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87–478 2003

HEARING ON

TECHNOLOGY AND THE

VOTING PROCESS

Hearing

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 

ADMINISTRATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

One Hundred Seventh Congress

FIRST SESSION

Hearing Held in Washington, DC, May 24, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration

(

(II)

BOB W. NEY, Ohio, Chairman 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California 

THOMAS M. REYNOLDS, New York 

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

Professional Staff 

PAUL VINOVICH, Staff Director 

BILL CABLE, Minority Staff Director 

(1)

TECHNOLOGY AND THE VOTING PROCESS 

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in Room 

1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Ney 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Ney, Ehlers, Doolittle, Hoyer, and 

Fattah. 

Staff present: Jeff Janas, Professional Staff; Reynold 

Schweickhardt, Technology Director; Roman Buhler, Counsel; Paul 

Vinovich, Counsel; Chet Kalis, Professional Staff Member; Sara 

Salupo, Staff Assistant; Robert Bean, Minority Staff Director; Matt 

Pincus, Minority Professional Staff; and Keith Abouchar, Minority 

Professional Staff. 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I want to 

thank the witnesses for coming to the committee. I would note we 

have several things going on in a conference on the Majority side, 

so the members will be coming in. Also the ranking member has 

a previous commitment, but he will be here; and a couple of the 

other members will also be coming in at different times. We do 

have Mr. Fattah and myself, So we appreciate you coming. 

Our witnesses are Christopher Baum, Vice President/Research 

Director of the Gartner Group, Stamford, Connecticut; Thomas Palfrey, Professor of Economics and Political Science, Co-Director MIT 

Voting Technology Project, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California; David Woods, Professor, Institute for Ergonomics, 

Associate Director of the Midwest Center for Inquiry on Patient 

Safety of the Veterans Health Administration, from my alma 

mater, Ohio State University. I attended there when we used to 

beat Michigan regularly, years ago. And Ronald Rivest, Viterbi Professor of Computer Science, Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

I want to welcome all the witnesses. As you are probably aware, 

we have had different panels on election reform, and I think they 

have been interesting panels as this has progressed. This is the 

fourth hearing in a series of hearings. Your panel brings a different, I think, perspective to the hearing process. The first panel 

we had were secretaries of state, State legislators, county commissioners, disabled community, and American Legion. 

Our second hearing had the local election officials, who were on 

the front line of this, and then the third hearing included the vendors. And now we have the technology exposition. And now I think 

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from the academic side and the technological side, you will bring 

a different perspective for us. 

Mr. Fattah, do you have a statement? 

Mr. FATTAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for 

your continuing role in this to tackle this issue that is critically important to the lifeblood of our democratic process. I have an opening statement that I would like to submit into the record on behalf 

of the ranking member, the gentleman from Maryland, and I would 

like to do that if there is no objection. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The statement of Mr. Hoyer follows:]

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Mr. FATTAH. And I would like to thank our witnesses today and 

I look forward to their testimony. I have a particular interest in the 

Caltech-MIT project, but I am sure that each of our witnesses will 

have testimony that will help us grapple with this issue. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And thank you, Mr. Fattah. 

And we will begin with the first witness, Christopher Baum. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BAUM, VICE PRESIDENT/RESEARCH DIRECTOR, GARTNER GROUP, STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT 

Mr. BAUM. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, Gartner is honored today to give testimony on the trends 

in voting technology. The events of last November point clearly to 

a crisis in confidence in the American electoral system. However, 

there is no clear consensus on how to fix the problem. Some believe 

that electronic voting is the only way to go. After all, it is the same 

technology that worked so well in the banking industry. However, 

there are other opinions. Last week I was present at an election 

site in Boiling Point, Pennsylvania, where voters were invited to 

try a new computerized system in a ‘‘shadow election.’’ after they 

had cast their official ballot on the regular system. I saw one gentleman who declined to try the new system. I asked him why. He 

said, if you aren’t smart enough to vote on paper, you shouldn’t be 

allowed to vote. 

However, Gartner believes that computer-based voting technologies, with appropriate supporting processes and infrastructure, 

can significantly reduce election problems and restore the public 

trust. The public has already demonstrated its faith in electronic 

systems using ATMs to make deposit and filing taxes electronically. Computerized voting appliances can significantly improve 

both the balloting and tallying processes, increasing accuracy both 

in the votes cast and the vote count. 

Gartner recently completed a survey on the intentions of the 

United States’ largest voting districts in the aftermath of the 2000 

Presidential elections. The findings of the survey have been submitted to this committee; but, in summary, we would like those 

present to consider the following: 

Forty percent of the districts surveyed have already either implemented new technology or have begun major new voting technology 

projects. 

Those favoring Federal guidance on purchasing and implementing new technologies are evenly matched with those opposed 

to such guidance, about 45 percent on each side, with 10 percent 

abstaining. 

One quarter of those opposing Federal guidance specifically listed 

implementation problems with the Americans With Disabilities 

Act, ADA, and the National Voter Registration Act, ‘‘Motor Voter 

Act,’’ as examples of why Federal intervention is not warranted. 

However, 50 percent of those in favor of Federal guidance cited 

the need for uniformity in Federal elections. The most cited example was guidance in establishing proper unit trails that can support 

recounts, but do not impinge on privacy. 

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While desires for overall Federal involvement is mixed, 65 percent favored a specific Federal role in the valuation of new voting 

technology. 

And, not surprisingly, 75 percent reported that their jurisdictions 

would require increased fundings to acquire new technology. 

As a result of this survey, Gartner believes that the local voting 

jurisdictions are willing to purchase and implement new voting 

technologies in time for the 2004 Presidential election, if the Federal and State funds are made available by mid-2002. Gartner predicts that if Federal and State funds are not available by mid-2002, 

no more than 40 percent of the voting precincts currently using antiquated systems will successfully implement new voting technologies in time for the 2004 elections. 

By comparing the survey results with buying trends, voting system life cycles, voting appliance costs, and projected funding, 

Gartner has created a projection of voting technology for the next 

3 Presidential elections. These projections have been submitted to 

the committee. 

In the short term, optical scan technology will experience a quick 

growth, as it is the easiest alternative to implement, and offers a 

single solution for both polling place and absentee voting. Eventually, however, direct record electronic, or DRE, and the closely-related i-voting technology also win out. 

There are a number of stumbling blocks in addition to funding. 

First and foremost, is the vast number of different procurement 

procedures used throughout the country. These processes are at 

best cumbersome and lengthy. This is not just another technological purchase. There are significant political pressures at work 

as well. For example, Philadelphia recently signed its contract for 

new voting technology in April, capping off a process that began in 

1995. Also daunting, is the fact that no single standard exists to 

certify voting technologies. There is an opportunity for the Federal 

Government to provide guidance and promote innovation in this 

area. 

While this hearing focuses on voting technology, it is critical to 

realize that there is more to an election than casting a ballot. Without rational improvements in voter registration, authentication, 

Election Day planning and operations, and the ballot tallying process, we run the risk of fixing Election Day but not improving the 

voting process. 

Thank you for your attention. 

[The statement of Mr. Baum follows:]

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The CHAIRMAN. Appreciate your testimony. 

And next, Mr. Palfrey. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS R. PALFREY, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, CO-DIRECTOR/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF 

TECHNOLOGY, PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. PALFREY. Mr. Chairman, and members of the House Administration Committee, thank you for letting me speak to you today. 

I am Thomas Palfrey, professor of economics and political science 

at Caltech, and codirector of the Caltech/MIT voting technology 

project. My counterpart at MIT is Stephen Ansolobehere who is a 

political science professor there. 

A week after the 2000 Presidential election, David Baltimore, the 

President of Caltech, called up Charles Vest, the President of MIT, 

with an idea. The idea was that our two institutions should collaborate to develop improved voting technologies. The problems observed counting the vote in Florida and elsewhere originated with 

technology. 

Presidents Vest and Baltimore assembled a team of computer scientists, mechanical engineers, process engineers, systems specialists, and social scientists. The Carnegie Corporation and our two 

institutes have funded our endeavors. 

We are in the initial phase of our project, which is a study phase 

and will culminate in a report this summer, which will include a 

number of public policy recommendations. You will hear some of 

those recommendations today. 

First, what is voting technology? Voting technology is usually 

and incorrectly equated with voting machines. In fact, voting technology encompasses a wide range of issues related to conducting an 

election, and the Caltech/MIT voting project has been addressing 

all of these issues collectively. Voter registration systems, ballot 

and voter-interface design, security, absentee ballots, voter education, polling place practices, and recounting procedures are some 

of the important components of the overall technology of voting systems. 

First, what are some of the problems that we have identified? 

First of all, the high-risk rates of uncounted, undermarked, and 

spoiled ballots, what our preliminary study called residual votes. 

The average incidence of such votes is on the order of 2 percent and 

has been there for about half a century, as far as we can go back 

and measure. Counties using punch cards average the highest residual vote rate of about 3 percent, but even if you exclude these, 

we are still over 11⁄2 percent in residual vote rate. That converts 

to 11⁄2 million votes or more in the most recent Presidential election. 

Our project identifies what we think is a realistic goal of shooting 

at about a half a percent, because we must understand that some 

of these uncounted ballots are intentionally uncounted in the sense 

that the voters did not actually cast a vote. 

What are some of the other problems? There is a poor monitoring 

in the system. There is very little systemwide data. Something we 

noticed when we began our study is when we began to look for 

numbers, they aren’t all there. So, we basically contacted thouVerDate jul 14 2003 10:44 Aug 27, 2003 Jkt 087478 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\87478.XXX 87478
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sands of counties directly to try to get information about undervotes and overvotes, absentee ballots, how much they spend on 

election polling place practices, and so forth, and it is not collected 

in the systematic way. 

This lack of monitoring makes it difficult to provide feedback for 

industry and for voting administrators to improve the system. 

There is flawed and haphazard recount procedures. Some States 

have nothing in place. Other States have rules that are so vague 

that it is very difficult to implement in a systematic and uniform 

way. We discovered that with Florida.

Lack of uniform standards for usability and accessibility. Many 

of the systems that exist now do not conform to typical standards 

that we have acquired under ADA. The user interfaces on some of 

the newer machines—some of the older machines—make it very 

difficult for the voter to figure out how to correctly cast the vote. 

Examples like the butterfly ballot are the most obvious ones, but 

one can find other examples in large numbers. 

Finally, there are shortcomings in the voter registration system. 

The system of cleaning or not cleaning, and purging or not purging 

voter registration rolls, has created problems at the polling places. 

What sort of recommendations do we have in mind? Well, the 

first and most obvious is probably to phase out at some pace—we 

are not sure what the right pace is—what we call dominated technologies. These are technologies that are underperforming and do 

not have significant enough cost advantages to justify them. 

The second complementary recommendation is to phase in 

undominated technologies. The current leading technologies right 

now appear to be precinct-counted optical scanning equipment and 

two forms of electronic voting. The first form being what I would 

call integrated touch screen machines. That is, a big box, so they 

are basically modern lever machines, except they are electronic and 

have a touch screen interface, and modular systems which have a 

touch screen, and then it is connected to more off-the-shelf type of 

equipment. So the architecture is actually different. 

All three of these have advantages, however some of them have 

disadvantages. The electronic technologies are really in their infancy, so innovation is playing a big role in the development of 

these. It is an ongoing process and it needs to be encouraged. 

Third, the transition from old machinery to newer machinery has 

to be done at a measured pace. It is not something that can be 

done overnight. We are talking about a relatively small industry, 

that in a good year, might have $150 million to $200 million in revenue. We are talking about over 3,000 counties who have strapped 

budgets. We are talking about complicated ways of providing Federal funding through grants processes and things like that. 

This is not something that can be done overnight. It has to be 

done in such a way that there is a lot of thought and study that 

goes into it, and it should be done as an ongoing process. 

Finally, along with Federal funding, we think it would be advisable to have set up an independent Federal agency, independent 

from the FEC, that oversees election administration in the country, 

helps administer these grants, administers research grants to research institutions in universities, and organizes the data, serves 

as an information clearinghouse. 

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Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Palfrey follows:]

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The CHAIRMAN. Professor Woods. 

Mr. WOODS. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Fattah, and distinguished members of the committee. November 2000 was a vivid 

time in all of our lives, and in the heartland of America as well as 

here within the Beltway. The intense debate following the electoral 

surprise and crisis paralleled debates I have participated in as a 

human factor psychologist and researcher in industries such as nuclear power, aviation, and, most recently, health care. 

The first step in that debate always seems to be assigning blame. 

Some people argued it was a voter error problem. Others commented on the antiquated technology such as punch cards. Many 

of the young people caught up in the debate were quite intrigued 

by these devices, thinking them only relics of their parents’ ancient 

history. 

My field of human factors studies the interaction of people and 

devices, people and computers, and how these systems sometimes 

fail to have both technological and human components. 

What has our science learned from aviation and health care work 

that we can apply to election technology? First, the difficulties we 

witnessed are not simply voter error. Rather, they are system 

issues in the interaction between people and technology. And I 

want to point out that these interface issues apply just as much to 

the election official interacting with the equipment as well as to the 

voter interacting with the equipment. 

Second, the difficulties we witness cannot be solved simply by replacing apparently antiquated equipment. Replacement systems 

can exhibit poor user/device interface that results in predictable 

risks of error. 

Third, the good news. Many of these issues can be addressed by 

basic bread-and-butter usability, engineering and testing techniques, techniques that have been developed through our work 

with the Department of Defense and aviation and aerospace industries, and today have matured in the computer software industry, 

and are readily available, quick, and economical to apply. 

Fourth, there are unique aspects to the voting context that create 

potentially difficult design decisions and tradeoffs that require 

careful consideration and longer-term investment of our energy and 

innovation skills. 

Let’s go back through these four points a little bit more. It is 

very important to recognize—and we constantly deal with this 

problem after a crisis like the November election—we very easily 

fall back into the blame game. Which is easier? A black eye for 

human intelligence or a black eye for technology? Instead, we have 

to look at the system and the interaction. The failures are in the 

failure design for effective interaction between people and technology. 

Second, unfortunately, buying the vendor’s latest model or bringing in computer interfaces, in and of itself, will not make issues 

and problems revealed by the Florida ballots and electoral controversies go away. The kinds of problems that were revealed can 

apply to the interaction of people and any kind of technology. 

I also commented that we have a mature research base that is 

available, and a mature engineering base that is available to apply. 

Techniques for usability-testing the prototype designs have maVerDate jul 14 2003 10:44 Aug 27, 2003 Jkt 087478 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\87478.XXX 87478
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tured in the software industry and these can be brought to bear 

very economically. 

Examples of the kinds of principles and techniques we bring to 

bear is the principle of good feedback. If you have to have effective 

device design for interaction, for usability, give people feedback so 

they can see the results of their actions, recognize problems, and 

correct them. The same principle applies to the interfaces with the 

election officials tabulating the vote; provide a visible audit trail. 

With computer technology you can design electronic voting systems in many ways. You can even try to copy old paper or lever 

technology over inside the computer system. The change to computer technology brings potential benefits, but also new pitfalls. 

And this imposes a responsibility on the designers to think through 

how the functions you want to accomplish can break down, and 

how trouble can arise. This requires usability testing. 

There is also the need in the long run for careful consideration 

of the new issues that arise. Balancing security and visibility feedback, providing wide access across a diverse and aging population, 

handling large numbers of issues and ballot choices in a timely 

fashion, supporting recovery for mistakes, and doing it all in a low 

cost, are formidable design challenges. 

I want to point out that adopting new technology may reduce our 

overall average in accuracy or imprecision rate, but create the possibility of new forms of failure. 

From past research we also find if vendors’ claim for failure-proof 

designs merit skepticism, as the humorist Douglas Adam quipped, 

‘‘The major difference between a thing that might go wrong and a 

thing that cannot possibly go wrong is when a thing that cannot 

possibly go wrong in fact goes wrong’’ it usually turns out to be impossible to get at or repair. 

So part of usability design is to take into account the possibility 

for error and unanticipated situations. Computerized voting and 

tabulation systems must support our human ability to check and 

detect if new inaccuracies are creeping in. It is easy to rationalize 

away the need for action. Hyper-close elections are rare. My precinct didn’t really have a highly publicized problem. It was only the 

usual error rate. 

