area handbook series

Sudan

a country study



Sudan

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Helen Chapin Metz
On the cover: An Nilain Mosque, at the site of the confluence

of the Blue Nile and White Nile in Khartoum

Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1992.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sudan : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of

Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 4th ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA

pam ; 550-27) " Research completed June 1991."

"Supersedes the 1982 edition of Sudan: a country study, edited

by Harold D. Nelson" —T.p. verso. Includes bibliographical references (pp. 289-304) and index.

ISBN 0-8444-0750-X

1. Sudan. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library of

Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA

pam ; 550-27.

DT154.6.S93 1992 92-21336

962.4—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-27

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by

the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under

the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the

Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other

published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

111

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the writers

of the 1982 edition of Sudan: A Country Study, edited by Harold D.

Nelson. Their work provided general background for the present

volume.

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government

agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, research

materials, and expertise in the production of this book. The in- dividuals included Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country

Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army.

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal Research

Division staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the

manuscript. These people included Sandra W. Meditz, who re- viewed all graphic and textual material and served as liaison with

the sponsoring agency, Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing

and book production, and Joshua Sinai, who contributed additional

research.

Also involved in preparing the text were editorial assistants

Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson; Ruth Nieland, who edited

the chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed the prepublication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook, who compiled the

index. Malinda B. Neale and Linda Peterson of the Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared the camera-ready copy under the

supervision of Peggy Pixley.

Graphics were prepared by David P. Cabitto, and Tim L. Merrill

reviewed map drafts. David P. Cabitto and Greenhorne and

O'Mara prepared the final maps. Special thanks are owed to Marty

Ittner, who prepared the illustrations on the tide page of each chapter, and Wayne Home, who did the cover art. Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of many individuals and public and private agencies, especially the Embassy

of the Republic of Sudan, who allowed their photographs to be used

in this study.

Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile xv Introduction xxiii Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Thomas Ofcansky

EARLY HISTORY 3 Cush 4

Meroe 5 Christian Nubia 6 THE COMING OF ISLAM 9 The Arabs 9 The Decline of Christian Nubia 11 The Rule of the Kashif 11 The Funj 12 The Fur 13 THE TURKIYAH, 1821-85 14 THE MAHDIYAH, 1884-98 18 The Khalifa 20

Reconquest of Sudan 21 THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM,

1899-1955 23

Britain's Southern Policy 26

Rise of Sudanese Nationalism 29

The Road to Independence 30

The South and the Unity of Sudan 31 INDEPENDENT SUDAN 32

The Politics of Independence 32

The Abbud Military Government, 1958-64 36

Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69 37

THE NIMEIRI ERA, 1969-85 41 Revolutionary Command Council 41 The Southern Problem 43

Political Developments 46

National Reconciliation 47

vii
THE TRANSITIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL 49

SADIQ AL MAHDI AND COALITION

GOVERNMENTS 51 Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 55

Robert 0. Collins

PHYSICAL SETTING 58

Geographical Regions 58

Soils 63

Hydrology 64

Climate 65

POPULATION 67

ETHNICITY 69

Language 69

Ethnic Groups 72 THE SOCIAL ORDER 88

Northern Arabized Communities 89

Southern Communities 93

Urban and National Elites 96

Women and the Family 98

RELIGIOUS LIFE 100

Islam: Tenets and Practice 100

Islamic Movements and Religious Orders 104

Christianity 107

Indigenous Religions 107

EDUCATION 110

Girls' Education 115

Education Reform 116

HEALTH 118

Chapter 3. The Economy 125

Robert 0. Collins

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 129

FOREIGN AID 135

PRICES, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND UNIONS 137

Prices 137

Employment 138

Wages 139

Unions 140

AGRICULTURE, LIVESTOCK, FISHERIES,

AND FORESTRY 142

Land Use 144

Land Tenure 145

Irrigated Agriculture 147

viii
Rainfed Agriculture 151 Livestock 153

Fisheries 156

Forestry 158

MANUFACTURING 160

MINING 164

ENERGY SOURCES AND SUPPLY 166

Electric Power 166

Petroleum Use and Domestic Resources 168

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 172

Railroads 172

Roads 176

Inland Waterways 178

Civil Aviation 180

Marine Ports and Shipping 182

Pipelines 184

Communications 184

FINANCE 185

Banking 185

Islamic Banking 186

FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 187

Foreign Trade 187

Balance of Payments 190

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 195

Eric Hooglund

INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 199

Revolutionary Command Council for National

Salvation 200

The Presidency 200

Council of Ministers 201

Parliamentary Government 201

Constitutional Development 202

Regional and Local Administration 203

THE LEGAL SYSTEM 206

Courts 210

Human Rights 211

SOUTHERN AND WESTERN SUDAN 212

Southern Sudan 212

Western Sudan 215

POLITICAL GROUPS 215

Umma Party 217

Democratic Unionist Party 218

The Muslim Brotherhood 219

ix
The Republican Brothers 219

Secular Political Parties 220

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 221

INFORMATION MEDIA 221

Newspapers 221

Radio and Television 222

FOREIGN RELATIONS 222

Egypt 223

Libya 224

Chad 225

Relations with Other African States 225

Relations with Other Arab States 226

United States 227

Relations with Other Countries 228

Chapter 5. National Security 229

Jean R. Tartter THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL LIFE 232

Development of the Armed Forces 233

Role in Government 234

The Armed Forces in Sudanese Society 237

EXTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS 239

CIVIL WARFARE IN THE SOUTH 240

First Civil War, 1955-72 241

Renewed Civil Warfare, 1983- 242

SUDANESE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES 244

Army 245

Air Force 248

Air Defense Command 250

Navy 250

Personnel 251

Training 253

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 254

Defense Costs 254

PARAMILITARY GROUPS 255

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE 259

SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 262

STATE OF INTERNAL SECURITY 264

INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCIES 266

Sudan Police Force 266

Security Organizations 270

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 271

Incidence of Crime 273

Prison System 274

x
Appendix. Tables 277

Bibliography 289

Glossary 305

Index 309

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Sudan, 1991 xxii 2 The Mahdist State, 1881-98 22

3 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1955 28

4 Topography and Drainage 60

5 Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1991 76

6 Transportation System, 1991 174

7 Organization of the Government, 1991 208

8 The Civil War in Southern Sudan, Spring 1991 244

9 Organization of the Armed Forces, 1991 246

10 Military Ranks and Insignia, 1991 256

xi

Preface

This edition of Sudan: A Country Study replaces the previous edition, published in 1982. Like its predecessor, the present book at- tempts to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant

historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects

of contemporary Sudan. Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; official reports and documents of governments and international organizations; and foreign

and domestic newspapers and periodicals. Relatively up-to-date

economic data were lacking.

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some of the more valuable sources for further reading

appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measurements are given

in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those

who are unfamiliar with the metric system (see table 1 , Appendix). The Glossary provides brief definitions of terms that may be

unfamiliar to the general reader.

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases posed a particular problem. For many of the words—such as Muhammad, Muslim, Quran, and shaykh—the authors followed a modified version

of the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic

Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for

British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN system; the modification entails the omission of all diacritical markings and hyphens.

In numerous instances, however, the names of persons or places are so well known by another spelling that to have used the

BGN/PCGN system may have created confusion. The reader will find Khartoum for the city rather than Al Khartum (the latter form

is used for the state by that name), Roseires Dam rather than Ar

Rusayris, and the Mahdi rather than Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah. Place-names pose another problem in that the

government changed the administrative divisions of Sudan in

February 1991. The country was then divided into nine states, generally with names and borders similar to the historical provinces

of the colonial period and early independence. Readers will thus

find Bahr al Ghazal and Kurdufan, for example, referred to either

as states or as provinces depending on the context. The body of the text reflects information available as of June

1991. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- curred since the completion of research, and the Country Profile

and Glossary include updated information as available.

Xlll

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Democratic Republic of Sudan.

Short Form: Sudan.

Term for Citizens: Sudanese.

Capital: Khartoum.

Date of Independence: January 1, 1956.

Geography

Size: Total area 2,505,813 square kilometers; land area 2,376,000

square kilometers; coastline 716 kilometers; largest country in Africa.

NOTE—The Country Profile contains updated information as available.

xv
Topography: Plateau and plains predominate. Mountainous areas behind Red Sea coast, in far south, and in far west. Only interior

highlands of consequence are Nuba Mountains west of White Nile

River. All significant streams flow to White Nile and Blue Nile

rivers, which join just north of Khartoum to form River Nile. Extensive swamps in south, especially along Bahr al Ghazal (southernmost part of White Nile).

Climate: Rainfall ranges from rare and occasional in far northern

desert to relatively abundant and frequent (rainy seasons of six to nine months) in southern third of Sudan. In most years central

third has enough rain for agriculture but lack of rain in 1980s and

1991 caused years of drought. Dust storms (often preceding rainstorms) common in north and northern parts of central Sudan,

reducing visibility and causing much discomfort. Mean temperatures and daily maximums generally high; desert temperatures often

quite cool at night.

Society

Population: Census of 1983 set population at 21.6 million people; July 1990 population estimate approximately 25 million. Annual growth rate between 2.8 and 3.1 percent. Half of population

under eighteen years of age. About 20 percent of population urban,

concentrated chiefly in three cities—Khartoum, Omdurman, and

Khartoum North—constituting national capital area. Languages: About 400 languages, but Arabic primary and offi- cial language. English common second language in south. Other

languages include Bedawiye used by Beja and various dialects of

Niger-Kurdufanian and Nilo-Saharan.

Ethnic Groups: Largest ethnic category in 1983 (nearly 40 per- cent of total, nearly 55 percent in north) comprises those considering

themselves Arabs, but category internally split by regional and tribal loyalties and affiliation to various Muslim politico-religious groups.

Major Muslim (but non-Arab) groups are Nubians in far north,

nomadic Beja in northeast, and Fur in west. Southern non-Muslim

groups include Dinka (more than 10 percent of total population

and 40 percent in south), Nuer, and numerous smaller Nilotic and

other ethnic groups.

Religion: More than half of total population Muslim, most living

in north where Muslims constitute 75 percent or more of population. Relatively few Christians, most living in south. Most people

xvi
in south and substantial minority in north adherents of various in- digenous religions.

Education: Six-year primary education increasingly available, but

in early 1990s the south and many northern communities still suffered from shortage of schools and teachers; many schools in

south destroyed by civil war. Small proportion of primary school

graduates continued in three-year junior secondary and upper

secondary schools or attended technical schools. Most schools in

urban locations; many lacked adequately trained teachers. Universities producing adequate numbers of highly educated graduates

but Sudanese with skills relevant to largely agricultural economy

still in short supply. Estimate of adult literacy about 30 percent.

Health: By 1991 civil war had destroyed most medical facilities in the south, and famine in 1980s and 1991 had serious impact on general health. Weak modern medical infrastructure suffering

personnel shortages and urban-rural imbalance; most personnel

and facilities concentrated in capital area. Malaria and gastrointestinal diseases prevalent through much of country; tuberculosis widespread in north but also occurs in south; schistosomiasis (snail fever) more restricted to territory near White Nile and Blue Nile rivers

and adjacent irrigated areas; sleeping sickness spreading in south;

acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) also increasing.

Economy

Salient Features: Government-dominated mixed economy.

Modern agriculture sector and most of modern industry controlled

by government corporations directly or through joint ventures; vir- tually all small- and medium-sized industry, most services, traditional agriculture, and handicrafts controlled privately. Civil war

in south, massive influx of refugees from neighboring countries,

and drought in 1980s and 1991 have hampered economic development. New economic recovery program announced June 1990 to end economic stagnation, develop agriculture, liberalize trade, abolish most government monopolies, progressively eliminate budget

deficit, and develop energy resources. Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry: Agriculture and

livestock raising provided livelihood for 61 percent of working population and roughly 95 percent of exports in early 1990s. Agriculture characterized by modern market-oriented sector of irrigated

and mechanized rainfed farming concentrated in central part of

country and large traditional sector engaged in subsistence activities elsewhere. Principal modern sector crops: cotton, sorghum,

xvii
peanuts, sugarcane, wheat, sesame. Traditional sector crops: sor- ghum, millet, sesame, peanuts. Fisheries still largely subsistence

occupation. Apart from gum arabic, a major export, forests used

mainly for fuel. Manufacturing: Public enterprises dominant in modern manufacturing activity, mainly foodstuffs, beverages, textiles. Output of

government plants generally well below capacities because of raw

materials shortages, power outages, lack of spare parts, and lack

of competent managerial staff and skilled laborers. Three-quarters

of large-scale modern manufacturing in Al Khartum State. Mining: Contributed less than 1 percent to gross domestic product

(GDP) in 1990. Most petroleum exploration operations ended in

1984 because of civil war in south and had not resumed as of

mid- 1991.

Energy: Chief sources of energy in 1992: domestic wood, charcoal, hydroelectric power, imported petroleum; large hydroelectric potential only partially exploited. Central area of country served

by electric power grid; some towns elsewhere had local generating

facilities. Foreign Trade: Agricultural products (cotton, gum arabic,

peanuts, sesame, livestock) dominate exports. Large trade deficit since late 1970s, accentuated by increased costs of petroleum imports. Main destinations of exports in 1986: Saudi Arabia, Japan,

Britain, other European Community (EC) members. Main suppliers: Saudi Arabia (petroleum), Britain, other EC members,

United States, Japan, China.

Transportation

Railroads: In 1991 government-owned Sudan Railways operated

about 4,800 kilometers of 1.067-meter-gauge rail lines from Port

Sudan to most major interior production and consumption centers except in far south. Also 716 kilometers of 1 .6096-meter-gauge plantation line. Substantial loss of rail traffic to road transport after mid-1970s attributable to inefficient operations, but railroad still important for low-cost volume movement of agricultural exports

and for inland delivery of heavy capital equipment, construction

materials, and other goods for economic development.

Roads: In 1991 road system of between 20,000 and 25,000 kilo- meters, of which more than 2,000 kilometers paved or asphalted

and about 3,700 kilometers gravel. Remaining roads fair-weather

earth and sand tracks.

xvin
Inland Waterways: In 1991 about 1,750 kilometers navigable, but

service on White Nile River in south largely discontinued by civil war.

Civil Aviation: Government-owned Sudan Airways in 1991

provided scheduled domestic air transport service to about twenty

towns; international service by Sudan Airways and foreign airlines. Khartoum International principal airport; seven other airports had

paved runways.

Marine Ports and Shipping: Port Sudan and Sawakin on Red

Sea only deepwater ports; some modern port equipment available

but most cargo handling manual. National merchant marine (ten

ships of 122,200 deadweight tons in 1990) operated to Red Sea,

Mediterranean, European ports.

Pipelines: Petroleum-products pipeline, 815 kilometers long, from

Port Sudan to Khartoum; intermediate offtake point at Atbarah.

Government and Politics

Government: All executive and legislative powers vested in Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS), a fifteen-member body of military officers. RCC-NS chairman Lieutenant General Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir designated president of the republic and prime minister. RCC-NS appointed

members of Council of Ministers, or cabinet, governors of states, and judges of courts. In mid-February 1992, Bashir announced

formation of appointed 300-member Transitional National Assembly. No plans for new elections announced as of mid- 1992. Government's authority in southern one-third of Sudan in mid- 1992

concentrated around towns, a number of which had been retaken

from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) during

1991-92 campaign.

Administrative Divisions: In 1991 RCC-NS decreed division of

Sudan into nine states. Each state further subdivided into provinces

and local government areas or districts. Justice: Court system consisted of civil and special courts. Civil courts required to appjy Islamic law, or sharia, but also permitted

to consider customary law in reaching decisions. Apex of civil judicial system was High Court of Appeal. Lower courts consisted

of state courts of appeal and at local level, major courts and magistrate's courts. Special courts, under military jurisdiction, dealt

with offenses affecting national security or involving official cor- ruption.

xix
Politics: Although RCC-NS banned all political parties in 1989,

it tolerated political activity by National Islamic Front (NIF), a

coalition dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Leaders of other

parties had reorganized abroad or in southern areas outside government control. Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)

drew support from predominandy non-Muslim and non-Arab

population of the south.

Foreign Affairs: Prior to 1989 coup, Sudan had relatively close

relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United States, and had

history of tense relations with Libya. RCC-NS changed orientation of Sudan's foreign policy, particularly by supporting Iraq during Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

retaliated by suspending economic assistance, which constituted

crucial component of government's budget.

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1991 Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF)

totaled approximately 71,500 personnel; army had about 65,000;

air force and air defense command each had about 3,000; navy

had about 500.

Major Tactical Units: SPAF organized into six regional commands

having divisional structures. Main units: two armored brigades, one mechanized infantry brigade, one airborne brigade, one air assault brigade, seventeen infantry brigades, three artillery regiments, two antiaircraft artillery brigades, and one engineering regiment. Strengths of brigades, battalions, and companies varied

greatly. Air force organized into two fighter-ground attack squadrons and two fighter squadrons, of which only one functioning,

plus transport squadron, unarmed helicopter squadron, and training

aircraft. Air defense command equipped with radar-directed antiaircraft guns and Soviet SA-2 missiles. Naval forces, under army

command, had some functioning river patrol boats but little or no

capacity to patrol Red Sea coast. Much of armed forces equipment

nonoperational because of poor maintenance and lack of spare parts.

Civil War: Since 1983 armed rebellion has been conducted by

forces of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) with estimated

strength of 50,000 to 60,000 in 1991. SPLA controlled most rural areas of the south, government forces holding major towns. In

1991-92 government forces launched campaign and captured many

SPLA-held centers. SPLA armed with light weapons, shoulderfired antiaircraft missiles, some artillery and rocket launchers, and

a few armored vehicles. Government forces assisted by tribal militia

xx
groups, which were guilty of many atrocities against civilians in

the south. Government also organized in 1989 paramilitary body

called Popular Defence Forces that participated in 1991-92 campaign in the south.

Military Assistance: Most military equipment supplied by Soviet

Union, 1968-71; limited cooperation with Soviet Union continued

until 1977. Egypt and China subsequently became prominent suppliers. In early 1980s, United States became principal source of

aid, notably aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery. United

States aid sharply reduced in 1983 and formally terminated in 1989.

Defense Costs: Official data unavailable; defense budget estimated

at US$610 million in 1989, constituting 7.2 percent of gross national product.

Internal Security Forces: National police (Sudan Police Force)

totaled about 30,000. State Security Organisation main instrument

of domestic intelligence and internal security until 1985. After 1989

military coup, separate Islamic-oriented security bodies formed to suppress opposition to regime.

xxi
CENTRAL ( AFRICAN ; REPUBUC ~^'(

International boundary

Administrative boundary

State boundary ® National capital ® State capital

50 100 150 Kilometers 50 100 150 Miles

A, ALISTIWAI 1

"V y~..<n *- -\ KENYA s ZAIRE (UGANDA) ' t

I Boundary representation w • nothecessa

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Sudan, 1991

xxii
Introduction

SUDAN, LIKE MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, consists of numerous ethnic groups. Unlike most states, however, Sudan has

two distinct divisions: the north, which is largely Arab and Muslim, and the south, which consists predominantly of black Nilotic

peoples, some of whom are members of indigenous faiths and others

who are Christians. British policy during the Anglo-Egyptian con- dominium (1899-1955) intensified the rift because Britain established separate administrations for the two areas and forbade

northerners to enter the south. In the 1990s, many southerners con- tinued to fear being ruled by northerners, who lacked familiarity

with their beliefs and ethnic traditions and sought to impose north- ern institutions on them.

Given its proximity to Egypt and the centrality of the Nile River

that both countries share, it is not surprising that culturally Egypt

has influenced Sudan significantly, especially the northern part of

the country. Ancient Cush, located in present-day northern Sudan, was strongly influenced by Egypt for about 1,000 years beginning

ca. 2700 B.C. Although the Hyksos kings of Egypt temporarily

broke off contact, Cush subsequently was incorporated into Egypt's

New Kingdom as a province about 1570 B.C. and remained under

Egyptian control until about 1100 B.C. In a move that reversed

the pattern of Egyptian dominance, a Cushite king conquered

Upper Egypt in 730 B.C.; in 590 B.C., however, the Cushite capital was sacked by the Egyptians and the court moved farther south

along the Nile to Meroe.

By the sixth century A.D. , Meroe had broken up into three kingdoms collectively referred to as Nubia. The people of Nubia adopted

Christianity and were ministered to largely by Egyptian clergy.

The kingdoms reached their peak in the ninth and tenth centuries. Prior to the coming of Islam, the people had contact with the

Arabs primarily in the form of trade. Sudan became known as a

source of ivory, gold, gems, aromatic gum, and cattle, all products

that were transported to markets in Egypt and Arabia. Following

the Muslim conquest of the area, in 1276 the Mamluk rulers of

Egypt gave Nubia to a Muslim overlord. The Nubians themselves

converted to Islam only gradually; a majority of them remained

Christian until the fifteenth or sixteenth century. During the six- teenth century, the Muslim religious brotherhoods spread through

northern Nubia, and the Ottoman Empire exerted its jurisdiction

through military leaders whose rule endured for three centuries.

xxiii
In 1820 Muhammad Ali, who ruled Egypt on behalf of the Ottomans, sent 4,000 troops to Sudan to clear the area of Mamluks.

The invasion resulted in Ottoman-Egyptian rule of Sudan from

1821 to 1885; the rule was accompanied by the introduction of secular courts and a large bureaucracy. The 1880s saw the rise of the

Mahdist movement, consisting of disciples of Muhammad Ahmad

ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, a Sudanese who proclaimed himself the

Mahdi or "guided one," and launched a jihad against the Ottoman rulers. Britain perceived the Mahdists as a threat to stability

in the region and sent first Charles George Gordon and then Herbert Kitchener to Sudan to assert British control. The British conquest led to the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium

and, initially, to military rule of Sudan, followed by civilian administration. Britain largely ignored southern Sudan until after World War I, leaving Western missionary societies to establish

schools and medical facilities in the area. After World War I, Sudanese nationalism, which favored either

independence or union with Egypt, gathered popular support.

Recognizing the inevitable, Britain signed a self-determination

agreement with Sudan in 1952, followed by the Anglo-Egyptian

accord in 1953 that set up a three-year transition period to self- government. Sudan proclaimed its independence January 1, 1956.

The country had two short-lived civilian coalition governments before a coup in November 1958 brought in a military regime under

Major General Ibrahim Abbud and a collective body known as the

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Abbud' s government sought

to arabize the south and in 1964 expelled all Western missionaries.

Northern repression of the south led to open civil war in the

mid-1960s and the rise of various southern resistance groups, the

most powerful of which was the Anya Nya guerrillas, who sought

autonomy. Civilian rule returned to Sudan between 1964 and 1969,

and political parties reappeared. In the 1965 elections, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub became prime minister, succeeded in June

1966 by Sadiq al Mahdi, a descendant of the Mahdi. In the 1968

elections, no party had a clear majority, and a coalition government took office under Mahjub as prime minister.

In May 1969, the Free Officers' Movement led by Jaafar an

Nimeiri staged a coup and established the Revolutionary Command

Council (RCC). In July 1971, a short-lived procommunist military coup occurred, but Nimeiri quickly regained control, was

elected to a six-year term as president, and abolished the RCC.

Meanwhile in the south, Joseph Lagu, a Christian, had united

several opposition elements under the Southern Sudan Liberation

Movement. In March 1972, the southern resistance movement

xxiv
concluded an agreement with the Nimeiri regime at Addis Ababa,

and a cease-fire followed. A Constituent Assembly was created in

August 1972 to draft a constitution at a time when the growing

opposition to military rule was reflected in strikes and student unrest. Despite this dissent, Nimeiri was reelected for another six- year term in 1977.

During the early stages of his new term, Nimeiri worked toward

reconciliation with the south. As the south became stronger,

however, he considered it a threat to his regime; and in June 1983,

having abolished the Southern Regional Assembly, he redivided

the southern region into its three historical provinces. The Sudanese

People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), founded in 1983, opposed this di- vision. They intensified their opposition following the imposition

of Muslim sharia law throughout the country, and the civil war

in the south broke out again with renewed vigor. In early 1985,

while Nimeiri was returning from a visit to the United States, a

general strike occurred that the government could not quell, fol- lowed by a successful military coup led by Lieutenant General Abd

ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab. A Transitional Military Council was created, but the government proved incapable of establishing a national political consensus or of dealing with the deteriorating

economic situation and the famine threatening southern and western

Sudan. In March 1986, in the Koka Dam Declaration, the government and the SPLM called for a Sudan free from "discrimination

and disparity" and the repeal of the sharia.

Sadiq al Mahdi formed what proved to be a weak coalition

government following the April 1986 elections. An agreement with

the SPLM was signed by Sadiq al Mahdi' s coalition partners at Addis Ababa in November 1988; the agreement called for a ceasefire and freezing the application of the sharia. Sadiq al Mahdi'

failure to end the civil war in the south or improve the economic

and famine situations led to the overthrow of the government at the end ofJune 1989 by Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir.

Sudan's economic straits reflected its position as Africa's largest nation geographically, but one possessed of large areas of desert

and semidesert east and west of the Nile and in the south the world's

largest swamp, As Sudd, which led to tropical rain forests in the

southernmost area. As a result, although the Nile itself with its tributaries—the Blue Nile and the White Nile, which joined at Khartoum—constituted a vital communications link for the country

and a source of water for agriculture, the cultivable area of Sudan

was somewhat limited. Moreover, in years of drought the agriculturally productive sector declines appreciably, causing the likeli- hood of severe famine. xxv
In accordance with the focal role played by the Nile, about onethird of Sudan's 1990 estimated population of 25 million lived

around Khartoum and in Al Awsat State (see fig. 1). The latter included the rich agricultural region of Al Jazirah, south of Khartoum between the Blue Nile and the White Nile. Although only

one-fifth of the population lived in urban areas, two-thirds of the

total population resided within 300 kilometers of Khartoum. About

600 ethnic groups speaking around 400 languages were represented.

Arabic was the official language of the country, with English spoken

widely in the south. Ethnic statistics for the 1990s were lacking,

but in 1983 Arabs constituted about two-fifths of the total population, representing the majority in the north where the next largest

group was the Nile Nubians. Much of the remainder of Sudan's

population consisted of non-Muslim Nilotic peoples living in

southern Sudan or in the hilly areas west of the Blue Nile or near

the Ethiopian border. Among the largest of these ethnic groups were the Dinka and the Nuer, followed by the Shilluk. Many of

these groups migrated with their herds, seeking areas of rainfall,

and therefore it was difficult to establish their numbers accurately.

In the early 1990s, agriculture and livestock raising provided the

major sources of livelihood for about four-fifths of the population.

Wherever possible, Nile waters were used for irrigation, and the

government has sponsored a number of irrigation projects. Commercial crops such as cotton, peanuts, sugarcane, sorghum, and

sesame were grown, and gum arabic was obtained from Acacia Senegal trees. Most of these products along with livestock destined primarily

for Saudi Arabia also represented Sudan's major exports.

Manufacturing concentrated on food-processing enterprises and

textiles, as well as some import substitution industries such as ce- ment, chemicals, and fertilizers. Industry, however, contributed

less than one-tenth to gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary)

in the early 1990s, in comparison with agriculture's more than three- tenths contribution. Sudan was among the world's poorest countries according to the World Bank (see Glossary), with an annual

per capita income of US$310 in FY (fiscal year—see Glossary) 1991

.

Several factors accounted for the relative economic insignificance

of the industrial sector. Historically, during the colonial period,

Britain had discouraged industrialization, preferring to keep Sudan

as a source of raw materials and a market for British manufactured

goods. Following independence, a paucity of development programs

as well as better employment opportunities in the Persian Gulf states contributed to a shortage of skilled workers. In the early 1990s,

Sudan also had limited energy sources—only small amounts of

petroleum in the south between Kurdufan State and Bahr al Ghazal

xxvi
State and only a few dams producing hydroelectric power. In addition, transportation facilities were limited; there existed only a

sketchy network of railroads and roads, many of the latter being

impassable in the rainy season. Inland waterways could also be

difficult to use because of low water, cataracts, or swamps. The

lack of a good transportation network hindered not only the marketing of produce and consumer goods but also the processing of

such minerals as gold, chrome, asbestos, gypsum, mica, and ura- nium. The lack of capital accumulation also limited financial resources and necessitated funding by the government, which it- self had inadequate revenues. Some northern Sudanese hoped that

the rise of Islamic banks might result in more capital being invested

in private industrial development, especially after the World Bank

refused to extend further loans to the country.

Sudan's problems with the World Bank occurred initially in 1984.

The World Bank cited Sudan's large external debt—in June 1992

the debt was about US$15.3 billion, of which approximately twothirds represented payment arrears—and its failure to take steps

to restructure its economy as reasons for denying credit. The large

debt resulted primarily from the nationalization of major sectors of the economy in the 1970s and the use of funds borrowed from

abroad to finance enterprises with low productivity. The government needed to use its revenues to meet the losses of these enterprises. In addition, the civil war, the prolonged drought, widespread

malnutrition, famine, and the hundreds of thousands of refugees

further sapped the economy.

Not until June 1990 did the government act to reform the econ- omy by instituting a three-year (FY 1991-93) National Economic

Salvation Program. The program aimed to reduce the budget

deficit, privatize nationalized enterprises, heighten the role of the

private sector, and remove controls on prices, profits, and exports.

In October 1991, other steps toward economic reform included

devaluing the official exchange rate from £Sd4.5 to £Sdl5 (for value

of the Sudanese pound—see Glossary) to the United States dollar

and reducing subsidies on sugar and petroleum products. In February 1992, in a further liberalization of the economy, all price controls were removed and official exchange rates devalued to £Sd90

to the United States dollar. Officials hoped that these measures would not cause the inflation rate, which was about 115 percent

per year as of March 1992, to worsen. In a further move designed

to curb inflation, Sudan instituted a new currency, the dinar, worth

ten Sudanese pounds, in May 1992.

Although the World Bank refused to authorize new loans for Sudan, in July 1991 the Bank granted Sudan US$16 million for xxvn
the Emergency Drought Recovery Project. In addition, in the spring

of 1992 Sudan received an agricultural credit of US$42 million from

the African Development Bank and some bilateral aid from Iran

and Libya. Like the World Bank, the United States and the European Community had suspended loans to Sudan but had provided some humanitarian assistance; the value of United States humanitarian aid in 1991 was estimated to exceed US$150 million.

Nevertheless, the drought, the famine, and the massive influx into

the north of refugees from the south as a result of the civil war caused

the country's already precarious economy to deteriorate further

and complicated the government's ability to rule. Since the military coup of June 30, 1989, the constitution had

been suspended, political parties banned, and the legislative as- sembly dissolved. For practical purposes, in mid- 1992 Bashir made

political decisions in his capacity as president or head of state, prime

minister, commander in chief, and chairman of the legislative body

created by the 1989 coup, the Revolutionary Command Council

for National Salvation (RCC-NS). The RCC-NS consisted of

fifteen members who had carried out the coup along with Bashir.

Several members had ties to the National Islamic Front (NIF), the

political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist (sometimes

seen as fundamentalist) activist group.

Although political parties were illegal under the Bashir government, the NIF represented the equivalent of a party. The nature

of the relationship between Bashir and the NIF was not clear. Some

well informed Western observers considered Bashir to be a tool of the NIF in spreading its Islamist programs and its strong advocacy of the imposition of the sharia. Other observers believed

that Bashir was using the NIF for his own purposes. The leading

figure in the NIF was Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi, an Oxfordeducated Muslim religious scholar and lawyer, who strongly advocated the spread of Islamism in the Muslim world. As Turabi was ending his tour of the United States and Canada in the spring

of 1992, he was attacked in Ottawa in late May by a Sudanese

opponent of the NIF and was seriously injured. Although by late July Turabi had resumed meetings with government and Islamic

officials and speeches to Muslim groups in Khartoum and in London, the effects of his impaired health on the NIF, the RCC-NS,

and the political scene were uncertain in mid-August.

In addition to their legislative functions, members of the RCCNS shared with Bashir and members of the Council of Ministers

functions traditionally associated with the executive branch, such

as heading government ministries. The Council of Ministers in- cluded civilians as well as military officers and in practice was xxvm
subordinate to the RCC-NS. In April 1991, probably in response

to growing criticism of its authoritarian rule, the RCC-NS con- vened a constitutional conference. However, major opposition

groups boycotted the conference. As on previous occasions, the principal intractable problem proved to be the inability of Muslims and

non-Muslims to agree on the role of Islamic law as the basis of

the legal system at both the national and local levels. Another vexing problem historically was the relationship of

regional and local governmental bodies to the national government.

The Nimeiri regime had created a pyramidal structure with councils at various levels. The councils were theoretically elective, but

in practice the only legal party at the time, the Sudan Socialist

Union, dominated them. In February 1991, the RCC-NS in- troduced a federal structure, creating nine states that resembled

the nine provinces of Sudan's colonial and early independence years. The states were subdivided into provinces and local government

areas, with officials at all levels appointed by the RCC-NS.

Although the governors of the three southern states were southerners, power lay in the hands of the deputy governors who were Muslim members of the NIF and who controlled finance, trade, and

cooperatives. Below them the most important ministerial posts in

the southern states also were held by Muslims, including the post

of minister of education, culture, youth, guidance, and information.

In a further step, in mid-February 1992, Bashir announced the

formation of an appointed 300-member Transitional National Assembly to include all RCC-NS members, federal cabinet ministers,

and state governors. Bashir also indicated in March that, beginning in May, popular conferences based on religious values would

be held in the north and in "secure areas" of the south to elect chairmen and members of such conferences. The election process

would create a "general mobilization of all political institutions."

Although the agendas for conferences over the succeeding ten-year

period would be based on national issues set by the head of state and local issues raised by the governors, the government touted

the process as one that would "fulfill the revolution's promise to hand over full power to the people." The proposed conference committees were somewhat reminiscent of the popular committees

established by the Popular Defence Act of October 1989. Initially,

these popular committees had the function of overseeing rationing, but their mandate was broadened to include powers such as arresting enemies of the state. The control exerted by the RCC-NS over various parts of the

country varied. For example, western Sudan, especially Darfur,

enjoyed considerable autonomy, which at times approached

xxix
anarchy, as a result of the various armed ethnic groups and the

refugee population that existed within it. The situation was even more confused in the south, where until 1991 the government had

controlled the major centers and the SPLM occupied the smaller

towns and rural areas. The government launched a military campaign in 1991-92 that succeeded in recapturing many military posts

that had served as SPLM and SPLA strongholds. The government's

success resulted in part from the acquisition of substantial military equipment financed by Iran, including weapons and aircraft

bought from China. Another reason for the successes of the government forces was the split that occurred in August 1991 within the

SPLA between John Garang's Torit faction (mainly Dinka from

southern Al Istiwai) and the Nasir group (mainly Nuer and other

non-Dinka from northern Al Istiwai). The two groups launched

military attacks against each other, thereby not only destroying their

common front against the government but also killing numerous

civilians. The Nasir group had defected from the main SPLA body

and tried unsuccessfully to overthrow Garang because of the SPLA's

human rights violations, Garang's authoritarian leadership style,

and his favoritism toward his ethnic group, the Dinka. Abortive

peace talks with representatives of both groups as well as the government were held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May and early June 1992.

(In December 1989, former United States president Jimmy Carter had attempted without success to mediate peace talks between

the government and the SPLA.) The Torit faction sought a secular state and an end to the sharia; the Nasir group wanted self- determination or independence for southern Sudan. During the

talks, both groups agreed to push for self-determination, but when

the government rejected this proposal, they decided instead to dis- cuss Nigeria's power-sharing plan.

A major basis of southern dissidence was strong opposition to the imposition of the sharia—the SPLA had vowed not to lay down

its arms until the sharia was abrogated. The other source of con- cern was the fear of northern pressure to arabize the education sys- tem (the Bashir regime had declared Arabic the language of

instruction in the south in early 1992), government offices, and

society in general. These fears had led to the civil war, which, with

a respite between 1972 and 1983, had been ongoing since 1955.

The Bashir government's need for assistance in pursuing the war

in the south determined to a large degree Sudan's foreign policy

in the 1990s. Bashir recognized that the measures taken in the south,

which outside observers termed human rights abuses, had alienated

the West. Historically, the West had been the source of major financial support for Sudan. Furthermore, Sudan's siding with Iraq in xxx
the 1991 Persian Gulf War had antagonized Saudi Arabia and

Kuwait, principal donors for Sudan's military and economic needs

in the preceding several decades.

Bashir therefore turned to Iran, especially for military aid, and,

to a lesser extent, to Libya. Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi

Rafsanjani visited Sudan in December 1991, accompanied by several cabinet ministers. The visit led to an Iranian promise of military and economic assistance. Details of the reported aid varied,

but in July 1992, in addition to the provision of 1 million tons of

oil annually for military and civil consumption, aid was thought

to include the financing of Sudanese weapons and aircraft purchases

from China in the amount of at least US$300 million. Some ac- counts alleged that 3,000 Iranian soldiers had also arrived in January 1992 to engage in the war in the south and that Iran had been

granted use of Port Sudan facilities and permission to establish a communications monitoring station in the area; however, these

reports were not verified as of mid-August 1992.

The only other country with which Sudan had close relations

in the early 1990s was Libya. Following an economic agreement

the two countries signed in July 1990, head of state Muammar al Qadhafi paid an official visit to Khartoum in October. Bashir paid

a return visit to Libya in November 1991 . Libyan officials arrived

in Khartoum for talks on unity, primarily economic unity, in January 1992.

While the government was cultivating relations with Iran and

Libya, the SPLM and SPLA were seeking other sources of aid in

Africa. They had lost their major source of support when the

government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia was overthrown

in May 1991. The SPLM and SPLA subsequendy sought help from

Kenya, Uganda, and several other African countries, thereby creat- ing tensions between those nations and the Bashir regime. Furthermore, Sudan's relations with Egypt had soured in 1991 as a

result of the Bashir government's failure to support Egypt's position in the Persian Gulf War. One manifestation of the deteriorating relations occurred in April 1992 when Sudan became involved

in a border confrontation with Egypt. The disagreement resulted

from an oil concession Sudan had granted to a subsidiary of Canada's International Petroleum Corporation for exploration of a

38,400-square-kilometer area onshore and offshore near Halaib on

the Red Sea coast, an area also claimed by Egypt.

Initially, Sudan's military was seen as being free from specific

ethnic or religious identification and thus in a position to accomplish what civilians could not, namely to resolve economic problems

and to bring peace to the south. Such hopes proved futile, however.

xxxi
The growing civil war in the south and the strength of the SPLA

and the SPLM posed tremendous problems for the military and

for the internal security forces. The civil war was extremely costiy;

according to one Sudanese government estimate, it cost approximately US$1 million per day. Furthermore, it disrupted the econ- omy—Bashir stated in February 1992 that the loss of oil revenues

alone since 1986 had amounted to more than US$6 billion. In addition, based on United States Department of State estimates in

late 1991, war had displaced as many as 4.5 million Sudanese.

To counter the SPLA, the government armed various non-Arab

southern ethnic groups as militias as early as 1985. In addition,

in October 1989 the Bashir government created a new paramilitary body, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) to promote the Is- lamist aims of the government and the NIF. Although the Bashir

regime prominendy featured the PDF's participation in the 1991-92

campaign in the south, informed observers believed the PDF's role lacked military significance.

In view of the ongoing civil war, internal security was a major

concern of the Bashir regime, which reportedly had been the object of coup attempts in 1990, 1991, and 1992. In this regard, the

government faced problems on several fronts. There was the outright dissidence or rebellion of several southern ethnic groups. There was also the creation in January 1991 of an opposition abroad in

the form of a government in exile. This body, called the National

Democratic Alliance, was headed by Lieutenant General Fathi

Ahmad Ali, formerly commander of the armed forces under Sadiq

al Mahdi. There also was increasing opposition in the north on

the part of Sudanese who favored a secular state, including professional persons, trade union leaders, and other modernizers. Such

persons opposed the application of Islamic hudud punishments, the

growing restrictions on the activities and dress of women, and the

increasing authoritarianism of the government as reflected, for ex- ample, in the repression of criticism through censorship, imprisonment, and death sentences. On a wider scale Sudanese in the north

staged protests in February 1992 against the price increases on sta- ples after price supports were removed.

As a result of the repressive measures taken by the government

and the actions of armed government militias in the south as well

as retaliatory measures of the SPLA forces, the human rights group

Africa Watch estimated that at least 500,000 civilian deaths had

occurred between 1986 and the end of 1989. The overall number

of deaths between 1983 and mid- 1992 was far greater, an outcome

not only of the civil war, but also of the famine and drought in

the late 1980s and early 1990s. In late 1989, the government, which xxxn
has considered famine relief efforts a highly political issue, ended

its cooperation with relief efforts from abroad because it feared such measures were strengthening southern resistance. The pressure of

world public opinion, however, obliged Sudan to allow relief ef- forts to resume in 1990.

The United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP) had

initiated Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in March 1989, which

had delivered more than 1 10,000 tons of food aid to southern Sudan

before it was obliged by renewed hostilities to close down operations in October 1989. OLS II was launched in late March 1990,

via the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross,

to bring in food flights via Kenya and Uganda. In the spring of

1990, WFP indicated it was helping 4.2 million people in Sudan:

1 .8 million refugees in Khartoum; 1 .4 million people in rural areas of the south; 600,000 who had sought refuge in southern towns;

and 400,000 in the "transition zone" in Darfur and Kurdufan,

between the north and the south.

In addition to these sources of suffering, the government, beginning in the 1980s, had undertaken campaigns to destroy the

Dinka and the Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups in Darfur. As of

1991, the Bashir regime was also using armed militias to undertake depopulation campaigns against the Nuba in southern Kurdufan. Moreover, the government had to deal with the return in

1991 of Sudanese citizens and their families who had been working in Iraq and Kuwait; according to estimates of the International

Labour Organisation, such persons numbered at least 150,000. Fi- nally, during the period from late November 1991 to early 1992,

the government forcibly uprooted more than 400,000 non-Arab

southern squatters, who had created shanty towns in the outskirts

of Khartoum, and transported them to the desert about fifty kilo- meters away, creating an international outcry.

In summary, in August 1992 the Bashir government found it- self in a very difficult position. Although the country's economic

problems had begun to be addressed, the economic situation re- mained critical. At the peace negotiations in Abuja, slight progress

had been made toward ending the civil war in the south, but the

central concerns about imposition of the sharia and arabization had

not been resolved. Moreover, the regime appeared to be facing

growing dissension, not only in the south but from elements in the

north as well. These considerations raised serious questions about

the stability of the Bashir government.

August 14, 1992 Helen Chapin Metz

xxxiii

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Tomb of the Mahdi in Omdurman
THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY SUDAN has been divided between its Arab heritage, identified with northern Sudan, and its African heritage to the south. The two groups are divided along

linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines, and the cleavage

has generated ethnic tensions and clashes. Moreover, the geographical isolation of Sudan's southern African peoples has prevented them

from participating fully in the country's political, economic, and

social life. Imperial Britain acknowledged the north-south division

by establishing separate administrations for the two regions. In- dependent Sudan further reinforced this cleavage by treating African

southerners as a minority group.

Another major factor that has affected Sudan's evolution is the

country's relationship with Egypt. As early as the eighth millennium B.C., there was contact between Sudan and Egypt. Modern

relations between the two countries began in 1820, when an Egyptian army under Ottoman command invaded Sudan. In the years

following this invasion, Egypt expanded its area of control in Sudan

down the Red Sea coast and toward East Africa's Great Lakes

region. The sixty-four-year period of Egyptian rule, which ended

in 1885, left a deep mark on Sudan's political and economic sys- tems. The emergence of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1899

reinforced the links between Cairo and Khartoum. After Sudan

gained independence in 1956, Egypt continued to exert influence over developments in Sudan.

Similarly, the period of British control (1899-1955) has had a

lasting impact on Sudan. In addition to pacifying and uniting the

country, Britain sought to modernize Sudan by using technology

to facilitate economic development and by establishing democratic institutions to end authoritarian rule. Even in 1991, many

of Sudan's political and economic institutions owed their existence

to the British.

Lasdy, Sudan's postindependence history has been shaped largely

by the southern civil war. This conflict has retarded the country's

social and economic development, encouraged political instability,

and led to an endless cycle of weak and ineffective military and

civilian governments. The conflict appeared likely to continue to

affect Sudan's people and institutions for the rest of the twentieth

century.

Early History

Archaeological excavation of sites on the Nile above Aswan has

3
Sudan: A Country Study

confirmed human habitation in the river valley during the Paleolithic period that spanned more than 60,000 years of Sudanese his- tory. By the eighth millennium B.C., people of a Neolithic culture

had settled into a sedentary way of life there in fortified mud-brick

villages, where they supplemented hunting and fishing on the Nile

with grain gathering and cattle herding. Contact with Egypt probably occurred at a formative stage in the culture's development

because of the steady movement of population along the Nile River.

Skeletal remains suggest a blending of negroid and Mediterranean

populations during the Neolithic period (eighth to third millennia

B.C.) that has remained relatively stable until the present, despite

gradual infiltration by other elements.

Cush

Northern Sudan's, or Nubia's, earliest record comes from Egyptian sources, which described the land upstream from the first cataract, called Cush, as "wretched." For more than 2,000 years

after the Old Kingdom (ca. 2700-2180 B.C.), Egyptian political

and economic activities determined the course of the central Nile

region's history. Even during intermediate periods when Egyptian

political power in Cush waned, Egypt exerted a profound cultural

and religious influence on the Cushite people.

Over the centuries, trade developed. Egyptian caravans carried

grain to Cush and returned to Aswan with ivory, incense, hides,

and carnelian (a stone prized both as jewelry and for arrowheads)

for shipment downriver. Egyptian traders particularly valued gold

and slaves, who served as domestic servants, concubines, and sol- diers in the pharaoh's army. Egyptian military expeditions penetrated Cush periodically during the Old Kingdom. Yet there was

no attempt to establish a permanent presence in the area until the

Middle Kingdom (ca. 2100-1720 B.C.), when Egypt constructed a network of forts along the Nile as far south as Samnah, in north- ern Sudan, to guard the flow of gold from mines in Wawat.

Around 1720 B.C., Asian nomads called Hyksos invaded Egypt,

ending the Middle Kingdom. Links with Cush were severed, and

forts along the Nile were destroyed. To fill the vacuum left by the

Egyptian withdrawal, a culturally distinct indigenous kingdom

emerged at Karmah, near present-day Dunqulah. After Egyptian

power revived during the New Kingdom (ca. 1570-1100 B.C.),

the pharaoh Ahmose I incorporated Cush as an Egyptian province

governed by a viceroy. Although Egypt's administrative control

of Cush extended down only to the fourth cataract, Egyptian sources

list tributary districts reaching to the Red Sea and upstream to the confluence of the Blue Nile and White Nile rivers. Egyptian

4
Historical Setting

authorities ensured the loyalty of local chiefs by drafting their chil- dren to serve as pages at the pharaoh's court. Egypt also expected

tribute in gold and slaves from local chiefs. Once Egypt had established political control over Cush, officials and priests joined military personnel, merchants, and artisans and

setded in the region. The ancient Egyptian language became widely

used in everyday activities. The Cushite elite adopted Egyptian

gods and built temples like that dedicated to the sun god Amon

at Napata, near present-day Kuraymah. The temples remained

centers of official religious worship until the coming of Christianity to the region in the sixth century. When Egyptian influence

declined or succumbed to foreign domination, the Cushite elite regarded themselves as champions of genuine Egyptian cultural

and religious values.

By the eleventh century B.C., the authority of the New Kingdom dynasties had diminished, allowing divided rule in Egypt, and

ending Egyptian control of Cush. There is little information about

the region's activities over the next 300 years. In the eighth cen- tury B.C., however, Cush reemerged as an independent kingdom

ruled from Napata by an aggressive line of monarchs who gradually extended their influence into Egypt. About 750 B.C., a Cushite

king called Kashta conquered Upper Egypt and became ruler of

Thebes until approximately 740 B.C. His successor, Painkhy, subdued the delta, reunited Egypt under the Twenty-fifth Dynasty,

and founded a line of kings who ruled Cush and Thebes for about

a hundred years. The dynasty's intervention in the area of modern

Syria caused a confrontation between Egypt and Assyria. When

the Assyrians in retaliation invaded Egypt, Taharqa (688-663

B.C.), the last Cushite pharaoh, withdrew and returned the dynasty to Napata, where it continued to rule Cush and extended

its dominions to the south and east. Meroe

Egypt's succeeding dynasty failed to reassert control over Cush.

In 590 B.C., however, an Egyptian army sacked Napata, compelling the Cushite court to move to a more secure location at Meroe

near the sixth cataract. For several centuries thereafter, the Meroitic

kingdom developed independently of Egypt, which passed successively under Persian, Greek, and, finally, Roman domination. During the height of its power in the second and third centuries B.C .

,

Meroe extended over a region from the third cataract in the north

to Sawba, near present-day Khartoum, in the south.

The pharaonic tradition persisted among a line of rulers at Meroe, who raised stelae to record the achievements of their reigns

5
Sudan: A Country Study

and erected pyramids to contain their tombs. These objects and

the ruins of palaces, temples, and baths at Meroe attest to a centralized political system that employed artisans' skills and com- manded the labor of a large work force. A well-managed irrigation

system allowed the area to support a higher population density than was possible during later periods. By the first century B.C., the use of hieroglyphs gave way to a Meroitic script that adapted the

Egyptian writing system to an indigenous, Nubian-related language

spoken later by the region's people. Meroe's succession system was

not necessarily hereditary; the matriarchal royal family member

deemed most worthy often became king. The queen mother's role

in the selection process was crucial to a smooth succession. The

crown appears to have passed from brother to brother (or sister)

and only when no siblings remained from father to son. Although Napata remained Meroe's religious center, northern

Cush eventually fell into disorder as it came under pressure from

the Blemmyes, predatory nomads from east of the Nile. However,

the Nile continued to give the region access to the Mediterranean

world. Additionally, Meroe maintained contact with Arab and In- dian traders along the Red Sea coast and incorporated Hellenistic

and Hindu cultural influences into its daily life. Inconclusive evi- dence suggests that metallurgical technology may have been trans- mitted westward across the savanna belt to West Africa from

Meroe's iron smelteries.

Relations between Meroe and Egypt were not always peaceful.

In 23 B.C., in response to Meroe's incursions into Upper Egypt,

a Roman army moved south and razed Napata. The Roman com- mander quickly abandoned the area, however, as too poor to warrant colonization.

In the second century A.D., the Nobatae occupied the Nile's

west bank in northern Cush. They are believed to have been one

of several well-armed bands of horse- and camel-borne warriors

who sold protection to the Meroitic population; eventually they

intermarried and established themselves among the Meroitic people as a military aristocracy. Until nearly the fifth century, Rome

subsidized the Nobatae and used Meroe as a buffer between Egypt

and the Blemmyes. Meanwhile, the old Meroitic kingdom contracted because of the expansion of Axum, a powerful trading state in modern Ethiopia to the east. About A. D. 350, an Axumite army

captured and destroyed Meroe city, ending the kingdom's independent existence.

Christian Nubia

By the sixth century, three states had emerged as the political

and cultural heirs of the Meroitic kingdom. Nobatia in the north,

6
Tombs in the north at Meroe of kings who ruled ca. 300-200 B. C. Temple of Naqa, southwest of Meroe

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

7
Sudan: A Country Study

also known as Ballanah, had its capital at Faras, in what is now

Egypt; the central kingdom, Muqurra, was centered at Dunqulah,

the old city on the Nile about 150 kilometers south of modern

Dunqulah; and Aiwa, in the heartland of old Meroe in the south,

had its capital at Sawba. In all three kingdoms, warrior aristocracies ruled Meroitic populations from royal courts where functionaries bore Greek titles in emulation of the Byzantine court. The earliest references to Nubia's successor kingdoms are contained in accounts by Greek and Coptic authors of the conversion

of Nubian kings to Christianity in the sixth century. According

to tradition, a missionary sent by Byzantine empress Theodora ar- rived in Nobatia and started preaching the gospel about 540. It

is possible that the conversion process began earlier, however, under

the aegis of Coptic missionaries from Egypt, who in the previous

century had brought Christianity to the area. The Nubian kings

accepted the Monophysite Christianity practiced in Egypt and

acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Coptic patriarch of Alexandria over the Nubian church. A hierarchy of bishops named by

the Coptic patriarch and consecrated in Egypt directed the church's

activities and wielded considerable secular power. The church sanc- tioned a sacerdotal kingship, confirming the royal line's legitimacy. In turn the monarch protected the church's interests. The

queen mother's role in the succession process paralleled that of

Meroe's matriarchal tradition. Because women transmitted the right to succession, a renowned warrior not of royal birth might be nominated to become king through marriage to a woman in line of succession.

The emergence of Christianity reopened channels to Mediter- ranean civilization and renewed Nubia's cultural and ideological

ties to Egypt. The church encouraged literacy in Nubia through

its Egyptian-trained clergy and in its monastic and cathedral schools. The use of Greek in liturgy eventually gave way to the Nubian

language, which was written using an indigenous alphabet that combined elements of the old Meroitic and Coptic scripts. Coptic,

however, often appeared in ecclesiastical and secular circles. Additionally, early inscriptions have indicated a continuing knowledge

of colloquial Greek in Nubia as late as the twelfth century. After

the seventh century, Arabic gained importance in the Nubian kingdoms, especially as a medium for commerce. The Christian Nubian kingdoms, which survived for many centuries, achieved their peak of prosperity and military power in the

ninth and tenth centuries. However, Muslim Arab invaders, who

in 640 had conquered Egypt, posed a threat to the Christian Nubian

kingdoms. Most historians believe that Arab pressure forced

8
Historical Setting

Nobatia and Muqurra to merge into the kingdom of Dunqulah

sometime before 700. Although the Arabs soon abandoned attempts

to reduce Nubia by force, Muslim domination of Egypt often made

it difficult to communicate with the Coptic patriarch or to obtain

Egyptian-trained clergy. As a result, the Nubian church became

isolated from the rest of the Christian world.

The Coming of Islam

The coming of Islam eventually changed the nature of Sudanese

society and facilitated the division of the country into north and

south. Islam also fostered political unity, economic growth, and

educational development among its adherents; however, these

benefits were restricted largely to urban and commercial centers. The spread of Islam began shortly after the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632. By that time, he and his followers had converted most of Arabia's tribes and towns to Islam (literally,

submission), which Muslims maintained united the individual

believer, the state, and society under God's will. Islamic rulers,

therefore, exercised temporal and religious authority. Islamic law

(sharia—see Glossary), which was derived primarily from the

Quran, encompassed all aspects of the lives of believers, who were

called Muslims ("those who submit" to God's will).

Within a generation of Muhammad's death, Arab armies had

carried Islam north and east from Arabia into North Africa. Muslims imposed political control over conquered territories in the name

of the caliph (the Prophet's successor as supreme earthly leader

of Islam). The Islamic armies won a major North African victory

in 643 in Tripoli (in modern Libya). However, the Muslim subjugation of all of North Africa took about seventy-five years. The

Arabs invaded Nubia in 642 and again in 652, when they laid siege

to the city of Dunqulah and destroyed its cathedral. The Nubians

put up a stout defense, however, causing the Arabs to accept an

armistice and withdraw their forces. The Arabs

Contacts between Nubians and Arabs long predated the coming of Islam, but the arabization of the Nile Valley was a gradual

process that occurred over a period of nearly 1,000 years. Arab

nomads continually wandered into the region in search of fresh

pasturage, and Arab seafarers and merchants traded in Red Sea

ports for spices and slaves. Intermarriage and assimilation also facili- tated arabization. After the initial attempts at military conquest

failed, the Arab commander in Egypt, Abd Allah ibn Saad, con- cluded the first in a series of regularly renewed treaties with the

9
Sudan: A Country Study

Nubians that, with only brief interruptions, governed relations between the two peoples for more than 600 years. So long as Arabs

ruled Egypt, there was peace on the Nubian frontier; however, when

non-Arabs acquired control of the Nile Delta, tension arose in

Upper Egypt.

The Arabs realized the commercial advantages of peaceful rela- tions with Nubia and used the treaty to ensure that travel and trade

proceeded unhindered across the frontier. The treaty also contained

security arrangements whereby both parties agreed that neither

would come to the defense of the other in the event of an attack

by a third party. The treaty obliged both to exchange annual trib- ute as a goodwill symbol, the Nubians in slaves and the Arabs in

grain. This formality was only a token of the trade that developed

between the two, not only in these commodities but also in horses

and manufactured goods brought to Nubia by the Arabs and in

ivory, gold, gems, gum arabic, and cattle carried back by them

to Egypt or shipped to Arabia.

Acceptance of the treaty did not indicate Nubian submission to the Arabs, but the treaty did impose conditions for Arab friendship that eventually permitted Arabs to achieve a privileged position in Nubia. For example, provisions of the treaty allowed Arabs

to buy land from Nubians south of the frontier at Aswan. Arab

merchants established markets in Nubian towns to facilitate the

exchange of grain and slaves. Arab engineers supervised the operation of mines east of the Nile in which they used slave labor

to extract gold and emeralds. Muslim pilgrims en route to Mecca

traveled across the Red Sea on ferries from Aydhab and Sawakin,

ports that also received cargoes bound from India to Egypt.

Traditional genealogies trace the ancestry of most of the Nile

Valley's mixed population to Arab tribes that migrated into the

region during this period. Even many non-Arabic-speaking groups

claim descent from Arab forebears. The two most important Arabicspeaking groups to emerge in Nubia were the Jaali and the Juhayna

(see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Both showed physical continuity with

the indigenous pre-Islamic population. The former claimed descent

from the Quraysh, the Prophet Muhammad's tribe. Historically,

the Jaali have been sedentary farmers and herders or townspeople

settled along the Nile and in Al Jazirah. The nomadic Juhayna

comprised a family of tribes that included the Kababish, Baqqara,

and Shukriya. They were descended from Arabs who migrated after the thirteenth century into an area that extended from the savanna and semidesert west of the Nile to the hill country east of the Blue

Nile. Both groups formed a series of tribal shaykhdoms that

succeeded the crumbling Christian Nubian kingdoms and that

10
Historical Setting

were in frequent conflict with one another and with neighboring non-Arabs. In some instances, as among the Beja, the indigenous

people absorbed Arab migrants who settled among them. Beja rul- ing families later derived their legitimacy from their claims of Arab

ancestry.

Although not all Muslims in the region were Arabic- speaking,

acceptance of Islam facilitated the arabizing process. There was

no policy of proselytism, however, and forced conversion was rare. Islam penetrated the area over a long period of time through

intermarriage and contacts with Arab merchants and settlers. Exemption from taxation in regions under Muslim rule also proved

a powerful incentive to conversion.

The Decline of Christian Nubia

Until the thirteenth century, the Nubian kingdoms proved their

resilience in maintaining political independence and their commitment to Christianity. In the early eighth century and again in the

tenth century, Nubian kings led armies into Egypt to force the

release of the imprisoned Coptic patriarch and to relieve fellow

Christians suffering persecution under Muslim rulers. In 1276,

however, the Mamluks (Arabic for "owned"), who were an elite but frequently disorderly caste of soldier-administrators composed

largely of Turkish, Kurdish, and Circassian slaves, intervened in a dynastic dispute, ousted Dunqulah's reigning monarch and deliv- ered the crown and silver cross that symbolized Nubian kingship

to a rival claimant (see The Rule of the Kashif, this ch.). Thereafter, Dunqulah became a satellite of Egypt.

Because of the frequent intermarriage between Nubian nobles

and the kinswomen of Arab shaykhs, the lineages of the two elites merged and the Muslim heirs took their places in the royal line

of succession. In 1315 a Muslim prince of Nubian royal blood

ascended the throne of Dunqulah as king. The expansion of Islam

coincided with the decline of the Nubian Christian church. A "dark

age" enveloped Nubia in the fifteenth century during which political authority fragmented and slave raiding intensified. Communities in the river valley and savanna, fearful for their safety, formed

tribal organizations and adopted Arab protectors. Muslims probably did not constitute a majority in the old Nubian areas until

the fifteenth or sixteenth century.

The Rule of the Kashif

For several centuries Arab caliphs had governed Egypt through

the Mamluks. In the thirteenth century, the Mamluks seized control of the state and created a sultanate that ruled Egypt until the

11
Sudan: A Country Study

early sixteenth century. Although they repeatedly launched military expeditions that weakened Dunqulah, the Mamluks did not

directly rule Nubia. In 1517 the Turks conquered Egypt and in- corporated the country into the Ottoman Empire as a pashalik

(province).

Ottoman forces pursued fleeing Mamluks into Nubia, which had

been claimed as a dependency of the Egyptian pashalik. Although

they established administrative structures in ports on the Red Sea

coast, the Ottomans exerted little authority over the interior. Instead, the Ottomans relied on military kashif (leaders), who controlled their virtually autonomous fiefs as agents of the pasha in

Cairo, to rule the interior. The rule of the kashif, many of whom

were Mamluks who had made their peace with the Ottomans, lasted 300 years. Concerned with little more than tax collecting and slave

trading, the military leaders terrorized the population and constandy

fought among themselves for title to territory.

The Funj

At the same time that the Ottomans brought northern Nubia

into their orbit, a new power, the Funj, had risen in southern Nubia

and had supplanted the remnants of the old Christian kingdom

of Aiwa. In 1504 a Funj leader, Amara Dunqas, founded the Black

Sultanate (As Saltana az Zarqa) at Sannar. The Black Sultanate

eventually became the keystone of the Funj Empire. By the midsixteenth century, Sannar controlled Al Jazirah and commanded

the allegiance of vassal states and tribal districts north to the third cataract and south to the swampy grasslands along the Nile.

The Funj state included a loose confederation of sultanates and

dependent tribal chieftaincies drawn together under the suzerainty

of Sannar' s mek (sultan). As overlord, the mek received tribute, levied

taxes, and called on his vassals to supply troops in time of war. Vassal states in turn relied on the mek to setde local disorders and

to resolve internal disputes. The Funj stabilized the region and in- terposed a military bloc between the Arabs in the north, the Ethiopians in the east, and the non-Muslim blacks in the south.

The sultanate's economy depended on the role played by the

Funj in the slave trade. Farming and herding also thrived in Al

Jazirah and in the savanna. Sannar apportioned tributary areas

into tribal homelands (each one termed a dar; pi., dur), where the

mek granted the local population the right to use arable land. The

diverse groups that inhabitated each dar eventually regarded themselves as units of tribes. Movement from one dar to another entailed a change in tribal identification. (Tribal distinctions in these areas in modern Sudan can be traced to this period.) The mek

12
Historical Setting

appointed a chieftain (nazir; pi. , nuzzar) to govern each dar. Nuzzar

administered dur according to customary law, paid tribute to the

mek, and collected taxes. The mek also derived income from crown

lands set aside for his use in each dar. At the peak of its power in the mid-seventeenth century, Sannar

repulsed the northward advance of the Nilotic Shilluk people up

the White Nile and compelled many of them to submit to Funj

authority. After this victory, the mek Badi II Abu Duqn (1642-81)

sought to centralize the government of the confederacy at Sannar.

To implement this policy, Badi introduced a standing army of slave

soldiers that would free Sannar from dependence on vassal sultans

for military assistance and would provide the mek with the means

to enforce his will. The move alienated the dynasty from the Funj

warrior aristocracy, which in 1718 deposed the reigning mek and

placed one of its own ranks on the throne of Sannar. The mideighteenth century witnessed another brief period of expansion when

the Funj turned back an Ethiopian invasion, defeated the Fur, and

took control of much of Kurdufan. But civil war and the demands

of defending the sultanate had overextended the warrior society's resources and sapped its strength.

Another reason for Sannar' s decline may have been the growing influence of its hereditary viziers (chancellors), chiefs of a non- Funj tributary tribe who managed court affairs. In 1761 the vizier

Muhammad Abu al Kaylak, who had led the Funj army in wars,

carried out a palace coup, relegating the sultan to a figurehead role. Sannar' s hold over its vassals diminished, and by the early

nineteenth century more remote areas ceased to recognize even the

nominal authority of the mek.

The Fur

Darfur was the Fur homeland. Renowned as cavalrymen, Fur

clans frequently allied with or opposed their kin, the Kanuri of

Borno, in modern Nigeria. After a period of disorder in the six- teenth century, during which the region was briefly subject to Borno, the leader of the Keira clan, Sulayman Solong (1596-1637),

supplanted a rival clan and became Darfur' s first sultan. Sulayman Solong decreed Islam to be the sultanate's official religion.

However, large-scale religious conversions did not occur until the

reign of Ahmad Bakr (1682-1722), who imported teachers, built

mosques, and compelled his subjects to become Muslims. In the

eighteenth century, several sultans consolidated the dynasty's hold on Darfur, established a capital at Al Fashir, and contested the

Funj for control of Kurdufan.

13
Sudan: A Country Study

The sultans operated the slave trade as a monopoly. They lev- ied taxes on traders and export duties on slaves sent to Egypt, and

took a share of the slaves brought into Darfur. Some household

slaves advanced to prominent positions in the courts of sultans,

and the power exercised by these slaves provoked a violent reaction among the traditional class of Fur officeholders in the late eighteenth century. The rivalry between the slave and traditional elites caused recurrent unrest throughout the next century.

The Turkiyah, 1821-85

As a pashalik of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had been divided

into several provinces, each of which was placed under a Mamluk

bey (governor) reponsible to the pasha, who in turn answered to the Porte, the term used for the Ottoman government referring

to the Sublime Porte, or high gate, of the grand vizier's building.

In approximately 280 years of Ottoman rule, no fewer than 100

pashas succeeded each other. In the eighteenth century, their

authority became tenuous as rival Mamluk beys became the real power in the land. The struggles among the beys continued until

1798 when the French invasion of Egypt altered the situation. Combined British and Turkish military operations forced the withdrawal

of French forces in 1801, introducing a period of chaos in Egypt.

In 1805 the Ottomans sought to restore order by appointing

Muhammad Ali as Egypt's pasha.

With the help of 10,000 Albanian troops provided by the Ottomans, Muhammad Ali purged Egypt of the Mamluks. In 1811 he

launched a seven-year campaign in Arabia, supporting his suzerain,

the Ottoman sultan, in the suppression of a revolt by the Wahhabi,

an ultraconservative Muslim sect. To replace the Albanian soldiers,

Muhammad Ali planned to build an Egyptian army with Sudanese

slave recruits.

Although a part of present-day northern Sudan was nominally an Egyptian dependency, the previous pashas had demanded lit- tle more from the kashif who ruled there than the regular remit- tance of tribute; that changed under Muhammad Ali. After he had

defeated the Mamluks in Egypt, a party of them escaped and fled south. In 1811 these Mamluks established a state at Dunqulah as a base for their slave trading. In 1820 the sultan of Sannar informed

Muhammad Ali that he was unable to comply with the demand

to expel the Mamluks. In response the pasha sent 4,000 troops to invade Sudan, clear it of Mamluks, and reclaim it for Egypt. The

pasha's forces received the submission of the kashif, dispersed the

Dunqulah Mamluks, conquered Kurdufan, and accepted Sannar'

s

14
Historical Setting

surrender from the last Funj sultan, Badi IV. The Jaali Arab tribes

offered stiff resistance, however.

Initially, the Egyptian occupation of Sudan was disastrous. Under

the new government established in 1821, which was known as the

Turkiyah or Turkish regime, soldiers lived off the land and exacted

exorbitant taxes from the population. They also destroyed many

ancient Meroitic pyramids searching for hidden gold. Furthermore,

slave trading increased, causing many of the inhabitants of the fertile Al Jazirah, heartland of Funj, to flee to escape the slave traders.

Within a year of the pasha's victory, 30,000 Sudanese slaves went

to Egypt for training and induction into the army. However, so many perished from disease and the unfamiliar climate that the

remaining slaves could be used only in garrisons in Sudan.

As the military occupation became more secure, the government

became less harsh. Egypt saddled Sudan with a parasitic bureaucracy, however, and expected the country to be self-supporting.

Nevertheless, farmers and herders gradually returned to Al Jazirah.

The Turkiyah also won the allegiance of some tribal and religious

leaders by granting them a tax exemption. Egyptian soldiers and

Sudanesejahidiyah (slave soldiers; literally, fighters), supplemented

by mercenaries recruited in various Ottoman domains, manned

garrisons in Khartoum, Kassala, Al Ubayyid, and at several smaller

outposts. The Shaiqiyah, Arabic speakers who had resisted Egyptian occupation, were defeated and allowed to serve the Egyptian

rulers as tax collectors and irregular cavalry under their own

shaykhs. The Egyptians divided Sudan into provinces, which they

then subdivided into smaller administrative units that usually cor- responded to tribal territories. In 1835 Khartoum became the seat of the hakimadar (governor general); many garrison towns also developed into administrative centers in their respective regions. At

the local level, shaykhs and traditional tribal chieftains assumed

administrative responsibilities.

In the 1850s, the pashalik revised the legal systems in Egypt and

Sudan, introducing a commercial code and a criminal code administered in secular courts. The change reduced the prestige of

the qadis (Islamic judges) whose sharia courts were confined to deal- ing with matters of personal status. Even in this area, the courts lacked credibility in the eyes of Sudanese Muslims because they

conducted hearings according to the Ottoman Empire's Hanafi

school of law rather than the stricter Maliki school customary in

the area. The Turkiyah also encouraged a religious orthodoxy favored in

the Ottoman Empire. The government undertook a mosquebuilding program and staffed religious schools and courts with

15
Sudan: A Country Study

teachers and judges trained at Cairo's Al Azhar University. The

government favored the Khatmiyyah, a traditional religious order,

because its leaders preached cooperation with the regime. But

Sudanese Muslims condemned the official orthodoxy as decadent

because it had rejected many popular beliefs and practices.

Until its gradual suppression in the 1860s, the slave trade was

the most profitable undertaking in Sudan and was the focus of Egyptian interests in the country. The government encouraged economic

development through state monopolies that had exported slaves,

ivory, and gum arabic. In some areas, tribal land, which had been

held in common, became the private property of the shaykhs and was sometimes sold to buyers outside the tribe. Muhammad Ali's immediate successors, Abbas I (1849-54) and

Said (1854-63), lacked leadership qualities and paid little atten- tion to Sudan, but the reign of Ismail (1863-79) revitalized Egyptian interest in the country. In 1865 the Ottoman Empire ceded

the Red Sea coast and its ports to Egypt. Two years later, the

Ottoman sultan granted Ismail the title of khedive (sovereign

prince). Egypt organized and garrisoned the new provinces of

Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal, and Equatoria and, in 1874, conquered

and annexed Darfur. Ismail named Europeans to provincial governorships and appointed Sudanese to more responsible government

positions. Under prodding from Britain, Ismail took steps to complete the elimination of the slave trade in the north of present-day

Sudan. The khedive also tried to build a new army on the European model that no longer would depend on slaves to provide manpower. However, this modernization process caused unrest. Army

units mutinied, and many Sudanese resented the quartering of

troops among the civilian population and the use of Sudanese forced

labor on public projects. Efforts to suppress the slave trade angered

the urban merchant class and the Baqqara Arabs, who had grown

prosperous by selling slaves. There is little documentation for the history of the southern

Sudanese provinces until the introduction of the Turkiyah in the

north in the early 1820s and the subsequent extension of slave raiding into the south. Information about their peoples before that time

is based largely on oral history. According to these traditions, the

Nilotic peoples—the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and others—first entered southern Sudan sometime before the tenth century. During

the period from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth century,

tribal migrations, largely from the area of Bahr al Ghazal, brought

these peoples to their modern locations. Some, like the Shilluk, developed a centralized monarchical tradition that enabled them to preserve their tribal integrity in the face of external pressures in

16
Historical Setting

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The non-Nilotic Azande

people, who entered southern Sudan in the sixteenth century, es- tablished the region's largest state. In the eighteenth century, the

militaristic Avungara people entered and quickly imposed their

authority over the poorly organized and weaker Azande. Avungara power remained largely unchallenged until the arrival of the

British at the end of the nineteenth century. Geographic barriers

protected the southerners from Islam's advance, enabling them to retain their social and cultural heritage and their political and reli- gious institutions. During the nineteenth century, the slave trade

brought southerners into closer contact with Sudanese Arabs and

resulted in a deep hatred for the northerners.

Slavery had been an institution of Sudanese life throughout his- tory, but southern Sudan, where slavery flourished particularly, was originally considered an area beyond Cairo's control. Because

Sudan had access to Middle East slave markets, the slave trade

in the south intensified in the nineteenth century and continued

after the British had suppressed slavery in much of sub-Saharan

Africa. Annual raids resulted in the capture of countless thousands

of southern Sudanese and the destruction of the region's stability

and economy. The horrors associated with the slave trade generated European interest in Sudan.

Until 1843 Muhammad Ali maintained a state monopoly on slave trading in Egypt and the pashalik. Thereafter, authorities sold

licenses to private traders who competed with governmentconducted slave raids. In 1854 Cairo ended state participation in

the slave trade, and in 1860, in response to European pressure,

Egypt prohibited the slave trade. However, the Egyptian army failed to enforce the prohibition against the private armies of the slave

traders. The introduction of steamboats and firearms enabled slave

traders to overwhelm local resistance and prompted the creation

of southern ''bush empires" by Baqqara Arabs.

Ismail implemented a military modernization program and proposed to extend Egyptian rule to the southern region. In 1869 British

explorer Sir Samuel Baker received a commission as governor of

Equatoria Province, with orders to annex all territory in the White

Nile's basin and to suppress the slave trade. In 1874 Charles George

Gordon, a British officer, succeeded Baker. Gordon disarmed many

slave traders and hanged those who defied him. By the time he

became Sudan's governor general in 1877, Gordon had weakened

the slave trade in much of the south.

Unfortunately, Ismail's southern policy lacked consistency. In

1871 he had named a notorious Arab slave trader, Rahman Mansur

az Zubayr, as governor of the newly created province of Bahr al

17
Sudan: A Country Study

Ghazal. Zubayr used his army to pacify the province and to eliminate his competition in the slave trade. In 1874 he invaded

Darfur after the sultan had refused to guard caravan routes through

his territory. Zubayr then offered the region as a province to the

khedive. Later that year, Zubayr defied Cairo when it attempted

to relieve him of his post, and he defeated an Egyptian force that

sought to oust him. After he became Sudan's governor general,

Gordon ended Zubayr' s slave trading, disbanded his army, and

sent him back to Cairo.

The Mahdiyah, 1884-98

Developments in Sudan during this period cannot be understood

without reference to the British position in Egypt. In 1869 the Suez

Canal opened and quickly became Britain's economic lifeline to India and the Far East. To defend this waterway, Britain sought

a greater role in Egyptian affairs. In 1873 the British government

therefore supported a program whereby an Anglo-French debt commission assumed responsibility for managing Egypt's fiscal affairs. This commission eventually forced Khedive Ismail to abdicate in

favor of his more politically acceptable son, Tawfiq (1877-92).

After the removal, in 1877, of Ismail, who had appointed him

to the post, Gordon resigned as governor general of Sudan in 1880.

His successors lacked direction from Cairo and feared the political

turmoil that had engulfed Egypt. As a result, they failed to continue the policies Gordon had put in place. The illegal slave trade

revived, although not enough to satisfy the merchants whom

Gordon had put out of business. The Sudanese army suffered from

a lack of resources, and unemployed soldiers from disbanded units

troubled garrison towns. Tax collectors arbitrarily increased

taxation.

In this troubled atmosphere, Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid

Abd Allah, afaqir or holy man who combined personal magnetism

with religious zealotry, emerged, determined to expel the Ottomans

and restore Islam to its primitive purity. The son of a Dunqulah

boatbuilder, Muhammad Ahmad had become the disciple of

Muhammad ash Sharif, the head of the Sammaniyah order. Later,

as a shaykh of the order, Muhammad Ahmad spent several years

in seclusion and gained a reputation as a mystic and teacher. In

1880 he became a Sammaniyah leader.

Muhammad Ahmad's sermons attracted an increasing number

of followers. Among those who joined him was Abdallahi ibn

Muhammad, a Baqqara from southern Darfur. His planning capabilities proved invaluable to Muhammad Ahmad, who revealed

himself as Al Mahdi al Muntazar ("the awaited guide in the right

18
Historical Setting

path," usually seen as the Mahdi), sent from God to redeem the

faithful and prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet

Isa (Jesus). The Mahdist movement demanded a return to the simplicity of early Islam, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, and

the strict seclusion of women.

Even after the Mahdi proclaimed a jihad, or holy war, against

the Turkiyah, Khartoum dismissed him as a religious fanatic. The

government paid more attention when his religious zeal turned to denunciation of tax collectors. To avoid arrest, the Mahdi and a

party of his followers, the Ansar, made a long march to Kurdufan,

where he gained a large number of recruits, especially from the

Baqqara. From a refuge in the area, he wrote appeals to the shaykhs

of the religious orders and won active support or assurances of neutrality from all except the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah. Merchants

and Arab tribes that had depended on the slave trade responded

as well, along with the Hadendowa Beja, who were rallied to the

Mahdi by an Ansar captain, Usman Digna.

Early in 1882, the Ansar, armed with spears and swords, over- whelmed a 7,000-man Egyptian force not far from Al Ubayyid and

seized their rifles and ammunition. The Mahdi followed up this victory by laying siege to Al Ubayyid and starving it into submission after four months. The Ansar, 30,000 men strong, then defeated an 8,000-man Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. Next the

Mahdi captured Darfur and imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian

in the khedive's service, who later became the first Egyptianappointed governor of Darfur Province.

The advance of the Ansar and the Beja rising in the east imperiled communications with Egypt and threatened to cut off gar- risons at Khartoum, Kassala, Sannar, and Sawakin and in the

south. To avoid being drawn into a costly military intervention,

the British government ordered an Egyptian withdrawal from

Sudan. Gordon, who had received a reappointment as governor

general, arranged to supervise the evacuation of Egyptian troops

and officials and all foreigners from Sudan.

After reaching Khartoum in February 1884, Gordon realized

that he could not extricate the garrisons. As a result, he called for reinforcements from Egypt to relieve Khartoum. Gordon also recommended that Zubayr, an old enemy whom he recognized as an excellent military commander, be named to succeed him to give

disaffected Sudanese a leader other than the Mahdi to rally behind. London rejected this plan. As the situation deteriorated,

Gordon argued that Sudan was essential to Egypt's security and

that to allow the Ansar a victory there would invite the movement

to spread elsewhere.

19
Sudan: A Country Study

Increasing British popular support for Gordon eventually forced

Prime Minister William Gladstone to mobilize a relief force under

the command of Lord Garnet Joseph Wolseley. A "flying column"

sent overland from Wadi Haifa across the Bayyudah Desert bogged

down at Abu Tulayh (commonly called Abu Klea), where the

Hadendowa Beja—the so-called Fuzzy Wuzzies—broke the British line. An advance unit that had gone ahead by river when the

column reached Al Matammah arrived at Khartoum on January 28, 1885, to find the town had fallen two days earlier. The Ansar

had waited for the Nile flood to recede before attacking the poorly

defended river approach to Khartoum in boats, slaughtering the

garrison, killing Gordon, and delivering his head to the Mahdi's

tent. Kassala and Sannar fell soon after, and by the end of 1885

the Ansar had begun to move into the southern region. In all Sudan,

only Sawakin, reinforced by Indian army troops, and Wadi Haifa on the northern frontier remained in Anglo-Egyptian hands (see

fig. 2). The Mahdiyah (Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Islamic

laws. Sudan's new ruler also authorized the burning of lists of

pedigrees and books of law and theology because of their association with the old order and because he believed that the former

accentuated tribalism at the expense of religious unity.

The Mahdiyah has become known as the first genuine Sudanese

nationalist government. The Mahdi maintained that his movement

was not a religious order that could be accepted or rejected at will,

but that it was a universal regime, which challenged man to join or to be destroyed. The Mahdi modified Islam's five pillars to support the dogma that loyalty to him was essential to true belief (see

Islamic Movements and Religious Orders, ch. 2). The Mahdi also added the declaration "and Muhammad Ahmad is the Mahdi of

God and the representative of His Prophet' ' to the recitation of

the creed, the shahada. Moreover, service in the jihad replaced the

hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, as a duty incumbent on the faithful. Zakat (almsgiving) became the tax paid to the state. The Mahdi

justified these and other innovations and reforms as responses to instructions conveyed to him by God in visions.

The Khalifa

Six months after the capture of Khartoum, the Mahdi died of

typhus. The task of establishing and maintaining a government

fell to his deputies—three caliphs chosen by the Mahdi in emulation of the Prophet Muhammad. Rivalry among the three, each

supported by people of his native region, continued until 1891 , when

Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, with the help primarily of the Baqqara

20
Historical Setting

Arabs, overcame the opposition of the others and emerged as unchallenged leader of the Mahdiyah. Abdallahi—called the Khalifa

(successor)—purged the Mahdiyah of members of the Mahdi's family and many of his early religious disciples.

Originally, the Mahdiyah was a jihad state, run like a military

camp. Sharia courts enforced Islamic law and the Mahdi's precepts, which had the force of law. After consolidating his power,

the Khalifa instituted an administration and appointed Ansar (who

were usually Baqqara) as amirs over each of the several provinces.

The Khalifa also ruled over rich Al Jazirah. Although he failed

to restore this region's commercial well-being, the Khalifa organized

workshops to manufacture ammunition and to maintain river

steamboats.

Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the Mahdiyah period, largely because of the Khalifa's commitment to using

the jihad to extend his version of Islam throughout the world. For

example, the Khalifa rejected an offer of an alliance against the

Europeans by Ethiopia's negus (king), Yohannes IV. In 1887 a 60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia, penetrated as far as Gonder, and captured prisoners and booty. The Khalifa then re- fused to conclude peace with Ethiopia. In March 1889, an Ethiopian force, commanded by the king, marched on Qallabat; however,

after Yohannes IV fell in battle, the Ethiopians withdrew. Abd ar Rahman an Nujumi, the Khalifa's best general, invaded Egypt

in 1889, but British-led Egyptian troops defeated the Ansar at Tushkah. The failure of the Egyptian invasion ended the Ansar' s in- vincibility. The Belgians prevented the Mahdi's men from

conquering Equatoria, and in 1893 the Italians repulsed an Ansar

attack at Akordat (in present-day Eritrea) and forced the Ansar

to withdraw from Ethiopia.

Reconquest of Sudan

In 1892 Herbert Kitchener (later Lord Kitchener) became sirdar, or commander, of the Egyptian army and started preparations for

the reconquest of Sudan. The British decision to occupy Sudan

resulted in part from international developments that required the

country be brought under British supervision. By the early 1890s,

British, French, and Belgian claims had converged at the Nile headwaters. Britain feared that the other colonial powers would take

advantage of Sudan's instability to acquire territory previously an- nexed to Egypt. Apart from these political considerations, Britain

wanted to establish control over the Nile to safeguard a planned

irrigation dam at Aswan.

21
Sudan: A Country Study

Figure 2. The Mahdist State, 1881-98

In 1895 the British government authorized Kitchener to launch

a campaign to reconquer Sudan. Britain provided men and materiel

while Egypt financed the expedition. The Anglo-Egyptian Nile Expeditionary Force included 25,800 men, 8,600 of whom were British. The remainder were troops belonging to Egyptian units that

included six battalions recruited in southern Sudan. An armed river

flotilla escorted the force, which also had artillery support. In preparation for the attack, the British established army headquarters at

22
Historical Setting

Wadi Haifa and extended and reinforced the perimeter defenses

around Sawakin. In March 1896, the campaign started; in September, Kitchener captured Dunqulah. The British then constructed a rail line from Wadi Haifa to Abu Hamad and an

extension parallel to the Nile to transport troops and supplies to Barbar. Anglo-Egyptian units fought a sharp action at Abu Hamad,

but there was little other significant resistance until Kitchener

reached Atbarah and defeated the Ansar. After this engagement,

Kitchener's soldiers marched and sailed toward Omdurman, where

the Khalifa made his last stand.

On September 2, 1898, the Khalifa committed his 52,000-man

army to a frontal assault against the Anglo-Egyptian force, which was massed on the plain outside Omdurman. The outcome never was in doubt, largely because of superior British firepower. During the five-hour battle, about 11,000 Mahdists died whereas

Anglo-Egyptian losses amounted to 48 dead and fewer than 400

wounded.

Mopping-up operations required several years, but organized

resistance ended when the Khalifa, who had escaped to Kurdufan,

died in fighting at Umm Diwaykarat in November 1899. Many

areas welcomed the downfall of his regime. Sudan's economy had

been all but destroyed during his reign, and the population had

declined by approximately one-half because of famine, disease,

persecution, and warfare. Moreover, none of the country's traditional institutions or loyalties remained intact. Tribes had been

divided in their attitudes toward Mahdism, religious brotherhoods

had been weakened, and orthodox religious leaders had vanished.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899-1955

In January 1899, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement restored Egyptian rule in Sudan but as part of a condominium, or joint authority, exercised by Britain and Egypt. The agreement designated

territory south of the twenty-second parallel as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Although it emphasized Egypt's indebtedness to Britain for its participation in the reconquest, the agreement failed to

clarify the juridical relationship between the two condominium

powers in Sudan or to provide a legal basis for continued British

presence in the south. Britain assumed responsibility for governing the territory on behalf of the khedive.

Article II of the agreement specified that "the supreme military

and civil command in Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed

the Governor-General of Sudan. He shall be appointed by Khedival

Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and shall be removed only by Khedival Decree with the

23
Sudan: A Country Study

consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government." The British

governor general, who was a military officer, reported to the Foreign Office through its resident agent in Cairo. In practice, however,

he exercised extraordinary powers and directed the condominium

government from Khartoum as if it were a colonial administration. Sir Reginald Wingate succeeded Kitchener as governor general

in 1899. In each province, two inspectors and several district commissioners aided the British governor (mudir). Initially, nearly all administrative personnel were British army officers attached to the

Egyptian army. In 1901, however, civilian administrators started

arriving in Sudan from Britain and formed the nucleus of the Sudan

Political Service. Egyptians filled middle-level posts while Sudanese

gradually acquired lower-level positions.

In the condominium's early years, the governor general and

provincial governors exercised great latitude in governing Sudan.

After 1910, however, an executive council, whose approval was

required for all legislation and for budgetary matters, assisted the

governor general. The governor general presided over this council, which included the inspector general; the civil, legal, and financial secretaries; and two to four other British officials appointed

by the governor general. The executive council retained legislative authority until 1948.

After restoring order and the government's authority, the British dedicated themselves to creating a modern government in the

condominium. Jurists adopted penal and criminal procedural codes

similar to those in force in British India. Commissions established

land tenure rules and adjusted claims in dispute because of grants

made by successive governments. Taxes on land remained the basic

form of taxation, the amount assessed depending on the type of

irrigation, the number of date palms, and the size of herds; however,

the rate of taxation was fixed for the first time in Sudan's history.

The 1902 Code of Civil Procedure continued the Ottoman separation of civil law and sharia, but it also created guidelines for the

operation of sharia courts as an autonomous judicial division under

a chief qadi appointed by the governor general. Religious judges

and other sharia court officials were invariably Egyptian.

There was little resistance to the condominium. Breaches of the

peace usually took the form of intertribal warfare, banditry, or

revolts of short duration. For example, Mahdist uprisings occurred

in February 1900, in 1902-3, in 1904, and in 1908. In 1916 Abd

Allah as Suhayni, who claimed to be the Prophet Isa, launched an unsuccessful jihad.

The problem of the condominium's undefined borders was a

greater concern. A 1902 treaty with Ethiopia fixed the southeastern

24
Portrait of Herbert Kitchener, commander

of the Anglo-Egyptian army that reconquered Sudan in the 1890s

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

boundary with Sudan. Seven years later, an Anglo-Belgian treaty

determined the status of the Lado Enclave in the south, establishing a border with the Belgian Congo (present-day Zaire). The

western boundary proved more difficult to resolve. Darfur was the

only province formerly under Egyptian control that was not soon

recovered under the condominium. When the Mahdiyah disintegrated, Sultan Ali Dinar reclaimed Darfur' s throne, which had

been lost to the Egyptians in 1874 and, with British approval, held

the throne under Ottoman suzerainty on condition that he pay an- nual tribute to the khedive. When World War I broke out, Ali Dinar

proclaimed his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and responded to the Porte's call for a jihad against the Allies. Britain, which had

declared a protectorate over Egypt in 1914, sent a small force against

Ali Dinar, who died in subsequent fighting. In 1916 the British

annexed Darfur to Sudan and terminated the Fur sultanate (see

fig. 3). During the condominium period, economic development oc- curred only in the Nile Valley's settled areas. In the first two decades of condominium rule, the British extended telegraph and rail lines to link key points in northern Sudan but services did not reach more remote areas. Port Sudan opened in 1906, replacing Sawakin

as the country's principal outlet to the sea. In 1911 the Sudanese

government and the private Sudan Plantations Syndicate launched

the Gezira Scheme (Gezira is also seen as Jazirah) to provide a

25
Sudan: A Country Study

source of high-quality cotton for Britain's textile industry (see

Irrigated Agriculture, ch. 3). An irrigation dam near Sannar, completed in 1925, brought a much larger area in Al Jazirah under

cultivation. Planters sent cotton by rail from Sannar to Port Sudan

for shipment abroad. The Gezira Scheme made cotton the mainstay of the country's economy and turned the region into Sudan's

most densely populated area. In 1922 Britain renounced the protectorate and approved Egypt's

declaration of independence. However, the 1923 Egyptian constitution made no claim to Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Subsequent negotiations in London between the British and the new

Egyptian government foundered on the Sudan question. Nationalists who were inflamed by the failure of the talks rioted in Egypt

and Sudan, where a minority supported union with Egypt. In

November 1924, Sir Lee Stack, governor general of Sudan and

sirdar, was assassinated in Cairo. Britain ordered all Egyptian

troops, civil servants, and public employees withdrawn from Sudan.

In 1925 Khartoum formed the 4,500-man Sudan Defence Force

(SDF) under Sudanese officers to replace Egyptian units.

Sudan was relatively quiet in the late 1920s and 1930s. During

this period, the colonial government favored indirect rule, which

allowed the British to govern through indigenous leaders. In Sudan,

the traditional leaders were the shaykhs—of villages, tribes, and

districts—in the north and tribal chiefs in the south. The number

of Sudanese recognizing them and the degree of authority they held

varied considerably. The British first delegated judicial powers to shaykhs to enable them to settle local disputes and then gradually

allowed the shaykhs to administer local governments under the

supervision of British district commissioners.

The mainstream of political development, however, occurred

among local leaders and among Khartoum's educated elite. In their

view, indirect rule prevented the country's unification, exacerbated

tribalism in the north, and served in the south to buttress a less- advanced society against Arab influence. Indirect rule also implied

government decentralization, which alarmed the educated elite who

had careers in the central administration and envisioned an eventual transfer of power from British colonial authorities to their class. Although nationalists and the Khatmiyyah opposed indirect rule,

the Ansar, many of whom enjoyed positions of local authority, supported the concept.

Britain's Southern Policy

From the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the Brit- ish sought to modernize Sudan by applying European technology

26
Historical Setting

to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its authoritarian

institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions.

However, southern Sudan's remote and undeveloped provinces

Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile—received little offi- cial attention until after World War I , except for efforts to suppress tribal warfare and the slave trade. The British justified this policy by claiming that the south was not ready for exposure to the modern world. To allow the south to develop along indigenous

lines, the British, therefore, closed the region to outsiders. As a

result, the south remained isolated and backward. A few Arab merchants controlled the region's limited commercial activities and Arab

bureaucrats administered whatever laws existed. Christian missionaries, who operated schools and medical clinics, provided limited

social services in southern Sudan.

The earliest Christian missionaries were the Verona Fathers, a Roman Catholic religious order that had established southern missions before the Mahdiyah. Other missionary groups active in the

south included Presbyterians from the United States and the Anglican Church Missionary Society. There was no competition

among these missions, largely because they maintained separate

areas of influence. The government eventually subsidized the mission schools that educated southerners. Because mission graduates

usually succeeded in gaining posts in the provincial civil service,

many northerners regarded them as tools of British imperialism.

The few southerners who received higher training attended schools

in the British East African colonies (present-day Kenya, Uganda,

and Tanzania) rather than in Khartoum, thereby exacerbating the

north-south division.

British authorities treated the three southern provinces as a

separate region. The colonial administration, as it consolidated its southern position in the 1920s, detached the south from the rest of Sudan for all practical purposes. The period's "closed door"

ordinances, which barred northern Sudanese from entering or working in the south, reinforced this separate development policy.

Moreover, the British gradually replaced Arab administrators and

expelled Arab merchants, thereby severing the south's last economic

contacts with the north. The colonial administration also dis- couraged the spread of Islam, the practice of Arab customs, and

the wearing of Arab dress. At the same time, the British attempted

to revitalize African customs and tribal life that the slave trade had

disrupted. Finally, a 1930 directive stated that blacks in the southern

provinces were to be considered a people distinct from northern

Muslims and that the region should be prepared for eventual in- tegration with the British East African colonies.

27
Sudan: A Country Study

Figure 3. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1955

Although potentially a rich agricultural zone, the south 's eco- nomic development suffered because of the region's isolation.

Moreover, a continual struggle went on between British officials in the north and south, as those in the former resisted recommendations that northern resources be diverted to spur southern eco- nomic development. Personality clashes between officials in the two

branches in the Sudan Political Service also impeded the south'

s

growth. Those individuals who served in the southern provinces

28
Historical Setting

tended to be military officers with previous Africa experience on

secondment to the colonial service. They usually were distrustful

of Arab influence and were committed to keeping the south under

British control. By contrast, officials in the northern provinces

tended to be Arabists, often drawn from the diplomatic and consular service. Whereas northern provincial governors conferred

regularly as a group with the governor general in Khartoum, their

three southern colleagues met to coordinate activities with the gover- nors of the British East African colonies.

Rise of Sudanese Nationalism

Sudanese nationalism, as it developed after World War I, was

an Arab and Muslim phenomenon with its support base in the

northern provinces. Nationalists opposed indirect rule and advocated a centralized national government in Khartoum responsible

for both regions. Nationalists also perceived Britain's southern policy as artificially dividing Sudan and preventing its unification under an arabized and Islamic ruling class. Ironically, however, a non-Arab led Sudan's first modern nationalist movement. In 1921 Ali Abd al Latif, a Muslim Dinka and

former army officer, founded the United Tribes Society that called

for an independent Sudan in which power would be shared by tribal and religious leaders. Three years later, Ali Abd al Latif s movement, reconstituted as the White Flag League, organized demonstrations in Khartoum that took advantage of the unrest that

followed Stack's assassination. Ali Abd al Latif s arrest and subsequent exile in Egypt sparked a mutiny by a Sudanese army battalion, the suppression of which succeeded in temporarily crippling

the nationalist movement.

In the 1930s, nationalism reemerged in Sudan. Educated Sudanese wanted to restrict the governor general's power and to obtain Sudanese participation in the council's deliberations. However,

any change in government required a change in the condominium agreement. Neither Britain nor Egypt would agree to a modification. Moreover, the British regarded their role to be the protection

of the Sudanese from Egyptian domination. The nationalists feared

that the eventual result of friction between the condominium powers

might be the attachment of northern Sudan to Egypt and southern

Sudan to Uganda and Kenya. Although they settled most of their

differences in the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, which set a timetable

for the end of British military occupation, Britain and Egypt failed to agree on Sudan's future status. Nationalists and religious leaders were divided on the issue of

whether Sudan should apply for independence or for union with

29
Sudan: A Country Study

Egypt. The Mahdi's son, Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi, emerged as a spokesman for independence in opposition to Ali al Mirghani,

the Khatmiyyah leader, who favored union with Egypt. Coalitions

supported by each of these leaders formed rival wings of the nationalist movement. Later, radical nationalists and the Khatmiyyah created the Ashigga, later renamed the National Unionist Party

(NUP), to advance the cause of Sudanese-Egyptian unification.

The moderates favored Sudanese independence in cooperation with

Britain and together with the Ansar established the Umma Party.

The Road to Independence

As World War II approached, the SDF assumed the mission of

guarding Sudan's frontier with Italian East Africa (present-day

Ethiopia). During the summer of 1940, Italian forces invaded Sudan

at several points and captured Kassala. However, the SDF pre- vented a further advance on Port Sudan. In January 1941 , the SDF,

expanded to 20,000 troops, retook Kassala and participated in the

British offensive that routed the Italians in Eritrea and liberated

Ethiopia. Some Sudanese units later contributed to the British

Eighth Army's North Africa victory.

In the immediate postwar years, the condominium government

made a number of significant changes. In 1942 the Graduates'

General Conference, a quasi-nationalist movement formed by educated Sudanese, presented the government with a memorandum

that demanded a pledge of self-determination after the war to be

preceded by abolition of the "closed door" ordinances, an end to the separate curriculum in southern schools, and an increase in

the number of Sudanese in the civil service. The governor general

refused to accept the memorandum but agreed to a governmentsupervised transformation of indirect rule into a modernized sys- tem of local government. Sir Douglas Newbold, governor of Kurdufan Province in the 1930s and later the executive council's civil secretary, advised the establishment of parliamentary government

and the administrative unification of north and south. In 1948, over Egyptian objections, Britain authorized the partially elected

consultative Legislative Assembly representing both regions to supersede the advisory executive council.

The pro-Egyptian NUP boycotted the 1948 Legislative Assembly elections. As a result, pro-independence groups dominated the

Legislative Assembly. In 1952 leaders of the Umma-dominated

legislature negotiated the Self-Determination Agreement with

Britain. The legislators then enacted a constitution that provided

for a prime minister and council of ministers responsible to a bi- cameral parliament. The new Sudanese government would have

30
Historical Setting

responsibility in all areas except military and foreign affairs, which

remained in the British governor general's hands. Cairo, which

demanded recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan, repudiated the condominium agreement in protest and declared its reigning monarch, Faruk, king of Sudan.

After seizing power in Egypt and overthrowing the Faruk monarchy in late 1952, Colonel Muhammad Naguib broke the deadlock on the problem of Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Cairo previously had linked discussions on Sudan's status to an agreement on the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal. Naguib

separated the two issues and accepted the right of Sudanese self- determination. In February 1953, London and Cairo signed an

Anglo-Egyptian accord, which allowed for a three-year transition

period from condominium rule to self-government. During the transition phase, British and Egyptian troops would withdraw from

Sudan. At the end of this period, the Sudanese would decide their

future status in a plebiscite conducted under international supervision. Naguib's concession seemed justified when parliamentary

elections held at the end of 1952 gave a majority to the proEgyptian NUP, which had called for an eventual union with Egypt.

In January 1954, a new government emerged under NUP leader

Ismail al Azhari.

The South and the Unity of Sudan

During World War II, some British colonial officers questioned

the economic and political viability of the southern provinces as separate from northern Sudan. Britain also had become more sensitive to Arab criticism of the southern policy. In 1946 the Sudan

Administrative Conference determined that Sudan should be administered as one country. Moreover, the conference delegates

agreed to readmit northern administrators to southern posts, abolish

the trade restrictions imposed under the " closed door" ordinances,

and allow southerners to seek employment in the north. Khartoum

also nullified the prohibition against Muslim proselytizing in the

south and introduced Arabic in the south as the official administration language.

Some southern British colonial officials responded to the Sudan

Administrative Conference by charging that northern agitation had

influenced the conferees and that no voice had been heard at the

conference in support of retaining the separate development policy. These British officers argued that northern domination of the

south would result in a southern rebellion against the government.

Khartoum therefore convened a conference at Juba to allay the

fears of southern leaders and British officials in the south and to

31
Sudan: A Country Study

assure them that a postindependence government would safeguard

southern political and cultural rights.

Despite these promises, an increasing number of southerners ex- pressed concern that northerners would overwhelm them. In particular, they resented the imposition of Arabic as the official language of administration, which deprived most of the few educated English-speaking southerners of the opportunity to enter public service. They also felt threatened by the replacement of trusted

British district commissioners with unsympathetic northerners.

After the government had replaced several hundred colonial offi- cials with Sudanese, only four of whom were southerners, the

southern elite abandoned hope of a peaceful, unified, independent

Sudan.

The hostility of southerners toward the northern Arab majority

surfaced violently when southern army units mutinied in August

1955 to protest their transfer to garrisons under northern officers. The rebellious troops killed several hundred northerners, including government officials, army officers, and merchants. The government quickly suppressed the revolt and eventually executed seventy

southerners for sedition. But this harsh reaction failed to pacify

the south, as some of the mutineers escaped to remote areas and

organized resistance to the Arab-dominated government of Sudan.

Independent Sudan

The Azhari government temporarily halted progress toward self- determination for Sudan, hoping to promote unity with Egypt.

Although his pro-Egyptian NUP had won a majority in the 1953

parliamentary elections, Azhari realized that popular opinion had

shifted against union with Egypt. As a result, Azhari, who had been

the major spokesman for the "unity of the Nile Valley," reversed

the NUP's stand and supported Sudanese independence. On December 19, 1955, the Sudanese parliament, under Azhari's leadership, unanimously adopted a declaration of independence; on

January 1, 1956, Sudan became an independent republic. Azhari

called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and requested that the

condominium powers sponsor a plebiscite in advance of the scheduled date.

The Politics of Independence

Sudan achieved independence without the rival political parties

having agreed on the form and content of a permanent constitution. Instead, the Constituent Assembly adopted a document known

as the Transitional Constitution, which replaced the governor general as head of state with a five-member Supreme Commission that

32
As Sudd, the world's largest swamp, found in south-central Sudan

along the White Nile River

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

was elected by a parliament composed of an indirectly elected Senate

and a popularly elected House of Representatives. The Transitional

Constitution also allocated executive power to the prime minister,

who was nominated by the House of Representatives and confirmed

in office by the Supreme Commission.

Although it achieved independence without conflict, Sudan in- herited many problems from the condominium. Chief among these was the status of the civil service. The government placed Sudanese

in the administration and provided compensation and pensions for British officers of the Sudan Political Service who left the country ; it retained those who could not be replaced, mosdy technicians and

teachers. Khartoum achieved this transformation quickly and with

a minimum of turbulence, although southerners resented the

replacement of British administrators in the south with northern

Sudanese. To advance their interests, many southern leaders concentrated their efforts in Khartoum, where they hoped to win constitutional concessions. Although determined to resist what they

perceived to be Arab imperialism, they were opposed to violence.

Most southern representatives supported provincial autonomy and

warned that failure to win legal concessions would drive the south

to rebellion.

33
Sudan: A Country Study

The parliamentary regime introduced plans to expand the country's education, economic, and transportation sectors. To achieve

these goals, Khartoum needed foreign economic and technical as- sistance, to which the United States made an early commitment.

Conversations between the two governments had begun in mid1957, and the parliament ratified a United States aid agreement

in July 1958. Washington hoped this agreement would reduce

Sudan's excessive reliance on a one-crop (cotton) economy and

would facilitate the development of the country's transportation

and communications infrastructure.

The prime minister formed a coalition government in February

1956, but he alienated the Khatmiyyah by supporting increasingly

secular government policies. In June some Khatmiyyah members

who had defected from the NUP established the People's Democratic Party (PDP) under Mirghani's leadership. The Umma and

the PDP combined in parliament to bring down the Azhari government. With support from the two parties and backing from the

Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, Abd Allah Khalil put together a coalition government.

Major issues confronting Khalil' s coalition government included

winning agreement on a permanent constitution, stabilizing the

south, encouraging economic development, and improving rela- tions with Egypt. Strains within the Umma-PDP coalition hampered the government's ability to make progress on these matters. The Umma, for example, wanted the proposed constitution to institute a presidential form of government on the assumption that

Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi would be elected the first president. Consensus was lacking about the country's economic future. A poor

cotton harvest followed the 1957 bumper cotton crop, which Sudan

had been unable to sell at a good price in a glutted market. This

downturn depleted Sudan's reserves and caused unrest over government-imposed economic restrictions. To overcome these

problems and finance future development projects, the Umma called for greater reliance on foreign aid. The PDP, however, objected

to this strategy because it promoted unacceptable foreign influence

in Sudan. The PDP's philosophy reflected the Arab nationalism

espoused by Gamal Abdul Nasser, who had replaced Egyptian

leader Naguib in 1954. Despite these policy differences, the UmmaPDP coalition lasted for the remaining year of the parliament's

tenure. Moreover, after the parliament adjourned, the two parties promised to maintain a common front for the 1958 elections.

The electorate gave a plurality in both houses to the Umma and

an overall majority to the Umma-PDP coalition. The NUP,

however, won nearly one-quarter of the seats, largely from urban

34
Historical Setting

centers and from Gezira Scheme agricultural workers. In the south,

the vote represented a rejection of the men who had cooperated

with the government—voters defeated all three southerners in the

preelection cabinet—and a victory for advocates of autonomy within a federal system. Resentment against the government's taking over mission schools and against the measures used in suppressing the

1955 mutiny contributed to the election of several candidates who

had been implicated in the rebellion.

After the new parliament convened, Khalil again formed an Umma-PDP coalition government. Unfortunately, factionalism,

corruption, and vote fraud dominated parliamentary deliberations

at a time when the country needed decisive action with regard to the proposed constitution and the future of the south. As a result,

the Umma-PDP coalition failed to exercise effective leadership.

Another issue that divided the parliament concerned SudaneseUnited States relations. In March 1958, Khalil signed a technical

assistance agreement with the United States. When he presented

the pact to parliament for ratification, he discovered that the NUP

wanted to use the issue to defeat the Umma-PDP coalition and

that many PDP delegates opposed the agreement. Nevertheless,

the Umma, with the support of some PDP and southern delegates,

managed to obtain approval of the agreement.

Factionalism and bribery in parliament, coupled with the government's inability to resolve Sudan's many social, political, and eco- nomic problems, increased popular disillusion with democratic

government. Specific complaints included Khartoum's decision to

sell cotton at a price above world market prices. This policy resulted

in low sales of cotton, the commodity from which Sudan derived

most of its income. Restrictions on imports imposed to take pres- sure off depleted foreign exchange reserves caused consternation

among town dwellers who had become accustomed to buying for- eign goods. Moreover, rural northerners also suffered from an embargo that Egypt placed on imports of cattle, camels, and dates

from Sudan. Growing popular discontent caused many antigovernment demonstrations in Khartoum. Egypt also criticized Khalil and

suggested that it might support a coup against his government.

Meanwhile, reports circulated in Khartoum that the Umma and

the NUP were near agreement on a new coalition that would ex- clude the PDP and Khalil.

On November 17, 1958, the day parliament was to convene,

a military coup occurred. Khalil, himself a retired army general,

planned the preemptive coup in conjunction with leading Umma

members and the army's two senior generals, Ibrahim Abbud and

Ahmad Abd al Wahab, who became leaders of the military regime.

35
Sudan: A Country Study

Abbud immediately pledged to resolve all disputes with Egypt, in- cluding the long-standing problem of the status of the Nile River.

Abbud abandoned the previous government's unrealistic policies

regarding the sale of cotton. He also appointed a constitutional commission, headed by the chief justice, to draft a permanent constitution. Abbud maintained, however, that political parties only

served as vehicles for personal ambitions and that they would not

be reestablished when civilian rule was restored.

The Abbud Military Government, 1958-64

The coup removed political decision making from the control

of the civilian politicians. Abbud created the Supreme Council of

the Armed Forces to rule Sudan. This body contained officers af- filiated with the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah. Abbud belonged to the Khatmiyyah, whereas Abd al Wahab was a member of the

Ansar. Until Abd al Wahab's removal in March 1959, the Ansar

were the stronger of the two groups in the government.

The regime benefited during its first year in office from successful marketing of the cotton crop. Abbud also profited from the

settlement of the Nile waters dispute with Egypt and the improvement of relations between the two countries. Under the military

regime, the influence of the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah lessened.

The strongest religious leader, Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi, died in

early 1959. His son and successor, the elder Sadiq al Mahdi, failed

to enjoy the respect accorded his father. When Sadiq died two years

later, Ansar religious and political leadership divided between his

brother, Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi, and his son, the younger Sadiq

al Mahdi.

Despite the Abbud regime's early successes, opposition elements

remained powerful. In 1959 dissident military officers made three

attempts to displace the Abbud government and to establish a "popular government." Although the courts sentenced the leaders of these attempted coups to life imprisonment, discontent in

the military continued to hamper the government's performance.

In particular, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which supported the attempted coups, gained a reputation as an effective an- tigovernment organization. To compound its problems, the Abbud

regime lacked dynamism and the ability to stabilize the country.

Its failure to place capable civilian advisers in positions of authority, to launch a credible economic and social development program,

and to gain the army's support created an atmosphere that en- couraged political turbulence.

Abbud' s southern policy proved to be his undoing. The government suppressed expressions of religious and cultural differences

36
Historical Setting

and bolstered attempts to arabize society. In February 1964, for example, Abbud ordered the mass explusion of foreign missionaries from the south. He then closed parliament to cut off outlets

for southern complaints. Southern leaders had renewed in 1963

the armed struggle against the Sudanese government that had con- tinued sporadically since 1955. The rebellion was spearheaded from

1963 by guerrilla forces known as the Anya Nya (the name of a poisonous concoction).

Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69

Recognizing its inability to quell growing southern discontent,

the Abbud regime asked the civilian sector to submit proposals for a solution to the southern problem. However, criticism of government policy quickly went beyond the southern issue and included

Abbud's handling of other problems, such as the economy and education. Government attempts to silence these protests, which were

centered in the University of Khartoum, brought a reaction not

only from teachers and students but also from Khartoum's civil servants and trade unionists. The so-called October Revolution of

1964 centered around a general strike that spread throughout the

country. Strike leaders identified themselves as the National Front

for Professionals. Along with some former politicians, they formed

the leftist United National Front (UNF), which made contact with

dissident army officers. After several days of rioting that resulted in many deaths, Abbud

dissolved the government and the Supreme Council of the Armed

Forces. UNF leaders and army commanders who planned the transition from military to civilian rule selected a nonpolitical senior

civil servant, Sirr al Khatim al Khalifa, as prime minister to head

a transitional government.

The new civilian regime, which operated under the 1956 Transitional Constitution, tried to end political factionalism by establishing a coalition government. There was continued popular

hostility to the reappearance of political parties, however, because

of their divisiveness during the Abbud regime. Although the new

government allowed all parties, including the SCP, to operate, only

five of fifteen posts in Khatim's cabinet went to party politicians.

The prime minister gave two positions to nonparty southerners and

the remaining eight to members of the National Front for Professionals, which included several communists.

Eventually two political parties emerged to represent the south.

The Sudan African National Union (SANU), founded in 1963 and

led by William Deng and Saturino Lahure, a Roman Catholic

priest, operated among refugee groups and guerrilla forces. The

37
Sudan: A Country Study

Southern Front, a mass organization led by Stanislaus Paya- sama that had worked underground during the Abbud regime, functioned openly within the southern provinces. After the collapse of

government-sponsored peace conferences in 1965, Deng's wing of

SANU—known locally as SANU-William—and the Southern Front

coalesced to take part in the parliamentary elections. SANU re- mained active in parliament for the next four years as a voice for southern regional autonomy within a unified state. Exiled SANU

leaders balked at Deng's moderate approach and formed the Azania

Liberation Front based in Kampala, Uganda.

Anya Nya leaders remained aloof from political movements. The

guerrillas were fragmented by ethnic and religious differences. Additionally, conflicts surfaced within Anya Nya between older leaders

who had been in the bush since 1955, and younger, better educated men like Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese army captain, who

eventually became a strong guerrilla leader, largely because of his

ability to get arms from Israel. The government scheduled national elections for March 1965

and announced that the new parliament's task would be to pre- pare a new constitution. The deteriorating southern security situ- ation prevented elections from being conducted in that region,

however, and the political parties split on the question of whether

elections should be held in the north as scheduled or postponed

until the whole country could vote. The PDP and SCP, both fearful of losing votes, wanted to postpone the elections, as did southern

elements loyal to Khartoum. Their opposition forced the government to resign. The president of the reinstated Supreme Commission, who had replaced Abbud as chief of state, directed that the

elections be held wherever possible. The PDP rejected this decision and boycotted the elections.

The 1965 election results were inconclusive. Apart from a low

voter turnout, there was a confusing overabundance of candidates on the ballots. As a result, few of those elected won a majority of

the votes cast. The Umma captured 75 out of 158 parliamentary

seats while its NUP ally took 52 of the remainder. The two parties

formed a coalition cabinet in June headed by Umma leader Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, whereas Azhari, the NUP leader, be- came the Supreme Commission's permanent president and chief

of state. The Mahjub government had two goals: progress toward solv- ing the southern problem and the removal of communists from positions of power. The army launched a major offensive to crush

the rebellion and in the process augmented its reputation for brutality among the southerners. Many southerners reported

38
Historical Setting

government atrocities against civilians, especially at Juba and Waw.

Sudanese army troops also burned churches and huts, closed

schools, and destroyed crops and cattle. To achieve his second objective, Mahjub succeeded in having parliament approve a decree

that abolished the SCP and deprived the eleven communists of their

seats. In October 1965, the Umma-NUP coalition collapsed because

of a disagreement over whether Mahjub, as prime minister, or Azhari, as president, should conduct Sudan's foreign relations.

Mahjub continued in office for another eight months but resigned

in July 1966 after a parliamentary vote of censure, which resulted

in a split in the Umma. The traditional wing led by Mahjub, under

the Imam Al Hadi al Mahjub's spiritual leadership, opposed the

party's majority. The latter group professed loyalty to the imam's

nephew, the younger Sadiq al Mahdi, who was the Umma's offi- cial leader and who rejected religious sectarianism. Sadiq became

prime minister with backing from his own Umma wing and from

NUP allies. The Sadiq al Mahdi government, supported by a sizable

parliamentary majority, sought to reduce regional disparities by

organizing economic development. Sadiq al Mahdi also planned

to use his personal rapport with southern leaders to engineer a peace

agreement with the insurgents. He proposed to replace the Supreme

Commission with a president and a southern vice president and

called for the approval of autonomy for the southern provinces.

The educated elite and segments of the army opposed Sadiq al Mahdi because of his gradualist approach to Sudan's political, eco- nomic, and social problems. Leftist student organizations and the

trade unions demanded the creation of a socialist state. Although

these elements lacked widespread popular support, they represented an influential portion of educated public opinion. Their resentment

of Sadiq increased when he refused to honor a Supreme Court ruling

that overturned legislation banning the SCP and ousting communists elected to parliamentary seats. In December 1966, a coup

attempt by communists and a small army unit against the government failed. The government subsequently arrested many communists and army personnel.

In March 1967, the government held elections in thirty-six constituencies in pacified southern areas. The Sadiq al Mahdi wing

of the Umma won fifteen seats, the federalist SANU ten, and the

NUP five. Despite this apparent boost in his support, however,

Sadiq' s position in parliament had become tenuous because of concessions he promised to the south in order to bring an end to the

civil war. The Umma traditionalist wing opposed Sadiq al Mahdi

39
Sudan: A Country Study

because of his support for constitutional guarantees of religious free- dom and his refusal to declare Sudan an Islamic state. When the

traditionalists and the NUP withdrew their support, his government fell. In May 1967, Mahjub became prime minister and head

of a coalition government whose cabinet included members of his

wing of the Umma, of the NUP, and of the PDP. In December

1967, the PDP and the NUP formed the Democratic Unionist Party

(DUP) under Azhari's leadership.

By early 1968, widening divisions in the Umma threatened the

survival of the Mahjub government. Sadiq al Mahdi's wing held

a majority in parliament and could thwart any government action.

Mahjub therefore dissolved parliament. However, Sadiq refused

to recognize the legitimacy of the prime minister's action. As a

result, two governments functioned in Khartoum—one meeting

in the parliament building and the other on its lawn—both of which

claimed to represent the legislature's will. The army commander

requested clarification from the Supreme Court regarding which

of them had authority to issue orders. The court backed Mahjub's dissolution; the government scheduled new elections for April.

Although the DUP won 101 of 218 seats, no single party controlled a parliamentary majority. Thirty-six seats went to the Umma

traditionalists, thirty to the Sadiq wing, and twenty-five to the two

southern parties—SANU and the Southern Front. The SCP secre- tary general, Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, also won a seat. In a major

setback, Sadiq lost his own seat to a traditionalist rival. Because it lacked a majority, the DUP concluded an alliance with

Umma traditionalists, who received the prime ministership for their

leader, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, and four other cabinet posts.

The coalition's program included plans for government reorganization, closer ties with the Arab world, and renewed economic development efforts, particularly in the southern provinces. The

Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub government also accepted military, technical, and economic aid from the Soviet Union. Sadiq

al Mahdi's wing of the Umma formed the small parliamentary opposition. When it refused to participate in efforts to complete the

draft constitution, already ten years overdue, the government

retaliated by closing the opposition's newspaper and clamping down

on pro- Sadiq demonstrations in Khartoum.

By late 1968, the two Umma wings agreed to support the Ansar

chief Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi in the 1969 presidential election.

At the same time, the DUP announced that Azhari also would seek

the presidency. The communists and other leftists aligned themselves behind the presidential candidacy of former Chief Justice

40
Historical Setting

Babikr Awadallah, whom they viewed as an ally because he had

ruled against the government when it attempted to outlaw the SCP.

The Nimeiri Era, 1969-85

On May 25, 1969, several young officers, calling themselves the

Free Officers' Movement, seized power. At the conspiracy's core were nine officers led by Colonel Jaafar an Nimeiri, who had been

implicated in plots against the Abbud regime. Nimeiri 's coup

preempted plots by other groups, most of which involved army fac- tions supported by the SCP, Arab nationalists, or conservative re- ligious groups. He justified the coup on the grounds that civilian

politicians had paralyzed the decision-making process, had failed to deal with the country's economic and regional problems, and

had left Sudan without a permanent constitution.

Revolutionary Command Council

The coup leaders, joined by Awadallah, the former chiefjustice

who had been privy to the coup, constituted themselves as the ten- member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which possessed

collective executive authority under Nimeiri 's chairmanship. On

assuming control, the RCC proclaimed the establishment of a

''democratic republic" dedicated to advancing independent

"Sudanese socialism." The RCC's first acts included the suspension of the Transitional Constitution, the abolition of all government institutions, and the banning of political parties. The RCC

also nationalized many industries, businesses, and banks. Furthermore, Nimeiri ordered the arrest of sixty-three civilian politicians

and forcibly retired senior army officers. Awadallah, appointed prime minister to form a new government

to implement RCC policy directives, wanted to dispel the notion

that the coup had installed a military dictatorship. He presided over

a twenty-one-member cabinet that included only three officers from

the RCC, among them its chairman, Nimeiri, who was also defense

minister. The cabinet's other military members held the portfolios for internal security and communications. Nine members of

the Awadallah regime were allegedly communists, including one

of the two southerners in the cabinet, John Garang, minister of

supply and later minister for southern affairs. Others identified

themselves as Marxists, Since the RCC lacked political and administrative experience, the communists played a significant role

in shaping government policies and programs. Despite the influence

of individual SCP members, the RCC claimed that its cooperation with the party was a matter of convenience.

41
Sudan: A Country Study

In November 1969, after he claimed the regime could not sur- vive without communist assistance, Awadallah lost the prime

ministership. Nimeiri, who became head of a largely civilian government in addition to being chief of state, succeeded him. Awadallah

retained his position as RCC deputy chairman and remained in

the government as foreign minister and as an important link with

leftist elements.

Conservative forces, led by the Ansar, posed the greatest threat

to the RCC. Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi had withdrawn to his Aba

Island stronghold (in the Nile, near Khartoum) in the belief that

the government had decided to strike at the Ansar movement. The

imam had demanded a return to democratic government, the ex- clusion of communists from power, and an end to RCC rule. In

March 1970, hostile Ansar crowds prevented Nimeiri from vis- iting the island for talks with the imam. Fighting subsequently

erupted between government forces and as many as 30,000 Ansar.

When the Ansar ignored an ultimatum to surrender, army units

with air support assaulted Aba Island. About 3,000 people died

during the battle. The imam escaped only to be killed while at- tempting to cross the border into Ethiopia. The government exiled Sadiq al Mahdi to Egypt, where Nasser promised to keep him

under guard to prevent him from succeeding his uncle as head of

the Ansar movement.

After neutralizing this conservative opposition, the RCC concentrated on consolidating its political organization to phase out

communist participation in the government. This strategy prompted

an internal debate within the SCP. The orthodox wing, led by party

secretary general Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, demanded a popular front

government with communists participating as equal partners. The

National Communist wing, on the other hand, supported cooperation with the government.

Soon after the army had crushed the Ansar at Aba Island, Nimeiri

moved against the SCP. He ordered the deportation of Abd al Khaliq Mahjub. Then, when the SCP secretary general returned

to Sudan illegally after several months abroad, Nimeiri placed him

under house arrest. In March 1971, Nimeiri indicated that trade

unions, a traditional communist stronghold, would be placed under

government control. The RCC also banned communist-affiliated student, women's, and professional organizations. Additionally,

Nimeiri announced the planned formation of a national political

movement called the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), which would

assume control of all political parties, including the SCP. After this speech, the government arrested the SCP's central committee and

other leading communists.

42
Historical Setting

The SCP, however, retained a covert organization that was not

damaged in the sweep. Before further action could be taken against

the party, the SCP launched a coup against Nimeiri. The coup

occurred onJuly 19, 1971, when one of the plotters, Major Hisham

al Atta, surprised Nimeiri and the RCC meeting in the presidential palace and seized them along with a number of pro-Nimeiri

officers. Atta named a seven-member revolutionary council, in

which communists ranked prominently, to serve as the national

government. Three days after the coup, however, loyal army units

stormed the palace, rescued Nimeiri, and arrested Atta and his confederates. Nimeiri, who blamed the SCP for the coup, ordered the

arrest of hundreds of communists and dissident military officers. The government subsequently executed some of these individuals

and imprisoned many others.

Having survived the SCP-inspired coup, Nimeiri reaffirmed his

commitment to establishing a socialist state. A provisional constitution, published in August 1971, described Sudan as a "socialist

democracy" and provided for a presidential form of government

to replace the RCC. A plebiscite the following month elected

Nimeiri to a six-year term as president.

The Southern Problem

The origins of the civil war in the south date back to the 1950s.

On August 18, 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit composed of southerners, mutinied at Torit. Rather than surrender

to Sudanese government authorities, many mutineers disappeared

into hiding with their weapons, marking the beginning of the first war in southern Sudan. By the late 1960s, the war had resulted

in the deaths of about 500,000 people. Several hundred thousand more southerners hid in the bush or escaped to refugee camps in

neighboring countries.

By 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain

weapons and supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya

recruits and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and international arms dealers with monies collected in the south and from

among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East,

Western Europe, and North America. The rebels also captured

arms, equipment, and supplies from government troops.

Militarily, Anya Nya controlled much of the southern countryside while government forces occupied the region's major towns.

The guerrillas operated at will from remote camps. However, rebel units were too small and scattered to be highly effective in any

43
Sudan: A Country Study

single area. Estimates of Anya Nya personnel strength ranged from

5,000 to 10,000.

Government operations against the rebels declined after the 1969

coup. However, when negotiations failed to result in a settlement,

Khartoum increased troop strength in the south to about 12,000

in 1969, and intensified military activity throughout the region.

Although the Soviet Union had concluded a US$100 million to US$150 million arms agreement with Sudan in August 1968, which

included T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and aircraft, the

nation had not delivered any equipment to Khartoum by May 1969.

During this period, Sudan obtained some Soviet-manufactured

weapons from Egypt, most of which went to the Sudanese air force. By the end of 1969, however, the Soviet Union had shipped un- known quantities of 85mm antiaircraft guns, sixteen MiG-21s, and

five Antonov-24 transport aircraft. Over the next two years, the

Soviet Union delivered an impressive array of equipment to Sudan,

including T-54, T-55, T-56, and T-59 tanks; and BTR-40 and

BTR-152 light armored vehicles (see Foreign Military Assistance,

ch. 5). In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of southern

forces opposed to Khartoum, proclaimed the creation of the

Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Anya Nya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians

supported the SSLM. Although the SSLM created a governing in- frastructure throughout many areas of southern Sudan, real power

remained with Anya Nya, with Lagu at its head.

Despite his political problems, Nimeiri remained committed to ending the southern insurgency. He believed he could stop the fighting and stabilize the region by granting regional self-government

and undertaking economic development in the south. By October

1971 , Khartoum had established contact with the SSLM. After considerable consultation, a conference between SSLM and Sudanese

government delegations convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in

February 1972. Initially, the two sides were far apart, the southerners demanding a federal state with a separate southern government

and an army that would come under the federal president's com- mand only in response to an external threat to Sudan. Eventually,

however, the two sides, with the help of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile

Selassie, reached an agreement.

The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed autonomy for a southern

region—composed of the three provinces of Equatoria (presentday Al Istiwai), Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile (present-day Aali an Nil)—under a regional president appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional

44
45
Sudan: A Country Study

Assembly. The High Executive Council or cabinet named by the

regional president would be responsible for all aspects of government in the region except such areas as defense, foreign affairs,

currency and finance, economic and social planning, and interregional concerns, authority over which would be retained by the

national government in which southerners would be represented.

Southerners, including qualified Anya Nya veterans, would be in- corporated into a 12,000-man southern command of the Sudanese

army under equal numbers of northern and southern officers. The

accords also recognized Arabic as Sudan's official language and

English as the south' s principal language, which would be used

in administration and would be taught in the schools.

Although many SSLM leaders opposed the setdement, Lagu ap- proved its terms and both sides agreed to a cease-fire. The national

government issued a decree legalizing the agreement and creating an international armistice commission to ensure the well-being of

returning southern refugees. Khartoum also announced an amnesty, retroactive to 1955. The two sides signed the Addis Ababa

accords on March 27, 1972, which was thereafter celebrated as National Unity Day.

Political Developments

After the settlement in the south, Nimeiri attempted to mend

fences with northern Muslim religious groups. The government

undertook administrative decentralization, popular with the Ansar,

that favored rural over urban areas, where leftist activism was most

evident. Khartoum also reaffirmed Islam's special position in the

country, recognized the sharia as the source of all legislation, and

released some members of religious orders who had been incarcerated. However, a reconciliation with conservative groups, which

had organized outside Sudan under Sadiq al Mahdi's leadership

and were later known as the National Front, eluded Nimeiri.

In August 1972, Nimeiri sought to consolidate his position by

creating a Constituent Assembly to draft a permanent constitution. He then asked for the government's resignation to allow him

to appoint a cabinet whose members were drawn from the Constituent Assembly. Nimeiri excluded individuals who had opposed

the southern settlement or who had been identified with the SSU's

pro-Egyptian faction.

In May 1973, the Constituent Assembly promulgated a draft

constitution. This document provided for a continuation of presidential government, recognized the SSU as the only authorized

political organization, and supported regional autonomy for the

south. The constitution also stipulated that voters were to choose

46
Historical Setting

members for the 250-seat People's Assembly from an SSU-approved

slate. Although it cited Islam as Sudan's official religion, the constitution admitted Christianity as the faith of a large number of

Sudanese citizens (see Christianity, ch. 2). In May 1974, voters

selected 125 members for the assembly; SSU-affiliated occupational

and professional groups named 100; and the president appointed

the remaining 25. Discontent with Nimeiri's policies and the increased military role in government escalated as a result of food shortages and the

southern settlement, which many Muslim conservatives regarded

as surrender. In 1973 and 1974 there were unsuccessful coup at- tempts against Nimeiri. Muslims and leftist students also staged

strikes against the government. In September 1974, Nimeiri re- sponded to this unrest by declaring a state of emergency, purging

the SSU, and arresting large numbers of dissidents. Nimeiri also

replaced some cabinet members with military personnel loyal to him.

Conservative opposition to Nimeiri coalesced in the National

Front, formed in 1974, The National Front included people from

Sadiq's wing of Umma; the NUP; and the Islamic Charter Front,

then the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic activist movement. Their activity crystallized in a July 1976 Ansarinspired coup attempt. Government soldiers quickly restored order

by killing more than 700 rebels in Khartoum and arresting scores of dissidents, including many prominent religious leaders. Despite

this unrest, in 1977 Sudanese voters reelected Nimeiri for a second

six-year term as president.

National Reconciliation

Following the 1976 coup attempt, Nimeiri and his opponents

adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government offi- cials met with the National Front in London, and arranged for a conference between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in Port Sudan.

In what became known as the "national reconciliation," the two

leaders signed an eight-point agreement that readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the dissolution of the National Front. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political

prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan's nonaligned foreign policy, and

promised to reform local government. As a result of the reconciliation, the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi. The SSU also admitted former supporters of the National Front to its ranks. Sadiq renounced multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime's

one-party system.

47
Sudan: A Country Study

The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the February 1978 People's Assembly elections. Nimeiri authorized return- ing exiles who had been associated with the old Umma Party, the

DUP, and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats, leading many observers to applaud Nimeiri 's efforts to democratize

Sudan's political system. However, the People's Assembly elec- tions marked the beginning of further political decline. The SSU's

failure to sponsor official candidates weakened party discipline and

prompted many assembly deputies who also were SSU members

to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a result, an increasing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance per- sonal rather than national interests. The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant

corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on

Nimeiri' s ability to govern Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri

adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the State Security Organisation to imprison without trial thousands of opponents and dissidents (see Security Organizations, ch. 5). Nimeiri

also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing his own power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their

abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with popular feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation.

On June 5, 1983, Nimeiri sought to counter the south' s growing political power by redividing the Southern Region into the three

old provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Al Istiwai, and Aali an Nil; he

had suspended the Southern Regional Assembly almost two years

earlier. The southern-based Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which emerged in mid- 1983, unsuccessfully

opposed this redivision and called for the creation of a new united

Sudan.

Within a few months, in September 1983 Nimeiri proclaimed

the sharia as the basis of the Sudanese legal system. Nimeiri 's decrees, which became known as the September Laws, were bit- terly resented both by secularized Muslims and by the predominantly non-Muslim southerners. The SPLM denounced the sharia

and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. Meanwhile, the security situation in the south had deteriorated so much that by the end of 1983 it amounted to a resumption of the

civil war.

In early 1985, antigovernment discontent resulted in a general

strike in Khartoum. Demonstrators opposed rising food, gasoline,

48
Historical Setting

and transport costs. The general strike paralyzed the country.

Nimeiri, who was on a visit to the United States, was unable to suppress the rapidly growing demonstrations against his regime.

The Transitional Military Council

The combination of the south' s redivision, the introduction

throughout the country of the sharia, the renewed civil war, and

growing economic problems eventually contributed to Nimeiri'

s

downfall. On April 6, 1985, a group of military officers, led by

Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab, overthrew

Nimeiri, who took refuge in Egypt. Three days later, Dhahab

authorized the creation of a fifteen-man Transitional Military Council (TMC) to rule Sudan. During its first few weeks in power, the

TMC suspended the constitution; dissolved the SSU, the secret

police, and the parliament and regional assemblies; dismissed

regional governors and their ministers; and released hundreds of

political detainees from Kober Prison. Dhahab also promised to negotiate an end to the southern civil war and to relinquish power

to a civilian government in twelve months. The general populace

welcomed and supported the new regime. Despite the TMG's energetic beginning, it soon became evident that Dhahab lacked the

skills to resolve Sudan's economic problems, restore peace to the

south, and establish national unity.

By the time Dhahab seized power, Sudan's economy was in

shambles. The country's international debt was approximately

US$9 billion. Agricultural and industrial projects funded by the

International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) and the World

Bank (see Glossary) remained in the planning stages. Most factories operated at less than 50 percent of capacity, and agricultural

output had dropped by 50 percent since 1960. Moreover, famine

threatened vast areas of southern and western Sudan.

The TMC lacked a realistic strategy to resolve these problems.

The Dhahab government refused to accept IMF economic austerity measures. As a result, the IMF, which influenced nearly all bilateral and multilateral donors, in February 1986, declared Sudan

bankrupt. Efforts to attract a US$6 billion twenty-five-year investment from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development

failed when Sudan mismanaged an initial US$2.3 billion investment. A rapid expansion of the money supply and the TMC's in- ability to control prices caused a soaring inflation rate. Although

he appealed to forty donor and relief agencies for emergency food

shipments, Dhahab was unable to prevent famine from claiming an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 lives. He also failed to end

49
Sudan: A Country Study

hostilities in the south, which constituted the major drain on Sudan's

limited resources. Shortly after taking power, Dhahab adopted a conciliatory approach toward the south. Among other things, he declared a

unilateral cease-fire, called for direct talks with the SPLM, and

offered an amnesty to rebel fighters. The TMC recognized the need

for special development efforts in the south and proposed a national

conference to review the southern problem. However, Dhahab's refusal to repeal the sharia negated these overtures and convinced

SPLM leader John Garang that the Sudanese government still wanted to subjugate the south.

Despite this gulf, both sides continued to work for a peaceful

resolution of the southern problem. In March 1986, the Sudanese,

government and the SPLM produced the Koka Dam Declaration,

which called for a Sudan "free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism and all causes of discrimination and disparity." The declaration also demanded the repeal of the sharia and the opening of a

constitutional conference. All major political parties and organizations, with the exception of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

and the National Islamic Front (NIF), supported the Koka Dam

Declaration. To avoid a confrontation with the DUP and the NIF,

Dhahab decided to leave the sharia question to the new civilian

government. Meanwhile, the SPLA kept up the military pressure on the Sudanese government, especially in Aali an Nil, Bahr al Ghazal, and Al Istiwai provinces.

The TMC' s greatest failure concerned its inability to form a national political consensus. In late April 1985, negotiations between

the TMC and the Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions re- sulted in the establishment of a civilian cabinet under the direction of Dr. Gazuli Dafalla. The cabinet, which was subordinate

to the TMC, devoted itself to conducting the government's daily

business and to preparing for the election. Although it contained

three southerners who belonged to the newly formed Southern

Sudanese Political Association, the cabinet failed to win the loyalty

of most southerners, who believed the TMC only reflected the poli- cies of the deposed Nimeiri. As a result, Sudan remained a divided

nation.

The other factor that prevented the emergence of a national political consensus concerned party factionalism. After sixteen years

of one-party rule, most Sudanese favored the revival of the multiparty system. In the aftermath of Nimeiri' s overthrow, approximately forty political parties registered with the TMC and

announced their intention to participate in national politics. The

political parties ranged from those committed to revolutionary

50
Historical Setting

socialism to those that supported Islamism. Of these latter, the NIF

had succeeded the Islamic Charter Front as the main vehicle for the Muslim Brotherhood's political aspirations. However, policy

disagreements over the sharia, the southern civil war, and the country's future direction contributed to the confusion that characterized Sudan's national politics.

In this troubled atmosphere, Dhahab sanctioned the promised

April 1986 general election, which the authorities spread over a

twelve-day period and postponed in thirty-seven southern constituencies because of the civil war. The Umma Party, headed by

Sadiq al Mahdi, won ninety-nine seats. The DUP, which was led

after the April 1985 uprising by Khatmiyyah leader Muhammad

Uthman al Mirghani, gained sixty-four seats. Dr. Hassan Abd Allah

at Turabi's NIF obtained fifty-one seats. Regional political parties from the south, the Nuba Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills

won lesser numbers of seats. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP)

and other radical parties failed to score any significant victories.

Sadiq al Mahdi and Coalition Governments

In June 1986, Sadiq al Mahdi formed a coalition government

with the Umma, the DUP, the NIF, and four southern parties.

Unfortunately, however, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and

incapable of governing Sudan. Party factionalism, corruption, per- sonal rivalries, scandals, and political instability characterized the

Sadiq regime. After less than a year in office, Sadiq al Mahdi dis- missed the government because it had failed to draft a new penal

code to replace the sharia, reach an agreement with the IMF, end

the civil war in the south, or devise a scheme to attract remittances

from Sudanese expatriates. To retain the support of the DUP and

the southern political parties, Sadiq formed another ineffective coali- tion government.

Instead of removing the ministers who had been associated with

the failures of the first coalition government, Sadiq al Mahdi re- tained thirteen of them, of whom eleven kept their previous portfolios. As a result, many Sudanese rejected the second coalition

government as being a replica of the first. To make matters worse, Sadiq and DUP leader Mirghani signed an inadequate memorandum of understanding that fixed the new government's priorities as affirming the application of the sharia to Muslims, consolidating the Islamic banking system, and changing the national flag and

national emblem. Furthermore, the memorandum directed the

government to remove Nimeiri's name from all institutions and

dismiss all officials appointed by Nimeiri to serve in international

and regional organizations. As expected, antigovernment elements

51
Sudan: A Country Study

criticized the memorandum for not mentioning the civil war,

famine, or the country's disintegrating social and economic conditions.

In August 1987, the DUP brought down the government be- cause Sadiq al Mahdi opposed the appointment of a DUP member, Ahmad as Sayid, to the government. For the next nine months,

Sadiq and Mirghani failed to agree on the composition of another

coalition government. During this period, Sadiq moved closer to the NIF. However, the NIF refused to join a coalition government

that included leftist elements. Moreover, Turabi indicated that the

formation of a coalition government would depend on numerous

factors, the most important of which were the resignation or dis- missal of those serving in senior positions in the central and regional

governments, the lifting of the state of emergency reimposed in

July 1987, and the continuation of the Constituent Assembly.

Because of the endless debate over these issues, it was not until

May 15, 1988, that a new coalition government emerged headed

by Sadiq al Mahdi. Members of this coalition included the Umma,

the DUP, the NIF, and some southern parties. As in the past,

however, the coalition quickly disintegrated because of political bickering among its members. Major disagreements included the NIF's

demand that it be given the post of commissioner of Khartoum,

the inability to establish criteria for the selection of regional governors, and the NIF's opposition to the replacement of senior military officers and the chief of staff of the executive branch.

In November 1988, another more explosive political issue

emerged when Mirghani and the SPLM signed an agreement in

Addis Ababa that included provisions for a cease-fire, the freezing

of the sharia, the lifting of the state of emergency, and the abolition of all foreign political and military pacts. The two sides also proposed to convene a constitutional conference to decide Sudan's

political future. The NIF opposed this agreement because of its stand on the sharia. When the government refused to support the

agreement, the DUP withdrew from the coalition. Shortly thereafter armed forces commander in chief Lieutenant General Fathi

Ahmad Ali presented an ultimatum, signed by 150 senior military

officers, to Sadiq al Mahdi demanding that he make the coalition

government more representative and that he announce terms for ending the civil war. On March 1 1 , 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi responded to this pressure

by dissolving the government. The new coalition included the

Umma, the DUP, and representatives of southern parties and the

trade unions. The NIF refused to join the coalition because it was

52
Historical Setting

not committed to enforcing the sharia. Sadiq claimed his new

government was committed to ending the southern civil war by

implementing the November 1988 DUP-SPLM agreement. He

also promised to mobilize government resources to bring food relief to famine areas, reduce the government's international debt, and

build a national political consensus. Sadiq' s inability to live up to these promises eventually caused his downfall. On June 30, 1989,

Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir

overthrew Sadiq and established the Revolutionary Command

Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan. Bashir' s commitment to imposing the sharia on the non-Muslim south and to seeking a military victory over the SPLA, however, seemed likely to keep the country divided for the foreseeable future and hamper

resolution of the same problems faced by Sadiq al Mahdi.

Moreover, the emergence of the NIF as a political force made compromise with the south more unlikely.

* * *

Interested readers may consult several books for a better understanding of Sudan's history. Useful surveys include P.M. Holt's

and M.W. Daly's, A History of the Sudan; Peter Woodward's, Sudan,

1898-1989; and Kenneth Henderson's Sudan Republic. Richard

Hill's Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881 assesses Egypt's nineteenth cen- tury conquest and occupation of Sudan. For an excellent analysis

of the British period, see M.W. Daly's Empire on the Nile and Imperial Sudan. The postindependence period is discussed in Mansour

Khalid's The Government They Deserve; and Gabriel Warburg's Is- lam, Nationalism, and Communism in a Traditional Society. Apart from

these books, the Sudan Notes and Records journal is essential for studying Sudan's historical development.

Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the liter- ature about southern Sudan. Many of Robert Collins 's studies are

particularly useful, including Land Beyond the Rivers; Shadows in the Grass; and The Waters of the Nile. Two sympathetic assessments of

southern Sudan's relationship to Khartoum are Dunstan M. Wai's,

The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan and Abel Alier's, Southern Sudan.

For an Arab viewpoint, Mohamed Omer Beshir's The Southern

Sudan: Background to Conflict and The Southern Sudan: From Conflict

to Peace are pertinent. (For further information and complete cita- tions, see Bibliography.)

53

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Dinka spearfisherman contemplates the White Nile as a food source.
THE FIRST AND OVERWHELMING impression of Sudan is

its physical vastness and ethnic diversity, elements that have shaped

its regional history from time immemorial. The country encompasses virtually every geographical feature, from the harsh deserts

of the north to the rain forests rising on its southern borders. Like

most African countries, Sudan is defined by boundaries that European powers determined at the end of the nineteenth century. The

British colonial administration in Sudan, established in 1899, emphasized indirect rule by tribal shaykhs (see Glossary) and chiefs,

although tribalism had been considerably weakened as an administrative institution during the Mahdist period (1884-98). This loosening of loyalties exacerbated problems in governmental structure and administration and in the peoples' identification as Sudanese.

To this day, loyalty remains divided among family, clan, ethnic

group, and religion, and it is difficult to forge a nation because

the immensity of the land permits many of Sudan's ethnic and tribal groups to live relatively undisturbed by the central government.

The Nile is the link that runs through Sudan and influences the

lives of Sudan's people, even though many of them farm and herd

far from the Nile or its two main tributaries, the Blue Nile and

the White Nile. Not only do nomads come to the river to water

their herds and cultivators to drain off its waters for their fields,

but the Nile facilitates trade, administration, and urbanization.

Consequently, the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile

became the administrative center of a vast hinterland because the area commanded the river, its commerce, and its urban society.

This location enabled the urban elites to control the scattered and

often isolated population of the interior while enjoying access to the peoples of the outside world.

Although linked by dependence on the Nile, Sudan's population is divided by ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. Many

Sudanese in the north claim Arab descent and speak Arabic, but

Sudanese Arabs are highly differentiated. Over many generations,

they have intermingled in varying degrees with the indigenous peoples. Arabic is Sudan's official language (with Arabic and English

the predominant languages in the south), but beyond Khartoum

and its two neighboring cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North

a variety of languages is spoken. A more unifying factor is Islam,

which has spread widely among the peoples of northern Sudan.

But, once again, the Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims of northern

57
Sudan: A Country Study

Sudan form no monolithic bloc. Some, especially in the urban

centers, are strictly orthodox Muslims, whereas others, mostly in

the rural areas, are attracted more to Sufism, Islamic mysticism,

in their search for Allah. Within this branch and tendency of Islam

are a host of religious sects with their own Islamic rituals and syncretistic adaptations.

The Sudanese of the south are of African origin. Islam has made

only modest inroads among these followers of traditional religions

and of Christianity, which was spread in the twentieth century by

European missionaries, and Arabic has not replaced the diverse

languages of the south. The differences between north and south

have usually engendered hostility, a clash of cultures that in the

last 150 years has led to seemingly endless violence. The strong

regional and cultural differences have inhibited nation building and

have caused the civil war in the south that has raged since independence, except for a period of peace between 1972 and 1983. The

distrust between Sudanese of the north and ^iose of the south

whether elite or peasants—has deepened wifh the long years of

hostilities. And the cost of war has drained valuable national resources at the expense of health, education, and welfare in both

regions.

Physical Setting

Sudan is Africa's largest country, embracing 2,505,813 square

kilometers of northeast and central Africa. It consists of a huge plain

bordered on three sides by mountains: to the east the Red Sea Hills, to the west Jabal Marrah, and on the southern frontier the Didinga

Hills and the Dongotona and Imatong mountains. Jutting up

abruptly in the south-central region of this vast plain are the iso- lated Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills, and far to the southeast,

the lone Boma Plateau near the Ethiopian border. Spanning eigh- teen degrees of latitude, the plain of the Sudan (see Glossary) in- cludes from north to south significant regions with distinctive

characters—northern Sudan, western Sudan, the central clay plains, eastern Sudan, the southern clay plains, the Jabal Hadid, or Ironstone Plateau, and the southern hill masses (see fig. 4). Geographical Regions

Northern Sudan, lying between the Egyptian border and Khartoum, has two distinct parts, the desert and the Nile Valley. To

the east of the Nile lies the Nubian Desert; to the west, the Libyan

Desert. They are similar—stony, with sandy dunes drifting over

the landscape. There is virtually no rainfall in these deserts, and

in the Nubian Desert there are no oases. In the west there are a

58
-18

-24

I 24 30

International boundary

Administrative boundary

# Populated place

Spot elevations

in meters ® National capital C1 — Cataract LIBYA

CHAD

^

-6

CENTRAL^

AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

.•"V

100 200 Miles ZAIRE

100 200 Kilometers 24 Boundary representation

I nor necessarily authoritative Figure 4. Topography and Drainage

60



The Society and Its Environment

few small watering holes, such as Bir an Natrun. Here the water

table reaches the surface to form wells that provide water for nomads, caravans, and administrative patrols, although insufficient to support an oasis and inadequate to provide for a settled population. Flowing through the desert is the Nile Valley, whose alluvial

strip of habitable land is no more than two kilometers wide and

whose productivity depends on the annual flood. Western Sudan is a generic term describing the regions known

as Darfur and Kurdufan that comprise 850,000 square kilometers.

Traditionally, this area has been regarded as a single regional unit

despite the physical differences. The dominant feature throughout this immense area is the absence of perennial streams; thus,

people and animals must remain within reach of permanent wells. Consequently, the population is sparse and unevenly distributed.

Western Darfur is an undulating plain dominated by the volcanic

massif of Jabal Marrah towering 900 meters above the Sudanic

plain; the drainage from Jabal Marrah onto the plain can support

a settied population. Western Darfur stands in stark contrast to northern and eastern Darfur, which are semidesert with littie water

either from the intermittent streams known as wadis or from wells

that normally go dry during the winter months. Northwest of Darfur

and continuing into Chad lies the unusual region called the jizzu

(see Glossary), where sporadic winter rains generated from the

Mediterranean frequently provide excellent grazing into January

or even February. The southern region of western Sudan is known

as the qoz (see Glossary), a land of sand dunes that in the rainy season is characterized by a rolling mantle of grass and has more

reliable sources of water with its bore holes and hafri (sing. , hafr—

see Glossary) than does the north. A unique feature of western

Sudan is the Nuba Mountain range of southeast Kurdufan in the center of the country, a conglomerate of isolated dome-shaped,

sugarloaf hills that ascend steeply and abruptly from the great

Sudanic plain. Many hills are isolated and extend only a few square

kilometers, but there are several large hill-masses with internal

valleys that cut through the mountains high above the plain.

Sudan's third distinct region is the central clay plains that stretch eastward from the Nuba Mountains to the Ethiopian frontier,

broken only by the Ingessana Hills, and from Khartoum in the

north to the far reaches of southern Sudan. Between the Dindar

and the Rahad rivers, a low ridge slopes down from the Ethiopian

highlands to break the endless skyline of the plains, and the occasional hill stands out in stark relief. The central clay plains provide the backbone of Sudan's economy because they are productive

where settlements cluster around available water. Furthermore, in

61
Sudan: A Country Study

the heartland of the central clay plains lies the jazirah (see Glossary), the land between the Blue Nile and the White Nile (literally

in Arabic "peninsula") where the great Gezira Scheme (also seen

as Jazirah Scheme) was developed. This project grows cotton for export and has traditionally produced more than half of Sudan's

revenue and export earnings.

Northeast of the central clay plains lies eastern Sudan, which

is divided between desert and semidesert and includes Al Butanah,

the Qash Delta, the Red Sea Hills, and the coastal plain. Al Butanah

is an undulating land between Khartoum and Kassala that provides good grazing for cattle, sheep, and goats. East of Al Butanah

is a peculiar geological formation known as the Qash Delta. Originally a depression, it has been filled with sand and silt brought down

by the flash floods of the Qash River, creating a delta above the

surrounding plain. Extending 100 kilometers north of Kassala, the

whole area watered by the Qash is a rich grassland with bountiful

cultivation long after the river has spent its waters on the surface

of its delta. Trees and bushes provide grazing for the camels from

the north, and the rich moist soil provides an abundance of food

crops and cotton. Northward beyond the Qash lie the more formidable Red Sea

Hills. Dry, bleak, and cooler than the surrounding land, particularly in the heat of the Sudan summer, they stretch northward into

Egypt, a jumbled mass of hills where life is hard and unpredictable for the hardy Beja inhabitants. Below the hills sprawls the

coastal plain of the Red Sea, varying in width from about fifty- six kilometers in the south near Tawkar to about twenty-four kilometers near the Egyptian frontier. The coastal plain is dry and barren.

It consists of rocks, and the seaward side is thick with coral reefs. The southern clay plains, which can be regarded as an extension of the northern clay plains, extend all the way from northern

Sudan to the mountains on the Sudan-Uganda frontier, and in the

west from the borders of Central African Republic eastward to the

Ethiopian highlands. This great Nilotic plain is broken by several

distinctive features. First, the White Nile bisects the plain and provides large permanent water surfaces such as lakes Fajarial, No,

and Shambe. Second, As Sudd, the world's largest swamp, provides a formidable expanse of lakes, lagoons, and aquatic plants,

whose area in high flood waters exceeds 30,000 square kilometers,

approximately the area of Belgium. So intractable was this sudd

(see Glossary) as an obstacle to navigation that a passage was not

discovered until the mid-nineteenth century. Then as now, As Sudd

with its extreme rate of evaporation consumes on average more

than half the waters that come down the White Nile from the

62
The Society and Its Environment

equatorial lakes. These waters also create a flood plain known as the toic that provides grazing when the flood waters retreat to the

permanent swamp and sluggish river, the Bahr al Jabal, as the

White Nile is called here.

The land rising to the south and west of the southern clay plain

is referred to as the Ironstone Plateau (Jabal Hadid), a name derived from its laterite soils and increasing elevation. The plateau

rises from the west bank of the Nile, sloping gradually upward to the Congo-Nile watershed. The land is well watered, providing rich

cultivation, but the streams and rivers that come down from the

watershed divide and erode the land before flowing on to the Nilotic

plain to flow into As Sudd. Along the streams of the watershed

are the gallery forests, the beginnings of the tropical rain forests that extend far into Zaire. To the east of the Jabal Hadid and the

Bahr al Jabal rise the foothills of the mountain ranges along the

Sudan-Uganda border—the Imatong, Didinga, and Dongotona

which rise to more than 3,000 meters. These mountains form a

stark contrast to the great plains to the north that dominate Sudan's

geography.

Soils

The country's soils can be divided geographically into three

categories: the sandy soils of the northern and west central areas, the clay soils of the central region, and the laterite soils of the south.

Less extensive and widely separated, but of major economic importance, is a fourth group consisting of alluvial soils found along

the lower reaches of the White Nile and Blue Nile rivers, along

the main Nile to Lake Nubia, in the delta of the Qash River in

the Kassala area, and in the Baraka Delta in the area of Tawkar

near the Red Sea in Ash Sharqi State. Agriculturally, the most important soils are the clays in central

Sudan that extend from west of Kassala through Al Awsat and

southern Kurdufan. Known as cracking soils because of the practice of allowing them to dry out and crack during the dry months

to restore their permeability, they are used in the areas of Al Jazirah

and Khashm al Qirbah for irrigated cultivation. East of the Blue

Nile, large areas are used for mechanized rainfed crops. West of

the White Nile, these soils are used by traditional cultivators to grow sorghum, sesame, peanuts, and (in the area around the Nuba

Mountains) cotton. The southern part of the clay soil zone lies in

the broad floodplain of the upper reaches of the White Nile and

its tributaries, covering most of Aali an Nil and upper Bahr al Ghazal states. Subject to heavy rainfall during the rainy season,

the floodplain proper is inundated for four to six months. The large

63
Sudan: A Country Study

swampy area, As Sudd, is permanently flooded, and adjacent areas are flooded for one or two months. In general this area is poorly

suited to crop production, but the grasses it supports during dry

periods are used for grazing.

The sandy soils in the semiarid areas south of the desert in north- ern Kurdufan and northern Darfur states support vegetation used

for grazing. In the southern part of these states and the western

part of southern Darfur are the so-called qoz sands. Livestock rais- ing is this area's major activity, but a significant amount of crop

cultivation, mainly of millet, also occurs. Peanuts and sesame are grown as cash crops. The qoz sands are the principal area from

which gum arabic is obtained through tapping of Acacia Senegal

(known locally as hashab). This tree grows readily in the region,

and cultivators occasionally plant hashab trees when land is returned

to fallow.

The laterite soils of the south cover most of western Al Istiwai

and Bahr al Ghazal states. They underlie the extensive moist woodlands found in these provinces. Crop production is scattered, and

the soils, where cultivated, lose fertility relatively quickly; even the

richer soils are usually returned to bush fallow within five years. Hydrology

Except for a small area in northeastern Sudan where wadis dis- charge the sporadic runoff into the Red Sea or rivers from Ethiopia flow into shallow, evaporating ponds west of the Red Sea Hills,

the entire country is drained by the Nile and its two main tributaries, the Blue Nile (Al Bahr al Azraq) and the White Nile (Al

Bahr al Abyad). The longest river in the world, the Nile flows for 6,737 kilometers from its farthest headwaters in central Africa to the Mediterranean. The importance of the Nile has been recognized since biblical times; for centuries the river has been a life- line for Sudan.

The Blue Nile flows out of the Ethiopian highlands to meet the

White Nile at Khartoum. The Blue Nile is the smaller of the two;

its flow usually accounts for only one-sixth of the total. In August,

however, the rains in the Ethiopian highlands swell the Blue Nile

until it accounts for 90 percent of the Nile's total flow. Several dams

have been constructed to regulate the river's flow—the Roseires

Dam (Ar Rusayris), about 100 kilometers from the Ethiopian

border; the Meina al Mak Dam at Sinjah; and the largest, the fortymeter-high Sennar Dam constructed in 1925 at Sannar. The Blue

Nile's two main tributaries, the Dindar and the Rahad, have headwaters in the Ethiopian highlands and discharge water into the Blue

64
The Society and Its Environment

Nile only during the summer high-water season. For the remainder

of the year, their flow is reduced to pools in their sandy riverbeds.

The White Nile flows north from central Africa, draining Lake

Victoria and the highland regions of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

At Bor, the great swamp of the Nile, As Sudd begins. The river

has no well-defined channel here; the water flows slowly through

a labyrinth of small spillways and lakes choked with papyrus and

reeds. Much water is lost to evaporation. To provide for water trans- portation through this region and to speed the river's flow so that

less water evaporates, Sudan, with French help, began building

the Jonglei Canal (also seen as Junqali Canal) from Bor to a point

just upstream from Malakal. However, construction was suspended

in 1984 because of security problems caused by the civil war in

the south.

South of Khartoum, the British built the Jabal al Auliya Dam

in 1937 to store the water of the White Nile and then release it in the fall when the flow from the Blue Nile slackens. Much water

from the reservoir has been diverted for irrigation projects in central Sudan, however, and much of the remainder evaporates. Hence

the overall flow released downstream is not great.

The White Nile has several substantial tributaries that drain

southern Sudan. In the southwest, the Bahr al Ghazal drains a basin

larger in area than France. Although the drainage area is extensive, evaporation takes most of the water from the slow-moving

streams in this region, and the discharge of the Bahr al Ghazal into

the White Nile is minimal. In southeast Sudan, the Sobat River

drains an area of western Ethiopia and the hills near the SudanUganda border. The Sobat' s discharge is considerable; at its confluence with the White Nile just south of Malakal, the Sobat

accounts for half the White Nile's water. Above Khartoum, the Nile flows through desert in a large S- shaped pattern to empty into Lake Nasser behind the Aswan High

Dam in Egypt. The river flows slowly above Khartoum, dropping

little in elevation although five cataracts hinder river transport at times of low water. The Atbarah River, flowing out of Ethiopia,

is the only tributary north of Khartoum, and its waters reach the

Nile for only the six months between July and December. During

the rest of the year, the Atbarah' s bed is dry, except for a few pools

and ponds.

Climate

Although Sudan lies within the tropics, the climate ranges from

arid in the north to tropical wet-and-dry in the far southwest. Temperatures do not vary greatly with the season at any location; the

65
Sudan: A Country Study

most significant climatic variables are rainfall and the length of the

dry season. Variations in the length of the dry season depend on

which of two air flows predominates, dry northeasterly winds from

the Arabian Peninsula or moist southwesterly winds from the Congo

River basin.

From January to March, the country is under the influence of

the dry northeasterlies. There is practically no rainfall countrywide

except for a small area in northwestern Sudan where the winds

have passed over the Mediterranean and bring occasional light

rains. By early April, the moist southwesterlies have reached

southern Sudan, bringing heavy rains and thunderstorms. ByJuly

the moist air has reached Khartoum, and in August it extends to

its usual northern limits around Abu Hamad, although in some

years the humid air may even reach the Egyptian border. The flow

becomes weaker as it spreads north. In September the dry northeasterlies begin to strengthen and to push south, and by the end

of December they cover the entire country. Yambio, close to the

border with Zaire, has a nine-month rainy season (April-December)

and receives an average of 1,142 millimeters of rain each year;

Khartoum has a three-month rainy season (July- September) with an annual average rainfall of 161 millimeters; Atbarah receives

showers in August that produce an annual average of only 74 milli- meters. In some years, the arrival of the southwesterlies and their rain

in central Sudan can be delayed, or they may not come at all. If that happens, drought and famine follow. The decades of the 1970s

and 1980s saw the southwesterlies frequently fail, with disastrous

results for the Sudanese people and economy.

Temperatures are highest at the end of the dry season when

cloudless skies and dry air allow them to soar. The far south,

however, with only a short dry season, has uniformly high temperatures throughout the year. In Khartoum, the warmest months

are May and June, when average highs are 41 °C and temperatures can reach 48°C. Northern Sudan, with its short rainy sea- son, has hot daytime temperatures year round, except for winter

months in the northwest where there is precipitation from the

Mediterranean in January and February. Conditions in highland

areas are generally cooler, and the hot daytime temperatures during the dry season throughout central and northern Sudan fall rapidly

after sunset. Lows in Khartoum average 15°C in January and have

dropped as low as 6°C after the passing of a cool front in winter.

The haboob, a violent dust storm, can occur in central Sudan

when the moist southwesterly flow first arrives (May through July).

The moist, unstable air forms thunderstorms in the heat of the

66
The Society and Its Environment

afternoon. The initial downflow of air from an approaching storm

produces a huge yellow wall of sand and clay that can temporarily

reduce visibility to zero. Population

Population information for Sudan has been limited, but in 1990

it was clear that the country was experiencing a high birth rate and

a high, but declining, death rate. Infant mortality was high, but

Sudan was expected to continue its rapid population growth, with

a large percentage of its people under fifteen years of age, for some

time to come. The trends indicated an overall low population density. However, with famine affecting much of the country, internal migration by hundreds of thousands of people was on the

increase. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

reported that in early 1991, approximately 1,800,000 people were

displaced in the northern states, of whom it was estimated that

750,000 were in Al Khartum State, 30,000 each in Kurdufan and

Al Awsat states, 300,000 each in Darfur and Ash Sharqi states, and 150,000 in Ash Shamali State. Efforts were underway to provide permanent sites for about 800,000 of these displaced people.

The civil war and famine in the south were estimated to have dis- placed up to 3.5 million southern Sudanese by early 1990.

In addition to uncertainties concerning the number of refugees,

population estimates were complicated by census difficulties. Since

independence there have been three national censuses, in 1955-56,

1973, and 1983. The first was inadequately prepared and executed.

The second was not officially recognized by the government, and

thus its complete findings have never been released. The third census was of better quality, but some of the data has never been analyzed because of inadequate resources. The 1983 census put the total population at 21.6 million with

a growth rate between 1956 and 1983 of 2.8 percent per year (see

table 2, Appendix). In 1990, the National Population Committee

and the Department of Statistics put Sudan's birth rate at 50 births

per 1 ,000 and the death rate at 19 per 1 ,000, for a rate of increase

of 31 per 1,000 or 3.1 percent per year. This is a staggering in- crease. When compared with the world average of 1 .8 percent per

year and the average for developing countries of 2 . 1 percent per

annum, this percentage made Sudan one of the world's fastest growing countries. The 1983 population estimate was thought to be too low, but even accepting it and the pre- 1983 growth rate of 2.8 percent, Sudan's population in 1990 would have been well over 25

million. At the estimated 1990 growth rate of 3.1 percent, the population would double in twenty-two years. Even if the lower estimated

67
Sudan: A Country Study

rate were sustained, the population would reach 38.6 million by

2003 and 50.9 million by 2013.

