IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2024 ND 29

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Devin Louis Fischer, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20230239

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial 

District, the Honorable Benjamen J. Johnson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State’s Attorney, Williston, ND, for plaintiff and 

appellee; submitted on brief.

Richard E. Edinger, Fargo, ND, for for defendant and appellant. 

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

FEBRUARY 22, 2024 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Fischer

No. 20230239

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Devin Fischer appeals from a district court’s judgment and amended 

judgment finding him guilty of reckless endangerment and terrorizing. Fischer 

argues the court erred by implicitly accepting and then rejecting a binding plea 

agreement, which required him to go to trial on the original charges. Fischer 

also argues the district court judge was biased against him and erred in not 

granting his motion to recuse. We affirm.

I

[¶2] On January 9, 2022, Fischer attempted to enter the home of his 

estranged wife but was unsuccessful. In the process, he fired four .38 caliber 

rounds into a door lock and door jam. Fischer left the home and disposed of the 

gun. The police later arrested Fischer and charged him with burglary, reckless 

endangerment, terrorizing and tampering with physical evidence. 

[¶3] In January 2023, the State and Fischer reached a plea agreement. The 

agreement called for the State to dismiss the burglary, reckless endangerment, 

tampering with physical evidence charges, and to amend the class C felony 

terrorizing charge to class A misdemeanor menacing. On January 17, 2023, the 

district court held a hearing to consider the plea deal. 

[¶4] Midway through the hearing, the district court learned that several 

individuals wanted to exercise their victim rights under N.D. Const. art. I, 

§ 25(1)(g) and attend the court’s hearing. The court proceeded with the change 

of plea, stating “[w]hat we’re going to do is we’ll deal with the guilty plea. We’ll 

accept that, and then we’ll see [when] they’re going to be here and if we can 

work it in to do the sentencing this afternoon or tomorrow, but we’ll just see 

with that.” 

[¶5] During the proceeding on January 17, 2023, the State notified the 

district court that this was a binding plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11, which the 

court acknowledged. That exchange included the following:
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“The Court: Attorney Madden, this is binding under Rule 11?

Mr. Madden: Yes.

The Court: What that means, Mr. Fischer, is I have the authority 

to accept or reject the agreement. If I accept the agreement, I have 

to sentence you in accordance with it. If I reject the agreement, 

then I would allow you to withdraw your guilty plea and you can 

proceed to trial. Do you understand that?

The Defendant: I understand.” 

[¶6] The State orally amended the terrorizing charge to menacing. Fischer 

pleaded guilty to the amended charge. The State provided a factual basis, 

which Fischer agreed was “substantially true and correct and that’s why [he 

was] pleading guilty to this offense of menacing here today[.]” That factual 

basis included informing the court Fischer fired bullets into a locked door while 

people were in the house. After a Rule 11 colloquy, the court found the guilty 

plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, an adequate factual basis existed, 

and accepted the guilty plea. The court “set aside the other counts till later” 

and planned to return later in the day or the next day to hear from the victims 

and for sentencing. 

[¶7] The next day, January 18, 2023, the district court judge opened the 

proceeding by stating, “This is a sentencing hearing. Defendant pled guilty 

yesterday to Class A misdemeanor of menacing.” During the hearing three 

individuals provided victim impact statements, and one of them played the 

video of Fischer shooting the door and attempting to enter the home. 

[¶8] After watching the video, the district court judge stated the evidence and 

witnesses’ statements create a “felony.” He further stated, “[a]nd frankly, after 

watching that video, if the video was offered, I don’t realistically see how he 

would be found not guilty of all of those charges.” Subsequently, the court 

rejected the plea agreement. 

[¶9] On February 13, 2023, the district court conducted a pre-trial conference 

where it heard from the State and Fischer about rejection of the plea 
3

agreement and Fischer’s claim the court was biased due to the statements 

made by the judge during the proceeding on January 18. The court ruled that 

the plea agreement was not accepted, the fact that 18 hours lapsed between 

accepting the guilty plea and rejecting the plea agreement is not 

determinative, and the judge would not grant the motion to recuse because he 

made his statements in open court as part of the need to explain why he 

rejected the plea agreement. 