The Chicago Tribune, in a study, concluded that the error rate 

in Cook County in the last Presidential election had doubled to 6 

percent. I and my colleagues in the human factors profession are 

shocked that we seem so willing to tolerate even that traditional 

3 percent failure rate as a norm. And we ask, where in business 

or transportation or medicine would we tolerate such failure rates? 

Voting is the centerpiece of democracy, and we need to establish 

systems to monitor for the early warning signs that inaccuracies or 

systematic errors are creeping into our voting system. 

In closing, I would like to remind you that technology alone is 

not sufficient. Harnessing the system of people and technology to 

fulfill the ideals of the democratic process calls us all to make a 

commitment to excellence. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Woods follows:]

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The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rivest. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD L. RIVEST, VITERBI PROFESSOR OF 

COMPUTER SCIENCE, LABORATORY FOR COMPUTER 

SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. RIVEST. Chairman Ney, Mr. Hoyer, and distinguished members of the Committee on House Administration, I thank you for 

the opportunity to testify to your committee on the issue of security 

in voting technology. I have been involved in the mathematical aspects of security for the last 25 years. I lead the cryptography and 

information security within MIT’s laboratory for computer science. 

I am a founder of RSA Data Security, a leading provider of security 

technology. Codes I have developed are used daily to secure millions of on-line Internet transactions. 

For the past 5 years, I have investigated the security of electronic voting. My students have implemented an electronic voting 

system used for student elections at MIT. I am currently participating in the Caltech MIT voting project just described to you by 

Professor Palfrey. Our initial report will be out this summer. The 

opinions expressed here are my own.

I find voting intriguing. It is not only important for democratic 

society, but it is also technically challenging. 

The challenge arises primarily from the need to remove voters’ 

identities from their cast ballots, in order to prevent vote buying 

and the coercion of voters. This requirement for anonymity makes 

electronic voting different than electronic commerce or electronic 

banking, where well-labeled receipts and well-labeled audit trails 

are standard. This requirement for anonymity can also make fraud 

easier as the addition, deletion, or modification of an anonymous 

ballot is harder to detect. 

In 1869, inspired by the potential benefits of electricity, Thomas 

Alva Edison was granted U.S. Patent 90646 for an electric vote recorder. Congress declined to use it because it reported votes too 

quickly. Today, inspired by the potential benefits of computing and 

Internet technology, inventors and election systems vendors are offering new technologies. We need to carefully assess what these 

new technologies can offer, to see if they really meet our needs and 

do so securely. 

Given the short time available, I would like to offer some personal opinions on the security of existing prospective voting systems. I would be happy to expand further on any of these points 

in response to your questions. 

Number one, we are not ready for Internet voting from home. I 

believe that voting equipment should be under the control of election officials. At least a decade of further research and development 

on the security of home computers is required before Internet voting from home should be contemplated. 

Number two, however, I believe that we should use the Internet 

to post A lists of registered voters, B lists of actual voters, and C 

lists of actual ballots cast. Not being matched with the voters 

names, of course. 

Number three, as far as getting the biggest bang for the buck as 

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tion procedures and the computerization of voter list registration 

lists; and (B) eliminate absentee balloting except for cases of need. 

I am against voting by mail for convenience. I prefer having a national voting holiday or allowing voters to vote several weeks early 

at the town hall if need be. Voters who vote absentee are simply 

not guaranteed the same freedom from coercion and bribery that 

ordinary voters have. 

Number four, I believe voting systems should have a physical 

audit trail. That audit trail should be directly created by the voter, 

or at least directly verifiable by the voter when he casts his vote. 

It need not be paper, but it should be immutable and archival. 

Many have proposed electronic systems fail this requirement. Electronic voting systems offer improved ease of use and lots of flexibility, but they do not intrinsically offer improved security. On the 

other hand, a physical audit trail is not a security panacea, although it is a big help. 

Number five, we must ensure the highest degree of confidence 

that our elections are free of manipulation and fraud. The certification of voting systems should be an important part of this process. 

However, it is difficult to certify complex software-based systems 

involving elaborate user interface and cryptographic functionality. 

Experts in computer security and cryptography need to be involved 

in the certification process. Requiring that all security-critical portions of the source code be ‘‘open source’’ can greatly help to establish confidence in such complex systems. 

We are no more guaranteed protection against election fraud by 

buying flashy electronic equipment, than we are guaranteed protection against fire by buying a shiny new fire engine. Security demands depends on the entire system, not just the components, 

which need sound operational procedures managed by training personnel. These operational procedures, which themselves should be 

documented and certified, should primarily ensure that no single 

person or vendor is ever in a position to compromise the integrity 

of our democratic process. 

Finally, I know that we are in the midst of a technological revolution that provides both an enduring and improving set of opportunities, and an increasing set of vulnerabilities. If there is a 

chance to improve things now, then our focus should not be on immediately spending money for new equipment but, rather, on improving the higher-order processes of voting system research, evolution certification, selection, financing, staffing, and oversight as 

well as on improving voter education. 

I thank you for your attention. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Rivest follows:]

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The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the panel’s input. I am going to go 

ahead and yield to Mr. Ehlers first. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that, since 

I have to leave shortly. 

I really appreciate the testimony we have heard, and it brings 

out a number of factors that have always struck me as very important. My background is both having served in local government 

where we deal directly with the election process, and also with 

being a scientist by training and being appalled at some of the 

things that I saw. 

I think the very first step, of course, is good law. That was a very 

major problem in Florida. The law was not well written, well structured, it was not clear, and could not be clearly interpreted. I think 

that problem is being dealt with rather quickly by most legislatures 

throughout this land. 

Secondly, we need good technology. I think we have done reasonably well in that in terms of the technology itself, ranging from the 

paper ballot up to the computers. What I find missing in that, however, is the next factor we need, and that is good human factors 

engineering. I think that has been a major problem with the newer 

election devices that have been developed and are on the market. 

I also think something we don’t pay enough attention to is good 

security, good privacy, and good integrity. We pay a huge amount 

of attention to that in our computer systems in commerce. Even in 

the House, when we put that system in, that is one thing that I 

insisted on very strongly. And I am very proud, as is Ronald 

Schweickhardt who sits behind me, a staff member involved in 

this, and a number of other members. 

It is interesting to read in the paper about all the hackers breaking into the Pentagon, the Senate, the White House, but you have 

never read about them hacking into the House. I don’t want to say 

that too loudly because then we will become the prime target. 

I am very pleased. We put a lot of effort on security, and I believe we have succeeded, but you have to have precisely the same 

security in the voting booth that we installed here. And I don’t see 

that at all in the electronic systems, and even many of the other 

systems are not as secure. 

Just a quick comment on what was said earlier, I think it is important for everyone to vote at once, to the greatest extent possible. 

I am prejudiced on that because I run for office and my campaign 

is planned so that all the information is out there by Election Day. 

People vote 3 weeks ahead of time, they miss most of the information that I am providing. But also, absentee ballots lend themselves 

tremendously to abuse and fraud. The one thing we haven’t mentioned here, I think the greatest opportunity for fraud, is in voter 

registration; and we need to pay much more attention to voter 

fraud there and ensuring that voting lists are good, that we purge 

them regularly; that when someone moves, they can’t keep registration at their former address and so forth. 

Now, given these facts and some suggestion of research grants, 

what would you recommend the Federal Government spend its 

money on for research grants if we should decide to go in that direction? Where would you concentrate the efforts in trying to get 

at these various problems I mentioned? 

40

Mr. WOODS. One of the resources that is available we have already, through work with aerospace, the Department of Defense, 

the government has already built up expertise on these human factor engineering issues. For example, in the national laboratories, 

they have expert groups who provide advice on these interface design issues to many government agencies. We could bring those in 

to, in the short run, provide a great deal of guidance about how to 

evaluate potential new systems and how to implement them and 

train the kinds of election officials in operating these to achieve 

greater levels of success and avoid some of these difficulties that 

could be done very quickly. Some of these organizations could provide input to election officials in the form of a guidance document, 

probably on the order of months, and on the order of tens of thousands of dollars in investment for a short-run benefit. 

Mr. EHLERS. But we have talked in here about educating the voters, training the poll workers and so forth. I really would like to 

see a system where that is not a factor. In other words, the human 

factors are so good that you don’t need to educate voters. 