Both within Sudan and among the international community, it was commonly thought that with an average population density

of nine persons per square kilometer, population density was not

a major problem. This assumption, however, failed to take into

account that much of Sudan was uninhabitable and that its people were unevenly distributed, with about 33 percent of the nation's

population occupying 7 percent of the land and concentrated around

Khartoum and in Al Awsat. In fact, 66 percent of the population

lived within 300 kilometers of Khartoum (see table 3, Appendix).

In 1990 the population of the Three Towns (Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North) was unknown because of the constant

influx of refugees, but estimates of 3 million, well over half the

urban dwellers in Sudan, may not have been unrealistic. Nevertheless, only 20 percent of Sudanese lived in towns and cities; 80 per- cent still lived in rural areas. The birth rate between the 1973 census and the 1987 National

Population Conference appeared to have remained constant at from

48 to 50 births per 1,000 population. The fertility rate (the aver- age number of children per woman) was estimated at 6.9 in 1983.

Knowledge of family planning remained minimal. During the period, the annual death rate fell from 23 to 19 per 1,000, and the

estimated life expectancy rose from 43.5 years to 47 years. For more than a decade the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) of Sudan had not kept pace with the increasing population, a trend indicating that Sudan would have difficulty in providing adequate services for its people. Moreover, half the population were under eighteen years of age and therefore were primarily con- sumers not producers. Internal migration caused by civil war and

famine created major shifts in population distribution, producing

overpopulation in areas that could provide neither services nor employment. Furthermore, Sudan has suffered a continuous "brain

drain" as its finest professionals and most skilled laborers emigrated,

while simultaneously there has been an influx of more than 1 million refugees, who not only lacked skills but required massive relief. Droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have undermined Sudan's

food production, and the country would have to double its production to feed its expected population within the next generation. In

the absence of a national population policy to deal with these

problems, they were expected to worsen. Moreover, throughout Sudan continuous environmental degradation accompanied the dearth of rainfall. Experts estimated that

desertification caused by deforestation and drought had allowed

68
The Society and Its Environment

the Sahara to advance southward at the rate of ten kilometers per

year. About 7.8 million Sudanese were estimated to be at risk from

famine in early 1991, according to the United Nations World Food

Programme and other agencies. The Save the Children Fund esti- mated that the famine in Darfur would cost the lives of "tens of

thousands" of people in the early 1990s. Analysts believed that the

lack of rainfall combined with the ravages of war would result in

massive numbers of deaths from starvation in the 1990s.

Ethnicity

Sudan's ethnic and linguistic diversity remained one of the most

complex in the world in 1991. Its nearly 600 ethnic groups spoke more than 400 languages and dialects, many of them intelligible to only a small number of individuals. In the 1980s and 1990s some

of these small groups became absorbed by larger groups, and migration often caused individuals reared in one tongue to converse only

in the dominant language of the new area. Such was the case with

migrants to the Three Towns. There Arabic was the lingua franca

despite the use of English by many of the elite. Some linguistic

groups had been absorbed by accommodation, others by conflict. Most Sudanese were, of necessity, multilingual. Choice of language

played a political role in the ethnic and religious cleavage between

the northern and southern Sudanese. English was associated with

being non-Muslim, as Arabic was associated with Islam. Thus language was a political instrument and a symbol of identity.

Language

Language differences have served as a partial basis for ethnic

classification and as symbols of ethnic identity. Such differences

have been obstacles to the flow of communication in a state as lin- guistically fragmented as Sudan. These barriers have been over- come in part by the emergence of some languages as lingua francas

and by a considerable degree of multilingualism in some areas. Most languages spoken in Africa fall into four language superstocks. Three of them—Afro-Asiatic, Niger-Kurdufanian, and NiloSaharan—are represented in Sudan. Each is divided into groups

that are in turn subdivided into sets of closely related languages.

Two or more major groups of each superstock are represented in

Sudan, which has been historically both a north-south and an east- west migration crossroad.

The most widely spoken language in the Sudan is Arabic, a member of the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family.

Cushitic, another major division of the Afro-Asiatic language, is represented by Bedawiye (with several dialects), spoken by the

69
Sudan: A Country Study

largely nomadic Beja. Chadic, a third division, is represented by

its most important single language, Hausa, a West African tongue

used by the Hausa themselves and employed by many other West

Africans in Sudan as a lingua franca.

Niger-Kurdufanian is first divided into Niger-Congo and Kurdufanian. The widespread Niger-Congo language group includes

many divisions and subdivisions of languages. Represented in Sudan

are Azande and several other tongues of the Adamawa-Eastern

language division, and Fulani of the West Atlantic division. The

Kurdufanian stock comprises only thirty to forty languages spoken

in a limited area of Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and their environs.

The designation of a Nilo-Saharan superstock has not been fully

accepted by linguists, and its constituent groups and subgroups

are not firmly fixed, in part because many of the languages have

not been well studied. Assuming the validity of the category and

its internal divisions, however, eight of its nine major divisions and

many of their subdivisions are well represented in Sudan, where

roughly seventy-five languages, well over half of those named in

the 1955-56 census, could be identified as Nilo-Saharan. Many

of these languages are used only by small groups of people. Only

six or seven of them were spoken by 1 percent or more of Sudan's

1956 population. Perhaps another dozen were the home languages

of 0.5 to 1 percent. Many other languages were used by a few thousand or even a few hundred people.

The number of languages and dialects in Sudan is assumed to be about 400, including languages spoken by an insignificant number of people. Moreover, languages of smaller ethnic groups tended

to disappear when the groups assimilated with more dominant eth- nic units.

Several lingua francas have emerged and many peoples have be- come genuinely multilingual, fluent in a native language spoken

at home, a lingua franca, and perhaps other languages. Arabic is the primary lingua franca in Sudan, given its status as the country's official language and as the language of Islam. Arabic, however, has several different forms, and not all who master one are

able to use another. Among the varieties noted by scholars are classical Arabic, the language of the Quran (although generally not a spoken language and only used for printed work); Modern Standard Arabic, derived from classical Arabic and used by the educated

in conversation; and at least two kinds of colloquial Arabic in the

Sudan—that spoken in roughly the eastern half of the country and

called Sudanese colloquial Arabic and that spoken in western Sudan,

closely akin to the colloquial Arabic spoken in Chad. There are

70
The Society and Its Environment

other colloquial forms. A pidgin called Juba Arabic is peculiar to southern Sudan. Although some Muslims might become acquainted

with classical Arabic in the course of rudimentary religious schooling, very few except the most educated know it except by rote. Modern Standard Arabic is in principle the same everywhere

in the Arab world and presumably permits communication among

educated persons whose mother tongue is one or another form of

colloquial Arabic. Despite its international character, however,

Modern Standard Arabic varies from country to country. It has

been, however, the language used in Sudan's central government,

the press, and Radio Omdurman. The latter also broadcast in classical Arabic. One observer, writing in the early 1970s, noted that

Arabic speakers (and others who had acquired the language informally) in western Sudan found it easier to understand the Chadian

colloquial Arabic used by Chad Radio than the Modern Standard

Arabic used by Radio Omdurman. This might also be the case elsewhere in rural Sudan where villagers and nomads speak a local dialect of Arabic.

Despite Arabic's status as the official national language, English was acknowledged as the principal language in southern Sudan in

the late 1980s. It was also the chief language at the University of

Khartoum and was the language of secondary schools even in the

north before 1969. The new policy for higher education announced

by the Sudanese government in 1990 indicated that Arabic would

be the language of instruction in all institutions of higher learning.

Nevertheless, in the south, the first two years of primary school were taught in the local language. Thereafter, through secondary

school, either Arabic or English could become the medium of in- struction (English and Arabic were regarded as of equal importance); the language not used as a medium was taught as a subject.

In the early 1970s, when this option was established, roughly half

the general secondary classes (equivalent to grades seven through

nine) were conducted in Arabic and half in English in Bahr al Ghazal and Al Istiwai provinces. In early 1991 , with about 90 per- cent of the southern third of the country controlled by the Sudanese

People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the use of Arabic as a medium

of instruction in southern schools remained a political issue, with

many southerners regarding Arabic as an element in northern cul- tural domination.

Juba (or pidgin) Arabic, developed and learned informally, had

been used in southern towns, particularly in Al Istiwai, for some

time and had spread slowly but steadily throughout the south, but

not always at the expense of English. The Juba Arabic used in the

71
Sudan: A Country Study

marketplace and even by political figures addressing ethnically

mixed urban audiences could not be understood by northern

Sudanese.

Ethnic Groups

The definition and boundaries of ethnic groups depend on how

people perceive themselves and others. Language, cultural characteristics, and common ancestry may be used as markers of ethnic

identity or difference, but they do not always define groups of people. Thus, the people called Atuot and the much larger group called Nuer speak essentially the same language, share many cultural

characteristics, and acknowledge a common ancestry, but each group

defines itself and the other as different. Identifying ethnic groups

in Sudan is made more complicated by the multifaceted character

of internal divisions among Arabic-speaking Muslims, the largest

population that might be considered a single ethnic group.

The distinction between Sudan's Muslim and non-Muslim people

has been of considerable importance in the country's history and

provides a preliminary ordering of the ethnic groups. It does not,

however, correspond in any simple way to distinctions based on

linguistic, cultural, or racial criteria nor to social or political solidarity. Ethnic group names commonly used in Sudan and by foreign

analysts are not always used by the people themselves. This fact

is particularly true for non-Arabs known by names coined by Arabs

or by the British, who based the names on terms used by Arabs

or others not of the group itself. Thus, the Dinka and the Nuer,

the largest groups in southern Sudan, call themselves, respectively,

Jieng and Naath.

Muslim Peoples

Arabs

In the early 1990s, the largest single category among the Muslim peoples consisted of those speaking some form of Arabic. Excluded were a small number of Arabic speakers originating in Egypt

and professing Coptic Christianity. In 1983 the people identified

as Arabs constituted nearly 40 percent of the total Sudanese population and nearly 55 percent of the population of the northern

provinces. In some of these provinces (Al Khartum, Ash Shamali,

Al Awsat), they were overwhelmingly dominant. In others (Kurdufan, Darfur), they were less so but made up a majority. By 1990

Ash Sharqi State was probably largely Arab. It should be emphasized, however, that the acquisition of Arabic as a second language

did not necessarily lead to the assumption of Arab identity.

72
The Society and Its Environment

Despite common language, religion, and self- identification, Arabs

did not constitute a cohesive group. They were highly differentiated

in their modes of livelihood and ways of life. Besides the major

distinction dividing Arabs into sedentary and nomadic, there was

an old tradition that assigned them to tribes, each said to have a common ancestor. The two largest of the supratribal categories in the early 1990s were the Juhayna and the Jaali (or Jaalayin). The Juhayna category

consisted of tribes considered nomadic, although many had become

fully settled. The Jaali encompassed the riverine, sedentary peoples from Dunqulah to just north of Khartoum and members of

this group who had moved elsewhere. Some of its groups had be- come sedentary only in the twentieth century. Sudanese saw the

Jaali as primarily indigenous peoples who were gradually arabized.

Sudanese thought the Juhayna were less mixed, although some

Juhayna groups had become more diverse by absorbing indigenous

peoples. The Baqqara, for example, who moved south and west

and encountered the Negroid peoples of those areas were scarcely

to be distinguished from them.

A third supratribal division of some importance was the Kawahla,

consisting of thirteen tribes of varying size. Of these, eight tribes

and segments of the other five were found north and west of Khartoum. There people were more heavily dependent on pastoralism

than were the segments of the other five tribes, who lived on either

side of the White Nile from south of Khartoum to north of Kusti.

This cluster of five groups (for practical purposes independent tribes)

exhibited a considerable degree of self-awareness and cohesion in some circumstances, although that had not precluded intertribal

competition for local power and status. The ashraf (sing. , sharif), who claim descent from the Prophet

Muhammad, were found in small groups (lineages) scattered among

other Arabs. Most of these lineages had been founded by religious

teachers or their descendants. A very small group of descendants

of the Funj Dynasty also claimed descent from the Umayyads, an

early dynasty of caliphs based in present-day Syria. That claim

had little foundation, but it served to separate from other Arabs

a small group living on or between the White Nile and the Blue

Nile. The term ashraf was also applied in Sudan to the family of

Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, known as the Mahdi

(1848-85; see The Mahdiyah, ch. 1). The division into Jaali and Juhayna did not appear to have a significant effect on the ways in which individuals and groups regarded

each other. Conflicts between tribes generally arose from competition for good grazing land, or from the competing demands of

73
Sudan: A Country Study

nomadic and sedentary tribes on the environment. Among nomadic

and recendy sedentary Arabs, tribes and subtribes competed for

local power (see The Social Order, this ch.).

Membership in tribal and subtribal units is generally by birth,

but individuals and groups may also join these units by adoption,

clientship, or a decision to live and behave in a certain way. For

example, when a sedentary Fur becomes a cattle nomad, he is per- ceived as a Baqqara. Eventually the descendants of such newcomers

are regarded as belonging to the group by birth.

Tribal and subtribal units divide the Arab ethnic category vertically, but other distinctions cut across Arab society and its tribal and subtribal components horizontally by differences of social sta- tus and power. Still another division is that of religious associations (see Islamic Movements and Religious Orders, this ch.).

Nubians

In the early 1990s, the Nubians were the second most signifi- cant Muslim group in Sudan, their homeland being the Nile River

valley in far northern Sudan and southern Egypt. Other, much

smaller groups speaking a related language and claiming a link with

the Nile Nubians have been given local names, such as the Birqid

and the Meidab in Darfur State (see fig. 5). Almost all Nile Nubians

speak Arabic as a second language; some near Dunqulah have been

largely arabized and are referred to as Dunqulah.

In the mid-1960s, in anticipation of the flooding of their lands

after the construction of the Aswan High Dam, 35,000 to 50,000

Nile Nubians resettled at Khashm al Qirbah on the Atbarah River

in what was then Kassala Province. It is not clear how many

Nubians remained in the Nile Valley. Even before the resetdement,

many had left the valley for varying lengths of time to work in the

towns, although most sought to maintain a link with their traditional homeland. In the 1955-56 census, more Nile Nubians were

counted in Al Khartum Province than in the Nubian country to the north. A similar pattern of work in the towns was apparently

followed by those resettled at Khashm al Qirbah. Many Nubians

there retained their tenancies, having kin oversee the land and hiring

non-Nubians to work it. The Nubians, often with their families,

worked in Khartoum, the town of Kassala, and Port Sudan in jobs

ranging from domestic service and semi-skilled labor to teaching

and civil service, which required literacy. Despite their knowledge

of Arabic and their devotion to Islam, Nubians retained a considerable self-consciousness and tended to maintain tightly knit communities of their own in the towns.

74
The Society and Its Environment

Beja

The Beja probably have lived in the Red Sea Hills since ancient

times. Arab influence was not significant until a millennium or so ago, but it has since led the Beja to adopt Islam and genealogies

that link them to Arab ancestors, to arabize their names, and to include many Arabic terms in their language. Although some Arabs

figure in the ancestry of the Beja, the group is mosdy descended

from an indigenous population, and they have not become generally arabized. Their language (Bedawiye) links them to Cushiticspeaking peoples farther south.

In the 1990s, most Beja belonged to one of four groups—the

Bisharin, the Amarar, the Hadendowa, and the Bani Amir. The

largest group was the Hadendowa, but the Bisharin had the most

territory, with settled tribes living on the Atbarah River in the far south of the Beja range and nomads living in the north. A good

number of the Hadendowa were also setded and engaged in agriculture, particularly in the coastal region near Tawkar, but many re- mained nomads. The Amarar, living in the central part of the Beja

range, seemed to be largely nomads, as were the second largest

group, the Bani Amir, who lived along the border with northern

Ethiopia. The precise proportion of nomads in the Beja population in the early 1990s was not known, but it was far greater rela- tively than the nomadic component of the Arab population. The

Beja were characterized as conservative, proud, and aloof even

toward other Beja and very reticent in relations with strangers. They

were long reluctant to accept the authority of central governments.

Fur

The Fur, ruled until 1916 by an independent sultanate and

oriented politically and culturally to peoples in Chad, were a sedentary, cultivating group long setded on and around the Jabal Marrah.

Although the ruling dynasty and the peoples of the area had long

been Muslims, they have not been arabized. Livestock has played

a small part in the subsistence of most Fur. Those who acquired

a substantial herd of cattle could maintain it only by living like the neighboring Baqqara Arabs, and those who persisted in this pattern eventually came to be thought of as Baqqara.

Zaghawa

Living on the plateau north of the Fur were the seminomadic

people calling themselves Beri and known to the Arabs as Zaghawa.

Large numbers of the group lived in Chad. Herders of cattle,

camels, sheep, and goats, the Zaghawa also gained a substantial

part of their livelihood by gathering wild grains and other products.

75
Sudan: A Country Study

International boundary

Administrative boundary

Semitic-Nilotic lin- guistic boundary

Arabic-speaking area

National capital NUER Major ethnic group Baka Secondary ethnic group

100 200 Kilometers

NOTE: Because of their scattered distribution, Hausa and Fulani are not shown on the map. Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative.

Figure 5. Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1991

Cultivation had become increasingly important but remained risky,

and the people reverted to gathering in times of drought. Converted

to Islam, the Zaghawa nevertheless retain much of their traditional

religious orientation.

Masalit, Daju, and Berti

Of other peoples living in Darfur in the 1990s who spoke NiloSaharan languages and were at least nominally Muslim, the most

76
The Society and Its Environment

important were the Masalit, Daju, and Berti. All were primarily

cultivators living in permanent villages, but they practiced animal

husbandry in varying degrees. The Masalit, living on the SudanChad border, were the largest group. Historically under a minor

sultanate, they were positioned between the two dominant sultanates

of the area, Darfur and Wadai (in Chad). A part of the territory

they occupied had been formerly controlled by the Fur, but the

Masalit gradually encroached on it in the first half of the twentieth century in a series of local skirmishes carried out by villages on both sides, rather than by the sultanates. In 1990-91 much of

Darfur was in a state of anarchy, with many villages being attacked.

There were many instances in which Masalit militias attacked Fur

and other villages (see Western Sudan, ch. 4).

The Berti consisted of two groups. One lived northeast of Al

Fashir; the other had migrated to eastern Darfur and western Kurdufan provinces in the nineteenth century. The two Berti groups

did not seem to share a sense of common identity and interest. Members of the western group, in addition to cultivating subsis- tence crops and practicing animal husbandry, gathered gum arabic

for sale in local markets. The Berti tongue had largely given way

to Arabic as a home language.

The term Daju was a linguistic designation that was applied to a number of groups scattered from western Kurdufan and southwestern Darfur states to eastern Chad. These groups called themselves by different names and exhibited no sense of common

identity.

West Africans

Living in Sudan in 1990 were nearly a million people of West

African origin. Together, West Africans who have become Sudanese

nationals and resident nonnationals from West Africa made up 6.5

percent of the Sudanese population. In the mid-1970s, West Afri- cans had been estimated at more than 10 percent of the population of the northern provinces. Some were descendants of persons

who had arrived five generations or more earlier; others were re- cent immigrants. Some had come in self-imposed exile, unable to accommodate to the colonial power in their homeland. Others had

been pilgrims to Mecca, settling either en route or on their return. Many came over decades in the course of the great dispersion of

the nomadic Fulani; others arrived, particularly after World War

II, as rural and urban laborers or to take up land as peasant culti- vators. Nearly 60 percent of people included in the West African category were said to be of Nigerian origin (locally called Borno after the

77
Sudan: A Country Study

Nigerian emirate that was their homeland). Given Hausa dominance in northern Nigeria and the widespread use of their language

there and elsewhere, some non-Hausa might also be called Hausa

and describe themselves as such. But the Hausa themselves, particularly those long in Sudan, preferred to be called Takari. The

Fulani, even more widely dispersed throughout West Africa, may

have originated in states other than Nigeria. Typically, the term

applied to the Fulani in Sudan was Fallata, but Sudanese also used

that term for other West Africans.

The Fulani nomads were found in many parts of central Sudan

from Darfur to the Blue Nile, and they occasionally competed with

indigenous populations for pasturage. In Darfur groups of Fulani

origin adapted in various ways to the presence of the Baqqara tribes. Some retained all aspects of their culture and language. A few had

become much like Baqqara in language and in other respects,

although they tended to retain their own breeds of cattle and ways

of handling them. Some of the Fulani groups in the eastern states were sedentary, descendants of sedentary Fulani of the ruling group

in northern Nigeria.

Non-Muslim Peoples

In the 1990s, most of Sudan's diverse non-Muslim peoples lived

in southern Sudan, but a number of small groups resided in the

hilly areas south of the Blue Nile on or near the border with Ethiopia. Another cluster of peoples commonly called the Nuba, but socially and culturally diverse, lived in the Nuba Mountains of southern

Kurdufan State. Nilotes

Nilote is a common name for many of the peoples living on or near the Bahr al Jabal and its tributaries. The term refers to people speaking languages of one section of the Nilotic subbranch of

the Eastern Sudanic branch of Nilo-Saharan and sharing a myth

of common origin. They are marked by physical similarity and

many common cultural features. Many had a long tradition of

cattlekeeping, including some for whom cattle were no longer of

practical importance. Because of their adaptation to different cli- mates and their encounters, peaceful and otherwise, with other peoples, there was also some diversity among the Nilotes.

Despite the civil war and famine, the Nilotes still constituted more

than three-fifths of the population of southern Sudan in 1990. One

group—the Dinka—made up roughly two-thirds of the total cate- gory, 40 percent or more of the population of the area and more

than 10 percent of Sudan's population. The Dinka were widely

78
A Shilluk, member of a leading southern ethnic group,

prepares to launch his canoe. Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

79
Sudan: A Country Study

distributed over the northern portion of the southern region, particularly in Aali an Nil and Bahr al Ghazal. The next largest group,

only one-fourth to one-third the size of the Dinka, were the Nuer.

The Shilluk, the third largest group, had only about one-fourth

as many people as the Nuer, and the remaining Nilotic groups were much smaller.

The larger and more dispersed the group, however, the more

internally varied it had become. The Dinka and Nuer, for example, did not develop a centralized government encompassing all or any large part of their groups. The Dinka are considered to have

as many as twenty-five tribal groups. The Nuer have nine or ten

separately named groups.

Armed conflict between and within ethnic groups continued well

into the twentieth century. Sections of the Dinka fought sections

of the Nuer and each other. Other southern groups also expanded

and contracted in the search for cattle and pasturage. The Nuer

absorbed some of the Dinka, and some present-day sections of the

Nuer have significant Dinka components.

Relations among various southern groups were affected in the

nineteenth century by the intrusion of Ottomans, Arabs, and eventually the British. Some ethnic groups made their accommodation

with the intruders and others did not, in effect pitting one southern

ethnic group against another in the context of foreign rule. For

example, some sections of the Dinka were more accommodating

to British rule than were the Nuer. These Dinka treated the resist- ing Nuer as hostile, and hostility developed between the two groups

as result of their differing relationships to the British. The granting of Sudanese independence in 1956, and the adoption of cer- tain aspects of Islamic law, or the sharia, by the central government

in 1983 greatly influenced the nature of relations among these

groups in modern times.

The next largest group of Nilotes, the Shilluk (self-named Collo), were not dispersed like the Dinka and the Nuer, but settled mainly

in a limited, uninterrupted area along the west bank of the Bahr

al Jabal, just north of the point where it becomes the White Nile

proper. A few lived on the eastern bank. With easy access to fairly

good land along the Nile, they relied much more heavily on culti- vation and fishing than the Dinka and the Nuer did, and they had

fewer cattle. The Shilluk had truly permanent settlements and did

not move regularly between cultivating and cattle camps.

Unlike the larger groups, the Shilluk, in the Upper Nile, were

traditionally ruled by a single politico-religious head (reth), believed

to become at the time of his investiture as king the representative,

if not the reincarnation, of the mythical hero Nyiking, putative

80
The Society and Its Environment

founder of the Shilluk. The administrative and political powers of

the reth have been the subject of some debate, but his ritual status was clear enough: his health was believed to be closely related to the material and spiritual welfare of the Shilluk. It is likely that

the territorial unity of the Shilluk and the permanence of their settie- ments contributed to the centralization of their political and ritual structures. In the late 1980s, the activities against the SPLA by

the armed militias supported by the government seriously alienated

the Shilluk in Malakal.

Bari, Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari

Several peoples living mainly to the south and east of the Nilotes

spoke languages of another section of the Nilotic subbranch of

Eastern Sudanic. Primary among them were the Bari and the closely

related Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari. The Bari and Mandari, who

lived near the Nilotes, had been influenced by them and had sometimes been in conflict with them in the past. The more southerly

Kuku and Kakwa lived in the highlands, where cultivation was more rewarding than cattle-keeping or where cattle diseases pre- cluded herding.

Murle, Didinga, and Others

Two other tribes, the Murle and the Didinga, spoke Eastern Sudanic languages of subbranches other than Nilotic. The Murle had

dwelt in southern Ethiopia in the nineteenth century and some were

still there in the 1990s. Others had moved west and had driven

out the local Nilotes, whom they reportedly regarded with contempt,

and had acquired a reputation as warriors. Under environmental

pressure, the Murle raided other groups in the late 1970s and early

1980s.

Along the mountainous border with Ethiopia in Al Awsat State

lived several small heterogeneous groups. Some, like the Uduk,

spoke languages of the Koman division of Nilo-Saharan and were

believed to have been in the area since antiquity. Others, like the

Ingessana, were refugees driven into the hills by the expansion of

other groups. Most of these peoples straddling the Sudan-Ethiopia

border had experienced strife with later-arriving neighbors and

slave-raiding by the Arabs. All adapted by learning the languages

of more dominant groups.

Azande

In western Al Istiwai and Bahr al Ghazal states lived a number

of small, sometimes fragmented groups. The largest of these groups were the Azande, who comprised 7 to 8 percent of the population

81
Sudan: A Country Study

of southern Sudan and were the dominant group in western Al

Istiwai.

The Azande had emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when groups of hunters, divided into aristocrats and commoners, entered the northeastern part of present-day Zaire (and

later southwestern Sudan) and conquered the peoples already there. Although the aristocrats provided ruling kings and nobles, they

did not establish an inclusive, centralized state. The means of suc- cession to kingship, however, encouraged Azande expansion. A

man succeeded to his father's throne only when he had vanquished

those of his brothers who chose to compete for it. The brothers

princes without land or people but with followers looking for the

fruits of conquest—would find and rule hitherto unconquered

groups. Thus, the Azande became a heterogeneous people.

Their earlier military and political successes notwithstanding,

the Azande in the twentieth century were poor, largely dependent on cultivation (hunting was no longer a feasible source of food),

and afflicted by sleeping sickness. The British colonial authorities

instituted a project, known as the Azande Scheme, involving cot- ton growing and resettlement in an effort to deal with these

problems. The program failed, however, for a variety of reasons, including an inadequate understanding of Azande society, econ- omy, and values on the part of the colonial planners. Azande soci- ety deteriorated still further, a deterioration reflected in a declining

birth rate. Azande support of the Anya Nya guerrilla groups, as well as conflicts with the Dinka, also served to worsen the Azande 's situation. In the early 1980s, there was talk of resurrecting a re- vised Azande project but the resumption of the civil war in 1983

prevented progress. Bviri and Ndogo

Several other groups of cultivators in southwestern Sudan spoke

languages closely akin to that of the Azande but lacked a dominant

group. The most important seemed to be the Bviri. They and a

smaller group called Ndogo spoke a language named after the latter; other, smaller communities spoke dialects of that tongue. These

communities did not share a sense of common ethnic identity,

however.

Others

The other groups in southwestern Sudan spoke languages of the

central branch of Nilo-Saharan and were scattered from the western

Bahr al Ghazal (the Kreish) to central Al Istiwai (the Moru and

the Avukaya) to eastern Al Istiwai (the Madi). In between, in Al

82
An Azande chief in the south standing near a hut being completed

for his new wife

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

Istiwai, were such peoples as the Bongo and the Baka. The languages of Moru and Madi were so close, as were aspects of their

cultures, that they were sometimes lumped together. The same was

true of the Bongo and the Baka, but there was no indication that

either pair constituted a self-conscious ethnic group.

Nuba

Living in the Nuba Mountains of southern Kurdufan State were

perhaps three dozen small groups collectively called the Nuba but

varying considerably in their culture and social organization. For

example, some were patrilineally organized, others adhered to matrilineal patterns, and a very few—the southeastern Nuba

had both patrilineal and matrilineal groupings in the same community. The Kurdufanian languages these people spoke were not

generally mutually intelligible except for those of some adjacent

communities.

Despite the arabization of the people around them, only small

numbers of Nuba had adopted Arabic as a home language, and

even fewer had been converted to Islam. Some had, however, served

in the armed forces and police. Most remained cultivators; animal

husbandry played only a small part in their economy.

83
Sudan: A Country Study

Migration

One of the most important and complicating factors in defining

ethnicity is the dramatic increase in the internal migration of

Sudanese within the past twenty years. It has been estimated that

in 1973 alone well over 10 percent of the population moved away

from their ethnic groups to mingle with other Sudanese in the big

agricultural projects or to work in other provinces. Most of the

migrants sought employment in the large urban areas, particularly

in the Three Towns, which attracted 30 percent of all internal

migrants. The migrants were usually young; 60 percent were between the ages of fifteen and forty-four. Of that number, 46 per- cent were females. The number of migrants escalated greatly in

the latter 1980s because of drought and famine, the civil war in

the south, and Chadian raiders in the west. Thus, as in the past,

the migrants left their ethnic groups for economic, social, and psy- chological reasons, but now with the added factor of personal

survival.

Another ethnic group involved in migration was that of the

Falasha, who were Ethiopian Jews. In January 1985, it was re- vealed that the Sudanese government had cooperated with Ethiopia, Israel, and the United States in transporting several thousand

Falasha through Sudan to Israel. Their departure occurred initially on a small scale in 1979 and 1982 and in larger numbers between

1983 and 1985. In Sudan the Falasha had been placed in temporary

refugee settlements and reception centers organized by the Sudanese

government.

In addition to the problems of employment, housing, and ser- vices that internal migration created, it had an enormous impact on ethnicity. Although migrants tended to cluster with their kinsfolk in their new environments, the daily interaction with Sudanese

from many other ethnic groups rapidly eroded traditional values

learned in the villages. In the best of circumstances, this erosion

might lead to a new sense of national identity as Sudanese, but

the new communities often lacked effective absorptive mechanisms

and were weak economically. Ethnic divisions were thus reinforced,

and at the same time social anomie was perpetuated.

Refugees from other countries, like internal migrants, were a

factor that further complicated ethnic patterns. In 1991 Sudan was

host to about 763,000 refugees from neighboring countries, such

as Ethiopia and Chad. Included among the refugees were about

175,000 soldiers, most of whom fled following the overthrow of the

Ethiopian government in May 1991. Over the past several years, approximately 426,000 Sudanese had fled their country, becoming

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refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. Many of them began returning

to Sudan in June 1991. Incoming refugees were at first hospitably

received but they gradually came to be regarded as unwelcome visitors. The refugees required many social services, a need only partially met by international humanitarian agencies, which also had

to care for Sudanese famine victims. The presence of foreign refugees, who had little prospect of returning to their own countries,

thus created not only social but also political instability.

Regionalism and Ethnicity

The long war in Sudan had a profound effect not only on ethnic

groups but also on political action and attitudes. With the exception of a fragile peace established by negotiations between southern

Sudanese insurgents (the Anya Nya) and the Sudan government

at Addis Ababa in 1972, and lasting until the resumption of the

conflict in 1983, southern Sudan has been a battlefield. The conflict has deeply eroded traditional ethnic patterns in the region,

and it has extended northward, spreading incalculable political and

economic disruption. It has, moreover, caused the dislocation and

often the obliteration of the smaller, less resistant ethnic groups.

The north- south distinction and the hostility between the two

regions were grounded in religious conflict as well as a conflict between peoples of differing culture and language. The language and

culture of the north were based on Arabic and the Islamic faith,

whereas the south had its own diverse, mostly non-Arabic languages

and cultures. It was with few exceptions non-Muslim, and its reli- gious character was indigenous (traditional or Christian). Adequate

contemporary data were lacking, but in the early 1990s possibly no more than 10 percent of southern Sudan's population was Christian. Nevertheless, given the missions' role in providing education in the south, most educated persons in the area, including the

political elite, were nominally Christians (or at least had Christian

names). Several African Roman Catholic priests figured in southern

leadership, and the churches played a significant role in bringing

the south' s plight to world attention in the civil war period (see

The Southern Problem, ch. 1). Sudan's Muslim Arab rulers thus

considered Christian mission activity to be an obstacle to the full arabization and Islamization of the south.

Occasionally, the distinction between north and south has been

framed in racial terms. The indigenous peoples of the south are

blacks, whereas those of the north are of Semitic stock. Northern populations fully arabized in language and culture, such as the Baqqara,

however, could not be distinguished physically from some of the

southern and western groups. Many sedentary Arabs descended from

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Sudan: A Country Study

the pre-Islamic peoples of that area who were black, as were the

Muslim but nonarabized Nubians and the Islamized peoples of

Darfur.

It is not easy to generalize about the importance of physical at- tributes in one group's perceptions of another. But physical appearance often has been taken as an indicator of cultural, religious,

and linguistic status or orientation. Arabs were also likely to see southerners as members of the population from which they once

took slaves and to use the word for slave, abd, as a pejorative in

referring to southerners.

North-south hostilities predate the colonial era. In the nineteenth

century and earlier, Arabs saw the south as a source of slaves and

considered its peoples inferior by virtue of their paganism if not

their color. Organized slave raiding ended in the late nineteenth

century, but the residue of bitterness remained among southerners, and the Arab view of southerners as pagans persisted.

During British rule, whatever limited accommodation there may

have been between Arabs and Africans was neither widespread nor deep enough to counteract a longer history of conflict between these

peoples. At the same time, for their own reasons, the colonial authorities discouraged integration of the ethnically different north

and south (see Britain's Southern Policy, ch. 1). Neither Arab attitudes of superiority nor British dominance in

the south led to loss of self-esteem among southerners. A number

of observers have remarked that southern peoples, particularly

Nilotes, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk, naturally object to the assumption by the country's Arab rulers that the southern peoples ought to be prepared to give up their religious orientation and

values.

Interethnic tensions also have occurred in the north. Disaffection in Darfur with the Arab-dominated Khartoum government

led in the late 1980s to Darfur becoming a virtually autonomous

province. There has also been a history of regionally based politi- cal movements in the area. The frustrations of a budding elite among the Fur, the region's largest ethnic group, and Fur-Arab

competition may account for that disaffection and for Darfur regionalism. After World War II, many educated Fur made a point of

mastering Arabic in the hope that they could make their way in

the Arab-dominated political, bureaucratic, and economic world;

they did not succeed in their quest. Further, by the late 1960s, as cash crops were introduced, land and labor were becoming objects

of commercial transactions. As this happened, the Arabs and the

Fur competed for scarce resources and, given their greater prominence and power, the Arabs were regarded by the Fur as exploiters.

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The Society and Its Environment

The discovery of oil in the late 1970s (not appreciably exploited

by 1991 because of the civil war leading to the departure of Chevron

Overseas Petroleum Corporation personnel) added another resource and further potential for conflict. Opposition to the imposition by

Nimeiri of the sharia in 1983, and the later attempts at Islamization of the country in the late 1980s, as well as the government's

poor handling of the devastating famine of 1990 deeply alienated

the Fur from the national government.

There were other tensions in northern Sudan generated not by

traditional antipathies but by competition for scarce resources. For

example, there was a conflict between the Rufaa al Huj, a group

of Arab pastoralists living in the area between the Blue Nile and

the White Nile, and Fallata (Fulani) herders. The movements of

the Fallata intersected with the seasonal migrations of the Rufaa

al Huj . Here ethnic differences aggravated but did not cause competition.

The reluctance of southern groups to accept Arab domination

did not imply southern solidarity. The opportunities for power and

wealth in the new politics and bureaucracy in southern Sudan were

limited; some groups felt deprived of their shares by an ethnic group

in power. Moreover, ethnic groups at one time or another competed for more traditional resources, contributing to a heritage of

hostility toward one another.

In the early 1990s, one of the main sources of ethnic conflict in

the south was the extent to which the Dinka dominated southern

politics and controlled the allocation of rewards, whether of government posts or of other opportunities. In the 1955-56 census, the

Dinka constituted a little more than 40 percent of the total population of the three provinces that in 1990 constituted southern

Sudan: Bahr al Ghazal, Aali an Nil, and Al Istiwai. Because no

other group approached their number, if their proportion of the

regional total had not changed appreciably, the Dinka would be

expected to play a large part in the new politics of southern Sudan.

Some of the leading figures in the south, such as Abel Alier, head

of southern Sudan's government until 1981, and SPLA leader John

Garang, were Dinka (although the SPLA made an effort to shed

its Dinka image by cultivating supporters in other groups). It is not known whether the twenty-five Dinka tribal groups were equally

represented in the alleged Dinka predominance. Some groups, such

as the Nuer, a comparable Nilotic people and traditional rivals of

the Dinka, had been deprived of leadership opportunities in colonial

times because they were considered intractable, were then not

numerous, and lived in inaccessible areas (various small groups

in Bahr al Ghazal and northern Aali an Nil provinces). In contrast,

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Sudan: A Country Study

some small groups in Al Istiwai Province had easier access to education and hence to political participation because of nearby missions. The first graduating class of the university in Juba, for example, had many more Azande students from Al Istiwai Province

than from Bahr al Ghazal and Aali an Nil.

The Social Order

Local ethnic communities remained in the early 1990s the fundamental societies in rural Sudan, whether they were fully settled,

semisedentary, or nomadic. Varying in size but never very large,

such communities formerly interacted with others of their kind in

hostile or symbiotic fashion, raiding for cattle, women, and slaves or exchanging products and sometimes intermarrying. In many

cases, particularly in the north, local communities were incorporated into larger political systems, paying taxes to the central

authority and adapting their local political arrangements to the

needs of the central government. Even if they were not incorporated into major tribes or groups, many people considered themselves part of larger groupings, such as the Juhayna, the Jaali, or

the Dinka, which figured in a people's system of ideas and myths

but not their daily lives. In the north the Muslim religious orders were important. They brought religion to the people, and their leaders acted as mediators between local communities. Despite these

connections, however, the local village or nomadic community was

the point of reference for most individuals.

Most of these communities were based on descent, although oc- cupation of a common territory became increasingly important in

long- settled communities. Descent groups varied in hierarchical

arrangement. In some, the people were essentially equal. In others,

various lineages held political power, with their members filling

certain offices. Lineage groups might also control religious ritual

in the community. On the one hand, people who held ritual or

political offices often had privileged access to economic resources. On the other hand, many communities granted formal or informal authority to those who were already wealthy and who used

their wealth generously and with tactical skill. Theoretically, descent- group societies are cohesive units whose

members act according to group interests. In practice, however,

individuals often had their own interests, and these interests sometimes became paramount. An individual might, however, use the

ideal of descent-group solidarity to justify his behavior, and an ambitious person might use the descent- group framework to organize

support for himself. Sudanese communities always have experienced a good deal of change, either because of forces like the Muslim

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The Society and Its Environment

orders, or as a result of dynamics within the groups themselves,

like the expansion of Nuer communities.

The Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1955) weakened the

role of hitherto autonomous communities and created a more sta- ble social order. Warfare and raiding between communities largely

ended. Leadership in raids was no longer a way to acquire wealth

and status. Although many local communities remained subsistence

oriented, they became more aware of the world economy. Their

members were introduced to new resources and opportunities,

however scarce, that reoriented their notions of power, status, and

wealth and of the ways they were acquired. If one invested in a

truck rather than in a camel and engaged in trading rather than

herding, one's relationship to kin and community changed.

The central authorities—links with the world economy and with

services like education and communications—were located in the

cities and large towns. Urban centers therefore became the sources of change in the condominium era, and it was there that new oc- cupations emerged. These new occupations had not yet changed

the social strata, however.

In rural areas several large-scale development projects were in- troduced, resulting in major rearrangements of communities and

authority structures. The most significant example was the Gezira

Scheme, located between the Blue Nile and the White Nile, and

considered the world's largest single-management farming enterprise (about 790 hectares were covered by the project). The scheme

involved small-scale farmer tenants producing cotton under the administration of the Sudan Gezira Board, a state subsidiary.

Northern Arabized Communities

Distinctions may be drawn among long-settled arabized communities, those settled in the past half century, and those—the

minority—that remained nomadic. Recendy settled groups might

still participate in nomadic life or have close connections with no- madic kin.

Formerly, where long- settled and nomadic or beduin communities came in contact with each other, relations were hostile or

cool, reflecting earlier competition for resources. More recently, a degree of mutual dependency had developed, usually involving

exchanges of foodstuffs. Along the White Nile and between the White Nile and Blue Nile,

sections of nomadic tribes had become sedentary. This transition

occurred either because of the opportunities for profitable cultivation or because nomads had lost their animals and turned to culti- vation until they could recoup their fortunes and return to nomadic

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Sudan: A Country Study

life. Having settled, some communities found sedentary life more

materially rewarding. Sometimes nomads lacking livestock worked

for sedentary Arabs, and where employer and employee were of

the same or similar tribes, the relationship could be close. It was

understood that when such a laborer acquired enough livestock,

he would return to nomadic life. In other cases, a fully settied former

nomad with profitable holdings allowed his poorer kin to maintain his livestock, both parties gaining from the transaction.

Arab nomads in Sudan in the early 1990s were generally camel

or cattle herders. They might own sheep and goats also for eco- nomic reasons, but these animals were not otherwise valued. Typically, camel herders migrated to the more arid north, whereas catde

herders traveled farther south where camel herding was not feasible. The ancestors of the Baqqara tribes began as nomadic camel

herders. When they moved south to raid for slaves, they found

camel travel inappropriate and took cattle as well as people from

the southerners. They have been cattle herders since the eighteenth

century. Their environment permitted cultivation also, and most

Baqqara grew some of their food. Camel herders, in contrast, rarely

sowed a crop, although they might gather wild grain and obtain

grains from local cultivators.

In the 1990s, the communities of arabized nomads were similar. In principle, all units from the smallest to the largest were based on patrilineal descent. The largest entity was the tribe. A tribe was

divided into sections, and each of these, into smaller units. If a

tribe were small, it became a naziriyah (administrative unit—see Glossary); if large, its major sections became naziriyat. The sec- tions below the naziriyah became umudiyat (sing. , umudiyah—see Glossary). Below that were lineages, often headed by a shaykh, which

had no formal position in the administrative hierarchy. The smallest

unit, which the Baqqara called usrah, was likely to consist of a man,

his sons, their sons, and any daughters who had not yet married.

(Patrilineal cousins were preferred marriage partners.) The usrah and the women who married into it constituted an extended family.

All divisions had rights to all tribal territory for grazing purposes

as long as they stayed clear of cultivated land; however, through

frequent use, tribal sections acquired rights to specific areas for gardens. Members of an usrah, for example, returned year after year to the same land, which they regarded as their home.

The constant subdividing of lineages gave fluidity to nomadic

society. Tribal sections seceded, moved away, and joined with others

for various reasons. The composition and size of even the smallest

social units varied according to the season of the year and the natural

environment. Individuals, families, and larger units usually moved

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The Society and Its Environment

in search of a more favorable social environment, but also because

of quarrels, crowding, or personal attachments. The size and composition of various groups, and ultimately of the tribe itself, depended on the amount of grazing land available and on the policies

and personalities of the leaders.

Traditionally, a man rich in cattle always had been sure to at- tract followers. The industry, thrift, and hardiness needed to build a large herd have been considered highly desirable qualities. At

the same time, a rich man would be expected to be generous. If he lived up to that expectation, his fame would spread, and he would

attract more followers. But wealth alone did not gain a nomad power

beyond the level of a camp or several related camps. Ambition,

ability to manipulate, hardheaded shrewdness, and attention to such

matters as the marriage of his daughters to possible allies were also required.

In the precondominium era, leaders of various sections of a tribe

had prestige but relatively little authority, in part because those

who did not like them could leave. The colonial authorities stabi- lized the floating power positions in the traditional system. For purposes of taxation, justice, and public order, the new government

needed representative authorities over identifiable groups. Locality could not serve as a basis in a nomadic society, so the government settled on the leaders of patrilineal descent groups and gave

them a formal power they had previously lacked.

Among the nomadic Kababish camel herders (a loose confederation of tribes fluctuating in size, composition, and location), the

definition of the tribe as a single unit by the colonial authorities

and the appointment of an ambitious and capable individual as

nazir led to a major change in social structure. Tribal sections and

subsections were gradually eroded, leaving the individual household as the basic unit, ruled by the nazir and his primitive bureaucracy. The ruling lineage developed a concept of aristocracy, became

very wealthy, and in effect spoke for its people in all contexts. The administrative structure of the naziriyah and umudiyah ended

shortly after the establishment of President Jaafar an Nimeiri's

government in 1969, but the families of those who had held formal

authority retained a good deal of local power. This authority or

administrative structure was officially revived in 1986 by the coali- tion government of Sadiq al Mahdi.

Of continuing importance in economic and domestic matters and

often in organizing political factions were minimal lineages, each

comprehending three (at best four) generations. The social status of these lineages depended on whether they stemmed from old set- tler families or from newer ones. In villages composed of families

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Sudan: A Country Study

or lineages of several tribes, marriage would likely take place within

the tribe. A class structure existed within villages. Large holdings were

apt to be in the hands of merchants or leaders of religious brotherhoods, whose connections were wider and who did not necessarily

live in the villages near their land. Although no longer nomadic,

the ordinary villager preferred not to cultivate the land himself,

however. Before the abolition of slavery, slaves did much of the

work. Even after emancipation some ex- slaves or descendants of

slaves remained as servants of their former masters or their descendants. Some villagers hired West Africans to do their work. Exslaves and seminomads or gypsies {halabi, usually smiths) living near the village were looked down on, and marriage with them

by members of other classes was out of the question. A descendant of slaves could acquire education and respect, but villagers

did not consider him a suitable partner for their daughters. Slave

women had formerly been taken as concubines by villagers, but

it was not clear that they were acceptable as wives.

Landholders in government-sponsored projects did not own the

property but were tenants of the government. The tenants might

be displaced Nubians, settled non-Arab nomads—as in Khashm

al Qirbah—settled or nomadic Arabs, or West Africans. Many of

these people used hired labor, either West Africans or nomads temporarily without livestock. In many instances, the original tenant

remained a working farmer even if he used wage labor. In others,

however, the original tenant might leave management in the hands

of a kinsman and either live as a nomad or work and live in a city, a lifestyle typical of Nubians.

Although all settled communities were linked to the government,

the projects involved a much closer relation between officials and

villagers because officials managed the people as well as the enterprise. In effect, however, officials were outsiders, dominating the

community but not part of it. They identified with the civil ser- vice rather than the community.

West Africans working in Arab settled communities formed co- hesive communities of their own, and their relations with Arab

tenants appeared to be restricted to their work agreements, even though both groups were Muslims. Cotton cultivation, practiced on most of the farms, was labor intensive, and because available

labor was often scarce, particularly during the picking season, the

West African laborers could command good wages. Their wages

were set by agreements between the tenants who held the land and

the headmen of the West African communities, and these agreements tended to set the wage scale for Arab laborers as well.

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The Society and Its Environment

In the White Nile area, more recently settled by nomadic groups,

aspects of nomadic social organization persisted through the con- dominium era. As among the nomads, leadership went to those

who used their wealth generously and judiciously to gain the support of their lineages. In this case, however, wealth often took the

form of grain rather than livestock. Most major lineages had such

leaders, and those that did not were considered at a disadvantage.

In addition to the wealthy, religious leaders (shaykhs) also had in- fluence in these communities, particularly as mediators, in contrast to secular leaders who were often authoritarian.

The establishment of the naziriyah and umudiyah system tended

to fix leadership in particular families, but there were often conflicts over which members should hold office. In the case of the

Kawahla tribes of the White Nile, the ruling family tended to settle these differences in order to maintain its monopoly of important positions, and it took on the characteristics of a ruling lineage.

Other lineages, however, tended to decline in importance as the

system of which they had been a part changed. The ruling lineage

made a point of educating its sons, so that they could find positions in business or in government. Although the Nimeiri government abolished the older system of local government, it appears

that the former ruling lineage continued to play a leading role in

the area. Southern Communities

In preindependence Sudan, most southern communities were

small, except for the large conglomerate of Nilotes, Dinka, and

Nuer who dominated the Bahr al Ghazal and the Aali an Nil

provinces and the Azande people of Al Istiwai Province. During

the condominium, the colonial administration imposed stronger

local authority on the communities. It made local leaders chiefs or headmen and gave them executive and judicial powers

tempered by local councils, usually of elders—to administer their

people, under the scrutiny of a British district commissioner. As

in the north, the relatively fluid relationships and boundaries among

southern Sudanese became more stabilized.

There is no systematic record of how independence, civil war,

and famine have affected the social order of southern peoples. The

gradual incorporation of southerners into the national system—if only as migrant laborers and as local craftpeople—and increased

opportunities for education have, however, affected social arrangements, ideas of status, and political views.

An educated elite had emerged in the south, and in 1991 , some members of this elite were important politicians and administrators

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Sudan: A Country Study

at the regional and national levels; however, other members had

emigrated to escape northern discrimination. How the newer elite was linked to the older one was not clear. Secular chieftainships

had been mostly gifts of the colonial authorities, but the sons of

chiefs took advantage of their positions to get a Western education and to create family ties among local and regional elites. Southern Sudan's development of an elite based on education

and government office was facilitated by the absence of an indige- nous trading and entrepreneurial class, who might have challenged

the educated elite. Southern merchants were mostly Arabs or others

of nonsouthern origin. In addition, the south lacked the equivalent of the northern Muslim leaders of religious orders, who also

might have claimed a share of influence. Instead of several elites owing their status and power to varied sources and constituencies,

the south developed an elite that looked for its support to persons

of its own ethnic background and to those who identified with the

south's African heritage. It was difficult to assess in the early 1990s,

however, whether the civil war still allowed any elite southerners

to gain much advantage.

In traditional Nilotic society clans were of two kinds. One kind, a minority but a large one, consisted of clans whose members had

religious functions and furnished the priests of subtribes, sections,

and sometimes of tribes. These priests have been called chiefs or masters of the fishing spear, a reference to the ritual importance

of that instrument. Clans of the other kind were warrior groupings. The difference was one of function rather than rank. A spear- master prayed for his people going to war or in other difficult situations and mediated between quarreling groups. He could function as a leader, but his powers lay in persuasion, not coercion.

A spearmaster with a considerable reputation for spiritual power

was deferred to on many issues. In rare cases—the most important was that of the Shilluk—one of the ritual offices gained in- fluence over an entire people, and its holder was assigned the

attributes of a divine king.

A special religious figure—commonly called a prophet—has

arisen among some of the Nilotic peoples from time to time. Such

prophets, thought to be possessed by a sky spirit, often had much

wider influence than the ritual officeholders, who were confined

to specific territorial segments. They gained substantial reputations

as healers and used those reputations to rally their people against

other ethnic groups and sometimes against the Arabs and the Europeans. The condominium authorities considered prophets subversive even when their message did not apparently oppose authority

and hence suppressed them.

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The Society and Its Environment

Another social pattern common to the Nilotes was the age-set

system. Traditionally, males were periodically initiated into sets according to age; with the set, they moved through a series of stages,

assuming and shedding rights and responsibilities as the group advanced in age. The system was closely linked to warfare and raiding, which diminished during the condominium. In modern times

the civil war and famine further undermined the system, and its remnants seemed likely to fade as formal education became more

accessible.

Historically, the Dinka have been the most populous Nilotic people, so numerous that social and political patterns varied from one

tribal group to another. Among the Dinka, the tribal group was composed of a set of independent tribes that settled in a continu- ous area. The tribe, which ranged in size from 1,000 to 25,000

persons, traditionally had only two political functions. First, it controlled and defended the dry season pastures of its constituent subtribes; second, if a member of the tribe killed another member,

the issue would be resolved peacefully. Homicide committed by someone outside the tribe was avenged, but not by the tribe as a

whole. The colonial administration, seeking equitable access to adequate pasturage for all tribes, introduced a different system and

thus eliminated one of the tribe's two responsibilities. In postindependence Sudan, the handling of homicide as a crime against

the state made the tribe's second function also irrelevant. The utili- zation and politicization of ethnic groups as units of local government have supported the continuation of tribal structures into the

1990s; however, the tribal chiefs lacked any traditional functions,

except as sage advisers to their people in personal and family matters. In the contemporary period, some attempts have been made

to transform these ethnic tribal structures in order to produce a

national or at least a greater summational identity. For instance,

in the early formation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), one of the main ideological tenets was the need to produce a new nonnorthern riverine area solidarity based on the

mobilization of diverse ethnic groups in deprived areas. Although

its success has been limited, to achieve this new sense of solidarity

it has attempted to recruit not only southerners, but also the Fur,

Funj, Nuba, and Beja communities.

The subtribes were the largest significant political segments, and

they were converted into subchiefdoms by the colonial government.

Although the subchiefs were stripped of most of their administrative authority during the Nimeiri regime (1969-85) and replaced

by loyal members of the Sudan Socialist Union, the advice of subchiefs was sought on local matters. Thus, a three-tiered system was

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Sudan: A Country Study

created: the traditional authorities, the Sudanese civil service, and

the political bureaucrats from Khartoum. During the 1980s, this confused system of administration dissolved into virtual anarchy

as a result of the replacement of one regime by another, civil war, and famine. In the south, however, the SPLM created new local administrative structures in areas under its control. In general, thus,

although severely damaged, the traditional structure of Nilotic so- ciety remained relatively unchanged. Loyalties to one's rural ethnic community were deeply rooted and were not forgotten even by those who fled for refuge to northern urban centers. Urban and National Elites In this regionally and ethnically differentiated country, peoples

and communities have been identified as Sudanese only by virtue

of orientation to and control by a common government. They

seemed not to share significant elements of a common value sys- tem, and economic ties among them were tenuous. If a national

society and elites were emerging, it was in the Three Towns constituting the national capital area. It was in Khartoum, Khartoum

North, and Omdurman that the national politicians, high-level

bureaucrats, senior military, educated professionals, and wealthy

merchants and entrepreneurs lived, worked, and socialized. Even

those who had residences elsewhere maintained second homes in

Omdurman.

These elites had long recognized the usefulness of maintaining

a presence in the capital area, invariably living in Omdurman, a much more Arab city than Khartoum. The other, truly urban elites also tended to live in Omdurman, but the concentration of north- ern Sudan's varied elites in one city did not necessarily engender

a common social life. As in many Arab and African cities, much

of Omdurman's population lived in separate if not wholly isolated

quarters.

Two components of the elite structure were not dominantly

urban, however, although they were represented in the cities. These were the heads of important religious groups, whose constituencies and sources of power and wealth were largely rural, and what

may be termed tribal elites, who carried some weight on the national level by virtue of their representing regional or sectional interests. To the extent that the elites were Muslim and Arab—most were

both—they shared a religion and language, but they were otherwise marked by differences in interest and outlook. Even more

divergent were the southerners. Most elite southerners were non- Muslims, few spoke Arabic fluently, and they were regarded

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The Society and Its Environment

and saw themselves—not primarily as a professional or bureaucratic

elite, but as a regional one. Many were said to prefer a career in

the south to a post in Khartoum. These southern elites exercised

political power directly or gave significant support to those who

did. But so diverse and sometimes conflicting were their interests

and outlooks that they did not constitute a cohesive class. Changing Sudanese society had not developed a consensus on

what kinds of work, talents, possessions, and background were more

worthy than others and therefore conferred higher status. There

had long been merchants, entrepreneurs, and religious leaders in

Sudan. The latter had a special status, but wealth and the influence

and power it generated had come to carry greater status in the

Sudan of 1991 than did religious position. The educated secular

elite was a newer phenomenon, and some deference was given its members by other elites. In the Muslim north, the educated ranged

from devotees of Islamic activism to Islamic reformers and a few

avowed secularists. Despite the respect generally given the educated, those at either extreme were likely to make members of other

elites uncomfortable.

The younger, larger generation of the educated elite were not

all offspring of the older, smaller educated elite. Many were sons (and sometimes daughters) of businessmen, wealthy landowners,

and the tribal elite. It had not been established where the interests

of first- generation educated persons lay, whether with a growing

educated elite or with their families of very different backgrounds.

A peculiar feature of the educated Sudanese was the fact that large

numbers lived outside Sudan for years at a time, working in Middle Eastern oil-producing states, Europe, or North America. Some

of their earnings came back to Sudan, but it was not clear that they

had much to do with the formation or characteristics of a specifically Sudanese elite. Tribal and ethnic elites carried weight in specific localities and

might be significant if the states were to achieve substantial au- tonomy; however, their importance on the national scene was questionable.

Socializing and intermarriage among members of the different

elites would have been significant in establishing a cohesive upper

class. But that had not happened yet, and movement in that direction had suffered a severe blow when the government of Colonel

Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir that came to power on June 30,

1989, imprisoned and executed leaders of the elite. Until the Bashir

government displaced it in favor of Islamists, the elite regarded

itself as the arbiter of social acceptance into the company of those

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Sudan: A Country Study

riverine Arab families who had long lived in the OmdurmanKhartoum area, had substantial income from landholding, and had

participated in the higher reaches of government during the con- dominium or engaged in the professions of medicine, law, and the

university. Men from these families were well educated. Few en- gaged in business, which tended to be in the hands of families of

at least partial Egyptian ancestry.

Beginning in the late 1960s, northern Muslims of non-Egyptian

background began to acquire substantial wealth as businessmen,

often as importers and exporters. By the early 1980s, perhaps twenty

of them were millionaires. These men had been relatively young

when they began their entrepreneurial activity, and unlike members of the older elite families, they were not well educated. By

the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, many of these businessmen had started sending their children to Britain or the United

States for their education. Reflecting trends in other societies,

whereas the sons of the older elite had been educated mainly for government careers, by the 1980s business education was increasingly emphasized. In contrast to the more secular elites in the professions, the civil service, and the military, however, many members

of these newer economic elites gravitated toward religion and the

Muslim Brotherhood.

Typically, the older elite intermarried and excluded those whose

backgrounds they did not know, even if the families were wealthy

and successful in business, religion, or education. Gradually, after independence, Arabic speakers of other sedentary families acquired

higher education, entered the bureaucracy or founded lucrative

businesses, and began to participate to a limited degree in the social circle of the older families. The emphasis on * 'good family"

persisted, however, in most marriages. Sedentary Arabs were ac- ceptable, as were some persons of an older mixture of Arab and

Nile Nubian ancestry, for example, the people around Dunqulah.

But southern and western Sudanese—even if Muslims—and members of nomadic groups (particularly the darker Baqqara Arabs) were not. A southern Sudanese man might be esteemed for his

achievements and other qualities, but he was not considered an

eligible husband for a woman of a sedentary Arab family. There

were some exceptions, as there had been decades ago, but they were

generally perceived as such.

Women and the Family

In Sudan, the extended family provided social services. Traditionally, the family was responsible for the old, the sick, and the

mentally ill, although many of these responsibilities had been eroded

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The Society and Its Environment

by urbanization. Whether in rural or urban society, however, the

burden of these social services fell upon the women.

Except for a small number of liberated, educated young women

from families of the elite, women remained within the household

and were segregated at all festivities, eating after the men. This was particularly the case with Muslim households. Men entertained

in their own quarters, and males of an extended family ate together.

In a small family, the husband ate alone or, more frequently, took

his bowl to join his male neighbors.

A young university couple might live much as in the West, in a house without relatives, and might live, eat, and entertain to- gether. Nevertheless, traditional patterns were deeply rooted, and

the husband would often be away visiting his male friends in the

market and cafes. At home a servant helped with the children.

Although the educated young married or unmarried woman had

greater mobility because of her job, she was not exempt from the

traditional restrictions and the supremacy of the Muslim husband.

She was aware that her education and job were not a license to trespass upon male-dominated social norms.

In some respects, the uneducated woman had greater freedom

so long as it was with her peers; for even among well-to-do families, a young woman was restricted to her household and female

friends until transferred to similar seclusion in the house of her husband. Paradoxically, this segregation could create a spirit of in- dependence, particularly among educated women, for there were

a host of aunts, cousins, and grandmothers to look after the chil- dren and allow the mothers to work outside the home. Nevertheless, social traditions governed the way of life of Sudanese women.

The segregation and subordination of women in Sudanese society

should not obscure the fact that women dominated the household

just as their men commanded public life. The home and the rear- ing of children were their domains—so long as they upheld maleoriented social norms. Two traditional customs among Sudanese women had an enor- mous impact upon their private and social relationships—the zar

cult and female "circumcision." Zar was the name given to the

ceremony conducted only by women practitioners required to pacify

evil spirits and to cleanse women of afflictions caused by demons

or jinn. Zar cults were numerous throughout Muslim Africa. Ill- nesses, including depression, infertility, and other organic and psychological disorders, were attributed to possession by hostile spirits.

Although zar ceremonies varied widely, they not only freed the one

possessed but were great social occasions where women could communicate together as men did within male circles.

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Sudan: A Country Study

Female circumcision, or infibulation (excising the external genitalia and sewing the vagina shut) was widely practiced throughout

Muslim Africa, and especially among Sudan's northern Arab population. Enormous pressure was put on the twelve-year-old or younger girl, as well as older women and their families, to observe

these ceremonies and practices.

The issue of female circumcision was controversial, however,

because of the physical and psychological problems it caused

women. Midwives performed the operations, which often led to shock, hemorrhage, and septicemia. They created innumerable obstetrical problems before and after childbirth and throughout life. Despite international conferences, legislation, and efforts to eradi- cate these practices, however, in the early 1990s they appeared to be on the increase, not only in Sudan but in Africa, generally. At

the same time, the adoption of Western medicine by growing educated classes was increasingly promoting awareness of the harmful effects of infibulation on women; the spread of Islam, however,

inhibited the eradication of this practice.

In southern Sudan, the role of women differed dramatically from

that in the north. Although women were subordinate to men, they

enjoyed much greater freedom within southern Sudan's societies. Female circumcision was not practiced and no zar cult existed,

although the spirits were regularly consulted about private and public affairs through practitioners. Women had greater freedom of

movement and, indeed, participated to a limited degree in the councils of lineage. Husbands consulted their wives on matters pertaining

to public affairs. Many women also played important roles in the

mediation of disputes.

Religious Life

Somewhat more than half Sudan's population was Muslim in the

early 1990s. Most Muslims, perhaps 90 percent, lived in the north,

where they constituted 75 percent or more of the population. Data on Christians was less reliable; estimates ranged from 4 to 10 per- cent of the population. At least one-third of the Sudanese were still attached to the indigenous religions of their forebears. Most Christian Sudanese and adherents of local religious systems lived in

southern Sudan. Islam had made inroads into the south, but more

through the need to know Arabic than a profound belief in the tenets of the Quran. The SPLM, which in 1991 controlled most of southern

Sudan, opposed the imposition of the sharia (Islamic law).

Islam: Tenets and Practice

Sudanese Muslims are adherents of the Sunni branch of Islam,

sometimes called orthodox, by far the larger of the two major

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branches; the other branch is Shia (see Glossary), which is not

represented in Sudan. Sunni Islam in Sudan is not marked by a uniform body of belief and practice, however. Some Muslims opposed aspects of Sunni orthodoxy, and rites having a non-Islamic

origin were widespread, being accepted as if they were integral to Islam, or sometimes being recognized as separate. Moreover, Sunni

Islam in Sudan (as in much of Africa) has been characterized by

the formation of religious orders or brotherhoods, each of which

made special demands on its adherents.

Sunni Islam requires of the faithful five fundamental obligations

that constitute the five pillars of Islam. The first pillar, the shahada or profession of faith, is the affirmation "There is no god but God

(Allah) and Muhammad is his prophet." It is the first step in becoming a Muslim and a significant part of prayer. The second obligation is prayer at five specified times of the day. The third enjoins

almsgiving. The fourth requires fasting during daylight hours in

the month of Ramadan. The fifth requires a pilgrimage to Mecca

for those able to perform it, to participate in the special rites that occur during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar.

Most Sudanese Muslims who are born to the faith meet the first requirement. Conformity to the second requirement is more variable. Many males in the cities and larger towns manage to pray

five times a day—at dawn, noon, midafternoon, sundown, and

evening. Only one of these prayer times occurs during the usual

working day of an urban dweller. A cultivator or pastoralist may

find it more difficult to meet the requirements. Regular prayer is considered the mark of a true Muslim; it is usually accomplished

individually or in small groups. Congregational prayer takes place

at the Friday mosque when Muslims (usually men, but occasionally women separately located) gather, not only for the noon prayer, but also to hear readings and a sermon by the local imam (see Glossary). Muslims fast during the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, Ramadan, the time during which the first revelations to Muhammad occurred. It is a period during which most Muslims

must abstain from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual activity

during the daylight hours. The well-to-do perform litde work during this period, and many businesses close or operate on reduced

schedules. Because the months of the lunar calendar revolve through

the solar year, Ramadan occurs during various seasons over a period

of a decade or so. In the early 1990s, observance appeared to be

widespread, especially in urban areas and among sedentary Sudanese Muslims.

Historically, in the Muslim world almsgiving meant both a special tax for the benefit of the poor and voluntary giving to the needy,

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Sudan: A Country Study

but its voluntary aspect alone survives. Alms may be given at any

time, but there are specific occasions in the Islamic year or in the

life of the donor when they are more commonly dispensed. Gifts,

whether of money or food, may be made on such occasions as the

feasts that end Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca, or in pen- ance for some misdeed. These offerings and others are typically

distributed to poor kin and neighbors.

The pilgrimage to Mecca is less costly and arduous for the Sudanese than it is for many Muslims. Nevertheless, it takes time (or

money if travel is by air), and the ordinary Sudanese Muslim has

generally found it difficult to accomplish, rarely undertaking it before middle age. Some have joined pilgrimage societies into which

members pay a small amount monthly and choose one of their number when sufficient funds have accumulated to send someone on

the pilgrimage. A returned pilgrim is entided to use the honorific

title hajj or hajjih for a woman.

Another ceremony commonly observed is the great feast Id al Adha (also known as Id al Kabir), representing the sacrifice made

during the last days of the pilgrimage. The centerpiece of the day

is the slaughter of a sheep, which is distributed to the poor, kin,

neighbors, and friends, as well as the immediate family.

Islam imposes a standard of conduct encouraging generosity,

fairness, and honesty. Sudanese Arabs, especially those who are wealthy, are expected by their coreligionists to be generous.

In accordance with Islamic law, most Sudanese Muslims do not

eat pork or shellfish. Conformity to the prohibitions on gambling

and alcohol is less widespread. Usury is also forbidden by Islamic

law, but Islamic banks have developed other ways of making money

available to the public (see Islamic Banking, ch. 3). Sunni Islam insists on observance of the sharia, which governs

not only religious activity narrowly conceived but also daily per- sonal and social relationships. In principle, the sharia stems not

from legislative enactment or judicial decision but from the Quran

and the hadith—the accepted sayings of Muhammad. That principle has given rise to the conventional understanding, advocated

by Islamists, that there is no distinction between the religious and

the secular in a truly Islamic society. Until 1983 modern criminal

and civil, including commercial, law generally prevailed in Sudan.

In the north, however, the sharia was expected to govern what is usually called family and personal law, i.e., matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In the towns and in some sedentary communities sharia was accepted, but in other sedentary

communities and among nomads local custom was likely to

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The Society and Its Environment

prevail—particularly with respect to inheritance (see The Legal System, ch. 4). In September 1983, Nimeiri imposed the sharia throughout the

land, eliminating the civil and penal codes by which the country

had been governed in the twentieth century. Traditional Islamic

punishments were imposed for theft, adultery, homicide, and other

crimes. The zealousness with which these punishments were car- ried out contributed to the fall of Nimeiri. Nevertheless, no suc- cessor government, including that of Bashir, has shown inclination

to abandon the sharia.

Islam is monotheistic and insists that there can be no intercessors between an individual and God. Nevertheless, Sudanese Islam

includes a belief in spirits as sources of illness or other afflictions and in magical ways of dealing with them. The imam of a mosque

is a prayer leader and preacher of sermons. He may also be a teacher

and in smaller communities combines both functions. In the latter

role, he is called afaqih (p\.,fuqaha), although afaqih need not be an imam. In addition to teaching in the local Quranic school

(khalwa—see Glossary), the faqih is expected to write texts (from

the Quran) or magical verses to be used as amulets and cures. His

blessing may be asked at births, marriages, deaths, and other important occasions, and he may participate in wholly non-Islamic

harvest rites in some remote places. All of these functions and capacities make the, faqih the most important figure in popular Islam.

But he is not a priest. His religious authority is based on his putative knowledge of the Quran, the sharia, and techniques for dealing with occult threats to health and well-being. The notion that

the words of the Quran will protect against the actions of evil spirits or the evil eye is deeply embedded in popular Islam, and the amulets prepared by the faqih are intended to protect their wearers

against these dangers.

In Sudan as in much of African Islam, the cult of the saint is of considerable importance, although some Muslims would reject

it. The development of the cult is closely related to the presence

of the religious orders; many who came to be considered saints on

their deaths were founders or leaders of religious orders who in

their lifetimes were thought to have baraka, a state of blessedness

implying an indwelling spiritual power inherent in the religious

office. Baraka intensifies after death as the deceased becomes a wali

(literally friend of God, but in this context translated as saint). The

tomb and other places associated with the saintly being become

the loci of the person's baraka, and in some views he or she be- comes the guardian spirit of the locality. The intercession of the

wali is sought on a variety of occasions, particularly by those seeking

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Sudan: A Country Study

cures or by barren women desiring children. A saint's annual holy

day is the occasion of a local festival that may attract a large gathering.

Better-educated Muslims in Sudan may participate in prayer at a saint's tomb but argue that prayer is directed only to God. Many

others, however, see the saint not merely as an intercessor with

and an agent of God, but also as a nearly autonomous source of

blessing and power, thereby approaching popular as opposed to orthodox Islam.

Islamic Movements and Religious Orders

Islam made its deepest and longest lasting impact in Sudan

through the activity of the Islamic religious brotherhoods or orders.

These orders emerged in the Middle East in the twelfth century

in connection with the development of Sufism, a mystical current

reacting to the strongly legalistic orientation of orthodox Islam. The

orders first came to Sudan in the sixteenth century and became

significant in the eighteenth. Sufism seeks for its adherents a closer

personal relationship with God through special spiritual disciplines.

The exercises (dhikr) include reciting prayers and passages of the

Quran and repeating the names, or attributes, of God while per- forming physical movements according to the formula established

by the founder of the particular order. Singing and dancing may

be introduced. The outcome of an exercise, which lasts much longer

than the usual daily prayer, is often a state of ecstatic abandon.

A mystical or devotional way (sing. , tariqa; pi. , turuq) is the basis

for the formation of particular orders, each of which is also called a tariqa. The specialists in religious law and learning initially looked

askance at Sufism and the Sufi orders, but the leaders of Sufi orders

in Sudan have won acceptance by acknowledging the significance

of the sharia and not claiming that Sufism replaces it. The principal turuq vary considerably in their practice and in- ternal organization. Some orders are tightly organized in hierarchical fashion; others have allowed their local branches considerable

autonomy. There may be as many as a dozen turuq in Sudan. Some

are restricted to that country; others are widespread in Africa or

the Middle East. Several turuq, for all practical purposes independent, are offshoots of older orders and were established by men

who altered in major or minor ways the tariqa of the orders to which

they had formerly been attached.

The oldest and most widespread of the turuq is the Qadiriyah

founded by Abd al Qadir al Jilani in Baghdad in the twelfth cen- tury and introduced into Sudan in the sixteenth. The Qadiriyah 's principal rival and the largest tariqa in the western part of the country

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The Society and Its Environment

was the Tijaniyah, a sect begun by Ahmad at Tijani in Morocco,

which eventually penetrated Sudan in about 1810 via the western

Sahel (see Glossary). Many Tijani became influential in Darfur,

and other adherents settled in northern Kurdufan. Later on, a class of Tijani merchants arose as markets grew in towns and trade ex- panded, making them less concerned with providing religious

leadership. Of greater importance to Sudan was the tariqa established by the followers of Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris, known as Al

Fasi, who died in 1837. Although he lived in Arabia and never

visited Sudan, his students spread into the Nile Valley establishing indigenous Sudanese orders, the Majdhubiyah, the Idrisiyah,

and the Khatmiyyah.

Much different in organization from the other brotherhoods is the Khatmiyyah (or Mirghaniyah after the name of the order's

founder). Established in the early nineteenth century by Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani, it became the best organized and most

politically oriented and powerful of the turuq in eastern Sudan (see

The Turkiyah, 1821-85, ch. 1). Mirghani had been a student of

Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris and had joined several important orders,

calling his own order the seal of the paths (Khatim at Turuq

hence Khatmiyyah). The salient features of the Khatmiyyah are

the extraordinary status of the Mirghani family, whose members

alone may head the order; loyalty to the order, which guarantees

paradise; and the centralized control of the order's branches.

The Khatmiyyah had its center in the southern section of Ash

Sharqi State and its greatest following in eastern Sudan and in portions of the riverine area. The Mirghani family were able to turn

the Khatmiyyah into a political power base, despite its broad geographical distribution, because of the tight control they exercised over their followers. Moreover, gifts from followers over the years

have given the family and the order the wealth to organize politically. This power did not equal, however, that of the Mirghani'

s

principal rival, the Ansar, or followers of the Mahdi, whose presentday leader was Sadiq al Mahdi, the great-grandson of Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, al Mahdi, who drove the

Egyptian administration from Sudan in 1885.

Most other orders were either smaller or less well organized than

the Khatmiyyah. Moreover, unlike many other African Muslims,

Sudanese Muslims did not all seem to feel the need to identify with one or another tariqa, even if the affiliation were nominal. Many

Sudanese Muslims preferred more political movements that sought

to change Islamic society and governance to conform to their own

visions of the true nature of Islam.

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Sudan: A Country Study

One of these movements, Mahdism, was founded in the late nineteenth century. It has been likened to a religious order, but

it is not a tariqa in the traditional sense. Mahdism and its adherents, the Ansar, sought the regeneration of Islam, and in general were critical of the turuq. Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd

Allah, afaqih, proclaimed himself to be Al Mahdi al Muntazar ("the

awaited guide in the right path," usually seen as the Mahdi), the

messenger of God and representative of the Prophet Muhammad,

not simply a charismatic and learned teacher, an assertion that be- came an article of faith among the Ansar. He was sent, he said, to prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet Isa (Jesus)

and the impending end of the world. In anticipation ofJudgment

Day, it was essential that the people return to a simple and rigorous, even puritanical Islam (see The Mahdiyah, 1884-98, ch. 1). The

idea of the coming of a Mahdi has roots in Sunni Islamic traditions. The issue for Sudanese and other Muslims was whether

Muhammad Ahmad was in fact the Mahdi.

In the century since the Mahdist uprising, the neo-Mahdist move- ment and the Ansar, supporters of Mahdism from the west, have

persisted as a political force in Sudan. Many groups, from the Baqqara cattle nomads to the largely sedentary tribes on the White

Nile, supported this movement. The Ansar were hierarchically or- ganized under the control of Muhammad Ahmad's successors, who

have all been members of the Mahdi family (members of the ashraj).

The ambitions and varying political perspectives of different members of the family have led to internal conflicts, and it appeared

that Sadiq al Mahdi, putative leader of the Ansar since the early

1970s, did not enjoy the unanimous support of all Mahdists. Mahdist family political goals and ambitions seemed to have taken

precedence over the movement's original religious mission. The

modern-day Ansar were thus loyal more to the political descendants of the Mahdi than to the religious message of Mahdism.

A movement that spread widely in Sudan in the 1960s, responding to the efforts to secularize Islamic society, was the Muslim

Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan al Muslimin), founded by Hasan al Banna

in Egypt in the 1920s. Originally it was conceived as a religious

revivalist movement that sought to return to the fundamentals of

Islam in a way that would be compatible with the technological

innovations introduced from the West. Disciplined, highly motivated, and well financed, the Muslim Brotherhood, known as the

Brotherhood, became a powerful political force during the 1970s

and 1980s, although it represented only a small minority of

Sudanese. In the government that was formed in June 1989, fol- lowing a bloodless coup d'etat, the Brotherhood exerted influence

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The Society and Its Environment

through its political expression, the National Islamic Front (NIF)

party, which included several cabinet members among its adherents (see Political Groups, ch. 4). Christianity

Christianity was most prevalent among the peoples of Al Istiwai State—the Madi, Moru, Azande, and Bari. The major churches

in the Sudan were the Roman Catholic and the Anglican. Southern

communities might include a few Christians, but the rituals and

world view of the area were not in general those of traditional

Western Christianity. The few communities that had formed around

mission stations had disappeared with the dissolution of the missions in 1964. The indigenous Christian churches in Sudan, with

external support, continued their mission, however, and had opened

new churches and repaired those destroyed in the continuing civil conflict. Originally, the Nilotic peoples were indifferent to Christianity, but in the latter half of the twentieth century many people

in the educated elite embraced its tenets, at least superficially. English and Christianity have become symbols of resistance to the

Muslim government in the north, which has vowed to destroy both.

Unlike the early civil strife of the 1960s and 1970s, the insurgency

in the 1980s and the 1990s has taken on a more religiously confrontational character.

Indigenous Religions

Each indigenous religion is unique to a specific ethnic group or

part of a group, although several groups may share elements of

belief and ritual because of common ancestry or mutual influence.

The group serves as the congregation, and an individual usually

belongs to that faith by virtue of membership in the group. Believing and acting in a religious mode is part of daily life and is linked to the social, political, and economic actions and relationships of the group. The beliefs and practices of indigenous religions

in Sudan are not systematized, in that the people do not generally

attempt to put together in coherent fashion the doctrines they hold

and the rituals they practice.

The concept of a high spirit or divinity, usually seen as a creator and sometimes as ultimately responsible for the actions of lesser

spirits, is common to most Sudanese groups. Often the higher di- vinity is remote, and believers treat the other spirits as autonomous, orienting their rituals to these spirits rather than to the high

god. Such spirits may be perceived as forces of nature or as manifestations of ancestors. Spirits may intervene in people's lives,

either because individuals or groups have transgressed the norms

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Sudan: A Country Study

of the society or because they have failed to pay adequate atten- tion to the ritual that should be addressed to the spirits.

The Nilotes generally acknowledge an active supreme deity, who

is therefore the object of ritual, but the beliefs and rituals differ from group to group. The Nuer, for example, have no word cor- responding solely and exclusively to God. The word sometimes so translated refers not only to the universal governing spirit but also

to ancestors and forces of nature whose spirits are considered aspects

of God. It is possible to pray to one spirit as distinct from another

but not as distinct from God. Often the highest manifestation of

spirit, God, is prayed to directly. God is particularly associated

with the winds, the sky, and birds, but these are not worshiped.

The Dinka attribute any remarkable occurrence to the direct in- fluence of God and will sometimes mark the occasion with an appropriate ritual. Aspects of God (the universal spirit) are distinguished,

chief of which is Deng (rain). For the Nuer, the Dinka, and other

Nilotes, human beings are as ants to God, whose actions are not

to be questioned and who is regarded as the judge of all human

behavior.

Cattle play a significant role in Nilotic rituals. Catde are sacrificed to God as expiatory substitutes for their owners. The function is consistent with the significance of cattle in all aspects of Nilotic life. Among the Nuer, for example, and with some variations among

the Dinka, cattle are the foundation of family and community life, essential to subsistence, marriage payments, and personal pride.

The cattle shed is a shrine and meeting place, the center of the

household; a man of substance, head of a family, and a leading

figure in the community is called a "bull." Every man and the

spirits themselves have ox names that denote their characteristic

qualities. These beliefs and institutions give meaning to the symbolism of the rubbing of ashes on a sacrificial cow's back in order

to transfer the burden of the owner's sins to the animal.

The universal god of the Shilluk is more remote than that of the

Nuer and Dinka and is addressed through the founder of the Shilluk royal clan. Nyiking, considered both man and god, is not clearly

distinguished from the supreme deity in ritual, although the Shilluk may make the distinction in discussing their beliefs. The king

(reth) of the Shilluk is regarded as divine, an idea that has never been accepted by the Nuer and Dinka.

All of the Nilotes and other peoples as well pay attention to ancestral spirits, the nature of the cult varying considerably as to the

kinds of ancestors who are thought to have power in the lives of

their descendants. Sometimes it may be the founding ancestors of

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The Society and Its Environment

the group whose spirits are potent. In many cases it is the recently

deceased ancestors who are active and must be placated.

