country government’s 

concerns and ensured that food aid reached those in need. In December 2001 and May 2002, 

Zimbabwe rejected U.S. offers to provide shipments of corn that could not be certified as 

100 percent biotech free. According to ACDI/VOCA, an NGO specializing in development 

and food aid issues, through early 2002 most problems relating to biotech food aid had been 

resolved relatively quickly and amicably. See ACDI/VOCA, Genetically Modified Food: 

Implications for U.S. Food Aid Programs (Washington, D.C.: Revised February 2002).

30According to USAID officials, the United States did not anticipate the biotech issue, since 

Mozambique and Zambia had accepted U.S. corn food aid for years. USDA officials said that 

it was difficult to determine with certainty those food aid recipient countries in southern 

Africa that would accept or reject food aid containing biotech commodities because of 

nontransparent, evolving decision-making processes.
Page 31 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

unrestricted import and distribution of food aid, including biotech 

products, on an emergency basis for the duration of the crisis. Efforts 

included providing information about agricultural biotechnology and the 

safety of biotech food aid to Zambia and the other countries. Nevertheless, 

Zambia rejected all food aid that could have included biotech 

commodities.31 Zimbabwe implemented stringent grain handling 

procedures, including milling of whole grain maize, that significantly 

slowed distribution of food aid. Malawi, Mozambique, and Lesotho also 

debated what to do and eventually imposed milling requirements on whole 

grain maize that were enforced with varying degrees of rigor.32

Toward the end of August 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a common 

statement on biotech food aid, as did the European Union. Both statements 

indicated that biotech food aid was unlikely to present a risk to human 

health and suggested milling the maize as a way to overcome 

environmental and trade concerns. However, U.S. officials from State, 

USAID, and USDA believe that, given the severity of the crisis and existing 

scientific evidence, U.N. agencies and the European Union did not speak 

out early or forcefully enough on the issue.

The United States rejected the option of donating only milled maize, citing 

increased costs and limited U.S. milling capacity that would cause delays in 

getting food aid to needy people. U.S. officials estimate that U.S.-based 

milling would double the costs of its food aid, thus reducing the amount of 

aid it could provide. Additionally, according to U.S. officials, agreeing to 

mill all of the maize could have promoted the idea that unprocessed maize 

was unsafe. (App. VII provides further discussion of issues related to 

biotech food.)

Despite the United States’ early and large donations, the impasse over 

biotech food significantly compromised the food pipeline in several ways: 

31The United States provided about 280,000 MT of whole kernel maize; about 77,000 MT of 

corn meal; about 43,000 MT of corn soy blend and corn soy milk; and about 21,000 MT of 

vegetable oil made from either corn or soybeans. Altogether, about 84 percent of the 

donated U.S. tonnage could have contained biotech commodities. 

32According to USAID, in practice Malawi has preferred that whole kernel maize be milled 

prior to distribution but has not allowed its requirement to slow deliveries of food aid in any 

way and has only milled comparatively small quantities.
Page 32 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

• Food aid was reduced and delayed. On September 3, 2002, Zambia’s 

Agriculture Minister, in a statement to the press, demanded that 19,000 

MT of biotech maize that had been delivered to storage facilities inside 

the country be sent to a country that was willing to accept it. (WFP was 

officially notified on October 29, 2002.) According to U.S. officials, by 

early November, Zambia had rejected an additional 57,000 MT of biotech 

maize intended for its food aid beneficiaries. The combined 76,000 MT 

of maize considerably exceeded WFP’s cereal shortfall for Zambia for 

the July through December period and would have fed 1.5 million 

Zambians for 3 months.33 In the case of Zimbabwe, there were delays 

while the government debated whether to accept whole grain maize and 

then negotiated, developed, and put in place restrictions it deemed 

suitable. According to a U.S. official, at one point, more than 80,000 MT 

of U.S. whole kernel maize imports destined for Zimbabwe were delayed 

in South Africa and Mozambique port warehouses awaiting permits—

while the food aid pipeline lacked cereal.

• Costs of food aid operations increased. WFP, national governments, 

and other donors have borne the additional costs associated with 

requirements to mill some or all of the U.S.-donated maize. These costs 

include the milling itself, added charges for transporting whole grain 

maize to mills and for shipping milled product, added storage costs 

because of limited milling capacity, and grain losses associated with the 

milling process.34 WFP estimates that when it has to mill the product in 

South Africa, regional distribution costs could total up to $80 per metric 

ton more than for unmilled U.S. maize.35

• Logistics of the food aid effort were complicated. Logistics became 

more complex because of (1) U.S. whole kernel maize piling up in ports 

as governments debated whether to accept biotech maize and, if so, 

under what conditions, (2) limited milling capacity, (3) added 

transportation and storage requirements, and (4) the short shelf life of 

maize milled regionally (3 months compared with 12 months for whole 

33According to WFP, 1 MT of cereal feeds approximately 60 people per month.

34Milling reduces the volume of the product. As a result, more whole grain maize must be 

supplied to meet the food needs of the beneficiaries.

35WFP’s estimate of $80 per MT represents the rule of thumb for maximum costs, which 

include extraction rates during milling, additional transport, bagging, fumigation, and 

drying, as well as additional oversight. Actual total costs for milling, however, could not be 

calculated because milling is integrated into the overall procurement and logistics network.
Page 33 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

maize). Because food is distributed to households on a monthly basis, 

WFP had to ensure that milled maize would not take more than 2 

months to arrive at final distribution sites.

U.S. officials said that recipient countries in southern Africa did not make 

timely, informed decisions about whether to accept or reject biotech food 

aid. These officials also said the U.S. government does not have 

comprehensive data on which recipient countries are likely to accept or 

reject biotech food aid, nor does the U.S. government have a strategy for 

providing alternatives to biotech food to countries that may reject it. 

According to officials from State, USAID, and USDA, these problems are 

not confined to the southern Africa region but also have a global reach.

Declining Support for 

Agricultural Sector and 

the HIV/AIDS Epidemic 

Pose Challenges to 

Emerging from Crisis 

into Sustained 

Recovery

The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis into 

sustained recovery include (1) a decline in agriculture sector investments; 

(2) limited scope of existing programs in agricultural development; and (3) 

the negative impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Recognizing the need to 

address numerous challenges to move out of this crisis into recovery, the 

U.N. Secretary-General and several other key stakeholders have called for a 

comprehensive and targeted approach to break the pattern of recurrent 

food crises in Africa. The food outlook for the next crop year has improved, 

but without continuing efforts to respond to the region’s problems, 

recurring food crises may be difficult to avoid. 
Page 34 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Agriculture Sector 

Investments by Donors and 

Governments Have 

Declined

Since agriculture accounts for 70 percent of the labor force in Africa, 

investments that improve productivity in the agricultural sector have 

significant implications for food security and overall rural development. 

According to the International Food Policy Research Institute, a 1 percent 

increase in agricultural productivity would help 6 million more Africans 

raise their incomes above $1 per day. However, data show declining 

investments in the agricultural sector as agricultural lending by the World 

Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Fund for 

Agricultural Development has fallen. Similarly, agricultural spending by 

national governments and U.S. bilateral assistance for agricultural 

programs in the affected countries have declined.36

Agricultural Lending by Selected 

International Financing 

Organizations

Total lending to the agriculture sector by selected international financing 

organizations declined during the 1990s. For example, measured in 2003 

dollars, the African Development Bank approved about $873 million in 

loans for agriculture in 1990 compared with $236 million in 2000, as shown 

in figure 8. Similarly, the World Bank approved $4.7 billion in loans for 

agriculture in 1990 compared with $1.4 billion in 2000. Bank officials noted 

that the World Bank now approaches the agricultural sector in the context 

of the Bank’s overall rural development strategy that includes, among other 

things, lending for rural infrastructure, rural health, and environment and 

natural resource management. For this reason, starting in 2001, the World 

Bank began to include agricultural investments as part of its rural 

development lending. However, this does not negate the overall declining 

trend in agricultural lending between 1990 and 2000.

36The private sector is also a source of agricultural investment in terms of capital (farm 

machinery and equipment) and technology (seed, irrigation, and soil conservation). 

However, little or no data are available to determine the size, growth, and impact of private 

sector investments on agricultural production in these countries.
Page 35 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 8: Agricultural Lending by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, 

and the International Fund for Agricultural Development–1990 through 2000

Note: IFAD provides strictly agricultural development loans.
Page 36 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Our review of World Bank agricultural loans to the six affected countries 

since 1990 found that 15 had been made—with 9 of them approved between 

1990 and 1993. There were no loans recorded for Swaziland. As shown in 

figure 9, in 2002, the downward trend in World Bank agricultural lending to 

the affected region reversed with two $50 million emergency drought 

recovery loans for Zambia and Malawi. These loans included an 

agricultural component but also comprised health, social services, and 

other emergency programs.

Figure 9: World Bank Agricultural Sector Loans Approved for the Affected

Countries–1990 to 2002
Page 37 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Agricultural Spending by 

National Governments

In general, national governments have been spending a declining share of 

their budgets on agriculture, as shown in figure 10. Real spending on 

agriculture has declined for two countries—Lesotho and Zambia—whereas 

total government spending has increased for all six affected countries. For 

the remaining countries, national government spending on agriculture has 

been stagnant or has grown at a slower rate than total government 

spending.

