Air University

Joseph J. Redden, Lt Gen, Commander

Air Command and Staff College

John W. Rosa, Col, Commandant

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

A Joint Task Force

Staff Structure for the

New Millennium

Leaner, Faster, and

More Responsive

LISA A. ROW

Major, USMC

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 4

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

December 1998
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are s

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Unive

the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any othe

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wr

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and S

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of 

best” student research projects from the prior academ

year. The ACSC research program encourages our s

dents to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in th

own professional development and in “advancing ae

space power.” The series title reflects our desire to p

petuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier gene

tions of airmen. Projects selected for publication comb

solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentat

in exploring war at the operational level. With this bro

perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an ecle

range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and 

erational questions. Some of these studies provide n

solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us 

leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. 

making these research studies available in the Wr

Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical exami

tion of the findings and to stimulate further research 

these areas.

John W. Rosa, Col, US

Commandant

iii

Preface

If one has a new way of thinking, why not apply i

wherever one’s thought leads to? It is certainly enter 

taining to let oneself do so, but it is also very illuminat 

ing and capable of leading one to new and deep in 

sights.

—Frank Oppenheime

Profound changes stalk today’s military. Professio

journal authors and current symposia speakers conte

plate how technology may impact future battle-space fu

tions. Other commentators predict effects from milit

force reductions on our future capabilities. Some think

seek innovative ways to describe future operations and 

account for these changes in technology and structu

Professional military educators waver between teach

present realities and encouraging future visions. All 

these authors, speakers, thinkers, and teachers exhort 

as the military at large, to think hard about anticipa

changes and plan for their integration.

I developed this thesis because I perceived a void 

applying these themes—technology, force reductions, a

futuristic visions—to command and control and to rela

impacts for staff structures. I seek concrete application 

these ideas, rather than more rhetoric on what might be 

someday. This paper represents my effort to peer into o

future and see possibilities. At a minimum, I hope to s

ideas, and at best, I wish to contribute ideas worthy 

testing in some future joint task force (JTF) staff.

I remain indebted to my faculty research advisor, 

Michael Grumelli, for his candor, humor, and wise coun

throughout this project.

v

Abstract

Our military future will likely be radically different fr

our past. Consequently, military personnel can prepare 

this future by investigating ways to adapt to novel ch

lenges posed by new weapons, new theories, or new 

ganizations.

This study explores the problem of how joint task fo

staffs should reorganize to improve future command a

control to meet demands of the most likely future envir

ment. The research methodology consisted of a literat

search from a broad body of evidence. Sources includ

business literature, studies by organizations such as 

Center for Naval Analyses, and research papers produ

by other students.

Several key changes envisioned for the military prov

a foundation for the project and introduce future ope

tional and environmental complexities. These changes 

clude emerging international and national trends such 

increased military operations other than war and grow

military pressures to shrink but remain effective. Anot

trend, the “revolution in military affairs,” includes su

aspects as a “system of systems” and “dominant ba

space awareness.” Additionally, Joint Vision 2010 offer

conceptual view of future battle-space activities that 

portrayed as markedly different from today’s activit

Against this backdrop of change, two primary reasons 

using military staffs—information management and d

sion making—open a path to the heart of the paper a

serve as a frame of reference for new organizational 

signs.

Two metaphors offer vivid conceptual staff images. Fi

the “spider plant” metaphor depicts a multifaceted orga

zation with a core structure and many outlying satel

organizations, illustrating the potential for semiauto

mous operations. Second, the “brain” metaphor captu

the essence of relationships between key organizatio

elements and shows natural applications of decentrali

decision making. The study concludes with a discussion 

benefits gained through reorganization: faster, more 

sponsive operations and leaner structures.

vii
Both metaphors strive to define essential relationsh

between staff elements. The overarching theme invol

finding areas where commanders and staffs can decentr

ize operations to improve speed and responsiveness. Of

this decentralized approach is enabled by technology, ho

ever, the leaders must first be willing to let go of th

control and learn to live in a complex environment—n

the edge of chaos.

With a goal of stirring ideas for reorganization, t

study applies contemporary vision statements a

thoughts to command and control and related staff str

tures. It demonstrates potential to improve operations 

developing innovative ways to visualize staff interactio

The time has come to move beyond rhetoric about 

future and to develop useful ways to prepare. This w

provides one step along the path of innovation.

viii
A Joint Task Force Staff Structure

for the New Millennium

Leaner, Faster, and More Responsive

Giulio Douhet, long acknowledged as an innovator a

early airpower theorist, recognized a changing warfare 

vironment and strove to meet its challenges. Douhet ep

mizes a small minority of military professionals who 

willing to invest their time contemplating what might 

achieved. In 1947, Lt Gen James M. Gavin, former co

manding general of the 82d Airborne Division, describ

the military majority: “We professional soldiers are tra

tionally laggard in facing and adopting changes, especi

radical changes that upset proven methods and the w

in which we have been doing things for years pas

Emerging international and national changes will lik

reach General Gavin’s “radical” threshold. US milit

leaders must adopt new strategies to stay relevant—sta

ing at the highest levels of command.

Changes in Our Military Future

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the

character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt them -

selves after the changes occur.

—Giulio Douhet

Three broad changes loom on the US military horiz

emerging international and national trends, the revolut

in military affairs, and Joint Vision 2010. These chan

are the result of the emerging operating environment, 

pabilities, and operational concepts affecting joint ope

tions. Together they present a complex mosaic against wh

current practices must be gauged.

Emerging International and National Trends

Speculation abounds for what the world’s future hol

Widespread technology, rising nationalism, and grow

economic and environmental interdependence all incre

international complexities. These complexities often cre

1
situations in other regions requiring intervention. Milit

operations other than war (MOOTW) represent the m

likely future interventions.

With respect to missions of the future, it would appear that within

the residual, state-centric international system, conflicts amon

major powers will be the exception. . . . Recent OOTW mission

which have involved joint forces—in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia

Liberia—contrast sharply with the focus of the Cold War era and

the regional conflict in the Gulf that immediately followed it. But in

fact they have been the normal missions of the Armed Forces sav

for the historical anomaly of the Cold War. 2

In terms of national trends, two unrelated circumstan

converged within the United States and resulted in 

creased military pressures that now affect operational c

siderations. First, the Soviet Union imploded, and with 

went many military defense concerns of US citizens. Th

citizens now want greater fiscal focus on domestic issu

Second, the United States conducted a massive, incredi

rapid, and relatively casualty-free operation in the Mid

East. Many citizens now perceive that all operations sho

be fast and clean. A continuing technology explosion f

ther compounds these issues for the military.

Revolution in Military Affairs

“RMA [revolution in military affairs] proffers three 

instruments of national power: the system of systems, 

tended information dominance, and information warfar

The system of systems offers a glimpse at technology t

facilitates change in military operations. Key compone

within the system of systems include position reporti

surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Dominant bat

space awareness results from leveraging these capabilities 

produce a common operational picture and from shar

information through networked communications. Milit

forces must harness these capabilities to achieve Jo

Vision 2010.

