1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EILEEN E. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 15-2080 (JEB) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION For the past 25 years Plaintiff Eileen Jenkins has built a care er as an architect for the District of Columbia. In 2011, her particular office was conso lidated into D.C. General Services, Construction Division. Jenkins’s lateral transfer into that Di vision is the foundation for many of her grievances today. Because she was transferred “as is,” Pla intiff was required to apply for a new position within General Services in order to move onto the new D.C. pay scale. In 2014, she applied for two such jobs as a Project Manager – one of whi ch was grade 13 on that pay scale, and the other of which w as grade 14. Jenkins was offere d only the lower position, which she subsequently declined. This case largely arises out of her non-selection for the grade 14 post, a decision that she alleges was the result of both r ace discrimination, in violatio n of Title VII and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, a nd age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Jenkins further claims that she was subjected to a hostile workplace at the Division, also in violation of Title VII. The District now mov es for summary judgment on all counts, claiming that no reasonabl e jury could find Plaintiff’s non-selection discriminatory or her2 work environment hostile. This Court agrees and will grant Def endant’s Motion.
I. Background Because the District is moving for summary judgment, the Court describes the facts in the light most favorable to J enkins. See Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In 1992, Plaintiff was hired by the Design and Engineering Unit of the D.C. Public Schools as an architect. In 2008, that Unit wa s reorganized into the Office of Public Education Facilities Modernization (OPEFM). See EC F No. 20-1, Exh. B (Notification of Personnel Action). Three years later, Jenkins’s job was again restructured when the OPEF M became part of the District of Columbia General Services, Cons truction Division (DGS). Id. at 20. For the transfers to both OPEFM and DGS, Jenkins was transferred “as is,” meaning that he r pay plan, title, grade, and step remained the same. See EC F No. 23 (Opposition to MSJ) at 6. At the time of her assignment to DGS, Jenkins was a grade 14, step 7 architect und er the Education Service System (EG) pay scale. See Notification of Personnel Action. In order to transfer from the E G scale to that used by DGS – th e Career Service (CS) scale – Jenkins was told that she was required to apply for an open position within the Construction Division. Be ginning in 2012, DGS posted numerous job openings for internal candidates, including multiple positions for grade 13 and 14 Pr oject Managers. See ECF No. 20- 1, Exh. C (Vacancies List). Althoug h these vacancies were open to all employees, Jenkins did not apply for any. Id. Instead, s he seems to have directed he r energies toward contesting the terms of her lateral transfer. For example, Jenkins sent a ser ies of emails and letters to D.C. Council members and to the mayor of the District, all of which discussed her alleged “pay disparity,” ECF No. 23-3 (Email to Mayor Muriel Bowser) at 2, a nd perceived lack of adequate compensation. See ECF No. 23-3 (Email to D.C. Council Chairman Phil Mendelson); id. (Letter3 to Council Member Kenyan McDuffi e). The Court notes that, inte restingly, none of these communications mentioned race or age discrimination as a basis for her disputes with DGS. In March 2014, Jenkins finally s ubmitted applications for two o f the available DGS positions – Project Manager CS-14, #24562, and Project Manager CS-13, #24563 – both of which would have transferred her to the Career Service pay scal e. See Opp. at 9. On March 26, 2014, DGS offered Plaintiff the CS-13 Project Manager position. See ECF No. 23-10 (Selection Certificate for CS-13). Even t hough this move might seem to ha ve demoted her (from a grade 14 to a grade 13), the EG and CS pay scales are different. In fac t, if accepted, this job would have increased Jenkins’s salar y from $81,642 to $86,056, as well as making her eligible for an additional 3% cost-of-livi ng increase. See ECF No. 20-1, Exh. G (Offer of CS-13 Position). Jenkins nonetheless rejected the CS-13 offer, expressing her di scontent with DGS’s decision not to select her for the CS-14 position. See ECF No. 23-5 (Letter from Jenkins to June Locker). In June 2014, Plaintiff filed a cha rge with the D.C. Office of Human Rights, alleging race and age discrimination. See O pp. at 10. DCOHR dismissed the c harge and transferred the case to the Equal Employment Oppor tunity Commission. Id. The EEOC, in turn, did not sustain Jenkins’s charges and sent her a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on September 1, 2015. Id. Although neither party has submitted the EEOC filings or record s, the District does not argue that Jenkins failed to administr atively exhaust her claims. Th e Court therefore proceeds under the assumption that this has properly occurred. On December 1, 2015, Jenkins filed su it in this Court. Her Com