19–010

Calendar No. 281

108TH CONGRESS REPORT " SENATE ! 1st Session 108–149

WASTEWATER TREATMENT SECURITY ACT OF 2003

SEPTEMBER 17, 2003.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. INHOFE, from the Committee on Environment and Public 

Works, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 1039] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Environment and Public Works, to which was 

referred a bill (S. 1039) to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to enhance the security of wastewater treatment works, 

having considered the same reports favorably thereon with an 

amendment and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass. 

GENERAL STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

As with many sectors of society, publicly owned wastewater 

treatment works began the process of reexamining the security of 

their facilities in light of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. 

The nation’s 16,000 publicly owned treatment works comprise not 

only treatment plants but also 100,000 major pumping stations, 

600,000 miles of sanitary sewers and 200,000 miles of storm sewers. The sewers create an underground network that connects the 

population and financial centers of every major U.S. city. Further, 

the sewers often run alongside or beneath major roadways. The potential to use them for a terrorist attack is significant. Further, 

damage to a wastewater treatment plant could result in significant 

loss of life, environmental damage and the contamination of surface 

and groundwater/drinking water supplies. 

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In 1998, with Presidential Decision Directive 63, the Federal 

Government began an assessment of the vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical infrastructures, including the nation’s water supply. 

The EPA was designated the lead agency in charge of overseeing 

security of the nation’s water systems and has worked with Sandia 

National Labs to develop an assessment tool for drinking water 

utilities. The EPA worked with the Association of Metropolitan 

Water Agencies to develop and operate the Information Sharing 

and Analysis Center (ISAC) which was developed to distribute secure, critical information to drinking water utilities throughout the 

Nation. It wasn’t until after September 11th, 2001 that the ISAC 

was expanded to include wastewater utilities. 

In the fiscal year 2002 Departments of Veterans Affairs and 

Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act (P.L. 107–73), Congress appropriated $500,000 for 

EPA to develop an assessment tool for wastewater treatment 

works. The EPA contracted with the Association of Metropolitan 

Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) to develop the tool which has now been 

distributed to more than 2,600 public systems to aid them in determining what vulnerabilities exist at their facilities. In the fiscal 

year 2002 Supplemental Appropriations bill, Congress provided 

EPA with $90 million to address security at drinking water facilities. EPA earmarked $3 million of those funds for wastewater utilities. EPA has also worked to protect wastewater treatment works 

in accordance with the EPA Strategic Plan for Homeland Security, 

issued in September 2002. 

OBJECTIVES OF THE LEGISLATION

While many treatment works have completed the task of identifying their security needs, others need some assistance. Therefore, 

S. 1039 provides treatment works of all sizes resources to determine, and address, their security needs. S. 1039 will help secure 

these systems by providing treatment works with an incentive to 

complete their assessments. The legislation carries with it the full 

force of law to ensure that those who receive Federal money have 

completed their assessments. It authorizes EPA to continue working with nonprofit organizations to improve and distribute vulnerability assessment tools and provide technical assistance to small 

utilities as they seek to identify and meet their security needs. The 

bill also authorizes research into water security threats and new 

technologies so that treatment works have the most up-to-date information about their options when determining how best to secure 

their individual facilities. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title 

The Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2003.

Sec. 2. Wastewater treatment works security 

(A) DEFINITION OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

Summary 

Creates a new section 222 of the Federal Water Pollution Control 

Act and defines a vulnerability assessment. 

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Discussion 

An assessment is an examination of the treatment works’ vulnerability to an unlawful action intended to substantially disrupt the 

ability of the treatment works to operate or to have an adverse impact on the critical infrastructure, the environment or public health 

or safety. The assessment includes a review of the facilities, systems and devices used for storing, treating, recycling or reclaiming 

municipal sewage or industrial wastes; the sewer system; the electronic and computer system; the pumping and power equipment; 

the use, storage and handling of chemicals and the operation and 

maintenance of the system. It will also include the identification of 

procedures, countermeasures and equipment that a treatment 

works may implement or use to reduce the vulnerabilities identified in the assessment. 

(B) GRANTS FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY

ENHANCEMENTS

Summary 

Authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to a State, municipality or inter-municipal or interstate agency to conduct a vulnerability assessment of a publicly owned treatment works and address a security need identified in the assessment. 

Discussion 

Authorizes grants to conduct vulnerability assessments and address a need identified in the assessment. 

(C) GRANTS FOR SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS

Summary 

Paragraph (1) requires an applicant to certify to the EPA that it 

has conducted a vulnerability assessment and that the need for 

which it is seeking funding was identified in the assessment. Upon 

receiving this certification, the EPA may provide grants to the applicant for specific purposes listed in paragraph (2). 

Paragraph (2) establishes a list of security needs for which an 

applicant may receive funding. 

Paragraph (3) authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to 

an applicant who certifies it has conducted a vulnerability assessment and identified a need not included on the list in Paragraph 

(2). 

Paragraph (4) prohibits funds from being used for personnel costs 

and the operation and maintenance of facilities, equipment or systems. The Administrator may not require an applicant to provide 

the Administrator with a copy of a vulnerability assessment as a 

condition of applying for or receiving a grant under this section. 

Discussion 

A treatment works must certify to EPA that it has conducted an 

assessment and that one of the enhancements listed in Paragraph 

(2) is included in the assessment. Falsely certifying information to 

the Federal Government is a crime (18 U.S.C. 1001) punishable by 

fine or imprisonment. Further, EPA through its grant making procedures has the authority to ensure that grant money is used for 

4

its intended purposes. If the agency finds that it was not, the grant 

can be revoked and a charge of false certification made. The applicant may seek funding for a need not in Paragraph (2) but identified in a vulnerability assessment by submitting an application to 

the Administrator. Funds cannot be used for personnel costs or operation and maintenance of facilities, equipment or systems. EPA 

cannot require the applicant submit its assessment to the agency 

as a condition of applying for or receiving funds. 

(D) GRANT AMOUNTS

Summary 

Paragraph (1) establishes a Federal-local cost share of 75 percent–25 percent. 

Paragraph (2) limits the size of any one applicant to $150,000. 

Discussion 

Because securing our nation’s infrastructure against terrorism is 

a partnership between Federal, State and local government, this 

section authorizes a Federal-local cost share. In order to ensure 

that funds are widely distributed and not absorbed by a few large 

systems, grants are limited to $150,000. 

(E) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT

WORKS

Summary 

Paragraph (1) defines a small publicly owned treatment works as 

a population of fewer than 20,000 individuals. 

Paragraph (2) authorizes the Administrator to, in coordination 

with the States, provide technical assistance to small treatment 

works in assessing and addressing their security needs. 

Discussion 

It is critical that small systems, which often have fewer resources 

at their disposal, have the same level of protection as large systems. Subsection (e) authorizes a technical assistance program for 

treatment works serving less than 20,000 people. Technical guidance may include training, technical assistance programs and preliminary engineering evaluations. The Administrator may provide 

grants to nonprofit organizations with expertise in assisting small 

systems.

(F) REFINEMENT OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY FOR

PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT WORKS

Summary 

Authorizes grants to nonprofit organizations to improve vulnerability assessment methodologies and tools for publicly owned 

treatment works at no cost to the treatment works. 

Discussion 

Authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to nonprofit organizations to improve vulnerability assessment methodologies and 

tools for publicly owned treatment works, including those that are 

part of a combined public wastewater treatment and water supply 

5

system. The grants may be used to develop and distribute assessment software upgrades, improve and enhance critical technical 

and user support functions, expand libraries of information addressing threats and countermeasures and implementing user 

training initiatives. These services are to be provided at no cost to 

the participants/recipients. 

(G) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Summary and discussion 

Authorizes $200 million for use in making grants to conduct vulnerability assessments and implement security enhancements 

under subsection (b); $15 million for technical assistance for small 

systems; $5 million over 5 years for refinement of vulnerability assessment methodology. 

Sec. 3. Research and review 

Creates a new section 223 of the Federal Water Pollution Control 

Act (FWPCA). 

(A) DEFINITIONS

Summary 

Defines ‘‘covered treatment works’’ and ‘‘harmful intentional act.’’ 

Discussion 

A covered treatments works has the same definition as it does 

in section 212 of FWPCA (33 U.S.C. 1292); a harmful intentional 

act means a terrorist attack or other intentional act carried out 

with respect to a covered treatment works that is intended to substantially disrupt the ability of the treatment works to provide safe 

and reliable conveyance and treatment of wastewater, disposal of 

effluent or storage of potentially harmful chemical used to treat 

wastewater. The harmful intentional act is one that may also inflict damage to critical infrastructures and have an adverse effect 

on the environment or otherwise pose a significant threat to public 

health or safety. 

(B) REVIEW BY ADMINISTRATOR

Summary and discussion 

Requires the Administrator to research and review means by 

which terrorists, including domestic or foreign terrorists, or other 

individuals or groups can carry out a harmful intentional act 

against a treatment works and the identification of alternative 

processes for treating, conveying and disposing of wastewater. 

(C) MEANS OF CARRYING OUT HARMFUL INTENTIONAL ACT

Summary 

The Administrator shall review the various means by which a 

treatment works could be affected through a harmful intentional 

act. 

Discussion 

The Administrator shall review the means by which the treatment works, pipes and constructed conveyances could be destroyed 

6

or otherwise prevented from providing adequate conveyance, 

pretreatment, treatment and disposal of wastewater; means by 

which the pipes, constructed conveyances, pretreatment, treatment, 

storage and disposal systems could be altered or affected so as to 

pose a threat to public health and safety or the environment; 

means by which pipes, constructed conveyances, pretreatment, 

treatment, storage and disposal systems could be reasonably protected from harmful intentional acts and reasonably secured from 

use as a means of transportation by terrorists, including domestic 

or foreign terrorists, or other individuals or groups; and the means 

by which information systems at treatment works could be disrupted by terrorists, including domestic or foreign terrorists, or 

other individuals or groups. 

(D) CONSIDERATIONS

Summary and discussion 

The Administrator shall ensure that EPA’s research encompasses 

treatment works of all sizes and from various geographic regions 

and may consider the vulnerability of, or potential for forced interruption of service for, a region or service area, including the National Capital Area. 

(E) INFORMATION SHARING

Summary 

The Administrator, as soon as practicable, shall share the information found in the review with covered treatment works through 

the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) or other appropriate means. 

Discussion 

The Administrator will distribute the findings of EPA’s research 

to treatment works through the ISAC or other appropriate means. 

Any new approaches identified by EPA will be provided to treatment works for information only as they consider what new approaches may be suitable for their facility. Because each system 

may have different needs, the committee intends that the determination of how to use this information will be left to each individual treatment works, on a voluntary basis. 

(F) FUNDING

Summary and discussion 

Authorizes $15 million for carrying out this section for the period 

of fiscal years 2004 through 2008. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

During the 107th Congress, Representatives Don Young, James 

L. Oberstar, John J. Duncan Jr., and Peter DeFazio introduced 

H.R. 5169, ‘‘The Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act.’’ On 

July 24, 2002, the bill was reported out of committee by voice vote. 

It passed the House of Representatives by voice vote on October 7, 

2002. 

During the 108th Congress, Representatives Don Young, James 

L. Oberstar, John J. Duncan Jr., and Jerry F. Costello introduced 

7

legislation nearly identical to H.R. 5169, H.R. 866 which passed the 

committee on March 11, 2003 by voice vote. It passed the House 

of Representatives on May 7, 2003 by a vote of 413–2. On May 12, 

Senators James Inhofe and Mike Crapo introduced the Senate companion to H.R. 866, S. 1039. On May 15, the Committee on Environment and Public Works agreed to S. 1039, as amended, by a 

vote of 13 to 6 and ordered the bill reported to the Senate. 

ROLLCALL VOTES

The Committee on Environment and Public Works met to consider S. 1039 on May 15, 2003. The committee adopted by unanimous consent an amendment by Senator Jeffords to establish a $15 

million research program on potential threats, best practices and 

new technologies to help wastewater treatment works better secure 

their facilities and processes from terrorist attacks. The amendment was modified by unanimous consent of the committee before 

adoption to clarify the definition of a treatment works. The committee then defeated an amendment offered by Senator Jeffords to 

require treatment works to conduct vulnerability assessments and 

develop emergency response plans and submit both to the Department of Homeland Security. The amendment was defeated by a 

rollcall vote of 9 ayes, 10 nays. Voting in favor were Jeffords, Baucus, Reid, Graham, Lieberman, Boxer, Wyden, Carper and Clinton. 

Voting against were Inhofe, Warner, Bond, Voinovich, Crapo, 

Chafee, Cornyn, Murkowski, Thomas and Allard. The committee 

then defeated by voice vote an amendment by Senator Jeffords to 

eliminate the cost share and the limit on grant amounts. The committee then favorably reported the bill by a vote of 13 to 6. Voting 

in favor were Senators Inhofe, Warner, Bond, Voinovich, Crapo, 

Chafee, Cornyn, Murkowski, Thomas, Allard, Reid, Graham, and 

Carper. Voting against were Senators Jeffords, Baucus, Lieberman, 

Boxer, Wyden and Clinton. 

REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT

In compliance with section 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the committee makes evaluation of the regulatory impact of the reported bill. 

The bill does not create any additional regulatory burdens, nor 

will it cause any adverse impact on the personal privacy of individuals. 

MANDATES ASSESSMENT

In compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

(Public Law 104–4), the committee finds that S. 1039 would not impose Federal intergovernmental unfunded mandates on State, local, 

or tribal governments. 

COST OF LEGISLATION

Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act requires that a statement of the cost of the reported bill, 

prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, be included in the report. That statement follows:

8

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, May 20, 2003. 

Hon. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

Chairman, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1039, the Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2003. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Susanne S. Mehlman. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN. 

S. 1039—Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2003, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and 

Public Works on May 15, 2003 

Summary: CBO estimates that implementing this legislation 

would cost $234 million over the next 5 years, assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts. The funds would be used by the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to make grants to States, 

municipalities, or intermunicipal or interstate agencies to conduct 

vulnerability assessments of publicly owned wastewater treatment 

facilities and to undertake security enhancements at such facilities. 

In addition, the funds would be used by EPA to provide technical 

assistance to small publicly owned treatment facilities, such as 

training and engineering evaluations of security measures, and to 

make grants to treatment facilities operated by nonprofit organizations to conduct self-assessments of security vulnerabilities. S. 1039 

also would authorize funding for EPA to research and review ways 

that wastewater treatment facilities could be intentionally harmed 

and how wastewater could be treated and disposed of in the event 

a facility is damaged. 

Enacting S. 1039 would not affect direct spending or revenues. 

S. 1039 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates 

as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and 

would impose no costs on State, local, or tribal governments. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: For this estimate, 

CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by the end of fiscal year 

2003. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost $234 

million over the 2004–2008 period, assuming appropriation of the 

amounts authorized for each year. Those estimated outlays are 

based on historical patterns for similar activities. The estimated 

budgetary impact of S. 1039 is shown in the following table. The 

costs of this legislation fall within budget function 300 (natural resources and environment).

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Grants for Wastewater Treatment Security: 

Authorization Level ............................................................................... 200 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................ 100 60 30 10 0 

Grants for Small Publicly Owned Treatment Facilities: 

Authorization Level ............................................................................... 16 1 1 1 0 

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By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................ 8 5 3 3 0 

EPA Research and Review: 

Authorization Level ............................................................................... 15 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................ 10 4 1 0 0 

Total Proposed Changes: 

Authorization Level ............................................................................... 231 1 1 1 0 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................ 118 69 34 13 0 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 1039 contains no 

intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA 

and would impose no costs on State, local, or tribal governments. 

