Illinois Official Reports 

Supreme Court

People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655

Caption in Supreme

Court:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

RICHARD HOLMAN, Appellant.

Docket No. 120655

Filed September 21, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that 

court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, the Hon. 

Charles V. Romani, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy 

Defender, and Amanda R. Horner, Assistant Appellate Defender, of 

the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for 

appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, 

Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant 

Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Bluhm Legal Clinic, of Chicago (Shobha L. Mahadev and Scott F. 

Main, of counsel, and Mila Babic and Betsy Varnau, Law Students), 

for amicus curiae Children & Family Justice Center.
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Justices JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, 

Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION 

¶ 1 The central issue in this case is whether defendant Richard Holman, who received a 

sentence of life without parole for a murder that he committed at age 17, is entitled to a new 

sentencing hearing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). We 

hold that the defendant’s original sentencing hearing complied with Miller and affirm the 

Madison County circuit court’s decision to deny his motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On July 13, 1979, Rodney Sepmeyer returned from work to the rural house near downstate 

Maryville where he lived with his 83-year-old grandmother, Esther Sepmeyer. Inside, Rodney 

found Esther’s dead body kneeling and slumped forward over the side of a bed in a bedroom 

that they shared. She had been shot in the cheek just below the right eye, and a pool of blood 

stained the sheets. The house was ransacked, and a television, a turntable, a radio, and a 

lawnmower were missing. Rodney’s .22-caliber rifle also was missing, and the metal cabinet 

in the bedroom where he stored the gun was open. 

¶ 4 Rodney summoned his father, Lenard, who lived nearby. Lenard called the police. A crime 

scene technician found a spent .22-caliber shell casing at the base of the bedroom heating 

stove, as well as the empty rifle box and an empty box of rounds on the kitchen floor. The 

technician lifted latent fingerprints from the handle of a small mirror left on the bedroom floor 

and from the door of the metal cabinet. The coroner’s physician later recovered a .22-caliber 

bullet from Esther’s neck. According to the physician, Esther was likely knocked unconscious 

after being shot, but she may have lived for as long as a half-hour. After the autopsy, the 

investigation of Esther’s murder stalled. 

¶ 5 Several weeks later, the defendant and Girvies Davis were arrested and incarcerated in the 

St. Clair County jail for an unrelated offense. While there, the defendant and Davis both made 

inculpatory statements about their collaboration in a crime spree through Madison and St. Clair 

Counties. In his own handwriting, Davis listed 11 homicides, shootings, and robberies, which 

included Esther’s murder. The defendant told police officers about eight homicides, all of 

which appeared on Davis’s list, in addition to Esther’s murder. Regarding that offense, both the 

defendant and Davis admitted that they took items from her house, but each accused the other 

of being the shooter.1 They were charged by information with three counts of first degree 

 

1The defendant’s statement was reduced to writing several months after it was made by the police 

officer who interrogated him. That written statement does not appear in the record, but the officer 

testified at trial as to its contents. Davis’s statement was reduced to writing by another police officer the 

day it was made. That written statement does appear in the record, as well as in People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 

2d 1, 8-9 (1983). 
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murder. The police obtained a warrant and searched Davis’s residence, where they found the 

radio and the lawnmower.2The State’s fingerprint expert later matched the defendant’s left 

index fingerprint to the fingerprints lifted from the mirror and the cabinet. 

¶ 6 The defendant and Davis were tried together. On March 16, 1981, a jury found the 

defendant guilty of first degree murder.3 Because he was five weeks from his eighteenth 

birthday at the time of the offense, he was not eligible for the death penalty. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 

1979, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(b). The multiple-murder sentencing statute in effect at that time provided 

that the court “may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment” if any of the 

aggravating factors in section 9-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 were present. Ill. Rev. Stat. 

1979, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-8-1(a)(1). One of those aggravating factors was the prior murders of two 

or more persons. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(b)(3). The case proceeded to sentencing. 

¶ 7 The Madison County circuit court’s probation and court services department prepared a 

presentence investigation report (PSI).4The PSI included the defendant’s criminal history. At 

age 14, he was adjudicated delinquent for burglary and placed on two years’ probation. At age 

15, he was adjudicated delinquent for three counts of criminal damage to property and 

committed to the Department of Corrections’ juvenile division. The defendant was paroled and 

then arrested for burglary three months later. His parole was revoked, and he was returned to 

the Department of Corrections. The defendant was paroled again at age 17. While he was free, 

Esther was murdered. The PSI contained the defendant’s statement to the probation officer 

about that offense: 

“I fenced the stolen stuff but I didn’t commit the home invasion. I wasn’t present when 

the murder took place. Girvies Davis made a statement indicating my name. That gave 

police enough grounds to question me. I refused to talk because I didn’t know 

anything.”

¶ 8 The PSI stated that the defendant’s father died when the defendant was around 7 years old, 

and his stepfather died when he was around 16. The defendant reportedly had “a close, loving 

relationship” with his mother and six siblings. He was never married but reportedly had two 

young children. The defendant was healthy and suffered from no known physical disabilities. 

According to the PSI, the defendant had between seven and nine years of formal education, but 

he was “borderline retarded.” The probation officer concluded:

“The defendant expressed no guilt for this offense or remorse for the victim, who 

was an 82 year old woman who posed no physical threat to him. 

 

2Davis’s statement explained why the police never recovered the television or the rifle. According 

to Davis, he and the defendant sold the television at a bar and then “drove halfway across [the pay 

bridge] and threw the 22 rifle into the river” on the night of Esther’s murder. The missing turntable was 

never mentioned or found. 

3Davis was also found guilty. He received the death penalty, but this court vacated that sentence 

and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 29. Earlier, Davis received the death 

penalty for the first degree murder of Charles Biebel. See People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1 (1983). Evidence 

at that trial indicated that the defendant was the “actual triggerman” responsible for Biebel’s death. 

Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 24. 

4

The first page of the PSI erroneously stated the defendant’s birth date as August 20, 1960, but later 

stated it correctly as August 20, 1961. 
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The defendant’s history of senseless criminal acts of mortal violence toward others 

and lack of remorse for his victims indicates to this officer that the defendant has no 

predilection for rehabilitation.”

¶ 9 Attached to the PSI were three psychological reports—two from a psychiatrist, Dr. Syed 

Raza, and one from a psychologist for the circuit court’s probation department, Cheryl Prost. 

Dr. Raza’s initial report described his interview with the defendant. The defendant offered an 

alternate version of the events on the date of Esther’s murder. According to the defendant, he 

drove Davis’s wife to work, drank beer at a bar with Davis, took a nap at home, picked up a 

girl, visited another bar and a “dice house,” and ended up at home. He awoke the next morning 

and heard police officers speaking to his mother. The defendant was taken to the St. Clair 

County jail, where a detective interrogated him. He asserted that he did not understand most of 

the questions, and the detective “seemed mad at him and hit him.” The defendant then was 

informed that he was charged with murder. Even though the defendant attended his own trial, 

he insisted that he still did not know who had been murdered or how the crime occurred: “My 

lawyer won’t tell me either. They say I am stupid.”

¶ 10 Dr. Raza noted that the defendant mentioned an incident prior to 1977 when he fell from a 

two-story building and hit his head. Afterwards, he was seen by a psychiatrist in Rockford. The 

defendant did not believe that he had a drinking problem. He had used marijuana for almost a 

year before his arrest. Dr. Raza found that the defendant’s attitude was “a mixture of extreme 

apprehension with a sense of hopelessness, some depression and maybe a touch of 

manipulativeness.” The interview was difficult because the defendant’s eye contact was 

extremely poor and his answers were very vague. Dr. Raza detected no “thought disturbance” 

and tentatively diagnosed the defendant with “borderline or dull normal intelligence, acute 

reactive anxiety and some depression,” pending further evaluation and testing.

¶ 11 Prost’s report described her interview with and tests of the defendant. The defendant again 

mentioned his childhood fall and stated that, since then, he had had a severe headache “like 

dynamite ready to explode,” which he treated with aspirin every day. Contrary to the PSI, Prost 

reported that the defendant stated that he was in seventh grade remedial classes before 

dropping out of school. On an intelligence test, the defendant scored in the borderline or mildly 

retarded range. Prost attributed some of his performance to “neurological impairment.” Other 

tests confirmed that and indicated a high probability of organic brain damage. Prost 

recommended a neurological evaluation. 

¶ 12 After reviewing Prost’s report, Dr. Raza made an addendum to his initial report. Dr. Raza 

stated that he had reviewed the medical records of the defendant from the Warren G. Murray 

Children’s Home in Centralia, where the defendant lived for two months in 1976. The records 

showed that the defendant received a full physical examination, which revealed no deficits. He 

was diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded. According to Dr. Raza, therapists at the home 

stated that the defendant “is at times not aware of his surroundings and is easily led into doing 

‘bad deeds,’ ” due to his lack of confidence and high need for approval from more intelligent 

peers. Dr. Raza observed that the defendant’s intelligence test results improved between his 

time at the children’s home and his interview with Prost: “This improvement can be explained 

by growing up in chronological age and maturation process of his central nervous system.” The 

defendant’s verbal intelligence indicated that he does have capacity for making a “socially 

appropriate judgment.” Dr. Raza opined, “Taking all these factors into consideration, it is my 
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opinion that I do not see him as severely handicapped in terms of intellectual ability as to 

interfere with his ability to see right from wrong.”