Figure 10: Agricultural Spending as a Percentage of Total Government Spending– 

1996/97 through 2001/02 (in 2003 dollars)

Note: 2001/2002 data for Lesotho, Malawi, and Zimbabwe were not available.We did not calculate the 

percentage of government spending for agriculture for Mozambique. The IMF provided us with the 

percentage data. 
Page 38 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

U.S. Bilateral Assistance for 

Agricultural Sector

Although the levels of U.S. bilateral assistance for agriculture by country 

have been mixed, overall assistance to the region’s agricultural sector has 

declined from $27 million in 1998 to $20.6 million in 2003. The largest 

reductions were for Malawi, which went from $10.3 million in 1998 to $3.2 

million in 2003, while assistance to Mozambique went from $14.5 million in 

1998 to $12.8 million in 2003 (see fig. 11). 

Figure 11: USAID Bilateral Assistance in the Agricultural Sector to Four Countriesa–

1998 to 2003 

a

USAID does not have bilateral programs in Lesotho and Swaziland. However, these two countries do 

benefit from some regional assistance and limited funding support through other U.S. government 

agencies.

b

The combined figure includes Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It does not include 

Regional Center funding.

Existing Programs Are 

Helpful but Limited in Scope

To promote agricultural development and work toward achieving food 

security, FAO, IFAD, and WFP advocate an approach that helps support 

small farmers, enhances the ability of the poor to access food, and aids 
Page 39 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

recovery efforts (fig. 12 describes examples of some of the current 

programs). Several U.N. and USAID officials told us that while many of the 

programs they have funded have demonstrated promising results, the 

programs are limited in scope due to resource constraints and would need 

to be implemented on a much wider scale for greater impact and 

effectiveness.
Page 40 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 12: Examples of Existing Programs Related to Food Security

Agricultural experts have promoted programs to diversify crops that are good alternatives to 

maize, particularly in areas with erratic rainfall and adverse conditions. For example, in Malawi, 

FAO and USAID are supporting programs, such as the Southern Africa Root Crops Research 

Network, designed to multiply and distribute improved varieties of sweet potatoes and cassava. 

In addition, USAID-supported farmer associations throughout the country are promoting 

higher-value crops such as groundnuts and aromatic rice.

Because the region lacks irrigation schemes, drought-affected areas included many villages that 

were close to significant water sources, such as Lake Malawi and the Zambezi river basin. FAO 

officials believe that, with better water management schemes, such villages should be able to 

collect and save water to mitigate drought. As part of its program of assistance, FAO helps 

farmers identify water management techniques and implement suitable low-cost solutions to 

increase agricultural production. FAO also promotes water users associations and appropriate 

irrigation support services to make water management sustainable.

Sources: GAO; photos, GAO (top and bottom 2 photos), all other photos, FAO.

Many farmers depleted their livestock and other assets during the crisis and have limited access to 

credit. During the crisis, several countries experienced shortages in agricultural inputs such as 

fertilizer, seed, and tools. Nonetheless, some governments and major donors did have programs to 

deliver basic agricultural inputs to small farmers to help boost agricultural production for the next 

growing season. For example, in Malawi, the government targeted 2 million farmers for free "starter 

packs" (primarily seeds). In addition, the United Nations reported distributing more than 177,000 

packs of seed and tools but noted that funding constraints limited the amount of seeds distributed. 

Representatives of nongovernmental organizations, which focus their activities at the village level, 

stressed the effectiveness of such mitigation measures. 

The lack of a functioning rural infrastructure often prevents farmers from marketing their crops. 

Donor and government officials in the region stress the need to rehabilitate the rural infrastructure. 

In Mozambique, USAID has programmed resources to rehabilitate farm-to-market roads and to 

construct the long-delayed final segment of the north-south trunk road. As a result, farmers and 

other residents along the road have found better access to markets. In 2001, according to a USAID 

report, sales of beans, maize, and cotton in some areas along the road alignment increased 20 

percent over the previous year. 

In light of erratic weather conditions in the region, numerous officials cited the need to prepare for 

emergencies and manage disasters more effectively. According to many USAID, U.N., and host 

government officials, Mozambique has been better able to respond to the current food crisis than it 

was to the disastrous 2000-2001 floods because it developed a national plan that was put into effect 

at the national, provincial and district, and local community levels at the onset of the crisis. Among 

other things, the plan coordinated efforts in various sectors; prepositioned food stocks in strategic 

locations; and provided information to people in vulnerable areas. 

Cassava multiplication program (Malawi).

Seed input fair (Mozambique).

FAO-sponsored joint irrigation schemes (Mozambique).

Food for work programs help build rural 

infrastructure such as schools (Zambia).

High water mark of the 2000-2001 flood on food 

warehouse wall (Mozambique).

Rebuilding assets

Developing better water management schemes

Rehabilitating rural infrastructure

Improving emergency preparedness and disaster management

Improving crop diversification
Page 41 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Negative Impact of 

HIV/AIDS on Food Security 

Will Grow 

In addition to being a significant factor that contributed to the food crisis, 

HIV/AIDS will continue to affect food security in the region by decreasing 

food production, lowering household income, and increasing household 

expenses, according to numerous experts. These effects will increase as 

the HIV/AIDS epidemic worsens. For example, by lowering the productivity 

of agricultural labor in its food supply model, USDA estimated that 

HIV/AIDS will cause a 3.3 percent reduction in grain output in sub-Saharan 

Africa over the next decade relative to the region's baseline projections. As 

a result, the projected food deficit will grow by 13 percent.37

According to an IMF study, HIV/AIDS will also lower gross domestic 

product (GDP). Figure 13 shows the projected decrease in growth rates of 

GDP per capita attributable to HIV/AIDS in 10 to 15 years: Estimates range 

from minus 4 percent in Mozambique to about minus 7 percent in 

Zimbabwe. Projected average per capita GDP growth rates without 

HIV/AIDS range from 1.5 percent for Lesotho to 3.9 percent for 

Mozambique, indicating that the HIV/AIDS effect will significantly reduce 

national income.38 In fact, for a typical sub-Saharan African country with 

HIV/AIDS prevalence of 20 percent, national income is estimated to be 67 

percent lower at the end of a 20-year period than without the disease.

37The projected food deficit is defined as the gap between projected domestically produced 

food supplies and projected food needs based on a basic nutritional requirement and 

projected population.

38GDP projections are from Global Insight’s 2000 forecast and indicate annual growth rates 

from 2006 to 2020.
Page 42 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 13: Projected Impact on GDP Due to HIV/AIDS 

Note: Estimates are for an economy open to trade and are for a 10- to 15-year period with 2000 as the 

base year.

U.N. Secretary-General and 

Others Cite Need for 

Integrated Response 

Although the international response was sufficient to avoid famine in past 

food crises in the region—as well as the current one—food security 

continues to be a significant development challenge. U.N. and U.S. officials 

acknowledge that food aid and humanitarian assistance alone will not 

prevent future crises without a comprehensive recovery strategy that 

addresses the underlying causes of food insecurity. In our review, we found 

no evidence of such a strategy.

In March 2003, the U.N. Secretary-General noted that the devastating 

impact of HIV/AIDS requires an integrated response that may include longterm measures even when addressing short-term emergencies and called 

for a more systematic, targeted approach to break the pattern of recurrent 

food crises in Africa. Many other authoritative experts and key 

stakeholders have echoed the U.N. Secretary-General’s call for an 

integrated response. For example, in December 2002, SADC—the principal 

organization for regional cooperation in food and agriculture and related 
Page 43 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

economic and social issues—acknowledged the need for political 

commitment at all levels within the region and for coordinated support 

from SADC, national governments, donors, nongovernmental 

organizations, and civil society to ensure food security in the future. Among 

those calling for a comprehensive response to address food security—one 

that integrates agricultural development, HIV/AIDS, natural disaster 

management, and other appropriate interventions—are the U.N. Office for 

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Food Policy 

Research Institute, and the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in 

Africa. 

In recent years, international donors have announced major initiatives 

related to food security. These include plans not only to enhance food 

availability by increasing agricultural production but strategies to increase 

food accessibility by reducing poverty. For example, the United Nations’ 

2001 Millennium Development Goals pledged to help cut hunger in Africa in 

half by 2015.39 The World Bank and IMF have worked with countries 

eligible for debt relief—Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia—to ensure that 

food security and agriculture are central themes in these countries’ Poverty 

Reduction Strategy Papers.40 Among other measures, these strategy papers 

emphasize promoting small-scale irrigation, reducing land degradation, and 

improving access to credit and agricultural inputs. In early 2002, USAID 

introduced its Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa, which is 

designed to accelerate agricultural growth and reduce vulnerability to 

hunger and poverty. However, as of April 2003, of the six affected countries, 

only Mozambique was proposed for funding ($3.9 million in 2003) under the 

initiative.

39One of the key Millennium Development Goals is the eradication of extreme poverty and 

hunger and cutting in half between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people whose income is 

less than $1 a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. 

40These countries are required to develop Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) as the 

basis for assistance from the World Bank and IMF under the Initiative for Highly Indebted 

Poor Countries, where official creditors agree to help the most indebted countries obtain 

debt relief. In addition to these three countries, Lesotho has prepared an Interim PRSP and 

should issue a full PRSP this year. 
Page 44 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Regional Food Outlook 

Remains Tenuous; 

Sustained Efforts Seen as 

Necessary

Despite improved weather conditions and a better harvest beginning in 

April 2003, food security conditions in the region are still tenuous. As of the 

end of March 2003, early warning systems were forecasting that some parts 

of the region may have better harvests than last year; however, they also 

note that food insecurity and the need for emergency aid persist—and may 

worsen—in some areas, particularly in Zimbabwe and parts of southern 

Mozambique. In February 2003, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs stated that, because the response to improve 

agricultural inputs has been inadequate, recovery by the next agricultural 

season is unlikely and the need for food aid prolonged. In fact, the current 

emergency operations, which were for the crop year that concluded March 

2003, have been extended through June 2003. Beyond that, according to 

WFP and USAID officials, the need for food aid will likely continue, 

particularly for many of the poorest and most vulnerable households.

Conclusions The current food crisis is complicated by disruptive agricultural and 

governance policies in the affected countries and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 

While the WFP, the United States, some donor governments, and NGOs 

provided enough food to prevent a famine, overall donor response was 

insufficient in terms of food quantities and timeliness to prevent 

widespread hunger. In addition, other obstacles—including poor 

infrastructure in the affected countries and concerns associated with 

biotech food—hampered an effective response. The controversy about 

biotech food aid, in particular, significantly complicated logistics, 

increased costs, and delayed food aid reaching beneficiaries. Concerns 

about agricultural biotechnology may be an obstacle to addressing future 

emergency food aid needs around the world, partly because the United 

States accounts for about half of global food aid and because several U.S. 

food aid commodities are genetically modified.Action is needed to reduce 

the likelihood of biotech food aid becoming a serious problem in future 

crises. Furthermore, in a region where agricultural production is critical to 

national economies and food security, there is a need for viable agricultural 

policies and funding by national governments, as well as adequate 

agricultural assistance and related strategies from multilateral 

organizations and donors, including the United States. Without a concerted 

strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural development, the 

impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, destabilizing food 

crises are likely to recur.
Page 45 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To maximize the effectiveness of the U.S. response to future food crises in 

the southern Africa region as well as in other parts of the world, we 

recommend that the Secretaries of State and Agriculture and the 

Administrator of USAID initiate a comprehensive review of the issues 

pertaining to biotech foods in emergency food aid. In anticipation of future 

food crises, this review could consider measures such as (1) encouraging 

recipient countries to enhance their capacity to make informed decisions 

regarding agricultural biotechnology and offering technical assistance in 

this endeavor; (2) identifying which countries are likely to accept, restrict, 

or reject biotech food aid; and (3) determining ways that the United States 

can contribute to emergency food aid needs in countries that decide to 

restrict or reject biotech food aid.

To further food security in the region, we recommend that the Secretaries 

of State and Agriculture and the Administrator of USAID work with 

international organizations, donors, and national governments to develop a 

comprehensive, targeted strategy to ensure sustained recovery that (1) 

integrates agricultural development, HIV/AIDS awareness and action, 

natural disaster management, and other appropriate interventions; (2) 

estimates costs and resource requirements; and (3) establishes a plan for 

mobilizing resources, a timetable for achieving results, and indicators for 

measuring performance.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

The Department of State, USDA, USAID, and WFP provided written 

comments on a draft of our report. These comments are reprinted in 

appendixes VIII, IX, X, and XI, along with our responses to specific points.

In general, the Departments of State and Agriculture, USAID, and WFP 

agreed with our overall conclusions and recommendations. However, they 

expressed technical concerns, primarily related to our discussion of 

biotech food, which we have addressed in the text as appropriate.

USDA objected to our use of the term “biotech food,” saying it prefers 

“foods which may contain the products of agricultural biotechnology.” 

USDA also said that it opposes the use of the term “genetically modified 

organisms” and the acronym “GMO” because these terms carry negative 

connotations. According to the department, modern agricultural 

biotechnology is simply the next step in plant breeding technology. 

Notwithstanding USDA’s comments, FAO, WHO, and WFP use the terms 

genetically modified food, GM food, and biotech food. In fact, after 
Page 46 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

receiving USDA’s comments, we found that USDA was still using the terms 

“biotech plants” and “biotech crops” in some of its publicly available 

informational materials. USAID objected to our use of the term “biotech 

food aid,” noting that the United States provides food aid from the general 

U.S. food supply, which may contain biotech crops. In certain places, we 

now refer to U.S. food aid as aid that may contain biotech crops.

In commenting on our recommendation to initiate a comprehensive review 

of the issues associated with biotech foods in emergency food aid, USDA 

said that it agrees that all relevant parts of the U.S. government must 

continue to review and engage other countries regarding their biotech 

policies, including those related to food aid. USDA said it will continue to 

support developing countries’ efforts to enhance their capacity for making 

science-based and transparent decisions regarding products of modern 

agricultural biotechnology. At the same time, USDA said it is difficult to 

accurately identify countries that might accept or reject products of 

modern agricultural biotechnology because many developing countries’ 

policies depend upon the specific political, economic, and social 

circumstances at the time. 

The Department of State said that an interagency review on how to manage 

the presence of bioengineered foods in food aid might be useful for 

developing a strategy. However, the department said that such a review 

should be narrowly focused to ensure better coordination among food aid, 

development, trade policy and regulatory agencies. USAID said it supports 

further interagency discussion and coordination on the dimensions of 

biotechnology in food aid. USAID noted that it is actively engaged in 

supporting the development of capacity in a number of food aid recipient 

countries to make informed decisions, but said in practical terms this is a 

long-term strategy and unlikely to assist in emergency situations such as 

we saw in southern Africa. USAID said it believes that the most practical 

solution will be to work with recipient governments and partners involved 

in the delivery of food aid to build confidence in the existing safety 

evaluations of these products, including evaluations done in the United 

States and by other countries, scientists, and international organizations 

such as FAO and WHO. 

Regarding our recommendation to develop an integrated recovery strategy, 

the Department of State, USAID, and WFP fully support the need for a 

comprehensive, coordinated approach to help address the underlying 

causes of food insecurity. State cited U.S. efforts to work with major donor 

countries to create a multilateral framework for improving long-term food 
Page 47 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

security throughout the world. USAID said that, along with an interagency 

working group formed by the sub-policy planning committee to coordinate 

the U.S. government response to the food crisis, it is in the process of 

drafting a recovery strategy and action plan, which will guide the 

development and review of new USAID country strategies in the region. 

WFP emphasized the need for the international community to remain 

engaged within the region and to help national governments address 

medium- to longer-term issues related to food insecurity. We agree that 

such efforts must be sustained if destabilizing food crises are to be avoided.

In addition, we provided FAO, IMF, and the World Bank an opportunity to 

review parts of a draft of this report for technical accuracy, and we 

incorporated their comments as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretaries of State and Agriculture, and the USAID 

Administrator. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-3149. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix XII.

Sincerely yours,

David Gootnick

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 48 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenendxIdeisi

To determine what factors contributed to the current crisis in southern 

Africa, we met with and analyzed information from government officials at 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 

Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and State in Washington, D.C., and U.S. 

missions in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South 

Africa. We also met with officials and reviewed information from the World 

Food Program (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and 

the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) at their 

headquarters in Rome and in the southern African countries we visited. In 

addition, we gathered information from and met with representatives of the 

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other U.N. 

agencies, other donor governments, and host government ministries. We 

also gathered information and met with representatives of early warning 

systems and interagency food security assessment teams. In addition, we 

gathered information and met with representatives of nongovernmental 

organizations (NGO), including Africare, Bread for the World, the Coalition 

for Food Aid, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the Coalition for Food Aid, 

Save the Children, World Vision, and ACDI/VOCA. We also reviewed studies 

from public and private research institutions on the causes of the current 

and past food crises in southern Africa.

To determine how well the populations’ overall food needs were met during 

the crisis period, we met with officials and reviewed information from 

WFP, FAO, host governments, the private sector, donor governments, 

NGOs, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). We 

also met with and gathered information from representatives of 

interagency famine early warning and vulnerability assessment teams. In 

addition, we analyzed country-specific and regional WFP food aid data 

tracking food aid flows from donors (through WFP and NGOs) to the 

country level and, for WFP food aid, to the beneficiary level. Because of 

southern Africa’s infrastructure and technology problems, our collection 

and analysis of agricultural supply and demand information had inherent 

limitations. We observed food aid distribution at various stages including at 

the points of entry and storage facilities at the extended delivery points and 

final distribution points. We met with WFP, NGO, donor, national 

government, and local government officials responsible for managing and 

monitoring the food aid distribution process. We reviewed WFP’s real time 

logistics information system including its monitoring and loss reports. We 

also reviewed U.S. and other donor financial contributions to determine 

similar information on nonfood aid-related assistance. We verified the 

accuracy of data and reports, to the extent possible, by tracing the flow of 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 49 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

information and obtaining comparable data from multiple government, 

international organization, NGO, and private sector sources.