plaint alleges that she was treated differently by DGS because of her race, in violatio n of Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, an assertion she ba ses largely on her non-selection for the CS-14 position. See Compl., ¶¶ 28-38. She also allege s age discrimination under th e Age Discrimination in4 Employment Act, stating that “le ss experienced similarly situat ed Architects and/or Project Managers under the age of 40 wer e hired at a higher pay scale a nd/or paid a higher wage than [Jenkins] for same or similar [w ork] performe d during the relev ant period.” Id., ¶¶ 45-52. Finally, Jenkins brings a hostile-workplace claim under Title V II, alleging that as a result of her race and age, her “supervisors routinely humiliated [her] and e ngaged in [a] persistent pattern of severe and pervasive harassment. ” Id., ¶¶ 58-65. The District has now moved for summary judgment on all counts, asserti ng that there is no record evide nce supporting any of Jenkins’s allegations. See ECF No. 20 (MSJ).
II. Legal Standard Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. L iberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A fact is “materia l” if it is capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the l itigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a rea sonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Sc ott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 38 0 (2007). When a motion for summary judgme nt is under consideration, “[t] he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ( en banc ). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “eschew making credibility determinati ons or weighing the evidence.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The no n-moving party’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be5 supported by affidavits, declarati ons, or other competent evide nce, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. C iv. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). T he non-movant is required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor. See Laningham v . Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
III. Analysis There are a few issues to addr ess before proc eeding to Plaintif f’s more substantive claims. First, the Court can eas ily dispose of her allegation that the District violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Compl., ¶ 1. As Defenda nt notes in its Motion – and Jenkins concedes in her response – a plaintiff cannot s ue a municipality under § 1981. See MSJ at 10; Opp. at 1. The District is correct that the S upreme Court has held that 42 U.S .C. § 1983, not § 1981, provides the exclusive remedy for discri mination and retaliation claims when the alleged violation is by a
state actor. See Jett v. Dallas Independent S chool District, 491 U.S. 701, 109 ( 1989); Olatunji v. D.C., 958 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2013). The Court will therefore grant the District’s Motion with respect to this count. Second, there is the question of w hich decisions, precisely, Je nkins alleges were the result of race and age discrimination. Although her Complaint largely addresses her non-selection for the CS-14 position, it also makes certain broader allegations r egarding her employment. Specifically, she asserts that s he did not “have her pay scale properly changed,” “[was] not being paid commensurate with her dut ies,” and was “demoted in paygrad e.” Compl., ¶ 30. Plaintiff does not, however, offer any record evidence to connect these g rievances with any race or age discrimination. Jenkins also gene rally contends that the Distr ict “limited, segregated and classified her in a way that de prived her of employment opportu nities and otherwise adversely6 affected her status as an employee because of her race.” Id. She provides no evidentiary support for this unspecified claim be yond the denial of her CS-14 appli cation. As this Circuit has held, “[T]he burden on a defendant moving for summary judgment may be discharged without factual disproof of the plaintiff's cas e; the defendant need only ident ify the ways in which the plaintiff has failed to come forward wit h sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury to find in her favor on one or more essential elements of her claim.” Grimes v . D.C., 794 F.3d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Here, Jenkins’s filings fall far below this “suffi cient evidence” bar on claims unrelated to the CS-14 position. Additionally, Plaintiff’s briefing itself appears to concede th at the only act at issue is her non-selection for the CS-14 openi ng. See Opp. at 11 (stating t hat the position a t issue is CS-14, #24562); id. at 21, 24-25 (discussi ng discrimination count only in context of non- selection for CS-14 position). Indeed, in addressi ng the District’s Statemen t of Facts, Jenkins expressly asserts that her claim is not based on the city’s hiring decisi ons outside of the positions for which she applied. Id. at 7, 11. The Court will, consequently, cons ider her other claims as forfeited or insufficiently supported, and it will only address her non-sele ction as a CS-14 Project Manager and her hostile-work-environment claim.
