NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT 

PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DANA NICOLE YRASTORZA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0059 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2012-009381-002

The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Terry M. Crist

Counsel for Appellee

Bain & Lauritano, Glendale

By Sheri M. Lauritano

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 6-13-2019
STATE v. YRASTORZA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Dana Yrastorza appeals her convictions and sentences for 

multiple offenses stemming from a series of burglaries, arguing law 

enforcement’s warrantless search of her historical cell-site location 

information (“CSLI”) violated her Fourth Amendment rights. She failed to 

raise this argument in the trial court, however, and has failed to 

demonstrate reversible error on appeal.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 As part of an investigation into a string of burglaries, 

Scottsdale police reviewed security footage and conducted surveillance and 

wiretaps. Through these investigatory measures, officers identified Gary 

Eisenmann as the serial burglar and Yrastorza as his accomplice. 

¶3 After receiving a tip that Eisenmann planned to commit 

another burglary, officers obtained search warrants authorizing them to 

search Eisenmann’s truck, warehouse, and home. When officers conducted 

a traffic stop and executed the search warrant on Eisenmann’s truck, they 

found the passenger, Yrastorza, in possession of several pieces of jewelry,

later identified as fruits of the burglaries. Police then executed the search 

warrants on Eisenmann’s house and warehouse. At the warehouse, the 

officers located items purchased by Yrastorza with stolen credit cards

belonging to the victims of the burglaries. 

¶4 The State charged Yrastorza with multiple felonies all

stemming from her participation in the series of burglaries. Yrastorza and 

Eisenmann were tried together.

¶5 At trial, in addition to presenting other investigative

evidence, the State presented historical CSLI data obtained through the 

defendants’ cellphone service providers. The CSLI data revealed that 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s 

verdict. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
STATE v. YRASTORZA

Decision of the Court

3

Yrastorza was within a few miles of at least seven of the homes burglarized 

by Eisenmann. Neither Eisenmann nor Yrastorza moved to suppress the 

CSLI information in the trial court.

2 Following a 31-day trial, a jury found 

Yrastorza guilty on all counts.

DISCUSSION

¶6 Yrastorza asserts that the CSLI data used to “tie [her] to the 

burglaries” should have been suppressed because it was obtained without 

a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Carpenter v. United States, 

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018). Yrastorza contends that admission of the CSLI 

data constituted fundamental reversible error.

¶7 Yrastorza argues that the trial court erred by failing to 

suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless search. To support this 

claim, Yrastorza asserts that “[w]ithout this cell phone information the State 

may not have been able to tie [her] to the crimes.” In general, we review the 

admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Ellison, 213 

Ariz. 116, 129, ¶ 42 (2006). Because Yrastorza did not move to suppress the 

CSLI data, however, we review this claim for fundamental error only. See

State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 135, ¶ 1 (2018).

¶8 To prevail on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must

first establish that trial error exists. Id. at 142, ¶ 21. Once trial error has been 

established, we must determine whether the error is fundamental, 

considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. “A defendant establishes 

fundamental error by showing that (1) the error went to the foundation of 

the case, (2) the error took from the defendant a right essential to his 

defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have 

received a fair trial.” Id. If the defendant establishes fundamental error 

under the first or second prong, he must make a separate showing of 

prejudice, which also “involves a fact-intensive inquiry.” Id. (citation 

omitted). If the third prong is established, the defendant “has shown both 

fundamental error and prejudice, and a new trial must be granted.” Id.

Under this standard, “[t]he defendant bears the burden of persuasion at 

each step” in this process. Id.

 

2 Although Eisenmann moved to suppress a police wiretap of his 

cellphone and evidence gathered from the placement of a GPS tracker on 

his vehicle, the motion did not encompass CSLI data. Yrastorza joined the 

motion to suppress, though her cellphone was not subject to a wiretap.
STATE v. YRASTORZA

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 Here, there is no trial error. The good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule applies to the State’s routine procurement of third-party 

call records because the incident occurred in 2012—well before the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter. See State v. Jean, 243 Ariz. 331,

342-43, ¶¶ 40, 47 (2018) (searches via global positioning satellite tracking 

device that were conducted in reasonable reliance on appellate precedent 

not subject to exclusionary rule). Before Carpenter was decided, nearly all 

federal circuit courts of appeal and the “vast majority of federal district 

judges” had ruled that cell phone users had no expectation of privacy in 

CSLI and, thus, warrants were not needed to obtain CSLI data from cellular 

carriers. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2016) (en 

banc) (collecting cases). Because the Carpenter decision had not been issued 

at the time of Yrastorza’s arrest, the good-faith exception applies, giving the 

State a second vehicle to introduce the evidence at trial. See Jean, 243 Ariz. 

at 342-43, ¶¶ 40-47 (finding the good-faith exception applied based on 

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and the prior expectation of 

privacy framework under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Weakland, 246 

Ariz. 67, 73, ¶ 20 (2019) (applying the good-faith exception because it “is 

unreasonable to require the police to predict a shift in the law when our 

trial and appellate courts failed to do so”). Because no trial error exists, 

Yrastorza has not shown fundamental error.

CONCLUSION

¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.