Of the wide range of natural forces thought to be activated by

spirits, perhaps the most common is rain. Although southern Sudan

does not suffer as acutely as northern Sudan from lack of rain, there

has sometimes been a shortage, particularly during the 1970s and

1980s and in 1990; this shortage has created hardship, famine, and

death amidst the travail of civil war. For this reason, rituals con- nected with rain have become important in many ethnic groups,

and ritual specialists concerned with rain or thought to incarnate

the spirit of rain are important figures.

The distinction between the natural and the supernatural that

has emerged in the Western world is not relevant to the traditional

religions. Spirits may have much greater power than human beings,

but their powers are perceived not as altering the way the world

commonly works but as explaining occurrences in nature or in the

social world.

Some men and women are also thought to have extraordinary

powers. How these powers are believed to be acquired and exercised varies from group to group. In general, however, some people are thought to have inherited the capacity to harm others and

to have a disposition to do so. Typically they are accused of in- flicting illnesses on specific individuals, frequently their neighbors

or kin. In some groups, it is thought that men and women who

have no inherent power to harm may nevertheless do damage to others by manipulating images of the victim or items closely as- sociated with that person.

Occasionally an individual may be thought of as a sorcerer. When

illness or some other affliction strikes in a form that is generally

attributed to a sorcerer, there are ways (typically some form of divi- nation) of confirming that witchcraft was used and identifying the

sorcerer. The notions of sorcery are not limited to the southern Sudanese,

but are to be found in varying forms among peoples, including

nomadic and other Arabs, who consider themselves Muslims. A

specific belief widespread among Arabs and other Muslim peoples

is the notion of the evil eye. Although a physiological peculiarity

of the eye (walleye or cross-eye) may be considered indicative of

the evil eye, any persons expressing undue interest in the private concerns of another may be suspected of inflicting deliberate harm

by a glance. Unlike most witchcraft, where the perpetrator is known

by and often close to the victim, the evil eye is usually attributed

to strangers. Children are thought to be the most vulnerable.

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Sudan: A Country Study

Ways exist to protect oneself against sorcery or the evil eye. Many

magico-religious specialists—diviners and sorcerers—deal with these

matters in Sudanese societies. The diviner is able to determine

whether witchcraft or sorcery is responsible for the affliction and

to discover the source. He also protects and cures by providing

amulets and other protective devices for a fee or by helping a vic- tim punish (in occult fashion) the sorcerer in order to be cured of

the affliction. If it is thought that an evil spirit has possessed a person, an exorcist may be called in. In some groups these tasks may

be accomplished by the same person; in others the degree of specialization may be greater. In northern Sudan among Muslim peoples,

thefaqih may spend more of his time as diviner, dispenser of amulets, healer, and exorcist than as Quranic teacher, imam of a mosque, or mystic.

Education

The public and private education systems inherited by the

government after independence were designed more to provide civil servants and professionals to serve the colonial administration than

to educate the Sudanese. Moreover, the distribution of facilities,

staff, and enrollment was biased in favor of the needs of the administration and a Western curriculum. Schools tended to be

clustered in the vicinity of Khartoum and to a lesser extent in other

urban areas, although the population was predominandy rural. This

concentration was found at all levels but was most marked for those

in situations beyond the four-year primary schools where instruction was in the vernacular. The north suffered from shortages of

teachers and buildings, but education in the south was even more

inadequate. During the condominium, education in the south was

left largely to the mission schools, where the level of instruction

proved so poor that as early as the mid- 1930s the government imposed provincial education supervisors upon the missionaries in

return for the government subsidies that they sorely needed. The

civil war and the ejection of all foreign missionaries in February

1964 further diminished education opportunities for southern Sudanese.

Since World War II, the demand for education has exceeded

Sudan's education resources. At independence in 1956, education

accounted for only 15.5 percent of the Sudanese budget, or £Sd45

million (for value of the Sudanese pound—see Glossary), to support 1,778 primary schools (enrollment 208,688), 108 intermediate schools (enrollment 14,632), and 49 government secondary

schools (enrollment 5,423). Higher education was limited to the

University of Khartoum, except for less than 1,000 students sent

110
Anglican mission school at Yei, southern Sudan

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

abroad by wealthy parents or on government scholarships. The

adult literacy rate in 1956 was 22.9 percent, and, despite the ef- forts of successive governments, by 1990 it had risen only to about

30 percent in the face of a rapidly expanding population.

The philosophy and curriculum beyond primary school followed

the British educational tradition. Although all students learned

Arabic and English in secondary and intermediate schools, the language of instruction at the University of Khartoum was English.

Moreover, the increasing demand for intermediate, secondary, and

higher education could not be met by Sudanese teachers alone, at least not by the better educated ones graduated from the elite teacher-training college at Bakht ar Ruda. As a result, education

in Sudan continued to depend upon expensive foreign teachers.

When the Nimeiri-led government took power in 1969, it considered the education system inadequate for the needs of social and

economic development. Accordingly, an extensive reorganization was proposed, which would eventually make the new six-year

elementary education program compulsory and would pay much

more attention to technical and vocational education at all levels. Previously, primary and intermediate schools had been preludes

to secondary training, and secondary schools prepared students for the university. The system produced some well-trained university

111
Sudan: A Country Study

graduates, but little was done to prepare for technical work or skilled labor the great bulk of students who did not go as far as the university or even secondary school.

By the late 1970s, the government's education system had been

largely reorganized. There were some preprimary schools, mainly in urban areas. The basic system consisted of a six-year curriculum in primary schools and a three-year curriculum in junior

secondary schools. From that point, qualified students could go on to one of three kinds of schools: the three-year upper secon- dary, which prepared students for higher education; commercial

and agricultural technical schools; and teacher-training secondary

schools designed to prepare primary-school teachers. The latter two

institutions offered four-year programs. Postsecondary schools

included universities, higher technical schools, intermediate teachertraining schools for junior secondary teachers, and higher teachertraining schools for upper-secondary teachers (see table 4, Appendix).

Of the more than 5,400 primary schools in 1980, less than 14

percent were located in southern Sudan, which had between 20

and 33 percent of the country's population. Many of these southern

schools were established during the Southern Regional administration (1972-81). The renewal of the civil war in mid- 1983 destroyed many schools, although the SPLA operated schools in areas under its control. Nevertheless, many teachers and students were among the refugees fleeing the ravages of war in the south.

In the early 1980s, the number of junior (also called general)

secondary schools was a little more than one-fifth the number of

primary schools, a proportion roughly consistent with that of general

secondary to primary-school population (260,000 to 1,334,000).

About 6.5 percent of all general secondary schools were in the south

until 1983.

There were only 190 upper-secondary schools in the public sys- tem in 1980, but it was at this level that private schools of varying

quality proliferated, particularly in the three cities of the capital area. Elite schools could recruit students who had selected them

as a first choice, but the others took students whose examination

results at the end ofjunior secondary school did not gain them entry

to the government's upper secondary schools. In 1980, despite the emphasis on technical education proposed

by the government and encouraged by various international advi- sory bodies, there were only thirty-five technical schools in Sudan,

less than one-fifth the number of academic upper secondary schools. In 1976-77 eight times as many students entered the academic stream

as entered the technical schools, creating a profound imbalance in

112
The Society and Its Environment

the marketplace. Moreover, prospective employers often found

technical school graduates inadequately trained, a consequence of

sometimes irrelevant curricula, low teacher morale, and lack of

equipment. Performance may also have suffered because of the low

morale of students, many of whom tended to see this kind of schooling as second choice at best, a not surprising view given the sys- tem's past emphasis on academic training and the low status of

manual labor, at least among much of the Arab population. The

technical schools were meant to include institutions for training

skilled workers in agriculture, but few of the schools were directed

to that end, most of them turning out workers more useful in the

urban areas. The hope for universal and compulsory education had not been

realized by the early 1980s, but as a goal it led to a more equitable

distribution of facilities and teachers in rural areas and in the south.

During the 1980s, the government established more schools at all levels and with them, more teacher-training schools, although these were never sufficient to provide adequate staff. But the process was

inherently slow and was made slower by limited funds and by the

inadequate compensation for staff; teachers who could find a market

for their skills elsewhere, including places outside Sudan, did not

remain teachers within the Sudanese system.

The proliferation of upper-level technical schools has not dealt

with what most experts saw as Sudan's basic education problem:

providing a primary education to as many Sudanese children as

possible. Establishing more primary schools was, in this view, more

important that achieving equity in the distribution of secondary

schools. Even more important was the development of a primaryschool curriculum that was geared to Sudanese experience and took

into account that most of those who completed six years of schooling did not go further. The realistic assumption was that Sudan's

resources were limited and that expenditures on the postprimary

level limited expenditures on the primary level, leaving most

Sudanese children with an inadequate education. In the early 1990s,

this situation had not significantly changed.

In the mid-1970s, there were four universities, eleven colleges,

and twenty-three institutes in Sudan. The universities were in the

capital area, and all of the institutions of higher learning were in

the northern provinces. Colleges were specialized degree- granting

institutions. Institutes granted diplomas and certificates for periods

of specialized study shorter than those commonly demanded at universities and colleges. These postsecondary institutions and

universities had provided Sudan with a substantial number of well- educated persons in some fields but left it short of technical personnel

113
Sudan: A Country Study

and specialists in sciences relevant to the country's largely rural

character.

By 1980 two new universities had opened, one in Al Awsat

Province at Wad Madani, the other in Juba in Al Istiwai Province,

and in 1981 there was talk of opening a university in Darfur, which was nearly as deprived of educational facilities as the south. By

1990 some institutes had been upgraded to colleges, and many had

become part of an autonomous body called the Khartoum Insti- tute of Technical Colleges (also referred to as Khartoum Polytechnic). Some of its affiliates were outside the capital area, for example,

the College of Mechanical Engineering at Atbarah, northeast of

Khartoum, and Al Jazirah College of Agriculture and Natural

Resources at Abu Naamah in Al Awsat.

The oldest university was the University of Khartoum, which was established as a university in 1956. In 1990 it enrolled about

12,000 students in degree programs ranging from four to six years

in length. Larger but less prestigious was the Khartoum branch

of the University of Cairo with 13,000 students. The size of the

latter and perhaps its lack of prestige reflected the fact that many

if not most of its students worked to support themselves and at- tended classes in the afternoon and at night, although some day

classes were introduced in 1980. At the Khartoum branch only tu- ition was free, whereas all costs at the fully residential University

of Khartoum were paid for by the government. At the Institute

of Higher Technical Studies, which had 4,000 students in 1990,

tuition was free, and a monthly grant helped to defray but did not

fully cover other expenses. The smallest of the universities in the

capital area was the specialized Islamic University of Omdurman,

which existed chiefly to train Muslim religious judges and scholars. The University ofJuba, established in 1977, graduated its first class in 1981. It was intended to provide education for development and for the civil service for southern Sudan, although it was

open to students from the whole country. In its first years, it enrolled a substantial number of civil servants from the south for fur- ther training, clearly needed in an area where many in the civil service had had little educational opportunity in their youth. After

the outbreak of hostilities in the south in 1983, the university was moved to Khartoum, a move that had severely curtailed its instructional programs, but the university continued to operate again in

Juba in the late 1980s. Al Jazirah College of Agriculture and Natural

Resources was also intended to serve the country as a whole, but

its focus was consistent with its location in the most significant

agricultural area in Sudan.

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The Society and Its Environment

Of particular interest was the dynamic growth and expansion

of Omdurman Ahlia University. It was established by academics,

professionals, and businesspeople in 1982 upon the hundredth an- niversary of the founding of the city of Omdurman and was in- tended to meet the ever-growing demand for higher education and

training. The university was to be nongovernmental, job oriented,

and self-supporting. Support came mainly from private donations,

foreign foundations, and the government, which approved the allot- ment of thirty acres of prime land on the western outskirts of

Omdurman for the campus. Its curriculum, taught in English and

oriented to job training pertinent to the needs of Sudan, had at- tracted more than 1,800 students by 1990. Its emphasis on training

in administration, environmental studies, physics and mathematics,

and library science had proven popular.

Girls' Education

Traditionally, girls' education was of the most rudimentary kind,

frequently provided by a khalwa, or religious school, in which

Quranic studies were taught. Such basic schools did not prepare

girls for the secular learning mainstream, from which they were

virtually excluded. Largely through the pioneering work of Shaykh

Babikr Badri, the government had provided five elementary schools

for girls by 1920. Expansion was slow, however, given the bias for boys and the conservatism of Sudanese society, with education re- maining restricted to the elementary level until 1 940 . It was only

in 1940 that the first intermediate school for girls, the Omdurman

Girls' Intermediate School, opened. By 1955, ten intermediate

schools for girls were in existence. In 1956, the Omdurman Secondary School for Girls, with about 265 students, was the only girls'

secondary school operated by the government. By 1960, 245

elementary schools for girls had been established, but only 25 junior

secondary or general schools and 2 upper-secondary schools. There

were no vocational schools for girls, only a Nurses' Training College with but eleven students, nursing not being regarded by many

Sudanese as a respectable vocation for women. During the 1960s

and 1970s, girls' education made considerable gains under the education reforms that provided 1 ,086 primary schools, 268 intermediate schools, and 52 vocational schools for girls by 1970, when girls'

education claimed approximately one-third of the total school resources available. Although by the early 1990s the numbers had

increased in the north but not in the war-torn south, the ratio had

remained approximately the same. This slow development of girls' education was the product of

the country's tradition. Parents of Sudanese girls tended to look

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Sudan: A Country Study

upon girls' schools with suspicion if not fear that they would cor- rupt the morals of their daughters. Moreover, preference was given

to sons, who by education could advance themselves in society to the pride and profit of the family. This girls could not do; their

value was enhanced not at school but at home, in preparation for marriage and the dowry that accompanied the ceremony. The girl was a valuable asset in the home until marriage, either in the kitchen or in the fields. Finally, the lack of schools has discouraged even

those who desired elementary education for their daughters.

This rather dismal situation should not obscure the successful

efforts of schools such as the Ahfad University College in Omdurman, founded by Babikr Badri as an elementary school for girls

in the 1920s. By 1990 it had evolved as the premier women's university college in Sudan with an enrollment of 1,800. It had a mixture of academic and practical programs, such as those that educated

women to teach in rural areas. Education Reform

The revolutionary government of General Bashir announced

sweeping reforms in Sudanese education in September 1990. In

consultation with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic

teachers and administrators, who were the strongest supporters of

his regime, Bashir proclaimed a new philosophy of education. He

allocated £Sd400 million for the academic year 1990-91 to carry

out these reforms and promised to double the sum if the current education system could be changed to meet the needs of Sudan.

The new education philosophy was to provide a frame of refer- ence for the reforms. Education was to be based on the permanence of human nature, religious values, and physical nature. The

reform could be accomplished only by a Muslim curriculum, which

in all schools, colleges, and universities would consist of two parts: an obligatory and an optional course of study. The obligatory course

to be studied by every student was to be based on revealed

knowledge concerning all disciplines. All the essential elements of

the obligatory course would be drawn from the Quran and the

recognized books of the hadith. The optional course of study would

permit the student to select certain specializations according to in- dividual aptitudes and inclinations. Whether the government could

carry out such sweeping reforms throughout the country in the face

of opposition from within the Sudanese education establishment

and the dearth of resources for implementing such an ambitious

project remained to be seen. Membership in the Popular Defence

Forces, a paramilitary body allied to the National Islamic Front,

became a requirement for university admission. By early 1991,

116
Hospital at Li Yubu, near the border with Central African Republic,

cares for lepers and victims of sleeping sickness. Leprosy patients outside the bush dispensary

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

117
Sudan: A Country Study

Bashir had decreed that the number of university students be doubled and that Arabic replace English as the language of instruction in universities. He dismissed about seventy faculty members

at the University of Khartoum who opposed his reforms.

Health

The high incidence of debilitating and sometimes fatal diseases

that persisted in the 1 980s and had increased dramatically by 1 99

1

reflected difficult ecological conditions and inadequate diets. The

diseases resulting from these conditions were hard to control without

substantial capital inputs, a much more adequate health care sys- tem, and the education of the population in preventive medicine.

By 1991 health care in Sudan had all but disintegrated. The civil war in southern Sudan destroyed virtually all southern medical facilities except those that the SPLA had rebuilt to treat their own

wounded and the hospitals in the three major towns—Malakal,

Waw, and Juba—controlled by government forces. These facili- ties were virtually inoperable because of the dearth of the most basic

medical supplies. A similar situation existed in northern Sudan,

where health care facilities, although not destroyed by war, had

been rendered almost impotent by the economic situation. Sudan

lacked the hard currency to buy the most elementary drugs, such

as antimalarials and antibiotics, and the most basic equipment, such

as syringes. Private medical care in the principal towns continued

to function but was also hampered by the dearth of pharmaceuticals. In addition, the Bashir government harassed the private sector, particularly the Sudan Medical Association, which was dis- solved and many of its members jailed. Compounding the rapid

decline in health care have been the years of famine during most

of the 1980s, culminating in the great famine of 1991, which was

caused by drought and widespread crop failures in Bahr al Ghazal

State and in Darfur and Kurdufan. The famine was so widespread

that, according to various estimates, 1.5 million to 7 million

Sudanese would perish.

Widespread malnutrition also made the people more vulnerable

to the many debilitating and fatal diseases present in Sudan. The

most common illnesses were malaria, prevalent throughout the

country; various forms of dysentery or other intestinal diseases,

also widely prevalent; and tuberculosis, more common in the north

but also found in the south. More restricted geographically but af- fecting substantial portions of the population in the areas of oc- currence were schistosomiasis (snail fever), found in the White Nile

and Blue Nile areas and in irrigated zones between the two Niles,

and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), originally limited to the

118
The Society and Its Environment

southern borderlands but spreading rapidly in the 1980s in the

forested regions of southern Sudan. It was estimated that by 1991

nearly 250,000 persons had been affected by sleeping sickness. Not

uncommon were such diseases as cerebrospinal meningitis, measles,

whooping cough, infectious hepatitis, syphilis, and gonorrhea.

Even in years of normal rainfall, many Sudanese in the rural areas suffered from temporary undernourishment on a seasonal

basis, a situation that worsened when drought, locusts, or other

disasters struck crops or animals. More dangerous was malnutrition among children, defined as present when a child's body weight was less than 80 percent of the expected body weight for the age. The weight criterion in effect stood for a complex of nutritional

deficiencies that might lead direcdy to death or make the child sus- ceptible to diseases from which he or she could not recover. A

Sudanese government agency estimated that half the population

under fifteen—roughly one-fourth of the total population—suffered

from malnutrition in the early 1980s. This figure increased substantially during the famine of 1991.

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was present in

Sudan, primarily in the southern states bordering Uganda and

Zaire, where the disease had reached epidemic proportions. There

had been a steady increase in AIDS in Khartoum because of the

hundreds of thousands of people emigrating to the capital to es- cape the civil war and famine. The use of unsterile syringes and

untested blood by health care providers clearly contributed to its spread. In spite of the increase in the spread of AIDS, the Sudanese

government in 1991 lacked a coherent national AIDS control policy.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government undertook

programs to deal with specific diseases in limited areas, with help

from the World Health Organization and other sources. It also in- itiated more general approaches to the problems of health maintenance in rural areas, particularly in the south. These efforts began

against a background of inadequate and unequal distribution of

medical personnel and facilities, and events of the late 1980s and

early 1990s caused an almost complete breakdown in health care. In 1982 there were nearly 2,200 physicians in Sudan, or roughly one for each 8,870 persons. Most physicians were concentrated in

urban areas in the north, as were the major hospitals, including

those specializing in the treatment of tuberculosis, eye disorders,

and mental illness. In 1981 there were 60 physicians in the south

for a population of roughly 5 million, or one for approximately 83,000

persons. In 1976 there were 2,500 medical assistants, the crucial

participants in a system that could not assume the availability of an adequate number of physicians in the foreseeable future. After

119
Sudan: A Country Study

three years of training and three to four years of supervised hospital experience, medical assistants were expected to be able to diag- nose common endemic diseases and to provide simple treatments

and vaccinations. There were roughly 12,800 nurses in 1982 and

about 7,000 midwives, trained and working chiefly in the north.

In principle, medical consultation and therapeutic drugs were

free. There were, however, private clinics and pharmacies, and

they were said to be growing in number in the capital area in the

late 1970s and early 1980s. The ever worsening shortage of medical personnel and of pharmaceuticals had, however, limited the

effectiveness of free treatment. In urban areas, physicians and medical assistants could be seen only after a long wait at the hospitals or clinics at which they served. In rural areas, extended travel as well as long waits were common. In urban and rural areas, the

drugs prescribed were often not obtainable from hospital pharmacies. In the Khartoum area, they could be obtained at considerable cost from private pharmacies. In addition to the problems of

cost, however, were those posed by difficulties of transportation

and inadequate storage facilities. In the south, especially during

the rainy season, the roads were often impassable. There and else- where, the refrigeration necessary for many pharmaceuticals was

not available. All of these difficulties were compounded by inadequacies of stock rotation and inspection. Members of the country's

elite overcame these problems by taking advantage of medical treat- ment abroad.

In the mid-1970s, the Ministry of Health began a national program to provide primary health care with emphasis on preventive

medicine. The south was expected to be the initial beneficiary of

the program, given the dearth of health personnel and facilities there, but other areas were not to be ignored. The basic component in the system was the primary health care center staffed by

community health workers and expected to serve about 4,000 persons. Community health care workers received six months of for- mal training followed by three months of practical work at an

existing center, after which they were assigned to a new center. Refresher courses were also planned. The workers were to provide health care information and certain medicines and would refer cases they could not deal with to dispensaries and hospitals. In principle, there would be one dispensary for every 24,000 persons. Of

the forty primary health care centers and dispensaries to be completed by 1984, about half were in place by 1981 . In addition, local

(district) hospitals were to be improved. The program in the south was supported by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), which also provided medical advisers. In 1981 the program

120
Doctors at a bush dispensary inspecting a pneumonia patient outside his hut

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

was most advanced in eastern Al Istiwai Province, but it was too

early to assess the effects on the health of the people, and the program had virtually disappeared by 1991.

Two local programs for the control of endemic disease were also undertaken in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One was in the area

of the Gezira Scheme, where it was estimated that 50 to 70 per- cent of the people suffered from schistosomiasis, a health problem

aggravated by the presence of malaria and dysentery. The Blue

Nile Health Care Project, a ten-year program inaugurated in early

1980, was intended to deal with all of these waterborne diseases

simultaneously. Because people bathed in and drank the water in

the irrigation canals, which were contaminated by human waste, a major change in their habits was required, as well as the provision of healthful drinking water and sanitary facilities that did not

drain into the canals. Diarrheal diseases were to be treated with

rehydration salts that should diminish considerably the very high

rate of infant deaths. As of 1991, the persistent civil war and the

collapse of the Sudanese economy made the inauguration of these

projects doubtful. Other programs to provide relief to disease and

famine victims in Sudan were organized by foreign aid agencies

such as the United Nations World Food Programme, the Save the

Children Fund, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, and the

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Sudan: A Country Study

French medical group, Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without

Borders). Sudan in 1991 faced serious problems in providing its people with adequate health care as well as education and an ac- ceptable standard of living.

* * *

Extensively detailed and systematic analyses of contemporary

Sudanese society or any large segment of it were not available as of 1991. The Bashir government's systematic purge of the civil ser- vice, the professional associations, the academic community, and

the trade unions disrupted and curtailed the flow of statistics and

information from ministries and other government and nongovernmental organizations. Such research material has also been impeded

by the civil war in southern Sudan and the recurring famines.

Nevertheless, many monographs have been written on specific

Sudanese subjects ranging from anthropology to zoology.

As a description of the physical and geographical nature of Sudan,

K.M. Barbour's The Republic of the Sudan: A Regional Geography re- mains the standard work, supplemented by J.M.G. Lebon's Land

Use in the Sudan. Because the Nile flows are crucial to Sudan, they

have been extensively studied, producing a voluminous literature. Information on this subject is synthesized in two works: John Waterbury, Hydropolitics and the Nile Valley and Robert O. Collins, The

Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal, 1900-1988.

Interpretations of the population situation by several authors are found in Population ofthe Sudan: AJoint Project on Mapping andAnalyzing

the 1983 Census Data and in articles in the SudanJournal ofPopulation

Studies. Most ethnic studies are monographs that describe a particular

ethnic group. Those include Edward E. Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer

and Francis Mading Deng's The Dinka of the Sudan. For a more re- cent and sensitive treatment of ethnicity in Sudan, see articles in

The Middle EastJournal, autumn 1990; the perceptive novel by Francis Mading Deng, Cry of the Owl; and Abel Alier's Southern Sudan:

Too Many Agreements Dishonoured.

Anne Cloudsley's Women of Omdurman: Life, Love, and the Cult

of Virginity, Asma El Dareer's Woman, Why Do You Weep? Circumcision and Its Consequences, and Hanny Lightfoot Klein's Prisoners of

Ritual: An Odyssey into Female Genital Circumcision in Africa are perhaps

the three most informative studies of women's role in Sudan.

Although it is somewhat outdated (he does not discuss the Muslim Brotherhood, which appeared in Sudan only in the 1950s), J. Spencer Trimingham's Islam in the Sudan remains the best refer- ence on orthodox Islam and the Sufi brotherhoods. Anthropologist

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The Society and Its Environment

Godfrey Lienhardt's Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka

explores the importance of religion among the largest ethnic group

in Sudan.

The history of education in southern Sudan is covered in Lilian

Passmore Sanderson and Neville Sanderson's Education, Religion,

and Politics in Southern Sudan, 1899-1964. To assess the contemporary

reordering of the education system, one should examine M. Abdalghaffar Othman's Current Philosophies, Patterns, and Issues in Higher

Education.

The two standard historical studies of the Sudan Medical Service are Ahmed Bayoumi's The History of Sudan Health Services and

Herbert Chavasse Squire's The Sudan Medical Service. (For further

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

123

Chapter 3. The Economy
Worker picking cotton, one of Sudan 's leading exports
THE ECONOMY OF SUDAN continued to be in disarray in

mid- 1991 . The principal causes of the disorder have been the violent, costly civil war, an inept government, an influx of refugees

from neighboring countries as well as internal migration, and a decade of below normal annual rainfall with the concomitant failure of staple food and cash crops. The economic and political upheavals that characterized Sudan

in the 1980s have made statistical material either difficult to obtain or unreliable. Prices and wages in the marketplace fluctuated

constantly, as did the government's revenue. Consequently, in- formation concerning Sudan's economy tends to be more histori- cal than current. In the 1970s, economic growth had been stimulated by a large

influx of capital from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, invested with the

expectation that Sudan would become "the breadbasket" of the

Arab world, and by large increments of foreign aid from the United States and the European Community (EC). Predictions of continuing economic growth were sustained by loans from the World

Bank (see Glossary) and generous contributions from such disparate

countries as Norway, Yugoslavia, and China. Sudan's greatest eco- nomic resource was its agriculture, to be developed in the vast arable

land that either received sufficient rainfall or could be irrigated from

the Nile. By 1991 Sudan had not yet claimed its full water share

(18.5 billion cubic meters) under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement

between Egypt and Sudan.

Sudan's economic future in the 1970s was also energized by the

Chevron Overseas Petroleum Corporation's discovery of oil on the

borderlands between the provinces of Kurdufan and Bahr al Ghazal.

Concurrently, the most thoroughly researched hydrological project

in the Third World, the Jonglei Canal (also seen as Junqali Canal), was proceeding ahead of schedule, planned not only to provide water

for northern Sudan and Egypt, but also to improve the life of the

Nilotic people living in the canal area. New, large agricultural

projects had been undertaken in sugar at Kinanah and cotton

at Rahad. Particularly in southern Sudan, where the Addis Ababa accords of March 27, 1972, had seemingly ended the insurgency, a sense of optimism and prosperity prevailed, dashed,

however, when the civil war resumed in 1983. The Khartoum

government controlled these development projects, but entre- preneurs could make fortunes through the intricate network of

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Sudan: A Country Study

kinship and political relations that has traditionally driven Sudan's

social and economic machinery.

In the early 1970s, public enterprises dominated the modern

sector, including much of agriculture and most of large-scale in- dustry, transport, electric power, banking, and insurance. This sit- uation resulted from the private sector's inability to finance major

development and from an initial government policy after the 1969

military coup to nationalize the financial sector and part of exist- ing industry. Private economic activities were relegated to modern

small- and medium-scale industry. The private sector dominated

road transport and domestic commerce and virtually controlled

traditional agriculture and handicrafts.

In the 1980s, however, Sudan underwent severe political and

economic upheavals that shook its traditional institutions and its economy. The civil war in the south resumed in 1983, at a cost of more than £Sdll million per day (for value of the Sudanese

pound—see Glossary). The main participant in the war against the

government was the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA),

the armed wing of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement

(SPLM), under John Garang's leadership. The SPLA made steady

gains against the Sudanese army until by 1991 it controlled nearly one-third of the country.

The dearth of rainfall in the usually productive regions of the

Sahel (see Glossary) and southern Sudan added to the country's

economic problems. Refugees, both Sudanese and foreigners from

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad, further strained the Sudanese

budget. International humanitarian agencies have rallied to Sudan's

aid, but the government rejected their help.

When Jaafar an Nimeiri was overthrown in April 1985, his political party disappeared, as did his elaborate security apparatus.

The military transitional government and the democratically elected coalition government of Sadiq al Mahdi that succeeded the exiled

Nimeiri failed to address the country's economic problems. Production continued to decline as a result of mismanagement and natural

disasters. The national debt grew at an alarming rate because

Sudan's resources were insufficient to service it. Not only did the

SPLA shut down Chevron's prospecting and oil production, but

it also stopped work on the Jonglei Canal.

On June 30, 1989, a military coup d'etat led by Colonel (later

Lieutenant General) Umar al Bashir overthrew the government

of Sadiq al Mahdi. Ideologically tied to the Muslim Brotherhood

and dependent for political support on the Brotherhood's party,

the National Islamic Front, the Bashir regime has methodically

purged those agencies that dealt primarily with the economy—the

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The Economy

civil service, the trade unions, the boards of publicly owned enterprises, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and the

central bank. Under Bashir's government, Sudan's economy has

been further strained by the most severe famine of this century,

the continuation of the war in the south, and a foreign policy that

has left Sudan economically, if not politically, isolated from the

world community.

Economic Development

Historically, the colonial government was not interested in

balanced economic growth and instead concentrated its development efforts on irrigated agriculture and the railroad system

throughout the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (see The AngloEgyptian Condominium, 1899-1955, ch. 1). Incidental government

investment had gone mainly into ad hoc projects, such as the construction of cotton gins and oilseed-pressing mills as adjuncts of

the irrigation program. A limited amount of rainfed mechanized

farming, similarly on an ad hoc basis, had also been developed during World War II. After the war, two development programs

actually lists of proposed investments—were drawn up for the periods 1946-50 and 1951-55. These plans appear to have been a belated effort to broaden the country's economic base in preparation

for eventual Sudanese independence. Both programs were seriously

hampered by a lack of experienced personnel and materials and

had little real impact. Independently, the private sector had ex- panded irrigated agriculture, and some small manufacturing operations had been started, but only three larger industrial enterprises

(meat and cement plants and a brewery) had been constructed,

all between 1949 and 1952. As a result, at independence the new

Sudanese government's principal development inheritance was the vast irrigated Gezira Scheme (also seen as Jazirah Scheme) and

Sudan Railways.

Not until 1960 did the new government attempt to prepare a

national development plan. Since that time, three plans have been

formulated, none of which has been carried through to completion. Work on the first of these, the Ten-Year Plan of Economic

and Social Development, for the fiscal years (FY—see Glossary)

1961-70, began in late 1960, but the plan was not formally adopted until September 1 962 , well over a year after its scheduled start- ing date. The total ten-year investment was set at £Sd565 million,

at the time equivalent to more than US$1.6 billion. The private

sector was expected to provide 40 percent of the amount. Unfortunately, the goals were overly ambitious, and the government had

few experienced planners. The plan as prepared was not adhered

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Sudan: A Country Study

to, and implementation was actually carried out through investment programs that were drawn up annually and funded through

the development budget. Projects not in the original plan were fre- quently included. Investment was at a high rate in the first years, well beyond projections, and a number of major undertakings had

been completed by mid-plan, including the Khashm al Qirbah and

Manaqil irrigation projects, a sugar factory at the former site, another at Al Junayd irrigation project, and the Roseires (also called Ar Rusayris) Dam.

As the 1960s progressed, a lack of funds threatened the continuation of development activities. Government current expenditure

had increased much faster than receipts, in part because of the in- tensification of the civil war in the south, and government surpluses

to finance development vanished. At the same time, there was a

shortfall in foreign investment capital. The substantial foreign

reserves held at the beginning of the plan period were depleted,

and the government resorted to deficit financing and foreign borrowing. The situation had so deteriorated by 1967 that implementation of the Ten-Year Plan was abandoned. Sudan's international

credit worthiness became open to question.

Despite major financial problems, real economic gains were

nevertheless made during the Ten-Year Plan, and per capita in- come rose from the equivalent of US$86 in 1960 to about US$104

at the end of the decade. Late in the 1960s, the government pre- pared a new plan covering FY 1968 to FY 1972. This plan was

discarded after the military coup led by Nimeiri in May 1969. Instead, the government adopted the Five-Year Plan of Economic

and Social Development, 1970-74. This plan, prepared with the

assistance of Soviet planning personnel, sought to achieve the major

goals of the May revolution (creation of an independent national

economy; steady growth of prosperity; and further development

of cultural, education, and health services) through socialist development.

During the plan's first two years, expenditures remained low,

affected largely by uncertainties that stemmed from the civil war.

After the war ceased in early 1972, the government felt that the

plan failed to provide for transportation improvements and largescale productive projects. In 1973, the government therefore established the Interim Action Program, which extended the original

plan period through FY 1976. New objectives included the removal of transportation bottlenecks, attainment of self-sufficiency

in the production of several agricultural and industrial consumer

items, and an increase in agricultural exports. To accomplish these

goals, proposed public sector investment increased from £Sd215

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The Economy

million to £Sd463 million (however, actual expenditures during

the five years, excluding technical assistance, were £Sd250 million).

Private sector projected investment was estimated at £Sdl70 million originally, but the nationalizations carried out in 1970 and

1971 discouraged private investment in productive undertakings.

Foreign private capital investment became negligible, and domestic private capital was put mostly into areas considered less subject to takeover, such as service enterprises, housing, traditional

agriculture, and handicrafts (see Manufacturing, this ch.). The

denationalizations since 1972 resulted in increased private foreign

investment in development. The final investment total during the

first five years was considerably above the original plan projection.

The plan failed to achieve its goal of a 7.6 percent annual growth

rate in gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), however, and was extended to 1977.

From FY 1973, after introduction of the Interim Action Program, through 1977, development expenditures grew to more than

1 billion Sudanese pounds. The government initiated several irri- gation projects at Rahad, Satit southeast of Khashm al Qirba, Ad

Damazin, and Kinanah; and established factories at Sannar,

Kinanah, at Shandi on the Nile northeast of Khartoum, Kusti,

Kaduqli, Nyala, and Rabak on the White Nile south of Khartoum. Roads between Khartoum and Port Sudan were paved with

tarmacadam and excavation began on the Jonglei Canal. The original plan called for almost half of investment to be provided by sur- pluses in the central government budget. Although this assumption

appeared highly optimistic in view of the modest surpluses attained

during the last half of the 1960s, tax revenues did increase as projected.

Earnings from public corporations, however, fell short of projections, and growth in government current expenditures greatly ex- ceeded revenue growth. As a result, not only were there no surpluses

in the public sector, but the government had to borrow from the

Bank of Sudan to cover the current expenditure account. Foreign

capital, although abundant, also did not equal the spending on development, and, contrary to the expectations of the plan's drafters,

the government had to resort to domestic borrowing to proceed

with project implementation.

In early 1977, the government published the successor Six-Year

Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977-82. Its goals and

projections also appeared optimistic because of the worsening

domestic economic situation, which was marked by growing in- flation. The inflation stemmed in large part from deficit development financing (printing money), increasing development costs

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Sudan: A Country Study

because of worldwide price rises, and rising costs for external capital. During the plan's second year, FY 1978, there was no eco- nomic growth as the deficit development financing in the mid- and

late 1970s led Sudan into a deepening economic crisis. At the same

time, external debt pressures mounted, and Sudan failed to meet

its scheduled payments (see Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments, this ch.). A substantial cutback in further development ex- penditures became unavoidable. The result was an abandonment

of Six-Year Plan projections, a restriction of expenditures generally to the completion of projects under way, improvement of the

performance of existing operational projects, elimination of trans- port constraints, and a series of short-term "rolling" programs that

particularly emphasized exports.

In October 1983, the government announced a three-year public investment program, but efforts to Islamize the economy in 1984

impeded its implementation, and after the Nimeiri overthrow in

April 1985, the program was suspended (see table 5, Appendix).

In August 1987, an economic recovery program was initiated. This

program was followed, beginning in October 1988, by a three-year

recovery program to reform trade policy and regulate the exchange

rate, reduce the budget deficit and subsidies, and encourage ex- ports and privatization. There was little possibility for early eco- nomic recovery offered by the military government of Colonel Umar

al Bashir that took office on June 30, 1989. The government's eco- nomic policies proposed to Islamize the banking system, but for- eign business interests viewed this measure as a disincentive to do

business in Sudan because no interest would be paid on new loans.

Furthermore, Islamic banks and other economic supporters of the

regime were to be granted disproportionate influence over the econ- omy, a policy that led to widespread resentment among other sectors. Finally, the government did not go far enough to satisfy the

International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) or other major

creditors that it had sufficiently reduced subsidies on basic commodities, thus reducing its budget deficit. Bashir had announced

an economic recovery program in mid- 1990, but in 1991 its results were still awaited.

The late 1970s had seen corruption become widespread. Although

always present, corruption never had been a major characteristic

of the Sudanese economic scene. The enormous sums that poured

into Sudan in the late 1970s from the Arab oil-exporting countries,

the United States, and the European Community, however, provided opportunities for the small clique that surrounded Nimeiri to enrich themselves. This corruption fell into three principal categories: embezzlement of public funds, most of which left the

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The Economy

country; agricultural acquisition schemes; and investment in the

mercantile sphere.

The most common ways of embezzling public funds were ac- quiring liquid assets from banks or government agencies, selling

the state's assets, selling state land, and smuggling. The siphoning off of liquid assets usually required the connivance of a high

government official. Between 1975 and 1982, more than 800 cases were reported of embezzlement of, on the average, more than

£Sd1,000. In one case, principal bank officials embezzled £Sd3 million; another bank made a loan of £Sd200 million to a businessman whose business was fictitious. State property sold by embezzlers included gasoline and medicines. State officials also sold real estate in residential areas at below the market price. An impressive residence would then be built on the property for rental to diplomatic officials or executives of

multinational companies. In the past, small operators penetrating

the vast and unpatrolled borders of Sudan had carried out smuggling, but in the late 1980s it became a vast and sophisticated business. Of the smuggling operations uncovered, one involved £Sd2.5

million in cloth, another £Sdl million in matches, and a third

£Sd0.5 million in automobiles.

Another highly profitable form of corruption was the selling of

state farmlands, each about 30,000 feddans (1 feddan is equivalent

to 0.42 hectare). Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC) offi- cials sold large numbers offeddans at low prices to senior officials in Khartoum; many of the latter exploited the land for profit at the expense of the peasantry and caused profound ecological deterioration.

As corruption ran rampant during the late 1970s until Nimeiri was overthrown, commercial companies, particularly in the exportimport trade, profited through their influence on public policy and

through special permits they received. The Islamic institutions that

dominated Sudanese banking facilitated this corruption (see Islamic

Banking, this ch.). These banks, of which the most important was

the Faisal Islamic Bank, possessed privileges not enjoyed by

Sudanese national banks, such as exemption from taxation and the

right to transfer profits abroad. An example of the combination

of political power and financial capital was the Islamic Development Company. Established in 1983 as a limited shareholding company with an authorized capitalization of US$1 billion, the company

was chartered to invest in agriculture, industry, services, construction, and Islamic banks. In practice, it concentrated on the ex- port-import trade, where high profits could be made quickly and

easily, in contrast to the slow returns of agricultural development

133
Sudan: A Country Study

projects. The board of directors consisted of ten persons, four

Sudanese and six foreign nationals, mostly Saudis, including a son

of the late King Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud. Of the Sudanese,

three belonged to the National Islamic Front, and the fourth was

the son of the leader of the Khatmiyyah, a Muslim religious group

associated with the National Unionist Party. All had connections

with Islamic banks and the Sudanese parliament. Their purpose was to strengthen the Islamist movement's economic power by tying their commercial enterprise to the state in order to achieve a

privileged position in the marketplace. They accomplished this aim

by granting shares valued at US$100,000 to founding members

and to prominent persons, ranging from the republic's president

to wealthy Muslim businessmen.

In spite of the growth of the Islamic banking movement, between 1978 and 1985, agricultural and industrial production had

declined in per capita terms. Imports during much of the 1980s were three times the level of exports. By 1991 the value of the

Sudanese pound against the dollar had sunk to less than 10 per- cent of its 1978 value, and the country's external debt had risen

to US$13 billion, the interest on which could be paid only by rais- ing new loans.

Two reasons for this decline were the droughts and accompanying famine occurring in the 1980s and 1991, and the influx of more

than 1 million refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, and Uganda, in addition to the persons displaced by the continuing war in

southern Sudan who were estimated to number between 1 . 5 million and 3.5 million. Nevertheless, the decline in Sudan's agricultural and industrial production had begun before these calamities.

Few development projects were completed on time and those that were failed to achieve projected production. After 1978 the GDP

steadily fell so that the vast sums of money borrowed could not

be repaid by increased productivity. Sudan found itself in a cycle

of increasing debt and declining production.

These economic problems had two fundamental causes. First,

in planning littie thought was given to the impact of any one project on the whole economy and even less to the burden such huge

projects would place on a fragile infrastructure. Some ministries

undertook projects by unilaterally negotiating loans without refer- ence to the Central Planning Agency. Second, remittances by

Sudanese laborers in the Persian Gulf (thousands of workers were

based in Kuwait and Iraq, until many of them were expelled) placed a stress on Sudan's economy because the government was forced

to relax its stringent currency controls to induce these workers to

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The Economy

repatriate their earnings. Such funds were largely invested in con- sumer goods and housing, rather than in development projects.

Foreign Aid

Foreign capital has played a major role in development. The great

reliance on it and the general ease with which it was acquired were

major factors contributing to the severe financial problems that beset

the country after the mid-1970s. Sudan obtained public sector loans

for development from a wide variety of international agencies and

individual governments. Until the mid-1970s, the largest single source had been the World Bank, including the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). By 1975 the World Bank and its organs had

furnished the equivalent of US$300 million. Excluding repayments,

the outstanding amount had risen to US$786 million in 1981, as major commitments to projects including agriculture, transportation, and electric power were made (chiefly by IDA, which account- ed by 1981 for more than US$594 million of the outstanding total). The Arab oil-producing states, as their balance of payments sur- pluses grew in the 1970s following increases in world petroleum

prices, also became significant suppliers of development capital

through bilateral loans and Arab international institutions. The

largest of the latter was the Arab Fund for Economic and Social

Development (AFESD), through which was proposed the 1976 pro- gram to develop Sudan as a breadbasket for the Arab world. The

implementing agency, the Arab Authority for Agricultural Invest- ment and Development (AAAID), was established in Khartoum,

based on an agreement signed in November 1976 by twelve Arab

states. After the mid-1970s, Saudi Arabia, one of the founders of

AAAID, through its Saudi Development Fund became the largest source of investment capital, apparently convinced that Sudan's

development could complement its own, especially in making up

its large food deficits. Unfortunately, the ambitious plans for Sudan's becoming the Arab world's major food source faded by

the mid-1980s into an economic nightmare as agricultural production declined sharply.

In 1977 the United States resumed economic (and military) aid

to Sudan. This aid followed a ten-year lapse beginning with a break

in diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1967, with re- lations restored in July 1972 (see United States, ch. 4). In 1977

the United States had become concerned about geopolitical trends

in the region, particularly potential Libyan or Marxist Ethiopian

attempts to overthrow the pro-Western Nimeiri government. In

the five-year period 1977-81, United States economic aid amounted

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Sudan: A Country Study

to almost US$270 million, of which two-thirds was in the form of

grants. By 1984, when the United States had become Sudan's largest source of foreign aid, the country's worsening economic and

political situation, particularly Nimeiri's domestic policies with

regard to the south and the imposition of the sharia (Islamic law) on society, caused the United States to suspend US$194 million

of aid. In 1985, following Nimeiri's visit to Washington, the United

States provided Sudan with food aid, insecticides, and fertilizers. After Nimeiri's overthrow in April 1985 and Sudan's failure to make

repayments on loans, the United States discontinued non-food aid. The aid had been administered by the United States Agency for International Development (AID). It not only included direct funds

for projects and project assistance through commodity imports

(mainly wheat under the Food for Peace Program), but also generated local currency that was used to support general development

activities. AID continued providing humanitarian relief assistance

to distressed regions in Sudan through early 1991.

Britain also made substantial aid contributions to Sudan, notably the sum of US$140 million to the Power III Project in the 1980s

(see Electric Power, this ch.). In January 1991, Britain suspended

its development aid to Sudan, which had amounted to US$58 million in 1989, while continuing humanitarian aid. This policy change was caused by a number of factors, including alleged terrorist activities by Sudanese agents against Sudanese expatriates in Britain. In addition to Britain, France, West Germany, Norway, Japan,

and other countries have provided significant economic or humanitarian aid to Sudan (Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands also have been Sudan's main sources of imports). Japan is a major buyer of Sudanese cotton, while Sudan imports Japanese

machinery. In early 1990, to ease Sudan's debt burden, the Danish government cancelled Sudan's outstanding debt totalling more

than US$22.9 million. Other major financial assistance came from

Arab countries, especially from Saudi Arabia (Sudan's largest importer) and Kuwait. By December 1982, Sudan owed the Persian

Gulf states US$2 billion. Saudi Arabia's assistance after 1980 mainly

took the form of balance of payments support and petroleum shipments, rather than project aid. The total amount of aid from Arab

states dropped in 1988 to only US$127 million, the lowest figure

since the late 1970s. Arab aid totaled US$215 million in 1985,

US$208 million in 1986, and US$228 million in 1987. Sudan's sup- port of Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf war alienated the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, sharply curtailing their economic aid to Khartoum. The increasingly close ties between Sudan and Iran in the

early 1990s also concerned the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia and

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The Economy

was a factor in their diminished financial aid to Khartoum. Economic cooperation was initiated with Libya in the late 1980s, with

Libya becoming Sudan's third largest supplier in 1989.

In mid- 1991 the World Bank announced its decision to close its Khartoum office by December 31 , 1991 . The decision resulted from

the deterioration in relations between Sudan and international

monetary bodies following cessation of debt repayment by Khartoum to the World Bank and the IMF.

Among communist countries, prior to the collapse of communist

regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China had been

the most important provider of development funds. By 1971 it had

furnished loans equivalent to US$82 million, and through 1981 an additional US$300 million was reported to have been made avail- able. Sudan valued these loans because they were interest free and

had long grace periods before repayments started. Economic cooperation with China continued into the 1980s. Sudan and China signed a trade cooperation protocol in March 1989, with technical agreements also renewed. A commercial protocol between the two countries was signed in April 1990. China remained a significant

importer of Sudanese cotton in the mid-1980s, and Sudan imported about US$76 million in goods from China in 1988. Relations

between Sudan and the Soviet Union improved markedly following Nimeiri's overthrow in 1985, but the overthrow did not result, as Khartoum had hoped, in Soviet economic assistance, but rather

in a decrease in United States aid. Prices, Employment, Wages, and Unions

Prices

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning' s Department

of Statistics compiled monthly data on consumer prices in Sudan

based on approximately 100 items on sale in the capital area's three

cities, Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North. This report

contained two indexes covering the cost of consumer goods used

by Sudanese having incomes below and above £Sd500 a year. At

the beginning of the 1970s, annual price rises were moderate. From

1973 onward, the inflation rate grew because of continuing worldwide inflation, an increase in the money supply resulting from the

central government's deficit financing and from borrowing by state corporations, shortages of consumer goods, and problems of supply caused by transport deficiencies. Late in the 1970s, increased

private sector borrowing added to the pressures on prices. In the

six-year period from 1972 to 1977, inflation increased at an aver- age rate of almost 24 percent a year for the low-income group and

137
Sudan: A Country Study

22 percent for the higher group. In 1979 the official rate was 30.8

percent and 33.6 percent for the low and high groups, respectively. The reported rates were somewhat lower in 1980: 25.4 and 26.3

percent, respectively.

A series of currency devaluations took place, beginning in 1979,

as part of the new financing agreement with the IMF (see Balance

of Payments, this ch.). The economic results of the devaluations

did not meet expectations, however, leading by the late 1980s to resistance to IMF demands for further devaluations. The accom- panying austerity measures during the 1980s included attempts

gradually to remove subsidies on food and other products, reductions in public expenditures, real wages, and nonessential imports,

as well as an effort to reinvigorate the export sector. Such efforts,

however, had little impact on Sudan's economic viability as far as international financial lenders were concerned.

Annual inflation was estimated at 300 percent in mid- 1991, with

the market value of the Sudanese pound deteriorating at a constant rate. Sudan's debt burden, estimated at US$4 billion in 1981

,

rose to US$13 billion by mid- 1990, with debt arrears to the IMF

alone since 1984 totalling more than US$1.1 billion, a situation

that led the IMF to threaten to expel Sudan unless it settled its debt arrears. In September 1990, the IMF adopted a Declaration

of Noncooperation regarding Sudan, as a prelude to expulsion. In

May 1991 , an IMF delegation arrived in Khartoum for discussions

with the government, which by then had repaid the IMF a token

US$15 million and reaffirmed its determination to cooperate with

the IMF. The IMF then postponed for six months its decision on

whether to expel Sudan. The deterioration in Sudan's debt position also placed in doubt future World Bank lending to Sudan, with

existing loans still secure. Employment

The size of the country's economically active labor force has been

difficult to estimate because of different definitions of participation in economic activity and the absence of accurate data from

official sources, particularly the 1973 and 1983 censuses. In rural

areas, large numbers of women and girls were engaged in traditional productive occupations, but apparently many have not been

included in counts of the active work force. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated in 1 980

that the work force was about 6 million persons, or approximately

33 percent of the population. This figure included about 300,000

unemployed. It also included the many male Sudanese working

in other Arab states, a loss to Sudan that may have amounted to

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The Economy

as much as 50 percent of its professional and skilled work force. The drop in world oil prices in the 1980s caused the Persian Gulf

states to cut back drastically on their expatriate workers, leading

in turn to increased unemployment in Sudan. In mid- 1989 a total of 7,937,000 people were employed in Sudan, according to an ILO

estimate. In the early 1990s, Sudan's employment situation was

exacerbated by the 1 99 1 Persian Gulf War, which resulted in the

departure of the thousands of Sudanese workers based in Kuwait

and Iraq, leaving many of their possessions behind. Sudan's support of Iraq also contributed to the departure of thousands of

Sudanese workers from Saudi Arabia.

Unemployment figures were affected by the severe drought that

spread throughout Sudan in the 1980s. In 1983-84, for example,

several million people migrated from the worst hit areas in both

the west and the east to Khartoum and other urban areas along

the Nile. Many remained in these areas once the drought had eased,

living in shanty towns and contributing to unemployment or underemployment in the cities. In addition, more than 1 million people

from the south migrated to the north, as a result of the civil war

and famine in these areas. Agriculture was the predominant activity in Sudan, although

its share of the labor force has gradually declined as other sectors of economic activity have expanded. In the 1955-56 census—the

only complete count of the labor force for which data have been

published (detailed results of the 1973 and 1983 censuses had not

been released as of mid- 1991)—almost 86 percent of those then

considered as part of the work force were involved in agriculture,

livestock raising, forestry, fisheries, or hunting. The Ministry of

Finance and Economic Planning estimated that by 1969-70 the

total had declined to somewhat less than 70 percent and that at the end of the 1970s the sector accounted for less than 66 percent.

In mid- 1989, the ILO estimated that about 4,872,000 people were employed in agriculture. Services, which included a government

work force that grew about 10 percent a year in the 1970s, emerged

as the second largest area of activity, encompassing an estimated

10.4 percent of those economically active in 1979-80, compared

with 4.6 percent in 1955-56. Nonagricultural production—manufacturing, mining, electric power, and construction—accounted for 6.7 percent during 1979-80 and about 5.6 percent in 1955-56.

Wages

In 1991 reliable figures for wages in Sudan were difficult to obtain. Public sector wages have been generally higher than those

of the privately employed, except in a few large private firms.

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Sudan: A Country Study

Until late 1974, when the Minimum Standard of Wages Order

(Presidential Order No. 21) was issued, there had not been a minimum wage in the private sector, although in a few occupations such

as stevedoring at Port Sudan, official wage orders had set certain

minimums. The 1974 minimum, established at £Sdl6.50 a month, was equivalent to the minimum entry wage for public sector jobs.

It applied, however, basically only to workers in establishments

having ten or more employees in the Khartoum area, Al Jazirah,

and certain other urban centers. Its geographical limitations together

with important exemptions—employees below the age of eighteen,

all those in enterprises having fewer than ten workers, seasonal

agricultural workers, and some others—excluded about threequarters of all wage earners. Employers were allowed to raise wages

that were below the minimum to the prescribed level in three steps

to be achieved by October 1977. In 1979 the minimum wage was

raised to £Sd28 a month, and a minimum daily rate of £Sdl.50 was established for unskilled workers.

In mid- 1978 rising inflation and worker unrest led the government to inaugurate the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme

(JECS), through which a substantial two-stage increase in public

sector wages was to be effected. Considerable discontent with gradings appeared to have arisen, and for many people, little improvement in salaries occurred. One of the problems reportedly was the

misjudgments in the JECS reclassification process that resulted in

commitment of all allocated funds for the program well before the

program had been half completed. In early 1979, members of the

domestic bank workers' union and hospital technicians, among

others, carried out strikes, and in August the powerful 32,000-

member Sudan Railway Workers' Union (SRWU) also walked out. The government promised SRWU members that they would be

given the second half of the JECS raise, but the strike was ended

by the use of armed troops. SRWU again went on strike in MayJune 1981 , in part also because of continued discontent with JECS

actions. The strike, which was also ended by use of the military, was declared illegal and the union dissolved. Various leaders were

arrested. The government then appointed a preparatory committee to reestablish the SRWU.

Unions

Trade union activity was banned by the Bashir government fol- lowing its rise to power in the 1989 coup, and many union offi- cials were imprisoned. Prior to 1989, the trade unions that were

active were nevertheless under state control, most having been es- tablished in their latest incarnation by the government in 1971.

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The Economy

The labor union movement originated in 1946 with the formation

by some Sudan Railways employees of the Workers' Affairs Association, the predecessor of the SRWU. Two years later the Trades

and Tradesmen's Union Ordinance of 1948, which was based largely on the British model and the concepts of voluntary association

and limited government intervention in union affairs, gave offi- cial sanction to unions. The 1948 ordinance permitted formation

of unions by as few as ten individuals, and a proliferation of mostly small, ineffective bodies emerged. The major exception was the

rail union, which, as an official body, became Sudan's wealthiest

and most powerful union. In 1949 the workers' association helped

form the national Workers' Congress, which in 1950 became the

Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF). Dominated

by communists, the SWTUF was closely associated with the

Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). The SWTUF failed to receive

government recognition, and its interests and actions tended strongly to be along political lines. After national independence, the fed- eration had frequent confrontations with the new government,

including a successful general strike in October 1958. This strike was one of the factors that contributed to the military takeover of

the government the following month (see The Abbud Military

Government, 1958-64, ch. 1). At the time of the 1958 coup, the SWTUF controlled roughly

70 percent of all labor union membership. The new military government repealed the 1948 ordinance, dissolved all unions, and detained many of the federation's leaders. Some union organization was again permitted after 1960 but it was prohibited for white-collar

workers, and federations were not allowed. Upon restoration of

the civilian government in 1964, the 1948 ordinance was reinstated, and the SWTUF reemerged. Union membership increased

rapidly and had risen to about 250,000 workers in about 500 to 600 unions by 1970. Most were small (three-quarters had fewer

than 200 members), financially weak, and generally not very ef- fective. The few larger unions were in the public sector, led by the

SRWU.

SWTUF leadership remained in communist hands. The SCP

was allied with the group that carried out the military coup of May

1969, and the SWTUF and the unions were welcomed as partners

in the proclaimed socialist struggle to better the conditions of the

workers. Strikes, however, were prohibited by a presidential or- der issued shortly after the 1969 takeover. The relationship was

abruptly ended after the abortive communist coup in mid- 1971.

The government dissolved the SWTUF and executed a number

of its leaders.

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Sudan: A Country Study

Late in 1971, the government promulgated the Trade Unions

Act, under which directives were issued in 1973 that established

eighty-seven unions based on sectoral, occupational, and industrial lines. Somewhat more than half were "employees' " unions

(for white-collar employees), and the rest were "workers' " unions (for blue-collar workers). The existing unions were variously

merged into the specified groupings. The act contained measures

to strengthen unionism, including a provision for compulsory dues

and employer-paid time off to serve as union officials. The SWTUF

was reinstituted for the "workers' " unions, and the Sudanese Federation of Employees and Professionals Trade Unions formed in

1975 for the white-collar group. Their representation of union in- terests was carried on within guidelines set by the government and

the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the mass political party established by the government in 1972. In the late 1970s, they led strikes,

which, although illegal, resulted in settlement of issues through

negotiations with the government. The last major attempt by or- ganized labor to strike occurred in June 1 98 1

, but the strike by

the Sudan Railways Workers' Union was broken by the Nimeiri

government, which arrested its leaders.

Prior to 1989, the SWTUF, in its weakened state, included fortytwo trade unions, representing more than 1.7 million workers in

the public and private sectors. The federation was affiliated with

the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity.

Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry

In the early 1990s, agriculture and livestock raising were the main

sources of livelihood in Sudan for about 61 percent of the working

population. Agricultural products regularly accounted for about

95 percent of the country's exports. Industry was mostly agriculturally based, accounting for 15 percent of GDP in 1988. The aver- age annual growth of agricultural production declined in the 1980s

to 0.8 percent for the period 1980-87, as compared with 2.9 per- cent for the period 1965-80. Similarly, the sector's total contribution to GDP declined over the years, as the other sectors of the

economy expanded. Total sectoral activities, which contributed an

estimated 40 percent of GDP in the early 1970s, had fluctuated

during the 1980s and represented about 36 percent in 1988 (see

table 6, Appendix). Crop cultivation was divided between a modern,

market-oriented sector comprising mechanized, large-scale irrigated

and rainfed farming (mainly in central Sudan) and small-scale farming following traditional practices that was carried on in the other

142
Experimental farm in Yambio, western Al Istiwai State Courtesy Robert 0. Collins Cotton growing in Al Jazirah, where international funding

has helped rehabilitate irrigation systems

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

143
Sudan: A Country Study

parts of the country where rainfall or other water sources were suffi- cient for cultivation.

Large investments continued to be made in the 1980s in

mechanized, irrigated, and rainfed cultivation, with their combined

areas accounting for roughly two-thirds of Sudan's cultivated land

in the late 1980s. The early emphasis on cotton growing on irrigated

land had decreased. Although cotton remained the most important crop, peanuts, wheat, and sugarcane had become major crops, and considerable quantities of sesame also were grown (see table

7, Appendix). Rainfed mechanized farming continued to produce

mostly sorghum, and short-fiber cotton was also grown. Production in both subsectors increased domestic supplies and export

potentials. The increase appeared, however, to have been achieved

mainly by expanding the cultivated area rather than by increasing

productivity. To stimulate productivity, in 1981 the government

offered various incentives to cultivators of irrigated land, who were

almost entirely government tenants. Subsistence cultivators produced sorghum as their staple crop, although in the northerly,

rainfed, cultivated areas millet was the principal staple. Subsistence

farmers also grew peanuts and sesame.

Livestock raising, pursued throughout Sudan except in the ex- tremely dry areas of the north and the tsetse-fly-infested area in

the far south, was almost entirely in the traditional sector. Because

livestock raising provided employment for so many people, modernization proposals have been based on improving existing practices and marketing for export, rather than moving toward the

modern ranching that requires few workers.

Fishing was largely carried out by the traditional sector for subsistence. An unknown number of small operators also used the country's major reservoirs in the more populated central region and

the rivers to catch fish for sale locally and in nearby larger urban

centers. The few modern fishing ventures, mainly on Lake Nubia

and in the Red Sea, were small.

The forestry subsector comprised both traditional gatherers of

firewood and producers of charcoal—the main sources of fuel for homes and some industry in urban areas—and a modern timber

and sawmilling industry, the latter government owned. Approximately 21 million cubic meters of wood, mainly for fuel, were cut

in 1987. Gum arabic production in FY 1986-87 was about 40,000

tons. In the late 1980s, it became the second biggest export after cotton in most years, amounting to about 1 1 percent of total exports.

Land Use

By 1991 only partial surveys of Sudan's land resources had been

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The Economy

made, and estimates of the areas included in different land-use

categories varied considerably. Figures for potentially arable land

ranged from an estimate of 35.9 million hectares made in the

mid-1960s to a figure of 84 million hectares published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources in 1974. Estimates of

the amount actually under cultivation varied in the late 1980s, ranging from 7.5 million hectares, including roughly 10 or 11 percent

in fallow, to 12.6 million hectares.

Substantial variations also existed in land classified as actually

used or potentially usable for livestock grazing. The ministry and

the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have

classified about 24 million hectares as pastureland. The 1965 esti- mate of land use classified 101.4 million hectares as grazing land,

and in 1975 an ILO-United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) interagency mission to Sudan estimated the total potential grazing land at between 120 million and 150 million hectares.

Forestland estimates also differed greatly, from less than 60 million hectares by staff of the Forestry Administration to about 915

million hectares by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural

Resources and the FAO (see Forestry, this ch.). Dense stands of

trees covered only between 20 million and 24 million hectares of

the total foresdand. Differences in land classification may have been

accounted for by use of some woodland areas for grazing and some

traditional grazing lands for raising crops. Given the dearth of rainfall during the 1980s and early 1990s, the ecological damage from

mechanized farming, and the steady march of desertification, dis- crepancies in these statistics had little meaning in 1991.

It was generally agreed, however, that in the late 1980s Sudan

still had a substantial amount of land suitable for future cropping.

The ILO-UNDP mission believed that two-thirds of the potential area for livestock grazing, however, was already in use. In addition to land suitable for cultivation and livestock grazing, Sudan

also had about 76 million to 86 million hectares of desert. Additionally, an area of about 2.9 million hectares was covered by

swamps and inland water, and about 280,000 hectares were oc- cupied by urban setdements and other man-made features.

Land Tenure

The right to own property, to bequeath it to heirs, and to in- herit it was established by the Permanent Constitution of 1973;

this right was suspended in 1985. Sudan had long had a system

of land registration through which an individual, an enterprise, or the government could establish tide to a piece of land. Such registration had been extensive in northern Sudan, especially in Al

145
Sudan: A Country Study

Khartum, Al Awsat, and Ash Shamali provinces. Before 1970 all other land (unregistered) belonged to the state, which held ownership in trust for the people, who had customary rights to it. In 1970

the Unregistered Land Act declared that all waste, forest, and unregistered lands were government land. Before the act's passage,

the government had avoided interfering with individual customary

rights to unregistered land, and in the late 1980s it again adhered

to this policy.

The government owned most of the land used by the modern

agricultural sector and leased it to tenants (for example, the Gezira

Scheme) or to private entrepreneurs, such as most operators of large- scale mechanized rainfed farming. In the late 1980s, however, the

great area of land used for pasture and for subsistence cultivation was communally owned under customary land laws that varied

somewhat by location but followed a broadly similar pattern. In

agricultural communities, the right to cultivate an area of unused

land became vested in the individual who cleared it for use. The

rights to such land could be passed on to heirs, but ordinarily the

land could not be sold or otherwise disposed of. The right was also retained to land left in fallow, although in Bahr al Ghazal, Aali an Nil, and Al Istiwai there were communities where another in- dividual could claim such land by clearing it. Among the transhumant (see Glossary) communities of the north,

the rights to cultivated land were much the same, but the dominant

position of livestock in community activities had introduced cer- tain other communal rights that included common rights to graz- ing land, the right-of-way to water and grazing land, the right to grass on agricultural land unless the occupier cut and stacked it, and the right to crop residues unless similarly treated. In the western savannas, private ownership of stands of hashab trees could be

registered, an exception to the usual government ownership of the

forests. But dead wood for domestic fuel and the underlying grass were common property. Water, a matter of greatest importance

to stock raisers, was open to all if free standing, but wells that had

been dug and the associated drinking troughs were private property

and were retained by the digger season after season. In northern

Sudan, especially in the western region where increasing population and animal numbers have placed pressure on the land, violations of customary laws and conflicts between ethnic groups over land rights have been growing. Resolution of these problems has

been attempted by local government agencies but only on a case- by-case basis.

146
Control device for switching waterflow to one of the many canals usedfor

irrigation in Al Jazirah, south of Khartoum

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

Irrigated Agriculture

In 1991 Sudan had a large modern irrigated agriculture sector

totaling more than 2 million hectares out of about 84 million hect- ares that are potentially arable. About 93 percent of the irrigated area was in government projects; the remaining 7 percent belonged

to private operations. The Nile and its tributaries were the source

of water for 93 percent of irrigated agriculture, and of this the Blue

Nile accounted for about 67 percent. Gravity flow was the main

form of irrigation, but about one-third of the irrigated area was

served by pumps.

The waters of the Nile in Sudan have been used for centuries

for traditional irrigation, taking advantage of the annual Nile flood. Some use of this method still continued in the early 1990s, and

the traditional shaduf(a. device to raise water) and waterwheel were

also used to lift water to fields in local irrigation projects but were

rapidly being replaced by more efficient mechanized pump sys- tems. Among the first efforts to employ irrigation for modern commercial cropping was the use of the floodwaters of the Qash River

and the Baraka River (both of which originate in Ethiopia) in eastern Sudan to grow cotton on their deltas (see fig. 4). This project

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Sudan: A Country Study

was started in the late 1860s by the Egyptian governor and continued until interrupted by the turbulent period of the 1880s, leading

to the reconquest of the country by the British in 1899. Cultivation was resumed in 1896 in the Baraka Delta in the Tawkar area, but in the Qash Delta it only resumed after World War I. Between

1924 and 1926, canals were built in the latter delta to control the

flood; sandstorms made canals unfeasible in the Baraka. Between

the 1940s and the 1970s, various projects were developed to irrigate

land. In 1982 both deltas yielded only one crop a year, watered

by the flood. Adequate groundwater, however, offered the eventual possibility of using pump irrigation from local wells for additional cropping or for supplementing any flood shortages.

The drought that affected Sudan in the 1980s was a natural di- saster that had a crushing effect on the country's irrigation sys- tems. In 1990-91 , for instance, water was so scarce in the Tawkar

area that for the first time in 100 years the crops failed. As of 1990, the country's largest irrigation project had been developed on land between the Blue and White Nile rivers south of

their confluence at Khartoum. This area is generally flat with a

gentle slope to the north and west, permitting natural gravity irri- gation, and its soils are fertile cracking clays well suited to irrigation. The project originated in 1911, when a private British

enterprise, Sudan Plantations Syndicate, found cotton suited to the area and embarked on what in the 1920s became the Gezira

Scheme, intended principally to furnish cotton to the British textile industry. Backed by a loan from the British government, the

syndicate began a dam on the Blue Nile at Sannar in 1913. Work

was interrupted by World War I, and the dam was not completed

until 1925. The project was limited by a 1929 agreement between

Sudan and Egypt that restricted the amount of water AngloEgyptian Sudan could use during the dry season. By 1931 the

project had expanded to 450,000 hectares, the maximum that then

could be irrigated by the available water, although 10,000 more

hectares were added in the 1950s. The project was nationalized

in 1950, and was operated by the Sudan Gezira Board as a government enterprise. In 1959 a new agreement with Egypt greatly in- creased the allotment of water to Sudan, as did the completion in

the early 1960s of the Manaqil Extension on the western side of

the Gezira Scheme. By 1990 the Manaqil Extension had an irrigated area of nearly 400,000 hectares, and with the 460,000 hectares eventually attained by the original Gezira Scheme, the combined projects

accounted for half the country's total land under irrigation.

In the early 1960s, the government set up a program to resettle Nubians displaced by Lake Nubia (called Lake Nasser in Egypt),

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The Economy

which was formed by the construction of the Aswan High Dam

in Egypt. To provide farmland for the Nubians, the government

constructed the Khashm al Qirbah Dam on the Atbarah River and

established the Haifa al Jadidah (New Haifa) irrigation project.

Located west of Kassala, this project was originally designed to

irrigate about 164,000 hectares. In 1982 it was the only large irri- gation project in the country that did not use the waters of the Blue

Nile or White Nile. The resettlement was effected mainly after completion of the Khashm al Qirbah Dam in 1964. Part of the irrigated area was also assigned to local inhabitants. The main commercial

crops initially introduced included cotton, peanuts, and wheat. In

1965 sugarcane was added, and a sugar factory having a design

capacity of 60,000 tons was built to process it. The project enabled 200,000 hectares of land to be irrigated for the first time. Heavy

silting as well as serious problems of drainage and salinity occurred.

As a result, by the late 1970s the reservoir had lost more than 40

percent of its original storage capacity and was unable to meet the

project water requirements. These problems persisted in the early

1990s.

The multipurpose Roseires Dam was built in 1966 and powergenerating facilities were installed in 1971 . Both the water and the

power were needed to implement the Rahad River irrigation project

located east of the Rahad River, a tributary of the Blue Nile. The

Rahad entered the Blue Nile downstream from the dam, and during the dry season had an insufficient flow for irrigation purposes.

Work on the initial 63,000 hectares of the project began in the early

1970s, the first irrigation water was received in 1977, and by 1981

about 80 percent of the prepared area was reported to be irrigated.

(In May 1988, the World Bank agreed to provide additional funding for this and other irrigation projects.) Water for the project was pumped from the Blue Nile, using electric power from the

Roseires plant, and was transported by an eighty-kilometer-long

canal to the Rahad River (en route underpassing the Dindar River,

another Blue Nile tributary). The canal then emptied into the Rahad above a new barrage that diverted the combined flow from

the two sources into the project's main irrigation canal. Irrigation was by gravity flow, but instead of flat field flooding, furrow irri- gation was used because it permitted more effective use of

machinery.

In the 1920s, private irrigation projects using diesel pumps also had begun to appear in Al Khartum Province, mainly along the

White Nile, to provide vegetables, fruit, and other foods to the capital area. In 1937 a dam was built by the Anglo-Egyptian con- dominium upstream from Khartoum on the White Nile at Jabal

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Sudan: A Country Study

al Awliya to regulate the supply of water to Egypt during the August to April period of declining flow. Grazing and cultivated land

along the river was flooded for almost 300 kilometers. The government thereupon established seven pump irrigation projects, partially financed by Egypt, to provide the area's inhabitants with an

alternative to transhumance.

This irrigation project eventually proved successful, making possible large surpluses of cotton and sorghum and encouraging pri- vate entrepreneurs to undertake new projects. High cotton profits

during the Korean War (1950-53) increased private interest along

the Blue Nile as well, and by 1958 almost half the country's ir- rigated cotton was grown under pump irrigation. During the 1960s,

however, downward fluctuations in world cotton prices and dis- putes between entrepreneurs and tenants led to numerous failures

of pump irrigation projects. In 1968 the government assumed

ownership and operation of the projects. The government established the Agricultural Reform Corporation for this purpose, and

the takeover began that year with the larger estates. Subsequently, as leases expired, the corporation acquired smaller projects, until

May 1970 when all outstanding leases were revoked. A considerable number of small pump operations that developed on privately

owned land, chiefly along the main Nile but also on the Blue Nile,

continued to operate.

Since the 1950s, the government has constructed a number of

large pump projects, mostly on the Blue Nile. These have included the Junayd project on the east bank of the Blue Nile east of the

Gezira Scheme. This project, with an irrigated area of about 36,000

hectares, went into operation in 1955 to provide an alternative liveli- hood for nomadic pastoralists in the area. It produced cotton until

1960, when about 8,400 hectares were converted to sugarcane. A

sugar factory built to process the crop (with a potential capacity

of 60,000 tons of sugar a year) opened in 1962. In the early 1970s,

the Japanese-assisted As Suki project, also of 36,000 hectares, was

established upstream from Sannar to grow cotton, sorghum, and

oilseeds. In the mid-1970s, the government constructed a second

project near Sannar of about 20,000 hectares. In addition to cot- ton and other crops such as peanuts, about 8,400 hectares of the area were devoted to raising sugarcane. The cane-processing fac- tory, with a design capacity of 1 10,000 tons of sugar a year, opened

in 1976. Several smaller Blue Nile projects added more than 80,000

additional hectares to Sudan's overall irrigated area during this time. In the 1970s, when the consumption and import of sugar grew

rapidly, domestic production became a priority, and two major

150
The Economy

pump-irrigated sugar plantations were established on the White

Nile in the Kusti area. The Hajar Asalaya Sugar Project, begun

in 1975, had an irrigated area of about 7,600 hectares. The sugar

factory, completed in 1977, had a potential annual capacity of

110,000 tons. The Kinanah Sugar Project, which had almost 16,200

hectares under irrigation in 1981 and had a future potential of over 33,000 hectares, was one of the world's largest sugar-milling and

refining operations. In 1985-86 production reached more than

330,000 tons a year. This project, first proposed in 1971, was beset with funding problems and overruns that increased overall costs from the equivalent of US$113 million estimated in 1973 to more

than US$750 million when the plant opened officially in early 1981

.

The Kinanah Sugar Project, unlike the country's four other

government-owned sugar projects, was a joint venture among the

governments of Sudan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and the Arab

Investment Company, the Sudan Development Corporation,

Kinanah Limited, and the AAAID, including local Sudanese banks.

An initial trial run in the 1979-80 cane season produced 20,000

tons of sugar. Yield increased to an estimated 135,000 to 150,000

tons the following season. Production at the Hajar Asalaya facto- ry did not get under way until the 1979-80 season because of cane and sugar-processing difficulties. Problems have also affected the

other three state sugar factories, but as a result of proposed World

Bank management, the output total of these four government operations for the 1984-85 season improved to nearly 200,000 tons. Output declined to 159,000 tons in 1985-86 because of the drought.

In 1989 sugarcane production reached 400,000 tons. Rainfed Agriculture

Cultivation dependent on rainfall falls into two categories. Most

Sudanese farmers have always relied on rainfed farming. In addition to these traditional farmers, a large modern mechanized rainfed

agriculture sector has developed since 1944-45, when a government project to cultivate the cracking clays of central Sudan start- ed in the Al Qadarif area of Ash Sharqi Province, largely to meet

the food needs of army units stationed in the British colonies in eastern Africa (present-day Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). An

average of about 6,000 hectares a year was cultivated between 1945

and 1953, producing chiefly sorghum, under a sharecropping ar- rangement between the government and farmers who had been

allocated land in the project. These estates proved cosdy, however,

and in 1954 the government began encouraging the private sector

to take up mechanized farming in the area, a policy that continued

after Sudan gained independence in 1956. Under the new approach,

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Sudan: A Country Study

the government established several state farms to demonstrate

production methods and to conduct research. Research activities have been very limited, however, because of staffing and funding

problems, and the farms have been operated essentially as regular

production units.

The private sector response was positive, and by 1960 mechanized

farming had spread into other areas of the cracking clay zone in

Ash Sharqi and Al Awsat provinces. The government set aside rec- tangular areas that were divided into plots of 420 hectares (later

raised in places to 630 hectares) each. Half of these plots were leased

to private farmers, the other half left in fallow. After four years, the originally leased land was to be returned to fallow and the farmer was to receive a new lease to an adjacent fallow area. When the

demand for land grew faster than it could be demarcated, areas outside the designated project limits were taken over by private

individuals. The four-year lease proved unpopular because it meant

new investment in clearing land every four years, and apparently

much of the worked land continued to be cultivated while fallow

land was also placed under cultivation. By 1968 more than 750,000

hectares were being cultivated, of which it was estimated that more

than 200,000 hectares constituted unauthorized holdings. The aver- age agricultural production growth rate declined, however, from

2.9 percent in the period between 1965 and 1980, to 0.8 percent

in the period between 1980 and 1987, the latest available figures.

Reportedly, for the 1991-92 season, the Ministry of Agriculture

and Natural Resources planned for about 7.3 million hectares of

food crops to be planted, with about 1.6 million hectares planted

in the irrigated sector and about 5 . 7 million hectares in the rainfed areas. The investment requirements for mechanized farming favored

prosperous cultivators, and eventually most farms came to be operated by entrepreneurs who raised capital through mortgageable

property or other assets in the urban centers. Through arrangements with other individuals, these entrepreneurs frequendy

managed to control additional plots beyond the legal limit of two. Their ability to obtain capital also permitted them to abandon

depleted land and to move into newly demarcated uncleared areas, a practice that had a deleterious impact upon the environment,

deprived the indigenous inhabitants of work opportunities, and in- creased desertification. In 1968, to expand the operator base and

to introduce more control over land allocation, crops, and farming methods, the government established the Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC), an autonomous agency under the Ministry

of Agriculture and Natural Resources. From 1968 through 1978,

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The Economy

the IDA made three loans to the government to enable the MFC

to provide technical assistance, credit for landclearing and

machinery, and marketing aid to individual farmers and cooperative groups. The MFC also became the operator of state farms.

In the late 1970s, about 2.2 million hectares had been allocated

for mechanized farming, and about 420,000 hectares more had been

occupied without official demarcation. About 1.9 million hectares

in all were believed to be under cultivation in any one season. Of

the officially allocated land, more than 70 percent was held by pri- vate individuals. Private companies had also begun entering the

field, and some allocations had been made to them. State farms

accounted for another 7.5 percent. About 15 percent of the total allocated land was in MFC-IDA projects. The largest proportion

of mechanized farming was in Ash Sharqi Province, 43 percent;

the next largest in Al Awsat Province, 32 percent; and about 20

percent was in Aali an Nil Province. Mechanized farming had also been initiated in southern Kurdufan Province through a project

covering small-scale farmers in the area of the Nuba Mountains,

but under a different government program. Proposals also had been

made for MFC projects using mechanized equipment in other areas of southern Kurdufan (some have already been tried) and southern

Darfur provinces. There were serious feasibility problems in view

of competition for land and conflicts with traditional farming practices, difficult soil conditions, and the probable negative effect on

the large numbers of livestock of nomads.

Only a few crops had been found suitable for cultivation in the

cracking clay area. Sorghum had been the principal one, and during the early 1980s it was planted on an average of about 80 per- cent of the sown area. Sesame and short-fiber cotton were also

grown successfully but in relatively smaller quantities, sesame on

about 15 percent of the land and cotton on about 5 percent. Soil

fertility has reportedly been declining because of the continued

planting of sorghum and the lack of crop rotation. Yields have apparently decreased, but in view of the area's greatly varying cli- matic conditions and the uncertain production data, definitive

conclusions on trends appeared premature.

Livestock

In the early 1990s, drought caused a dramatic decline in livestock

raising in Sudan, following a period in the early 1980s when

livestock provided all or a large part of the livelihood of more than

40 percent of the country's population. Livestock raising was over- whelmingly in the traditional sector, and, although initial steps had

been taken to improve productivity and develop market orientation,

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Sudan: A Country Study

for the modern monetized economy the sector represented largely a potential asset. In 1983 Sudan's more than 50 million animals

comprised the second largest national herd in Africa, next in size to that of Ethiopia. An FAO estimate in 1987 indicated that there were about 20.5 million cattle, 19 million sheep, 14 million goats,

and 3 million camels. Other animals included 660,000 donkeys,

21,000 horses, a small number of pigs (kept by such non-Muslim

peoples as the Nuba) and 32,000 chickens. By 1991 these numbers had been reduced by perhaps one-third by the drought of

1990-91; the August 1988 floods in the south, described as the worst

in Sudan's history; and the ravages of civil war in the south. Poultry was raised mainly by farm families and villagers. A small modern

sector consisted of limited government commercial operations and

a few semicommercial private ventures. Sudanese cattle are of two principal varieties: Baqqara and Nilotic. The Baqqara and two subvarieties constituted about 80 per- cent of the country's total number of cattle. This breed was found

chiefly in the western savanna regions and in fewer, although significant, numbers farther to the east from Aali an Nil to Kassala

in Ash Sharqi. The Nilotic, constituting approximately 20 percent

of all cattle, were common in the eastern hill and plains areas of

southeastern Al Istiwai, which were free of the tsetse fly, and in

those parts of the Bahr al Ghazal and Aali an Nil lying outside

the tsetse-fly zone. Because of periodic rinderpest epidemics, the

total number of cattle was relatively small until about 1930, when

it stood at an estimated 2 million. A vaccination program begun

about that time and mass inoculations during the succeeding decades resulted in a great increase in numbers, which by 1970 had

reached about 12 million.