A. Race Discrimination
1. Legal Standard Jenkins alleges race discrimina tion under both Title VII and th e DCHRA. These statutes prohibit “employers from inten tionally discriminating on the ba sis of race with respect to the ‘benefits, privileges, terms, and c onditions’ of employment.” Ayissi–Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Because the same analytic fram ework governs discrimination claims under both laws, the Court will consider Jenkins’s alleg ations of racial discrimination7 under the federal standard. S ee McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andr ews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 3, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Title VII ana lysis applies to discrim ination claims under DCHRA). To make out a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff may rely on di rect or circumstantial evidence that “permits an infer ence of discrimination.” Holcom b, 433 F.3d at 899. Where, as in this case, the plaintiff proffers only circumstantial support, her claim is governed by the familiar framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this test, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case by showing that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffe red an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Wiley v. Glassm an, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In doing s o, the plaintiff must show that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivati ng factor” for the adverse employ ment practice, even if other factors contributed. See 42 U.S .C. § 2000e-2(m); Desert Palace , Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101- 02 (2003). Once a plaintiff has made out his prima facie case, the burden then shi fts to the defendant to come forward with a legitimat e, non-discriminatory reason fo r the challenged action. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Af fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 ( 1981). If the employer articulates such a justifica tion for its hiring decision, “the burden-shifting framework” then “falls away, and the ‘central question’ b ecomes whether ‘the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find t hat the employer’s asserted nond iscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employe r intentionally discriminated against the employee.’” Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Brady v. Off ice of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). At the summary-judgment stage , therefore, the inquiry typically collapses into one sim ple question: Given all the evi dence, could a reasonable jury8 conclude that the defendant enga ged in intentional discriminati on against the plaintiff? See Brady, 520 F.3d 490 at 494. That is not to say, however, that evidence of a prima facie case is wholly shunted from the inquir y on a motion for summary judgmen t. On the contrary, in answering the sufficient-eviden ce question, the Court must cons ider “the total circumstances of the case,” including strengths a nd weaknesses in “ the plaintiff ’s prima facie case,” along with other evidence adduced by both pa rties during discovery. See E vans v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 134 4, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
2. Merits Jenkins alleges that DGS did not s elect her as a CS-14 Project Manager because she is black. Specifically, Plaintiff a sserts that she applied for “a position she was qualified for and was not chosen based on her protect ed trait,” and that the reco rd supports an inference that “it is more likely than not that a discri minatory reason motivated [he r] employer.” Opp. at 22-23. The District responds that Jenki ns has failed to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination. It additionally argues that, assu ming she did make such a showing, DGS made its hiring decisions for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, including that “man agement considered the internal candidates hired for the CS-14 pos itions to have a more extensi ve project management background than Jenkins.” Repl y at 2-3. Defendant contends th at as Jenkins has not established a triable issue of f act with respect to this rationale being pr etext, the District is entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 3. The city is correct that the record does not support an inferen ce of race discrimination. Indeed, the evidence does not e ven back up a number of Jenkins’ s factual assertions. Plaintiff contends, for instance, that th e District “did not even conside r her for the Project Manager CS-14 position, a position she was qualified for,” citing to her Apri l 22, 2014, letter to the hiring9 official, June Locker, in which J enkins wrote that she “was onl y considered for the grade 13 position, without the benefit of i nterviewing/discussing my qua lifications for the grade 14 position.” Opp. at 23; Letter to J une Locker. Yet Plaintiff n eglects to address two other exhibits she herself submitted showing that she was in fact considered f or the CS-14 opening. See Exh. D (Email from Cecilia Bankins) (stating that Jenkins was referr ed to Locker “for both the CS-13 and CS-14 positions”); Exh. P (Sele ction Certificate for CS-14 Posting) (listing Jenkins as a “candidate submitted for consider