AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

United States Marine Corps

Air-Ground Integration in th

Pacific Theater

GARY L. THOMAS

Major, USMC

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 9

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

November 1999

AIR UNI V ERSITY
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views o

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any o

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wri

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and S

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of 

best” student research projects from the prior academ

year. The ACSC research program encourages our s

dents to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in th

own professional development and in “advancing ae

space power.” The series title reflects our desire to perp

uate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generati

of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine so

research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation 

exploring war at the operational level. With this broad p

spective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic ra

of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operatio

questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions 

familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the fam

iar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making th

research studies available in the Wright Flyer Pape

ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the fi

ings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, US

Commandant

iii
Preface

This paper addresses Marine Corps aviation’s contri

tion in the area of air-ground integration during 

Second World War. I chose this topic because it is not 

area that has been widely researched, and it deals wit

mission that I am tasked with as a FA-18 pilot. The is

of air-ground integration is as relevant today as it was 

World War II, and it has many implications for air supp

in the joint arena. In addition, I have heard many an

dotes describing how well the Marines had conducted 

support, and I wanted to see if the research would supp

that premise. Finally, I have always enjoyed studying 

battles in the Pacific, and this provided me with a gold

opportunity to do just that using some of the finest p

mary source documents in the country.

I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Rich

Muller for his guidance and assistance on this project. 

has given me a great appreciation for the value of resea

and how the lessons learned from it can be applied to 

current environment. His humor and insight have m

the project particularly enjoyable.

v
Abstract

United States Marine Corps Air-Ground Integration in 

Pacific Theater addresses how the United States Mar

Corps dealt with the challenge of air support for 

infantry in the Second World War. Sources for resea

included primary documents on doctrine and perso

interviews from the United States Air Force Histor

Research Agency. Periodicals written before and imme

ately after the war provided additional informati

Finally, books on Marine Corps aviation from the 

University Library provided some material.

The research indicated that the Marines developed 

effective means for air-ground integration during 

Second World War. A great deal of this success was due 

the Marine Corps’ philosophy of airpower as well as 

experience gained during the interwar years, particula

in Nicaragua. In addition, the unique environment in 

Pacific influenced many of the procedures that were dev

oped. Finally, the Marines learned a great deal during 

course of the Pacific campaign itself. The battles 

Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Luzon illustrate the sig

icant innovations and improvements that were made d

ing the war.

vii
United States Marine Corps

Air-Ground Integration

in the Pacific Theater

The effective integration of air and ground units h

always been a difficult task. During the Second Wo

War, this difficulty manifested itself time and again. 

the beginning of the war, the German Luftwaffe proba

had the most effective system for integrating air a

ground units on the battlefield.1 As time progress

however, many air forces began to develop procedu

that resulted in excellent air support for troops on 

ground. The Army Air Forces (AAF) and Royal Austral

Air Force, in particular, made significant contributions 

this area. However, the United States Marine Co

(USMC) received much of the credit for innovations in 

integration of air and ground units. According to 

Franklin Cooling, “The achievements of the Marine Cor

close support effort were appreciated at the time, and 

fact that their exploits were celebrated in a number 

well-written books has kept this appreciation alive. Th

are probably some US Air Force officers who believe 

concept of close air support began with the Mar

Corps.”2 If Cooling’s assertion is true, what made 

Marine Corps so effective in this area? An examination 

the successes the Marine Corps enjoyed in air-grou

integration makes apparent that the foundation was l

many years before the war began. The Marine Corps’ p

losophy of airpower, its experience during the interw

years, the unique environment in the Pacific, a

wartime experience, particularly in the Guadalcan

Bougainville, and Luzon campaigns, led the Mar

Corps to develop one of the most effective means of a

ground integration in the Pacific theater.

Marine Aviation’s Focus

Since its inception, Marine aviation has focused on a

ground integration. After World War I, Marine aviation w

faced with the task of selling the benefits of airpower to 

1
rest of the Marine Corps. Unlike the Army Air Serv

(AAS), which was beginning to see an independent role 

aviation, Marine aviators saw their role as supporting 

ground forces. Maj Alfred Cunningham, the first Mar

aviator, stated the direction that Marine aviation was t

ing when he said, “It is fully realized that the only exc

for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting 

troops on the ground to successfully carry out their op

ations.”3 This statement was published in a 1920 article 

the Marine Corps Gazette and foreshadowed the approa

that Marine aviation would take in the interwar years a

the Second World War.