For example, in voting I think you should show the final slate 

and have a Regis Philbin question at the end: Is this your final 

vote? And, if not, you can go back and change it. Poll workers, too, 

they are wonderful people, just the salt of the Earth, really trying 

to serve their country in a very difficult job, which they only do a 

couple of times a year for long hours and hardly any pay, but they 

only do it a couple of times a year. You can’t train them every time. 

And again, I think we need a system that doesn’t require much 

training for poll workers. 

Let me ask a follow up question to that, and the others can comment on any of these issues. What is the Federal Government’s appropriate role in this? We don’t run the elections. We have always 

trusted local governments and States to handle that. How would 

we deal with the human factors issue? Are we going to recommend 

certain systems? Are we going to set Federal standards that systems have to meet in order to be used to elect Federal candidates? 

How do you see us playing a role in that? 

Mr. PALFREY. I think the Federal Government could certainly 

play a role in setting standards for certification of processes. I don’t 

think the Federal Government wants to insist on everything being 

exactly one way. I think, for example, the current testing procedures that are done to certify equipment is machine testing. It is 

basically machines testing machines. I think human testing is 

needed for the ballot interfaces and for the various designs that are 

proposed. Currently there is no human testing. I think that is one 

thing that a Federal agency could do is to oversee the testing of 

these machines and the development of appropriate standards. 

Mr. WOODS. There are many kinds of guidance documents available to organizations that design computer devices for human use. 

For example, several organizations have just put out new guidance 

documents on access to computer and electronic systems for the 

disabled and the visually handicapped. These kinds of documents 

do not tie the hands of designers but, rather, try to be a positive 

resource, to say there are some of the effective techniques and 

ways that you can design your electronic interfaces, as in this case, 

to make access for the disabled more successful. 

41

Mr. EHLERS. How do we deal with the security issue? You know, 

if we have the modern equipment of Tamany Hall, any college 

freshman can make some changes to the software on the computers. How do we really ensure the security of the hardware or 

the software? 

Mr. RIVEST. That is a very complex question. I think continued 

monitoring of what is going on, making sure there is separation of 

function, taking apart voting equipment after it has been used to 

see if it has been tampered with, making sure the code is ‘‘open 

source,’’ and looked at by lots of people. It is a multifaceted problem. Making sure the poll workers know what is appropriate to do 

and what is not, making sure the equipment doesn’t support modes 

of operation that would allow a poll worker to reset the clock or 

whatever you can do through various kinds of tampering. We are 

dealing with computer systems now that are very much—voting 

systems that are computer systems and have all the complexity 

and security problems of computer systems. We need to keep the 

system simple as possible to minimize the complexity. And security 

often arises from simplicity. So, looking for simplicity in design is 

an important criterion here, too. 

Mr. EHLERS. Do you think it would be reasonable after each election that all the systems are tested, that you run a quick program 

through them to make sure there——

Mr. RIVEST. It is reasonable to do some sampling, random sampling, look at some of them to see if there has been any tampering. 

Mr. BAUM. Also, sir, you could apply statistics to the districts 

and find out where there are anomalies and test that equipment 

stronger, and you can harden the equipment that is being used. 

You can also move to internal memories on the computer systems 

that are unalterable so they can’t be changed on Election Day. 

There are a number of technologies that you can apply here to this 

equipment to make them almost military grade in terms of hardness. 

Mr. EHLERS. What I hear coming through, though, is that you 

see the Federal role as one of doing the research, setting the standards, and helping the States and localities to meet the standards. 

Mr. BAUM. That is certainly what our survey shows would be acceptable by State and local governments. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ehlers. Mr. Hoyer. 

Mr. HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I apologize 

for my lateness. I had another meeting at 11 o’clock, and took that 

as quickly as I could and got here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for including my statement in the 

record. I won’t repeat it. 

Mr. Baum in the end of your prepared statement, you mention, 

and I quote, ‘‘the daunting fact that no single standard exists to 

certify voting technology.’’ This is an opportunity for the Federal 

Government to provide guidance and promote innovation. 

You have just been discussing that, obviously, in response to Mr. 

Ehlers’ question. Can you describe specifically how the Gartner 

Group found—what it found when it looked at the voting machine 

certification process. 

42

Mr. BAUM. Yes, sir. What we found was disarray. There is, of 

course, the NASED who will approve voting machines, and anyone 

can adopt NASED-approved machines. But that process, while well 

documented, is still open to a certain amount of interpretation. 

For the States and local governments that do not accept NASEDapproved machines, there quite often is no set standard. It is conceivable and I have seen instances where new technologies are 

being introduced, for the companies to call on local sales or local 

election officials. The response is, come back when you have been 

certified by someone, not necessarily who, but just someone. 

That is where the difficulty comes in. There are over 3,000 touch 

points for election systems. One of the things that is very interesting, is we don’t even have consensus on the number of counties 

there are in the United States currently. We went out and called 

the secretaries of state of each State and got the number of counties that they thought they had, and added them up and got 3,066. 

According to the Federal U.S. Census, there were 3,042. So there 

are some fundamental issues here that we really need to address. 

And the lack of standards, you simply cannot survive in a market 

where you have got a $20 million opportunity or $200 million opportunity, and you have to deal with 3,000 separate standards for 

equipment. 

Mr. HOYER. Could I say this as an aside, not necessarily as a 

question? In the State of Maryland, which is a relatively simply organized State in that we have 23 counties and Baltimore City, 

could the discrepancy be that for many purposes Baltimore City is 

considered to be a county, NACo however would presume it to be 

a city? 

Mr. BAUM. Right. 

Mr. HOYER. So that might—I don’t know how many other States 

have that same phenomenon—but that might count for that 20-

plus discrepancy between the two. 

Clearly, it would be useful from your standpoint, to have an 

agency at some level that looked to assist not in a mandatory way, 

but in an advisory way, to solve this chaos or disarray—I think you 

used the world ‘‘disarray,’’ chaos may be a harsher word—but disarray that you confronted? 

Mr. BAUM. Yes, sir. We do not necessarily believe it needs to be 

a separate organization than the FEC, but we do think that there 

needs to be a place where officials can go and where vendors can 

do to say these are the requirements that we recommend, these are 

the procedures that can bring you to those requirements, and these 

are the sources of information. 

Mr. HOYER. I would say, as an aside, to all of you as you do your 

work, it is my view that the time has come when the election administration responsibilities at the Federal level and the monitoring responsibilities of finances in elections need to be separate, 

not because they are inherently contradictory to one another as the 

OEA currently exists in the FEC, but because there is so much immediate demand on the financial oversight, that electoral reform at 

the Federal level, as it has at the State and local levels, has taken 

a second or third share. 

Professor Rivest—how do you pronounce that? 

43

Mr. RIVEST. It is pronounced different ways within my own family. 

Mr. HOYER. Well, I would like to pronounce it the way you pronounce it. 

Mr. RIVEST. Rivest. 

Mr. HOYER. You offer some very sobering insights regarding the 

fraud security of new voting technologies, specifically Internet voting. Let me say I also agree with the chairman and with yourself 

very strongly that voting is a communitarian process—George Will 

wrote a column on this some months ago—and that coming together in and of itself has a value, I think, above and beyond the 

process value. 

You express confidence in using the Internet for improving voter 

registration, but please elaborate on how the Internet can improve 

registration. Obviously, as a number of you have referenced in your 

comments, that is a very key issue with which we need to deal if 

we are going to have voter confidence; that they come to the polls 

and they will be allowed to vote. That, coupled with a very good 

provisional voting process. But would you comment on that? 

Mr. RIVEST. I would be very happy to comment on that, Mr. 

Hoyer. I think at the highest level, the voting system will be improved by a greater degree of transparency, having more information available to more people, more eyes looking at the process. Applying that to the voting registration process, if the voting registration lists are posted on the Internet in a way that anybody can look 

at, you will see fewer dead people on the rolls, you will see fewer 

people that are still on the rolls that have moved. You know, somebody will call up their official and say, did you know that so and 

so has left town? Things like this can happen. 

So just the process of keeping the accuracy of the voter registration lists will be improved by having it open and public, as I believe 

it should be. 