Joint Vision 2010

“Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for h

America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and in

vation of our people and leverage technological opportu
ties to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfig

ing.”4

 These emerging concepts rest upon the promises 

information superiority and full-spectrum dominance.

Information superiority serves as the foundation for f

spectrum dominance. Fused all-source intelligence and 

hanced command and control permit forces to gain inf

mation superiority. Next, forces must confront two challen

in seeking full-spectrum dominance. First, they must embr

new technologies, and second, the individual war fight

must use initiative and creativity to maximize opportunities

Adm Jay Johnson, chief of naval operations, stated, “

concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010 can multiply 

combat power. . . . But the real challenge is in chang

our way of thinking.”5

 In order to change contempor

thinking about joint task force (JTF) staff design, a cruc

first step involves defining the future environment. Agai

a backdrop of pending military changes—emerging int

national and national trends, a revolution in military affa

and Joint Vision 2010’s new operational concepts—the sta

purpose and functions in this new future must be assessed

Need for Staffs

Joint force commanders are provided staffs to assist them in

the decisionmaking and execution process. The staff is an

extension of the commander; its sole function is command sup -

port, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by

the commander.

—Joint Publication 0-2

As military operations have grown in complexity, s

structures have also grown until modern staffs represent

monolithic organizations are bloated and distorted alm

beyond recognition. Broad categories of modern staff e

ments include the “personal staff, special staff, and g

eral or joint staff divisions.”6

 For the United Task Fo

(UNITAF) portion of Somalia relief operations, the JTF 

malia staff table of organization reflects 906 billets! 7

 T

size seems to contradict Lt Gen John H. Cushman’s te

which says, “Even as a commander directs modern war 

all its complexity, he will want to keep his staff as small 

possible, realizing that when minds are gifted he can 
his job done better with fewer.” 8

 Surely military person

are no less gifted than General Cushman believes. At 

most elemental level, the staff’s purpose is twofold: to m

age information on behalf of the commander and to ass

the commander with decision-making functions. All ot

tasks tie to one of these purposes.

Information Management

“A staff is an aid to command. It serves to ease 

commander’s workload by furnishing basic information a

technical advice.”9

 Situational awareness provided by 

staff depends upon information—timely, accurate inform

tion. Staffs manage this information by processing it 

the commander’s use and by sharing it with others. P

cessing converts data into knowledge and awareness, a

cannot be overemphasized. Vice Adm Arthur Cebrow

(director of US Navy space, information warfare, and co

mand and control) and John Garstka (Joint Staff J-6 s

ence and technical advisor) describe the benefit of inf

mation processing and link it to speed of command: “T

force achieves information superiority, having a dram

cally better awareness or understanding of the battlesp

rather than simply more raw data. . . . The results t

follow are the rapid foreclosure of enemy courses of act

and the shock of closely coupled events.” 10 Awareness 

curs after staffs gather and analyze data.

Gathering, Analysis, Presentation. Staffs process d

to save commanders time and to translate technical ma

rial into usable form. Commanders have little time to d

with raw data. The “cognitive hierarchy” shown in Jo

Pub 6, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communicatio

and Computers (C4

) Systems Support to Joint Operatio

depicts information as data which has been processed 

some way.11 Staffs primarily process information spec

cally sought by the commander.

Commanders define information priorities to guide s

efforts. These priorities fall into two of three categor

described as “Commander’s Critical Information Requ

ments.”12 Information about the enemy or environment 

comes a priority intelligence requirement. Information ab

friendly forces becomes a friendly force information 
quirement. These requirements focus staff collection a

processing efforts to expedite information management 

ties and conserve resources. Some information, if exc

sively detailed or technical, merits translation.

Staff members present information to the comman

after rendering the material useful. This task may requ

describing information in layman’s terms or depicting 

formation graphically. A classic example involves weat

reports. Rather than provide raw data or information ab

climatic conditions, weather reports present USA Tod

style pictures with amplification about weather impacts 

current operations. Staffs must use ingenuity like this 

optimize information quality for commanders, and prov

“understanding at a glance.”

Information Sharing/Flow. The second aspect of in

mation management involves disseminating informati

While staffs predominantly manage information for th

own commander, much information serves multiple 

ganizations. Information sharing benefits others and c

improve overall force efficiency. Too often, hierarchical 

ganizations “control” information and impede access. 13 

formation gains value when shared, and loses value wh

unnecessarily restricted. Shared information may trave

two directions within an organization, laterally or vertically

Information must move laterally within organization

Typically adjacent or parallel elements represent sim

structures —“sister units” —which may lack formal repo

ing relationships. Yet today, modern technology crea

numerous options for lateral information sharing. Sta

must develop lateral information flow paths to optim

information resources. Additionally, lateral communicati

provide redundancy when vertical communications exp

ence outages. In addition to “pure” lateral information fl

sophisticated networks may also incorporate diagonal 

formation flow—simultaneously hierarchical and lateral

Vertical relationships symbolize “normal” information f

paths within typical military hierarchies. Staffs ensure t

subordinates receive potentially useful information as w

as keeping higher headquarters informed.16 Any staff re

ganization must accommodate both information mana

ment and flow concerns.
Decision Making

A second principle staff task involves decision maki

Although commanders remain ultimately responsible, t

cannot realistically make all decisions. Consequently, co

manders empower staff members to make decisions wit

certain limits. These decisions arise during both ope

tional planning and execution.

Planning. Once operations commence, planning and e

cution occur simultaneously.17 As a result, command

cannot stay fully engaged in planning because they m

attend to execution. Staffs plan based upon command

intent, specific guidance, and their own situational awa

ness, and then translate approved plans into orders a

action items.

Staffs play a key planning role by “developing basic 

cisions into adequate plans, and anticipating future ne

and drafting tentative plans to meet them.” 18 Typica

course of action development involves dynamic collabo

tion by many functional specialists to create an optim

plan. As perhaps the most critical staff function, course 

action development represents the organization’s bid 

anticipate the future and prepare for success therein.

Course of action planners must remain closely asso

ated with current operations personnel to maintain ove

operational coherence and to capitalize on successes. Jo

Vision 2010 describes how the separation between pl

ners and executors may narrow, and perhaps disapp

altogether: “Real-time information will likely drive paral

not sequential, planning and real-time, not prearrang

decisionmaking.”19 Parallel planning may prove difficult 

some whose sole experience involves linear planning effort

Planning staff responsibilities continue beyond plan 

proval and include “translating plans into orders, and tra

mitting them to subordinate commands.”20 In some cas

this documentation includes whole annexes and appen

ces to voluminous written orders. Technology now perm

paperless information transfer that may speed delive

Additionally, graphic information may be shared more e

ily today. Future technology may eliminate a need for w

ten orders—video and audio tapes may store records 

planning results recorded during confirmation briefs, a
electronic search and retrieval devices will lead a user 

the desired plan section. In the interim, staff design m

account for personnel who perform planning functions 

include development and dissemination of orders.