Interwar Years

The Marine Corps gained a great deal of experience 

air-ground integration during the interwar years. With 

exception of US pilots who fought in Spain with the Rep

licans and those who later flew with the Royal Air Fo

(RAF) Eagle Squadrons, Marine aviators were the o

American flyers in combat between 1918 and 19

Marines flew missions for ground troops in Haiti, 

Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.4

Dive-bombing

One of the tactics practiced by the corps at this ti

that greatly improved its ability to support the troops 

the ground was dive-bombing. The British pioneered t

tactic while conducting close-support operations in 191

In 1923 Maj Ross E. Rowell, USMC, was assigned to 

AAS for a tour of duty at Kelly Field, Texas. At that tim

the 3d Attack Group was experimenting with dive-bom

ing. However, the AAS cooled to this type of attack beca

many aviators felt aircraft were too vulnerable to anti

craft artillery while dive-bombing. In contrast, Row

became convinced that dive-bombing attacks could 

most useful in small guerilla wars. In 1924 Rowell beca

the commander of VO-1M, a squadron he trained a

dive-bombing unit. Later, during the Cleveland Air Ra

of 1933, Rowell and his marines demonstrated the di

bombing technique. According to Rowell, Maj Ernst Ud
a famous German ace who attended the show, was v

interested in dive-bombing and made many detai

inquiries. Udet commented that he could see import

developments for that type of attack. Udet was later p

moted to lieutenant general and was responsible for 

development of the German air force and the design of 

Stuka.6

Nicaragua

In February 1927 Major Rowell received orders to t

VO-1M and its DeHavilland DH-4Bs to Nicaragua to p

vide air support to marines fighting the bandits led 

Sandino. This assignment provided Rowell with the opp

tunity to put his dive-bombing technique to the test as w

as to begin to develop procedures for air-ground integ

tion. Rowell’s aircraft were armed with four 25-pound fr

mentation bombs, 600 rounds of ammunition for the fi

gun, and 600 rounds for the free gun.7 During the ca

paign, aircraft and infantry communicated with each ot

using the Very pistol, panels, and message drop and p

up. The infantry used panels to mark frontline positi

and to indicate the direction and distance to the objec

to be attacked.8 In this fashion, Rowell’s aircraft were a

to provide effective close air support. A column was ne

sent out without a plane in almost constant attendanc

These procedures had been developed during World W

but had been largely forgotten by most air arms.

An example of effective air-ground integration 

curred in the small Nicaraguan village of Ocotal. The

eight hundred Sandinistas attacked a small Marine o

post. A Marine reconnaissance aircraft saw panel sign

indicating an emergency. Several DH-4Bs then di

bombed the rebels and dispersed them.10 As each aircr

commenced its dive, it opened fire with its fixed g

dropped a bomb at the end of the dive, and then haras

the enemy with the observer’s gun as the plane f

away. This procedure was repeated until all ordna

was expended.11 The planes took back the seriou

wounded, left a supply of ammunition for the garris

and continued reconnaissance in the area to ensure 

bandits did not return.12 This mission was the f
known case of an air attack being directed by grou

troops.13 The outpost was the first American unit kno

to have survived a ground assault by vastly super

forces thanks to aerial intervention.14

Throughout their time in Nicaragua, Marine aviat

continued to gain valuable experience with air supp

Airplanes served as artillery in which the Marines w

deficient. In addition, aircraft participated in sieges a

battles where very little space separated the contend

forces. They flew escort missions for columns and dete

ed and broke up ambushes. Finally, they flew reconna

sance missions providing valuable intelligence informat

to the infantry units on the ground.15

Exercises

After their experience in Nicaragua, Marine aviat

continued to practice air-ground integration. In 19

Marines began to emphasize infantry-air communicat

using radios, which gave the infantry limited practice 

directly controlling aircraft.16 The idea of direct contro

aircraft by a supported unit would resurface during 

pitched battles of the Pacific campaign. During 1940 a

1941, aviators participated in several exercises. Mar

squadrons took part in the Guantanamo, Louisiana, a

North Carolina maneuvers, mostly with Army troops. S

eral lessons were learned in the area of air support. Fi

adequate and reliable radio communication from air 

ground was essential for effective support. In additi

pilots found that one-channel radios were entirely ina

quate to conduct the coordination required for close 

support, and the later two-channel installations were 

much better. Second, panels and pyrotechnics pro

inferior to radio communication but often had to 

resorted to because of poor radio equipment and ra

discipline. Their use, however, required thorough a

ground coordination. The difficulty in using panels w

exacerbated by the fact that the new monoplanes w

much faster than the old biplanes, making it hard 

pilots to correctly identify targets. Third, an airborne co

dinator was required for liaison between scout bombers 

the air and infantry assault units on the ground.17 Unf
tunately for the Marines, not much was done to exp

these lessons, and they would have to be relearned 

Guadalcanal.