ation”). Although the Court d oes not typically weigh conflicting evidence at summary j udgment, Jenkins’s statement t hat she was “not even consider[ed]” for the CS-14 position is undermined by her own s ubmissions. This allegation thus cannot support a ra ce-discrimination claim. Another of Jenkins’s asserti ons regarding her non-selection for the CS-14 position is even more egregiously off the mark. P laintiff states that she was t reated “less favorably because she is African American,” reciting the s tandard that “a showing that a member outside of the protected class received a promotion inste ad of the plainti ff is sufficie nt to create an inference of discrimination.” Opp. at 22 (citing McCaskey v. Henry, 461 F. App’x 268, 270 (4th Cir. 2012)). She maintains that “it is undis puted that Robbie Stewart, Antho ny Goodman and Cassidy Mullen are white and were the selecti ons to fill the DGS – Project Man ager CS-14, #24562 positions.” Id. Jenkins then cites to thr ee exhibits, none of which sugges ts that those three individuals were actually selected. See Exh. D (Letter from Cecelia Bankins to Eileen Jenkins); E xh. E (Letter to June Locker from Eileen Jenkins ); Exh. T (Personnel List). Ano ther of Plaintiff’s exhibits does, however, show who was hired for the #24562 openings – Eupert Br aithwaite, Ugur Ertem, Dwight Goupal, and Emmanuel Nnnoli . See Exh. P (Selection Cert ificate for Posting #24562, CS-14). The Division’s personne l list (also submitted by Jenki ns) establishes th at none of these10 individuals is, in fact, white. Instead, the list supports the District’s assertion that DGS “selected four minorities,” Reply at 4, a s Braithwaite, Goupal, and Nnoli are black, and Ertem is Asian. See Personnel List. All Jenkins had to do in order to correctl y determine the race of those selected for the CS-14, #24562 posi tion was to reference her ow n evidence. Her clear misstatement of the evidence is alarming and borders on the san ctionable. Looking at the actual record in t his case, it becomes clear tha t the race of the individuals selected for the CS-14 positions presents a formidable obstacle to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim. Because the District has presented a non-discriminatory rationa le – namely, that DGS selected better-qualified internal candida tes for the CS-14 position – J enkins must show that this justification was a pretext for race discrimination. At this s tage, the question for the Court is whether a reasonable jury could i nfer that her non-selection fo r the CS-14 position was in fact due to discriminatory animus. W ith respect to this inquiry, th e fact that a contested position was filled by members of the same race “cuts strongly against any i nference of discrimination.” Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting t hat although plaintiff may make

out prima facie case without showing that she was passed over for candidate ou tside of her protected class, hiring of indivi dual within that class is high ly relevant to determining whether plaintiff can show pretext). Here, Jenkins asserts that she can show discrimination because she had “more experience than four individuals who were white.” ECF 23-19 (Declaration of Eileen Jenkins). Yet, in light of the races of the candidates w ho were actually hired for the CS-14, # 24562 Project Manager positions, this argument is simply nonsensical. With respect t o the three black hirees, moreover, the selection of indi viduals within Jenkins ’s protected class l argely undermines any possible inference of discriminatory animus. With respect to the one As ian hire, Ugur Ertem, Jenkins11 must rebut the District’s cont ention that Ertem was a stronger internal candidate. This she cannot do. According to the Personn el List, Ertem was already at a grade-15 level and in a supervisory position within the D ivision when he was selected a s a CS-14 Project Manager. See Personnel List at 2. In order t o “establish discriminatory int ent” by “comparing qualifications,” a plaintiff must show that she is “significantly better qualified than the person who obtained the position.” Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F .3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citat ion omitted). Plaintiff falls far short of this standar d, as she provides no explanatio n of why she, as a grade 14 architect, was in fact better qualified t han Ertem (or any other candidate ) for the contested position. Jenkins may well believe that she was “overqualified” for the C S-13 opening and “better suited” for the CS-14 position. See Opp. at 10. Yet this Cour t does not sit as a “super-personnel department that reexamines an e ntity’s business decisions.” Fi schbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and t hus declines to second g uess the District’s hiring practices in the absence of any s upport for Jenkins’s claim of discriminatory intent. Looking at all the evidence in toto , as the Court must after Defe ndant offers a non-discriminatory rationale, it is abundantly clear that no reas onable jury could infer that she was “treated differently based upon her status as an African-American.” Opp. at 23. Because there is no triable issue of fact as to the District’s proffered expl anation, the Court will grant t he Motion for Summary Judgment on this count.
B. Age Discrimination To prevail on a claim of age di scrimination, a plaintiff must s how that: (1) she “suffered an adverse employment action”; a nd (2) that the employer took t hat action “because of” her age. Brady, 520 F.3d at 493; see also Wilson v. Cox, 753 F.3d 244, 2 47 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that courts “generally apply the same approach in ADEA cases . . . as [they] do in Title VII cases”).12 As with Title VII, once an employer has proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action, the only question for the Court is “whether the plainti ff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-discri minatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer inte ntionally discriminated agains t the plaintiff on a prohibited basis.” Adeyemi v. Distr ict of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). Here, Jenkins asserts that the D istrict hired “individuals who were younger than Plaintiff to fill the position of CS-14 Proje ct Manager.” Opp. at 25; id . at 26 (stating that “District chose four younger employees for CS-14 P roject Manager positions”). Once again, Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this alleg ation, and that omission is su fficient to doom her claim. The District, however, has also done itself no favors by failing to submit records establishing the ages of the four individuals selec ted for the CS-14 position. The c ity asserts that “all applicants” for the open positions “were over forty years of age,” but then cit es only to its own general counsel’s letter to the EEOC. See MSJ at 13. Such legal advocacy cannot , at summary judgment, pass for record evidence establishing tha t there is no triable issue of fact. Yet, even assuming that the four individuals hired for the CS-1 4 position were under the age of 40, Jenkins’s age-discrim ination claim still cannot proc eed. This is because the District offers a non-discriminatory rat ionale for its hiring decision – namely, that the individuals selected were either at a highe r grade than CS-14 or already in a supervisory position. See Reply at 5. Because the District offe rs such an explanation, the bur den shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate pretext. She does not succeed. As just mentioned, the personnel list shows that the four indiv iduals hired for the CS-14, # 24562 openings were each at either a higher pay grade than Je nkins or in a supervisory position at the time they were selecte d. Three of the four were already at the CS-15 level and thus took a13 grade demotion when they accepted the CS-14 posting. The other , Emmannuel Nnoli, was at the CS-14 grade at the time of sel ection, but was already in a supe rvisory role within the Division. See Personnel List. Jenkins, m eanwhile, was an EG grade-14 arc hitect with no supervisory title. Although, as already indicated, th e grades are not equivalent a cross pay scales, a CS-13 was paid more than an EG-14, and the CS pa y scale was considerably highe r overall. See ECF No. 20-1 at 29, 58 (EG and CS pay scales). Y et Plaintiff provides no ex planation for why she was better, or even equally, qualified for the CS-14 position than the four individuals selected. Although Jenkins asserts that she had over “10 years’ experience at the time and degrees in Architecture and Construction,” Opp. at 27, she i s unable to show that such experience casts any doubt upon Defendant’s decision to hire ca ndidates who already held higher -paying positions within the Division. Because Jenkins provides no evidence supporting an i nference that the District’s hiring decision was based on age rathe r than legitimate reasons , she cannot establish a material issue of triable fact with r espect to her ADEA claim.
