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© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“The August 13 Agreement has failed to provide 

a framework for peace in 

the country and, as implemented, will not provide free 

and fair elections.”

December 1, 2010 

Chad’s 2007 Peace Agreement 

Plagued by Poor Implementation

Summary

•	 Political crises and armed opposition movements have plagued Chad for several years. 

•	 After several failed peace initiatives, the August 13 Agreement was reached in 2007. The 

agreement is the most viable framework for bringing peace to Chad. It calls on the Chadian 

government to reform critical electoral institutions, undertake a credible electoral census and 

demilitarize politics in order to ensure fair and transparent elections. 

•	 To date, the agreement has been poorly implemented. It jeopardizes the credibility of the 

upcoming legislative elections, currently scheduled for February 2011. 

•	 Only comprehensive reform that addresses the development and governance challenges 

facing Chad will definitively end its political crisis.

Background and Key Provisions of the August 13 Agreement

Internal political conflict and open armed conflict have plagued Chad, but it has intensified since 

1998 during President Idriss Déby Itno’s administration. The reasons are multiple: the majority 

of the population lacks services and has difficulty accessing basics such as food, health care and 

water; some in Déby’s Zaghawa clan complain that he did not support co-ethnic Sudanese fighters 

in Darfur; and many disagreed with Déby’s revision of the constitution in 2005, which permitted 

him to run for a third term. Indeed, the main political parties and the majority of the electorate 

boycotted the 2006 presidential elections, saying that they were rigged and fraudulent. This threedimensional crisis—involving electoral institutions, armed groups and poor quality of life—can 

only be effectively resolved through a comprehensive and all-inclusive dialogue. However, the 

government is not keen on starting such a process. Although it was signed amid armed conflict 

and in the absence of broad political dialogue, the August 13 Agreement of 2007 remains the most 

viable vehicle for bringing peace to Chad. 

Encouraged and facilitated by the European Union, the August 13 Agreement brought opposition political parties, the ruling party (and its allies) and government officials together to find a 

way out of the political and security crises. Despite excluding representatives of civil society and 

rebel groups at the negotiating table, as well as failing to address security issues and organize a 

national reconciliation process–two critical weaknesses–the agreement is a good starting point 

for a peace process. It emphasizes the need to reform critical electoral institutions, undertake a 

credible electoral census and demilitarize politics to ensure fair and transparent elections. This 

Delphine Djiraibe

E-mail: ddjiraibe@hotmail.com

peaceBrieF69
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Chad’s 2007 Peace Agreement Plagued by Poor Implementation

page 2 • PB 69 • December 1, 2010

peace brief assesses the August 13 Agreement’s implementation and reviews its accomplishments 

and continuing challenges. 

Thus far, the implementation of the agreement, coupled with ongoing security concerns in the 

east, raise serious doubt about its ability to foster sustainable peace in Chad, despite some notable 

improvements to security and the political atmosphere. In the most glaring example, peace efforts 

were undermined by the February 2008 attack by a coalition of rebel groups on N’Djamena, which 

precipitated an intense war causing thousands of casualties. In addition, politicians and civil society members were targeted; heads of political parties were arrested; and, the spokesperson of the 

main coalition of opposition political parties, Ibni Mahamat Saleh, is still missing and likely dead. 

The first test of the August 13 Agreement is 2010, also a year of sociopolitical challenges for Chad. 

During this pivotal year, Déby’s third term will near its end, with important upcoming legislative, 

local, and presidential elections in 2011. 

Political Developments in Chad

Recently there have been several important political developments. Notably, the rebel movements 

in the eastern part of the country seem to be stabilizing. Chad and Sudan have reached a rapprochement, highlighted by President Déby’s visit to Khartoum. Defense and security forces have 

been strengthened (resulting in a sharp increase in the number of military weapons purchased) 

and several rebel leaders have returned to the country. At the national level, a number of initiatives 

have been launched in a bid to improve the overall governance of the country, including the 

campaign against corruption, the development of public work sites, the organization of a forum 

on human rights and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. 

Déby appears to be in a strong political position as he nears the end of his second term. For 

instance, the main coalition of political parties, the Political Parties Coalition for the Defense of 

the Constitution, had suspended participation as a member of the follow-up committee on the 

August 13 Agreement for a short period, but the coalition returned to the negotiating table and 

currently oversees the implementation of the agreement. Four of the parties have decided to join 

the government, despite the fact that their spokesperson, Mr. Saleh, is missing and the poor level 

of implementation of the core elements of the August 13 Agreement. 

State of the August 13 Agreement

Although there has been some progress in the agreement’s implementation, it is not enough to 

guarantee credible elections. Problems arose in the census-taking exercise, the establishment of 

the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), the financing of the elections and the 

creation of the Permanent Bureau of Elections. 

The Census

The June 2009 census, mandated by the August 13 Agreement as a precondition to the creation of 

the registered voting lists, is not reliable. The results of the national census do not give an accurate 

demographic assessment of the country. For example, according to the census, N’Djamena has 

less than 1 million residents, but in 1979 more than 500,000 inhabitants populated the same city. 

Taking into account that the population doubles every 30 years, the population of N’Djamena 

should have largely passed the million resident mark. Similar problems have been identified with 

the entire census-taking effort. Undoubtedly, these questions will create tension, notably when 

the electoral map is established.
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Chad’s 2007 Peace Agreement Plagued by Poor Implementation

page 3 • PB 69 • December 1, 2010

National Independent Electoral Commission

As per the agreement, the National Independent Electoral Commission was created and published 

a calendar of elections (legislative elections in November 2010, local elections in December 2010 

and presidential elections in April 2011).1 However, there are serious concerns about the NIEC’s 

neutrality, capacity and financial solvency. 

Although the independence of the NIEC is an essential condition for holding free, fair and 

democratic elections, the mere fact that membership is equally shared between political parties—

who have an interest in free and fair elections—does not guarantee neutrality and independence. 

Indeed, when the question arose regarding whether the general census should be biometric 

or computerized, it was the president of the republic and several other signatory parties to the 

August 13 Agreement that decided, not the NIEC. 

Similarly, the NIEC was forced to decrease the duration of a multitude of activities related to the 

electoral process. Particularly troubling was a reduction in time allotted for the public to check the 

voters’ list and verify their names. Although NIEC used the extra time to move up the legislative 

elections to November 2010, they risked a botched electoral process thus exposing the process to 

the possibility of contested results. Indeed, the realization that several tasks would not be completed has compelled the NIEC to further postpone the legislative elections to February 2011.

Election Finances

The NIEC is poorly resourced. Of the estimated 22 billion FCFA ($48 million) needed for electoral 

operations, the government of Chad has only budgeted 5 billion FCFA. It is important for the 

state to finance these elections if it is to effectively convey its political openness and willingness 

to support a process meant to ensure that elections are legitimate. Even when a state is short 

on resources, the contribution of the development partners should only be a supplement to the 

financing provided by the state. This financial deficit could prove to be an impediment to the 

proper execution of the NIEC’s mandate. 

Permanent Bureau of Elections

The secretariat of the NIEC, the Permanent Bureau of Elections, is supposed to manage the 

day-to-day activities of organizing the elections, but it is not yet functional. Indeed, the delay in 

finalizing the registered voters’ lists has already delayed the electoral process. These delays will 

involve changes in procedures and another amendment of the electoral code. Additionally, this 

bureau risks being politicized because it relies on existing government institutions for its work. The 

failure to begin the depoliticization and demilitarization of public administration called for in the 

August 13 Agreement compromises the neutrality of the Permanent Bureau of Elections. There 

are risks that the candidate who controls the ministries of central and territorial administration will 

manipulate the voters’ lists and related files.

Demilitarization of Politics

Perhaps the most problematic issue is implementation of the agreement’s requirement for the demilitarization and depoliticization of the administration and for freedom of the press. Government 

officials and some analysts claim that the implementation of these provisions is a long process that 

cannot occur before the planned elections. Yet without progress in these areas, stakeholders are 

painfully aware that elections will not be credible. 
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About This Brief

This Peace Brief assesses the 

status of implementation of the 

2007 peace agreement in Chad 

and reviews its accomplishments 

and continuing challenges. 

Delphine Djiraibe is founder and 

chief attorney of the Public Interest Law Center in Chad and the 

coordinator of the Comité de Suivi 

de l’Appel à la Paix et à la Réconciliation. She is the 2004 recipient 

of the Robert F. Kennedy Human 

Rights Award. Part of a series on 

Chad, this brief was originally presented at a conference organized 

by the U.S. Institute of Peace and 

the International Peace Institute on 

May 20, 2010.

Continuing Insecurity in the East

The security situation at the eastern border remains precarious. Communities and displaced 

people are still coming under attack from Sudanese and Chadian armed movements despite 

the recent rapprochement between Chad and Sudan, the deployment of a mixed command 

comprised of government and rebel soldiers and the signing of the peace agreement between 

the Justice and Equality Movement and the government of Sudan in Doha, Qatar (thus halting 

the spillover of the Darfur conflict into Chad). Indeed, the rebel groups continue to exist even with 

the cooptation of several rebel leaders by the Déby government. In fact, some fear that with the 

normalization of relations between Chad and Sudan and the establishment of a joint security force 

to protect the borders, the rebel groups could advance into the central and southern regions of 

the country, further spreading insecurity. 

Conclusions and Continuing Challenges 

The August 13 Agreement has failed to provide a framework for peace in the country and, as 

implemented, will not provide free and fair elections. Indeed, challenges for credible elections, 

security and reconciliation remain the same as before the August 13 Agreement. After the 2011 

presidential elections, the newly elected president will have several challenges:

•	 Ensuring internal and border security.

•	 Establishing democracy at the grass-roots level.

•	 Providing equal access to education, justice and health to all Chadians.

•	 Creating a transparent and rational system to manage national resources and effective 

resource redistribution, to ensure that Chadians have decent living standards.

•	 Fighting corruption and ensuring that misused funds are recovered.

•	 Organizing a national reconciliation process to ensure a sustainable peace.

Only a reform and governing agenda that aims to resolve these critical challenges will bring 

peace to Chad.

Endnotes

1. This calendar has since been revised. Legislative and local elections have been postponed to 

February and March 2011, respectively.

Chad’s 2007 Peace Agreement Plagued by Poor Implementation

page 4 • PB 69 • December 1, 2010