I think the process of registering to vote per se, is not something 

we should be attempting to do over the Internet. I think it should 

require an in-person visit. But once you are on the registration 

rolls, having your name listed as you are registered to vote in this 

county, I think that would be a help. 

Mr. HOYER. Do you have any thought as to how long it would 

take to construct a statewide system in a State like California, 

which is—well, there are no States like California. That was a stupid thing to say. There are only a few Nations like California. But 

a State—let’s say a smaller State, Florida, has just gone to mandating a system of central registration. I don’t know what cost that 

they attributed to that. Maryland is going to a central registration 

system. I think that is going to be critical, because in an era of very 

mobile individuals and families, when you move from precinct to 

precinct, house to house, and you really don’t—there is nothing 

that tells you this is a precinct line—that we need to have that 

kind of system. 

What is technically—how long would it take to create such a system in a State like Maryland or Florida or Pennsylvania, and what 

would its cost presumably be? Anybody have a guess on that? Have 

you looked at it? 

44

Mr. RIVEST. Let me just respond. Part of it is different States do 

it in different ways. I think it is Michigan that is combining it with 

the DMV database. If you have a single voter registration database 

and that is its only function, you might be able to do it in 2 or 3 

years. And I don’t know what the cost would be per voter. But if 

you are trying to organize your State’s citizen records along more 

lines than one, so you are doing the DMV and the Social Security 

or whatever, everything else altogether with within the State, I 

think that could be 6 or 7 years and lots more money. 

Mr. HOYER. Professor Rivest, one of the things, though, if you try 

to combine it, your transparency issue becomes more complicated, 

it seems to me, because there is information that voters clearly do 

not want and should not want transparent to the rest of us. 

Mr. RIVEST. Yes. 

Mr. HOYER. So that from my perspective, you are really going to 

have very limited use of a document that is totally transparent, 

and I agree with you it ought to be totally transparent, because I 

think that will protect against fraud and mistakes. I think my own 

view is that there are far more mistakes than there are actual intentional fraudulent acts. 

Mr. BAUM. Sir, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 pretty much requires a strong link with the Department of Motor Vehicles in each of the States, so that has to be investigated. Even so, 

there are commercial products available already. At its most simple 

level, a statewide voter registration system is simply a database. 

Now, there are security issues that surround it, but they are all 

known and solvable. And when you are taking a look at a State 

with the population of New Mexico, or something like that, it is not 

even a large database, so these are—again, it is more of a political 

consideration than a technical consideration. 

Mr. HOYER. Well, I am hoping that one of the things we do in 

legislation, that we are considering, is to have dollars available to 

assist States in the creation of a central database. In my view, in 

large part, the States will have to decide the individual problems 

and how they create that; that we can assist them in doing that 

to provide greater voter confidence when they go to the precinct, 

somebody will know in this computer age, when everybody gets on 

the Internet, can get access to gargantuan amounts of information, 

that they can get information that Joe Dokes has in fact registered 

to vote in this State. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I have got other questions but I know that 

time keeps running. Do you have questions? 

The CHAIRMAN. I have got questions. 

Mr. HOYER. Why don’t I yield to you? 

The CHAIRMAN. And if you want more time. I want to ask a specific question, Mr. Palfrey. Are you aware of any research that has 

studied the voting patterns of persons who are dyslexic or, let’s say, 

illiterate? 

Mr. PALFREY. With respect to the voting technology? 

The CHAIRMAN. And how to facilitate and help those individuals. 

Or is there technology that—for example, technology comes forth—

is it helpful, not helpful? 

Mr. PALFREY. There is some informal research. I don’t think 

there has been very much that has systematically been done to 

45

identify specific problems with technologies. Certainly, with respect 

to user interfaces, maybe Professor Woods can say more about this 

as far as dyslexic interfaces, but I think as far as handicapped considerations, use of audio, use of Braille and also overlays for the 

optical scanning equipment. 

The CHAIRMAN. We know, if it is an issue of sight, I saw the 

equipment here. So we know you have the earpiece. If it is an issue 

of height, you can accommodate downwards. But if it is an issue 

of dyslexia or an issue of illiteracy—

Now, an easy answer is, we take somebody in the voting booth, 

a poll worker. For a lot of people, though, it is such a private item 

about voting. So I just wondered—again, for sight, there are certain 

devices, but what about dyslexia? 

Mr. PALFREY. Well, there are examples——

Mr. HOYER. Can I make a comment, because I would like to 

hear—everything you mentioned, the hearing—that the audio 

transmission may not only solve the sight problem but may solve 

the inability—the dyslexic problem or another reading problem 

that might occur. That might solve, most of us wouldn’t think of 

it in those terms, but it may do that as well. You might want to 

comment on it. 

The CHAIRMAN. And touchtone screen. It was an interesting issue 

that we were discussing today. 

Mr. PALFREY. Right. And that is a possibility in some foreign 

countries, where illiteracy is a more serious problem than it is 

here. In South America, for example, they actually have pictures 

of the candidates, or icons to represent different parties, for example, to assist voters who can’t read. 

The CHAIRMAN. Also, Professor Palfrey, in your study over a 20-

year period, 60 percent of the counties have adopted new technologies of one sort or the other. Forty percent of the counties have 

been using the same technology basically, I would assume, for 20 

years. Are there any similarities or common characteristics about 

counties that have been using the same technologies for a long period of time versus the ones that have switched to some new technology? Are there any outstanding——

Mr. PALFREY. Yes, there are two factors that seem to be important with that. The larger counties, populationwise, we have tended to switch to new technologies, largely to handle problems of 

bandwidth and just dealing with large numbers of voters. So, they 

are concerned about speed and cost. That actually was one of the 

reasons for the transition even earlier to punch card systems, but 

certainly transitions from paper ballots to optical scanning equipment was done for cost and speed considerations in larger counties. 

There is also a correlation, with sort of average income levels or 

the sort of county revenues controlling for size, that counties that 

don’t have as much to spend, available to spend, have not been 

changing as fast. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Baum, I wanted to ask you a question. You 

had stressed, and I think made a couple of good points about, the 

fact of the different standard where somebody turns to an election 

official and they say, ‘‘as long as you are certified.’’

Mr. BAUM. Right. 

46

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just throw something out here, because 

you mentioned the word ‘‘agency’’ a couple of times, as other people 

indicated. Let’s assume you are not going to create an agency per 

se, as we would think an agency to be, because the downside of 

that, frankly, in the election process, is that it is not an environmental issue or a highway where you have a daily ongoing situation. So therefore, the thought of agency would tend to scare people 

across the board here, I think on both sides of the aisle, and a majority of both, only because a downside could be that there would 

be constant rules made by a rulemaking body that would make 

people eventually shiver about the agency saying whether you have 

an ID at the poll or not, versus, you know, the local governments 

and the Congress. 

So let’s assume we don’t have a full-blown agency. But what 

would you—or could you speculate, on what you would want to see 

if we created some type of body that was an advisory type of body; 

who would be on that body, in your opinion? 

Mr. BAUM. Well, first I would like to respectfully suggest that it 

is certainly more than a one-day project or a single-day project. The 

example I like to give most is that of a wedding. When you start 

planning a wedding, the events of the day actually become very 

much smaller in proportion to what it took you to get there. And 

running an election from an election board’s point of view is very 

much like planning a wedding year after year after year. 

The CHAIRMAN. I should clarify. I know it is year-round. I am 

just saying, if you had an agency, though, and you set up a fullblown agency, if it does have a daily function, I think we would be 

scared of the product after about a year. If you have an agency that 

creates a new staff daily, thinks of new rules to create on local people, I should tell you where I am coming from on that. 

Mr. BAUM. So in that setting, then, I think that what you need 

is representative—I think what we are talking about here is really 

a governance board, not a new kind of committee, but people that 

are involved with the process. And that means that you have people from State and local and Federal elections; you have people 

that have other concerns, interest groups, people who come in that 

are proponents for those who have disabilities; making sure that 

people that come in, from the Majority and Minority parties, to ensure that ballots are fair in the way that they are set up, and people with other interests coming in—I was going to use the term 

‘‘disinterested,’’ but we are all voters, we should all be interested. 

Like my fellow panel members here; people that can come in and 

come together and build a consensus on these, including the vendors themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I had a question of Professor Rivest. For the machines you are 

familiar with—because Mr. Swigert tells me he wouldn’t let you 

bring a laptop in here. That is how good you are. So those voting 

systems which you are familiar with, how long would it take to 

break into them while in a polling place? That could change the results of an election, if that could be done? Is it a long time process? 