C. Hostile Work Environment In addition to alleging that her non-selection for the CS-14 po sition was the result of discrimination, Jenkins also conte nds that the District violate d Title VII by creating “a hostile or abusive work environment that is discriminatory.” Opp. at 27. In support of this position, she broadly asserts that she “was routinely and continually subject ed to harassing conduct,” Compl., ¶ 59, and that in particular, “while working on an assignment,” her supervisor, Maurice Dunn, “yelled and berated [her] in fr ont of her co-workers.” Opp. a t 11. An office becomes “hostile” for the purposes of Title VII only if the allegedly offensive conduct “permeate[s] [the workpl ace] with ‘discriminatory . . . intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pe rvasive to alter the condition s of the victim’s employment and14 create an abusive work environmen t.” Harris v. Forklift Sys. I nc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that determining whether a hostile workplace exists has both subjective and objective comp onents, with the latter judged “from the perspective of a reas onable person in th e plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.” Oncale v. Sundow ner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, the District has not chall enged Jenkins’s subjective beli ef that she experienced a hostile work environment. What re mains, consequently, is for t he Court to determine the objective reasonableness of her allegations. Considering the e vidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record sho ws no basis upon which a reasonable jury could find in her favor. Indeed, Jenkins’s assertions regarding the alleged workplace ha rassment and abuse do not approach the standard for establishing such a claim. First, her generalized claim r egarding harassing conduct lack s any specific evidentiary support. Plaintiff’s perfunctory s tatement that she was once “ yelled [at] and berated” in front of her co-workers, moreover, does not rise to the level of “severe or pervasive” abuse. See ECF No. 23 (Response to Interrogato ries) at 8-9. Although many emp loyees may wish it were otherwise, Title VII sets a high ba r for the types of behavior that create a hostile workplace. As courts have repeatedly held, a pl aintiff cannot prevail simply by alleging that she was subject to humiliation or one specific instance of mistreatment. Aldrich v. Burwell, 197 F. Supp. 3d 124, 135 (D.D.C. 2016) (stating that hos tile work environment typica lly arises not “from discrete acts,” but from “several indivi dual acts that . . . become acti onable due to their ‘cumulative effect’”); Pitts v. Howard Univ., 111 F. Supp. 3d 9, 24 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that conduct alleged “must be extreme to am ount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment,”15 and thus satisfy hostile-environment standard). Title VII does not establish a “general civility code for the American workplace, ” and the behavior alleged here is not “so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions” of J enkins’s employment. See Oncal e, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (internal quotation omitted). Second, and more fundamentally, Jenkins seems to ignore the req uirement that, in order to violate Title VII, the “intimid ation, ridicule, [or] insult” must be discriminatory – i.e ., “because of the employee’s protected status.” Peters v. Distri ct of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted). Court have “ routinely held that hostile behavior, no matter how unjustified or egr egious, cannot support a claim of hostile work environment unless there exists some linkage between the hostile behavior a nd the plaintiff's membership in a protected class.” Na’im v. Clinton, 626 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D. D.C. 2009); see Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding sum mary judgment on plaintiff's hostile-work-environment claim in part because “none of the com ments or actions directed at [plaintiff] expressly focuse d on his race, religion, age, or di sability”); Ch aple v. Johnson, 453 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2006) (observi ng that “[i]t must be clear that the hostile work environment was the result of discrimination based on a protect ed status”). Here, Plaintiff submits not a shred of evidence th at the alleged episode of yel ling was related to unlawful discrimination, and she offers only t he conclusory statement th at the general and unspecified harassment was “based on her race (African American) and her ag e.” Compl., ¶ 63. Because Jenkins is unable to show a “correlation to the claimed ground[ s] of discrimination,” she presents no issue of triable fact for a jur y with respect to this count. See Bryant v. Brownlee, 265 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D.D.C. 2003).16 IV. Conclusion Although Jenkins may feel aggriev ed by the circumstances of her bureaucratic transfers, she fails to demonstrate a triabl e issue of fact with respect r ace or age discrimination, or her hostile-work-environment claim. F or the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the District is entitled to summary judgme nt and will grant its Motion. A s eparate Order consistent with this Opinion will be issued this day.

/s/ James E. Boasber g JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: November 21, 2017