### DISS ENT ING OP INION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 36 2- CV IN THE INT EREST OF B.R. Fr om the 224th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CI -09727 Honora ble Antonia Arte ag a, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Dissenting O pinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: May 26, 2010 Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt f ro m pa rt A o f t he ma jor ity op ini on be c a us e the ma

jor ity fa ils to proper ly interpre t section 154.131(c) of the F amily Code. When interpretingstatutes, our primar y conce rn is the L eg islature’s intent as ex presse d by the languag e of the statute. En te rg yGu lf S tates, In c . v . S

um me rs , 282 S.W .3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009); State v. Shumak

e , 1 99 S.W. 3d

27 9, 28 4 ( Te x. 20 06 ). We c on str ue the statut e ’s wo rd s a c c or din g to the ir pla in a nd c omm on me anin g un le ss a

c on tr a ry int e nti on is ap pa re nt fr om t

he c on te xt or

un le ss such a c onstruction leads to nonsensica l or absurd r esults. FKM P’ship, L t d. v. Bd. of Rege nts of Univ. of Houston Sys ., 25 5 S. W.3 d 6 19 , 6 33 (T e x. 20 08 ); see also Flem ing Foods of Tex., Inc . v. Rylander , 6 S.W .3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999). When we interpr et a c ode ena cted by the leg islature, we
rea d words and phrase s in c ontext and construe the m acc ording to the rules of g rammar and common usag e. T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 31 1. 01 1( a ) ( Ve rn on 20 05 ); J on es v . S tate , 175 S.W .3d 927, 930 (Tex. A pp—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Even when a statute is not ambig uous on its fa ce , t h e C ode Con str uc tio n A c t a llo ws a

re vie wi ngc ourt

to c on sid e r o the r m a tte rs in a sc e rt a ini ngle g isl a tiv e int e nt,D i s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 2- including the objective of the law, the leg islative history , and the c onsequenc es of a particula r construction. T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 31 1. 02 3 ( Ve rn on 20 06 ); Helena Chem. Co. v. W ilkins , 47 S.W. 3d 48 6, 49 3 ( Te x. 20 01 ); Shumake , 199 S.W .3d at 284. We m u s t ex am i n e the leg islature’s words in context of t h e s t at u t e as a whole. Ha rri s Co . H os p. Di st. v . To mb all

Re g’ l H os p ., 283 S.W .3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009). Se c tio n 1 60 .6 36 of

the Te xas F a mil y

Cod e a uth or ize s th e tr ia l court to or de r r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d
s u p p o rt a s p r o v id e d b y Ch a p te r 1 5 4 o f th e F a mi ly

Code. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 1 6 0
. 6 3 6 (g) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). Chapter 154 subse ctions c and d pr ovide: (c) I t is presu m ed t h at a cour t order limiting the a

mount of retroa ctive child support to an amount that does not e x cee d the total amount of support that would have bee n due for the four year s prec edingthe date the pe ti t i o n s eeking support wa s filed is rea sonable a nd in the best interest of the child. (d) The pre sumption create d under this sec t i on may be re butted by evidenc e that the oblig or: (1) knew or

should have know n that the obligor was the fathe r of the c hild for whom support is sought; and (2) soug ht to avo id the establishment of a suppor t obligation to the child.
Id . § 154.131 (Ve rnon 2008). Construing the a

mendment to Chapter 154 a ccor ding to the pla in and common meaningof its words, subsection (c) cre ates a presumption that retroa ctive child support re prese nting an amount that would have be en due f or the four y ear s prec eding the date the pe tition s eekingsupport was filed is reasona ble and in the be st interest of the c hild. Perforc e, if the trial court or ders a n amount that is more than what would have been due for the prec edingfour y ear s, the order is not reasona

ble andD i s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 3- not in the child’s best interest. Thus, the le g islature adde d subsection (d) , whi ch allows the tria l court to orde r an a

mount of retroa ctive child support that excee ds what would have been due in the previous four

y ear s if the obligor

knew or should have known that he wa s the fathe r of the c hild and avoided the e stablishment of the support obligation. This proce dure serves public policy conce rns of what is in the best interest of the child and what is rea sonable for both the mother and f ather . The presumption addre sses both the situation whe re a mother keeps knowledg e of the c hild’s exi stence from the biolog ical father or when a f ather actively avoids the establishment of a child support. The leg islative history

supports my

int erp re t at ion of the statute. Subsections (c ), (d) , and (e ) we re a dded to the Family Code by way of H.B. 899 of t he 77th Reg ular S ession of the Te x as L eg islature. The Ho norable Senfronia T hompson was the author of the bill and testif ie d a b o u t th e inte n t o f th e b il l d u r in g a c o mm itte e h e ar in g o n M ar c h 6 , 2001. See testimony of Repre sentative Thompson on H.B. 899, 77th R.S. (2001), available at http://ww w.house.state.tx.us/committees/audio77/340 .htm ( ar c h i v e d b r o a d c a s t s M ar c h 6 , 2 0 0 1 )
. In he r t e sti mony , Re pr e se ntativ e Th omp so n to ld t he c omm itt e e that th e purp os e of the bil l w a s to lim it
an aw ard of retroa ctive child support to no more than what would have been due for the pr ece ding four y ear s unless the pre sumption contained in the bill was rebutted. Id . Represe ntative Thompson explained the impetus of the bill was a study that found men who a

re sa ddled with a lar g e amount
o f retroa ctive child support ar e less likely to meet cur

rent c hild support obligations. Id .; se e als o J ohn J . Sampson et. al., Sampson & Tinda ll’s T ex as Family Code Ann., Title 5, subtitle B, cha p. 154, pg 614 cmt. (Thomson W es t 2009) (“I n eff ect, [subsection (c) ] create s an estoppel by lache sD i s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 4- defe nse with the burde n of re futation falling upon the oblige e or the state, as the case may be.”) . The majority err s in holding subsec tions (c) a nd (d) inapplica

ble to this case. Ap ply ingthe pr e sumpt ion , I

wo uld re ve rse and remand

the tr ia l c ourt ’s re tr oa c tiv e c hil d support awa

rd. He re, the re is insuffic ient evidenc e to re but the pre s umption. Although Luis has acknow ledg ed he is B .R.’s father , Amber’ s only evidenc e to re but the sec o n d p ro n g of the pr e sumpt ion is th at Luis pr ov ide d s ome ir re g ula r s up po rt fo r B .R. , th a t su c h s up po rt fe ll “emba rra ssingly” short of the support he shoul d have paid, and L uis knew he had a duty to support B .R. but f a ile d to take ste ps to e sta

bli sha fo rm a l su pp or t ob lig a tio n. Th is e vid e nc e do e s n ot d ir e c tly
or by inf e re nc e sh ow that L uis so ug ht t o avo id t he e sta bli sh me nt o f a

su pp or t ob lig a tio n. B e c a

us e there is no evidence rebuttin g t h e sec ond prongof the pre sumption, t he re troac tive child support
awa rd must be limited to an amount not to exceed the total amount that would have been due for the four y ear s prec edingthe date the petition seeking support was filed. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 154.131(c) (d)( Ver

non 2008). Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt t o th e ma

jor ity ’s re so lut ion

of the re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt iss ue . T his court should hold the trial cour t abused its discretion, re verse the par t of the t rial court judgment that
aw ar d s $ 6 7,943.78 for r etroa ctive child support, and r emand the c ase f or a ne w deter

mination of retroa ctive child support. I join in all other aspec ts of the majority opinion.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice