Air University

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Air War College

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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

The F-22

The Right Fighter for

the Twenty-first Century?

MICHAEL J. COSTIGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 9

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 1997
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 may have re

firmed the need for all three major aircraft modernizat

programs—the F-22, F/A-18E/F, and Joint Strike Fighte

but the debate is far from over. The F-22, the most expens

of the three programs, stands out as a lucrative target 

budget cutters. Critics are quick to point out that the F

was designed during the cold war to defend the North Atl

tic Treaty Organization airspace against the Warsaw Pa

numerical superiority. With the cold war long over and 

Soviet Union relegated to history, many experts quest

whether the F-22 is still necessary. They point to the Uni

States’s overwhelming dominance in the Persian Gulf W

using F-15Cs as evidence. F-22 proponents counter that 

world is still a very dangerous place, and the United Sta

needs the F-22 to ensure air superiority.

In this study Lt Col Michael J. Costigan, USAF, take

critical look at the F-22 and its role in our military strategy 

the twenty-first century. Although the Soviet Union is go

the United States may well face regional adversaries who 

enjoy numerical superiority while the United States depl

its forces. Use of chemical or biological weapons could s

our deployment considerably while forcing other friendly 

sets in theater to disperse, further limiting their effectivene

In this scenario, the argument for the F-22 becomes m

compelling. Its innovative technologies provide the F-22 w

supercruise, stealth, and integrated avionics, and enable i

guarantee the air superiority so necessary to victory. I 

courage each of you to read this review of the aircraft tha

planned to form the cornerstone of the US Air Force’s 

superiority mission in the twenty-first century.

D. BRUCE SMITH

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iii
About the Author

Lt Col Michael J. “Mike” Costigan (BS, University of C

cinnati; MS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and 

Air Force Institute of Technology) is a command pilot w

has flown the F-4, T-38, and F-15. After completing 

USAF Test Pilot School at Edwards Air Force Base (AF

California, he continued at Edwards and served as chie

the Cruise Missile Branch (1987–88) and the Figh

Branch (1988–89) of the 6512th Test Squadron, as direc

of STOL/Maneuver Tech Demo Joint Test Force (1989–

and the Integrated Control and Avionics for Air Superio

Joint Task Force (1991–92), and was executive officer 

AF Flight Test Center (1992–93). At Wright -Patter

AFB, Ohio, Colonel Costigan was chief of the F-22 Cock

Branch (1993–95) and of the F-22 Avionics Bran

(1995–96). He is a graduate of Air Command and S

College and a 1997 graduate of Air War College. Colo

Costigan has been assigned as deputy program direct

special programs, at the Aeronautical Systems Center, Eg

AFB, Florida.
The F-22

The Right Fighter for

the Twenty-first Century?

The United States armed forces are entering what m

prove to be one of the most difficult periods in their h

tory. The Soviet Union—the focus for US defense plann

for one-half century—is gone, defeated by economic for

rather than Western military might. The breakup of 

Soviet Union was hardly complete when Saddam Husse

army brutally invaded and occupied Kuwait. The war t

resulted held several important lessons for US and ot

military planners. US military might could not be ch

lenged in conventional warfare. It is unlikely that in 

future a regional power will challenge the United States 

the way that Iraq did. Instead many countries may turn 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to counter our ov

whelming conventional superiority. Postwar investigati

in Iraq revealed it is astonishingly easy to hide WMD fac

ties from international inspectors. Use of such weapo

must be considered in any US national defense strategy.

The Gulf War also signaled that, even with the cold w

over, the world is still a very dangerous place. The end 

the uncomfortable stability of the bipolar cold war has 

sulted in more regional conflicts as ancient hatreds boi

the surface. The world peace many leaders expected dis

peared as Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait City. The invas

served as a powerful reminder that the United States c

expect to have its vital interests challenged with li

warning. In 1994 British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hu

said that “although the world has changed, it remain

deeply turbulent and dangerous place.”1

Finally, the Gulf War pointed to a change in how w

are waged. The principle of mass, which previously impl

large troop formations and long bombing campaigns, m

soon mean precision munitions augmented by power

information systems. This change is fortunate becau

weapons of mass destruction make any strategy neces

tating large troop concentrations very risky.

1
Even though the United States is in the enviable po

tion of being the world’s preeminent military power, as w

as the world leader in the technologies that may revo

tionize warfare, disturbing trends are on the horizon. O

military budget is shrinking and will continue to do so i

the foreseeable future as social programs continue to 

pand and Congress looks to the Department of Defen

(DOD) as a source to balance the budget. 2

Against this backdrop, the US Air Force is acquiring 

most expensive and capable fighter in history, the F-

With a recently announced cost growth of $1.45 bill

added to the $12 to $14 billion already spent on the en

neering and manufacturing development program,3

 C

gress must soon decide if we will acquire the fleet of 4

aircraft the Air Force desires at a cost of $160 million eac

In a Pentagon budget many believe to be underfinanced 

the out-years, the F-22 program is expected to consu

$73.5 billion.5

 Given tight budgets and a changed wo

some critics are asking if the F-22 is the right aircraft 

the twenty-first century, or if it is needed at all. Rep

sentative Curt Weldon, the Republican chairman of 

House Committee on National Security’s Research and 

velopment panel recently complained that “we haven’t b

given a threat that warrants these programs.” 6

The stakes are high. There is frequently a tendency 

nations to prepare to fight the last war, with disastro

consequences, as France did following World War I. If 

F-22 is a product of a bureaucratic system preparing 

fight the Gulf War again—unable to adapt to the realities 

the rapidly changing world—then the impact on US m

tary power could be profound. The Air Force cannot aff

the development of another air superiority fighter for so

time, and even if the money were available, it takes m

than 16 years to field a new weapon system. 7

 Indeed, pl

ners are counting on the F-22 to carry the air superior

mission into 2050 and beyond. If the F-22 proves poo

suited to warfare in the twenty-first century, it will beco

one of the most expensive blunders in military history a

could leave the Air Force dependent on aging F-15s 

signed in the 1960s to fight in the next century.
This study examines the relevance of the F-22 in 

twenty-first century. First, the F-22 weapon system is d

cussed to analyze the technologies that are designed 

make it superior to other fighters in the world. Second, 

changing nature of warfare is explored to investigate 

probable scenarios that the United States will encounter 

the future and the kind of strategies that make sense 

the United States. Third, conclusions will be drawn on h

well the F-22 fits into future war scenarios and proba

defense strategies, and whether the F-22 is the right a

craft to purchase today.

The F-22

The F-22 can trace its history to the early 1980s 

military planners began looking for a replacement for 

F-15 to perform the air superiority mission. Defending 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against a Sov

Union invasion was still the central theme for milit

planning. It was expected that the Warsaw Pact would 

joy a sizable numerical superiority over NATO air forces, 

planners looked to technological superiority to counter 

numerical deficit. Therefore, the F-22 was optimized 

fight and win in the European theater against overwhe

ing numbers of Soviet aircraft.8

In order to accomplish this, the F-22 incorporates in

vative technologies to provide the aircraft with three ch

acteristics that, in synergy, make it dominant against a

current or projected air-to-air threat.9

The F-22 is designed to cruise at supersonic speeds 

military power, a capability called supercruise. While m

current fighters can achieve supersonic speeds, they m

use afterburners to do so. The tremendously high fuel c

sumption while using afterburners means they can o

maintain supersonic speeds for very short periods. By 

ing engines that provide very high thrust without having 

use the afterburners and moving all weapons to inter

bays to reduce drag, the F-22 can cruise at superso

speeds while using only slightly more fuel than a conv

tional fighter uses to cruise at subsonic speeds. Along w

its low radar cross section, this allows it to penetrate den
integrated air defense systems (IADS) and makes it mu

more difficult for enemy fighters to maneuver to weapo

firing positions. The low drag and efficient engines also g

the F-22 exceptional range, minimizing the need for 

refueling assets.

The low radar cross section, responsible for the stea

characteristics of the aircraft, complements the sup

cruise capability. The incorporation of third-generati

low-observable technologies means the F-22 does not s

fer the aerodynamic penalties that previous stealth p

forms such as the F-117 and B-2 had to endure. The F-

not only has a much smaller radar cross section than 

F-15 and F-16 but also is more maneuverable as well.

