SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3696-16T2

LINDA B. JONAS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EDWIN R. JONAS, III,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted May 16, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, 

Docket No. FM-04-0259-89.

Edwin R. Jonas, III, appellant pro se.

Linda B. Jonas, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Edwin R. Jonas, III, was once a prominent 

Haddonfield attorney. His undoing has been his inexplicable, 

obstinate, unlawful, and decades-old refusal to pay child support 

and alimony obligations that have accumulated since his 1990

divorce. The extreme measures he has taken over the years to 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

August 17, 2018
2 A-3696-16T2

avoid his obligations include removing the parties' children from 

the country, attempting to dissipate assets, making false 

statements to the court, and fleeing the jurisdiction. 

There have been ten post-judgment appeals involving this 

action.1 This is the eleventh. Here, defendant appeals from an 

April 7, 2017 order denying the following relief: modification of 

a May 4, 2006 order; vacation of October 22, 1996, May 19, 1999, 

and May 23, 2006 orders; and costs and counsel fees. Defendant 

also appeals the grant of plaintiff Linda B. Jonas' cross-motion 

to enforce litigant's rights by compelling compliance with May 4, 

2006, January 30, 2008, and December 29, 2011 orders. Lastly, 

defendant appeals from an April 11, 2017 order denying his motion 

to transfer venue. 

On appeal, defendant argues the following points: (1) the 

trial court erred in applying the fugitive disentitlement 

doctrine; (2) all judges of the Camden County Superior Court should 

recuse themselves due to the appearance of impropriety; (3) the 

judge who decided these motions ethically erred by ruling on the 

underlying motions before determining defendant's motion for a 

 

1 The previous appeals, which detail this action's lengthy 

procedural history, are: Nos. A-3104-90, A-4322-90, A-1309-91, A1431-93, A-1342-95; consolidated appeal Nos. A-3734-95 and A-1950-

96 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 1997); No. A-5857-98; No. A-5241-05 (App. 

Div. Jan. 30, 2008); and No. A-1118-10 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2011). 
3 A-3696-16T2

change in venue; (4) defendant was denied due process because of 

the lack of notice of the motion hearing and lack of an impartial 

tribunal; and (5) the motion judge erred by barring defendant from 

filing any further applications and by refusing to hear the merits 

of defendant's motions.

Defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We 

add only the following brief comments.

In one of the relatively early post-judgment proceedings, 

defendant misrepresented to the court that he did not intend to 

either leave the State with the parties' three children or

liquidate assets. He then left the country with the children, 

bought a home in the Cayman Islands, and attempted to sell a 

convenience store he owned. Jonas v. Jonas, Nos. A-3734-95 and 

A-1950-96 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 1997) (slip op. at 4-6). 

In consequence, on January 12, 1996, a Family Part judge 

entered an order directing title to defendant's property in 

Medford, his condominium in Florida, and his convenience store be 

transferred to plaintiff. The order authorized plaintiff to "hold, 

sell, liquidate or otherwise dispose of same for creation of a 

constructive trust to ensure payment of spousal and child support." 

Id. at 10-11. The order further provided the net proceeds of the 
4 A-3696-16T2

sales should be held in trust by plaintiff's counsel and used to

pay outstanding support orders. Id. at 11. 

We affirmed these orders. Id. at 26-27. In doing so, we 

noted if defendant returned to the jurisdiction and complied with 

the orders, the order of January 12, 1996, which required plaintiff 

to maintain records of the trust, gave defendant "the means to 

hold the plaintiff accountable" for any diversion. Id. at 27.

In a subsequent appeal, we recounted that in 2006 a Family 

Part judge, considering a motion by plaintiff to enforce litigant's 

rights and a cross-motion by defendant to compel an accounting of 

the constructive trust, invoked the fugitive disentitlement 

doctrine and dismissed defendant's cross-motion without prejudice. 

Jonas v. Jonas, No. A-1118-10 (Dec. 29, 2011) (slip op. at 3). We 

noted we had previously affirmed the Family Part judge's invocation 

of the doctrine, as well as the judge's dismissal of defendant's 

cross-motion. The judge dismissed defendant's cross-motion

without prejudice to future consideration provided defendant 

personally appeared and posted a surety bond to cover all 

outstanding judgments. Ibid. We continued:

Despite the clarity of this court's 1997 

decision, which conditions defendant's right 

to seek an accounting and appointment of an 

independent trustee on compliance with court 

orders, and the 2008 decision approving 

application of the fugitive disentitlement 

doctrine, defendant has not posted bond in the 
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judgment amount, personally appeared in court 

or even filed a certification signed by him. 

Instead, he filed identical, consecutive 

motions to vacate orders entered prior to 2008 

and compel an accounting and appointment of 

an independent trustee. Defendant's only 

argument respecting his entitlement to be 

heard on the motions was his attorney's 

representation that he could not locate an 

arrest warrant.

[Ibid.]

In the case before us, without posting a bond, defendant 

moved for an accounting. He is now apparently willing to appear 

in court. He makes numerous allegations of impropriety against 

his former wife and her attorney, and he repeatedly refers to the 

value of the property that the court ordered sold to enforce his 

support obligations. Conspicuously absent from his pleadings is 

any mention of the current sum of money he owes for twenty-eight 

years of accumulated alimony and child support, including medical 

and educational expenses for his children. Also missing is any

mention of any attempt he ever made to voluntarily pay so much as 

one month of alimony or child support. 

In view of defendant's continuing refusal to comply with 

court orders and post a bond for either past judgments or current 

support arrearages, we find no error in the trial court's dismissal 

of his motion.

Affirmed.