[¶10] On May 8, 2023, the district court convened a three-day trial where the 

jury found Fischer guilty of terrorizing and reckless endangerment. The jury 

found Fischer not guilty on the charges of burglary and tampering with 

physical evidence. Fischer timely appealed in July 2023, and this Court 

temporarily remanded to the lower court to correct the judgment. 

II

[¶11] Fischer argues the district court erred by rejecting his plea agreement 

the day after expressly accepting his guilty plea to the amended charge of 

menacing. The dispositive question is whether the court implicitly accepted the 

plea agreement by accepting Fischer’s guilty plea to the reduced charge of 

menacing.

[¶12] We first consider our standard of review, which neither party briefed as 

required by N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(B). A district court has broad discretion in 

deciding whether to accept or reject a guilty plea or a plea agreement. See

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“A court may reject a plea in 

exercise of judicial discretion.”); U.S. v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th

Cir. 2015) (“We review a district court’s decision not to accept a plea agreement 

for abuse of sound discretion.”). This Court has not addressed the narrower 

issue raised here about whether a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea constitutes 

the implicit acceptance of an overall plea agreement. Therefore, we have no 

precedent and look outward for guidance. 

[¶13] North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is adopted from, and is 

similar to, F.R.Crim.P. 11. See N.D.R.Crim.P. 11, Explanatory Note. “[A]ny 
4

interpretation and construction placed upon identical or similar language by 

the federal courts will be entitled to great weight in applying the rule to state 

courts.” State v. Holy Bull, 238 N.W.2d 52, 55 (N.D. 1975). South Dakota also 

has adopted a criminal rule of procedure that is modeled after federal rule 11. 

State v. Hale, 2018 SD 9, ¶ 15, 907 N.W.2d 56. South Dakota Supreme Court 

addressed the appropriate standard of review in a similar case, concluding, 

“Whether the circuit court accepted a binding plea agreement is a question of 

law reviewed de novo.” Id. at ¶ 11 (citing State v. Shumaker, 2010 SD 95, ¶ 5, 

792 N.W.2d 174). A federal court similarly concluded, “Whether the district 

court is required to enforce a plea agreement is a question of law, which we

review de novo.” U.S. v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1993). We agree 

with these courts that the question whether a plea agreement was approved 

requires application of law rather than exercise of discretion. Therefore, we 

review Fischer’s question de novo.

[¶14] “Once the court has accepted a plea agreement, however, it is, as a 

general rule, bound by the terms of that agreement.” U.S. v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 

392, 399 (7th Cir. 1996); see also U.S. v. Cunavelis, 969 F.2d 1419, 1422 (2d Cir. 

1992) (if the court accepts the plea agreement, it must conform to the sentence 

of that bargain); Fagan, 996 F.2d at 1012-14 (“once the district court accepts a 

guilty plea, absent fraud or breach of the plea agreement by the defendant, the 

court has no authority to vacate the guilty plea”); U.S. v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 

1532-33 (11th Cir. 1992) (if the court accepted the plea agreements, the 

defendant’s rights should be “redressed by specific performance of the plea 

agreement in the form of evidentiary hearings before a different district court 

judge”); U.S. v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Once a court has 

accepted an agreement, however, there is no provision in the rules that allows 

it to reject or modify the agreement.”).

[¶15] The entry of pleas and making of plea agreements is controlled by 

N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. Rule 11(a) regulates entry of guilty, not guilty, and 

conditional pleas. Id. Rule 11(b) regulates the advice judges must provide to 

defendants, ensuring voluntariness, and requiring a factual basis containing 

all elements of a crime before a guilty plea can be accepted. Id. Unlike Rule 
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11(a) and (b) pertaining to pleas, Rule 11(c) regulates the use of plea 

agreements. Id.

[¶16] Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(2) “[t]he parties must disclose the plea 

agreement in open court when the plea is offered, unless the court for good 

cause allows the parties to disclose the plea agreement in camera.” Here, the 

parties and the district court complied with this portion of Rule 11 by disclosing 

the agreement and its terms at the January 17, 2023 hearing. 

