2018 IL 121995 

IN THE
 

SUPREME COURT
 

OF
 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
 

(Docket No. 121995) 

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Appellee, v. 

MARK E. LASKOWSKI et al. (Pacific Realty Group, LLC, Appellant). 

Opinion filed January 19, 2018. 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and 

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The issue we must decide is whether Pacific Realty Group, LLC, timely filed its 

motion to quash service. We hold that it did. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On June 11, 2010, in its capacity as the trustee for certain certificate holders of 

an alternative loan trust, the Bank of New York Mellon (the Bank) filed a 

residential mortgage foreclosure complaint against Mark Laskowski, Pacific 

Realty Group, LLC (Pacific), and others in Will County circuit court. In July 2010, 

the Bank filed an affidavit for service by publication stating that, after a due 

diligence search, it was unable to locate or serve Pacific. The Bank’s search 

included both directory assistance records and the Illinois Secretary of State’s 

business registration records. After service by publication was made, Pacific failed 

to appear or otherwise respond to the complaint. In July 2012, the trial court entered 

an order of default and a judgment of foreclosure. In the judgment, the trial court 

made a specific finding that service of process was properly made as to Pacific. In 

February 2013, the subject property was sold at a sheriff’s sale. 

¶ 4 In April 2013, the Bank filed a motion requesting an order approving the report 

of the sale of the property and the proposed distribution of the proceeds, as well as 

an order of possession. The motion was noticed up for April 18, 2013, and on that 

date Pacific’s attorney showed up for the first time and filed an appearance. 

However, because the Bank failed to appear, the trial court on its own motion 

dismissed the Bank’s case for want of prosecution (DWP). Shortly thereafter, the 

Bank moved to vacate the DWP. On May 30, 2013, the trial court granted the 

Bank’s motion and reinstated the case. 

¶ 5 On July 18, 2013, Pacific filed a motion to quash service of process. The motion 

alleged that Pacific is a foreign LLC registered in New Mexico and that it does not 

have a registered agent in Illinois. According to Pacific, this means that service by 

publication was improper because section 1-50 of the Limited Liability Company 

Act (805 ILCS 180/1-50 (West 2010)) does not allow an unregistered foreign LLC 

to be served in that manner. In May 2014, the trial court denied Pacific’s motion. In 

doing so, the trial court first found that the motion was untimely because it was 

filed more than 60 days after Pacific filed its appearance in the case. See 735 ILCS 

5/15-1505.6(a) (West 2012). The trial court also denied the motion on the merits, 

holding that service by publication was proper. The trial court subsequently entered 

an order approving the report of the sheriff’s sale and the proposed distribution of 

the proceeds. 

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¶ 6 Pacific appealed, and a divided appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 

decision denying Pacific’s motion. 2017 IL App (3d) 140566. On appeal, Pacific 

argued both that its motion to quash service was timely and that it should have been 

granted on the merits. The appellate court majority began with the timeliness 

question, citing section 15-1505.6(a) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law 

(735 ILCS 5/15-1505.6(a) (West 2012)). In relevant part, that section states that, 

“unless extended by the court for good cause shown,” the deadline for filing a 

motion to quash service in a residential foreclosure case is “60 days after *** the 

date that the moving party filed an appearance.” Id. § 15-1505.6(a)(i). The majority 

explained that, although Pacific filed its appearance on April 18, 2013, it did not 

file its motion to quash service until July 18, 2013, which was nearly 90 days later. 

2017 IL App (3d) 140566, ¶ 16. As importantly, Pacific did not seek or obtain an 

extension of the 60-day deadline “for good cause,” as section 15-1505.6(a) allows. 

Id. Consequently, the majority held, Pacific’s motion to quash was clearly 

untimely, and the trial court was correct to deny it as such. Id. As a final matter, the 

majority stated that, because it affirmed the trial court’s finding that Pacific’s 

motion was untimely, it “need not address *** whether the service by publication 

on Pacific in this case was proper.” Id. ¶ 17. 

¶ 7 Justice Holdridge dissented. His position was that, under the principles 

announced by this court in Case v. Galesburg Cottage Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 207 

(2007), “the 60-day deadline for contesting service could not have applied” while 

the case was DWP. 2017 IL App (3d) 140566, ¶ 23 (Holdridge, J., dissenting). 

Rather, that deadline began to run only when the case was reinstated, which 

occurred on May 30, 2013. Id. Pacific’s motion to quash therefore was timely, as it 

was filed 49 days later, on July 18, 2013. Id. 