Another innovative characteristic incorporated into 

F-22 is an integrated avionics suite. In past aircraft, 

pilot had to run the radar, monitor the radar warning 

ceiver, activate the identification friend or foe interrogat

interpret the separate displays to form a mental image 

the air battle, fly the aircraft to avoid ground threats, d

pense protective measures when needed, and fire 

weapons. In a region such as Europe where the grou

threat was dense and the air filled with hundreds of a

borne targets, even the most experienced pilots could f

it difficult to maintain situation awareness.

The F-22 overcomes this problem by using the lat

computer technology to accomplish many of the tasks 

pilots used to perform. Instead of spending time operat

the complex sensors, the pilot becomes an informat

manager. He or she can observe a bird’s-eye view of the 

battle on a single large display that shows information fr

all the sensors in an easy-to-comprehend pictorial form

The onboard computers handle the majority of the sen

taskings, including keeping track of friendly and ene

aircraft, freeing the pilot to fly the airplane and fire 

weapons.10 The sensors, including the radar system, inc

porate the latest electronics and allow the F-22 to det

enemy aircraft at greater distances than can conventio

fighters. F-22 avionics systems communicate with ea

other using a data link, allowing all members of a flight 

share information on the air battle. Link-16 also allows 
F-22 to receive information from other US fighters and 

airborne warning and control system (AWACS). 11

The combination of supercruise, stealth, and integra

avionics makes the F-22 dominant over all current or p

jected aircraft. Other fighters will not be able to detect 

F-22 before its pilot has already seen a complete view 

the air battle and decided how to employ his weapons. I

complex air battle with dozens of aircraft, the integra

avionics and stealth will allow the pilot to choose wh

and when to engage to maximize survivability while 

stroying enemy aircraft that are not even aware of the 

22’s presence.12 Simulations using projected threat airc

for the year 2008 reveal that F-15 losses could be 20 tim

those of the F-22 in some situations. 13

One late addition to the F-22’s requirements arose fr

lessons learned in the Gulf War. After establishing air 

periority, the F-15Cs could not perform air-to-ground m

sions and were relegated to performing air defense m

sions against a nonexistent threat. The F-22 overcom

this limitation by having the capability to carry two JDA

1000 precision munitions internally, while still carryin

lethal load of radar-guided AIM-120C and heat-seek

AIM-9X air-to-air missiles for self-protection.14 Thus, a

establishing air superiority, the F-22 can attack targ

deep in enemy territory with precision in all weather con

tions. The same supercruise, stealth, and integrated avi

ics technologies that proved dominant in air-to-air com

make the F-22 an equally capable air-to-ground platfo

against even well-defended targets.

Advanced technology also aids the F-22’s maintaine

Though complex, the F-22’s systems are designed to op

ate with a mean time between maintenance of three hou

more than twice that of the F-15 it replaces. 15 Miss

capable rates are expected to be 92 percent, or 5 perc

better than the F-15.16 Combat turn times17 for the F

are only 20 minutes, a five-minute improvement over 

F-15.18 Those systems expected to fail most frequently 

located behind easily accessible panels. All the systems 

designed with a high degree of self-diagnostic capabi

and rely on easily replaced line-replaceable units. The 
sult is unprecedented mission capable rates in a weap

system that requires much reduced logistics support.

The ability to fight in a chemical warfare environm

was also an important consideration for the F-22. The 

struments within the cockpit are designed to withsta

chemical cleansing agents without degrading their p

formance. Easily changed charcoal filters purify outside 

coming into the cockpit. Air used to inflate the pilot’s u

per and lower anti-g garments is also purified. A vas

improved face mask specially designed to complemen

lightweight helmet does not restrict the pilot’s view—a m

jor problem in the current chemical ensemble—and 

much more comfortable. A cooling vest worn next to 

pilot’s upper body prevents the severe overheating pil

can experience with the current chemical ensemble.