In the vast areas used by pastoral herders (estimated to be 80

million to 100 million hectares), cattle husbandry was conducted

in an economic, cultural, and social context that had evolved over

generations. The system included an emphasis on increasing herd

size as an investment for future family security. Small surpluses

(usually bulls) were available for subsistence use, exchange, or sale for local consumption or export. Cattle were also used for marriage payments and among the Nilotes for rituals. Numbers of cattle also helped to establish or increase status and power in a social sys- tem in which cattle were the measure of wealth.

Most Nilotic cattle were kept by transhumant groups. Migrations, related to the wet and dry seasons, usually did not exceed

150 to 160 kilometers. The majority of the Baqqara strain of cattle belonged to the Baqqara Arabs (see Northern Arabized Communities, ch. 2). The latter were largely nomadic, but since at least

154
Market, or suq, in Yambio, with townspeople engaged in bargaining

Cattle suq in Juba, capital of Al Istiwai State Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

155
Sudan: A Country Study

the early 1900s had had a settled base on which crop cultivation was practiced. The farmers, their relatives, or their agents moved

the cattle over traditional migratory routes northward during the

rainy season and southward to the area of the Bahr al Arab as the

dry season progressed. Migrations in either direction might amount

to 400 kilometers. The expansion of mechanized rainfed agricul- ture in the region used by the Baqqara, continued government ef- forts to enlarge the cultivated area, and pressures on the land from

the growing population gradually reduced grazing areas. At the same time, traditional cultural forces brought about a steady in- crease in cattle numbers. The result was increasing overstocking

and pasture depletion, until the outbreak of civil war in 1983 and

the devastating droughts of the 1980s and early 1990s decimated

not only the Nilotic herds but also livestock throughout Sudan.

Many families and indeed whole ethnic groups who had traditionally survived on their cattle, sheep, goats, or camels, lost all of their

herds and were forced to migrate to the Three Towns (Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North) in search of sustenance. Sheep were herded chiefly by transhumants in Darfur and Kurdufan. Large numbers were found in the drier areas at greater ele- vations than the usual cattle zone. Several breeds were raised, but

the predominant and preferred one was the so-called desert sheep,

which had both good weight and good milk yield. Villagers in Al

Awsat also raised large numbers of sheep, mostly on a nonmigratory basis. Fodder was obtained from crop residues on irrigated

and rainfed farms and from vegetation along the rivers and canals.

Goats, of which there were three principal breeds (desert, Nubian, and Nilotic), were found throughout the country south of the

northern desert areas. They were raised mainly by sedentary families for milk and meat. Goat meat, although less popular than mutton, formed part of the diet of most families, particularly those

having low incomes. Goat milk was an important source of protein,

and many families in urban areas kept a few goats for their milk.

Camels were largely concentrated in the desert and subdesert

regions of northern Darfur, northern Kurdufan, and southern Ash

Sharqi. They were kept almost entirely by nomadic and seminomadic peoples, for whom the animal represented the preferred

mode of transport. Camels were also important for milk and for meat. Camel ownership and numbers were sources of prestige in

nomadic societies. Fisheries

Sudan's total production of fish, shellfish, and other fishing

products reached an estimated 24,000 tons per year in 1988, the

156
The Economy

latest available yearly figures. This figure compared with estimates

of a potential yearly catch exceeding 100,000 tons. The principal source of fish was the Nile River system. In central and northern

Sudan, several lakes and reservoirs have been formed by the damming of the river and its branches: the 180-kilometer section of

Lake Nubia on the main Nile in Sudan and the reservoirs behind

the Roseires and Sennar dams on the Blue Nile, the Jabal al Awliya

Dam on the White Nile, and the Khashm al Qirbah Dam on the

Atbarah tributary of the main Nile. These bodies of water accounted

for about 1 1 ,000 tons of fish against a calculated potential of about

29,000 tons. Production from Lake Nubia through 1979, the latest figures

available in 1991, was only 500 tons a year, or about one-tenth

of the estimated potential. Inhabitants around the lake, which had

formed gradually in the 1960s, had no previous experience in fish- ing, and the first significant commercial exploitation of the lake's resources was undertaken by the government's Fisheries Administration. In 1973 a private company also started operations. In the

mid- and late 1970s, an ice plant and a cold storage facility were

built at Wadi Haifa with assistance from China. China also fur- nished thirty-five two-ton fishing vessels, a number of transport

launches, and other fishing equipment. Cooling plants were constructed at Khartoum and Atbarah to hold fish that were brought

from Wadi Haifa by railroad. Although ice was used in the shipments, substantial loss occurred, especially during the hotter

months. To what extent fish production from the lake and availability to consumers were increased by these new facilities was not

known in 1991.

The largest potential source of freshwater fish was southern

Sudan, whose extensive river network and flooded areas in As Sudd

were believed able to provide 100,000 to 300,000 tons annually on a sustained basis. Statistics on actual production were unavailable in 1991 ; much was consumed locally, although limited quantities of dried and salted fish were exported to Zaire where it was

in great demand.

The country's second source of fish, the Red Sea coastal area, was relatively unexploited until the late 1970s. Annual production

toward the end of the decade amounted to about 500 tons of fish, shellfish (including pearl oysters), and other marine life. In 1978

the British Ministry of Overseas Development began a joint project

with the government Fisheries Administration to raise output by

making boats, motors, and equipment available to fishermen. In- cluded was an ice plant built at Sawakin to furnish local fishermen

with ice for their catch. By 1982 the project was well advanced,

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Sudan: A Country Study

and about 2,000 tons of fish were taken annually. A sustained catch

of 5,000 tons might eventually be possible.

Forestry

Sudan has a large quantity of natural forest, much of which re- mained almost totally unexploited in 1991. Since the early 1900s,

extensive areas of woodland and forest have been converted to agricultural use. Large amounts of land classifiable as woodland

have also been cleared in the development of large-scale mechanized

rainfed farming in Ash Sharqi and Al Awsat states, and smaller

amounts in Aali an Nil and southern Kurdufan states. In the late 1970s, FAO estimated that the country's forests and woodlands

totaled about 915,000 square kilometers, or 38.5 percent of the land

area. This figure was based on the broad definition of forest and

woodland as any area of vegetation dominated by trees of any size.

It also included an unknown amount of cleared land that was ex- pected to have forest cover again "in the foreseeable future." An

estimate in the mid-1970s by the Forestry Administration, however,

established the total forest cover at about 584,360 square kilometers, or 24.6 percent of the country's land area. More than 129,000

square kilometers (about one-quarter) of this amount were locat- ed in the dry and semiarid regions of northern Sudan. These forests were considered valuable chiefly as protection for the land against

desertification, but they also served as a source of fuel for pastoral

peoples in those regions. The continued population pressure on

the land has resulted in an accelerated destruction of forestland,

particularly in the Sahel, because charcoal remained the predominant fuel. The loss of forestland in the marginal areas of the north,

accelerated by mechanized farming and by drought, resulted in a steady encroachment of the Sahara southward at about ten kilometers a year in the 1980s.

The productive forest extended below the zone of desert encroachment to the southern border. It included the savanna woodlands

of the central and western parts of the country, which were dominated by various species of acacia, among them Acacia Senegal, the

principal source of gum arabic. Gum arabic was Sudan's second

largest export product, accounting for 80 percent of the world's

supply. It is nontoxic, noncalorific, and nonpolluting, having no

odor or taste. It is used widely in industry for products ranging

from mucilage (for postage stamps) to foam stabilizers to excipient

in medicines and dietetic foods. In 1986-87 Sudan produced more

than 40,000 tons marketed through the Gum Arabic Company.

In the late 1980s, the drought severely curtailed production.

158
Fisherman with his nets on the Nile in northern Sudan

Port Sudan on the Red Sea, Sudan 's major port

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

159
Sudan: A Country Study

The principal area of productive forest and woodland, however, was in the more moist southern part of the country. Covering an

area of more than 200,000 square kilometers and consisting mainly of broadleaf deciduous hardwoods, it remained largely undeveloped in 1990. Timber processed by government mills in the area included mahogany for furniture and other hardwoods for railroad

ties, furniture, and construction. Domestic production of timber

fell far short of local needs in the 1970s, and as much as 80 percent

of the domestic requirement was met by imports.

Plantations established by the government Forestry Administration in the mid-1970s totaled about 16,000 hectares of hardwoods

and 500 to 600 hectares of softwoods; most were in the south. They

included stands of teak and in the higher elevations of the Imatong

Mountains, exotic pines. Eucalyptus stands had also been established in the irrigated agricultural areas to serve as windbreaks and

to supply firewood. A gradually increasing forest reserve had been

developed, and by the mid-1970s it covered more than 13,000

square kilometers. Additional protection of forest and woodland

areas was provided by several national parks and game reserves

that encompassed 54,000 square kilometers in the mid-1970s.

Since 1983 the civil war has virtually halted forestry production

in southern Sudan, which provided the majority of the country's

forestry products. According to FAO estimates, however, in 1987

Sudan produced 41,000 cubic meters of sawed timber, 1,906,000

cubic meters of other industrial roundwood, and more than 18 million cubic meters of firewood. Each of these categories showed a

substantial increase from production levels in the 1970s. The in- satiable demand was for charcoal, the principal cooking fuel, and

the one major forest product not dependent upon the south. Because wood of any kind could be turned to charcoal, the acacia

groves of the Sahel have been used extensively for this purpose,

with a resulting rapid advance of deforestation. To improve government forestry conservation and management policy, as well as the

issue of land use, in 1990-91 plans were under way to establish a forestry resource conservation project, funded and cofinanced

by several international development agencies and donors.

Manufacturing

The development of modern manufacturing received littie direct

encouragement in Sudan during the condominium period. British

economic policies were aimed basically at expanding the production

of primary products, mainly cotton, for export. Imports and traditional handicraft industries met the basic needs for manufactured

goods. Indirectly, however, the vast Gezira Scheme cotton-growing

160
The Economy

project induced the construction of ginneries, of which more than

twenty were in operation by the early 1930s. A secondary development was the establishment of several cottonseed oil-pressing mills. During World War II, small import substitution industries arose, including those manufacturing soap, carbonated drinks, and other consumer items. These operations did not survive the competition

from imports after the war's end. Foreign private interests invested in a few larger enterprises that included a meat-processing fac- tory, a cement plant, and a brewery, all opened between 1949 and

1952.

At independence the Sudanese government supported an industrial development policy to be effected through the private sector. To facilitate this process, Khartoum adopted the Approved Enterprises (Concessions) Act of 1956, to encourage private Sudanese

and foreign investment. The act placed few restrictions on foreign

equity holdings. By 1961, however, the government had concluded that the private sector lacked interest or funds to establish enterprises important to the national economy, and so it entered the

manufacturing field. The first government project was a tannery

opened that year, and this was followed in 1962 by a sugar fac- tory. In 1962 Khartoum formed the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to manage government plants. During the decade,

several additional government enterprises were built, including a second sugar factory, two fruit and vegetable canneries, a dateprocessing plant, an onion-dehydrating plant, a milk-processing

plant, and a cardboard factory. During this time, the private sec- tor also made substantial investment, which resulted in factories

making textiles and knitwear, shoes, soap, soft drinks, and flour. Other private enterprises included printing facilities and additional

oil-pressing mills. Among the largest private undertakings was the

foreign-financed and foreign-built oil refinery at Port Sudan, which

opened in 1964. Well over half the private sector investment during the decade came from foreign sources. Government participation in the manufacturing sector increased

dramatically after the 1969 military coup and the adoption of a

policy aimed at placing the country's economic development in

government hands, although private ownership continued. During 1970 and 1971, Khartoum nationalized more than thirty pri- vate enterprises. In 1972, however, to counter the drop in foreign

private investment that followed, Nimeiri announced that private

capital would again be accorded favorable treatment, and the

government passed the Development and Promotion of Industrial

Investment Act of 1972, containing even more liberal provisions

than precoup legislation.

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Sudan: A Country Study

As the economy remained dependent on private capital, as well

as capital investment from developed nations, the government in- corporated further incentives for the favorable treatment of such

capital in a 1974 revision of the industrial investment act and added

provisions against arbitrary nationalization. Moreover, in 1972

Khartoum denationalized some enterprises nationalized earlier and

returned them to their former owners under an arrangement for joint government-private ownership. One of the largest of these

enterprises was the Bata Shoe Company, which was returned in

1978 as a reorganized joint company in which Bata held a 51 per- cent interest and the government 49 percent. The most successful

such enterprise, however, was the Bittar Group, which in 1990 had

become the largest undertaking in Sudan. Begun in the 1920s, nationalized in 1969 but returned to its owners in 1973, it has diversified into products ranging from exports of vegetable oils to imports

of wheat, sugar, and insecticides. The firm has been active in a wide range of projects involving agriculture, electricity, and such

industrial products as household and office equipment, soap, and

detergents.

Throughout the 1970s, the government continued to establish

new public enterprises, some state-owned, others in conjunction

with private interests, and some having foreign government participation, especially by the Arab oil-producing states. The new

plants included three sugar factories, among which was the Kinanah

sugar-milling and refining factory; two tanneries; a flour mill; and more than twenty textile plants. Ajoint venture with United States

interests built Sudan's first fertilizer plant south of Khartoum, which was in operation by 1986. Private investment continued, particularly in textiles. About 300 million meters of cloth were produced

annually in the 1970s, but output fell to 50 million meters in 1985.

In 1988 the textile industry functioned at about 25 percent of ca- pacity. The latter figure reflected the effects of the civil war, the

dearth of hard currency for spare parts to maintain machinery,

and the debt crisis. Since independence Sudan's modern manufacturing establishment has emphasized the processing of agricultural products and

import substitution. The production of foodstuffs, beverages, and

clothing has accounted for a large part of total output. Significant

import substitution industries included cement, chemicals, and dry

battery manufacture; glass-bottle-making; petroleum refining; and

fertilizer production. In the late 1980s, estimates of the contribution of modern manufacturing to GDP varied from about 7 to 8

percent a year, including mining (compared to about 2 percent in

1956). Employment in the sector had risen during that period from

162
Craftsman engaged in jewelry making, Omdurman

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

possibly 9,000 in 1956 to 185,000 in 1977, including wage earners

in government enterprises. Almost three-quarters of large-scale

modern manufacturing was located in Al Khartum, attracted by

market size, higher per capita income, better transportation and

power infrastructure, and access to financial and government

services.

Total manufacturing output, however, had not met expectation

by the end of the 1970s and steadily declined in the 1980s. Overall

output in some subsectors had grown as new facilities began operating, but the goal of self- sufficiency had generally not been at- tained. Shortages of domestic and imported raw materials, power

failures, transportation delays, lack of spare parts, and shortages

of labor ranging from qualified managerial staff and skilled workers to casual laborers had been drawbacks to effective operations

and increased output. Losses of skilled labor and management to the Persian Gulf states have been particularly debilitating. In the

1980s, many factories operated below capacity—frequently at well

under 50 percent of their potential. In some instances, low production also was related to poor project planning. For example, the

government cannery at Kuraymah in Ash Shamali was already constructed when scientists found that the surrounding farming area could not produce the quantity of crops the plant could process.

163
Sudan: A Country Study

The milk-processing facility at Babanusah south of Khartoum had

a similar record of poor planning. Efforts to improve the trans- portation and power infrastructure, whose deficiencies have been

major contributors to the manufacturing problems, and rehabilitation of existing plants were among the basic goals of the 1977-82

Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (see Economic

Development; Foreign Aid, this ch.). That plan was never effec- tively implemented. Some progress has been reported, but in 1990

the production problems faced earlier by manufacturing persisted.

Mining

In 1990 the mining industry accounted for less than 1 percent

of the total GDP. A wide range of minerals existed in Sudan, but

the size of reserves had not been determined in most cases. The

discovery of commercially exploitable quantities of petroleum in

the late 1970s offered some hope that the sector would play an in- creased role in the economy in the future (see Petroleum Use and

Domestic Resources, this ch.). However, from February 1984, some months after concessions were allotted, oil exploration operations

had been suspended in the south, where the largest deposits were

located, as a result of the region's security problems. Nonhydrocarbon minerals of actual or potential commercial value included

gold, chrome, copper, iron, manganese, asbestos, gypsum, mica,

limestone, marble, and uranium. Gold had been mined in the Red

Sea Hills since pharaonic times. Between 1900 and 1954, several

British enterprises worked gold mines in the area and extracted a considerable quantity of the metal—one mine alone reportedly

produced three tons of gold between 1924 and 1936. Gold also has

been mined along the borders between Sudan and Uganda and

Zaire, but not in commercially profitable amounts. During the

1970s, the government's Geological Survey Administration located more than fifty potential gold-producing sites in different parts of

the country. Several joint ventures between the Sudanese Mining

Corporation, a government enterprise, and foreign companies were

launched in the 1980s; these undertakings produced gold at Gebeit

and several other mines near the Red Sea Hills beginning in 1987.

In 1988 about 78,000 tons of gold ore were mined in Sudan. In

late 1990, Sudan and two French mining companies formed a joint

venture company to exploit gold reserves in the Khawr Ariab wadi

in the Red Sea Hills. Chrome ore was mined in the Ingessana Hills in Al Awsat. In

the late 1970s, output was reportedly more than 20,000 tons a year, of which more than four-fifths were produced by the Ingessana Hills

Mines Corporation, a subsidiary of Sudanese Mining Corporation.

164
The Economy

A private operation produced the remainder. The ore was exported, chiefly to Japan and Western Europe. In the 1980s, the establishment of ferrochrome processing facilities had been discussed

with Japanese interests, but the estimated 700,000 tons of reserves were insufficient for profitable long-term operations. By 1983, when

the civil war brought a halt to all production in the Ingessana Hills,

chrome production had declined about 50 percent to only 10,000

tons per year. In 1988 production of chromium ore was estimated

at 5,000 metric tons. Asbestos had also been found in the Inges- sana Hills area. It was reportedly of good commercial grade, and

mining possibilities were under study by a Canadian subsidiary

of the United States firm ofJohns-Manville. A small pilot extraction plant had been built, but larger scale operations were dependent on locating adequate reserves and on the ending of the civil war.Large gypsum deposits, estimated to contain reserves of 220 million tons, were found along the Red Sea coast. Reportedly of high

purity, the ore was mined mainly north of Port Sudan. In the late 1980s, about 20,000 tons were produced annually, about 6,000 tons by the Sudanese Mining Corporation and the remainder by pri- vate operations. Gypsum was used mostly in the production of ce- ment. Limestone, found in substantial quantities in Sudan, was mined both for use in making cement and for other construction

materials. Marble was also quarried for the latter purpose.

There has been some commercial mining of mica, exploitable

deposits of which had been located in Ash Shamali Province by

a UN mineral survey team between 1968 and 1972. The Sudanese

Mining Corporation produced about 1,000 tons of scrap mica in

FY 1978, but output reportedly slumped thereafter to about 400

tons annually. Manganese and iron ore, of which several large

deposits exist in different parts of the country, have been mined

at times but only on a small basis by international standards. There

were more than 500 million tons of iron ore deposits in the Fodikwan area of the Red Sea Hills, and beginning in the late 1980s

a project had been planned to produce between 120,000 and 200,000

tons a month. Exploitation of Sudan's mineral deposits, however,

depended in large part on foreign companies willing to undertake

such risks in the face of the country's mounting problems and on

international market factors. Uranium ores have been discovered in the area of the Nuba

Mountains and at Hufrat an Nahas in southern Kurdufan. Minex Company of the United States obtained a 36,000-squarekilometer exploratory concession in the Kurdufan area in 1977,

and the concession was increased to 48,000 square kilometers in

165
Sudan: A Country Study

1979. Uranium reserves are also believed to exist near the western

borders with Chad and Central African Republic. Another potential source of mineral wealth was the Red Sea bed. In 1974 offi- cials established a joint Sudanese-Saudi Arabian agency to develop

those resources, which included zinc, silver, copper, and other

minerals. Explorations below the 2,000-meter mark have indicated that large quantities of the minerals are present, but as of 1990 no actual extraction had been undertaken.

Energy Sources and Supply

In 1990 the chief sources of energy were wood and charcoal,

hydroelectric power, and imported oil. Wood and charcoal were

principally used by households for heating and cooking. Substantial quantities of wood fuels, amounting to roughly one-fifth of the

country's annual consumption, were also used by commercial

operations—chiefly baking and brickmaking and, to a lesser extent, tobacco curing. Some use was also made of other vegetable

matter including sugarcane bagasse, which met a significant part

of the energy needs of the sugar mills, and cotton stalks, used lo- cally by households. Consumption of wood and charcoal has con- tinued to increase as the population has grown, and some concern

has been voiced at the gradual depletion of forest and woodland

resources serving the large towns. Overuse of the sparser vegetation in the semidesert grazing areas reportedly was resulting in some

fuel deficiencies in those regions, as well as in desertification.

The country's hydroelectric potential has been only partially exploited. Major undeveloped hydropower sources existed at the

several cataracts on the main Nile downstream from Khartoum.

Natural gas was discovered in the early 1960s along the Red Sea

coast in a fruitless search for petroleum. In the mid-1970s, further

quantities were found during additional oil explorations, but development was not considered at the time to be commercially feasi- ble. In October 1988, Sudan announced that natural gas production

would start in one year; presumably this would come from the 85

billion cubic meters of gas reserves Chevron had earlier estimated.

The 1979 and later petroleum discoveries in southern and southwestern Sudan added a new potential domestic energy source. However, these deposits to date have yielded little oil because

petroleum companies, such as Chevron, had suspended oilfield ex- plorations in these regions because of the civil war. Sudan had no known deposits of coal or lignite as of the early 1990s.

Electric Power

The only sizable area of the country having electric power

166
The Economy

available to the public was the central region along the Blue Nile

from Khartoum south to Ad Damazin. The central region in the

early 1990s accounted for approximately 87 percent of Sudan's total electricity consumption. The area was served by the country's only

major interconnected generating and distributing system, the Blue

Nile Grid. This system provided power to both the towns and the

irrigation projects in the area, including the Gezira Scheme.

Another small, local, interconnected system furnished power in the eastern part of the country that included Al Qadarif, Kassala, and

Haifa al Jadidah. The remaining customers were in fewer than

twenty widely scattered towns having local diesel-powered generating facilities: Shandi, Atbarah, and Dunqulah in the north;

Malakal, Juba, and Waw in the south; Al Fashir and Nyala in

Darfur; Al Ubayyid and Umm Ruwabah in Kurdufan; a few towns

along the White Nile south of Khartoum; and Port Sudan. About

fifty other urban centers in outlying regions, each having populations of more than 5,000, still did not have a public electricity supply in 1982, the latest year for which statistical information was

available. Rural electrification was found only in some of the vil- lages associated with the main irrigation projects.

Approximately 75 percent of the country's total electric power was produced by the Public Electricity and Water Corporation

(PEWC), a state enterprise. The remaining 25 percent was generated for self-use by various industries including food-processing

and sugar factories, textile mills, and the Port Sudan refinery. Pri- vate and PEWC electricity generation increased about 50 percent

in the 1980s, to an estimated 900 gigawatt hours in 1989 in at- tempts to counter frequent cuts in electric power. PEWC also handled all regular electricity distribution to the public. In 1989 PEWC

power stations had a total generating capacity of 606 megawatts,

of which about 53 percent was hydroelectric and the remainder

thermal.

The largest hydroelectric plant was at Roseires Dam on the Blue

Nile; it had a capacity of 250 megawatts. Other hydroelectric sta- tions were located at the Sennar Dam farther downstream and at Khashm al Qirbah Dam on the Atbarah River; the latter was part

of the small power grid in the Al Qadarif-Kassala area. The Sen- nar and Roseires dams were constructed originally to provide irri- gation, Sennar in 1925 and Roseires in 1966. Electric-power

generating facilities were added only when increasing consumer demands had made them potentially viable (Sennar in 1962 and

Roseires in 1971), yet power generation in Sudan has never satis- fied actual needs.

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Sudan: A Country Study

The Blue Nile Grid, in addition to its Roseires and Sennar

hydroelectric plants, had thermal plants at Burri in eastern Khartoum, where work on a 40-megawatt extension began in 1986, and

in Khartoum North, where a 60-megawatt thermal station began

operation in 1985. In the late 1980s, two additional stations producing 40 to 60 megawatts each were under consideration for Khartoum North.

The demand for electricity on the Blue Nile system increased

greatly in the late 1970s, and power shortages have been acute from

1978 onward. Shortages have been blamed in part on management

inefficiency and lack of coordination between the PEWC and irri- gation authorities and other government agencies. Demand con- tinued to grow strongly during the 1980s as development projects were completed and became operational and the population of the

Three Towns increased dramatically. New generating facilities were completed in 1986 under the Power III Project, almost doubling

generating capacity in the Blue Nile Grid. The project included

work on the Roseires units, funded by IDA, and on the Burri and

Khartoum North installations, funded by the British Overseas Development Administration. In 1983, recognizing the need for more

electricity, the government began seeking support for the Power

IV Project to be funded by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to bring the entire electrical system up to its full generating

capacity. The plan was later scaled back from the initial cost of

US$100 million and renamed Power V Project.

Petroleum Use and Domestic Resources

In 1982 roughly four-fifths of the nation's energy requirement

for industry, modern agriculture, transportation, government ser- vices, and households (in addition to wood fuel, charcoal, and the

like) was provided by imported petroleum and petroleum products.

Approximately 10 percent of these imports were used to generate

electricity. Foreign exchange costs for oil imports rose dramatically after 1973 and by 1988 amounted to almost 46 percent of earnings from merchandise exports. Dependence on external sources might lessen when the security situation permits Sudan's domestic petroleum resources to be exploited.

The search for oil began in 1 959 in the Red Sea littoral and con- tinued intermittently into the 1970s. In 1982 several oil companies were prospecting large concessions offshore and on land from

the Tawkar area near the Ethiopian border to the northern part

of the Red Sea Hills. No significant discoveries were reported. In

1974 Chevron, a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of California,

168
_. :

Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile, one ofSudan 's oldest dams and major source of electric power for eastern Sudan

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

Waterworks at Maridi, west ofJuba

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

169
Sudan: A Country Study

began exploration of a 5 16, 000-square-kilometer concession (later

reduced to 280,000 square kilometers by voluntary relinquishment)

in southern and southwestern Sudan. Drilling began in 1977, and

the first commercial flow was obtained in July 1979 at AbuJabirah

in southern Kurdufan Province. In 1980 major finds were made

at the company's Unity Field near Bentiu in Aali an Nil Province,

where further drilling by early 1981 had brought in forty-nine wells

having a combined flow of more than 12,000 barrels a day. The

company has estimated this field's reserves at from 80 to 100 million barrels, but exploration farther south placed the reserves at more than 250 million barrels. Other oil companies—including some from the United States, Canada, and France—have also obtained concessions, and by 1982 almost one-third of Sudan had

been assigned for exploration. Oil exploration and production have

been hampered, however, by the almost total lack of infrastruc- ture and by the civil war in the south of the country. Chevron had

found small aircraft and helicopters essential for transport, the latter for moving portable rigs and equipment and for general use during the rainy season when all roads and locally constructed air strips were washed out. The domestic processing of crude petroleum began in late 1964

when the Port Sudan oil refinery went into operation. The refinery,

which was financed, built, and managed by the British Petroleum

and Royal Dutch Shell companies—from July 1976 as a joint equal

shareholding project with the government—had a capacity of about

21,440 barrels per day. Its capacity was well in excess of Sudan's

needs at the time it was built, and refined products were exported.

Local demand had quintupled by 1990, well beyond the plant's

capacity. As a result, more than one-third of the gas oil (used in

diesel motors and for heating) and well over two-fifths of the kero- sene required for domestic use had to be imported. A substantial

quantity of other products refined by the plant in excess of Sudan's

own needs were exported.

The domestic petroleum discoveries led to intensive discussion

within the government concerning the establishment of a new

refinery. Southern Sudan pressed for construction near the oilfields in the south, but it was decided finally to locate the refinery at Kusti on the White Nile about 315 kilometers south of Khartoum. In

August 1981, the White Nile Petroleum Company (WNPC) was

set up by the central government as a subsidiary of the Sudanese

National Oil Company to handle the undertaking. The government held a two-fifths share in WNPC, Chevron Overseas Petroleum Corporation another two-fifths, and the International Finance

Corporation the remaining one-fifth. Plans called for a 550-kilometer

170
The Economy

pipeline to be built from the oilfields to the new refinery. By early

1982, however, the estimated costs of the refinery and pipeline had

risen to at least the equivalent of US$ 1 billion as against an earlier

project allotment of about one-third that figure.

The Kusti refinery was predicated on production for domestic

consumption. Its estimated capacity (in early 1982) of between

15,000 and 25,000 barrels a day would meet only part of Sudan's

overall requirements, however, and the quality of the petroleum

would restrict economic production to certain products. Hence the

Port Sudan refinery would have to continue operating. In view of

the greatly increased cost estimates of the new plant, the World

Bank in 1982 undertook a study of an alternative plan that might

be more attractive to foreign capital. Under this plan, the proposed

pipeline would run to Port Sudan, and an extension to the exist- ing refinery would make it possible to export surplus refined

products and even earn foreign-exchange credits. Contracts were

let for the construction of the pipeline, but the government canceled them in September 1986. Further seismic studies were undertaken in the swamps (As Sudd) of Aali an Nil, but all of Chevron's

exploration and development activities came to an abrupt end in

February 1984 when guerrillas from the southern Sudanese insurgent group known as Anya Nya II attacked the main forward

Chevron base across the Bahr al Ghazal River from Bentiu, kill- ing four Chevron employees. Chevron immediately terminated its development program and, despite repeated demands by successive Sudanese governments, has refused to return to work its concession until the safety of its personnel can be guaranteed by a

settlement of the Sudanese civil war. Total, the French oil company, shut down its operations several months later. The Nimeiri government pressured foreign oil companies to re- sume exploration and drilling and hoped to encourage them to do

so in part by forming the National Oil Company of Sudan (NOCS)

in a joint venture with Saudi Arabian entrepreneur Adnan

Khashoggi. After Nimeiri was overthrown, the new government

dissolved NOCS but continued to press companies to renew work.

As a result, Chevron stated in late 1987 that it would begin a sixtyday, two-well drilling program in southern Kurdufan in 1988, but

postponed the work because of the spread of civil war. Several other

foreign companies indicated an interest in petroleum exploration

in 1988, following the completion of a three-year World Bank study

of Sudan's hydrocarbon potential. The minister of energy and mining had announced in May 1987 that Sudan's confirmed oil reserves totaled 2 billion barrels, with an estimated 500 million barrels

recoverable.

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Sudan: A Country Study

Transportation and Communications

Sudan's transport infrastructure in 1990 included an extensive

railroad system that served the more important populated areas except in the far south, a meager road network (very little of which

consisted of all-weather roads), a natural inland waterway—the Nile

River and its tributaries—and a national airline that provided both

international and domestic service. Complementing this infrastruc- ture was Port Sudan, a major deep-water port on the Red Sea,

and a small but modern national merchant marine. Additionally, a pipeline transporting petroleum products extended from the port

to Khartoum (see fig. 6).

Only minimal efforts had been expended through the early 1980s

to improve existing and, according to both Sudanese and foreign

observers, largely inefficiendy operated transport facilities. Increas- ing emphasis on economic development placed a growing strain on the system, and beginning in the mid-1970s a substantial proportion of public investment funds was allocated for transport sector development. Some progress toward meeting equipment goals had

been reported by the beginning of the 1980s, but substantial fur- ther modernization and adequately trained personnel were still re- quired. Until these were in place, inadequate transportation was

expected to constitute a major obstacle to economic development.

Railroads

The country had two railroads. The main system, Sudan Railways, which was operated by the government-owned Sudan Railways Corporation, provided services to most of the country's

production and consumption centers. The other railroad, the Gezira

Light Railway, was owned by the Sudan Gezira Board and served

the Gezira Scheme and its Manaqil Extension. Railroads dominated commercial transport, although competition from the highways has been increasing rapidly. The preeminence of the railroad

system was based on historical developments that led to its construction as an adjunct to military operations, although the first line, built in the mid- 1870s from Wadi Haifa to a point about

fifty-four kilometers upstream on the Nile River, was initially a commercial undertaking. This line, which had not proved viable

commercially, was extended in the mid- 1880s and again in the

mid- 1890s to support the Anglo-Egyptian military campaigns

against the Mahdiyah (see The Mahdiyah, 1884-98, ch. 1). Of lit- tle other use, it was abandoned in 1905.

The first segment of the present-day Sudan Railways, from Wadi

Haifa to Abu Hamad, was also a military undertaking; it was built

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The Economy

by the British for use in General Herbert Kitchener's drive against

the Mahdiyah in the late 1890s. The line was pushed to Atbarah

during the campaign and after the defeat of the Mahdiyah in 1898 was continued to Khartoum, which it reached on the last day of

1899. The line was built to 1 .067-meter-gauge track specifications,

the result apparently of Kitchener's pragmatic use of the rolling

stock and rails of that gauge from the old line. This gauge was used

in all later Sudanese mainline construction.

The line opened a trade route from central Sudan through Egypt

to the Mediterranean and beyond. It became uneconomical,

however, because of the distance and the need for transshipment

via the Nile, and in 1904 construction of a new line from Atbarah

to the Red Sea was undertaken. In 1906 the new line reached re- cently built Port Sudan to provide a direct connection between

Khartoum and ocean-going transport.

During the same decade, a line was also built from Khartoum

southward to Sannar, the heart of the cotton- growing region of Al

Jazirah. A westward continuation reached Al Ubayyid, then the

country's second largest city and center of gum arabic production,

in 1911. In the north, a branch line that tied the navigable stretch

of the Nile between the fourth and third cataracts into the trans- port system was built from near Abu Hamad to Kuraymah. Traffic

in this case, however, was largely inbound to towns along the river, a situation that still prevailed in 1990.

In the mid- and late 1920s, a spur of the railroad was built from

Taqatu Hayya, a point on the main line 200 kilometers southwest

of Port Sudan, southward to the cotton-producing area near Kassala, then on to the grain region of Al Qadarif, and finally to a junction with the main line at Sannar. Much of the area's traffic,

which formerly had passed through Khartoum, has since moved

over this line directly to Port Sudan.

The final spurt of railroad construction began in the 1950s. It included extension of the western line to Nyala (1959) in Darfur

Province and of a southwesterly branch to Waw (1961), southern

Sudan's second largest city, located in Bahr al Ghazal Province.

This work essentially completed the Sudan Railways network, which

in 1990 totaled about 4,800 route kilometers.

Conversion of Sudan Railways to diesel fuel started in the late 1950s, but a few mainline steam locomotives continued in use in

1990, serving lines having lighter weight rails. Through the 1960s,

the railroads essentially had a monopoly on transportation of export

and import trade, and operations were profitable. In the early 1970s,

losses were experienced, and, although the addition of new diesel

equipment in 1976 was followed by a return to profitability, another

173
Sudan: A Country Study

9 'Nimule s\ v *-w

- Y

" vv ^ KENYA ZAIRE /

<^

/to* necessarily auihorifatfv-e ^> \

Figure 6. Transportation System, 1991

downturn had occurred by the end of the decade. The losses were

attributed in part to inflationary factors, the lack of spare parts,

and the continuation of certain lines characterized by only light

traffic, but retained for economic development needs and for social reasons. The chief cause of the downturn appeared to have been loss of

operational efficiency. Worker productivity had declined. For ex- ample, repair of locomotives was so slow that only about half of the

174
The Economy

total number were usually operational. Freight car turnaround time

had lengthened considerably, and the reported slowness of management to meet growing competition from road transport was also a major factor. The road system, although generally more expensive, was used increasingly for low-volume, high-value goods be- cause it could deliver more rapidly—two or three days from Port

Sudan to Khartoum, compared with seven or eight days for ex- press rail freight and up to two weeks for ordinary freight. At the

end of the 1980s, moreover, only 1 to 2 percent of freight trains

arrived on time. The gradual erosion of freight traffic was evident

in the drop from more than 3 million tons carried annually at the

beginning of the 1970s to about 2 million tons at the end of the

decade. The 1980s also saw a steady erosion of tonnage as a result of a combination of inefficient management, union intransigence,

the failure of agricultural projects to meet production goals, the

dearth of spare parts, and the continuing civil war.

Despite the rapidly growing use of roads, the railroads have re- mained of paramount importance because of their ability to move

the large volume of agricultural exports at lower cost and to trans- port inland the increasing imports of heavy capital equipment and

construction materials for development, such as requirements for

oil exploration and drilling operations. Efforts to improve the rail system reported in the late 1970s and the 1980s included laying

heavier rails, repairing locomotives, purchasing new locomotives,

modernizing signaling equipment, expanding training facilities, and

improving locomotive and rolling-stock repair facilities. One project

would double-track the line from Port Sudan to the junction of the

branch route to Sannar, thus in effect doubling the Port SudanKhartoum rail line. Substantial assistance has been furnished for

these and other stock and track improvement projects by foreign

governments and organizations, including the European Development Fund, the Development Finance Company, the AFESD, the

International Development Association, Britain, France, andJapan.

Implementation of much of this work has been hampered by politi- cal instability in the 1980s, debt, the dearth of hard currency, the

shortage of spare parts, and import controls. Railroads were estimated in mid- 1989 to be operating at less than 20 percent of capacity.

The Gezira Light Railway, one of the largest light railroads in

Africa, evolved from tracks laid in the 1920s construction of the

canals for the Gezira Scheme. At the time, the railroad had about

135 route kilometers of 1 .6096-meter-gauge track. As the size of

the project area increased, the railroad was extended and by the

mid-1960s consisted of a complex system totaling 716 route kilo- meters. Its primary purpose has been to serve the farm area by

175
Sudan: A Country Study

carrying cotton to ginneries and fertilizers, fuel, food, and other

supplies to the villages in the area. Operations usually have been

suspended during the rainy season. Roads

In 1990 Sudan's road system totaled between 20,000 and 25,000

kilometers, comprising an extremely sparse network for the size of the country. Asphalted all-weather roads, excluding paved streets in cities and towns, amounted to roughly 2,000 kilometers, of which

the Khartoum-Port Sudan road accounted for almost 1,200 kilometers. There were between 3,000 and 4,000 kilometers of gravel

roads located mostly in the southern region where lateritic roadbuilding materials were abundant. In general, these roads were

usable all year round, although travel might be interrupted at times

during the rainy season. Most of the gravel roads in southern Sudan

have become unusable after being heavily mined by the insurgent

southern forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)

(see Civil Warfare in the South, ch. 5). The remaining roads were

little more than fair-weather earth and sand tracks. Those in the

clayey soil of eastern Sudan, a region of great economic importance, were impassable for several months during the rains. Even

in the dry season, earthen roads in the sandy soils found in vari- ous parts of the country were generally usable only by motor vehicles equipped with special tires. Until the early 1970s, the government had favored the railroads,

believing they better met the country's requirements for transportation and that the primary purpose of roads was to act as feeders

to the rail system. The railroads were also a profitable government

operation, and road competition was not viewed as desirable. In

the mid- 1930s, a legislative attempt had been made to prevent

through-road transport between Khartoum and Port Sudan. The

law had little effect, but the government's failure to build roads

hindered the development of road transportation. The only major

stretch of road that had been paved by 1970 was between Khartoum and Wad Madani. This road had been started under a United

States aid program in 1962, but work had stopped in 1967 when

Sudanese-United States relations were broken over the June 1967

Arab-Israeli War. United States equipment was not removed,

however, and was used by government workers to complete the

road in 1970.

Disillusionment with railroad performance led to a new emphasis on roads in a readjustment of the Five-Year Plan in 1973 —the

so-called Interim Action Program—and a decision to encourage

competition between rail and road transport as the best way to

176
Warning that river hadflooded the road

Courtesy Robert O.Collins

Relief truck of the Norwegian People's Aid near Kapoeta in eastern AI Istiwai

in the 1990 rainy season Courtesy Roger Winter

177
Sudan: A Country Study

improve services. Paving of the dry-weather road between Khartoum and Port Sudan via Al Qadarif and Kassala was the most

significant immediate step; this project included upgrading of the

existing paved Khartoum-Wad Madani section. From Wad Madani

to Port Sudan, the road was constructed in four separate sections,

each by different foreign financing, and in the case of the Wad

Madani-Al Qadarif section, by direct participation of the Chinese.

Other section contractors included companies from Italy, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. The last section opened in late 1980.

Other important road-paving projects of the early 1980s included a road from Wad Madani to Sannar and an extension from San- nar to Kusti on the White Nile completed in 1984. Since then the

paved road has been extended to Umm Ruwabah with the intention to complete an all-weather road to Al Ubayyid. Paradoxically,

most truckers in 1990 continued to pass from Omdurman to Al

Ubayyid through the Sahelian scrub and the qoz (see Glossary) to avoid the taxes levied for use of the faster and less damaging paved

road from Khartoum via Kusti.

A number of main gravel roads radiating from Juba were also improved. These included roads to the towns southwest of Juba

and a road to the Ugandan border. In addition, the government

built a gravel all-weather road east ofJuba that reaches the Kenyan

border. There it joined an all-weather road to Lodwar in Kenya

connecting it with the Kenyan road system. All these improvements

radiating from Juba, however, have been vitiated by the civil war,

in which the roads have been extensively mined by the SPLA and

the bridges destroyed. In addition, because roads have not been

maintained, they have seriously deteriorated.

Small private companies, chiefly owner-operated trucks, fur- nished most road transport. The government has encouraged pri- vate enterprise in this industry, especially in the central and eastern

parts of the country, and the construction of all-weather roads has

reportedly led to rapid increases in the number of hauling businesses. The Sudanese-Kuwaiti Transport Company, a large government enterprise financed largely by Kuwait, began operations in

1975 with 100 large trucks and trailers. Most of its traffic was between Khartoum and Port Sudan. Use of road transport and bus

services is likely to increase as paved roads are completed south

of Khartoum in the country's main agricultural areas. Inland Waterways

The Nile River, traversing Sudan from south to north, provides an important inland transportation route. Its overall usefulness,

however, has been limited by natural features, including a number

178
The Economy

of cataracts in the main Nile between Khartoum and the Egyptian

border. The White Nile to the south of Khartoum has shallow

stretches that restrict the carrying capacities of barges, especially

during the period of low water, and the river has sharp bends. Most

of these southern impediments have been eliminated by Chevron,

which as part of its oil exploration and development program

dredged the White Nile shoals and established navigational bea- cons from Kusti to Bentiu. A greater impediment has been the

spread of the water hyacinth, which impedes traffic. Man-made

features have also introduced restrictions, the most important of

which was a dam constructed in the 1930s on the White Nile about

forty kilometers upriver from Khartoum. This dam has locks, but

they have not always operated well, and the river has been little used from Khartoum to the port of Kusti, a railroad crossing 319

kilometers upstream. The Sennar and Roseires dams on the Blue

Nile are without locks and restrict traffic on that river. In 1983 only two sections of the Nile had regular commercial

transport services. The more important was the 1,436-kilometer

stretch of the White Nile from Kusti to Juba (known as the Southern

Reach), which provided the only generally usable transport connection between the central and southern parts of the country. Virtually all traffic, and certainly scheduled traffic, ended in 1984,

when the SPLA consistently sank the exposed steamers from sanctuaries along the river banks. River traffic south of Kusti had not

resumed in mid- 1991 except for a few heavily armed and escorted

convoys.

At one time, transport services also were provided on tributaries of the White Nile (the Bahr al Ghazal and the Jur River) to the west of Malakal. These services went as far as Waw but were

seasonal, depending on water levels. They were finally discontinued

during the 1970s because vegetation blocked waterways, particularly the fast- growing water hyacinth. On the main Nile, a 287-

kilometer stretch from Kuraymah to Dunqulah, situated between

the fourth and third cataracts and known as the Dunqulah Reach,

also had regular service, although this was restricted during the

low-water period in February and March. Transport facilities on

both reaches were operated after 1973 by the parastatal (mixed

government and privately owned company) River Transport Corporation (RTC). Before that they had been run by the SRC, es- sentially as feeders to the rail line. River cargo and passenger traffic have varied from year to year, depending in large part on the availability and capacity of transport vessels. During the 1970s, roughly

100,000 tons of cargo and 250,000 passengers were carried annually. By 1984, before the Southern Reach was closed, the number

179
Sudan: A Country Study

of passengers had declined to less than 60,000 per year and the

tonnage to less than 150,000. Although no statistics were available, the closing of the Southern Reach had by 1990 made river

traffic insignificant.

Foreign economists have characterized the RTC's operations as

inefficient, a result both of shortages of qualified staff and of barge

capacity. The corporation had a virtual monopoly over river trans- port, although the southern regional government had established

river feeder transport operations, and private river transport ser- vices were reported to be increasing until the resumption of the

civil war. Despite its favored position, the RTC and its predecessor (SRC) experienced regular losses that had to be covered by

government appropriations. In the late 1970s, the corporation pro- cured new barges, pusher-tugboats, and other equipment in an ef- fort to improve services, but this attempt proved useless because

of the warfare that had continued from 1983.

Civil Aviation

In mid- 1991 scheduled domestic air service was provided by

Sudan Airways, a government-owned enterprise operated by the

Sudan Airways Company. The company began its operations in

1947 as a government department. It has operated commercially

since the late 1960s, holding in effect a monopoly on domestic ser- vice. In 1991 Sudan Airways had scheduled flights from Khartoum to twenty other domestic airports, although it did not always

adhere to its schedules. It also provided international services to several European countries, including Britain, Germany, Greece,

and Italy. Regional flights were made to North Africa and the Middle East as well as to Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. The Sudan Airways fleet in 1991 consisted of thirteen aircraft,

including five Boeing 707s used on international flights, two Boeing 737s and two Boeing 727s employed in domestic and regional

services, and four Fokker F-27s used for domestic flights.

Sixteen international airlines provided regular flights to Khartoum. The number of domestic and international passengers in- creased from about 478,000 in 1982 to about 485,000 in 1984. Air

freight increased from 6 million tons per kilometer in 1982 to 7.7 million tons per kilometer in 1984. As compared with the previ- ous year, in 1989 passenger traffic on Sudan Airways fell by 32

percent to 363,181 people, reducing the load factor to 34.9 percent. By contrast, freight volume increased by 63.7 percent to 12,317 tons. At the end of 1979, Sudan Airways had entered into a pooling agreement with Britain's Tradewind Airways to furnish

charter cargo service between that country and Khartoum under

180
River steamers and barges were once major means of

transporting passengers and goods on the Nile. Buffalo Cape on the Bahr al Ghazal River in Aali an Nil State, a river station where steamers took on wood for fuel; village huts in background

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

181
Sudan: A Country Study

a subsidiary company, Sudan Air Cargo. A new cargo terminal was built at Khartoum.

Sudan Airways' s operations have generally shown losses, and

in the early 1980s the corporation was reportedly receiving an an- nual government subsidy of about £Sd500,000. In 1987 the government proposed to privatize Sudan Airways, precipitating a heated

controversy that ultimately led to a joint venture between the

government and private interests. Like the railroads and river trans- port operators, however, Sudan Airways suffered from a shortage

of skilled personnel, overstaffing, and lacked hard currency and

credit for spare parts and proper maintenance.

In the early 1980s, the country's civilian airports, with the ex- ception of Khartoum International Airport and the airport at Juba,

sometimes closed during rainy periods because of runway conditions. After the 1986 drought, which caused major problems at regional airports, the government launched a program to improve

runways, to be funded locally. Aeronautical communications and

navigational aids were minimal and at some airports relatively

primitive. Only Khartoum International Airport was equipped with

modern operational facilities, but by the early 1990s, Khartoum

and seven other airports had paved runways. In the mid-1970s,

IDA and the Saudi Development Fund agreed to make funds avail- able for construction of new airports at Port Sudan and Waw, reconstruction and improvement of the airport at Malakal, and

substantial upgrading of the Juba airport; these four airports ac- counted for almost half of domestic traffic. Because the civil war

resumed, improvements were made only at Port Sudan. Juba air- port runways were rebuilt by a loan from the European Development Fund, but the control tower and navigational equipment

remained incomplete.

Marine Ports and Shipping

In 1990 Sudan had only one operational deep-water harbor, Port

Sudan, situated on an inlet of the Red Sea. The port had been

built from scratch, beginning in 1905, to complement the railroad

line from Khartoum to the Red Sea by serving as the entry and

exit point for the foreign trade the rail line was to carry. It operated as a department of SRC until 1974 when it was transferred to the Sea Ports Corporation, a newly established public enterprise

set up to manage Sudan's marine ports. Facilities at the port eventually included fifteen cargo berths, sheds, warehouses, and storage

tanks for edible oils, molasses, and petroleum products. Equipment

included quay, mobile, and other cranes, and some forklift trucks,

but much of the handling of cargo was manual. There were also

182
The Economy

a number of tugboats, which were used to berth ships in the nar- row inlet. During the early 1970s, port traffic averaged about 3 million tons a year, compared with an overall capacity of about 3.8 million tons. Exports were somewhat more than 1 million tons and

imports about 2 million tons; about half of the latter was petroleum and petroleum products. By the mid-1970s, stepped up eco- nomic development had raised traffic to capacity levels. In 1985,

however, largely as a result of the civil war, exports were down

to 663 thousand tons (down 51 percent from the previous year),

and imports were 2.3 million tons (down 25 percent from the previ- ous year). Physical expansion of the harbor and adjacent areas was

generally precluded by natural features and the proximity of the

city of Port Sudan. However, surveys showed that use could be

increased considerably by modernization and improvement of existing facilities and the addition of further cargo-handling equipment. In 1978, with the assistance of a loan from the IDA, work

began on adding deep-water berths and providing roll-on/roll-off

container facilities. A loan to purchase equipment was made by

a West German group. The first phase was completed in 1982,

and the second phase began in 1983, aided by a US$25 million

World Bank credit. One of the major improvements has been to make the port more readily usable by road vehicles. Developed

almost entirely as a rail- serviced facility, the port had large areas of interlacing railroad tracks that were mostly not flush with sur- rounding surfaces, thereby greatly restricting vehicular movement.

Many of these tracks have been removed and new access roads constructed. Much of the cleared area has become available for additional storage facilities. In the early 1980s, the Nimeiri government announced a plan

to construct a new deep-water port at Sawakin, about twenty kilo- meters south of Port Sudan. Construction of a new port had long

been under consideration in response to the projected growth of

port traffic in the latter part of the twentieth century. A detailed

study for the proposed port was made by a West German firm in

the mid-1970s, and plans were drawn up for three general cargo

berths, including roll-on/roll-off container facilities, and an oil ter- minal. Major funding for the port, known as Sawakin, was offered

in 1985 by West Germany's development agency Kreditanstalt fur

Wiederaufbau and the DFC . After the Nimeiri government repeatedly postponed work on the port, the German government allo- cated the funds instead for purchase of agricultural inputs. Once

work resumed, however, Sawakin port opened in January 1991,

183
Sudan: A Country Study

and was capable of handling an estimated 1.5 million tons of car- go a year. A national merchant marine, Sudan Shipping Line, was established in 1962 as a joint venture between the government and Yugoslavia. In 1967 it became wholly government owned. From the

initial two Yugoslav-built cargo vessels, the line had grown by the

mid-1970s to seven ships, totaling about 52,340 deadweight tons. During 1979 and early 1980, eight more ships were added, including

six built in Yugoslavia and two in Denmark. In 1990 the merchant

marine represented a total of ten ships of 122,200 deadweight tons. The Yugoslav vessels were all multipurpose and included container transport features. The Danish ships were equipped with roll- on/roll-off facilities. Sailings, which had been mainly between Red

Sea ports and northern Europe, were expanded in the late 1980s

to several Mediterranean ports.

Pipelines

By the early 1970s, operational problems on the Port SudanKhartoum section of Sudan Railways had resulted in inadequate

supplies of petroleum products reaching Khartoum and other parts

of the country. In 1975 construction of an oil pipeline from the

port to Khartoum was begun to relieve traffic pressure on the rail- road. It was completed in mid- 1976, but leaks were discovered and

the 815-kilometer-long pipeline, laid generally parallel to the rail- road, did not become operational until September 1977. As constructed, its capacity was 600,000 tons a year, but that throughput was only attained in mid- 1981. In early 1982, steps were taken to add additional booster pumping stations to increase the rate to an

annual throughput capacity of 1 million tons. The line carried only

refined products, including gasoline, gas oil, kerosene, and aviation fuel obtained either from the refinery at the port or from importholding facilities there. These fuels were moved in a continuous

operation to storage tanks at Khartoum with some capacity offload- ed at Atbarah. Rail tank cars released by the pipeline were reas- signed to increase supplies of petroleum products in the western

and southwestern regions of the country.

Communications

Domestic telecommunications in Sudan were sparse, and the sys- tem suffered from poor maintenance. In 1991 the country had only

73,000 telephones, two-thirds of which were in the Khartoum area. Telex was available in the capital. A domestic satellite system with

fourteen ground stations, supplemented by coaxial cable and a microwave network, linked telephone exchanges and broadcast

184
The Economy

facilities within the country. Eleven cities had amplitude modulation (AM) radio stations, and Khartoum, Atbarah, and Wad Madani had television stations with broadcasts in Arabic seven hours

nightly. The country had an estimated 6 million radio receivers

and 250,000 television sets in 1991.

International telecommunications were modern and provided

high-quality links to the rest of the world. A satellite ground sta- tion near the capital working with the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization's (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean satellite permitted direct dialing of telephone calls between Sudan and Europe, North America, and parts of Africa. In addition, a second

satellite ground station was linked to the Arab Satellite Organization's (Arabsat) pan-Arab communications network. The Arabsat network was used for live television broadcasts, news exchanges,

and educational programming among the members of the League

of Arab States (Arab League).

Finance

Banking

The traditional banking system was inherited from the AngloEgyptian condominium (1899-1955). When the National Bank of

Egypt opened in Khartoum in 1901 , it obtained a privileged position as banker to and for the government, a "semi-official" central bank. Other banks followed, but the National Bank of Egypt

and Barclays Bank dominated and stabilized banking in Sudan until after World War II. Post-World War II prosperity created a demand for an increasing number of commercial banks. By 1965 loans

to the private sector in Sudan had reached £Sd55.3 million.

Before Sudanese independence, there had been no restrictions on the movement of funds between Egypt and Sudan, and the value

of the currency used in Sudan was tied to that of Egypt. This situ- ation was unsatisfactory to an independent Sudan, which established the Sudan Currency Board to replace Egyptian and British

money. It was not a central bank because it did not accept deposits,

lend money, or provide commercial banks with cash and liquidity.

In 1959 the Bank of Sudan was established to succeed the Sudan

Currency Board and to take over the Sudanese assets of the National Bank of Egypt. In February 1960, the Bank of Sudan began

acting as the central bank of Sudan, issuing currency, assisting the

development of banks, providing loans, maintaining financial

equilibrium, and advising the government.

There were originally five major commercial banks (Bank of

Khartoum, An Nilein Bank, Sudan Commercial Bank, the People's

185
Sudan: A Country Study

Cooperative Bank, and the Unity Bank) but the number subsequently grew. The public was dissatisfied with the commercial

banks, however, because they were reluctant to lend capital for longterm development projects. Since the Nimeiri government decreed

the 1970 Nationalization of Banks Act, all domestic banks have

been controlled by the Bank of Sudan.

In 1974, to encourage foreign capital investment, foreign banks were urged to establish joint ventures in association with Sudanese

capital. Banking transactions with foreign companies operating in

Sudan were facilitated so long as they abided by the rulings of the

Bank of Sudan and transferred a minimum of £Sd3 million into

Sudan. Known as the "open door" policy, this system was partly a result of Nimeiri' s disillusion with the left after the unsuccessful

communist coup of 1971. Several foreign banks took advantage

of the opportunity, most notably Citibank, the Faisal Islamic Bank,

Chase Manhattan Bank, and the Arab Authority for Agricultural

Investment and Development.

In addition, the government established numerous specialized

banks, such as the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (1959) to promote

agricultural ventures, the Industrial Bank of Sudan (1961) to promote private industry, the Sudanese Estates Bank (1966) to provide housing loans, and the Sudanese Savings Bank established

to make small loans particularly in the rural areas. The system

worked effectively until the late 1970s and 1980s, when the decline

in foreign trade, balance-of-payments problems, spiraling exter- nal debt, the increase in corruption, and the appearance of Islamic banking disrupted the financial system.

Islamic Banking

The Faisal Islamic Bank, whose principal patron was the Saudi

prince, Muhammad ibn Faisal Al Saud, was officially established

in Sudan in 1977 by the Faisal Islamic Bank Act. The "open door"

policy enabled Saudi Arabia, which had a huge surplus after the

1973 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

increases in the price of petroleum, to invest in Sudan. Members

of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the National Is- lamic Front, played a prominent role on the board of directors of

the Faisal Islamic Bank, thus strengthening the bank's position in

Sudan. Other Islamic banks followed. As a consequence, both the

Ansar and Khatmiyyah religious groups and their political parties, the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party, formed their

own Islamic banks.

The Faisal Islamic Bank enjoyed privileges denied other commercial banks (full tax exemption on assets, profits, wages, and

186
The Economy

pensions), as well as guarantees against confiscation or nationalization. Moreover, these privileges came under Nimeiri's protection from 1983 onward as he became committed to applying Islamic

doctrine to all aspects of Sudanese life. The theory of Islamic banking is derived from the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad's ex- hortations against exploitation and the unjust acquisition of wealth,

defined as riba, or, in common usage, interest or usury. Profit and

trade are encouraged and provide the foundation for Islamic banking. The prohibitions against interest are founded on the Islamic

concept of property that results from an individual's creative labor or from exchange of goods or property. Interest on money loaned

falls within neither of these two concepts and is thus unjustified.

To resolve this dilemma from a legal and religious point of view,

Islamic banking employs common terms: musharakah or partnership for production; mudharabah or silent partnership when one party

provides the capital, the other the labor; and murabbahah or deferred

payment on purchases, similar in practice to an overdraft and the

most preferred Islamic banking arrangement in Sudan. To resolve

the prohibition on interest, an interest-bearing overdraft would be

changed to a murabbahah contract. The fundamental difference between Islamic and traditional banking systems is that in an Islamic system deposits are regarded as shares, which does not guarantee

their nominal value. The appeal of the Islamic banks, as well as government support and patronage, enabled these institutions to acquire an estimated 20 percent of Sudanese deposits. Politically,

the popularity and wealth of Islamic banks have provided a financial basis for funding and promoting Islamic policies in government.

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

Foreign Trade

In 1989 Sudan's export earnings amounted to £Sd3, 023.1 million and its imports £Sd5,373.4 million. Export earnings dropped

to an estimated £Sd 1,800 million in 1990, with imports remaining at the 1989 level. Agricultural products have dominated

Sudanese exports since the condominium period, and in the 1980s

they accounted for more than 90 percent of export receipts. Cotton, gum arabic, peanuts, sesame, and sorghum were the main

commodities. Live animals; hides and skins; and peanut, cottonseed, and sesame products (oil and meal) constituted the more

important remaining export items (see table 8, Appendix). Sudan

has long been the world's second largest exporter of long-staple

cotton, and cotton exports constituted more than 50 percent of total exports by value in the 1960s but declined to about 30 percent in

187
Sudan: A Country Study

the 1980s. Gum arabic was in second place until the 1960s when

production of peanuts expanded to occupy that position. However,

gum arabic returned to second place in the late 1980s. Sesame be- came the third most valuable export in the 1970s. Fluctuations have

occurred in the earnings of these four principal commodities as the

result of weather conditions, local price situations, and world market

prices.

Foodstuffs and textiles were Sudan's largest imports by value

at the start of national independence. These commodities held that

position into the mid-1970s, when they were surpassed by increased

imports of machinery and transport equipment as the government

began an intensive drive for economic development. The share of

foodstuffs and textiles declined by roughly one-half during the decade, from 40.5 percent in 1971 to less than 20 percent in 1979.

In 1986 manufactured goods, including textiles, accounted for 20

percent of imports whereas wheat and foodstuffs represented about

15 percent. Machinery and transport equipment, which had ac- counted for about 22 percent of imports in 1970, averaged 40 per- cent between 1975 and 1978, reaching a high of 45 percent in 1976,

and dropped to 25 percent in 1986, reflecting the slowdown of eco- nomic development (see table 9, Appendix).

Government plans for self-sufficiency through the development

of import substitution industries achieved limited success in cer- tain cases. Notable was the reduction in imports of refined petroleum products that resulted from the 1964 opening of the Port Sudan

refinery. Substantial savings were made in foreign exchange ex- penditure until the rise in world crude petroleum prices after 1973.

Crude oil and certain refined products accounted for only about

1 percent of import values in 1973 but had increased to more than

12 percent in 1986. Progress has been extremely slow in sugar

production, and government factories were reported in the late 1970s to be meeting about one-third of the domestic demand. After its opening in 1980, the new Kinanah sugar mill and refinery,

which alone had a rated capacity sufficient to replace most current sugar imports, helped in 1981 to increase overall sugar production to 71 percent of estimated consumption. Domestic textile production had also increased gready from the 1960s, and the share

of textiles in total imports had declined from about 20 percent at the end of the 1960s to less than 4 percent in 1980.

In the early condominium era, Egypt had been Sudan's main

customer. The development of the Gezira Scheme, however, result- ed in large-scale exports of cotton to Britain, which by the end of

the 1920s was purchasing about 80 percent of Sudanese exports.

Although development of the textile industry in other European

188
The Economy

countries gradually cut into Britain's share of cotton exports, at the start of World War II that country still was the destination of

almost half of Sudan's total export trade and at the time of Sudanese

independence continued to be the largest customer. During the

1960s, India, West Germany, and Italy emerged as major buyers;

late in the decade Japan also became a major customer. In the late 1980s, Britain remained an important export destination. Other

major customers were France, China, and Saudi Arabia. In 1989

Saudi Arabia was Sudan's main export market, buying an esti- mated 16.8 percent of Khartoum's exports, particularly sorghum

and livestock. The United States, although not one of Sudan's

largest purchasers, became a major customer in the latter 1980s,

buying mainly cotton, gum arabic, and peanuts (see table 10, Appendix).

After the May 1969 coup, Khartoum took steps to expand trade

with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Exports to the Soviet

Union rose dramatically in 1970 and 1971 as that country became

Sudan's leading customer. After the abortive communist-led coup

of 1971, however, relations deteriorated, and Soviet purchases

dropped to almost nil. After 1985 overtures to improve economic

relations with the Soviet Union met with little response. Economic ties with China improved in the mid- and late 1980s, with ex- ports to Beijing reaching an estimated 7.3 percent of Khartoum's

total exports in 1989, making it Sudan's fifth largest customer.

Sudan's imports were provided by a wide range of countries,

led by Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s. In 1989, Saudi Arabia supplied nearly 14.1 percent of Sudan's total imports, with petroleum the chief import item. Britain was Sudan's main import source

until 1980; in the late 1980s it became Khartoum's second largest

provider, supplying an estimated 8.3 percent of the country's imports in 1989. Britain had well-established commercial and banking operations in Khartoum and a leading position in exporting

manufactured goods, vehicles, tobacco, beverages, chemicals, and

machinery to Sudan. Among the ten or twelve other top suppliers, the United States, West Germany (Germany after 1990),

France, Italy, the Netherlands, China, and India were most significant. Most were also major export customers.

Through 1978 Iraq had been a prime source of Sudan's imports

because it was the principal supplier of crude petroleum, a function that was taken over by Saudi Arabia in 1979 after Iraq cut

off oil supplies because Sudan had backed Egypt in the latter' s peace

initiative with Israel. In the last years of the Nimeiri government,

bilateral trade with Egypt was cut sharply but in April 1988, Sudan

and Egypt signed a trade agreement valued at US$225 million.

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Sudan: A Country Study

In June 1991, Sudan ratified a US$300 million trade agreement

with Egypt. Improved relations with Libya enabled Tripoli to become Sudan's third biggest importer in 1989. In January 1989,

Sudan and Tripoli signed a US$150 million agreement for Sudan

to buy Libyan crude oil. The two countries signed a trade pact

in December 1989, with Sudan agreeing to purchase Libyan fuel,

chemicals, fertilizer, cement, and caustic soda.

Balance of Payments

A reasonably accurate presentation of Sudan's balance of

payments—the summary in money terms of transactions with the

rest of the world—was hampered by what foreign economists considered understatements in official statistics of imports and public

sector loans. The lack of reliable statistical information was a problem, but the effects on the economy of mismanagement, famine, and war were obvious. In the current account (covering trade,

services, and transfer transactions), the trade balance throughout

the two decades from 1960 to 1980 usually showed a deficit; only

in 1973 was a relatively substantial surplus registered. After 1973

the trade balance was unfavorably affected by higher petroleum

import costs and the greater costs of other imports that resulted

from the worldwide inflation engendered by oil price increases. The

impact on the balance of payments was especially serious because

of its coincidence with the implementation after 1973 of an intensive development program that required greatiy increased imports.

The current account situation was not improved by the services sector (insurance, travel, and others), which regularly experienced

a net loss, as did investment income. Transfers usually had a positive balance, but one insufficient to offset the usual deficit in trade

and services. Net inflows and disbursement of foreign loans and

other capital failed to cover the shortage in the current account,

and the overall balance of payments was regularly in deficit (see

table 11, Appendix).

The government from its earliest days had been forced to resort

to external financing to cover balance of payments shortfalls. Deficits

and debt service obligations were relatively insignificant until the

mid-1970s. Particularly from 1974 to 1977, large-scale borrowing

and new commitments were estimated at more than the equivalent of US$2.4 billion. At the end of 1979, outstanding public and

publicly guaranteed debts (disbursed) totaled more than US$2.5

billion, of which almost US$1 .8 billion was owed to governments,

US$535 million to commercial lenders, and US$235 million to suppliers. In 1981 Sudan's debt burden was estimated at US$4 bil- lion. Little control over borrowing was exercised within the

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The Economy

government. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning offi- cially had responsibility for contracting foreign loans, but such loans

frequently had been authorized directly by Nimeiri. Many were

relatively short-term and at interest rates too high for Sudan, considering its economic situation. Until the coup d'etat of Colonel

Umar al Bashir on June 30, 1989, there was little fiscal control over currency and imports, and imports tended to include a large

number of luxury goods. After 1989 there was no improvement

in Sudan's foreign debt situation, despite a reduction in government subsidies for bread, a 50-percent reduction of wheat imports,

and the end of sugar importation, which was expected to save an

estimated US$400 million annually. Despite these measures, total foreign debt rose in 1990 to US$13 billion, with debt liabilities,

including principal and interest, estimated at US$980 million in

1988-89.

In 1978 Sudan failed to meet its obligations fully—debt service

payments owed that year amounted to 17.9 percent of export earnings. It was apparent that it would also not meet its obligations

in 1979, and so it sought relief from creditors. In late 1979, acting

through the so-called Paris Club, a group of industrialized credi- tor countries including the United States, Japan, and nine West

European states, Sudan rescheduled an estimated US$400 million

to US$500 million of the debts guaranteed by Western export credit

agencies. The agreed payments were to be made over a seven-year

period commencing after a three-year grace period. Rescheduling

of another US$600 million in loans and interest with more than

100 commercial banks—represented by the 5 main creditor

banks—required a further two years; the agreement was signed

at the end of 1981 . Despite repeated reschedulings of Sudan's debt

burden, both arrears and debt service payments continued to in- crease. Since 1978 the government has undertaken various measures

to improve the balance of payments situation. A 1979 devaluation

of the overpriced Sudanese pound was carried out, reducing its value from the equivalent of US$2.87 to US$0.22. As of March

31 , 1991 , the official exchange rate was US$1 = £Sd4.50. Since then

Sudan's economy has steadily weakened, as have its relations with

the IMF and the Paris Club. In 1989 Sudan had repaid the IMF

only a token US$15 million and continued to resist IMF demands

for further economic austerity measures. Despite declarations by

the Sudanese government that it was determined to cooperate with

international lending organizations, in mid- 1991 Sudan had made

itself ineligible for debt relief because it was unable to service its debt.

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Sudan: A Country Study

* * *

Despite the problem of obtaining reliable and current information, a number of significant books and monographs have been

published recently on various aspects of Sudan's economy. Among

these is El Wathiq Kameir and Abrahim Kursany's Corruption as

the 'Fifth

3 Factor of Production in the Sudan, which should be read in

conjunction with the two books by Mansour Khalid, Nimeiri and

the Revolution ofDis-May and The Government They Deserve. These books

not only unravel corruption but also provide insightful analyses

of Sudanese governments. Tim Niblock's Class and Power in Sudan

covers the whole of the condominium and ends with the Nimeiri

regime. Of more contemporary interest is the sound analysis of

Sudan's economy in Medani M. Ahmed's The Political Economy of

Development in the Sudan. A more recent work is a collection of es- says, Sudan since Independence; several of these essays edited by Muddathir Abd al Rahim, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo, and Peter Woodward pertain to the economy.

A very useful collection of essays is that edited by Ali Mohamed

el Hassan, "Essays on the Economy and Society of the Sudan."

More recent is a collection of essays on Sudan's economy edited

by Paul van de Wei and Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed, Perspectives on Development in the Sudan. Ali Abdel Gadir Ali's, Some Aspects ofProduction in Sudanese Traditional Agriculture has insightful comments

on Sudan's economy. Siddiq Umbadda's Import Policy in the Sudan,

1966-1976 and Mekki El Shibly's Monetisation, Financial Intermediation, and Self-Financed Growth in the Sudan, analyze the economy during the Nimeiri years. An assessment of Sudan's agricultural

development is provided in Tony Barnett's and Abbas Abdelkarim's

book, Sudan: The Gezira Scheme and Agricultural Transition. An important journal specifically devoted to the Sudan's economy, particularly during the Nimeiri regime, is SudanJournal ofEconomic and

Social Studies. Statistical information can be found in the Annual Reports of

the Bank of Sudan (especially the 1989 edition), but their statisti- cal information becomes increasingly unreliable after the fall of the

Nimeiri regime, reflecting the political instability. Moreover, af- ter the coup ofJune 30, 1989, the regime became increasingly secretive. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Report: Sudan,

published quarterly, provides valuable data about Sudan's econo- my, as does the chapter on Sudan in the annual Europa volume

Africa South of the Sahara.

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The Economy

Finally, Islamic banking as a relatively new phenomenon in

Sudan cannot be ignored because of its impact on the economy

and the powerful political influence these financial structures are enjoying in contemporary Sudan. Joseph Schacht's An Introduction

to Islamic Law; Islamic Banking and Finance, edited by Chibli Mallat; and the influential work by A. Mirakhour and Z. Iqbal, Is- lamic Banking, are useful works on the subject. (For further

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

193

Chapter 4. Government and Politics
People's Palace in Khartoum, executive headquarters of the national government
IN MID- 1991 SUDAN was ruled by a military government that

exercised its authority through the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS). The chairman of the fifteen- member RCC-NS and head of state was Lieutenant General Umar

Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, who also served as prime minister,

minister of defense, and commander in chief of the armed forces. The RCC-NS had come to power at the end of June 1989 as a

result of a coup d'etat that overthrew the democratically elected

civilian government of Sadiq al Mahdi. Although the RCC-NS

initially stressed that its rule was a transitional stage necessary to prepare the country for genuine democracy, it banned all political

party activity, arrested numerous dissidents, and shut down most

newspapers. Subsequently, members of the RCC-NS claimed that

Western-style democracy was too divisive for Sudan. In place of

parliament, the RCC-NS appointed committees to advise the

government in specialized areas, such as one concerning the legal

system to bring legislation into conformity with the sharia, or Islamic

law.

The factors that provoked the military coup, primarily the closely

intertwined issues of Islamic law and of the civil war in the south,

remained unresolved in 1991 . The September 1983 implementation

of the sharia throughout the country had been controversial and

provoked widespread resistance in the predominantly non-Muslim

south. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and

its military arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA),

were formed in mid- 1983. They became increasingly active in the

wake of President Jaafar an Nimeiri's abolition of the largely au- tonomous Southern Regional Assembly and redivision of the south,

and as his program of Islamization became more threatening. Opposition to the sharia, especially to the application of hudud (sing.

,

hadd), or Islamic penalties, such as the public amputation of hands

for theft, was not confined to the south and had been a principal

factor leading to the popular uprising of April 1985 that overthrew

the government of Jaafar an Nimeiri. Although implementation

of the sharia remained suspended for the next four years, north- ern politicians were reluctant to abolish Islamic law outright,

whereas southern leaders hesitated to abandon armed struggle unless

the legal system were secularized. The continuing conflict in the

south prevented progress on economic development projects and

eventually compelled the Sadiq al Mahdi government in the spring

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Sudan: A Country Study

of 1989 to consider concessions on the applicability of sharia law

as demanded by the SPLM.

On the eve of an historic government-SPLM conference to dis- cuss the future status of Islamic law in Sudan, a group of military

officers carried out a coup in the name of the newly constituted

RCC-NS. Their intervention in the political process halted fur- ther steps toward a possible cancellation of the suspended but still valid sharia. Although the RCC-NS initially announced that the

sharia would remain frozen, the government encouraged courts,

at least in the north, to base decisions on Islamic law. SPLM leaders charged that the government was unduly influenced by Islamic

political groups and announced that the SPLA would not lay down

its arms and discuss political grievances until the government

abrogated the sharia. Because neither the RCC-NS nor its southern

opponents were prepared to compromise on the sharia, the military conflict continued in the south, where the government's

authority was limited to the larger towns and the SPLA or other

militias controlled most of the secondary towns and rural areas. Although the RCC-NS banned all political parties following the

1989 coup, members of this ruling body have not concealed their

personal and ideological ties to the National Islamic Front (NIF),

the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. RCC-NS policy decisions on many social, as well as political and economic issues, reflected strong NIF influence. For example, the RCC-NS purged

hundreds of army personnel, senior civil servants, and teachers per- ceived as being insufficiently Islamic, decreed that men and women

must sit in separate sections on public buses, and forbade any

Sudanese female to leave the country without the written consent

of her father or legal male guardian. Finally, on New Year's Eve

1990, the government announced that the sharia would be applied

in the north.

The RCC-NS policies aroused antagonism in the north as well

as the south, and consequently political instability has continued

to dominate Sudan. During 1990, for example, the Bashir government announced that at least two alleged coup attempts within the

military had been foiled. In addition, there were several instances

of antigovernment demonstrations being violentiy suppressed. Opposition politicians, international organizations, and foreign governments all accused the government of systematic human rights abuses

in its efforts to quell dissent. Opposition to the Bashir government

induced exiled leaders of banned political parties in the north and

SPLA leaders in the south to meet on a number of occasions to work out a joint strategy for confronting the regime. Consequently,

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Government and Politics

in mid- 1991 the regime's stability seemed fragile and its political

future uncertain.

Further clouding the regime's prospects for stability was the threat

of famine in many parts of the vast country as a result of the

drought, which had been sporadic throughout the 1980s and particularly severe since 1990, and of the continuing civil war. The

Bashir government was preoccupied with the political ramifications

of food shortages because it was acutely aware that riots by hungry Sudanese were one of the factors that had brought down the

Nimeiri regime in 1985. Nevertheless, the government was determined that any food aid the country received not reach SPLAcontrolled areas. The efforts to mix politics and humanitarian

assistance angered foreign aid donors and international agencies,

resulting in food shipment suspensions that have aggravated the

food shortages.

Institutions of Government

Since obtaining independence from Britain on January 1, 1956,

Sudan has had a political history marked by instability. The military first intervened in politics in November 1958 by overthrowing the parliamentary government of Prime Minister Abd Allah

Khalil (see The Abbud Military Government, 1958-64, ch. 1). The

ensuing regime of Major General Ibrahim Abbud lasted for six years before dissolving itself in the face of widespread popular opposition in 1964. The country then again experimented with civilian democratic government, which was terminated by a military coup

in 1969. Colonel Jaafar an Nimeiri, leader of the junior officers who staged that coup, survived in power for sixteen years until over- thrown by a military coup in 1985. The new government under

Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab legalized

political parties, scheduled elections, and handed over power to

civilians in 1986. Sudan's third experiment in democratic rule was

ended by yet another military coup on June 30, 1989.

The leaders of the 1989 military coup abolished all the existing

executive and legislative institutions of government, suspended the

constitution, arrested many prominent civilian politicians, banned

all political parties and partisan political activity, and restricted free- dom of the press. They established the Revolutionary Command

Council for National Salvation, which was designated the legisla- tive authority of the country. The chairman of the RCC-NS was

designated as head of state. The RCC-NS also appointed a cabi- net that served in many respects as the executive authority. Although the RCC-NS described its rule as transitional, pending the

reestablishment of security and order throughout the country,

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Sudan: A Country Study

as of mid- 1991 the RCC-NS had not legalized political parties nor

introduced permanent governmental institutions.

Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation

In mid- 1991 the RCC-NS remained the top decision-making

body of the state. It consisted of fifteen members, all of whom were

military officers. They were the original officers who had joined

Bashir to carry out the 1989 coup. The most important members

included Bashir, the chairman; Major General Az Zubair Muhammad Salih, the vice chairman and deputy prime minister; Major

General At Tijani Adam at Tahir; Colonel Salah ad Din Muhammad Ahmad Karrar, a naval officer and chairman of the RCCNS's economic committee; Colonel Muhammad al Amin Khalifa

Yunis, chairman of the RCC-NS's peace and foreign relations committee; Colonel Bakri Hassan Salih; and Major Ibrahim Shams

ad Din, commander of the NIF's youth movement. Two members, Brigadier General Uthman Ahmad Uthman, chairman of the

RCC-NS's political committee, and Colonel Faisal Madani, were

reportedly placed under house arrest in 1991 after they had tried

to resign from the RCC-NS.

The RCC-NS had designated itself the legislative arm of government, but in practice it exercised some executive functions as well.

Its chairman also served as prime minister and president of the republic. Although the RCC-NS had not publicized the rules and procedures governing its deliberations, most political affairs analysts

believed government decisions were based on a majority vote of

members rather than the ultimate authority of the chairman. The

RCC-NS also had not drawn up any regulations pertaining to membership tenure or the selection of new members. The primary responsibility of the RCC-NS appeared to be preparing legislative decrees.

Legislation was drafted in special committees, including committees

for political issues, the economy, and foreign affairs, then placed

before the RCC-NS for approval. In 1990 the RCC-NS created

appointive civilian consultative councils to advise its committees. As

of early 1991, five members of the RCC-NS also headed ministries.

The RCC-NS appointed a secretary general who was responsible for running the day-to-day affairs of the RCC-NS. The post

of secretary general in the early 1990s went to a junior officer

seconded to the RCC-NS. Colonel Abd al Mahmud was the first RCC-NS secretary general. He was replaced in June 1990 by

Colonel Abd ar Rahim Muhammad Husayn.

The Presidency

The president served as head of state. As of early 1991, however,

the RCC-NS had not defined the powers and duties of the office

200
Government and Politics

nor specified the term of office. The presidency was neither an elec- tive nor an appointive position. In accordance with an RCC-NS

decree, the chairman of the RCC-NS was designated the president of the republic. Since the 1989 coup, RCC-NS chairman

Bashir, who was born in 1944, has been the president. At the time

of the coup, Bashir had achieved only the rank of colonel. He was

the commander of a paratroop brigade stationed at Al Mijlad in

southern Sudan and had returned to Khartoum with 1 75 paratroopers only a few days prior to the coup. Bashir' s earlier experience

included military training in Egypt and Malaysia, and service on

the frontline with the Egyptian armed forces during the October

1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the late 1970s, he was a military adviser in the United Arab Emirates. Soon after the coup, Bashir

promoted himself to lieutenant general.

Council of Ministers

The RCC-NS appointed the Council of Ministers, or cabinet,

which included civilian politicians and military officers. Cabinet

composition varied, but in 1991 it included the prime minister;

the deputy prime minister; some ministers of state and finance;

and heads of about twenty other ministries. The main ministries

included agriculture and natural resources, construction and public works, culture and information, defense, education, energy and

mining, finance and economic planning, foreign affairs, health,

higher education and scientific research, industry, interior, irri- gation, justice, labor and social insurance, trade and cooperation,

transport and communications, and welfare and social development.

Although the Council of Ministers was the designated executive

arm of the government and a majority of ministers were civilians,

in practice the council had no power independent of the RCC-NS.

The prime minister, RCC-NS chairman Bashir, had authority to appoint and dismiss ministers, and he reshuffled the cabinet several

times between 1989 and 1991. The important portfolios of defense

and interior were held by RCC-NS members, and at least three

other ministries were headed by RCC-NS officers. The civilian

ministers could not undertake independent initiatives and had to obtain advance approval from the RCC-NS for any major policy

decisions.

Parliamentary Government

The RCC-NS dissolved the elected legislature when it seized

power in 1989. As of mid- 1991, no plans had been announced for new elections or for the creation of a new representative body.

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Sudan: A Country Study

Nevertheless, Sudan's postindependence political history, characterized by alternating periods of parliamentary democracy and mili- tary rule, suggested that there was support for a popularly elected

assembly. The country's first parliament, the Legislative Assembly, was established during the final years of British colonial rule,

and the country's first multiparty elections were held in 1948. Subsequently, the Constituent Assembly drew up a transitional constitution that provided for a two-chamber legislature: an indirectly

elected upper house, called the Senate, and a House of Representatives elected by direct popular vote. The British model of government was followed, that is, a parliamentary system in which the

political party winning the most seats in the lower house formed

the government. Multiparty elections for the House of Representatives were held in 1953 and 1958. The second parliament had

been in session only a few months before being forcibly dissolved

by a military coup. Parliamentary government was restored briefly

between 1964 and 1969, during which time there were two multiparty elections for the House of Representatives.

Following the precedent set by the 1958 military coup, Nimeiri

dissolved parliament and banned political parties when he seized

power in May 1969. Five years later, in 1974, he permitted controlled elections for a new People's Assembly. In this and subsequent balloting, candidates had to be approved by the government,

and persons with known or suspected ties to the banned political

parties were barred from participation. The People's Assembly

never functioned as an institution independent of the executive and was dissolved after Nimeiri 's overthrow in April 1985. The first genuinely democratic parliamentary elections since 1968 were held

in April 1986, but no political party won a majority of seats. During the next three years, six successive coalition governments were

formed. The assembly was dissolved and political parties again

banned following the June 30, 1989, military coup.

Constitutional Development

One of the first acts of the RCC-NS after seizing power was

to abolish by decree the transitional constitution of 1985, drafted

following the overthrow of the Nimeiri government to replace the

1973 Permanent Constitution. Bashir and other RCC-NS members initially promised that a constituent assembly would be con- vened to draw up a new constitution. During its first eighteen

months, however, the RCC-NS government failed to address the

issue of a constitution. Then in early 1991, in response to increasing criticism of its authoritarian and arbitrary rule, the RCC-NS

announced the convening of a constitutional conference. Bashir

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Government and Politics

invited civilian politicians, including those opposed to the government, to attend the conference and discuss without fear of reprisal

legal procedures that might be set forth in a constitutional document. Although representatives of some banned political parties

attended the constitutional conference in April, the conclave's lack

of an electoral mandate, its government sponsorship, and a boycott by major opposition groups served to undermine the legitimacy

of its deliberations.

The 1991 constitutional conference necessarily labored under a heavy historical legacy: drawing up a constitution acceptable to

all elements of the country's diverse population has been an in- tractable political problem since Sudan became independent in 1956

with a temporary constitution known as the Transitional Constitution. The primary reason for this situation has been the inability

of the country's major religious groups, the majority Muslims and

the minority non-Muslims, to agree on the role of the sharia, or

Islamic law. Islamic political groups, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, have insisted that any constitution must be based on the

sharia. The non-Muslims have been equally insistent that the country must have a secular constitution. Despite the convening over

the years of numerous committees, conferences, and constituent

assemblies to discuss or draft a constitution, most Muslim and non- Muslim political leaders refused to compromise their views about

the role of the sharia. The unresolved constitutional issue remained

one of the major sources of disaffection in the predominantly non- Muslim south, where deep-seated fears of Islamization have been

reinforced by the government's Islamic education policies during

the Ibrahim Abbud military dictatorship (1958-64), Nimeiri's September 1983 introduction of the Islamic sharia by decree, and the

failure since 1985 to remove the sharia as the basis of the legal

system.

Regional and Local Administration

Relations between the central government and local authorities

have been a persistent problem in Sudan. Much of the present pat- tern of center-periphery political relationships—local officials appointed by authorities in Khartoum—originated in the early part

of the century. During most of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium

period (1899-1955), the British relied upon a system called indig- enous administration to control local governments in nonurban

areas. Under this system, traditional tribal and village leaders

nuzzar (sing., nazir), umada (sing., umda), and shaykhs—were entrusted with responsibility for administrative and judicial functions

within their own areas and received financial and, when necessary,

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Sudan: A Country Study

military support from the central authorities. Following World War

II, pressures arising from younger and better educated Sudanese

led the British in 1951 to abandon administration by local rulers

in favor of a system of local government councils. As they evolved

under successive national administrations following independence

in 1956, a total of eighty-four such councils were created and entrusted with varying degrees of community autonomy. This sys- tem, however, was plagued by problems of divided power, the

councils being responsible to the minister of local government

whereas provincial governors and district commissioners remained

under the supervision of the minister of interior. Effectiveness varied

from one local authority to another, but all suffered from inadequate finances and a shortage of trained personnel willing to serve

in small, isolated communities. In the south, such problems were compounded when hundreds of colonial officials were replaced by

Sudanese civil servants, almost all of whom were northerners. In

many rural areas of Sudan, the system in the early years of in- dependence was little different from the old indigenous administration dominated by the conservative, traditional elite, whereas

in most cities the effectiveness of councils was seriously weakened

by party politics.

The Abbud regime sought to end the dual features of this sys- tem through the 1961 Local Government Act, which introduced

a provincial commissioner appointed by the central government

as chairman of the provincial authority, an executive body of offi- cials representing Khartoum. The 1961 law was not intended to be a democratic reform; instead, it allowed the central government

to control local administration despite the existence of provincial

councils chosen by local governmental and provincial authorities.

Soon after coming to power in the military coup of 1969, the

Nimeiri government abolished local and regional government struc- tures. The People's Local Government Act of November 1971

designed a pyramidal structure with local community councils at the base and progressively higher levels of authority up to the ex- ecutive councils of the ten provinces. By 1980 community councils included an estimated 4,000 village councils, more than 800

neighborhood councils in cities and towns, 281 nomadic encampment councils, and scores of market and industrial area councils.

In theory, membership on these local councils was based on popular election, but in practice the councils were dominated by local representatives of the Sudan Socialist Union, the only political party

that Nimeiri permitted to function. Above the community councils was a second tier of local government structures that included

228 rural councils and 90 urban councils. A third tier consisted

204
People's Palace, Khartoum, executive center ofgovernment, seenfrom the Nile

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

Throne room and council house of an Azande chief, southern Sudan

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

205
Sudan: A Country Study

of thirty-five subprovincial district councils, and at the apex were

the province commissions, presided over by the province gover- nor appointed from Khartoum.

Although there were some changes following Nimeiri's overthrow

in 1985, the local government structures remained relatively intact. Parliament devolved more authority to community councils

and reorganized the functions and powers of the province commissions. In February 1991 , the RCC-NS instituted a major change

in local government by introducing a federal structure. The federalism decree divided the country into nine states: Aali an Nil, Al

Awsat, Al Istiwai, Al Khartum, Ash Shamali, Ash Sharqi, Bahr

al Ghazal, Darfur, and Kurdufan. Generally, both the borders and names of the states are similar to the historical nine provinces of

Sudan during the colonial period and early years of independence.

The states were further subdivided into 66 provinces and 218 local government areas or districts. The RCC-NS appointed a governor, deputy governor, and council of ministers for each state. These

officials were responsible for administration and economic planning in the states. They also appointed the province and district authorities in the states. The latter officials, for the most part the same persons who occupied local government posts before the federal structure was introduced, continued to be responsible for elementary and secondary education, health, and various government programs and services in the cities, towns, and villages (see

fig. 7). The Legal System

The administration of justice traditionally was regarded by

arabized Sudanese and a number of southern ethnic groups as the

most important function of government. In precolonial times super- vision ofjustice was solely in the hands of the ruler. In the north,

most cases were actually tried by an Islamic judge (qadi) who was

trained in one of the Sunni (see Glossary) Islamic legal schools.

Crimes against the government, however, were heard by the ruler

and decided by him with the advice of the grand mufti, an expert

in the sharia, who served as his legal adviser.

Although the Muslim influence on Sudanese law remained important, the long years of British colonial rule left the country with a legal system derived from a variety of sources. Personal law per- taining to such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption, and family disputes was adjudicated in the sharia courts in

the predominandy Muslim areas. Customary law, modified in vary- ing degrees by the impact of the sharia and the concepts introduced

by the British, governed matters of personal law in other areas of

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Government and Politics

the country. Laymen, generally a chief or group of elders, pre- sided over local courts. In addition to personal law, these courts,

which numbered more than 1 ,000, heard cases involving land titles, grazing rights, and other disputes between clans and tribes. The primary legal influence remained British because of the

weight given to British legal precedents and because most of the

lawyers and judges were British trained. After independence in

1956, much discussion took place on the need to reform or abrogate

the system inherited from the British. A commission was preparing a revision of the legal system when Nimeiri and the Free

Officers' Movement carried out the 1969 military coup against the

elected civilian government (see The Nimeiri Era, 1969-85, ch. 1). The Nimeiri regime, which looked to Gamal Abdul Nasser's

government in Egypt as a model, dissolved this commission and

formed a new one dominated by twelve Egyptian jurists. In 1970

this commission unveiled a new civil code of 917 sections, copied

in large part from the Egyptian civil code of 1949, with slight modifications based on the civil codes of other Arab countries. The next

year draft commercial and penal codes were published.

This major change in Sudan's legal system was controversial be- cause it disregarded existing laws and customs, introduced many

new legal terms and concepts from Egyptian law without source

material necessary to interpret the codes, and presented serious

problems for legal education and training. The legal profession objected that the Sudanese penal code, which was well established

and buttressed by a strong body of case law, was being replaced

by the Egyptian code, which was largely transplanted from a French

legal system entirely alien to Sudan. Following a 1971 abortive coup

attempt against the Nimeiri government and increasing political

disillusionment with Egypt, the minister ofjustice formed a committee of Sudanese lawyers to reexamine the Egyptian-based codes.

In 1973 the government repealed these codes, returning the country's legal system to its pre- 1970 common-law basis.

Following the suppression of a coup attempt in late 1976, Nimeiri

embarked on a political course of "national reconciliation" with

the religious parties (see National Reconciliation, ch. 1). He agreed

to a principal Muslim Brotherhood demand that the country's laws

be based on Islam and in 1977 formed a special committee charged

with revising Sudan's laws to bring them into conformity with the

sharia. He appointed Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi, secretary general

of the Muslim Brotherhood, as chairman of the committee. NonMuslims viewed the committee with suspicion, and two southern

politicians who had agreed to serve on the commission rarely participated in its work. Turabi' s committee drafted a total of seven

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Sudan: A Country Study

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208
Government and Politics

bills, which it sent to the People's Assembly for enactment. One

of the proposed laws, the Liquor Prohibition Bill, prohibited the

sale, manufacture, advertising, and public consumption of alco- hol among Muslims. Another was the Zakat Fund Legislative Bill,

which made mandatory the collection of a tax from Muslims for a social welfare fund administered separately from government ac- counts. The Sources ofJudicial Decisions Bill called for repealing

the section of the existing civil procedure code that permitted judges

to apply the concept of "equality and good conscience" in the ab- sence of a provision of law and provided that this be replaced by

the Quran or the standards of conduct based on the words and practice of the Prophet Muhammad. The Turabi committee also called

for the imposition of hudud and for bans on the payment of interest on loans.

During the next six years, only one of the Turabi committee's

proposals, the law on zakat, was actually enacted. Following Turabi's appointment as attorney general in November 1981, however,

Islamizing the legal system proceeded in earnest. This process cul- minated in the summer of 1983 with the establishment of a threemember committee that revised Turabi's earlier proposals. In

September 1983, Nimeiri issued several decrees, known as the September Laws, that made the sharia the law of the land. In November the People's Assembly approved without debate legislation to

facilitate the implementation of the sharia. These bills included the

Sources of Judicial Decisions Bill, mentioned above, and a new

penal code based on hudud.

The imposition of Islamic law was bitterly resented by secularized Muslims and the predominantly non-Muslim southerners.

The enforcement of hudud punishments aroused widespread opposition to the Nimeiri government. Several judges who refused to apply the sharia were summarily dismissed. Their replacements,

men with little or no legal training but possessing excessive zeal

for the strict application of hudud, contributed to a virtual reign

of terror in the court system that alienated many devout Muslims,

including Sadiq al Mahdi, great-grandson of the religious ruler who

defeated the British in 1885 (see The Khalifa, ch. 1). By early 1985, even Turabi believed it was time to disassociate the Muslim Brotherhood from Nimeiri' s vision of Islamic law. He resigned as attor- ney general and was promptly arrested.

Following Nimeiri' s overthrow in April 1985, imposition of the

harshest punishments was stopped. Nevertheless, none of the suc- cessor governments abolished Islamic law. Both the transitional

military government of General Siwar adh Dhahab and the

democratic government of Sadiq al Mahdi expressed support for

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Sudan: A Country Study

the sharia but criticized its method of implementation by Nimeiri.

The complete abolition of the 1983 September Laws, however, re- mained a primary goal of the SPLM, which refused to end hostilities in the south until its demand was met. By early 1989, a reluctant

Sadiq al Mahdi indicated his willingness to consider abrogation

of the controversial laws. This process prompted his coalition part- ner, the NIF, organized by Turabi after Nimeiri' s overthrow, to resign from the government in protest. Subsequently, Sadiq al Mahdi announced that the cabinet would consider on July 1, 1989,

draft legislation repealing the September Laws and would meet with

SPLM leaders to resolve peacefully the country's civil war. The military coup ofJune 1989 occurred only twenty-four hours

before the Sadiq al Mahdi government was scheduled to vote on

rescinding the September Laws. Although the Bashir government

initially retained the official freeze on implementation of those laws,

it unofficially advised judges to apply the sharia in preference to secular codes. Turabi, who in 1983 had played an influential role in drafting the September Laws, was enlisted to help prepare new

laws based on Islamic principles. In January 1991 , Bashir decreed

that Islamic law would be applied in courts throughout the north,

but not in the three southern provinces.

Courts

Prior to Nimeiri 's consolidation of the court system in 1980, the

judiciary consisted of two separate divisions: the Civil Division

headed by the chief justice and the Sharia Division headed by the

chief qadi. The civil courts considered all criminal and most civil cases. The sharia courts, comprising religious judges trained in

Islamic law, adjudicated for Muslims matters of personal status,

such as inheritance, marriage, divorce, and family relations. The

1980 executive order consolidating civil and sharia courts created a single High Court of Appeal to replace both the former Supreme

Court and the Office of Chief Qadi. Initially, judges were required

to apply civil and sharia law as if they were a single code of law.

Since 1983, however, the High Court of Appeal, as well as all lower

courts, were required to apply Islamic law exclusively. Following

the overthrow of Nimeiri in 1985, courts suspended the application of the harsher hudud punishments in criminal cases. Each

province or district had its own appeal, major, and magistrates'

courts. Serious crimes were tried by major courts convened by

specific order of the provincial judge and consisted of a bench of

three magistrates. Magistrates were of first, second, or third class and had corresponding gradations of criminal jurisdictions. Local

magistrates generally advised the police on whether to prepare for

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Government and Politics

a prosecution, determined whether a case should go to trial (and on what charges and at what level), and often acted in practice as

legal advisers to defendants.

In theory the judiciary was independent in the performance of

its duties, but since 1958 the country's various military governments have routinely interfered with the judicial process. For ex- ample, in July 1989 the RCC-NS issued Decree Number 3, which

gave the president the power to appoint and dismiss all judges.

Under the authority of this decree, Bashir dismissed scores ofjudges,

reportedly because they were insufficiently committed to applying

the sharia in their decisions, and replaced them with supporters

of the NIF. One of the most extensive judicial firings occurred during September 1990, when more than seventy judges were dis- missed. The effect of these actions was to make the judiciary

responsible to the president.

In November 1989, the RCC-NS established special courts to investigate and try a wide range of violations, including particularly security offenses and corruption. The special security courts handled cases that dealt primarily with violations of the emergency laws issued by the RCC-NS. The special corruption courts ini- tially investigated charges that the state brought against officials of the Sadiq al Mahdi government, but since 1990 they have dealt

with cases of embezzlement, foreign-currency smuggling, and black

market profiteering. Critics charged that there was a lack of due

process in the special courts and that the regime used them as a means of silencing political opponents. Judges sitting in the special courts included both civilians and military officers. Human Rights

International human rights organizations and foreign governments, including the United States, have reported that since the

Bashir government came to power in 1989, it systematically en- gaged in a range of human rights abuses against persons suspected

of dissident political activity (see Security Organizations, ch. 5). The Sudanese Human Rights Organization was forcibly dissolved

in July 1989, and scores of politicians, lawyers, judges, and teachers were arrested. According to a February 1991 report by Amnesty

International, arbitrary arrest continued to be frequent, at least 40 political prisoners with serious health conditions were not receiving medical treatment, more than 200 political prisoners had been

detained for more than a year without charges, torture was routine, and some political prisoners were summarily executed after

trials in which the accused were not afforded opportunities to present

any defense.

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Sudan: A Country Study

Southern and Western Sudan

Southern Sudan

The three southern provinces of Al Istiwai, Bahr al Ghazal, and

Aali an Nil were centers of opposition to Khartoum's authority

since before independence. The first rebellion began in 1955 as a mutiny of southern troops who believed that the departure of the

British would be followed by northern efforts to force arabization

and Islamization on their region. The antigovernment movement

gathered momentum after Sudan's independence in 1956 with the

formation of opposition elements. The harsh treatment of southern

civilians by northern armed forces and police caused a number of

better educated southerners who served in government posts or were

teachers to go into exile. Ultimately, in February 1962, many of

these persons formed the Sudan Africa Closed Districts National

Union. In April 1963, the group changed its name to the Sudan

African National Union (SANU) and advocated outright independence for southern Sudan. Meanwhile, numerous less educated

southern males, many of whom had been junior civil servants or former members of the Equatoria Corps, sought refuge in the bush

and formed guerrilla bands, the Anya Nya, which began activities in 1963 (see Civil Warfare in the South; Paramilitary Groups,

ch. 5). As the Anya Nya developed into an effective military force,

it gradually succeeded in expelling central government officials from an increasing number of southern districts. In 1971, by which time

Anya Nya controlled most rural areas, its military leaders formed

a political organization, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

(SSLM).

The Nimeiri regime recognized that the escalating civil strife in

the south was a debilitating drain on the country's resources and

a serious impediment to Sudan's economic development. In 1971

Nimeiri agreed to negotiate a compromise with the SSLM. Several sessions of mediated discussions culminated in peace negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February and March 1972.

Under the provisions of the Addis Ababa accords, the central

government and the SSLM agreed to a cease-fire, and Khartoum

recognized the regional autonomy of the three southern provinces.

After signing the accord, Nimeiri issued a decree for the establishment of a Southern Regional Assembly. The assembly's members

were elected in multiparty elections, the first of which was held

in 1973, with a second election five years later. Throughout the

1970s, the Nimeiri government observed the Addis Ababa accords

fairly faithfully, and the south' s relative political freedom contrasted

sharply with the authoritarian rule in the rest of the country.

212
Government and Politics The Addis Ababa accords eventually were undermined by the same factors that had fueled southern rebellion in the 1960s: fears that the north was determined to force arabization and Islamization upon the south. These fears were revived, beginning in the

late 1970s, by the increasing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood

over central government policies. In 1981 Nimeiri virtually abrogated the Addis Ababa accords by dissolving the Southern Regional

Assembly. In addition to these major political developments, the

general economic stagnation of the south, which by the early 1980s was plagued with high inflation, lack of employment opportunities,

and severe shortages of basic goods, tended to reinforce southern

suspicions of Khartoum.

After Nimeiri appointed Muslim Brotherhood leader Turabi as attorney general in November 1981, southern confidence in the

central government's motives eroded rapidly. A mutiny among

about 1,000 southern troops in February 1983 stimulated attacks on government property and forces throughout the region. By August a former colonel in the Sudanese army, John Garang, had

been instrumental in forming the Sudanese People's Liberation

Movement (SPLM). When Nimeiri imposed the sharia on the

whole country one month later, further inflaming attitudes among

non-Muslims in the south, the SPLM rebellion, coordinated by

its newly formed military arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation

Army (SPLA), turned into a full-scale civil war (see Sudanese People's Liberation Army, ch. 5). The intensification of fighting

throughout 1984, and the SPLA's general success in expelling

government forces from most rural districts and some towns were

important factors contributing to Nimeiri 's overthrow in 1985.

Unlike its predecessor, the SSLM, the SPLM sought, not seces- sion from Sudan, but a solution based on a secular, democratic,

and federal political system. Because one of the first acts of the transitional military government that overthrew Nimeiri was to sus- pend enforcement of the September Laws, Garang and other SPLM

leaders initially were optimistic about resolving their grievances

with Khartoum. The SPLM thus agreed to participate in negotiations with central government representatives and leaders of north- ern political parties. In 1986 SPLM leaders and several northern

politicians met at Ethiopia's Koka Dam, where they signed an important declaration stating their common commitment to democracy. Nevertheless, the primary issue separating the SPLM from

the northern parties—the role of the sharia—remained unresolved.

Sadiq al Mahdi, whom Nimeiri had imprisoned for his criticism

of the manner in which the 1983 laws had been implemented, as

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Sudan: A Country Study

prime minister became reluctant to abrogate the sharia as the SPLM

demanded.

Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani, head of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and spiritual leader of the Khatmiyyah religious

order, was one of the few northern politicians who recognized that

ending the civil war and compromising on the issue of the sharia were inseparable. In November and December 1988, he met with

Garang in Ethiopia and reached a tentative agreement that involved

major government concessions with respect to the sharia. This

agreement received the backing of many northern groups that

wanted an end to the debilitating civil war. The NIF, however,

strongly opposed the agreement and exerted considerable pressures on the Sadiq al Mahdi government to reject it. Sadiq al Mahdi' s temporizing on the Mirghani-Garang agreement sparked demonstrations in Khartoum by various labor unions

and professional associations. Military officers who opposed continuation of the fighting in the south intervened in February 1 989

to demand that the government seriously negotiate an end to the

civil war. The military's memorandum to the cabinet provoked

a political crisis that led Sadiq al Mahdi to form a new coalition

government without NIF participation. This National Salvation

government was dedicated to compromise with the SPLM on the

basis of the Mirghani-Garang agreement. Accordingly, it set up

a special committee of legal experts to draft legislation for the repeal

of the September Laws.

The June 1989 coup made the Mirghani-Garang agreement a moot issue. Although the RCC-NS declared a unilateral cease-fire

and announced its determination to settle the conflict in the south

peacefully, its Islamic policies tended to alienate further, rather than

to conciliate, the SPLM. Garang announced that the SPLA would

continue the struggle but insisted that the SPLM was prepared to discuss a resolution of the civil war provided the government agreed

not to enforce the sharia. Garang sent SPLM representatives to Ethiopia in August 1989 and to Kenya in December to discuss the war with RCC-NS representatives, but these meetings produced no results. The RCC-NS adopted the position that there could be no preconditions for peace talks. Consequentiy, the war continued,

with the SPLA forces generally prevailing in military clashes with

army contingents, especially in Al Istiwai, where support for the

SPLM initially had been weak. In mid- 1991 the government still held several important southern towns, including the largest cities ofJuba and Yei in Al Istiwai, but they were besieged by the SPLA

and could be resupplied only by air.

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Government and Politics

Western Sudan

Regional resentment of Khartoum was not limited to the south,

but was present to varying degrees in other areas of Sudan, especially the western state of Darfur. Although the ethnically diverse

people of Darfur were predominantly Muslim, more than 40 per- cent were not Arabs and generally felt more affinity with related

groups in neighboring Chad than with Khartoum. The civil strife in Chad during the 1980s inevitably spilled over into western

Darfur, exacerbating historical tensions between the non-Arab Fur

and Zaghawa ethnic groups (see Chad, this ch.). The perception

among many Fur that the RCC-NS encouraged and even armed

militia among their enemies inspired guerrilla attacks on central

government facilities and forces in Darfur. The general sense of

antagonism toward the RCC-NS was reinforced by the drought

and the near-famine conditions that have afflicted Darfur since 1984.

Like its predecessors, the RCC-NS failed to cope with the social

and economic consequences of the environmental disaster, a situ- ation that increased alienation from the central government. By

the early 1990s, much of Darfur was in a state of anarchy.

Political Groups

The RCC-NS banned all political parties following the 1989 coup

and arrested several political leaders including the deposed prime

minister, Sadiq al Mahdi. Nevertheless, all northern parties that

existed at the time of the coup maintained their party structures outside the country or in southern areas controlled by antigovernment forces. Some banned political parties actually operated fairly

openly in Khartoum and other urban centers. The National Islamic

Front, whose leaders were considered to have close relations with

several RCC-NS members, was particularly open. Both supporters and opponents of the regime asserted that in the past most

government decisions were made by a secretive council of forty

men whose members included both top military leaders and prominent figures in the NIF, a coalition dominated by the Muslim

Brotherhood. In addition, several cabinet ministers belonged to the NIF. With the exception of the NIF, however, the precoup parties generally did not cooperate with the military government and

were committed to its overthrow.

The RCC-NS attempted to broaden its legitimacy by meeting

with members of the various opposition parties. Its first effort to reach out to the banned parties was to invite them to send representatives to a National Dialogue Conference, held in Khartoum in

the autumn of 1989. Most of the parties sent delegates, but the

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Sudan: A Country Study

SPLM was conspicuously absent. The substantive results of the

National Dialogue Conference were meager because the RCC-NS

controlled the agenda and did not permit any criticism of its rule. Various meetings in 1990 and 1991 appeared to be aimed at coopting individuals rather than engaging in serious discussions about

the country's government. The state-controlled media covered these

meetings, but the participants rarely were prominent party leaders. In fact, Sadiq al Mahdi's Urama Party disassociated itself from

contacts with the RCC-NS by announcing through its publications

that the person with whom the RCC-NS met was not connected

with the party. The DUP expelled two members for unauthorized

contact with the government.

After the 1989 coup, the banned parties gradually coordinated

a common opposition strategy. Northern political leaders initiated a dialogue with the SPLM that resulted in early 1 990 in a formal

alliance among the SPLM, the Umma Party, and the DUP. This

grouping, known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an

organization in exile, most of whose leaders lived in Cairo, provided

the Umma and other parties with access to valuable radio trans- mitting facilities in SPLM-controlled areas. The NDA was further

strengthened when several high-ranking military officers whom the

RCC-NS had dismissed from service in 1989 established informal

contacts with it. The most prominent of these officers was Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad Ali, who had served as armed forces

commander in chief prior to Bashir's coup. In January 1991, the

NDA proposed to establish a government in exile for the purpose

of overthrowing the Bashir regime. General Ali was named head

of the government and Garang his deputy. In March 1991, the

NDA met in Ethiopia with representatives of military officers,

professional associations, trade unions, and the Sudanese Communist Party to discuss ideas for organizing a national government.

Although all political parties remained officially banned in 1991,

many precoup parties continued to operate underground or in exile. All the major Sudanese political parties in the north were affili- ated with Islamic groups, a situation that has prevailed since

before independence in 1956. Among the important religious or- ganizations that sponsored political parties were the Ansar, the

Khatmiyyah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Although several secular parties had been set up between 1986 and 1989, except for the

long-established Sudanese Communist Party and the Baath (Arab

Socialist Resurrection) Party, none of these had effective organizations after the coup.

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Khartoum International Airport, Sudan's major air center Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

Umma Party

During the last period of parliamentary democracy, the Umma

Party was the largest in the country, and its leader, Sadiq al Mahdi,

served as prime minister in all coalition governments between 1986

and 1989. Originally founded in 1945, the Umma was the politi- cal organization of the Islamic Ansar movement. Its supporters fol- lowed the strict teachings of the Mahdi, who ruled Sudan in the

1880s. Although the Ansar were found throughout Sudan, most

lived in rural areas of western Darfur and Kurdufan. Since Sudan

became independent in 1956, the Umma Party has experienced

alternating periods of political prominence and persecution. Sadiq

al Mahdi became head of the Umma and spiritual leader of the

Ansar in 1970, following clashes with the Nimeiri government, during which about 3,000 Ansar were killed. Following a brief reconciliation with Nimeiri in the mid-1970s, Sadiq al Mahdi was

imprisoned for his opposition to the government's foreign and

domestic policies, including his 1983 denunciation of the September Laws as being un-Islamic.

Despite Sadiq al Mahdi's criticisms of Nimeiri 's efforts to exploit religious sentiments, the Umma was an Islamic party dedicated to achieving its own Muslim political agenda for Sudan. Sadiq

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Sudan: A Country Study

al Mahdi had never objected to the sharia becoming the law of the

land, but rather to the "un-Islamic" manner Nimeiri had used

to implement the sharia through the September Laws. Thus, when

Sadiq al Mahdi became prime minister in 1986, he was loath to become the leader who abolished the sharia in Sudan. Failing to appreciate the reasons for non-Muslim antipathy toward the sharia,

Sadiq al Mahdi cooperated with his brother-in-law, NIF leader

Turabi, to draft Islamic legal codes for the country. By the time

Sadiq al Mahdi realized that ending the civil war and retaining

the sharia were incompatible political goals, public confidence in

his government had dissipated, setting the stage for military intervention. Following the June 1989 coup, Sadiq al Mahdi was ar- rested and kept in solitary confinement for several months. He was

not released from prison until early 1991. Sadiq al Mahdi indicated approval of political positions adopted by the Umma Party

during his detention, including joining with the SPLM and northern

political parties in the National Democratic Alliance opposition

grouping.

Democratic Unionist Party

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was similarly based on

a religious order, the Khatmiyyah organization. Ever since the

Khatmiyyah opposed the Mahdist movement in the 1880s, it has

been a rival of the Ansar. Although the Khatmiyyah was more

broadly based than the Ansar, it was generally less effective politically. Historically, the DUP and its predecessors were plagued by

factionalism, stemming largely from the differing perspectives of

secular-minded professionals in the party and the more traditional

religious values of their Khatmiyyah supporters. Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani, the DUP leader and hereditary Khatmiyyah

spiritual guide since 1968, tried to keep these tensions in check by

avoiding firm stances on controversial political issues. In particular, he refrained from public criticism of Nimeiri' s September Laws

so as not to alienate Khatmiyyah followers who approved of implementing the sharia. In the 1986 parliamentary elections, the

DUP won the second largest number of seats and agreed to participate in Sadiq al Mahdi' s coalition government. Like Sadiq al Mahdi, Mirghani felt uneasy about abrogating the sharia, as demanded by the SPLM, and supported the idea that the September Laws could be revised to expunge the "un-Islamic" content

added by Nimeiri.

By late 1988, however, other DUP leaders had persuaded Mirghani that the Islamic law issue was the main obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the civil war. Mirghani himself became convinced

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Government and Politics

that the war posed a more serious danger to Sudan than did any

compromise over the sharia. It was this attitude that prompted him

to meet with Garang in Ethiopia where he negotiated a cease-fire

agreement based on a commitment to abolish the September Laws.

During the next six months leading up to the June 1989 coup, Mirghani worked to build support for the agreement, and in the process

emerged as the most important Muslim religious figure to advocate concessions on the implementation of the sharia. Following

the coup, Mirghani fled into exile and he has remained in Egypt.

Since 1989, the RCC-NS has attempted to exploit DUP factionalism by coopting party officials who contested Mirghani's leadership, but these efforts failed to weaken the DUP as an opposition

group.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in Egypt, has been

active in Sudan since its formation there in 1949. It emerged from

Muslim student groups that first began organizing in the universities during the 1940s, and its main support base has remained

the college educated. The Muslim Brotherhood's objective in Sudan

has been to institutionalize Islamic law throughout the country.

Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi, former dean of the School of Law

at the University of Khartoum, had been the Muslim Brotherhood's

secretary general since 1964. He began working with Nimeiri in

the mid-1970s, and, as his attorney general in 1983, played a key

role in the controversial introduction of the sharia. After the over- throw of Nimeiri, Turabi was instrumental in setting up the NIF,

a Brotherhood-dominated organization that included several other

small Islamic parties. Following the 1989 coup, the RCC-NS ar- rested Turabi, as well as the leaders of other political parties, and

held him in solitary confinement for several months. Nevertheless,

this action failed to dispel a pervasive belief in Sudan that Turabi

and the NIF actively collaborated with the RCC-NS. NIF influence

within the government was evident in its policies and in the presence

of several NIF members in the cabinet.

The Republican Brothers

A small but influential religious party in the early 1 980s was the

Republican Brothers. A Sufi shaykh, Mahmud Muhammad Taha,

founded the Republican Brothers in the 1950s as an Islamic re- form movement stressing the qualities of tolerance, justice, and

mercy. Taha came to prominence in 1983 when he opposed

Nimeiri 's implementation of the sharia as being contrary to the essence of Islam. He was arrested and subsequently executed for

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Sudan: A Country Study

heresy in January 1985. The execution of such a widely revered

religious figure—Taha was seventy-six—aroused considerable

revulsion in Sudan and was one of the factors that helped precipitate the coup against Nimeiri. Although the Republican Brothers

survived the loss of its leader and participated in the political process during the parliamentary period, it has not been politically active

since 1989.

Secular Political Parties

The two most important secular political parties in the north were

the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and the Baath. The SCP

was formed in 1944 and early established a strong support base

in universities and labor unions. Although relatively small, the SCP

had become one of the country's best organized political parties

by 1956 when Sudan obtained its independence. The SCP also was

one of the few parties that recruited members in the south. The

various religiously affiliated parties opposed the SCP, and, consequently, the progression of civilian and military governments alter- nately banned and courted the party until 1971, when Nimeiri

accused the SCP of complicity in an abortive military coup. Nimeiri

ordered the arrest of hundreds of SCP members, and several leaders, including the secretary general, were convicted of treason in

hastily arranged trials and summarily executed. These harsh measures effectively crippled the SCP for many years. Following Nimeiri' s overthrow, the SCP began reorganizing, and

it won three seats in the 1986 parliamentary elections. Since the June

1989 coup, the SCP has emerged as one of the Bashir government's

most effective internal opponents, largely through fairly regular publication and circulation of its underground newspaper, Al Midan.

In November 1990, Babikr at Tijani at Tayyib, secretary general

of the banned SCP, managed to escape from house arrest and flee to Ethiopia.

The Baath Party of Sudan was relatively small and sided with

the Baath Party of Iraq in the major schism that divided this panArab party into pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian factions. The Baath re- mained committed to unifying Sudan with either Egypt or Libya

as an initial step in the creation of a single nation encompassing

all Arabic-speaking countries; however, the Baath's ideological

reservations about the existing regimes in those two countries

precluded active political support for this goal. The Nimeiri and

Bashir governments alternately tolerated and persecuted the Baath.

The RCC-NS, for example, arrested more than forty-five Baathists

during the summer of 1990. Restrictions against the Baath were

220
Government and Politics

eased at the end of year, presumably because Sudan supported Iraq

during the Persian Gulf War.

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement

Although based almost exclusively in the three predominantly

non-Arab southern states, the SPLM was the most important opposition force in Sudan (see Southern and Western Sudan, this ch.).

Most of its early members were ethnic Dinka, and until the late 1980s most recruits into its SPLA were of Dinka origin. The SPLM

was strongest where the largest number of Dinka resided, that is, in Aali an Nil and Bahr al Ghazal. Both Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi

had tried to exploit historical ethnic tensions between the Dinka

and other groups, such as the Nuer and Azande, as part of the

effort to contain the spread of the civil war. The RCC-NS, however,

tended to view all non-Muslims in the south as the same and in- discriminately bombed non-Dinka towns and armed the Arab

militias that massacred civilians. The human rights group Africa

Watch reported in 1990 that the kidnapping, hostage-taking, and

other activities by militias in the south approached a reemergence

of slavery. The effect of RCC-NS policies was to strengthen the

appeal of the SPLM in non-Dinka areas, particularly the Azande

territory of western Al Istiwai. By 1991 almost one-half of the SPLA

forces were non-Dinka, although most of the higher-ranking officers remained Dinka.

Information Media

Since independence the mass media have served as channels for

the dissemination of information supporting various political parties (during parliamentary periods) or official government views

(during the years of military rule). Radio, an important medium

of mass communication in the country's vast territory, has remained

virtually a government monopoly, and television broadcasting has

been a complete monopoly. The official Sudan News Agency

(SUNA), first established in 1971, distributed news about the country in Arabic, English, and French to foreign and domestic services. Newspapers

Before the 1989 coup, Sudan had a lively press, with most political parties publishing a variety of periodicals. In Khartoum, twentytwo daily papers were published, nineteen in Arabic and three in

English. Altogether, the country had fifty-five daily or weekly

newspapers and magazines. The RCC-NS banned all these papers

and dismissed more than 1,000 journalists. At least fifteen journalists, including the director of the Sudan News Agency and the

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Sudan: A Country Study

editor of the monthly Sudanow, were arrested after the coup. Since

coming to power, the RGC-NS has authorized the publication of

only a few papers and periodicals, all of which were published by

the military or government agencies and edited by official censors. The leading daily in 1991 was Al Inqadh al Watani (National Sal- vation).

Radio and Television

Radio and television broadcasting were operated by the government. In 1990 there were an estimated 250,000 television sets in

the country and about 6 million radio receivers. Sudan Television

operated three stations located in Omdurman, Al Jazirah, and

Atbarah. The major radio station of the Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation was in Omdurman, with a regional station

in Juba for the south. Following the 1989 coup, the RCC-NS dis- missed several broadcasters from Sudan Television because their

loyalty to the new government and its policies was considered

suspect.

In opposition to the official broadcast network, the SPLM operated its own clandestine radio station, Radio SPLA, from secret transmitters within the country and facilities in Ethiopia. Radio

SPLA broadcasts were in Arabic, English, and various languages

of the south. In 1990 the National Democratic Alliance began broadcasts on Radio SPLA's frequencies.

Foreign Relations

The 1989 coup accelerated the trend in Sudan's foreign policy

of turning away from traditional allies, such as Egypt and the United

States. This trend had begun following the overthrow of Nimeiri's

government in 1985. As prime minister, one of Sadiq al Mahdi's

foreign policy objectives was to ease the strain that had characterized relations with Ethiopia, Libya, and the Soviet Union during

the latter years of Nimeiri's rule. Nevertheless, the country's need

for foreign economic assistance to deal with the consequences of

drought and civil war generally curtailed the extent to which for- eign relations could be realigned.

The Persian Gulf crisis and subsequent war in 1991 caught Sudan

in an awkward position. Although Khartoum's officially stated position was one of neutrality, the unofficial government position was

one of sympathy for Iraq, stemming largely from a sense of appreciation for the military assistance Baghdad had provided since

1989. Sudan's failure to join the anti-Iraq coalition infuriated Saudi

Arabia, which retaliated by suspending much-needed economic as- sistance, and Egypt, which responded by providing aid to opponents

222
View of Khartoum, Sudan 's capital, showing the Blue Nile

and the Blue Nile bridge

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington

of the Bashir regime. After the RCC-NS sent the deputy leader

of the NIF to the Islamic Conference in Baghdad that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn organized in January 1991, Egypt withdrew

its ambassador from Khartoum. The RCC-NS's efforts to maintain close relations with Iraq resulted in Sudan's regional isolation. Egypt

In 1991 Sudan's relations with its most important neighbor were

strained. This was partially a legacy of Cairo's close support of

Nimeiri prior to 1985. Sudan was one of the few Arab countries

that backed Egypt in 1979 after Anwar as Sadat had signed a

separate peace agreement with Israel, and Nimeiri had taken a lead- ing role in the early 1980s to help rehabilitate Egypt's position with

the rest of the Arab world. Nimeiri was in Egypt en route home

from a trip to the United States when his government was over- thrown. Egyptian president Husni Mubarak granted Nimeiri political asylum and rejected Sudan's subsequent calls for his

extradition. Beginning in 1986, relations gradually improved, and

they were relatively normal by the time the Bashir coup occurred.

Relations with Egypt deteriorated steadily after the RCC-NS

came to power. The Bashir regime was convinced that Egypt

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Sudan: A Country Study

supported opposition politicians, several of whom, including Mirghani, were granted political asylum; the NDA was also allowed

to operate in Egypt. Mirghani and other leaders, including Nimeiri,

issued regular criticisms of the government from the relatively safe haven of Cairo. The RGC-NS responded by providing asylum to Egyptian Islamic activists against whom were pending various

criminal charges and by encouraging NIF supporters residing in

Egypt to physically assault the organization's opponents. Relations were further strained early in 1990 when the Egyptian government

invited a high-ranking SPLM delegation to Cairo. Even before the

Persian Gulf crisis erupted in August, Mubarak accused Sudan

of stationing Iraqi missiles on its soil and aiming them at the Aswan

High Dam, a charge strongly denied by the RCC-NS. Relations

only worsened after Sudan refused to join the Arab coalition against

Iraq. As of mid- 1991, Egypt had not returned its ambassador to Khartoum and was openly providing financial support to the DUP,

the SPLM, and other opposition groups.

Libya

Sudan's relations with Libya, its neighbor on the northwest, alter- nated between extreme hostility and cordiality throughout the 1980s.

Nimeiri and Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi were especially

antagonistic toward each other. Nimeiri permitted the Libyan National Salvation Front to broadcast anti-Qadhafi diatribes from radio

transmitters located in Sudan. The Libyan government responded

by training anti- Nimeiri opposition forces in Libya and providing

financial and material support to the SPLM. Repairing relations

with Libya has been a goal of the transitional, parliamentary, and

military governments since 1985. The Sadiq al Mahdi government

permitted Libya to station some of its military forces in Darfur,

whence they assisted Chadian rebels in carrying out raids against

government forces in Chad. The expanding relations between

Sudan and Libya were not viewed favorably in Cairo, and in 1988,

apparently in response to pressures from Egypt and the United

States, the Sudanese government requested a withdrawal of the

Libyan forces. Relations with Libya expanded again after the June 1989 coup.

Khartoum and Tripoli both expressed interest in an eventual unifi- cation of their nations. In July 1990, the Libyan-Sudanese joint

General Peoples' Committee held its first meeting, and the Councils of Ministers of the two countries met in a combined session.

Although a unity agreement was negotiated in 1990, the chief result of these meetings was not political union but greater economic

cooperation. Libya and Sudan signed a trade and development

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Government and Politics

protocol that provided, among other things, for Libyan investment

in agricultural projects in exchange for guaranteed access to Sudanese food supplies. The two countries also agreed to form a working committee to draft plans for easing travel restrictions between Darfur and the Al Khalij area on the Libyan side of the

border. Later in 1990, Qadhafi made an official state visit to Khartoum. Although the Libyan leader expressed satisfaction with the

progress made in relations between the two countries, he also lec- tured the RCC-NS on the inappropriateness of its close ties to the

NIF.

Chad

Throughout the 1980s, relations with Chad, Sudan's neighbor on the west, were affected both by the civil strife in that country,

which often spilled over into Darfur, and relations with Libya, which

intervened in Chad's internal conflicts. At the time of the Bashir

coup in June 1989, western Darfur was being used as a battieground

by troops loyal to the Chadian government of Hissein Habre and

rebels organized by Idris Deby and supported by Libya. Deby was

from the Zaghawa ethnic group that lived on both sides of the ChadSudan border, and the Zaghawa of Darfur provided him support

and sanctuary. Hundreds of Zaghawa from Chad had also fled into

Sudan to seek refuge from the fighting. The RCC-NS was not pre- pared for a confrontation with Chad, which was already providing assistance to the SPLM, and thus tended to turn a blind eye

when Chadian forces crossed into Darfur in pursuit of the rebels. In May 1990, Chadian soldiers invaded the provincial capital

of Al Fashir, where they rescued wounded comrades being held

at a local hospital. During the summer, Chadian forces burned

eighteen Sudanese villages and abducted 100 civilians. Deby's Patriotic Movement for Salvation (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut)

provided arms to Sudanese Zaghawa and Arab militias, ostensibly so that they could protect themselves from Chadian forces. The

militias, however, used the weapons against their own rivals, principally the ethnic Fur, and several hundred civilians were killed

in civil strife during 1990. The government was relieved when Deby

finally defeated Habre in December 1990. The new government

in N'Djamena signaled its willingness for good relations with Sudan

by closing down the SPLM office. Early in 1991, Bashir visited

Chad for official talks with Deby on bilateral ties. Relations with Other African States Since 1983, Sudan's relations with its other African neighbors,

Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire,

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Sudan: A Country Study

have been affected by the civil war in the south. These five countries hosted thousands of Sudanese refugees who had fled the fighting and provided various forms of assistance and/or sanctuary to the SPLM and SPLA. As of mid- 1991, most of the border area with the Central African Republic, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire was under SPLM control. The governments of Kenya and Uganda

openly supported the SPLM's humanitarian organizations and

facilitated the movement of international relief personnel and supplies into southern Sudan. The SPLM's most important foreign

supporter, however, was the government of Colonel Mengistu Haile

Mariam in Ethiopia. The Mengistu regime had provided military

assistance, including facilities for training, to the SPLA and ex- tensive political backing to the SPLM. In retaliation, Khartoum

had allowed Ethiopian rebels to maintain facilities in Sudan, the

Eritrean People's Liberation Front at Port Sudan, and the Tigray

People's Liberation Front at Al Qadarif. As of mid- 1991, it was

not clear how the overthrow of the Mengistu regime would affect Ethiopia's relations with the SPLM and the Bashir government.

Relations with Other Arab States Other than Egypt and Libya, Sudan's most important relations

with Arab countries were with the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf, in particular Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab

Emirates. After 1974 these three countries became important

sources of foreign economic assistance and private investment. During the economic crises of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia provided Sudan

with military aid, concessionary loans, outright financial grants,

and oil at prices well below the cost of petroleum in the international market. By 1990 foreign capital transfers had become the

Sudanese government's most important source of revenue. Despite its economic dependence, the Bashir regime refused to support the Saudi position during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91

.

Other than the receipt of a small quantity of Iraqi military supplies, which the Bashir government used in its prosecution of the war in the south, its motive for its pro-Iraq stance remained obscure. In fact, relations between Baghdad and Khartoum, while

correct, were limited in 1990. In the spring of that year, the Iraqi

government had ignored official protests from Bashir and met with

representatives of the banned Sudanese Baath Party and other opposition groups. The decision to side with Iraq adversely affected

Sudan's relations with Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies. Riyadh

retaliated by suspending all grants, project loans, and concessionary oil sales, measures that had a devastating impact on Sudan's

budget and economy. After Iraq was defeated, Bashir and other

226
Government and Politics RCC-NS members tried to repair the damaged relations with Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait, but as of mid- 1991, these countries had not

resumed their former largesse to Sudan.

United States

Sudan and the United States enjoyed generally close relations

during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, then-Vice President

George Bush had paid an official visit to Khartoum only one month

before Nimeiri's overthrow in April 1985, and Nimeiri himself was

in Washington trying to obtain more United States aid when the mass demonstrations that culminated in his downfall erupted. Both

the transitional military government and the parliamentary government viewed past United States support for Nimeiri suspiciously

and were determined to end the de facto alliance that had developed after 1979. Because the most visible symbol of this alliance was Operation Bright Star, the biennial joint military exercises that

had taken place partly on Sudanese territory, one of the first policy decisions was to terminate Sudan's participation in Operation

Bright Star. Nevertheless, relations with the United States remained

important while Sadiq al Mahdi was prime minister because

Washington continued to be a significant donor of foreign aid.

This situation changed following the 1989 military coup. Washington terminated all economic assistance to Sudan in accordance

with the provisions of a foreign assistance appropriations law that

barred all United States assistance to a country whose democratically elected government had been overthrown by the military.

Although this legislation included mechanisms for the Department

of State to waive the provision, the Bush administration chose not

to do so. The RCC-NS viewed the aid cut-off as an unfriendly

gesture. Subsequently, when the United States continued to provide humanitarian assistance for the thousands of Sudanese being

displaced by drought and civil war, administering this relief aid

directly through the United States Agency for International Development, the RCC-NS accused Washington of interfering in the

country's internal affairs. Khartoum's reluctance to cooperate with

the humanitarian program prompted United States officials in early

1990 to criticize publicly the Bashir government for impeding the

distribution of emergency aid and even confiscating relief supplies.

These charges, which were echoed by the British, the French, and

several international relief agencies, further antagonized the

RCC-NS.

In this atmosphere, it was perhaps inevitable that Bashir would

mistrust the motives of the United States when it proposed a peace

initiative to end the civil war. In May 1990, after temporizing for

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Sudan: A Country Study

several weeks, the RCC-NS rejected the United States proposals

for a cease-fire. Khartoum's support for Iraq during the Persian

Gulf war further strained relations between the two governments.

Finally, in February 1991 , the United States withdrew all its diplomatic personnel from Sudan and closed its embassy in Khartoum.

Relations with Other Countries

In 1991 Sudan was a member of several international organizations including the United Nations and its specialized agencies,

the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity.

The policies of the RCC-NS, however, alienated all the European countries that traditionally had provided economic and humanitarian assistance to Sudan. Britain suspended several million

dollars of grants and loans for development projects in January

1991 after the government released from prison five Palestinians

who had been convicted of the 1988 terrorist murder of five Brit- ons at a Khartoum hotel. Subsequently, London broke diplomatic

relations as well. The twelve-member European Community is- sued a statement in February 1991 expressing its collective "shock

and dismay" at Khartoum's failure to cooperate with nations and

international organizations trying to assist Sudanese victims of

drought and civil strife. The RCC-NS tried to counterbalance these

deteriorating relations with expanded ties to such countries as China, Iran, Nigeria, and Pakistan. None of these countries,

however, had the resources to replace the significant and needed

aid that had dried up in the Arabian Peninsula, Europe, and North

America.

* * *

Several excellent studies exist of Sudan's politics since independence in 1956 and up to the overthrow of the Nimeiri regime in

1985. There is a paucity, however, of published sources for the more recent years. The best overviews of pre- 1985 political his- tory are Peter Bechtold's Politics in the Sudan since Independence, Tim

Niblock's Class and Power in Sudan, and Peter Woodward's Sudan,

1898-1989: The Unstable State. An excellent analysis of the move- ment to establish the sharia as the basis for Sudan's law is Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban's Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan. (For further

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

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Chapter 5. National Security
Sudan 's national emblem, a prominent symbol in military insignia
Sudan occupies a strategically sensitive area

of the African continent, and the nation's military establishment,

developed during the period of British colonial administration, has

remained influential in independent Sudan. Problems of domestic

origin have, however, been the paramount sources of national security concern. Sudan has experienced civil war during three-quarters of its existence as an independent nation. Historical divisions between the

Arab-dominated north and the predominantly Black African, non- Muslim south spawned civil strife that was settled only in 1972,

after about seventeen years. Open conflict broke out again in 1983

after President Jafaar an Nimeiri abrogated the peace accord by

abolishing the Southern Regional Assembly, redividing the south

into three regions, and imposing the sharia, or Islamic law, on the

entire country. Since that time, the southern rebel forces, known

as the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), have gradually expanded the fighting, leaving the government forces in control of only a few key garrison towns of the south. Essentially a

revolt among the Dinka and Nuer peoples, the largest groups in

the south, the conflict has spread beyond the southern region to southern Darfur, southern Kurdufan, and southern Al Awsat states. The struggle has been complicated by the government policy of

arming militias in communities opposed to the SPLA. As a result, local intercommunal conflicts have been exacerbated, and the

civilian population has been victimized by violence and atrocities. Millions have been forced to flee their homes in the south to es- cape the fighting and avert starvation.

In spite of the pressures it faced in the south, the Sudanese military constituted the most stable institution in a nation beset by upheaval and economic crisis. Initially having a reputation for nonpartisanship, the armed forces were generally accepted as the

guardians of the state when confidence in elected leaders faltered. Nimeiri, who came to power in a military coup d'etat in 1969, was

himself deposed by a group of officers in 1985. After a three-year

period of civilian parliamentary government from 1986 to 1989, a group of middle-ranking officers again intervened to impose mili- tary rule. Aligned with the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Is- lamist (Muslim activist, also seen as fundamentalist) party, the new

military clique purged the armed forces of potential dissenters, ar- rested suspected opponents, and introduced harsh internal security

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Sudan: A Country Study

controls. A politico-military militia, the Popular Defence Forces

(PDF) was organized as an urban security force dedicated to the

goals of the Islamist movement.

Its economy in a crippled condition, Sudan has been almost entirely dependent on help from other countries to equip its armed

forces. After severing military ties with the Soviet Union in 1977,

Sudan turned to Egypt, China, the West European countries, and

the United States for arms. In most cases, these purchases were

financed by Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. The

reluctance of Western nations to supply weapons and munitions

that could be used to support military operations in the south and

the new military leaders' alienation from other Middle Eastern

countries have made it increasingly difficult to procure arms and

materiel.

The Sudanese armed forces, numbering about 71,000 in the early

1990s, were responsible for both internal and external security. Most

troops were deployed to defend against SPLA attacks and contain

the southern insurgency. Their effectiveness was impaired by poor

morale and shortages of functioning weapons and essential supplies. Most of the armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft from the

Soviet Union were more than twenty years old and no longer ser- viceable as a result of lack of maintenance and spare parts.

In addition to the questionable effectiveness of its armed forces,

Sudan faced other security problems. Sudan had on its borders two

states equipped with Soviet arms: Ethiopia on the east and Libya on the northwest. Although each of these states constituted a potential threat, it was the seemingly unwinnable war in the south and

the growing unpopularity of a military leadership fueled by strong

Islamism that were the dominant national security issues. The Military in National Life

The warrior tradition has played an important part in the his- tory of Sudanese society, and military involvement in government

has continued in modern Sudan. Although Sudan inherited a parliamentary government structure from the British, the Sudanese

people were accustomed to a British colonial administration that was inherently military in nature. British officers held high administrative positions in both the provincial and central governments.

At independence Sudan faced difficult problems that few believed

could be solved by untested parliamentary rule in a country fragmented by competing ethnic, religious, and regional interests. It seemed natural to turn to a national institution like the army that

could address these problems through a system of centralized en- forcement and control.

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National Security

Development of the Armed Forces

The military force that eventually became the Sudanese army

was established in 1898, when six battalions of black soldiers from

southern Sudan were recruited to serve with Britain's General

Herbert Kitchener in his campaign to retake Sudan (see Reconquest of Sudan, ch. 1). In the succeeding thirty years, no fewer

than 1 70 military expeditions were sent to establish order, halt inter- tribal warfare, and restrain occasional messianic leaders, mostly

in Darfur in the west. During the period of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-

1955), participation of southerners in northern units of the Sudanese

armed forces was all but eliminated. The British had developed

a policy of administrative separation of the Muslim-dominated

northern Sudan and the mostly non-Muslim south, where the

separate Equatoria Corps commanded by British officers was maintained (see The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899-1955, ch. 1). Sudanese troops in the north were commanded largely by Egyptian and British commissioned officers until an anti-British mutiny in 1924, apparently incited by Egyptian officers, caused

Egyptian troops and units to be sent home. In 1925 local forces were designated the Sudan Defence Force (SDF), and the Sudanese

assumed an increasing share of responsibility for its command.

After 1900 the British sought to develop an indigenous officer

class among educated Sudanese, mostly from influential northern

families. Consequently, the SDF came to be viewed as a national

organization rather than as an instrument of foreign control. The

prestige of the 20,000-man SDF was enhanced by its outstanding

performance in World War II against numerically superior Italian

forces that operated from Ethiopia. In the decade between the end

of World War II and Sudan's independence, the SDF did not grow

significantly in size, but Sudanese assumed increasingly important

posts as British officers were reassigned or retired. Sudanese officer candidates were screened and selected, but Sudanization of the

armed forces in practice meant their arabization. The underdeveloped education system in the south produced few qualified candidates, and most lacked fluency in Arabic, the lingua franca of the

armed services. The British had hoped to use the recruitment of

southerners into the army after World War II to spur their integration into Sudanese national life. On the eve of independence, in 1955, the SDF's Equatoria

Corps—made up almost entirely of southern enlisted men but in- creasingly commanded by northerners as the British withdrew

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Sudan: A Country Study

mutinied because of resentment over northern control of national

politics and institutions. Northern troops were sent to quell the re- bellion, and the Equatoria Corps was disbanded after most of its men went into hiding and began what became a seventeen-year

struggle to achieve autonomy for the south.

At independence in 1956, Sudan's 5,000-man army was regarded

as a highly trained, competent, and apolitical force, but its character

changed in succeeding years. To deal with the southern insurgency,

the army expanded steadily to 12,000 personnel in 1959, and it leveled off at about 50,000 in 1972. After independence, the military—particularly the educated officer corps—lost much of its former apolitical attitude; soldiers associated themselves with parties and movements across the political spectrum.

Role in Government

On four occasions since independence, the Sudanese armed forces have stepped in to overthrow civilian political institutions and impose a period of military rule. In some instances, the military leadership introduced a measure of stability and renewal. The military

enjoyed an advantage because they were accepted by the people

as a balancing element against domination by one of the major

social, political, or religious groupings that contested for civilian

political power. The view of the military as an institution free from

specific ethnic or religious identification raised expectations that

the armed forces could achieve what civilian politicians could not. Almost invariably, however, the military leaders found themselves

unskilled in dealing with the country's chronic economic problems

and the chaotic conditions caused by civil war. Accustomed to wielding authority, the military regimes tended to become increasingly

authoritarian. Major government initiatives foundered because they were imposed inflexibly with little regard for practical possibilities

and the interests affected. The military's first intervention in Sudanese politics occurred

in November 1958, hardly three years after independence. Civilian

politicians appeared unable to cope with economic distress and the

insurrection in the south. Major General Ibrahim Abbud, the

armed forces commander, led the coup. Although the action was

apparently planned in concert with leading politicians who en- visaged a short military rule, Abbud remained in power until 1964.

Initially popular in comparison to the heads of the fractious,

stalemated first civilian governments, Abbud was forced to step

down when antiregime demonstrations rocked Khartoum. In spite

of increasingly dictatorial methods, Abbud had been unable to impose economic order or bring an end to the fighting in the south.

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National Security

The army remained a pillar of support for the civilian regime that

followed, and senior military officers continued to serve in politi- cal appointments (see Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69, ch. 1). A number of field- grade officers, however, some of whom had been

linked to Abbud's ouster, had littie loyalty to the political system

and were impatient with the consensus-oriented civilian government. Disgruntled over the stalemate in the civil war, the intractable economic situation, and official repression of leftist and

pan-Arab organizations, a small group calling itself the Free

Officers' Movement took control in 1969. At its head was Jafaar an Nimeiri, then a colonel.

From 1969 until 1971, a military government—the Revolutionary

Command Council (RCC), composed of nine young officers and

one civilian—exercised authority over a largely civilian cabinet.

The RCC represented only a faction within the military establishment. Initially, it followed radical policies in cooperation with the

Sudanese communists, carrying out nationalizations, escalating the war in the south, violently repressing the Ansar politico-religious

sect, and suppressing democratic institutions. More than 300 highranking officers who had been influential in previous governments were arrested or removed from the army when they refused to support the policies of Nimeiri and the RCC. Only one general officer was retained. Later, differences within the RCC between those

officers with nationalist sympathies and leftist-oriented officers guided by the well-organized Sudanese Communist Party precipitated a communist-led coup attempt in 1971 . Officers heading loyal

units resisted the leftist takeover, enabling Nimeiri to survive and

regain control (see Revolutionary Command Council, ch. 1). After the RCC was dissolved in late 1971 , the country was technically no longer ruled by a military government. Nimeiri' s mounting prestige forged him a broader base of support than he had

achieved during the RCC years. Over the next decade, the military establishment remained Nimeiri' s major constituency and

source of power and was, accordingly, well represented in the

government. Military men were appointed to head important ministries, to undertake major domestic and international missions, and

to assist in the founding and staffing of the country's sole political

party, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Defense ministers (who

were general officers) served concurrently as secretaries general of

the SSU. The National Security Council, whose members were

generally military officers, served as an important arena for framing political and economic policies. Eighteen seats in the largely

powerless People's Assembly were reserved for armed forces per- sonnel. Nimeiri justified the predominance of military personnel

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Sudan: A Country Study

in the upper echelons of government by pointing out that they

represented the most disciplined organization in Sudan and that,

in a country riven by partisanship, the military as an institution was motivated by nationalist convictions.

Although military officers remained prominent in the government, by the early 1980s Nimeiri increasingly acted as if the armed

forces were an instrument of his personal political dictates rather

than the source of his political power. The armed forces gave the

support necessary for Nimeiri to survive numerous coup attempts

(some by dissatisfied military elements), but the special relationship between Nimeiri and his high command seriously eroded. In an extraordinary move in 1982, Nimeiri retired General Abd al Majid Hamid Khalil—vice president, minister of defense, com- mander in chief of the armed forces, secretary general of the SSU,

and generally regarded as the heir apparent—along with twentytwo other top-ranking officers. Following the purge, Nimeiri assumed personal command of the

armed forces and for a time held the defense portfolio in the cabinet. In 1983 large numbers of southern troops mutinied, and civil war broke out again after Nimeiri' s centralist and Islamist policies had increased southern alienation. Nimeiri 's increasingly ar- bitrary actions also drove away his traditional sources of support,

and the armed forces were of little help as resistance to his policies

mounted in the form of massive demonstrations and strikes. While Nimeiri was en route home from a visit to Washington

in 1985, he was deposed in a bloodless coup led by Minister of

Defence Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab.

The new leadership formed a Transitional Military Council of

fifteen officers to govern the country for a one-year period until

civil authority could be restored. The council fulfilled its purpose

when elections were held in April 1 986 and a civilian government

took office. Coalition governments in the established pattern of Sudanese

politics ruled from 1986 to 1989 under Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi. The government forces were unable to bring the southern

insurrection under control, and Sadiq al Mahdi's relations with

the military were often stormy. In September 1986, the commander

in chief of the armed forces and the chief of the general staff were

forcibly retired along with about twenty other officers. In February 1989, the army leadership presented Sadiq al Mahdi with an

ultimatum, demanding that he make the coalition government more

representative and that he bring the civil war to an end. In June

1989, Sadiq al Mahdi's government was overthrown in a coup led

by Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, a paratroop officer

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National Security

stationed in the south. Bashir headed a ruling Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS) of fifteen officers,

mostly of middle rank (see Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, ch. 4). The RCC-NS justified its action by

citing the neglect of the armed forces by the Sadiq al Mahdi government and its failure to reverse the deteriorating economic situation and reestablish security in the south. Bashir was head of state, prime minister, commander in chief of the armed forces, and

minister of defense. The vice chairman of the RCC-NS, a major

general, was named deputy prime minister. Other officers held the

key domestic security portfolios of minister of interior, minister

of justice, and attorney general.

Like preceding military regimes, Bashir' s government was ini- tially welcomed as bringing an end to a period of political turbulence and paralysis of action. It was soon revealed, however, to be linked to the more orthodox Muslim elements of the Muslim

Brotherhood and the National Islamic Front (NIF) political party.

Its violent suppression of political expression and cruel treatment

of suspected opponents had a disillusioning effect. It dismissed or

retired the army commander and 27 other generals composing the

senior leadership, and up to 500 other officers. In April 1990, the

RCC-NS executed twenty-eight officers, including senior officers

removed by the junta, to put down a threatened coup against the

regime. The RCC-NS's ruthless action had the effect of intimidating potential opposition.

The harshness displayed by the Bashir military government and

its incompetence in dealing with Sudan's economic difficulties had

by the close of 1990 alienated nearly all governments to which it could turn for help. The Bashir junta justified its intervention as the only alternative to civilian mismanagement. Unlike other military governments, however, it followed policies that were highly

partisan, bearing the distinct ideological imprint of the NIF and

the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Armed Forces in Sudanese Society

When the British attempted to forge an indigenous officer class before World War II, most Sudanese officers came from upper and

middle-class urban families that enjoyed inherited wealth and prestige. After that time, greater numbers were drawn from the emerging class of merchants and civil servants inhabiting urban areas where formal elementary and secondary education was more easily

obtainable. Officer cadets, who had to possess a fourth-year secondary school certificate, were chosen on the basis of performance in a series of written and oral competitive examinations. A requirement

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Sudan: A Country Study

that cadets possess a good knowledge of Arabic had long eliminated

many southerners educated in English who otherwise might have

qualified. It was estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of all Sudanese

officer cadets in 1981 were southerners.

The quality of incoming officers, extremely high during the pre- independence period, was thought to have been lowered by the in- creased size of the army—particularly during the 1968-72 surge

in personnel strength. The Sudanese Communist Party, which had

become entrenched in the universities and trade unions during the

1960s, contributed to the emergence of a generation of officers that was predominantly anti-Western. Many officers received their initial training from Soviet advisers. After the revolt against Nimeiri

in 1971 , in which some communist officers were implicated, retri- bution fell on many of the officers with leftist leanings. The officer

corps became increasingly conservative at a time when Nimeiri himself was stressing nationalism for Sudan. The military faction that

deposed Nimeiri in 1985 was not distinguished by any particular

political orientation, although as individuals its members maintained links with all the important social, religious, and ethnic

groups.

In spite of the linkage of the Bashir junta to the NIF and Nimeiri'

s

earlier Islamization program, it was generally believed that among

career officers no more than 5 percent were dedicated to Muslim

activism. Most officers were modern in outlook, of middle-class

and urban backgrounds, and inclined to be nonsectarian.

In the armed forces as a whole, the political and ethnic makeup

was influenced by historical factors. From the time of the AngloEgyptian condominium, many nomadic peoples of northeastern

Sudan had served in the military, as had members of the Khatmiyyah politico-religious sect. By the 1980s, however, Sudanese

from the northeast and the Nile Valley were estimated to consti- tute no more than 20 percent of the military, although they con- tinued to be well represented in the officer corps. Many officers had ties to the Khatmiyyah group and to the Mirghani family and

were supporters of the Democratic Unionist Party. Under the Bashir

government, northerners continued to dominate the senior leadership, although numerous sensitive positions were held by officers with origins in the south. A general who was a Dinka led one of

the brigades active in the fighting against the Dinka-led SPLA.

In the early 1980s, it was estimated that members of the Ansar

politico-religious group and other Sudanese from Darfur and Kurdufan provinces accounted for approximately 60 percent of the

army's enlisted manpower. The Ansar and other western Sudanese

might have been even more numerous in the uniformed services

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National Security

had not recruitment restrictions been imposed during the Nimeiri

regime, when these groups were perceived to be among the major

sources of opposition to the national leadership.

The presence in the armed forces of non-Muslim black southerners has been a source of contention in Sudan since the condominium period. Until after World War II, southerners were recruited

for service only in the Equatoria Corps and rarely served alongside northern Sudanese. Recruitment was suspended after the 1955

mutiny in the south, and when it was resumed the following year, southern volunteers were required to serve in the north under north- ern officers. The rebellion in the south discouraged southerners

from joining the armed forces until the 1972 settlement.

As part of the Addis Ababa accords ending the civil war, 6,000

of the former Anya Nya (named after a tribal poison) guerrillas were to be integrated gradually into the national army's Southern

Command to serve with 6,000 northerners. By including southern

officers in the top echelon of the Southern Command, the two forces appeared to have meshed successfully. In 1982 it was estimated

that southerners outnumbered northerners 7,000 to 5,000 in the

Southern Command, but there were relatively few southerners sta- tioned in the north, and none held important positions. Nimeiri 's decision the following year to transfer southern troops to the north

because of his doubts over their loyalty to the central government was resisted by the southerners and was one of a number of fac- tors that triggered the renewal of the civil war. External Security Concerns

The largest nation in Africa, Sudan has a common frontier with

eight other countries. It occupies a strategic location on the conti- nent. Its capital, Khartoum, is situated at the junction of the White

Nile and the Blue Nile. Via its port on the Red Sea, Port Sudan,

the nation is linked to the Arab countries of the Middle East. To

the south, it is adjacent to the tropical lake country of central Africa.

In the west, it is exposed to recurrent conflict among Chadian fac- tions and potential contention with Libya. Even under stable conditions, it would be impracticable for Sudan to devote sufficient

military force to ensuring the security of its entire periphery. Fortunately, few problems have arisen necessitating a strong military

presence along the boundaries with Egypt, Kenya, Central Afri- can Republic, and Zaire. Threats to the stability of the border area have generally been confined to Chad on the west, Ethiopia on

the east, and, to a lesser degree, Uganda in the south.

Relations between Sudan and Egypt have varied but in general

in the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by differences over such

239
Sudan: A Country Study

matters as use of the Nile waters. Egypt subscribed to a stable,

militarily viable Sudan because it regarded Sudanese territory as providing depth to its own strategic defenses, buffering it from

potential threats emanating from sub-Saharan Africa. The border

between Egypt and Sudan was unguarded except for minimal policing to discourage smuggling and drug trafficking.

Sudan's Darfur Province contiguous with Chad was unstable

during most of the 1980s. The instability resulted from the combination of Chadian combatants operating from bases on Sudanese

territory, Libyan troops and Libyan-supported units of the Islamic

Legion crossing the border in search of rebels, and fighting among

Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups (see Chad, ch. 4). Arms were

easily available in the border zone. Conceivably, Libya might desist from further interference in Darfur following the victory—gained

with Libyan help—of the Chadian rebels under Idris Deby in December 1990.

The 1,600-kilometer border between Ethiopia and Sudan was

also disturbed; both nations provided each other's insurgents with

military assistance and sanctuary. In the northeast, the Sudanese

government supported the Eritrean People's Liberation Front oper- ating from Sudanese territory at Port Sudan. The Tigray People's

Liberation Front was also given facilities at Al Qadarif. Ethiopia

retaliated by providing the SPLA insurgents in the south with supplies and bases. Sudan periodically accused Ethiopia of carrying

out bombing raids against the estimated 100,000 Eritrean refugees

living in camps and villages in eastern Sudan.

A comparable situation prevailed on Sudan's border with Uganda.

In 1986 and 1987, the president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni,

accused Sudan of allowing its territory to be used as a haven in

cross-border attacks by 3,000 members of the former Ugandan army

loyal to the deposed dictator, Idi Amin Dada. Sudan, in turn,

charged that SPLA units were receiving aid from Uganda. In

mid- 1990, the Sudanese government announced that an agreement

had been reached providing for the establishment of border security posts and that each country would prohibit its territory from

being used for hostile attacks against the other.

Civil Warfare in the South

Except for a period of tenuous peace between 1972 and 1983,

Sudan has been the scene of armed rebellion in the south since before the nation became independent in 1956. The second stage of

the Sudanese civil war entered its ninth year in 1991. The protracted struggle pitting the mostly Muslim north against the adherents of indigenous faiths and of Christianity in the south has

240
One ofabout 200 burnt-out huts in Yei; destruction of homes was a common

form of reprisal during the civil war in southern Sudan.

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths—mostly noncombatants—and has forced millions to flee the south in search of food

and escape from violence. The rebel forces controlled most of the

rural areas of the south as of mid- 1991 , besieging the government

troops holding the major towns. Both sides were guilty of violence

against civilians, but the government's policy since 1985 of arming undisciplined tribal militia bands was responsible for the most

flagrant cruelties.

First Civil War, 1955-72

In August 1955, five months before independence, southern

troops of the Equatoria Corps, together with police, mutinied in

Torit and other towns. The mutinies were suppressed although some

of the rebels were able to escape to rural areas. There they formed

guerrilla bands but, being poorly armed and organized, presented no extensive threat to security. The later emergence of a secessionist

movement in the south led to the formation of the Anya Nya guerrilla army, composed of remnants of the 1955 mutineers and recruits

among southern students. Active at first only in Al Istiwai, Anya

Nya carried its rebellion to all three southern provinces between

1963 and 1969. In 1971 a former army lieutenant, Joseph Lagu,

241
Sudan: A Country Study

united the ethnically fragmented guerrilla bands in support of a new political movement, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The war ended in March 1972 with an agreement

between Nimeiri and Lagu that conceded to the south a single

regional government with defined powers.

Renewed Civil Warfare, 1983-

Under the terms of the 1972 peace settlement, most of the Anya Nya fighters were absorbed into the national army, although a number of units unhappy with the agreement defected and went into

the bush or took refuge in Ethiopia. Angry over Sudan's support

for Eritrean dissidents, Ethiopia began to provide help to Sudan's

independent rebel bands. The rebel forces gathered more recruits

among the Dinka and Nuer people, the largest groups in the south,

and eventually adopted the name of Anya Nya II. Those original Anya Nya who had been absorbed into the army

after the 1972 peace accord were called upon to keep the guerrillas

in check and at first fought vigorously on behalf of the national

government. But when in 1983 Nimeiri adopted policies of redividing the south and imposing Islamic law, the loyalty of southern

soldiers began to waver. Uncertain of their dependability, Nimeiri

introduced more northern troops into the south and attempted to transfer the ex-guerrillas to the north. In February 1983, army units

in Bor, Pibor Post, and Pochala mutinied. Desertions and mutinies in other southern garrisons soon followed.

In mid- 1983 representatives of Anya Nya II and of the mutinous

army units meeting in Ethiopia formed the Sudanese People's

Liberation Army (SPLA). John Garang, a Dinka Sudanese, was named its commander and also head of the political wing, the

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The southern

forces in rebellion failed to achieve full unity under Garang, and,

in a struggle for power, the dissident units composed of elements

of Anya Nya II were routed by Garang' s forces. The defeated remnants, still calling themselves Anya Nya II, began to cooperate with

the national army against the SPLA.

Still scarcely an effective fighting force, the SPLA relied at first on ambushes of military vehicles and assaults on police stations

and small army posts, mainly in the Nuer and Dinka areas of Aali an Nil Province and northern and eastern Bahr al Ghazal Province.

An SPLA attempt to invade eastern Al Istiwai in early 1985 was met with stiff resistance by the army and government militias. But

by 1986 the SPLA was strong enough to hold the important town

of Rumbek in southern Bahr al Ghazal for several months and was

also able to press an attack against Waw, the provincial capital.

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National Security

During 1987, the SPLA took Pibor Post and Tonga in Aali an Nil,

and by the beginning of 1988, it had captured a number of towns on the Ethiopian border and near the White Nile. Advancing northward into Al Awsat Province, it held Kurmuk and Qaysan for a time in late 1987.

The SPLA was opposed by many communities in Al Istiwai Province where the Dinka and Nuer were not popular. The national army

was assisted by a militia of the Mundari people, but the SPLA was

gradually able to consolidate its position in eastern Al Istiwai. By

1988 the SPLA controlled the countryside around Juba, the major

southern city, besieging at least 10,000 government troops, who were

virtually cut off from supplies except for what could be delivered

by air. During a general offensive in early 1989, the SPLA captured Torit and other strategic towns of eastern Al Istiwai. From

May to October 1989, an informal truce prevailed. After the conflict resumed, the areas being contested were principally in western

and central Al Istiwai, focusing on the government garrisons at Juba

and Yei (see fig. 8). The fighting often consisted of ambushes by

the more lightly armed but mobile guerrillas against government

convoys moving supplies from the north. With captured weapons

and arms imported from Ethiopia and other African countries, the

SPLA was increasingly capable of conducting orthodox warfare employing artillery and even armored vehicles, although its forces still avoided conventional engagements against government units.

Anya Nya II began to crumble in 1987, many units and their

commanders deserting to the SPLA. But since 1985, the government had been encouraging the formation of militia forces in areas where opposition to the Dinka- and Nuer-dominated SPLA was

strongest. These militias were soon playing a major role in the fighting and were partly responsible for the ravages that the civilian

population had been forced to endure. The arming of tribal groups

inflamed existing intercommunal conflicts and resulted in the

deliberate killing of tens of thousands of noncombatants and a vast displacement of civilians. Millions of villagers were forced from their homes as a conse- quence of the fighting and the depredations of militias, the SPLA,

and Anya Nya II. Devastation of northern Bahr al Ghazal by the

roving murahalin (Arab militias) forced large numbers of destitute

people to evacuate the war zone in 1986 and 1987, many of them

making their way to northern Sudan to escape starvation. Raiding decreased in 1988 and diminished further in 1989 as a result of depopulation of the land and a stronger SPLA presence in north- ern Bahr al Ghazal. Nevertheless, the migrations continued because

of the severe food shortage. Almost 1 million southerners were

believed to have reached Khartoum in 1989, and hundreds of

243
Sudan: A Country Study

International boundary

Administrative boundary

State boundary

I 1 Territory controlled by Sudanese People's

Liberation Army (SPLA) • Towns in SPLA hands ® Government garrison ® National capital

100 200 Kilometers

I

' r-1

1

DARFUR

\

? f

r~1

yr iJaysan Malut^J Kunpuk^?

\ ^

Tonga (§>, -^bahralghazalV, \

AN

.rr i A

Rumbek^ S_/'

Pocha1a\ 9Kongor \

*Pibor \

x >Sor posf

« \x „ Maridi AL IStlWAI

. Nzara • ^ V"HI ^ YambioJIolion « mjuba

/

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative.

Figure 8. The Civil War in Southern Sudan, Spring 1991

thousands had appeared in other towns and cities. About 350,000

Sudanese refugees were registered in Ethiopia in 1989, at least 100,000 were in Juba, and 28,000 crossed into Uganda to escape

the fighting in southern Al Istiwai.

Sudanese People's Armed Forces

The armed forces of the national government, known as the

Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF), were believed to have

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National Security

a total personnel strength of about 71 ,500 in 1991 . The army numbered about 65,000 officers and enlisted men. The navy had perhaps

500, and the air force and air defense command each had a complement of about 3,000.

General Bashir, the chairman of the RCC-NS and head of state since the coup ofJune 1989, was also supreme commander of the

armed forces and minister of defense. A colonel at the time of the

coup, Bashir subsequently assumed the rank of lieutenant general.

The SPAF chief of staff, Lieutenant General Ishaq Ibrahim Umar,

was in immediate command of the armed forces. The general staff included deputy chiefs of staff for operations, administration, and

logistics, who also held the rank of lieutenant general. The com- mander of the air force, the commander of air defense command,

division commanders, and most military governors held the rank

of major general. A retired major general was appointed minister

of state for defense affairs to serve as Bashir' s deputy in the Ministry

of Defence (see fig. 9). The actual responsibilities and influence

of senior officers depended greatly on their political status, ethnic

affiliation, and other factors in addition to their positions in the

chain of command.

Army

The army was basically a light infantry force in 1991, supported

by specialized elements. Operational control extended from the

headquarters of the general staff in Khartoum to the six regional

commands (central, eastern, western, northern, southern, and

Khartoum). Each regional command was organized along divisional

lines. Thus, the Fifth Division was at Al Ubayyid in Kurdufan

(Central Command), the Second Division was at Khashm al Qirbah

(Eastern Command), the Sixth Division was assigned to Al Fashir

in Darfur (Western Command), the First Division was at Juba

(Southern Command), and the Seventh Armored Division was at Ash Shajarah near Khartoum (Khartoum Command). The Airborne Division was based at Khartoum International Airport. The

Third Division was located in the north, although no major troop

units were assigned to it. Each division had a liaison officer attached

to general headquarters in Khartoum to facilitate the division's communication with various command elements.

This organizational structure did not provide an accurate pic- ture of actual troop deployments. All of the divisions were understrength. The Sixth Division in Darfur was a reorganized brigade

with only 2,500 personnel. Unit strengths varied widely. Most

brigades were composed of 1,000 to 1,500 troops. Each battalion

varied in size from 500 to 900 men, and a company might have

245
Sudan: A Country Study

246
National Security

as few as 150 and as many as 500. In the south, the First Division was supplemented by a number of independent brigades that could

be shifted as the requirements of the conflict dictated. According

to The Military Balance, 1991-1992, the main army units were two

armored brigades, one mechanized infantry brigade, seventeen in- fantry brigades, one paratroop brigade, one air assault brigade, one reconnaissance brigade, three artillery regiments, two antiaircraft artillery brigades, one engineering regiment, and one special

forces battalion.