¶ 13 At the sentencing hearing, the State presented one witness, a former East St. Louis 

homicide section police officer. The officer stated that he investigated the murder of Frank 

Cash and the attempted murder of John Ostman and that he testified in the defendant’s trial for 

those offenses. The officer also stated that he investigated the murder of John Oertel and that 

he testified in the defendant’s trial for that offense. Oertel was killed roughly two months 

before Esther, while the defendant was still 17 years old. Cash was killed a month after Esther, 

after the defendant had turned 18. The State introduced certified copies of the defendant’s 

convictions in both cases. In the former he received concurrent 35- and 25-year sentences. In 

the latter he received a 40-year sentence. 

¶ 14 Before closing arguments, the defendant’s attorney told the court that the defendant did not 

want to offer any mitigating evidence and that the defendant’s mother did not want to testify on 

his behalf. Consequently, the defendant’s attorney conceded, “I have no evidence to present at 

this time” and declined the trial court’s invitation to make any additions, corrections, or 

modifications to the PSI. In closing, the prosecutor highlighted the defendant’s criminal 

history and the fact that he was on parole when Esther was murdered. According to the 

prosecutor, Esther was old and feeble and posed no threat to the defendant. The prosecutor 

noted that the defendant still denied any involvement in the murder, despite his fingerprints at 

the scene. The prosecutor added: 

“I believe more than about any other Defendant that I have seen come through here 

Mr. Holman deserves to be removed from society for the rest of his natural life. It’s 

only an accident of birth that he did not qualify for the death penalty, having been too 

young when these offenses were committed to have qualified. Not being able to seek 

the death penalty on Mr. Holman, I believe that we have to seek the next best thing ***. 

*** I believe that the life sentence here is necessary to deter others from going out on 

similar crime sprees ***.”

¶ 15 The defendant’s attorney argued that the question before the court was whether the court 

“should assess natural life to this very young man.” The defendant’s attorney asked the court to 

consider rehabilitation as a goal and argued that isolation in the prison system militates against 

that goal. Finally, the defendant’s attorney pleaded with the trial court to consider “some other

alternative than that requested by the State and to give this young man an opportunity.”

¶ 16 The trial court offered the defendant an opportunity to make a statement. The defendant 

said: 

“Your Honor, [the prosecutor] made the statement that I was convicted of 

several—three counts of Murder before. That I have been convicted as of what they say 

as accessory of the Murder, of knowing this Murder have taken place. I was never 

convicted of no Murder. And that is my statement.” 

¶ 17 Then the trial court spoke: 

“In this sentence the Court has considered the factors enumerated in the Criminal 

Code as factors in Mitigation and factors in Aggravation. The Court does not find any 

factors in Mitigation. There are many factors in Aggravation. The Court has considered 

the evidence presented at the trial in this cause. The Court has considered the 

presentence investigation. The Court has considered the evidence presented at this 
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hearing today and the arguments of counsel. And the Court believes that this Defendant 

cannot be rehabilitated, and that it is important that society be protected from this 

Defendant. 

 It is therefore the sentence of this Court and you are hereby sentenced, Mr. Holman, 

to the Department of Corrections for the rest of your natural life.”

¶ 18 The defendant appealed his conviction but did not challenge his sentence. The appellate 

court affirmed the conviction. People v. Holman, 115 Ill. App. 3d 60 (1983). 

¶ 19 In 2001, the defendant filed two pro se postconviction petitions. Both petitions were 

dismissed, and the defendant’s appeals from those rulings were also dismissed. In 2009, the 

defendant filed a pro se “petition for relief from void judgment” under section 2-1401 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010). That petition was denied, and 

the appellate court affirmed. People v. Holman, 2011 IL App (5th) 090678-U.

¶ 20 In 2010, the defendant filed a pro se petition for leave to file a successive postconviction 

petition, the pleading that began the case before us. The defendant raised several claims; his 

final claim purported to assert his actual innocence. That petition was denied. On appeal, the 

defendant abandoned his earlier claims and instead argued that his life sentence was 

unconstitutional under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

48 (2010), and particularly Miller. The appellate court rejected that argument because the 

defendant had not raised it before the trial court. People v. Holman, 2012 IL App (5th) 

100587-U, ¶ 18. The appellate court further noted that the defendant’s sentence was not 

unconstitutional under Miller because the defendant here was “afforded a ‘sentencing hearing 

where natural life imprisonment [was] not the only available sentence.’ ” Id. ¶ 19 (quoting 

People v. Morfin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103568, ¶ 59). The defendant appealed. 