To determine the major obstacles to the food aid effort, we met with key 

officials and gathered and examined data from governments and the 

private sector in recipient countries, WFP, donor governments, NGOs, and 

SADC on the rate and amount of donor contributions, infrastructure, and 

biotech food aid and its impact on food aid distribution in the current 

crisis. We examined U.S. and other donor funding of WFP’s EMOP, 

reviewing actual country donations against pledges to determine the 

sufficiency and timeliness of donations. We reviewed and examined data 

on the transportation network for moving food in the region and identified 

and confirmed transportation and infrastructure obstacles during our 

fieldwork in country. We verified and confirmed the general accuracy of 

these data through multiple private sector and governmental organizations. 

With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, we had seven 

U.S. scientists provide an independent perspective on the Zambian 

Scientists’ biotech report. 

To determine the challenges to emerging from the crisis into sustained 

recovery, we met with numerous NGOs, the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, 

and the Departments of Agriculture and State and analyzed information on 

the decline in agricultural sector investment, the limited scope of existing 

programs in agricultural development, and the negative impact of the 

HIV/AIDS epidemic. In addition, we reviewed studies from private and 

public research institutions, such as the International Food Policy 

Research Institute, on the challenges to moving from crisis into recovery. 

We also analyzed agricultural funding data of the six southern African 

national governments. To analyze World Bank agricultural lending, we 

reviewed World Bank annual reports and its Web site from 1990 to 2002 to 

determine the amount and nature of loans made to the six affected 

southern African countries. After identifying the loans, we calculated an 

average deflator for each fiscal year (July to June) and calculated the 2003 

value of each of these loans. To analyze the percentage of government 

budgets expended for agriculture, we gathered fiscal data for each of the 

six countries from the IMF country statistical appendices for 1997 through 

2002. We then calculated the current and capital expenditures from 

agriculture as a share of the total current and capital expenditures in the 

government budget. We also calculated the real growth rate using least 

square regression methodology for agricultural and total spending. Finally, 

to determine the impact of HIV/AIDS on food security among the six 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 50 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

affected countries, we reviewed USDA and IMF studies that quantified the 

food security situation and its economic implications. 

The information on foreign laws in this report does not reflect our 

independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary 

sources.

We conducted our review from August 2002 through May 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 51 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix II

Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis ApenIdxi

Figure 14 is a chronology of key events (political actions, alerts, and 

emergencies) that occurred in the region and in some of the affected 

countries during the 2-year period from July 2001 through April 2003.
Appendix II

Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis

Page 52 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Figure 14: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis

2001 2002

Hungry Season Hungry Season

Malawi AntiCorruption 

Bureau receives 

complaint about 

possible grain 

hording

Severe or abnormal weather

Emergencies

WFP launches emergency operation

Source: GAO.

Early warnings and assessments

Political actions or NGO events

U.N. 

consolidated 

appeal 

launched 

(regional 

EMOP)

GIEWS warns that 

four million people 

in southern Africa 

face severe food 

shortages

First Crop 

and Food 

Supply 

Assessments 

conducted

Drought-like 

weather in 

southern 

Mozambique, 

southern Zambia, 

Swaziland, 

and Zimbabwe

Excessive rains 

in Lesotho, 

northern 

Zambia, and 

Malawi

Expected 

weather 

patterns

Normal 

crop 

year

Zambia 

suspends 

biotech food 

distribution

Lesotho,

Swaziland

Zimbabwe Zambia Malawi Mozambique

Zambian 

scientists 

trip 

abroad

Zambia 

reaffirms 

decision to 

reject biotech 

food

Nacala Railroad 

Bridge destroyed 

by heavy rain

Deadline for 

commercial 

farmers to 

vacate land in 

Zimbabwe

Last of 

Malawi 

Strategic 

Grain 

Reserves 

sold

Malawi 

declares 

food 

emergency

Malawi declares 

a flood emergency

U.N. consolidated 

appeal mid-term review

Regional 

EMOP 

extended 

through 

June 

2003

Riots over 

food 

availability in 

Balawayo, 

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe 

declares 

a food 

emergency

Swazi 

government 

declares 

urgent need 

for food aid

Lesotho 

declares a 

food 

emergency

C-SAFE consortium 

approved by 

USAID

C-SAFE consortium 

formed among World 

Vision, CRS, and CARE

U.S. government 

begins donating 

food aid to region

Frost in 

Lesotho

Save the 

Children-UK 

warns of 

impending 

crisis

First 

Emergency 

Food Security 

Assessment 

Report released

Second 

Emergency 

Food Security 

Assessment 

Report released

Zambia 

declares 

national 

disaster on 

food security

Rainy Dry Rainy

Fallow Harvest Harvest Growing Fallow Growing

2003

Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Page 53 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix III

Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability 

Assessment Methods ApenIdxi

Two types of data collection systems tracked the food crisis in southern 

Africa: (1) early warning systems, which monitor factors that affect food 

supply to provide decision makers with notice of potential crises; and (2) 

assessment systems, which monitor the nutritional needs of vulnerable 

populations in order to design or assess interventions. 

Early Warning Systems Famine early warning systems are designed to provide decision makers 

with information of an impending food crisis or famine. These systems 

compile various indicators of food security at a regional, national, or 

subnational scale, including information on weather and household 

purchasing power. While early warning systems are useful, preventing food 

crises depends on timely responses to the information they disseminate.

For this report, we reviewed two early warning systems:

• FEWS NET: The Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) is a specialized 

Information Network (NET) based in 17 African countries contending 

with chronic food insecurity.1

 FEWS NET is a partnership-based 

program initiated and funded by USAID. The goal of FEWS NET is to 

strengthen the ability of African countries and regional organizations to 

manage risk of food insecurity by providing timely and analytical early 

warning and vulnerability information. FEWS NET monitors 

information from multiple technologies, such as satellites and field 

observations, and seeks to facilitate timely access to that information; 

identifies specific, acute food security threats; and provides regular 

information assessments to decision makers that reflect the best 

judgment of the food security community.

• GIEWS: FAO’s Global Information Early Warning System on Food and 

Agriculture (GIEWS) is an information system based in Rome that 

includes 116 governments, 3 regional organizations, and 61 

nongovernmental organizations. The goal of GIEWS is to provide the 

international community with warning of imminent food crises to 

ensure timely interventions in countries or regions affected by natural 

or man-made disasters. The system seeks to monitor all aspects of food 

supply and demand in all countries on a continuous basis at the global, 

regional/subregional, national, and subnational levels. It reports to the 

1

Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, 

Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Appendix III

Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability 

Assessment Methods

Page 54 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

international community through its system of regular and ad hoc 

reports.

FEWS NET and GIEWS often contribute to the WFP/FAO Crop and Food 

Supply Assessment Missions. Additionally, FEWS NET supplies GIEWS 

with the major proportion of its remote-sensing data for monitoring 

agricultural production. However, according to USAID, these two early 

warning systems differ in three main areas:

• Geographic scope: FEWS NET has a 17-country scope in Africa, 

whereas GIEWS has a global mandate. 

• Level of detail: FEWS NET reports on the subnational level based on 

information gathered by field staff located throughout their scope, 

whereas GIEWS reports on the national and global levels from their 

headquarters in Rome with few field staff.

• Technical focus on food security: FEWS NET focuses on food 

availability, access, and utilization, while GIEWS focuses on food 

production and availability.

Early Warning Systems in 

the Southern Africa Food 

Crisis

The famine early warning systems produced relevant information regarding 

the southern Africa food crisis. FEWS NET and GIEWS reported on such 

food security indicators as adverse weather events, current food shortages, 

the status of cereal imports, the status of strategic grain reserves, the status 

of grain prices, and forecasts for the 2001/02 harvest. 

In particular, in late 2001 and early 2002 the early warning systems reported 

questionable food security in parts of the six countries, accounting for the 

poor 2000/01 harvest and anticipating future cereal gaps based on a poor 

outlook for the 2001/02 harvest. In November 2001, FEWS NET reported 

that the 2000/01 cereal harvest from earlier that year would likely be 

insufficient to fill food needs in each country except Mozambique. After 

FEWS NET highlighted these potential maize shortages, the U.S. 

government began carefully monitoring the situation in southern Africa, 

according to a Department of State cable. By mid-February 2002, GIEWS 

warned that impending severe food shortages threatened some 4 million 

people in the southern African countries, including parts of each of the six 

countries. That same month, however, FEWS NET reported that although 

there were localized areas of concern at the national and subnational 

levels, there was no reason for serious concern over production prospects 
Appendix III

Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability 

Assessment Methods

Page 55 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

from a regional perspective at that point in the growing season. In April 

2002, closer to the harvest period, GIEWS warned of a looming food crisis 

in southern Africa, with conditions in several countries set to worsen. By 

May 2002, FEWS NET also warned of the potential for a food security crisis 

of regional magnitude if appropriate and timely action were not taken. 

Nevertheless, the early warning systems did not anticipate the severity of 

the situation in Malawi. Although the systems did report serious maize 

(corn) production shortfalls in Malawi during the 2000/01 harvest caused 

by mid-season floods and late-season drought, flawed agricultural statistics 

provided by the government of Malawi2

 indicated that the production 

shortfall would be covered by other food crops, especially cassava. 

According to the IMF, the data error only became apparent in February 

2002 when Malawi began experiencing severe food shortages.

Assessment Systems For this report, we reviewed the following assessments:

• VAM: The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit (VAM) analyzes, 

maps, and reports on populations and geographic areas experiencing 

food insecurity to inform WFP food aid operations in 43 countries. VAM 

uses state-of-the-art mapping techniques to pinpoint the people most 

vulnerable to hunger and target their needs. VAM and FEWS NET work 

in close collaboration in the African countries where they are both 

present. VAM relies on FEWS NET for early warning analyses in most 

African countries. VAM also has a global mandate in supporting internal 

WFP operations, whereas FEWS NET attempts to build assessment 

capacity within the countries.

• CFSAM: Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) is a rapid 

assessment of information generated in an affected country used to fill 

in information gaps and to provide an early forecast of production and 

the emerging food supply situation of that country. This is done only at 

the request of the host country government. A mission may also collect 

information on household food security, vulnerability, coping 

mechanisms, and social welfare programs. GIEWS/FAO coordinates 

such missions in conjunction with WFP and other stakeholders such as 

host country ministerial staff, FEWS NET staff, and the Southern 

2

Early warning systems often rely on data supplied by the governments of the countries in 

question.
Appendix III

Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability 

Assessment Methods

Page 56 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

African Development Community’s (SADC) Regional Early Warning Unit 

(REWU). CFSAM targets a wider audience than WFP’s internally 

focused VAM unit. The international community uses the CFSAM 

information to calculate how much food aid and other relief assistance 

is needed to assist the most vulnerable people.

• VAC: SADC and some of its member states established vulnerability 

assessment committees (VAC) to better assess and address food 

security issues.3

 The purpose of VAC assessments is to (1) provide 

additional information to help adjust response programs to better meet 

the needs of vulnerable populations; (2) rapidly investigate and 

characterize or verify suspected crises in local areas; and (3) better 

understand the causes of the emergency and their implications for a 

return to food security. The committees use a coordinated, collaborative 

process that integrates the most influential assessment and crisis 

response players into the effort to help gain privileged access to national 

data sets and expert technicians and increase the likelihood of reaching 

consensus among national governments, implementing partners, and 

major donors. Key players include the SADC Regional Early Warning 

Unit and national VACs, VAM, FEWS NET, GIEWS, and several NGOs. 

The assessment methodology included sample surveys at the district, 

community, and household levels and incorporated household food 

economy and nutritional surveys.

Use of Assessments in the 

Southern Africa Food Crisis

Several of the above assessments have been used to prepare for and 

monitor the southern Africa food crisis (see app. II for timeline). FAO 

conducted a series of CFSAMs starting in May 2002. The missions 

estimated cereal requirements and cereal production for each of the six 

countries and the extent to which the gap could be offset by commercial 

imports. (See app. V for more on commercial sector imports and their role 

in the crisis.) The remaining deficit was identified as requiring emergency 

food aid. The regional and national VACs built assessment capacity in the 

region and increased the breadth and depth of food security monitoring 

3

The SADC Vulnerability Assessment Committee, established in early 1999, is a committee 

of national professionals working at the regional level to enhance food security and 

livelihood conditions within the SADC member states. In August 2001, SADC Ministers of 

Agriculture encouraged member states to establish cross-sectoral and interagency 

vulnerability assessment groups to better understand food security and livelihood 

conditions of vulnerable communities and better target emergency and development 

interventions. The SADC VAC coordinates and backstops the national committees.
Appendix III

Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability 

Assessment Methods

Page 57 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

during the crisis. To this end, the committees conducted assessments and 

prepared reports on their results in September 2002 and January 2003. A 

third assessment occurred in May 2003.
Page 58 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix IV

U.S. Donations ApenVIdxi

By early 2002, the United States had recognized the seriousness of the 

developing food crisis in southern Africa and initiated actions to donate 

substantial quantities of food aid to the region. For example, in midFebruary 2002, USAID arranged a loan of 8,470 metric tons (MT) of maize 

to southern Africa from stocks held in Tanzania; the commodity began 

arriving in the region in mid-March. On March 15, 2002, USAID authorized 

World Vision to provide 14,310 MT of food aid to Zimbabwe (the amount 

was later increased to 19,710 MT). On March 21, USAID authorized the 

purchase of 35,330 MT of commodities—from existing stocks in New 

Orleans—to be shipped to southern African ports; these stocks arrived by 

the end of June 2002.

Overall, between late April 2002 and March 31, 2003, the United States 

donated and delivered nearly 500,000 MT of food aid to the region valued at 

about $275 million. The food represented approximately 68 percent of the 

total food aid delivered into the region between April 1, 2002, and March 31, 

2003.1

 U.S. deliveries included: 

• 81,950 MT for precursor WFP emergency programs in each of the six 

countries—Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and 

Zimbabwe, valued at $43 million;2

• 19,710 MT for the World Vision program in Zimbabwe, valued at $12.8 

million; 

• 326,553 MT for the WFP regional operation, valued at $165.4 million; and

• 71,600 MT for the C-SAFE operation, valued at $53.5 million.

Table 4 provides a breakout of the U.S. food aid by country and commodity. 

As the table shows, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia received the largest 

amounts of aid. Maize (corn) and maize meal accounted for more than 70 

percent of the donated commodities. About 84 percent of all the donated 

food represented biotech commodities (i.e., maize, maize meal, oil, and 

corn soya blend (CSB)/corn soya milk(CSM)).

1

The U.S. contribution to the southern African region was consistent with its global food aid 

performance in recent years. For example, from1992 through 2001, the United States 

accounted for an average 58 percent of global food aid deliveries, ranging between 45.9 

percent in 1995 and 68.8 percent in 1999. 

2

Together, the six operations were designed to assist 4.8 million people.
Appendix IV

U.S. Donations

Page 59 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Table 4: U.S. Government Food Aid Response to the Southern Africa Crisis

Source: USAID.

Country Corn

Corn

meal Beans Oil

Corn soy

blend/corn

soy milk Sorghum Bulgur Total

Lesotho 23,500 2,510 800 950 27,760

Malawi 114,650 8,500 8.720 4,720 14,905 151,495

Mozambique 13,000 2,680 2,860 1,250 19,790

Swaziland 11,500 700 725 2,617 15,542

Zambia 26,500 9,600 7,900 100 400 15,000 15,000 74,500

Zimbabwe 90,800 56,510 17,120 11,946 24,030 10,000 215,406

Total 279,950 77,120 37,920 21,301 43,202 15,000 25,000 499,493
Page 60 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix V

Commercial Imports ApenVdxi

The extent and availability of commercial cereal food supplies during the 

food crisis1

 are difficult to assess for a number of reasons. Early concerns 

about the progress of commercial imports stemmed from the large 

amounts of cereal imports needed, the high regional prices for maize,2

 and 

the lack of sufficient foreign exchange resources for governments and 

private sector entities to purchase the required imports.3

 Nonetheless, data 

available in mid-May 2003 indicated that 1.72 million MT of commercial 

cereal imports had been received in the six countries between April 1, 2002, 

and March 31, 2003.4

 However, the regional Vulnerability Assessment 

Committee September 2002, December 2002, and January 2003 reports 

indicated some serious problems with food availability during the year. 

(See app. III for a detailed description of the VACs.) Factors contributing 

to the uncertainty over commercial cereal food supplies included the lack 

of time frames indicating when imports needed to be purchased, data 

reliability issues, problems between urban and rural distribution of food 

supplies, and government policies that provided disincentives to the 

private sector to import food or that, once imports were received in 

country, discouraged the efficient supply of those goods to the local 

market.

In contrast to WFP’s food aid effort, the CFSAMs did not identify the 

monthly rate at which imports needed to occur, making it difficult to judge 

1

One factor that reportedly affected the availability of commercial imports was the drop in 

maize production in South Africa, a primary supplier of maize to regional markets. South 

Africa's average maize production in 2001 and 2002 was 9 percent lower than the previous 5-

year average (from 1996 to 2000).

2

Maize prices fluctuated throughout the season and region. In Malawi, maize prices reached 

unprecedented levels during the pre-harvest period. In Zimbabwe, the price of maize on the 

black market rose by 167 percent from August to December. In Mozambique, November 

2002 prices were generally higher than 2001 prices in four of seven provinces surveyed, but 

the same or lower in the other three provinces.

3

The January 2003 VAC regional report concluded that Zimbabwe faced the greatest 

challenge of the six countries for purchasing required imports. Zimbabwe has been 

experiencing an economic crisis as its annual inflation rate has reached 180 percent and its 

gross domestic product has declined by 12 percent in 2002.