Execution. During operations, commanders need as

tance in monitoring the myriad of ongoing activities. Pr

ently, a separate staff stands watch in an operations c

ter and assists with decision-making activities. 21 S

members usually represent functional specialties of 

ments engaged in operations. These staff members per fo

two basic functions for commanders. First, they mon

operations, making recommendations to modify plans a

activities. Second, they coordinate support for subordin

units as requested.

Staffs monitor activities of subordinate and adjacent e

ments for the commander, specifically to maintain optim

situational awareness for decision making.22 Monitoring 

its least intrusive form occurs when elements conduct 

erations and submit routine reports that the monitor u

to maintain awareness of current status and activities

more intrusive form occurs when a monitor demands in

mation updates from subordinate elements despite hav

the latest updates already. Both the common operatio

picture and new information transfer techniques promise 

improve situational awareness available to monitors.23

Coordination comprises the second function perform

by operations center personnel. Staffs perform this fu

tion on behalf of subordinate elements, and it contribu

to success of the force as a whole. In many cases, milit

organizations maintain parallel primary staff structu

that coordinate within their narrow functional area

However, smaller staffs may lack expertise found on hig

staffs and may request support. Subordinate units m

also funnel requests for information support through 

monitor, as the operations center likely has the best si

ational awareness. Any reorganization scheme must 

count for adequate monitors, although fewer would suf

in a decentralized decision-making environment.

Modern technology offers improvements that enha

staff functions of information management and decis

making. These improvements could also provide person
savings. Computers enhance information gathering, ana

sis, and presentation. Communication capabilities and 

formation transfer technologies provide means to sh

information throughout a network, potentially eliminat

layers. Automated decision-making tools offer potentia

reduce human intervention in selected situations. Grea

situational awareness achieved through the “system 

systems” presents potential personnel savings within 

erations centers as previously manual communication a

plotting functions are automated. Additionally, network

telecommunications offer direct access from field units 

specialists, possibly obviating the need for operations c

ter personnel to coordinate support.

These advances could permit a greater span of cont

over widely dispersed forces by fewer personnel. Howev

Joint Vision 2010 clearly articulates the inherent ch

lenge in bringing this about.

In order to make optimum use of the technologies and operationa

concepts discussed earlier, we must carefully examine th

traditional criteria governing span of control and organizationa

layers for services, commands, and defense agencies. We will need

organizations and processes that are agile enough to exploi

emerging technologies and respond to diverse threats and enem

capabilities. As we move forward, we may require furthe

reductions in supervision and centralized direction.25

As a result, the key to exploiting the full potential 

these new technologies lies in the willingness of comma

ers to relinquish control. These technologies achieve li

if commanders only use them to modernize current hier

chical command and control methods. The future 

mands a new and creative organizational approach.

Reengineering the Staff

The military staff must be adequately composed: it must con -

tain the best brains in the fields of land, air and sea warfare,

propaganda war, technology, economics, politics and also

those who know the peoples’ life.

—Gen Erich von Ludendorf

In his book Seeing Organizational Patterns: A New T

ory and Language of Organizational Design, Robert Ke

asserts that “organizations are inherently triadic beca
there are only three ways in which people can relate wi

out conflict to each other . . . autonomy, control, a

cooperation.”26

He proposes that the “overwhelming tendency for m

agement is to become obsessed with control” and sugge

that careful balance of the triadic variables offers a bet

alternative to close control.27 Figure 1 illustrates poten

characteristics of each variable and provides a means 

assessing which variables prove more desirable.

Keidel then constructs multiple views of organizatio

interaction using these three variables. In one example, 

defines organizational structures as a combination of th

elements: organizational charts, physical layouts, and 

terdependence or work flow. He then relates these e

ments to the triadic variables. When these structural e

Figure 1. Organizational Design Tradeoffs (Robert W. Ke

Seeing Organizational Patterns: A New Theory and Languag

Organizational Design (San Francisco, Calif.: Berrett-Koe

Publishers, 1995), 6. 
ments interact in a matrix with the triadic variables

number of relationships emerge (table 1).

For military operations, the ideal reporting relation 

probably a “Flat/Clear” format because this relation p

mits rapid responses. However, present reporting cha

resemble the “Steep/Clear” configuration of a control str

ture. Preferred physical layouts ought to encourage 

“Spontaneous Interaction” shown under “Cooperation” 

maximize contributions of all elements. Additionally, “Rec

rocal” work and information flow between force eleme

represents an ideal arrangement for military planning a

execution to capitalize on the speed of direct exchanges. 

incorporate these ideas, the challenge becomes design

an organizational structure that balances the triadic v

ables to keep the favorable relationships identified here.

A further venture into contemporary literature provi

numerous design choices. Among those, Gareth Morga

works abound with wildly imaginative examples. Morg

stresses visualization and metaphors as a means to und

stand organizational interactions. He explains metap

characteristics:

Metaphor is often regarded just as a device for embellishin

discourse, but its significance is much greater than this. The use o

metaphor implies a way of thinking and a way of seeing tha

Table 1

Organizational Structures

Superimposed on Triadic Variables

Autonomy Control Cooperatio

Organization Chart

(What is the form of our

reporting relation?)

Flat/Clear Steep/Clear Flat/Amorph

Physical Layout

(What interaction does our

physical design

encourage?)

Independent

Action

Programmed

Interaction

Spontaneou

Interaction

Interdependence

(How does our

work/information flow?)

Pooled Sequential Reciprocal

Source: Keidel, 65–66.
pervade how we understand our world generally. . . . Metaphor i

inherently paradoxical. It can create powerful insights that als

become distortions, as the way of seeing created through 

metaphor becomes a way of not seeing. 28

A machine metaphor describes one traditional view 

the military. Morgan describes how Frederick the Gr

adjusted his machine to improve efficiency: “And to ens

that the military machine was used as wisely as possib

he developed the distinction between advisory and co

mand functions, freeing specialist advisors (staff) from 

line of command to plan activities.” 29 Today we continue 

use specialist advisors in much the same way as histori

military leaders like Frederick the Great and Napoléon Bo

parte. Technology, however, has advanced well beyond 

imaginings of these leaders and offers fantastic opportu

ties for change. Two promising metaphors for change 

the spider plant and the brain.

Spider Plant Metaphor

The spider plant provides a very powerful image fo

joint task force staff. The “parent plant” represents 

operations centers (future and current). The “baby plan

or offspring represent all of the agencies, boards, and c

ters participating in the operation. Each offspring ma

tains ties to the parent via a cord representing some re

tionship.