¶ 21 While the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal was pending before us, we decided 

People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, which held that Miller announced a new substantive rule of 

constitutional law and that rule applied retroactively. Consequently, we denied the defendant’s 

petition but vacated the appellate court’s initial decision in this case and remanded so that court 

could consider whether, in light of Davis, a different result was warranted. People v. Holman, 

No. 115597 (Jan. 28, 2015) (supervisory order). 

¶ 22 On remand, the appellate court reached the merits of the defendant’s Miller claim. 2016 IL 

App (5th) 100587-B. The appellate court recognized that Miller and, more recently, 

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), require trial courts to consider 

youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing life sentences on juveniles. 2016 IL 

App (5th) 100587-B, ¶¶ 35-37. Because the trial court in this case did so, the defendant’s 

sentence was constitutionally permissible. Id. ¶ 46. The appellate court rejected the 

defendant’s alternative argument that Miller should be extended to create a categorical ban on 

juvenile life sentences. Id. ¶ 52.

¶ 23 This court allowed the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. 

Mar. 15, 2016). We also allowed the Children & Family Justice Center of the Bluhm Legal 

Clinic at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the 

defendant. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). On the legal issues before us, our review 

is de novo. People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 25. 
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¶ 24 ANALYSIS 

¶ 25 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act offers a procedural device through which a criminal 

defendant may assert that “in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was 

a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the 

State of Illinois or both.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2010). Proceedings on a 

postconviction petition are collateral to proceedings in a direct appeal and focus on 

constitutional claims that have not and could not have been previously adjudicated. See People 

v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). Accordingly, issues that were raised and decided on 

direct appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata; issues that could 

have been raised, but were not, are forfeited. See People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 328 (2009). 

The Act itself contemplates the filing of a single petition: “Any claim of substantial denial of 

constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.” 725 ILCS 

5/122-3 (West 2010). Because successive petitions impede the finality of criminal litigation, 

that statutory bar will be relaxed only “ ‘when fundamental fairness so requires.’ ” People v. 

Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 81 (quoting People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 458 (2002)). 

¶ 26 Generally, there are two such instances. See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22. A 

defendant may raise a due process claim of actual innocence to prevent a miscarriage of justice 

(Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 83), or a defendant may raise any other defaulted constitutional 

claim by satisfying the so-called “cause-and-prejudice” test (id. ¶ 82). To establish “cause,” 

the defendant must show some objective factor external to the defense that impeded his ability 

to raise the claim in the initial postconviction proceeding. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460. To 

establish “prejudice,” the defendant must show the claimed constitutional error so infected his 

trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. Id. at 464. The cause-and-prejudice test 

has been codified in the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2010); People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 

2d 150, 156 (2010). 

¶ 27 Initially, the State contends that the defendant’s Miller claim is “thrice-forfeited” because 

he failed to raise an as-applied challenge to his sentence in his 2010 motion for leave to file a 

successive postconviction petition, his 2012 pre-remand appellate court briefs, and his 2013 

pre-remand petition for leave to appeal. Relying upon People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 505 

(2004), the State asserts that a claim not raised in a postconviction petition cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal. The State insists that the defendant’s as-applied Miller claim must be 

presented to the trial court in a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. 

¶ 28 The defendant contends that the State forfeited its forfeiture argument because that 

argument was raised for the first time in the State’s response brief before this court. The 

defendant’s point is well taken. If the State’s position is that the defendant should have raised 

his as-applied Miller claim in a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, 

the State should have made that argument during supplemental briefing on remand when the 

defendant originally presented that claim. See People v. Lucas, 231 Ill. 2d 169, 175 (2008) 

(“The doctrine of forfeiture applies to the State as well as to the defendant and the State may 

forfeit an argument that the defendant forfeited an issue by not properly preserving it for 

review.”).

¶ 29 The State’s forfeiture aside, we would still reach the merits of the defendant’s claim. In 

Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 36-37, we explained the difference between facial and 

as-applied constitutional claims: 
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“Although facial and as-applied constitutional challenges are both intended to address 

constitutional infirmities, they are not interchangeable. [Citation.] An as-applied 

challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the constitution as it applies to the 

facts and circumstances of the challenging party. [Citation.] In contrast, a facial 

challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, 

i.e., the specific facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant. [Citation.] 

 Because facial and as-applied constitutional challenges are distinct actions, it is not 

unreasonable to treat the two types of challenges differently ***. By definition, an 

as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular circumstances and 

facts of the individual defendant or petitioner. Therefore, it is paramount that the record 

be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of 

appellate review.”

