United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 12, 2017

Decided February 26, 2018

Before

          WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

          KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

          DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 17‐2122

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL RAY DAVIS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the   

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:16‐CR‐30111‐SMY

Staci M. Yandle,

Judge.

O R D E R

Michael Davis pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon and

was sentenced to 96 months in prison. He challenges his sentence, arguing that the

district court erred in calculating his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. The

judge started from a base offense level of 26, relying in part on two prior convictions for

“crimes of violence.” See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(1), 4B1.2(a). One of the predicates is an

Illinois conviction for attempted armed robbery. Davis maintains that the Illinois crime

of attempted armed robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. We reject this

argument and affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17‐2122    Page 2

A grand jury indicted Davis on one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. See

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The firearm in question was semiautomatic with a large‐capacity

magazine. He eventually pleaded guilty. The probation office began its calculation of

the Guidelines sentencing range by assigning a base offense level of 26 based on two

case‐specific characteristics: (1) Davis’s offense involved a semiautomatic firearm

capable of accepting a large‐capacity magazine, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1)(A); and (2) he

has two qualifying convictions under § 2K2.1(a)(1)(B), which applies if the defendant

has at least two prior adult convictions for either a “controlled substance offense” or a

“crime of violence.”

The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as a felony punishable by more than

one year in prison that

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another, or

(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a

forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful

possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive

material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2016 ed.) (emphasis added). The Application Notes explain that the

term “crime of violence” includes “the offense of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and

attempting to commit such offenses.” Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (emphasis added).   

The probation office identified two qualifying crimes of violence: an Illinois

conviction for aggravated battery and an Illinois conviction for attempted armed

robbery. Davis objected to counting the latter conviction. He argued that attempted

armed robbery is not a crime of violence because an attempt crime requires only a

“substantial step” toward completing the substantive offense, not “a violent step.” The

judge rejected this argument, noting that robbery is a specifically enumerated crime of

violence and Application Note 1 expressly sweeps in attempts to commit a crime of

violence. Starting with a base offense level of 26, the judge calculated a Guidelines

sentencing range of 87 to 108 months and imposed a sentence of 96 months, the middle

of the range.
No. 17‐2122    Page 3

On appeal Davis renews his contention that his Illinois conviction for attempted

armed robbery is not a predicate crime of violence under the Guidelines. His argument

is somewhat different than the one he advanced in the district court. He now maintains

that the Illinois attempt crime “encompasses conduct broader than a generic attempt.”

That’s incorrect. Illinois attempt law, like its federal counterpart, requires a “substantial

step” toward the completed offense. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8‐4(a) (“A person

commits the offense of attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he or she

does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.”)

(emphasis added); United States v. Muratovic, 719 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Attempt

convictions require specific intent to commit the full robbery and a substantial step

taken toward that end.”); see also People v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 533, 535 (Ill. 1992); People v.

Terrell, 459 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (Ill. 1984); People v. Garrett, 928 N.E.2d 531, 536 (Ill. App.

Ct. 2010).

   

There’s nothing unique about Illinois’s attempt statute that sets it apart from the

generic offense. Indeed, in a similar case involving a conviction for attempted armed

robbery under Illinois law, we said it would be frivolous to argue that the “substantial

step” requirement in Illinois attempt law is more lenient than the generic contemporary

requirement. United States v. Andrews, 419 F. App’x 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2011).

Davis fares no better with his argument that Illinois armed robbery does not

qualify as a crime of violence. As we’ve noted, § 4B1.2(a)(2) expressly lists robbery as a

qualifying predicate crime of violence. If more were needed, we have repeatedly held

that Illinois robbery is a crime of violence under the “force” clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1). See

United States v. Chagoya‐Morales, 859 F.3d 411, 422 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Bedell,

981 F.2d 915, 915–16 (7th Cir. 1992). Davis concedes the point but gives us no reason to

overrule these decisions. The district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.