The army did not have its own general headquarters but functioned under the immediate control of the deputy chief of staff for operations. Headquarters and training facilities were maintained

in or near the national capital area for most of its specialized corps. These included the armored, artillery, signal, and medical service

administrations; the transportation and supply corps; and the en- gineering branch. Among other support elements were the military police and the border guards.

The Sudanese army's inventory of armaments and equipment was extremely varied, reflecting its shifting military relations with

other nations in a position to supply arms. At different times, Britain, the Soviet Union, China, the United States, Libya, and Egypt

have been important sources of weaponry (see Foreign Military

Assistance, this ch.). Much of the equipment delivered to Sudan,

particularly from the Soviet Union, was obsolescent, and maintenance has been seriously deficient. Because Sudan had been

deprived of support from a number of countries and was unable

to afford foreign exchange to pay for needed spare parts, much

of the existing stock of arms was believed to be inoperable. The

army was virtually immobilized at times for lack of fuel and ammunition.

During the 1970s, the bulk of the army's armored strength consisted of T-54 and T-55 medium tanks delivered by the Soviet

Union early in the decade. About seventy Chinese Type 62 light

tanks were also delivered in 1972. During the early 1980s, this equipment was supplemented by M-41, M-47, and M-60A3 tanks

produced in the United States. Most of the Soviet tanks were believed to be unserviceable, and only the M-60A3 tanks were considered to be up-to-date. The Sudanese army also had a mixed

collection of armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored recon- naissance vehicles, and other wheeled fighting vehicles. The most

modern of these were 36 M-113 APCs and 100 Commando-type

armored cars from the United States, and 120 Walid APCs from

Egypt (see table 12, Appendix).

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Sudan: A Country Study

Artillery pieces included a number of guns and howitzers mostly

of United States and Soviet origin. All of the artillery was towed

with the exception of 155mm self-propelled howitzers acquired from

France in 1981 . The army's modest antitank capability was based on the jeep-mounted Swingfire guided-wire missile, manufactured

in Egypt under British license.

Air Force

The air force has been largely dependent on foreign assistance

since its inception in 1957, when four primary trainer aircraft were

delivered by Egypt. The British provided most aircraft and training (some in Sudan and some in Britain) before 1967. After that

time, Soviet and Chinese advisers and technicians assumed a supportive role, and their equipment became the foundation for the

Sudanese air force in the 1970s. These aircraft included Sovietbuilt MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighter-bombers and Chinese-built J-5

(essentially the same as the MiG-17) and J-6 (practically identical

to the Soviet MiG-19) fighter-bombers. Seven Northrop F-5Es and

two F-5Fs were delivered by the United States beginning in 1981

,

but plans to acquire additional F-5s never materialized because

funds were not available. Libya transferred five Soviet MiG-23s

in 1987.

As of 1990, combat aircraft were organized into two fighterground attack squadrons (one with the nine F-5s and the other

with ten J-5s), and one fighter squadron withJ-6s. A second fighter

squadron of MiG-21 s and MiG-23s was listed, although it was believed that as of 1991 all of the MiGs were nonoperational with

the exception of one MiG-23. The combat squadrons were armed

with Soviet Atoll and American Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

Sudan had no bomber force. In 1986 it was reported that Libyan

Tu-22 bombers had been used against rebel positions in the south.

Other bombing attacks were carried out by transport planes (see

table 13, Appendix).

The actual state of readiness of the combat arm of the air force was uncertain, but it was believed that much of the equipment was

not in serviceable condition owing to a shortage of parts and in- adequate maintenance. Pilot proficiency training was limited by

fuel shortages that kept aircraft grounded. A small contingent of

Chinese technicians assisted with maintenance and pilot training.

A few training aircraft were also supplied by the Chinese. The air force had been of little value in providing air cover for ground operations in the south. The SPLA boasted that its shoulder-fired

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) had brought down many aircraft,

248
Sudanese army soldiers in T-54 tanks Courtesy Thomas Ofcansky

claiming that several jet fighters had been destroyed, as well as a number of helicopters and transports.

The transport arm of the air force was of central importance in

maintaining supply links with beleaguered southern garrisons. The

single transport squadron received six C-130H Hercules transports

from the United States in 1978 and 1979. Although one was damaged by an SPLA missile in 1987, the five aircraft still operational in 1991 provided airlift capability essential to government

garrisons in the south. The air force also had two Canadian-built

DHC-5D Buffalo transports and two Soviet An- 12 heavy cargo

transports, as well as four smaller Casa C-212 Aviocars from Brazil. The air force had a number of unarmed helicopters available

for ground support operations against the southern rebels, although

it was estimated that as many as 50 percent were not in flying condition. The newest helicopter models were French-designed SA-330

Pumas assembled in Romania and Agusta/Bell 212s manufactured

in Italy.

The two main bases of the air force were at Khartoum International Airport and Wadi Sayyidna Air Base north of Omdurman.

The air force also had facilities at civilian airports, including those

at Atbarah, Al Fashir, Juba, Malakal, Al Ubayyid, Port Sudan,

and Wad Madani.

249
Sudan: A Country Study

Air Defense Command

The air defense command maintained its headquarters at Port

Sudan and was commanded by a major general. A secondary com- mand post was at Omdurman. One of its two brigades was equipped

with antiaircraft guns and the other was armed with SAMs (see

table 14, Appendix). The three battalions of SAMs had been in- troduced to provide high- and medium-altitude air defense for Port

Sudan, Wadi Sayyidna, and Khartoum. In the absence of Soviet

technicians who had serviced the missiles and associated radar during the 1970s, the SA-2 systems were considered to be nonoperational.

The second air defense brigade was deployed to provide tactical air defense in the Western Command and Southern Command.

In addition to Vulcan 20mm self-propelled guns supplied by the

United States, it was equipped with a variety of weapons whose

operational status was uncertain. Fire control and acquisition radar

for the Vulcan and other systems was provided by the United States,

Egypt, and France. The vulnerability of Sudanese air defenses was

exposed in 1984 when a Libyan Tu-22 bomber was able to overfly

much of the country in daylight, dropping bombs in the vicinity

of the national radio station at Omdurman at a time of tension

between Nimeiri and Qadhafl.

Navy

The navy, formed in 1962, was the smallest branch of the country's military establishment. Its personnel strength was uncertain

but was estimated at 500 officers and men. Headed by a brigadier

general from headquarters in Port Sudan, the service was responsible for coastal and riverine defense and for deterring smuggling

along the Red Sea coast. A Nile River patrol unit was based at Khartoum.

The navy was formed originally around a nucleus of four armed

coastal patrol boats provided by Yugoslavia. Subsequently, river

patrol boats, landing craft, and auxiliary vessels were also obtained

from Yugoslavia, and a Yugoslav training staff was on hand until

1972. In 1975 the Yugoslav patrol boats were replaced by two

seventy-ton patrol craft and four ten-ton patrol craft transferred

from Iran and armed with machine guns. In 1989 four new 19.5-ton

riverine fast patrol craft armed with 20mm and 7.62mm machine

guns were delivered by Yugoslavia for operations on the White Nile.

The purpose of the new craft was to protect river convoys of supplies and troops to the south. The operational status of the two large

patrol craft was regarded as uncertain in 1990. The general standard

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National Security

of efficiency of the navy was considered to be inadequate as a con- sequence of a lack of maintenance and spare parts. Most auxiliary

vessels had drifted into a state of total disrepair (see table 15, Appendix).

The navy was assigned two Casa C-212 aircraft, operated by air force crews, which had a limited capacity to carry out maritime recon- naissance over the Red Sea. The airplanes were unarmed.

Personnel

The Sudanese armed forces have not been the source of any strain on the nation's manpower resources. In 1990 there were an esti- mated 5,600,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49, of whom

3,400,000 were fit for military service. The number reaching the

military age of eighteen annually was approximately 273,000. The

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

estimated that, as of 1989, only 2.5 persons per 1,000 of population were in the armed forces. Among Sudan's neighbors, cor- responding figures were Egypt 8.7 per 1,000, Ethiopia 5.0 per

1,000, and Libya 21.0 per 1,000.

In the first years after independence, recruitment notices reportedly attracted ten applicants for each vacancy. Poorer Sudanese,

particularly westerners and southerners, were attracted to the armed

forces in great numbers. Not all could be accommodated, so that

selection of enlisted men was fairly strict, based on physical condition, education, and character of the applicant. Although the adult

literacy rate in Sudan was then estimated to be no more than 20

percent, enlisted personnel were required to have some ability to read and write. The recruit enlisted for three years, and if his record

remained good, he could reenlist for further three-year periods until

he had served a total of twenty years, at which time he was retired

with the highest rank he had attained. Soldiers who received technical training could be obliged to sign an understanding that they

would remain on active duty for nine years. There were reports as of the late 1980s that the morale of the

army had suffered because soldiers from other areas of Sudan dis- liked assignment to the south, where they faced an interminable war in which they had no personal interest and in which a military

victory seemed unattainable. Newer recruits, many from the west,

felt isolated and threatened in the besieged garrison towns. Large

numbers of government troops whose homes were in the south had

reportedly deserted to the SPLA, their motivation for continuing

the struggle against the insurgency drained by food shortages and

lack of needed supplies. Both under the Sadiq al Mahdi government and immediately after the June 1989 coup, the leadership

251
Sudan: A Country Study

announced that conscription would be introduced to permit an ex- pansion of the government's efforts in the south, but the rate of

enlistments had apparently remained high enough so that it had

not been necessary to impose a draft. It was possible that, in the

light of widespread economic distress, the army was still regarded

as a means of escape from poverty.

Pay rates of both officers and noncommissioned officers generally have been equal to or better than those of civilians of comparable status. Base pay was extremely low by United States standards; a colonel received the equivalent of about US$150 a month in 1990. Military personnel were, however, entitled to ex- tensive additional benefits. Housing was provided for senior per- sonnel commensurate with their office and rank, and generous

housing allowances were provided for others. Free medical care was provided to all armed forces personnel and their families.

Although the country was suffering from a food scarcity, essential

goods were available at commissaries at subsidized prices. Items

severely rationed in the civilian economy, such as tea, coffee, sugar, and soap, as well as bread produced by military bakeries, could

be purchased at low prices and resold at a considerable profit. This

trade offered a welcome supplement to the incomes of the junior

ranks. Officers outside Khartoum usually held second jobs. Enlisted personnel were likely to set themselves up as small farmers

or traders with profits from the resale of rationed goods. Officers

of field grade and above could purchase imported automobiles free of duty; higher-ranking officers were assigned full-time cars and

drivers. Gasoline was also available at low prices. In addition, senior

officers had numerous opportunities to travel abroad at government expense.

Retirement income was virtually as high as the active duty salary,

and most of the privileges of military service continued.

The behavior of government soldiers in the south and in the areas where the SPLA was active was the subject of critical reports by

Amnesty International, Africa Watch, and other international

human rights groups. Amnesty International described numerous

incidents in which the army was responsible for the deliberate kill- ing or mistreatment of civilians from ethnic groups suspected of

supporting the SPLA. Very few SPLA prisoners of war were held

by the government; many cases were documented of captured SPLA

fighters, including wounded, being executed without trial. Few if any prosecutions resulted in connection with the alleged

violations. The United States Department of State has confirmed

Amnesty International's conclusion that the Sadiq al Mahdi government appeared to condone human rights abuses by the military,

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National Security

citing the cases of generals who received promotions after service

in areas where atrocities occurred. There was limited evidence of a shift in attitude by the Bashir government after it assumed power

in 1989. Two of the implicated generals were forced to retire from

government service, and some soldiers were relieved, although not

disciplined, after a series of revenge killings and other violations

against civilians in Waw.

Although the Bashir government had announced its intention of

purging the armed services of women after it came to power in 1989,

large-scale dismissals did not take place. As of 1991 , it was reported

that about 2,000 women were in uniform, 200 of them officers through the rank of lieutenant colonel. The women were assigned

to a range of military duties in the medical service as nurses, dieti- tians, and physical therapists, and in administration, translation,

military intelligence, communications, and public affairs. Training

The SPAF established numerous institutions for training its mili- tary personnel. Foreign military observers believed that the training offered was of a professional caliber within the limitations of

available resources. The Military College at Wadi Sayyidna, near Omdurman, had been Sudan's primary source of officer training

since it opened in 1948. A two-year program, emphasizing study

of political and military science and physical training, led to a commission as a second lieutenant in the SPAF. In the late 1970s and

early 1980s, an average of 120 to 150 officers were graduated from

the academy each year. In the late 1950s, roughly 60 graduated

each year, peaking to more than 500 in early 1972 as a result of

mobilization brought on by the first southern rebellion. Students

from other Arab and African countries were also trained at the Military College, and in 1982 sixty Ugandans were graduated as part

of a Sudanese contribution to rebuilding the Ugandan army after Amin's removal from power. It was announced in 1990 that 600

members of the National Islamic Front's associated militia, the

Popular Defence Forces (PDF), had been selected to attend the Military College to help fill the ranks of the officer corps depleted by

resignations or dismissals (see Paramilitary Groups, this ch.).

The Military College's course of study, while rigorous, was re- portedly weak in scientific and technical instruction. Junior officers were, however, given opportunities to continue their education at the University of Khartoum. Many officers also studied abroad.

It was estimated that at least 50 percent had received some schooling in Egypt. Others were sent to the United States, Britain (pilots

and mechanics), Germany (helicopter pilots), and Middle Eastern

countries. Most high naval officers had been trained at the Yugoslav

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Sudan: A Country Study

naval academy; other naval officers were detailed for training in

the states of the Persian Gulf. Opportunities for training abroad were greatly curtailed, however, as a result of international disapproval of the policies of the Bashir government.

Since the early 1970s, the Staff College in Omdurman has graduated fifty-five to sixty majors and lieutenant colonels annually with

masters' degrees in military science. Officers from other Arab

countries—Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates—at- tended, as well as some Palestinians. Since 1981 the High Military Academy in Omdurman, a war college designed to prepare

colonels and brigadier generals for more senior positions, offered a six-month course on national security issues. The academy was

commissioned to produce strategic analyses for consideration by

the Bashir government.

In addition to the academies, the SPAF also operated a variety

of technical schools for junior and noncommissioned officers, in- cluding infantry, artillery, communications, ordnance, engineering, and armored schools, all in the vicinity of Khartoum. An air force training center at Wadi Sayyidna Air Base was constructed

with Chinese help to train technicians in aircraft maintenance,

ground control, and other skills. In the army, recruitment and basic

training of enlisted personnel were not centralized but were the

responsibility of each division and regional command.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Before 1970 the highest officer grade in the rank structure was

that offariq (equivalent to a lieutenant general), but new grades were added when Nimeiri became a general and, later, a field marshal. As of 1991, however, there were no officers higher than

lieutenant general, and only five, including Bashir, at that rank

(see fig. 10).

The army service uniform was dark green, with insignia of rank

displayed in gold on shoulder boards. It differed only slightly from

police officer uniforms, which were another shade of green with

black shoulder boards. A green beret was standard in the army

except for airborne units, which wore red berets. The police wore

black berets. Officers of field grade and above frequently wore ser- vice caps. The air force uniform was blue, although the insignia

of rank were the same as for the army. The standard naval uniform was white with blue shoulder boards.

Defense Costs

The civil war in the south had a devastating impact. Not only were military operations in the south a great expense, but the

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economy was disrupted by the fighting, and perhaps 3 million per- sons were displaced from or within the war zones. Because of secrecy

restrictions dating from the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, no substantial information on the defense budget was released publicly or provided to the People's Assembly, which, however, had been

suspended in 1989. Various official and unofficial estimates of the

size of defense expenditures and the burden imposed on the econ- omy by the military establishment have differed widely. A United

States government agency estimated the defense budget at US$610

million in 1989, representing 7.2 percent of gross national product

(GNP—see Glossary). The Sudanese government has estimated

the cost of conducting the war at about US$1 million a day.

Although the specific components of military spending were not

available, it was known that the principal category of the defense

budget was personnel-related costs. Most large purchases of arms

had been financed with credits from the supplying countries. Financial assistance from other countries, principally the Arab oil- producing states of the Persian Gulf, had made these credit purchases possible. Arms imports had fallen since the resumption of

the civil war in 1983, as a result of the unwillingness of Western

countries to supply weapons that could be used in the hostilities,

and of subsequent cutbacks in financial aid from the Middle East. The total amount of funds for military procurements available

through loans, grants, direct purchases, and barter arrangements was not made public.

Paramilitary Groups

Various militia groups, supplied and supported by the government, have served as important adjuncts to the armed forces in

the fighting in the south. Beginning in 1983, when the first militias were formed under Nimeiri, the government increasingly relied on the militias to oppose the SPLA. The militias were given arms

and ammunition but usually operated independently of the army.

No reliable data were available on the size of militia forces, although

it has been roughly estimated that 20,000 men participated in militia

activities at one time or another.

The Anya Nya II group, formed among southern mutineers from

the army (after first splitting off from the rebel movement and obtaining weapons and training from the SPAF), was a major factor

in the war between 1984 and 1987. Predominantly from the Nuer,

the second largest ethnic group in the south, Anya Nya II fought

in rural areas of Aali an Nil on behalf of the government. Anya

Nya II emerged as a significant factor in the war in that province,

disrupting SPLA operations and interfering with the movement

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of SPLA recruits to the Ethiopian border area for training. Anya Nya II units were structured with military ranks and were based

near various army garrisons. The government assisted the group

in establishing a headquarters in Khartoum as part of regime ef- forts to promote Anya Nya II as an alternative southern political

movement in opposition to the SPLA. Eventually, however, SPLA

military success led to a decline in morale within Anya Nya II and

induced major units, along with their commanders, to defect to the SPLA beginning in late 1987. By mid- 1989, only one Anya

Nya II faction remained loyal to the government; it continued its close relations with the government after the Bashir coup and re- tained its political base in Khartoum.

Some of the most devastating raids and acts of banditry against

the civilian population were perpetrated by the militias known as murahalin, formed among the Rizeiqat, Rufaa al Huj, Misiriyah,

and other groups, all members of the cattle-raising Baqqara Arab

nomad tribes in Darfur and Kurdufan. These Arab communities

traditionally competed for pasture land with the Dinka of north- ern Bahr al Ghazal and southern Kurdufan. Raiding by the murahalin between 1985 and 1988 precipitated a vast displacement of

Dinka civilians from Bahr al Ghazal. Although already armed, the

murahalin were given arms and ammunition and some covert training by the SPAF. Some joint counterinsurgency operations also

took place in conjunction with government forces. According to Amnesty International, the raids carried out by the murahalin were accompanied by the deliberate killing of tens of thousands of

civilians; the abduction of women and children, who were forced

into slavery; the looting of cattle and other livestock; and the burning

of houses and grain supplies. By late 1988, the growing presence

of the SPLA reduced the threat of the murahalin against villages

and cattle camps. Moreover, the devastation was so severe that

little was left to plunder. Dinka refugees moving north to escape

famine were still exposed to militia attacks, however.

The Rizeiqat murahalin were responsible for one of the worst

atrocities of the war when, in retaliation for losses suffered in an engagement with the SPLA, more than 1 ,000 unarmed Dinka were

massacred at the rail junction of Ad Duayn, most of them burned

to death. The tactics of the Misiriyah murahalin were similar to those

of the Rizeiqat; their ambushes of refugees and attacks on villagers

in northeastern Bahr al Ghazal were among the most murderous

and destructive of any perpetrated by the militia groups. The

government armed the Rufaa al Huj as a militia in 1986, after the

SPLA appeared in southern Al Awsat Province to recruit followers among the non-Arab peoples of the area. In the early months

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Sudan: A Country Study

of 1987, combined operations by the SPAF and the Rufaa al Huj

militia against non-Arab populations in retaliation for the SPLA

offensive resulted in many atrocities. The government also armed as militias a number of southern

non-Arab tribes opposed to the SPLA. In 1985 members of the

Mundari in Al Istiwai, who were hostile to the Dinka because of

their ruthless behavior, were recruited to help counter the growing SPLA threat in that province. Most of the Mundari dissociated themselves from the militia, however, as the presence of the

SPLA strengthened in Al Istiwai. In Bahr al Ghazal, the government formed a militia concentrated around Waw, and established a training base for it there. Hostile relations with the Dinka in the area spawned considerable violence, culminating in massacres in

August and September 1987 among Dinka who had taken refuge

in Waw.

In February 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi proposed that the murahalin

militias be institutionalized into popular defense committees.

Although the armed forces apparently went ahead with the formation of some such committees, the proposals were strongly opposed

by other political groups in Khartoum, who feared that the murahalin would become a factional fighting unit loyal to Sadiq al Mahdi' s Umma Party.

In October 1989, the Bashir government promulgated the Popular Defence Act, whose original purpose seemed to be to proceed

with the plan of the previous government to give legitimacy to the

militias as auxiliaries of the SPAF. The government established a new paramilitary body, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), to promote the political objectives of the government and the NIF.

This action did not, however, result in the disappearance of the

existing militias. The PDF was under the command of a brigadier

general of the army, and its recruits were armed with AK-47 as- sault rifles. According to the government, the weapons would be

stored in army depots and distributed only when needed.

Both men and women ostensibly were enrolled on a voluntary

basis, although some coercion was reported. Military officers and

civil servants at all levels were also recruited, particularly those wishing to demonstrate their loyalty to the Islamic activist movement.

Membership in the PDF was required for admission to a university and for most significant positions in northern society.

The original period of training was to be for up to three months,

and refresher training could last up to fifteen days a year. In June

1990, the government held a graduation for the second PDF training

class, numbering 1 ,287 persons. According to the chief of the PDF,

more than ten PDF camps would be located in various parts of

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the country; each camp would be capable of training three groups

of 5,000 a year. The government's target was a PDF personnel

of 150,000, but independent observers doubted that this goal could

be achieved with available resources or that the PDF would assume more than a marginal role in maintaining internal security.

Foreign Military Assistance

Sudan lacked a reliable source of military materiel as of mid- 1991

,

even though the country faced a severe shortage of equipment and

of support items. Most of its weaponry of Soviet design was more

than twenty years old and could be kept operational only with the

limited help provided by Libya and China. As a result, most of

the Soviet tanks, artillery, missiles, and aircraft were not in ser- viceable condition. Western suppliers were unwilling to provide arms for use against the southern insurgents. Military credits previously available from Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Persian

Gulf had been cut off as a reaction to Sudan's continued support

of Iraq, following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Egypt, normally an important source of both equipment and training, had severely

curtailed its cooperation with the Bashir government. Some as- sistance, particularly in the form of munitions, had been provided

by Iraq, but this help had ended in August 1990. Although Libya

and China continued to provide some military items, the supply

from China was limited by the strict financial terms imposed by

the Beijing authorities.

Except for a production line for small caliber ammunition, Sudan

has never had an arms industry. Consequently, foreign sources

for weapons, equipment, ammunition, and technical training have

been indispensable. After independence British advisers helped train

the Sudanese army and air force, and British equipment predominated in the ground forces. Relations between the government in

Khartoum and London were periodically strained, however, and

after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, diplomatic and military ties were severed. Military links with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) were also broken for a time.

The breach with the Western nations was followed by a period

of close military cooperation with the Soviet Union between 1968

and 1971. Sudan benefited from the Soviet Union's first signifi- cant military assistance program in a sub-Saharan Africa country. By 1970 it was estimated that there were 2,000 Soviet and East European technical advisers in the country. About 350 Sudanese

received training in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Soviet assistance corresponded with a dramatic growth in the

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Sudan: A Country Study

Sudanese armed forces from 18,000 in 1966 to nearly 50,000 by

1972. The bulk of the equipment used by the ground and air forces

throughout the 1970s and until the early 1980s was of Soviet ori- gin, including tanks, artillery, and MiG combat aircraft. Vulnerabilities resulting from overreliance on one arms supplier

became obvious when relations with the Soviet Union cooled considerably following the coup attempt against Nimeiri in 1971 . Soviet

and East European military advisers were expelled from Sudan for a year. After relations were repaired, previously arranged deliveries of tanks were completed and a new purchase of combat aircraft was negotiated. Military agreements with the Soviet Union re- mained in force until 1977, but Sudan began to pursue a policy

of diversifying its arms sources. When Moscow promised extensive military aid to the revolutionary regime in neighboring Ethiopia, the Sudanese government expelled all ninety Soviet military

advisers and ordered the military section of the Soviet embassy in

Khartoum closed.

After its relations with the Soviet Union chilled again, Sudan

turned to China, which supplied the SPAF initially with light

weapons and later delivered fighter aircraft and light tanks. As of

the mid-1980s, about fifty Chinese advisers provided maintenance

support for tanks and aircraft, including Soviet equipment previously supplied, and trained Sudanese pilots and aircraft mechanics.

Military cooperation with Britain resumed in 1973, although it was confined mainly to training and instruction at the Military College and the armored, infantry, and signals schools. Yugoslavia

assisted in founding the Sudanese navy; for more than a decade

it provided all of the vessels and the bulk of officer and technical

training. The Yugoslav naval support program was not renewed

in 1972, however, because of frustrations the Yugoslavs had en- countered in accomplishing their mission. In 1989 four more river

craft were acquired from Yugoslavia, and subsequendy a Yugoslav delegation was reported to have visited Khartoum to discuss a revival of training assistance.

The purchase of weapons from Western countries was financed

largely by oil-rich Arab states that were pleased to see Soviet in- fluence in Sudan ended. Arab financial assistance, especially from

Saudi Arabia, was instrumental in the purchase in 1977 of six C-130

Hercules transport aircraft from the United States, estimated to

cost US$74 million, and two Buffalo transports from Canada. Saudi

assistance was also credited for Sudan's acquisition of ten light

helicopters and as many as 4,000 vehicles from West Germany.

In addition, Saudi Arabia in 1980 supplied the SPAF with seventy

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used American-built M-41 and M-47 tanks from its reserve in- ventory.

Until 1985 Sudan maintained its closest military ties with Egypt.

Under a twenty-five-year defense agreement signed in 1976, the

two countries established a joint defense council, a joint general

staff organization, and a permanent military committee to implement decisions of the joint council and the staff organization. Since

1986 Egypt has provided Egyptian-manufactured Swingfire antitank missiles, Walid armored personnel carriers, ammunition, and

other equipment to Sudan. Although Sadiq al Mahdi declared his

intention to abrogate the defense pact in order to meet a key SPLA

condition for peace, Bashir reaffirmed the pact after his takeover

in 1989. The internal repressions of the new government and

Sudan's refusal to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990,

however, produced discord between the two nations, and Egypt

rejected appeals from Sudanese leaders for additional military aid. Until 1976 United States military aid to Sudan was negligible,

consisting primarily of training in the United States for a small

number of Sudanese officers. Soon after officially agreeing in

November 1976 to provide Sudan with selected arms, the United

States sold Sudan transport aircraft financed by Saudi Arabia, fol- lowed several years later by F-5 combat airplanes. Believing that

Sudan was threatened by neighboring Ethiopian and Libyan forces

heavily armed by the Soviet Union, Washington adopted a growing role in Sudan's security. Between fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1979 and FY 1982, military sales credits rose from US$5

million to US$100 million. Subsequent aid was extended on a grant

basis. In addition to aircraft, United States aid consisted of APCs,

M-60 tanks, artillery, and Commando armored cars. United States grant aid reached a peak of US$101 million in FY 1982; at the

time, this amount constituted two-thirds of all United States military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. Between the inception of the

program in 1976 and its virtual termination in 1986, military grants

and sales credits to Sudan totaled US$154 million and US$161 million, respectively. Sudan granted the United States naval port facilities at Port Sudan and agreed to some airport prepositioning

rights for military equipment for contingent use by the United States Central Command. Sudanese and United States forces participated

in joint maneuvers designated Operation Bright Star in 1981 and

1983.

When civil war again erupted in the south in 1983, military grants

and credits from the United States dropped abruptly, and in 1985

Sudan terminated Operation Bright Star. After FY 1987, no as- sistance was extended with the exception of less than US$1 million

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Sudan: A Country Study

annually for advanced training for Sudanese officers and training

in the maintenance of previously supplied equipment. Military aid was formally suspended in 1989 under a provision of the United

States Foreign Assistance Act prohibiting assistance to countries

in arrears on interest payments on previous loans. In March 1990,

the United States also invoked a provision of the act barring as- sistance to regimes overthrowing a democratic government.

According to a survey by ACDA of sources of arms imported

by Sudan, Sudan obtained about US$350 million in military arms and equipment between 1983 and 1988. The United States was

the largest supplier, accounting for US$120 million. China and

France each provided US$30 million and Britain US$10 million.

About US$160 million came from unidentified sources, probably

largely from Egypt and Libya, and as purchases from other Western

suppliers financed by Arab countries.

Sudanese People's Liberation Army

The SPLA was formed in 1983 when Lieutenant Colonel John

Garang of the SPAF was sent to quell a mutiny in Bor of 500

southern troops who were resisting orders to be rotated to the north.

Instead of ending the mutiny, Garang encouraged mutinies in other

garrisons and set himself at the head of the rebellion against the

Khartoum government. Garang, a Dinka born into a Christian

family, had studied at Grinnell College, Iowa, and later returned

to the United States to take a company commanders' course at Fort Benning, Georgia, and again to earn advanced economics degrees

at Iowa State University.

By 1986 the SPLA was estimated to have 12,500 adherents or- ganized into twelve battalions and equipped with small arms and

a few mortars. Recruits were trained across the border in Ethiopia, probably with the help of Ethiopian army officers. By 1989

the SPLA's strength had reached 20,000 to 30,000; by 1991 it was

estimated at 50,000 to 60,000. Many members of the SPLA con- tinued their civilian occupations, serving in individual campaigns

when called upon. At least forty battalions had been formed, bearing

such names as Tiger, Crocodile, Fire, Nile, Kalishnikov, Bee,

Eagle, and Hippo.

In addition to Garang, who as commander in chief adopted the

rank of colonel, other senior officers included a field commander,

a chief of staff, and a chief of staff for administration and logistics.

Most of these officers, as well as zonal commanders, held the rank

of lieutenant colonel; battalion commanders were majors or captains. Promotion was based on seniority and the number of battles fought. Consequently, most of the senior leadership and field

262
SPLA soldier guarding

a cattle vaccination program

near Kapoeta, June 1988

Courtesy Roger Winter

SPLA-built bridge on road between Kapoeta and Torit in eastern AI Istiwai, 1990

Courtesy Roger Winter
Sudan: A Country Study

commanders were members of the Dinka group. Others were from

the Nuer and Shilluk groups. Members of some other groups from

Al Istiwai were given commands to help win over members of their

groups.

The SPLA claimed that its arms came from captured government stocks or were brought by troops deserting from the SPAF.

It admitted to having received a considerable amount of support

and materiel from Libya before 1985 because of Libya's hostility

toward Nimeiri and its desire to see him overthrown. It denied

receiving arms from Ethiopia, although it operated from bases in

Ethiopia, and outside observers believed that that country furnished

the bulk of the SPLA's weaponry. The government's claims that

the SPLA had Israeli advisers and received equipment from Israel were generally discounted. Its small arms included Soviet, United

States, and German assault rifles. According to The Military Balance,

1991-1992, the SPLA also had 60mm mortars, 14.5mm antiaircraft

guns, and Soviet SA-7 shoulder-fired SAMs. Other sources claimed

that the SPLA had captured or otherwise acquired howitzers, heavier mortars, BM-21 truck-mounted rocket launchers, jeep-mounted

106mm antitank recoilless rifles, and about twenty armored vehicles. It had a supply of land mines that were widely used.

Amnesty International and Africa Watch have cited deliberate

killings by the SPLA of SPAF and militia prisoners captured in

combat, and of civilians believed to be informers or opposed to the insurgency movement. Although about 300 government troops were being held by the SPLA as of mid- 1989, there were reports

that after the capture of Bor, surrendering soldiers, possibly numbering in the hundreds, were shot. Indiscriminate SPLA rocket

and mortar attacks on government-held towns resulted in many

civilian casualties.

State of Internal Security

A population divided among nearly 600 ethnic groups and tribal units and a conspicuous split between a largely Arab population

in the north and black, non-Muslim southerners meant that Sudan's

government had a high potential for instability. Political movements

based on these regional, tribal, religious, and socioeconomic divi- sions have been responsible for numerous breakdowns of authority. Nimeiri' s autonomy solution for the south in 1972 ended the

first civil war. His decision in 1981 to abolish the Southern Regional

Assembly and the later redivision of the south into three regions,

however, revived southern opposition and helped to reignite the

southern insurgency. Dissatisfaction with Nimeiri 's rule also grew

in the north as economic distress became more acute. The 1985

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military coup that ousted Nimeiri was preceded by massive demonstrations in Khartoum triggered by price increases of food staples.

The traditional political parties that dominated civilian politics re- emerged in 1986 after a year of transitional military rule. Most

parties continued to reflect sectarian loyalties rather than to promote national interests. Unable to function effectively through shift- ing political coalitions and unable to end the war in the south,

civilian authority was again overturned, to be replaced by the

authoritarian rule of Bashir on June 30, 1989.

The new military government immediately invoked emergency

legislation banning strikes and other work stoppages as well as unauthorized political meetings. Political parties and trade unions were

dissolved and their property frozen or seized. Leading members

of the main political parties were arrested, as were senior members of the Sudan Bar Association and other prominent figures

thought to be unfriendly to the new regime. More than 100 trade

unionists were detained, while others were dismissed from the civil service, the army, and the police.

Although some political prisoners had been released by early

1990, evidence of continued opposition to the military government

brought harsh repressive measures. In December 1989, a prominent physician was sentenced to death (later commuted to imprisonment) for organizing a doctors' strike. Another doctor was sentenced

to fifteen years' imprisonment. In March 1990, the government

announced that it had crushed a coup conspiracy, arresting prominent members of the Umma Party and military officers. Less than

a month later, the regime alleged that it had discovered another

coup plot among the military and executed twenty-eight highranking officers whom it claimed were implicated.

Although the military government was widely unpopular, its ruthless suppression of any manifestation of discontent appeared

to have frightened the internal opposition into silence. A number

of exiled politicians active in the previous Sadiq al Mahdi government announced the formation of an opposition organization, the

National Democratic Alliance, in early 1990. The SPLA radio sta- tion in Ethiopia allotted broadcasting time to the alliance, but the

group, brought together by political expediency, had difficulty or- ganizing effective opposition to the Bashir regime. Former armed

forces chief of staff, Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad Ali, was among the exiled dissidents and became head of the National

Democratic Alliance. Military purges, however, had left the majority of active officers silent for fear of dismissal and loss of their commands. Infiltration of informers into the SPAF made any form of

dissident activity risky. Curfews were imposed, and detachments

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Sudan: A Country Study

of troops guarding bridges and other key points minimized the possibility of military action to topple the regime. At the Khartoum

International Airport, the Airborne Division, which was considered

loyal to the government, was available at short notice to help repel a coup attempt.

The presence of as many as 1 million refugees from southern

Sudan in the vicinity of Khartoum was potentially destabilizing,

but the refugees were weak and too divided into ethnic and regional

groups to be a political threat. Student groups had in the past been

involved in demonstrations that contributed to the downfall of un- popular governments, but the loyalty of the majority of students was uncertain.

The small communist movement, with considerable support

among educated Sudanese and involvement in student and union

organizations, was among the opposition elements to the Bashir

government. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) played an

important role in the first years of Nimeiri's rule but was harshly

suppressed and forced underground after participation in the unsuccessful coup against Nimeiri in 1971. Although Nimeiri's campaign of reconciliation with his political opponents in 1977 enabled some prominent SCP members to resurface, communists arrested

for organizing strikes and demonstrations comprised the largest

single group of political prisoners. The SCP's role in the urban

demonstrations of 1985 contributed to Nimeiri's overthrow. The

SCP became active in parliamentary politics in 1986 but was among

the political groups banned by the Bashir regime. It joined with

other parties in underground opposition to the military government. Several communists were rounded up and detained without

charge after the 1989 coup, allegedly for instigating a protest against

the government among students at the University of Khartoum.

Internal Security Agencies

Apart from in the south, domestic order in Sudan was a shared

responsibility of the military, the national police force, and security organs of the Ministry of Interior. Martial law was in effect in government-controlled areas of the south and in some northern

areas as well. Sudan Police Force

The Sudan Police Force (SPF) had its beginnings in 1898 when

a British army captain was placed in the central administration for police duties, and thirty British army officers directly responsible

to him were detailed to organize provincial police establishments.

The arrangement proved overly centralized, however, and complete

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decentralization of police control was introduced in 1901. As great

differences arose in the standards and performance of the police

in the various provinces, a modified form of administrative control by the central authorities was decreed in 1908, with the provincial governors retaining operational control of the forces. The SPF

was officially established by the British in 1 908 and was absorbed

by the Sudanese government on independence in 1956.

It was technically and economically impractical for the police

to cover the entire area of Sudan; therefore, a system of communal

security was retained for more than seventy years. The central

government gave tribal leaders authority to keep order among their

people. They were allowed to hire a limited number of "retain- ers" to assist them in law enforcement duties. This system was

finally abolished by the Nimeiri government in the early 1970s.

Under Nimeiri, command and administration of the SPF was

modified several times. The police were responsible to the minister

of interior until 1979, when the post of minister of interior was

abolished and various ministers were made responsible for differ- ent areas of police work. This arrangement proved unwieldy,

however, and the Police Act of 1979 instituted a unified command

in which the head of the force reported directly to the president.

After Nimeiri's fall, the cabinet position of minister of interior was

restored, and the director general of police was made responsible

to him.

Central police headquarters in Khartoum was organized into di- visions, each commanded by a police major general. The divisions were responsible for criminal investigations, administration, training, public affairs, passport control, immigration, and security affairs. The main operational elements were the traffic police and

the riot police. The 1979 legislation brought specialized police units,

such as that of the Sudan Railways, under the authority of the SPF

headquarters. The Khartoum headquarters maintained liaison and

cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization

(Interpol) and with agencies involved in combating international

drug traffic. The government's new system of administration delegated many

powers to the regional level, but law enforcement outside major

urban areas remained provincially oriented. Thus, the national

police establishment was subdivided into provincial commands,

which were organized according to the same divisions found in the

national headquarters. Local police directors were responsible to provincial police commissioners, who in turn were responsible to the SPF director general in Khartoum. Each provincial command

had its own budget.

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Sudan: A Country Study

The SPF expanded from roughly 7,500 officers and men at in- dependence in 1956 to approximately 18,000 in 1970 and 30,000

by the mid-1980s. Except for the south where internal security in

government-held areas was the responsibility of military and security

organs, the police establishment was distributed roughly in proportion to population density but was reinforced in areas where there was a likelihood of trouble. In some places, the police were too thinly

scattered to provide any real security. It was reported that there were no police stations along the Nile from the town of Wadi Haifa on the Egyptian border south to Dunqulah, a distance of about

300 kilometers. Elsewhere in the north, police posts could be staffed by as few as two police with insufficient transport or communications equipment to patrol their district. Efforts to control smuggling were apparently the responsibility of the armed forces and

the security authorities.

Police officer cadets usually received two years of training at the

Sudan Police College near Khartoum. The institution was equipped

to provide theoretical and practical instruction; it also served as a training school for military personnel who required police skills in their assignments. In addition to recruit training, the college

offered instruction in aspects of criminal law, general police duties,

fingerprinting, clerical work, photography, and the use of small arms. Enlisted recruits usually underwent four months of training

at provincial headquarters. Although not numerous, women served

in the SPF in limited capacities. They were generally assigned to administrative sections, to juvenile delinquency matters, or to criminal cases in which female Sudanese were witnesses or defendants.

The Bashir government announced plans to remove women from

the police, but, according to one report, a number of women were

actually promoted to higher positions because of the mass firing

of senior male police officers. Provincial police had traditionally enjoyed good relations with

the community, but during the Nimeiri regime many people re- garded them more as the object of fear than as a source of security. The police were said to have acted appropriately—firmly but

with restraint—during civil demonstrations in the first half of the

1980s. Since the resumption of civil war in 1983, serious abuses

of human rights have not generally been attributed to the police, as they have been to the armed forces, government militias, and

security organizations. Police treatment of persons under arrest could be harsh. Police patrols in Khartoum have harassed or beaten

people occasionally without apparent motive. Public order campaigns in Khartoum, often targeting southern refugees, could result in roundups of thousands charged with illegal street vending or

268
Police post near Yet, western Al Istiwai State Police force in Maridi

Courtesy Robert O. Collins

269
Sudan: A Country Study

loitering. In urban areas police reportedly often acted against refu- gees, stealing from them and beating them for minor infractions.

Refugees seldom had recourse to the legal system when attacked

by the police. The police were known to have inflicted floggings

summarily for drinking alcohol or for curfew violations. Brutality

increased after the 1989 coup, but roundups and floggings declined

somewhat after officials of the Bashir government promised closer

supervision of the police.

Security Organizations

The Sudanese internal security and intelligence apparatus evolved

into a feared and hated institution after Nimeiri came to power

in 1969. During the period of Revolutionary Command Council

rule (1969-71), the military intelligence organization was expanded

to investigate domestic opposition groups. After the council was

abolished, the organization's responsibilities focused on evaluating and countering threats to the regime from the military. It also

provided a 400-man Presidential Guard.

The Office of State Security was established by decree in 1971

within the Ministry of Interior. The new agency was charged with

evaluating information gathered by the police and military intelli- gence; it was also responsible for prison administration and pass- port control. The sensitive central security file and certain other

intelligence functions were, however, maintained under the president's control. In 1978 the presidential and Ministry of Interior

groups were merged to form the State Security Organisation (SSO).

Under the direction of Minister of State Security Umar Muhammad at Tayyib, a retired army major general and close confidant

of the president, the SSO became a prominent feature of the Nimeiri

regime, employing about 45,000 persons and rivaling the armed

forces in size. This apparatus was dismantled in 1985.

According to the United States Department of State's Country

Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor 1990, government surveillance,

which was previously rare, became intense after the 1989 coup.

Efforts were made to prevent contact between Sudanese and foreigners. Civilians, especially suspected dissidents, were harassed, church

services were monitored, and activities ofjournalists were closely

supervised. Neighborhood "popular committees" used their control over the rationing system to monitor households.

The Bashir government created a new security body. Generally

referred to as "Islamic Security" or "Security of the Revolution,"

it was under the direct control of a member of the RCC-NS. Its purpose was to protect the Bashir regime against internal plots and

to act as a watchdog over other security forces and the military.

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National Security

It quickly became notorious for indiscriminate arrests of suspected

opponents of the regime and for torturing them in its own safe houses before turning them over to prison authorities for further

detention. A similar organization, Youth for Reconstruction, mobilized younger Islamic activists. Criminal Justice System

The Sudanese criminal code embodied elements of British law,

the penal code of British colonial India, and the Egyptian civil code

(see The Legal System, ch. 4). In 1977 Nimeiri formed a committee, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, to revise the legal code

according to the sharia (Islamic law). In September 1983, the

Nimeiri government introduced a version of the sharia prescribing harsh corporal punishments for such crimes as murder, theft,

drinking alcohol, prostitution, and adultery. These "September

Laws," sometimes known as hudud (sing., hadd, penalty prescribed

by Islamic law) provided for execution, flogging, amputation, and

stoning as modes of punishment for both Muslims and non- Muslims. During the final twenty months of Nimeiri's rule, at least ninety persons convicted of theft had their hands amputated. The

military and civil governments succeeding Nimeiri between 1985

and 1989 suspended the September Laws. Progress on a new Is- lamic penal code to replace the September Laws was delayed by

the legislature pending a constitutional assembly that would include

the SPLA. Although flogging, consisting normally of forty lashes, was limited to offenses involving sex or alcohol, it was often inflicted summarily. In 1989 the RCC-NS extended flogging as a punishment for a much wider range of offenses. Extreme hudud sen- tences such as amputations were not handed down, however, and

many hudud sentences imposed under the Sadiq al Mahdi government were converted to jail terms and fines. In the regular criminal court system, extensive guarantees of due

process were prescribed for accused persons. These courts consisted

of a panel of three judges. The judicial process involved a police or magistrate's investigation and an arrest warrant preceding the

arrest. Trials were held in public except when the accused requested a closed trial. The accused had to be brought before a court within

forty-eight hours of arrest, informed of the charges, and provided

with access to an attorney of the accused's choice. There were legal

aid services for the poor, but, because resources were limited, legal

aid was apportioned to those facing serious charges and those most

in need. Bail was permitted except in some capital cases. Defendants had the right to speak, to present evidence on their own behalf,

271
Sudan: A Country Study

and to appeal judgments through a series of courts from the magistrate level to the High Court of Appeal.

Under the state of emergency imposed by the Sadiq al Mahdi

regime in 1987, the government had wide powers in areas declared

to be emergency zones to arrest and preventively detain for an in- definite period anyone suspected of contravening emergency

regulations. Military personnel could not be arrested by civilian

authorities, nor was there provision for judicial review of actions

by the armed forces. The Sadiq al Mahdi government declared

emergency zones in the southern and western areas of the country

and used the detention powers on people suspected of sympathy

with the rebellion.

On seizing power in 1989, the RCC-NS declared a state of emer- gency for the whole of Sudan and granted itself broad powers. The

government initially detained more than 300 people without warrants, including many prominent political and academic figures,

journalists, alleged leftists, and trade unionists. About sixty judges

who petitioned against the government's action were also detained.

Many of the original detainees were released within several months,

but they were replaced by others. There were an estimated 300

to 500 detainees at the close of 1990; some reports claimed as many

as 1,000 detainees.

After the 1989 coup, the regular civilian courts continued to handle ordinary criminal offenses, including theft and some capital

crimes, although the court system was seriously backlogged and

the judiciary was less independent of the executive than previously.

After experimenting with various forms of special courts, the

RCC-NS established special security courts in November 1989.

These courts were formed by the military governors of the regions

and the commissioner of the national capital. The courts had threemember panels of both military and civilian judges. They tried

persons accused of violating constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, and some portions of the criminal code, notably drug crimes

and currency violations. The new security courts did not extend nor- mal protections to the accused. Attorneys were permitted to sit with

defendants but were not permitted to address the courts. Sentences

imposed by the courts were to be carried out immediately, with the

exception that death penalties were to be reviewed by the chiefjustice

and the head of state. The special security courts gained a reputation for harsh sentences. Two defendants convicted of illegal possession of foreign currency and another convicted of drug smuggling were executed and others were sentenced to death for similar crimes,

although the sentences were not carried out.

272
Trial in Tambura, western Al Istiwai State, with stolen goods (honey in cans) and judges in foreground, accused on the right

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins

In areas of the south affected by the war, normal judicial procedures could not be applied and civil authorities were made redundant by the application of the state of emergency. Units of the armed

forces and militias ruled by force of arms, and in many cases the

accused were summarily tried and punished, especially for offenses

against public order. In war-torn southern Kurdufan the government authorized a system ofjustice administered by village elders,

and a similar system was reportedly in effect in areas controlled

by the SPLA.

Incidence of Crime

The widespread instability and clashes between ethnic groups

arising from the civil war were accompanied by breakdowns of law

and order in many parts of the country. Killings, rapes, and thefts of personal possessions, food, and livestock were committed by

various militia groups and frequentiy by the SPLA and the government armed forces as well. Large areas of Sudan became depopulated as a result of the fighting and migrations in search of safety.

The availability of weapons contributed to the prevalence of banditry, especially along the Chad, Zaire, and Uganda borders. In

the western province of Darfur, the police wielded little authority,

273
Sudan: A Country Study

and lawlessness prevailed. Smuggling was also common, particularly along the Ethiopian border.

The collapse of security in many areas was not fully reflected

in available statistics on crime, although some indications of the

pattern of criminality did emerge. According to the most recent data reported by Sudan to Interpol covering the year 1986, more

than 135,000 criminal offenses were recorded, reflecting a rate of

650 crimes per 100,000 of population. More than 1,000 homicides

occurred, and 3,300 sex offenses were registered, including 600

rapes. There were 7,300 serious assaults. The more than 100,000

thefts of various kinds constituted by far the most common category

of crime. They included armed robbery (33,000 cases), breaking

and entering (22,500), theft under aggravated circumstances

(1,900), and automobile theft (1,500). There were 15,000 cases of

fraud and 3,600 drug infractions.

Sudan was not a major international narcotics marketplace. Most

narcotics consumed in Sudan consisted of marijuana grown in the eastern part of the country. Penalties for narcotics use were similar to those for alcohol and could include flogging. In nearly all categories except narcotics violations, Sudan reported more offenses

than Egypt, a country with more than twice the population. This

discrepancy may be accounted for by more accurate police records on the extent of criminal activity or by different definitions of the

offenses reported to Interpol.

Sudanese authorities claimed to have solved more than 70 per- cent of most forms of robbery and theft and 53 percent of all crimes

reported. Only 25 percent of homicides, 40 percent of general sex

offenses, and 32 percent of rape cases were recorded as solved.

Prison System

General supervision of the Sudan Prison Service was carried out

by the director general of prisons, who was responsible for the country's central prisons and reformatories. Provincial authorities

managed detention centers and jails in their administrative jurisdictions. The central prisons were Kober in Khartoum North,

Shalla in Al Fashir, Darfur State, and Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

It was reported that there were about 1 40 local prisons and detention centers in the early 1990s.

Prison conditions were generally poor. Treatment of prisoners

varied widely, however. Some were restricted by shackles, whereas

others were allowed to return home at night. There were persis- tent reports of beatings and other forms of mistreatment, including torture, of detainees and other political prisoners in the central

penal institutions, although these were apparently inflicted by

274
National Security

security officials and not regular prison guards. After reports appeared that detainees of the Bashir government were being subjected to torture, Amnesty International was allowed to visit a select group of prisoners at Kober, where prison conditions were reputed

to be the best in Sudan. Facilities at the large prison at Port Sudan

were spartan. Although treatment was not brutal, extreme heat

contributed to the harsh living conditions. The most primitive conditions were said to be at Shalla. In general, political prisoners welcomed transfer to prison to escape physical abuse from security

personnel.

Although conditions at prison hospitals were described as fair, a number of political prisoners complained of being denied treat- ment for medical problems. Trade unionists arrested after the 1989

coup and held at Kober Prison submitted a protest alleging the

denial of family visits and of adequate medical treatment, while

challenging the legal grounds for their arrests. In retaliation, the

government transferred many of them to Shalla Prison, 600 kilo- meters from Khartoum. The Sudanese regime's violations of the

civil rights of its citizens in 1991 continued to be a source of con- cern not only to members of the opposition in Sudan but also to the international community in general.

* * *

Details on military units and equipment are available from The

Military Balance published annually by the International Institute

for Strategic Studies in London. Further information on the sources of Sudan's arms can be found in Forecast International/DMS Market

Intelligence Report: Middle East and Africa. Reports by two international human rights organizations give accounts of the conflict in

the south, the role of various militia groups, and the abuses committed by all of the fighting units, especially against the civilian

population. These are Amnesty International's Sudan: Human Rights

Violations in the Context of Civil War, published in 1989, and Africa

Watch's Denying "The Honor ofLiving": Sudan, A Human Rights Disaster, published in 1990.

The Southern Sudan by Douglas H. Johnson provides a concise

account of the fighting in the south through 1988. The section on Sudan by Gwynne Dyer in World Armies includes an abbreviated

history of the Sudanese armed forces until 1983. Articles by John

O. Voll in Current History in 1986 and 1990 discuss the record of

military regimes in Sudan as alternatives to civilian government.

United States- Sudanese military relations are recounted in

Jeffrey A. Lefebvre's "Globalism and Regionalism: U.S. Arms

275
Sudan: A Country Study

Transfers to Sudan" in Armed Forces and Society. Information on the

criminal courts system and the record of the Bashir government

with respect to judicial processes and human rights can be found

in the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published

by the United States Department of State. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

276
Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Population Distribution and Density by Province, 1983

3 Population of Major Towns, Census Years 1973 and 1983

4 Enrollment, Teachers, and Institutions by Level of Education, 1985-86

5 Government Budget, 1983-84, 1984-85, and 1985-86

6 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1985-86 to 1988-89

7 Principal Crops, 1986-88

8 Principal Exports, 1986-89

9 Principal Imports, 1986-89

10 Principal Trading Partners, 1987-89

11 Balance of Payments, 1986-88

12 Major Army Equipment, 1991

13 Major Air Force Equipment, 1991

14 Major Air Defense Equipment, 1991

15 Major Naval Equipment, 1991

277

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

Table 2. Population Distribution and Density

by Province, 1983

Province Population Density 1

1,471,540 6.8 4,026,668 28.3 1,406,181 5.3 1,802,299 85.5 1,067,098 2.2 2,208,199 6.5 2,265,510 10.6 3,093,660 6.8 3,074,797 8.1 SUDAN 20,415,952 2 8.6

1 Inhabitants per square kilometer.

2 Adjusted total population in 1983 was 21,593,000. Source: Based on information from Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning,

Department of Statistics, 1983 Preliminary Census Results, Khartoum, 1984, passim; and Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Department of Statistics, Khartoum, unpublished data.

279
Sudan: A Country Study

Table 3. Population of Major Towns, Census

Years 1973 and 1983

Town 1973 1983 Al Qadarif 66,465 119,002

Al Ubayyid 90,073 139,446

99,652 142,909

333,906 476,218

150,989 341,155

526,284

Port Sudan 132,632 212,741

106,715 141,065

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning,

Department of Statistics, 1983 Preliminary Census Results, Khartoum, 1984, passim.

Table 4. Enrollment, Teachers, and Institutions by

Level of Education, 1985-86

Level Enrollment Teachers Institutions

235,943 5,569 4,003

1,766,738 50,389 7,009 Secondary

General 2 542,788 21,970 n.a. Teacher training 1 3,444 479 n.a. 23,150 1,280 n.a. 569,382 23,729 n.a. Universities and higher

institutes 1 37,367 2,165 n.a.

n.a. —not available.

1 1985 figures.

2 1986 figures. Source: Based on information from "Sudan—Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North

Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 801.

280
Appendix

Table 5. Government Budget, 1983-84, 1984-85, and 1985-86 1 (in millions of Sudanese pounds) 2

1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 Revenues

Direct taxes 404.5 300.5 351.6

Indirect taxes 839.9 984.6 1,222.6 Other 224.6 200,4 216.2

Total revenues 1,469.0 1,485.5 1,790.4 Expenditures

Ordinary budget Defense and security 260.6 462.0 473.1 Economic services 74.3 196.0 208.0

Social services 69.9 160.8 182.0 Loan repayments 212.0 118.0 465.4

Provincial governments 270.3 360.5 557.0 Other 755.6 1,214.9 1,492.8 Total ordinary budget 1,642.7 2,512.2 3,378.3 Development budget

Agricultural sector 135.4 139.1 96.3

Industrial sector 119.2 110.1 74.6

Transportation and communications 67.6 52.1 57.9

Services sector 59.4 54.3 32.5 Other 101.4 97.4 107.8

Total development budget 483.0 453.0 369.1

Total expenditures 2,125.7 2,965.2 3,747.4

1 Years ending June 30.

2 For value of the Sudanese pound—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from "Sudan—Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North

Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 799.

281
Sudan: A Country Study

Table 6. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1985-86 to 1988-89 1 (in percentages)

Sector 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89

32.0 34.0 32.0 36.0 Commerce 22.0 15.0 15.0 n.a. Transportation and

10.0 11.0 11.0 n.a. 10.0 7.0 8.0 8.2 Construction 4.0 5.0 6.0 4.6

n.a. n.a. 1.8 10.0 n.a. n.a. 11.5 Other services 12.0 26.0 25.0 37.8 TOTAL 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

n.a. —not available; included in other categories.

1 Years ending June 30.

2 At factor cost. Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Table 7. Principal Crops, 1986-88

(in thousands of tons)

Crop 1986 1987 1988 80 80 65 Cotton, seed 413 546 1 394 2 Cottonseed 1 271 300 290 Cotton lint 1 150 174 130 Dates 2 120 125 120

128 130 128

Millet 285 153 1 550 1 Peanuts (in shell) 379 434 527 1 216 258 278 1 2,282 1,300 4,640 1 4,500 5,000 4,500

155 160 158 130 127 125 Wheat 199 157 181 1 Yams 2 116 118 120

1 Unofficial estimate.

2 Food and Agriculture Organization estimate. Source: Based on information from "Sudan—Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North

Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 798.

282
Appendix

Table 8. Principal Exports, 1986-89

(in millions of Sudanese pounds) *

Commodity 1986 1987 1988 1989

Cotton 366.7 455.2 978.4 1,348.8 Sesame 58.8 134.8 269.0 333.3 Gum arabic 141.7 267.1 281.6 313.0 Sorghum (durra) n.a. 248.8 106.7 297.1 Sheep and lambs 66.8 42.9 124.5 192.5 Other 199.2 348.3 530.2 538.4 TOTAL 833.2 1,497.1 2,290.4 3,023.1

n.a. —not available.

* For value of the Sudanese pound—see Glossary.

Table 9. Principal Imports, 1986-89

(in millions of Sudanese pounds) *

Commodity 1986 1987 1988 1989

481.4 1.0 1,042.6 1,178.5 Petroleum and petroleum

products 292.6 7.9 1,044.6 1,082.2 405.7 4.9 776.1 826.4

368.9 507.8 786.6 Chemicals 342.9 248.1 500.9 399.1

120.5 199.6 402.2 412.8 Other 687.2 312.5 497.9 687.8 TOTAL 2,402.2 2,612.9 4,772.1 5,373.4

n.a. —not available.

* For value of the Sudanese pound—see Glossary.

283
Sudan: A Country Study

Table 10. Principal Trading Partners, 1987-89

(in percentages)

Country 1987 1988 1989 Exports

17.2 17.2 n.a. n.a. 16.8

Italy 10.7 10.7 7.4 8.0 n.a. Japan 7.4 7.4 10.9

7.0 7.0 8.0

n.a. 7.3

n.a. 6.5

4.7 4.7 n.a. Imports

12.1 6.6 n.a. 10.4 11.8 14.1 10.0 9.3 8.3 Netherlands 6.5 6.4 5.3 Japan 6.2 n.a. n.a.

n.a. 6.0

Italy 6.0 5.6 n.a. 5.9 5.8

n.a. —not available.

284
Appendix

Table 11. Balance of Payments, 1986-88 1 (in millions of United States dollars)

1986 1987 1988 QOC o -633.7 - 694.8 -948.5

306.9 -429.7 -521.5

OOQ Q 171 1 / 1 .0 - 272.8 -323.1 -341.3 -350.9 - 560.6 -691.2

Private unrequited transfers (net) ... - 89.3 133.7 216.3

194.6 1 17.0

1 7 A 939 A — jjo.U -110.4 - 235.7 63.1

15.1 322.4 5.0 -95.3 86.7 68.1

Errors and omissions (net) -89.4 - 185.3 7.5 -83.1 - 142.6 44.7 248.0 295.4 287.1 -37.6 - 178.3 49.5

1 Figures may not add because of rounding.

2 f.o.b. —free on board. Source: Based on information from "Sudan—Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North

Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 800.

285
Sudan: A Country Study

Table 12. Major Army Equipment, 1991

Type and Description Country of Origin

In Inventory Main battle tanks T-54/55 Soviet Union 200 Type 59 China 10 M-60A3 United States 20

Light tanks Type 62 China 70 Armored reconnaissance vehicles AML-90 France 6 Saladin Britain 15 Ferret -do- 50 BRDM 1/2 Soviet Union 30 Armored personnel carriers BTR-50/152 -do- 40 OT-62/64 Czechoslovakia 30 M-113 United States 36 V-100/ 150 Commando -do- 80 Walid Egypt 100

Artillery M-101, 105mm United States 18 Model 56, 105mm -do- 6 D-74, 122mm -do- 4 M-1938, 122mm -do- 24 Type 54/D-30, 122mm Soviet Union/ 42 China

M-46/Type 59-1, 130mm -do- 27 D-20, 152mm Soviet Union 4 M-114A1, 155mm United States 12 AMX Mk F-3, 155mm, self- propelled France 6 Multiple rocket launchers BM-21, 122mm Soviet Union 4 Antitank weapons

Swingfire guided-wire missiles Egypt 4 M-1942 76mm guns Soviet Union 18 M-1944 100mm guns -do- 20 B-10 82mm recoilless rifles -do- 30 M-40A1 106mm recoilless rifles United States 100 Mortars M-43, 120mm Soviet Union 12 AM-49, 120mm -do- 24

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1991-1992, London, 1991, 119.

286
Appendix

Table 13. Major Air Force Equipment, 1991

Type and Description Country of Origin

In Inventory

Fighter ground attack aircraft F-5E/F United States 9 J-5 China 10 J-6 -do- 9

Fighter aircraft MiG-21 1 Soviet Union 8 MiG-23 2 -do- 3 J-6 China 6 Counterinsurgency aircraft BAC-167 Mk Strikemaster 1 Britain 3 BAC Jet Provost Mk 55 -do- 3 Transport aircraft C-130H Hercules United States 5 An-24 Soviet Union 5 DHC-5D Buffalo Canada 2 C-212 Aviocar Brazil 4 EMB-110P -do- 6 F-27 Friendship Netherlands 1 Falcon 20/50 executive jet France 2 Maritime reconnaissance aircraft Casa C-212 Aviocar Brazil 2 Helicopters

AB-212 Italy 11 IAR/SA-330 Puma France/ 15 Romania

Mi-4 Soviet Union 4 Mi-8 -do- 14 Mi-24 (armed) -do- 2 Training aircraft MiG-15U -do- 4 MiG-21 U -do- 4 JJ-5 China 2 JJ-6 -do- 2__

1 Nonoperational.

2 One operational. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1991-1992, London, 1991, 119; and Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Middle East and Africa, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1990.

287
Sudan: A Country Study

Table 14. Major Air Defense Equipment, 1991

Type and Description Country of Origin

In Inventory

Antiaircraft guns M-167 Vulcan, 20mm United States n.a. M-163 Vulcan, 20mm, self- propelled -do- n.a. ZU-23-2, 37mm Egypt n.a. M-1939/Type 63, 37mm China 120 L-60 Bofors, 40mm Sweden 60 KS-12, 85mm Soviet Union n.a. KS-19, 100mm -do- n.a.

Surface-to-air missiles SA-2 high altitude, radar-guided -do- 18 launchers SA-7 man-portable,

short-range -do- n.a. Redeye United States n.a.

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1991-1992, London, 1991, 119.

Table 15. Major Naval Equipment, 1991

Country of In Type and Description Origin Inventory

Patrol craft Coastal, 70 tons (from Iran), each with one Oerlikon 20mm gun West Germany 2 Sewart, 10 tons (from Iran), each with one 12.7mm machine gun United States 4 Inshore (river operations) type 15, 19.5 tons, each with one Oerlikon 20mm gun and two 7.62mm machine guns Yugoslavia 4 Amphibious craft Sobat (DTM-221) LCU, 410 tons -do- 2 Source: Based on information fromJane's Fighting Ships, 1991-92, Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom, 1991, 512-13.

288
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(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Africa Confidential [London]; Afri- can Defence Journal [Paris]; Africa Report; Economist [London];

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports [London]; Joint Publications Research Service, Near East and South Asia; Keesing's Record

of World Events [London]; Middle East International [London]; Middle EastJournal; New African [London] ; New York Times; and Washington Post.)

304
Glossary

dinar—Sudanese unit of currency introduced in May 1992 to replace the Sudanese pound (q.v.). One dinar was worth ten Sudanese pounds.

fiscal year (FY)—An annual period established for accounting purposes. The Sudanese fiscal year extends from July 1 to the fol- lowing June 30. gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of

domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods

for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed

to be included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of

physical assets have not been made. Income arising from in- vestments and possessions owned abroad is not included, only

domestic production. Hence, the word domestic is used to dis- tinguish GDP from gross national product (q.v.). gross national product (GNP)—The gross domestic product (q. v.

)

plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with for- eign countries, including income received from abroad by

residents and subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of

goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because

indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP

is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and

subsidies.

hadith—Tradition based on the precedent of the Prophet Muhammad's words and deeds that serves as one of the sources of Is- lamic law.

hafr (pi., hafri) —An excavated water reservoir fed by rainfall. imam—A word used in several senses. In general use and lowercased, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such,

it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- cient education to carry out this function. It is also used figuratively by many Sunni (q. v. ) Muslims to mean the leader of the

Islamic community. Among Shia (q. v. ) Muslims, the word takes

305
Sudan: A Country Study

on many complex and controversial meanings; in general,

however, it indicates that particular descendant of the House

of Ali who is believed to have been God's designated repository

of the spiritual authority inherent in that line. The identity of

this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity have

been the major issues causing divisions among Shia.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for sta- bilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main

business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members

(including industrialized and developing countries) when they

experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic

adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing

countries.

jazirah—Peninsula or island; with upper case, term refers to the

cultivated lands south of Khartoum between the Blue Nile and

the White Nile.

jizzu—Located in the area of 16° north latitude in northwest Darfur

and in Chad; region beyond the semidesert where the late rains

produce a combination of grass and herbaceous plants in winter

such that camels and sheep can graze without additional water

supply.

khalwa—Small Islamic rural school that stressed memorization of

the Quran and provided some instruction in the reading and

writing of Arabic.

naziriyah (pi., nazuriyat) —Formerly, among nomadic and seminomadic Arab groups, an administrative and local court under

a nazir, comprising several umudiyat (q.v.). A naziriyah included either an entire tribe or a section of a large tribe. qoz—General term used for sand dunes.

Sahel—A narrow band of land bordering the southern Sahara,

stretching across Africa. It is characterized by an average an- nual rainfall of between 150 and 500 millimeters and is mainly suited to pastoralism.

sharia—Traditional code of Islamic law, both civil and criminal,

based in part on the Quran. Also drawn from the hadith (q. v.); the consensus of Islamic belief (ijma; i.e., consensus of the

authorities on a legal question); and analogy (qiyas; i.e., an

elaboration of the intent of law).

shaykh—Leader or chief. Word of Arabic origin used to mean either a political or a learned religious leader. Also used as an

honorific.

306
Glossary

Shia (from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali)—A member of the smaller

of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia supported the

claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate

and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue

they divided from the Sunni (q. v.) in the first great schism

within Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions

among the Shia over the identity and number of imams (q. v.). Shia revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be

in hiding.

the Sudan—Historical term for the geographical region stretching across Africa from Cape Verde on the Atlantic coast to the

Ethiopian plateau in the east between about 8° and 16° north

latitude; characterized by savanna and semiarid steppe. Term

derived from Arabic biladas sudan (literally, land of the blacks).

Not to be confused with Sudan, the country.

Sudanese pound (£Sd)—Until May 1992, Sudanese currency consisted of 1,000 millimes = 100 piasters = 1 Sudanese pound.

As of March 31, 1991 , the official exchange rate was US$1 =

£Sdl.30; from February 1985 to October 1987, the official ex- change rate was set at US$1 = £Sd2.50. The Sudanese pound

was gradually being replaced by the dinar (q.v.).

sudd—Barrier or obstruction; with lower case the term designates

clumps of aquatic vegetation that block the Nile channel; with

upper case, the term is used loosely for the entire White Nile

swamps.

Sunni (from sunna meaning ' 'custom," giving connotation of or- thodoxy in theory and practice)—A member of the larger of

the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the tradi- tional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the

Umayyad line. On this issue they divided from the Shia (q.v.)

in the first great schism within Islam.

Three Towns—Sudanese reference to the cities of Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman. Located in close proximity to the juncture of the White Nile and Blue Nile rivers, they form

a single metropolitan area. transhumant—Transhumance is the seasonal movement of livestock

along well-established routes by herders or by an ethnic group

as a whole.

umudiyah (pi., umudiyaf)—Formerly a political division under an

umda, encompassing a number of villages in the case of sedentary peoples or a section of a tribe in the case of nomadic peoples. Among nomadic or seminomadic peoples, several such

divisions constituted a naziriyah (q.v.).

307
Sudan: A Country Study

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans to developing countries

for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund

but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960

to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much

easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage

the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institu- tions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group,

member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q. v.).

308
Index

AAAID. See Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development

Aali an Nil (province/state), 48, 63, 93, 206; agriculture in, 153, 158; civil war

in, 242-43; Dinka in, 80, 87, 93, 221; land tenure in, 146; militias in, 255; opposition of, to Islamization, 212; Sudanese People's Liberation Army

presence in, 50 Aba Island, 42 Abbas I, 16 Abbud, Ibrahim, xxiv, 35-36 Abbud government (see also Supreme

Council of the Armed Forces), xxiv, 36-37, 199, 234; arabization under,

xxiv, 37; civil war under, 234; economy

under, 37, 234; education under, 37, 203; government dissolved by, 37; Is- lamization under, 203; missionaries ex- pelled by, xxiv, 37; opposition to, 36,

37, 234; problems in, 36, 234; promises

of, 36; southern policies of, 36-37, 204, 234 Abd al Latif, Ali, 29; exiled, 29 Abd al Qadir al Jilani, 104 Abd al Wahab, Ahmad: in coup of 1958, 35-36; as member of Ansar, 36 Abu Hamad, 23; rail transportation to, 173 Abujabira, 170 Abu Klea. See Abu Tulayh

Abu Tulayh (Abu Klea), 20 ACDA. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 119 Ad Damazin irrigation project, 131 Addis Ababa accords (1972), xxv, 85, 212, 242, 264; abrogated, 213, 231, 239;

signed, 46, 52; terms of, 44-46, 239 AFESD. See Arab Fund for Economic and

Social Development

African-Arab relations. See north-south di- vision African Development Bank, 168; agricul- tural credit from, xxviii African heritage (see also south; southerners), 3, 94

Africa Watch, 17, 221, 252, 264

Agricultural Bank of Sudan, 186

agricultural production, 134, 135; decline

of, 49; growth of, 142, 152

agricultural products (see also cotton), 118, 162; dates, 35; millet, 64, 144; peanuts,

xxvi, 63, 64, 144, 149, 150, 187, 188;

as percentage of exports, 142; sesame,

xxvi, 63, 64, 144, 153, 187, 188; sor- ghum, xxvi, 63, 144, 150, 151, 153, 187; wheat, 144, 149, 188

Agricultural Reform Corporation, 150

agricultural sector: in drought, xxv; as percentage of gross domestic product, xxvi

agriculture (see also livestock raising), xxvi, 127; in Al Jazirah, 12; commercial

xxvi, 64; under five-year plans, 130;

forests converted to, 158; loans for, 49, 135; as public enterprise, 128; share of

labor force, 139, 142; subsistence, 144;

traditional, 128, 142

agriculture, irrigated, 129, 142, 144, 147-51; in Al Jazirah, 63; area for, 147;

for cotton, 148; in Khashm al Qirbah,

63

agriculture, mechanized, 144, 151-52;

area cultivated, 153; operators of, 152, 153

agriculture, rainfed, 129, 142, 144, 151-53; mechanized, 151, 156, 158;

traditional, 151 Ahfad University College, 116 Ahmose I, 4 AID. See United States Agency for Inter- national Development AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

air defense command, 250; headquarters,

250; materiel of, 250; number of per- sonnel in, 245; state of readiness of, 250

air force, 248-49; aircraft of, 248; bases, 249; helicopters of, 249; insignia of, 254; materiel of, 248; number of per- sonnel in, 245; ranks of, 254; state of, 248; training in, 248; transport arm of, 249; uniforms of, 254

airports, 182, 245, 249, 266 309
Sudan: A Country Study

Akordat, 21 Al Awsat (province/state), xxvi, 206;

agriculture in, 152, 153, 158; Arabs in, 72; civil war in, 231, 243, 257-58; eth- nic groups in, 81 ; land registration in, 146; refugees in, 67; university in, 114 Al Azhar University, 16 Al Bahr al Abyad. See White Nile Al Bahr al Azraq. See Blue Nile Albanians, 14 Al Butanah, 62 Al Fashir, 13; airport, 249; army in, 245;

electric generation in, 167 Al Fasi, 105

Ali, Fathi Ahmad, xxxii, 52, 216, 265

Ali, Muhammad, xxiv

Alier, Abel, 87 Al Inqadh al Watani, 222 Al Istiwai (province/state), xxx, 48, 64, 206; Anya Nya in, 241; civil war in, 243; ethnic groups in, 81, 87, 93; health care in, 121; land tenure in, 146; lan- guage in, 71; language of instruction

in, 71; opposition of, to Islamization,

212; religion in, 107; Sudanese People's Liberation Army presence in, 50, 214,

258; Sudanese People's Liberation Movement influence in, 221 Al Jazirah, xxvi, 10, 12; cotton cultiva- tion in, 26; farming in, 12, 15, 63; herding in, 12, 15; under Mahdiyah,

21; television station in, 222 Al Jazirah College of Agriculture and

Natural Resources, 114 Al Junayd irrigation project, 130 Al Khartum (province/state), 74, 146,

206; Arabs in, 72; irrigation projects in, 149; manufacturing in, 163; refugees

in, 67

Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions, 40 Al Mahdi al Muntazar. See Mahdi

Al Matammah, 20 AlMidan, 220 Al Ubayyid: airport, 249; army in, 245; Egyptian garrisons in, 15; electric generation in, 167; Mahdi' s siege of, 19 Aiwa, 8, 12 Amin Dada, Idi, 240 Amnesty International, 211, 252, 264, 275

Anglican Church. See Church of England

Anglo-Belgian treaty, 25

Anglo-Egyptian accord, xxiv Anglo-Egyptian condominium (see also British rule), 23-32; administration of, 24; army under, 233; banking under,

185; borders of, 24-25; dam built by, 149-50; economic development under,

25, 26-27, 129; established, xxiv, 3; eth- nic communities under, 89; executive

council of, 24; governor general of, 23-

24, 26; indirect rule under, 26, 57, 203-

4; judicial system under, 24; land tenure under, 24; local government councils, 204; north-south conflict under, xxiii; religion under, 94; repudiated by Egypt,

31; resistance to, 24; southern social order under, 93; taxes under, 24; terms

of, 23-24; transition from, 31 Anglo-Egyptian Nile Expeditionary Force, 22 An Nilein Bank, 185 Ansar (see also Mahdi), 19-20, 46, 105,

106; affiliated with Abbud government,

36; battle of, against Nimeiri govern- ment, 42, 217; British indirect rule sup- ported by, 26; defeat of, 21, 23; Egypt

invaded by, 21; Ethiopia invaded by,

21 ; Islamic bank formed by, 186; Khar- toum destroyed by, 20; under Mahdiyah, 21; in military, 238-39; under

Nimeiri government, 42, 47, 235; political party of, 216, 217; as rival of Khatmiyyah, 218; support of, for Khalil, 34; in Umma Party, 30; Umma

support for, 40, 217 Anya Nya rebels (see also civil war), xxiv, 37, 85, 212; arms imports by, 38, 43;

conflicts in, 38; formation of, 241; government operations against, 44; in- corporated into army, 46, 239, 242; number of, 43; rural areas controlled by, 43; in Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, 44; support for, 82; train- ing of, 43 Anya Nya II, 255-57; attack by, on Chevron employees, 171; defections from,

257; formation of, 242, 255; morale in, 257; structure of, 257; training of, 255; weapons of, 255 Arab Authority for Agricultural Invest- ment and Development (AAAID), 135, 151, 186 Arab countries (see also under individual

countries): aid from, 132, 135, 136-37,

310
Index

232, 260-61; investment from, 162;

military assistance from, 259; relations with, 226-27; training of military

officers in, 253-54 Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), 49, 135, 175 Arab heritage (see also Arabs; north), 3; claimed by Nubians, 10-11

Arabia, 14; Nubian trade with, xxiii, 10 Arabian Peninsula, 66

Arabic, 69, 85; classical, 71; colloquial, 70-71; Juba, 71-72; as language of government, 71; as language of instruction, xxx, 71, 111, 118; as language of mass media, 71, 185, 221, 222; as lan- guage of military, 233, 238; as lingua

franca, 69, 70, 233; Modern Standard,

70, 71; in Nubia, 8; as official lan- guage, xxvi, 31, 32, 46, 57, 71; in south, 31, 32; varieties of, 70-72 Arab Investment Company, 151

Arab-Israeli War (1973), 201

arabization: under Abbud, xxiv, 37; of armed forces, 233; under Bashir, xxx; under British, 27; as cause of civil war,

xxx; facilitated by intermarriage, 9,11;

facilitated by Islam, 11; fears of, 213;

of Jaali, 73; of Nile River Valley, 71; of Nubians, 74; of south, xxiv, 85, 212 Arab League. See League of Arab States Arab nationalism, 34

Arabs, xxiii, 9-11; Christian, 72; differ- ences among, 57, 74; distribution of, 72; early contact of, with Nubians, 9-10; Egypt ruled by, 10; influence of, on

Nilotes, 80; invasion of Nubia by, 9; and

Meroe, 6; nationalist movement among,

29; nomadic, 73, 74, 75, 78, 89-91; as percentage of population, xxvi, 72; privileged position of, in Nubia, 10-11;

racial background of, 86; sedentary, 73, 74, 75; siege of Dunqulah by, 9; slaves used by, 10, 86; as tenants, 92; tribal

conflicts among, 73-74; tribes of, 73, 74

Arabsat. See Arab Satellite Organization

Arab Satellite Organization (Arabsat), 185

archaeological exploration, 3-4 armed forces (see also military; see also under

individual branches), 244-55, 255, 265; Arabic in, 233, 238; arabization of, 233; under Bashir, 231, 253; desertion from, 251; development of, 233-34;

ethnic groups in, 238; human rights abuses by, 252, 273; internal security

operations of, 268; literacy rate in, 251

;

under Nimeiri, 236; nomads in, 238; personnel in, 232, 245, 259-60; politi- cal groups in, 238; purged, 231, 236,

265; racial segregation in, 239; role of, in foreign policy, xxxi; role of, in gov- ernment, 234-37; in south, 273 army, 245-48; Anya Nya incorporated

into, 46; armored strength of, 247; artillery of, 248; economic problems of, 18; headquarters of, 247; indigenous

officers in, 233, 237-38; insignia of, 254; morale of, 251; mutiny by, 29, 32, 35, 43, 213, 234, 236, 242, 262; number of personnel in, 234, 245; operational control of, 245; opposition to British officers in, 233; opposition of, to Sadiq al Mahdi government, 39; or- ganizational structure of, 245; origins

of, 233; purged, 198, 265; ranks of, 254; recruitment, 254; Southern Command, 239; southern officers in, 239; support units of, 247; training, 254;

training facilities of, 247; uniforms of, 254; units of, 247; unit strengths of, 245-47 Ar Rusayris. See Roseires Dam

asbestos, 165 Ashigga Party, 30

ashraf, 73 Ash Shajarah, 245 Ash Shamali (province/state), 206; Arabs

in, 72; land registration in, 146; refu- gees in, 67 Ash Sharqi (province/state), 63, 206;

agriculture in, 152, 153, 158; refugees

in, 67

Asia, 18 As Saltana az Zarqa. See Black Sultanate As Sudd, xxv, 62-63, 64, 65, 157; oil prospecting at, 171 As Suki irrigation project, 150

Assyria, 5 Aswan, 21 Aswan High Dam, 65, 149; resettlement of Nubians near, 74, 148-49

Atbarah, 23, 66, 157; airport, 249; electric generation in, 167; rail transportation from, 173; television station in, 222 Atbarah River, 65, 74, 149 311
Sudan: A Country Study

Atta, Hisham al, 43 Atuot people, 72

austerity measures, 49, 138

aviation, 180-82 Avungara people, 17 Awadallah, Babikr, 41, 42 Axum, 6 Aydhab, 10 Azande people, 17, 81-82, 88, 93; birth

rate of, 82; conflicts of, with Dinka, 82, 221; government of, 82; as percentage

of population, 81; religion of, 107; sleep- ing sickness among, 82; support of, for Anya Nya guerrillas, 82 Azande Scheme, 82 Azania Liberation Front, 38

Azhari, Ismail al, 31, 38, 40 Azhari government, 322; brought down

by religious coalition, 34; secularization under, 34

Baath Party, 216, 220-21, 226; desire of, for unification with Egypt or Libya,

220; opinions of, 220 Badi II Abu Duqn, 13 Badi IV, 15 Badri, Babikr, 115, 116 Bahr al Ghazal (province/state), 18, 27, 44, 48, 63, 64, 93, 118, 206; civil war

in, 242, 243; Dinka in, 80, 87, 93, 221, 257; Egyptian garrisons in, 16; ethnic groups in, 81; land tenure in, 146; lan- guage of instruction in, 71; migration

from, 16; militias in, 258; opposition

of, to Islamization, 212; petroleum in, xxvi; Sudanese People's Liberation Army presence in, 50 Bahr al Ghazal River, 65 Bahr al Jabal River, 63, 78 Baka people, 83 Baker, Samuel, 17 Bakht ar Ruda, 110