¶ 30 The defendant’s claim in Thompson illustrated that point. The defendant there maintained 

that the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development highlighted in Miller

applied not only to juveniles but also to young adults like himself between the ages of 18 and 

21. Id. ¶ 38. We rejected that claim because the record contained “nothing about how that 

science applies to the circumstances of defendant’s case, the key showing for an as-applied 

constitutional challenge.” Id. We stated the trial court was the most appropriate tribunal for 

such factual development. Id. 

¶ 31 Thompson mentioned Davis, where we held that the statute under which a juvenile 

defendant received a mandatory life sentence was not facially unconstitutional under Miller. 

Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 32. We also held that Miller applied to, and invalidated, that 

sentence, even though the defendant’s Miller claim was raised for the first time on appeal. Id.

¶ 43. We excused the defendant’s failure to raise an as-applied Miller claim sooner because the 

record was sufficiently developed to address that type of claim. 

¶ 32 Thompson instructs that a defendant must present an as-applied constitutional challenge to 

the trial court in order to create a sufficiently developed record. Davis creates a very narrow 

exception to that rule for an as-applied Miller claim for which the record is sufficiently 

developed for appellate review. Here, in deciding the defendant’s first petition for leave to 

appeal, we directed the appellate court to reconsider its judgment in light of Davis. Like the 

Miller claim in Davis, the Miller claim in this case does not require factual development. All of 

the facts and circumstances to decide the defendant’s claim—that his sentencing hearing did 

not comply with Miller—are already in the record. Consequently, in the interests of judicial 

economy (see People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 506 (1994)), we choose to address the merits of 

the defendant’s claim, rather than requiring him to return to the trial court to file another 

motion for leave to file another successive postconviction petition and restart the process of 

adjudicating his Miller claim.5

 

5The State has brought to our attention the recent Fourth District Appellate Court decision in 

People v. Merriweather, 2017 IL App (4th) 150407. Merriweather held that a juvenile defendant 

“forfeited his as-applied challenge to his sentence under Miller by raising it for the first time on appeal” 

and urged him to raise such a claim in a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Id.

¶¶ 18-19. The Fourth District departed from the First District decision in People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App 

(1st) 121604. Nieto, referencing an “implicit finding” in Thompson, stated that “juveniles can raise 

as-applied Miller challenges for the first time on appeal.” Id. ¶ 39. Merriweather and Nieto both 
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¶ 33 The United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const., 

amend. VIII. Inherent in that prohibition is the concept of proportionality. See Graham, 560 

U.S. at 59. Criminal punishment should be “graduated and proportioned to both the offender 

and the offense.” Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 18 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 469, 132 S. Ct. at 

2463, and Roper, 543 U.S. at 560). When the offender is a juvenile and the offense is serious, 

there is a genuine risk of disproportionate punishment. In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the 

United States Supreme Court addressed that risk and unmistakably instructed that youth 

matters in sentencing. Roper held that the eighth amendment prohibited capital sentences for 

juveniles who commit murder. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79. Graham held that the eighth 

amendment prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide 

offenses. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. And Miller held that the eighth amendment prohibited 

mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S. Ct. 

at 2475. 

¶ 34 The defendant in this case did not receive a mandatory life sentence but rather a 

discretionary life sentence. Thus, we initially must decide whether his Miller claim is even 

viable. That is, we must decide whether Miller applies to discretionary life sentences. In Davis, 

we noted: 

“Miller holds that a mandatory life sentence for a juvenile violates the eighth 

amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. *** Miller does not 

invalidate the penalty of natural life without parole for multiple murderers, only its 

mandatory imposition on juveniles. [Citation.] A minor may still be sentenced to 

natural life imprisonment without parole so long as the sentence is at the trial court’s 

discretion rather than mandatory.” (Emphases in original.) Davis, 2014 IL 115595, 

¶ 43.

Davis is correct about the scope of Miller. In Davis, however, we were not asked to decide 

whether Miller could apply to discretionary sentences. Further, we did not discuss Miller at 

length or address Montgomery at all because it had not yet been decided. We turn to those 

cases. 

¶ 35 In Miller, the Court identified a foundational principle that “imposition of a State’s most 

severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” 

Miller, 567 U.S. at 474, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. That principle emerged from two lines of 

precedent: capital cases where the Court required the sentencer to consider the characteristics 

of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense before imposing the death penalty and 

so-called “categorical ban” cases, like Roper and Graham, where the Court invalidated certain 

sentences for all juvenile defendants. Roper and Graham established that “children are 

constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” in three important ways. Id.

at 471, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. First, juveniles are more immature and irresponsible than adults. Id. 

