The Honor able Allen Shar p, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of * Indiana, sitting by

desig nation. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0058n.06 F iled: Janu ary 24, 2007 No. 05-1497 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT J A M E S D . M IT C H E LL; J O HN W . M IT C H E LL, Pe tit ion e rs -A

pp e lla nts , v. ROBERT EDWARD AI

NB I NDER, J R.; CANTONE RESEARCH I NC., Re sp on de nts -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : CL AY and SUTTO N, Circuit J udg es; SHARP, Dist rict Judge. * SHARP, Dist rict Judge. J ames D. Mitche ll and J ohn W. Mi tchell (c ollectively , “Mitchell”) appea l from a district cour t decision uph o l d i n g an arbitration awa rd in favor

of Robert Edwa

rd Ainbinder and Cantone R esea rch, I nc. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. I . J ames Mitchell and his father, John Mi tchell, opene d three acc ounts with CantoneNo. 05-1497

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- 2 - Re se arc h, Inc ., a

br ok e ra g e fi rm

in N e w Je rs e y . O ne a c c ount w a s h e ld b y Jame s Mi tc he ll, another was he ld jointl y

by J ames a nd his father , and anothe r wa s held by the Special Ne eds Trust for John W . Mitchell, J r. Robert Ainbinder , one of Cantone Resear ch’s br okers, wa s listed as the a ccount e x ecutive on a ll three a ccounts fr om J anuar y throug h J uly

of 1998. In July 19 98 , A inb ind e r l e ft

Canto ne Re se arc h to joi n Sh arp e Ca pit a l. M itc he ll tr ans fe rr e d h is i nd ivi du a l a c c ount t o Sh arp e Ca pit a l a t th at ti me , b ut k e pt t

he joi nt a nd tr us t a c c ounts at Ca

nto ne Re se arc h. Mit c he ll i nc ur re d lo sse s o n a ll thr e e a c c ounts . On Janu ary 2, 20 01 , M itc he ll f

ile d a Cla im f or Ar bit ratio n w ithNA SD D isp ute Resolution, I nc. ag ainst Ainbinder and Ca ntone Resea

rch. The statement of c laim alleg ed that Ai nb ind e r a

nd Canto ne Re se arc h v iol ate d f e de ra l and

state se c ur iti e s la

ws wi th r e sp e c t to Mit c he ll’ s inve stm e nts at Ca nto ne Re se arc h a

nd Sha rp e Ca pit a l. T he state me nt o f c la im a lso broug ht common law claims of unsuitability , churning , unauthorized trading , fra ud, and bre ach of fiducia ry duty . The thre e-me mber pa nel of a rbitrators, a

pproved by

the par ties, conducte d nine day s of hea

ring s betwee n J une 10, 2003, and A pril 7, 2004. On May

3, 2004, the ar

bitrators denied Mitche ll’s claims. On J uly 2, 2004, Mitchell filed a pe tition i n the district court to vac ate the a rbitration awa rd. On Mar ch 10, 2005, the district cour t denied the pe tition t o vacate and e ntere d judgme nt on the ar bitration awa

rd. This appe al followed.No. 05-1497

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- 3 - I I . As a thre shold matter, we br iefly addre ss Cantone Resea

rch’ s contention that we la ck jurisdiction to hear this case beca use the amount in controversy require ment has not bee n satisfied. Diver sity

jurisdiction ex ists only

“whe re the matter in controve rsy exceeds the sum or va lue of $7 5, 00 0, e xclu siv e of

int e re sts and

c os ts. ” 28 U. S.C. § 1 33 2; see Ev erett v. Ve rizon W ireless, Inc. , 4 60 F .3 d 8 18 , 8 22 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) . T his Court ha s st ate d th at di str ic t c ourt s “should consider

the amount alleg ed in a c omplaint and should not dism iss a complaint for lac k of su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n unle ss i t a pp e ars to a

le g a l c e rt a int

y that th e pla int if

f i n g oo d f

a ith cannot c laim the jurisdictional amount.” Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. Harmon , 88 F.3d 415, 41 6 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 6) . Wh e re , a s h e re , th e pe tit ion e r s e e ks to r e op e n th e arb itr atio n, the amou nt i n controve rsy