Parent Plant. As noted, the parent plant symbolizes 

core of the staff. Most often the core includes the futu

and current operations centers where near-term plann

and execution monitoring take place. All other elements—

offspring—feed information to the core and receive supp

from it.

The parent plant defines relationships to and from 

spring. Depending upon the nature of the offspring, th

relationships may differ from one to another. The Germ

military concept of auftragstaktik fits nicely here in t

the parent defines the offspring’s mission and end st

through mission-type orders and commander’s intent. T

offspring endeavors to conduct its mission semiauto

mously, while retaining a link to the parent for informat
flow and support. Morgan describes his vision of this m

tual support:

The understanding and agreements struck through this kind o

“cord dialogue” are crucial in creating a shared frame of referenc

through which the “pot” and “offshoots” can operate in harmon

without direct control. Whenever one engages in decentralize

activity, there is always a danger of the decentralized units lurchin

in directions that violate the spirit or principles of the enterprise a

a whole. The bureaucrat tries to protect against this by minimizin

the space for maneuver through the creation of hierarchy, rules

and top-down management. The umbilical cord manager looks t

shared understandings as a means of creating integration whil

maximizing the space, autonomy, and self-organizing capacities o

the units being controlled. Minimum, rather than maximum

specifications and controls are the order of the day. 30

The spider plant metaphor offers opportunities to establ

two desired aspects of Robert Keidel’s theory: “Flat/Cle

reporting relationships and “Reciprocal” information flow

The parent provides essential support to offspring wh

permitting them freedom of action. Rather than hig

headquarters perceiving itself as the supported elemen

spider plant metaphor reinforces the concept of a par

caring for its offspring—ensuring they have needed s

port. Morgan suggests five potential arrangements betw

the parent and offspring:

1. A shared sense of overall vision and values.

2. Agreement on accountabilities.

3. Resource flows in both directions.

4. Information systems.

5. Rewards.31

These links demonstrate the significant support aspect fr

the parent to the offspring, as well as a unifying vision 

achieving responsiveness through auftragstaktik.

Offspring. Offspring of a JTF staff include agencies, boar

and centers. In his research paper about shrinking the fo

print of joint task force staffs, Maj Michael D. Wykoff reve

the potential magnitude of these staff elements.

Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni, commanding general of 

Marine Expeditionary Force, U. S. Marine Corps, has identifie

about one hundred integrated staff cells that JTF commanders can

select from and establish in theater for specialized tasks. An

integrated staff cell is a functional organization as opposed to th

traditional staff section that performs a group of related tasks. 32
In addition to those integrated staff cells listed in 

appendix, subordinate task forces command posts, serv

component command posts, and functional component 

eration centers also represent potential offspring. For c

lition operations, this list becomes even larger. A Cen

for Naval Analyses study identified nine categories of e

ments, outside of the joint task force, with whom a jo

force commander may need to coordinate:

1. Foreign militaries.

2. US government agencies (Department of State, F

eral Management Agency).

3. Ad-hoc US government interagency teams.

4. US embassies and country teams.

5. Multinational organizations (United Nations, No

Atlantic Treaty Organization, religious organizations).

6. Foreign governments/agencies.

7. Nongovernment organizations (International R

Cross, Doctors without Borders).

8. Corporations.

9. Nongovernment local leaders (tribe, warlord). 33

The sheer size of this organization demands a new w

of thinking about military operations and control, es

cially when leveraged by technology. The multitude of 

teracting elements demands those cooperative aspects 

Keidel’s theory regarding “Spontaneous Interaction” a

“Reciprocal” information flow.

The complexity of modern operations, with potenti

one hundred offspring contributing to a mission, create

broad span of control requirement for the joint force co

mander. Often clumping elements under principal s

directorates reduces this burden. This clumping techniq

proved ineffective for several recent MOOTW operatio

JTF Sea Angel (Bangladesh) personnel reported blurr

between J-2 (intelligence) and J-3 (operations) function

JTF Gitmo (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) personnel revea

blurring between J-3 and J-4 (logistics) functions and d

culty defining J-2 tasks;35 and JTF Provide Promise (B

nia) personnel also identified blurring of responsibility 

tween the J-2 and J-3. 36 Additionally, two functio

component commands—Strategic Command (STRATCO

and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) presen
combine the J-3 and J-4 into a single department. 37 Th

examples of functional overlap and ambiguities spark 

question about continued utility of the conventional s

model.

Whether offspring monitoring occurs through the jo

operations center or by principal staff cells, one mi

conclude that contemporary operations ought to be dec

tralized. With so many elements, only decentralization p

vides flexibility to react quickly and exploit fleeting opp

tunities. Joint Vision 2010 suggests this possibility:

The implications of improved systems integration are both

profound and complex. New technologies will allow increase

capability at lower echelons to control more lethal forces over large

areas, thus leveraging skills and initiative of individuals and sma

units. These capabilities could empower a degree of independen

maneuver, planning, and coordination at lower echelons, which

were normally exercised by more senior commanders in the past. 38

In turn, decentralization may permit joint force comma

ers to field smaller staff elements, as the demands up

the staff to “control” operations lessen.

One requirement levied through decentralized ope

tions arises as a need for networked information exchan

between operational elements, support elements, and s

elements. Morgan describes two means of making syne

and integration occur between offspring. One method 

volves writing requirements into the cord relationshi

Under Keidel’s organizational structure theory in table 

this notion of writing requirements appears to fit a “C

trol” technique leading to “Programmed Interaction” w

“Sequential” work and information flow. These relati

ships were rejected earlier in favor of the “Cooperati

technique which allows “Spontaneous Interaction” and “

ciprocal” work and information flow. A “bumblebee” me

phor supports the latter technique, permitting free inf

mation flow and interaction.

One practical example of a “bumblebee” is a liaison o

cer. Because the liaison works for the sending unit, t

unit can also require the liaison to coordinate with mu

ple agencies, moving from unit to unit (plant to plant) 

the operations area. In another example, support flig

from the United States to the theater may perform a bu

blebee function by carrying essential materiel and pers
nel. Military forces seem predisposed to carry as ma

people and things as possible into the theater. This a

tude proves wasteful. In the future, a first response ou

to involve liaison bumblebees and electronic connectiv

for all elements that need not physically reside in theate

The spider plant metaphor offers an example of pict

ing the joint task force as a collection of discrete elemen

By viewing each element and its relationship to the par

plant as a separate and unique occurrence, planners m

recognize ways to streamline the staff by leaving so

elements at home. Defining these relationships also he

determine missions for each discrete element, which sho

allow leaders to better decide how many personnel sho

deploy rather than the typical response of taking everyo

and sorting out the situation on the ground. Moving aw

from the spider plant, a quite different way to view 

joint task force involves using a “brain” analogy.

Brain Metaphor

In another metaphor to describe a modern organizati

Morgan reports, “Organizations are information system

They are communication systems. And they are decisi

making systems. We can thus go a long way toward und

standing them as information processing brains.” 39 T

particular metaphor proves useful in assessing relati

ships between the joint task force core staff and ot

elements.