4

The May 2002 FAO/WFP CFSAM initially estimated the annual cereal deficit for each 

country and how much of that could be met by commercial imports, with the remainder to 

be offset by emergency food aid. Subsequent VAC reports updated estimates of the cereal 

deficit as well as domestic cereal and stock requirements and production. Given that the 

U.N. regional emergency food aid appeal used the original CFSAM emergency food aid 

targets, we derived the annual commercial import requirement by subtracting planned 

emergency food aid from the March 2003 revised cereal deficit.
Appendix V

Commercial Imports

Page 61 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

the timeliness of commercial imports. The September VAC report for 

Zambia indicated concern that it could be difficult for importers to find 

maize in regional markets (as several countries in the region had large 

deficits and would be competing to buy from the same suppliers), which in 

turn could delay purchases. According to the December VAC report for 

Lesotho, maize, wheat, and sorghum were generally not available for 

purchase at the end of the year in communities across that country. In 

Swaziland, maize was reported to be readily available in retail outlets 

nationwide even though there had been no commercial imports between 

July and November. However, there were fears that a shortfall in maize 

imports would occur between December and March, causing another 

round of price hikes. 

Once data on commercial cereal imports began to be available, data 

reliability became an issue in some cases. For example, according to the 

December Zimbabwe VAC report, figures on the combination of 

commercial imports, food aid imports, and available national production 

should have resulted in a surplus of 200,000 MT at the national level. 

However, the report indicated there was something seriously wrong with 

the numbers, since 41 percent of communities surveyed reported that 

cereal grains were not or were rarely available from the government’s grain 

marketing board and the other 59 percent reported that the grains were 

only occasionally available. U.S. government officials noted that there have 

been numerous anecdotal reports of the government’s politicizing food aid, 

which may partly explain some of the discrepancy.

While commercial cereal imports may have been provided to urban 

markets, shortages were reported in many rural areas, indicating problems 

with the distribution of commercial cereal supplies. The December VAC 

report for Lesotho indicated that maize mealmaize that has undergone 

the milling processwas said to be available, though very expensive, in the 

various urban centers but generally not available in the rural areas, which 

were characterized as experiencing a serious food crisis. The January VAC 

report for Zambia said there was no commercial shortfall in urban areas 

and millers did not expect one through February and beyond. However, 

most of the maize that had been imported (officially or via cross-border 

trade) was reportedly only servicing the urban markets, leaving the rural 

areas with a severe commercial grain shortfall that drastically pushed up 

prices. Of 48 villages surveyed, fewer than 10 percent said maize was 

readily available and fewer than 30 percent said maize was occasionally 

available.
Appendix V

Commercial Imports

Page 62 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Finally, some national governments implemented subsidies and price 

controls that raised concern about private sector imports and whether 

imports received would be supplied to local markets efficiently. For 

example, in response to the crisis, Malawi implemented a countrywide 

subsidy on the consumer price of maize to make it more affordable to the 

public. However, this policy, combined with high interest rates that 

inhibited the private sector from borrowing to cover its purchases, meant 

that the private sector could not profit from importing maize and selling it 

at the subsidized price. In Zambia, the government encouraged a program 

whereby a private sector group, the Millers Association, would import 

300,000 MT of maize without having to pay import duties and the 

government would import 155,000 MT of maize to begin a strategic reserve. 

However, the Zambian government reportedly provided conflicting 

information about the amount of food it was to import for relief versus 

strategic reserves, thus causing confusion about planned imports, 

uncertainty over market prices, and conditions favorable for market 

speculation. In Zimbabwe, the government banned all private sector 

imports and implemented price controls on maize. This policy reportedly 

encouraged traders with food supplies to stockpile them or sell them at a 

much higher price on black markets in country or across borders.
Page 63 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix VI

Nonfood Emergency Needs ApenVdxiI

U.N. agencies requested $143.7 million to address urgent, nonfood 

humanitarian needs that increased people’s vulnerability to famine for the 

July 2002 through June 2003 period. As of April 9, 2003, less than 25 percent 

of the total identified requirements had been funded. Figure 15 compares 

the sectors and dollar amounts for which the U.N. agencies requested 

funding to actual contributions. As the figure shows, the largest amounts 

were requested for health, agriculture, and economic recovery. Only five of 

the nine sectors received any funding and four of these were only partially 

funded. The four sectors with the highest rates of funding were: multisector, 583 percent of the requested amount; coordination and support 

services, 49 percent of the requested amount; agriculture, 35 percent; and 

health, 21 percent. 

Figure 15: U.N. Nonfood Emergency Appeals and Contributions by Sector 
Appendix VI

Nonfood Emergency Needs

Page 64 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Funding requests were tied to specific projects. For example, the World 

Health Organization (WHO) asked for $2.9 million for projects in Malawi to 

enable earlier detection of epidemics, improve response to disease 

outbreaks in emergency situations, and strengthen emergency health 

coordination. FAO requested funding for an $8.5 million project in 

Zimbabwe to (1) increase agricultural production among 400,000 

vulnerable households by providing inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, (2) 

facilitate tillage, (3) rehabilitate local water sources, and (4) develop 

opportunities to market agricultural products. 
Page 65 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

Crisis ApenVdxiI

This appendix provides additional information on crops and foods 

produced with modern agricultural biotechnology, how concerns about

agricultural biotechnology developed in southern Africa, and how issues 

surrounding agricultural biotechnology affected delivery of U.S. food aid 

during the southern Africa food crisis.

Modern Agricultural 

Biotechnology 

 Modern agricultural biotechnology refers to various scientific techniques 

used to modify plants, animals, or microorganisms by introducing in their 

genetic makeup genes for specific desired traits, including genes from 

unrelated species. Genetic engineering techniques allow development of 

new crop or livestock varieties, since the genes for a given trait can be 

introduced into a plant or animal species to produce a new variety 

incorporating that specific trait. Additionally, genetic engineering increases 

the range of traits that can be introduced in new varieties by allowing genes 

from totally unrelated species to be incorporated into a particular plant or 

animal variety.1

Crops and foods containing or derived from genetically modified (GM) 

plants have been characterized by various users as biotech, GM, genetically 

modified organisms (GMO), and bioengineered crops and foods. 

Biotech crops currently on the market are mainly aimed at increasing crop 

protection by introducing resistance against plant diseases caused by 

insects or viruses or by increasing tolerance to herbicides. Biotech crops 

have lowered pest management costs and enhanced yields. By the end of 

2000, such crops had been planted on nearly 100 million acres worldwide. 

As of 2000, the United States had 76.7 million acres of biotech crop 

varieties: 26 percent of all maize planted, 68 percent of cotton, and 69 

percent of soybeans. 

The United States and a number of other countries have established 

regulatory processes for assessing whether foods derived from agricultural 

biotechnology are as safe for humans, animals, other plants, and the 

environment as their traditional counterparts. Safety assessments of GM 

foods investigate direct health effects (toxicity), tendencies to provoke 

allergic reaction, nutritional effects, and any unintended effects that could 

1

U.S. General Accounting Office, International Trade: Concerns Over Biotechnology 

Challenge U.S. Agricultural Exports, GAO-01-727 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2001).
Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

Crisis

Page 66 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

result from gene insertion.2 Environmental assessments consider the ability 

of the GMO to escape and potentially introduce the engineered genes into 

wild populations; susceptibility of nontarget organisms (e.g., insects that 

are not pests) to the gene product; loss of biodiversity; and increased use of 

chemicals in agriculture. The environmental aspects vary considerably 

according to local conditions.

GM food such as whole kernel maize seed contains living modified 

organisms (LMO) that are capable of transferring or replicating genetic 

material. If maize is milled, this is no longer the case. Whole kernel maize 

seed can be eaten as a food or planted to grow a new crop.

Challenges to U.S. 

Agricultural Exports 

Containing Biotech 

Commodities

U.S. agricultural biotech exports have faced several significant challenges 

in international markets. First, as the single, major producer of biotech 

products, the United States has been relatively isolated in its efforts to 

maintain access for these products.3 Second, in many parts of the world, 

consumer concerns about the safety of biotech foods have increased, 

leading key market countries to implement or consider regulations that 

may restrict U.S. biotech exports. Third, in the United States, biotech and 

conventional varieties are typically combined in the grain handling system 

for more efficient use of crops from multiple sources.4

 Thus, foreign 

regulations on biotech could affect all U.S. exports of these commodities as 

well as food products containing or derived from biotech crops. 

Specifically, regulations limiting or banning the importation of foods 

containing biotech products present serious challenges to U.S. exporters of 

corn and soy products, according to Department of State and USDA 

officials.

2

In May 2002, GAO reported on biotechnology experts’ views on the adequacy of tests used 

to evaluate potential health risks associated with genetically modified foods. Experts we 

contacted agreed that the regimen of tests used is adequate in assessing the safety of such 

foods. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Genetically Modified Foods: Experts View 

Regimen of Safety Tests as Adequate but FDA’s Evaluation Process Could Be Enhanced,

GAO-02-566 (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2002).

3

According to USDA officials, more than 17 countries currently produce biotech agricultural 

commodities. According to a USAID official, an estimated 20 percent of the Brazilian soy 

crop and 20 percent of South Africa’s yellow maize are bioengineered.

4

Once a product of modern agricultural biotechnology is determined to be as safe as its 

conventional counterpart, it is allowed to circulate freely in the U.S. market.
Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

Crisis

Page 67 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Several international organizations are involved in developing guidance on 

biotech food and its regulation. The Codex Alimentarius Commission 

(Codex)a joint FAO/WHO body responsible for an international food 

code—has been developing principles for the human health risk analysis of 

biotech foods. These principles are based on a premarket assessment, 

performed on a case-by-case basis, that evaluates both direct effects (from 

the inserted gene) and unintended effects that may arise from inserting the 

new gene. The principles are in the final stage of an eight-step international 

agreement process. Draft language under consideration includes an option 

for mandatory labeling based on the method of production, even if there is 

no detectable presence of DNA or protein in the end product resulting from 

genetic modification. The United States and several other countries have 

opposed mandatory processed-based labeling for foods, which may contain 

the products of agricultural biotechnology. They favor mandatory labeling 

only with regards to allergic reactions, changes in nutritional content, and 

changes in handling requirements. Codex has been deadlocked on the 

labeling issue for several years.

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international environmental 

treaty, regulates transboundary movements of LMOs. Biotech foods are 

within the scope of the protocol only if they contain LMOs. The protocol 

requires exporters to get consent from importing countries before the first 

shipment of LMOs intended for release into the environment. This 

requirement does not apply to LMOs intended for direct use as food, feed, 

or for processing.5

 The protocol will enter into force 90 days after the 50th

country has ratified it, which may be in late 2003, according to a USAID 

official. The United States is not a signatory to the agreement. However, 

according to U.S. officials, as a practical matter U.S. exporters will need to 

observe and comply with local regulations implementing the protocol. 

U.S. Versus EU Approval 

Process

The United States and the European Union (EU) have very different 

regulatory frameworks for approving new agricultural biotech products.

5

For these products, the protocol establishes procedures for countries to exchange 

information. According to the protocol, the initial documentation should clearly identify 

that the shipment “may contain” LMOs that are not intended for intentional introduction 

into the environment and contain a point of contact for further information. Subsequent 

information that will be placed on an international data base should contain information 

such as the characteristics of LMOs; any national laws, regulation, or guidelines on LMOs; 

and other related information.
Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

Crisis

Page 68 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

The United States generally applies existing food safety and environmental 

protection laws and regulations6

 to biotech products and approves them 

based on their characteristics rather than on whether they are derived from 

biotechnology. To evaluate new products, U.S. regulators require sufficient 

evidence to determine their safety or risk. Under this approach, the United 

States has approved most new biotech varieties.

The EU follows the “precautionary principle,” under which the EU 

maintains that approval of new biotechnology products should not proceed 

if there is “insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain” scientific data regarding 

potential risks. The EU has not approved any new biotech foods for 

marketing since 1998.7

 This stance has affected the viability of biotech 

trade in other parts of the world. For example, given the importance of the 

EU market, U.S. soybean producers have been reluctant to introduce new 

biotech varieties not approved for marketing in the EU. Similarly, maize 

growers in Argentina, who export to the EU, are deferring planting a 

biotech variety known as “Round-up Ready” corn because the EU has not 

approved it. They are only planting biotech varieties approved by the EU.

Biotech Issues in Zimbabwe According to U S. officials, Zimbabwe raised concerns about the potential 

adverse environmental and commercial/trade impacts of unmilled biotech 

products as early as the summer of 2001, a year before the U.N.’s southern 

Africa appeal. It did not want planting of whole kernel biotech seeds or 

feeding of livestock on biotech products. In December 2001, the United 

States offered to provide 14,300 MT of maize to Zimbabwe, but the 

government refused, since it could not be certified as GMO-free. In January 

2002, the United States agreed to provide 8,500 MT of fortified corn meal to 

Zimbabwe as an initial contribution to a WFP program launched in 

November 2001. Since this was a milled product that did not contain any 

living GMOs, the government accepted it. 

In May 2002, the United States offered an additional shipment of 10,000 MT 

of whole kernel maize for the WFP program. The government again said it 

would only accept contributions that included assurances that the food 

6

The U.S. system involves coordination among USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency, 

and the Food and Drug Administration.

7

According to a U.S. official, the EU has had a moratorium on new approvals, which goes a 

step beyond merely applying precaution to each regulatory decision.
Appendix VII

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was not derived from GMOs. As a result, the maize was reallocated to 

Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique.

Near the end of July 2002, Zimbabwe proposed to accept a U.S. offer of 

17,500 MT of maize that might contain biotech commodity. However, the 

maize would be temporarily stored in silos to be milled and subsequently 

distributed. In the meantime, the government would use its own maize for 

distribution, which would be packed into USAID food bags and distributed. 

This proposal became known as “the swap.” Near the end of August, the 

United States approved the swap arrangement. However, on September 1, 

the Agriculture Minister of Zimbabwe was quoted as emphatically rejecting 

biotech food assistance.8

 Four days later, though, the President approved 

accepting biotech maize, subject to special shipping, milling, and 

distribution requirements.9

Biotech Issues in Zambia In February and March 2002, WFP and U.S. officials notified Zambia that 

U.S. donations to that country would likely include maize containing 

biotech varieties. In June 2002, Zambia’s Vice President said the country 

would gladly accept the U.S. maize Zimbabwe refused. However, during 

June and July a public debate on biotech food began and appeared to be 

backed strongly by the opposition political party. In August, a 6-hour town 

meeting on the issue was held, and on August 16, the government decided 

to suspend all biotech imports and distributions. 

After this announcement, the USAID Administrator invited seven Zambian 

scientists to visit the United States on a fact-finding mission regarding the 

biotech issue. The scientists came to the United States in September and 

subsequently visited South Africa and several European countries as well. 

Their report concluded that: 

• distributing biotech maize carries a high risk of eroding local maize 

varieties;

8

The swap never took place because the Zimbabwe government did not fulfill its part of the 

agreement, according to USAID officials. 

9

According to U.S. officials, as of late February 2003, WFP had milled more than 41,000 MT 

of U.S. maize in Zimbabwe and some U.S. maize destined for Zimbabwe in South Africa. 

WFP was expecting that all U.S. corn stored in the region would be milled and transported 

to end sites by the end of March or early April.
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• the safety aspects of biotech foods are not conclusive;10 and

• there is a potential risk of biotech maize, if planted, affecting the export 

of baby corn and honey in particular and organic foods in general to the 

EU.

They recommended that the government continue its policy of not 

accepting biotech foods. On October 29, the Zambian government agreed.

Seven experts in the field of modern agricultural biotechnology reviewed 

the Zambian scientists’ report for us. With regard to human health and 

safety issues, two experts found the report to be fair, accurate, and factbased; two experts disagreed with this assessment; and three did not 

respond. Concerning environmental issues, three experts said the report 

was fair, accurate, and fact-based; two experts disagreed; one expert was 

not certain; and one did not respond. The experts generally agreed that 

cross-pollination, or gene flow, would occur between biotech and 

conventional maize plants, but disagreed about whether this warrants a 

ban on biotech maize. Four experts suggested that milling of biotech maize 

was a viable option for maintaining safety while simultaneously feeding the 

hungry; the other three did not comment on this issue. Overall, the experts 

supported the need for Zambia and other southern African countries to be 

able to assess GMOs in their environments.

U.S. Views and Approach During June 2002, the United States planned how it would respond to the 

biotech issue. It recognized that (1) Zimbabwe’s rejection of whole kernel 

maize was a problem that had to be addressed, (2) other affected countries’ 

positions on the import and transport of biotech food needed to be 

determined, and (3) it was important to provide information about biotech 

food. By early July, the United States was planning to use private and, if 

necessary, public diplomacy to get the affected countries to accept the 

biotech food aid. It would work with and through SADC and its members to 

remove barriers to biotech food aid and would support WFP in asking for 

humanitarian exceptions to current and proposed biotech regulations. 

When feasible, the United States would attempt to provide alternative food 

aid to countries that had bans on agricultural biotechnology in place. 

However, if recipient countries placed special regulations on biotech 

10Issues include concerns related to toxicity, allergenicity, and antibiotic resistance.
Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

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productsfor example, milling or labeling requirementsthey themselves

would have to pay to implement these requirements. The U.S. government 

opposed agreeing to provide only milled biotech food aid because the 

process added costs and delayed shipments. 

On July 25, 2002, the State Department directed its embassies in the six 

affected states and Botswana to stress to host governments the importance 

of addressing the region’s immediate needs rather than engaging in 

protracted debate on the merits or supposed dangers of biotech food. State 

warned that recent decisions by some recipient and transit countries not to 

accept whole kernel biotech maize risked endangering the lives of millions 

of people. State advised U.S. missions to urge SADC member states to 

immediately adopt an agreement allowing unrestricted import and 

distribution of food aid, including biotech produce, on an emergency basis 

for the duration of the crisis. State’s background and guidance to its 

overseas posts on biotech food aid included the following: 

• Food that is exported from the United States, whether commercially or 

through food aid, is the same food eaten by Americans in terms of its 

GMO content.

• To date, there is no scientific evidence to suggest that commercially 

available biotech commodities and processed foods are any less safe 

than their conventional counterparts.

• Commercially produced bioengineered plant varieties in the United 

States have been reviewed under the U.S. regulatory process, which sets 

rigorous standards for human, animal, and plant health and for 

environmental safety. These varieties have received safety approval in a 

number of countries.