This bill would benefit State and local governments by authorizing 

$216 million in 2003 for grants to conduct vulnerability assessments, implement security enhancements, provide technical assistance, and to improve self-assessment methodologies and tools. The 

recipients of grants for vulnerability assessments and security enhancements would be required to match Federal funds, but such 

costs would be incurred voluntarily. 

Previous cost estimate: On February 28, 2003, CBO transmitted 

a cost estimate for H.R. 866, the Wastewater Treatment Security 

Act of 2003, as ordered by the House Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure. CBO estimated that implementing H.R. 866 

would cost about $220 million over a 5-year period. The two bills 

are similar, but S. 1039 would authorize additional funding for 

EPA to research and review the impact that intentional damages 

would have on wastewater treatment facilities. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Susanne S. Mehlman; Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Greg Waring; Impact on the Private Sector: Jean Talarico. 

Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

(10)

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS JEFFORDS, BAUCUS, 

LIEBERMAN, BOXER, AND CLINTON 

General statement 

In the wake of September 11, 2001, it is imperative that the Nation takes every reasonable action we can to prevent terrorism, create effective response and recovery mechanisms, and find ways to 

minimize any impacts should an event occur. The Congress has a 

key role in facilitating these actions by establishing authorities for 

government agencies, establishing the legal framework in which 

homeland security improvements will occur, and appropriating adequate funding for the homeland security mission. Protecting our 

nation’s critical infrastructure is a major piece of our homeland security strategy. 

The water sector has been identified as an element in our nation’s critical infrastructure since the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD–63), issued in by President Clinton in May 

1998, which was the first major governmental action focused on reducing the vulnerability of our nation’s critical infrastructure. At 

that time, and in each document outlining homeland security responsibilities since that time, the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) was designated as the lead for water infrastructure protection. 

The security needs are significant in the water and wastewater 

sectors. There are over 16,000 publicly owned treatment works in 

the United States, serving almost 190 million people. These industrial facilities use large quantities of toxic chemicals in their treatment and disinfection processes. They are located near population 

centers and other critical infrastructure. A chemical accident would 

pose a serious threat. In addition, collection systems run beneath 

every city and town in America, creating potential corridors for 

travel or opportunities for access. 

There are also serious public health risks associated with a disruption or service failure at a wastewater treatment plant. Treatment works clean wastewater that comes from our toilets, showers, 

and sewers and send it back into our rivers, streams, lakes, and 

oceans. Those same bodies of water are our drinking water sources. 

Without proper treatment, we would see the public health effects 

of the same type of water-borne disease outbreaks such as cholera 

that we saw in Iraq earlier this year due to the failure of wastewater treatment plants. 

After the recent events during the 2003 blackout, we have seen 

firsthand the impact that a cessation of operations at a drinking 

water or wastewater plant can have. In Cleveland, Ohio, after the 

August 2003 blackout, several sewage treatment plants discharged 

at least 60 million gallons of sewage into the Cuyahoga River, Lake 

Erie, and their tributaries after the power outage caused the plants 

pumps and blowers to cease operations. Raw sewage bypassed the 

11

treatment process and entered receiving waters untreated. The 

plants have no back-up power systems. Five Cleveland beaches 

were closed to swimming to protect against water-borne disease. 

Cleveland’s water system also suffered a hit when 1.5 million customers lost water or water pressure due to power failures at four 

water plants. The city was under a boil water notice for 4 days. In 

Detroit, Michigan, after the blackout in August 2003 caused the 

city’s water treatment plants to cease operations, the city was 

under a boil-water advisory for almost a week. 

We believe that the Congress should take the risk to wastewater 

treatment plants on seriously. Unfortunately, we believe that S. 

1039, the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety Act, 

as reported out of committee, provides security for our nation’s 

wastewater infrastructure in name, only. 

Background 

Almost immediately after September 11, 2001, the Committee on 

Environment and Public Works began working with the water and 

wastewater industries and the EPA to ensure that the nation’s 

water infrastructure was adequately protected. The committee met 

with key members of the EPA’s security team to review the status 

of our nation’s water infrastructure. Several short-term actions had 

already been taken. Based on the recommendations of PDD 63, the 

EPA and its industry partner, the Association of Metropolitan 

Water Agencies (AMWA), had already established a communication 

system, the water infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center (ISAC), designed to provide real-time threat assessment 

data to water utilities throughout the Nation. 

Through this partnership, the EPA and AMWA, in cooperation 

with Sandia National Laboratory, developed an assessment tool 

that individual water utilities can use to assess their facilities for 

potential physical and cyber threats. The committee endorsed the 

concept of vulnerability assessments with bi-partisan action early 

in the debate on homeland security. On October 11, 2001, Senators 

Jeffords (I–VT), Smith (R–NH), Graham (D–FL), and Crapo (R–ID) 

sent a letter to the President with Representatives Tauzin (R–LA), 

Dingell (D–MI), Gillmor (R–OH), and Pallone (D–NJ) requesting 

that the President use a portion of discretionary funds to provide 

assistance for these assessments to water utilities. No response 

was received. 