Development of Doctrine

While aviators were gaining practical experience, 

Marine Corps was beginning to develop doctrine for 

support of troops on the ground. This doctrine includ

procedures that would form the foundation for operati

in the Pacific. The development of doctrine began in 19

when aviation was taken from the Division of Operati

and Training at Headquarters Marine Corps and est

lished as an independent section under the comm

dant.18 A doctrine manual for the use of Marine Corps a

ation was produced that same year. Much of the man

dealt with air support of amphibious assaults. The do

ment outlined Marine aviation’s focus when it stat

“Continuous air support must be provided throughout 

landing phase and continued until the attacking force 

well established on shore. The closest of cooperation m

exist between air units and their operations must be me

ulously coordinated with those of the supported troo

Much liaison and careful planning is required to ins

proper air support under the difficulties to be encounte

in these operations.” The manual emphasized the imp

tance of the radio for air-ground and interplane commu

cations. It also emphasized the use of panels to m

frontline positions. Finally, it mentioned the use 

pyrotechnics as a means for aircraft and ground troops 

communicate.19

On 1 April 1936, Rowell, who was now the officer 

charge, became the director of Marine Corps Aviati

which acquired division status. This put him in a posit

to further incorporate his personal experiences in Mar

Corps doctrine. In January 1939, the Navy’s Gene

Board drafted Marine aviation’s mission: “Marine aviat

is to be equipped, organized and trained primarily for 

support of the Fleet Marine Force in landing operati

and in support of troop activities in the field; and seco

arily as replacement squadrons for carrier-based naval 

craft.”20 In 1940 the Marine Corps published the Sm
Wars Manual, reiterating the mission of Marine aviati

“The primary mission of combat aviation in a small wa

the direct support of the ground forces.” The docum

also outlined the procedure for requesting air support, a

it stipulated that panels should be used to mark frien

positions and the direction and estimated distance 

enemy positions.21 This mission reflected the deep bel

Marine aviators had held for quite some time. 

The Marine concept was in contrast to the Army 

men’s view that air support for the infantry did not t

advantage of the full capabilities of airpower. Since th

airmen were striving for their independence and perfe

ing the art of strategic bombing, they did not want to 

tied too closely to ground forces. In July of 1943, W

Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command a

Employment of Air Power, articulated the view of Army 

men regarding air support: “In the zone of contact, m

sions against hostile units are most difficult to cont

are most expensive, and are, in general, least effect

Targets are small, well dispersed, and difficult to locate

addition, there is always a considerable chance of strik

friendly forces. . . . Only at critical times are contact zo

missions profitable.”22 In contrast to the AAF view in 

100-20, Navy Marine Corps (NAVMC) 3045, Marine Co

Aviation—General, published that same year by 

Marine Corps, stressed the synergistic effect of air-grou

integration: “The basis of effective air support of grou

forces is teamwork. The air and ground units in su

operations form a combat team. Each member of the te

must have the technical skill and training to enable it 

perform its part in the operation and a willingness 

cooperate thoroughly.”23 NAVMC 3045 expressed an a

tude that was being displayed by Marine aviators a

infantrymen on tiny islands in the Pacific. This attitu

influenced the degree of diligence applied to overcom

the difficulties of air-ground integration.

Unique Environment in the Pacific

The unique environment in the Pacific created 

atmosphere where the need for integration was more p
nounced. For example, the great flying distances requi

in the Pacific precluded the United States from initiat

its strategic bombing campaign against Japan u

advanced bases in the Marianas were seized in 1944. T

requirement for advanced bases resulted in the island h

ping campaign that brought relatively large ground for

in contact with one another. The small size of many of 

islands resulted in concentrated forces facing each othe

proximity as soon as US forces landed on these islands

addition, the inability to bring heavy forces ashore in 

early stages of amphibious operations made air suppor

necessity. This required air-ground integration, setting 

stage for the Marines to refine the procedures that h

been practiced before the war. 

Other factors required air-ground integration 

extremely well coordinated to be effective and prev

friendly casualties. The density of the jungle hinde

visual acquisition of targets, and also made it difficult 

forces to find one another until they were very clos

Thus attacking aircraft had to bomb very close to frie

lies. Finally, since ground forces were operating on rem

islands, aviation assets often had to be based on the sa

islands. Such basing allowed extensive liaison between 

and ground forces that resulted in improved integration 

the war progressed.

Guadalcanal

On Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, the Mari

got their first opportunity to practice some of the meth

that they had worked on during the previous two decad

Unfortunately, many hard lessons were learned a

relearned regarding air-ground integration. The mission 

the Marines at Guadalcanal was to seize the island a

then defend it from Japanese attack. A major mission 

aviation was to disrupt attempts by the Japanese to la

forces on the island. The mission of the ground forces, 

the other hand, was to protect Henderson Field by destr

ing hostile forces ashore and preventing a surprise att

from the sea by night.25 Of note, most of the Marine air a
ground commanders on Guadalcanal were veterans 

Nicaragua.26

Air-Ground Integration

During the invasion, an air control center aboard 

flagship of the attack force commander controlled a

coordinated air support by maintaining radio cont

with aircraft on station as well as with the carrier ta

force. Significantly, there was no direct communicat

between the landing force and the aircraft on stati

Later, Army and Marine pilots rendered support to 

ground troops, but again, communication facilities w

limited. Liaison with the infantry was effected us

rudimentary means. Frontline messages had to 

relayed from the ground force commander to the divis

command post to Henderson Field, thence back to 

supporting planes. Pilots were briefed on the ground 

sometimes walked up to the front lines to look at targe

Marking targets for aircraft was very challenging. The u

of panels proved to be very difficult in the jungle. Us

mortar shells to designate and outline targets was mu

more successful. 