Two Hemispheres. The brain’s two hemispheres sh

one shell. They perform complementary functions. If 

corpus callosum that joins the hemispheres is severed, 

brain continues to perform but integrated functioning 

lost.40 For example, language functions typically reside 

the left hemisphere. A picture presented to the right 

will cross to the left hemisphere and can be verbally iden

fied. A picture presented to the left eye crosses into 

right hemisphere, which is language deficient. Upon qu

tioning, the subject will not be able to identify the obj

presented to the left eye. This example illustrates a pot

tial pitfall in separating the two hemispheres of the c

staff, the future and current operations sections. Assu

that situational awareness represents language capac
The current operations section acts as the left hemisph

and controls situational awareness. Important informat

presented to the future operations section may mean no

ing because that section lacks capacity for situational awa

ness when separated from current operations.

At a minimum, future operations and current ope

tions staffs should be located, as far as possible, wit

one open facility. Joint Vision 2010 suggests one driver 

this arrangement: “Real-time information will likely dr

parallel, not sequential, planning and real-time, not pre

ranged, decisionmaking.”41 Only when these two hemisphe

of the joint task force brain fully integrate can mod

joint task forces realize the synergy afforded by the revo

tion in military affairs. Ultimately, if the Joint Vision 20

prediction comes true, these two sections will merge i

one unit.

Under a three-tiered planning and execution model, 

ture plans conducts midrange to far-term planning, fut

operations conducts near-term planning, and current 

erations monitors execution and conducts reactive pl

ning. This model epitomizes linear planning and executi

To capitalize on technological advances and promises 

faster tempo operations, this linearity must change. O

means to initiate this change is through collocation 

future and current operations. Future operations plann

must maintain up-to-the-minute situational awareness 

produce viable plans that seamlessly meld with curr

operations.

An inverse relationship exists for the current operatio

staff. These personnel, who conduct reactive planning d

ing operations, benefit from insight about the future 

erations under consideration. This insight may permit 

active planning to lead the operations into a natural blend

with future operations plans.

The present, separated physical design leads to “C

trol” characterizations under Keidel’s theory, which incl

“Programmed Interactions” and “Sequential” informat

flows. The desired relationship, “Spontaneous Interacti

with “Reciprocal” work and information flows, occurs wh

both hemispheres habitually share one shell.
Nervous Systems. James Schneider, professor of m

tary theory at the School of Advanced Military Stud

observed in a recent article that “command and staff pr

esses are basically poor models of the brain and nervo

system.”42 In the human body, the brain acts through 

central and peripheral nervous systems. These syste

receive information from the periphery and act upon 

When compared to a military organization, the exter

elements beyond the future and current operations cent

(brain) represent the input agents sending signals to a

receiving information from the brain. As noted with 

spider plant metaphor, multitudes of external eleme

exist in contemporary operations.

The brain possesses a capacity to rapidly signal 

body through a vast network of nerve cells. Emergenc

often demand flash responses from reflexes through

the body. In these cases, critical information hastens to 

locations. Modern information technology provides ca

bility to achieve that same effect throughout a disper

organization.

Morgan describes this capability using a hologram an

ogy: “Information technology also has holographic char

teristics in that it has the capacity to spread informat

and intelligence throughout a system so that people can 

integrated even though they are far apart, because th

possess the knowledge and intelligence to act on behal

the whole.”43 Organizations networked by informat

technologies can mimic the nervous system and deve

capacities to respond quickly and with unity of effort.

One limitation to implementing the brain model lies 

hierarchical mind-sets. Rapid, flexible response occurs o

when information travels directly from the “senses” to 

location most needing the information. Conventional s

structures potentially limit information sharing by slow

information flow or blocking it altogether.

A related issue deals with having the authority to 

spond when information reveals a need to act quickly. 

the nervous system, certain stimuli cause immediate 

sponses, before the brain even processes the signal. P

reactions offer one example. Military organizations co

benefit from adopting a similar technique—decentrali
decision making. Such responses capitalize upon fleet

opportunities, achieving the promise of the revolution 

military affairs.

Professor Schneider discusses the potential for a fo

to act autonomously: “A joint force . . . may suffer co

plete cybernetic collapse—the analog to a broken neck—

spontaneously reorganize at lower echelons and contin

with its mission. The efficacy of the German idea of auft

staktik is based on the self-organizing ability of subordin

leaders and units.”44 Military decentralization, based up

a mission statement, commander’s intent, and end sta

permits speed and flexibility and also limits depende

upon critical nodes.

Military leaders often shy away from decentralizat

because such operations tend to become disorderly—a

the military abhors disorder. Complexity theory sugge

that order emerges from seeming chaos if we look for 

Keidel lends perspective to this concern by relating 

triadic variables—control, cooperation, and order—to ch

and complexity. “In short, complexity theory argues t

there is a third realm, complexity, or the ‘edge of chaos’ t

represents a transition state between order and chaos. . . 

terms of triangular design, complexity parallels cooperat

order parallels control, and chaos parallels autonomy

Decentralized operations, favoring cooperation over p

autonomy, hover at the edge of chaos. While staffs strive 

hold operations closer to complexity than chaos, th

should remain flexible in cases where autonomy becom

necessary, recognizing that elements will self-organize 

meet new demands.

Morgan’s metaphors offer powerful tools with which 

examine organizations and seek fresh understandings 

their dynamics. Two metaphors—the spider plant a

brain—provide value in assessing relationships betwee

core element and many peripheral elements. At the he

of this discussion lies the promise of information techno

gies, upon which staff interactions may move to new lev

of cooperation.

Creativity remains essential for change and impro

ment. In Classics of Organizational Theory, James Cham

and Michael Hammer describe the modernization proce
“Reengineering is about innovation. It is about exploit

the latest capabilities of technology to achieve entirely n

goals. One of the hardest parts of reengineering lies 

recognizing the new unfamiliar capabilities of technol

instead of its familiar ones.”46 Military reorganization, 

ing the spider plant and brain metaphors and embrac

enabling technologies, demonstrates essential creativity a

yields two benefits for future war fighting: faster, m

responsive operations and leaner structures.

Reorganization Benefits

With exponentially exploding technology in weapons and our

ability to process information, the ability to optimize the com -

mand and control structure will take on even greater impor -

tance. Herein lies one of the great challenges we face in the

continuing development of joint doctrine. We must optimize a

commander’s ability to focus a growing resource base while

enhancing his ability to deal with an increasingly complex set

of tasks and conditions.

—Gen C. C. Krulak 

Reorganizing JTF staffs with a more direct relations

between elements offers several benefits. First, operatio

become faster when streamlining eliminates layers m

obsolete through technology and new operational conce

Second, leaner structures enhance force protection by lo

ering the number of personnel, agencies, boards, and c

ters (targets) in a theater. Finally, the restructured s

permits decentralized decision making and information sh

ing needed for Joint Vision 2010.