Legislative action quickly followed. During the 107th Congress, 

Senator Jeffords (I–VT) and Senator Smith (R–NH), at that time 

the chair and ranking member of the committee introduced S. 

1593, the Water Infrastructure Security and Research Development 

Act, which authorized the U.S. EPA to provide funding to support 

research projects on critical infrastructure protection for water supply systems. The two leaders of the committee also introduced S. 

1608, which sought to provide grants to drinking water and wastewater facilities to meet immediate security needs. 

S. 1593, the Water Infrastructure Security and Research Development Act, sought to complement the ongoing work at EPA and 

in the water industry by focusing on mid- to long-term actions designed to enhance our current water security capabilities. The bill 

authorized $12 million over 5 years to continue ongoing work called 

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for by Presidential Decision Directive 63, conduct research to assess potential threats to our water supply system, and develop solutions to safeguard our water systems against those threats. 

Projects were intended to address both water and wastewater security needs. S. 1608 focused on short term security needs such as 

re-keying of doors and locks or installation and maintenance of 

fencing, gating, or lighting. The committee reported both bills on 

December 10, 2001. 

The provisions of S. 1593 and S. 1608 were modified and incorporated into H.R. 3448, the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–188), which was signed 

into law on June 12, 2002. This Act requires that all community 

water systems serving a population greater than 3,300 people conduct a vulnerability assessment and an emergency response plan 

that incorporates the results of the vulnerability assessment. The 

Act establishes specific deadlines and requires that the vulnerability assessments be submitted to the EPA. It includes extensive 

information protection requirements at the Agency. The Act authorizes $160 million for fiscal year 2002 and such sums as necessary for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 for these purposes and 

to address basic security enhancements. Finally, the Act requires 

the Administrator to review and disseminate information to the 

drinking water industry on current and future methods of prevention of, detection of, and response to contaminant and supply disruption. Despite the fact that the original Senate bills addressed 

both water and wastewater needs, the provisions of H.R. 3448 were 

modified to address drinking water facilities only due to jurisdictional concerns raised by a House committee. 

Under the authorities provided by P.L. 107–188, EPA continued 

its work with AMWA to refine and operate the ISAC. EPA provided 

$51 million in funding to water utilities in fiscal year 2002, and the 

Agency partnered with numerous industry associations to develop 

vulnerability assessment and emergency response plan tools and 

training tailored for specific applications. EPA has also worked to 

protect wastewater treatment works in accordance with the EPA 

Strategic Plan for Homeland Security, issued in September 2002. 

Since September 11, 2001, EPA has provided $1.1M to the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) to develop a 

wastewater security vulnerability assessment tool. That tool is now 

available to individual treatment works. 

After the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response 

Act of 2002 was enacted without addressing wastewater security, 

Senator Jeffords introduced S. 3037, the Wastewater Treatment 

Works Security and Safety Act, on October 3, 2002. S. 3037 mirrors 

the original provisions of S. 1593 and S. 1608 as well as the modified provisions for drinking water in H.R. 3448. The legislation requires all wastewater utilities to conduct vulnerability assessments 

and to develop or modify emergency response plans to incorporate 

the results of the vulnerability assessments. It requires that these 

documents be presented to the EPA for review, and it includes significant security measures designed to protect this information 

from unauthorized disclosure. It authorizes $185 million for assistance in completing vulnerability assessments, for immediate security improvements, and for assistance to small treatment works. It 

13

authorizes $15 million for research to identify threats, detection 

methods, and response actions. AMSA endorsed S. 3037 on October 

1, 2002. During the 107th Congress, the House passed a wastewater security bill, H.R. 3169, the Wastewater Treatment Works 

Security and Safety Act. Due to significant differences over the 

treatment of vulnerability assessments in each bill, the House and 

the Senate were unable to reach agreement on this issue during 

the 107th Congress. 

In the 108th Congress, on April 3, 2002, Senators Jeffords (I–

VT), Graham (D–FL), Lieberman (D–CT), and Lautenberg (D–NJ) 

introduced the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety 

Act, S. 779. On May 12, 2002, Senators James Inhofe (R–OK) and 

Mike Crapo (R–ID) introduced S. 1039, also entitled the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety Act. The committee 

considered and passed S. 1039 on May, 15, 2003. We were very 

pleased that the committee granted our requests to take action on 

wastewater security. However, we believe that S. 1039, as it passed 

the committee, does not fulfill our responsibility to provide the 

American people with the level of security that is required for our 

wastewater treatment works. 

Discussion 

During the committee’s consideration of S. 1039, Senator Jeffords 

offered an amendment that would have required publicly owned 

treatment works serving more than 25,000 people conduct a vulnerability assessment and an emergency response plan and submit 

those documents to the Department of Homeland Security. The Jeffords amendment failed on party lines with 9 Democrats voting 

yes, 1 Independent voting yes, and 9 Republicans voting no. Without the modifications that were included in the Jeffords amendment, we believe that S. 1039 as passed by the committee provides 

security to wastewater treatment works in name only. 