“includes the matter at stake in the ar bitration.” See Sirotzky

v. New Y ork Stock Exc hange , 3 47 F .3 d 9 85 , 9 89 (7 th C ir . 2 00 3) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Ford v. H amilton Inve stments, Inc. , 29 F.3d 255, 260 ( 6th Cir. 1994). Even a c ursory revie w of the state ment of claim re veals that we ll over $75,000 wa s at stake in the a rbitration. Mitchell’s total claim, which included punitive damag es, totaled more than $770,000, exclusive of costs and attorney fee s. S ee Kleppe r v. First Am. Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 341 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (re quest for punitive damag es may satisfy the amount-in-c ontroversy require ment). Ther e beingnothing to sug g est that that claim was ma de in bad f

aith, we r eac h the merits of this case . Our r ole in r e vie wi ngarb itr atio n d e c isi on s is lim ite d, and we a pp ly “ on e of the na rr ow e st standards of

judicial revie w in all of Amer ican jurisprude nce.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn.No. 05-1497

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- 4 - Va lle yTra de s &Lab or

Cou nc il , 184 F.3d 510, 515 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (interna l quotation marks omitted). So long as “ an ar bitrator is eve n arguably

construingor apply

ing the contra ct and actingwithin the scope of his a uthority , the fa ct that a c ourt is convinced he committed serious err or does not suff

ice to over

turn his decision.” Major League Baseball Playe rs Ass’n v. Garv ey , 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). A c ourt may vacate an a

rbitration awa rd : ( 1) wh e re the awa

rd wa s p ro c ur e d b y

fr a ud ; ( 2) wh e re the arb itr ator s w e re e vid e ntl y partial or c orrupt; (3) where misconduct of the a rbitrators pr ejudiced the rig hts of the par ties; or (4 ) whe re the arb itr ator s e xce e de d th e ir po we rs . 9 U. S.C. § 1 0( a ). A r e vie wi ngc ourt may a lso vacate an a

war d wher e the a

rbitrators have manife stly disreg arde d the law. Dawahare v. Spence r , 2 1 0 F. 3 d

6 6 6 , 6 6 9 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Glennon v. D ean W itter Reynolds, Inc
. , 83 F.3d 132, 135 ( 6th Cir. 1996)). When revie winga district cour t’s denial of a

motion to vacate a

n arbitration decision, we c onsider questions of law de novo , and we acc ept the cour t’s finding s of fac t, unless clear ly

err oneous. Nationw ide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hom e Ins. Co. , 278 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2002). Mitchell argues that the a rbitration pane l manifestly disreg arde d the law in its decision. Specifica lly , Mitchell argues that the pa nel ac ted with manifest disreg ard f or the lawin denying their suitability , churning , and bre ach of fiduciar y duty claims. We disag ree .

“ An arb itr atio n p ane l a c ts w ithmanif e st d isr e g ard

if ‘( 1) the a pp lic a ble le g a l pr inc ipl e is clea rly define d and not subject to re asonable debate ; and (2) the arbitrators ref used to hee d that leg al principle.’ ” Da wah ar e , 2 1 0 F. 3 d at6 6 9 (qu o t i n g Merrill Lynch, Pierc e, Fe nner &Smith,No. 05-1497

