NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

SDS-IC, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-3551 ) FLORIDA CONCENTRATES ) INTERNATIONAL, LLC; FLORIDA ) SPARKLING DS, LLC; DIDIER HARDY; ) PRIMO WATER CORPORATION; ) PRIMO PRODUCTS, LLC; SUSAN ) BALLANTYNE; and SCOT ) BALLANTYNE, ) ) Appellees. ) ___________________________________ ) Opinion filed January 30, 2015. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Cynthia A. Pivacek, Judge. Nicholas P. Mizell and Louis D. D'Agostino of Cheffy Passidomo, P.A., Naples, for Appellant. Shelley D. Momo of Carreras & Lemoine, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, and Robert L. Schenk of Schenk Smith LLC, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellees Florida Concentrates International, LLC; Florida Sparkling DS, LLC; and Didier Hardy. James E. Moon of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Ft. Myers, and Robert- 2 - Cousins of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees Primo Water Corporation and Primo Products, LLC. No appearance for remaining Appellees.

KHOUZAM, Judge. SDS-IC appeals an omnibus order which, in relevant part, denied SDSIC's motion to quash attempted service of process. Because the attempted service of process was invalid, the trial court erred in denying the motio n and we must reverse. SDS-IC is an international corporation incorporated in Hong Kon g, China. Florida Concentrates International, Florida Sparking DS, and Di dier Hardy (Appellees) filed a complaint against SDS-IC and other defendants in Septem ber 2012. Foregoing service via the Central Authority as contemplated in the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters articles 2-6, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 (Hague Conventio n), Appellees elected instead to attempt service of process on SDS-IC by delivering a copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint directly to SDS-IC's registered add ress in Hong Kong. In the affirmation of service filed November 26, 2012, the process server averred that she served a "true copy" of both the summons and complaint at SDS-I C's registered office

on November 2. The affirmation does not indicate at what time service was accomplished, nor does it specify who was served. After SDS-IC failed to respond to the complaint, a clerk's defa ult was entered in July 2013. In November 2013, SDS-IC filed a motion to quash attempted service of process and to vacate the clerk's default. In the a lternative, SDS-IC- 3 - requested more time to respond to the complaint and to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Appellees opposed the motion, and all parties fi led affidavits to support their positions. Appellees relied upon two affidavits of Patri ck Ronald Paul Hamlin, an attorney at the firm that employed the process server who attem pted to serve SDS-IC in this case. In the affidavits, Hamlin stated in basic terms the service requirements of Hong Kong and the Hague Convention, and Hamlin thereafter concl uded that "service of process and the later Entry of Default was [sic] validly eff ected" under all applicable

laws. After a hearing in March 2014, the trial court entered an order on June 27, 2014, which denied the portions of the motion seeking to quash service of process and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction but granted the porti ons of the motion seeking to vacate the default and enlarge the time to respond to the compl aint. SDS-IC timely appealed, raising two arguments: first, that the service of pro cess was invalid because it complied with neither Florida law nor the Hague Convention; and second, that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction . We agree that SDS-IC was not properly served and that the service of process must be quashed. This outcome renders moot the second issue relating to personal juri sdiction. Article 1 of the Hague Conventio n provides that it "shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to tran smit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." Hague Convention, supra, at 362. Articles 2 through 6 address a scheme by which each state designates a C entral Authority to receive requests for service coming from other states. Id. at 362-63 Article 10 adds in relevant part:- 4 - Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not i nterfere with . . . (b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination. Id. at 365. This language has been interpreted to mean that se rvice of process under Article 10(b) is proper so long as the service laws of the stat e of origin are followed and the state of destination has not objected to them. See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981) (concluding th at in the alternative to service via the Central Authority, Article 10(b) "also allows s ervice to be effected without utilizing the Central Authority as long as the nation receiving service has not objected to the method used. Thus, the more liberal methods provided in th e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state long-arm rules may be used as long as the n ation receiving service has not objected to them"). Article 19 of the Convention prote cts the same conduct but