Effectiveness of Integration

The first attempt at close air support in the Pacific p

duced mixed results. In some cases, effective strikes w

made no more than one hundred yards from friendly po

tions.27 One tactic emerged which was to reappear ti

and again during the course of the war. On some clo

support missions, the aircraft, after completing bomb

and strafing, made dummy runs, thus keeping the Ja

nese soldiers under cover while friendly troops advance

However, on 3 November, friendly aircraft strafed positi

of the 7th Marines resulting in several casualties in a u

that was already badly under strength.29

The Army P-400 (an early export version of the Bel

39 Airacobra) was most effective in supporting grou

activities, particularly during the Battle of Bloody Rid

In addition, both the Marine dauntless dive-bomber (SB

and P-400 were used with good effect in support of 
Tasimboko raid. However, air-ground communication w

poor, and after the battle, steps were taken to improv

air liaison parties (ALP). Maj Gen Alexander Archer V

degrift, the commander of the Marine forces, stated t

there remained a need for regularly organized air-grou

communication teams within infantry regiment

Although some degree of air-ground integration had b

achieved, there were several shortcomings, particularly 

the areas of communication and target identification.

Bougainville

The battle at Bougainville (largest of the Solom

Islands) proved to be a major step forward in air-grou

integration. The objective of the invading forces was 

secure a defensible perimeter large enough to contain 

airfields needed for the neutralization of Rabaul (site o

major enemy base in the Bismarck Archipelago), not 

conquer the whole island. The task occupied the grou

forces at Cape Torokina during November and Decem

1943, and Marine aircraft rendered support when ca

upon.31

Air-Ground Integration

One of the reasons that air-ground integration impro

at Bougainville was that the Marines trained intensiv

before the operation. Preparations for close air supp

were begun more than three months before L day. Th

officers (bomber pilots) and six enlisted men (radiomen

the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing reported to the 1st Mar

Division for air-liaison duty. Lt Col John Gabbert org

ized an air-liaison party school to teach the capabili

and limitations of close air support, procedures 

requesting such support, and details of air-ground co

munication. An officer from the operations section of ea

battalion and regiment was ordered to attend the sch

Extensive tests proved the reliability of safety margins 

different sized bombs (see table 1). The 100-pound bo

and the gun were the weapons of choice.
Table 1

Test Data for Close Air Support

Bomb Normal Closest Possible

Use Use 

(Pounds) (Yards) (Yards)

100 100 75

500 500 300

1,000 1,000 500

2,000 1,000 700

Another reason air-ground integration improved w

that liaison with the infantry was superb. Since air a

ground components were part of the same service, G

bert could brief pilots and ground-liaison personnel 

one language. Infantry officers briefed pilots on the pe

liarities of the terrain and the tactical situation. In a s

ilar manner, ground-liaison officers were flown in atta

ing strike aircraft. Furthermore, air-liaison officers w

assigned to rifle companies.32 This greatly improved 

quality of air support. In addition, jeep-mounted SC

193 radios provided reliable communication between a

ation and ground units for the first time. Targets w

marked using smoke instead of the previous practice 

using panels. 

Hellzapoppin Ridge

One of the places where air and ground units work

particularly well together was “Hellzapoppin Ridge.” H

pilots were much more successful identifying their targ

because the 3d Marine Division marked its front lines w

colored smoke grenades and fired white phosphorus sh

into the target area. On one occasion, 11 Avenger att

aircraft (TBF) attacked the reverse slope with dela

action bombs. Some of the bombs struck within 50 ya

of the Marine positions. After the strike, marines were a

Source: Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Baltimore: Nautica

Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1987), 190.
to take the ridge. During the attack, most of the bom

used were one hundred pounders. Unfortunately, 

marines were killed and six more wounded by one pla

whose crew misidentified its target and struck frien

forces. Nevertheless, the infantrymen judged the strike 

“the most effective factor in taking the ridge.”33

Effectiveness of Integration

The improvements in technique fashioned by 

Solomons Marines proved to be very beneficial and p

big dividends to Gen Douglas MacArthur’s soldiers wh

Marine aviators moved from Bougainville over to 

Philippines. One of the major improvements was that 

liaison parties were well trained. In addition, effective co

munication was achieved between aviators and grou

troops. Target marking had also been improved, wh

greatly enhanced the accuracy of bomb delivery. Fina

the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions incorporated the less

learned from the Bougainville campaign and other ca

paigns into a document entitled “Standing Operating P

cedure for Close Air Support Aviation.” This document p

vided standardization and outlined command and con

procedures and the duties of air liaison parties (see 

1).34

Command of Close Support

Air Base Commander Support Aircraft Air Liaison P

Commander Support

Airlift calls for aircraft to

launch or directs them to a

target if already airborne 

Air Liaison Party makes

requests for air support

directly to Commander

Support Aircraft

Source: 1st Marine Division, Standing Operating Procedure for Close Air Support Aviation, 2

May 1944.