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- 5 - Inc. v . Jaros , 70 F.3d 418, 421 ( 6th Cir. 1995)). Proof that the pa nel “disre g arde d” the law or “re fused to hee d” the law implicitl y

require s proof that the a

rbitrators “ have c onsciously chosen not to apply ” the r eleva

nt law. Se e Da wah ar e , 2 1 0 F. 3 d at6 6 9 (c i t i n g M &

C Co rp . v . E

rwi n Behr GmbH

&Co. , 8 7 F .3 d 8 44 , 8 51 n. 3 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 6) ). To make thi ng s e ve n mo re dif fi c ult for pe titioners, arbitrator s are not require d to expl ain their de cisions. When they choose not to do so , a s th e y

have do ne he re , “ it i s a ll b ut i mpo ssi ble to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he y a c te d w ithmanif

e st disreg ard f

or the law .” Da wah ar e , 2 1 0 F. 3 d at6 6 9 (c i t i n g Jaros , 70 F.3d at 421)). “I f the c ourt can f ind any line of ar g ument that is leg ally plausible and supports the a war d then it must be c on fi rm e d. On ly

wh e re no jud g e or

g ro up of jud g e s c ou ld c on c e iva

bly c ome to t he same deter mination as the arbitrators must the awar d be set a side.” Jaros , 70 F.3d at 421 We ag ree with the district court’s c onclusion that Ainbinder and Ca ntone Resea

rch pr e se nte d p la

us ibl e argume nts fo r t

he de nia l of

Mit c he ll’ s su ita

bil ity c la im. Contr ary

to Mitchell’s asser

tions on appeal, the a

rbitration pane l was pre sented with evide nce sug g esting that Mitchell was an a g g ressive tra der who pref err ed hig h risk investments. We also ag ree with the district court’s c onclusion that Ainbinder and Ca ntone Resea

rch prese nted plausible ar g uments for the de nial of Mitchell’s chur ning c laims. To bring a succ essful c hurn ingc la im, a

pe tit ion e r m

us t e sta bli shthr e e e le me nts : “ (1 ) t he tr a din gmus t be e xce ssi ve in light of the customer’ s objectives; (2) the broker must ex erc ise control over the ac count; [and] (3) the br oker must ac t with intent to defraud or with willful and rec kless disreg ard of the customer’ s interest.” M & B Co ntrac ting Co rp . v . D ale , 795 F.2d 531, 533 ( 6th Cir. 1986)No. 05-1497

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- 6 - (citations omitted). Mitchell relies solely on the hig h rate of turnover to support his churning claim. While that may

be enough to support a chur ning c laim before an ar

bitration panel, it does not require a findingof excessive tra ding in e very instance. N ASD Conduct Rule I M-2310(b)( 2) states that “[t] here are no specific standards to mea sure e x cessivene ss of ac tivity in customer acc ounts beca

use this must be related to the obje ctives and f inancial situation of the c ustomer involved.” (inter

nal quotations omitt ed). Mitchell also argues that Christine Cantone, vice president of Cantone Resea

rch, pe rjured herse lf duringthe ar

bitration proce eding s and that this perjury amounts to “fra

ud” and “ undue means” under 9 U .S.C. § 10(a)(1) . Specifica lly , Mitchell argues that Ms. Cantone testified fa lse ly that: ( 1) the re c or ds re qu e sts of Canto ne Re se arc h r e late d s ole ly to A inb ind e r, wh e n in fac t the reque sts called for the re cords of

“any other broke r” a ssigne d to or associated with the Mitchell acc ounts; and (2) that no broke r at Cantone Re sear ch re quired spec ial supervision, when in fac t Ainbinder wa s to be under stric t supervision. Gene rally , when a

plaintiff is seekingvacatur of an a rbitration awa

rd under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1), f raud must be e stablished by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e. See B onar v. De an W itter Rey nolds, Inc. , 836 F.2d 1378, 1383 ( 11th Cir. 1988). Both per jury and fr aud re quire proof

of so me so rt of wi llf ul i nte nt t o g ive fa lse te sti mony . T he re fo re , M itc he ll w ou ld b e re qu ir e d to prove, by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e, that Ms. Cantone intende d to provide fa lse testimony . They have f ailed to do so. Ther efor e, vac atur on this basis would be improper .No. 05-1497

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- 7 - III . For these re asons, the judg ment of the district cour t is AFF I RMED.