First, S. 1039 does not require the completion of a vulnerability 

assessment or the incorporation of the results into a treatment 

works’ emergency response plan. The Jeffords amendment would 

have required these actions to increase security at treatment works 

serving more than 25,000 people. We believe that conducting a vulnerability assessment, addressing the security needs it identifies, 

and incorporating the results into a facility’s emergency response 

plan are most basic actions that must be taken in each sector of 

our nation’s critical infrastructure. In the General Statement section of this report, we detail the potential impacts of an interruption of water and wastewater systems. One of the examples cited 

is the Cleveland water system which suffered a disruption during 

the August 2003 blackout. The Plain Dealer reported on August 16, 

2003 that the Mayor of Cleveland called FirstEnergy executives to 

request that the water plants be placed on a ‘‘protected’’ list of addresses that would not be affected by the rolling blackouts. This is 

an example of exactly the type of action that could be identified in 

a vulnerability assessment and taken in advance of a power outage, 

significantly reducing the impact of an event on the citizens of the 

city. 

S. 1039 fails to increase the level of security of our nation’s publicly owned treatment works. We do not know if individual publicly 

14

owned treatment works will choose to complete a vulnerability assessment, because there is no requirement to do so. In addition, we 

do not know if they will incorporate their findings into emergency 

response plans that are designed to protect communities surrounding those plants, because there is no requirement to do so. 

We believe that these most basic actions are not too heavy a burden for the wastewater treatment industry, which is no different 

than other critical infrastructure sectors. We believe that the 

wastewater industry should not be exempt from taking basic precautions to evaluate and address its security needs. Therefore, we 

believe that S. 1039 as reported from committee fails to ensure that 

even the most basic steps toward a higher level of security in the 

nation’s critical infrastructure sectors are taken. 

Second, S. 1039 as reported does not require, and may actually 

preclude, the submission of vulnerability assessments that are conducted to the Federal Government—a serious obstacle in the DHS’s 

ability to perform its mission. We believe that providing the results 

of a facility’s vulnerability assessment and its emergency response 

plan to the Federal Government is a vital step both to ensure that 

vulnerability assessments are completed in critical infrastructure 

sectors and to ensure that the Federal Government has all of the 

information it requires to secure the Nation against a potential terrorist attack. In addition, elected officials in Congress have a Constitutional oversight role over Federal agencies and the laws they 

implement. Under S. 1039, Congress will not be accountable to the 

public for the purpose or implementation of this law—Congress will 

not be able to request or access information from the Federal agencies because the agencies will not have such information. 

In the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, 

issued in July 2002, ‘‘Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key 

Assets’’ is identified as a ‘‘Critical Mission Area’’ for the DHS. One 

of the ‘‘Major Initiatives’’ of DHS in this area is identified as, 

‘‘Build and maintain a complete and accurate assessment of America’s critical infrastructure and key assets.’’ The Strategy states: 

* * * the Department would build and maintain a complete, current, and accurate assessment of vulnerabilities and preparedness 

of critical targets across critical infrastructure sectors. The Department would thus have a crucial capability that does not exist in 

our government today: the ability to continuously evaluate threat 

information against our current vulnerabilities, inform the President, issue warnings, and effect action accordingly. 

It is clear that the Department believes that the ability to 

produce a map of the nation’s critical infrastructure and cross-reference it to threat information is one of the most basic tasks that 

must be completed to increase the security of the Nation. 

In addition, the President’s Strategy states, ‘‘A complete and 

thorough assessment of America’s vulnerabilities will not only enable decisive near-term action, but guide the rational long-term investment of effort and resources.’’ Not only does DHS plan to use 

vulnerability assessments to evaluate threat information and provide warnings, but also to allocate resources. We agree with DHS 

that identifying where we are vulnerable, where we are threatened, 

and targeting resources to the cross-section of those two areas is 

the most efficient way to spend limited resources. 

15

Under S. 1039 as reported, it is unclear where DHS will get the 

information they require to complete its national vulnerability assessment and make resource allocation decisions that will increase 

the level of security in our Nation. It is clear that DHS is likely 

to receive partial information covering only the subset of the wastewater treatment industry that voluntarily chooses to complete a 

vulnerability assessment and that voluntarily chooses to share the 

information they collect with DHS. In fact, subsection (c)(4)(B) of 

S. 1039, which precludes EPA from asking for a vulnerability assessment as a condition of receiving assistance under this Act, is 

likely to make it extremely difficult for the Federal Government, 

including DHS, to seek this information for any purpose. Without 

the best, most up-to-date, accurate information available, DHS will 

be unable to fully perform its mission. 

Senator Jeffords’ amendment sought to correct this situation by 

requiring that vulnerability assessments and emergency response 

plans be sent to DHS. Despite the fact that the President designated the EPA as the lead for water security and the fact that 

the drinking water vulnerability assessments are already housed 

there, the Jeffords amendment would have sent the wastewater 

documents to DHS in response to preference for DHS raised by 

some members. However, this amendment was defeated along 

party lines. 

We believe that the Federal Government has a responsibility to 

protect the American people. Without the provisions in the Jeffords 

amendment, we believe that S. 1039 does not fulfill this responsibility. If S. 1039 is implemented as it passed the committee, the 

Federal Government will not know if publicly owned treatment 

works will voluntarily conduct a vulnerability assessment, if they 

will voluntarily implement the security needs identified, or if they 

will incorporate the results into their emergency response plans, 

and there will be no way of finding out. The DHS’s mission to increase the security of the country will be hindered. We believe that 

S. 1039 fails to take responsible, basic steps to protect our wastewater infrastructure security from terrorist attack, putting Americans at risk.