Figure 1. Command and Control Procedures for 

Support
Lt Col Keith B. McCutcheon’s Training Program

One of the most significant contributions to air-grou

integration occurred after the battle of Bougainville w

over. Colonel McCutcheon, the operations officer 

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 24, received word that 

unit would probably be used in the campaign to liber

the Philippines. As a result, in October 1944, he initia

an intensive two-month training program. This progr

consisted of 40 lectures on the subject of air-ground in

gration and close air support. Instructors included vete

ALP officers from the Central Pacific and Army offic

from the 37th and Americal Divisions. Five hundred o

cers and gunners of the dive-bomber squadrons of MAG 

and MAG 32 attended the classes.35

During the instruction, aviators proposed that for fut

operations, they should furnish their own air liaison p

ties, though there was nothing in their tables of organ

tion making such a provision. They also proposed that 

frontline ALP would control planes by direct communi

tion. Although frontline ALPs had occasionally contro

aircraft directly, it was considered unorthodox. Marines 

that the ALP should talk planes onto a target by direct co

munication. According to them, this was far more effici

than relaying the information through intervening echel

and a far distant controller. This policy change proved a 

nificant enhancement of air-ground integration in 

Philippines campaign. The Fifth Air Force, however, did 

contemplate direct communication between the ALP a

aircraft providing support. This difference became a po

of contention because the Marine aviators were under 

operational control of Fifth Air Force. Interestingly, 

Navy concurred with the Army Air Corps in this respect

Marine aviators also reiterated the principle, as arti

lated in Marine Corps doctrine, that close support aviat

was only an additional weapon to be employed at the d

cretion of the ground commander. This concession was 

as difficult for Marine aviators as it was for Army and N

officers.37 It was this attitude, as well as the quality 

training they had received, that would hold the Marine a

ators in good stead when the liberation of the Philippi

began.
Luzon

Commanders have repeatedly expressed their admiration for

the pin point precision, the willingness and enthusiastic desire

of pilots to fly missions from dawn to dusk and the extremely

close liaison with the ground forces which characterizes the

operations of the Marine fighter groups.

—Walter E. Krueger

Commanding General, Sixth Army

The Luzon campaign provides one of the notable m

stones in Marine aviation history. During the campai

Marine aviators practiced joint warfare by providing t

close support to Army troops. The impact of this exp

ence would influence Marine aviation’s postwar missi

The lessons learned on Luzon would pay off five years la

in Korea.38 The ability of the air arm to devote itself to 

infantry was dependent on a number of factors. First a

foremost was the fact that air superiority was compl

Japanese air forces no longer posed a threat in the Phi

pines. Of the sorties flown over Luzon between Janu

1945 and the end of the war, 85 percent were in supp

of ground forces. The marines of MAG 24 and MAG 

arrived on 25 January 1945 at Mangaldan. They were p

of the 308th Bomb Wing. The mission of the Sixth Ar

was to drive from the beaches of Lingayen south to Ma

la. The 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to advance 

Manila on the right (west) flank. The 6th Infantry Divis

was ordered to advance to Manila on the left (east) flan

Air-Ground Integration

The foundation for effective integration between 

Marine aviators and the Army units was laid when 

Marines sent members of air liaison parties to talk w

Army commanders. An example of this occurred wh

Marine captain Godolphin paid a visit to the 1st Cava

Division. At the time, neither the AAF nor the grou

troops were ready to have strikes directed on targets fr

frontline jeeps. The Marines, however, were determined 

show the soldiers what Marine flyers, under proper fro

line control, could do. At division headquarters, Godolp

recognized one of his former students at Princeton, 
Army lieutenant colonel who was the G-2 of the divisi

This meeting led to a close working relationship betw

the Marine ALPs and the mechanized cavalrymen.

The AAF’s 308th Bomb Wing did not develop the sa

type of relationship with ground units. When requests 

air support were made, they had to be forwarded a

approved first by division, then corps, then army, a

finally by the 308th Bomb Wing. As a result, response 

requests was slow. In addition, there was no direct con

by air liaison parties. This meant that pilots were not ne

ly as accurate when they delivered their ordnance beca

target descriptions were incomplete. 

In contrast to this situation, Marine ALPs saw t

requests for air support were serviced as quickly as po

ble. When requests were made through Marine chann

they went directly from division to Mangaldan strip, wh

Colonel McCutcheon ran operations. McCutcheon th

sent the airplanes required. Requests did not have to p

through nearly as many agencies, thus greatly improv

response time. In addition, the Marines offered an air a

that improved response time even more.

