United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

PAUL GRIGLOCK, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF, 

SOPHIE GRIGLOCK, DECEASED, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2011-5134 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Case No. 99-VV-275, Senior Judge Robert H. 

Hodges, Jr. 

__________________________ 

Decided: August 10, 2012 

__________________________ 

AMY J. FASHANO, Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, 

P.C., of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for petitionerappellant. On the brief was RONALD C. HOMER. 

VORIS E. JOHNSON, JR., Trial Attorney, Torts Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. With 

him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney 

General, MARK W. ROGERS, Acting Director, VINCENT J.
GRIGLOCK v. HHS 2

MATANOSKI, Acting Deputy Director, and CATHARINE E.

REEVES, Assistant Director. 

__________________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Sophie Griglock’s estate appeals a decision for compensation under the Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -

34 (2006). The Special Master determined that Ms. 

Griglock’s death was caused by an influenza vaccination, 

that her estate had standing to petition for injury compensation, but that entitlement was limited to death 

benefits because injury benefits were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court of Federal Claims 

(“Claims Court”) affirmed the decision and denied the 

Griglock estate’s petition for review. See Griglock v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., 99 Fed. Cl. 373, 377 (2011). 

We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The Vaccine Act established a program to increase the 

safety and availability of vaccines, and through the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program claimants may get 

compensation for vaccine-related injuries or death. See 42 

U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1, 300aa-10(a). The relevant compensation provisions provide: 

(a) General rule 

Compensation awarded under the Program to a 

petitioner under section 300aa-11 of this title for a 

vaccine-related injury or death associated with 

the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 

1988, shall include the following: 

. . . . 
3 GRIGLOCK v. HHS

[(1)](B) Subject to section 300aa-16(a)(2) of 

this title, actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of the judgment awarding such expenses which— 

(i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury 

for which the petitioner seeks compensation . . . 

(2) In the event of a vaccine-related death, an 

award of $250,000 for the estate of the deceased. 

. . . . 

(4) For actual and projected pain and suffering 

and emotional distress from the vaccinerelated injury, an award not to exceed 

$250,000. 

42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) (emphasis added). The program 

also limits the period during which a petitioner may file 

for compensation; those relevant to this case are: 

[(a)](2) . . . if a vaccine-related injury occurred as a 

result of the administration of such vaccine, no 

petition may be filed for compensation under the 

Program for such injury after the expiration of 36 

months after the date of occurrence of the first 

symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of such injury, and 

(3) . . . if a death occurred as a result of the administration of such vaccine, no petition may be 

filed for compensation under the Program for such 

death after the expiration of 24 months from the 

date of the death and no such petition may be 

filed more than 48 months after the date of the oc-
GRIGLOCK v. HHS 4

currence of the first symptom or manifestation of 

onset or of the significant aggravation of the injury from which the death resulted. 

42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-16.

Ms. Griglock, a seventy-year-old retired woman, received an influenza vaccination on October 6, 2005. See

Griglock v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-275B, 

2011 WL 839738, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 11, 2011) (“Special 

Master’s Decision”). She went to her doctor on November 

23, 2005, complaining of weakness, and was admitted to 

the hospital that day. Her treating neurologist determined that she suffered from Guillain-Barré Syndrome 

(“GBS”). After treatment she improved initially, but 

shortly thereafter she developed respiratory failure and 

was placed on a ventilator. Ms. Griglock passed away on 

May 11, 2007; her death certificate lists “ventilatordependent respiratory failure due to GBS” as the immediate cause of death. 

Her estate filed a petition for compensation on April 

30, 2009. The Secretary of Health and Human Services 

(“Government”) responded that there was insufficient 

evidence to find that the influenza vaccine Ms. Griglock 

received on October 6, 2005 caused her GBS and subsequent GBS-related death. However, the Government 

stated it would not contest the issue further and recommended an award of up to $250,000 as a death benefit 

under § 300aa-15(a)(2). The estate then filed a Motion for 

Damages claiming entitlement for unreimbursable medical expenses under § 300aa-15(a)(1)(B) and for pain and 

suffering under § 300aa-15(a)(4). 

The Special Master determined that the vaccination 

caused Ms. Griglock’s GBS and GBS-related death. 

Furthermore, the Special Master determined that the 

estate had standing to petition for injury compensation, 
5 GRIGLOCK v. HHS

but that entitlement was limited to death benefits because injury benefits were barred by the applicable statute of limitation under § 300aa-16(a)(2). 