Faster, More Responsive Operations

Information technologies promise faster and more 

sponsive operations. This effect will follow from decentr

ized decision making resulting from such capabilities 

cooperative engagement targeting, sensor-to-shooter rep

ing, in-transit visibility, and so on. These capabilities eli

nate the need for some layers presently arrayed in 

military command and control structure (for example, c

trol and reporting centers or intermediate logistics nodes). 

ditionally, networked information sharing will permit quic
operational support through near-real-time agency in

actions.

Decentralized Decision Making. Increasing volume

current military literature call for decentralized decis

making. Modern military thinking emphasizes getting 

side an enemy’s decision cycle (Col John R. Boyd’s 

serve, orient, decide, act loop47) through faster tempo. 

erarchical organizations cannot achieve decision spe

necessary to achieve this goal, especially in very dynam

and chaotic MOOTW scenarios. Two distinguished US M

tary Academy personnel, Lt Gen Howard Graves (form

superintendent) and Don Snider (Olin Professor of N

tional Security Studies), commented on this issue in su

MOOTW missions as Somalia: “Most OOTW missions h

also called for decentralized mission execution. This d

persion requires greater political-military sophistication 

younger officers, to include direct contact with the med

nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governmen

as well as coping with the inherent ambiguities and co

plexities of such international operations.”48

Using the spider plant metaphor, offspring require auth

ity to act without need for consultation with the par

plant. Predefined arrangements, such as rules of enga

ment, a shared sense of overall vision and values, a

agreement on accountabilities, provide the basis for at-t

scene decision making. Unpredictable situations like MOO

require maximum latitude for military personnel in cont

with the local population. In an environment of weak 

nonexistent government and law enforcement, military p

sonnel need freedom for rapid response in potential ca

drons of volatile activity. Freedom of action permits sp

and flexibility to achieve Joint Vision 2010 goals of do

nant maneuver and precision engagement.

Through the improved situational awareness provid

by the common operating picture, field units can bet

locate gaps or weaknesses and exploit dominant man

ver.49 This maneuver may occur in a classic war-fight

sense to interject forces between adversaries in a pe

operation or to act in a supporting role for humanitar

assistance relief distribution. In dispersed operations l

MOOTW, many military elements move in a large ar
Each element needs decision-making independence for do

nant maneuver. Intervening agencies between units a

an operations center add little value for rapid operations

Likewise, a force seeking to engage a fleeting target 

quires instant response. Direct communication from s

sor to shooter proves essential for precision engagemen

mobile targets. Intervening command layers slow the tra

fer of perishable information. For targets of opportun

encountered by the force, decentralized decision mak

permits rapid and flexible engagement.

Information Decentralization. Besides decision m

ing, commanders must also decentralize information. T

value in this arrangement was previously discussed 

dominant maneuver and precision engagement. Howev

information decentralization also enables the other two Jo

Vision 2010 concepts: focused logistics and full-dim

sional protection.

Focused logistics benefit from networked users and su

pliers. Wal-Mart provides a superb example of this conc

within the civilian sector.

Wal-Mart has developed a significant competitive edge by reducin

its cost of sales to two to three percentage points below th

industry average. Wal-Mart was able to achieve this edge b

making the shift to network-centric operations and translatin

information superiority into competitive advantage. Realizing that i

had grown past the point where it could cost-effectively synchroniz

supply and demand from the top down, the company over time se

up a sophisticated operational architecture—consisting of 

sensory capability and a transaction grid—to generate a highe

level of awareness within its retail ecosystem. Point-of-sal

scanners—part of the sensor grid—collect information on the 9

million transactions that take place each week. This information i

shared with suppliers in near real time, so they are able to bette

control production and distribution, as well as manage their own

supply chains. . . . This degree of self-synchronization emerged

from the co-evolution of organization and process. 50

Military forces could benefit from such a direct, respons

support system. An essential component lies in decentr

ized, networked information throughout the operations ar

Military forces today place increased emphasis on fo

protection. Success requires both decentralized inform

tion and decision making. All forces engaged in protect

operations need the most current situational awarene

as well as direct cueing from sensors whenever possib
Considering air-to-surface and surface-to-surface mis

speeds, force-protection forces must operate with a h

degree of autonomy. Excessive layering in this miss

could result in dead Americans and mission failure. Jam

Champy and Michael Hammer, authors of an article ab

technology’s enabling role in reorganization, offer one vi

“The costs of hierarchical decisionmaking, however, 

now too high to bear. Modern database technology allo

information previously available only to management to 

widely accessible.”51

Military forces must capitalize on the speed and resp

siveness generated by information technology. Hierarch

and “stove-pipes” prevent realization of Joint Vision 20

Conversely, operational benefits of reorganizing joint t

force staffs using the spider plant and brain metaph

results in faster, more responsive operations.

Leaner Structures

Another benefit of joint task force staff reorganizat

emerges as leaner structures. Deploying fewer personne

a theater potentially reduces risk, assuming that pers

nel left at home are not the force-protection or secu

elements. Smaller “footprints” conserve resources all arou

and also reduce personnel tempo. Leaner structures oc

by eliminating elements without direct troop or asset c

trol, using reach-back capability for routine support, a

eliminating intervening command and control agencies.

Reduced Layers. “Organizations are rarely establish

as ends in themselves. They are instruments created 

achieve other ends. This is reflected in the origins of 

word organization, which derives from the Greek organ

meaning a tool or instrument.”52 One of the great milit

challenges lies in eliminating unnecessary command a

staff layers. The military must grapple with such very r

issues as how to train and evaluate commanders with

command opportunities at various ranks. Additionally, 

military places great value in “real-world” operational 

perience—which tends to unnaturally swell staff sizes. 

reorganize successfully, the military must escape 

bonds of its culture, and make hard choices about exac

what staff structure best meets future needs.
Technology permits increased span of control and wi

coordination between elements, thereby obviating a n

for any element that lacks a direct role in operations. T

most obvious place to test this theory is within land forc

These forces use many layers to reduce span of contro

between three and five elements per command level. Su

hierarchical layering will likely be detrimental for fut

rapid decision making, and would be pointless for inf

mation sharing in a highly networked environment. T

civilian sector has already noted this by-product of 

vanced technology: “Information technology, used ima

natively, has eliminated the need for separate, fully form

field units with their own overheads. . . . Wireless d

communication goes further and begins to eliminate 

need for field offices entirely.”53

Telecommunications offer reach-back capabilities fr

theater to a home station. Support and services can n

be coordinated without carrying an entire organization 

the operations area. Gareth Morgan describes this en

ronment:

As information technology catapults us into the reality of an

Einsteinian world where old structures and forms of organization

dissolve and at times become almost invisible, the old approach n

longer works. Through the use of telephone, fax, electronic mail

computers, video, and other information technology, people an

their organizations are becoming disembodied. They can act as i

they are completely connected while remaining far apart. They can

have an instantaneous global presence. They can transcen

traditional barriers of space and time, continually creating an

recreating themselves through changing networks of interconnection

based on “real time” communication.54

Using the spider plant metaphor, a joint task force co

“create and recreate” itself in each phase of an operati

based upon the capabilities and services it needed th

From the outset, some offspring would collocate with 

parent plant, but others—perhaps many others—could 

main home. Regardless of location, the cord arrangeme

would still exist between elements. This vision deman

trust from commanders, a belief that elements not un

physical control will respond with the same urgency a

deployed.