(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). Second, juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences 

and pressures from family and peers than adults. Id. And third, juveniles are more malleable 

than adults—their characters are less fixed and their malfeasance is less indicative of 

 

involved as-applied Miller claims challenging so-called mandatory de facto life sentences. Because 

that type of claim is not before us here, those cases are distinguishable. We leave for another day any 

resolution of the purported appellate court split. 
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irretrievable depravity. Id. Those differences lessen juveniles’ moral culpability and enhance 

their prospects for reform. Id. at 472, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. Thus, the Miller Court summarized: 

“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison 

without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. [Citation.] By making youth (and 

all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a 

scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. at 479, 132 S. Ct. at 

2469.

¶ 36 The Court noted, “Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not 

consider [the petitioners’] alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a 

categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.” Id.

The Court continued, recognizing that life without parole sentences for juvenile defendants 

may comport with the eighth amendment: 

“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s 

diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate 

occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. 

That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of 

distinguishing at this early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 

unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 

reflects irreparable corruption.’ Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to 

make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children 

are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to 

a lifetime in prison.” Id.

¶ 37 The Court reiterated that its decision “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain 

process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a 

particular penalty,” life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at 483, 132 S. Ct. at 

2471. Stated differently, a trial court must consider a juvenile’s “age and age-related 

characteristics and the nature of their crimes” as “mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 489, 132 S. 

Ct. at 2475. Earlier in its opinion, the Court discussed those characteristics: 

“[I]n imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats 

every child as an adult. To recap: Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile 

precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among 

them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It 

prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds 

him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or 

dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the 

extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may 

have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of 

a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his 

inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or 

his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. [Citations.] And finally, this mandatory 

punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances 

most suggest it.” Id. at 477-78, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 

¶ 38 Miller contains language that is significantly broader than its core holding. None of what 

the Court said is specific to only mandatory life sentences. Montgomery made that clear. In 
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Montgomery, the Court held that Miller applied retroactively. 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 

736. Because the defendant there had received a mandatory life sentence, which violated 

Miller, the Court reversed that sentence and remanded for further proceedings. In doing so, the 

Court offered insight into Miller. The Montgomery Court summarized Miller in several similar 

ways. The Court asserted that “Miller requires that before sentencing a juvenile to life without 

parole, the sentencing judge take into account ‘how children are different, and how those 

differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’ ” Id. at ___, 

136 S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). The Court repeated that 

“Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant 

characteristics before determining that life without parole is a proportionate sentence.” Id. at 

___, 136 S. Ct. at 734. According to the Court, “[a] hearing where ‘youth and its attendant 

characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles 

who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.” Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 

735 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S. Ct. at 2460). 

¶ 39 Notably, unlike Miller, Montgomery did not specify which characteristics attend youth. 

The Court remained hesitant to create more procedural requirements for state trial courts, such 

as a requirement that courts make findings of fact regarding a juvenile’s incorrigibility, before 

imposing a life sentence. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 735. The Court emphasized, however, that 

while “Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement[, that] does not leave States free 

to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole.” Id. Such a 

sentence is disproportionate under the eighth amendment. Id. 

¶ 40 A handful of cases from other states have limited Miller and Montgomery to only 

mandatory life sentences. See Foster v. State, 754 S.E.2d 33, 37 (Ga. 2014); Arredondo v. 

State, 406 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tex. App. 2013); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 

705, 721 (Va. 2017) (“[b]oth cases addressed mandatory life sentences without possibility of 

parole” (emphasis in original)). Those cases give insufficient regard to the Supreme Court’s 

far-reaching commentary about the diminished culpability of juvenile defendants, which is 

neither crime- nor sentence-specific. The greater weight of authority has concluded that Miller

and Montgomery send an unequivocal message: Life sentences, whether mandatory or 

discretionary, for juvenile defendants are disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, 

unless the trial court considers youth and its attendant characteristics. See, e.g., State v. Riley, 

110 A.3d 1205, 1216 (Conn. 2015) (“Miller does not stand solely for the proposition that the 

eighth amendment demands that the sentencer have discretion to impose a lesser punishment 

than life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender”); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 576 

(S.C. 2014) (“whether their sentence is mandatory or permissible, any juvenile offender who 

receives a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is entitled to the same constitutional 

protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual 

punishment”). We agree with that conclusion and hold that Miller applies to discretionary 

sentences of life without parole for juvenile defendants. We must next decide what it means to 

apply Miller. 

¶ 41 The defendant urges us to adopt the characteristics mentioned in Miller, which he terms the 

“Miller factors,” and direct trial courts to use them when revisiting life sentences imposed on 

juvenile defendants before that case was decided. In response, the State acknowledges that 

Miller requires trial courts to consider the mitigating characteristics of youth. The State, 
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however, contends that, although the Court provided an illustrative list of some of those 

characteristics, it did not require consideration of any specific factors. 