¶ 8 We granted Pacific’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 

2016)). 

¶ 9 DISCUSSION 

¶ 10 In this court, Pacific raises the same two arguments that it raised in the appellate 

court below. First, Pacific argues that its motion to quash service was timely. 

Second, Pacific argues that its motion to quash service should have been granted 

because service by publication was improper in this case. We will begin with the 

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timeliness question. 

¶ 11 Timeliness 

¶ 12 Pacific’s timeliness argument raises a question of statutory interpretation, and 

the principles governing such inquiries are familiar and well settled. The cardinal 

rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s 

intent. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 15. The most reliable indicator of 

legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary 

meaning. Id. That said, a court also will presume that the legislature did not intend 

absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Id. Consequently, where a plain or literal 

reading of a statute renders such results, the literal reading should yield. Id. The 

construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. 

¶ 13 The statute at issue is section 15-1505.6(a) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure 

Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1505.6(a) (West 2012)). In relevant part, that section provides 

that: 

“In any residential foreclosure action, the deadline for filing a motion to *** 

quash service of process *** unless extended by the court for good cause 

shown, is 60 days after the earlier of these events: (i) the date that the moving 

party filed an appearance; or (ii) the date that the moving party participated in a 

hearing without filing an appearance.” Id. 

Here, it is undisputed that Pacific filed its motion to quash service on July 18, 2013, 

which was approximately 90 days after it filed its appearance. The question for us is 

whether the 60-day statutory clock continued to run while the Bank’s case was 

DWP. Pacific insists that it did not because, as long as the case was DWP, there was 

neither reason nor opportunity for Pacific to file a motion to quash service. In 

support, and like the dissent below, Pacific relies principally upon this court’s 

decision in Case. The Bank, by contrast, argues that section 15-1505.6(a) is “clear 

and unambiguous” in stating that, unless extended by the court for good cause, the 

deadline for filing a motion to quash service in a residential foreclosure action is 60 

days after the moving party files its appearance. Here, the court did not extend the 

60-day deadline, and Pacific filed its motion approximately 90 days after filing its 

appearance. Thus, the Bank argues, there is no question that Pacific’s motion was 

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untimely, and this court does not have to look any further than the plain language of 

the statute to reach this obvious conclusion. 

¶ 14 For two reasons, we agree with Pacific. To begin with, the plain language of 

section 15-1505.6(a) supports the conclusion that the 60-day clock is tolled while 

the underlying case is DWP. In relevant part, section 15-1505.6(a) states that, “[i]n 

any residential foreclosure action,” the deadline for filing a motion to quash service 

of process is 60 days after the moving party files its appearance. Id. The key phrase 

here is “[i]n any residential foreclosure action,” because that phrase expressly 

defines the setting in which the passage of time will be measured. Needless to say, 

60 days cannot pass in a residential foreclosure action if no such action is pending. 

Nor can a party comply with the statutory filing deadline in the absence of an active 

case, even if it wanted to. Thus, to suggest that Pacific was still on the clock even 

when the Bank’s case was DWP is to suggest the impossible, both conceptually and 

practically. The legislature’s use of the phrase “[i]n any residential foreclosure 

action” clearly reflects this reality, and we therefore reject the Bank’s contention 

that the 60-day deadline was unaffected by the dismissal of the Bank’s case. 

¶ 15 As Pacific correctly points out, this conclusion finds solid support in our 

decision in Case. In Case, the plaintiffs filed a negligence complaint on April 25, 

2003. Case, 227 Ill. 2d at 209. A month later, on May 20, 2003, the plaintiffs 

voluntarily dismissed that complaint pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2006)). Case, 227 Ill. 2d at 210. 

Almost one year later, on April 12, 2004, the plaintiffs refiled their complaint 

pursuant to section 13-217 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2006)). Case, 

227 Ill. 2d at 210. Section 13-217 provides that, where a plaintiff voluntarily 

dismisses a timely filed complaint, that plaintiff has either one year or the 

remaining limitations period, whichever is greater, to refile the action. By April 26, 

2004, the plaintiffs had obtained service of process on all of the defendants. Id. The 

defendants later filed a motion to dismiss under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) 

(eff. July 1, 1997), arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exercise reasonable 

diligence in obtaining service of process. Case, 227 Ill. 2d at 211. After a hearing, 

the trial court held that the plaintiffs had violated Rule 103(b), in that it took the 

plaintiffs almost one year after the initial filing to obtain service on the defendants, 

despite the fact the defendants were all local health care providers with readily 

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ascertained locations. Id. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case 

with prejudice. Id. 