Getting the F-22 into theater is also much easier th

with previous aircraft. Deploying a squadron of 24 F-2

for 30 days of combat requires only eight C-141Bs to ca

the required support equipment and supplies, less th

one-half the 18 C-141Bs required to deploy a same-si

F-15C squadron.19

While the F-22 will no doubt prove extremely effect

against the threat for which it was designed, the quest

remains whether the cold war scenario that spawned 

requirements for the F-22 will still be applicable in 

twenty-first century. After all, F-15Cs proved more th

enough to handle the best aircraft that Saddam co

throw against Coalition forces. The Coalition suffered bu

single air-to-air loss versus 33 kills against an air fo

with some of the best fighters money could buy. 20 The F

could undoubtedly do better, but at what cost?

The more disturbing dilemma is that an adversary m

decide not to challenge US air superiority with conv

tional aircraft, but instead turn to other means such 

ballistic and cruise missiles. This decision could imply t

the F-22 would be unable to perform the air superio

role for which it was intended. Given this reasoning, crit

have argued that the F-22 may not be the optim

weapon system on which to spend DOD’s increasin

pressured acquisition budget.
Twenty-first Century Warfare

The lesson of Desert Storm is don’t mess with the

United States without nuclear weapons.

—Gen K. Sandurji 

Former chief of staff of the Indian Army

Certainly few tasks can be more difficult than predict

the future, yet this challenge is what defense plann

must capture. As discussed earlier and emphasized 

General Sandurji,21 few nations can be expected to rep

Saddam’s blunder and take on the United States us

conventional forces alone, including tactical aircraft. 

stead, “niche competitors” such as Iraq can be expected 

try to acquire or develop alternative delivery systems, su

as stealthy cruise missiles and theater ballistic miss

(TBM) to deliver WMD, including nuclear, biological, a

chemical munitions.

Use of WMD against US forces by a niche competi

entails considerable risks for both sides. The United Sta

will enjoy escalation dominance in the nuclear as well 

conventional arena and could reserve the right to use n

clear weapons or punishing conventional attacks agains

nation that first uses chemical or biological weapo

against US forces. Such a nuclear threat certainly figu

into Saddam’s reticence to use his huge stockpiles 

chemical weapons, even when it was evident he was 

danger of losing the war.22 However, such a strategy 

fraught with the potential for miscalculations on b

sides, leaving US National Command Authorities (NCA

a very precarious position.23

Nevertheless, even the threat of WMD could dramatica

change the decisions by the NCA. A potential advers

could presume that the United States would not beco

involved if threatened with huge losses, or would at 

very least limit its military and political objectives. T

was the strategy employed by Saddam Hussein, though 

was foiled in this case by US technological superiority. T

threat of using WMD could also intimidate regional 

allies into denying basing rights, crippling the US pow
projection capabilities. Or perhaps an adversary could u

the threat of WMD to gain a more favorable settlement. 2

Even if the political gamble failed and the United Sta

deployed forces, WMD delivered by cruise missiles a

TBMs could deny US forces the use of port facilities, a

fields, and the logistical bases needed for its high-techn

ogy forces. At the very least, the logistical buildup would 

delayed, perhaps long enough for a large enemy grou

force to overrun critical areas.

With its forces likely to face cruise missiles, TBMs, a

possibly both, US military planners must develop 

proaches to counter these threats. The failure to deve

credible defenses would either leave the United States v

nerable to WMD “blackmail” or force policy makers to r

on the risky calculus of nuclear deterrence. Either 

proach is highly undesirable. The question left to be det

mined is whether the F-22 adds to a credible defen

against WMD.

Is the F-22 the Right System?

The F-22’s usefulness in twenty-first century regio

conflicts involving WMD delivered by cruise missiles a

TBM largely depends on US strategy. One approach is 

simply remove US forces beyond the range of advers

delivery systems. Robert W. Chandler suggests the Uni

States invest in long-range bombers and cruise miss

instead of tactical aircraft, mounting attacks from the 

homeland.25 In a similar approach, Jeffery R. Barnett a

suggests we develop longer range tactical aircraft that c

be based beyond the range of enemy delivery systems. 26

Both of these approaches suffer fatal flaws. While 

personnel may be protected, allies and coalition partn

would be open to the threat of WMD used against th

cities and populations. Given this strategy, it is unlik

the United States would find many in-theater partn

willing to base US ground forces—who would presuma

be moved into theater after the air campaign was compl

and the WMD neutralized—or even support US objectiv

Thus, this strategy, intended to avoid the political pr

lems associated with US casualties, encourages natio
with WMD to threaten their neighbors to achieve their 

litical goals. Rather than strengthening US power, su

strategies are destabilizing.