To further improve coordination, an experienced p

acted as the air coordinator. The air coordinator w

responsible for helping to direct strike aircraft in his a

of responsibility. The goal was to have the air coordina

work the same area on all his missions to promote fam

iarity with the target area.40 Furthermore, Marine air l

son parties provided direct control of aircraft; a prac

the corps believed would greatly improve accuracy. Fin

ly, the policy of alternating pilots in air liaison pa

work—to give them a “feel of the ground”—had b

planned at Bougainville and was faithfully followed.41 Al

these factors combined to impress the ground forces a

would have a significant impact when the Army un

began their drive to Manila.

Support of the 1st Cavalry Division

Marine aviators had an opportunity to apply all of 

integration techniques they had learned when they w

ordered to provide an air alert of nine planes from dawn 

dusk over the 1st Cavalry Division. The mission, in eff
was to guard the flank of the division in its deep penet

tion. The aircraft basically became a flying column for B

Gen William C. Chase, an unglamorous mission but exa

ly what the Army wanted. Missions included close air s

port and reconnaissance. In addition, the ALPs had 

opportunity to provide direct control of aircraft dur

close air support. Direct control of the SBDs produced o

standing results near Santa Maria and San Isidro.

Support of the 6th Infantry Division

Marine aviators also provided excellent support to 

6th Infantry Division. However, convincing the comma

ing general that the Marines could provide reliable a

safe air support for his troops was a difficult sale. Maj G

Edwin Patrick had earlier stated that bombs would not 

dropped closer than one thousand yards from his troo

He changed his mind when he saw Captain Godolp

direct close air support strikes against Japanese positi

near the Marikina River, where Army and Marine coor

nation was superb. In this particular instance, a Philipp

guerilla had plotted the Japanese positions on a m

Copies of the map were given to the airborne coordina

and to Godolphin, who directed a very successful strike 

81 aircraft from his position with the air liaison pa

Close air support was also provided during the attack 

the Shimbu Line. In this instance, effective attacks w

conducted inside of five hundred yards. In addition, a t

tic that had been used with success at Guadalcanal w

used on Luzon. Some aircraft conducted dummy ru

while the infantry advanced under them. This kept 

heads of the enemy down, while minimizing the possibi

of fratricide. When the Japanese caught on to this tac

one section would make a dummy run while the next s

tion dropped ordnance. This technique was very effec

due to the close coordination between the aircraft a

ground troops.42

Effectiveness of Integration

After two and one-half years of experience in the Paci

Marine Corps air-ground integration had reached a re

tively mature state. One of the reasons was the Mar
tenacity in developing effective liaison with the suppor

ground units, which was no easy task. On Luzon the cl

liaison with the Army was built on trust. For examp

pilots showed up at the front lines on the afternoon bef

a morning mission to view the situation and take a look 

the targets.43 A member of one of the ALPs recounts a p

ticular incident. “I remember an especially able regu

Marine officer, Major Frazer, who landed his plane one 

and came up forward. When the Japs let some rockets 

he hit the dirt hard, like me. While we were loving the 

a dogface in the same position said: ‘Hey, were you one 

those guys up there this morning?’ Frazer grunted u

huh. ‘Well,’ said the soldier, ‘I’ll be damned.’ It was the f

time he’d ever seen a flyer close-up.”44

In addition to the close relationship that develop

between aviators and ground troops, the Marines a

used a streamlined command and control system co

bined with ground and airborne alerts that decrea

response time. One of the problems encountered was t

communications were sometimes hampered because th

were too many aircraft working on the same frequen

This problem was partially overcome by setting the Mar

SBDs up on medium frequencies, thus separating th

channels from the Army’s channels. This arrangement w

possible because SBD radios had four VHF channels a

two high or medium channels.45 Next, direct control by 

air liaison parties greatly improved accuracy. This po

cannot be overemphasized in light of the fact that it is 

ficult to pick up targets in the jungle from the air. Fina

having pilots serve in air liaison parties resulted 

infantrymen and aviators better understanding each o

ers’ needs. This helped to overcome the perceptions t

pilots were aloof and not particularly responsive to 

needs of the infantryman.