The estate petitioned for review seeking compensation 

not only for death benefits under § 300aa-15(a)(2), but 

also for injury benefits under § 300aa-15(a)(1)(B) and 

§ 300aa-15(a)(4). The Claims Court looked at the plain 

meaning of the Vaccine Act and determined that § 300aa16(a) provided distinct filing periods for injury and for 

death compensation. Because the estate did not file 

within the thirty-six month filing period set forth for 

injury benefits in § 300aa-16(a)(2), the claims for injury 

compensation were barred. The Claims Court reasoned 

that “[a]llowing [the] estate to recover both injury and 

death compensation with a filing pursuant to section 

300aa-16(a)(3) would give no effect to the limiting statutory language set forth in section 300aa-16(a)(2).” 

Griglock, 99 Fed. Cl. at 377. As a result, the Claims 

Court recognized “that while the Vaccine Act emphasizes 

generosity to claimants, the Act also provides limitations 

on that generosity.” Id. The Claims Court affirmed the 

Special Master’s Decision and denied the estate’s petition 

for review. The estate filed a timely appeal. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) and 42 

U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f). 

DISCUSSION

“We review an appeal from the Court of Federal 

Claims in a Vaccine Act case de novo, applying the same 

standard of review as the Court of Federal Claims applied 

to its review of the special master’s decision.” Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 618 F.3d 1339, 

1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We give no deference to the Claims 

Court’s or Special Master’s determinations of law, but 

uphold the Special Master’s findings of fact unless they 
GRIGLOCK v. HHS 6

are arbitrary or capricious. Id. Accordingly, we review 

questions of statutory interpretation de novo, and give 

deference to the Special Master’s findings of facts. Id. 

“Thus, although we are reviewing as a matter of law the 

decision of the Court of Federal Claims under a nondeferential standard, we are in effect reviewing the decision of the Special Master under the deferential arbitrary 

and capricious standard on factual issues . . . .” Lampe v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 219 F.3d 1357, 1369 

(Fed. Cir. 2000). 

As an initial matter, the Government argues that the 

estate lacks standing to file a petition for compensation 

related to Ms. Griglock’s injury. Specifically, the Government contends that the plain language of the statute 

states that only the vaccine-injured person has standing 

to file a petition for compensation for injury and their 

estate only has standing to file a petition for compensation for their vaccine-related death. However, § 300aa11(b)(1)(A) makes no such distinction and only indicates 

who may file a petition: “any person who has sustained a 

vaccine-related injury . . . or the legal representative of 

any person who died as a result of the administration of a 

vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table may . . . file a 

petition for compensation under the Program.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 300aa-11(b)(1)(A). As this court previously stated “this 

provision . . . plainly does not dictate that a properly filed 

petition by the estate of a person who suffered both vaccine-related injuries and a vaccine-related death (and 

thus had standing to file under § 300aa-11(b)(1)(A)) may 

not contain a request for any and all of the types of compensation listed in § 300aa-15(a).” Zatuchni v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 516 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (emphasis added). The estate has standing to file a 

petition for compensation as the legal representative of a 

person who died as a result of the administration of a 
7 GRIGLOCK v. HHS

vaccine. Thus, we next determine to what compensation 

the estate is entitled. 

The estate argues that when a petition is properly 

filed in accordance with § 300aa-16(a)(3), the petitioner is 

entitled to all benefits provided by § 300aa-15(a), given 

that death benefits are provided as one of several types of 

compensation available. The Special Master disagreed, 

reasoning that although § 300aa-11 and § 300aa-15 refer 

to both death benefits and injury benefits, making neither 

exclusive of the other, § 300aa-16 clearly delineates 

statutes of limitations applicable to each separately. 

Thus, “[f]iling a timely petition for a death benefit cannot 

convert an otherwise untimely injury claim into a timely 

event.” Special Master’s Decision, at *8. The Claims 

Court further explained why the estate’s interpretation 

was incorrect, stating that 

The effect of [the estate’s] argument is to render 

the Vaccine Act’s limitation on the claims for injuries irrelevant where a claimant dies from his or 

her vaccine-related injury. Claimants who die 

would always be allowed a claim for injuries as 

well, so long as they met the new limitation on 

claims for death benefits. This result renders 

meaningless the Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations for claims that petitioner’s injuries were vaccine-related. 

Griglock, 99 Fed. Cl. at 377. 

This court previously stated that when petitions are 

properly filed a “petitioner may receive the compensation 

for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering . 

. . in addition to the $250,000 death benefit.” Zatuchni, 

516 F.3d at 1315; see id. at 1321. But in Zatuchni, unlike 

here, petitioner had filed for injury compensation within 

the thirty-six-month time frame provided in § 300aa-
GRIGLOCK v. HHS 8

16(a)(2). Id. at 1314. Petitioner died from vaccine-related 

causes while her petition was pending and her estate was 

substituted in her place. Except under special circumstances such as where the statute of limitations is equitably tolled, cf. Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 654 

F.3d 1322, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc), to properly 

file for injury benefits a petition must be filed within 

thirty-six months; any indication in Zatuchni otherwise is 

dictum. 