¶ 42 The appellate court observed that courts in other states have struggled with how to apply 

Miller. 2016 IL App (5th) 100587-B, ¶ 33 (quoting Riley, 110 A.3d at 1214 n.5). Some courts 

have read Miller narrowly, holding that trial courts must consider generally mitigating 

circumstances related to a juvenile defendant’s youth. See, e.g., Ex Parte Henderson, 144 So. 

3d 1262, 1283 (Ala. 2013) (“the Miller Court did not delineate specifically which factors to use 

in sentencing a juvenile”); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012) (holding that the 

sentencing court in that case complied with the requirements of Miller by taking into account 

how juveniles are different from adults); State v. Long, 138 Ohio St. 3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 

N.E.3d 890, ¶¶ 15-16 (stating that Miller “does not lay out the ‘certain process’ that trial judges 

should follow when sentencing juveniles” and that various factors “may prove helpful” but are 

not required). 

¶ 43 Other courts have read Miller more broadly, holding that trial courts must consider 

specifically the characteristics mentioned by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 

324 P.3d 245, 268-69 (Cal. 2014) (“Miller discussed a range of factors relevant to a sentencer’s 

determination of whether a particular defendant” is irreparably corrupt); Riley, 110 A.3d at 

1216 (quoting Miller’s list of characteristics); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74-76 (Iowa 2013) 

(listing factors and stating that Miller provided “clearer guidance on the considerations given 

in sentencing”); State v. Fletcher, 47,777, p. 10 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13); 112 So. 3d 1031 

(remanding for “a more thorough review of the appropriate factors enunciated in Miller”); 

State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding that the juvenile defendant’s 

life sentence was unconstitutional because “the sentence [must] consider whether this 

punishment is just and appropriate in light of [his] age, maturity and the other factors discussed 

in Miller”); State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 256-57 (Minn. 2014) (stating that “mitigating 

circumstances might include, but are not limited to,” the characteristics in Miller); Parker v. 

State, 2011-KA-01158-SCT (¶ 19) (Miss. 2013) (noting that Miller identified “several 

factors,” then quoting Miller’s list of characteristics); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 962 (Okla. 

2016) (quoting Miller and labeling three of the listed characteristics “important youth-related 

considerations”); Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 745 (Pa. 2012) (stating that “although 

Miller did not delineate specifically what factors a sentencing court must consider, at a 

minimum it should consider” a paraphrased version of the listed characteristics); Aiken, 765 

S.E.2d at 577 (quoting the factors listed in Miller); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 42, 294 

P.3d 36 (quoting the factors listed in Miller and stating that those factors are “not exhaustive”). 

As the California Supreme Court observed, “the emerging body of post-Miller case law” has 

held that a trial court must consider some variant of the Miller factors before imposing a life 

sentence without the possibility of parole. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d at 269. 

¶ 44 We adopt the latter approach. Not only is that approach consistent with People v. Reyes, 

2016 IL 119271, ¶ 3, where we referred to the characteristics listed in Miller as “mitigating 

factors,” it is also consistent with our earlier case law. We have long held that age is not just a 

chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance. See 

People v. McWilliams, 348 Ill. 333, 336 (1932) (stating that, in sentencing a juvenile 

defendant, the trial court “may search anywhere” for aggravation and mitigation evidence, 

including “the general moral character of the offender, his mentality, his habits, his social 

environments, his abnormal or subnormal tendencies, his age, his natural inclination or 
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aversion to commit crime, the stimuli which motive his conduct, and *** [his] life, family, 

occupation, and record”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341 (2002) (holding that “a 

mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the 

factual realities of the case and does not accurately represent [the] personal culpability” of the 

15-year-old defendant); cf. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 497 (1981) (“[h]ighly 

relevant—if not essential—to [a sentencing judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the 

possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and 

characteristics” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 45 Additionally, consideration of the Miller factors is consistent with section 5-4.5-105 of the 

Unified Code of Corrections, which now requires the trial court to consider factors taken from 

the Supreme Court’s list. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016). Because Miller is retroactive 

(see Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 736; Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39), all 

juveniles, whether they were sentenced after the statutory amendment became effective on 

January 1, 2016, or before that, should receive the same treatment at sentencing. See People v. 

Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶ 23.6

¶ 46 Under Miller and Montgomery, a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life 

imprisonment without parole, but only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct 

showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the 

possibility of rehabilitation. The court may make that decision only after considering the 

defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not 

limited to, the following factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of 

the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 

appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; 

(3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of 

familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s 

incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his 

incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects for 

rehabilitation. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 

¶ 47 For juvenile defendants like the defendant in this case, who were sentenced before the 

statutory amendment, any inquiry into the Miller factors is backwards-looking. As Graham

instructed, “[e]ven if the State’s judgment that [the defendant] was incorrigible were later 

corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate 

because that judgment was made at the outset.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. Bad conduct while 

imprisoned cannot buttress a finding of incorrigibility. Similarly, good conduct while 

imprisoned cannot undercut such a finding. In revisiting a juvenile defendant’s life without 

parole sentence, the only evidence that matters is evidence of the defendant’s youth and its 

attendant characteristics at the time of sentencing. Whether such evidence exists depends upon 

the state of the record in each case. A court revisiting a discretionary sentence of life without 

parole must look at the cold record to determine if the trial court considered such evidence at 

the defendant’s original sentencing hearing. We must decide whether the trial court did so 

here. 

 

6According to a recent report, there are 20 juveniles, including the defendant, serving discretionary 

life sentences in Illinois. See A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, Associated Press, 

July 31, 2017, https://apnews.com/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85.
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¶ 48 In announcing the defendant’s sentence, the trial court explicitly stated that it considered 

the trial evidence and the PSI, as well as the evidence and arguments from the sentencing 

hearing. The trial court knew the defendant was 17 at the time of the offense, and the 

prosecutor and the defendant’s attorney both highlighted his age in their arguments at the 

sentencing hearing. The PSI and the psychological reports provided some insight into his 

mentality but did not depict him as immature, impetuous, or unaware of risks. The PSI 

included information about the defendant’s family. Although his father and his stepfather had 

died, he reportedly maintained a close relationship with his mother and siblings. The evidence 

at trial showed that there was some dispute between the defendant and Davis about who shot 

Esther, but both were intimately involved with the offense. The defendant’s fingerprints were 

found in two locations at the house, including the cabinet where the rifle was kept. The PSI 

alerted the trial court to the defendant’s susceptibility to peer pressure, as well as his low 

intelligence and possible brain damage from a head injury, but there was nothing presented at 

trial or sentencing to indicate that the defendant was incompetent and could not communicate 

with police officers or prosecutors or assist his own attorney. Dr. Raza’s second report spoke 

positively about the defendant’s verbal intelligence. As to the defendant’s prospects for 

rehabilitation, the PSI included a statement from the probation officer, who found “no 

predilection for rehabilitation,” in light of the defendant’s “history of senseless criminal acts of 

mortal violence toward others and lack of remorse for his victims.” 

¶ 49 The defendant insists that the trial court did not, in fact, consider any mitigating 

circumstances of his youth because the trial court stated that it found “no mitigating factors.” 

The defendant misapprehends the trial court’s statement. The court actually said that it 

considered the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation and that it found none of the 

latter. The trial court’s statement is undeniably true. There was no evidence at trial or 

sentencing regarding any of the 12 factors listed in section 1005-5-3.1(a). See Ill. Rev. Stat. 

1979, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-3.1(a). Further, the defendant forgets that he advised his attorney that he 

did not want to offer any mitigating evidence and his mother advised his attorney that she did 

not want to testify on his behalf. The defendant’s attorney informed the court of their wishes 

and acknowledged, “I have no evidence to present at this time.” And the defendant’s attorney 

specifically declined the trial court’s invitation to make any additions, corrections, or 

modifications to the PSI. In short, the defendant had every opportunity to present evidence to 

show that his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility. See 

Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (juveniles facing life sentences “must be given 

the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption”). He chose to offer 

nothing. 

¶ 50 Thus, the trial court had no evidence to consider on any of the statutory factors in 

mitigation, but some evidence related to the Miller factors. On the other side of the scale, the 

trial court had significant evidence to consider on the statutory factors in aggravation. See Ill. 

Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-3.2. The defendant admits in his reply brief that “there are 

bad facts.” That is an understatement. The trial court knew those facts, having presided over 

the case from pretrial motion hearings through the trial and the sentencing hearing. The court 

concluded that the defendant’s conduct placed him beyond rehabilitation and sentenced him to 

life without parole. The defendant’s sentence passes constitutional muster under Miller. 

¶ 51 Finally, we note that amicus asks for a categorical ban on life sentences for juveniles. We 

refuse to adopt such a rule. Whether or not discretionary life sentences for juveniles are 
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advisable is a question for legislators. Whether or not such sentences are constitutional is a 

question for judges, and the justices of the United States Supreme Court have so far declared 

that they may be, provided the trial court complies with Miller. Even the defendant agrees that 

“[n]othing in this Court’s jurisprudence or Miller held that a natural life sentence may never be 

appropriate.”

¶ 52 CONCLUSION 

¶ 53 For the reasons that we have stated, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment, which 

affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. 

¶ 54 Affirmed.