in the converse: it states that the Convention does not affect the receiving state's ability to accept service of process complying with its internal laws v ia methods other than those described in the Convention. See Banco Latino, S.A.C.A. v. Gomez Lopez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Article 19 should be bro adly construed so as to permit service by any means, subj ect to the Federal Rules of Ci vil Procedure, not proscribed by the foreign country."). With regard to Florida law, section 48.194(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provides that "service of process on persons outside of this st ate shall be made in the same manner as service within this state by any officer authori zed to serve process in the state where the person is served," along with the proviso t hat "[s]ervice of process on persons outside the United States may be required to conform to the provisions of- 5 - the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extr ajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters." Section 48.21(1) provides that t he required return-ofservice form must include "the date and time when it comes to h and, the date and time when it is served, the manner of service, the name of the perso n on whom it was served and, if the person is served in a representative capacity, the position occupied by the person." See also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070(e) ("The date and hour of service shall be endorsed on the original process and all copies of it by the pe rson making the service."). Section 48.21(2) adds that although the return-of-service is am endable, the failure to state the required facts invalidates the service. Section 48.0 81(3)(a) provides that a corporation who has not designated a registered agent can be se rved by serving "any employee at the corporation's principal place of business." "[S]tatutes governing service of process must be strictly const rued, and valid service on a corporation may only be effected by complyin g with them." Int'l Steel Truss Co. v. Artec Grp., Inc., 824 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1056 (Fla. 2008). Here, a review of the record reflects that service of process o n SDS-IC did not comply with Florida law or the Hague Convention. It is und isputed that Appellees did not utilize China's Central Authority designated under the Hague Convention for

service. The return-of-service in the record patently does not comply wi th Florida's service of process laws. It lacks statements regarding the tim e it was received by the process server, the time it was served on a defendant, the mann er of service, the name- 6 - of the person served, and the position of the person served. A dditionally, the return-ofservice alleges that only a copy was served rather than the ori ginal process. Consequently, the record evidence falls far short of demonstrat ing strict compliance with Florida laws regarding service of process. And although Appellees cite to Koechli v. BIP International, In c., 861 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), for the proposition that the trial court has discretion to declare service under the Hague C onvention valid despite techni cal deficiencies, that case does not control here. Koechli specifically addressed ser vice via the Hague Convention's Central Authority provisions, a method of service that undisputedly was

not used in this case. Having now determined that the service of process in this case strictly complied with neither China's Central Authority under the Hague Convention nor Florida law—which Appellees tacitly concede—we must address Appellees' remaining argument that the service should nevertheless be upheld because it complied with China's service laws. For the reasons set forth below we rejec t Appellees' remaining argument. First, although Appellees correctly identify that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution invalidates any state laws that are inconsistent with the Hague Convention, they do not address as part of this argument the actual text of the Hague Convention or how any of Florida's laws are inconsistent with it. A review of Article 10 belies their argument, as the convention makes clear that it "does not interfere with" the originating state's existing service laws, Hague Conv ention, supra, at 363, and- 7 - both parties agree that neither the United States nor China has made any relevant objections. Moreover, Appellees have cited no authority which supports this argument. Second, even to the extent this argument may be persuasive, it is unsupported by the record. Appe llees have not cited to a singl e authority addressing Chinese laws regarding service of process. Instead, they have submitted only the conclusory affidavit of an individual at the firm who attempted service. This legal opinion was not competent evidence. See Estate of Murray ex re l. Murray v. Delta Health Grp., Inc., 30 So. 3d 576, 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("An e xpert may render an opinion regarding an ultimate issue in a case, but he or she is not permitted to render an opinion that applies a legal standard to a set of facts."); Fir st Mortg. Corp. of Stuart v. deGive, 177 So. 2d 741, 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) ("The foregoing and other parts of the affidavits submitted by the defendant are opinion testimony and legal conclusions that

would not be admissible in evidence at a trial and the court sh ould have disregarded the incompetent and inadmissible matter and given consideration onl y to the competent and admissible portions."). Consequent ly, even assuming that compl iance with Hong Kong's service laws would operate to validate the service attem pted in this case, no competent evidence in the record exists to support the argument

. We must therefore reverse the order on appeal to the extent it denied SDS-IC's motion to quash and rem and with instructions to grant the motion to quash service of process. This renders moot the issue of personal ju risdiction. See Nat'l Safety Assocs., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 799 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("Proper service of process is indispensable for the court to o btain personal jurisdiction over a defendant.").- 8 - Order reversed in part; remanded with instructions to grant the motion to quash attempted service of process.

BLACK and SLEET, JJ., Concur.