Indeed, looking at the plain meaning of the Vaccine 

Act, each section has a distinct purpose: § 300aa-11 

provides who may file a petition for compensation; 

§ 300aa-15 provides the types of compensation that may 

be awarded; and § 300aa-16 provides limitations upon 

when a petition may be filed. Accordingly, as this court 

noted in Zatuchni, the Vaccine Act “imposes firm deadlines for both the filing and resolution of petitions . . . . A 

petition . . . [for injury] must be filed within 36 months of 

the onset of symptoms; if a death occurred, a petition 

must be filed within 24 months of the death and no more 

than 48 months after the onset of symptoms.” Zatuchni, 

516 F.3d at 1316–17 (internal citation omitted). A petition for injury benefits, even if filed by the legal representative of a person who has died as a result of a vaccine, 

must be filed within the timeline provided for injury 

benefits under § 300aa-16(a)(2), as the statute specifically 

states “no petition may be filed for compensation under 

the Program for such injury after the expiration of 36 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2). 

The estate also contends that a reading of § 300aa-15 

and § 300aa-16 together creates an ambiguity because 

only § 300aa-15(a)(1)(B) (for unreimbursable vaccinerelated medical expenses) expressly states that its provisions are “[s]ubject to section 300aa-16(a)(2).” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 300aa-15(a)(1)(B). We cannot agree because there is no 
9 GRIGLOCK v. HHS

ambiguity in § 300aa-16. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 

115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context . . . .”) (internal 

citations omitted). The § 300aa-16 creates separate 

limitations periods for petitions pertaining to compensation for injury benefits and for death benefits. To re-open 

the window of opportunity for compensation for injury 

because a petition for death benefits has been timely filed 

would render meaningless the statute of limitations 

specified in § 300aa-16(a)(2). See Sharp v. United States, 

580 F.3d 1234, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Where the intent is 

unambiguously expressed by the plain meaning of the 

statutory text, we give effect to that clear language without rendering any portion of it meaningless.”). 

The timeline of relevant events is uncontested. Ms. 

Griglock’s onset of GBS was evident at her doctor’s visit 

on November 23, 2005, and she passed away on May 11, 

2007. Therefore, the estate satisfied the requirements for 

a timely petition for death benefits under § 300aa-16(a)(3) 

by filing on April 30, 2009 (to satisfy both the twenty-fourmonth and fourty-eight-month requirements the petition 

had to be filed by May 11, 2009). However, to fulfill the 

requirements under § 300aa-16(a)(2), a petition for vaccine-related injury compensation had to be filed by November 24, 2008, thirty-six months after the date of the 

onset of GBS. Accordingly, the estate’s petition for vaccine-related injury is time barred. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa16(a)(2). 

The estate’s overarching policy arguments are not 

availing. The estate avers that “the Program must be at 

least as generous as the outside civil system it seeks to 

replace.”* The estate notes that this court has previously 

 * The estate also argues that the Vaccine Act is a 

remedial insurance program, and not a waiver of sover-
GRIGLOCK v. HHS 10

stated “Congress found that the traditional tort system 

was not working for victims because it resulted in lengthy 

delays, high transaction costs, and sometimes no recovery.” Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 440 

F.3d 1317, 1327 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, the Vaccine Act itself shows that there are limitations to the 

generosity of the program. The Vaccine Program is more 

generous to petitioners than civil tort actions in some 

ways, e.g., presumption of causation, less-adversarial 

proceedings, and relaxed rules of evidence. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 300aa-11(c)(1), § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A), § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B). 

Yet, there are limits under the Vaccine Act that do not 

apply in civil tort actions, including pain and suffering 

award limits of $250,000. Id. at § 300aa-15(a)(4). In 

Zatuchni this court recognized a number of “limitations 

and trade-offs that restrict recovery” under the Vaccine 

Act including: “the statute of limitations, the filing requirements of § 300aa-11, the single petition rule, the 

limitation on the number of pre-Act petitions for which 

compensation may be awarded, and limits on the amount 

of compensation that may be paid under certain subsec-

 

eign immunity. We do not agree. This court has “previously explained that the Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations must be strictly and narrowly construed because it 

is ‘a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity by the 

United States, and courts should be careful not to interpret [a waiver] in a manner that would extend the waiver 

beyond that which Congress intended.’” Markovich v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 477 F.3d 1353, 1360 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 654 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). This 

argument need not be revisited. See Wilkerson v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 593 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (applying Markovich and dismissing the petition as 

untimely). 
11 GRIGLOCK v. HHS

tions of § 300aa-15.” Zatuchni, 516 F.3d at 1322. Thus, 

the Vaccine Act provides a generous compensation program, but with limits, including the statute of limitations, 

to that generosity. 

CONCLUSION

 For the above mentioned reasons, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED 

No costs.