[¶17] For a binding plea agreement like that offered here, “the court may 

accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed 

the presentence report.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(A). If the agreement is 

accepted, the court “must inform the defendant that, to the extent the plea 

agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) [forebear bringing or 

dismiss other charges] or (C) [agreed upon sentence], the agreed disposition 

will be included in the judgment.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4). A court rejecting a 

binding plea agreement must do as follows:

“If the court rejects a plea agreement containing provisions of the 

type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must do the 

following on the record and in open court:

(A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;

(B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required 

to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an 

opportunity to withdraw the plea; and

(C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not 

withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably toward 

the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated.”

N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(5).

[¶18] Here, the district court’s proceedings and statements reflect uncertainty 

whether it was accepting a guilty plea only or accepting (or rejecting) the plea 

agreement. The court permitted the State to amend the terrorizing charge to 
6

menacing and provide a factual basis. For purposes of this appeal, we conclude 

the court complied with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b) when accepting Fischer’s guilty 

plea to the amended charge of menacing. However, when the court accepted 

the guilty plea, it and the parties created the current issue on appeal by not 

clearly establishing whether acceptance of the guilty plea constituted 

acceptance of the plea agreement as a whole. 

[¶19] All parties agree this is a novel issue in North Dakota. Fischer argues 

our disposition should be guided by a South Dakota case holding that a court 

which expressly or implicitly accepts a plea agreement is bound by the 

agreement unless fraud has occurred. Hale, 2018 SD 9, ¶ 11. 

[¶20] In Hale, the State and Hale made a plea deal in exchange for dismissing 

charges, pleading guilty to a reduced charge, limited incarceration, and him 

testifying against his co-defendants in a kidnapping case. 2018 SD 9, ¶ 2. At a 

change of plea hearing, the circuit court found the defendant made the plea 

knowingly and voluntarily and it was supported with a factual basis. Id. at ¶¶

3-4. The court accepted the guilty plea to the reduced offense of aggravated 

assault, dismissed other pending charges, and agreed to sentence Hale 

according to the agreement. Id. Dialogue between the court and Hale included 

the following:

“THE COURT: Okay. Knowing what you know now, would you like 

to go ahead and take the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”

Id. at ¶ 3.

[¶21] One week after Hale pleaded guilty, his co-defendants pleaded guilty. 

Hale, 2018 SD 9, ¶ 5. Two weeks later during a hearing, the court ordered a 

presentence investigation and told the State and Hale, via email, that it 

intended to reject the plea agreement. Id. The State and Hale argued the court 

accepted the plea agreement and Hale “cooperated in the prosecution of his 

codefendants as required by the plea agreement.” Id. at ¶ 6. The circuit court 

eventually rejected the plea agreement, explaining that while it “expressly 
7

accepted [Hale’s] plea at the plea hearing, it did not accept the plea 

agreement—either expressly or impliedly.” Id. ¶ 7. 

[¶22] The South Dakota Supreme Court determined the court implicitly 

agreed to the plea agreement because the circuit court acted as if it accepted 

the plea agreement and its actions led to the defendant giving up his rights, 

including assisting in the prosecution of his co-defendants. Hale, 2018 SD 9, 

¶¶ 17-18. Hale, by relying on the agreement and cooperating with the State to 

secure his co-conspirators’ guilty pleas, gave up his “bargaining chip” and was 

entitled to receive the benefit of this bargain. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. The Supreme 

Court held the court accepted the plea agreement and must sentence in 

accordance with the plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 19.

[¶23] Our district court’s actions were different than the circuit court’s 

proceedings in Hale. Therefore, we do not reach the same result as the South 

Dakota Supreme Court. The courts in both cases accepted the defendants’ 

guilty pleas. 2018 SD 9, ¶ 4. Neither court specifically stated it was accepting 

or rejecting the plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 7. In Hale, that omission was 

significant because the court’s discussions with Hale at the change of plea 

proceeding included him agreeing to accept “the plea agreement.” Id. at ¶ 19.

After Hale accepted the plea, and other charges were dismissed, the court did 

not reject the plea agreement until weeks later. Id. at ¶ 7. 