Mr. RIVEST. I think it depends on who is doing it. I think if you 

have a voter who is just walking in to try to, you know, monkey 

with the equipment he is probably unlikely to have much effect. A 

47

poll worker, similarly, has little background with the equipment 

and wouldn’t know quite what to do except to operate it. A vendor’s 

technician on-site might have intimate knowledge of how the machine works and might have a preprogrammed smart card to 

change a tally or something like that. 

So I think it depends on knowledge of the equipment. It could 

be very quick if someone knowledgeable—changing electronic systems, you know, can be done quickly. If there is a card that is 

plugged in, as many machines have, that controls the operation of 

the machine. If the card can be changed you are changing the programming of the machine. If there is no audit trail, if that card 

was removed and replaced, you may have a successful hack. 

The CHAIRMAN. Some observers have recommended an open 

source process, so software can be used to control voting systems 

that would be subject to impartial inspection that could lead to increased quality. What do you think about that idea? 

Mr. RIVEST. I am in favor of it, basically. I think that this poll 

process is too important to be left wrapped in the cloaks of the vendors’ claims of proprietary need. I think that having the software 

available for inspection by whomever will increase our confidence 

that the voting is being tabulated correctly. 

It is not sufficient by itself, of course. You need to assure that 

the software that you have looked at is actually the software that 

is running in the machine and have procedures installed to ensure 

things like that. But having the software out for inspection I think 

will be to everyone’s benefit. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The last question I have is for Professor Woods. 

We had the voting machines in here, and I found them of interest because that is the first time in my life I have not used a punch 

card. I went originally to the X’s we used to do when I first voted 

down in Ohio in Belmont County. Then we went to the punch 

cards, because that is what we used. So this is the first time I ever 

actually touched some other type of device. 

The one thing I would ask of the vendors is, don’t help me, let 

me see if I can do that. I don’t claim to have the ability of Mr. 

Ehlers on scientific knowledge at all our computers, but it was interesting just using the machines. 

Now, I noticed an exhibit was there when, once you wanted to 

make your choice, you had to retouch to cancel out and then you 

touch back. But then there was another machine that you pushed 

the next name, it automatically canceled back. Because of what you 

do, dealing with human interface and ergonomics, is there any machine, when you talk about the touch screens or maybe a non-touch 

screen, that is a better type of machine or the machine of the day? 

Mr. WOODS. It is difficult for us to recommend a particular technology or system. But the example you use is I think a very illustrative example where some of the principles we found apply. One 

is feedback. So either of those systems can confuse people depending on the degree to which they get clear feedback with respect to 

their actions. 

So, for example, take the second case you have mentioned before, 

where you simply push the second candidate. Someone could get 

confused about what the impact of that is. Are they going to end 

up the equivalent on the punch card of having two holes punched? 

48

If you have clear feedback—for example, when you press the second one, the first one starts to blink in a salient way and then goes 

dark—those kinds of systems are likely to work better. 

The second aspect of my response, this is the sign of usability 

testing, is about that we have procedures for doing tests so we 

don’t rely just on opinion or quick walk-up, a couple users trying 

it out. We have processes to do that that are very economical to 

generate the best kind of information to act on and get the best leverage when you have to make design decisions or purchasing 

choices. So by using that technology of user testing, technology that 

is used every day in the software industry for the products you and 

your family buy on the local scene, those kinds of tests can result 

in many of these kinds of questions and result in more easy to understand and use, especially for the diverse population that you 

pointed out is so critical to the voting application. 

The CHAIRMAN. One final thought—I will see if Mr. Hoyer has 

some questions—basically indicated here and at least one of the 

testimonies that, you know, it is the human error. You know, we 

know that is part of it. But if it is just a human error factor, should 

we just keep punch cards and spend a lot of money? Well, if it is 

only human error, could we keep those punch cards and spend a 

lot of money to educate people, or should we go on to something 

else? 

Mr. PALFREY. With respect to punch cards, I think we should go 

on to something else. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony did indicate, though, that it is 

human error. Well, if it is, do you just work with what you have? 

Mr. PALFREY. One way I like to think about it is in terms of a 

technology being dominated. In other words, if you think about 

spending the effort to educate the voters, if you want to spend the 

same amount of effort educating voters using punch card systems 

or you are educating voters using an optical scanning system, what 

would the results be? And I think the results of one would be better than the other. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anyone that would like to keep punch 

cards? 

Mr. BAUM. I think punch card manufacturers would like to keep 

punch cards. 

The CHAIRMAN. We know that. 

Mr. WOODS. The success we have achieved in cockpits and other 

high criticality domains has come from dropping this red herring 

of human error. When we want to label a problem as human error, 

the scientific approach says you take that as a symptom of an underlying problem in the system and the interaction between people 

and technology. And there lies the grounds for improvement so that 

we can achieve what we all desire, in this case in the democratic 

process. 

So, now, with respect to punch cards in particular, it violates a 

very old rule for designing interfaces between devices and people, 

all right? The punch card, you actually make a hole, all right? The 

absence of something, the hole is supposed to indicate the presence, 

the state that we are interested in, the vote. 

If I had designed—when I started our designing nuclear power 

plant control rooms 20 years ago, if I had tried to code the critical 

49

state stage of the nuclear reactor using that principle that is done 

in punch cards, I would not be here today. We have learned 

through bitter experience in aviation interfaces and energy systems 

that is not a good way to set up the interface. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are making a good point. So I totally grasp 

it, it is not a good way to set it up to read that card, or it is not 

a good way to set up to have the human being, the voter, reacting 

that way of the punch?

Mr. WOODS. Both. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, on the reading side of it, I believe, 

of the machine reading it—it is probably not the word—but why 

the voter? 

Mr. WOODS. We say that in all these issues of did they punch 

through, was the card aligned, the basic rule of thumb is you want 

people to make a positive indication so that you have transparency 

and traceability, as my colleague to my right indicated earlier. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions? That is interesting. 

Mr. HOYER. Well I think that—we pretty much have a consensus 

I think in the country at State, local and Federal levels that we 

want to get—rid ourselves of the punch card, save perhaps the 

manufacturers, as Mr. Baum put it. But it is interesting that systemically there is a reason for that as well. I was glad to hear that. 

Let me ask Dr. Rivest, then I am going to go to some other quick 

questions. You have reservations about the Internet voting, and 

that is shared I think by a vast number of people, including myself. 

However, I would like your comments on whether it is worth testing in an area that we think does not work as well, and we need 

to make it work well and may be an area where we want to at least 

test this, and that is overseas voting and military voting. Could you 

comment on applications that may be perhaps more appropriate in 

that limited setting? 

Mr. RIVEST. I would be happy to. 

I think that the military application is a good one to look at. I 

think that you have the kinds of controls both over the environment and the networks that you may not have in other kinds of 

remote Internet voting, and you also have a very clear and important need for our soldiers to be able to vote, and also I am in favor 

of experimentation. 

I think we need to plan to evolve our voting systems over the 

next 20, 30—you know, as technology improves, we are going to 

keep changing our minds as to what, as Professor Palfrey said, 

what the dominating technology is. But in order to learn what the 

dominating technology is, what the best voting systems are, we 

need to have experience with them. 

So, for all of those reasons, I think that experimenting on a small 

basis at first, maybe expanding if the system seems to work well, 

with remote Internet voting for military purposes, I would be in 

favor of that. But it needs to be carefully controlled and looked at. 

The Internet is a very fragile and vulnerable entity, and it is vulnerable to attack by malicious organizations from outside our country. So we need to make sure that there is back-up systems in 

place should our soldiers not be able to use the Internet. 

Mr. HOYER. Thank you. 

50

Professor Palfrey, I was pleased to see in your statement that 

you support the five principles that Chairman Ney and I are essentially working around; and I take it from your statement that our 

focus should not be exclusively on the 72,000 precincts, or whatever 

number precinct we have, the 72,000 precincts, but on a broader 

array of the technology use in other technologies, used in other precincts, is that correct? 

Mr. PALFREY. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. HOYER. How expensive do you think we ought to be on this 

in terms of assistance to improve an election infrastructure? 

Mr. PALFREY. Well, I think as far as coming up with a single 

number I am not sure that is quite the way that I think about it, 

partly because I view this as sort of an ongoing process. As far as 

approximately, I don’t know if you are looking for approximate 

numbers. 

Mr. HOYER. No, I was not looking for a number. I apologize if I 

implied that, obviously. 

But the bill that I have introduced, along with a lot of other people, sought first, as Florida has done, to eliminate the punch card 

system. And then, as you know, it provides ongoing resources for 

technology replacement as well as a lot of other things in terms of 

education and technology development. 

What I am wondering is, if we limited our first step to that, 

would you think that is an error, or do you think we ought to make 

sure that this can be applied to other technologies, i.e., lever machines initially? Obviously, we are talking about limited resources 

that we will come up with in the first traunch, if you will. That 

is what I am really getting at. 

Mr. PALFREY. I think there are other technologies that have 

known problems besides punch card systems. Without identifying 

specific vendors, there are examples of full face DRE machines that 

have not been successful, that the administrators that use them 

would probably be happy to replace. I think centrally counted precinct scan equipment should be replaced by precinct counting. If 

you are looking for a quick fix of that, that is certainly a better 

technology having to do with the voter feedback and also the ability 

for errors to be detected before the vote is tallied. 

Mr. HOYER. so in other words—and I hadn’t thought about 

that—but clearly everybody believes that in order for a system to 

be as accurate as it can be you need precinct where-a-voter-is-stillpresent technology to let the voter know whether or not they have 

made mistakes. 

Mr. PALFREY. Yes. I think we are at a stage now where there exists technologies to do that. We should take advantage of it. 

Mr. HOYER. Okay. That is helpful. 

Dr. Woods, you addressed three key factors of voting—user 

friendliness, voter feedback and balance the design. What is the 

best feedback tool to let voters verify whether they actually voted 

for the candidates that they want without compromising voter privacy? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, you have hit the heart of the design problem 

from a human factor’s perspective. 

Normally, as Professor Rivest indicated, we don’t have those simultaneous constraints to deal with. Obviously, the feedback has 

51

to be something that can be terminated by the voter so that they 

get a display, they get feedback that says this is what the machine 

thinks you told it. Then, in registering their vote, the voter must 

have a confident feeling that that information has gone into the 

computer and the traceability back to them has gone away; and 

that requires careful design and testing with users, again meeting 

the challenge of the diverse kinds of populations we have in the 

voting. And that is the kind of usability testing that is standard 

in our profession and that we can carry out on a very rapid basis. 

But there is no way to give a global answer without going through 

that indurative testing process. 

Mr. HOYER. Okay. Obviously, that, however, is going to be one 

of the key issues we need to deal with; and I say that perhaps not 

at our level. We are talking about a lot of things that, frankly, 

States and locals are going to make the decision—final decision on, 

perhaps with advice of counsel and best practices and best standards advice, but——

Mr. WOODS. This is where an independent technical group can 

come in and demonstrate. Often, we can show you some clearly undesirable ways to try to accomplish those goals, and we can point 

people in these kinds of guidance documents I have referred to to 

several different kinds of techniques that will work and how to do 

quick tests to verify that your particular choice as an election official or a State official will be successful. 

Mr. HOYER. Thank you. 

Dr. Woods, let me ask you about the DRE machines, because I 

want to know what extent the flaws in DRE machines are attributable to poor ballot design versus problems that are inherent in 

the technology itself or perhaps a combination of the two. I think 

Dr. Palfrey just made the observation that DRE machines themselves—some technology applications have not worked as well and 

administrators are not pleased with how well they have worked. 

Could you comment on the issue? 

Mr. WOODS. I haven’t looked directly and evaluated those interfaces. Ohio State did run a study 2 years before the recent controversy evaluating a variety of different voting systems and anticipated many of the punch card difficulties and identified a variety 

of other problems with the visual layout of the ballot design, ways 

that people could miss certain aspects of the ballot choices they 

had. For example people were able to—we had some issues where 

people—shorter people missed certain referenda, didn’t even realize 

that they had those options available to vote on them. That is why 

there was no choice made on those issues facing the voter. So those 

layout issues can apply. 

Mr. HOYER. Anybody else have any comment on that? 

Mr. PALFREY. I think actually Mr. Ney identified one source of 

some of these problems when he mentioned the machines that he 

looked at and there was all sorts of variety of ways that lights 

popped on and went off and whatever. And if there isn’t good, you 

know, clear instructions on the screen for what is going on, voters 

could easily get the wrong idea. 

Mr. HOYER. Seems to me you need to take this technology and 

expose it to large focus groups and make a scientific analysis of the 

human error rate, user friendliness of the technology. I think that 

52

is going to take a lot of—I imagine you folks are the perfect people 

probably to do that on contract for some group, perhaps the OEA, 

which would be able to give grants to carry out such testing. I 

mean, ultimately, a human being is going to use this, got to put 

a lot of human beings in the room and see what happens. 

Mr. PALFREY. Not only sort of human testing, sort of human laboratory testing where you put them in a room and have them bang 

around it, and also field testing could be useful as well. 

Mr. BAUM. In addition to in-field testing, we are not really talking about voter education here. That is an oxymoron. You don’t go 

out and educate voters on the technology. They come in and use it. 

Mr. Ney, you indicated that was your first time seeing that technology. For a majority of voters the first time they are going to see 

that technology is when they go in to vote on it. That is incorrect. 

They should have had a familiarity with it before. You put it out 

in the shopping malls, you put it out in the libraries, you put it 

out in the high schools and let them go out and play with it some. 

So by the time they go in and see it, it is not an intimidation of 

the equipment. 

The CHAIRMAN. Especially for certain age years now. My children, if I buy a VCR today, they install it, my 12-year-old. It used 

to be my 17 year old when he was 12. If I need something done 

on the computer, they come over, and they help me. I am the problem. They aren’t. 

So I know you know the school age children through computers 

through school are not the—that they are not—that they don’t need 

the education. They will have a much easier time. They don’t fear 

things as I do. I am not a user of technology. I try and, you know, 

I do e-mail and things like that. So there is also age groups. 

That is why you have got a great idea, the malls. If you have a 

mobile traveling unit that goes to senior centers, it is you know, 

open to the public. The schools are great, too. But school children 

are going to adapt quicker because they are used to computers. 

Mr. BAUM. it depends. I think my kids would be very intimidated 

by a punch card machine——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, that is right. 

Mr. BAUM [continuing]. And have a whole different experience 

with what the marked sensor cards are, too. The optical scan, you 

look at one of those, and you are taking a test. 

Mr. WOODS. We refer to this problem as the walk-up interface 

problem, because people won’t have practice. Even if it is you are 

voting in the same area, you only do it once a year. So it is always 

this kind of walk-up interface, and you have to remember again 

how to do it. 

I would point you, without even the latest technology, to the L.A. 

Olympics in 1984. One major telecommunications company in the 

U.S. Human factors group was—volunteered to help design the information system—the electronic information system for the athletes, the participants in those games, how to deal with people with 

different languages and backgrounds and compute awareness. And 

they needed information about the times of their various practices 

and preliminary heats and also how to contact and schedule meetings with that tremendous opportunity to get to know people from 

around the world. 

53

It was a tremendous success because they applied the science of 

human factors to those walk-up interfaces and experienced very 

few problems. People didn’t think about it as a problem or a challenge, how to learn how to operate the device. They just walked up 

and found the information or communication to the people they 

wanted to contact. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Hoyer made a good point about focus 

groups. You have the scientific community that watches the group’s 

interaction, you have your different type of people that are watching, but have you the people that participate in focus groups? I 

think that in fact, you know, would help a lot. 

Mr. WOODS. Those usability tasks can be run. 

Again, I would point out there are plenty of interfaces and potential for problems to arise when the election officials interact in the 

various stages of processing the votes. We shouldn’t forget about 

those interfaces as well, because that is where we would inadvertently introduce large inaccuracies. 

Mr. HOYER. Thank you. 

Let me sort of ask a global question. If we could do only one 

thing this year, do you have any thought as to what that ought to 

be? In other words, the first step. I have mentioned some first steps 

personally, but do you have any views? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, from my point of view, it would be very easy 

to put out a kind of initial guide to the human factors of voting 

technology that would give some examples, some basic principles 

and some testing focus group techniques, how to run the focus 

groups, to provide an initial resource to local election officials as 

they contemplate what decisions they should make now or put off 

as more information and options become available. And I think 

there are independent bodies, national laboratories such as 

Brookhaven National Lab or universities, who could respond quickly to provide that guidance. 

Mr. HOYER. Any other Comment? 

Mr. BAUM. I think if you were only going to do one thing—and 

that is my sincere hope that that is not the case—it would be to 

publish some information on how to live with what you have. I 

mean, yes, there are challenges in each one of these technologies. 

But with proper planning, with good processes in place and good 

training in place, we can certainly reduce the error rate of even the 

equipment that is there by handling it better. 

Mr. RIVEST. I think I would respond by saying to create a organization whose mission is to assist the States, the local officials, by 

creating a fund, and organization to generate and distribute and 

share information about voting systems, supporting research, supporting focus groups on usability, supporting hacker attacks on systems to see what can be done. You know, publishing a source code, 

when that could be made available. An organization whose goal is 

to help the State officials know everything that needs to be known 

about these systems so they can choose well. 

Mr. PALFREY. I would second that. Because I think one of the 

biggest problems is lack of information, okay? You have election administrators who are in a situation, whether the money is coming 

from the Federal Government or not, they are basically under pressure. They are going to have to replace some equipment. They don’t 

54

have good guidance for how to do it, how to implement it, what 

kind of pitfalls there are. And it goes to security, it goes to all these 

other different issues. I think you really do need an agency or an 

organization who is responsible for collecting and providing an information clearinghouse of that sort. 

Mr. HOYER. As I say and as you know, we do have an organization, small and incorporated within the FEC, the OEA. But, I was 

stricken by the fact that all of the Secretaries of State that testified 

and all of the election administrators that testified were looking to 

the OEA for better information, better—best practices advice and 

counsel, better standards advice. And you have echoed that, and I 

hope we do that. 

I want to say very quickly, I hope we don’t do just one thing. I 

agree with that, and the question was, to that degree, rhetorical. 

Last question I will ask, Mr. Chairman, and I have some others 

here but, if we might, I hope that our staffs can feel free to contact 

you from time to time and get the value of your expertise. 

What would the best way for Congress to facilitate research and 

development of new voting technology, and how can Congress make 

it easier to develop and implement new technology? I think that is 

going to be, I hope, one of the aspects of what we will do. Because 

such a limited market, such a relatively—‘‘sterile’’ is the wrong 

word but stable market, not a very volatile or vibrant market here, 

so the technology has not turned over as quickly as it otherwise 

might have. Florida has spurred that, and we will have a short 

window, in my opinion, to take advantage of that sort of awareness. So how can we best do that—that is, to spur our DT&E in 

this area? 

Mr. BAUM. I would like to point out that, although the market 

for public elections may be set and stable, there are other kinds of 

elections where this technology applies. There are union elections, 

professional organization elections, and all kinds of places where 

these other factors are also a part. That allows the opportunity for 

the private sector and the public sector to cooperate here in building up standards that become then, generally accepted election 

standards. So that is one area of cooperation with the private sector where Congress can make a huge contribution. Also, as we have 

all stated before, coming up with standards that can be applied in 

these areas would make a significant contribution. 

Mr. PALFREY. I think one of the barriers to innovation, is that 

election administrators have to be cautious when they make an acquisition of a replacement for whatever technology they had. And 

what has happened is that they just switch wholesale to a new 

technology. 

I think one thing that would help innovation—and there are 

start-up companies that are out there trying to work on innovation 

in this area—is to provide some sort of funding for pilot testing, 

pilot experiments, and field testing so that you don’t have to jump 

into it full force. You can try it out in a couple precincts, see how 

it is working, and monitor it. I think that is one thing that might 

help. 

Mr. RIVEST. I think perhaps some guidance to either NSF or 

DARPA, or both, to support research in this area could be helpful. 

DARPA may seem strange, but in fact there is national security inVerDate jul 14 2003 10:44 Aug 27, 2003 Jkt 087478 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\87478.XXX 87478
55

volved with these elections. NSF has traditionally funded research 

in computer security and cryptography, for example. As my colleagues have pointed out, there are also businesses that need to be 

involved. I am not sure what the best way to encourage them to 

innovate is. 

Mr. WOODS. Another aspect of the activity of the independent resource in that area, we need a mechanism for people to monitor potential or emerging sources of inaccuracy and problems. This is almost a classic advice that we give to almost every agency that has 

safety, for the potential for a crisis to arise. We don’t want to react 

after the fact to a crisis, like Florida, and try to repair and intervene. High reliability organizations are out there testing and monitoring their systems to notice early warning signs or even dress rehearsals. Instead of rationalizing away the dress rehearsal of inaccuracies in this, our system, which we have been too tolerant of, 

we need these bodies to be out there saying, whoops, look at what 

we are starting to see as problems, sharing that information so 

people can change the technology, change the education, and 

change the procedures they are using to prevent crises from happening. 

Mr. HOYER. Thank you very much to the panelists. You have 

been very helpful, I think, and very thoughtful. Hopefully, as I said 

earlier, we will be able to work with you so you can help us. Again, 

there’s a much longer term—States and localities and whatever 

agency, whether it is the existing OEA within FEC or some other 

organizational structure like that, work with them to accomplish 

objectives which I think clearly all of us want to accomplish. 

And they are not partisan in nature. Everybody wants to make 

sure that, not only does every American have the right to vote, but 

every American’s vote is made easier to cast, more accurately, and 

counted correctly. And although this is not solely a technology 

problem, clearly it manifested itself in many ways as a technology 

problem, as well as a human behavior interface with technology 

problem. 

Thank you very much; and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We do appreciate your testimony today. You are 

an important component from the technology side. 

Also one thing, I want to assure you too, and I feel very good 

about, the way we have proceeded and also about the ideas that 

Mr. Hoyer has been able to develop and we have been able to develop together and, you know, to reach some basic consensus 

among members when you start to talk about it. 

I think the statement you made, Professor Woods, is what we are 

doing—you know, this isn’t debating Florida, but Florida caused 

the debate. And I can barely remember anyone coming to me over 

a period of 20-some years, whatever office I have held, of saying, 

gee, this certain technology needs to be looked at or it needs work. 

It wasn’t drawn out until you had some national view. And that is 

what the Presidential did. 

So I think what we are doing is trying to work with the desires 

of the locals to do something about the existing systems that are 

out there, but also I think what we are doing, is we are not in the 

middle of the crisis right now, we are personally not letting this sitVerDate jul 14 2003 10:44 Aug 27, 2003 Jkt 087478 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\87478.XXX 87478
56

uation go. We are driving a piece of legislation. I think it is going 

to be good. But I think we are reacting the right way to look ahead. 

So, I think your statements were well taken. It is the way to proceed on this, and I think that is what we are doing. 

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, on a nonelectoral reform issue, if I 

might, I want to say to you and to Dr. Woods that—how highly resentful we in Maryland are that you have taken our president of 

the University of Maryland away. I don’t know whether you have 

had an opportunity to get to know Brit Kirwan very well, but he 

is an extraordinary asset. He is a wonderful human being. Ohio 

State is very fortunate to have him. We miss him a lot in College 

Park. 

I am on the board of regents of the university systems, and I was 

a graduate of the University of Maryland and worked with Brit 

very, very closely for all the time that he was at the university 

which, as you know, was over 2 decades. I trust that Ohio appreciates him as much as they should. You certainly compensated him 

better than we did; and he appreciates that, I know. But I hope you 

enjoy working with Brit. He is a terrific fellow. 

The CHAIRMAN. We like him, and we in Ohio will not mention 

what Baltimore took from us in Cleveland a few years ago. We will 

just leave it at that. 

On that note, I ask unanimous consent that witnesses be allowed 

to submit their statements for the record. Members have 7 legislative days to insert extraneous material into the record, and for 

those statements and materials to be entered into the appropriate 

place within the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

I ask unanimous consent the staff be permitted to make technical and conforming changes on all matters considered, by the 

committee at today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

Having completed our business of the day for this hearing on 

election reform, the committee is hereby adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]