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON. 

BARBARA BOXER. 

MAX BAUCUS. 

JIM JEFFORDS. 

JOE LIEBERMAN. 

(16)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS REID, GRAHAM, AND 

CARPER 

We voted to support S. 1039 with the hope of moving forward on 

this issue which is so critical to our nation’s security in a timely 

manner while working to resolve the concerns we have with the 

legislation. Because that has not occurred, we are joining our colleagues in expressing our opposition to S. 1039 as it passed the 

committee. We concur with the minority views.

HARRY REID. 

TOM CARPER. 

BOB GRAHAM. 

(17)

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules 

of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill as reported 

are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing 

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman: 

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 

[As Amended Through P.L. 107–303, November 27, 2002] 

(33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.) 

AN ACT To provide for water pollution control activities in the Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency and in the Federal Works Agency, and for 

other purposes. 

* * * * * * *

TITLE II—GRANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF TREATMENT WORKS 

* * * * * * *

SEC. 221. SEWER OVERFLOW CONTROL GRANTS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—In any fiscal year in which the Administrator has available for obligation at least $1,350,000,000 for the purposes 

of section 601—

* * * * * * *

SEC. 222. WASTEWATER TREATMENT WORKS SECURITY. 

(a) DEFINITION OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In this section, the term ‘‘vulnerability assessment’’ means an assessment of the vulnerability of a treatment works to an unlawful action intended—

(A) to substantially disrupt the ability of the treatment 

works to safely and reliably operate; or 

(B) to have a substantial adverse effect on critical infrastructure, public health or safety, or the environment. 

(2) INCLUSIONS.—The term ‘‘vulnerability assessment’’ includes—

(A) a review of the vulnerabilities of the treatment works 

that identifies, with respect to the treatment works—

(i) facilities, systems, and devices used in the storage, treatment, recycling, or reclamation of municipal 

sewage or industrial wastes; 

(ii) intercepting sewers, outfall sewers, sewage collection systems, and other constructed conveyances; 

(iii) electronic, computer, and other automated systems; 

(iv) pumping, power, and other equipment; 

18

(v) use, storage, and handling of various chemicals; 

and 

(vi) operation and maintenance procedures; and 

(B) the identification of procedures, countermeasures, and 

equipment that a treatment works may implement or use to 

reduce the vulnerabilities of the treatment works identified 

in a review described in subparagraph (A). 

(b) GRANTS FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.—The Administrator may provide grants to a State, 

municipality, or intermunicipal or interstate agency—

(1) to conduct a vulnerability assessment of a publicly owned 

treatment works; and 

(2) to implement security enhancements described in subsection (c)(1) and other security enhancements to reduce 

vulnerabilities identified in a vulnerability assessment. 

(c) GRANTS FOR SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.—

(1) PREAPPROVED SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.—Except as provided in paragraph (3), on certification by an applicant that a 

vulnerability assessment has been completed for a treatment 

works, and that the security enhancement for which assistance 

is sought is for the purpose of reducing vulnerabilities of the 

treatment works identified in the vulnerability assessment, the 

Administrator may provide grants to the applicant under subsection (b)(2) for 1 or more of the uses described in paragraph 

(2). 

(2) USES OF GRANT FUNDS.—The uses referred to in paragraph (1) are—

(A) the purchase and installation of equipment for materials and activities relating to access control, intrusion prevention and delay, and detection of intruders and hazardous or dangerous substances, including—

(i) barriers, fencing, and gates; 

(ii) security lighting and cameras; 

(iii) metal grates, wire mesh, and outfall entry barriers; 

(iv) securing of manhole covers and fill and vent 

pipes; 

(v) installation and rekeying of doors and locks; and 

(vi) smoke, chemical, and explosive mixture detection 

systems; 

(B) the conduct of an activity to improve the security for 

electronic, computer, or other automated systems and remote security systems, including—

(i) controlling access to those systems; 

(ii) intrusion detection and prevention; and 

(iii) system backup; 

(C) participation in a training program, and the purchase of training manuals and guidance material, relating 

to security; and 

(D) the conduct of security screening of employees or contractor support services. 

(3) ADDITIONAL SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.— 

19

(A) GRANTS.—The Administrator may provide a grant 

under subsection (b) to an applicant for additional security 

enhancements not specified in paragraph (2). 

(B) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible for a grant under this 

subsection, an applicant shall—

(i) submit to the Administrator an application containing a description of the security enhancement; and 

(ii) obtain approval of the application by the Administrator. 

(4) LIMITATIONS.— (A) USE OF FUNDS.—A grant provided under subsection 

(b) shall not be used for—

(i) payment of personnel costs; or 

(ii) operation or maintenance of facilities, equipment, 

or, systems. 

(B) DISCLOSURE OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT.—As a 

condition of applying for or receiving a grant under this 

subsection, the Administrator may not require an applicant 

to provide the Administrator with a copy of a vulnerability 

assessment. 

(d) GRANT AMOUNTS.— (1) FEDERAL SHARE.—The Federal share of the cost of an activity funded by a grant under subsection (b) shall not exceed 

75 percent, as determined by the Administrator. 

(2) MAXIMUM AMOUNT.—The total amount of grants made 

under subsection (b) for any publicly owned treatment works 

shall not exceed $150,000, as determined by the Administrator. 

(e) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL PUBLICLY OWNED TREAT- MENT WORKS.— (1) DEFINITION OF SMALL PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT

WORKS.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘small publicly owned 

treatment works’’ means a publicly owned treatment works that 

services a population of fewer than 20,000 individuals. 

(2) SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator, in coordination 

with the States, may provide technical guidance and assistance to small publicly owned treatment works for—

(i) the conduct of a vulnerability assessment; and 

(ii) the implementation of security enhancements to 

reduce vulnerabilities identified in a vulnerability assessment. 

(B) INCLUSIONS.—Technical guidance and assistance provided under subparagraph (A) may include technical assistance programs, training, and preliminary engineering 

evaluations. 

(3) PARTICIPATION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS.—The Administrator may provide grants to nonprofit organizations to 

assist in accomplishing the purposes of this subsection. 

(f) REFINEMENT OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

FOR PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT WORKS.— (1) GRANTS.—The Administrator may provide to nonprofit organizations 1 or more grants to be used in improving vulnerability assessment methodologies and tools for publicly owned 

treatment works, including publicly owned treatment works 

20

that are part of a combined public wastewater treatment and 

water supply system. 

(2) ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES.—A grant provided under this subsection may be used—

(A) to develop and distribute vulnerability self-assessment methodology software upgrades; 

(B) to improve and enhance critical technical and user 

support functions; 

(C) to expand libraries of information addressing threats 

and countermeasures; and 

(D) to implement user training initiatives. 

(3) COST.—A service described in paragraph (2) that is funded by a grant under this subsection shall be provided at no cost 

to the recipients of the service. 

(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to 

be appropriated, to remain available until expended— (1) $200,000,000 for use in making grants under subsection 

(b); 

(2) $15,000,000 for use in providing assistance under subsection (e); and 

(3) to carry out subsection (f), $1,000,000 for each of fiscal 

years 2003 through 2007. 

SEC. 223. RESEARCH AND REVIEW. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) COVERED TREATMENT WORKS.—The term ‘‘covered treatment works’’ has the meaning given the term ‘‘treatment works’’ 

in section 212. 

(2) HARMFUL INTENTIONAL ACT.—The term ‘‘harmful intentional act’’ means a terrorist attack or other intentional act carried out with respect to a covered treatment works that is intended— 

(A) to substantially disrupt the ability of the covered 

treatment works to provide safe and reliable— 

(i) conveyance and treatment of wastewater; 

(ii) disposal of effluent; or 

(iii) storage of a potentially hazardous chemical used 

to treat wastewater; 

(B) to damage critical infrastructure; 

(C) to have an adverse effect on the environment; or 

(D) to otherwise pose a significant threat to public health 

or safety. 

(b) REVIEW BY ADMINISTRATOR.—Not later than 2 years after the 

date of enactment of this section, the Administrator, in coordination 

with appropriate Federal agencies, shall research and review (or 

enter into a contract or cooperative agreement to provide for research and review of)—

(1) means by which terrorists or other individuals or groups 

could carry out harmful intentional acts; and 

(2) means by which alternative processes of conveying, treating, and disposing of wastewater could be provided in the event 

of the destruction, impairment, or disruption of covered treatment works as the result of harmful intentional acts. 

(c) MEANS OF CARRYING OUT HARMFUL INTENTIONAL ACTS.—

Means referred to in subsection (b)(1) include—

21

(1) means by which pipes and other constructed conveyances 

used in covered treatment works could be destroyed or otherwise 

prevented from providing adequate conveyance, pretreatment, 

treatment, and disposal of wastewater meeting applicable public health standards; 

(2) means by which conveyance, pretreatment, treatment, storage, and disposal facilities used by, or in connection with, covered treatment works could be destroyed or otherwise prevented 

from providing adequate treatment of wastewater meeting applicable public health standards; 

(3) means by which pipes, constructed conveyances, 

pretreatment, treatment, storage, and disposal systems that are 

used in connection with treatment works could be altered or affected so as to pose a threat to public health, public safety, or 

the environment; 

(4) means by which pipes, constructed conveyances, 

pretreatment, treatment, storage, and disposal systems that are 

used in connection with covered treatment works could be reasonably protected from harmful intentional acts; 

(5) means by which pipes, constructed conveyances, 

pretreatment, treatment, storage, and disposal systems could be 

reasonably secured from use as a means of transportation by 

terrorists or other individuals or groups who intend to threaten 

public health or safety; and 

(6) means by which information systems, including process 

controls and supervisory control, data acquisition, and cyber 

systems, at covered treatment works could be disrupted by terrorists or other individuals or groups. 

(d) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out the review under this section, the Administrator— 

(1) shall ensure that the review reflects the needs of covered 

treatment works of various sizes and various geographic areas 

of the United States; and 

(2) may consider the vulnerability of, or potential for forced 

interruption of service for, a region or service area, including 

the National Capital Area. 

(e) INFORMATION SHARING.—As soon as practicable after the review carried out under this section has been evaluated by the Administrator, the Administrator shall disseminate to covered treatment works information on the results of the review through the Information Sharing and Analysis Center or other appropriate means. 

(f) FUNDING.—There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out 

this section $15,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2004 through 

2008.

Æ