NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT D. MCKENZIE ; PATTIE MCKENZIE,
Plaintif

f s

– Appellants ,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; BOISE CASCADE WOOD PRODUCTS, LLC, a foreign limited liability company; HM, INC., a domestic business corporation; EDWARD A. HANSCOM, individually, DBA Hanscom Logging ,

Defendant s

– Appell ees
. No. 16

- 35942
D.C. No. 1 : 14

- cv - 01503

- CL

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Mark D

. Clarke , Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 4 , 201 8 Portland , Oregon
Before: M. SMITH and MURGUIA , Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, ** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 3 6

- 3.

** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JUN 26 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

Robert McKenzie was injured while felling trees for a timber sale on federal
land. In brief, a “harvest” tree of the kind McKenzie was generally supposed to fell

was too close to a “reserve” hardwood tree of the kind he was generally not supposed
to fell

. McKenzie now argues that it would have been safe r to leave both trees alone
or to first fell the reserve tree to make more room for the harvest tree. But , believing job rules left him no choice, McKenzie felled only the harvest tree without clearing

extra room for it

. It tipped into the reserve tree that McKenzie had left standing, slid unexpectedly, and crushed him as he tried to get away.
McKenzie sued the defendant s

– appellants, all of which had a role in the
timber sale: t he United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) owned the land,
Boise Cascade Wood Products had bought the timber, and HM, Inc. (operated by Ed Hanscom) performed the logging. McKenzie himself worked for a timber

- felling subcontractor hired by HM. In his complaint, McKenzie alleged six overlapping theories of liability : (1)
that the timber sale ’s terms were unsafe given the density of the forest and the steep ness of the terrain , (2) that Boise and the BLM failed to properly delegate the responsibility for tree

- feller safety, (3) that al l defendants improperly required and
reminded fellers or other defendants not to fell hardwoods, (4) that all defendants
failed to afford fellers discretion to fell hardwoods when necessary for safety, (5)
that all defendants failed to ensure fellers’ safe ty, and (6) that all defendants failed3

to have a relevant safety program. McKenzie brought these claims under both the common law of negligence and Oregon’s Employer Liability Law , which generally requires owners and contractors to “use every device, care and precaution that is practicable to use for the protection and safety of life and limb.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.305

. His wife also brought a derivative claim, for loss of consortium. See
Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ. , 3 73 P.3d 1158, 1167 (Or. Ct. App. 2016)

. In responding to defense motions for summary judgment, McKenzie again presented several alleged grounds for liability

. T he district court collapsed these issues in to one: whether McKenzie was required to fell only the harvest tree or whether he had had the discretion , for safety,
to fell both the harvest and the reserve trees , or neither

. And t he court found it beyond genuine dis pute that McKenzie did have the discretion he claimed was required; he just had not exercised it. O n that basis, the court granted complete summary judgment against McKenzie.
This was error. First, “ ‘ a judge’s function ’ at summary judgment is not ‘ to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ’ ” Zetwick v. C ounty of Yolo , 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton , 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam)). “[W]here evidence is genuinely disputed on a particular issue

— such as by conflicting testimony

— that ‘issue is inappropriate for resol ution on summary4

judgment.’” Id. (quoting Direct Techs., LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc. , 836 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016)). H ere, McKenzie testified that he thought he was not permitted to fell in the manner he deemed safest, but was instead required to make t he best he
could of an unsafe situation. A t oral argument , the defendants

– appellants could not identify any instance in which McKenzie was clearly told otherwise

. And it is
unclear whether record examples of other exercises of discretion would have applied
to the particular sizes and locations of trees in this instance

. Second , the court did not explain why McKenzie’s discretion to make safety exceptions was , in the court’s words, “the heart of [the] case,” “[r]egardless of the complicated facts and legal c laims.” This discretion appears to be unrelated to some
of McKenzie’s claims

— for example, that the sale’s terms were unsafe for the terrain and that more supervisors should have been present. To the extent the McKenzie s ’ claims depend on that discretion, w e revers e for the reason stated

. To the extent they
do not , the district court did not explain what justified complete rather than partial summary judgment. See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. , 339 F.3d 1158, 1180

– 81 (9th Cir. 2003)

. We thus vacate the order entirely , which affords the district court the opportunity to address if any partial summary judgment remain s warranted.
Because we reverse and vacate , we need not address McKenzie’s additional arguments , that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint and that5

summary judgment should have been denied as a sanction

. The district court may
wish to address these on remand. Finally, we exercise our discretion not to rule on the defendants’ asserted
alternative bases for susta ining summary judgment. Portman v. C ounty of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 910 (9th Cir. 1993) (“ Although we may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any basis presented in the record, we are not obliged to do

so. ” )

. These arguments mostly concern the scope of indirect employment, a predicate
for claim s under the Employer Liability Law where, as here, the defendants are not actual employers

. See Boothby v. D.R. Johnson Lumber Co. , 137 P.3d 699, 704 (Or. 2006)

. Below, the district court mostl y rejected these arguments , although it did not
rule on all of them

. O n remand , the district court might re - engage its earlier decisions
in fact

- intensive analyses varying by defendant and theory of liability. We thus think it best to await the complete disposition of the case before we consider these arguments in a possible future appeal

. REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED
.