• Developing countries are concerned that genetically engineered genes 

may contaminate other farmers’ fields or wild plants in the centers of 

origin, but this occurrence would not necessarily be negative or 

damaging. Genes naturally flow (through cross-pollination) between 

traditionally developed varieties and modern hybrids.

• Some African countries are concerned that if farmers plant whole grain 

U.S. food aid, their trade with the EU may be affected. At this point in 

time, the only whole grain in food aid that might contain biotech 

varieties is maize. If whole maize is planted, it is possible biotech 

varieties co-mingled in food aid could cross-pollinate with local 
Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

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Page 72 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

varieties. However, it is unlikely that the biotech grain will grow well as 

it is made from hybrid seed and not well-adapted to conditions in 

southern Africa.

U.N. Response In May 2002, WFP’s Executive Director raised the issue of biotech food aid 

with the U.N. Secretary General and in June briefed him on why biotech 

food aid was an impediment for operations in southern Africa. By early July 

2002, the U.N. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs had 

sought guidance from FAO, WHO, and WFP regarding food aid with biotech 

components. The FAO Director-General responded with a letter incorrectly 

citing the Cartagena Protocol as recommending that all food aid that might 

contain biotech products be subject to an “advanced informed agreement” 

and be milled before distribution to avoid the possibility of germination. 

However, the Cartagena Protocol expressly states that advanced informed 

agreement does not apply when the shipment is for direct use as food or 

feed, or for processing, nor does it suggest that grain shipments containing 

living biotech components be milled. After the United States raised 

concerns about this misinformation, the Director-General issued a 

correction letter.11 Nonetheless, the FAO representative in Malawi repeated 

the same erroneous recommendations to Malawi’s Ministry of Agriculture. 

The United States again cited the error, but in August, the FAO 

representative in Zimbabwe gave similar inaccurate advice. This time, 

when the United States alerted FAO, the problem was quickly corrected, 

according to FAO. 

On August 23, 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a joint U.N. statement on 

the use of biotech foods as food aid in southern Africa.12 Its key points 

included the following: 

• Although there are no existing international agreements in force 

regarding trade in biotech food or food aid, WFP policy is that all 

donated food must meet the safety standards of both the donor and 

11The Director-General advised U.S. officials that it was still possible that material imported 

for food, feed, or processing purposes could be used as seed or that spillage could occur, 

which might lead to propagation of the GMO in the country of import or transit. Processes 

such as milling, he noted, make germination impossible.

12According to WFP officials, WFP’s Executive Director was tasked to negotiate drafting of 

the statement. 
Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

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recipient countries and all applicable international standards, 

guidelines, and recommendations.

• FAO and WHO are confident that the principal country of origin (i.e., the 

United States) has applied its national food safety risk assessment 

procedures to its food aid and has fully certified that these foods are 

safe for human consumption. Based on national information from a 

variety of sources and current scientific knowledge, FAO, WHO, and 

WFP believe the consumption of biotech food now being provided as 

food aid in southern Africa is unlikely to present human health risk. 

• Any potential risks to biological diversity and sustainable agriculture 

from inadvertent introduction of GMOs have to be judged and managed 

by countries on a case-by-case basis. In the case of maize, processing 

techniques such as milling or heat treatment may be considered to avoid 

inadvertent introduction of biotech seed. However, U.N. policy does not 

require that biotech grain used for food, feed, or processing be treated 

this way. 

• Governments must carefully consider the severe and immediate 

consequences of limiting the food aid available for millions so 

desperately in need. 

European Union Statement Several of the southern African countries were concerned that if whole 

kernel biotech maize were planted and used as feed for their cattle, their 

ability to export grain and cattle to the EU would be hampered. On August 

28, 8 days after Zambia announced it would not accept biotech foods, the 

delegation of the European Commission in Zambia issued a press release to 

clarify its position, which stated the following:

• The United States, the EU, and others have evaluated several biotech 

maize varieties, and some have been authorized for use, including 

planting. Given the serious food shortages in the region, governments 

may want to use these evaluations rather than wait for them to be 

repeated locally.

• The fact that a country grows biotech maize has no impact on its ability 

to export other agricultural products to the EU. 
Appendix VII

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food 

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• The importation and use of biotech maize in a form other than grain 

should eliminate concerns about negative biodiversity effects and trade 

consequences.13

• EU scientists have found no evidence that the biotech maize varieties 

they have assessed are harmful to human health.

13Although the EU statement indicated Zambia’s acceptance of biotech maize would not 

legally undermine its ability to export biotech maize to the EU, private entities could add 

restrictions that might affect such exports.. 
Page 75 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix VIII

Comments from the Department of State ApenVdxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 76 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 77 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 78 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 79 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

See comment 10.

See comment 11.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 80 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the State Department’s letter dated 

June 3, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. We recognize that the United States is taking steps to help improve 

long-term food security in the region that include, among others, the 

Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa, which was introduced 

early last year. However, as noted in figure 11, overall assistance to the 

region's agricultural sector has declined between 1998 and 2003; and as 

of April 2003, only one out of the six countries (Mozambique) was 

proposed to receive funding under the new initiative. We also recognize 

that U.S. bilateral assistance in several of the affected countries has 

funded a number of programs related to food security over the years, 

including ongoing programs on agricultural development, HIV/AIDS, 

and disaster management. While all these programs do help to promote 

food security, U.N. and U.S. officials told us that to have broad impact, 

these programs need to be implemented on a much larger scale. Our 

recommendation that U.S. agencies work with international 

organizations, donors, and national governments to develop a 

comprehensive, targeted strategy for sustained recovery would, if 

implemented, help coordinate efforts, integrate approaches, and 

leverage limited resources as necessary to achieve greater 

effectiveness.

2. We modified the text on pages 3 and 23 to note that the United States 

anticipated the crisis at the outset. Although the United States acted 

early so that food would arrive in a timely way, USAID officials advised 

us that no food was prepositioned in any of the countries. We modified 

the text on page 18 to reflect the point on the C-SAFE program.

3. We modified the text on pages 10-11 to reflect this information.

4. According to USAID officials, available quantities of sorghum and 

bulgur were limited.

5. We noted this view on page 46.

6. We modified our discussion of Malawi’s policy on page 31.

7. We modified the text on pages 31 to reflect this point.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 81 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

8. We replaced the definition, cited from a World Health Organization 

publication, with an alternative. See pages 3 and 65. We modified the 

discussion of safety issues on pages 64-65.

9. We modified the text on these several issues on page 67.

10. We clarified this footnote, on page 67, to indicate what information 

would be required in the initial documentation and what information 

would be required in subsequent exchanges of information.

11. On page 68, we changed our reference to the precautionary principle to 

clarify that the statements represent the EU’s arguments under the 

principle.
Page 82 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix IX

Comments from Department of Agriculture ApenXIdxi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix IX

Comments from Department of Agriculture

Page 83 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix IX

Comments from Department of Agriculture

Page 84 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance
Appendix IX

Comments from Department of Agriculture

Page 85 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on USDA’s letter dated June 3, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. We modified the text on page 30 to reflect this point.

2. We modified the text on page 66 to reflect the first point. Our draft 

report noted that the biotech and conventional varieties are typically 

combined in the U.S. grain handling system. Regarding the use of the 

term biotech, see pages 45-46.
Page 86 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix X

Comments from the U. S. Agency for 

International Development ApenXdxi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.
Appendix X

Comments from the U. S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 87 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance
Appendix X

Comments from the U. S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 88 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated June 9, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. Currently in draft form, the recovery strategy/action plan USAID 

outlines in its comments represents a beginning. USAID notes that its 

draft strategy has already been useful as a planning tool in developing 

USAID’s country strategies for the region. As such, the recovery 

strategy/action plan will help target U.S. efforts. However, our 

recommendation goes beyond U.S. efforts. To ensure sustained 

recovery in an environment of constrained resources, we believe there 

is a need for a comprehensive strategy that pulls together the efforts of 

international organizations, donors, and national governments; 

integrates approaches; and leverages limited resources. 
Page 89 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix XI

Comment from the World Food Program ApenXdxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix XI

Comment from the World Food Program

Page 90 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 4.
Appendix XI

Comment from the World Food Program

Page 91 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance
Appendix XI

Comment from the World Food Program

Page 92 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the WFP’s letter dated June 2, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. We agree with WFP’s support for further collaboration with the U.S. 

government and other partners in defining and implementing a 

sustainable recovery strategy.

2. We further highlighted the problems of extreme poverty and regional 

economic decline on page 11.

3. We further highlighted Zimbabwe’s economic problems on page 11.

4. We reflected these points on page 25.
Page 93 GAO-03-644 Foreign Assistance

Appendix XII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApenXdxiI

GAO Contacts Phillip J. Thomas (202) 512-9892

Wayne Ferris (202) 512-5169

Acknowledgments In addition to the persons named above, Joy Labez, Miriam Carroll, Kendall 

Schaefer, and Janey Cohen made key contributions to this report. Nathan 

Anderson, Nima Edwards, Etana Finkler, Chase Huntley, Bruce Kutnick, 

Jeremy Latimer, Barbara Shields, and Eve Weisberg provided technical 

support.

(320145)
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