For those airpower advocates who believe that airpow

alone can be used to accomplish military objectives, a

that ground forces may not be necessary, consider t

airpower was applied against Iraq under nearly ideal c

ditions, yet Saddam’s forces did not withdraw from Kuw

until forced out by Coalition ground forces. 27 For the fo

seeable future, any US strategy must include provisions 

ground forces, which implies a compelling need for 

gional partners.

Even if the United States were willing to leave regio

partners unprotected, it is unlikely the United States co

afford the huge arsenals of cruise missiles needed to ma

tain the operations tempo that US information syste

allow, and that have become a cornerstone of US doctri

Furthermore, because of their long flight times cruise m

siles are simply not practical against mobile targets us

current technology. Similarly, long-range bombers, wh

capable of delivering devastating strikes and able to atta

mobile targets not hit by cruise missiles, are not availa

in sufficient numbers to maintain high-tempo operatio

from the US homeland and, like cruise missiles, have 

erational limitations. Stealth bombers such as the B-2 

vulnerable to fighters using a visual attack, so it must 

flown only at night. This leaves long periods when ene

installations and ground forces would be free from air atta

It is clear that compelling reasons exist to maintain t

tical airpower in theater, including manned fighters. Ho

ever, the problem remains of finding a strategy to coun

the WMD threat against US and friendly forces in theat

Several factors must be considered. The extreme letha

of WMD implies that any defense must be as nearly perf

as possible. Even one cruise missile or TBM that succe

fully penetrated defenses could have terrible con

quences. These factors imply the need for a defense 

depth with multiple systems.28

At the same time it must be recognized that no defen

can ever be perfect, so US forces must be dispersed. T

enormous concentrations of troops, equipment, and 
craft seen in the Gulf War are simply too risky. While it h

been necessary in the past to group aircraft so main

nance operations can be performed efficiently, it is unlik

the United States can afford that luxury in the futu

Therefore, future weapon systems must be capable of hi

tempo operations from dispersed locations with redu

logistic support.29

Finally, the threat of WMD does not mean the conv

tional air superiority role has diminished. Quite to 

contrary, it is more critical than ever before. Tacti

fighters and bombers make very efficient delivery s

tems for WMD, either directly or as a platform to ca

cruise missiles. Furthermore, US forces will likely 

forced to gain air superiority with fewer aircraft. Not o

will the need for dispersal limit the number of aircr

but US planners must also assume that a future adv

sary will not allow US forces months to flow equipm

and personnel into theater. US aircraft may well 

forced to fight for air superiority against overwhelm

odds, possibly against Russian-built aircraft, in si

ations not all that different than those for which 

F-22 was originally designed.

For these same reasons, all aircraft should be dual 

multirole and have low radar signature. It simply may 

be possible to mount the thousands of sorties needed 

take down an IAD system that will allow nonstealthy fig

ers to accomplish their missions. Rather, US aircraft w

have to rely on stealth and advanced avionics systems 

penetrate enemy airspace in small packages to perfo

offensive counterair missions against enemy aircraft car

ing WMD, and to deliver punishing bombardment agai

WMD storage facilities and delivery systems. Destruction 

enemy WMD assets must be a critical pillar of any 

strategy to counter the WMD threat. 30

The F-22 fits very well into this view of twenty-first c

tury warfare, despite the fact it was designed for a Eu

pean theater Soviet threat. Because of its extreme lethal

high mission capable rates, and low maintenance requ

ments, small numbers of F-22s operating from disper

locations can provide the same offensive and defensive 

pability as many more conventional fighters, such as 
F-15C, provide today. The advanced avionics and ability 

data link with AWACS and other F-22s could provid

very effective all-weather defense against cruise mis

and aircraft WMD attacks. The F-22’s radar is designed 

find stealthy targets such as the French Apache cru

missile, that have radar cross sections intentionally 

duced to avoid detection.31 At the same time, the F-22 c

deliver air-to-ground munitions against enemy targets.