Bakr, Ahmad, 13 balance of payments, 190-91; deficit, 190; problems, 186 balance of trade, 190 Ballanah (Nobatia), 6, 8 banking, Islamic, 132, 186-87; growth of, 134; theory of, 187 banking system, 128, 185-86; attempt to Islamize, 132; joint ventures in, 186;

origins of, 185; problems with, 186

Bank of Khartoum, 185 Bank of Sudan, 131, 185; domestic banks

controlled by, 186; purges of, 129

banks: commercial, 185-86; Islamic, xxvii, 186-87 Banna, Hasan al, 106 Baqqara people, 10, 18, 20-21, 73, 78; agriculture of, 156; as Ansar, 19, 21; bush empires of, 17; as camel herders,

90; as cattle herders, 90, 154-56; identification as, 75; under Mahdiyah, 21; migration of, 156; in militias, 257; racial background of, 85; slave raiding

by, 90; slave trade with, 16, 17 Baraka Delta, 63; cotton cultivation in, 148

Barbar, 23

Barclays Bank, 185

Bari people, 81; religion of, 107

Bashir, Umar Hassan Ahmad al, 197, 200, 265; background of, 201; coup by, xxv,

53, 128, 236-37; roles of, 245; visit to Libya by, xxxi Bashir government. See Revolutionary

Command Council for National Sal- vation Bata Shoe Company, 162 Bayyudah Desert, 20

Beja people, 62, 75; Amarar, 75; Arab ancestry claimed by, 11, 75; Bani Amir,

75; Bisharin, 75; characteristics of, 75; Hadendowa, 19, 20, 75; language of, 75; in Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, 95

Belgian Congo {see also Zaire), 25 Belgium: army of, 21; claims of, to Afri- can territory, 21 Bentiu: oil production at, 170

Berti people, 76-77

Bir an Natrun, 61

birth rate, 67

Bittar Group, 162

black market activity, 211 Black Sultanate (As Saltana az Zarqa),

12 Blemmyes, 6 Blue Nile, xxv, 4, 57, 62, 63, 64-65, 89; drainage of, 64

Blue Nile Grid, 167-68

Blue Nile Health Care Project, 121 Boma Plateau, 58 Bongo people, 83

Bor, 65, 242 312
Index

borders, 57; under Anglo-Egyptian con- dominium, 24-25; conflicts on, xxxi, 240, 273, 274; security of, 239, 274

Borno, 13 bourgeoisie, 97, 98

Britain: aid from, 136, 175, 227, 228; air service to, 180; cotton exports to, 188-

89; defense of Egypt by, 14; invasion

by, xxiv; materiel from, 247, 248, 259, 262; occupation of Sudan by, 21-23;

position of, in Egypt, 18; southern pol- icy of, 26-29, 31; trade with, 136, 189;

training of military officers in, 253, 259, 260

British Ministry of Overseas Develop- ment, 157

British Overseas Development Administration, 168

British Petroleum, 170

British rule (see also Anglo-Egyptian con- dominium): arabization of south dis- couraged under, 27; Azande Scheme

under, 82; closed-door ordinances under,

27, 30, 31, 86; industrialization dis- couraged under, xxvi; influence of, 3, 80; Islam in south discouraged under, 27; nationalist demands under, 31; nomads

under, 91; north-south division reinforced by, 3, 233; self-determination agreement

under, xxiv; sharecropping under, 151 budget deficit, 132 bureaucracy: under Ottoman-Egyptian

rule, xxiv

Burri, 168 Burundi, 65

Bviri people, 82

Cairo, 16, 26

camels, 154, 156; Egyptian import embargo on, 35; herding of, 90; number

of, 154 Canada, 170, 260

capital accumulation, xxvii carnelian, 4

Carter, Jimmy, xxx

Catholics, Roman, 85, 107

cattle, 75, 154; Baqqara, 154; cultural

context, 154; diseases of, 154; effects of drought on, 154; Egyptian import embargo on, 35; herding, 90, 154-56; im- portance of, 91, 108; Nilotic, 154; number of, 154; ownership of, 80; raiding, 88; in religion, 108; trade in, xxiii, 10; as wealth, 91 census: 1955-56, 74; 1983, 67; problems

with, 67

Central African Republic, 225, 239

Central Planning Agency, 134 Chad, 215; air service to, 180; assistance by, to Sudanese rebels, 225; civil war

in, 225, 239, 240, 273 Chad Radio, 71 Chase Manhattan Bank, 186 Chevron Overseas Petroleum Corporation, 166; departure of, 87, 128, 171;

exploration by, 168-70; guerrilla attack on, 171; infrastructure developed by,

179; oil discovered by, 127 China: aid from, 127, 137, 157, 178;

materiel from, xxx, xxxi, 248, 259, 260, 262; military assistance from, 232, 260;

relations with, 228; trade with, 189; trade agreement with, 137

Christianity (see also under individual denominations), 85, 107; literacy encouraged

by, 8; in Nubia, 8; in south, 47, 58; as symbol of resistance, 107

Christian missionaries, 58; expelled, xxiv, 37, 110; in Nubia, 8; in south, 27

Christian missions: dissolved, 107; medical facilities of, xxiv, 27; schools of, xxiv, 27, 35, 85, 110

Christians, xxiii; as percentage of population, 85, 100 chrome, 164-65; export of, 165; mined,

164 Church of England, 27, 107 Church Missionary Society, 27

Citibank, 186

civil code: of 1949, 207; of 1970, 207

civil law: under Anglo-Egyptian con- dominium, 24

civil service, 96; attempts to arabize, xxx;

northerners in, 33; purges of, 129, 198, 265; southerners in, 27, 212; transition

in, from condominium, 33

civil war (see also Anya Nya rebels; Sudanese People's Liberation Army),

xxiv, 3, 37, 51, 58, 78, 80, 109, 121, 199, 231, 240-44, 251; under Abbud,

234; arabization as cause of, xxx; at- tempts to end, 49, 214, 264; deaths from, xxxii, 43, 69, 241; destruction of

schools by, 112; economic cost of, xxvii, xxxii, 49, 128, 222, 234, 254-55; effect 313
Sudan: A Country Study

of, on development, 87, 178, 182; ef- fect of, on economy, 127, 130, 183,

190; effect of, on environment, 160; ef- fect of, on ethnic groups, 85, 93, 95;

effect of, on industry, 162; effect of, on

livestock, 153, 154, 156; effect of, on

political systems, 96; medical facilities destroyed by, 118; under Nimeiri, 235;

origins of, 43; problems caused by,

xxxii, 65, 170; refugees from, 67, 68, 84, 241; resumption of, 48, 127, 128, 236, 239; as security issue, 232; sharia

as cause of, 197, 213, 214, 218-19

climate, 65-67; dry season, 66; rainfall, 66; temperature, 65, 66; winds, 66

closed-door ordinances, 27, 86; demand

for abolition of, 30, 31 Code of Civil Procedure (1902), 24

College of Mechanical Engineering, 114

Collo people. See Shilluk people

communications {see also telecommunications), 89, 184-85; infrastructure, 34 communists (see also Sudanese Communist

Party), 38; opposition of, to Revolutionary Command Council for National

Salvation, 266; reinstated, 39; role of, in Revolutionary Command Council,

41, 42 Congolese rebels: arms supplied to Anya

Nya by, 43 Congo River basin, 66

Constituent Assembly, 32, 46, 202; creat- ed, xxv

constitution: need for permanent, 34, 36; suspended, 49, 199

constitutional conference, 202-3

constitutions: draft, 40, 46-47; of 1952, 30-31; of 1971, 43; Permanent Constitution, 202; Transitional Constitution,

32-33, 37, 41, 202, 203

construction, 139 Coptic church, 72; authority of, over Nubian church, 8; power of, 8; support of, by Nubians, 11 Coptic language, 8 corruption, 186; embezzlement, 132-33,

211; in export companies, 133-34; in national government, 35, 49, 132-34,

48; in real estate, 133

cotton, 63, 127; under Abbud, 36; in Azande Scheme, 82; as commercial

crop, xxvi, 62; cultivation, 92, 144,

148, 153; excessive reliance on, 34; export of, 137, 187-89; in Gezira Scheme,

26, 89, 160; irrigation for, 147-48, 149, 150; marketing of, 36; markets for, 136; prices of, 34; profits, 150; sales of, 35 Council of Ministers, xxviii, 201; composition of, 201

Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor 1990 (United States Department of

State), 270

coups d'etat, 234; attempted, xxiv, xxxii, 36, 39, 43, 47, 198, 207, 235, 236; of

1958, xxiv, 35-36, 141, 199, 202, 234; of 1969, xxiv, 41, 141, 199, 207, 231; of 1985, xxv, 49, 199, 231, 236; of

1989, xxv, 53, 128, 198, 199, 202, 210, 214, 218, 222, 231, 236-37, 265

courts (see also sharia), 210-11; under

Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 24; backlogs in, 272; Civil Division, 210;

religious and secular combined, 210;

secular, xxiv; sentences in, 272; Sharia Division, 210; special corruption, 211; special security, 211, 272

crime, 273-74; banditry, 273; categories

of, 273, 274; by militias, 273-74; rate, 274; solution of, 274

criminal code, 271

criminal justice system, 271-72; judicial process under, 271-72; trials under, 271-72

currency, xxvii; devaluations, 138, 191; shortage of hard, 162; tied to Egyptian

currency, 185; value of, 134 Cush (see also Meroe), 4-5; Egyptian in- fluence on, 4-5; in Egypt's New Kingdom, xxiii, 4-5; religion in, 5; trade of, with Egypt, 4; Upper Egypt conquered

by, xxiii, 5

Dafalla, Gazuli, 50 Daju people, 76-77 Darfur (province/state), 13, 14, 18, 19, 61, 118, 206; agriculture in, 153; anar- chy in, 77, 215, 273-74; under AngloEgyptian condominium, 24; autonomy

of, xxix, 86; Chadian civil war in, 225, 239, 240; civil war in, 231; conquered

by Ansar, 19; conquered by Egypt, 16,

18; ethnic groups in, 86; famine in, 69; grazing in, 64; Islamic religious orders

in, 105, 217; military personnel from,

314
Index

238-39; militias in, 257; Nubians in, 74; refugees in, 67 death rate, 67, 68

debt, domestic, 131

debt, external, 49, 128, 130, 138, 186, 190; canceled by Denmark, 136; causes of, xxvii; failure to repay, 132; in 1991, 134;

in 1992, xxvii; outstanding amount,

135, 190; rescheduling, 191 Deby, Idris, 225, 240

deforestation, 160 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 40,

48, 51, 52, 216, 218-19, 238; antigov- ernment actions of, 216; Egyptian sup- port for, 224; factions in, 218; Islamic bank formed by, 186; as Khatmiyyah

party, 218; as rival of Ansar, 218

demonstrations: antigovernment, 35, 37,

40, 49, 197, 198, 214, 234, 265; police ac- tions in, 268; by students, xxv, 265, 266

denationalization, 131 Deng, William, 37 Denmark, 136 Department of Statistics, 67

desert {see also under individual deserts), xxv,

57, 58-61; area of, 145

desertification, 68-69, 145, 152, 158, 166 Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act of 1972, 161 Development Finance Company (DFC),

175, 183 DFC. See Development Finance Company

Dhahab, Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh, xxv, 17-18; coup by, 49, 199, 236 Dhahab government, 199; relations of, with Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, 50; sharia under, 209-10

Didinga Hills, 58, 63 Didinga people, 81 Digna, Usman, 19 Dinar, Ali (sultan), 25 Dindar River, 61, 64 Dinka people (Jieng), xxvi, xxx, 29, 78-80, 88, 93, 257; armed conflict of, 80, 82; in civil war, 231, 242; distribu- tion of, 80; dominance of, 87; govern- ment efforts to destroy, xxxiii; massacre

of, 258; origins of, 16; as percentage of population, 87; political system in, 95; refugees, 257; religion among, 108;

self-esteem of, 86; in Sudanese People's Liberation Army, 262; in Sudanese

People's Liberation Movement, 221;

tribal groups of, 80, 95

dissidents, 47, 48, 197 Doctors Without Borders (Medecins sans

Frontieres), 122 Dongotona Mountains, 58, 63

drought, xxv, 66, 68, 118, 145; deaths from, xxxii, 69; desertification caused

by, 68-69; economic cost of, xxvii,

xxviii, 134, 222; effect of, on agriculture, 158; effect of, on irrigation, 148, 151; effect of, on livestock, 153, 154,

156; effect of, on unemployment, 139;

political ramifications of, 199, 214;

refugees from, 84, 128 drug trafficking, 240, 267, 274 Dunqas, Amara, 12 Dunqulah, 4; ancient, 8; Arab siege of, 9; captured by British, 23; electric generation in, 167; Mamluk attempts to conquer, 12; Mamluks in, 14; Muqurra

and Nobatia merged into, 9; Muslim

ascendancy in, 11 DUP. See Democratic Unionist Party

eastern Sudan, 62 economic development, 129-35; under

Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 25, 26-

27, 28; expenditures, 131; foreign aid for, 135; imports for, 188; need for, 34; obstacles to, 172, 197; projects, 127, 134, 186; railroads in, 174; under Sadiq al Mahdi, 39; slowdown of, 188; in south, 2 economic plans {see also under individual

plans), 129-30, 206; problems with, 134 economy, 49, 121; under Abbud, 37, 234; attempt to Islamize, 132; attempt to re- form, xxvii; destruction of, under the

Khalifa, 23; deterioration of, 191; growth

of, 127; importance of clay plains in, 61; problems, 127, 134, 234, 237; recovery programs, 132; straitened circumstances

of, xxv; World Bank insistence on re- structuring of, xxvii education {see also under schools), 89, 110-

18; under Abbud, 37, 203; abroad,

111; under Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 110; attempts to arabize, xxx;

British model for, 111; curriculum,

110; demand for, 110; English as lan- guage of, 71; girls', 115-16; govern- ment control of, 206; higher, 110, 113-14; inadequacy of, 113; reform,

315
Sudan: A Country Study

115, 116-18; reorganization of, 111-

12; spending on, 110; technical and

vocational, 111-12; to train civil ser- vants, 110 Egypt (see also Turkiyah), 10, 201, 239;

aid by, to Sudanese rebels, 222-23,

224; aid from, 132, 135, 136-37, 232; Anglo-French debt commission in, 18; Ansar invasion of, 21 ; Arab rule of, 10; army of, 14, 15, 16; asylum granted by,

to exiled Sudanese, 223-24; border

conflict with, xxxi; British position in, 18; condominium repudiated by, 31; and Cush, xxiii, 4-5; desire for union

with, xxiv, 31, 220; exports to, 188; French invasion of, 14; Hyksos invasion of, 4; import embargo by, 35; in- dependence declared by, 26; influence

of, xxiii, xxiii, 3, 207; invasion by

(1820), 3, 14; investment from, 162; Mamluk rule of, 11-12; Mamluks

purged from, 14; materiel from, 247, 248, 250, 259, 262; Middle Kingdom

of, 4; military assistance from, 232,

259; military ties with, 261; modernization in, 16; nationalist riots in, 26; New Kingdom of, 4; Nimeiri given asy- lum by, 49, 223; Nubian trade with,

xxiii; occupation by, 15; Ottoman rule

of, 12, 14; relations with, xxxi, 3, 34, 222-24, 226-27, 239-40; Sadiq al Mahdi exiled to, 42; slave trade with,

14, 16; trade agreement with, 189-90;

training of military officers in, 253; trib- ute to, 5; Upper Egypt, xxiii, 5, 10; war

of, with Assyria, 5; water disputes with, 36, 148, 240

Egypt, Upper, xxiii, 5, 10

elections: of 1948, 30, 202; of 1952, 30; of 1953, 202; of 1958, 34, 202; of 1965,

38; of 1967, 39; of 1968, 40; of 1969, 40-41; of 1974, 47, 202; of 1986, 51, 202

electric power, 128, 139, 166-68; demand

for, 168; distribution of, 166-67; generation of, 168; hydroelectric, xxvii, 149, 166; in rural areas, 167; shortages of, 168

elites: Arab, 96; under Bashir, 97; bourgeoisie, 97, 98; in Darfur, 14; differ- ences among, 96; educated, 93-94, 97, 233, 237; ethnic, 97; intermarriage among, 98; languages of, 69; Muslim,

96; national, 96-98; opposition of, to Sadiq al Mahdi government, 39; political development among, 26; religious, 96, 97; southern, 96-97; tribal, 96, 97; urban, 57, 96-98 Emergency Drought Recovery Project,

xxviii employment, 138-39, 162-63

energy (see also under kinds of energy): from

forestry products, 144; loans for, 135; petroleum for, xxvi; sources, 166-71;

supply, 166-71

English, xxvi, 57; as language of education, 71, 111, 115; as language of mass

media, 221 , 222; as language of south,

46; spoken by elite, 69; spoken in south,

71; as symbol of resistance, 107 environment, 68

Equatoria, 21; Egyptian garrisons in, 16 Equatoria Corps, 43, 212, 233, 233-34,

239; mutiny of, 234, 241 Equatoria Province (see also Al Istiwai), 17, 27, 44

Eritrea, 21, 30

Eritrean People's Liberation Front, 226, 240

Ethiopia, xxxi, 81, 232, 239, 260, 261;

air service to, 180; Ansar invasion of, 21; assistance by, to Sudanese rebels, xxxi, 226, 240, 242, 262, 264; border

disturbances with, 240, 274; migration

of Falasha from, 84; refugees in, 85, 225, 242, 244; relations with, 222, 225

ethnic communities: under Anglo-Egyptian

condominium, 89; change in, 88; descent

in, 88; nomadic, 88; religion in, 88; semi- sedentary, 88; settled, 88

ethnic communities, arabized, 89-93;

competition among, 89; nomadic, 89, 90; setded, 89-90

ethnic groups (see also tribes; see also under

individual groups), xxiii, xxx, 72-88; ancestry of, 10; conflicts among, 87; dif- ferences among, 57; impact of civil war

on, 85; number of, xxvi, 69, 264;

religion of, 107-10

ethnicity, 69; impact of migration on, 84; of Muslims, 72 Europe: exports to, 165; military as- sistance from, 232, 259; Sudanese exiles in, 43; trade with, 189 European Community, 228; aid from,

xxviii, 127, 132 316
Index

European Development Fund, 175, 182 exchange rate, xxvii

exiles, 43

export earnings, 187; from agricultural

products, 187; in 1990, 187

exports, 183; agricultural, xxvi, 142, 187;

livestock, xxvi; markets for, 189; value

of, 134

factionalism, 35, 37

factories, 49

Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud (king), 134

Faisal Islamic Bank, 133, 186; privileges

of, 186-87

Faisal Islamic Bank Act (1977), 186

Falasha, 84

Fallata. See Fulani people

family, 98-99

family planning, 68

famine, xxv, 49, 66, 78, 87, 109, 119; deaths from, xxxii, 49, 69, 118; eco- nomic cost of, xxvii, xxviii, 134; impact

of, 93, 95, 96, 190; political ramifications of, 199, 214; refugees from, 67,

84, 243-44; relief efforts, xxxiii; risk of, 69

Faras, 8 farms, state, 152 Faruk (king), 31 Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- many), 120; aid from, 136, 168, 178,

183; air service to, 180; military as- sistance from, 260; relations with, 259; trade with, 136, 189; training of mili- tary officers in, 253

financial sector, 185-87; disruptions to, 186; nationalization of, 128

Fisheries Administration, 157

fishing, 144, 156-58; ice plants for, 157; production, 156-57; source of, 157; work force in, 139

five-year plan of 1968-72, 130 Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1970-74), 130

floods, 154 Fodikwan, 165

food production, 68

foreign economic assistance, 34, 135-37; from Arab countries, 132, 135, 136-37,

232, 260-61 ; from Arab Fund for Eco- nomic and Social Development, 175; from Britain, 136, 175, 227, 228; from

China, 127, 137, 157, 178; from Development Finance Company, 175; from European Community, xxviii, 127, 132; from European Development

Fund, 175; from France, 136, 175, 227, 228; from International Development

Association, 175; from Iran, xxviii, xxxi; from Italy, 178; from Japan, 136, 175; from Kuwait, xxxi, 136; from

Libya, xxvii, xxxi; need for, 222; from Norway, 127, 136; role of, in develop- ment, 135, 178; from Saudi Arabia,

xxxi, 136, 226; from Soviet Union, 40; Umma's call for greater, 34; from

United States, xxviii, 34, 127, 132, 135-36, 176, 227, 260-61; from West Germany, 136, 168, 178, 183; from

Yugoslavia, 127, 178

foreign exchange: costs for oil imports,

168; reserves, depleted, 35

foreign investment, 161; from Arab countries, 162; dependence on, 162; from

Kuwait, 127, 151, 178; from Saudi

Arabia, 127, 135, 151, 186; shortfall in, 130

foreign military assistance, 232, 259-62;

for air force, 248; from Arab countries, 259; from China, 232, 260; cutbacks in, 255; from Egypt, 232, 259; from Iran, xxx, xxxi; from Iraq, 259; for navy,

250; from Saudi Arabia, 232, 259, 261; from Soviet Union, 40, 232, 238, 250,

259; from United States, 261-62; from West Germany, 260; from Yugoslavia,

250, 260

foreign policy: civil war as basis for, xxx;

military role in, xxxi; nonaligned, 47;

objectives, 222

foreign rebels: support for, in Sudan, 226, 240, 242

foreign relations, 222-28; with Arab

countries, 226-27; with China, 228; with Egypt, xxxi, 3, 34, 222-24, 239-40; with Ethiopia, 222, 225; with

Iran, 136, 228; with Iraq, 222, 226; with Kuwait, 226, 227; with Libya,

xxxi, 190, 222, 224-25, 239, 240, 250; with Nigeria, 228; with Saudi Arabia,

226; with Soviet Union, 137, 222, 260; with United States, 35, 227-28, 259

foreign technical assistance, 34; from

Soviet Union, 40; from United States, 34, 25, 176 317
Sudan: A Country Study

foreign trade, 57, 186, 187-90; Arab- Nubian, 9, 10; with British, 136, 189; with China, 137, 189; with Egypt, 188, 189-90; with Libya, 190; by Nubian

kingdoms, xxiii, 9, 10; with Saudi Arabia, xxvi, 189; with Soviet Union, 189; with United States, 189; with West

Germany, 136, 189

forest (see also fuel), 158-60; area of, 158-60; converted to agricultural use, 158; depletion of, 166; gum arabic production from, xxiii, 144, 158; land

area of, 158; reserve, 160; woodlands

of, 158

forestry, 144, 158-60; exports from, 144; production, 158, 160; work force in, 139

Forestry Administration, 145, 158, 160

France, 170; aid from, 136, 175, 227,

228; claims of, to African territory, 21; invasion of Egypt by, 14; materiel from, 248, 249, 250, 262; trade with, 189

Free Officers' Movement: coup by, xxiv, 41, 207, 235

French: as language of mass media, 221

fuel: charcoal, 144, 158, 160, 166; con- sumption of, 166; firewood, 144, 158; vegetable matter, 166; wood, 166

Fulani people, 78, 87 Funj Dynasty, 73 Funj Empire, 12-13; decline of, 13; econ- omy of, 12; government of, 12; sultan

of, 12-13; wars of, 13 Funj people, 12-13; in Sudanese People's

Liberation Movement, 95; tribal homeland (dar) of, 12-13; warrior aristocracy

of, 13 Fur people, 13-14, 75, 214; competition

of, with Arabs, 86-87; conquered by

Funj, 13; converted to Islam, 13; gov- ernment efforts to destroy, xxxiii, 225;

slave trade by, 14; in Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, 95; sultanate of, ended, 25; tribal identification of, 75

Garang, John, xxx, 50, 87, 128, 216, 219; background of, 262 ; in Nimeiri govern- ment, 41; Sudanese People's Liberation Army under, 214, 242; Sudanese People's Liberation Movement under, 213, 214

gas, natural, 166

gasoline, 48; embezzled, 133 GDP. See gross domestic product gems: trade in, xxiii, 10 General Peoples' Committee, 224

genocide: by Bashir regime, xxxiii geographical regions, 58-63; central clay

plains, 61-62; east, 62; north, 58-61; northern clay plains, 62; southern clay

plains, 62; west, 61 Geological Survey Administration, 164 Gezira Board, 89 Gezira Light Railway, 172, 175-76; net- work, 175; purpose, 175-76

Gezira Scheme, 35, 62, 89, 129, 146, 175; under Anglo-Egyptian condominium,

25-26, 160-61, 188-89; electric power

for, 167; health problems in, 121; Manaqil Extension, 148, 172; origins of, 148

girls: education for, 115-16; in labor

force, 138; role of, 116

Gladstone, William, 20 GNP. See gross national product

goats, 154, 156

gold, 15; mined, 4; mines, 164; trade in,

xxiii, 4, 10; as tribute, 5 Gordon, Charles George, xxiv; fight of, with Mahdi, 19-20; resignation of, 18; slave trade abolished by, 17-18

government, local, 203-6; abolished, 204; under Bashir, 206; under Nimeiri, 204-

6; relation of, to national government,

xxix, 203; structure of, 206

government, national, 85; administration

of, 96; Arabic used in, 71; atrocities by,

39; coalition, 236; education subsidized

by, 27; health programs of, 119; inflexibility in, 234; military involvement in, 232, 234-37; mission schools taken over

by, 35; operations against Anya Nya

rebels, 44; relation of, to regional gov- ernments, xxix, 203; spending, 131; sponsorship of militias, 255, 257, 258;

talks of, with Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, 198 government, regional, 203-6; abolished, 204; relation of, to national govern- ment, xxix, 203 government in exile (see also National Democratic Alliance), 216

Graduates' General Conference, 30

grain, 10 Great Lakes region, 3 318
Index

Greece, 180

gross domestic product (GDP), 134;

agriculture as percentage of, xxvi, 142; industry as percentage of, xxvi; manufacturing as percentage of, 162; mining as percentage of, 164

gross national product (GNP): defense budget as percentage of, 255 gum arabic: export of, 10, 16, 158, 187, 188; production of, xxvi, 64, 77, 144,

158, 173 Gum Arabic Company, 158 gypsum, 165

haboob dust storm, 66-67 Habre, Hissein, 225

hafri, 61 Haile Selassie, 44 Hajar Asalaya Sugar Project, 151 Haifa al Jadidah irrigation project, 149 Hausa language, 70 Hausa people, 78

health, 118-22; illnesses, 118-19

health care: availability of, 120; primary, 120-21

health care personnel, 119-20; community, 120

health care system, 118; dearth of supplies in, 118; government control of, 206

herding, 12

hides: trade in, 4 High Court of Appeal, 210 High Executive Council, 46 High Military College, 254

horses, 154; trade in, 10 House of Representatives, 202

hudud, xxxii; suspended, 210

Hufrat an Nahas, 165 humanitarian aid, 199, 227 human rights, 211; organizations, 211, 252 human rights violations, 211; by armed

forces, 252; by government, xxx, 198, 237, 241; by militias, 221, 231, 241, 243; by Sudanese People's Liberation Army, xxx, 241

hunting, 139 Husayn, Abd ar Rahim Muhammad, 200

hydrology, 64-65

Hyksos, 4

ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross IDA. See International Development Association IDC. See Industrial Development Corporation

Idris, Ahmad ibn (Sayyid), 105

Idrisiyah Muslims, 105 IFC. See International Finance Corporation ILO. See International Labour Organisation Imatong Mountains, 58, 63, 160

imports, 183, 190, 191; of food, 188; of machinery, 188; of manufactured

goods, 188; of petroleum, 188; restric- tions on, 35; sources of, 136, 189; of

textiles, 188; of transport equipment,

188; value of, 134 import substitution, 162, 188

incense: trade in, 4 income per capita, xxvi, 130 independence: declared, xxiv, 32; desire

for, xxiv; impact of, on social order, 93;

politics of, 32-36; preparation for, 30-31

India, 10, 18; trade with, 189

Indians, 6

Industrial Bank of Sudan, 186

industrial development, 161

Industrial Development Corporation

(IDC), 161

industrialization: discouraged by British, xxvi; need for investment in, xxvii

industrial production, 134

industrial sector: denationalization of, 162; under five-year plans, 130; loans

for, 49; nationalization in, xxvii; as per- centage of gross domestic product, xxvi; private enterprises in, 129; as public enterprise, 128

infant mortality, 67, 121

inflation, 131-32; in 1970s, 137-38; in 1980s, 49, 138; in 1991, 138; in 1992,

xxvii

infrastructure, 170 Ingessana Hills, 58, 61, 164, 165 Ingessana Hills Mines Corporation, 164, 165

inland waterways (see also Nile River),

172, 178-80; obstacles in, 178-79;

transportation on, 178, 179-80

Institute of Higher Technical Studies, 114 319
Sudan: A Country Study

insurance industry, 128

Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

Interim Action Program, 130, 131, 176

intermarriage, 10, 11 internal security, xxxii, 232, 264-66

internal security forces {see also under in- dividual agencies), 266-71; Islamic security, 270-71; Office of State Security, 270; Presidential Guard, 270; problems

of, in civil war, xxxii; State Security

Organisation, 270

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), xxxiii International Confederation of Arab

Trade Unions, 142

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), 267, 274

International Development Association (IDA), 135, 153, 168, 175, 183

International Finance Corporation (IFC),

170; loans from, 135

International Labour Organisation (ILO),

xxxiii, 138, 139, 145

International Monetary Fund, 49, 132; debt arrears to, 138; financing agree- ment with, 138; relations with, 191; Sudan declared bankrupt by, 49

International Petroleum Corporation:

concession to, xxxi

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 185

Interpol. See International Criminal Police Organization

Iran: aid from, xxviii, xxxi; military as- sistance from, xxx, xxxi; oil from, xxxi; relations with, 136, 228

Iraq, 139, 189; military assistance from,

259; relations with, 222, 226; support

for, in Persian Gulf War, 226, 228, 259

iron, 165

Ironstone Plateau (Jabal Hadid), 63

irrigation (see also agriculture, irrigated): for commercial crops, 147-48; electric power for, 167; form of, 147; funding for, 149; in Gezira Scheme, 26; governmentsponsored projects, xxvi; in Meroe, 6; nationalization of, 150; Nile used for, xxvi, 147; projects, 130, 131, 149-50; pumps used for, 150, 151; traditional, 147 Islam (see also Muslims; sharia), xxiii, 46,

85; alms in, 101-2; arabization facilitated by, 11; under British, 27; conversions, 13; cult of the saint in, 103-4; dis- tribution of, 102-3; evil eye in, 109-10;

fakih in, 103; five pillars of, 101; imam

in, 103; influence of, on north-south di- vision, 9; introduction of, 9-14; Nubian

conversion to, xxiii, 9; as official religion, 47; personal conduct in, 102; pilgrimage

in, 102; Ramadan in, 101; spread of, 9, 17; theology of, 100-104; as unifying fac- tor, 57

Islam, Shia, 101

Islam, Sufi, 58; history of, 104; practice of, 104; turuq in, 104-5

Islam, Sunni, 57-58, 100-101

Islamic Charter Front, 47, 51 Islamic Conference, 223

Islamic Development Company, 133-34

Islamic Legion, 240

Islamic movements, 104-7

Islamic security, 270-71

Islamic University of Omdurman, 114

Islamization: under Abbud, 203; attempts

at, 87, 132; under Bashir, 198; fears of, in south, 203, 212, 213; of legal system,

209; under Nimeiri, 197

Ismail (pasha), 16; forced to abdicate, 18; southern policy of, 17-18

isolation, 223

Israel, 84; Anya Nya trained by, 43; arms

supplied by, to Anya Nya, 38, 43

Italy: aid from, 178; air service to, 180; army of, 21, 233; invasion of Sudan by,

30; trade with, 189

Italian East Africa, 30

ivory: trade in, xxiii, 4, 10, 16

Jaali people, 10-11, 88; ancestry of, 10; arabization of, 73; resistance of, to Egyptian invaders, 15 Jabal al Auliya Dam, 65, 157 Jabal Hadid. See Ironstone Plateau Jabal Marrah, 58, 61, 75 Japan: aid from, 136, 175; trade with, 136, 165, 189

jazirah, 62

Jazira Scheme. See Gezira Scheme JECS. See Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme

Jieng people. See Dinka people

jihad, xxiv

jizzu, 61 320
Index

Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme

QECS), 140

Johns-Manville, 165

Jonglei Qunqali) Canal, 65, 127, 128, 131 Jordan, 254

journalists, 221-22, 272 Juba, 118, 214; airport, 182, 249; army

in, 245; atrocities against civilians in, 39; civil war in, 243; electric generation in, 167; refugees in, 244

judges, 210-11; appointment of, 211; dis- missal of, 211; duties of, 210-11; imprisoned, 272 Juhayna people, 10-11, 73, 88; ancestry

of, 10; migrations of, 10; tribes of, 10 Junayd irrigation project, 150

Kababish people, 10, 91 Kaduqli, 131 Kakwa people, 81 Kanuri people, 13 Karmah, 4

Karrar, Salah ad Din Muhammad Ahmad,

200

kashif: rule of, 11-12

Kashta, 5 Kassala, 20, 30, 74; Egyptian garrisons

in, 15, 19 Kawahla people, 73, 93 Kaylak, Muhammad Abu al, 13 Keira clan, 13 Kenya, 239; aid from, to Sudanese rebels, xxxi, 225; air service to, 180; refugees

in, 85, 225

Khalifa, the (see also Abdallahi ibn Muhammad), 21; death of, 23 Khalifa Yunis, Muhammad al Amin, 200

Khalil, Abd Allah, 34; coup by, 35-36

Khalil, Abd al Majid Hamid, 236

Khalil government, 199; issues confronting, 34; resignation of, 38 Khartoum, xxvi, 74, 250; Ansar destruction of, 20; army in, 245; demonstrations in, 40; Egyptian garrisons in, 15,

19; elites in, 96; industries in, 157; navy

in, 250; police in, 268; population of, 68; rail transportation to, 173; rainfall

in, 66; as seat of government, 15; shanty towns around, xxxiii; temperatures in, 66 Khartoum Institute of Technical College

(Khartoum Polytechnic), 114

Khartoum International Airport, 182, 245, 249, 266 Khartoum North: electricity generation

in, 168; elites in, 96; population of, 68 Khashm al Qirbah: agriculture in, 63; army in, 245; irrigation project, 130; Nubians in, 74 Kashm al Qirbah Dam, 149, 157, 167 Khashoggi, Adnan, 171 Khatim al Khalifa, Sirr al, 37 Khatim government, 37-38 Khatmiyyah Muslims, 16, 19, 26, 30,

105; affiliated with Abbud government,

36; alienated by Azhari, 34; history of, 105; Islamic bank formed by, 186; in military, 238; political influence of, 134, 214; political party of, 216, 218;

salient features of, 105; uprising by, 51 Kinanah, 127; factory at, 131, 162; irri- gation project, 131; sugar mill, 188 Kinanah Limited, 151 Kinanah Sugar Project, 151

Kitchener, Herbert, xxiv; Ansar defeated

by, 23; as commander of Egyptian army, 21, 23, 173, 233 Kober Prison, 49, 274, 275 Koka Dam Declaration (1986), xxv, 50, 213; support for, 50 Korean War, 150

Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, 183 Kuraymah, 173 Kurdufan (province/state), 13, 14, 19, 23, 30, 51, 118, 206; agriculture in, 153, 158; army in, 245; civil war in, 231;

ethnic groups in, 83, 257; grazing in, 64; Islamic religious orders in, 105, 217; military personnel from, 238-39;

militias in, 257, 273; petroleum in, xxvi; refugees in, 67 Kurmuk, 243

Kusti: factory at, 131; oil refinery at, 170-

71 Kuwait, 139; aid from, xxxi, 136; invest- ment from, 127, 151, 178; relations with, 226, 227; training of military

officers from, 253

Lado Enclave, 25 Lagu, Joseph (see also Southern Sudan

Liberation Movement), xxiv, 38, 44,

46, 241-42

Lahure, Saturino, 37 321
Sudan: A Country Study

Lake Fajarial, 62 Lake Nasser. See Lake Nubia

Lake No, 62 Lake Nubia, 63, 65, 148-49; fishing in, 144, 157

lakes, 157 Lake Shambe, 62 Lake Victoria, 65

landownership, 145-46; customary, 146; by state, 146 land registration, 145 land tenure, 92, 145-46; under AngloEgyptian condominium, 24; hired labor

for, 92; wages for workers in, 92

land use, 144-45; cultivation, 145; forest, 145; grazing, 145; pasture, 145

languages (see also under individual languages), 69-72; acquisition of, by migrants, 69;

Afro-Asiatic, 69-70; differences among,

57; distribution of, 69-71; lingua francas, 69, 70; in Meroe, 6; multilingualism, 69, 70; Niger-Kurdufanian, 69, 70; Nilo-Saharan, 69, 70; number of, xxvi, 69, 70; as political instrument, 69; of

south, xxvi, 58; as symbol of identity, 69 League of Arab States (Arab League), 185, 228

legal system {see also sharia), 206-11; under

Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 24; Brit- ish influence on, 207; customary, 206-7; Egyptian influence on, 207; Islamization

of, 209; precolonial, 206; problems in, 207; revisions of, 207-9

Legislative Assembly, 30, 202; boycott of

elections for, 30; elections for, 30

Libya, 232, 261; aid from, xxviii, xxxi; Bashir's visit to, xxxi; desire for union

with, 220, 224; economic cooperation

with, 137, 224-25; materiel from, 247,

248, 259, 262; relations with, xxxi, 190, 222, 224-25, 239, 240, 250; support of, for Sudanese rebels, 224, 264; trade

with, 190 Libyan Desert, 58 Libyan National Salvation Front, 224

limestone, 165

lineages: minimal, 91-92; in nomadic society, 90-91, 93; ruling, 93 Liquor Prohibition Bill, 209

literacy: encouraged by church, 8; rate, 111, 251

livestock, 153-56; camels, 154, 156; cattle, 154-56; effects of drought on, 153,

154; export of, 187; goats, 154, 156; number of, 154; sheep, 154, 156

livestock raising (see also agriculture), xxvi, 146; in Darfur, 64; methods of, 144;

traditional, 153; work force in, 139, 142

loans, 185 Local Government Act (1961), 204

location, 239

Madani, Faisal, 200 Madi people, 83; religion of, 107 Mahdi (see also Ansar; Mahdist movement;

Mahdiyah), xxiv, 105, 217; background

of, 18; death of, 20; exile of, 19; family

of, 73; jihad of, xxiv, 19; Muhammad

Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah revealed

as, xxiv, 18; self-proclaimed Mahdi, xxiv, 106; theology of, 19, 20 Mahdi, Abd ar Rahman al, 30, 34, 35 Mahdi, Al Hadi al (imam), 36, 39, 40, 42 Mahdi, Sadiq al (elder), 36 Mahdi, Sadiq al (younger), xxiv, xxv,

xxxii, 36, 40, 46, 51, 209; amnesty

granted to, 47; arrested, 215, 217, 218;

exiled to Egypt, 42; meeting of, with

Nimeiri, 47 Mahdi al Muntazar, Al. See Mahdi

Mahdi government, 39, 128, 197; agree- ment of, with Sudanese People's Liber- ation Movement, xxv, 210; coalitions

of, xxv, 40, 51-52, 214, 217, 218, 236; corruption in, 51; dissolved, 51, 52; ethnic groups under, 221; factionalism

in, 51; foreign policy under, 222; for- eign relations under, 227; goals of, 39; human rights abuses under, 252-53;

legal charges against, 211; military under, 236; militias under, 258; nomads

under, 91; opposition to, 39; overthrown,

xxv, 40, 53, 236-37; priorities of, 51; sharia under, 209-10, 213-14; state of emergency under, 272 Mahdist movement (see also Mahdi; Mahdiyah), xxiv, 19, 57, 106; as threat to regional stability, xxiv Mahdist uprisings: under Anglo-Egyptian

condominium, 24 Mahdiyah (see also Mahdi; Mahdist movement), 18-23, 172; established, 20; purged, 21; sharia under, 21 Mahjub, Abd al Khaliq, 40, 42; deported, 42 322
Index

Mahjub, Muhammad Ahmad, 38, 40; resignation of, 39 Mahjub government, 38-39, 40; communists under, 38; southern problem

under, 38 Mahmud, Abd al, 200 Majdhubiyah Muslims, 105 Malakal, 118; airport, 249; electric gener- ation in, 167

malnutrition, 118; among children, 118-

19; economic cost of, xxvii; seasonal, 119 Mamluks, xxiii; in Dunqulah, 14; Egypt

ruled by, 11-12, 14; intervention of, in Nubia, 11, 12; purged from Egypt, 14; slave trading by, 12, 14 Manaqil irrigation project, 130 Mandari people, 81 manufactured goods, 10 manufacturing, 139, 160-64; under AngloEgyptian condominium, 160- 61; food

processing, xxvi; import substitution, xxvi; output, 163; as percentage of gross domestic product, 162; poor planning

in, 163-64; private-sector, 161; publicsector, 161; textiles, xxvi marble, 165 marriage: among elites, 98

Masalit people, 76-77 mass media, 221-22; government monopoly on, 221; languages of, 221

materiel {see also Sudanese People's Liberation Army; see also under individual branches of armedforces), 247; from Britain, 247, 248, 259, 262; from China,

xxx, xxxi, 248, 259, 260, 262; condition of, 232, 259; from Egypt, 247, 248, 250, 259, 262; from France, 248, 249,

250, 262; from Libya, 247, 248, 259,

262; procurement, 232, 247, 255, 259; shortages of, 232, 259; sources of, 262; from Soviet Union, 44, 247, 248, 260; from United States, 247, 248, 250, 262; from Yugoslavia, 250 Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC),

152-53; corruption in, 133; farms oper- ated by, 153 Medecins sans Frontieres. See Doctors Without Borders

medical facilities: destroyed in civil war,

118; provided by Christian missions,

27; of Sudanese People's Liberation Army, 118

medicine: availability of, 120; embezzled,

133 Meina al Mak Dam, 64 Mengistu Haile Mariam, xxxi, 226 merchant marine, 172, 184 Meroe (see also Cush; Nubia), xxiii, 5-6;

destruction of, 6; extent of, 5; influences on, 6; irrigation in, 6; language in, 6; move by Cush to, 5; pharaonic tradi- tion in, 5-6; political system in, 6; population density in, 6; queen mother in, 6; relations of, with Egypt, 6; succes- sor to, 6-9 MFC. See Mechanized Farming Corporation mica, 165 Middle East: air service to, 180; Sudanese

exiles in, 43

migration, 84-85; of elite ("brain drain"),

68; to escape civil war, 68, 139; to es- cape famine, 67, 139, 243; impact of, on ethnicity, 84; internal, 67, 68, 84; of

Nilotic peoples, 16; of Nubians, 10, 74; urban, 84

military (see also armed forces), 216; as- sistance, 135; coup attempts by, 36, 234, 237; coups by, 231, 234; involve- ment in government, 232, 234-37; problems of, in civil war, xxxii; recruit- ment, 239, 251

Military College, 253, 260

military officers: anti-Western sentiment of, 238; under Bashir, 238; benefits for, 252; black-market activities of, 252; executed, 237; indigenous class of, 237-38; moonlighting by, 252; under Nimeiri, 238; pay

rates for, 252; in political appointments,

235-36; purged, 237, 236; retirement in- come of, 252; southern, 239; women as, 253

military personnel, 251-52; conscription

of, 252; deserters, 251; enlistment rate, 251, 252; morale of, 251

military spending, 254-55; budget for 1989, 253

military training, 253-54; abroad, 253-

54; for enlisted personnel, 254; for for- eign personnel, 253, 254; for officers, 253

militias (see also under individual groups), xxxii, 231, 243, 255-59; government

support for, 258; human rights abuses

by, 221, 231, 241, 243, 257, 258, 273; 323
Sudan: A Country Study

looting by, 257, 273; Nuer in, 255; number participating in, 255; in south, 273

minerals, 164 Minex Company, 165 Minimum Standard of Wages Order, 140 mining, 139, 162, 164-66; as percentage

of gross domesic product, 164

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 145, 152, 201 Ministry of Construction and Public Works, 201

Ministry of Culture and Information, 201 Ministry of Defence, 201, 245

Ministry of Education, 201 Ministry of Energy and Mining, 201 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 139, 191, 201; Department of

Statistics, 137; purges of, 129 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 201 Ministry of Health, 120-21, 201 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 201 Ministry of Industry, 201 Ministry of Interior, 201 Ministry of Irrigation, 201 Ministry of Justice, 201

Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, 201 Ministry of Trade and Cooperation, 201 Ministry of Transport and Communications, 201 Ministry of Welfare and Social Develop- ment, 201 Mirghani, Ali al, 30, 34 Mirghani, Muhammad Uthman al, 51, 52, 105, 214, 218-19; exiled, 219, 224 Mirghani family, 105, 238 Mirghani-Garang agreement, 214

Misiriyah militias, 257 Moru people, 83; religion of, 107 mountains, 58, 63 Mouvement Patriotique du Salut. See Patriotic Movement for Salvation Mubarak, Husni, 223 Muhammad, Abdallahi ibn {see also the

Khalifa), 18, 20, 21 Muhammad (Prophet), 187 Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd

Allah. See Mahdi

Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub: coalition under, xxiv; as prime minister, xxiv Muhammad Ali, 14, 17

Mundari people, 243; militia of, 258 Muqurra, 8, 9

murahalin. See militias Murle people, 81 Museveni, Yoweri, 240 Muslim Brotherhood {see also National Is- lamic Front), xxviii, 106-7, 47, 186,

209, 219; elites as members of, 98, 219; influence of, on government, 48, 51, 106-7, 116, 128, 198, 203, 207-9, 213, 215, 237, 271; origins of, 219; politi- cal party of, 216 Muslim religious orders, xxiii, 88-89,

104-7, 216; influence of, 88; landownership by, 92; Nimeiri's attempt at reconciliation with, 46 Muslims (see also Islam; sharia), xxiii, 9; Arab, 72-74; Beja, 75; Berti, 76-77; conquest of Nubia by, xxiii; Daju, 76-

77; ethnicity of, 72-78; Fur, 75; Masalit, 76-77; nationalist movements among,

29; Nubian, 74; as percentage of population, 100; political ascendancy of, 11;

strikes by, 47; subjugation of North

Africa by, 9; Sunni, 57-58; West Afri- can, 77-78; Zaghawa, 75-76

Naath people. See Nuer people

Naguib, Muhammad, 31 Napata, 5, 6 Nasir faction of Sudanese People's Liber- ation Army, xxx

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 34, 42 National Bank of Egypt, 185 National Communists, 42

National Democratic Alliance (NDA),

xxxii, 216, 218, 265; broadcasts by, 222, 265; Egyptian support for, 224

National Dialogue Conference, 215-16;

results of, 216

National Economic Salvation Program,

xxvii National Front, 46, 47; dissolved, 47

National Front for Professionals, 37

National Islamic Front (NIF), xxviii, 51, 186, 210, 219, 258; political influence

of, xxviii, 51, 52, 107, 116, 128, 134,

198, 214, 215, 219, 231, 237; training of military officers from, 253

nationalist movements, 29-30; desire of, for independence, xxiv, 29-30; desire 324
Index

of, for unification of Sudan, 29; desire

of, for union with Egypt, xxiv, 29-30

nationalists: opposition of, to indirect

rule, 26; riots by, 26

nationalization, 128, 161, 235; abandon- ment of, 131, 162

Nationalization of Banks Act (1970), 186 National Oil Company of Sudan, 171 National Population Committee, 67

national reconciliation, 47-49; test of, 48

National Salvation government, 214

National Security Council, 235

National Unionist Party (NUP), 30, 35,

47; boycott of 1948 elections by, 30;

coalitions of, 40; desire of, for union

with Egypt, 31, 32; in 1958 elections, 34-35; in 1965 elections, 38; in 1967

elections, 39; political influence of, 134

National Unity Day, 46

navy, 250-51; aircraft of, 251; insignia

of, 254; materiel of, 250; military as- sistance to, 260; mission of, 250; number of personnel in, 245; operational

status of, 250-51; ranks of, 254; train- ing of, 250; uniforms of, 254; vessels

of, 250 NDA. See National Democratic Alliance Ndogo people, 82

Netherlands: trade with, 136, 189 Newbold, Sir Douglas, 30

newspapers, 221-22; closed, 197, 221; purged, 221-22 NIF. See National Islamic Front

Nigeria, 13; air service to, 180; relations with, 228

Nile River (see also Blue Nile; White Nile), xxv, 65; archaeological exploration

along, 3-4; drainage of, 64; Dunqulah

Reach, 179; importance of, xxiii, xxv,

57, 64; as inland waterway, 172; trans- portation on, 178-79; used for irriga- tion, xxvi, 147

Nile River Valley, 58, 59; arabization of, 9; ethnic groups in, 10

Nile Waters Agreement (1959), 148, 240; shortage under, 127

Nilotes, 78-81, 93; age-sets in, 95; home

of, 78, 80; influences on, 80; as percentage of population, 78; relations among,

80; religion among, 108

Nilotic peoples (see also under individual peoples), xxiii, 16-17; clans of, 94; religion

of, 107; social organization of, 94

Nilotic plain, 62, 63

Nimeiri, Jaafar an, 187; attempt by, to reconcile with Muslim groups, 46; coup

by, xxiv, 41, 199, 202, 235; elected to

first term, xxiv, 43; elected to second

term, xxv, 47; exiled, 49, 223; over- thrown, 49, 209; parliament dissolved by, 202; as prime minister, 42, 47 Nimeiri government (see also Revolutionary Command Council), xxiv, 41-49; Addis Ababa accords under, xxv, 212,

231, 264; Ansar under, 235; battle of, against Ansar, 42, 217; cabinet of, 41;

civil war under, 235; corruption in, 132-33; coup attempts against, 236; education reorganized under, 111-12; end of, 103, 128; ethnic groups under,

221; foreign relations under, 222; gov- ernment structure under, xxix, 204-6;

internal security under, 270; legal sys- tem under, 207; military under, 236,

239; nationalization under, 235; nomads

under, 91; opposition to, xxv; September Laws of, 203, 271; sharia imposed

by, 87, 103, 203, 213, 219, 231, 242; south under, xxv, 136, 197, 204, 231,

242; state of emergency under, 47; tribal authority under, 95; unions under, 142 Nobatae, 6 Nobatia (Ballanah), 6, 8, 9 nomads, 57; administration of, 91; Arab,

89-91; gardening by, 90; leaders of, 91, 93; lineages in, 90-91, 93; marriage among, 90; in military, 238; organization of, 90; power among, 91; settled, 93; social organization of, 93; as tenants, 92; water for, 61 non-Muslims, 78-83; Azande, 81-82; Bari, 81; Bviri, 82; Didinga, 81; ethnicity of, 72; Kakwa, 71; Mandari, 81; Murle, 81; Ndogo, 82; Nilotes, 78-81; Nuba, 83 north (see also north-south division), xxiii; British indirect rule by shaykhs in, 26;

legal system in, 206; Muslims in, 57-

58; repression of south by, xxiv; temperatures in, 66 North Africa, 180 North America, 43

northerners: anti-Islamist, xxxii; forbid- den to enter south, xxiii; protests by,

against removal of subsidies, xxxii north-south division, 3, 58, 85, 92, 231,

240, 264; education and, 27; influence 325
Sudan: A Country Study

of Islam on, 9; language and, 69; by

race, 85; reinforced under British, 3, 233; in Sudan Political Service, 28-29;

violence in, 32, 86 Norway: aid from, 127, 136 Nuba Mountains, 51, 58, 61, 83; lan- guages spoken in, 70; mining in, 165 Nuba people, 83; economy of, 83; govern- ment efforts to destroy, xxxiii; lan- guages of, 83; social organization of, 83; in Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, 95 Nubia, 4, 6-9; Arab invasion of, 9; Arab

position in, 10-1 1

; Arab threat to, 8-9;

Christianity in, xxiii, xxiii, 8, 11; Christian missions in, xxiii; contacts of, with Arabs, xxiii; dark age of, 11; decline of, 11; Greek influence on, 8; Greek lan- guage in, 8; introduction of Islam to, 9-14; Islam in, xxiii; kingdoms of, xxiii, 10; Muslim conquest of, xxiii; political system in, 8; queen mother in, 8; warrior aristocracy in, 8 Nubian Desert, 58 Nubian language, 8 Nubian people, xxvi, 74, 86; arabization

of, 74; displaced by Lake Nubia,

148-49; distribution of, 74; early contacts of, with Arabs, 9-10; homeland

of, 74; intermarriage of, with Arabs,

10, 11; as Muslims, 74; resetdement of, 74, 148-49; as tenants, 92; urban

migration of, 74 Nuer people (Naath), xxvi, xxx, 72, 80, 87, 89, 93; in civil war, 231, 242; conflicts of, with Dinka, 80, 221; in

militias, 255; origins of, 16; religion among, 108; self-esteem of, 86; in Sudanese People's Liberation Army,

264; tribal groups of, 80 Nujumi, Abd ar Rahman, 21 NUP. See National Unionist Party

Nurses' Training College, 115

Nyala: electric generation in, 167; factory

at, 131 Nyiking, 80

October Revolution (1964), 37, 141

Office of Chief Qadi, 210

Office of State Security, 270

oil (see also petroleum): discovery of, 87, 127; exploration for, xxxi, 166, 168,

170; foreign exchange costs of, 168;

refinery, 161, 170-71; reserves, 171; revenues lost to civil war, xxxii Omdurman, 23; air defense command in, 250; elites in, 96; population of, 68;

television station in, 222 Omdurman Ahlia University, 115 OPEC . See Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Operation Bright Star, 227, 261 Organization of African Trade Union

Unity, 142 Organization of African Unity, 228

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC), 186 Ottoman-Egyptian rule, xxiv, 12; bureaucracy introduced by, xxiv; secular courts introduced by, xxiv Ottoman Empire: defense of Egypt by,

14; influence of, on Nilotes, 80; rule of Egypt by, 12, 14 Ottoman Porte, xxiii Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, 121

Painkhy, 5 Pakistan, 228

Paris Club: relations with, 191 parliament, 201-2; under Azhari, 33;

closed by Abbud, 37; corruption in, 35; dissolved, 40, 49, 201, 202; factional- ism in, 35, 37

Patriotic Movement for Salvation (Mouve- ment Patriotique du Salut), 225 Payasama, Stanislaus, 38 PDF. See Popular Defence Forces PDP. See People's Defence Party

People's Assembly, 47, 209, 235; elec- tions, 48, 202

People's Cooperative Bank, 185-86

People's Defence Party (PDP), 34, 35, 38, 40

People's Local Government Act (1971), 204

Persian Gulf War: alienation of international community in, xxx-xxxi, 136, 222-23, 224, 226, 259; repatriated workers during, xxxiii, 139; support for Iraq

in, 221, 228, 259

petroleum {see also oil): discovery of, 164;

for electric generation, 168; exploration, 164; exported, 170; imported,

168, 170, 183, 188, 190; pipeline, 171; 326
Index

production, 171; resources, xxvi, 168-

71; use, 168-71 PEWC. See Public Electricity and Water

Corporation

physicians, 118, 119 Pibor Post, 242, 243

pipelines, 184; capacity of, 184; problems

on, 184

plain of the Sudan, 58

Pochala, 242

police, 266-70; actions of, 268-70; ad- ministration of, 265, 267; communal,

267; distribution of, 268; insignia of, 254; mutiny by, 241; under Nimeiri,

267; number of, 268; organization of, 267; origins of, 266-67; purged, 265; ranks of, 254; responsibilities of, 268;

training of, 268; uniforms of, 254; units

of, 267; women in, 268

Police Act (1979), 267

political development, 26, 27

political instability, 199

political parties: banned, xxviii, 36, 41, 197, 198, 199, 202, 215, 265, 266; under Bashir government, xxviii, 197,

198, 199, 202, 215; factions in, 50; under Khatim government, 37; under

Nimeiri government, 42, 202; reli- gious, 207; representing south, 37;

revival of, 50-51; secular, 220-21; underground activities of, 216

Popular Defence Act (1989), xxix, 258

Popular Defence Forces (PDF), 258; camps, 258-59; created, xxxii, 232; membership in, 116, 258; number of personnel in, 258, 259; training of, 258; training of military officers from, 253

population (see also ethnic groups; see also under individual ethnic groups), 67-69; under age eighteen, 68; Arabs as percentage of, xxvi, 72; Azande as percentage

of, 81; birth rate, 67, 82; Christians as percentage of, 85, 100; death rate, 67,

68; density, 6, 68; destruction of, under

the Khalifa, 23; Dinka as percentage of, 87; distribution of, xxvi; family planning, 68; fertility rate, 68; growth rate, 67; infant mortality, 67; life expectancy, 68; Muslims as percentage of, 100; Nilotes as percentage of, 78; in 1983, 67; in 1990, xxvi, 67; Nubian,

74; projected, 67-68; rural, 68; urban,

xxvi, 68; West Africans as percentage

of, 77; workforce as percentage of, 138, 142

ports, 182-84; capacity of, 183; facilities, 182-83; traffic in, 183

Port Sudan, xxxi, 25, 26, 30, 74, 172, 182-83, 250; air defense command in, 250; airport, 182, 249; built, 182; electric generation in, 167; improvements

in, 183; navy in, 250; oil refinery, 170, 171, 188; port facilities, 182-83; rail transportation to, 173; United States fa- cilities in, 261 Port Sudan Prison, 274, 275 Power Project: III, 136, 168; IV, 168; V,

168

Presbyterians, 27

presidency, 200-201

Presidential Guard, 270

press: Arabic used in, 71; restrictions on, 199

price controls, xxvii

prices, 137-38 prime minister, 33

prisoners: political, 266, 274; treatment

of, 274-75

prison system, 274-75

private sector: enterprises controlled by,

128, 161; investment, 131; irrigated

agriculture in, 129; loans to, 185

professional associations, 37, 47, 216; banned, 42; demonstrations by, 214

Public Electricity and Water Corporation

(PEWC), 167

public sector: earnings, 131; enterprises

controlled by, 128; investment, 130-31,

132; wages, 139

Qadhafi, Muammar al: state visit by,

xxxi, 225 Qadiriyah brotherhood, 104

Qallabat, 21 Qash Delta, 62; cotton cultivation in, 148 Qash River, 62, 63 Qaysan, 243

qoz, 61, 64, 178 Quran, 9, 70, 116, 187 Quraysh people, 10

Rabak, 131

radio, 185, 221, 222; receivers, 222; sta- tions, 222 327
Sudan: A Country Study

Radio Omdurman, 250; Arabic used in, 71 Radio SPLA, 222

Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi: state

visit by, xxxi Rahad River, 61, 64 Rahad River irrigation project, 127, 131

railroads, xxvii, 172-76; constructed by

British, 23, 25, 129, 172-73; efforts to improve, 175; foreign assistance for, 175; gauge of, 173; history of, 172-73; importance of, 175; for military use, 172-73; network, 173; for trade, 173

rainfall, 63, 66

rain forests, xxv, 12, 57 RCC-NS. See Revolutionary Command

Council for National Salvation Red Sea, 3, 4, 6, 62; fishing in, 144, 157 Red Sea Hills, 51, 58, 62; mining in, 164

refugees, foreign, xxx, 68; from Chad, 84, 128, 134; economic cost of, xxvii,

xxviii; from Eritrea, 128, 134, 240; from Ethiopia, 84, 128, 134; number

of, 84, 134; from Uganda, 128, 134

refugees, Sudanese, 84-85, 128; from civil war, xxxii, 43, 231, 242, 243, 257; from

famine, 243-44; international aid to, xxxiii; number of, xxxii, 67, 84, 266;

public order campaigns against, 268-70

religion {see also under individual religions), xxiii; differences among, 57; Egyptian,

adopted in Cush, 5; under Egyptian

rule, 15-16; in south, 58

religion, traditional, xxiii, 58, 85, 88, 107-10; ancestors in, 108-9; believers, as percentage of population, 100; cattle in, 108; evil eye in, 109-10; pantheon of, 107-8; rain in, 109; sorcerers

in, 109-10; spirits in, 107-8

religious conflicts, 240

religious leaders, 97 Republican Brothers, 219-20

reservoirs, 157 Revolutionary Command Council, xxiv, 41-43, 235; Ansar as threat to, 42; dis- solved, 235; problems in, 235; role of communists in, 41, 42 Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS), 53, 197, 198, 199-200, 219, 237, 265; armed forces under, 231, 253; civilian consultative councils, 200; committees

of, 197, 200; constitutional conference

of, xxix; coup attempts against, xxxii; economy under, 237; education reform

under, 116; elites under, 97; foreign re- lations under, 223-24; functions of, xxviii, 200; genocide programs of, xxxiii; government structure under,

xxix; humanitarian aid rejected by, 227-28; human rights abuses by, 198, 211, 265; influence of Muslim Brother- hood in, 237; influence of National

Islamic Front in, 219, 237; instability

of, 199; judiciary under, 211; media

under, 222; members of, xxviii, 200;

militias under, 221; opposition to, xxxii, xxxiii, 198, 214, 220, 232; parlia- ment dissolved by, 202; peace talks

of, with Sudanese People's Liberation Army, xxx; physicians harassed by,

118; policies under, xxviii; political parties banned by, 198, 215; political parties under, xxviii, 202, 216; politi- cal prisoners under, 274, 275; popular committees under, xxix, 270; popular conferences under, xxix; problems in, xxxiii; protests against, 17; purges by, 128, 198, 211, 231, 265; repression under, 265, 272; sharia under, 210, 271; state of emergency

under, 272; surveillance under, 270;

ties of, to National Islamic Front, 198; unions under, 140; women under, 268

River Transport Corporation (RTC):

cargo carried by, 179-80; efforts to improve, 180; inefficiency in, 180; pas- sengers carried by, 179-80

Rizeiqat militias, 257

roads, 120, 176-78; attempts to improve, 176-78; development of, 131, 176; fi- nancing for, 178; impassable, 176; mined by Sudanese People's Liberation Army, 176, 178; network of, xxvii, 172, 176; paving projects, 178 Romans, 6 Roseires Dam (Ar Rusayris), 64, 130,

149, 179; electricity generated by, 167;

fishing in, 157 Royal Dutch Shell, 170 RTC. See River Transport Corporation

Rufaa al Huj people, 87; militia of, 257

rural areas: administration of, 46; controlled by Anya Nya, 43; population of, 68 Rwanda, 65 328
Index

Saad, Abd Allah ibn, 9-10

Sadat, Anwar as, 223 Saddam Husayn, 223 Sadiq al Mahdi. See Mahdi, Sadiq al Salih, Az Zubair Muhammad, 200

Salih, Bakri Hassan, 200 Sammaniyah Muslims, 18 Samnah, 4

Sannar, 12, 13, 19, 20; factory at, 131;

irrigation dam near, 26, 64; rail trans- portation to, 173; surrender of, to Egypt, 14-15 SANU. See Sudan African National Union

SANU-Williams, 38

Satit irrigation project, 131 Saudi Arabia, 139; aid from, xxxi, 136, 226; aid suspended by, 222; exports to, xxvi; investment by, 127, 135, 151,

186; military assistance from, 232, 259, 261; oil from, 226; relations with, 226;

trade with, 189 Saudi Development Fund, 135 Save the Children Fund, 69, 121 Sawakin, 10, 19, 20, 23, 25, 157-58 Sawakin port, 183-84 Sawba, 5, 8 Sayid, Ahmad as, 52

schools: distribution of, 113; private, 112;

technical, 112-13, 113

schools, intermediate: enrollment in, 110;

girls', 115; number of, 110

schools, junior secondary: girls', 115; number of, 112

schools, primary, 110, 113; destroyed by

civil war, 112; enrollment in, 110;

girls', 115; language of instruction in, 71; in north, 110; number of, 110, 112; operated by Sudanese People's Liberation Army, 112; in south, 110, 112; system of, 112

schools, secondary: English as language

of instruction in, 71; enrollment in, 110; girls', 115; number of, 110 SCP. See Sudanese Communist Party SDF. See Sudan Defence Force Sea Ports Corporation, 182

"security of the revolution," 270-71

Self-Determination Agreement (1952),

xxiv, 30

Senate, 202 SennarDam, 26, 64, 148, 179; electricity generation by, 167; fishing behind,

157; nationalized, 148

September Laws {see also sharia), 48, 203, 207-9, 218, 271; demands for repeal of, 210, 213, 217, 219; suspended, 271

service sector, 139, 190 Shaiqiyah people, 15 Shalla Prison, 274, 275 Shams ad Din, Ibrahim, 200

Shandi: electric generation in, 167; fac- tory at, 131 shanty towns, 139

sharia {see also Islam; Muslims), 9; under

Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 24, 206-7; under Bashir, 210; call for re- peal of, xxv ; as cause of civil war, 214, 218-19, 242; courts, 210; Egyptian

judges in, 24; hudud under, 209, 271; imposition of, xxv, xxviii, xxx, 46, 48,

87, 102-3, 136, 197, 198, 203, 213, 219, 231, 271; under Mahdiyah, 21; national division on, xxix, 51, 80, 198; under Nimeiri, 203, 213, 242; opposition to, 50, 100, 197-98, 209, 219;

precolonial, 106; role of, 203; under

Sadiq al Mahdi, 213; support for, 209, 218; under Turkiyah, 15

Sharif, Muhammad ash, 18 shaykhs, 93

sheep, 154, 156

Sheikan, 19

Shilluk people (Collo), xxvi, 13, 80; government of, 80-81; origins of, 16;

political organization of, 94, 108; prophets in, 94; religion among, 108;

self-esteem of, 86; settlement of, 80; in Sudanese People's Liberation Army,

264

Shukriya people, 10

Sinjah, 64

Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social De- velopment (1977-82), 131-32, 164

Slatin, Rudolf, 19

slave raiding, 11, 88; by Baqqara tribes, 90; by Mamluks, 12, 14; in south, 16

slavery, 10, 221

slaves, 4, 92; physical appearance of, 86;

as soldiers, 14, 15; as tribute, 5, 10

slave trade, 4, 9, 19; abolition of, 16, 17, 27; with Egypt, 14, 16; Egyptian monopoly on, 17; by Funj, 12; by Fur, 14; private, 17; revival of, 18; in south, 17 smuggling, 133, 211, 240, 250, 268, 274

Sobat River, 65

social services, 27 329
Sudan: A Country Study

social status, 97-98

social stratification, 92

soils, 63-64; clay zone, 63-64; fertility of, 153; kinds of, 63; laterite, 64; sandy, 64

soldiers: unemployed, 18 Solong, Sulayman, 13 Sources of Judicial Decisions Bill, 209

south {see also north-south division), xxiii, 50, 212-14; under Abbud, 36-37, 204, 234; Arab control of commercial sec- tor in, 27; Arabic as official language

in, 31, 32; arabization of, xxiv, 85, 212; autonomy of, 212, 264; British indirect rule in, 26, 204; British policy in, 26-29; closed-door ordinances in, 27; communities of, 93; economic develop- ment of, 28; fear by, of Islamization, 203, 213; fear by, of northern domination, 32, 33, 204, 213; government control of, xxix-xxx; ignored by British, xxiv; isolation of, 17, 27, 28, 35; lan- guages in, xxvi, 68, 71; militias in, 273; need to stabilize, 34; under Nimeiri,

xxv, 136; political parties representing,

37, 51, 220; provinces of, 27; redivided under Nimieri, xxv, 197, 231, 242, 264; regional autonomy for, 46; reli- gion in, 58; repression of, by north,

xxiv; slave raiding in, 16; slave trade

in, 17; Sudanese People's Liberation Movement in, xxx; women in, 100

southerners: in army, 46, 238; in civil service, 27, 212; communities of, 93;

conflicts among, 87; fear by, of north- ern domination, xxiii; rejection of, in government, 35; self-esteem of, 86 Southern Front, 38; in 1968 elections, 39

southern policy, 50; of Abbud, 36-37; of

British, 26-29, 31, 86; of Mahjub, 38; of Nimeiri, 43 Southern Region, 48; redivision of, 48 Southern Regional Assembly, 44-46;

abolished, xxv, 48, 197, 213, 231, 264;

established, 212 Southern Sudanese Political Association, 50 Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

(SSLM) {see also Joseph Lagu), 212; amnesty for, 46; formed, xxiv, 44, 242; governing infrastructure of, 44

Soviet Union: economic assistance from,

40; materiel from, 44, 247, 248, 260;

military assistance from, 40, 232, 238,

250, 259; planning assistance from,

130; relations with, 137, 222, 260; tech- nical assistance from, 40; trade with, 189 SPLA. See Sudanese People's Liberation Army

SPLM. See Sudanese People's Liberation Movement

SRC. See Sudan Railways Corporation

SRWU. See Sudan Railway Workers

Union

SSLM. See Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

SSO. See State Security Organisation SSU. See Sudan Socialist Union

Stack, Sir Lee, 26, 29

Staff College, 254

State Security Organisation (SSO), 48, 270

strikes, 47, 48-49, 140, 141, 142, 236,

266; prohibited, 141, 265; protesting

military government, xxv; protesting

sharia, xxv

student associations, 42

students: demonstrations by, xxv, 265,

266; opposition of, to Sadiq al Mahdi

government, 39; strikes by, 47

subsidies: on food, 138; on petroleum

products, xxvii; protests against re- moval of, xxxii; reduction of, xxvii, 191; removal of, 138; on sugar, xxvii Sudan Administrative Conference (1946): response to, 31; terms of, 31 Sudan Africa Closed Districts National Union {see also Sudan African National Union), 212 Sudan African National Union (SANU)

{see also Sudan Africa Closed Districts National Union), 37, 212; in 1967 elec- tions, 39; in 1968 elections, 39 Sudan Air Cargo, 180-82 Sudan Airways, 172, 180; fleet, 180; inter- national service, 180; number of passengers, 180; pooling agreement of, with Tradewind Airways, 180-82; problems

in, 182 Sudan Airways Company, 180 Sudan Bar Association, 265 Sudan Commercial Bank, 185 Sudan Currency Board, 185 Sudan Defence Force (SDF), 26; formation of, 233; in World War II, 30, 233 Sudan Development Corporation, 151 330
Index

Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) (see also communists), 36, 37, 38, 40, 43,

51, 141, 216, 220; abolished, 39; coup

attempt by, 235; declared legal, 39; execution of leaders of, 220; opposition

of, to Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, 220, 266; support for, 220, 238 Sudanese Estates Bank, 186 Sudanese Federation of Employees and

Professionals Trade Unions, 142 Sudanese Human Rights Organization, 211 Sudanese-Kuwaiti Transport Company,

178 Sudanese Mining Corporation, 164, 165 Sudanese National Oil Company, 170 Sudanese People's Armed Forces. See armed forces Sudanese People's Liberation Army

(SPLA), 48, 128, 252, 258, 262-64; at- tack by, on Chevron operation, 128; desertions to, 251, 257; ethnic groups

in, 264; foreign aid for, xxxi, 226, 240, 262; formed, 197, 242; human rights violations by, 264, 273; materiel for, 248-49, 264; medical facilities of, 118; number of personnel in, 262; officers

in, 262-64; opposition of, to division of south, xxv; peace talks in, xxx; peace

talks of, with government, xxx; power

of, in south, 12, 231; schools operated

by, 112; split in, xxx; training of, 262;

transportation disrupted by, 176, 178, 179 Sudanese People's Liberation Movement

(SPLM), 48, 128, 216; agreement of, with Sadiq al Mahdi, 5, 210; amnesty

for, 50; Egyptian support for, 224; for- eign aid for, xxxi, 224, 225, 226; formed, 197, 213; goals of, 213; in Koka Dam Declaration, xxv; members

of, 221; opposition of, to division of

south, xxv; sharia opposed by, 100, 210; solidarity under, 95; support for, 221; talks of, with government, 198 Sudanese Savings Bank, 186 Sudan Gezira Board, 148, 172 Sudan Medical Association, 118 Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation, 222 Sudan News Agency, 221

Sudanow, 222

Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 25-26, 148 Sudan Police College, 268 Sudan Political Service, 24; north-south

division in, 28-29 Sudan Prison Service, 274 Sudan Railways, 129, 141, 172; extent of, 173; financial problems in, 173-75; in- efficiency of, 173; network, 173; police

of, 267; problems in, 173-75; tonnage

transported by, 175; worker productivity in, 174 Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC), 172, 182 Sudan Railway Workers Union (SRWU),

140, 142 Sudan Shipping Line, 184 Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), xxix, 42,

46, 95, 204, 235; dissolved, 49; purged,

47; strikes by, 142 Sudan Television, 222 Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF), 141 Suez Canal, 18, 31

sugar, 127; cultivation, xxvi, 144, 149,

150; domestic production, 150-51, 188;

factories, 130, 149, 150-51, 161, 162, 188 Suhayni, Abd Allah as, 24 Supreme Commission, 32-33, 38 Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (see also Abbud government), xxiv, 36, 37 Supreme Court, 39, 40, 210 swamps, 145 SWTUF. See Sudan Workers Trade

Unions Federation

Taha, Mahmud Muhammad, 219-20

Taharqa, 5 Tahir, At Tijani Adam at, 200

Tawfiq, 18

tax collectors: under Egyptian rule, 15,

18; Mahdi's denunciation of, 19; by

Mamluks, 12

taxes: under Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 24; for development, 131 Tayyib, Babikr at Tijani at, 220

Tayyib, Umar Muhammad at, 270

teachers: foreign, 111; purged, 198; train- ing of, 111, 113 telecommunications (see also communications), 184-85; extended by British, 25

telephones, 184 331
Sudan: A Country Study

television, 185, 222; sets, 222; stations, 222

telex, 184 Ten-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1961-70), 129-30; aban- doned, 130; mismanagement of, 129- 30

textiles, 188-89; domestic, 188; imported, 188 Theodora, 8 Three Towns (see also Khartoum; Khar- toum North; Omdurman): language

in, 69; migration to, 84, 156 Tigray People's Liberation Front, 226, 240

Tijani, Ahmad at, 105 Tijaniyah brotherhood, 105 TMC. See Transitional Military Council

toic, 63 Tonga, 243

topography, 58

Torit: army mutiny at (1955), 43, 241;

civil war in, 243; faction of Sudanese

People's Liberation Army, xxx

torture, 211, 271, 274, 275

Total, 171 Trades and Tradesmen's Union Ordi- nance (1948), 141 Trade Unions Act (1971), 142 Tradewind Airways, 180-82

Transitional Military Council (TMC),

xxv, 49, 236; creation of, 49; failures

of, 50; in Koka Dam Declaration, xxv

Transitional National Assembly, xxix

transportation, xxvii, 49; under five-year plans, 130; infrastructure, 34, 172; on

inland waterways, xxvii; loans for, 135; problems caused by, xxvii, 172; prob- lems in, 120; as public enterprise, 128; road, 128 Treaty of Alliance (1936), 29

tribes (see also ethnic groups; see also under

individual tribes): Arab, 73-74; authority

of, 95; distinctions among, 12; homelands of, 12-13,16; under the Khalifa,

23; lineages in, 73, 88; membership in, 74; warfare among, 27 Turabi, Hassan Abd Allah at, 51, 52, 210; arrested, 209, 219; attack on,

xxviii; as attorney general, 213, 219; background of, xxviii, 219; revision of

legal system by, 207

Turkiyah, 14-18; bureaucracy under, 15;

jihad against, 19; legal system in, 15; religious orthodoxy under, 15-16 Tushkah, 21

Uganda, 65, 239; aid from, to Sudanese

rebels, xxxi, 225, 240; air service to, 180; border conflicts with, 240, 273;

training of military officers from, 253; refugees in, 226, 244 Umar, Ishaq Ibrahim, 245 Umayyads, 73 Umma Party, 47, 216, 217-18, 265; as Ansar political party, 217; coalitions of, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 51, 52; established, 30, 217; Islamic bank formed by, 186; under Mirghani government, 34; under

Nimeiri government, 217; in 1958 elec- tions, 34; in 1965 elections, 38; in 1967

elections, 39; in 1968 elections, 39; in 1978 elections, 48; in 1986 elections, 51; opposition of, to Bashir govern- ment, 216; support by, for Ansar, 40 Umma-NUP coalition, 38, 39 Umma-PDP coalition, 34, 35 Umm Diwaykarat, 23 Umm Ruwabah, 167 unemployment, 139 UNF. See United National Front

unions, 140-42, 216; banned, 140, 141, 265; demonstrations by, 214; govern- ment control of, 42, 140; officials of, ex- ecuted, 141; officials of, imprisoned,

140, 141, 272, 275; origins of, 141; purges of, 129; support of, for Sudanese Communist Party, 220, 238 United Arab Emirates, 201, 226; train- ing of military officers from, 253 United National Front (UNF), 37 United Nations, 228

United Nations Development Programme,

145 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 145, 160 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 67 United Nations World Food Programme

(WFP), 69, 121; Operation Lifeline Sudan, xxxiii United States, 48, 84, 170, 211; aid from,

xxviii, 34, 127, 132, 135-36, 176, 227, 260-61; joint venture with, 162; materiel from, 247, 248, 250, 262; 332
Index

military assistance from, 261-62; relations with, 35, 227-28, 259; technical assist- ance from, 34, 35, 176; trade with, 189 United States Agency for International Development (AID), 136, 227; Food

for Peace Program, 136 United States Arms Control and Disar- mament Agency (ACDA), 251, 262 United Tribes Society (see also White Flag

League): founded, 29 Unity Bank, 186

universities: admission to, 116, 258; sup- port of, for Sudanese Communist

Party, 220, 238

University of Cairo, 114

University of Juba, 88, 114

University of Khartoum, 110, 219; anti- government protests in, 37; Arabic as language of instruction in, 71 , 118; English as language of instruction in, 71, 111, 118; enrollment, 114; faculty dis- missed from, 118; training of military

officers in, 253 Upper Egypt. See Egypt, Upper

Upper Nile, 16 Upper Nile Province (see also Aali an Nil), 27, 44 uranium, 165; concession, 165-66 urban areas: administration of, 46; controlled by government forces, 43; migration to, 74, 84; population of, 68;

services in, 89

urbanization, 57 Uthman, Uthman Ahmad, 200

Verona Fathers, 27

villages: class structure in, 92; land tenure

in, 92; officials in, 92 Wadai (Chad), 77 Wadi Haifa, 20, 23, 157 Wadi Sayyidna Air Base, 249, 250, 254 Wad Madani, 249

wages, 139-40; minimum, 140; public

sector, 139 Wahhabi Muslims, 14

water: under Nile Waters Agreement,

148; for nomads, 61 Waw, 118; airport, 182; atrocities against

civilians in, 39; civil war in, 242, 258;

electric generation in, 167 Wawat, 4 West Africans, 77-78; origins of, 77; as

percentage of population, 77; as tenants, 92 West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany

western Sudan, 61, 215; government control of, xxix; geography of, 61; topog- raphy of, 61 WFP. See United Nations World Food

Programme

White Flag League (see also United Tribes

Society), 29 White Nile, xxv, 4, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 90; drainage of, 64; Southern Reach, 179, 180 White Nile Basin, 17 White Nile Petroleum Company, 170 Wingate, Sir Reginald, 24

Wolseley, Lord Garnet Joseph, 20 women: associations of, 42; circumcision

of, 99, 100; in labor force, 138; in Mahdist movement, 19; as military officers, 253; raiding for, 88; responsibilities of, 98-99; restrictions on, 99; segregation

of, 99; in south, 100; work by, outside

the home, 99; zar cult of, 99

workers: remittances from, 134-35 Workers' Affairs Association, 141 Workers' Congress, 141 work force, 138-39; in agriculture, 139;

as percentage of population, 138 World Bank, xxvi, 49, 138; credit from,

183; credit denied by, xxvii, 137; grant from, xxvii-xxviii; loans from, 127,

135, 149, 168 World Health Organization, 119 World War II, 25; Sudan Defence Force

in, 30, 233

Yambio, 66

Yei, 214; civil war in, 243 Yohannes IV, 21 Youth for Reconstruction, 271

Yugoslavia: aid from, 127, 178; joint ventures with, 184; materiel from, 250;

military assistance from, 250, 260;

training of military officers in, 253-54

Zaghawa people, 75-76, 215, 225; government efforts to destroy, xxxiii; location of, 75

Zaire, 225-26, 239, 273 Zakat Fund Legislative Bill, 209

zar cult, 99 Zubayr, Rahman Mansur az, 19 333

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