Testimony 

Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee 

on Immigration, Border Security and 

Citizenship

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT 

Tuesday, July 15, 2003 BORDER SECURITY 

New Policies and Increased 

Interagency Coordination 

Needed to Improve Visa 

Process 

Statement of Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-03-1013T 
Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State, 

Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa 

process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and 

increased agency coordination and information sharing. In our October 2002 

report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we found that 

• 

• State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should 

balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate 

travel when issuing visas; and 

• State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on 

terrorism grounds. 

In our June 2003 report, we found that State had revoked visas for terrorism 

concerns but that 

• The revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert 

homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who 

entered the country before their visas were revoked might be security 

risks; and 

• The process broke down when information on revocations was not being 

shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement 

officials. 

These weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in keeping 

potential terrorists out of the United States. 

Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System 

Inconsistent or incomplete 

information flow

No information flow

Sources: GAO and Art Explosion.

Department of State

Bureau of

Consular Affairs 

revokes visas

Department of Homeland Security

Department of State

Issuing visas

Managing stays

Controlling entries

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Justice

Since September 11, 2001, visa 

operations have played an 

increasingly important role in 

ensuring the national security of 

the United States. The 

Departments of State, Homeland 

Security, and Justice, as well as 

other agencies, are involved in the 

visa process. Each plays an 

important role in making security 

decisions so that potential 

terrorists do not enter the country. 

In two GAO reports, we assessed 

the effectiveness of the visa 

process as an antiterrorism tool. 

GAO made numerous 

recommendations to strengthen the 

visa process as an antiterrorism 

tool. Among them, GAO 

recommended that the Department 

of Homeland Security, in 

conjunction with the Departments 

of State and Justice, develop 

specific policies and procedures for

the interagency visa revocation 

process to ensure that when State 

revokes a visa because of terrorism 

concerns, the appropriate units 

within State, Homeland Security, 

and the FBI are notified 

immediately and that proper 

actions are taken. 

State said it is using our 

recommendations as a roadmap for 

making improvements in the visa 

process. Homeland Security 

agreed that the visa process should 

be strengthened as an antiterrorism 

tool. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1013T.

To view the full testimony, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-1013T, a testimony 

before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee 

on Immigration, Border Security and 

Citizenship 

July 15, 2003 

BORDER SECURITY 

New Policies and Increased Interagency 

Coordination Needed to Improve Visa 

Process 
Page 1 GAO-03-1013T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss our recent work on the visa process and 

some of the ways we believe this process could be strengthened as an 

important part of our country’s border security strategy. Mr. Chairman, 

citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States temporarily 

for business, tourism, and other reasons generally must apply for and 

obtain a U.S. travel document, called a nonimmigrant visa, at U.S. 

embassies or consulates abroad before arriving at U.S. ports of entry. In 

deciding who should and should not receive a visa, consular officers must 

perform a risk assessment that balances the need to facilitate legitimate 

travel with the need to protect the United States against potential 

terrorists and to deter others whose entry is considered likely to be 

harmful to U.S. national interests. Consular officers also need to delicately 

balance U.S. national security interests with other interests such as 

promoting U.S. business, tourism, education and cultural exchanges, and 

the overall health of our economy. 

Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly 

important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The 

Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other 

agencies, are involved in the visa process, with each playing an important 

role in making security decisions. 

My testimony today is based on two of our recent reports1

 on the visa 

process that contained observations and recommendations on ways in 

which national and border security could be strengthened through the visa 

process, implementation of clear visa policies and guidelines, and sharing 

of information and data. The first report focused on the effectiveness of 

the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and recommended ways that the 

process could be strengthened as a screen against terrorists. The second 

report provides examples of how weaknesses in policy and interagency 

coordination are affecting border security. In addition to my comments 

based on the two reports, I will provide a brief overview of an emerging 

visa policy issue that warrants oversight. 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as 

an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002) and U.S. General 

Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps 

in the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003). 
Page 2 GAO-03-1013T 

Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State, 

Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa 

function if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and 

increased agency coordination and information sharing. Our October 2002 

report addressed the need for a clear policy on how to balance national 

security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel when 

issuing visas. It also addressed the need for more coordination and 

information sharing to realize the full potential of the visa process. In 

addition, there is a need for more human resources and more training for 

consular officers. We made several recommendations to the Department 

of State and the new Department of Homeland Security to improve this 

process. State reported that it plans to use our recommendations as a road 

map for improving the visa process. 

Our June 2003 report also pointed out that the U.S. government does not 

have a clear and comprehensive policy on the interagency visa revocation 

process. This process should be used more aggressively to alert homeland 

security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who entered the 

country before their visas were revoked might be security risks. However, 

we found that the process broke down because information on visa 

revocations was not shared between State and appropriate immigration 

and law enforcement offices. It broke down even further when individuals 

in question had already entered the United States prior to revocation. In 

our review of the 240 visas that were revoked for terrorism concerns 

between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2002, we found numerous 

cases where notifications of the revocations did not reach appropriate 

units within the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)2

 and FBI. 

We also found evidence that individuals whose visas were revoked 

because of terrorism concerns entered the United States and may still 

remain in the country. We have made recommendations to the 

Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Justice to improve the 

revocation process. Homeland Security agreed that the visa revocation 

process needed to be strengthened. 

 2

On March 1, 2003, INS became part of three units within the Department of Homeland 

Security. INS inspection functions transferred to the Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection; its investigative and enforcement functions transferred to the Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and its immigration services function became part 

of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because our work focused on visa 

revocation cases that took place before the March 1 reorganization, our report referred to 

the U.S. government’s immigration agency as “INS.” 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-03-1013T 

State has directed that, beginning August 1, posts interview all foreign 

individuals, with a few exceptions, seeking to visit the United States prior 

to visa issuance. The purpose of this guidance is to tighten the visa 

process. The new regulations may result in delays if posts do not have 

adequate resources to handle the number of interviews. 

Mr. Chairman, I now want to provide additional details on the policies, 

procedures, and coordination that we described in our reports. 

The September 11 attacks illustrated the vulnerabilities in the visa process 

when it became known that all 19 of the terrorist hijackers had been 

issued visas to enter the United States. Before the attacks, the State 

Department’s visa operations focused primarily on screening applicants to 

determine whether they intended to work or reside illegally in the United 

States. In deciding on who should receive a visa, consular officers relied 

on the State Department’s consular “lookout” system, a name check 

system that incorporates information from many agencies, as the primary 

basis for identifying potential terrorists.3

 Consular officers were 

encouraged to facilitate legitimate travel and, at some posts we visited, 

faced pressure to issue visas. The State Department gave overseas 

consular sections substantial discretion in determining the level of 

scrutiny applied to visa applications and encouraged streamlined 

procedures to provide customer service and deal with a large workload. 

As a result, according to State Department officials and documents, 

consular sections worldwide adopted practices that reduced the review 

time for visa applications. For example, some posts decided not to 

interview applicants who appeared likely to return to their country at the 

end of their allotted time in the United States. 

Since the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has introduced some 

changes to strengthen the visa process. For example, the State Department 

has, with the help of other agencies, almost doubled the number of names 

and the amount of information in the lookout system. Further, the 

Department began seeking new or additional interagency clearances on 

selected applicants to screen out terrorists, although these checks were 

 3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should 

Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing GAO-03-322 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003). We recommended a series of actions including that the Department of 

Homeland Security and other agencies that have and use watch lists lead an effort to 

standardize and consolidate the federal government’s watch list structures and policies. 

Visa Process Should 

Be Strengthened as an 

Antiterrorism Tool 
Page 4 GAO-03-1013T 

not always completed by other U.S. agencies in a thorough or timely 

manner. We also observed that consular officers at some of the posts we 

visited were spending more time reviewing visa applications and 

interviewing applicants; they were able to do so, at least temporarily, 

because the number of visa applications decreased dramatically after 

September 11. 

While these actions have strengthened the visa process, our work in 2002 

showed that there were widely divergent practices and procedures among 

and within overseas posts regarding (1) the authority of consular officers 

to deny questionable applicants a visa, (2) the role of the visa process in 

ensuring national security, and (3) the types of changes in posts’ visa 

policies and procedures that are appropriate given the need for heightened 

border security. Also, the Departments of State and Justice disagreed on 

the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. Most consular 

officers at the posts we visited stated that more comprehensive guidance 

and training would help them use the visa process as an antiterrorism tool 

to detect questionable applicants. In July 2002, the Secretary of State 

acknowledged that the visa process needed to be strengthened and 

indicated that the State Department is working to identify areas for 

improvement. 

In addition, the State Department has stressed that it must have the best 

interagency information available on persons who are potential security 

risks in order to make good visa decisions. The additional data received 

from the intelligence and law enforcement community has increased 

State’s access to information for use in the visa adjudication process. In 

addition, State indicated that it will work with Homeland Security to 

establish the systems and procedures that will ensure seamless sharing of 

information in the future. 

We also found that human capital limitations are a concern, as some 

consular sections may need more staff if the number of visa applicants 

returns to pre-September 11 levels or if State continues to institute new 

security checks for visa applicants. At some posts the demand for visas 

combined with increased workload per visa applicant still exceeded 

available staff, as evidenced by the waiting time for a visa appointment 

and in overtime of consular staff. Moreover, several posts we visited 

reported that they could manage their existing workload with current 

staffing but would need more staff if they faced an increase in either 

security clearance procedures or visa applications. 
Page 5 GAO-03-1013T 

In our October 2002 report, we concluded that the visa process could be 

an important tool to keep potential terrorists from entering the United 

States but that weaknesses limited its effectiveness as an antiterrorism 

tool. The State Department needed to improve implementation of the visa 

process to increase its effectiveness and consistency among posts. 

To strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommended 

that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, 

• establish clear policy on addressing national security concerns through 

the visa process that is balanced with the desire to facilitate legitimate 

travel, provide timely customer service, and manage workloads; 

• develop comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how 

consular affairs should use the visa process as a screen against 

potential terrorists; 

• reassess staffing for visa operations in light of the current and 

anticipated number of visa applications and, if appropriate, request 

additional human resources to ensure that consular sections have 

adequate staff with necessary skills; and 

• provide consular training courses to improve interview techniques, 

recognize fraudulent documents, understand terrorism trends, and 

better use the name check system. 

To address visa issues requiring coordination and actions across several 

agencies, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security 

coordinate with appropriate agencies to 

• establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed 

to deny a visa on terrorism grounds under provisions of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act; 

• reassess interagency headquarters’ security checks on visa applicants 

to verify that all the checks are necessary and promptly conducted, and 

provide clear guidance to overseas posts and headquarters agencies on 

their roles in conducting these checks; 

• consider reassessing, on an interagency basis, visas issued before the 

implementation of the new security checks; 

• reexamine visa operations on a regular basis to ensure that the 

operations effectively contribute to the overall national strategy for 
Page 6 GAO-03-1013T 

homeland security; and 

• ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies promptly 

provide information to the State Department on persons who may pose 

a security risk and, therefore, should not receive visas. 

In its response to our recommendations, the Department of State noted 

that it has acted on or is currently acting on some of the issues we 

reported and continues to reexamine its visa process. Moreover, in 

January 2003, the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs reported that 

State plans to use our recommendations as a roadmap for improvements 

within the Bureau of Consular Affairs and in consular sections around the 

world. State has also indicated that it is currently undertaking a number of 

initiatives to review visa policies, staffing, and training needs. 

Furthermore, State said it is looking at refining various screening 

programs and will coordinate with other agencies to reassess interagency 

headquarters’ security checks. 

In our recent work on visa revocations, we again found weaknesses 

caused by the lack of comprehensive policies and coordination between 

agencies. The visa revocation process can be an important tool to prevent 

potential terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally, information on 

suspected terrorists would reach the Department of State before it decides 

to issue a visa; however, there will always be some cases in which the 

information arrives after the visa has been issued. Revoking a visa can 

mitigate this problem, but only if State notifies the appropriate agencies 

and if those agencies take appropriate actions to deny entry or investigate 

persons with a revoked visa. In our June 2003 report, we identified the 

policies and procedures of several agencies that govern the visa 

revocation process and determined the effectiveness of the process. We 

focused on all 240 visas that State revoked for terrorism concerns from 

September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2002. 

Our analysis indicated that the U.S. government has no specific written 

policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no 

written procedures to guide State in notifying relevant agencies of visas 

that have been revoked on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written 

procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither 

they nor the FBI has written internal procedures for notifying appropriate 

personnel to take action on visas revoked by the State Department. State 

and INS officials could articulate their informal policies and procedures 

for how and what purpose their agencies have used the process to keep 

New Policies and 

Procedures Are 

Needed to Fill Gaps in 

the Visa Revocation 

Process 
Page 7 GAO-03-1013T 

terrorists out of the United States, but neither they nor FBI officials had 

specific policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, or 

taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already 

entered the country. 

The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have contributed 

to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the 

probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United 

States. At the time of visa revocation, State should notify its consular 

officers at overseas posts, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 

FBI. State would have to provide notice of revocation, along with 

supporting evidence to the appropriate units within Homeland Security 

and the FBI, which would allow them to take appropriate action. In our 

review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units 

within INS and the FBI did not always receive timely notification of the 

revocations; (2) lookouts were not consistently posted to the agencies’ 

watch lists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism 

grounds entered the United States and may still remain in the country;4

 (4) 

INS investigators were not usually notified of individuals with revoked 

visas who had entered the United States and therefore did not open 

investigations on them; and (5) the FBI did not investigate individuals with 

revoked visas unless these individuals were also in TIPOFF. For instance: 

• In a number of cases, notification between State and the appropriate 

units within INS did not take place or was not completed in a timely 

manner. For example, INS officials said they did not receive any notice 

of the revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47 

cases, the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice only via a 

cable, which took, on average, 12 days to reach the Unit. 

• In cases in which the INS Lookout Unit had received notification, it 

generally posted information on these revocations in its lookout 

database within 1 day of receiving the notice. In cases where it was not 

notified, it could not post information on these individuals in its 

lookout database, which precluded INS inspectors at ports of entry 

from knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked. 

 4

This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS as of May 19, 2003. On 

May 20 and 21, INS and the FBI, respectively, provided additional information related to 

this matter. We were not able to complete analysis of the data prior to the release of our 

report due to the nature and volume of the data. The data could show that the actual 

number of persons is higher or lower than 30. 
Page 8 GAO-03-1013T 

Moreover, the State Department neglected to enter the revocation 

action for 64 of the 240 cases into its own watch list. 

• GAO’s analysis of INS arrival and departure data indicates that 29 

individuals entered the United States before their visas were revoked 

and may still remain in the country. These data also show that INS 

inspectors admitted at least four other people after the visa revocation, 

one of whom may still remain in the country. However, in testimony on 

June 18, 2003, the FBI said that none of these 30 individuals posed a 

terrorist threat since they were not in TIPOFF, a State-operated 

interagency terrorist watch list that FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking 

Task Force monitors. State Department officials told us during our 

review that State relied on sources of information in addition to 

TIPOFF in making visa revocation decisions. INS inspectors prevented 

at least 14 others from entering the country because the INS watch list 

included information on the revocation action or had another lookout 

on them. 

• INS investigators said they did not open cases on these individuals with 

revoked visas who had entered the United States because their unit had 

not been notified that State had revoked visas because of terrorism 

concerns and that these persons had entered the country. They added 

that, in the 10 cases that were referred to them, they conducted a full 

investigation of possible immigration violations. INS officials said that 

it would be challenging to remove individuals with revoked visas who 

had entered the United States unless they were in violation of their 

immigration status. Homeland Security officials said that the issue of 

whether a visa revocation, after an individual is admitted on that visa, 

has the effect of rendering the individuals out-of-status is unresolved 

legally. 

• FBI officials told us they were not concerned about individuals whose 

visas were revoked because of terrorism concerns unless the 

individuals’ names were in TIPOFF. They said that they had a system in 

place to monitor individuals in TIPOFF who enter the country but that 

they would not investigate individuals who were not in TIPOFF based 

solely on the revocation notice from State. FBI’s position indicates that 

FBI is not taking into account all sources of information that State uses 

in determining if a person may pose a terrorism threat. 

We concluded that the visa process could be an important tool to keep 

potential terrorists from entering the United States. However, there are 

currently major gaps in the notification and investigation processes. One 

reason for this is that there are no comprehensive written policies and 
Page 9 GAO-03-1013T 

procedures on how notification of a visa revocation should take place and 

what agencies should do when they are notified. As a result, there is 

heightened risk that persons who State believed should not have been 

issued a visa because of terrorism concerns could enter the country with 

revoked visas or be allowed to remain after their visas are revoked 

without undergoing investigation or monitoring. 