[¶24] The United States Supreme Court also has considered and rejected the 

argument that accepting a guilty plea results in acceptance of an associated 

plea agreement. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997). In Hyde, a 

defendant pleaded guilty to several federal fraud counts, consistent with a plea 

agreement for dismissal of other charges. Id. at 671-72. The district court 

accepted the guilty plea but deferred deciding whether to accept the plea 

agreement. Id. at 672. The defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty pleas 

before sentencing or the court’s decision whether to accept the plea agreement. 

Id. at 672-73. The court denied defendant’s request, finding he had not 

provided a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing the plea. Id. at 673. The court 

ultimately accepted the plea agreement, entered judgment, and sentenced the 

defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “if the court defers 
8

acceptance of a plea or of a plea agreement, the defendant may withdraw his 

plea for any or no reason, until the time that the court does accept both the 

plea and the agreement.” Id. at 673, 680. 

[¶25] The United State Supreme Court held, “a defendant may not withdraw 

his plea unless he shows a ‘fair and just reason’ under Rule 32(e).” Hyde, 520 

U.S. at 671. Nothing in the text of Rule 11, which sets out the prerequisites to 

accepting a guilty plea and plea agreement, supports the Court of Appeals’

holding. Id. at 674. That text shows that guilty pleas can be accepted while 

plea agreements are deferred and “the acceptance of the two can be separated 

in time.” Id. The Court further explained:

“The Court of Appeals equated acceptance of the guilty plea 

with acceptance of the plea agreement, and deferral of the plea 

agreement with deferral of the guilty plea. Nothing in the text of 

Rule 11 supports these conclusions. In fact, the text shows that the 

opposite is true: Guilty pleas can be accepted while plea 

agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be 

separated in time.

The prerequisites to accepting a guilty plea are set out in 

subdivisions (c) and (d) of Rule 11. Subdivision (c) says: ‘Before 

accepting a plea of guilty . . ., the court must address the defendant 

personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and 

determine that the defendant understands,’ numerous 

consequences of pleading guilty. For example, the court must 

ensure the defendant understands the maximum possible penalty 

that he may face by pleading guilty, Rule 11(c)(1), and the 

important constitutional rights he is waiving, including the right 

to a trial, Rules 11(c)(3), (4). Subdivision (d) says: ‘The court shall 

not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the 

defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is 

voluntary.’ The opening words of these two subdivisions are 

important: Together, they speak of steps a district court must take 

‘before accepting a plea of guilty,’ and without which it ‘shall not 

accept a plea of guilty.’ Based on this language, we conclude that 

once the court has taken these steps, it may, in its discretion, 

accept a defendant’s guilty plea. The Court of Appeals would read 

an additional prerequisite into this list: A district court shall not 
9

accept a plea of guilty without first accepting the plea agreement. 

But that ‘prerequisite’ is absent from the list set out in subdivisions 

(c) and (d), strongly suggesting that no such addition is 

warranted.”

Id.

[¶26] Here, while the record of proceedings on January 17 and 18, 2023, could 

have been clearer about the district court’s intentions, the court conducted a 

bifurcated proceeding for its consideration of the plea agreement. During those 

proceedings the court accepted Fischer’s plea but did not dismiss the other 

pending charges. Nor had the court fully considered the plea agreement’s 

sentencing proposal on the first day due to a delay in hearing the victim impact 

statements. After hearing the victims, the court was not satisfied with the 

proposed sentence. The plea agreement was rejected. Unlike in Hale, here 

Fischer was not prejudiced by rejection of the plea agreement because he did 

not give up his “bargaining chip.” Like in Hyde, here the court separately 

considered the guilty plea and the plea agreement, which it was permitted to 

do. Therefore, on this record, and assuming without deciding a court can 

implicitly accept a plea agreement, see N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4) and (5), we 

conclude the court accepted Fischer’s guilty plea but, by that action, did not 

accept the plea agreement. 

III

[¶27] Fischer argues that even if this Court does not follow the holding in Hale, 

his guilty plea to menacing should stand under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(5)(B). He 

reasons the plea to menacing was accepted and only a defendant can seek to 

withdraw an accepted guilty plea.

[¶28] Again, the parties did not provide a standard of review for this issue but, 

like the former, it involves an interpretation of law that we review de novo. 