¶ 16 In reversing the trial court’s decision, this court explained that “the pendency of 

an action that a defendant argues is delayed is central to any determination of 

whether a passage of time should be considered for purposes of Rule 103(b).” Id. at 

217. Further, the court explained that 

“[t]he requirement of a pending action against which to measure diligence is 

rooted in simple logic. If an action is dismissed, and not pending, there is no 

reason to serve a defendant with process. As such, there is nothing to delay, and 

nothing to be diligent about.” Id. 

Accordingly, the court concluded by holding that “the time that elapses between the 

dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint and its refiling pursuant to section 13-217 is not 

to be considered by a court when ruling on a motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 

103(b).” Id. at 222. 

¶ 17 The same logic that controlled Case controls here. Again, before 60 days can 

pass “[i]n any residential foreclosure action,” such an action necessarily must be 

pending. And unless such an action is pending, there is neither cause nor occasion 

to file a motion contesting the plaintiff’s service of process. Accordingly, we hold 

that the time that elapses between the DWP of a residential mortgage foreclosure 

action and its subsequent reinstatement is not to be counted in determining whether 

a motion to quash service is timely under section 15-1505.6(a). 

¶ 18 Our second reason for agreeing with Pacific is rooted in the principle that, in 

construing the language of a statute, courts will presume that the legislature did not 

intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Pacific’s reading of section 

15-1505.6(a) yields no such results. On the contrary, Pacific’s reading yields an 

entirely sensible and workable result, by which the statutory time period for filing a 

motion to quash service in a residential foreclosure action runs as long as the case is 

pending and ceases to run as long as the case is not pending. By contrast, the Bank’s 

reading of section 15-1505.6(a) yields results that are at once absurd, inconvenient, 

and unjust. The absurdity lies in the prospect of section 15-1505.6(a)’s 60-day 

filing period not only running but also expiring while the underlying case is DWP, 

which is what would have happened here had the order vacating the DWP come 

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just two weeks later than it did. The inconvenience comes in mandating the 

noticing up and filing of a motion to quash service in a case that’s been dismissed, a 

procedural maneuver so unprecedented that the Bank’s own counsel concedes 

“there’s no way to definitively know” how it could be done. Finally, the injustice 

would come in holding that a residential foreclosure defendant is bound by a 

statutory filing deadline with which it is legally impossible to comply, which is 

exactly what we would be saying if we endorsed the Bank’s reading of section 

15-1505.6(a) and held that the 60-day clock continues to run even while the action 

is dismissed. For all of these reasons, we emphatically reject the Bank’s reading of 

section 15-1505.6(a) in favor of that advocated by Pacific and compelled by the 

clear statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. 

¶ 19 The only question that remains on this point is whether Pacific’s motion to 

quash service was in fact timely. We hold that it was. Again, section 15-1505.6(a) 

provides that, in any residential foreclosure action, the deadline for filing a motion 

to quash service of process is “60 days after *** the date that the moving party filed 

an appearance.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1505.6(a)(i) (West 2012). And under our holding 

above, the time that elapses between the DWP of a residential mortgage foreclosure 

action and its subsequent reinstatement is not to be counted in calculating the 

statutory deadline. Here, Pacific filed its appearance on April 18, 2013, which was 

the same date that the trial court dismissed the Bank’s case for want of prosecution. 

This means that, once the DWP was vacated and the Bank’s case reinstated, Pacific 

had 60 days to file its motion to quash service. The trial court’s order vacating the 

DWP and reinstating the Bank’s case was entered on May 30, 2013, and Pacific 

filed its motion 49 days later, on July 18, 2013. This was well within the statutory 

deadline, and we therefore hold that Pacific’s motion to quash service was timely. 

¶ 20 Service by Publication 

¶ 21 Pacific’s other argument is that the trial court should have granted its motion to 

quash service because service by publication was legally improper in this case. As 

discussed above, because it agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Pacific’s 

motion to quash service was untimely, the appellate court below did not reach the 

question of whether service by publication was proper. We therefore remand this 

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case to the appellate court for the consideration of that question in the first instance. 

¶ 22 

¶ 23 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment affirming 

the trial court’s decision finding that Pacific’s motion to quash service was 

untimely, and we remand this cause to the appellate court for consideration of 

whether service by publication was proper in this case. 

¶ 24 

¶ 25 

Appellate court judgment reversed. 

Cause remanded. 

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