Conclusions

At the close of the Second World War, Marine aviat

received a great deal of credit for its contributions to a

ground integration. Naturally, the Marine Corps tried 

capitalize on this attention, particularly at a time wh
budgets were becoming tight and the services were try

to justify funding. Indeed, General Vandegrift made sev

al appearances before Congress articulating reasons w

the Marine Corps should continue to exist. It was in t

environment that the Marine Corps wrote its “Evaluat

of USMC Air Operations in World War II.” The first s

tence of the chapter on close air support stated, “The ba

principles and functional technique of close air support

employed during the war just ended, are a U.S. Mar

Corps development.”46 Statements such as this did not 

well with the Air Force. Commenting on the Luzon ca

paign, USAF Historical Study No. 86, Close Air Suppor

the War against Japan, made the following stateme

“There is a legend which holds that Marine Corps aviat

units on Luzon taught Fifth Air Force how to execute cl

support missions. . . . Without detracting in any way fr

the important contribution made by Marine units 

Luzon, however, it must be stated that the legend, assi

ously cultivated by Marine Corps publicists and hist

ans, is a myth and nothing more.”47 Neither the statem

made by the United States Marine Corps nor the Uni

States Air Force is entirely accurate. The Marine Corps 

not invent close air support, nor was it the only compon

to come up with innovations in air-ground integrati

However, the contributions made by the Marines in t

area were significant and enduring.

It should not be surprising that Marine Corps aviat

would excel in air-ground integration. This excellence 

due in large part to the focus that Marine aviators h

had from the beginning. With its small air force, the co

has always linked its aviation mission to that of 

infantry. This led to a mind-set that saw aviation in a s

port role. Then, when opportunities presented themsel

as they did in Nicaragua, the Marines began to deve

procedures for air-ground integration that were used a

foundation for operations in the Pacific. The Army 

Corps, on the other hand, was struggling to stretch 

scanty funds far enough to buy a few four-engine bombe

and thus reacted against performing missions to supp

the infantry. The airmen considered advocacy of control 

infantry officers to be a failure to recognize the full ca

bilities of airpower.48 This difference goes to the hear
the two service cultures. One culture encouraged impro

ment in air-ground integration while the other shunn

the concept. When World War II broke out, marines c

tinued to perfect the ideas that they had been working 

for 20 years. Some ideas were original and some were n

However, if it was a good idea, it was incorporated into 

system. Another advantage that the Marine aviator h

was his close association with the infantryman. Althou

they were pilots, Marine aviators saw themselves 

marines first. Many of the pilots had served as infantrym

or had been assigned to infantry units prior to becom

aviators. This helped them to understand the concerns 

the infantry and often resulted in a strong loyalty to th

brothers in arms on the ground. Naturally, they would 

everything in their power to provide the best possible 

support. Finally, the mission of Marine aviation was lim

ed in scope. Its concern was at the tactical level, a

marines focused their efforts there. The result was one 

the most effective means of air-ground integration in 

Pacific theater.

Notes

1. B. Franklin Cooling, ed. Case Studies in the Development of C

Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 56.

2. Ibid., 325.

3. Capt Charles W. Boggs Jr., “Marine Aviation: Origins and Grow

Marine Corps Gazette 34 (November 1950): 73.

4. Robert L. Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World W

(Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 19

22–23.

5. Richard P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield 

Attack, 1911–1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Pr

1989), 72.

6. Maj Gen Ross E. Rowell, “Origins and Early Use of Dive Bomb

Interview with MGen Ross E. Rowell” (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], A

Air Force Historical Research Agency [AFHRA], 24 October 1946), 

180.12-3, 10.

7. Maj Edwin H. Brainard, “Marine Corps Aviation,” Marine C

Gazette 13 (March 1928): 30.

8. Maj Ross E. Rowell, “Aircraft in Bush Warfare,” Marine C

Gazette 14 (September 1929): 198.

9. Brainard, 29–30.

10. Hallion, 73.

11. Brainard, 30.

12. Ibid., 31.
13. Maj Ross E. Rowell, “Annual Report of Aircraft Squadrons, 

Brigade,” Marine Corps Gazette 13 (December 1928): 255.

14. Hallion, 73.

15. Cooling, 45.

16. Capt Francis Pierce, “Infantry-Air Communication,” Marine C

Gazette 13 (December 1928): 266.

17. Sherrod, 294.

18. Ibid., 31.

19. H. Denny Camp, Employment of Marine Corps Aviation, Ma

Corps Schools, 1935, document located at Maxwell AFB, Ala., AFH

file186.5-10A, 64.

20. Sherrod, 31–32.

21. Small Wars Manual, 1940, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 9

22. Sherrod, 291.

23. Navy Marine Corps (NAVMC) 3045, Marine Corps Aviation–Ge

al, 1943, Marine Corps Schools, document located at Maxwell AFB, A

AFHRA, file 186.5-10, 95.

24. Hallion, 165.

25. Maj Gen Archer Vandegrift, Extracts From 1st Marine Divi

Commander’s Report on Guadalcanal Operations, 7 August–8 Decem

1942, document located at Maxwell AFB, Ala., AFHRA, file 750.04-1, 

26. Hallion, 166.

27. Cooling, 301.

28. Close Air Support in the War against Japan, US Air Force His

cal Study No. 86 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, February 1955), file 101

29.

29. John L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washing

D.C.: Headquarters US Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1949), 136

30. Vandegrift, 15.

31. Close Air Support in the War against Japan, 42.

32. John N. Rentz, Bougainville and the Northern Solomons (Wash

ton, D.C.: Headquarters US Marine Corps, Historical Section, Divisio

Public Information, 1948), 90.

33. Hallion, 167.

34. 1st Marine Division, Standing Operating Procedure for Close 

Support Aviation, 22 May 1944, document located at Maxwell AFB, A

AFHRA, file 186.204A, 1.

35. Sherrod, 294.

36. Charles W. Boggs Jr., Marine Aviation in the Philippines (Wash

ton, D.C.: Headquarters US Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1951), 

37. Sherrod, 295.

38. Ibid., 290.

39. Ibid., 300.

40. Lt Col Keith B. McCutcheon, “Close Air Support SOP,” Ma

Corps Gazette 29 (August 1945): 49.

41. Sherrod, 295.

42. Ibid., 304–5.

43. Cooling, 325.

44. Sherrod, 305.
45. Lt Col Keith B. McCutcheon, “Close Air Support on Luz

Marine Corps Gazette 29 (September 1945): 39.

46. Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Evaluation of USMC 

Operations in World War II, 1945, document located at Maxwell AFB, A

AFHRA, II-1.

47. Close Air Support in the War against Japan, 238.

48. Sherrod, 291.
Appendix A
Excerpts From Marine Corps

Aviation—General, 1943

CHAPTER VIII

AVIATION IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES

Paragraph

Section 1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

2. Combat Operations . . . . . . . 173

SECTION 1

GENERAL

171. Cooperation. The basis of effective air suppor

ground forces is teamwork. The air and ground units 

such operations form a combat team. Each member of 

team must have the technical skill and training to ena

it to perform its part in the operation and a willingness 

cooperate thoroughly.

SECTION 2

COMBAT OPERATIONS

173. Conduct. Combined operations of air and grou

forces must be closely coordinated by the commander 

the supported ground force. All operations should the

fore be conducted in accordance with well-defined a

practical plans.

175. Attacks. The timing of the air attack is of prim

importance in securing the maximum effect.

When friendly troops might be endangered, definite ti

limits for the commencement and termination of the att

should be prescribed. Time allowances for action upon 

23
requests, the transmission of the attack order throu

channels, the aircraft to leave the ground, and for the fli

to the objective must be carefully computed in determin

the time of attack.

When the nature of the attack permits, the firing of p

arranged flares by the last element of the combat aviat

may serve to signal the end of the air attack as well a

signal to launch the ground attack. The ground attack m

be launched on the signal from the combat aviation or 

the end of the time bracket, whichever comes first. 

177. Status of Air Units. In support operations wh

targets cannot be foreseen and developed sufficiently 

advance for normal air operating procedure, special pro

sion must be made to minimize the time lag betw

requests for missions and their execution. Frequently su

targets will be encountered in a fast moving ground sit

tion wherein time will be the vital factor in any air ope

tion conducted.

Alert Status. To meet this time requirement

suitable portion of supporting combat aviation should 

maintained on “alert” status, either ground or air, p

pared to proceed to and attack, with the least practica

delay, an assigned target. This will necessitate that the 

craft previously be armed and serviced.

In fast moving situations when “ground alert” does 

permit timely attacks, it may sometimes be necessary 

“air alert” a portion of the supporting force for the att

of targets of opportunity that constitute an immedi

threat to the operations of the supported ground force. 

alert is highly uneconomical and can be maintained o

for short periods of time. When airplanes are on air al

direct air-ground communication with support unit will 

maintained.1

Notes

1. Marine Corps Schools, Marine Corps Aviation—Gene

1943, document located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 

Force Historical Research Agency, file 186.5-10.

24
Appendix B
Mission Request Form

Sample mission request form from 1st and 3d Mar

Divisions, Standard Operating Procedure.1

Notes

1. 1st Marine Division, Standing Operating Proced

for Close Air Support Aviation, 22 May 1944, docum

located at Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Force Historical Resea

Agency, file 186.204A,8.

27

Mission Request Form

1. BOMB and/or STRAFE ____________

2. TARGET is ____________

3. TARGET is LOCATED

(Grid or Landmark) ____________

4. White SMOKE on TARGET ____________

5. TIME

(a) Of ATTACK ____________

(b) Of COMPLETION ____________

6. FRONT LINES MARKED

(a) Colored SMOKE ____________

(b) Panels ____________

7. DIRECTION of ATTACK ____________

8. Additional Information,

if required (Recommended bomb loading

and fusing, and number of planes to be

used).

_______________________________________

_______________________________________

_______________________________________

Note: Message will include essential information

in this order. Any part not applicable will

be omitted from the above form.
Glossary

AAS Army Air Service

ALP air liaison party

CSA commander support aircraft

MAG Marine aircraft group

P-400 Airacobra attack aircraft

SBD Dauntless dive-bomber

TBF Avenger attack aircraft

29