Although a very capable weapon system, the F-15C m

not be effective against overwhelming numbers of ene

aircraft, cannot detect stealthy cruise missiles as well 

the F-22, and may be difficult to maintain under disper

conditions. Furthermore, it is not survivable against 

intact IAD. While it performed admirably in the Gulf W

the F-15C is woefully inadequate for the regional confli

the United States will likely be involved in during 

twenty-first century.

However, it is also clear the F-22 only makes sense 

part of a larger strategy that contains improvements 

passive measures, a defense in-depth of TBM defens

and point defenses against cruise missiles that may h

penetrated the fighter barrier. Furthermore, without an 

fective shield against TBMs carrying WMD, the F-22— a

its pilots and maintainers—are vulnerable while on 

ground.

Conclusion

If the United States is to maintain the ability to proj

power and protect its vital national interests around 

globe, it must develop a credible defense against weapo

of mass destruction carried on stealthy cruise missiles a

theater ballistic missiles. Furthermore, retreating out 

theater and relying on very long-range airpower to atta

enemy forces is not feasible from either a technical o

geopolitical perspective. To provide basing for grou

troops and to maintain the high-tempo operations cal

for in US doctrine means manned fighters located in th

ter for the foreseeable future. The F-22 is the right aircr

for warfare in the twenty-first century.
Notes

1. David Shukman, Tomorrow’s War: The Threat of High-Techno

Weapons (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace, 1996), 1.

2. Ibid., 5. The US defense budget fell from $300 billion in 199

$251 billion in the 1998 request. David A. Fulghum, “Pentagon Bu

Suffers New Cuts: Administration Again Breaks Promise to Hike Mod

ization Funding,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 Febru

1997, 24.

3. David A. Fulghum, “Expanding Roles May Shield F-22,” Avia

Week and Space Technology, 6 January 1997, 42.

4. Mark Thompson, “The Sky’s the Limit,” Washington Times

March 1997, 32.

5. David C. Morrison, “Under Fire,” National Journal, 15 July 1

1818.

6. Thompson, 32.

7. Jacques S. Gansler, Defense Conversion: Transforming the Ars

of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), 10.

8. The author worked in the F-22 System Program Office as chie

the cockpit integrated product team (IPT) from 1993 to 1995 and 

chief of the avionics IPT from 1995 to 1996. He is extremely knowled

able about the design and capabilities of the F-22.

9. David A. Fulghum, “Weapons Mix Broadens F-22,” Aviation W

and Space Technology, 6 January 1997, 44.

10. Bill Sweetman, “Flying the F-22,” Popular Science, August 1

44–49.

11. Link-16 is the US standard data link system used to excha

battlefield information.

12. Stanley W. Kandebo and David Hughes, “F-22 to Counter 2

Century Threats,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 July 1

38.

13. Comparisons between the F-22 and conventional aircraft such 

the F-15 using simulations are highly dependent on assumptions and 

mission. For example, in a defensive counterair mission over frien

territory with AWACS support, the F-15 may be nearly equal to the F

On the other hand, in an offensive counterair mission over enemy te

tory where the IAD is largely intact, the F-22 may prove vastly superior

14. Ibid., 42.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Combat turn time is the time needed to refuel, rearm, and perf

any maintenance required to return an aircraft to combat status aft

returns from a mission.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Su

Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 199

21. Robert W. Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, Today’s Decisions (McL

Va.: American Committee on Development Affairs, 1996), 149.
22. Kathleen C. Bailey, “Responding to the Threat of Biological We

ons,” Security Dialogue 26, no. 4, 1995, 391–92.

23. Barry R. Schneider, “Strategies for Coping with Enemy Weap

of Mass Destruction,” Airpower Journal, Special Edition 1996, 42.

24. Ibid. See 37–39 for a description of adversary strategies u

WMD.

25. Chandler, 200–204.

26. Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace C

paigns in 2010 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 19

96–99.

27. For an excellent discussion of the role air power played in 

Coalition victory, see Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, 

Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston, M

Little, Brown and Co., 1995.

28. Schneider, 45–46.

29. Ibid., 44.

30. Ibid., 42–44.

31. Fulghum, “Weapons Mix Broadens F-22,” 44.