Fewer Command and Control Agencies. In addition 

savings from eliminated headquarters and nondeplo
staff elements, further savings may result from redu

command and control (C2

) agencies. Presently, C2 agenc

provide functional planning, supervision, and assista

to joint task force elements. Aviation command and cont

provides an example. Aircraft flying in support of grou

forces may be required to communicate with as many 

four agencies en route to the terminal controller. 55 T

pilot first checks out with his local organization as 

departs the field. Then he clears through air traffic cont

until away from the traffic pattern. Next, the pilot cle

with the local air defense/air control agency that ensu

safe passage through friendly air defenses. Finally, 

pilot talks to the air support coordinating agency, wh

then directs him to a terminal controller. No single agen

provides overall command and control of air operatio

each is subordinate to a command center. Military for

leveraging new technologies ought to be able to comb

these agencies and streamline operations significantly. S

eral spider plant offspring graft together to form a n

smaller offspring. Subsequent savings also reduce risk 

reducing footprint and lowering personnel tempo and co

Logistics organizations may realize similar savings w

capabilities like total asset visibility.

Additional structure savings may accrue from sensor-

shooter technologies that directly link critical element

In situations where fairly clear rules of engagement ex

or where specific threats pose little danger, certain ag

cies may not be needed. For example, in a low aircra

threat environment, agencies that oversee ground-ba

air defense units may not be needed. Combat air patr

may provide adequate defense from “air-breathing” thre

Thus, ground-based air defenses may provide only mis

defense, which presents much clearer engagement crite

or rules of engagement and therefore eliminates a need 

a supervising coordination agency. This modified struct

reduces footprint and conserves resources.

Technology advances such as the common operatio

picture may also eliminate some redundant C2

 agencies 

allowing all services to share a picture. Previously, so

agencies deployed in order to translate computerized inf

mation for other agencies. As an example, the Marine t
tical air operations center provides a capability to transl

a data link—NATO Link 1—to and from forces that la

the proper equipment. Whether or not the agency w

needed from a command and control perspective, it h

deployed simply to serve as a data-link conduit. 57 T

common operational picture will permit timely and dir

situational awareness for all, rather than only those w

highly specialized equipment.

Many benefits accrue from redesigning the JTF st

Rising highest among these is the capability to cond

faster, more responsive operations—both for combat a

for support. In fact, only by reorganizing will joint ta

forces achieve the objectives set forth in Joint Vision 20

An additional benefit is risk reduction through fewer 

sets deployed to theater. Fewer deploying forces may a

translate to reduced personnel tempo. A smaller footpr

in theater results in resource conservation and this tra

lates to fiscal savings as well. Finally, reducing deploy

forces enhances the military’s ability to respond to mu

ple, simultaneous operations.

Abundant reasons exist to redesign joint task force sta

The challenge now arises in convincing the military “

guard” to relinquish many long-held conceptions and c

tural norms. “Admiral William A. Owens, the former V

Chairman, indicated that ‘the problem with deep, fast, a

rampant innovation is not getting people to accept the n

but to relinquish the old.’ ” 58 The military must move 

yond rhetoric about change and implement it. Restruct

ing joint task force staffs provides a great starting point.

Conclusion

New conditions require . . . new and imaginative methods.

Wars are never won in the past.

—Gen Douglas MacArthur 

Five recommendations emerge from this study. Fi

the unified commanders must demand that services 

ploit information technologies to provide reliable rea

back capabilities. With such capabilities, serious disc

sion and experimentation can begin with respect to wh

staff elements really need to deploy. Some staff eleme
can provide service from the United States, and this 

rangement ought to become the normal situation. Bene

include risk reduction and cost reduction —both monet

and personnel.

Second, unified commanders must insist that joint tra

ing include decentralized operations in order to deve

confidence among leaders at all levels. Senior leaders

must begin to trust junior leaders to conduct success

operations without close control and monitoring. Jun

leaders must develop self-confidence in an environmen

decreased control, and they must learn to open communi

tion upwards without fears of overcontrol by seniors. T

change requires cultural shifts from “control” and “order

“cooperation” and “complexity.” Without this change, Jo

Vision 2010 remains a dream without substance.

Third, unified commanders must compel services to 

vest in information technologies until information netwo

span the battle space. Decentralized operations will l

potential without the capability to share a common ope

tional picture. Additionally, joint training in lateral inf

mation sharing must occur regularly. Only when all for

are interconnected can true synergy and cooperation occu

Fourth, unified commanders must insist that stream

ing of military structures occurs. This aspect likely po

the most painful and contentious issue for services to u

dertake. Hierarchical structures are inefficient for the en

ronment envisioned and must be eliminated.

Fifth, unified commanders must train with plann

and execution cells occupying the same spaces and op

ating as one staff. With increased information flows a

the common operational picture, parallel planning a

execution can become a reality. This real-time decis

making will be needed to meet goals of dominant man

ver and precision engagement.

“If the motives for change are present, and if failing 

implement effective responses to change risks national d

aster, why do militaries not implement effective chan

and how much of this failure is the responsibility of co

manders?”59 As US war fighters, unified commanders m

move Joint Vision 2010 from concept to practice. T

nation can no longer afford the status quo. The time w
never be better to redesign joint task force staffs for a n

millennium.

Notes

1. Lt Col Jay M. Parker, “Change and the Operational Command

Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 10 (Winter 1995–96): 92.

2. Lt Gen Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, “Emergence of 

Joint Officer,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 55.

3. Scott M. Fabbri and Adam B. Siegel, “JTF Operations f

1983–93” (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993), 9.

4. “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorr

Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 12 (Summer 1996): 35.

5. Adm Jay L. Johnson, “The Navy in Joint Vision 2010: A J

Vision,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 14 (Winter 1996–97): 19.

6. Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s G

1997 (Norfolk, Va.: Armed Forces Staff College, 1997), 2–45.

7. Maj Michael D. Wykoff, “Shrinking the JTF Staff: Can We Red

The Footprint Ashore?” (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advan

Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1996), 43.

8. Lt Gen John H. Cushman, Thoughts for Joint Commanders 

napolis, Md.: John H. Cushman, August 1993), 15.

9. AFSC Pub 1, 3–2.

10. Vice Adm Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Garstka, “Netwo

Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” US Naval Institute Proceed

124 (January 1998): 32.

11. Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communicati

and Computer (C4

) Systems Support to Joint Operations (Washing

D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, 1995), I–4.

12. Field Manual 7-30, The Infantry Brigade (Washington, D.C.: H

quarters, Department of the Army, 1994), 3–6 to 3–8.

13. Gerald W. Hopple, “Air Force Command and Control: Assessm

Criteria for Computer Based Decision Aiding Systems,” 103, and Anth

J. Bohannan, “C3I in Support of the Land Commander,” 183, in Pr

ples of Command and Control, edited by Vice Adm Jon L. Boyes and 

Stephen J. Andriole (Washington, D.C.: AFCEA/Signal Magazine, 198

14. Joint Pub 0-2, IV–11.

15. Lt Col Gregory A. Roman, “The Command or Control Dilem

When Technology and Organizational Orientation Collide,” Maxwell P

No. 8 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1997), 15.

16. Joint Pub 0-2, IV-10-11.

17. Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Pe

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992), 179.

18. AFSC Pub 1, 3–2.

19. “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorr

41.

20. AFSC Pub 1, 3–2.

21. Joint Pub 0-2, IV-14.

22. Ibid.
23. Cebrowski and Garstka, 32.

24. AFSC Pub 1, 2–50.

25. “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorr

48.

26. Robert W. Keidel, Seeing Organizational Patterns: A New Th

and Language of Organizational Design (San Francisco, Calif.: Ber

Koehler Publishers, 1995), 6.

27. Ibid., 7.

28. Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization, 2d ed. (Thousand O

Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997), 4–5.

29. Ibid., 16–17.

30. Gareth Morgan, Imagination: New Mindsets for Seeing, Organiz

and Managing (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997), 78.

31. Ibid., 77.

32. Wykoff, 23–24.

33. Fabbri and Siegel, 10.

34. Ibid., 108–09.

35. Ibid., 126.

36. Ibid., 181.

37. AFSC Pub 1, 2–39 to 2-40.

38. “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorr

40.

39. Morgan, Images of Organization, 78–79.

40. Dr. Eric Chudler, “Neuroscience for Kids – Hemispheres;” on-

Internet, 26 September 1997. Available from http://weber.u.wash

ton.edu/~chudler/split.html.

41. “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorr

41.

42. James J. Schneider, “Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity and 

Promise of Information Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 15 (Sp

1997): 23.

43. Morgan, Imagination, 10.

44. Schneider, 28.

45. Keidel, 137.

46. James Champy and Michael Hammer, “Reengineering the Co

ration: The Enabling Role of Information Technology;” reprinted as es

no. 48 by Steven J. Ott and Jay M. Shafritz, Classics of Organizati

Theory, 4th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), 60

47. Col John R. Boyd, “Organic Design for Command and Contro

Discourse on Winning and Losing, unpublished briefing papers, 

1987, 7.

48. Graves and Snider, 55.

49. “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorr

42–43.

50. Cebrowski and Garstka, 30.

51. Champy and Hammer, 614.

52. Morgan, Images of Organization, 15.

53. Champy and Hammer, 613–14.

54. Morgan, Imagination, 8.
55. Personal experience of the author at the Marine Tactical Air 

erations Center (1984–89) and Marine Tactical Air Command Ce

(1993–94).

56. “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorr

42.

57. Personal experience of the author, 1984–89 and 1993–94.

58. Capt James Stavridis, “The Second Revolution,” Joint Fo

Quarterly, no. 15 (Spring 1997): 13.

59. Parker, 91.

Appendix

JTF Integrated Staff Cells

PERSONNEL

Joint Reception Center

EPW Management Board

Joint Awards Board

MWR Commission

INTELLIGENCE

Joint Intelligence Center

or Support Element

National Intelligence Support Team

Joint Collections Board/SARC

Joint Crypto Resource Board

Joint Reserve Intelligence Center

Joint Interrogation Facility

Joint Document Exploitation Center

OPERATIONS

Force Fires Planning/Coordination Center

Joint Targeting Coordination Board

Combat Operations Center

Future Operations Cell

Rear Area Operations Center

Civil-Military Operations Center

Security Assessment Team

Doctrine and Documentation Cell

JULLS Team

Special Operations Team

Joint Search and Rescue Center

LOGISTICS

Joint Movement Control Center

Joint Aviation Log Support Board

Joint Material Priority Allocation Board

Joint Mortuary Affairs Board

Joint Contracting Board

Joint Petroleum Board

Joint Facilities Utilization Board

Joint Logistics Coordination Board

Logistics Readiness Center

33
PLANS

Future Plans Cell

Operational Planning Team

Political-Military Group

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command Coordination Cell

Joint Communication Control Center

MEDICAL

Joint Disease Control Board

Joint Medical Control Board

Health Service Support Board

Joint Blood Program Office

Joint Patient Movement Request Center

OTHER

ROE Commission

Joint Information Bureau

Information Management Technical Advisory/Analysi

Board

Joint Visitors Bureau

34
Definitions of Terms Used in

Joint Vision 2010

Dominant maneuver. Dominant maneuver will be 

multidimensional application of information, enga

ment, and mobility capabilities to position and e

ploy widely dispersed joint land, sea, air, and sp

forces to accomplish assigned operational tas

Dominant maneuver will allow our forces to gain 

decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, dep

and height of the battle space.

Precision engagement. Precision engagement will con

of a system of systems that enables our forces 

locate an objective or target, provide responsive co

mand and control, generate the desired effect, ass

the level of success, and retain the flexibility to re

gage with precision when required. Even from 

tended ranges, precision engagement will allow us 

shape battle space, enhancing the protection of 

forces.

Full-dimensional protection. The primary prerequi

for full-dimensional protection will be control of 

battlespace to ensure forces can maintain freedom 

action during deployment, maneuver, and enga

ment, while providing multilayered defenses for for

and facilities at all levels. Full-dimensional protect

will enable effective employment of our forces wh

degrading opportunities for an enemy. It will be 

sential, in most cases, for gaining and maintain

the initiative required to execute decisive operatio

The concept will be proactive, incorporating both 

fensive and defensive actions that may extend w

into areas of enemy operations.

Focused logistics. Focused logistics will be the fusion 

information, logistics, and transportation techno

gies to provide rapid crisis response, to track a

shift assets even while en route, and to deliver t

lored logistics packages and sustainment directly 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of ope

tions. It will be fully adaptive to the needs of o

increasingly dispersed and mobile forces, provid

support in hours or days versus weeks. Focus

35
logistics will enable joint forces of the future to 

more mobile, versatile, and projectable from anywh

in the world.

Full-spectrum dominance. Each of these operational c

cepts will reinforce the others and will allow us 

achieve massed effects in warfare from more d

persed forces—that is, taken together these four n

concepts will enable us to dominate the full range 

military operations from humanitarian assistan

through peace operations, up to and into the high

intensity conflict.

36
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