To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction 

with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General 

• develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa 

revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for 

suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted 

from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies and their 

respective inspection and investigation units in a timely manner; 

• develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law 

enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals 

whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain 

in the United States after revocation; and 

• determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in 

the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat. 

In response to our recommendations, the Department of State testified 

that the Bureau of Consular Affairs is engaged in an effort to formalize 

standard operating procedures. The Department of Homeland Security 

also remarked that it was working to better standardize its procedures. 

The FBI determined that 47 of the 240 persons with revoked visas were in 

TIPOFF and therefore could pose a terrorism threat but that it had no 

indication that any of these individuals were in the country. 

The Department of State has recently issued guidance to its posts about 

using the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. In May 2003, the Secretary 

of State announced that, by August 1, 2003, with a few exceptions, all 

foreign individuals seeking to visit the United States would be interviewed 

prior to receiving a visa. The purpose of this guidance is to tighten the visa 

process to protect U.S. security and to prepare for the eventual 

fingerprinting of applicants that State must undertake to meet the 

legislated mandate to include a biometric identifier with issued visas. To 

comply with the new guidance, some posts may have to make substantial 

Plans to Tighten the 

Visa Process 
Page 10 GAO-03-1013T 

changes in how they handle nonimmigrant applications. State 

acknowledges that posts may find that personnel or facility resources are 

not adequate to handle the additional number of interviews. Even though 

State expects interview backlogs, the Department has indicated that posts 

are to implement the interview requirement with existing resources. 

It is not certain what impact the new policy will have on visa issuance. 

However, education, business, and government officials have expressed 

concern that it was already taking too long to issue visas and that without 

a commensurate increase in resources to accommodate the heavier 

workload that may result from the new requirement, there could be 

serious delays for those seeking to visit the United States. In March 2003, 

the House Committee on Science held a hearing on “Dealing with Foreign 

Students and Scholars in the Age of Terrorism: Visa Backlogs and 

Tracking Systems.” In June 2003, the House Committee on Small Business 

held a hearing on “The Visa Approval Backlog and its Impact on American 

Small Business. “ In both hearings, higher education and business leaders 

and agency officials testified on the negative impacts of delays in issuing 

visas. The testimonies also highlighted the difficulties of balancing 

national security interests with the desire to facilitate travel. At the request 

of the House Committee on Science, we are currently examining the 

amount of time taken to adjudicate visa applications from foreign science 

students and scholars. As part of this work, we will be looking at how the 

new interview policy will affect the process. 

Before I conclude my statement, I would like to raise some questions that 

the subcommittee may want to consider in its oversight role: 

• Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice 

reached agreement on how best to communicate information on 

individuals who should not be issued visas and on individuals whose 

visas have been revoked? 

• Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice agreed 

on the level of evidence needed to deny and revoke visas? 

• Does the Department of State have adequate number of trained staff 

for visa processing, especially if the number of visa applicants or 

security checks increase? 

• Do the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice agree on 

whether persons who are in the country and have visas that have been 

revoked on terrorism concerns should be investigated and, if so, by 
Page 11 GAO-03-1013T 

which agency? 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate our two overarching areas of 

concern for U.S. visa policy. First, the U.S. government needs to have 

clear, comprehensive policies governing U.S. visa processes and 

procedures so that all agencies involved agree on the level of security 

screening for foreign nationals both at our consulates abroad and at ports 

of entry. These policies should balance the need for national security with 

the desire to facilitate legitimate travel to the United States. The 

Departments of State and Homeland Security should coordinate to 

establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed to 

deny a visa. There should also be a specific policy for the interagency visa 

revocation process, including the actions that immigration and law 

enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals 

with revoked visas who have entered the country. 

The second area of concern is the continued need for coordination and 

information sharing among agencies. If our intelligence or law 

enforcement community is concerned that an individual poses a security 

risk, we have to make sure that this information is communicated to the 

State Department so that consular officers can deny and, if need be, 

revoke visas in a timely manner. Similarly, when State revokes a visa for 

terrorism concerns, we have to make sure that full information on the 

revocation is communicated to immigration and law enforcement 

agencies. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have. 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202) 

512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included 

John Brummet, Andrea Miller, Kate Brentzel, Janey Cohen, Lynn Cothern, 

and Suzanne Dove. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgements 

(320213) 
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