United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-1909

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lonnie Wade Sigler

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge

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Submitted: April 9, 2018

Filed: July 10, 2018

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.
Lonnie Sigler appeals the district court’s re-imposition of two special 1

conditions of supervised release at his resentencing. He argues that they are onerous

and unnecessary. Finding no plain error, we affirm.

I. Background

In October 2011, Sigler pleaded guilty to the charge of felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court

accepted his plea and sentenced him—as an armed career criminal—to 142 months’

imprisonment. The court then credited Sigler 26 months for time served, resulting in

a reduced sentence of 116 months. Sigler also received a five-year term ofsupervised

release, and the court imposed two special conditions. The first required substance

abuse testing and treatment. The second required a mental health evaluation and

treatment when deemed necessary.

In April 2016, in the wake of Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016),

Sigler moved to vacate and to correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The

government and the district court agreed that post-Mathis, Sigler no longer qualified

as an armed career criminal. At Sigler’s resentencing hearing, the district court noted

Sigler’s long history of theft, drug charges and convictions, and many revocations

while under supervision. The court also took account of Sigler’s extensive history of

drug and alcohol abuse, marijuana and methamphetamine addiction issues, and a

childhood history of verbal and physical abuse. Additionally, the undisputed

presentence report indicated that Sigler suffers fromdepression and Attention Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The court vacated the initial judgment and

resentenced Sigler to time served—nearly 90 months’ incarceration—and three years

of supervised release. The district court then imposed the same conditions of

The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court

1

for the Northern District of Iowa.

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supervised release as those at Sigler’s original sentencing, including the two special

conditions. Sigler did not object to the imposition of the conditions.

II. Discussion

Sigler now argues on appeal that the two special conditions are both onerous

and unnecessary. “We review the terms and conditions ofsupervised release for plain

error when the defendant fails to raise an objection to those terms.” United States v.

Henkel, 358 F.3d 1013, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Ristine, 335

F.3d 692, 694 (8th Cir. 2003)). The district court plainly errs if it “deviates from a

legal rule, the error is clear under current law, and the error affects the substantial

rights of the defendant.” Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).

“Sentencing judges have discretion to impose special conditions ofsupervised

release so long as the conditions are reasonably related to the sentencing factors

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary, and are consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s pertinent

policy statements.” United States v. Sherwood, 850 F.3d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 2017)

(quoting United States v. Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1999)). 

A condition is reasonably related if tailored to “the nature and

circumstances ofthe offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics,

the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the public from

further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s educational,

vocational, medicinal[,] or other correctional needs.”

United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.

Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005)). A special condition need not “be related

to all of the statutory factors, but rather they are to be weighed independently.”

United States v. Camp, 410 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). We

encourage “individual findings” on each imposed special condition, but we need not

vacate the condition “where the basis for the special condition can be discerned from

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the record.” United States v. Hart, 829 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing United

States v. Schaefer, 675 F.3d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 2012)). However, where mental

health is concerned, “the district court must have reason to believe the defendant is

in need of [evaluation and/or treatment].” United States v. Fenner, 600 F.3d 1014,

1026 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Conelly, 451 F.3d 942, 945 (8th Cir.

2006)).

Sigler says the district court erred when it re-imposed the same supervised

release conditions from the original sentencing. Sigler believes he has already

sufficiently complied with the conditions. He voluntarily participated in a Residential

Drug Abuse Program while incarcerated, which required him to participate in drug

testing and treatment. To impose the condition again, he asserts, is unnecessary and

duplicative. As to the mental health condition, he contends imposing evaluation and

treatment is at odds with the court’s decision not to require him to live in a halfway

house post-release.

We are unpersuaded by Sigler’s argument. He must do more than show that the

conditions at resentencing are the same as at the initial sentencing. The district court

was not obligated to conclude that Sigler had no need of the release conditions

prospectively. Sigler failsto explain why the special conditions are onerous. Further,

the district court did not impose the same conditions mechanically. Rather, the court

carefully considered Sigler’s undisputed long history of drug addiction and abuse

issues, as well as his multiple drug relapses. Sigler also continues to suffer from

ADHD and depression, and these conditions support the district court’s decision to

require mental health evaluation and treatment, as necessary. The court’s decision to

forego requiring residency at a halfway house post-incarceration is not irreconcilably

in conflict with its requirement of mental health and substance abuse monitoring and

treatment.

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Because the district court carefully considered Sigler’s substance abuse and

mental health problems, and because the two special conditions ofsupervised release

comport with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we find no plain error. See Sherwood, 850 F.3d

at 394. 

III. Conclusion

Affirmed.

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