[¶29] Rule 11(c)(5)(B), N.D.R.Crim.P., requires that the district court “advise 

the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea 

agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.” Here, 
10

the court acknowledged, but did not advise, Fischer he could withdraw his plea. 

However, Fischer does not cite any authority providing a remedy for a court’s 

failure to provide this required advice. Additionally, we do not agree a 

defendant can unilaterally choose to enjoy part of the bargained for plea 

agreement without both him and the State being fully bound to all portions of 

the agreement. See State v. Barber, 217 P.3d 346, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) 

(specific performance entitles the defendant to bind the State to the bargained 

for recommendation, but does not bind the court). Therefore, the district court 

did not err by rejecting Fischer’s guilty plea to the reduced charge of menacing 

as part of rejecting the State’s agreement to reduce the terrorizing charge to 

menacing as part of the larger agreement.

IV

[¶30] Fischer argues the district court judge should have recused himself after 

watching the video of him shooting the door and stating the evidence would 

support a jury finding him guilty on all four counts. 

[¶31] “We review the district court’s decision on a motion for recusal for an 

abuse of discretion.” Rath v. Rath, 2018 ND 138, ¶ 25, 911 N.W.2d 919. “An 

abuse of discretion may occur when the district court misinterprets or 

misapplies the law, or when the district court acts in an arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or capricious manner.” State v. Archambault, 2022 ND 198, ¶ 10, 

982 N.W.2d 8. 

[¶32] “A judge shall disqualify in any proceeding in which the judge’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” N.D. Code of Judicial Conduct

2.11(A). “The law presumes a judge is unbiased and not prejudiced.” Lund v. 

Lund, 2011 ND 53, ¶ 14, 795 N.W.2d 318. “The test for the appearance of 

impartiality is one of reasonableness and recusal is not required in response to 

spurious or vague charges of impartiality.” Id.

[¶33] “A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be 

expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or 

impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might 
11

substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.” N.D.C.J.C. 2.10(A). “When 

making a recusal decision, a judge must determine whether a reasonable 

person could, on the basis of all the facts, reasonably question the judge’s 

impartiality.” Rath, 2018 ND 138, ¶ 25 (cleaned up). “Although a judge has a 

duty to recuse when required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge also has 

an equally strong duty not to recuse when the circumstances do not require 

recusal.” Id.

[¶34] On January 18, 2023, during the initial sentencing hearing, the judge 

stated, “[a]nd frankly, after watching that video, if the video was offered, I don’t 

realistically see how he would be found not guilty of all of those charges.” He 

did not make his comments in front of the jury but during a hearing where he 

explained why he rejected Fischer’s plea agreement. 

[¶35] During a February 2023 pre-trial conference, the judge found he did not 

need to recuse himself because “the Judicial Code of Conduct refers to out-ofcourt public statements, not in-court public statements.” He further stated 

that, “explaining the judge’s decisions is part of my job, and a big part of 

rejecting the agreement is basically my viewing of that evidence and 

determining that the agreement, in its form, was not an appropriate—or the 

punishment was not basically appropriate . . .” He continued, saying that his 

comments should not be introduced during trial and that they would screen 

jurors who are aware “of any proceedings” in this matter. 

[¶36] In this case, the judge’s comments are like those in Archambault where 

a judge stated outside the presence of the jury, “when your client gets in front 

of a police officer, having been advised of his Miranda rights and having signed 

a waiver of those rights and then confesses repeatedly to the offense, I think 

he’s pretty much given up his presumption of innocence.” 2022 ND 198, ¶ 12. 

This Court held the judge’s comments did not show bias because the jury did 

not hear the comments nor use the comments in its deliberation. Id. at ¶ 13. 

Here, the judge explained why he was rejecting the plea deal. The comments 

were made before the court empaneled a jury, and the jury did not hear or use 

the comments in its deliberation. The judge’s comments were a necessary part 
12

of explaining why he rejected the plea agreement and the judge did not abuse 

his discretion in not recusing.

V

[¶37] We affirm Fischer’s convictions for terrorizing and reckless 

endangerment and the district court’s denial of Fischer’s motion to recuse.

[¶38] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Lisa Fair McEvers 

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr