area handbook series

Laos

a country study



Laos

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Andrea Matles Savada

Research Completed

July 1994
On the cover: Boats tied up on the Mekong River, at the

foot of wide steps leading to Wat Xieng Thong in

Louangphrabang

Third Edition, First Printing, 1995.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Laos: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of

Congress ; edited by Andrea Maties Savada.—3rd ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA Pam ; 550-58)

"Supersedes the 1971 edition of Area Handbook for Laos."Research completed July 1994."

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 313-338) and

index.

ISBN 0-8444-0832-8

1. Laos. I. Savada, Andrea Mades, 1950- . II. Library of

Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-58

DS555.3.L34 1995 95-1 7235

951.93—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-58

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared

by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress

under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this

book list the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and

national security systems and institutions, and examining the

interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins,

dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the

issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their

involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes

toward each other and toward their social system and political

order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should

not be construed as an expression of an official United States

government position, policy, or decision. The authors have

sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.

Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, DC 20540-5220

iii

Acknowledgments

This edition supersedes the Area Handbook for Laos, published in 1971. Various members of the staff of the Federal

Research Division of the Library of Congress assisted in the

preparation of the book. Sandra W. Meditz made helpful suggestions during her review of all parts of the book. Robert L. Worden also reviewed parts of the book and made numerous

suggestions and points of clarification. Tim L. Merrill checked

the contents of all the maps and reviewed the sections on geography and telecommunications. Thomas D. Hall also assisted

with some of the maps. Thanks also go to David R Cabitto, who

managed graphics production; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and production and edited portions of the manuscript; Andrea T. Merrill, who provided invaluable assistance

with regard to tables and figures; and Barbara Edgerton,

Alberta Jones King, and Izella Watson, who did the word processing.

The authors also are grateful to individuals in various United

States government agencies who gave their time and special

knowledge to provide information and perspective. These individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country

Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the

Army, and the staff of the Embassy of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United States. Others who contributed were Joel Halpern, who reviewed

the text and also offered many valuable suggestions and points

of clarification; Ly Burnham, who reviewed the portions of the

text on demography; Harriett R. Blood, who prepared the

topography and drainage map; Maryland Mapping and Graphics, which prepared maps and charts; Teresa Kemp, who

designed the cover and chapter art; Juliet Bruce, who edited

chapters; Sheila L. Ross, who performed the final prepublication editorial review; Joan C. Cook, who compiled the index;

and Stephen C. Cranton, David P. Cabitto, and Janie L. Gilchrist, who prepared the camera-ready copy. The inclusion of

photographs was made possible by the generosity of individuals

and the Embassy of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Contents

Page

Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv Country Profile xxi

Introduction xxix

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Arthur J. Dommen

EARLY HISTORY 5 Power Centers in the Middle Mekong Valley 5 Mongol Influence 7 The Founding of Lan Xang 8

The Division of Lan Xang 9

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10

TheHoldofSiam 10

The Eviction of Siam 15

Laos under the French 16

WORLD WAR II AND AFTER 19

The French Protectorate and Direct

Administration 20

Nationalist Stirrings 21

Events in 1945 22

The Lao Issara Government 26

A Confusing Situation 27

THE COMING OF INDEPENDENCE 30

The Kingdom of Laos 30

The PathetLao 31

TOWARD NEUTRALITY: THE FIRST COALITION 34

Initial Difficulties 35

Renewed Negotiations 37

A Fragile Unity 39

vii
The 1958 Elections 40

North Vietnamese Invasion 42

The Army Enters Politics 44

THE ATTEMPT TO RESTORE NEUTRALITY 45

A Deepening Split 47

The Battle of Vientiane 51

The Widening War 52

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND THE ADVENT OF

THE SECOND COALITION 54

Expansion of Pathet Lao Influence 55

Protracted Diplomacy 56

Renewed Strains 57

The "Secret War" 58

THE THIRD COALITION AND THE LAO PEOPLE'S

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 61

The Vientiane Agreement 62

The Origins of the Prisoner of War/Missing

in Action Question 63

Formation of the Third Coalition 65

The Communist Seizure of Power 66

Establishment of the Lao People's

Democratic Republic 67

"Seminar Camps" and the Death of King

Savang Vatthana 68

Postwar Relations with the United States 70

Developments in the Lao People's

Democratic Republic 72

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 77

W. Randall Ireson

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 81

Topography 81

Climate 82

Transportation Routes 85

Natural Resources 86

POPULATION 86

Ethnic Diversity 87

The Refugee Population 91

Rural-Urban Distribution 93

RURAL LIFE 94

Lowland Lao Society 95

viii
Midland Lao Society 104

Upland Lao Society 110

The Pattern of Rural Life 119

URBAN SOCIETY 120

RELIGION 124

Buddhism 124

Animism 130

EDUCATION 133

Education Prior to the Lao People's

Democratic Republic 133

Education since 1975 134

HEALTH AND WELFARE 137

Public Health 137

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 140

Health Infrastructure . . 141

Social Welfare 142

FUTURE TRENDS 144

Chapter 3. The Economy 149

Susannah Hopkins

AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 153

Agriculture in the Economic System 153

Crops and Farming Systems 155

Fishing 160

Forestry 160

Agricultural Policy 162

Environmental Problems and Policy 163

INDUSTRYAND SERVICES 166

Industrial Output and Employment 166

Services 172

Industrial Policy 173

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS .... 1 74

Roads 175

Motor Vehicles 178

Inland Waterways 178

Civil Aviation 179

Telecommunications 179

PUBLIC FINANCE. 180

The Budget Deficit 180

Government Revenue 180

Government Expenditure 182

IX
Policy 182

THE FINANCIAL SECTOR . 183

The Banking System 183

Money and Prices 184

Money Supply and Inflation 186

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 187

The Foreign Exchange Rate 187

Foreign Trade 187

Direct Foreign Investment 194

Foreign Aid 196

External Debt 199

PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH 199

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 203

MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff

THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARYPARTY 206

Origins of the Party 206

Party Structure 208

Semisecrecy of the Lao People's

Revolutionary Party 212

Ideology of the Lao People's

Revolutionary Party 213

Leadership 214

THE CONSTITUTION 219

Development of the Constitution 219

Highlights of the Constitution 221

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 227

Bureaucratic Culture 227

Executive 228

Legislature 229

Judiciary 232

CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME 233

Human Rights 233

Insurgents 234

Refugees 235

Political Opposition 235

MASS MEDIA 236

FOREIGN POLICY 239

Basic Goals 241

Bureaucratic Complications 242

Economic Factors 242

x
Bilateral Relations 244

Chapter 5. National Security 259

Nicholas C. Auclair

THE ARMED FORCES 262

Historical Background 262

Structure and Administration of

the Armed Forces 270

Manpower and Conditions of Service 274

The Defense Budget 276

THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 276

Internal Threats and Resistance Movements 276

Foreign Military Presence 283

The Confrontational Relationship with Thailand. . 284

Relations with the United States 286

NATIONAL POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES 287

THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 288

Civil Liberties and Human Rights 288

Detention Centers 290

NARCOTICS AND COUNTERNARCOTICS ISSUES 292

Appendix. Tables 297

Bibliography 313

Glossary 339

Index 345

Contributors 363

List of figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Laos, 1994 xxviii 2 Administrative Organization and Territorial

Changes, 1895-1947 18

3 Laos in Its Southeast Asian Setting, 1994 80

4 Topography and Drainage 84

5 Population by Age and Gender, 1985 88

6 Ethnic Groups, 1992 90

7 Transportation and Selected Industrial and

Agricultural Activity, 1994 176

xi
8 Organization of the Lao People's Revolutionary

Party (LPRP), 1993 210

9 Structure of the Government, 1993 230

xii
Preface

This edition of Laos: A Country Study replaces the previous

edition, published in 1971, prior to the establishment of the

Lao People's Democratic Republic, which came into being in

December 1975. Like its predecessor, this study attempts to review the history and treat in a concise manner the dominant

social, political, economic, and military aspects of contemporary Laos.

Sources of information included books, scholarly journals,

foreign and domestic newspapers, official reports of governments and international organizations, and numerous periodicals on Asian affairs. A word of caution is necessary, however.

The government of a closed communist society such as Laos

controls information for internal and external consumption,

limiting both the scope of coverage and its dissemination. And,

data from and on Laos are, on the whole, limited, and often

contradictory.

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book, and

brief comments on some of the more valuable sources recom- mended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter.

A glossary and chronology (see Table A) also are included.

A word must also be offered on the use of the terms Lao and

Laotian. The term Lao refers to people who are ethnic Lao; it is not used to refer to those living in Laos who are members of

other ethnic groups, for example, Vietnamese, Chinese, or Hmong. The term Laotian is used to refer to all the people liv- ing in Laos, regardless of ethnic identity.

Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases those approved by the United States Board on Geographic

Names. However, as internal divisions have been drawn and

redrawn, place-names within Laos have also changed. Insofar

as possible, the present volume reflects these changes.

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion

table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix).

The body of the text reflects information available as ofJuly

1, 1994. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been

updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that

have occurred since the completion of research, the Country

Profile includes updated information as available, and the Bibxiii
liography lists recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the reader.
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

ca. 2,000 B.C.-A.D. 500

First century B.C.-fifth century A.D.

Mid-sixth century

Early eighth century 717

Eighth-twelfth centuries

Tenth-twelfth centuries

Twelfth century

1271-72

1279

1353-73

1373-1547

1574-78

1603 1621-1713

Eighteenth century

1772 1778

1867^87

1890 May 1893

July 1893

Early pottery and bronze culture, middle Mekong Valley. Early mandala (see Glossary) formed in middle Mekong

Valley. Zhenla established, centered on Champasak.

Zhenla divided into "Water Zhenla" and "Land Zhenla."

First tributary mission from Land Zhenla to Tang China. Mon mandala of central Mekong region fall under Khmer domination; Theravada Buddhism spread by Mon monks. Muang Sua (Louangphrabang) , renamed Xieng Dong

XiengTong; mandala infiltrated by Lao descending the Nam Ou. Candapuri mandala in Vientiane region absorbed within Khmer Empire. Panya Lang rules Xieng Dong Xieng Thong.

Tai mandala of Sukhotai founded by King Ramkhamhaeng; Xieng Dong Xieng Thong and Muang Vieng Chan Vieng Kham (Vientiane) briefly incorporated

into Sukhotai mandala. Reign of Fa Ngum, king of Lan Xang; beginning of recorded Laotian history. Successors of Fa Ngum continue to organize Lan Xang;

Phetsarath (r. 1520-47) involves Lan Xang in battles against Burma and Siam lasting two centuries. Lan Xang reduced by Burma to vassal state. Lan Xang renounces tributary ties to Burma.

Succession struggles for throne of Lan Xang result in accession of King Souligna Vongsa (r. 1633-90); his death engenders succession struggle among his nephews, culminating in division of Lan Xang into king- doms of Louangphrabang and Vientiane; south further

divides into Kingdom of Champasak in 1713. Lao states of Louangphrabang, Vientiane, and Champasak try to maintain independence from Burma and

Siam but eventually come under Siamese control. Suryavong seizes throne of Louangphrabang.

Beginning of Siamese domination of Champasak, Vientiane, and Louangphrabang.

Mekong expedition of Doudart de Lagree and Francis Gamier arrives in Louangphrabang, 1867; Siam contends with France, which establishes protectorate over Vietnam, to extend influence in Indochina; France

eventually installs Auguste Pavie in Louangphrabang as

first vice consul, February 1887. French colonial rule begins, lasts until 1953. French military occupation of Lao territories east of the Mekong. "Paknam incident" gives France excuse to demand ces- sion of east bank territories.

XV
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

October 1893

1895

January 15, 1896

April 19, 1899 1902-07

1925-26

June 5, 1930

1931-32

1940-45

1946

1947

1949

February 1950

August 1950 February 1951

Treaty concluded on October 3, 1893, between the Gov- ernment of the French Republic and the Government

of His Majesty the King of Siam formalizes Siamese

acceptance of French seizure of east bank territories. Laos, as French protectorate, divided into Upper Laos and Lower Laos. Anglo-French Convention defines British and French

spheres of influence in mainland Southeast Asia. Laos reorganized under resident superieur in Vientiane. France pacifies unrest in Bolovens Plateau; Sisavang

Vong becomes king (r. 1904-59); annexation of Laotian territories completed by treaties with Siam (1904,

1907), acquiring borders of contemporary Laos. Further treaties and agreements finalize border questions and establish permanent Franco-Siamese High

Commission of the Mekong.

Laos designated French colony by French Legislative Council. Louangphrabang confirmed as protectorate of France. August 30, 1940, Matsuoka-Henry Pact ending Franco- Thai War gives all Lao territories west of the Mekong to Thailand; May 9, 1941, Peace Convention between

France and Thailand; August 29, 1941, Treaty of Protectorate between France and the Kingdom of Louang- phrabang; Laos occupied by Japan, March 9, 1945; Laos "independent"; after surrender ofJapan, Sisavang Vong proclaims continuation of Laos as a French protectorate; Lao Issara (see Glossary) activists seize power

in Vientiane, Savannakhet, and other Laotian towns,

establish provisional government.

Sisavang Vong deposed; French begin reoccupation of

Laos, March; Sisavang Vong reinstated as king by Lao

Issara government; French retake Vientiane, and Lao

Issara government flees to Thailand; Franco-Lao modus vivendi establishes unity of Kingdom of Laos; Thailand returns former Laotian territories of Xaignabouri and Champasak to Laos. Constitution promulgated, making Laos a constitutional monarchy; elections held for National Assembly;

Prince Souvannarath forms government of Kingdom of

Laos. Kaysone Phomvihan forms Latsavong detachment, armed forces of Pathet Lao, the genesis of Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA); Franco-Lao General Convention grants Laos limited self-government within French

Union; Lao Issara government-in-exile dissolves, and members return to Laos or join newly formed Pathet Lao on Vietnam border. United States and Britain recognize Laos as an Associ- ated State in French Union.

Pathet Lao form "resistance government."

Indochinese Communist Party dissolves; separate parties established in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

October 22, 1953

May-July 1954

March 1955 December 14, 1955 1956-57 January 1956 September 1956 November 1957 May 1958

July 1958

August 1958

July-August 1959

October 1959

January 1960

April 1960 August 9, 1960

Franco-Lao Treaty of Amity and Association transfers remaining French powers to Royal Lao Government

(RLG) —while retaining control of military affairs

and completes independence of Laos. Laos participates in Geneva Conference on Indochina; under armistice agreements signed by French and Viet Minh on July 20, Viet Minh agree to withdraw from

Laos, and Phongsali and Houaphan provinces are des- ignated regroupment areas for Pathet Lao; RLG

pledges to integrate Pathet Lao fighters; International Control Commission established to implement agree- ments. Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party—LPP) established; first congress held. Laos admitted to the United Nations. Negotiations between RLG and Pathet Lao. Pathet Lao congress establishes Lao Patriotic Front

(LPF). Constitution amended to allow formation of coalition government.

First coalition government formed. LPF and allies win partial elections for National Assembly. Souvanna Phouma government resigns following cabinet

crisis caused by rightists. Rightist government of Phoui Sananikone formed,

excluding LPF. Fighting breaks out in northern Laos; UN subcommittee

investigates charges of North Vietnam's involvement; LPF deputies arrested. KingSisavang Vong dies; Savang Vatthana succeeds to the throne, rules until 1975. Kou Abhay forms provisional government following coup

attempt by army.

Elections for National Assembly believed rigged. Kong Le carries out successful Neutralist coup d'etat against rightist government of Prince Somsanith;

General Phoumi Nosavan forms countercoup committee in Savannakhet and declares martial law; Kong Le

hands over power to Souvanna Phouma's third govern- December 1960

January 1961

May 1961-June 1962

July 1962

Phoumi Nosavan captures Vientiane; Soviet airlift begins

to Kong Le and Pathet Lao troops. Souvanna Phouma government recognized by communist bloc; Prince Boun Oum's Vientiane government

recognized by West; heavy fighting breaks out; North

Vietnamese troops involved. Second Geneva Conference on Laos; agreements among

Neutralist, Pathet Lao, and rightist factions prepare way for second coalition government.

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Protocol

signed in Geneva.
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1963-May 1964

1968-74

August 1974-November 1975

December 1975

May 1976

July 1977

February 1979

January 1978 January 1981

April 1982 May 1984 March 1985 January 1986 November 1986

1988

1989

April 1990 March 1991

Laos increasingly linked with developments in Vietnam; North Vietnamese troops fail to withdraw; Ho Chi Minh Trail expanded; second coalition government

collapses; Pathet Lao offensive against Neutralists on

Plain of Jars succeeds; International Control Commission proves ineffective; bombing by United States

begins. Fighting escalates between Pathet Lao's LPLA and Royal Lao Army; Hmong under Vang Pao resist Pathet Lao- North Vietnamese advances; Second Party Congress

held, 1972; LPP renamed Lao People's Revolutionary

Party (LPRP); RLG and Pathet Lao begin negotiations

for cease-fire in 1972, resulting in Vientiane Agree- ment signed in February 1973; cease-fire proclaimed,

bombing by United States ends; protocol forming third

coalition government signed September 1973; govern- ment takes office by royal decree April 1974 as Provisional Government of National Union.

Fighting resumes; Vang Pao flees to Thailand; senior

rightist ministers and generals leave for Thailand; LPLA "liberates" provincial capitals; reeducation centers or "seminar camps" opened; "Revolutionary

Administration" takes power in Vientiane; elections held for local people's councils. Provisional Government of National Union dissolved; King Savang Vatthana abdicates; Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) proclaimed; Souphanouvong

becomes first president (in power until 1991); Kaysone Phomvihan, first prime minister. LPRP Central Committee passes Third Resolution,

guidelines for establishing the socialist revolution. Twenty-Five -Year Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed. Lao Front for National Construction established;

replaces LPF

Interim three-year economic development plan begins.

First Five-Year plan begins. Third LPRP Congress held. Constitution drafting committee named.

First national population census taken. Second Five-Year Plan begins. Fourth LPRP Congress held; Kaysone Phomvihan general secretary LPRP; New Economic Mechanism for- malizes reforms.

First elections since 1975 held; at district level in June,

provincial level in November.

National elections held in March; delegates elected to

first Supreme People's Assembly; opening session held May-June; last Vietnamese troops reportedly leave

Laos. LPRP approves draft constitution for discussion. Fifth LPRP Congress held, Secretariat abolished; Kay- sone Phomvihan chairman, LPRP; Souphanouvong

retires.

XV111
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

August 1991 New constitution endorsed by Supreme People's Assembly and adopted; Kaysone Phomvihan becomes presi- dent of LPDR; Khamtai Siphandon, prime minister. 1992 Kaysone dies in November; replaced as president by Nou- hak Phomsavan; Khamtai becomes chairman, LPRP, and prime minister, LPDR; elections to National

Assembly (renamed Supreme People's Assembly) held

in December.

1993 * Nouhak and Khamtai reelected as president and prime

minister in February; Council of Ministers reorganized. 1994 Phoumi Vongvichit, former acting president and high- ranking party figure, dies in January

XIX

Country Profile

COUNTRY

Formal Name: Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR, or

Laos).

Note—The country Profile contains updated information as available.

xxi
Short Form: Laos.

Term for Citizens: Laotian (s). Capital: Vientiane.

Date of Independence: July 19, 1949, from France.

Geography

Location and Size: Landlocked nation of approximately

236,800 square kilometers in center of Southeast Asian

peninsula, bordered by China to the north, Burma to the

northwest, Thailand to the west, Vietnam to the east, and

Cambodia to the south.

Land Boundaries: 5,083 kilometers total; Burma, 235

kilometers; Cambodia, 541 kilometers; China, 423 kilometers;

Thailand, 1,754 kilometers; Vietnam, 2,130 kilometers. Most of

western border demarcated by Mekong River.

Topography and Drainage: Largely mountainous, with

elevations above 500 meters typically characterized by steep

terrain and narrow river valleys. Only about 4 percent of total

land area arable.

Climate: Tropical monsoon; rainy season from May through

October, cool dry season from November through February,

and hot dry season March and April.

Society

Population: Estimates vary; approximately 4.7 million in July

1994. Growth rate estimates range from 2.6 to 2.9 percent per

year. More than 85 percent population rural, early 1990s.

Approximately 9,000 Laotians—mostly Hmong—in refugee

camps in Thailand according to United Nations Office of the

High Commissioner for Refugees, January 1995; approximately

1,500 refugees in southern China, late 1994.

Ethnic Groups: Officially multiethnic nation with more than

forty ethnic groups, classified into three general families: Lao

Sung (upland Lao), 10 percent of population in 1993; Lao

Theung (midland Lao), 24 percent; and Lao Loum (lowland

Lao), 66 percent. The term Laotian is used for the national

population; Lao for the ethnic group.

Language: Lao, official language; also French, English, various

xxii
highland ethnic languages.

Religion: Provision for religious freedom in constitution;

almost all Laotians Buddhist. Theravada Buddhism

predominant among Lao Loum and some Lao Theung;

animist beliefs widespread.

Education and Literacy: Universal, compulsory education after

establishment of LPDR in 1975 but limited resources. Enrollments: estimated 603,000 primary school students,

almost 130,000 secondary school students—including lowerand upper-secondary school—in 1992-93. Universal primary

education goal for 2000. Nine-month school year includes five years primary school, three years lower-secondary school, and

three years upper-secondary school. Those able to read and

write estimated by United Nations at 84 percent (92 percent of

men and 76 percent of women) ages fifteen to forty-five as of

1985; other figures cite only 45 percent total literacy;

government acknowledges need for improved literacy.

Health: Health and health care poor. Chronic moderate

vitamin and protein deficiencies common, especially among

upland ethnic groups. Poor sanitation. Number of health care personnel increasing; concentrated in Vientiane area, where

population per physician 1,400:1 versus national ratio of

10,000:2.6 in 1989. Birth rate 43.23 per 1,000; death rate 14.74

per 1,000 (1994 estimates). Life expectancy at birth 50.16 years

male, 53.28 years female (1994 estimates).

Economy

General Character: Predominantly rural and agricultural;

market-oriented economic liberalization measures beginning

in 1986 stimulated economic growth. Policy reforms continue,

including decentralizing and expanding private-sector

economy; reversing agricultural collectivization policy and

ending cooperatives; introducing foreign investment code; and

restructuring banking system. Agriculture accounts for almost

56 percent gross domestic product (GDP) and approximately

85-90 percent of workforce (1993 estimate). Unemployment

21 percent (1989 estimate).

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Estimates vary. US$989

million, US$295 per capita income (1993 estimate); from

US$295 to US$335 per capita (1994 estimate); real growth rate from 4.5 percent to 5.9 percent. Composition of GDP:

xxiii
agriculture and forestry, approximately 56 percent; industry

including construction, approximately 17 percent; services,

approximately 25 percent; and import duties, 2 percent (1993

estimate) . GDP growth targeted at 7 percent for fiscal year (FY)

1993-94. US$4.1 billion purchasing power equivalent (1993

estimate).

Industry: Almost no industrial production outside Vientiane

area. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Rice main crop; corn,

tobacco, coffee also grown.

Resources: Tin and gypsum most important mineral resources although exploitation on a small scale; electrical energy from

hydroelectric power; electricity exported to Thailand.

Foreign Trade: Total exports US$133 million—free on board

(f.o.b.) (1993 estimate); primarily to France, Germany, Japan,

Russia, Thailand, Vietnam, and United States. Principal

exports—timber and wood products, US$42 million; textiles

and garments, US$27 million; assembled motorcycles and

other items, US$20 million; electricity, US$16 million (1993

estimate). Total imports US$266 million—cost, insurance, and

freight (c.i.f) (1992 estimate); primarily from China, France,

Italy, Japan, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam; increased by

approximately 20.5 percent in 1993. Principal imports

petroleum, food, vehicles, machinery, consumer goods.

US$353.2 million total (1993 estimate).

Balance of Payments: Record trade deficit of estimated US$150

million in 1993. Foreign debt US$1.1 billion (1992 estimate).

Foreign Aid: Approximately US$167 million in 1992. Almost

totally dependent on foreign assistance for development and

financing deficit on current account balance. Major foreign aid

partners formerly communist countries, particularly Council

for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) members until

1990; since then, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,

and multilateral agencies, primarily the World Bank and Asian

Development Bank.

Currency and Exchange Rate: Kip (K). In 1992 exchange rate averaged US$1 = K705; in June 1994, estimated average US$1

=K721.

xxiv
Fiscal Year: October 1 to September 30. Transportation And Telecommunications

Roads, Railroads, and Ports: Landlocked; no ports, but some

inland waterways, primarily on Mekong River and its tributaries. Poorly developed road system although greater

infrastructure development, particularly as result of foreign

aid; few reliable transportation routes because of mountainous

topography and lack of development. No railroad system

although memorandum signed with Thailand in November

1994 to conduct six-month survey on possibility of construction

of railroad from middle of Friendship Bridge connecting Laos

and Thailand to a station in Laos.

Civil Aviation: Lao Aviation, state airline. Wattai Airport,

Vientiane, planned for upgrade to international standard.

Louangprabang Airport targeted for refurbishment and

expansion beginning May 1994. Lao People's Army building

new airport in Oudomxai. Main international routes to Bangkok, Guangzhou, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Kunming,

and Phnom Penh. Limited internal air service includes flights to Louangphrabang, Pakxe, Savannakhet, Vientiane, and

Xiangkhoang.

Telecommunications: Limited domestic and international

telecommunications links. Four government-owned television

channels (1994); ten medium-wave AM radio stations, seven

short-wave AM radio stations, and one FM radio station (1994).

One ground satellite station linked to Intersputnik system

(1994); all other international telecommunications go by

antiquated high-frequency radio to Hong Kong and short-wave

link to Bangkok (1987). Approximately 8,000 telephones,

largely limited to government users in capital (1986).

Government And Politics

Government: Lao People's Democratic Republic proclaimed

December 2, 1975, abolishing monarchy of Royal Lao

Government. New constitution unanimously endorsed by

unicameral eighty-five-member Supreme People's Assembly,

August 14, 1991; renamed National Assembly (1992); exercises

power according to principle of democratic centralism.

National Assembly elected December 1992; inaugural session,

xxv
February 1993. As legislative organ, oversees judiciary and

activities of administration. President head of state, elected by

National Assembly for five-year term; also commander in chief

of armed forces. Council of Ministers highest executive organ;

chairman is prime minister; vice chairmen oversee work of

ministers. Real power exercised by members of the ruling

party, Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), particularly

Political Bureau (Politburo) and Central Committee.

Politics: LPRP only legal party. Party conference held late

November 1993 to include representatives of provincial party

units, Central Committee members, secretaries of party

committees in ministries, departments, factories, and schools.

Speeches on neglect of party activities and quality of

membership hint at concern with corruption and need to build party at grass-roots level. Judiciary: Comprises Supreme People's Court, provincial and

municipal courts, people's district courts, and military courts. Administrative Divisions: Divided into sixteen provinces

(khoueng): Attapu, Borikhan, Bokeo, Champasak, Houaphan,

Khammouan, Louang Namtha, Louangphrabang, Oudomxai,

Phongsali, Saravan, Savannakhet, Xaignabouri, Xekong,

Xiangkhoang, and Vientiane; one municipality (ka?npheng

nakhon) , Vientiane; two special zones, Xaisomboun in

northeastern Vientiane Province (established June 1994), and

Xianghon-Hongsa, formerly two districts in Xaignabouri

Province (established mid-1992); districts (muang); and villages

( ban) . Foreign Affairs: "Special relationship"—twenty-five-year mutual

security treaty signed 1977—with Vietnam continues, although

intensity lessening. Relations with Thailand—primary

economic partner, particularly in hydroelectricity—improved

after period of distrust punctuated by border clashes.

Increased intra-regional ties; observer status, Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), since 1992. United States

granted Laos national interest waiver in April 1994 for

counternarcotics cooperation; determined necessary for

continued cooperation on issue of unaccounted-for United

States military personnel.

National Security

Armed Forces: Total strength approximately 37,000 in 1994:

xxvi
33,000 Lao People's Army; 3,500 Lao People's Air Force; 500

Lao People's Navy. Approximately 49,000 reach military age

annually (1994 estimate).

Internal Security Forces: Paramilitary self-defense force, or

Irregular People's Army, acts as lightly armed local defense

force organized at provincial level for territorial defense and at local levels. Most members retired military personnel;

approximately 100,000 persons. Also acts as reserve for regular

armed forces. Police force under jurisdiction of Ministry of

Interior.

Major Equipment and Military Expenditures: End of military

support from Russia and Vietnam combined with lack of

domestic funding inhibits needed modernization of aging

equipment, much of it from former Soviet Union and Vietnam.

Military expenditures—including public security budget

approximately US$104.9 million (1993 estimate).

Degenerating capabilities because of poor state of equipment

and personnel skills.

xxvii
~TT X7

CHINA

CHINA

^ Phongsai: \ •

21 1*

X n' VIETNAM

r \ a HA # « ^-i^-^ \

r LOUANG

I BOKEO 1 ^Muang I LOUANG- ff«^_ Xay J PHRABANG S ^L/ / / h( OUDOMXAI ^1J Louang- Louang- /: y'l n

HOUAPHAN

XAIGNABOURI

c > A Muang •.' / '« Xaignabouri {

XIANGKHOANG

Mua^ng

( /

s'

Phonsavan f

/ Phon-Hong f- " VIENTIANE/ i

Vientiane.

Pakxan / % BOLIKHAMXAI »»

. >\

KHAMMOUAN 1 THAILAND

International boundary

Province boundary ® National capital • Province capital NOTE—Vientiane is both a province and a municipality. 50 100 Kilometers

Savannakhet

\^ Thakhek Y

'1

\ SAVANNAKHET \

^•'SARAVAN / J

• ^ « Saravan \

XEKONG 4 y' Boundary representation mt necessarily authoritative

V.,

) TM*TM\S Lamam "Vi S *«**rv T -

-c'is- y / js<"?Sf

105 x/cambodia"!

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions ofLaos, 1994

xxviii
Introduction

A LANDLOCKED NATION in the center of the Southeast

Asian peninsula, the country that is now the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR, or Laos), is bordered by Cambodia,

China, Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam (only Cambodia is smaller), neighbors which, to varying degrees, have influenced

Laotian historical, cultural, and political development. Slightly

smaller than the state of Oregon, Laos is largely mountainous

and forested; only about 4 percent of its total land area is arable. The tropical monsoon climate is a major determining fac- tor in agricultural productivity and transportation.

Laos was inhabited five or more millennia ago by Austroasiatic peoples. From the first century A.D., princely fiefdoms

based on wet rice cultivation and associated with the pottery

and bronze culture of Ban Chiang developed in the middle

Mekong Valley. Various other kingdoms reflecting the cultures

of Cham and Mon peoples existed in the region; the fiefdoms were subject to the influence of mandala (see Glossary) in the

central Mekong region. Migrations in the seventh century con- tinued to expand both the various influences and the cultural

mix of the region. By the eighth century, the Mon mandala

were under Khmer domination.

Beginning in the thirteenth century, Mongols exercised a

decisive political influence in the middle Mekong Valley; dynastic conflicts associated with their intervention led to the founding of the Kingdom of Lan Xang (Kingdom of the Million

Elephants). At that time, the beginnings of a multiethnic

state—in the configuration of small confederative communities—were evident. The recorded history of Laos began in the

fourteenth century with Fa Ngum (r. 1354-73), the first king of

Lan Xang. Under Fa Ngum, the territory of Lan Xang was extended; it remained in these approximate borders for

another 300 years. The reign of King Souligna Vongsa (r. 1633-90) —a time

when the kingdom was united and ruled by its own king—has

been referred to as the golden age of Laos. With the death of

Souligna Vongsa, however, succession struggles led to the divi- sion of Lan Xang. Conflicts with Burma, Siam, Vietnam, and

the Khmer kingdom continued in the eighteenth century, culminating in Siamese domination.

xxix
Early in the nineteenth century, Siam held hegemony over much of the territory of contemporary Laos, which then consisted of the principalities of Louangphrabang, Vientiane, and

Champasak. Siam faced contention from France—which had

established a protectorate over Vietnam—and sought to extend its influence in Indochina. By the end of the nineteenth century, France had supplanted Siam as the dominant

power. Laos was integrated into the French colonial empire of

Indochina as a group of directly ruled provinces, except for

Louangphrabang, which was ruled as a protectorate.

Laos remained under French administration from about

1890 until World War II, when Japan occupied French

Indochina. Japanese military authorities induced King

Sisavong Vong of Louangphrabang to declare the independence of his kingdom from France in April 1945, prior to Japan's surrender in the war. In September 1945, an "independent" government under the Lao Issara (Free Laos—see Glossary) defied the king and declared the union of Vientiane and

Champasak with Louangphrabang. The following year, French

troops reoccupied the country, conferring limited autonomy

on the unified Kingdom of Laos within the French Union. A

constitution was promulgated in 1947, and elections were held

for a National Assembly. The independence of Laos was formally recognized within the French Union in 1949; Laos

remained a member of the union until 1953.

The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina provided for

the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

the first Indochina War—the struggle for independence

against French colonial forces, and the withdrawal of foreign

forces. The Royal Lao Government (RLG—see Glossary)

agreed to include the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation—see Glossary;

Pathet Lao became the generally accepted term for the communist-led guerrilla movement) in the government coalition.

Phongsali and Houaphan (Sam Neua) provinces were designated areas of regroupment for Pathet Lao forces, "pending a

political settlement."

Negotiations between the RLG and the Pathet Lao continued from 1955 to 1957. The Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic

Front—LPF; superseded by the Lao Front for National Construction in 1979), established in 1956, served as a political

front for the Pathet Lao and was secretly guided by the Lao

People's Party, which was established in 1955 as part of the

Indochinese Communist Party. In 1972 the Lao People's Party

xxx
changed its name to the Lao People's Revolutionary Party

(LPRP). Since 1975 it has been the ruling party.

A coalition government, including some Pathet Lao personalities, was formed by Prince Souvanna Phouma in 1957. It col- lapsed the following year, and rightist politicians took over. United States aid increased greatly. The communist insurgency

resumed in northern Laos in 1959. In 1960 Kong Le, a young Royalist paratroop captain, led a coup d'etat to install a Neutralist government under Souvanna

Phouma—neither rightist nor Pathet Lao—which would end

the fratricidal fighting. But within a year, rightist forces under

General Phoumi Nosavan drove Souvanna Phouma's government from Vientiane. The Neutralists then naively allied themselves with the Pathet Lao and received airlift support from the

Soviet Union. North Vietnamese troops intervened in Laos in

regular units for the first time, inflicting heavy losses on the

rightists receiving military and economic aid from the United

States. A Second Geneva Conference on Laos was held in 1961-62.

Agreements provided for the independence and neutrality of

Laos—something realized only on paper. A second coalition

government formed in July 1962 proved to be equally shortlived. The civil war quickly resumed and continued into the

1970s, with each side—backed either by the United States or Vietnam (supported by the Soviet Union)—trading accusations

of violating the agreements. Souvanna Phouma, prime minister

in the first coalition government in 1957, again following Kong

Le's coup in 1960, and again in July 1962 following that year's

Geneva agreements, became prime minister of a third coalition

government, or Provisional Government of National Union,

with the participation of the LPF in 1974. (He resigned upon

the establishment of the LPDR in 1975.)

The collapse of South Vietnam and Cambodia in mid-1975

played into the hands of the LPF and hastened the decline of

the third coalition government. The LPRP, the mastermind

behind the Lao Patriotic Front, dismissed the Provisional Government of National Union and persuaded King Savang Vat- thana to abdicate.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic was proclaimed on

December 2, 1975, ending the era of a conservative monarchy

dominated by a few powerful families. Souphanouvong became

the first president of the LPDR. A half-brother of Souvanna

Phouma, cousin of Savang Vatthana, one of the original

xxxi
founders of the Neo Lao Hak Xat, and the titular head of the

LPF, Souphanouvong was known as the "red prince" because of

his royal lineage and communist associations. The LPDR has

been a single-party communist government since its proclamation.

Ethnically diverse, Laos has more than forty ethnic groups.

Lao is the distinction for some of the ethnic groups; Laotian is the term used to refer to all people of Laos, or the national

population. The Lao, descendants of the Tai peoples who

began migrating from China in the first millennium A.D., constitute approximately half the people of Laos. Although government rhetoric celebrates the multiethnic nature of the

nation and asserts that it wishes to reduce the favoritism historically extended toward the "lowland" Lao Loum (see Glossary)

and the discrimination against the "midland" Lao Theung (see

Glossary) and "upland" Lao Sung (see Glossary), the ethnic

minorities are underrepresented in the LPRP Central Committee, the National Assembly, and in government offices. (Some

of the ethnic minorities have populations of only a few hundred persons.)

Although the different ethnic groups have different residential patterns, agricultural practices, and religious beliefs, for all groups the village community has a kinship nexus, which may

also differ in form. The mountainous topography, which has

inhibited roadbuilding and limited exchanges among villages

and ethnic groups, has contributed to maintaining distinctions

among ethnic groups.

Buddhism was the state religion of the Kingdom of Laos; the

present constitution formally proclaims religious freedom.

Although many communist nations do not look favorably upon

the practice of religion—constitutional stipulations notwithstanding—this is not necessarily the case in Laos, where

approximately 85 percent of citizens are Buddhist. Theravada

Buddhism is predominant among the Lao Loum and some Lao

Theung groups; animist beliefs are widespread among the

entire population. The wat, the Buddhist temple or monastery

complex, is a central fixture of village life, and the site of major

religious festivals, which occur several times a year. Since the

LPDR's establishment in 1975, the government has attempted

to manipulate Buddhism to support its political goals, although

without provoking a schism in the sangha, or clergy.

The population as of mid-1994 was estimated at approximately 4.7 million people. The population growth rate is relaxxxii
tively high—estimated at approximately 2.9 percent per year. But, child and infant mortality rates are also high, and life expectancy averages less than fifty-two years. Laos has a relatively low population density; more than 85 percent of the population is rural, living in small villages of typically fewer than

1,000 people. Rural life is tied to the changing agricultural sea- sons. Of the "urban" areas, most people live in the Mekong

River valley towns and those of its tributaries. Vientiane, the

capital and largest city, is also the center of a very limited industrial sector. The reach of recent economic reforms—and the

change and opportunity they offer—has not extended much

beyond the Vientiane plain.

Education and social services are rudimentary, although

some improvements have been made. The LPDR has made a commitment to five years of universal primary education, but

limited financial resources and a lack of trained teachers and

teaching materials have restricted educational opportunities.

Enrollments have increased, however. Western health care is largely confined to the more "urban" areas, dictated in part by

the difficulties of transportation. Similarly, improvements in

health care are constrained by finances and the limited numbers of trained health care workers.

Presenting a clear quantitative economic profile of Laos is complicated by the lack of recent (or other) statistics, as well as by reliability, as there are internal contradictions in many statistics. Nonetheless, Laos is clearly one of the poorest countries in

the world, with per capita GNP estimates ranging from US$295

to US$350 per annum. A rural, subsistence, agricultural econ- omy heavily influenced by weather—that is, conditions of

drought or flood—Laos still has not met self-sufficiency in food

production. LPDR officials frequently note that Laos remains

"underdeveloped," has a largely unskilled work force, and

needs infrastructure development. Such advancements are rec- ognized as particularly important in such fields as agro-forestry

and hydropower, two areas with potentially high foreign

exchange earnings. Imports far outpace exports. Even primary

exports—hydroelectricity, timber, and coffee—are limited. The

potential for the exportation of mineral resources, particularly

tin and gypsum, has not yet been realized.

Centralized economic measures of a command economy

were instituted when the LPDR was proclaimed in 1975. Beginning with the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, however, and

with various other reform measures since then, Laos has

xxxiii
opened up to market forces. The government has also encour- aged both foreign and domestic investment—especially for the

private sector. Reforms have abolished agricultural cooperatives, privatized most state enterprises while encouraging private-sector initiatives, and revised the taxation system.

Although still dominated by the agricultural sector, the econ- omy has been stimulated and the availability of goods has

increased. However, Laos remains dependent on continued

foreign aid and concessional loans.

As it came to power in late 1975 on the coattails of communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia, the LPDR naturally

turned to the communist bloc for economic support and

received aid from both the Soviet bloc countries and China.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Soviet bloc aid

has halted and Vietnamese patronage has diminished, necessitating a search for other investors and aid donors.

The situation with regard to economic assistance from Russia has begun to change. During 1994 Laos and Russia signed

two cooperation agreements. In March the Lao National Council of Trade and Industry and the Russian Council of Trade and

Industry signed documents on scientific and technical cooperation. Laos will receive technical assistance from Russia and

funds from third countries, the International Monetary Fund

(IMF—see Glossary), and interested businessmen for programs

to protect the environment, conserve and restore forests, raise

harvest efficiency, eradicate crop pests, and increase mining

and exploration efforts. In August, Laos signed a trade protocol with Russia for economic and trade cooperation. According

to its terms, Laos will buy construction materials, electric appli- ances, spare parts for aircraft, and other items; Russia will purchase tin, coffee, tropical wood products, and clothing from

Laos.

In the early 1990s, Laos received increased aid from Japan

and from Western nations—including Australia, France, and

Sweden—as well as increased support from international and

regional organizations. Foreign assistance in 1993-94 was esti- mated at US$211.7 million, of which US$141.4 million was

gratis aid and US$70.3 million was in the form of loans bearing

low interest rates. Assistance from the World Bank (see Glossary), the IMF, and

the Asian Development Bank has both guided and been predicated upon reform measures. Their programs, however, have

tended to be concentrated in Vientiane and the Mekong Valley

xxxiv
centers, with improvements in infrastructure thus benefitting

only the urban areas; rural areas have lagged behind on the

developmental scale. The LPDR's Socio-economic Development Plan 1993-2000

emphasizes the production of foodstuffs, commercial products,

rural development, human resources development, and the

exploitation of natural resources in conjunction with concerted efforts to protect the environment. It also calls for an

expansion of economic relations and cooperation with the out- side world. The importance of infrastructure development is also recognized. Roadbuilding is seen as strategically important

for socioeconomic development—especially with regard to programs for public health and education—particularly for

rural areas and areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. The Public Investment Programme (PIP), a part of the plan, is to be

supported by donors for as much as US$1.4 billion. PIP targets

include irrigating unused land, planting forests, and moving

away from subsistence production and slash-and-burn agriculture toward sedentary market agriculture and a more diversified economy.

As elsewhere, foreign and economic relations are linked; for

Laos, this is particularly true with regard to Thailand, its primary trading and investment partner. Laos and Thailand must

constantly negotiate a variety of political and economic issues,

including the status of Lao refugees and refugee camps in

Thailand as well as LPDR claims that Thailand is sheltering Lao

insurgents. Laos has pressed for additional border crossing

points and clearer border demarcation; free and fair competition in providing transport services for cross-border trade;

cooperation in various economic and technical projects and

joint trade and investment enterprises; and cooperation

between banks and customs services. Thailand is the primary

purchaser of timber and hydroelectricity from the LPDR; the

export of hydroelectric power is paradoxical given the low level of electrification in Laotian villages.

Notwithstanding several border incidents in the late 1980s,

relations between Laos and Thailand have improved over the

past decade. More recently, the April 1994 opening of the

Friendship Bridge linking the two countries has provided for

greater commercial potential—increased trade, tourism, and

transit. And, in July 1994, a joint venture agreement was signed

to allow a Thai company to build and develop a special eco- nomic zone—with nine projects—in Vientiane Municipality.

xxxv
The two countries have also agreed in principle to establish

consular missions outside each others' capitals. Insurgent raids

in rural areas, primarily from the Hmong, but also from

smaller Lao resistance groups based in Thailand, complicate

Lao-Thai relations and are an annoyance, but not a threat, to the stability of Laos.

The improved investment climate in Laos has also raised the

possibility of building a rail line; currently there is none. In

November 1994, Thailand was granted permission to conduct a six-month feasibility study on a railway line between Vientiane

and Nong Khai, Thailand, via the Friendship Bridge. Forty-two

percent of the cost of the survey will be paid by the British government, the remainder by a Thai company. If it is found eco- nomically feasible to develop a railway, and the Thai company

decides to invest in its construction, the National Railway Company, Limited, of Laos will be established. The LPDR will hold

25 percent of the railroad company, the Thai company the

remaining 75 percent.

As noted, the LPDR was established following communist

party victories in Vietnam and Cambodia. Similarities with

other one-party communist states exist. The party dominates

the government and still operates under relative secrecy. Highranking party members occupy high-level posts in the government, military, and mass organizations, and there is a distinct

overlap of military personnel. In fact, the ministers of interior,

agriculture and forestry, and national defense are army generals, as is the prime minister. At the third congress of the Lao

People's Revolutionary Youth Union held in May 1994, 214 of

247 delegates were LPRP members.

Even though the party's role and powers are scarcely mentioned in the constitution, the LPRP determines national policies through its nine-member Political Bureau (Politburo) and

fifty-two-member Central Committee. A constitution was not

adopted until 1991—sixteen years after the LPDR's founding.

The executive branch retains the authority to issue binding

decrees, but the party retains the power to make critical decisions.

The legislative branch is by constitutional provision the highest organ of state. Elections are held by secret ballot. The first elections to the Supreme People's Assembly were held in

March 1989, almost fourteen years after the LPDR's proclamation; the opening session was in May-June. Elections to the

National Assembly (the renamed Supreme People's Assembly)

xxxvi
for five-year terms were held in December 1992; the first ses- sion did not convene until February 1993. Although more than

150 candidates vied for eighty-five seats in the assembly, most

candidates belong to the LPRP—as it is the only legal party

and most are approved by the LPRP prior to the elections.

Although the National Assembly seemed to be playing a larger

role in the passage of legislation in the early 1990s, in reality

the assembly merely "discusses and endorses" all laws in controlled policy debates during the twice-yearly plenary sessions.

The LPRP grew from approximately 25,000 members at its inception in 1975 to approximately 60,000 members at the

time of the Fifth Party Congress in March 1991. (By contrast, in

1993 there were more than 70,000 Lao Federation of Trade

Union members.) During the Fifth Party Congress, the LPRP

removed several elder statesmen from the Politburo and

elected some slightly younger cadres to a new Central Committee. The party is not immune to internal criticism and has

acknowledged official corruption (and nepotism) as a serious

and continuing problem.

Formal avenues of information and communication have

been limited by lack of funds since French colonial rule and

are now tightly controlled. Dissemination of information is sporadic and further restricted by controls on the distribution of

printing materials. Radio and television services are also

monopolized by the party. Broadcasts from Thailand, however,

have a large audience in Laos.

Broad security measures limit freedoms as under other communist regimes; freedoms may be guaranteed in the constitution, but in reality they are quite restricted. After the

communist victory in 1975, many members of the previous

Royal Lao Government and military who had remained in the

country instead of fleeing were placed in reeducation centers or "seminar camps." "Social deviants" as well as political opponents were held in these centers; these camps have been closed

and most "political prisoners" have since been released. However, Amnesty International continues to press for the release

of persons still in detention.

After the LPRP seized power, and during its consolidation of

the government, some 350,000 persons—of whom many were Hmong belonging to Vang Pao's United States-funded irregulars—fled the country. Many persons remained in refugee

camps in Thailand; some departed from there to third counxxxvii
tries; still others resided in southern China. The refugee situation has recently changed significantly.

Although there are variations in the numbers of refugees

repatriated and/or remaining in the camps according to the

sources reporting, it can be said that a significantly larger number of refugees have been repatriated or resettled in a third

country compared with those who remain in Thailand. The

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR—see Glossary) began a voluntary repatriation program in 1980. Ten years later, fewer than 6,000 refugees had

been repatriated under UNHCR supervision. Approximately

15,000 refugees had returned to Laos independently, and the

vast majority—approximately 300,000—had resettled abroad.

In 1989 there were an estimated 90,000 Lao refugees in Thailand; as ofJune 1991, an estimated 60,000 refugees remained.

This number was further reduced by half at the end of 1993. As

ofJanuary 1995, UNHCR estimates were that only 9,000 refugees, mainly Hmong, remained in Thai camps. Vientiane esti- mated that the more than 8,000 refugees remaining in

Thailand at the end of 1994 would be repatriated by the end of

1995. Laos, Thailand, and the UNHCR have agreed to resettle or repatriate all remaining Lao refugees by the end of 1995.

The foreign relations of Laos have in large part been determined by the country's physical location and its desire to maintain national security. During the communist revolutionary

struggle in Indochina, Laos had close ties with Vietnam—

a

"special relationship"—which was formalized by a twenty-five- vear treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in 1977. More

recently, Laos has sought to improve relations with China, an

ally during the Indochina Wars, but with whom relations deteriorated following the 1979 China-Vietnam conflict. Trade

between the two countries has increased, and Laos has received

some economic and military aid. In May 1994, a high-level

LPDR military delegation paid an official \isit to China to promote relations of friendship and "all-around solidarity between

the two armies."

The end of the Cold War, concomitant with the limited ability of the former Soviet bloc and Vietnam to offer economic

assistance, has influenced the LPDR to become more flexible

in its foreign policy in the 1990s. Since 1992 Laos has held

observer status with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN—see Glossary); this has been viewed as a likely precursor to membership in that organization. And, despite various

xxxviii
cooperation projects with the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea (North Korea) during the 1980s, in January 1994 Laos

contracted with a Republic of Korea (South Korea) construction company to build a hydropower dam on the Ho River in

Champasak Province. Laos resumed diplomatic relations with

Israel in December 1993. The LPDR minister of foreign affairs visited Israel in August 1994; and Israel has agreed to provide

training grants to LPDR officials. In September 1994, Laos

established diplomatic relations with South Africa and Lithuania.

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Laos

were maintained upon the proclamation of the LPDR in 1975,

and the two countries have seen a slow, but steady, improvement in relations since 1982. Two key—and intertwining

components have dominated the United States relationship

with Laos: accounting for those Americans classified as prisoners of war (POW) or missing in action (MIA) at the end of the

Indochina Wars, and controlling the growth of, and trafficking

in, narcotics. Cooperation in one area begets cooperation in

the other.

As a measure of sincerity for improving relations, the United

States has sought greater LPDR cooperation in providing information on the fate of POW/MIAs and in searching for their

remains. As of September 1994, thirty-three joint missions of

field searches and excavations of crash sites had been conducted. In August 1994, the two sides agreed to carry out six

joint field activities in the future, and the United States was permitted to increase the number of personnel on its teams. In

counternarcotics cooperation, Laos agreed to step up its efforts to combat the cultivation, production, and transshipment of

opium, heroin, and marijuana. Crop substitution programs in

conjunction with the United States and the United Nations

Development Programme, as well as narcotics training programs and improved law enforcement measures, have been

instituted. In 1994, after four years of United States certification (with explanation) for counternarcotics cooperation, Laos was granted a national interest waiver in lieu of full certification because of poor counternarcotics performance. (Certification is dependent on counternarcotics cooperation either with

the United States or with the LPDR taking steps on its own to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of the

1988 United Nations Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances). In 1995 Laos was again

xxxix
certified as cooperating fully. If the United States were to deny

certification, continued efforts in counternarcotics cooperation and cooperation in POW/MIA accounting would be jeopardized. Counternarcotics efforts have made limited progress,

constrained in part by limited training, management and

administrative skills, and law enforcement, as well as by LPDR

finances and higher priorities. A decline in opium production

in the 1993-94 growing season was a result of adverse weather

rather than decreased areas under cultivation.

The LPDR is poorly equipped in the national security arena, and the need for modernization is evident. Constrained by its economic limitations and foreign assistance geared toward eco- nomic (primarily infrastructure) improvements, the Lao People's Army has been unable either to modernize its outdated

equipment or to elevate the level of training.

The primary mission of the armed forces has been to maintain national defense and public security, political stability, and

social order. However, national defense objectives and the security environment have changed. The armed forces are no

longer fighting a war of national liberation, although their war- time exploits are still extolled in the official media. Domestic

opposition is contained by the police and a system of party control. External opposition, in particular resistance elements

based in Thailand, is limited. Each of these factors has contributed to a reduction in the size of the armed forces in the 1990s.

In 1991 there were approximately 55,000 persons in the armed

forces; by 1994 armed forces personnel reportedly totaled

37,000.

The armed forces now have the additional assignment of

contributing to socioeconomic and rural development, with

the aim of achieving greater self-sufficiency. Thus, the military

is ordered to check and boost crop cultivation and monitor

livestock transport; grow vegetables for daily meals; and create

favorable conditions for promoting poultry and fish breeding.

In 1989 the Corporation for Agro-Forestry Development and

Service was established. Connected to the Ministry of National

Defense, the corporation is responsible for improving and

building the agricultural base and engaging in public security

activities in three southern districts of Xaignabouri Province.

In the five years since its establishment, the corporation has

repaired and paved roads and built irrigation systems. In

another venue, the Lao People's Army began a joint venture in

1994 with the Chinese People's Liberation Army to produce

xl
pharmaceuticals for the Lao People's Army as well as for

domestic and foreign markets.

The military relationship with Vietnam has also evolved. In

July 1994, it was noted that the Political and Military Institute

of the People's Army of Vietnam had accepted more than 400

students from the LPDR since 1978. Nonetheless, Laos cannot

rely on Vietnam for military assistance and equipment to the

extent it had previously.

Since its inception in December 1975, the LPDR has been

notable for its remarkable stability and continuity. For almost

twenty years, the same few men have been in power. The leadership core, an elite group of founding members of the LPRP,

hold key positions in the party, government, and military

organs. The majority of the members of the Politburo and the

Central Committee are people who participated in the revolutionary struggle.

In the early 1990s, the deaths of high-ranking leaders—a nat- ural consequence of an aging leadership—have meant a reshuffling of positions. Of note is the fact that no power struggles were in evidence. Rather, leaders simply moved up in rank.

The death in November 1992 of Kaysone Phomvihan, who had

been active since the 1940s in the resistance forces, then proclaimed the LPDR's first prime minister, and finally elected

president in 1991, left no gap in the leadership. Nouhak Phomsavan was elected to the largely ceremonial position of president. A close comrade of Kaysone, and similarly a veteran of

the revolution, Nouhak was a former minister of finance and a deputy prime minister. Nouhak will be eighty-one years old in

April 1995. Khamtai Siphandon, another leader in the early

resistance efforts, and a former minister of national defense

(1975-91) and deputy prime minister, moved up to the prime

minister's post in 1991. Supposedly ten years younger than

Nouhak, Khamtai's "youth" was seen by some as the reason for

his appointment to the more active role of prime minister.

Other elder statesmen also died in the early 1990s. Former

Politburo member Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of the

LPDR from the retirement of Souphanouvong in 1986—until

his own retirement in 1991 —died in January 1994. Among

other Politburo members who have died are deputy prime minister Phoun Sipraseut, who was also chief of the Foreign Relations Committee, LPRP Central Committee, and "official in

charge of guiding foreign affairs" (and former minister of for- eign affairs), who died in December 1994; Somlat Chanthamat,

xli
who died in 1993; Sisomphon Lovansai, who died in 1993; and

Sali Vongkhamsao, who died in 1991. Some of these leaders

had already retired and held largely ceremonial posts at the

time of their death.

Coming full circle, with a royalist heritage but communist

sympathies, was Prince Souphanouvong. President from the

founding of the LPDR until he withdrew for health reasons in

1986, his position was not officially relinquished until March

1991 at the Fifth Party Congress, when he was also removed

from the Politburo. His death in January 1995 ended the last direct link between the monarchy established in the mid-fourteenth century by Fa Ngum and the single-party communist

regime, that is the LPDR. (Two of Souphanouvong's sons, however, are active in the government, one in the Ministry of

Finance, the other in the Social Science Commission.)

Almost twenty years after the LPDR's founding, Laos is, once

again, as during many prior kingdoms, dominated by a small

and powerful elite marked by nepotism. The country will have

to deal with several significant issues in the years ahead even as the remaining aging leaders continued to govern in early 1995

as a cohesive group without active opposition. These issues

include: How effectively will the LPDR use the assistance proffered by various international banks, friendly aid donors, and

foreign investors? How will Laos deal with its considerable eco- nomic potential but also considerable educational deficits?

When will students begin to seek greater opportunities for

advancement outside the single-party system? Will the party

remain in full control and will there be a regularized political

succession? These are but some of the issues regarding the

future direction of Laos as the nation responds to the challenges presented by economic reform and progress.

March 1, 1995

* * * Since the Introduction was written, the work of the party and

government have continued as usual. The sixth ordinary ses- sion of the National Assembly closed and the tenth plenary ses- sion of the LPRP's Fifth Central Committee was held. The

National Assembly endorsed a ministerial reshuffle involving

lateral personnel changes. Meetings between the foreign ministers of Laos and Thailand discussed the need to resolve the still unsettled 1987 border dispute.

xlii
Of economic significance, was the April 5 signing of the

Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development

of the Mekong River Basin. The agreement, supported by the

United Nations Development Programme, replaces a 1957 pact

among Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, and took two

years to negotiate. The agreement establishes the Mekong

River Commission as an institutional body and legal framework

with which to promote basin-wide studies and joint development projects in the lower Mekong River basin; China and

Burma are expected to join the commission at some point. Five areas of cooperation have been delineated: hydropower generation, irrigation, fisheries, navigation, and tourism. Plans for a

series of dams on the Mekong, however, have been contested

by various environmental groups although the agreement purportedly takes environmental protection into account.

April 26, 1995

* * * On May 12, 1995, the United States removed Laos from its

list of countries prohibited from receiving foreign assistance

funds for reasons of national interest, making development aid an option.

June 22, 1995 Andrea Matles Savada

xliii

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Detailfrom a door of Wat Ba Khe in Louangphrabang shows courtier blowing conch shell
HISTORICAL RESEARCH SHOWS that the rudimentary

structures of a multiethnic state existed before the founding of

the Kingdom of Lan Xang in the thirteenth century. These prethirteenth-century structures consisted of small confederative

communities in river valleys and among the mountain peoples,

who found security away from the well-traveled rivers and over- land tracks where the institutions and customs of the Laotian

people were gradually forged in contact with other peoples of

the region. During these centuries, the stirring of migrations as well as religious conflict and syncretism went on more or less continuously. Laos's short-lived vassalage to foreign empires

such as the Cham, Khmer, and Sukhothai did nothing to dis- courage this process of cultural identification and, in fact,

favored its shaping.

In the thirteenth century—an historically important watershed—the rulers of Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang) constituted a large indigenous kingdom with a hierarchical

administration. Even then, migratory and religious crosscurrents never really ceased. The durability of the kingdom itself is attested to by the fact that it lasted within its original borders

for almost four centuries. Today, the Lao People's Democratic

Republic (LPDR, or Laos) covers only a small portion of the

territory of that former kingdom.

Internecine power struggles caused the splitting up of Lan

Xang after 1690, and the Lao and the mountain peoples of the

middle Mekong Valley came perilously close to absorption by

powerful neighboring rivals, namely Vietnam and Siam

(present-day Thailand); China never posed a territorial threat.

Only the arrival of the French in the second half of the nineteenth century prevented Laos's political disintegration. In a "conquest of the hearts" (in the words of the explorer and colonist Auguste Pavie) —a singular event in the annals of colonialism in that it did not entail the loss of a single Lao life—France

ensured by its actions in 1893 that Laos's separate identity

would be preserved into modern times. During the colonial

interlude, a few French officials administered what their early

cartographers labeled, for want of a better name, "le pays des

Laos" (the land of the Lao, hence the name Laos), preserving

3
Laos: A Country Study

intact local administrations and the royal house of Louangphrabang.

Laos's incorporation into French Indochina beginning in

1893 resulted, however, in Vietnamese immigration, which was

officially encouraged by the French to staff the middle levels of

the civil services and militia. During the few months in 1945

when France's power was momentarily eclipsed, the conse- quences of this Vietnamese presence nearly proved fatal for the

fledgling Lao Issara (Free Laos—see Glossary) government.

The issue of Vietnamese dominance over Indochina remained

alive into the postindependence period with the armed rebellion of the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation—see Glossary), who proclaimed themselves part of an Indochina-wide revolutionary

movement. The Royal Lao Government (RLG—see Glossary)

grappled with this problem for ten years but never quite suc- ceeded in integrating the Pathet Lao rebels peacefully into the

national fabric.

By the 1960s, outside powers had come to dominate events

in Laos, further weakening the Vientiane government's

attempts to maintain neutrality in the Cold War. For one thing,

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the

most powerful entity left in Indochina by the 1954 Geneva

armistice and the exit of France, cast a large shadow over the

mountains to the west. Also, the United States, which had

exerted strong pressure on France on behalf of the independence of Laos, became involved in a new war against what it regarded as the proxies of the Soviet Union and China. Even

then, however, high-level United States officials seemed ambivalent about Laos's claim to national sovereignty, and Laos

became the country where the so-called "secret war" was

fought.

In late 1975, months after the fall of Cambodia and the

Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) to the communists, the

Pathet Lao came to power in Laos, proclaiming that Laos's ter- ritorial integrity, as well as its independence, sovereignty, and

solidarity with other new regimes of Indochina, would be

defended (see fig. 1). In a demonstration of this determination, Laos fought a border war with Thailand in 1988, and protracted negotiations were necessary to demarcate the border

between the two countries. Internallv, the regime proved ruthless in stamping out political and armed opposition. Only since

the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1986 has

4
Historical Setting

the government made some headway in the long and difficult

process of bettering the lives of its citizens.

Early History

The original inhabitants of Laos were Austroasiatic peoples,

who lived by hunting and gathering before the advent of agriculture. Skilled at river navigation using canoes, Laotian traders used routes through the mountains, especially rivers, from

earliest times. The most important river route was the Mekong

because its many tributaries allowed traders to penetrate deep

into the hinterland, where they bought products such as cardamom, gum benzoin, sticklac, and many foods.

Power Centers in the Middle Mekong Valley

A number of princely fiefdoms based on wet rice cultivation

and associated with the pottery and bronze culture of Ban

Chiang developed in the middle Mekong Valley from the first century A.D. These fiefdoms exercised power over their neighbors, in circumstances of generally sparse populations, through

expanding and contracting spheres of influence best described

by the term mandala (see Glossary). Commerce, marriage contracts, and warfare served to expand the mandala.

Thus, a plurality of power centers occupied the middle

Mekong Valley in early times. Sikhottabong was a mandala

whose capital was located on the left bank of the Mekong at the

mouth of the Xe Bangfai and then moved westward as a result

of the expansion of Champa, an Indianized state on the coast

of Vietnam founded in A.D. 192. Cham, descendants of

Champa, were present at Champasak (Bassac) in the fifth century. The Mon kingdom of Candapuri, the earliest name of

present-day Vientiane (Viangchan), was another mandala. The

social structure of Sikhottabong and Candapuri appears to have been strongly hierarchical, with an aristocracy, a commoner class, and a slave class. The fact that some kings came

from the commoner class appears to indicate the presence of

some sort of consensus in effecting royal succession. At its peak, another important regional power, Funan, had its mandala incorporate parts of central Laos. The smaller, but also

important, Mon kingdom of Dvaravati (through which Theravada Buddhism—see Glossary—reached Laos in the seventh

and eighth centuries) was centered in the lower Menam Valley

beginning in the fifth century (see Buddhism, ch. 2).

5
Laos: A Country Study

In the seventh century, a northwesterly migration of Thais

from their region of origin in northwestern Tonkin brought to the Ta-li region (in what is present-day Yunnan, China) a suc- cessor state to the Ai Lao kingdom. This new kingdom, Nanchao, expanded its power by controlling major trading routes,

notably the southern Silk Road. Culturally, this polyethnic,

hierarchical, and militarized state was to have a great influence

on later societies in Indochina, transmitting the Tantric Buddhism of Bengal to Laos, Thailand, the Shan state, and possibly

Cambodia, as well as the political ideology of the maharaja

(protector of Buddhism). Nan-chao was organized administratively into ten prefectures called kien. This term seems to be the

origin of place-names keng (for example, Kengtung), chiang

(for example, Chiang Mai), and xiang (for example, Xiangkhoang). Moreover, the population and army of Nan-chao

were organized in units of 100, 1,000, and 10,000, a form later found in Indochina. Also, the title chao (prince) appears to have been of Nan-chao origin. Another branch of this same

migration began at the headwaters of the Nam Ou and fol- lowed it downstream to Louangphrabang, continuing on

through Xaignabouri to Chiang Mai.

As a result of the expansion and contraction of mandala,

places of importance were known by more than one name.

Muang Sua was the name of Louangphrabang following its conquest in A.D. 698 by a Thai prince, Khun Lo, who seized

his opportunity when Nan-chao was engaged elsewhere. Khun

Lo had been awarded the town by his father, Khun Borom, who

is associated with the Lao legend of the creation of the world,

which the Lao share with the Shan and other peoples of the

region. Khun Lo established a dynasty whose fifteen rulers

reigned over an independent Muang Sua for the better part of

a century.

In the second half of the eighth century, Nan-chao intervened frequently in the affairs of the principalities of the middle Mekong Valley, resulting in the occupation of Muang Sua

in 709. Nan-chao princes or administrators replaced the aris- tocracy of Thai overlords. Dates of the occupation are not

known, but it probably ended well before the northward

expansion of the Khmer Empire under Indravarman I (r. 877-

89) and extended as far as the territories of Sipsong Panna (see

Glossary) on the upper Mekong.

6
Historical Setting

In the meantime, the Khmers founded an outpost at Xay

Fong near Vientiane, and Champa expanded again in south- ern Laos, maintaining its presence on the banks of the Mekong

until 1070. Canthaphanit, the local ruler of Xay Fong, moved

north to Muang Sua and was accepted peacefully as ruler after

the departure of the Nan-chao administrators. Canthaphanit

and his son had long reigns, during which the town became

known by the Thai name Xieng Dong Xieng Thong. The

dynasty eventually became involved in the squabbles of a number of principalities. Khun Cuang, a warlike ruler who may

have been a Kammu (alternate spellings include Khamu and

Khmu) tribesman, extended his territory as a result of the war- ring of these principalities and probably ruled from 1128 to 1169. Under Khun Cuang, a single family ruled over a far-flung

territory and reinstituted the Siamese administrative system of

the seventh century. Muang Sua next became the Kingdom of

Sri Sattanak, a name connected with the legend of the naga

(mythical snake or water dragon) who was said to have dug the

Mekong riverbed. At this time, Theravada Buddhism was subsumed by Mahayana Buddhism.

Muang Sua experienced a brief period of Khmer suzerainty

under Jayavarman VII from 1185 to 1191. By 1180 the Sipsong

Panna had regained their independence from the Khmers,

however, and in 1238 an internal uprising in the Khmer outpost of Sukhodaya expelled the Khmer overlords.

Mongol Influence

Recent historical research has shown that the Mongols, who

destroyed Nan-chao in 1253 and made the area a province of

their empire—naming it Yunnan—exercised a decisive political influence in the middle Mekong Valley for the better part

of a century. In 1271 Panya Lang, founder of a new dynasty

headed by rulers bearing the title panya, began his rule over a

fully sovereign Muang Sua. In 1286 Panya Lang's son, Panya

Khamphong, was involved in a coup d'etat that was probably

instigated by the Mongols and resulted in the exile of his

father. Upon his father's death in 1316, Panya Khamphong

assumed the throne.

Ramkhamhaeng, an early ruler of the new Thai dynasty in

Sukhothai, made himself the agent of Mongol interests, and

from 1282 to 1284 eliminated the vestiges of Khmer and Cham

power in central Laos. Ramkhamhaeng obtained the allegiance

7
Laos: A Country Study

of Muang Sua and the mountainous country to the northeast.

Between 1286 and 1297, Panya Khamphong's lieutenants, act- ing for Ramkhamhaeng and the Mongols, pacified vast territories. From 1297 to 1301, Lao troops under Mongol command

invaded Dai Viet but were repulsed by the Vietnamese. Troops

from Muang Sua conquered Muang Phuan in 1292-97. In 1308

Panya Khamphong seized the ruler of Muang Phuan, and by

1312 this principality was a vassal state of Muang Sua.

Mongol overlordship was unpopular in Muang Sua. Internal

conflicts among members of the new dynasty over Mongol

intervention in their affairs resulted in continuing family

upheavals. Panya Khamphong exiled his son Fa Phi Fa and

most likely intended to leave the throne to his younger grandson, Fa Ngieo. Fa Ngieo, involved in various coups and coup

attempts, in 1330 sent his two sons to a Buddhist monastery

outside the Mongol realm for safety. The brothers were kidnapped in 1335 and taken to Angkor, where they were

entrusted to King Jayavarman Paramesvara, whose kingdom

had acknowledged Mongol suzerainty since 1285.

The Founding of Lan Xang

It was as a result of these family conflicts that the Kingdom of

Lan Xang—the name still carries associations of cultural kinship among the Lao—was established. The younger brother, Fa

Ngum, married one of the king's daughters and in 1349 set out

from Angkor at the head of a 10,000-member Khmer army. His

conquest of the territories to the north of Angkor over the next

six years reopened Mongol communications with that place,

which had been cut off. Fa Ngum organized the conquered

principalities into provinces {muang—see Glossary), and

reclaimed Muang Sua from his father and elder brother. Fa

Ngum was crowned king of Lan Xang at Vientiane, the site of

one of his victories, in June 1354. Lan Xang extended from the

border of China to Sambor below the Mekong rapids at Khong

Island and from the Vietnamese border to the western escarpment of the Khorat Plateau.

The first few years of Fa Ngum's rule from his capital Muang

Sua were uneventful. The next six years (1362-68), however,

were troubled by religious conflict between Fa Ngum's

lamaistic Buddhism and the region's traditional Theravada

Buddhism. He severely repressed popular agitation that had

anti-Mongol overtones and had many pagodas torn down. In

8
Historical Setting

1368 Fa Ngum's Khmer wife died. He subsequently married the

ruler of Ayuthia's daughter, who seems to have had a pacifying

influence. For example, she was instrumental in welcoming a

religious and artistic mission that brought with it a statue of the

Buddha, the phrabang, which became the palladium of the

kingdom. Popular resentment continued to build, however,

and in 1373 Fa Ngum withdrew to Muang Nan. His son, Oun

Huan, who had been in exile in southern Yunnan, returned to assume the regency of the empire his father had created. Oun

Huan ascended to the throne in 1393 when his father died,

ending Mongol overlordship of the middle Mekong Valley.

The kingdom, made up of Lao, Thai, and hill tribes, lasted

in its approximate borders for another 300 years and briefly

reached an even greater extent in the northwest. Fa Ngum's

descendants remained on the throne at Muang Sua, renamed

Louangphrabang, for almost 600 years after his death, maintaining the independence of Lan Xang to the end of the seven- teenth century through a complex network of vassal relations

with lesser princes. At the same time, these rulers fought off

invasions from Vietnam (1478-79), Siam (1536), and Burma

(1571-1621).

The Division of Lan Xang

In 1690, however, Lan Xang fell prey to a series of rival pretenders to its throne, and, as a result of the ensuing struggles,

split into three kingdoms—Louangphrabang, Vientiane, and

Champasak. Muang Phuan enjoyed a semi-independent status

as a result of having been annexed by a Vietnamese army in the

fifteenth century, an action that set the precedent for a tributary relationship with the court of Annam at Hue.

Successive Burmese and Siamese interventions involved

Vientiane and Louangphrabang in internecine struggles. In

1771 the king of Louangphrabang attacked Vientiane, determined to punish it for what he perceived to be its complicity in a Burmese attack on his capital in 1765. The Siamese captured

Vientiane for the first time in 1778-79, when it became a vassal

state to Siam. Vientiane was finally destroyed in 1827-28 following an imprudent attempt by its ruler, Chao Anou, to retaliate

against perceived Siamese injustices toward the Lao.

The disappearance of the Vientiane kingdom and the weakened condition of Louangphrabang led to a period of direct

Siamese rule on the left bank of the Mekong and to the virtual

9
Laos: A Country Study

annexation of Xiangkhouang as well as part of Bolikhamxai by

the Vietnamese. Moreover, the Siamese soon became more

directly involved with the Kingdom of Louangphrabang, whose

ruler, Manta Thourath (r. 1817-36), had sought to preserve

neutrality in the conflict between Siam and Vientiane. The

Siamese intervention was caused by an appeal by King Oun

Kham (r. 1872-94) for help in clearing his northeastern terri- tories of the Ho (Haw), bands of armed horsemen who had

fled the bloody Manchu campaign to pacify Yunnan.

The last major migration into Laos in the nineteenth cen- tury was that of the Hmong (see Glossary). Accustomed to

growing crops of dryland rice and maize at the highest elevations in mountainous southern China, where they had lived for

centuries, the Hmong practiced a peaceful coexistence with

their neighbors at lower elevations. Their major interaction

with others occurred in selling their chief cash crop, opium.

Developments in the Nineteenth Century

The French, in their early forays into the interior of

Indochina, had stuck mainly to the rivers, looking for access routes to China. An April 1867 expedition led by Ernest Doudart de Lagree and Francis Gamier visited the ruins of Vientiane. In 1869 an expedition led by Rheinart and Mourin

d'Arfeuille traveled up the Mekong without penetrating the

mountains. Although another explorer, Jules Harmand, a French army physician, reached Attapu on the Xe Kong, these

forays provided the French with only a superficial knowledge

of the peoples of the interior. What these early French explorers and scientists did find, however, were the Siamese and the

Vietnamese already contesting for suzerainty over the territory

between the mountains and the Mekong.

The Hold of Siam

This conflict had a long history. At the time of Siam's retributive campaigns against Vientiane in 1827-28, relations

between Vientiane and Annam were good. The Vietnamese

called Vientiane Van Tuong (the Kingdom of Ten Thousand

Elephants). But when Vientiane's ruler, Chao Anou, sought ref- uge in Hue following Siam's destruction of his capital, it caused

serious embarrassment to the Vietnamese. King Rama III of

Siam wrote to the Vietnamese emperor, Minh Mang, explaining that Chao Anou had refused obedience to him and had

10
*

Stonejars dating back to prehistoric times, Plain of

Jars, Xiangkhoang Province

Courtesy Embassy of the Lao

People's Democratic

Republic, Washington

started hostilities. Minh Mang, pursuing a consistently cautious

policy toward Rama III, lent Chao Anou two companies of men

to escort him back to Vientiane, instructing them to return

immediately after accomplishing their mission. Siamese and

Vietnamese sources—the Laotian primary sources having for

the most part disappeared—give conflicting versions of what

happened next. In any event, in mid-October 1828, Chao Anou

found himself once again engaged in hostilities with a stronger

Siamese force. He again fled to safety, this time to Muang

Phuan because a Siamese force was encamped at Nakhon Phanom, blocking the Mekong downstream.

The arrival of Chao Anou on their doorstep with a Siamese

army in pursuit confronted the leaders of Muang Phuan with a dilemma. When the Siamese commander issued an ultimatum

to surrender Chao Anou under penalty of an attack on

Xiangkhoang, the leaders of Muang Phuan quickly accepted.

The Siamese took Chao Anou to Bangkok and kept him captive.What followed was illustrative of the consequences of the

constant meddling in each other's affairs that went on among

the Laotian principalities. The reigning prince of Muang

Phuan was Chao Noi, son of the ruling family. Vientiane had

11
Laos: A Country Study

attempted to take advantage of Chao Noi's youth when his

father died to install Chao Xan, the head of a rival family from

Muang Kasi. The Phuan elders of Xiangkhoang refused to accept this candidate, so power was shared under a compromise arranged with help from Hue. Chao Xan, however, led a delegation to Hue, where he accused Chao Noi and his cousins

of bringing dishonor to the emperor by surrendering a vassal

prince to another king, of obstructing passage of a tribute mission from Louangphrabang across the territory of Muang

Phuan to Hue, and of negotiating to acknowledge Siamese

suzerainty.

Chao Noi was accordingly summoned to Hue to explain

himself but sent his eldest son, Po. Angered by this flagrant dis- regard of a direct order, Minh Mang took no action, awaiting news of the fate of Chao Anou, who was the nominal suzerain

and ordinarily would have dealt with the Phuan on behalf of

Hue. Once word was received that Chao Anou had died, Minh

Mang sent a Vietnamese detachment to Muang Phuan and

arrested Chao Noi and most of his family. In May 1829, the pris- oners were taken to Annam, where Chao Noi and his cousin were executed in January 1830. Chao Noi's young sons and

their mothers were kept in exile in Nghe An. The Muang

Phuan succession thus fell to Chao Xan. Minh Mang, however,

posted a quanphu (commissioner), supported by a garrison of

500 soldiers who were rotated seasonally, to reside permanently

at Chiang Kham (Khang Khay), at the headwaters of the Nam

Ngum, as a precaution against a recurrence of conflict with the

Siamese king.

Rama III sent a further letter to Minh Mang in early 1829

outlining his view of Chao Anou's treachery and thanking the

emperor for his presents. But the king failed to provide an

explanation for a serious incident at Nakhon Phanom in which

three Vietnamese mandarins had been killed. In November

1829, Siamese envoys returned home with a letter from Hue

reiterating earlier demands for punishment of those people

responsible. When it became obvious that Rama III would not

revert to the old arrangement of joint administration, Hue

gave administrative control over the entire eastern half of the

former kingdom of Vientiane to Vietnamese officials in Annam

and Tonkin. The territory was virtually annexed by Hue in

1831 under the name Tran Ninh Phu Tarn Vien. The Vietnamese presence at Khang Khay continued until the mid-1 850s.

12
Historical Setting

Ghao Anou's wars with the Siamese had stirred massive dis- ruptions of villages on the right bank. Terrified Lao fled every

which way. When the Siamese arrived at Nakhon Phanom in

182V, they found the town deserted, the officials having fled across the river to Mahaxai. In the aftermath of the war, however, the Siamese established new towns—Chiang Khan, Nong

Khai, Mukdahan, and Kemmarat—at key points on the

Mekong to serve as administrative centers and as logistical

bases for expeditionary forces operating across the river toward

the mountains.

On the left bank, where the writ of Siam ran as far south as Stung Treng, the Siamese followed a policy of depopulating

the country. This policy had actually been initiated as early as 1779; the first Phuan carried off by the Siamese arrived in

Bangkok around 1792, where they were used as workers in the

fields of the official classes. By removing people from the left bank, the Siamese deprived any invader from Annam of food

supplies, transport, and recruits. Sporadic resistance, however,

led for some time by the latsavong (first prince) of the old Vientiane kingdom, continued at Mahaxai until 1835, when the

leading Lao official there agreed to become governor of Sakon

Nakhon on the right bank, and the Siamese resettled there.

From 1837 to 1847, the Siamese carried out depopulation raids

annually during the dry season in Khamkeut and Khammouan

and in the valley of the Xe Banghiang. Entire Lao villages were

uprooted.

Meanwhile, the leaders of Houaphan principality, fearing

that the example of Muang Phuan might be applied to them,

submitted to the suzerainty of Bangkok through the intermediary of Louangphrabang. Events were not going well for the

Siamese in Muang Phuan. After the Siamese removed Chao

Xan and some of the elders to Bangkok in 1836, the Vietnamese in effect ruled the state directly, appointing local officials as administrators. The depopulation activities the Siamese carried

out on the Plain ofJars and elsewhere in Xiangkhoang caused

the remaining population to migrate eastward and southward,

forming new villages in the upper reaches of the Nam Mat and

around the northern extremities of the Nam Kading basin,

around Muang Mo, Muang Mok, and Muang Ngan. This

expansion of the Phuan state was encouraged by the Vietnamese in their administrative reorganization. Some of the Phuan,

however, perhaps enticed by Lao governors acting for the

Siamese, moved down the river valleys toward the Mekong.

13
Laos: A Country Study

There, new towns such as Bolikhamxai and Pakxan were

founded and given satellite status by the Siamese in the 1870s.

Tu Due, on his accession as Vietnamese emperor at Hue in

1847, allowed the sons of Chao Noi to return home with their

families and to reestablish Xiangkhoang as the Phuan capital.

They were given administrative responsibilities, and the eldest,

Prince Po, at last was permitted to replace the commissioner.

Meanwhile, King Tiantha Koumane of Louangphrabang (r. 1851-69), one of three sons of Manta Thourath who succeeded

to the throne, while in Bangkok to receive the investiture,

quickly arranged with the new Siamese king, Rama IV, to become once again the suzerain over the Phuan state. The

Vietnamese had no objection to vassal relations of the Phuan

with Louangphrabang. But Rama IV was deeply suspicious of

the Phuan elders and set as a condition for accepting this

arrangement that the Phuan send an annual tribute mission to Louangphrabang. Tiantha Koumane hence was able to reestablish his authority over Muang Phuan.

A new element—the Ho—entered the picture, further complicating the situation in northern Laos. The Ho first appeared

in mid-1869 in the upper valley of the Nam Ou, where they

made common cause with some Lu dissidents displaced from

the Sipsong Panna during a civil war lasting twenty-five years. An army from Louangphrabang attacked these bands and withdrew, taking prisoners.

The Lao and Siamese were ill prepared to face up to the new

danger of anarchy in their domains. Tiantha Koumane was

dving of malaria, and the Siamese, preoccupied with preparations for the cremation of their own monarch, Rama IV,

demanded that a tribute mission from Louangphrabang arrive

in Bangkok in time for the ceremony. Many princes and senior

officials had to absent themselves from Louangphrabang at this

critical time and had to remain in Bangkok afterward for audi- ences with the new monarch. Oun Kham, who was already fiftyeight vears old, did not receive his crown from the Siamese

until 1872.

It was not until 1873 that the Siamese sent an army up the

Nam Ou to attack the Ho and drive them out. Some Ho

retreated into Houaphan, while others overran the Plain of

Jars, where Chao Hung had succeeded his brother Chao Pho as ruler of the Phuan state, which became the main theater of

conflict. The Ho camped at Chiang Kham and demanded "tax"

14
Historical Setting

payments from the local population, threatening to kill anyone

who resisted. Chao Hung raised a small army and led it to assist the beleaguered governor of Chiang Kham in 1874, but a fatal bullet wound to Chao Hung prompted the withdrawal of his

army. Chao Hung's son, Prince Khanti, appealed to Annam for

aid. A joint attack was made on Chiang Kham but was also

repulsed.

Early the following year, the Ho began plundering the lowlands along the Mekong as far upriver as Chiang Khan and as far south as Nakhon Phanom, directly threatening Siam's security. The teenage King Rama V was unable to mount an effective response. The governor of Khorat took a force of men

across the flooded Mekong at the height of the monsoon and

attacked the Ho encamped in the ruins of Vientiane, killing

their warlord and forcing the others to retreat to Muang

Phuan. A concerted campaign against the Ho in their stronghold was finally put in motion in 1876, but it resulted more in

pillaging and looting the inhabitants than in stopping the Ho,

who, with their horses, were more than a match for the Siamese

and Lao foot soldiers. Rama V blamed the Phuan for having

brought trouble on themselves by giving rice, silver, and horses

to the Ho, which, in fact, they had done in a desperate effort to appease them. He rejected further appeals for aid on the

grounds that the local leaders would prove incapable of dealing with the situation after the army withdrew.

Meanwhile, the troubles in the upper valley of the Nam Ou

continued. Siamese commissioners had to assist Oun Kham in

restoring order in 1876 and to prod him into reorganizing the

towns under his rule. Affairs remained in a state of flux for the

next six years, and when in late 1882 Oun Kham appealed

again to Bangkok for help against the Ho, the Siamese sent a major military mission. Subsequently, the Siamese maintained

a permanent garrison at Louangphrabang.

The Eviction of Siam

The French, meanwhile, had imposed a treaty of protectorate on Annam in 1884. This treaty implied a French interest

going beyond exploratory involvement in the affairs of Laos. In June 1885, the French consul general in Bangkok notified the

Siamese government that a vice consulate would be established

in Louangphrabang under terms of a most-favored-nation

clause contained in a Franco-Siamese treaty of 1856. A new

15
Laos: A Country Study

Franco-Siamese convention of May 1886 acknowledged the

role of Siamese officials in Laos for the conduct of administrative matters but avoided implying French recognition of

Siamese claims to sovereignty there.

Auguste Pavie arrived at Louangphrabang in 1887 to assume

his post as vice consul. Pavie played a key role in saving Oun

Kham's life from raiders from Lai Chau, earning the king's

gratitude and a promise that he would place his kingdom

under France's protection. Incidents between Siamese and

French officials on the left bank, where the French had made

themselves advocates of Vietnamese claims to suzerainty, con- tinued in 1887-93. Finally, in March 1893, the French government, acceding to a campaign by the colonialist lobby in Paris,

decided to send three French commissioners, each with a small

armed force, to evict the Siamese from outposts they had established in central and southern Laos. The commissioners had

secret orders to avoid exchanges of fire if at all possible; ironically, the Siamese were under identical orders from their government.

The French government dispatched two warships to the Gulf

of Siam, and, in what became known as the Paknam incident,

forced passage of a fort at the mouth of the Menam River on

July 12 and anchored in the river with their guns trained on the

royal palace. On July 20, the French gave an ultimatum to the

Siamese government to recognize the rights of Annam to the

left-bank territories and to meet a list of other demands within

forty-eight hours. The Siamese replied on July 22, accepting

the first demand on central and southern Laos but rejecting

the rest. The French declared a blockade of Bangkok, whereupon the Siamese accepted the rest of the French demands. By

terms of the treaty concluded on October 3, 1893, between the

Government of the French Republic and the Government of

His Majesty the King of Siam, Siam renounced all claims to ter- ritories on the left bank and to islands in the river. Laos under the French

The Kingdom of Louangphrabang became a protectorate

and was initially placed under the governor general of

Indochina in Hanoi. Pavie saw to the officialization in Hanoi of

the titles of King Oun Kham, his eldest son who assumed the

duties of king under the name Zakarine—also known as Kham

Souk (r. 1894—1904) —and the viceroy, Boun Khong.

16


Historical Setting

The French originally divided central Laos into two administrative districts. By April and May 1894, however, the initial

organization was already being modified, and a new plan was

put into effect a year later. In 1899 Upper Laos was integrated

with Lower Laos under one administrator.

In 1904 and 1905, Laos was deprived of southern plateaus

that were previously part of its territory (see fig. 2). Under the

February 13, 1904, Convention Modifying the Treaty Concluded on October 3, 1893, Siam ceded to France control of

the right-bank portion of Louangphrabang (present-day

Xaignabouri Province) and part of the right-bank territory of

Champasak. The French governor general, by a decree of

March 28, 1905, fixed the border between Laos and Cambodia

at the Tonle Repou River. Under the March 23, 1907, Treaty

Between France and Siam, the French retroceded the territory

of Dan Sai, southwest of the "elbow" of the Mekong, to Siam.

The French thus reestablished a political entity in the middle Mekong Valley extending from China to the Khong falls on

the Cambodian border that owed allegiance to neither Vietnam nor Siam, thereby eluding Vietnamese claims to Laos,

whose historical basis they had verified in the archives in Hue.

Detachment of the administration of the left-bank territories

from Annam was justified on grounds of budgetary necessity in

the new French Indochina.

World War II and After

The French presence in Laos was sufficient to preserve internal peace and cope with sporadic localized revolts among some

of the mountain tribes in the years 1900-40. These revolts

owed their origin to resistance to paying taxes and supplying corvee labor or to outbreaks of messianic hysteria. However,

the French military in Indochina was too ill-equipped to con- template resisting Japan's movement to the south, which by

1940 had become the main focus ofJapanese military strategists. On August 30, 1940, the French Vichy government signed

the Matsuoka-Henry Pact granting Japan the right to station

troops in Indochina and use bases there for movement of

forces elsewhere in the region. The agreement, although rec- ognizing Japan's preeminent role in Southeast Asia, preserved

France's sovereignty over Indochina.

To the west, French forces in Indochina were confronted by

a threat from Thailand (Siam adopted this name in June

19


Laos: A Country Study

1939), where Pibul Songkram's government was arousing public unrest with inflammatory speeches in Bangkok and radio

broadcasts to those he called his brethren across the Mekong.

The broadcasts called for an uprising against the French, an

endeavor in which Pibul promised help—and for which he had

secretly sought Japanese backing. After a series of increasingly

serious incidents in the last months of 1940, Thai ground

troops attacked French forces in Cambodia in January 1941.

The May 9, 1941, Peace Convention Between France and Thailand, under mediation from Japan, was highly favorable to Thailand, which regained the right-bank territories that it had

given up in 1904.

Laotian outrage was predictable. King Sisavang Vong of

Louangphrabang (r. 1904-59) had only the promises made to

his grandfather by Pavie as the basis for France's intentions to

treat his kingdom as a protectorate. Worried in this regard, he

had obtained in 1932 from Paul Raynaud, the French minister

for colonies, written guarantees that France would continue to honor Pavie's promises. Therefore, the French were obliged to explain their giving away part of his kingdom or else offer the

king suitable compensation. As a result, the French governor

general, Admiral Jean Decoux, offered the king a treaty regularizing the protectorate and enlarging his domain. The

Franco-Laotian Treaty of Protectorate between France and the

Kingdom of Louangphrabang of August 29, 1941, attached the

provinces of Vientiane, Xiangkhoang, and Louang Namtha to Louangphrabang, which already included Phongsali and

Houaphan.

The French Protectorate and Direct Administration

The territory of Laos thus consisted of the Kingdom of

Louangphrabang, under French protection, and the provinces

south of the Nam Kading, which were administered directly by

a resident superieur in Vientiane. The latter had direct authority over the provincial residents, who were on an equal footing with

the Lao chao khoueng (provincial governors). The resident

superieur also acted as the representative of the French state to the king of Louangphrabang and supervised the administration of the kingdom through provincial commissioners. The

affairs of the kingdom were conducted by a four-member council headed by the viceroy. The resident superieur also coordinated

the activities of the public services of the Indochinese Federa20
Historical Setting

tion, which operated in both the north and the south, and

employed French, Vietnamese, and Lao civil servants. The treaty also reinstituted the position of viceroy, which

had been abolished by the French at the death of Boun Khong

in 1920. Boun Khong's son, Prince Phetsarath, became one of

the major figures of modern Laos. Among his accomplishments were the establishment of the system of ranks and titles of the civil service, promotion and pension plans, the organization of a Laotian consultative assembly consisting of district

and province chiefs, the reorganization of the king's Advisory

Council along functional lines, and the establishment of a school of law and administration. Phetsarath also reorganized

the administrative system of the Buddhist community of monks

and novices, the clergy (sangha), and established a system of

schools for educating monks in which the language of instruction was Pali, the sacred language of Theravada Buddhism.

Nationalist Stirrings

Although French rule in Laos was punctuated by rebellions

among tribal peoples that had to be suppressed by force, the

Laotians by and large accepted the French presence. The need

to counter the pan-Thai irredentism propagated by the Pibul

regime in Bangkok nevertheless led the Decoux administration

to foster Laotian nationalism through the Lao Renovation

Movement (Lao Nhay). The goals of this movement were to "provide Laos with its own personality with respect to its neighbors and to inculcate the sense of patrie." The first Lao-language publications in the style of the modern press, for

example, Lao Nhay (New Laos), and Tin Lao (News of Laos),

both launched in 1941, resulted from this movement.

An activist group of teachers and students among the Lao

nationalists, however, attempted to stage a coup d'etat at the

College Pavie in Vientiane in July 1940. When the coup failed,

they fled across the river and founded a semisecret organization, Laos for the Lao (Lao Pen Lao). Founding members

included the Pali teacher and historian Maha Sila Viravong,

Tham Sayasithena, Thongdy Sounthonvichit, and Oudone Sananikone and his half-brother Oun.

Beginning in December 1944, with the upswing of Allied for- tunes in Europe and the Pacific, General Charles de Gaulle's

provisional government in Paris began airdropping French

agents into Indochina with the aim of recruiting and training

21
Laos: A Country Study

guerrilla forces to harass the Japanese and maintain a French

presence. These agents readily found supporters in Laos, and

soon Franco-Laotian guerrilla groups were operating from jungle camps scattered from Louang Namtha Province in the

north to Ghampasak Province in the south. On March 9, 1945,

however, the Japanese carried out a coup de force that over- turned the 1940 political agreement and ended French administrative control throughout Indochina. Having the

Indochinese rulers renounce their treaties of protectorate with

France formed an integral part ofJapanese plans, but no steps were taken to prepare the Laotians or others for "independence."

Events in 1945

Japanese troops moved into the towns and quickly imprisoned French officials and their families and confiscated their

property. Prince Phetsarath, after ordering Laotian civil ser- vants to continue their duties as usual, left Vientiane for

Louangphrabang to be with the king.

After being delayed on the roads from Xiangkhoang and

Vientiane by the Franco-Laotian guerrillas (of whom the

Hmong were particularly effective), two battalions ofJapanese

troops finally arrived in Louangphrabang on April 7. They

found the French gone. AJapanese representative suggested

that the king proclaim Laos's independence and send someone

to discuss the terms of Laotianjapanese cooperation. Sisavang

Vong replied that he would stay with his people and that his

attitude toward the French would not change. Laos was too

small to be independent, but if he was obliged to accept independence he would do so. At the same time, he reluctantly

issued a proclamation on April 8 ending the French protectorate. The king secretly entrusted Prince Kindavong, a younger

half-brother of Phetsarath, with the mission of representing

him in the Allied councils abroad while he maintained clandestine contact with the Franco-Laotian guerrillas in Laos. He also

sent Crown Prince Savang Vatthana to Japanese headquarters

in Saigon, where he vigorously protested the Japanese actions.

Phetsarath no doubt saw some good coming from the turn

of events. The Japanese had told him that they intended that

the king's proclamation of independence apply to all of Laos.

Interested in the unity of Laos, he gave the Japanese a proposal

for unifying the Laotian civil service. Phetsarath also opened

22
Historical Setting

an account for the royal treasury with the Indochinese treasury

in Hanoi, which gave the kingdom greater fiscal autonomy.

Problems began to appear almost immediately, however. At the

end ofJune, the coffers were empty in spite of an infusion of

money brought back from Saigon by the crown prince. Japan, no longer able to provide for the salaries of the Laotian administration, allowed the civil service to languish.

Beyond this was the Vietnamese problem. In 1943 the six

chief towns of Laos counted 30,300 Vietnamese inhabitants out

of their total population of 51,150. Vietnamese occupied key

positions in the federal civil service, public works, posts and

telegraph, treasury, customs, and police. The political dangers

to Laos of the Vietnamese presence were demonstrated on

April 8 when Vietnamese residents of Khang Khay tried to detach Tran Ninh (Xiangkhoang), an integral part of the terri- tory of the Kingdom of Louangphrabang, from Laos and

attach it to Vietnam.

After their coup deforce, the Japanese put prices on the heads

of the Franco-Laotian guerrillas and anyone caught helping

them. In spite of the danger, the guerrillas sought recruits in

the countryside and stepped up their armed attacks against

Japanese communications, virtually cutting off several towns.

The guerrillas' message to Laotian civil servants: Disregard the

Japanese-inspired proclamation of independence and carry on

your regular duties without helping the Japanese. Chao khoueng

(provincial governors) who joined the guerrillas and chao

muang (district chiefs) faced the hard decision of leaving

behind their colleagues and sometimes their families. Whereas

many of the leading Lao and tribal figures supported the

Franco-Laotian guerrillas, some families had divided loyalties.

After Japan's surrender, Phetsarath acted on the premise

that the king's proclamation of independence was still in force.

On August 28, 1945, he sent a telegram to all provincial gover- nors notifying them that the Japanese surrender did not affect

independence and warning them to resist any foreign intervention in their administration. Phetsarath also refused to recognize the authority of the French resident superieur when he was

released from prison. Three days earlier, however, Colonel

Hans Imfeld, commissioner of the French Republic, had

entered Louangphrabang with a party of Franco-Laotian guerrillas and had received assurances from the king that the protectorate was still in force. Japanese troops having withdrawn to

23
Laos: A Country Study

the south, a party of Franco-Laotian guerrillas under the com- mand of Major Fabre entered Vientiane peacefully on September 3 to await developments. French civilians released from

internment were evacuated.

Vietnamese residents in Vientiane and other towns had

already begun spreading anti-French propaganda and making

preparations to resist the French. In these actions, they were

guided by agents of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), a Marxist-Leninist party founded in 1930 by Ho Chi Minh. The

ICP adhered to a Leninist strategy of seizing power by revolutionary action—national liberation followed by the transition

to socialism. The ICP had established cells in Laos in the early

1930s made up entirely of Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese agitation came to a head with a large demonstration in Vientiane on August 23. Phetsarath favored taking advantage of the French difficulties. As head of

government, however, he was restricted not only by the wishes

of the king, but also by the 1941 arrangement with the French

that had made the crown prince the chairman of the King's

Council. The French design had, perhaps intentionally, created an ambiguity that made for conflict. On September 2, Phetsarath sent a message to the king requesting a royal proclamation

of the unity of Laos.

While he was dealing with these matters, Phetsarath received an unsolicited message on September 3 from Prince Souphanouvong, another of his half-brothers. Souphanouvong had

spent the previous sixteen years working as an engineer in Viet- nam. Souphanouvong flew from Vinh to Hanoi in an aircraft

provided by the United States Office of Strategic Services

(OSS) to meet with Ho Chi Minh, who hadjust proclaimed the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi in the name of the

Viet Minh (see Glossary), an ICP front organization. (Although

OSS personnel were not authorized to operate in Indochina,

the OSS station in Kunming, China, took advantage of a mandate for OSS teams to perform prisoner of war (POW) recov- ery work to enter Indochina.) Prince Souphanouvong said he

was in a position to represent the interests of Laos and asked

for instructions. On September 5, he sent another message to Phetsarath saying that he had begun to negotiate with the Vietnamese for aid in the independence struggle and to form "an

Indochinese bloc opposing the return of colonialism." Phetsarath rejected Souphanouvong's offer.

24
Wat Pa Huak, one of

Louangphrabang's oldest Buddhist temples, has

gilded and carved wood

front doors, a mosaicfacade

depicting Buddha riding a

three-headed elephant, and

beautiful interior murals

showing historical scenes along the Mekong River. Courtesy Gina Merris

The official United States position, communicated to

France, was that there was no question concerning France's

sovereignty over Indochina. At the end of August, President

Harry S. Truman was personally assured by de Gaulle that

Indochina would be granted independence once the status quo before the Japanese aggression had been restored. Meanwhile, United States recognition of French sovereignty was

qualified by the proviso that the French claim of support by the

Indochinese populations be borne out by future events. Apparently without the knowledge of Washington, however, an OSS

team that reached Vientiane in September—escorted by members of the Lao Pen Lao newly returned from Thailand

assured Phetsarath that the French would not be allowed to return. The team advised Phetsarath to await the arrival of the

Inter-Allied Commission that was to decide his country's

future. This information misled Phetsarath into believing that

the international community supported an independent Laos.

On September 7, however, Phetsarath was informed by the

minister of interior that a royal proclamation had continued

the French protectorate over the Kingdom of Louangphrabang. On September 15, with the Inter-Allied Commission

nowhere in sight, Phetsarath issued a proclamation that unified the Kingdom of Louangphrabang with the four southern

provinces of Khammouan, Savannakhet, Champasak, and Sara25
Laos: A Country Study

van (Salavan). Vientiane would be the capital, and the Congress of People's Representatives would soon meet to decide all political, economic, and social questions.

On September 21, Fabre demanded the dismissal of Xieng

Mao (also known as Phaya Khammao, or Khammao Vilay), the

provincial governor since 1941, for anti-French activities, and

his replacement by Kou Voravong. The next day, an advance

guard of the Chinese Nationalist troops responsible for receiving the surrender of the Japanese arrived by boat down the

Mekong. They appeared more interested in buying up the

opium crop (harvested from late December to early February)

than in disarming the already departedJapanese.

The Lao Issara Government

On October 7, Souphanouvong and a Vietnamese escort

arrived in Savannakhet to find that Oun and his partisans, who

included Phoumi Nosavan, had crossed the river from Thailand, taken control of the town, and, in a loose alliance with

the large Vietnamese population, armed themselves from

looted armories of the local militia and with arms discarded by

the withdrawing Japanese. As a result of negotiations, their

forces merged. Souphanouvong became commander in chief

and Oun second in command. Souphanouvong and his escort

proceeded upriver, first to Thakhek and then to Vientiane,

where a provisional revolutionary government had been proclaimed two weeks earlier, taking the name Lao Issara (Free

Laos—see Glossary). Moreover, the Committee of Independence, strongly influenced by the Lao Pen Lao, controlled

Vientiane. Upon his arrival, Souphanouvong was made minister of foreign affairs and commander in chief. At his urging, a military cooperation convention was signed with Ho Chi

Minh's government.

Meanwhile, bolstered by renewed assurances of support

from the French, Sisavang Vong had sent messages on October

10 to Vientiane accusing Phetsarath of exceeding his authority

and stripping him of his position as prime minister and his title of viceroy. Phetsarath protested but accepted these decisions

and, after thanking the Laotian civil servants for their support,

immediately announced his withdrawal from public life. His

decision was no doubt influenced by the fact that he was married to a sister of Sisavang.

26
Historical Setting

The royal dismissal of Phetsarath turned Lao Issara leaders

against the monarchy, which they saw as hopelessly compromised by the French. In an effort to give their government

some semblance of legitimacy, Lao Issara leaders hastily named

the People's Committee, consisting of thirty-four members,

many of them Lao Pen Lao activists, but also including the gov- ernors of several provinces who were not even in Vientiane.

Members of the Chamber of People's Representatives were

elected—and simply notified after the fact—by the members of

the People's Committee in accordance with a provisional constitution adopted on the morning of October 12. At the news of the king's deposition and the report that the

Lao Issara government had dispatched an armed contingent to Louangphrabang under Sing Ratanassamay's command, the

agitation in the royal capital grew rapidly. With Imfeld and his

men disarmed and held under house arrest by Chinese troops,

the governor, Boungnavath, was free to act, and he had Royal

Lao Government (RLG—see Glossary) supporters arrested.

On November 10, hours before the arrival of Sing's force, a mob surrounded the royal palace, fired shots in the air,

climbed over the walls, and forced entry. Sing and his men had

an audience with the king that afternoon. The king declared

himself to be a simple citizen, prepared to hand over the phrabang and to vacate the royal palace when the government

thought it appropriate. Later that month, the government

issued a formal decree that no government member would

henceforth have any contact with the French.

A Confusing Situation

At the outset of its rule, the authority of the Lao Issara provisional government was extremely limited outside Vientiane. In

the north, the towns of Louangphrabang, Phongsali, and

Louang Namtha were occupied by the Chinese. The FrancoLaotian guerrillas, with support from Touby Lyfoung's Hmong,

had taken control of the main towns of Xiangkhoang Province

at the beginning of September. Their hold on Houaphan was much less solid, in spite of efforts on the part of the provincial

« governor, Phoumi Vongvichit, to prevent the Chinese from

entering the province. Here, because of its proximity to Vietnam, the revolutionary propaganda spread by the Viet Minh

was strong but also pro-Viet Minh rather than pro-Lao Issara. Moreover, the main roads leading east were denied to the

Franco-Laotian guerrillas by Viet Minh detachments coming

27
Laos: A Country Study

from Vietnam. In the center and south, the Lao Issara government controlled the towns of Thakhek and Savannakhet. Most

of the remainder of the provinces of Khammouan and Savannakhet was controlled by the Franco-Laotian guerrillas. The

same was true for the southernmost provinces of Pakxe and

Saravan, which fell largely in the British zone of operation

decided upon at the Potsdam Conference. Here also, Prince

Boun Oum of Champasak, sympathetic to the French, had

15,000 troops under his command.

The outlook became more favorable for the Lao Issara as the

year ended. France, preoccupied with the situation in Vietnam,

was unable to send reinforcements to the Franco-Laotian guerrillas. Fabre and his men were evacuated from Vientiane

eventually to Thailand—under an escort provided by the Chinese. Various events led the Franco-Laotian guerrillas to evacuate Xiangkhoang town and Louang Namtha. While Viet Minh

propaganda exploited differences between the Lao and Phuan

on the one hand and Touby's Hmong on the other, the Viet

Minh were themselves putting together a Hmong guerrilla

force under Faydang Lobliayao of the Lo clan. In Louangphrabang, Imfeld and his men had been subjected to all kinds of

pressure, culminating in their evacuation across the river

under Chinese escort on January 4. In Vientiane, the Lao Issara government was confronted

with a growing list of problems. The most serious was how to finance the government because the treasury was empty, and

there were no funds to pay civil servants. An attempt to tax

opium exports was unenforceable because the government did

not control opium trade routes. The government even took

steps to abolish the Indochinese regie (state monopoly) that

regulated the opium trade and make it a Laos monopoly. In

desperation, the government appealed to the Thai government for a press on which to print money. Foreign relations

and the procurement of military equipment were also problems.

Beginning in January 1946, with the loss anew of Xiangkhoang, the fortunes of the Lao Issara government began to decline. The Franco-Laotian guerrillas were receiving reinforcements and supplies by air and road from French headquarters in Saigon, which made entry into the towns possible

for the first time. Lao Issara appeals to the Viet Minh for assis- tance went largely unheeded, and the Franco-Laotian guerril28
Historical Setting

las once again were positioned along the main roads leading

from Vietnam.

After long negotiations in Chongqing, China's wartime capital, the French government obtained China's commitment to withdraw its troops from Indochina. The withddrawal allowed

the Franco-Laotian guerrillas to make their entry into Savannakhet against token resistance camouflaged by the Chinese withdrawal. At Thakhek, however, Souphanouvong and his largely

Vietnamese force were determined to make the French pay. In

a day-long battle on March 21, approximately 700 of the

defenders and 300 civilians were killed. With the French menacing Vientiane, the first move of the

Lao Issara government was to attempt to regularize its relations

with the monarchy. On March 23, Xieng Mao, having abandoned Vientiane for Louangphrabang, sent the king a letter

asking him to resume his throne. But the king was in no hurry,

and it was not until April 23 that the king signaled his acceptance of the constitution and reaffirmed the unity of Laos by a

royal ordinance.

Meanwhile, a strong French column was making its way up

the road from Vientiane to Louangphrabang. Simultaneously,

Hmong guerrillas moved west to harass Chinese troops in the

vicinity of the royal capital. The French column entered

Louangphrabang, forcing Phetsarath and the Lao Issara ministers to flee Laos. The king welcomed the French by declaring

null and void all acts that he had sanctioned under pressure

from the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Lao Issara since April

4, 1945. He also promised a democratic constitution.

The Lao Issara government-in-exile set up its headquarters

in Bangkok. Scattered groups of armed partisans mounted

raids into Laos from bases along the Mekong and in southern

Laos. One group was under the command of Thao O Anourack. After the Japanese takeover, Thao O had refused the

Franco-Laotian guerrillas' appeal to join them. When the Lao

Issara took over Savannakhet, the provincial governor

appointed him commander of liberation forces in Xepon.

Thus, when the Franco-Laotians reoccupied Xepon in March

1946, Thao O made his way east with some 200 to 300 men to the safety of Lao Bao just across the border of Vietnam. Eventually, he was forced to abandon Laos altogether and to make his

way to Hanoi, where the Viet Minh put him in touch with Kay- sone Phomvihan, a Vietnamese-Lao metis (person of mixed

29
Laos: A Country Study

race) from Savannakhet who had been sent to direct Lao Issara radio broadcasts over Radio Hanoi, and Nouhak Phoumsavan,

a Vietnamese from Mukdahan. Neither Kaysone Phomvihan

nor Nouhak Phoumsavan had a significant role in the Lao

Issara, but both had the confidence of Ho Chi Minh and saw in

Ho's government the salvation of an independent Laos.

The Vietnamese proposed to Thao O—and he accepted

that he form a committee for the liberation of Laos. Nouhak

became president of the committee. The enlistment of other

small groups from Xiangkhoang and Houaphan brought the

effective strength under Thao O's command to 500; he dispatched one company each to Xam Nua, Xiangkhoang, Muang

Mo, Nape, and Muang Sen. Thao O soon received secret codes

from Phetsarath and Souvanna Phouma in Bangkok that

allowed him to communicate with his companies.

The Coming of Independence

At the urging of the United States, France took steps to nor- malize its relations with Laos. In June 1946, a joint Franco-Laotian commission was established in Vientiane to discuss future

relationships. This commission produced a document confirming the existence of a unified Laos under the sovereignty of the

king of Louangphrabang. Major political, military, and eco- nomic powers remained in French hands. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were to be held within a year. A modus

vivendi was signed on August 27. A Franco-Siamese agreement

signed in Washington on November 17, 1946, restored the

right-bank provinces of Xaignabouri and Champasak to Laos.

The multinational conciliation commission that examined

Thailand's claims to these territories found in favor of Laos in

its report ofJune 27, 1947.

The Kingdom of Laos

On December 15, 1946, in the face of guerrilla raids from

across the Mekong, forty-four delegates to the Kingdom of

Laos's first popularly elected Constituent Assembly were chosen. Under French supervision, the delegates worked on a constitution promulgated by Sisavang Vong on May 11, 1947. This

constitution declared Laos an independent state within the

French Union. On November 26, 1947, the thirty-three deputies to Laos's first National Assembly invested a government

headed by Prince Souvannarath, another half-brother of Phet30
Historical Setting

sarath. By the terms of a confidential protocol of February 25,

1948, Boun Oum was allowed to keep his title of Prince of

Champasak but renounced his suzerain rights to this former

kingdom. In return he was made inspector general of the kingdom, the third-ranking personage of Laos after the king and

crown prince.

Under a successor government headed by Boun Oum, the

Franco-Lao General Convention ofJuly 19, 1949, gave Laos

greater latitude in foreign affairs. Over the following months,

France transferred its remaining powers. A Royal Lao Army was

created, which by the end of 1952 comprised seventeen companies, in addition to a battalion entirely commanded by Laotian

officers. On February 7, 1950, the United States and Britain

recognized Laos. Later that year, the United States opened a

legation in Vientiane.

Meanwhile, contacts had been made in Bangkok between

the French and moderates in the Lao Issara government-inexile. A coup d'etat in Thailand ushered in a government

much less sympathetic to the anti-French resistance in Laos

than its predecessor and deprived the hardliners among the

Lao Issara of precious support. A conflict developed between

Phetsarath and Souphanouvong over the issue of the Lao

Issara's ties to the Viet Minh. This conflict led to Souphanouvong's dismissal from the government-in-exile. When France

offered an amnesty, the government decreed its own dissolution in October 1949 and returned to Vientiane in a French

plane. Phetsarath was left in Thailand. Souphanouvong, vowing to continue to fight, headed for Vietnam. The Lao Issara was a spent force, although it lived on in legend.

The Pathet Lao

War had broken out in the meantime between the French

and Ho Chi Minh's government at the end of 1946. Leaving

Nouhak in charge of the resistance committee, Thao O set up

his base at Con Cuong (Vietnam), from which his men could

cross the border into Laos with relative impunity. In January

1949, Kaysone formed the first unit of a new resistance army,

the Latsavong detachment, named after the la tsavong of Vientiane, who had led resistance against the Siamese in the nineteenth century. To lend the resistance the appearance of

authority it lacked in reality, a government headed by Souphanouvong was formed at a congress held in Vietnam in August

31
Laos: A Country Study

1950. This government included Kaysone, Nouhak, Tiao Souk

Vongsak, and Phoumi Vongvichit

The congress created the Neo Lao Issara (Free Laos Front

see Glossary). The basic stance of this front's propaganda was

the united struggle against the French without reference to

political parties or ideology. Illustrative of this stance was the use henceforth of the name Pathet Lao (Lao Nation—see Glossary). Indicative of the "single battlefield" theme repeated in

Viet Minh propaganda were the increasing numbers of Viet

Minh agents sent to Laos: 500 to 700 political and military

agents at the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, approximately 5,000 to 7,000 agents at the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, and 17,000 agents in 1953.

In keeping with the united front against the French, Souphanouvong's Pathet Lao government included not only leaders

who had developed close ties to the Viet Minh over the previ- ous five years, but also members of the Lao aristocracy (such as Souphanouvong himself) and former officials of the RLG. Significantly, the Pathet Lao government also included two representatives of Laos's tribal groups who were made ministers

without portfolio.

By 1950 both Kaysone and Nouhak had become members of

the ICR The party's strategy was to operate clandestinely

behind broad national front organizations such as the Viet

Minh and the Neo Lao Issara that were capable of mobilizing

support from people for whom Marxism-Leninism held no

appeal. This strategy applied particularly to Laos, where issues

such as land reform and other aspects of class struggle, antithetical to the notion of Buddhist harmony, had almost no

appeal. The overthrow of the monarchy, which had figured as a

goal in the ICP program since 1932, was also not publicized.

Although the ICP had announced its dissolution in 1945, it continued to operate secretly. In February 1951, at its second

congress, the ICP decided to split into separate parties for each

of the three countries—Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—in

accordance with the need to mobilize mass support for the

anti-French war throughout Indochina. At this time, of 2,091

ICP members in Laos, only thirty-one were Laotians. The Laotian members of the ICP were "transferred" to a new party

whose name reflected its Laotian constituency but that was still tied to the two other parties of the ICP in the new triad.

32
That Luang in Vientiane, the most important Laotian national monument, has a

golden stupa believed to contain a relic oftJw Buddha.

Courtesy Gina Merris

The decision to form a new party led to considerable discussion among noncommunist Pathet Lao supporters unfamiliar

with Leninist strategy. In the second half of 1954, an important

meeting of Pathet Lao leaders was held near the Houaphan

Province border, where the need to establish this new party to ensure success of the struggle in the postwar period was

explained. Some participants supported this proposal; others

did not. Proponents of the new party met in secret. The Phak

Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party—LPP) was formally established on March 22, 1955. The very existence of the party was

kept a secret from nonparty people.

By 1951 enough Pathet Lao troops had been recruited and

trained to take part in Viet Minh military operations against

French Union forces in Laos. In the spring of 1953, the Viet

Minh overran almost all of Houaphan Province and portions of

33
Laos: A Country Study

Phongsali, Xiangkhoang, and Louangphrabang provinces.

Approximately 300 Pathet Lao accompanied the Viet Minh. On

April 19, Souphanouvong formally established the Pathet Lao

government in Houaphan Province. A "people's tribunal" presided over by Kaysone condemned the acting province chief to death for having helped organize guerrilla resistance to the

invaders.

With Louangphrabang in danger of Viet Minh occupation,

Crown Prince Savang Vatthana received a letter from the

United States charge d'affaires in Saigon, Robert McClintock,

expressing concern for the king's safety and saying that withdrawal from the capital "would seem the course of wisdom."

Savang said that the king intended to stay to bolster morale for

the defense of his capital. At the end of 1953 and beginning of

1954, the Viet Minh again invaded Laos, pushing as far as Thakhek and creating considerable difficulties for the French

Union defenders. Their appearance seemed timed to coincide

with the sale of the opium crop in Houaphan and Xiangkhoang provinces.

In elections to the National Assembly held on August 26,

1951, the National Progressive Party (Phak Xat Kao Na)

formed by the returned Lao Issara ministers, Xieng Mao, Sou- vanna Phouma, and Katay Don Sasorith, won fifteen of thirtynine seats. The Democratic Party (Praxathipatay) of Kou Voravong and his brother-in-law, Major Phoumi Nosavan, won four

seats; the National Lao Union (Lao Rouam Samphan) of Bong

Souvannavong won three; and seventeen seats went to independents that included Phoui Sananikone and Leuam Insixiengmay. With Xieng Mao having failed to form a government, Prince Souvanna Phouma headed a government

that was invested on November 21. The Franco-Lao Treaty of

Amity and Association on October 22, 1953, removed the last strictures on independence.

Toward Neutrality: The First Coalition

It was thus as a fully sovereign country that Laos sent a delegation headed by its foreign minister, Phoui Sananikone, to the

Geneva Conference on Indochina that put an end to the First

Indochina War in July 1954. The armistice agreement for Laos,

signed by a French general on behalf of French Union forces

and a Viet Minh military official, provided for a cease-fire to take effect at 8:00 a.m. on August 6. Viet Minh forces were to

34
Historical Setting

be withdrawn from Laos to North Vietnam within 120 days.

The Viet Minh delegation had brought Nouhak and another

Pathet Lao member, Ma Khamphitay, with them to Geneva on

Viet Minh passports, intending to have a Pathet Lao delegation

seated, but they were not recognized by the conference. A provision in the armistice agreement for Laos was nevertheless

inserted providing for the "fighting units of Pathet Lao" to be

regrouped in Houaphan and Phongsali provinces pending a

political settlement. The RLG pledged to take steps to integrate all Laotian citizens into the political life of the kingdom.

The representatives of the other powers at Geneva signed no

conference documents but instead subscribed to the Final Declaration taking note of the armistice agreements. United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lobbied hard to ensure

that the Laotians made no unnecessary concessions to the communists. At the final session, the United States delegation

declared that it would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the armistice agreements and that it would view any violations of them as a threat to peace and security. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai stressed the advisability of a coalition

government to the Laotians, urging an early meeting between

princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong. He seemed

prepared to offer an exchange of diplomats, his main concern

being that Laos be free of United States military bases.

Initial Difficulties

Implementation of the armistice agreement in Laos began

on schedule. The Joint Commission, on which the RLG was

represented by General Bounphone Maekthepharak, Colonel

Sengsouvanh Souvannarath, and Colonel Boun Ma, and the

Pathet Lao by Singkapo, Sisavath, and Ma Khamphitay, held a number of meetings at Khang Khay to deal with the details.

The presence of the International Control Commission (ICC),

made up of Canada, India, and Poland, also helped force the

two sides to live up to their commitments. However, the insis- tence of the Pathet Lao that their regroupment areas cover the

entire territory of the two provinces, along with a right to exclusive administration of those provinces, raised serious

problems almost immediately. Another part of the armistice

agreement that caused difficulties was, as noted in an ICC

report, the ". . . glaring differences regarding the number and

categories of prisoners of war and civil internees exchanged."

35
Laos: A Country Study

It became clear that higher-level negotiations were needed.

Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong met at Khang

Khay on September 8. The assassination of the defense minister, Kou Voravong, in Vientiane on September 18, however,

demonstrated the fragility of the Laotian political structure.

The act seemed to be a settling of old scores, dating probably

to Kou's energetic measures as interior minister to suppress

banditry perpetrated from across the river. Thailand also

seemed to be implicated, but the announcement by Thai

police that they had arrested the assassin, who claimed to have

been in league with Phoui, only poisoned relations between

the Voravong and Sananikone families. Crown Prince Savang

wondered aloud whether Phetsarath, with the help of foreigners, was trying to oust the monarchy.

The Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese backers, meanwhile, took advantage of the cease-fire to launch a vast recruitment campaign. In the cases of numerous recruits who were

later interviewed, the offer of schooling or more specialized

training in North Vietnam proved decisive to their enlistment,

and even those who were initially skeptical were ultimately won

over by the attentions of their Vietnamese instructors and the

persuasiveness of the political lessons they received. One major

consequence of this campaign was that the Pathet Lao ranks were swelled by recruits from the many different hill tribes of

Laos. These men were to constitute the initial Pathet Lao units.

The immediate goal after regrouping in the two provinces was

to form nine battalions, plus independent companies for propaganda missions.

Laos, a member of the United Nations (UN) since December 14, 1955, seemed an unlikely place for a resumption of hostilities. Peaceful coexistence was the dominant mood of the

time. A new government under Katay was represented at the

Asian-African Conference held in April 1955 in Bandung,

Indonesia, where he and North Vietnamese prime minister

Pham Van Dong spoke of peace and noninterference in each

other's affairs. But an initial round of negotiations between the

government and the Pathet Lao in Rangoon in October collapsed, dashing hopes of a rapid settlement of the Pathet Lao

question. Armed clashes between the Royal Lao Army and the

Pathet Lao continued sporadically in the two provinces.

The threat to the RLG posed by a combination of internal

subversion and outside aggression preoccupied its leaders,

36
Historical Setting

none more so than Crown Prince Savang Vatthana. As early as summer 1954, fearing a French deal with the Viet Minh that

might be injurious to Laotian sovereignty and territorial integrity, Savang had flown to Paris to make his own soundings of

French intentions. He was also anxious to probe United States diplomats for reassurances as to the nature of the support Laos

could expect in the event of an attack from its communist

neighbors. He told Dulles that Laos was in a "life or death

struggle" for survival and that the Laotian people were

opposed to communist dictatorship. Dulles replied, "You can count upon our support—moral, political, and material—so long as that support goes to a government vigorously seeking

to maintain its own independence."

Washington's immediate concern was that the Royal Lao

Army was inadequately trained and equipped because all French troops, except for a small detachment at Xeno in the

south, had departed. The Geneva armistice terms prohibited

Laos from having foreign military bases and participating in

any foreign military alliance, but allowed a small French training mission. Dissatisfied with the French mission and seeing a larger role for itself, the United States established a disguised

military mission in Vientiane, the Programs Evaluation Office

(PEO). This mission became operational on December 13,

1955, under the command of a general officer, who, like others

on his staff, had been removed from Department of Defense

rosters of active service personnel. The secrecy stemmed from

the Department of State's concern that the PEO's existence

might be construed as a violation of the Geneva Agreement of

1954, which United States policy continued to uphold.

The RLG held elections in December 1955 without the

Pathet Lao. As a result, the Progressive Party again emerged as the leading party with eighteen seats; the newly formed Independent Party (Phak Seli) of Phoui Sananikone and Leuam

secured nine seats, the Democratic Party secured four seats,

and the National Union Party won two seats. Renewed Negotiations

After the elections, Souvanna Phouma signaled a renewed

effort at negotiations, when, presenting his new government to the National Assembly on March 20, 1956, he called the settle- ment of the Pathet Lao problem "the gravest and most urgent"

question before the country. He opened negotiations in Vien37
Laos: A Country Study

tiane in August; the Pathet Lao were represented by Souphanouvong. Two joint declarations issued shortly thereafter by

the delegations pledged agreement on a foreign policy of

peaceful coexistence, a new cease-fire in the two northern

provinces, exercise of democratic freedoms, authorization for

the Pathet Lao's political party to operate, procedures for the

RLG's administration in the two provinces, integration of

Pathet Lao units into the Royal Lao Army, the formation of two

mixed commissions to work out the above-mentioned details,

the holding of supplementary elections to an enlarged

National Assembly, and the establishment of a coalition government. In preparation for engaging in the politics of the kingdom, the Pathet Lao had formed an organization to act as a front—the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front—LPF; see Glossary) in January 1956, with an innocuous-sounding platform. Souphanouvong and the other Pathet Lao delegates took

the oath of allegiance to the king in the presence of Souvanna

Phouma and Kou Abhay, president of the King's Council. This

round of negotiations concluded in a further series of agreements covering a cease-fire, implementation of a policy of

peace and neutrality, and measures guaranteeing civic rights

and nondiscrimination against Pathet Lao followers. In late August, Souvanna Phouma visited Beijing and Hanoi,

where he was warmly received. Far from committing Laos to the communist bloc as the United States Department of State

feared, these visits formed part of Souvanna Phouma's strategy

to neutralize the danger to Laotian independence posed by the

Pathet Lao. It was obvious to him that communism held little appeal for the inhabitants of Laos. Although there were communists among the leaders of the Pathet Lao—and Souvanna

Phouma refused to believe his half-brother was one of them

the communists depended on the exercise, or at least the

threat, of armed force to carry out their "revolution." Sou- vanna Phouma's strategy was intended to separate the nationalists from the communists in the Pathet Lao. He warned the

Pathet Lao's foreign backers that if they provided sanctuary to armed resistance groups—once the Pathet Lao had been reintegrated into the kingdom's political life—they would be going

back on their pledges of noninterference.

At the same time, however, Souvanna Phouma's ideas for

safeguarding Laotian independence differed radically from

Dulles's. Dulles viewed the Pathet Lao as unacceptable coalition partners; in his view, they were all simply communists

38
Historical Setting

rather than a front comprising a number of nationalists. The

United States ambassador in Vientiane, J. Graham Parsons,

informed Souvanna Phouma that Washington was implacably

opposed to a coalition government. The United States

remained unmollified by a secret protocol attached to a November 2, 1956, agreement on a neutral foreign policy that

proscribed the establishment of diplomatic relations with

North Vietnam and China in the immediate future. On

November 22, Parsons was instructed to inform the prime minister that the United States was unable to respond favorably to

his appeal for support.

Negotiations with the Pathet Lao resumed in February 1957

but were interrupted when Souvanna Phouma resigned in May

over an unfavorable vote in the National Assembly. In the

interim, Phetsarath had been persuaded to return from Thailand. Unbowed by age, but no longer keen on a role for himself in politics, he returned in March and took up residence in

Louangphrabang, where, in a gesture of royal reconciliation,

he made his obeisance to the king and received back his old

title of viceroy.

A Fragile Unity

Souvanna Phouma returned as prime minister in August

1957 following a cabinet crisis and was charged by the king with

forming a new government. He reopened negotiations, and on

October 22, a final agreement was reached. This agreement

called for reestablishing RLG administration over the two provinces, forming a coalition government, and holding supplementary elections to the National Assembly The government

set elections for May 1958. On November 18, Souphanouvong

symbolically returned to RLG authority, represented by Crown

Prince Savang, the two provinces, together with all the troops,

civil servants, and war materiel belonging to the Pathet Lao. A

RLG governor was appointed in Houaphan and a Pathet Lao

governor in Phongsali, each with a deputy of the opposite

camp. Mayoral and other provincial official positions were

equally divided between the two parties. It was agreed that two

Pathet Lao battalions, totaling 1,500 troops, would be integrated into the Royal Lao Army and the remainder would be

demobilized and sent home. The National Assembly unanimously approved the coalition government. Souphanouvong

became minister of planning, reconstruction, and urbanism,

39
Laos: A Country Study

and Phoumi Vongvichit became minister of culture and fine

arts.Souvanna Phouma visited Washington in January 1958 hoping to persuade United States policy makers, who worried

about his having accepted Pathet Lao participation in the government in advance of elections, that his strategy for dealing

with the Pathet Lao was the best course. He left Washington,

however, without gaining unqualified support for his strategy.

United States aid failed to blunt the effects of Pathet Lao

propaganda and indoctrination in the villages. The Pathet Lao

were masters of political persuasion, exploiting popular themes

of nationalism, anticorruption, and "anti-big family." There

were exceptions, however, to the general negative perception

of United States aid. Tom Dooley, a physician from the United

States, brought health care to the people who needed it most,

those in remote villages. Another American—an Indiana

farmer named Edgar "Pop" Buell—devoted the last years of his

life to helping the Hmong, including training the first Hmong

nurses and opening Hmong schools.

The 1958 Elections

The stunning success of the LPF and its allies in winning

thirteen of the twenty-one seats contested in the May 4, 1958,

elections to the National Assembly changed the political atmosphere in Vientiane. This success had less to do with the LPF's

adroitness than with the ineptness of the old-line nationalists,

who were more intent on advancing their personal interests

than on meeting the challenge from the LPF. The two largest

parties, the Progressive Party and the Independent Party, could

not agree on a list of common candidates in spite of repeated

prodding by the United States embassy and so split their votes

among dozens of candidates. The LPF and the Peace (Santiphab) Party carefully worked out a strategy of mutual support, which succeeded in winning nearly two-thirds of the seats with barely one-third of the votes cast. Souphanouvong garnered the most votes and became chairman of the National

Assembly. The Progressive Party and the Independent Party tar- dily merged to become the Rally of the Lao People (Lao

Rouam Lao).

In the wake of the election fiasco, Washington concentrated

on finding alternatives to Souvanna Phouma's strategrv of win- es o/ ning over the Pathet Lao and on building up the Royal Lao

40
Viet Mink and Laotian officials on November 1, 1945, reviewing a

parade of troops of the Chinese Nationalist 93d Division in Vientiane.

Prince Souphanouvong, commander in chief Lao Issara forces, is in

uniform in thefront row, next to his young son, Ariya.

Courtesy Tran Van Dinh (former military adviser, intelligence and

operations, to Prince Souphanouvong)

Army as the only cohesive nationalist force capable of dealing

with the communists' united front tactics. On June 10, 1958, a new political grouping called the Committee for the Defense

of the National Interests (CDNI) made its appearance. Formed

mainly of a younger generation not tied to the big families and

as yet untainted by corruption, it announced a program for

revitalizing the economy, forming an anticommunist front that

excluded the Pathet Lao, suppressing corruption, and creating a national mystique.

Washington, which was paying the entire salary cost of the

Royal Lao Army, was enthusiastic about the "young turks" of

the CDNI. This enthusiasm was not altogether shared by

41
Laos: A Country Study

United States ambassador Horace H. Smith, who asked what

right a group untested by any election had to set its sights on

cabinet appointments. Whereas Souvanna Phouma tried and

failed to form a government, creating a drawn-out cabinet crisis, Phoui Sananikone eventually succeeded and included four

CDNI members and Phoumi Nosavan in a subcabinet post.

North Vietnamese Invasion

In foreign and domestic affairs, the atmosphere changed in

the summer of 1958. Souvanna Phouma announced that with

the holding of elections the RLG had fulfilled the political obligations it had assumed at Geneva, and the ICC adjourned sine

die. Phoui, less scrupulous about preserving Laos's neutrality

than his predecessor, angered Beijing and Hanoi by admitting

diplomats from Taipei and Saigon. China and North Vietnam,

already upset by the departure of the ICC, which they had seen

as a restraining influence, protested. The United States worked

out an agreement with France that reduced the role of the

French military mission and enlarged that of the PEO, which

embarked on a major strengthening of its staff and functions.

The occupation by North Vietnamese security forces in

December 1958 of several villages in Xepon District near the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North Vietnam and South

Vietnam was an ominous development. The RLG immediately

protested the flying of the North Vietnamese flag on Laotian

territory. Hanoi claimed the villages had historically been part

of Vietnam. With regard to precedent, this was a decidedly

modest claim; nonetheless, it represented a unilateral reinterpretation of the French map used by the Truong Gia Armistice

Commission in the summer of 1954 to draw the DMZ, and,

backed by force of arms, it constituted nothing less than

aggression. Phoui received extraordinary powers from the

National Assembly to deal with the crisis. But the failure to regain their lost territory rankled the Laotian nationalists, who

were hoping for a greater degree of United States support.

One of Washington's major preoccupations was the danger

that the Royal Lao Army would integrate the Pathet Lao troops

without the safeguard of "screening and reindoctrinating"

them. The embassy was instructed to tell the government that

it would be difficult to obtain congressional approval of aid to Laos with communists in the Royal Lao Army. Before the final

integration of 1,500 Pathet Lao troops (two battalions) into the

42
Historical Setting

Royal Lao Army could take place as planned in May 1959, the

Pathet Lao used a quibble about officer ranks to delay the final

ceremony. As monsoon rains swept over the Plain ofJars one

night, one of the two battalions slipped away, followed soon

after by the other, near Louangphrabang. The event signaled a resumption of hostilities. InJuly Phoui's government, after protracted cabinet deliberations, ordered the arrest of the LPF

deputies in Vientiane—Souphanouvong, Nouhak, Phoumi

Vongvichit, Phoun Sipaseut, Sithon Kommadan, Singkapo, and

others. Tiao Souk Vongsak evaded arrest. Fighting broke out all along the border with North Vietnam.

North Vietnamese regular army units participated in attacks on

July 28-31, 1959. These operations established a pattern of

North Vietnamese forces leading the attack on a strong point,

then falling back and letting the Pathet Lao remain in place once resistance to the advance had been broken. The tactic

had the advantage of concealing from view the North Vietnamese presence. Rumors of North Vietnamese in the vicinity often

had a terrifying effect, however. Among the men who heard

such rumors in the mountains of Houaphan Province that sum- mer was a young Royal Lao Army captain named Kong Le.

Kong Le had two companies of the Second Paratroop Battalion

out on patrol almost on the North Vietnamese border. When

they returned to Xam Nua without encountering the enemy,

they found that the garrison had decamped, leaving the town

undefended.

Direct North Vietnamese involvement in Laos began taking

another form wherein aggression was difficult to prove. Two

months after the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, the

North Vietnamese established a small support group known as Group 100, on the Thanh Hoa-Houaphan border at Ban

Nameo. This unit provided logistical and other support to Pathet Lao forces. In view of the reversion to a fighting strategy,

the North Vietnamese and Lao parties decided to establish an upgraded unit. The new unit, known as Group 959, headquartered at Na Kai, just inside the Houaphan border, began operating in September 1959. Its establishment coincided with a major effort to expand the hitherto small Pathet Lao forces.

According to an official history published after the war, its mission was "serving as specialists for the Military Commission and

Supreme Command of the Lao People's Liberation Army, and

organizing the supplying of Vietnamese materiel to the Laotian

revolution and directly commanding the Vietnamese volunteer

43
Laos: A Country Study

units operating in Xam Nua, Xiangkhoang, and Viangchan."

These actions were in violation of the obligation Ho Chi Minh's

government had assumed as a participant in the 1954 Geneva

Conference to refrain from any interference in the internal

affairs of Laos.

The Vietnamese party's strategy was by now decided with

regard to South Vietnam. At the same time, the party outlined

a role for the LPP that was supportive of North Vietnam, in

addition to the LPP's role as leader of the revolution in Laos.

Hanoi's southern strategy opened the first tracks through the

extremely rugged terrain of Xepon district in mid-1959 of what

was to become the Ho Chi Minn Trail.

Phetsarath and Sisavang Vong, viceroy and king, died within

two weeks of each other in October 1959. Sisavang Vong

reigned over Laos for fifty-four turbulent years as a man of

honor, and, after his death, his memory was so venerated that

when the communists came to power in Vientiane they left his statue standing. His successor, Savang Vatthana, lacked both his

father's hold on his people and Phetsarath's charisma. A deeply

fatalistic man who foresaw he would be the last king of Laos,

Savang Vatthana remained uncrowned for the rest of his reign

because a propitious date for the coronation ceremony could

not be found.

The Army Enters Politics

With the LPF's deputies in prison, the political scene became increasingly chaotic, even lawless. When Phoui's mandate ended in December 1959, Phoumi Nosavan and his CDNI

supporters began their move to force the king to grant them

power by announcing that the supreme command of the

armed forces was "handling current affairs." Their move, however, was too bold and caused the Western ambassadors in

Vientiane to present a united front to the king in support of

constitutionality. An interim government headed by Kou

Abhay was charged with preparing for new elections. Phoumi,

temporarily rebuffed, bided his time as minister of defense.

The army had entered politics but not quite in the manner

Washington had hoped.

In the April 24, 1960, elections, Phoumi found his revenge.

By exerting considerable pressure, he had changes made in the

electoral law. With financial support from Marshal Sarit Thanarat of Thailand, Phoumi bought off strong or inconvenient

44
Historical Setting

candidates and enlisted civil servants as his campaign workers.

Election balloting was fraudulent, and the results, giving rightist candidates large majorities, were totally unbelievable. A new

government was formed on June 3, ostensibly headed by Somsanith but in fact controlled by Phoumi acting as minister of

defense under the aegis of his new political party, the Social

Party (Paxa Sangkhom). Souvanna Phouma, elected without

fraud, became the president of the National Assembly. The

imprisoned LPF deputies had not been allowed to run for the

Assembly, but sent word to LPF supporters to vote for any LPF

candidates who had dared run or else to vote for Peace Party

candidates. However, on May 23, under darkness and with the

cooperation of personnel at their prison, the LPF deputies

escaped and disappeared into the countryside.

The Attempt to Restore Neutrality

On August 9, Captain Kong Le led the Second Paratroop

Battalion in a virtually bloodless coup d'etat that changed the

history of modern Laos. In taking over Vientiane, the paratroopers had unwittingly chosen a moment when the entire

cabinet was in Louangphrabang conferring with the king. They

informed their compatriots and the outside world by broadcasting their communiques on the radio. In a rally at the city

football stadium on August 11, Kong Le expanded on his goals:

end the fighting in Laos, stem corruption, and establish a policy of peace and neutrality. Recalling the experience of the first coalition when the country was temporarily at peace, Kong Le

asked for the nomination of Souvanna Phouma as prime minister.On August 11, General Ouan Ratikoun, as the cabinet's

envoy, arrived in Vientiane from Louangphrabang. After negotiations with Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma as president of

the National Assembly, Ouan returned to Louangphrabang

with a document in which the coup leaders requested the cabinet to return. They agreed to withdraw their forces to specified

points in the city and stipulated that these steps would lead to negotiations on the government's future. Two days later, however, when Ouan returned alone, it became evident that the

cabinet was reluctant to return to Vientiane. Once this news

spread, demonstrators gathered outside the Presidency of the

Council of Ministers demanding Somsanith's immediate resignation; they next marched on the National Assembly, where

45
Laos: A Country Study

Souvanna Phouma met them and, startled by their vehemence,

attempted to moderate their demands. Inside, the forty-one

deputies present voted unanimously to censure the Somsanith

government. On August 14, a delegation of the assembly car- ried the news of this vote to Louangphrabang and asked the

king to name Souvanna Phouma to form a new government.

Fearing violence in Vientiane, Somsanith resigned, and the

king named Souvanna Phouma prime minister. The new government was invested by thirty-four deputies on August 16. The

next day, Kong Le declared his coup d'etat over and vacated

the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

On receiving word of the coup, Phoumi flew from Louangphrabang to Ubol, where he informed Thai and United States

officials of his intention to "straighten things out" in Laos and

from where he sent emissaries to Savannakhet and Pakxe. In

Bangkok the following day, Phoumi met with Sarit, United

States embassy counselor Leonard Unger, and the chief of the

United States military mission in Thailand. He outlined plans

for a parachute drop to recapture the Vientiane airport and

ferry in additional forces by air to oust the rebels. He requested

that Thailand and the United States provide air transport, fuel,

salaries for his troops, and two radio broadcasting units. He

also asked for a secure channel of communication between his

new headquarters at Savannakhet and Bangkok.

These steps, taken in secrecy, received immediate approval

in Washington. Orders went out to designate a senior PEO offi- cer as liaison to Phoumi, and a PEO channel was established

between Savannakhet and the United States military mission in

Bangkok, bypassing the embassy in Vientiane. Aircraft of Civil

Air Transport, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) front, were made available to Phoumi, and Laotian droops training at bases

in Thailand were to be returned as soon as possible to Savannakhet.

Sarit, Pibul's minister of defense who had come to power in a coup in October 1958, had invested heavily in Phoumi and

was not about to let him go. The United States Joint Chiefs of

Staff, for their part, saw aid to Phoumi as preserving at least

part of the anticommunist forces in Laos from the effects of the

split in the royal army. But from this point on, much as United

States officials tried to separate the two issues, aid to the anticommunists in Laos was inseparable from Sarit's personal com- mitment to Phoumi. The United States embassy in Bangkok

46
Historical Setting

was also alarmed by the possibility that inadequate support for

Phoumi might lead Sarit to intervene unilaterally in Laos

because he had already imposed a blockade on Vientiane.

A Deepening Split

Phoumi enlisted the support of the commanders of four of

Laos's five military regions. He also began immediately broadcasting propaganda denouncing Kong Le as a communist and

on August 15 proclaimed the establishment of a Counter Coup

d'Etat Committee. He appealed to all military personnel to

rally behind him, guaranteed their salaries, and proclaimed his

intention to liberate Vientiane from communist hands. Forces

loyal to Phoumi seized Pakxan.

The United States considered Souvanna Phouma's return to office bad news. A Department of State cable stated that the

United States sought "to bring about an acceptable power bal- ance of non-communist elements which would eliminate Kong

Le and restore authority and stability."

Souvanna Phouma, wanting to avoid civil war, with Phoumi's concurrence convoked the National Assembly in Louangphrabang on August 29. A new government, with Souvanna

Phouma as prime minister and Phoumi as deputy prime minister and minister of interior, was sworn in on August 31. Phoumi

announced the dissolution of his Counter Coup d'Etat Committee. This might have defused the crisis, but the same day,

Kong Le made a radio broadcast protesting the presence of

Phoumi in the cabinet. Souvanna Phouma convinced him to change his mind, which he did "for the sake of peace and rec- onciliation" on September 1. Phoumi returned to Savannakhet

and waited.

On September 10, Prince Boun Oum, speaking from Savannakhet in the name of the new Revolutionary Committee,

announced that the constitution had been abolished, and he

and Phoumi were assuming power. In mid-September, two

companies of Kong Le's paratroopers routed the two battalions

of Phoumi's advance guard from their position at Pakxan and

installed a defensive line on the north bank of the Nam

Kading. Phoumi made no move to organize his paratroop drop

on Vientiane, in spite of the considerable means at his disposal.

On the evening of September 21, Sarit made a speech in which

he hinted at Thai armed intervention in Laos.

47
Laos: A Country Study

Kong Le's reputation as a giant slayer had by now spread

from the capital to the far corners of the kingdom. On September 28, when he dropped a handful of paratroopers near Xam

Nua in order to explain the situation to the 1,500-person garri- son that in principle was loyal to Souvanna Phouma, rumors

that the garrison's officers, some of whom had been in contact

with Phoumi, might be cashiered created a panic. The garrison

abandoned the town to the Pathet Lao, who were accompanied

by their North Vietnamese advisers from Group 959. The withdrawing column surrendered its arms to the Pathet Lao near Muang Peun on October 2. The Pathet Lao now claimed to be supporting Souvanna

Phouma. The coup and Phoumi's resistance with foreign assis- tance, which the United States and Thailand had difficulty

camouflaging, gave the still-secret LPP an unprecedented

opportunity to burrow more deeply behind the nationalist

mantle, and it lost no time in seizing the occasion. Many Laotians came to see the Pathet Lao as acting to defend the country against United States- and Thai-backed aggression. Even in

Vientiane, there was growing resentment of the Thai blockade,

which caused a shortage of consumer goods and rising prices.

Foreseeing an opening for the Pathet Lao to negotiate with the

new government, Radio Hanoi and Radio Beijing broadcast

support for Souvanna Phouma.

Although Souvanna Phouma's government was accepted as the legal government of Laos by Britain, France, and the

United States, this did not prevent the United States from

broadening its support to Phoumi's forces on the grounds that

they were fighting the Pathet Lao. In fact, there is no record of

their taking any offensive action against the Pathet Lao.

Phoumi had ordered the pullback from Xam Nua. Winthrop

G. Brown, the new United States ambassador, reported

instances where Phoumi refused help to engage the Pathet Lao

because it was offered by Vientiane. The only offensive actions

taken by Royal Lao Army troops against the Pathet Lao

between August and December 1960 were those taken by

troops loyal to Souvanna Phouma in Phongsali and elsewhere.

The "compromise" worked out by the embassy with Sou- vanna Phouma, in which the prime minister would not object

to direct United States military aid to Phoumi as long as this

aid was not used against his government, was a sham. Whenever the embassy tried to persuade Phoumi to give up his plan

48
Historical Setting

and return to Vientiane, Phoumi pleaded fear for his safety

and escalated his demands. In Louangphrabang, King Savang

Vatthana temporized, hoping to bring the military leaders

together at least in a united stand against the communists and

putting off a political solution until later. Failing to achieve his

aim, he retreated, saying he was disgusted with all concerned.

Brown felt he was waiting for Phoumi's capture of Viendane to get him off the hook and avoid the necessity of his taking any

categoric actron. Brown cabled Washington on October 5 that, in the continued absence of an agreement between Phoumi and Souvanna

Phouma, United States support of Phoumi would lead to "fur- ther disintegration" of the anticommunist forces and would

involve the United States in actions that risked internationalizing the conflict in Laos.

At a meeting on October 11 with a visiting United States delegation made up of Parsons, Assistant Secretary of Defense

John N. Irwin II, and Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, chief of

staff to the commander in chief, Pacific, Souvanna Phouma

gave an indictment of the provocative errors committed by his successors after formation of the first coalition. He warned that

the only course for Laos was to implement the 1957 agreements before the Pathet Lao—with whom he was in touch and

intended to resume negotiations—presented even more far- reaching demands. The first Soviet ambassador to Laos, Aleksandr N. Abramov, arrived as Parsons was leaving.

After conferring with the king, the Parsons-Irwin-Riley team

proceeded to Bangkok. On October 17, Irwin and Riley met

with Phoumi in Ubol. Although the Department of State at that

point was under the impression that United States policy

required that Phoumi dissolve the Revolutionary Committee,

both as a gesture of good faith toward Souvanna Phouma in

preserving the unity of anticommunist forces in Laos and,

more practically, in order to avoid the growing impression

abroad that the United States was illegally aiding a rebel movement, no mention of this point was made either in Parsons's

instructions to his two colleagues or at the October 17 meeting.

Following the formal conversation, Riley took Phoumi aside

and told him that the United States had completely lost confidence in Souvanna Phouma and was backing Phoumi to go

back and clean up the situation. Irwin similarly told Phoumi

that although the United States was only supporting him in

49
Laos: A Country Study

building up his defenses for the moment, in the long run the

United States was supporting him all the way. The message was

not lost on Phoumi. The effect of these unauthorized remarks

was to undercut both Souvanna Phouma's efforts to negotiate a compromise solution with Phoumi and Brown's bona fides with

Souvanna Phouma, already strained by the continuing United

States aid flowing into Savannakhet in the absence of any

matching military action against the Pathet Lao. Phoumi's

intransigence in turn led the Department of State to make

ever-increasing demands on Souvanna Phouma in the interest

of "compromise," beginning with the charge that the prime

minister was not exercising sufficient control over Kong Le, the

demand that he take appropriate precautions to prevent Kong

Le from launching an attack on Savannakhet, and so forth.

Souvanna Phouma began negotiations with the Pathet Lao

on October 18. However, his position was much weaker than in

1957 when he faced the same set of Pathet Lao demands.

Although nothing substantive would come from these negotiations, they provided fuel for Phoumi's anticommunist propaganda and heightened nervousness in Washington and

Bangkok.

Next, Phoumi forced the commander of the Louangphrabang garrison to declare for the Revolutionary Committee.

This was an important move, for it placed the king within

Phoumi's territory. In Bangkok, Sarit's first reaction on hearing

the news was to ask the United States ambassador, U. Alexis

Johnson, whether now would be a good time for the Revolutionary Committee to "establish itself as a government." General Ouan Ratikoun quickly defected to Savannakhet. Phoumi

captured another general, Amkha Soukhavong, at Xiangkhoang and gained the support of General Sing Ratanassamay.

Phoumi's troops had been paid without Brown's having been

consulted. Ambassador Johnson, without consulting Brown,

assured Sarit that the United States would pay Phoumi's troops, an action that Brown protested.

When Phoumi finally launched his offensive on the Nam

Kading on November 21, Souvanna Phouma vainly attempted

to contact him. With badly needed supplies to Vientiane, especially fuel, still cut off by the Thai blockade, Souvanna

Phouma's forced acceptance of a Soviet offer of aid lent

Phoumi's imminent attack "to drive out the communists" a semblance of legitimacy. On December 11, Phoumi led the

50
Historical Setting

forty National Assembly deputies who had gathered in Savannahket over the preceding weeks to vote no confidence in Sou- vanna Phouma's government. The king accepted the vote as legal the next day when he signed Royal Ordinance No. 282,

dismissing Souvanna Phouma's government and giving powers

provisionally to the Revolutionary Committee. Royal Ordi- nance No. 283, approving a provisional government formed by

Prince Boun Oum, who acted as front man for Phoumi—the

king had scruples about naming a general to be prime minister—was signed on December 14. The Department of State

notified its acceptance of the new regime and said it was acting

to meet its requests for assistance "to restore peace to the country." At this time, neither the deputies nor the court were free

agents—and Souvanna Phouma had not resigned.

The Battle of Vientiane

The capital braced for Phoumi's attack. A last-minute and

temporary switch of sides by Colonel Kouprasith Abhay, com- mander of the Vientiane military region headquartered at Camp Chinaimo on the eastern outskirts, was quickly neutralized by Kong Le, but tension heightened. The Pathet Lao delegation hurriedly left town. More of Souvanna Phouma's

ministers disappeared and reappeared. The situation was becoming ungovernable. Souvanna Phouma viewed battle as inevitable, and, accompanied by his ministers Boun Om (Boun

Oum's nephew), Tiao Sisoumang Sisaleumsak, and Inpeng

Suriyadhay, flew to Phnom Penh on December 9, having delegated his powers to the military. The following morning, Quinim Pholsena, the minister of information whom Souvanna

Phouma had left behind, flew to Hanoi accompanied by

Phoumi Vongvichit, the chief Pathet Lao negotiator, and Lieutenant Deuane Sunnalath, Kong Le's deputy, on a mission to seek Soviet and North Vietnamese military aid, which began

arriving the following day on Soviet aircraft. Phoumi began his attack on December 13. From his com- mand post near the airport, Kong Le had positioned his men at key points on the outskirts, intending merely to fight a delaying

action to allow the safe evacuation to the north of his men and

their equipment. The regional command post of the Pathet

Lao, situated at Na Khang, sixty kilometers north of the capital,

disposed of three guerrilla groups but did not take part in the

battle of Vientiane. A massive display of firepower by Phoumi's

troops resulted in the deaths of 400 to 500 civilians in the town,

51
Laos: A Country Study

mostly Vietnamese residents, and the wounding of another

1,000 to 1,500 civilians. Kong Le's troops only lost seventeen.

Phoumi's armor rolled into town on December 16. Kong Le retreated slowly northward toward Louangphrabang, while Soviet aircraft parachuted in badly needed supplies—rice, salt, sugar, blankets, light arms, ammunition, and

radios. With new recruits, his ranks had swelled from 800 to 1,200 men. On December 23, at Phon Hong, about sixty kilometers north of the capital, Kong Le was visited by Kaysone,

who had come to settle the details of distribution of Soviet aid

and coordination of Neutralist and Pathet Lao troops in future

operations. OnJanuary 1, Kong Le's troops took control of the

Plain ofJars and Khang Khay after skirmishing with some of

the 9,000 Phoumist troops and an equal number of Hmong

guerrillas in the vicinity and recovered large quantities of supplies. The following day, the Neutralists occupied Xiangkhoang, and United States advisers and Phoumist troops were

evacuated from the Muang Phonsavan airfield.

Quinim and Tiao Sisaleumsak established themselves at Khang Khay and urged Souvanna Phouma, who was in Cambodia, to join them. Souvanna Phouma said that he was still legally prime minister but would resign at once if Phoumi's government were validated in accordance with the constitution.

Souvanna Phouma argued that the National Assembly's vote of

no confidence on December 11 was not valid because it had

taken place in neither the royal capital nor the administrative

capital. He regarded the king's dealings with the Revolutionary

Committee as beyond the king's authority. When the National

Assembly met in Vientiane and voted confidence in the Boun

Oum government on January 4, Souvanna Phouma ignored

the action.

The Widening War

The Soviet airlift, which continued despite United States

protests to Moscow, transformed the Plain ofJars into a vast armed camp, fully resupplying Kong Le. For the first time, the

Pathet Lao were equipped with heavy weapons allowing them

to play a major role in their military alliance with Kong Le's troops in support of Souvanna Phouma's government. There

was, moreover, another and more important factor: the commitment of significant numbers of North Vietnamese troops to the fighting, exactly what Souvanna Phouma and Brown had

52
The Anousavari, in

Vientiane, is built of cement and has bas-relief on the

sides and temple-like

ornamentation along the top and cornices; a stairway

leads to the top of the monument, which provides

panoramic views of the city. Courtesy Gina Merris

feared. Kong Le requested four battalions of North Vietnamese

troops on January 7. Two of these linked up with his forces on

Route 7 and down Route 13. The third was engaged in military

action at Tha Thorn, a key defense point south of the Plain of

Jars. The fourth took up a position north of the plain.

In Xiangkhoang, the Hmong once again blew up the bridges

on Route 7 in a desperate effort to interfere with North Vietnamese truck convoys rolling westward. The Royal Lao Army

had been quietly supplying arms to the Hmong since at least

March 1957 to enable them to resist the Pathet Lao, but the

North Vietnamese influx created a sudden need for arms far in excess of what the Laotians could supply, even with the help of

Thailand. The Hmong, under their military leader Vang Pao,

had taken up positions in the mountains surrounding the Plain

ofJars and asked to talk to United States officials. Vang Pao

requested quick delivery of arms, but United States officials were concerned that the Hmong would not fight, and the arms

might fall into communist hands. Vang Pao said all 7,000 volunteers would fight, but they needed the arms in three days or

they would have to fall back to less exposed positions. United

States airdrops of arms from stocks in Okinawa began three

53
Laos: A Country Study

days later, signaling the beginning of a heroic Hmong resis- tance. International Pressure and the Advent of the Second

Coalition

Souvanna Phouma reaffirmed his position that his was the

legal government of Laos. In an interview, he spoke bitterly

about his nemesis, Parsons, and said that "the Savannakhet

group" was committed to the policy of military confrontation

that had failed in the past. He believed Laos should conserve

its ancient traditions and monarchy and urged a political settle- ment along the lines negotiated in 1957.

Phoumi's failure to advance on the Plain ofJars made a deep

impression on the new administration of United States presidentJohn F. Kennedy. If Phoumi had his difficulties with Kong

Le's outnumbered battalion, he was no match for the North

Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao counteroffensive that opened in January drove Phoumi's poorly motivated

troops and their United States military advisers back—a retreat that irrevocably changed the balance of forces in Laos.

The United States embassy in Vientiane had accurate intelli- gence on the numbers and movements of North Vietnamese

military units in Laos, as opposed to the alarming reports emanating from Phoumi's headquarters. Central Laos and the

entire length of the road from the Sala Phou Khoun junction

south to Vangviang was in North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao hands

by mid-March.

Contact between emissaries of the two sides was finally made

by officers under a truce flag at the village of Ban Hin Heup on

the Vientiane-Louangphrabang road. Tripartite truce talks

opened in the nearby village of Ban Namone, with the ICC,

reconvened by the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference,

Britain, and the Soviet Union, present. The three negotiators were Nouhak, Pheng Phongsavan, and General Sing Ratanassamay. A cease-fire declared on May 3 did not prevent the Pathet

Lao from capturing Xepon, an important crossroads on the Ho

Chi Minh Trail, or put an end to the fighting in the Hmong

country. As part of the plan to find a settlement, an enlarged

Geneva Conference convened on May 16.

54
Historical Setting

Expansion of Pathet Lao Influence

There were thus two rival royal governments in Laos from

the beginning of 1961, the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government at Vientiane and the Souvanna Phouma government

at Khang Khay. The Pathet Lao, protected by the presence of

thousands of North Vietnamese troops, constituted a third fac- tion in what became a rightist-Neutralist-leftist division.

The idea of neutralism had been expressed by Kong Le in

his earliest speeches in Vientiane, which described the goals of

his coup d'etat as stopping the fighting among the Laotians

and enacting a policy of friendship with all foreign countries,

especially Laos's neighbors. At Khang Khay, Soviet diplomats

mingled with officials of missions from Beijing and Hanoi, with

which relations had been established on May 5. Kong Le's

troops readily adopted the unofficial name Neutralist Armed

Forces. Souvanna Phouma seized the opportunity of having a

sizeable number of adherents on hand at Khang Khay, including many Lao students returned from abroad, to form the Neutralist Party (Lao Pen Kang—known as the Neutralists). He was

confident the party would outpoll the Pathet Lao's LPF in a

free election.

Although publicly deferring to Souvanna Phouma on matters of government policy, the Pathet Lao secretly extended

their influence at the grassroots level, using their proven methods of propaganda and organization. In villages under their

control, the Pathet Lao installed their own personnel alongside

the existing administration—for example, a khana muang (liberated district) alongside a chao muang (district chief), a khana

seng (liberated subdistrict) alongside a pho tasseng (subdistrict

chief), and a khana ban (liberated village) alongside a pho ban

or nai ban (village chief). Access to the Pathet Lao-administered areas was forbidden to outsiders, even after the formation of the coalition government.

A hierarchy of politico-military participation and responsibility tied the villagers to a chain of command. All resources in

villages under Pathet Lao control were mobilized into both a horizontal and a vertical structure that included organizations

of women, youth, and monks. Villagers were easily susceptible

to Pathet Lao control, making a Pathet Lao village a world unto

itself. Children acted as couriers and lookouts; young people

joined the village self-defense units, the lowest level of guerrilla

organization; adults acted as porters for the regular guerrilla

55
Laos: A Country Study

units; and women made clothing, prepared food, and looked

after the sick and wounded.

Protracted Diplomacy

At the reconvened Geneva Conference, the Neutralists were

represented by Quinim, the rightists by Phoui Sananikone, and

the Pathet Lao by Phoumi Vongvichit. The separate delegations served until they agreed on forming a unified government to sign the final agreement. All Laos's neighbors were

represented, as were the three ICC member countries and

their cochairmen, and the United States and France.

The summit meeting between John F. Kennedy and Nikita

Khrushchev in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961, coincided with the

crisis over the North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao cease-fire violations at the besieged Hmong outpost of Padong. The Hmong

abandoned Padong in early June and established a new base at Long Chieng. Kennedy protested North Vietnam's involvement

to Khrushchev and pointed out that the United States was supporting Laos's neutrality. Both leaders agreed that the conflict

in Laos should not bring their two countries into confrontation. The idea of neutralizing Laos had been suggested to Kennedy as early as January.

For the next year, an enormous effort of persuasion involving all the great powers went into getting the Laotian parties to agree to form a coalition government. The effort included

meetings among princes Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum, and

Souphanouvong in Zurich and Vientiane and protracted diplomatic consultations in Vientiane, Xiangkhoang, Rangoon, Moscow, Paris, and Geneva.

Phoumi finally had to be disabused of the notion that he

could count on unqualified United States and Thai support.

Sarit favored supporting the negotiation policy. Phoumi

favored peace but felt that Souvanna Phouma was the wrong

choice to lead a new government. W. Averell Harriman, the

intermediary, and a United States delegation held a tense and

acrimonious meeting with Phoumi and his cabinet at the general's office in Vientiane. Phoumi repeated his opposition to Souvanna Phouma, and Harriman warned him he was leading

his country to disaster. The meeting ended inconclusively.

Phoumi further demonstrated his intransigence by building up

his forces at Nam Tha, a town in northwestern Laos without

strategic importance, thereby inviting attack. When the North

56
Historical Setting

Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacked, camouflaging their violation of the cease-fire with the usual propaganda about mutinies

in the opposing ranks, the defenders fled toward the Mekong,

leaving most of their weapons behind. Phoumi may have

hoped the debacle would precipitate Thai or United States

armed intervention, but it did not. In the end, he agreed to the

coalition.

Souvanna Phouma's new government took office on June

23, 1962, the second coalition in Laos's modern history. In

accordance with the principle of tripartism, seven cabinet seats were allocated to the Neutralists, four seats each to the rightists

and Pathet Lao, and four to nonparty people. The rapprochement between Souvanna Phouma and Kennedy was manifested

by the former's visit to Washington in July at the conclusion of

the Geneva Conference. Unlike in 1954, representatives of

each of the fourteen participating nations signed the final document, the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Protocol. Renewed Strains

The strains imposed on the Neutralists by their alliance of

convenience with the Pathet Lao were now manifested. In addition, the presence of the North Vietnamese army that this alli- ance implied did nothing to support neutralism. As if to confirm their doubts, the Neutralists were subjected to communist propaganda. Deuane Sunnalath, Kong Le's subordinate,

allowed himself to be subverted by this political influence and

started publishing his own newspaper, Khao Pathan Van (Daily

News), full of anti-United States propaganda. Most of Kong

Le's followers remained fiercely loyal, however, and the dissi- dents, who called themselves Patriotic Neutralists, remained a

minority.

On April 1, 1963, less than a year after the Geneva agreement, Foreign Minister Quinim was assassinated in Vientiane.

Protesting the lack of security, Pathet Lao members of the coalition immediately left town. Following a series of incidents in

which one of Kong Le's closest aides was assassinated and a United States plane on a supply flight to Kong Le authorized

by Souvanna Phouma was shot down by Deuane's troops, fighting broke out in the Neutralist camp. Kong Le pulled his men

back from Khang Khay and set up a new command post at Muang Souy on the western edge of the Plain ofJars. Kong Le

57
Laos: A Country Study

was running short of supplies, however, because the Soviet airlift had ended, and the North Vietnamese were in a position to block supplies by road.

An estimated 10,000 North Vietnamese were still present in

Laos, despite the stipulation their government had signed at Geneva that withdrawal of all foreign troops be completed by

October 7. In preparation for a massive escalation of the conflict in South Vietnam, North Vietnam had expanded the Ho

Chi Minh Trail through eastern Laos and garrisoned it with

support troops. North Vietnamese troops also were present in

northern Laos, where they were engaged almost continuously

in pressuring the Hmong guerrillas. All United States military

advisers had been withdrawn by the deadline, but clandestine

operations continued, and supply and reconnaissance flights

still were conducted over such heavily contested areas as the

Plain ofJars. Antiaircraft fire took its toll on such flights, and as a result, the planes began attacking targets on the ground in

Laos beginning in 1964.

The "Secret War"

United States support of Souvanna Phouma's government in

the face of continuing North Vietnamese aggression did not

constitute, technically speaking, a violation of the terms of the

1962 Geneva Protocol, as Radio Hanoi and Radio Pathet Lao

charged. It did not involve Laos in a military alliance, and

there were no United States military bases or ground troops in

Laos. Supply flights to RLG outposts were flown by civilian

companies under charter to Souvanna Phouma's government.

United States military pilots in civilian clothes, their names

deleted from Department of Defense rosters, flew forward air

control missions over Laos. United States pilots killed or captured in Laos often were officially described as lost "in Southeast Asia." CIA advisers assisted the guerrilla units of General

Vang Pao's Hmong army, which, along with irregular forces in

the south, was supplied with rice, arms, and pay by CIA operatives based at Udon Thani in Thailand. The total number of

CIA personnel involved in this effort never exceeded 225 and

included some fifty case officers.

On the periphery of the plenary sessions at Geneva, Harriman and his deputy, William H. Sullivan, had arrived at an

informal understanding with Soviet deputy foreign minister

Georgi M. Pushkin to the effect that as long as the United

58
Historical Setting

States did not technically violate the Geneva Protocol the

Soviet Union would not feel compelled, out of consideration of

its ally in Hanoi, to respond to United States activities in Laos.

The official curtain of secrecy associated with this arrangement

gave rise later to statements in Congress that the United States was engaged in a "secret war" in Laos, a perspective that

absolved the Ho Chi Minh government of responsibility for its support of the communist-dominated resistance movement in

Laos since 1945.

Souvanna Phouma was having problems of his own because

of the peculiar nature of the Cold War in Laos. In April 1964,

he visited Hanoi and Beijing. Premier Zhou Enlai reiterated

China's support for the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements and

advised Souvanna Phouma to dissociate the Laos question from

the Vietnam question, a difficult task. Hanoi seemed to have

succeeded in its strategy of making "one battlefield" out of

Indochina—Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam—and the Ho Chi

Minh Trail now extended through Laos and Cambodia.

After a new tripartite meeting on the embattled Plain ofJars,

Souvanna Phouma returned to Vientiane without any result

and announced his intention to resign. Two rightist generals

took advantage of the situation, staged a coup attempt, and

arrested Souvanna Phouma. Only concerted action by Western

ambassadors in the capital secured his release. Souvanna

Phouma pledged to merge the rightist and Neutralist factions.

There was further infighting among the generals. In February 1965, General Phoumi, whose business dealings had

earned him many enemies on the noncommunist side, left for

Thailand.

With the formal merger of their faction with the rightists,

Neutralist leaders increasingly felt their lives to be in danger.

Kong Le eventually took refuge in the Indonesian embassy in

Vientiane, leaving Laos soon after for the safety of Paris. He was

replaced as commander of Neutralist troops by General Sengsouvanh Souvannarath.

From 1965 to 1973, the civil war seesawed back and forth in

northern Laos, characterized by short but often very intense

engagements. Because of the large areas contested, even North

Vietnamese regular divisions in Laos, such as the 316th, were

used in small-unit engagements during the dry season to deny

control of territory and population to the other side. Population control was particularly important, because that was where

59
Laos: A Country Study

recruitment for military training and transport occurred. The

Hmong, in particular, suffered. Aside from the casualties,

entire villages periodically had to escape the fighting, disrupting crop growing and livestock tending.

An exception to the rule of small-scale engagements was the

major North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao offensive against Vang Pao

that began in mid-December 1971 and lasted until the end of

April 1972. This battle involved more than twenty North Vietnamese battalions and some 10,000 Hmong irregulars and

Royal Lao Army defenders. After blasting the last defensive

positions on the Plain of Jars with newly introduced 130mm

guns with a thirty-kilometer range, the North Vietnamese

advanced on Longtiang. They captured a number of positions

on a ridge dominating the airfield before being driven off with

heavy loss of life on both sides. The Hmong halted an attack of

T-34 tanks against the airfield by skillfully placing land mines.

Since 1963 Souvanna Phouma had kept vacant the cabinet

seats allotted to the LPF, as he had done in the case of

Phoumi's seat as interior minister in his August 30, 1960, government. When the National Assembly rejected his budget in

debate in September 1966, he obtained a vote in the King's

Council to dissolve the assembly and hold elections for a new

assembly the following year. Elections were held again on January 2, 1972; forty-one of the fifty-nine deputies elected were

new. The LPF boycotted the elections. The prime minister kept

up contact with Souphanouvong in his cave headquarters in

Houaphan, occasionally using the ICC and Soviet and North

Vietnamese ambassadors as messengers.

Powerless to stop the war and acquiescing in the diplomatic

fiction that the 1962 Geneva Agreement was still in effect, Sou- vanna Phouma endured the revilement of Radio Pathet Lao,

which called him a traitor, a capitulationist, and a tool of

United States aggressors. The war drained Laos's manpower

resources and pushed Souvanna Phouma into agreeing to introduce Thai artillery units on the royalist side and also

helped to identify him with the rightist faction. As a result of

the war, a peak number of 378,800 internally displaced persons were being cared for by the RLG in October 1973. Souvanna

Phouma never gave up hope of resuming negotiations when

conditions became more favorable.

60
The Unknown Soldiers Memorial, in Vientiane, was built after the revolution to commemorate the Pathet Lao who died during

the Second Indochina War.

Courtesy Gina Merris

The Third Coalition and the Lao People s Democratic

Republic

Negotiations in Paris in the autumn of 1972 between the

United States and North Vietnam created a favorable environment for reaching a cease-fire agreement in Laos. Negotiations

opened in Vientiane on October 17, 1972, and went on inconclusively between Pheng Phongsavan, representing Souvanna

Phouma, and Phoumi Vongvichit, representing the Pathet Lao.

Souvanna Phouma was hopeful that the United States would

keep up the pressure. But the situation had changed drastically

during the previous decade. There were now only two sides in

the negotiations, and the Pathet Lao insisted that their opponents be referred to as "the Viangchan government side."

61
Laos: A Country Study

Moreover, the United States was on its way out of Indochina

whether by its Vietnamization policy or by negotiations with

Hanoi. Nonetheless, there was no guarantee that Hanoi would

respect the provisions of negotiated agreements on Laos, and

the ability of the United States to enforce compliance was not

as great as Souvanna Phouma imagined. The pressure grew to conclude the negotiations rapidly.

The Vientiane Agreement

The two sides signed the peace agreement in Vientiane on

February 21, 1973. A new coalition government was to be

formed. Vientiane and Louangphrabang were to be neutralized by the arrival of Pathet Lao security contingents. A ceasefire was to take effect from noon on the following day. Unlike

in 1962, however, there were no solemn guarantees by fourteen

signatories of Laos's neutrality. The agreement was strictly

between Laotians, with the ICC more powerless than ever to

verify its execution.

By the time of the cease-fire, United States aircraft had

dropped almost 2.1 million tons of bombs on Laos, approximately the total tonnage dropped by United States air forces

during all of World War II in both the European and Pacific

theaters. Most bombs were dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail,

which had grown into a major transportation route for the

North Vietnamese. The cessation of United States bombing

allowed the North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao supply convoys to move with impunity, enabling them to initiate armed actions

that they camouflaged with accusations of cease-fire violations

by RLG forces. The United States, in protest against some of

the most flagrant cease-fire violations, sent its planes back into

action on limited missions. This enabled the Pathet Lao to claim that the United States had violated the Vientiane Agreement.

An uneasy lull settled on the Hmong country north of Vientiane. Air power had allowed the Hmong to maintain a tenuous

balance of force with their adversaries. However, the air strip at Longtiang was empty, and the Royal Lao Air Force T-28s, on

which General Vang Pao had often relied, had been pulled

back to Vientiane on orders from Souvanna Phouma. The

United States air armada that had operated from bases in Thailand was withdrawn. With the loss of air cover, no area in

Hmong territory was safe from artillery bombardment.

62
Historical Setting

Although their CIA advisers remained temporarily at Longtiang, the Hmong were beginning to feel deserted. With the war winding down in Vietnam and the military government in

Thailand overthrown in a student revolt in October 1973,

United States interest in Laos waned.

The Origins of the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Question

The unconditional return of prisoners of war (POWs) from

all the countries of Indochina was, in the words of Henry A.

Kissinger, the chief United States negotiator at Paris, "one of

the premises on which the United States based its signature of

the Vietnam agreement." Kissinger said he had received "cate- gorical assurances" from the North Vietnamese delegation in

Paris that United States POWs captured in Laos would be

released in the same time frame as those from North Vietnam

and South Vietnam, that is, by March 28, 1973.

Under the provisions of Chapter II, Article 5, of the Vientiane Agreement, the two sides were obligated to repatriate all persons held captive regardless of nationality within sixty days

of the formation of the coalition government. When the ceasefire came, it was generally assumed that the Pathet Lao held a

large number of United States citizens they or the North Viet- namese had captured in Laos, and the Department of Defense

listed some 555 United States personnel as unaccounted for

either as POWs, missing in action (MIA), or killed in action/

body not recovered. The Pathet Lao had released a number of

United States prisoners after the formation of the 1962 coalition. There was considerable uncertainty surrounding the

POW/MIA question, however, because the Pathet Lao had neither provided lists of those who had fallen into their hands nor adhered to international conventions on treatment of POWs,

in keeping with their contention that the United States was

guilty of an aggressive, undeclared war against Laos. Conditions of detention in jungle prison camps were harsh in the

extreme, as attested to by the few who managed to escape. Pris- oners had no medicine, and they had to supplement their

ration of rice, both meager and dirty, with beetles and rats. Soth Petrasy, permanent representative of the Pathet Lao

delegation in Vientiane, told Phone Chantaraj, editor of the

Vientiane newspaper Xat Lao (The Lao Nation), five days prior

to the signing of the Vientiane Agreement that the Pathet Lao

leadership had a detailed accounting of United States prison63
Laos: A Country Study

ers and the locations where they were being held and that they

would be released after the cease-fire. He added: "If they were

captured in Laos, they will be returned in Laos." On the day

the Vientiane Agreement was signed, the United States charge

d'affaires obtained confirmation from Soth of his previous

statements and requested further details. Although Soth proposed to send a message to Xam Nua asking for the number

and names of United States citizens held captive, this information was not forthcoming.

The United States embassy began pressing for the release by

March 28 of prisoners captured in Laos. The question was whether the Pathet Lao would consider themselves bound by

the agreement with its implication that they followed the

orders of the North Vietnamese. Resolution of the matter was

further complicated by the fact that procedures for prisoner

exchanges stipulated in the Vientiane Agreement had still to be negotiated by the two sides in Laos.

On March 26, Soth informed the United States that the

Pathet Lao would release eight^prisoners in Hanoi on March

28. These prisoners, whose names had previously been given to United States officials by the North Vietnamese in Paris, had

been held in North Vietnam for some time. On March 27, the

Pathet Lao delivered a note verbale to the United States embassy

that stated this fulfilled their POW release obligations and

demanded that the United States pressure the Vientiane government to negotiate "seriously" for implementing the political

provisions of the agreement. The Pathet Lao rejected subsequent United States requests to dissociate the question of

United States POWs from other matters covered by the Vientiane Agreement. The North Vietnamese, for their part, did

not respond to Kissinger's requests for clarification of the dis- crepancy between the number of POWs and MIAs carried by

the Department of Defense and the small number of POWs

released.

The protocol giving effect to the Vientiane Agreement was

signed on September 14, 1973. Paragraph 18 made the twoparty Joint Central Commission to Implement the Agreement

responsible for implementing provisions for exchanges of pris- oners and information. The names of personnel who had died

in captivity were to be exchanged within fifteen to thirty days,

and all prisoners were to be released within sixty days after for- mation of the coalition government. However, the only United

64
Historical Setting

States citizen released by the Pathet Lao in Laos in accordance

with these provisions was a civilian pilot captured after the

cease-fire. For the next twenty years, representatives of the new

regime would sit at a table and calmly inform visiting United

States officials and families of POW/MIAs that they knew nothing about the fate of United States POWs and MIAs in Laos

(see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4).

Formation of the Third Coalition

The Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU),

Laos's third experiment with coalition government, was finally

constituted on April 5, 1974, following one last desperate coup

attempt by rightist officers in exile against Souvanna Phouma.

Cabinet posts were assigned, with a vice premier and five ministers from each side plus two chosen by mutual consent. Under

each minister was a vice minister from the other side. The

makeup of the National Political Consultative Council, an

unelected pseudo-National Assembly, was similarly balanced.

Paragraph 14 of the September 14, 1973, protocol provided

for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos within sixty

days of the PGNU's formation, the same deadline as for pris- oner exchanges. Once again the United States met the deadline. Although it terminated the mission of Group 959 after the

cease-fire, North Vietnam did not withdraw its estimated

38,500 regular troops from Laos. Among other provisions that

occupied the Joint Central Commission to Implement the

Agreement was the demarcation of the cease-fire line and the

neutralization of the two capitals.

Because of the Pathet Lao ministers' opposition, the PGNU

barred the traditional opening of the National Assembly on

May 11, Constitution Day. The king voiced his displeasure over the PGNU's decision to circumvent the constitution and not convene the National Assembly, elected in 1972. The dissolution of the National Assembly and the holding of new elections, matters that had not been specifically included in the

Vientiane Agreement or its protocol, embroiled the PGNU in

endless argument. The king did not attend the session of the

National Political Consultative Council in Louangphrabang,

which, under the chairmanship of Souphanouvong, adopted a far-ranging eighteen-point political program. One of the points

in the National Political Consultative Council's program was a

65
Laos: A Country Study

demand that the United States pay reparations for war damages. The Communist Seizure of Power

On March 27, 1975, North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces

launched a strong attack against Vang Pao's Hmong defenders.

The attackers rapidly captured the Sala Phou Khoun road junction and then drove south along Route 13 as far as Muang Kasi.

Souvanna Phouma, wishing to avoid bloodshed, ordered Vang

Pao only to defend himself and refused to allow air strikes in

his support. The Pathet Lao singled out the Hmong as enemies

to be shown no quarter. Pathet Lao radio broadcasts spoke of

"wiping out" these special forces who had stood in their way for

fifteen years. Realizing that the Hmong were being abandoned and the

penalty they faced if left to the mercy of the Pathet Lao, Vang

Pao requested evacuation for his soldiers and their families to

safe haven in Thailand. The CIA station at Udon Thani offered

to evacuate families of key officers. Vang Pao requested an airlift for 5,000. Facing an ultimatum, Vang Pao and twelve

Hmong leaders signed a treaty on May 10 reminding the

United States of the pledges made to them and agreeing to leave Laos and never return. In the next days, a motley collection of planes piloted by United States volunteers, Hmong, and

Lao flew out a few hundred Hmong. Vang Pao himself left on

May 14, eluding the T-28s at Vientiane.

Meanwhile, a campaign of intimidation against rightist

members of the PGNU and military officers gathered momentum in Vientiane. Operating under the umbrella of a coalition

of twenty-one "organizations standing for peace and national

concord," a standard communist tactic, the demonstrators used

inflation and other popular grievances to mobilize support for

the eighteen-point program of the National Political Consultative Council. Souvanna Phouma tried at first to ban the demonstrations but later gave in and sided with their aims. The May

Day holiday provided the pretext for the largest demonstration

to date, followed a week later by a demonstration against the

rightist army and police. Demonstrators occupied the compound of the United States aid mission, forcing termination of

the aid program. Four rightist ministers, including the defense

minister, Sisouk na Champasak, fled. Another minister, Boun

Om, was assassinated in the capital.

66
Historical Setting

Elsewhere, takeovers of government offices and orchestrated

demonstrations led to the entry of Pathet Lao troops into

Pakxe, Savannakhet, Thakhek, and other towns during May "to secure their defense." People's revolutionary committees sur- faced to seize administrative power from the remnants of the

RLG. Officials and military officers who chose not to flee were summoned to "seminars." On August 23, the Pathet Lao completed its seizure of local power with the takeover of the Vientiane city administration by a revolutionary committee. The

Pathet Lao announced that military units had requested Pathet

Lao "advisers," thereby facilitating the integration of the army.

Throughout this time, the elite communist leaders who were making the decisions remained out of sight. Kaysone Phomvihan, in a speech in Vieng Xay on October 12, declared that

"the revolution will speed up." Simultaneously, the National

Political Consultative Council established new screening procedures for candidates for election that effectively eliminated all those who had not supported the LPF. Suddenly, in the last week of November, the NPCC convened in Xam Nua. Also in

November, elections were held in the "new zone," the former

RLG zone. Eligible voters were required to vote for a list of candidates whose names were distributed the evening before. Candidates were local party administrators, whose identities had

been kept secret up to then. On November 28, demonstrators

demanded the dissolution of the PGNU and the National Political Consultative Council as inappropriate to the situation. The

next day, Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong flew to Louangphrabang and persuaded the king to abdicate.

Establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic

The National Congress of People's Representatives, recreat- ing the mise-en-scene of 1945, met in the auditorium of the

former United States community school on December 1. Sisana Sisan delivered the opening speech on behalf of the preliminary committee for convening the National Congress of

People's Representatives. So far only the LPF and other front

organizations and delegations from the various provinces were

listed as attending among the 264 delegates. The preliminary

committee thereupon dissolved itself. Prince Souphanouvong, named to the presidium of the

National Congress, said in his speech that the congress would

"study" the king's abdication, the dissolution of the PGNU and

67
Laos: A Country Study

the National Political Consultative Council, and the political

report on abolishing the monarchy and establishing a people's

democratic republic. This last item was read by Kaysone, who

was also on the congress presidium. For most of the world, it was the first look at the man who, for thirty years, had led the

revolution in Laos from behind the scenes in Vietnam and in

the caves of Houaphan. Kaysone presided at the December 2

session. He began by reading a motion to establish the Lao

People's Democratic Republic, which was passed by acclamation. Kaysone then nominated Souphanouvong to be president

of the country. Again, the vote was unanimous. Next, Nouhak

took the podium to say it was necessary to elect a Supreme People's Assembly. He proposed Souphanouvong as president of

the Supreme People's Assembly and then read a list of fortyfour names. This vote was also unanimous.

Officially, the party—which had been renamed the Phak

Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party—LPRP;

see Glossary) at its Second Party Congress in 1972—played no

role in the National Congress. But it began making its public

appearance immediately thereafter in indirect ways; for example, banners carrying revolutionary slogans and messages of

congratulations from North Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese

leaders began to appear. With power firmly in its grasp, the

LPRP no longer had any reason to hide its identity. For the first time, the party publicly identified the seven members of its Political Bureau (Politburo). From this point, the party alone

made decisions in the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Gone were the "democratic freedoms" that had been extolled

in the National Political Consultative Council's eighteen

points. The Neutralist Party and other noncommunist parties

disappeared, leaving a one-party regime. Those who objected

could leave. Some 350,000 availed themselves of this opportunity over the next few years, leaving behind their homes and

belongings, and, in many cases, even their loved ones. "Seminar Camps" and the Death of King Savang Vatthana

"Seminar camps," also called reeducation centers, were the

centerpiece of the new regime's policy toward the enemies it had defeated. The LPRP's Marxist-Leninist dogma allowed no

respite in the class struggle, and those identified as its former

enemies were the presumed saboteurs and subversives of the

socialist phase of the revolution that was just getting under way.

After its victory, the regime made people judged unfit to partic68
Historical Setting

ipate in the new society in their present frame of mind construct a series of camps, known only by their numbers. They

included Camp 01 at Sop Hao; Camp 03 near Na Kai, newly

given the Pali name Viangxai, meaning "Victorious Town";

Camp 05 near Muang Xamteu; and Camps 04 and 06 near Muang Et, all in Houaphan. A camp was also built at Muang

Khoua on the Nam Ou, and others were built in the center and

south. There are no official figures on the numbers of people

sent for reeducation, because the camp network was kept a secret from the outside world. The only information was

brought out by former inmates and their families. Various published estimates have put the number of inmates at 30,000, at 37,600, and at 50,000.

Even before the communist takeover, the first groups of

high-level officials, including provincial governors and district

chiefs, had been transported to the camps, arriving in full dress

uniform. They had received letters signed by Souvanna

Phouma ordering them to attend an important meeting in

Vientiane. After an overnight stay in Vientiane, the group was

flown to the Plain ofJars, where a festive atmosphere prevailed.

The officials, about seventy in all, were feted with food and a movie, and North Vietnamese advisers were present. They were

then flown to Houaphan, separated into small groups, and

organized into work parties.

In August and September 1977, a group of twenty-six "reac- tionary" high-ranking officials and military officers in Camp 05 were accused of plotting a coup and arrested. These persons were taken away to Camp 01. They included Pheng Phongsavan, the minister who had signed the Vientiane Agreement;

Touby Lyfoung, the Hmong leader; Soukhan Vilaysan, another

of Souvanna Phouma's ministers who had been with him in the

Lao Issara and had risen to become secretary general of the

Neutralists; and Generals Bounphone Maekthepharak and

Ouan Ratikoun. All died in Camp 01. Thus, those who played

roles in the modern history of Laos were relegated by the

regime to the status of nonpersons and their fate placed in the

hands of their prison guards. Others, like Tiao Sisoumang

Sisaleumsak, a minister in Souvanna Phouma's 1960 government, General Sengsouvanh Souvannarath, commander of the

Neutralist forces, Khamchan Pradith, an intellectual and diplomat, and even Sing Chanthakoummane, a lieutenant in the

Second Paratroop Battalion in 1960, were held in seminar

camps for fifteen years or more before being released. Sou69
Laos: A Country Study

vanna Phouma was allowed to live quietly in Vientiane until his

death in January 1984.

The new regime feared that ex-King Savang Vatthana, who

until March 1977 had lived quietly in the royal palace as a private citizen with the meaningless title of adviser to President

Souphanouvong, would become a symbol of popular resis- tance. As a result, he was suddenly spirited away by helicopter

to Houaphan along with Queen Khamboui and Crown Prince

Say Vongsavang. Imprisoned in Camp 01, the crown prince

died on May 2, 1978, and the king eleven days later of starvation. The queen died on December 12, 1981. According to an

eyewitness, all were buried in unmarked graves outside the

camp's perimeter. No official announcement was made. More

than a decade later, during a visit to France in December 1989,

Kaysone confirmed reports of the king's death in an innocuous

aside that attributed it to old age. The party did not dare abolish the Buddhist community of

monks and novices, the clergy (sangha), of which the king had

been the supreme patron. It did, however, attempt to reshape

the sangha into an instrument of control. In March 1979, the

Venerable Thammayano, the eighty-seven-year-old Sangha-raja

of Laos, the country's highest-ranking abbott, fled by floating

across the Mekong on a raft of inflated car tubes. His secretary,

who engineered the escape, reported that the Sangha-raja had

been confined to his monastery in Louangphrabang and was

forbidden to preach. Ordinary monks were not forbidden to preach, but their sermons were commonly tape recorded and

monitored for signs of dissidence. As a result of these pressures, the number of monks in Laos decreased sharply after

1975 (see Buddhism, ch. 2).

Postwar Relations with the United States

Perhaps more understandable than its brutality toward its own people was the party's hostility toward the formerly large

United States aid program, which had been directed at supporting the RLG. Even so, the public humiliations inflicted on

the departing aid mission personnel—forced to leave behind

everything they could not carry aboard a plane—were excessive by any standard. Aid projects such as the Operation Brotherhood hospital at Longtiang were abandoned overnight. In

spite of Souvanna Phouma's assurances to the United States

ambassador that the government would provide continuity in

70
Monk crossing Wat Xieng Thong yard, Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

medical services, foreign nurses and other technicians were

not replaced.

No record exists of any discussion by the United States

embassy—staffed at the charge d'affaires level after the departure in April 1975 of Ambassador Charles S. Whitehouse—of

United States "participation" in healing war wounds or of the

reconstruction aid mentioned in Article 10c of the Vientiane

Agreement. Even had the United States been predisposed to discuss these matters, the conditions of the takeover by the

LPRP would have precluded it. Ambassadorial relations

resumed in 1992.

Another issue was opium production, which, in Laos as in

the rest of the Golden Triangle of Laos-Burma-Thailand, had

grown as the demand for the opium derivative heroin grew.

Opium production and trade became a source of tension in

relations between the two governments. Laos resented official

71
Laos: A Country Study

United States pressure as an attempt to shift the blame for the

problem (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4; Narcotics and Counternarcotics Issues, ch. 5).

Developments in the Lao People's Democratic Republic

In spite of the regime's revolutionary rhetoric about self-reli- ance on the march to socialism, Western aid was simply

replaced over the 1970s and 1980s by aid from "fraternal countries" of the Soviet bloc. Living standards declined further.

Nongovernmental organizations, including some from the

United States, in cooperation with local officials, established a few small-scale aid projects that reached out to real needs in

the areas of health, education, and economic development.

Kaysone and his colleagues, following the well-known examples of Soviet and East European party leaders, led carefully

protected lives behind the walls of their guarded compounds

in the capital, secluded from public scrutiny and shielded from

any manifestation of hostility, their movements kept secret. The

minister of interior, Somseun Khamphithoun, whose ministry was responsible for the operation of the seminar camps, was

never seen publicly in Vientiane. Corruption, widespread in

the years of the United States civilian and military aid programs, resumed with the new opportunities presented by the

"economic opening" beginning in 1986.

The first Supreme People's Assembly, appointed by the

National Congress on December 2, 1975, rapidly faded into

obscurity, although its twice-yearly meetings were reported in

the controlled press. In 1988, perhaps because the regime

wished to give itself some semblance of popular underpinning,

it suddenly announced that elections would be held for a new

Supreme People's Assembly. Elections were held on June 26,

1988, for 2,410 seats on district-level people's councils and on

November 20, 1988, for 651 seats on province-level people's

councils. On March 26, 1989, elections were held for seventynine seats on the Supreme People's Assembly. Candidates in all elections were screened by the party. Sixty-five of the seventynine members of the assembly were party members (see Legislature, ch. 4). In the area of foreign relations, Laos joined the ranks of the

"socialist camp" on December 2, 1975. Gone was any pretense

of neutrality. In the new state of affairs where "peace" had at long last been achieved and no one paid attention to the pres72
Historical Setting

ence of "fraternal" foreign troops on Laotian soil, the delegations of the ICC in Laos returned to their respective countries,

leaving behind piles of unpaid bills. In accordance with the organic links between the Vietnamese and Laotian parties that have been acclaimed by the highest party leaders, Laos has been tied more closely to Vietnam

than to any other country. The term special relations (in Lao,

khan phoua phan yang phiset) to describe the linkage between

the two parties and governments had come into use as early as November 1973 when Le Duan, first secretary of the Vietnamese party, visited Viangxai (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4).

Thereafter, special relations was the term increasingly emphasized in joint statements. In July 1977, Laos and Vietnam

signed the twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. They also agreed to redefine their common border, which

was demarcated in 1986. In early 1989, the Vietnamese troops

that had been stationed in Laos continuously since 1961 were

reported to have been withdrawn.

Despite some incidents along their common border, Thailand took an accommodating stand toward the country. Opening the border to trade and eliminating the "sanctuary"

problem were affirmed as goals in a 1979 joint communique

between Kaysone and the Thai prime minister, Kriangsak

Chomanand, which was subsequently cited by Laotians as the

touchstone of their relations with Thailand (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). Following a series of shooting incidents in 1984

involving rival claims to three border villages, a major dispute

arose in December 1987 over territory claimed by Laos as part

of Boten District in Xaignabouri and by Thailand as part of

Chat Trakan District in Phitsanulok Province. The fighting that

ensued claimed more than 1,000 lives before a cease-fire was

declared on February 19, 1988. The origin of the dispute was

the ambiguity of the topographic nomenclature used in the

1907 Franco-Siamese border treaty over the area of the Nam

Heung, up which Fa Ngum's army had traveled in the fourteenth century. After 1975 the sanctuary problem also defied

solution for a decade, with the Hmong and communist rebels

occupying some of the old Lao Issara resistance bases in Thailand. However, a series of working-level meetings between the

two sides were arranged that served to defuse the conflict, and

relations improved markedly in the late 1980s.

73
Laos: A Country Study

Although official relations between Laos and China were

strained by the Si no-Vietnamese War of 1979, the two countries

maintained diplomatic relations, and local trade continued

across their common border. The ending of the brief war saw a

rapid and steady improvement in mutual ties and exchanges of

visits at all levels. Kaysone visited Beijing, and a border demarcation commission completed its work to mutual satisfaction.

Laos seemed at last to have achieved stable relations with its neighbors. Centuries-old conflicts that had repeatedly seen foreign invaders trampling Laotian soil with their elephants or

tanks, Laotians conscripted by this or that pretender to the

throne, pagodas built and then destroyed, and the countryside

laid waste, had receded. Peace brought the prospect of a better

life, if not yet participation in a multiparty democracy. It was as

if after so much suffering Laotians had turned inward, seeking

the fulfillment that had always come from their families, their

villages, their sangha, and their pride in the moments of glory

in their country's long history. * * * No complete history of Laos exists in English, but there are three very useful bibliographies. The most useful for the beginner, because of the annotations, is Helen Cordell's Laos. The

compiler's introductory essay also provides an informative

overview of the country and its people. A far more extensive

bibliography, but lacking annotation except for subject matter

headings, is William W. Sage andJudith A. N. Henchy's Laos: A

Bibliography. Finally, Martin Stuart-Fox and Mary Kooyman's

Historical Dictionary of Laos contains a much more narrow selection of writings on Laos.

For the modern period before 1975, Arthur J. Dommen's

Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization and Hugh Toye's

Laos: Buffer State or Battleground are still standard. Maha Sila

Viravong's Phongsavadan Lao (History of Laos), although

flawed and somewhat dated, is still useful. MacAlister Brown

and Joseph J. Zasloffs Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist

Movement in Laos, 1930-85 provides detailed information on

the civil war years. No history of the Lao People's Democratic

Republic in English has yet appeared, and in view of the secre- tiveness of the regime, writing about it is difficult. Readers

interested in following current events are advised to rely on the

translations provided by the Foreign Broadcast Information

Service's Daily Report: East Asia.

74
Historical Setting

Primary source materials are available in both the French

and United States archives. The former deal mainly with the

colonial period. The latter contain so far declassified diplomatic correspondence of the Department of State through

1960, with the exception of that dealing with the POW/MIA

issue for 1973-92 declassified at a Senate committee's request.

All Department of Defense documents relating to the POW/

MIA issue are available at the Library of Congress. Documentation of the CIA's role in Laos is still withheld by the CIA.

Foreign scholars have not had access to the archives of the

Indochinese Communist Party, the Vietnamese Communist

Party, or the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (with the exception of some work byJapanese scholars in Hanoi dealing with

the period of the 1940s and early 1950s; e.g., Moto Furuta and

Masaya Shiraishi's Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s). These

archives seem unlikely to be opened short of an upheaval similar to that which befell the parties of Eastern Europe and the

Soviet Union.

Much scholarly writing on Laos history appears in periodicals, such as Asian Survey, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,

Pacific Affairs, and Peninsule. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

75

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Detail of a glass mosaic depicting scenes ofvillage life covering the walls of the "Library, " a small building on the grounds of Wat Xieng Thong, Louangphrabang; an example of sixteenth-century Buddhist architecture.
LAOS IS A RURAL COUNTRYwhose relatively low population

density has allowed the continuation of a village society reliant

on subsistence agriculture. The lack of a national government

infrastructure and effective transportation networks has also

contributed to the relative independence and autonomy of

most villages. Residence in a village thus has been an important

aspect of social identity, particularly for lowland Lao ethnic

groups. For many upland ethnic groups, clan membership is a more important point of social identification. For all groups,

the village community has a kinship nexus, although structures

differ. Rice is the staple food for all Laotians, and most families

and villages are able to produce enough or nearly enough each

year for their own consumption.

Laos is ethnically diverse; the population includes more than

forty ethnic groups, which are classified within three general

families of Lao Sung (upland Lao), Lao Theung (midland

Lao), and Lao Loum (lowland Lao). The country is officially a multiethnic nation, with Lao as the official language, but rela- tionships among the different groups have sometimes been

characterized by misunderstandings and competition over nat- ural resources. The different ethnic groups have substantially

different residential patterns, agricultural practices, forms of

village governance, and religious beliefs.

Only the national capital of Vientiane and a few other provincial capitals can be considered urban. These small cities are market and administrative centers that attract trading and communications activity, but they have developed very little manufacturing or industrial capacity. Daily and seasonal life in all sectors of the society is affected by the monsoon. Rice production determines periods of heavy and slack work, which are mirrored in school vacations, religious festivals, and government activity.

Most lowland Lao and some midland groups practice Theravada Buddhism, but also believe in spirits of places or of

deceased persons. Upland and most midland ethnic groups are

animist, with religious practices oriented toward protective or guardian spirits commonly associated with places or with a family or clan. Shamans or other spirit practitioners are recognized

79
Figure 3. Laos in Its Southeast Asian Setting, 1994

and respected for their divinatory and healing powers among

most ethnic groups, whether Buddhist or not. Education and social services remain rudimentary at best

but are improving. In lowland villages, traditional education was provided to boys and young men through the Buddhist

temples. Although this practice continues in some areas, in

general it has been supplanted by a national education system,

which, unfortunately, is hampered by limited financial

80
The Society and Its Environment

resources and a lack of trained teachers. Western medical care

is seldom available outside provincial or a few district centers

and even then is very limited. Child and infant mortality is high, and life expectancy is the lowest in Southeast Asia; the

population, however, is increasing at a rapid rate. Since the end

of World War II, significant differences in education, health,

and demographic conditions have prevailed among the ethnic

groups and between rural and urban populations.

The Physical Environment

Laos, a landlocked nation that covers 236,800 square kilometers in the center of the Southeast Asian peninsula, is sur- rounded by Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam

(see fig. 3). Its location has often made it a buffer between

more powerful neighboring states, as well as a crossroads for

trade and communication (see Developments in the Nineteenth Century, ch. 1; Foreign Trade, ch. 3). Migration and

international conflict have contributed to the present ethnic

composition of the country and to the geographic distribution

of its ethnic groups.

Topography

Most of the western border of Laos is demarcated by the

Mekong River, which is an important artery for transportation

(see fig. 4). Khong Falls at the southern end of the country prevents access to the sea, but cargo boats travel along the entire

length of the Mekong in Laos during most of the year. Smaller

power boats and pirogues provide an important means of

transportation on many of the tributaries of the Mekong. The

Mekong has thus not been an obstacle but a facilitator for communication, and the similarities between Laos and northeast

Thai society—same people, same language—reflect the close

contact that has existed across the river for centuries. Also,

many Laotians living in the Mekong Valley have relatives and

friends in Thailand. Prior to the twentieth century, Laotian

kingdoms and principalities encompassed areas on both sides

of the Mekong, and Thai control in the late nineteenth cen- tury extended to the left bank. Although the Mekong was

established as a border by French colonial forces, travel from

one side to the other has been significantly limited only since

the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic

(LPDR, or Laos) in 1975.

81
Laos: A Country Study

The eastern border with Vietnam extends for 2,130 kilometers, mostly along the crest of the Annamite Chain, and serves

as a physical barrier between the Chinese-influenced culture of

Vietnam and the Indianized states of Laos and Thailand. These

mountains are sparsely populated by tribal minorities, who tra- ditionally have not acknowledged the border with Vietnam any

more than lowland Lao have been constrained by the 1,754-

kilometer Mekong River border with Thailand. Thus, ethnic

minority populations are found on both the Laotian and Vietnamese sides of the frontier. Because of their relative isolation,

contact between these groups and lowland Lao has been mostly

confined to trading.

Laos shares its short—only 541 kilometers—southern border

with Cambodia, and ancient Khmer ruins at Wat Pho and other

southern locations attest to the long history of contact between

the Lao and the Khmer. In the north, the country is bounded

by a mountainous 423-kilometer border with China and shares

the 235-kilometer-long Mekong River border with Burma.

The topography of Laos is largely mountainous, with elevations above 500 meters typically characterized by steep terrain, narrow river valleys, and low agricultural potential. This mountainous landscape extends across most of the north of the

country, except for the plain of Vientiane and the Plain ofJars

in Xiangkhoang Province. The southern "panhandle" of the

country contains large level areas in Savannakhet and Champasak provinces that are well suited for extensive paddy rice

cultivation and livestock raising (see Crops and Farming Systems, ch. 3). Much of Khammouan Province and the eastern

part of all the southern provinces are mountainous. Together,

the alluvial plains and terraces of the Mekong and its tributaries cover only about 20 percent of the land area. Only about 4 percent of the total land area is classified as arable. The forested land area has declined significantly since

the 1970s as a result of commercial logging and expanded swidden, or slash-and-burn, farming (see Forestry, ch. 3).

Climate

Laos has a tropical monsoon climate, with a pronounced

rainy season from May through October, a cool dry season from November through February, and a hot dry season in

March and April. Generally, monsoons occur at the same time

across the country, although that time may vary significantly

82
t
8
The Society and Its Environment

from one year to the next. Rainfall also varies regionally, with

the highest amounts—3,700 millimeters annually—recorded

on the Bolovens Plateau in Champasak Province. City rainfall

stations have recorded that Savannakhet averages 1,440 milli- meters of rain annually; Vientiane receives about 1,700 millimeters, and Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang) receives about

1,360 millimeters. Rainfall is not always adequate for rice culti- vation, however, and the relatively high average precipitation

conceals years where rainfall may be only half or less of the

norm, causing significant declines in rice yields. Such droughts

often are regional, leaving production in other parts of the

country unaffected. Temperatures range from highs around

40°C along the Mekong in March and April to lows of 5°C or

less in the uplands of Xiangkhoang and Phongsali in January.

Transportation Routes

Because of its mountainous topography and lack of development, Laos has few reliable transportation routes. This inaccessibility has historically limited the ability of any government to maintain a presence in areas distant from the national or provincial capitals and has limited interchange and communication among villages and ethnic groups (see Transportation and

Telecommunications, ch. 3). The Mekong and Nam Ou are the

only natural channels suitable for large-draft boat transportation, and from December through May low water limits the size

of the craft that may be used over many routes. Laotians in lowland villages located on the banks of smaller rivers have traditionally traveled in pirogues for fishing, trading, and visiting up

and down the river for limited distances. Otherwise, travel is by

ox-cart over level terrain or by foot. The steep mountains and

lack of roads have caused upland ethnic groups to rely entirely

on pack baskets and horse packing for transportation.

The road system is not extensive. However, a rudimentary

network begun under French colonial rule and continued

from the 1950s has provided an important means of increased

intervillage communication, movement of market goods, and a focus for new settlements. In mid-1994, travel in most areas was

difficult and expensive, and most Laotians traveled only limited distances, if at all. As a result of ongoing improvements in

the road system during the early 1990s, however, it is expected

that in the future villagers will more easily be able to seek medical care, send children to schools at district centers, and work

outside the village.

85


Laos: A Country Study

Natural Resources

Expanding commercial exploitation of forests, plans for

additional hydroelectric facilities, foreign demands for wild

animals and nonwood forest products for food and traditional

medicines, and a growing population have brought new and

increasing attention to the forests. Traditionally, forests have

been important sources of wild foods, herbal medicines, and

timber for house construction. Even into the 1990s, the government viewed the forest as a valued reserve of natural products for noncommercial household consumption. Government

efforts to preserve valuable hardwoods for commercial extrac- tion have led to measures to prohibit swidden cultivation

throughout the country (see Agriculture and Forestry, ch. 3).

Further, government restrictions on clearing forestland for

swidden cropping in the late 1980s, along with attempts to gradually resettle upland swidden farming villages {ban—see Glossary) to lowland locations suitable for paddy rice cultivation, had significant effects on upland villages. Traditionally,

villages have relied on forest products as a food reserve during

years of poor rice harvest and as a regular source of fruits and

vegetables. By the 1990s, however, these gathering systems were

breaking down in many areas. At the same time, international

concern about environmental degradation and the loss of

many wildlife species unique to Laos has prompted the government to consider the implications of these developments.

Population

The first comprehensive national population census of Laos

was taken in 1985; it recorded a population of 3.57 million (see

fig. 5). Annual population growth was estimated at between 2.6

and 3.0 percent, and the 1991 population was estimated at 4.25

million. The national crude birth rate was estimated at about

forty-five per 1,000, while the crude death rate was about six- teen per 1,000. Fertility rates were consistently high from ages

twenty through forty, reflecting a lack of contraceptive use. Each woman bore an average of 6.8 children.

Birth control techniques were not generally available to the

population before the late 1980s, although there was limited use of oral contraceptives from the late 1960s through 1975.

The government took a pronatalist stance, believing that the

country was underpopulated. The overall population density was only eighteen persons per square kilometer, and in many

86
The Society and Its Environment

districts the density was fewer than ten persons per square kilo- meter. Population density per cultivated hectare was considerably higher, however, ranging from 3.3 to 7.8 persons per

hectare. Because high fertility and poor nutrition contribute to the poor health of women and high infant and child mortality,

since the late 1980s the Federation of Women's Unions has

advocated a policy of birth spacing to improve the health of

women and their children. Official prohibitions on contraceptive technology were relaxed, but use of contraception was still low as of mid-1994 and virtually nonexistent in villages distant

from provincial capitals or the Thai border. Regional differ- ences in birth rates as of late 1988—forty per 1,000 in Vientiane and Bolikhamxai provinces versus forty-eight per 1,000 in

other provinces—reflected uneven access to contraception

(see table 2, Appendix).

Ethnic Diversity

The population is ethnically diverse, but a complete classifi- cation of all ethnic groups has never been undertaken. Before

the Indochina wars, sources commonly identified more than

sixty different groups, whereas the 1985 census listed forty- seven groups, some with populations of only a few hundred

persons. Discrepancies in the number of groups resulted from

inconsistent definitions of what constitutes an ethnic group as opposed to a subgroup, as well as incomplete knowledge about

the groups themselves. The 1985 census distinguished three

general ethnic group classifications reflecting common origin

and language grouping and noted significant differences

among the groups comprising the three families. Because

detailed ethnographic information about many groups is lacking—especially for the midland groups—and because the

sheer number of ethnicities represented in Laos is so great, the

discussion of ethnic groups concentrates on one or two representative examples of each of the three larger groupings; other

groups may differ on a number of points (see fig, 6; table 3, Appendix).

The Lao Loum (see Glossary), or lowland Lao, constitute

the majority of the population—66 percent—and comprise sev- eral ethnic groups that began to move from the north into the

Southeast Asian peninsula about 1,000 years ago. All Lao Loum

speak languages of the Tai-Kadai family—for example, Lao,

Lue, Tai Dam (Black Tai), and Tai Deng (Red Tai). Lao Loum

87
Laos: A Country Study

AGE-GROUP

90 and over 85-89

80-84

75-79

70-74

65-69

60-64

55-59 50-54 45-49

40-44

35-39 30-34

25-29 20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

0-4

1l

21 MAlLES -FEMAl FS

400 300 200 100 100 200 300 400

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS

Figure 5. Population by Age and Gender, 1985

Source: Based on information from National Committee of Plan, Population Census of 1985, Vientiane, 1986. prefer to live in lowland valley areas and base agricultural production on paddy rice. The Lao Theung (see Glossary), or midland Lao, are of Austroasiatic origin and are probably the autochthonous inhabitants of Laos, having migrated northward in prehistoric times.

Originally paddy rice farmers, they were displaced into the

uplands by the migrations of the Lao Loum and in 1993

accounted for about 24 percent of the national population.

The cultural and linguistic differences among the many Lao

Theung groups are greater than those among the Lao Loum or Lao Sung (see Glossary), or upland Lao. Groups range from

the Kammu (alternate spellings include Khamu and Khmu)

and Lamet in the north, to the Katang and Makong in the center, to the Loven and Lawae in the far south.

The Lao Sung make up about 10 percent of the population.

These groups are Miao-Yao or Tibeto-Burmese speaking peoples, who have continued to migrate into Laos from the north

88
The Society and Its Environment

within the last two centuries. In Laos most highland groups live on the tops or upper slopes of the northern mountains, where

they grow rice and corn in swidden fields. Some of these vil- lages have been resettled in lowland sites since the 1970s. The

Hmong (see Glossary) are the most numerous Lao Sung

group, with villages spread across the uplands of all the north- ern provinces. Mien (Yao), Akha, Lahu, and other related

groups are considerably smaller in numbers and tend to be

located in rather limited areas of the north.

Government policy emphasizes the multiethnic nature of

the nation and in many ways works to reduce the discrimination against midland and upland minorities by some lowland

Lao (see Education, this ch.). Use of the three general ethnic

group classifications emphasizes the commonality of Lao

nationality but obscures significant differences among the

smaller groups. Most Laotians categorize ethnic groups in

terms of these three broad categories, and villagers themselves,

when asked their ethnicity by outsiders, are likely to respond

Lao Loum, Lao Theung, or Lao Sung, rather than their specific ethnicity.

Although ethnic differences are seldom a direct source of

conflict, historical patterns of exploitation and competition for

natural resources have led to tensions and occasional overt

conflicts, some of which persisted in the early 1990s. For example, lowland Tai-Lao migrants displaced the Lao Theung

groups into the uplands beginning a millennium ago, dominated them politically, and exploited them as well. The Lao

Theung were frequently referred to as "Kha," a derogatory

term meaning slave, which reflected their social, if not necessarily legal, status. (Slave trade did exist in the south of Laos

during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, usually involving the Lao Theung.) Rites surrounding the coronation of the

Lao king in Louangphrabang, as well as annual ceremonies of

renewal, include rituals in which the king makes symbolic payment to Lao Theung representatives for the land, and they in

turn acknowledge the legitimacy of the king.

French colonial rule tended to strengthen the position of

lowland Lao, both by granting them access to education and by

commonly appointing them as district and provincial gover- nors regardless of the ethnic makeup of a region. In the early

1900s, Lao Theung and Lao Sung groups carried out several

rebellions against Lao-Thai as well as French authority but all

89
Laos: A Country Study

Figure 6. Ethnic Groups, 1992

Source: Based on information from United Nations Children's Fund, Children and Women in the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Vientiane, 1992; and Laos, National Committee of Plan, Population Census of 1985, Vientiane, 1986. were eventually suppressed, leaving unresolved tensions. The

court, administration, and national symbols continued to be

defined in terms of Tai-Lao cultural traditions. During the

1950s, significant numbers of Lao Theung and Lao Sung were

recruited by the leftist Pathet Lao (Lao Nation—see Glossary),

and these groups played an important role in the military

90
The Society and Its Environment

struggle (see The Coming of Independence, ch. 1). Since 1975

the number of Lao Theung and Lao Sung in the national and

provincial administrations has increased, although in 1993 they were still underrepresented (see Government Structure, ch. 4).

National borders have not created significant barriers to the

movement and settlement patterns of the different Lao ethnic

groups because Laotian villagers have traditionally moved in

search of better land for rice farming. About 5 million Hmong

lived in southern China in the early 1990s, as opposed to about

200,000 in Vietnam, a similar number in Laos, and about

90,000 in northern Thailand. Kammu settlements existed both

in northern Laos and northern Thailand, and many of the

midland groups in the center of the country had villages in

both Laos and Vietnam. The lowland Lao historically lived on

both sides of the Mekong, with early Lao kingdoms encompassing much of the Khorat Plateau in present-day Thailand. Cultural and linguistic differences between the Lao Loum and the

Thai Isan—what the Thai call the inhabitants of the Khorat Plateau in northeast Thailand—were primarily a result of the

expansion of the Thai state and its influence in that region

since 1945. Significant political changes in Laos since 1975 also

contributed to a growing cultural distance.

The Refugee Population

During the Second Indochina War (1954-75), particularly

between 1960 and 1973, large numbers of Laotians were displaced from their villages, either to escape frequent bombings

or as a result of forced relocations by one side or the other

seeking to consolidate control over an area. In the eastern zone controlled by the Pathet Lao, many villages were abandoned, and the inhabitants either lived in caves, fled across the

border to Vietnam (where, despite the massive United States

aerial war, the bombing was less intense than in the areas from

which they had moved), or moved to refugee villages or camps

in Royal Lao Government (RLG—see Glossary) areas (see

Toward Neutrality: The First Coalition; The Attempt to Restore

Neutrality; International Pressure and the Advent of the Second Coalition; The Third Coalition and the Lao Democratic

People's Republic, ch. 1). These villages were established along

Route 13 from Savannakhet to Pakxan and continued north of

Vientiane. In addition, many Hmong and Mien villages that

had allied with the RLG were frequently forced to move as a

91
Laos: A Country Study

result of the changing battle lines and were regularly supplied

by the RLG and United States. At the end of the war, an estimated 700,000 persons, or about 25 percent of the population, were in some way displaced from their original homes. Many of these refugees

began to return to their villages, or at least to the same general

area, after the cease-fire of 1973, emptying many of the refugee

villages along Route 13. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR—see Glossary) provided some

assistance in transportation and initial rice supplies, and after

1975 the government also assisted to the extent possible with

its meager resources. Hmong who sided with the RLG were

forced to flee after 1975.

Not all internal refugees returned to their home districts,

however. Some chose to remain in more populated areas near

the Mekong and the larger towns, continuing to farm land that

they had cleared during the war. The fall of the RLG and

increased control by government cadres over daily activities in

the villages also caused many villagers to flee the country. Many

ended up in refugee camps in Thailand. The outmigration

occurred in three phases. An initial flight of RLG officials and

Westernized elite began in 1975. A second period of departures by many more ordinary villagers occurred between 1977

and 1981. These villagers were responding as much to eco- nomic hardship caused by poor weather and government mismanagement of the agricultural sector as to political control measures. A later period of less rapid departure lasted through

the late 1980s. In all, more than 360,000 Laotians—about 10

percent or more of the population—fled the country between

1975 and 1992. This group included nearly all Western-educated Laotians, and, as political scientist Martin Stuart-Fox has

noted, the loss of the intelligentsia may have set the country

back an entire generation. Some upland minorities who had

supported the RLG and the United States military effort also

fled immediately, while other groups continued a guerrilla

insurgency, which was not brought under control until after

about 1979 (see Threats to National Security, ch. 5).

By the end of 1992, approximately 305,000 Laotian refugees

had been permanently resettled in third countries, most com- monly in the United States and France. Forty thousand Laotians—mostly Hmong—remained in refugee camps in

Thailand, and 12,000 refugees had been voluntarily repatriated

92
The Society and Its Environment

to Laos under the supervision and with the assistance of the

UNHCR. International agreements mandated the resettlement or repatriation of all remaining refugees in Thailand by the

end of 1994.

Even without the circumstances of war, Laotian villagers tra- ditionally have moved in search of better prospects. Because of

the overall low population density, if farmland near a village

became scarce or its quality declined, part or all of a village

might decide to relocate where there was more potential. This

pattern occurs more frequently among upland semimigratory

peoples, where there is a regular pattern of movement linked

to the use of swidden fields. Even the lowland Lao, however,

have a history of village fragmentation in search of new lands,

although their investment in household or village infrastructure has tended to stabilize the population. Since the mid1980s, the government has encouraged or compelled a number of upland villages farming swidden rice to resettle in lowland environments—a pattern also used by the RLG to more

easily control villagers. In some instances, assistance in relocation and initial land clearing has been provided, while in others people have been left to fend for themselves in their new

locations.

Rural-Urban Distribution

In the early 1990s, over 85 percent of the Laotian population was rural, typically living in villages ranging from ten to 200

households, or up to about 1,200 persons. Towns grew during

the Second Indochina War as villagers fled to escape United

States bombing. After 1975 many rural migrants returned to farming. Most of the sixteen province capitals or centers can be

considered towns, although a few, such as Phongsali, Attapu,

and Xiangkhoang, are not much more than market centers,

with populations well under 5,000 surrounded by a somewhat

denser network of neighboring villages. In 1985 Vientiane had

a population estimated at about 250,000, with municipal water

and electricity systems, a variety of housing, and more developed educational and health facilities than were available else- where in the country.

The major provincial centers are Louangphrabang—the

former royal capital—Savannakhet, and Pakxe, with populations ranging from 20,000 to 109,000 and a range of services

and urban amenities. The other provincial capitals are distin93
Laos: A Country Study

guished by several government buildings, a regular market

although not always daily—at least one hotel and restaurant,

and occasional air service. Towns are primarily administrative

and market centers, with little or no industrial manufacturing

outside of Vientiane (see Industry and Services, ch. 3). Aside

from Vientiane and a few other provincial towns, growth has

been limited, and the general pattern of existence held over many generations. In 1994, most of the 121 district centers were little more than large villages with the addition of a middle school and a few score officials. Rural Life

Laotian society is above all else characterized by semi-independent rural villages engaged in subsistence agricultural production. Ethnic, geographic, and ecological differences create

variations in the pattern of village life from one part of the

country to another, but the common threads of village self-reli- ance, limited regional trade and communication, and identification with one's village and ethnic group persist regardless of

the setting. Rural trade networks, however, have been a part of

life since the 1950s. Except near the larger towns and in the

rich agricultural plains of Vientiane and Savannakhet, villages are spaced at least several kilometers apart and the intervening

land is variously developed as rice paddy and swidden fields or maintained as buffer forest for gathering wild plants and animals, fuelwood, and occasional timber harvest.

Ethnicity differentiates the villages but is usually not a source of conflict or antagonism. Nearly all villages are ethnically

homogeneous, although a few include two or more distinct

groups. Ethnic mixing often has resulted from different groups

migrating to a new settlement site at about the same time, or a

larger village at a crossroads or river transit point developing

into a minor trading center. Ethnic identity is never absolutely

immutable. Some minority Laotian individuals have adopted

lowland Lao behavior and dress patterns, or intermarried with

lowland Lao, and have effectively acculturated to lowland society. In some units, military service has also brought together

Laotians of different ethnic groups, both before and after

1975.

Only since 1975 has there been any sense of national unity

among most rural villagers. Precolonial governments

depended more on a system of control at the district level, with

94
The Society and Its Environment

the chao muang (district chief) maintaining his own allegiance

and tribute to the state (see Government Structure, ch. 4).

Administrative practices under the French and during the postWorld War II period were confined primarily to provincial and

a few district centers. The government was able to extract taxes with some facility but had little impact on the daily lives or thoughts of most villagers. However, since 1975, the government has expended considerable energy and resources on

national unification, so that even isolated villages recognize the

role of local government and consider themselves at some level to be part of a Laotian state. Lowland Lao Society

Lao Loum (Laotian of the valley) have been the dominant

group—numerically, politically, and economically—since the

founding of the Kingdom of Lan Xang in the fourteenth century. The Lao of the Lao Loum ethnic group comprise just over 50 percent of the total population. Other related lowland

groups include the Lue and Phu Thai, who together make up

an additional 15 percent of the population. Groups such as the

Tai Dam and Tai Deng are included by government statistics in

the general category Phu Thai despite linguistic and cultural

differences from other lowland groups. Variations occur

regionally and among different ethnic subgroups, but the general patterns are relatively uniform. Most officials in the RLG

were Lao Loum, and despite increases in the number of minority officials in the government, the lowland Lao held a clear

majority in the early 1990s. Lowland cultural patterns are fre- quently considered the norm in designing policy or setting

development priorities.

Lao Loum traditionally live in stable independent villages sit- uated near lowland rivers or streams. At higher elevations, vil- lages are located in valley areas that give as much access as possible to land suitable for paddy rice cultivation. Villages are self-contained and range from around twenty to over 200

households, although they typically contain forty or fifty houses

and 200 to 300 people. Usually, villages are separated by rice

fields or unused land. In rural areas, there might be five kilometers or more between villages, whereas in more densely populated areas only one kilometer or less separates the

settlements. Most villages have grown in population over time,

and if good land becomes scarce in the vicinity, it is not uncommon for some families to migrate to another area, either indi95
Laos: A Country Study

vidually or as a group. Individual households usually move to another village where the family has kin or friends, out larger

groups have often migrated to unsettled areas. Such village fis- sion or relocation continued into the early 1990s, although

migrants had to obtain permission from the district administration before settling in a new site. The traditional independence and relative isolation of lowland villages has been reduced since the late 1980s. Although

commerce in forest products—for example, sticklac—dates to colonial times, as roads have improved and marketing networks expanded, the government has encouraged commercial

production for trade and export. As long as the open eco- nomic policies of the New Economic Mechanism are operating, the process of integrating lowland villages into a national

socioeconomic system will likely continue (see Agriculture and

Forestry; Foreign Trade, ch. 3).

Lao Loum houses are built on wooden piles, with the floor

from one to two and one-half meters above the ground. This

style keeps the living area above the mud of the rainy season,

provides a shady area under the house to work or rest during

the day, and allows the house to catch breezes for natural cooling. Depending on the wealth and resources of the family, the

walls and floor may be made of woven split bamboo or sawn

wood; the roof is constructed from grass thatch, bamboo, wood

shingles, or corrugated steel roofing sheet. Some older houses

in well-off villages are roofed with clay tiles, but this style was no

longer common in the early 1990s. A separate rice granary is built in the house compound, also on posts using similar construction. Livestock is sometimes kept under the house.

Houses commonly range from five by seven meters to eight

by twelve meters, with the smallest size typical of a newly established household or a family that has recently moved. Most

houses are built with a porch on the long side that is used for

visiting and as a public area. The interior is divided into one or two sleeping rooms, a common room for visiting and eating,

and a separate kitchen area or side porch. Household furnishings are simple: mats or mattresses and blankets for sleeping on

the floor, a low woven bamboo and rattan table for eating, and

a few pots and dishes for cooking and1 eating. Lao Loum sit on

the floor and eat from common bowls of soup or other dishes.

Steamed rice is distributed among two or three common baskets placed around the edge of the table.

96
97
Laos: A Country Study

Lao Loum households average between six and eight persons, but may reach twelve or so in exceptional cases. The family structure is typically nuclear or stem: a married couple and

their unmarried children, or an older married couple together

with one married child and his or her spouse plus unmarried

children and grandchildren. Because kinship is reckoned bilat- erally and flexibly, Lao Loum may maintain close social relationships with kin who are only distantly related by blood.

Terms of address for persons in an older generation indicate

whether the relationship is through the father's or mother's

side and distinguish between elder and younger siblings.

Marriage occurs through a blend of traditional and modern

practices. In earlier generations, marriages may have been

arranged by the families, but at least since the 1960s, most couples usually have made their own choice, which is communicated to the parents. A bride-price is negotiated, which often

defrays the expenses of the wedding. The wedding takes place

at the home of the bride's family, with whom the couple initially resides, either in the same house or nearby. The groom

helps with farming in the bride's family for several years until

the couple feels they are economically ready to establish a separate household. Even then, they may continue to farm jointly

with the older generation and either divide the harvest or eat from a common granary. A bride may sometimes move into her

husband's household, but uxorilocal residence is somewhat

more common. Initial uxorilocal residence combined with the

sequential establishment of separate households by each older

sibling frequently leaves the youngest daughter and her husband to care for the aged parents and ultimately to inherit the

house. All the children divide lands and other valuables.

Polygyny is traditionally allowed but uncommon since the

LPDR government outlawed it shortly after coming to power.

Further, having multiple wives generally was restricted to the

elite because it required the ability to maintain a larger household. However, many men have mistresses. Divorce may be ini- tiated by either party. If a couple encounters domestic

difficulties, the two families usually address the problem first. If necessary, the village elders join the attempt to resolve the couple's differences and achieve a reconciliation. After a divorce,

both husband and wife may return to their families of birth,

unless either can make a living other than from farming. Children of divorce may remain with either parent. In the case of a

spouse's death, the widow or widower may return to her or his

98
The Society and Its Environment

natal household but more commonly maintains an independent household or remarries. The choice often hinges on the

ages of children; if none are old enough to help in the fields,

the family has a difficult time surviving without extra help.

The lowland Lao village economy is centered on paddy rice

cultivation, and most village activities and daily life revolve

around rice production. Glutinous, or sticky, rice is the staple

food; because it has a high starch content, sticky rice must be

steamed rather than boiled. It is eaten with the fingers and

dipped in soup or a vegetable or meat dish. Most Lao Loum vil- lages are self-sufficient in rice production, although the production of individual households within a village varies.

Household work centers on paddy production from the beginning of the rains in May through December when all the rice

has been brought to storage. Periods of intense work occur at the time of transplanting and harvesting, and cooperative work

groups are often organized among several families to help get

the tasks completed in a timely manner. Where level terrain is inadequate, lowland Lao also practice

swidden rice farming. This method is less efficient than paddy

rice cultivation, which provides higher and more stable yields

for less work. In certain villages, swidden rice is grown only in

some years as a supplement to paddy rice production, whereas

in others it is planted regularly in small quantities. Some Lao

Loum villages have no land suitable for rice paddies and are completely dependent on swidden rice production. Newly

established villages may first clear fields and plant swidden rice

for a year or two before plowing and bunding the fields to convert them to paddies.

In addition to paddy rice, most households also have a small

vegetable garden and some fruit trees, either in the house com- pound or near a stream or other water source. Other crops

include cotton, tobacco, and sugarcane, but they are usually

planted only in small quantities for personal use. Villagers also

raise chickens, ducks, and pigs, as well as a buffalo or two for

plowing the fields and perhaps a pair of cattle for pulling a

cart. In general, rural households are largely self-sufficient,

growing their own food, making their own tools and clothes,

and trading any surplus for soap, kerosene, medicines, and

kitchen or household goods.

Hunting, fishing, and gathering traditionally play an important role in the household economy, although as the popula99
Laos: A Country Study

tion has increased and wild areas have been degraded, access

to these resources has gradually deteriorated. Homemade rifles are used to hunt small deer, wild pigs, and small game such as squirrels and birds; fish are caught with a variety of nets, traps, or hooks. Bamboo shoots, mushrooms, fruit, medicinal or culi- nary roots, and leaves are gathered in the forest according to the season. Men hunt and fish with throw nets and hooks, while

women fish with dip nets and baskets and collect roots and wild

vegetables.

Household tasks are typically divided according to gender,

but the divisions are not rigid, and men and women often perform tasks interchangeably. For example, both sexes cut and

carry firewood. Women and children traditionally carry water

for household use and to cultivate kitchen gardens. Women do

most of the cooking, household cleaning, and washing and

serve as primary caretakers for small children. They are the

main marketers of surplus household food and other petty production, and women are usually the commercial marketers for

vegetables, fruit, fish, poultry, and basic household dry goods.

Men typically market cattle, buffalo, or pigs and are responsible for the purchase of any mechanical items. Intrafamily decision making usually requires discussions between husband and

wife, but the husband usually acts as the family representative

in village meetings or other official functions. In farming work,

men traditionally plow and harrow the rice fields, while women

uproot the seedlings before transplanting them. Both sexes

transplant, harvest, thresh, and carry rice. Occupational specialization in the village is low; virtually

everyone is a rice farmer first. Some villagers may have special

skills in weaving, blacksmithing, or religious knowledge, but

these skills are supplementary to the fundamental task of growing enough rice and vegetables for the family. Social and eco- nomic stratification tends to be low within any one village,

although villages may differ substantially one from another.

Status accrues to age, wealth, skill in specific tasks, and reli- gious knowledge. Factions based on kinship or political alli- ance may exist in a village but usually do not obstruct overall

village cooperation and governance.

Traditionally, lowland Lao villages are led by a village chief

(pho ban or nai ban) and one or two assistants who are elected

by the villagers, although district or province officials sometimes use their positions to influence the results. Respected

100
The Society and Its Environment

elders, including women, form an advisory group that mediates intravillage disputes. Since 1975 villages have been governed by an administrative committee headed by a village

president (pathan ban) and several other persons with responsibilities for such specific areas as economic and population

records, self-defense militia, agriculture, women's affairs, and

youth affairs. All members are in principle elected by popular

vote, although for about a decade after 1975, party cadres at the village level were supposed to have taken an active role to ensure that acceptable candidates were selected.

Even under the present political system, however, village

leaders have little or no formal authority and govern through

consensus and the use of social pressure to ensure conformity.

Village meetings are held infrequently, but are usually well

attended with different viewpoints on issues expressed openly.

If a consensus on an issue is not reached, leaders will delay

decisions to allow further discussion outside the meeting with

all members of the community. Typical issues might include

whether to build or expand a village school or dig a community

well, or how to organize the annual ceremony for the village

protective spirit. Historically, religious and ceremonial activities and ties with the Buddhist temple or monastery (wat) have

been very important in village life and a focus of considerable

time and expenditure.

Each family contributes equal amounts of labor, material,

and money to village projects. Once a decision is made to undertake a project, a committee is appointed to manage the

details and keep track of the contributions to ensure that every- one does his or her share. Systems of rotating labor groups for

village projects are common; for example, groups of ten households may supply one worker per household every three to seven days, depending on the number of groups, until the

project is finished. Some large projects, such as building a

school, may continue for several years, with work taking place

during the dry season when farming tasks are not heavy or when funds are available to purchase materials.

Households also cooperate informally, especially in agricultural work. Labor exchange occurs for almost every task associated with rice farming, although it is most common for

transplanting, harvesting, and threshing. There are two different patterns of farm exchange. In central and southern Laos,

villagers call on many other households, sometimes the entire

101
Laos: A Country Study

village, for one day's help to complete a specific task such as transplanting. No specific repayment is required, but the family is obligated to help others in the village if they are unable to finish work in time. In northern villages, mutual assistance is organized on the basis of exchanges between families that

should even out over the year; a day's work transplanting may

be repaid by a day's work threshing. The contributions of men,

women, and children over sixteen are considered equal,

regardless of the task. Houses are typically built by hand using local materials, and

once the householder has collected enough wood, bamboo,

and/or thatching grass, he will ask his neighbors and relatives to assist in the house raising. It usually takes twenty people a day or two to assemble the frame and raise the heavy timbers.

Once the heavy work is completed, the owners finish construction over the ensuing weeks. In this work as well as farm labor

exchange, the host family provides a meal to all those coming

to help. For common farmwork, the meal is relatively simple

and usually includes a chicken or duck and a bottle of local rice

liquor. For a house raising, the meal is more elaborate—a pig

or small ox and considerably more liquor after the task is done.

Illness, death, or other household emergencies also elicit help

from one's neighbors.

Lowland Lao are almost all Buddhists, and most villages have

a wat, which serves as both a social and religious center (see

Buddhism, this ch.). Whereas small villages may have only one

or two monks in residence plus a few novice monks, larger vil- lages may have up to six monks plus novices (see Religion, this

ch.). Many villagers assemble at the wat for prayers on the days

of each lunar quarter; on days of major religious festivals, they

carry out more elaborate ceremonies and may organize a boun

(religious fair) at the wat. Before the development of a national

education system, boys and young men received basic religious

and secular education at the wat. The wat is frequently used as a place for village meetings because the hall is often the only

building large enough to accommodate everyone at once. Most

villages have a small wat committee to oversee the maintenance

of the building, organization of the fair, and the general welfare of the monks and novices. The committee members are

selected by consensus on the basis of their morality and reli- gious sincerity and usually have been monks at some time in

their lives.

102
Lowland Lao informal

dress celebrating the opening

of Lane Xang Bank,

Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

i

Lowland Lao informal

dress in front of Wat Xieng

Thong dressedfor the Lao

New Year in typical

Louangphrabang style

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn

y f

103
Laos: A Country Study

Although they are Buddhists, Lao Loum also respect the

power of phi (spirits), which may be associated with a place or a deceased person. More important for village organization is the cult of a village protective deity, or phi ban, which is typically

celebrated yearly. Many villages have abandoned this practice

in the face of increased modernization and official discouragement by the government. However, some villages continued

through the early 1990s to offer an annual sacrifice to the phi

ban in a ceremony that both reaffirmed the importance of the

village as a unique social unit and aimed to secure the continued good fortune of the village and its inhabitants.

Midland Lao Society

Lao Theung (Laotian of the mountain slopes) make up

about 24 percent of the population and consist of at least

thirty-seven different ethnic groups ranging in population

from nearly 400,000 (the Kammu) to fewer than 100 (the Numbri). Many of the groups have additional members in Thailand

or Vietnam. Of the three main ethnic classifications, the differ- ences among the Lao Theung groups are greater than among

the Lao Loum or Lao Sung. Little is known about many of

these groups, and reasonably complete ethnographic accounts

are available only for a few. Most Lao Theung groups reside in a relatively limited geographic area; for example, the Nyaheun,

Sedang, and Lavae mostly live in the far southern provinces of

Attapu and Saravan (Salavan), whereas the Lamet reside near

the border between Bokeo, Oudomxai, and Louang Namtha

provinces. The Kammu live scattered throughout the north,

from Xiangkhoang to Bokeo.

The Lao Theung speak languages of the Austroasiatic family,

and although some languages are closely related, such as Kammu, Lamet, and Sam Tao, others are mutually incomprehensible. None of the languages has developed a written script.

The geographer Christian Taillard has suggested that the Lao

Theung were originally paddy rice farmers displaced by Tai

migrants into the hills and mountains and forced to turn to swidden rice production. However, Karl Gustav Izikowitz's ethnography of the Lamet reports that historically they had been

swidden farmers and did not cultivate paddy rice even in areas where suitable land was available. Certainly within the last two

centuries, all the Lao Theung have been characterized as swidden farmers and as semimigratory because they have occasionally relocated their villages as swidden areas were exhausted.

104
The Society and Its Environment

The Kammu and Lamet, who are found in northern Laos, have

different social organization and agricultural ecology than the

ethnic groups in southern Laos.

Most Lao Theung villages (based primarily on descriptions

of the Kammu) are located on mountain slopes but not at the

peaks or ridges—the name Lao Theung means roughly "the

Lao up there." Since the 1950s, however, a growing number of

villages have been established at lower elevations near rivers or

roads; villages grew up as roads were beginning to be rebuilt

and expanded. Sometimes these villages were founded by people fleeing the war, and sometimes they arose out of the people's desire to be closer to transportation, markets, and social

services. After 1975 many Hmong and some Kammu were

driven out by the Pathet Lao and the Lao People's Army (see

Glossary). Since the 1980s, the government has encouraged

upland swidden farming minorities to relocate to lowland areas

in order to reduce upland swidden farming and forest clearing.

Kammu and Lamet villages, as well as those of some other midland groups, are relatively permanent, some remaining over

fifty years in a location. Traditionally, villages managed the

rotation of swidden fields in such a way as to sustain agricultural production over long periods. Individual households

might move from a village to another location, or villages

might merge with a second village being established a short dis- tance away; however, the usual pattern was sedentary. Midland

groups inhabiting central Laos generally have been more

mobile, with villages relocated after a decade or so. It is not

clear, however, whether this is a long-standing pattern or a response to the unsettled conditions during the Second

Indochina War.

Lao Theung villages are usually somewhat smaller than most

Lao Loum villages, commonly ranging between twenty and

thirty households, but sites with fifty households and 300 or more inhabitants have been reported. Houses in Lamet and

Kammu villages are clustered without apparent organization or

orientation, but individual sites are selected with the advice of a

village spirit practitioner. Lamet villages are commonly divided

into two segments by the men's common house located in the

middle of the village, but a similar practice has not been

recorded for the Kammu. Traditionally, in Kammu households,

there is a separate common house for adolescent boys and

strangers, but this practice has not been continued in many

new settlements established after 1975.

105
Laos: A Country Study

The houses are built on wooden or bamboo piles between

one and two meters above the ground and are at least five by seven meters in size. Usually they are larger. Construction

materials include woven bamboo or sawn lumber for floors and

walls and grass thatch or bamboo shingle roofing. A kitchen

hearth is located inside the house, and an open porch is built

on at least one end of the house. A separate rice barn, also

built on piles, may be located in the village near the house

(Kammu) or on the edge of the village (Lamet). Villages are commonly built near a small stream to provide drinking and

washing water, which is often diverted through a bamboo aqueduct to facilitate filling buckets and bathing.

Almost all Lao Theung groups rely on swidden rice cultivation as the basis of their household economy. Lamet and

Kammu prefer glutinous rice, but some other groups prefer to eat ordinary rice. A small field house is almost always built in

the fields, and all or part of the family may sleep there for days

during the farming season rather than walk back to the village

every day.

Swidden rice seldom yields as much as paddy fields, and the

labor needed to keep weeds under control is the major constraint to expanding the area farmed. Corn, cassava, and wild

tubers are thus important components of the diet to supplement a frequently inadequate rice supply. As a consequence of

low rice yields, Lao Theung are generally considered to be the

poorest of the three ethnic groupings in Laos. Men often come

to towns to work as coolies. In addition to farming, Lao Theung engage in hunting and

gathering in the forests surrounding the village. Men shoot or

trap small game and occasionally a wild pig or deer. Both

women and men regularly collect bamboo and rattan sprouts,

wild vegetables, mushrooms, tubers, and medicinal plants, the

latter marketed by women. Fishing is common for some groups

but seldom practiced by others, perhaps as a consequence of

living in an upland environment distant from large streams.

Damrong Tayanin, an anthropologist of Kammu origin, has

described a pattern of land tenure for the Kammu in which

households own a large number of separate fields that are farmed over a twelve- to fifteen-year rotation; other households

recognize these ownership rights. The claimed fields are

divided among the offspring of each generation. However, no

other studies mention any Lao Theung group respecting per106
The Society and Its Environment

manent rights to swidden fields. In all cases, fields that are

cleared and farmed are allowed to revert to fallow after a year or two. Depending on the population-to-land balance, these

fields might be allowed to lie fallow for three to over fifteen

years before being cleared again. After each harvest, individual

households select the fields they will clear and farm the following year. Sometimes this choice is an individual decision, but

sometimes a group of households cooperates to clear and

fence a single large area, which is then divided. Or, a village

decides which area to clear and divide among all the families in

the village. Once a field is abandoned, anyone may clear it and

farm. Fallow periods shorter than five to seven years lead to gradual degeneration of the swidden system, however, because

they do not allow adequate regrowth of vegetation to restore

the soil fertility.

Almost all Lao Theung groups are patrilineal. Kammu and

Lamet households average between six and seven persons but

may be as large as twelve or fourteen persons. The ideal household consists of parents and children, wives of married sons, and grandchildren. Married sons eventually establish separate

households, but a family might be temporarily augmented by a

son-in-law who must live and work with the bride's parents for

several years in partial payment of the bride-price. The Kammu

and Lamet have eight and seven totemic clans, respectively,

which provide a basis for social organization and the regulation

of marriage. For the Lamet, the clans are exogamous, and each

village contains at least two clans, thus providing the possibility

of marriage exchanges. Kammu group the clans according to three categories—quadruped, bird, or plant— depending on

the clan's totem. The totem is a plant or animal that was instrumental in either saving or killing the legendary clan ancestor. One must marry someone from another clan, and more particularly, men should marry real or classificatory mother's brothers' daughters. Each group of clans (for example, quadruped)

always gives brides to one of the others (for example, bird) and

receives brides from the third (for example, plants) in a circular relationship. Thus, a village must have all three clan categories represented for marriage exchanges to proceed.

Lamet clans help in establishing relationships between per- sons both inside and outside a village. In the village, members

of the same clan are likely to develop cooperative relationships

in farming, and a man traveling outside his village might seek

out fellow clan members when arriving in another village. For

107
Laos: A Country Study

the Kammu, however, clan membership appears relevant only

for facilitating interhousehold cooperation and for regulating

marriage relationships within a village. Should a family move to another village, it may change its clan membership in order to

fit into the three-group marriage exchange circle. Marriage choices are made by the groom and bride. Once a couple agrees to marry, their parents negotiate a bride-price.

Among the Lamet, the bride's family also sends a dowry.

Because there are few opportunities to acquire significant

wealth in villages, Kammu and Lamet young men have frequently migrated to towns or to Thailand since the 1920s to work for several years until they acquire the funds needed for a bride-price. Among the Lamet, unmarried adolescent males

sleep in the communal men's house, although they work with

their families during the day.

Polygyny traditionally has been allowed, but it is rare, because few men can afford a second wife. Whereas a Lamet

man may marry two sisters, this practice is prohibited among

the Kammu; a widow may marry her husband's brother in

either culture. If he chooses not to marry her, however, the

brother is still responsible for her support. Initial residence

after marriage is usually patrilocal, but if the groom is unable

to pay the full agreed-upon bride-price, he may be obligated to

live and work in his in-laws's household for several years in lieu

of the bride-price. Upon the parents' death, the sons divide

items of value and, according to Damrong, rights to swidden

fields and fallows. Material possessions are generally limited

and include not much more than livestock, farm and household equipment, or perhaps a few silver coins—used in traditional dress—or ingots. Wooden and bronze drums were

important symbols of Lamet and Kammu household wealth in

the past, but most appear to have been lost or sold during the

Indochina wars. Gender role differentiation in both farming and household

activities is considerably greater among the Lao Theung than

among the Lao Loum. Men are primarily responsible for clear- ing and burning swidden fields, although women may assist in

clearing the smaller brush. Men punch holes for seed and the

women follow, dropping and covering the seed with topsoil.

Both sexes weed the fields, but the women are primarily

responsible for this time-consuming task. Harvest is a joint

activity. In the house, women cook, care for children, husk rice,

108
The Society and Its Environment

cut firewood, and haul water. Women also gather roots, shoots,

and other wild vegetative products. Men weave baskets, repair

farm tools, and hunt small game. Men are also more likely than

women to manage household finances and engage in trade,

typically selling livestock and collected forest products or scrap

metal from the war in exchange for rice. Izikowitz reports a significant trade of surplus rice by the Lamet and Kammu to

neighboring lowland Lao villages in exchange for salt and

metal implements in the 1920s and 1930s but notes that rice

sales were declining because of competition from other producers. Since at least the 1970s, few Lao Theung have produced any surplus rice. Women may sell vegetables, chickens, or occasionally handicrafts locally but do not have the important market role of lowland Lao women. Where villages have

access to primary schools, both boys and girls attend for a few

years, but girls are much more likely to drop out before boys do

(see Education, this ch.).

As in all villages in Laos, village governance is managed by an elected administrative committee consisting of a president

and several other members in charge of economic affairs, self- defense, agriculture, and so on (see Government Structure, ch.

4). Traditionally, the village has a chief who is the intermediary

between the village and the national government. Important

decisions are made by elders, who in the absence of a written

script memorize agreements among village members.

Both Kammu and Lamet villages have a ritual leader (Ikuun

in Kammu, xemia in Lamet), who officiates at important spirit

rituals that affect the entire village. This position is hereditary

in the male line. Kammu and Lamet, as most Lao Theung, are

animists and are respected by their lowland neighbors as being

especially proficient in protecting against or propitiating spirits

that may cause illness or accidents. Ancestral spirits are an

important aspect of household religious and safety rituals, but

above the grandparents' generation they are generalized, and

the spirits of specific persons are not worshiped. Kammu and

Lamet revere rather than fear the spirits of their ancestors, who

protect the household and village against harm as long as they

are respected and are offered sacrifices. Rituals are also performed at the start of any important undertaking, for example,

at the beginning of rice planting or building a house. Taboos

restrict certain activities; for example, Lamet cannot make or repair tools inside the family house but do this work in the

communal men's house.

109
Laos: A Country Study

Lao Theung are socially, economically, and politically the

most marginal group of the three ethnic classes. During the

Second Indochina War, many Lao Theung supported the Neo

Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front—LPF; see Glossary), the

political party of the Pathet Lao—or actively fought with the

Pathet Lao. Ethnic differences and resentments against lowland Lao dominance likely stimulated some of this support, as did effective Pathet Lao recruitment activities in the remote

eastern areas populated principally by Lao Theung groups.

During the years immediately after 1975, Lao Theung cadres

gained numerous mid-level positions in the new government,

but later many were replaced by lowland Lao with greater technical training and experience. Provincial and district officials are more likely to be Lao Theung in provinces with pronounced minority populations, and geographical isolation and

poor education are still barriers to the integration of all Lao

minorities in national affairs. The traditional subsistence swidden agricultural societies of the Lao Theung, which involved

little trade with other groups, led to a marginal economic exist- ence for many villages in the early 1990s. Numerous individual

Lao Theung have adopted lowland behavioral patterns and

successfully pass as lowland Lao, but prejudicial attitudes attributed to many lowland Lao continue to affect social and eco- nomic opportunities for many Lao Theung villages.

Upland Lao Society

Lao Sung (Laotian of the mountain top) include six ethnic

groups, of which the Hmong, Akha, and Mien (Yao) are the

most numerous. As of 1993, the Hmong numbered over

200,000, with settlements throughout the uplands of northern

Laos. About the same number of Hmong live in northern Vietnam, and approximately 90,000 live in Thailand; this number

does not include the 30,000 Hmong that were living in Thai

refugee camps at the end of 1992. Some 60,000 Akha reside in

Louang Namtha, Phongsali, and Bokeo provinces. The other

upland groups are the Phu Noi, found in Phongsali and north- ern Louangphrabang provinces, the Mien (in Bokeo and

Louang Namtha provinces), and small populations (fewer than

10,000) of Lahu and Kui located in the far northwest. The 1985

census also classified the 6,500 Ho (Haw) —Chinese originally

from Yunnan Province—with the Lao Sung. All these groups

have significant populations outside Laos, and the bulk of the

110
The Society and Its Environment

ethnographic information available is from studies conducted

in neighboring countries.

The Lao Sung are the most recent migrants to Laos, having

arrived from the north in a series of migrations beginning in

the early nineteenth century. Hmong entered northwestern

Vietnam from China prior to 1800, and early settlements in

northeastern Laos were reported around the turn of the nineteenth century. Pioneering settlements gradually extended

westward, crossing the Mekong around 1890 and reaching Tak

in northern Thailand around 1930. Mien migrations, in contrast, seem to have come southeast through Burma and Thailand before reaching Laos. All Lao Sung settlements are located in the north, with only Hmong villages found as far

south as Vientiane.

Lao Sung typically live on mountain tops, upland ridges, or

hillsides over 1,000 meters in elevation. The name Lao Sung

means "the Lao up high." Most groups are considered to be

semimigratory; villages are moved to new locations when swidden farming resources in the old locale have been exhausted.

Yet some villages have continued for more than 100 years, with

individual households moving in or out during this period.

Although all Lao Sung traditionally live in the uplands and

engage in swidden farming, their housing styles, diet, farming

techniques, kinship systems, and social organization vary from

one group to another.

The Hmong make up more than two-thirds of the Lao Sung.

Hmong villages in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand have traditionally been found on mountain.or ridge tops, with sites selected

according to principles of geomancy. Before the 1970s, villages

seldom consisted of more than twenty or thirty households.

Hmong rely on swidden farming to produce rice, corn, and

other crops, but tend to plant a field until the soil is exhausted,

rather than only for a year or two before allowing it to lie fal- low. Consequently, the fields farmed by a village would gradually become too distant for easy walking, and the village would

relocate to another site. The new site might be nearby or might

be many kilometers distant.

The Hmong fled China (where they were traditionally paddy

rice farmers) to escape persecution and pacification campaigns, gradually migrating through Vietnam and Laos into

Thailand. They adopted swidden farming in these regions by

necessity because lowland basins were already settled. Small

111
Laos: A Country Study

groups of households would leave an established village to start another village in relatively uninhabited upland areas. In turn,

other families moving from older settlements would settle an

area that had been vacated, always in search of better farmlands than those that had been left behind. As the population

of both Hmong and other neighboring groups increased, it ultimately became impossible to find new unclaimed lands,

and the pioneering settlement pattern ended sometime

between 1960 and 1975 in western Laos and northern Thailand. Villages in the old settled areas of eastern Laos

Xiangkhoang and Louangphrabang—in many cases have been

in one location for more than thirty or fifty years and have

grown in size to as many as sixty or eighty households and more

than 500 persons.

Hmong houses are constructed directly on the ground, with

walls of vertical wooden planks and a gabled roof of thatch or

split bamboo. In size they range from about five by seven

meters up to ten by fifteen meters for a large extended household. The interior is divided into a kitchen/cooking alcove at one end and several sleeping alcoves at the other, with beds or sleeping benches raised thirty to forty centimeters above the

dirt floor. Rice and unhusked corn are usually stored in large

woven bamboo baskets inside the house, although a particularly prosperous household may build a separate granary. Furnishings are minimal: several low stools of wood or bamboo, a low table for eating, and kitchen equipment, which includes a

large clay stove over which a large wok is placed for cooking

ground corn, food scraps, and forest greens for the pigs.

Almost every house has a simple altar mounted on one wall for

offerings and ceremonies associated with ancestral spirits.

The Hmong swidden farming system is based on white (nonglutinous) rice, supplemented with corn, several kinds of

tubers, and a wide variety of vegetables and squash. Rice is the

preferred food, but historical evidence indicates that corn was

also a major food crop in many locations and continues to be

important for Hmong in Thailand in the early 1990s. Most

foods are eaten boiled, and meat is only rarely part of the diet. Hmong plant many varieties of crops in different fields as a means of household risk diversification; should one crop fail, another can be counted on to take its place. Hmong also raise

pigs and chickens in as large numbers as possible, and buffalo

and cattle graze in the surrounding forest and abandoned

fields with little care or supervision.

112
The Society and Its Environment

Hmong have traditionally grown opium in small quantities

for medicinal and ritual purposes. From the beginning of their

colonial presence, the need for revenue prompted the French

to encourage expanded opium production for sale to the colonial monopoly and for payment as head taxes. Production,

therefore, increased considerably under French rule, and by

the 1930s, opium had become an important cash crop for the

Hmong and some other Lao Sung groups. Hmong participate

in the cash market economy somewhat more than other

upland groups. They need to purchase rice or corn to supplement inadequate harvests, to buy cloth, clothing, and household goods, to save for such emergencies as illness or funerals,

and to pay bride-prices. In the isolated upland settlements

favored by the Lao Sung, opium poppies, a cold-season crop, are typically planted in cornfields after the main harvest.

Opium, a sap extracted from the poppy plant, is almost the

only product that combines high value with low bulk and is nonperishable, making it easy to transport. It is thus an ideal

crop, providing important insurance for the household against

harvest or health crises. The government has officially outlawed opium production, but, mindful of the critical role it plays in the subsistence upland economy, has concentrated

efforts on education and developing alternatives to poppy

farming, rather than on stringent enforcement of the ban (see

Narcotics and Counternarcotics Issues, ch. 5). It also established a special police counternarcotics unit in August 1992.

Lao Sung farming is not mechanized but depends on household labor and simple tools. The number of workers in a household thus determines how much land can be cleared and

farmed each year; the time required for weeding is the main

labor constraint on farm size. Corn must be weeded at least

twice, and rice usually requires three weedings during the

growing season. Peppers, squash, cucumbers, and beans are

often interplanted with rice or corn, and separate smaller gar- dens for taro, arrowroot, cabbage, and so on may be found

adjacent to the swiddens or in the village. In long-established

villages, fruit trees such as pears and peaches are planted

around the houses.

In response to increasing population pressure in the

uplands, as well as to government discouragement of swidden

farming, some Hmong households or villages are in the process of developing small rice paddies in narrow upland valleys or relocating to lower elevations, where, after two centuries as

113
Laos: A Country Study

swidden farmers, they are learning paddy technology, how to

train draft buffalo, and how to identify seed varieties. To varying degrees, this same process is also occurring with other Lao

Sung groups in the early 1990s as it had under the RLG.

Hmong households traditionally consist of large patrilineal

extended families, with the parents, children, and wives and

children of married sons all living under the same roof. Households of over twenty persons are not uncommon, although ten

to twelve persons are more likely. Older sons, however, may

establish separate households with their wives and children

after achieving economic independence. By the 1990s, a ten- dency had developed in Laos for households to be smaller and

for each son and his wife to establish a separate household

when the next son married. Thus, the household tends toward

a stem family pattern consisting of parents and unmarried children, plus perhaps one married son. Following this pattern,

the youngest son and his wife frequently inherit the parental

house; gifts of silver and cattle are made to the other sons at marriage or when they establish a separate residence. In many

cases, the new house is physically quite close to the parents'

house.

Hmong reckon kinship patrilineally and identify fifteen or

sixteen patrilineal exogamous clans, each tracing their descent

back to a common mythical ancestor. There are several subdivisions in Hmong society, usually named according to features of

traditional dress. The White Hmong, Striped Hmong, and

Green Hmong (sometimes called Blue Hmong) are the most

numerous. Their languages are somewhat different but mutually comprehensible, and all recognize the same clans. Each vil- lage usually has at least two clans represented, although one

may be more numerous. Wives almost always live with their husband's family.

Marriage is traditionally arranged by go-betweens who represent the boy's family to the girl's parents. If the union is acceptable, a bride-price is negotiated, typically ranging from three to ten silver bars, worth about US$100 each, a partial relic from

the opium trade. The wedding takes place in two installments,

first at the bride's house, followed by a procession to the

groom's house, where a second ceremony occurs. Sometimes

the young man arranges with his friends to "steal" a bride; the

young men persuade the girl to come out of her house late at night and abduct her to the house of her suitor. Confronted by

114
115
Laos: A Country Study

the fait accompli, the girl's parents usually accept a considerably lower bride-price than might otherwise be demanded.

Although some bride stealing undoubtedly involves actual

abductions, it more frequently occurs with the connivance of

the girl and is a form of elopement.

As a result of a government directive discouraging excessive

expenditures on weddings, some districts with substantial

Hmong populations decided in the early 1980s to abolish the

institution of the bride-price, which had already been administratively limited by the government to between one and three

silver bars. In addition, most marriages reportedly occurred by

"wife stealing" or elopement, rather than by arrangement. In

the past, males had to wait for marriage until they had saved an

adequate sum for the bride-price, occasionally until their midtwenties; with its abolition, they seemed to be marrying earlier.

Hmong women typically marry between fourteen and eighteen

years of age.

The Hmong practice polygyny, although the government

officially discourages the custom. Given the regular need for

labor in the swidden fields, an additional wife and children can improve the fortunes of a family by changing the consumer/

worker balance in the household and facilitating expansion of

cropped areas, particularly the labor-intensive opium crop. Yet

the need to pay a bride-price limits the numbers of men who

can afford a second (or third) wife. Anthropological reports

for Hmong in Thailand and Laos in the 1970s suggested that

between 20 and 30 percent of marriages were polygynous.

However, more recent studies since the mid-1980s indicate a lower rate not exceeding 10 percent of all households. Divorce

is possible but discouraged. In the case of marital conflict,

elders of the two clans attempt to reconcile the husband and

wife, and a hearing is convened before the village headman. If reconciliation is not possible, the wife may return to her family.

Disposition of the bride-price and custody of the children

depend largely on the circumstances of the divorce and which

party initiates the separation.

Hmong gender roles are strongly differentiated. Women are responsible for all household chores, including cooking, grinding corn, husking rice, and child care, in addition to regular

farming tasks. Patrilocal residence and strong deference

expected toward men and elders of either sex often make the

role of daughter-in-law a difficult one. Under the direction of

116
The Society and Its Environment

her mother-in-law, the young bride is commonly expected to carry out many of the general household tasks. This subordinate role may be a source of considerable hardship and tension. Farm tasks are the responsibility of both men and women,

with some specialization by gender. Only men fell trees in the

swidden clearing operation, although both sexes clear the grass and smaller brush; only men are involved in the burning operation. During planting, men punch the holes followed by the

women, who place and cover the seeds. Both men and women

are involved in the weeding process, but it appears that women

do more of this task, as well as carry more than half of the harvested grain from the fields to the village. Harvesting and

threshing are shared. Women primarily care for such small animals as chickens and pigs, while men are in charge of buffalo,

oxen, and horses. Except for the rare household with some

paddy fields, the buffalo are not trained but simply turned out

to forage most of the year. As with all Laotian ethnic groups, there is virtually no occupational specialization in Hmong villages. Everyone is first and

foremost a subsistence farmer, although some people may have

additional specialized skills or social roles. Hmong are animists, although a small number have converted to Christianity as a result of contact with Protestant and

Roman Catholic missionaries. Most believe that spirits are a common cause for illness. Shamans (txiv neeb) who can treat spirit-induced illness are respected and play an important role

in the village, often being consulted to tell fortunes. Shamans

may be either male or female and are usually "chosen" by the

spirits after the former have suffered a long illness. Other men

and women may know curing rites but do not enter a trance as a shaman does (see Religion, this ch.).

Village stratification is limited but based primarily on clan

membership and wealth. Often the clan that founded a village

dominates it, either because of numerical majority or because

early settlement facilitated access to the better fields. A family's

wealth derives primarily from work and good luck. The ability to produce enough rice, or even a little to sell, and a decent

opium harvest depend on having enough workers in the family

to clear and care for more extensive swidden fields than aver- age. Livestock, particularly buffalo and cattle, are another

important source of mobile wealth. This wealth, however, is subject to loss through disease, just as savings of silver, livestock,

117
Laos: A Country Study

or cash can be lost almost overnight if the family experiences a

serious illness that reduces the workforce at a critical time or

that requires the sacrifice of chickens, pigs, or even a buffalo

for curing rituals. Proceeds from sales of opium and livestock

not immediately consumed are usually converted into silver

bars or jewelry for safekeeping.

In contrast to the Buddhist wat or the men's common house

in Lao Loum, Kammu, and Lamet villages, there is no building or other central point in a Hmong village. Hmong cultural

norms are more individualistic, and the household is more

important than the village. Despite greater overall village permanence than in former times, individual households may

come and go, usually in search of better opportunities but

occasionally because of conflict with relatives or neighbors.

The decline of migrating villages has been a gradual process

since the 1940s. As opportunities for pioneering settlements

have disappeared, households often relocate to be near other

clan members or less-distant relatives.

Village governance is usually in the hands of a president and

administrative committee, but clan elders have important consultative or advisory roles in all decisions. Interhousehold cooperative relationships occur less often than among the Lao

Loum and appear limited to labor exchanges for some farming

tasks and assistance at house raisings. Most cooperation takes

place among brothers or cousins, and it is primarily close kin

who can be relied upon for assistance in the case of family

hardship or emergency. Lacking any other resource, Hmong

will look for help from any other member of the same clan.

Hmong and other Lao Sung groups have traditionally lived

in villages distant from Lao Loum or Lao Theung settlements,

although trade in rice, forest products, and other market goods

has stimulated contact between the groups. As the population

of both Lao Sung and Lao Loum groups increased after the

war, Lao Sung expansion of swidden fields had an impact on

the watersheds of Lao Loum rice paddies. Northern Lao Loum

who cannot produce enough rice on limited paddy fields have

also begun to clear swiddens in the middle elevations. For the

most part, there has been no overt conflict, and trade and

casual contact have continued, but long-standing ethnic prejudice continued to color interethnic relations in these regions

of closer contact and competition for land in the early 1990s.

118
The Society and Its Environment

At the same time that roads in remote provinces were being

improved and international trade opened in the late 1980s, the

Thai government imposed a ban on logging and timber

exports following extensive deforestation and catastrophic

floods. Thai logging companies quickly turned to Laos as an

alternate source of tropical hardwoods. This suddenly

increased demand for tropical timber has stimulated additional competition for hitherto unvalued forestland and provoked increased criticism of upland swidden farming groups.

Although traditional levels of swidden farming did not cause

the same level of land and forest damage as have recent logging activities, government statements increasingly have attributed rapid deforestation to swidden clearing and have

envisioned the abolition of all upland swidden cultivation soon

after the year 2000. Thus, in the 1990s, there may be more pres- sure on arable land in the uplands than previously. However,

other analysts have noted the great impact of legal and illegal

logging, as well as the encroachment of lowland Lao farmers

into the uplands since the end of the Second Indochina War. A

continuing low-level insurgency against the government, substantially led by Hmong refugees who formerly fought for the

RLG, is a further source of official mistrust directed at some

Hmong and other minority groups. Government efforts to

resettle Hmong and other swidden farming communities in

lowland sites are motivated by security concerns—as was the

case under the RLG in the 1960s and 1970s—and by competition for timber, but may lead to increased disaffection of the

minorities affected.

The Pattern of Rural Life For Lao Loum, Lao Theung, and Lao Sung, the rhythm of

life is strongly tied to the changing seasons and the requirements of farming. For swidden farming villages, the work year

begins in January or February when new fields are cleared.

This time of the year is also good for hunting and for moving

to a new village. Opium farmers harvest the resin between January and March, depending on location and variety of poppy,

but otherwise there are few agricultural activities. Swidden

fields are burned around March and must be planted in May or June, just before the first rains. From the time the seeds sprout

until August, work revolves around the never-ending task of

weeding. Hunting and fishing continue, and with the coming

119
Laos: A Country Study

of the rains, the forest begins to yield new varieties of wild

foods.

For paddy farmers, the agricultural year begins with the first rains, when a small seedbed is plowed and planted. The seedlings grow for a month or so while the remaining fields are plowed and harrowed in preparation for transplanting. Transplanting requires steady work from every able-bodied person

over a period of about a month and is one of the main periods

of labor exchange in lowland villages.

Swidden farmers begin the corn harvest as early as September, and short-season rice varieties mature soon after the corn. Paddy rice seldom ripens before October, however, and the

harvest may continue through early December in some areas, although mid-November is more usual. Even late swidden rice

is finished by early November. Harvesting and threshing the

rice are the principal activities during the second period of

intense work in the farm year. Dry-season rice farmers repeat

the same cycle, but vegetables, tobacco, or other cash crops

require a more even labor input over the season. Food availability parallels the seasons. Wild foods and fish are abundant during the rainy season, although the months

just before the corn ripens may be difficult if the previous

year's harvest was inadequate. Fruit is available during the rainy

and cool dry seasons, but becomes scarce, as do most vegetables, from March through May. Hmong and Mien celebrate

their new year in December or January, when the harvest is complete but before the time to clear new fields. Lowland Lao

celebrate their new year on April 15, also shortly before the

start of the farming year. The harvest is marked by the That

Luang (see Glossary) festival, on the full moon of the twelfth

lunar month, which falls in late November or early December

(see Buddhism, this ch.).

Because most roads are in poor condition, travel in the rainy season is generally difficult, and villagers tend to stay close to home because of farmwork as well as the ever-present mud.

The dry season brings easier land travel and the free time it allows. Since the late 1980s, a few rural villagers have begun to travel to regional population centers in search of temporary

wage employment, often in construction.

Urban Society

With a population of somewhat over 250,000 in 1985, Vien120
The Society and Its Environment

tiane is the only city of any size in Laos. Three provincial capitals have populations of more than 20,000—Louangphrabang

with 20,000, Savannakhet with 109,000, and Pakxe with 50,000.

The 1985 census classified 15 percent of the population as "urbanized," but this figure includes the populations of all district centers, most of which are little more than large villages of

2,000 to 3,000 persons. The expanded marketing and commercial opportunities resulting from economic liberalization in

1986 have somewhat stimulated urban growth. Vientiane plan- ners anticipate an annual population expansion of 5.4 percent

through the year 2000, and many of the more rural provincial

capitals also are growing at a significant rate in the early 1990s.

Urban centers, for the most part, have developed from vil- lages that expanded or grew together around an administrative or trading center. Louangphrabang is the historical capital of

the kingdom of Lan Xang, and Vientiane and Pakxe are also

centers of earlier kingdoms. Migration of the Lao Loum into

the region resulted in the establishment of muang (see Glossary), semi-independent principalities, which sometimes

formed a larger state entity but which always preserved a cer- tain autonomy as a result of transportation and communication difficulties. Many of the original districts have since

become district centers, and the word itself is used for this

political division (see Party Structure, ch. 4). Although district

centers rarely had more than a few thousand people as the

mid-1990s approached, they serve as secondary administrative

posts and marketing centers for the surrounding villages and

are the location of the medical clinic and lower-secondary

school—grades six through eight—for the vast majority of the

rural population.

Population displacement during the Second Indochina War

caused growth in some cities—Vientiane, Louangphrabang,

and the main lower Mekong Valley towns—but depopulation

of centers in the eastern liberated zones. Xiangkhoang was

destroyed by bombing in 1969, and Xam Nua and Phongsali were virtually depopulated. These provincial capitals have been

revived since 1975, but their geographic isolation inhibits rapid

growth. The capital of Xiangkhoang was relocated twenty kilometers north to the village of Phonsavan. Administrative centers of several districts were also relocated after 1975 in order

to make them more central to all villages in the district.

121
Laos: A Country Study

Historically, towns were located along major rivers or in

upland valleys and were primarily populated by Lao Loum and

small populations of Vietnamese merchants, artisans, and civil servants (imported by the French), as well as by Chinese and

Indian traders. Migration of refugees during the Second

Indochina War brought an increased minority population,

which grew even faster after 1975 because officials of the new

regime, many of whom were Lao Theung and Lao Sung,

moved into administrative posts in Mekong towns. So many

Chinese and Indian merchants left Laos during the war that

these groups accounted for only a small portion of the urban

population in 1994. Many Vietnamese who were sympathetic to the RLG also fled, although an unknown number of advisers

from North Vietnam were posted to Vientiane and other major

centers. The Vietnamese population was nevertheless unlikely

to exceed a few thousand in any towns other than Vientiane

and Savannakhet.

All provincial capitals were centers of marketing, administration, education, and health care, but not of manufacturing

because there was almost no industrial production outside the

Vientiane area (see Industry and Services, ch. 3). As of mid1994, each capital had at least one upper-secondary school

often the only one in the province—along with specialized

technical schools for agriculture, teacher training, or public

health (see Education, this ch.). Almost every province capital

also had a hospital, but the quality of care and the availability

of medicines—although greater than that in villages—were fre- quently limited.

Everywhere, the basic village character of society is evident.

Even in Vientiane, a substantial number of the inhabitants are paddy rice farmers, either as their main occupation or as important supplemental work. Government officials' salaries are inadequate to support a family, and many officials rely on

family members to secure their basic rice supply by farming.

Cities and towns are also important markets for vegetables and

fruit produced in the nearby villages; the trade volume remains

small outside of Vientiane but has stimulated the gradually

increasing market orientation of rural producers.

Traditional festivals and religious ceremonies are observed

in towns much as in villages and are often organized on the

basis of a neighborhood, which is typically defined by the

boundaries of a formerly separate village. Family life-cycle cere122
The Society and Its Environment

monies frequently draw guests from outside the neighborhood

but rely on close neighbors and relatives to help with food and

other preparations, as in a village.

Between 1975 and 1990, urban amenities such as hotels, res- taurants, and cinemas were virtually absent outside of Vientiane, Savannakhet, and Louangphrabang. A few towns had

government-operated guest houses for official travelers and

one or two restaurants with a limited menu. Travelers in most

district centers and even some provincial capitals could find a meal only by making arrangements with a family or the care- taker assigned to the guest house. Town markets are also limited in size and number. After the economic reforms of the late 1980s, however, private restaurants and hotels opened in most

provincial centers and larger districts. Official travel increased,

and, more important, Laotian merchants, foreign delegations,

and tourists again began to travel within the country.

Sanitation services and utilities are not widespread. As of

mid-1994, only a few of the larger towns had municipal water

systems, and none had sewerage services. Electrification is a

limited but important feature of urban life (see Industrial Output and Employment, ch. 3). Outside of the Vientiane area, Thakhek, Louangphrabang, and Savannakhet, most district

centers did not have electricity in the early 1990s. Even in

towns, electric power is limited to a few hours a day. Automobile batteries and voltage inverters are widely used as a power

source to watch television or listen to a stereo cassette player.

The presence of a foreign diplomatic and aid community

has had a significant effect on the economy of Vientiane, both

in terms of direct aid and through employment of Laotians by

the missions and as domestic help (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3). In

response, Vientiane merchants stock imported consumer

goods such as electronics, clothing, and food, items purchased

by Laotians much more than by foreigners. A once dormant

service sector of automobile and truck repair, tailors, barbers,

and hairdressers has begun to revive. Patrons at restaurants

and the six disco establishments are also predominantly Laotians, reflecting the increased income available to private-sector businessmen and employees of foreign organizations.

Foreign assistance in Vientiane during the early years of the

LPDR helped to develop several upper-secondary schools and

technical-training schools and improve the two main hospitals.

123
Laos: A Country Study

However, Laotian cities have failed to attract the rural population, as cities do in other countries, because they offer little obvious economic opportunity and because the rural areas

offer the possibility of making a decent living within communities that have not been socially or economically fragmented by

the forces of modernization. Further, the government initially

had explicitly anti-urban policies. Other towns have experienced less in-migration than Vientiane; this pattern is likely to change if economic opportunities arise in secondary towns or

if competition for land and forest resources—or restrictions on

access—increases to the point of reducing the rural standard of

living. Nevertheless, even if a town does not dominate the

region, it has an impact on the lives of people living in the sur- rounding area. The larger the population of a town, the

greater the town's impact on the region. For example, farmers

within about fifteen kilometers of Louangphrabang grow vegetables for sale in the town market. In Vientiane, this radius

expands to forty kilometers; some village residents commute

up to thirty kilometers each way to government or private jobs

in the capital. Through these contacts, new ideas and material

goods filter into rural areas. Religion

Buddhism

Buddhism was the state religion of the Kingdom of Laos,

and the organization of the Buddhist community of monks and

novices, the clergy (sangha), paralleled the political hierarchy.

The faith was introduced beginning in the eighth century by

Mon Buddhist monks and was widespread by the fourteenth

century (see Early History, ch. 1). A number of Laotian kings were important patrons of Buddhism. Almost all lowland Lao

were Buddhists in the early 1990s, as well as some Lao Theung

who have assimilated to lowland culture. Since 1975 the communist government has not opposed Buddhism but rather has

attempted to manipulate it to support political goals, and with

some success. Increased prosperity and a relaxation of political

control stimulated a revival of popular Buddhist practices in

the early 1990s.

Lao Buddhists belong to the Theravada tradition, based on

the earliest teachings of the Buddha and preserved in Sri

Lanka after Mahayana Buddhism branched off in the second

124
The Society and Its Environment

century B.C. Theravada Buddhism (see Glossary) is also the

dominant school in Thailand and Cambodia.

Theravada Buddhism is neither prescriptive, authoritative, nor exclusive in its attitude toward its followers and is tolerant

of other religions. It is based on three concepts: dharma (see

Glossary), the doctrine of the Buddha, a guide to right action

and belief; karma (see Glossary), the retribution of actions, the

responsibility of a person for all his or her actions in all past

and present incarnations; and sangha, within which a man can improve the sum of his actions. There is no promise of heaven

or life after death but rather salvation in the form of a final

extinction of one's being and release from the cycle of births

and deaths and the inevitable suffering while part of that cycle.

This state of extinction, nirvana, comes after having achieved

enlightenment regarding the illusory nature of existence.

The essence of Buddhism is contained in the Four Noble

Truths taught by the Buddha: suffering exists; suffering has a

cause, which is the thirst or craving for existence; this craving can be stopped; and there is an Eightfold Path by which a permanent state of peace can be attained. Simply stated, the Eightfold Path consists of right understanding, right purpose, right

speech, right conduct, right vocation, right effort, right thinking, and right meditation.

The average person cannot hope for nirvana at the end of

this life, but by complying with the basic rules of moral conduct, can improve karma and thereby better his or her condition in the next incarnation. The doctrine of karma holds that,

through the working of a just and impersonal cosmic law,

actions in this life and in all previous incarnations determine

which position along the hierarchy of living beings a person

will occupy in the next incarnation. Karma can be favorably

affected by avoiding these five prohibitions: killing, stealing,

forbidden sexual pleasures, lying, and taking intoxicants. The

most effective way to improve karma is to earn merit (het

boun—literally, to do good—in Lao). Although any act of

benevolence or generosity can earn merit, Laotians believe the

best opportunities for merit come from support for the sangha

and participation in its activities. Traditionally, all males are expected to spend a period as a monk or novice prior to marriage and possibly in old age, and

the majority of Lao Loum men probably did so until the 1970s.

Being ordained also brings great merit to one's parents. The

125
Laos: A Country Study

period of ordination need not be long—it could last only for

the three-month Lenten retreat period—but many men spend

years in the sangha gaining both secular and religious knowledge. Study of the Pali language, in which all Theravada texts are written, is a fundamental component of religious training.

Ordination as a monk also requires a man to comply with the

227 rules of the monastic order; novices—those under twenty

years old—must obey seventy-five rules; and lay persons are expected to observe the five prohibitions. Only a few women,

usually elderly, become Buddhist nuns; they live a contemplative and ascetic life but do not lead religious ceremonies as do

monks.

Monks are trying to develop detachment from the world

and, thus, may have no possessions but must rely on the generosity of people for food and clothing. These gifts provide an

important opportunity for the giver to earn merit. Women are more active than men in preparing and presenting rice and

other food to monks, who make their morning rounds through

the town carrying a bowl to receive offerings that are their only

nourishment for the day. In villages where there are only a few

monks or novices, the women of the village often take turns

bringing food to the wat each morning. Attendance at prayers

held at the wat on the quarter, full, and new moon of each

lunar cycle also provides a regular means of gaining merit.

Major religious festivals occur several times a year. The

beginning and end of the Lenten retreat period at the full moon of the eighth and eleventh months are occasions for special offerings of robes and religious articles to the monks. During Buddhist Lent, both monks and laity attempt to observe

Buddhist precepts more closely. Monks must sleep at their own

wat every night—rather than being free to travel—and are expected to spend more time in meditation. Offerings to monks and attendance at full-moon prayers are also greater

than at other times. Vixakha Bouxa, which celebrates the birth,

enlightenment, and death of Buddha at the full moon of the

sixth month—usually May—corresponds with the rocket festi- val (boun bangfai), which heralds the start of the rains. The

date of Boun Phavet, which commemorates the charity and

detachment of Prince Vessantara, an earlier incarnation of the

Buddha, varies within the dry season, and, aside from its reli- gious orientation, serves as an important opportunity for a vil- lage to host its neighbors in a twenty-four-hour celebration

centering on monks reciting the entire scripture related to Ves126
Monk standing by the door

of That Luang, Vientiane

Courtesy Gina Merris

Monks sawing logs for

charcoal, Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris
Laos: A Country Study

santara. That Luang, a Lao-style stupa, is the most sacred Buddhist monument in Laos and the location of the nationally

important festival and fair in November.

For the Lao Loum, the wat is one of the two focal points of

village life (the other is the school). The wat provides a symbol

of village identity as well as a location for ceremonies and festi- vals. Prior to the establishment of secular schools, village boys

received basic education from monks at the wat. Nearly every

lowland village has a wat, and some have two. Minimally, a wat

must have a residence building for the monks and novices

(vihari), and a main building housing the Buddha statues

(sim), which is used for secular village meetings as well as for

prayer sessions. Depending on the wealth and contributions of

the villagers, the buildings vary from simple wood and bamboo

structures to large, ornate brick and concrete edifices decorated with colorful murals and tile roofs shaped to mimic the curve of the naga, the mythical snake or water dragon. An

administrative committee made up of respected older men

manages the financial and organizational affairs of the wat. Buddhist ceremonies generally do not mark events in a life- cycle, with the exception of death. Funerals may be quite elaborate if the family can afford it but are rather simple in rural set- tings. The body lies in a coffin at home for several days, during

which monks pray and a continual stream of visitors pays their

respects to the family and shares food and drink. After this

period, the body is taken in the coffin to a cremation ground

and burned, again attended by monks. The ashes are then

interred in a small shrine on the wat grounds.

Beginning in the late 1950s, the Pathet Lao attempted to convert monks to the leftist cause and to use the status of the

sangha to influence the thoughts and attitudes of the populace.

The effort was in many ways successful, despite efforts by the

RLG to place the sangha under close civil administrative control and to enlist monks in development and refugee assistance

programs. Political scientist Stuart-Fox attributed the success of

the Pathet Lao to the inability of the Lao Loum elite to integrate the monarchy, government, and sangha into a set of

mutually supportive institutions. Popular resentment of the

aristocracy, division of the sangha into two antagonistic sects,

the low level of its religious education and discipline, and

opposition to foreign (i.e., Western) influence all contributed

to the receptiveness of many monks to Pathet Lao overtures.

128
The Society and Its Environment

The politicization of the sangha by both sides lowered its status in the eyes of many, but its influence at the village level augmented popular support for the Pathet Lao political platform,

which paved the way for the change in government in 1975.

The LPDR government's successful efforts to consolidate its authority also continue to influence Buddhism. In political

seminars at all levels, the government taught that Marxism and

Buddhism are basically compatible because both disciplines

state that all men are equal, and both aim to end suffering.

Political seminars further discouraged "wasteful" expenditures

on religious activities of all kinds because some monks were

sent to political reeducation centers and others were forbidden

to preach. The renunciation of private property by the monks

was seen as approaching the ideal of a future communist society. However, Buddhist principles of detachment and nonmaterialism are clearly at odds with the Marxist doctrine of

economic development, and popular expenditures on reli- gious donations for merit making are also seen as depriving the

state of resources. Thus, although overtly espousing tolerance

of Buddhism, the state undercut the authority and moral standing of the sangha by compelling monks to spread party propaganda and by keeping local monks from their traditional

participation in most village decisions and activities. During

this period of political consolidation, many monks left the

sangha or fled to Thailand. Other pro-Pathet Lao monks joined

the newly formed Lao United Buddhists Association, which

replaced the former religious hierarchy. The numbers of men

and boys being ordained declined abruptly, and many wat fell empty. Participation at weekly and monthly religious ceremonies also dropped off as villagers under the watchful eye of

local political cadre were fearful of any behavior not specifically encouraged.

The nadir of Buddhism in Laos occurred around 1979, after

which a strategic liberalization of policy occurred. Since that

time, the number of monks has gradually increased, although

as of 1993, the main concentrations continue to be in Vientiane and other Mekong Valley cities. Buddhist schools in the

cities remain but have come to include a significant political

component in the curriculum. Party officials are allowed to participate at Buddhist ceremonies and even to be ordained as monks to earn religious merit following the death of close relatives. The level of religious understanding and orthodoxy of

the sangha, however, is no higher than it had been before 1975,

129
Laos: A Country Study

when it was justly criticized by many as backward and unobservant of the precepts.

From the late 1980s, stimulated as much by economic

reform as political relaxation, donations to the wat and participation at Buddhist festivals began to increase sharply. Festivals

at the village and neighborhood level became more elaborate,

and the That Luang festival and fair, which until 1986 had been

restricted to a three-day observance, lasted for seven days.

Ordinations also increased, in towns and at the village level,

and household ceremonies of blessing, in which monks were

central participants, also began to recur. Although the role of

Buddhism has been permanently changed by its encounter

with the socialist government, it appears that Buddhism's fundamental importance to lowland Lao and to the organization

of Lao Loum society has been difficult to erase, has been recognized by the government, and will continue for the foreseeable

future.

Animism

Despite the importance of Buddhism to Lao Loum and

some Lao Theung groups, animist beliefs are widespread

among all segments of the Lao population. The belief in phi

(spirits) colors the relationships of many Lao with nature and

community and provides one explanation for illness and dis- ease. Belief in phi is blended with Buddhism, particularly at the

village level, and some monks are respected as having particular abilities to exorcise malevolent spirits from a sick person or

to keep them out of a house. Many wat have a small spirit hut

built in one corner of the grounds that is associated with the

phi khoun wat, the beneficent spirit of the monastery.

Phi are ubiquitous and diverse. Some are connected with the

universal elements—earth, heaven, fire, and water. Many Lao

Loum also believe that they are being protected by khwan

(thirty-two spirits). Illness occurs when one or more of these

spirits leaves the body; this condition may be reversed by the

soukhwan—more commonly called the bad—a ceremony that

calls all thirty-two khwan back to bestow health, prosperity, and

well-being on the affected participants. Cotton strings are tied

around the wrists of the participants to keep the spirits in

place. The ceremony is often performed to welcome guests,

before and after making long trips, and as a curing ritual or

after recovery from an illness; it is also the central ritual in the

130
The Society and Its Environment

Lao Loum wedding ceremony and naming ceremony for new- born children.

Many Lao believe that the khwan of persons who die by accident, violence, or in childbirth are not reincarnated, becoming

instead phi phetu (malevolent spirits). Animist believers also

fear wild spirits of the forests. Other spirits associated with specific places such as the household, the river, or a grove of trees are neither inherently benevolent nor evil. However, occasional offerings ensure their favor and assistance in human

affairs. In the past, it was common to perform similar rituals

before the beginning of the farming season to ensure the favor

of the spirit of the rice. These ceremonies, beginning in the

late 1960s, were discouraged by the government as successive

areas began to be liberated. This practice had apparently died

out by the mid-1980s, at least in the extended area around

Vientiane.

Ceremonies oriented to the phi commonly involve an offering of a chicken and rice liquor. Once the phi have taken the

spiritual essence of the offering, people may consume the

earthly remains. The head of a household or the individual

who wants to gain the favor of the spirit usually performs the

ritual. In many villages, a person, usually an older man believed

to have special knowledge of the phi, may be asked to choose an auspicious day for weddings or other important events, or

for household rites. Each lowland village believes itself protected by the phi ban, which requires an annual offering to ensure the continued prosperity of the village. The village

spirit specialist presides over this major ritual, which in the past

often involved the sacrifice of a water buffalo and is still an

occasion for closing the village to any outsiders for a day. To

Hang phi ban (feed the village spirit) also serves an important

social function by reaffirming the village boundaries and the

shared interests of all villagers.

Most Lao Theung and Lao Sung ethnic groups are animists,

for whom a cult of the ancestors is also important, although

each group has different practices and beliefs. The Kammu call spirits hrooy, and they are similar to the phi of the Lao Loum;

the house spirit is particularly important, and spirits of wild

places are to be avoided or barred from the village. Lamet have

similar beliefs, and each village must have one spirit practitio- ner (xemia), who is responsible for making all the sacrifices to

village spirits. He also supervises the men's communal house

131
Laos: A Country Study

and officiates at the construction of any new houses. When a

spirit practitioner dies, one of his sons is elected by the married

men of the village to be his successor. If he has none, one of his

brother's sons is chosen. Ancestor spirits (mbrong n'a) are very

important to the Lamet because they look out for the wellbeing of the entire household. They live in the house, and no

activity is undertaken without informing them of it. Ancestor

spirits are fond of buffalos; thus buffalo skulls or horns from

sacrifices are hung at the altar of the ancestors or under the

gable of the house. Numerous taboos regarding behavior in

the house are observed to avoid offending ancestral spirits.

Hmong also believe in a variety of spirits (neeb), some associated with the house, some with nature, and some with ancestors. Every house has at least a small altar on one wall, which is the center of any ritual related to the household or its members. Annual ceremonies at Hmong New Year renew the general protection of the household and ancestral spirits. The

spirit of the door is important to household well-being and is the object of another annual ceremony and sacrifice. As with

other Lao groups, illness is frequently attributed to the action

of spirits, and spirit practitioners are called to carry out curing

rites. Two classes exist: ordinary practitioners and shamans.

Ordinary priests or the household head conduct the household ceremonies and ordinary divinations. The shaman may be

called on to engage in significant curing rituals. According to Hmong belief, spirits reside in the sky, and the

shaman can climb a ladder to the heavens on his magical horse

and contact the spirits there. Sometimes illness is caused by

one's soul climbing the steps to the sky, and the shaman must

climb after it, locate it, and bring it back to the body in order to

effect a cure. During the ritual, the shaman sits in front of the

altar astride a wooden bench, which becomes his or her horse.

A black cloth headpiece covers vision of the present world, and

as the shaman chants and enters a trance, he or she begins to shake and may stand on the bench or move, mimicking the

process of climbing to heaven. The chant evokes the shaman's

search and the negotiations with the heavenly spirits for a cure

or for information about the family's fortune.

Hmong shamans are believed to be chosen by the spirits,

usually after a serious or prolonged illness. The illness would

be diagnosed by another shaman as an initiatory illness and

confrontation with death, which was caused by the spirits. Both

132
The Society and Its Environment

men and women can be summoned in this way by the spirits to be shamans. After recovery from the illness, the newly chosen

shaman begins a period of study with a master shaman, which

may last two or three years, during which time he or she learns

the chants, techniques, and procedures of shamanic rites, as well as the names and natures of all the spirits that can bring

fortune or suffering to people. Because the tradition is passed

orally, there is no uniform technique or ritual; rather, it varies

within a general framework according to the practice of each

master and apprentice.

Education

Education Prior to the Lao People's Democratic Republic

Of the many ethnic groups in Laos, only the Lao Loum had

a tradition of formal education, reflecting the fact that the languages of the other groups had no written script. Until the

mid-twentieth century, education was primarily based in the

Buddhist wat, where the monks taught novices and other boys

to read both Lao and Pali scripts, basic arithmetic, and other

religious and social subjects. Many villages had wat schools for

novices and other village boys. However, only ordained boys

and men in urban monasteries had access to advanced study.

During the colonial period, the French established a secular

education system patterned after schools in France, and

French was the language of instruction after the second or

third grade. This system was largely irrelevant to the needs and

life-styles of the vast majority of the rural population, despite its extension to some district centers and a few villages. However,

it did produce a small elite drawn primarily from the royal family and noble households. Many children of Vietnamese immigrants to Laos—who made up the majority of the colonial civil service—also attended these schools and, in fact, constituted a

significant proportion of the students at secondary levels in

urban centers. Post-secondary education was not available in

Laos, and the few advanced students traveled to Hanoi,

Danang, and Hue in Vietnam and to Phnom Penh in Cambodia for specialized training; fewer still continued with university-level studies in France.

The Pathet Lao began to provide Lao language instruction

in the schools under its control in the late 1950s, and a Laotian

curriculum began to be developed in the late 1960s in the RLG

133
Laos: A Country Study

schools. In 1970 about one-third of the civilian employees of

the RLG were teachers, although the majority of these were

poorly paid and minimally trained elementary teachers. At that

time, there were about 200,000 elementary students enrolled

in RLG schools, around 36 percent of the school-age population.

Education since 1975

An important goal of the LPDR government was to establish a system of universal primary education by 1985. The LPDR

took over the existing RLG education system that had been

established in the 1950s and restructured it, facing many of the

same problems that had also confronted previous governments. The French system of education was replaced with a Laotian curriculum, although lack of teaching materials has

impeded effective instruction. An intensive adult literacy campaign was initiated in 1983-84, which mobilized educated per- sons living in villages and urban neighborhoods to bring basic

reading and writing skills to over 750,000 adults. Largely as a

result of this campaign, those able to read and write increased

to an estimated 44 percent. According to the United Nations

(UN), by 1985 those able to read and write were estimated at 92 percent of men and 76 percent of women of the fifteen to

forty-five age-group. Because few reading materials are available, especially in the rural areas, many newly literate adults

lose much of their proficiency after a few years. The decision to establish universal education led the government to focus its efforts on building and staffing schools in

nearly every village. Because resources are limited, most

schools are poorly constructed—of bamboo and thatch—and

staffed by only one or two teachers who are paid low wages,

usually in arrears. Many village schools have only one or two

grades, and books, paper, or other teaching materials are con- spicuous by their scarcity.

School enrollment has increased since 1975. In 1988 primary school enrollment was estimated at 63 percent of all school-age children. In 1992-93 an estimated 603,000 students were in primary school, compared to 317,000 students in 1976

and 100,000 students in 1959. However, the goal of achieving

universal primary education was postponed from 1985 to 2000

as a result of the lack of resources.

134
The Society and Its Environment

Because teachers are paid irregularly, they are forced to spend significant amounts of time farming or in other liveli- hood activities, with the result that in many locations classes are

actually held for only a few hours a day. Because of irregular

classes, overcrowding, and lack of learning resources, the aver- age student needed eleven to twelve years to complete the five- year primary course in the late 1980s. Repetition rates ranged

from 40 percent for the first grade to 14 percent for the fifth

grade. Dropouts also were a significant problem, with 22 percent of all entering first graders leaving school before the sec- ond grade. In the late 1980s, only 45 percent of entering first graders completed all five years of primary school, up from 18

percent in 1969.

Performance statistics vary according to rural-urban location, ethnic group, and gender. Enrollment and school quality are higher in urban areas, where the usefulness of a formal

education is more evident than in rural farming communities.

Isolated teachers confronted with primitive rural living and

teaching conditions have a difficult time maintaining their own

commitment as well as the interest of their pupils. Ethnic

minority students who have no tradition of literacy and who do

not speak Lao have a particularly difficult time. Unless the

teacher is of the same or similar ethnic group as the students,

communication and culturally appropriate education are limited. Because of these factors, in the late 1980s the enrollment

rate for the Lao Sung was less than half that of the Lao Loum;

enrollment was also low for Lao Theung children.

Girls are less likely than boys to attend school and attend for

fewer years—a discrepancy that was declining, however, in the

early 1990s. In 1969 only 37 percent of students in primary

school were girls; by 1989, however, 44 percent of primary

school students were girls. Because of Lao Sung cultural atti- tudes toward girls' and women's responsibilities, girls in these

groups accounted for only 26 percent of all students.

Secondary education enrollment has expanded since 1975

but as of mid-1994 was still limited in availability and scope. In

1992-93 only about 130,000 students were enrolled in all postprimary programs, including lower- and upper-secondary

schools, vocational programs, and teacher-training schools.

The exodus of Laotian elite after 1975 deprived vocational and

secondary schools of many of their staff, a situation that was

only partly offset by students returning from training in social135
Laos: A Country Study

ist countries. Between 1975 and 1990, the government granted over 14,000 scholarships for study in at least eight socialist

countries; just over 7,000 were to the Soviet Union, followed by

2,500 to Vietnam, and 1,800 to the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

In mid-1994, the school year was nine months. The typical

sequence includes five years of primary school, followed by

three years of lower-secondary school and three years of uppersecondary school. Some students go directly from primary or lower-secondary school to vocational instruction, for example,

in teacher-training schools or agriculture schools.

Local secondary education is concentrated in the provincial

capitals and some district centers. Dropout rates for students at secondary and technical schools are not as high as among primary students, but the gender and ethnic group differentials are more pronounced. In the late 1980s, only 7 percent of

lower-secondary students were Lao Sung or Lao Theung, a rate that dropped to 3 percent in upper-secondary school. For most

students who do not live in a provincial center, attendance at secondary school requires boarding away from home in makeshift facilities. This situation further discourages students in

rural areas from pursuing further education, with additional

differential impacts on girls and minorities. Vientiane has the

majority of advanced schools, including the national teachers'

training school at Dong Dok, the irrigation college at Tad

Thong, the agriculture college at Na Phok, the National Polytechnic Institute, and the University of Medical Sciences. Even

so, the level of training available at these schools is low. In 1986 the government began to reform the education sys- tem, with the goals of linking educational development more

closely to the socioeconomic situation in each locality, improving science training and emphasis, expanding networks to remote mountainous regions, and recruiting minority teachers. The plan envisioned making education more relevant to daily realities and building increased cooperation in educational activities among the various ministries, mass organizations, and the community. However, the ability to implement

this program through its scheduled completion in 2000

depends on a significant budgetary increase to the educational

sector in addition to receiving significant foreign aid. Education accounted for only 8 percent of government expenditures

in 1988, down from a 10 to 15 percent range during the pre136
The Society and Its Environment

ceding seven-year period, and cultural expenditures also were

not accorded a high priority.

Although more school texts and general magazines are being printed, poor distribution systems and budgetary constraints limit their availability throughout the country (see

Mass Media, ch. 4). Overall, 3.9 million books were printed in

1989, including school texts published by the Ministry of Education, and novels, stories, and poems published by the Ministry of Information and Culture. Translations into Lao of

various Russian-language technical, literary, and children's

books were available through the Novosti press agency. Almost

all these materials are inexpensive paperbound editions. Distribution of school texts is improving, and magazines and novels can occasionally be found in district markets distant from Vientiane. Thai printed material—for the most part, magazines and

books—was available after the late 1980s in a few shops. Yet, in

the early 1990s, it was rare to see a book or any other reading

material in rural villages, with the exception of political posters or a months-old edition of the newspaper Xieng Pasason (Voice

of the People) pasted on a house wall. Health And Welfare

Public Health

Health and health care in Laos were poor in the early 1990s.

Although diets are not grossly inadequate, chronic moderate

vitamin and protein deficiencies are common, particularly

among upland ethnic groups. Poor sanitation and the prevalence of several tropical diseases have further eroded the

health of the population. Western medical care is available in

few locations, and the quality and experience of practitioners

are, for the most part, marginal, a situation that has not

improved much since the 1950s.

The life expectancy at birth for men and women in Laos was

estimated in 1988 at forty-nine years, the same as in Cambodia

but at least ten years lower than in any other Southeast Asian

nation. High child and infant mortality rates strongly affected

this figure, with the Ministry of Public Health estimating the

infant mortality rate at 109 per 1,000 and the under-five mortality rate at 170 per 1,000 in 1988. The United Nations Children's

Fund (UNICEF—see Glossary) believed these figures underestimated the true mortality rate but still represented decreases

137
Laos: A Country Study

from comparable rates in 1960. Regional differences were

great. Whereas the infant mortality rate for Vientiane was

about 50 per 1,000, in some remote rural areas it was estimated

to be as high as 350 per 1,000 live births; that is, 35 percent of

all children died before the age of one.

Children's deaths are primarily caused by communicable dis- eases, with malaria, acute respiratory infections, and diarrhea

the main causes of mortality as well as morbidity. Vaccination

against childhood diseases was expanding, but in 1989 Vientiane's municipal authorities still were unable to vaccinate

more than 50 percent of targeted children. Other provinces

have much lower rates of immunization. Malaria is widespread

among both adults and children, with the parasite Plasmodium

falciparum involved in 80 to 90 percent of the cases. In the first malaria eradication program between 1956-60,

DDT was sprayed over much of the country. Since 1975 the

government has steadily increased its activities to eradicate

malaria. The Ministry of Public Health operates provincial sta- tions to monitor and combat malaria through diagnosis and

treatment. Prevention measures involve chemical prophylaxis

to high-risk groups, elimination of mosquito breeding sites,

and promotion of individual protection. The campaign has

had some success: the ministry reported a decline in the

infected population from 26 percent to 15 percent between

1975 and 1990.

As of 1993, diarrheal diseases were also common, with regular outbreaks occurring annually at the beginning of the rainy season when drinking water is contaminated by human and

animal wastes washing down hillsides. Only a few rural households have pit or water-seal toilets, and people commonly

relieve themselves in the brush or forested areas surrounding

each village. For children in these villages, many of whom are chronically undernourished, acute or chronic diarrhea is life- threatening because it results in dehydration and can precipitate severe malnutrition.

Although nutrition appears to be marginal in the general

population, health surveys are of varying quality. Some data

indicate that stunting—low height for age—in the under-five

population ranged from 2 to 35 percent, while wasting—low

weight for height—probably does not exceed 10 percent of the

under-five population. These figures reflect village diets based

predominantly on rice, with vegetables as a common accompa138
Laotians bringing offerings to a temple in Ban Houayxay, near the Thai border, in Bokeo Province

Courtesy Randall C. Merris

Musicians in Vientiane help to raise fundsfor wat restoration. Courtesy Gina Merris

139
Laos: A Country Study

niment and animal protein—fish, chicken, and wild foods

eaten irregularly. Children aged six months to two years—the

weaning period—are particularly susceptible to undernutrition. The nutritional status of adults is related closely to what is being grown on the family farm, as well as to dietary habits. For

example, fresh vegetables and fruits are not highly valued and

therefore are not consumed in adequate amounts. As a result,

it is likely that vitamin A, iron, and calcium deficiencies are common in all parts of the country.

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

Permissive attitudes of Laotian men toward sex and prostitution facilitated the transmission of human immunodeficiency

virus (HIV) during the 1980s and 1990s, making HIV infection

and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) a growing

concern. In 1992 a focused sample of about 7,600 urban resi- dents identified one AIDS case and fourteen persons who

tested HIV positive. No other statistics were available as of mid1994.

The government convened a conference on AIDS in 1992,

which noted the potential for a rapid spread of HIV in the population. Participants at the conference agreed that the spread

of AIDS in Laos was inevitable, and, in fact, would likely be

through young men who migrated to towns and then returned

to their villages, as well as through women who entered the sex

trades because of economic necessity. The numbers of HIV-positive people could increase to more than 10,000 within the next

few years, although these numbers would likely not expand at the same rate as in Thailand—even though Thai men demonstrate similar attitudes toward sex and prostitution—because

Laos's national policies forbid open prostitution. Through the

early 1990s, Laos avoided widespread prostitution such as that

found in neighboring countries, but it is likely to increase, as is the temporary migration of Laotian women to neighboring

countries to work in the sex industry. Other possible routes of

HIV infection include users of injectable illicit drugs and medical injections using unsanitary syringes. Should AIDS spread

significantly in Laos, it will not only have a devastating effect on

rural labor and the national economy, but will put impossible

stress on the health care system. As the best means of preventing an epidemic, the conference report emphasized education

in all sectors of the population through a variety of methods,

including the media.

140
The Society and Its Environment

Health Infrastructure

Despite government promises that the urban-oriented

health system inherited from the RLG would be expanded to support rural primary health care and preventative programs,

little money had been allocated to the health sector as of 1993.

According to figures from 1988, less than 5 percent of the total government budget was targeted for health, with the result that

the Ministry of Public Health was unable to establish a management and planning system to facilitate the changes envisioned.

UNICEF considered the effort to construct a primary health

care system to have failed entirely.

Official statistics identified hospitals in fifteen of the sixteen

provinces, plus several in Vientiane, and clinics in 110 districts and more than 1,000 tasseng (subdistricts—see Glossary). In

reality, most subdistrict clinics are unstaffed, unequipped, and

unsupplied, and in 1989 only twenty of the district clinics actually provided services. The physical condition of the facilities is poor, with clean water and latrines unavailable at most health

posts, and electricity unavailable at 85 percent of district clinics, rendering vaccine storage impossible. Drugs and equipment stored in the central warehouses are seldom distributed

to outlying provinces, and in most situations, patients had to purchase Western pharmaceuticals from private pharmacies

that import stock from Thailand or Vietnam.

The number of health care personnel has been increasing

since 1975, and in 1990 the ministry reported 1,095 physicians,

3,313 medical assistants, and 8,143 nurses. Most personnel are concentrated in the Vientiane area, where the population per

physician ratio (1,400 to one) is more than ten times higher

than in the provinces. In 1989 the national ratio was 2.6 physicians per 10,000 persons.

Training of medical personnel at all levels emphasizes theory at the expense of practical skills and relies on curricula similar to those used prior to 1975. International foreign aid

donors supported plans for a school of public health, and texts were written and published in Lao. As of 1990, however, the

school did not exist because of delays in approval of its struc- ture and difficulties in finding trainers with the appropriate

background.

Rural and provincial health personnel work under conditions similar to their counterparts in education: salaries are low

141
Laos: A Country Study

and seldom paid on time, necessary equipment and supplies are unavailable, and superiors offer little supervision or encouragement. In these circumstances, morale is low, job

attendance sporadic, and most health care ineffectual. In general, the population has little confidence in the health care sec- tor, although some village medics and a few district or

provincial hospitals are respected by their communities.

Use of traditional medical practitioners remains important

in urban as well as rural locations. Healers who know how to use medicinal plants are often consulted for common illnesses.

The Institute of Traditional Medicine of the Ministry of Public

Health formulates and markets a number of preparations from

medicinal plants. Spirit healers are also important for many

groups, in some cases using medicinal plants but often relying on rituals to identify a disease and effect a cure. Many Laotians

find no contradiction in consulting both spirit curers and Western-trained medical personnel.

In the absence of a widespread system of health workers,

local shops selling drugs became an important source of medicines and offered advice on prescriptions. However, these pharmacies are unregulated and their owners unlicensed. As a consequence, mis-prescription is common, both of inappropriate drugs and incorrect dosages. In rural areas, vendors com- monly make up small packets of drugs—typically including an

antibiotic, several vitamins, and a fever suppressant—and sell them as single-dose cures for a variety of ailments.

Social Welfare

Despite statistics indicating that Laos is one of the poorest

countries in the world, it has for the most part been spared the

acute problems often associated with underdevelopment and

poverty. Famine and serious epidemics have been absent in the

twentieth century, urban slums have not existed, and debt

bondage has been unknown. Because the rural economy was not effectively monetized through at least the early 1980s,

households usually countered seasonal crop shortages by

increasing their gathering activities and relying on wild tubers

and other foods as insurance crops. Most villages have customs

regarding the provision of rice loans—sometimes interestfree—to families experiencing a bad year. Most shelter in rural areas is self-built and not dependent on land ownership or

access to money. Thus, it is possible for most families to survive

142
The Society and Its Environment

at least at a subsistence level, although for many the material

standard of living is not high. Chronic marginal food production and lack of access to or inability to afford medical care and

education remain pervasive problems, however.

No reliable statistics regarding income distribution or the

extent of poverty were available as of mid-1994. A 1988 survey

of income distribution in urban Vientiane found an average

household monthly income of about K35,000 (for value of the

kip—see Glossary), or US$70, with the most common income

between K25,000 and K30,000 per month—about $US55 at the

1988 exchange rate. With 4.5 persons per average household,

the modal figure implied an annual per capita income of about

US$150, far below the UN poverty line of US$275. Whether

this survey included noncash income from agricultural production or other exchange is unknown, however; family crop production is still an important element in the economy of many

urban Vientiane families. These limited statistics emphasize the

relative sensitivity of urban residents to prices and cash income,

particularly when compared with rural villagers who are more

insulated from the effects of inflation and market behavior.

The government does not maintain a social welfare system,

but the National Committee for Social Welfare and War Veter- ans operates a number of "orphans' schools" in some province

centers and administers retirement pay to government officials. This retirement pay, however, is as insignificant as the offi- cials' salaries were before retirement. Orphans, handicapped

persons, and elderly persons living in rural villages are usually

supported and cared for by their relatives, although the level of

support depends on the economic resources of the caretakers.

Lowland Lao are traditionally tolerant of mentally handicapped members of their community, and these persons,

although not economically productive, are allowed to live with

their families and move around the village at will. This family

approach to social welfare operates in the towns as well, often

on a neighborhood basis but particularly relying on extended

kinship networks. As a consequence, urban beggars were

unknown between 1975 and about 1987, although a small number appeared in Vientiane after that date, perhaps reflecting

the increase in urban economic differentiation as much as any

increase in acute poverty.

Regional and ethnic discrepancies remain the greatest source of poverty and poor living conditions. Many lowland vil143
Laos: A Country Study

lages are prosperous, regularly produce a rice surplus, and

assist a small number of less well-off households within their

boundaries. Other villages, particularly those in the uplands or of minorities who have recently relocated to lowland sites, are

less well off and often unable to produce enough rice for vil- lage consumption. In these situations, the ability to produce

other salable commodities, whether livestock, opium, or vegetables, or to find wage-labor jobs, is critical to the well-being of

the household and the village. In settings where an entire vil- lage is rice-deficient, interfamily exchanges and rice loans can- not ameliorate the basic shortage affecting the community.

Acute regional crop shortfalls in several years between 1989

and 1993 were largely met by rice imports provided through

foreign aid. As market networks expand and as the economy

becomes increasingly monetized and population growth and

resettlement increase pressure on land resources, the number

of villages in marginal economic situations can be expected to increase.

Future Trends

In mid-1994 Laotian society was in a period of transition.

Although firmly based in self-sufficient village agricultural patterns, it is beginning to experience social and economic

change stimulated by government policies and slowly growing

communication with urban centers and neighboring modernizing countries. Most Laotians, however, have little experience

outside their district of residence and are able to live simply

and relatively comfortably on the food and other products they

produce or gather themselves. Limited but expanding trade

provides basic consumer goods that make life more comfortable or save labor. Trade also provides a stimulus to produce

somewhat more than the family needs for its immediate con- sumption. Nevertheless, villages in mountainous regions are

less advantaged and less connected to the market network and

to government influence than those on the plains and river valleys, and some are chronically unable to produce enough food

to meet their needs.

As the market economy expands and rural farmers find

opportunities for cash crop production, village labor exchange

relationships and other forms of cooperation are likely to begin to break down. These changes have already begun in the

villages on the Vientiane plain, although in outlying provinces

144
The Society and Its Environment

traditional cooperation networks remain more firmly in place.

Not surprisingly, social and economic stratification increases in

villages more closely linked to urban areas or markets, where

some families are quicker to exploit economic or educational

opportunities. Landownership remains relatively equal, but

unclaimed good quality land for paddy rice production is extremely difficult to locate, thus removing one factor that

served to minimize stratification in the past. At the end of the

twentieth century, competition for lowland farms and

increased pressure and restrictions on upland swidden farming

may combine to change the character of rural landownership

and farming. Genuinely landless families are likely to increase

in number, and urban populations also will likely continue to expand at a moderate rate, depending on the continued establishment of manufacturing enterprises in provincial centers. Substantial changes occurred in the education and health

systems after 1975, but both sectors are severely underfunded

and fail to meet the expectations of government policy makers.

Education is more likely to improve, and as schools improve,

expand their curriculum, and become more widespread, rural

youth will gradually acquire the outlook and skills needed for

work and life in an increasingly open and market-oriented society. Whether improved education also brings political inquiry

and change remains to be seen. Past performance of the state health sector does not generate much optimism regarding future developments. In the

early 1990s, economic growth and stratification were already

creating a demand for health care that remained unmet by the

government sector, and since the late 1980s, significant numbers of people have traveled to Thailand for treatment of seri- ous illnesses. Private health providers may increase, in much

the same way as private pharmacies have opened to meet the

demand for medications that cannot be obtained through the

state health system.

Religious traditions that were initially threatened by the

communist government have made a resurgence, and eco- nomic prosperity in lowland Lao areas has stimulated increased

donations to and support of the Buddhist wat'm many villages.

As of mid-1994, most ethnic minorities maintained animist tra- ditions as well, but were criticized formally and informally by

officials for being superstitious.

145
Laos: A Country Study

At least through the 1990s, the traditional elements of Laotian society will very likely continue, and society will maintain

its predominantly rural character. Self-sufficiency is not widely

at risk, although there are certain ethnic groups and regions of

the country experiencing inadequate food production and

continued lack of access to productive resources. Ethnic diversity will certainly continue to be a factor in government development policy as well as intervillage relationships but is unlikely to be a source of serious conflict. * * * There have been few contemporary works on Laotian society, and only one researcher, anthropologist Grant Evans, has

been able to carry out formal ethnographic or sociological

studies in Laos since 1975. Most recent books and articles have

focused on economic and political affairs. For information

about society, it is necessary to search for certain less accessible

reports prepared for development projects, as well as older

sources. For some of the better sources, knowledge of French is necessary. The best books as of the early 1990s were Evans's Lao

Peasants Under Socialism, Australian political scientist Martin

Stuart-Fox's Laos: Politics, Economics, Society, and French social

geographer Christian Taillard's Le Laos: Strategies d'un etat-tam- pon. The UNICEF report, Children and Women in the Lao People's

Democratic Republic, is not easily available but provides an excellent up-to-date overview of the economic, health, education,

and agricultural sectors, as well as the socioeconomic status of

women and children.

A number of monographs or journal articles on post-1975

Laos are noteworthy. These include Evans's Agrarian Change in

Communist Laos; an article entitled '"Rich Peasants' and Cooperatives in Socialist Laos," and another article entitled "Reform

or Revolution in Heaven? Funerals among Upland Tai." Carol

Ireson's study, "Women's Forest Work in Laos," outlines

women's roles regarding gathering of wild foods and other

resources in rural areas. Three short studies produced for the

Swedish development aid mission also provide useful details of

contemporary village life in rural areas: Agneta Hakangard's

"Road 13: A Socio-Economic Study of Villagers, Transport and

Use of Road 13 S, Lao P.D.R.;"Jan Ovesen's "Anthropological

Reconnaissance in Central Laos: A Survey of Local Communities in a Hydropower Project Area;" and Ing-Britt Trankell's

"On the Road in Laos: An Anthropological Study of Road Con146
The Society and Its Environment

struction and Rural Communities." Martin Stuart-Fox and Rod

Bucknell's "Politicization of the Buddhist Sangha in Laos" analyzes the religious changes occurring through the early 1980s.

Several works based on research during the RLG period

remain valuable. Jacques Lemoine's Un village Hmong vert du

Haut Laos is the only comprehensive source on the Hmong in

Laos, as is Karl Gustav Izikowitz's dated, but still fundamentally

useful account of the Lamet, Lamet: Hill Peasants in French

Indochina.

Several publications on the Kammu produced with the collaboration of Kristina Lindell, Damrong Tayanin, and their

coworkers provide detailed descriptions of Kammu life in Laos

prior to the revolution. See particularly Lindell, et al., The

Kammu Year: Its Lore and Music, Damrong and Lindell's Hunting

and Fishing in a Kammu Village; and Damrong's "Environment

and Nature Change in Northern Laos."

Articles by Christian Taillard and Georges Condominas provide an understanding of the social dynamics of lowland Lao

village life unavailable elsewhere, particularly Taillard's "Le vil- lage Lao de la region de Vientiane: Un pouvoir local face au

pouvoir etatique" and "Le dualisme urbain-rural au Laos et la recuperation de l'ideologie traditionnelle" and Condominas's

"Phiban Cults in Rural Laos." Martin John Philip Barber's

"Migrants and Modernization: A Study of Change in Lao Society" also contains valuable information on village social struc- ture in the Vientiane area. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

147

Chapter 3. The Economy
Detailfrom a Red Tai textile, with a spirit figure and a naga (mythical snake

or water dragon, associated with the rains and rivers) performing a healing

and spirit-appeasing ceremony; a naga almostforms the shape of a boat.
IN THE EARLY 1990s, the Lao People's Democratic Republic

(LPDR, or Laos) was among the ten poorest countries in the

world, according to a World Bank (see Glossary) ranking, with

a per capita gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) in

1991 ofjust US$200. Its labor force is poorly trained and educated, its infrastructure severely damaged from years of inadequate maintenance, and its ability to feed itself precariously

dependent upon the weather. Development expenditure is financed almost entirely by foreign aid, and, by 1991, exports

financed only 40 percent of imports. By the beginning of the

1990s, however, Laos, while still an impoverished country

highly dependent on foreign aid for its development, had

taken some essential steps toward a free-market economy.

Despite the many obstacles to economic development that

remained in the early 1990s, however, in little more than a decade, starting in 1979, the government had deliberately

shifted the focus of its economic policy away from socialist

goals and had made great strides. Many state-owned enterprises, which had been draining the nation's treasury through

subsidies, were privatized, and tax collection was boosted tre- mendously, helping to bring the fiscal deficit under control.

Liberal laws on foreign investment and trade were passed, precipitating a surge of investment activity. Prices of many commodities were freed from government controls, domestic

transport restrictions were lifted, and the cooperative farming

system was ended.

The Seventh Resolution, passed at a plenary session of the

Central Committee by the ruling Phak Pasason Pativat Lao

(Lao People's Revolutionary Party—LPRP; see Glossary) in late 1979, marked the start of the country's shift toward a marketoriented economy. The resolution affirmed the government's

commitment to begin to open to a market economy, as the necessary path to economic development. Since its inception in

1975, the government, in theory, has recognized private property and private enterprise. However, they were not encouraged, and, in fact, the provincial governments of Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang) and Phongsali abolished private

trade and traders through 1987. The objectives of the First

Five-Year Plan (1981-85) included self-sufficiency in food pro151
Laos: A Country Study

duction, defined as the equivalent of 350 kilograms of paddy

rice and other foodstuffs per capita per year, and the collectivization of agriculture. The plan also focused on developing

industrial activity, increasing trade with Thailand, improving

the shattered rural infrastructure, and increasing export reve- nues, all goals that received much greater attention as the tentative steps toward a market-oriented economy continued.

Growth during the plan period was slower than had been

anticipated, however, and the government decided to take

bolder steps toward reform. At the Fourth Party Congress in

1986, the Second Five-Year Plan (1986-90) was endorsed, and a new national development strategy was introduced. The New

Economic Mechanism, as this program was called, was

designed to expose the economy to world market forces gradually, without sacrificing the nation's goal of food self-sufficiency.

To implement this plan, many facets of the economy were

decentralized. Although the central authorities continued to set policy guidelines, responsibility for administering and

financing many programs for economic and social development was delegated to the provinces. About a year after the

congress, the new policy was promulgated into regulations, and

changes became rapid and extensive.

The second plan also sought to encourage foreign and pri- vate investment. Among the reforms called for under the New

Economic Mechanism were the lifting of numerous trade regulations and the creation of opportunities for foreign investment. In a major shift from its economic dependency on

Vietnam, Laos began to look toward Thailand—and, later,

toward other socialist countries—for private investment, technology transfer, and trade. Through the improvement of trans- portation and communications systems, encouragement of the

private sector, and development of the agroforestry industrial

processing sector, it was hoped that non-food imports could be

reduced and exports increased, thus improving the balance of

payments. Although Laos showed an overall balance of payments surplus in 1985 and 1986, the current account deficit

had been increasing, and during those years exports financed

less than 30 percent of imports. The government took a new

interest in environmental protection and sought to limit the

practice of swidden, or slash-and-burn, cultivation as a means

of protecting its forest resources and encouraging cash cropping. It proved difficult, however, to bring about such a change

because of negative effects on upland farmers' livelihoods. Tra152
The Economy

ditional swidden agriculture does not adversely affect forest resources to the same extent that commercial exploitation

does.

Many reforms were carried out successfully during the late 1980s, but the Second Five-Year Plan ended with economic performance lagging well behind planned achievements. Not least among the disappointments was the need to import rice during

the droughts of 1987 and 1988, underlining the fact that an

objective identified over ten years earlier—sustained self-suffi- ciency in food—had not been met.

Despite economic failures, however, the Fifth Party Congress, held in March 1991, reaffirmed the government's com- mitment to the development of a market-oriented economy.

The Third Five-Year Plan (1991-95) proposes a "strategy" that

aims to continue progress made under the previous two plans:

improving the country's infrastructure, promoting exports,

and encouraging import-substitution industries. In August

1991, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) approved a new

constitution—the first since the previous constitution was abolished in 1975 (see The Constitution, ch. 4). Among its provisions is the affirmation of the right to private ownership; the

words "democracy and prosperity" replaced "socialism" in the

national motto.

Agriculture and Forestry

Agriculture in the Economic System

At least 5 million hectares of Laos's total land area of

23,680,000 hectares are suitable for cultivation; however, just

17 percent of the land area (between 850,000 and 900,000

hectares) is, in fact, cultivated, less than 4 percent of the total area. Rice accounted for about 80 percent of cultivated land

during the 1989-90 growing season, including 422,000 hectares of lowland wet rice and 223,000 hectares of upland rice,

clearly demonstrating that although there is interplanting of

upland crops and fish are found in fields, irrigated rice agriculture remains basically a monoculture system despite government efforts to encourage crop diversification. Cultivated land

area had increased by about 6 percent from 1975-77, but in

1987 provided citizens with less than one-fourth of a hectare

each, given a population of approximately 3.72 million in 1986.

In addition to land under cultivation, about 800,000 hectares

153
Laos: A Country Study

are used for pastureland or contain ponds for raising fish. Pas- tureland is rotated, and its use is not fixed over a long period of

time.

In the early 1990s, agriculture remained the foundation of

the economy. Although a slight downward trend in the sector's contribution to gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) was evident throughout the 1980s and early 1990s—from about

65 percent of GDP in 1980 to about 61 percent in 1989 and further decreasing to between 53 and 57 percent in 1991 —a similar decrease in the percentage of the labor force working in

that sector was not readily apparent. Some sources identified

such a downward trend—from 79 percent in 1970 to about 71

percent in 1991—but both the LPDR's State Planning Commission and the World Bank reported that 80 percent of the labor

force was employed in agriculture in 1986. Available evidence

thus suggests that the percentage of the labor force employed

in agriculture in fact remained relatively steady at about 80 percent throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Agricultural production grew at an average annual rate of

between 3 and 4 percent between 1980 and 1989, almost double its growth rate in the preceding decade, despite two years of

drought—in 1987 and 1988—when production actually

declined. Paddy rice production declined again in 1991 and

1992, also because of drought. By 1990 the World Bank esti- mated that production was growing at an increasingly faster rate of 6.2 percent. Increased production, long one of the government's goals, is a result, in part, of greater use of improved

agricultural inputs during the 1970s and 1980s. The area of

land under irrigation had been expanding at a rate of 12 percent per annum since 1965, so that by the late 1980s, irrigated

land constituted between 7 and 13 percent of total agricultural

land. Although still a small percentage, any increase helps to

facilitate a continued rise in agricultural productivity. Smallscale village irrigation projects rather than large-scale systems

predominate. Use of fertilizers increased as well, at an average

annual rate of 7.2 percent; given that commercial fertilizer use had been virtually nonexistent in the late 1970s, this, too, is an

important, if small, achievement in the government's pursuit of

increased productivity. In addition, the number of tractors in use nearly doubled during the decade, from 460 tractors in

1980 to 860 in 1989.

154
The Economy

Crops and Farming Systems

Most farmers employ one of two cultivation systems: either

the wet-field paddy system, practiced primarily in the plains

and valleys, or the swidden cultivation system, practiced primarily in the hills. These systems are not mutually exclusive, especially among the Lao Loum (see Glossary), or lowland Lao, in areas remote from major river valleys (see Lowland Lao Society,

ch. 2). Swidden cultivation was practiced by approximately 1 million farmers in 1990, who grew mostly rice on about 40 percent of the total land area planted to rice. Swidden agriculture is highly destructive to the forest environment because it entails shifting from old to new plots of

land to allow exhausted soil to rejuvenate, a process that is esti- mated to require at least four to six years. The extent of

destruction, however, depends on the techniques used by the

farmers and the overall demographic and environmental cir- cumstances that relate to the length of the fallow period

between farming cycles. Further, traditional agricultural practices allowed for forest regeneration and not the stripping of

forest cover, which is a current commercial logging practice.

Swidden fields are typically cultivated only for a year, and then

allowed to lie fallow, although Kammu (alternate spellings

include Khamu and Khmu) anthropologist Tayanin Damrong

reports that at least through the 1970s some fields were planted

two years in a row. An increasing population, encroachment on

traditional swidden farming areas by other villages or ethnic

groups, and gradual deterioration of the soil as a result of these

pressures have led to increasingly frequent shortfalls in the harvests of midland swidden farmers.

The swidden farming process begins with clearing the

selected fields in January or February, allowing the cut brush

and trees to dry for a month, and then burning them. Rice or other crops are seeded by dibble shortly before the rains begin

in June, and the growing crops must be weeded two or three

times before the harvest in October. Swidden farming households are seldom able to harvest a rice surplus; in fact, the harvest usually falls one to six months short of families' annual rice

requirements.

Swidden cultivation is less productive than wet-field cultivation because it requires between ten and fifty times as much

land per capita—if one includes the fallow fields in the calculation—yet produces just 20 percent of the national rice harvest.

155
Laos: A Country Study

Mature fallows or young forests have other benefits such as wild

food gathering, animal habitat, and watershed protection. Government policy since the introduction of the New Economic

Mechanism has discouraged the practice of swidden cultivation

because it works against the goals of increased agricultural productivity and an improved forest environment. Also, the government wishes to control the population in close clusters.

Farmers have resisted the change, however, largely because

wet-field cultivation often is not feasible in their areas and

because no alternative method of subsistence has presented

itself, especially given the lack of markets and infrastructure

necessary for cash-cropping to be an attractive, or even a possible, venture. Further, government traders' defaults on purchase contracts with farmers in the late 1980s made farmers

with better physical access to markets skeptical about cash-crop

production. In general, despite government efforts to increase

export-oriented agricultural production, the "rice monoculture" persisted in Laos through the early 1990s.

Rice

Rice is the main crop grown during the rainy season, and,

under usual conditions, rainfall is adequate for rice production. However, if rain ceases to fall for several weeks to a month

at a critical time in the rice growing cycle, yields will be significantly affected. Upland rice varieties, although adapted to a lower moisture requirement, are also affected by intermittent

rains because farmers have no means of storing water in their

fields. Rice accounted for over 80 percent of agricultural land and

between 73 percent and 84 percent of total agricultural output

of major crops throughout the 1980s, except in 1988, and into

the early 1990s (see table 4, Appendix). Rice paddies also yield

fish in irrigation ditches in na (lowland rice fields). Production

of rice more than doubled between 1974 and 1986, from fewer

than 700,000 tons to 1.4 million tons; however, drought in 1987

and 1988 cut annual yields by nearly one-third, to about 1 million tons, forcing the government to rely on food aid for its domestic requirements. In 1988 and 1989, some 140,000 tons

of rice were donated or sold to Laos. With improved weather

and the gradual decollectivization of agriculture—an important measure under the New Economic Mechanism—rice production surged by 40 percent in 1989. The increase in

production reflected the importance of the agricultural sector

156
Sticky rice harvest, Vientiane

Rice padi, Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

157
Laos: A Country Study

to the economy and was largely responsible for the economic

recovery following the droughts. In 1990 production continued to increase, although at a much slower rate, and the point

of self-sufficiency in rice was reached: a record 1.5 million tons. Sufficiency at a national level, however, masks considerable

regional differences. The southern Mekong provinces of

Khammouan, Savannakhet, and Champasak regularly produce

surpluses, as do Vientiane and Oudomxai provinces, but an

inadequate transportation system often makes it easier for

provinces with shortages to purchase rice from Thailand or Vietnam than to purchase it from other provinces.

According to some sources, the percentage of the labor

force engaged in rice production declined gradually, by over 30

percent between 1986 and 1991, a trend encouraged by the

government because it tended to increase export-oriented production. Some feared, however, that this trend would threaten

sustained self-sufficiency in food, another key goal of the government. But sustained self-sufficiency more likely depends on

a continued increase in the use of agricultural inputs such as

fertilizers and improved strains of rice, and on the implementation of extension and research services, rather than on the

actual number of workers involved in planting.

The overall increase in rice production throughout the

1980s was the result of higher productivity per hectare, rather

than of an increase in the land area planted in rice; in fact, the area planted in rice decreased during the 1980s, from 732,000

hectares in 1980 to 657,000 hectares in 1990. Because farmers

make little use of fertilizers or irrigation, however, most land

still yielded only one annual crop in the early 1990s, despite

government efforts to foster the use of double-crop rice. Other Crops

Only about 150,000 hectares were planted with major crops

other than rice in 1990, an increase from approximately 80,000

hectares in 1980. Principal non-rice crops include cardamom

sometimes considered a forestry product—coffee, corn, cot- ton, fruit, mung beans, peanuts, soybeans, sugarcane, sweet

potatoes, tobacco, and vegetables. The only crop produced for

export in substantial quantities is coffee. Although the total area planted to these crops is small relative to the area planted

to rice, it increased from 10 percent of the total cropped area

in 1980 to about 18 percent in 1990. The increase in part

reflects the drop in rice production during the drought years;

158
The Economy

it also demonstrates some success in the government's push to

diversify crops. Yields for all the major crops except coffee, vegetables, and cardamom—for which some figures are only avail- able from 1986—increased gradually between 1980 and 1990,

most notably corn (by 70 percent), fruit (by 65 percent), peanuts (by 28 percent), and mung beans (by 25 percent) (see

table 5, Appendix). Despite increasing agricultural output,

however, Laos is still an importer of food, heavily dependent on

food aid.

Statistics for agricultural production do not reflect either the

nature of the subsistence agricultural economy or the importance of opium to the hill economy. Opium, legal in Laos and

once even accepted as a tax payment, is a lucrative cash crop

for the Lao Sung (see Glossary) —including the Hmong (see

Glossary) —who have resisted government efforts to replace

opium production with the production of other goods, for

which the market is much less profitable (see Upland Lao Society, ch. 2). Opium production provides the funds necessary to the household when there is a rice deficiency, common among

swidden farmers. Crop substitution programs, however, have

had some effect, and to some extent tougher laws against drug

trafficking and government cooperation on training programs

have also contributed to reduced output.

In 1994 Laos remained the third largest producer of illicit opium for the world market, according to United States drug

enforcement officials (see Narcotics and Counternarcotics

Issues, ch. 5). These officials estimate that the potential yield of

opium declined 47 percent—from 380 tons in 1989 when a memorandum of understanding on narcotics cooperation

between the United States and Laos was signed—to an esti- mated 180 tons in 1993. The 22 percent decline in opium production in 1993 from 1992, however, was largely attributed to adverse weather conditions.

Livestock

The government encourages animal husbandry through

programs for cattle breeding, veterinary services, cultivation of

pasture crops, and improvement of fish, poultry, and pig

stocks. Between 1976-78 and 1986-88, the stock of all farm animals increased greatly: cattle by 69 percent to 588,000 head;

goats by 128 percent to 73,000; pigs by 103 percent to 1.5 million; horses by 59 percent to 42,000; buffaloes by 55 percent to

1 million; and chickens by 101 percent to 8 million. Increases,

159
Laos: A Country Study

however, would have been significantly greater without diseases

and a persistent shortage of animal feed. Disease is a serious

problem: there is a significant annual mortality of chickens and

pigs in most villages, and buffaloes are also frequently subject

to epidemics.

Fishing

For many Laotians, freshwater fish are the principal source of protein; per capita consumption averages 5.1 kilograms

annually. Fishpond culture began in the mid-1960s, and production—mainly carp raised in small home lots—grew an aver- age 30 percent annually thereafter, the highest rate in Asia

between 1975 and 1985. The Mekong districts in the south

have especially high potential for greater increases in fish production. In the 1982-84 period, the average annual catch was

20,000 tons, all of which was consumed domestically.

Forestry

In the 1950s, forests covered 70 percent of the land area; yet,

by 1992, according to government estimates, forest coverage

had decreased by nearly one-third, to just 47 percent of total

land area. Despite the dwindling expanse, timber (including

ironwood, mahogany, pine, redwood, and teak) and other for- estry products (benzoin (resin), charcoal, and sticklac) consti- tute a valuable supply of potential export goods. The forest has

also been an important source of wild foods, herbal medicines,

and timber for house construction and even into the 1990s

continues to be a valued reserve of natural products for non- commercial household consumption. Since the mid-1980s,

however, widespread commercial harvesting of timber for the

export market has disrupted the traditional gathering of forest

products in a number of locations and contributed to

extremely rapid deforestation throughout the country (see

Environmental Problems and Policy, this ch.).

Deforestation increased steadily throughout the 1980s, at an

annual average rate of about 1.2 percent in the first half of the

decade according to the United Nations (UN) and other monitoring agencies. This rate represents the destruction of about

150,000 to 160,000 hectares annually, as compared with annual

reforestation of about 2,000 hectares. The government, however, reported a deforestation rate double this figure. Deforestation results from clearing forestland for shifting cultivation

160
The Economy

and removing logs for industrial uses and fuel. The volume of

logs (roundwood) removed for industrial purposes increased

by about 70 percent between 1975-77 and 1985-87, to about

330,000 cubic meters; however, this volume was dwarfed by that

removed for domestic (fuel) purposes. Between 1980 and

1989, the volume of logs removed for fuel increased by about

25 percent, to about 3.7 million cubic meters; only about

100,000 cubic meters were removed for industrial purposes. By

1991 these figures had increased to approximately 3.9 million

cubic meters and 106,000 cubic meters, respectively.

Following the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism, decentralization of forest management to autonomous

forest enterprises at the provincial level encouraged increased

exploitation of forests. At the central and provincial levels,

autonomous forest enterprises are responsible for forest management.

Timber resources have been commercially exploited on a small scale since the colonial period and are an important

source of foreign exchange. In 1988 wood products accounted

for more than one-half of all export earnings. In 1992 timber

and wood products were almost one-third of the total principal

exports.

The government needed to reconcile its opposing objectives

of decentralized forestry management and environmental protection. In January 1989, the government imposed a ban on

logging—initially announced in January 1988 as a ban on the

export of unprocessed wood—although exemptions are granted on a case-by-case basis. This measure was followed by

the imposition of high export taxes on timber and other wood

products, included in the June 1989 tax reforms. Toward the

end of 1989, logging was again permitted, but only based on

quotas extended to individual forestry enterprises. In response

to the restrictions, production of unprocessed logs (roundwood or timber) decreased slightly in 1989, but, according to the Asian Development Bank (see Glossary), production more

than recovered the following year. The effect of the restrictions

is most clearly shown in the export statistics for 1989—exports

of timber and wood products had decreased by 30 percent

from the previous year. In 1991 a new decree banned all logging until further notice, in hopes of controlling widespread

illegal logging and subsequent environmental destruction.

However, there was little practical impact, and illegal logging

161
Laos: A Country Study

remains widespread. The smuggling of logs to Thailand also is significant.

Agricultural Policy

Agriculture, the most important sector of the economy,

clearly benefited from the introduction of the New Economic

Mechanism. The changes positively affected performance by

establishing a consistent policy that induced increased agricultural production over a number of years—before the droughts

in 1987 and 1988—particularly in paddy production.

In June 1988, in line with the policies described by the New

Economic Mechanism, the government passed a resolution to reform the agricultural sector. As announced at the Fourth

Party Congress in 1986, the principal goal was to reorient the

sector toward a market economy. The abolition of the much

hated agricultural tax as well as the socialist restrictions on marketing helped to create necessary incentives for farmers.

The major change was in the pricing policy. The practice of

setting low producer prices for a wide range of crops was

ended, boosting incomes in rural areas. (In 1987 the procurement price of rice was only 30 percent of the market price)

.

Other changes were implemented. Restrictions on internal

trade of agricultural products were removed, allowing free

markets to operate, at least for important crops such as rice.

Laws also were enacted to guarantee farmers' rights to private

ownership of land, including the right to use, transfer commercially, and bequeath. Tax exemptions for specified periods also were decreed.

The reforms emphasize the government's belief that further

increasing and diversifying agricultural production requires

the participation and encouragement of the private sector. Food security, as always, remains a key objective, but the focus

of the new agricultural policy is on the production of cash

crops that can be processed—to increase their value—and then

exported. The means for reaching that goal include the popular 1989 measure of abandoning the poorly developed

attempts at establishing the socialist infrastructure of agriculture—a cooperative farming system.

The primary objective of the cooperative farming system,

based on the Vietnamese model, had been to help the nation

achieve self-sufficiency in food. Reflecting the government's

162
The Economy

pursuit of this goal, the number of government-assisted cooperative farms nearly tripled between 1978, when the drive to reorganize agriculture began, and the introduction of the New

Economic Mechanism in 1986. At that time, cooperative farms

numbered about 4,000 and employed about 75 percent of the

agricultural labor force, although most were cooperatives only

on paper, and there was no practical cooperative management.

By 1988, however, employment in the cooperatives had

decreased and included only 53 percent of all rural families

and about half of all rice fields. The distribution and sale of collectively managed land to families began in 1989. Most families in the old settled areas had their original land returned, which they still recognized.

By mid-1990 most state farms and agricultural cooperatives had

been disbanded. This move, in conjunction with the removal of

many restrictions on food prices and the distribution of agricultural goods, helped to precipitate a modest growth in agricultural output of about 7 percent in 1990.

At the Fifth Party Congress in March 1991, the government

reiterated the basic objective of its agricultural policy: a shift

from subsistence production to cash crop production through

crop diversification and improved linkages to export markets.

Although rural farmers have limited experience in marketing

their farm produce and are cautious about participating

actively in the market, they are beginning to produce and sell their specialized crops and livestock and buy manufactured

goods on a regular basis. At the congress, the government also

affirmed its support for the private ownership of land and its intent to protect farmers' rights to long-term use of land, to bequeath land to their children, and to transfer their land

rights in exchange for compensation. These assurances, among

other improvements in the economic atmosphere, are an

attempt to make Laos more attractive to foreign investors.

Environmental Problems and Policy

Laos suffers from a number of environmental problems, the

most important of which are related to deforestation. Expanding commercial exploitation of the forests, plans for additional

hydroelectric facilities, foreign demand for wild animals and

non-wood forest products for food and traditional medicines,

and a growing population put increasing pressure on the forests. Deforestation not only destroyed at least 150,000 to

163
Laos: A Country Study

160,000 hectares of valuable forest annually in the 1980s, but

also caused erosion—leading to siltation of reservoirs, navigation channels, and irrigation systems downstream—and

reduced groundwater levels. The practice of swidden cultivation not only contributes greatly to deforestation, but also in

1987 made Laos one of eleven countries in the world that

together were responsible for over 80 percent of net world car- bon emissions amounting to a per capita emission of ten tons

annually, compared with the world average of 1.17 tons per

capita. Further, during the Second Indochina War (1954-75),

Laos was heavily bombed and left with tons of unexploded ord- nance and bomb craters that ultimately altered the local ecology-The government's desire to preserve valuable hardwoods for

commercial extraction and to protect the forest environment,

as well as international concern about environmental degradation and the loss of many wildlife species unique to Laos, have

motivated efforts to prohibit swidden cultivation throughout

the country (see Natural Resources, ch. 2). This policy has had

a significant effect on the livelihoods of upland villagers dependent on swidden cultivation of rice. Traditionally, villagers

relied on forest products as a food reserve during years of poor

rice harvest and as a regular source of fruits and vegetables. By

the 1990s, however, these gathering systems were breaking

down in many areas. The government has restricted the clearing of forestland for swidden cropping since the late 1980s and

is attempting to resettle upland swidden farming villages in

lowland locations where paddy rice cultivation is possible. However, both the government's inability to ensure compliance

with the measures and the attraction of Thai money for forest

products inhibits implementation of the restrictions.

Although a lack of environmental planning, surveys, and legislation diminishes the likelihood of substantial improvement

of the environment in the near future, a number of decrees

have been issued to encourage environmental protection.

These decrees include general principles for protecting forestland; prohibitions on cutting certain tree species; regulations

on hunting, fishing, and the use of fire during the dry season; and regulations on the management and protection of forestland, wildlife, and fish. The use of manure and compost have

been encouraged to help rejuvenate soil. Managed burning

also encourages many forms of forest growth.

164
Rural housing and rice padis, Louangphrabang

Harvesting vegetables outside Vientiane

Courtesy Gina Merris

165
Laos: A Country Study

The government's commitment to environmental protection is affirmed in the constitution and in its policy of finding

new occupations for swidden cultivators. In 1991 the Ministry

of Agriculture and Forestry established a land use program

under the National Forest Resource Conservation and Development Strategy. The program reserves 17.0 million hectares,

including 9.6 million hectares for forest protection, 2.4 million

hectares for wildlife reserves and national parks, and 5.0 million hectares for production. The commitment, however, is mainly on paper: the highest priority park—Nam Theun—will

be flooded by a hydroelectric dam by 2000.

Industry and Services

Industrial Output and Employment

Estimates of the industrial sector's contribution (including

construction) to GDP vary, but most sources find it to be slowly

increasing, from about 10 percent in 1984 to about 17 percent

in 1993. The World Bank estimated the sector's contribution at 14 percent in 1989. Most sources also indicated an increase in

the percentage of the labor force employed in the sector, from

about 5 percent in 1970 to about 7 percent in 1980. However,

World Bank figures available in mid-1993 indicated that the

sector employed only just over 2 percent of the labor force in

1986. All sources agree that the growth of the industrial sector had increased throughout the 1980s; the World Bank estimated an average annual growth rate of 3.4 percent between 1980 and

1989, despite negative growth in the drought years of 1987 and

1988 during which exports of hydroelectricity were substantially lowered. By 1990 the growth rate had leveled off, from a surge of nearly 32.0 percent in 1989 to about 12.7 percent in

1992. The virtual end of the command economy fueled the

1989 industrial boom and supported steady growth for at least

the medium term. Principal activities in the industrial sector

include manufacturing, construction, mining, processing agricultural and forestry goods, and producing hydroelectricity.

Manufacturing

There is a paucity of any real industry in Laos outside of timber harvesting and electricity generation. Nonetheless, "manufacturing" represents about half of all industrial activity. Other

manufacturing activities include the production of agricultural

tools, animal feed, bricks, cigarettes, detergents, handicrafts,

166
The Economy

insecticides, matches, oxygen, plastics, rubber footwear, salt, soft drinks and beer, textiles and clothing, and veterinary products. Manufacturing employed only approximately 2 percent of

the labor force in 1991. As of 1994, the garment industry was "booming," with investment from China, France, Taiwan, and

Thailand; there were more than forty garment factories in the

Vientiane area. The manufacturing subsector was composed of over 600 fac- tories and plants, of which one-third were state-owned in 1991.

Most manufacturing is for domestic consumption and is cen- tered in the Vientiane area. As of mid-1994, there was little manufacturing in or near Laotian towns. In 1989 and 1990,

there was a rapid increase in cottage industries such as cotton

spinning and weaving, traditional village crafts, basket-weaving,

and the production of alcoholic beverages. As part of the informal business sector, however, cottage industries are not covered

by national statistics. Between 1980 and 1990, over 80 percent of manufacturing

was in the production of clothing, food and beverages, metal

products, tobacco products, and wood products (see table 6, Appendix). Industrial roundwood production increased 71

percent between 1975-77 and 1985-87 to an annual average of

330,000 cubic meters and then declined to 309,400 cubic

meters in 1990. Sources differ over the growth trend for lumber production; the UN reported a decrease in production of

61 percent between 1980 and 1988, and the Asian Development Bank showed an increase of nearly 400 percent in the same period. Cigarette production rose from 1.10 billion units

per year from 1981-84; to 1.12 billion units in 1985 and an esti- mated 1.20 billion units per year for 1986-90. Statistics over a lengthy period of time for the production of other major goods

are not readily available; however, the Asian Development

Bank estimated that the value of metal products, food and beverages, and clothing (at 1991 prices) had increased greatly

between 1980 and 1990, by 55 percent, 195 percent, and 196

percent, respectively (see table 7, Appendix). A general

upward trend in the growth of production is borne out by offi- cial LPDR statistics from the first half of the decade. The World

Bank reported that the manufacturing subsector grew by 35

percent in 1989, slowing to about 4 percent the following year. Energy

Mountainous terrain and heavy annual rainfall give Laos

167
Laos: A Country Study

considerable hydroelectric potential. The Mekong River and its uibutaries in Laos have an estimated hydroelectric potential of

between 18,000 and 22,000 megawatts, or roughly half that of

the river as a whole. The remaining potential belongs to Cambodia and other riparian countries. Total installed capacity in

1991 was 212 megawatts, the majority of it hydroelectric, or

only about 1 percent of the potential.

Production of hydroelectricity, the country's major export

until 1987, expanded slowly throughout the 1980s, from 930

thousand megawatt-hours in 1980 to about 1.1 million megawatt-hours in 1989, an increase of about 17 percent. The majority of electricity produced—approximately 75 to 80 percent, as of 1992—is exported to Thailand, which has an agreement to purchase all surplus electricity. The remainder is supplied to power networks for domestic consumption. Through 1986 the

sale of electricity to Thailand was the country's most important

source of foreign exchange. Despite increased production, in

1987 hydroelectricity yielded its place as the principal export to wood products, because of the drought, which lowered water

levels, and a reduction in the unit price of electricity to Thailand. By 1991 a new agreement between Laos and Thailand

had raised the unit price of electric power.

The largest hydropower facility in Laos is the Nam Ngum

dam, sited on the Nam Ngum River, north of Vientiane. The

Nam Ngum plant began operation in 1971 with an installed

generating capacity of thirty megawatts; by 1987 additional tur- bines had increased capacity to 150 megawatts. In the early

1970s, the Nam Ngum facility provided electricity to Vientiane;

the supply was gradually extended to surrounding villages on

the Vientiane plain. As of the early 1990s, approximately 80

percent of the power produced at Nam Ngum was exported to Thailand; some was diverted to the south for town and village

electrification.

A second hydroelectric dam was completed at Xeset near

Saravan (Salavan) in southern Laos in 1991. The Xeset plant

has an installed capacity of twenty megawatts.

About twenty smaller hydropower facilities and diesel plants

supply additional power. Since the mid-1980s, Thakhek and

Savannakhet had access to a regular power supply through a repurchase agreement with Thailand whereby a cable under

the Mekong diverts power from the Thai electrical grid; villages

along Route 9 east of Savannakhet have been receiving electric168
The Economy

ity since the late 1980s. Louangphrabang has seasonal access to power from a hydroelectric dam supplemented by diesel generators. A power transmission line from Nam Ngum to Louangphrabang is scheduled for completion in the mid-1990s and

will bring electrification to many villages near Route 13 that

previously relied on kerosene lamps and battery-operated flo- rescent lights.

Hydroelectric capacity will further increase as a result of

agreements signed either for construction of new facilities or

for conducting feasibility studies for additional sites. Thailand

is the primary investor in the hydroelectric sector; Australia,

Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden also have companies with interests in various projects.

As of 1992, other provincial centers relied primarily on diesel generators, which are run for three to four hours nightly

and serve only a fraction of the surrounding population. Most

district centers do not have electricity other than small private

generators that light the houses of a few dozen subscribers for

several hours each evening. Automobile batteries and voltage

inverters are used as a means of supplementing the limited

hours of power. These devices enable Laotians to watch televi- sion and listen to stereo cassette players, even in remote locations.

Despite assistance from the International Development

Association, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP—see Glossary), and other

donors to increase rural electrification services, national con- sumption of electricity increased slowly. The average annual

increase between 1970 and 1980 was 14.5 percent—an overall

increase of 287 percent—to 325 million kilowatt-hours. After

1980 the growth of consumption slowed greatly, to an average

annual rate ofjust 1.5 percent, reaching 365 million kilowatthours in 1988. Per capita consumption was just 93.6 kilowatthours, one of the lowest rates in the region.

According to the World Bank, energy consumption grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent between 1965 and 1980,

slowing to 1.8 percent in the 1980-90 period. Fuelwood consti- tutes about 85 percent of total energy consumption. Per capita

consumption of fuelwood is between one and three cubic

meters annually, accounting for more than ten times the con- sumption of wood for commercial purposes. Total usage

including fuelwood and charcoal—was 3.9 million cubic

169
Laos: A Country Study

meters in the 1985-87 period, a 21 percent increase over the

1975-77 period (see Forestry, this ch.). In 1985 hydroelectric

power accounted for approximately 5 percent of annual energy

consumption. Most consumption was in Vientiane; domestic

use accounted for about 89 percent in 1983 and industrial use only about 10 percent. The transportation sector, especially

civil aviation, which consumes imported petroleum products,

accounted for the remaining 5 percent of energy consumption.

The cost of fuel imports—primarily from the Soviet Union

until 1991—has placed a heavy burden on the economy, constituting nearly 19 percent of all imports in 1986. In 1989 approximately 124,000 tons of petroleum fuel were imported, an

increase of nearly 40 percent over the preceding year (see

Transportation, this ch.).

In 1987 an oil pipeline of 396 kilometers was laid from Vientiane to the border with Vietnam, close to the port of Vinh,

facilitating the import of oil from the Soviet Union. The pipeline's capacity is 300,000 tons annually, considerably in excess of the annual national oil consumption rate of approximately

100,000 tons. Mining

Assessments of mineral reserves are imprecise, because even by 1991 most of the country had not been geologically sur- veyed in a detailed manner. According to 1991 estimates,

deposits of gemstones, gold, gypsum, iron, lead, potash, silver,

tin, and zinc have relatively high commercial development

potential, but mining activity is on an extremely small scale. In

addition, Laos has small deposits of aluminum, antimony, chromium, coal, and manganese, as well as potential for oil and nat- ural gas. In 1989 exploration agreements for oil and gas were

signed with British, French, and United States companies.

Mining operations are carried out by state mining enterprises and supervised by the Department of Geology and Mines

and small-scale miners. Production of tin—the principal mineral export—decreased 50 percent between 1975 and 1988, to about 240 tons. Gypsum production increased 167 percent

between 1980 and 1988, to about 80,000 tons. Salt production

increased 233 percent between 1981 and 1988, to eleven tons. Coal production increased more than 600 percent between

1982 and 1988, to about 800 tons. In addition to commercial

enterprises, some individual households pan for alluvial gold

170
Loading a truck onto a boat on the Mekong River, Vientiane

Mekong River transport, Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

171
Laos: A Country Study

on the Mekong as well as on small streams during the dry sea- son to supplement household incomes.

Further development of the mineral sector is contingent

upon the willingness of private companies to invest. However,

the lack of adequate data, a trained labor force, dependable

and adequate infrastructure, and legislation (a mining code

was being drafted as of 1991) inhibit private companies from

major investments. Nonetheless, private investment was growing as of 1993.

Construction

Throughout the 1980s, the construction subsector grew at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent, surging by 24 percent in

1989. Vigorous growth continued the following year at a rate of

15 percent, reflecting a big increase in private demand for new

construction. Several sources estimate the construction subsector's contribution to the gross national product (GNP—see

Glossary) at about 5 percent throughout the decade. According to one estimate, the construction subsector employed more

than one-fourth of all industrial workers in 1986.

Services

Estimates of the services sector's contribution to GDP

including wholesale and retail trade, transport and communications, tourism, and public administration—vary. However,

the trend throughout the 1980s was an increasing share, from

about 15 percent of GDP in 1982 to about 25 percent in 1991.

Employment in the services sector, as a percentage of the labor

force, increased from 13 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1980,

remaining fairly stable through 1989. The sector grew at an

average annual rate of between 3 and 6 percent from 1980 to 1989, reaching a growth rate of about 13 percent in 1989 but

slowing to about 6 percent the following year. Wholesale and Retail Trade

According to government statistics, the number of retail

shops increased dramatically—by 44 percent—in just one year, to 21,600 in 1991, reflecting the response to relaxed restrictions on private trade and entrepreneurship as well as a renewed social acceptability of petty trade. Of these establishments, 97 percent are privately owned. During the same

period, the number of state-owned shops decreased by one172
The Economy

third, to 600 stores. Wholesale and retail trade grew at a rate of

20 percent in 1989 and 1990. Retail trade was worth about

K563,000 million (for value of the kip—see Glossary) in 1991, an increase of 38 percent over the preceding year. Tourism

In line with the government's desire to increase foreign

exchange earnings, Western tourists were first permitted to enter Laos in 1988, although just 600 persons visited, well

within the official limit of 1,000. The following year, 2,600 tourists visited, and in 1990, the figure increased by 130 percent, to approximately 6,000 tourists. The Ministry of Trade was

assigned responsibility for the development of the tourism

industry in 1989. In the following year, the government

monopoly on the industry was removed, and nine private tourist agencies were authorized. As of 1992, tourism was somewhat

limited to group travel. However, if an individual has a Laotian

sponsor who provides individual sponsorship assurances, it is possible to receive a visa without being a member of an organized tour group.

Industrial Policy

The organization of the industrial sector prior to 1986 was centered on the state. Between 1979 and 1984, most state- owned enterprises incurred huge losses, and industrial sector

output decreased by 10 percent. At the same time, gross industrial production began to shift slightly to the private sector: pri- vate industrial output as a percentage of gross industrial output

doubled to 8 percent between 1980 and 1983, whereas state output decreased slightly from 93 percent to 89 percent. In the

early 1980s, a slow increase in the number of private enterprises began, reflecting both the government's newly relaxed

policy on the private sector and the private sector's greater effi- ciency and profitability compared to that of the state sector. Following the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism, the private sector's involvement in industry increased even more, as industrial management was decentralized and

most prices—except prices of basic utilities, air transport,

postal service, and telecommunications—were freed from

price controls. In 1988 Decree 19 granted state-owned enterprises expanded financial and managerial responsibilities.

173
Laos: A Country Study

As a result of these changes, some state-owned enterprises were forced to curtail production sharply or to close down

entirely, precipitating a short-run drop in manufacturing output. It was not until March 1990, however, that the government

provided a legal basis for the actual privatization of state-owned

enterprises, through the promulgation of Decree 17. Under

this decree, most state-owned enterprises were transformed

into enterprises under other forms of ownership, through leas- ing, sale, joint ownership, or contracting with workers' collectives. Exceptions included enterprises deemed necessary to the

nation's security or economic and social health, such as utilities and educational facilities. The extension of credit to unprofitable state-owned enterprises was discontinued, and state-owned

enterprises were required to set prices and salaries at free market levels. By the end of the year, the private sector's contribution to net material product (see Glossary) had increased

dramatically, to 65 percent.

The government reported at the Fifth Party Congress in

1991 that its "disengagement" policy was succeeding; two-thirds

of the approximately 600 state-owned enterprises had been

either partially privatized or leased to domestic or foreign parties. The remaining state-owned enterprises were granted

greater autonomy in making investment decisions and setting

input and output targets, in hopes of improving their productivity.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Because of its mountainous topography and lack of development, Laos has few reliable transportation routes, and as of

mid-1994, there were no railroads. This inaccessibility has his- torically limited the ability of the government to maintain a presence in areas distant from the national or provincial capitals and to some extent limits communication among villages

and ethnic groups (see Population; Rural Life, ch. 2). The

Mekong and Nam Ou are the only natural channels suitable

for large draft boat transportation, and from December

through April low water limits the size of the craft that may be

used on many routes. Between 1985 and 1990, freight and pas- senger traffic increased at rates of 14 percent and 8 percent,

respectively. This occurred largely as a result of the government's abolishment, in 1986, of restrictions on the interprovincial movement of goods, which had artificially isolated markets

174
The Economy

throughout the country. In 1991 approximately 91 percent of

freight traffic—measured in ton-kilometers—was carried by

road and 9 percent by river, whereas 95 percent of passenger

traffic—measured in passenger-kilometers—was carried by

road, 3 percent by river, and the remaining 2 percent by

domestic air service.

As of 1991, freight transport services were provided by four

state transport enterprises, a number of provincial transport

enterprises, and the private sector. The state has a monopoly

on freight transport between Laos and ports in Vietnam.

Although no longer regulated by provincial government, the

private sector's participation in road transport remains severely

restricted by government regulations; in 1990 the private sector accounted for just 13 percent of freight transport and 43 percent of passenger transport. According to the Asian Development Bank, it is considered unlikely that the transportation

subsector will eventually be a focus of the government's privatization efforts because poor road conditions, lack of spare parts, an aging vehicle fleet, and low transport tariffs—in some cases below operating costs—make such a move doubtful, at least for

the short term. The Ministry of Communications, Transport,

Posts, and Construction oversees transport and telecommunications.

Roads

Laos had a minimal road network in the early 1990s. By 1991

the country's total road length was about 13,970 kilometers, an

increase of just 22 percent over 1976. Of the total length, 24

percent, or 3,353 kilometers, is paved and 30 percent gravel;

the remaining roads are trails unusable during the rainy sea- son.Route 13, a main north-south road, was built under French

colonial rule. The highway parallels the Mekong and extends

from the Cambodian border to Louangphrabang; the quality

of the road varies over its length. Together with a few trans- mountain roads, Route 13 connects Laos with Vietnam and

provides a rudimentary national road system. In addition,

there are three east-west roads, Routes 7, 8, and 9, which are linked to Routes 7, 8, and 9 in Vietnam to facilitate access to Vietnamese seaports (see fig. 7).

In the late 1960s, China constructed a network of paved

roads in northern Laos, linking most of the northern provin175
Laos: A Country Study

Figure 7. Transportation and Selected Industrial and Agricultural

Activity, 1994

Source: Based on information from Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, Landerbericht

Laos, 1990, Wiesbaden, October 1990, 11.

cial capitals and for the first time facilitating motorized trans- portation across this region. These roads enabled government

officials to reach some hitherto remote areas of the country,

which helped begin the process of national integration that

continues in the 1990s. These roads were maintained in rea- sonably good repair into the 1990s, providing an important

new means of increased intervillage communication and move176
The Economy

ment of market goods, as well as a locale for additional settle- ments. However, as of 1993, the link between this network and

Louangphrabang was a 100-kilometer stretch of dirt track pass- able only during the dry season. During the 1990s, all major routes in the center and south

are being improved and/or surfaced, and a larger network of

feeder roads is gradually being constructed by provincial governments. Development of these roads will facilitate a greater

government presence at the village level and easier travel by vil- lagers to district and provincial centers. Such improved trans- portation will also assist villagers seeking medical care and

those sending children to school at district centers. Improved

transportation may also be an additional stimulus to villagers

looking for wage labor outside the village; tribal groups in

northern Laos have engaged in seasonal labor in northern

Thailand since at least the 1930s.

As roads improve and marketing networks expand, the government has encouraged commercial production for trade and

export. As a result, the independence and relative isolation of

lowland villages have been reduced. Travel, whether for visiting or marketing—particularly the extensive market network developed as a result of the long-standing opium trade—or because

of military conscription, broadens the outlook of villagers and

makes then aware of the relationships between Laos and its neighbors, of national policy issues, and of the possibility of a different material standard of living. Lao in lowland villages

travel by oxcart over level terrain, or on foot. The steep mountains and lack of roads have caused upland ethnic groups to rely entirely on pack baskets and pack horses for transportation. Wheeled vehicles traditionally have not been used. Travel

in most areas is still difficult and expensive, and most villagers

travel only limited distances if at all. Despite the fact that the road network is the backbone of the

transportation network, it had received very little maintenance

work prior to 1985. The protracted war and period of government reorganization, limited financial resources, and lack of

maintenance equipment have contributed to the road net- work's deterioration. The deterioration has had serious conse- quences throughout the economy, including hindering

domestic and foreign trade, discouraging foreign investors,

and slowing domestic revenue collection.

177
Laos: A Country Study

In early 1990, an agreement was signed with Thailand and

Australia for the construction of the 750-meter Friendship

Bridge—which opened in April 1994—across the Mekong

River, linking Thailand and Laos by road for the first time. As a

result, tourism is expected to increase dramatically and freight

transport costs to decrease, facilitating regional trade.

Motor Vehicles

In 1987 there were about 30,000 motor vehicles, divided

equally between commercial and private vehicles; this number

represents an increase of about 67 percent from 1979. Between

1977 and 1990, the number grew by an estimated 12.3 percent

annually. Although government statistics estimated close to 1 million vehicles in 1990, this estimate included scrapped vehicles. Inland Waterways

Inland waterways, including the Mekong River, constitute

the second most important transport network in the country.

There are about 4,600 kilometers of navigable waterways,

including sections of the Mekong, the Ou, and nine other riv- ers. The Mekong accounts for about 1,330 kilometers of the

total navigable length. Although the Mekong flows through

Laos for approximately 2,030 kilometers, it is only navigable for

about 70 percent of this length, mainly because of rapids and

low water levels in the dry season. Between Vientiane and

Savannakhet, the river can accommodate boats with between

seventy and 140 deadweight tons; otherwise it can carry

between fifteen and fifty deadweight tons, depending on the

season. Residents of lowland villages located on the banks of

smaller rivers have traditionally traveled in pirogues for fishing,

trading, or visiting up and down the river for limited distances.

Both public and private trade associations handle river traffic, including the State River Transport Company, based in

Vientiane. In mid-1987 the State Water Transport Company

had thirty-seven boats, most built with help from Vietnam.

There are state warehouses at Savannakhet, Xeno, and Vientiane, in addition to a number of ports. River transportation

has improved as government policy has emphasized expanded

trade with Vietnam and with rural regions.

178
The Economy

Civil Aviation

Lao Aviation, the national airline, services domestic and for- eign points from Wattai Airport, the primary airport, located

outside Vientiane. Domestic air service was already somewhat

well developed prior to the beginning of the Indochina War

years and offered limited international service from the 1950s.

Lao Aviation has domestic flights to provincial capitals, including Louangphrabang, Louang Namtha, Pakxe, Saravan, and

Xiangkhoang. Improvements in civil air service are encour- aged by the government as a way to boost tourism and commercial appeal. New airports and renovations—primarily

expansion projects, so as to have the capability to handle larger

aircraft—are planned for Khamkeut, Louang Namtha, Louangphrabang, Oudomxai, and Phongsali. As of mid-1993, however,

work had not begun. International service is provided to Hanoi, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Kunming and

Guangzhou in China. Flights to Burma, Chiang Mai (Thailand), Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taipei are in the planning

stages. Lao Aviation has formed a joint venture with firms from

Australia, Thailand, and the United States to increase and

upgrade its international flights.

Telecommunications

In mid-1994, the Lao telecommunications system was rudimentary, with a telephone system that serves primarily government offices and broadcast facilities in only a few large towns.

In 1986 there were approximately 8,000 telephones for the

entire country, or fewer than 2 telephones per 1,000 people.

There reportedly was a substantial expansion of telephone

lines in Vientiane beginning in 1989, but no updated figures are available.

One powerful amplitude modulation (AM) station is located

in Vientiane; the other nine AM stations are low-powered trans- mitters scattered in other cities. Seven shortwave stations

broadcasting in six tribal languages reach remote areas, including one that broadcasts in Cambodian, French, Thai, and Vietnamese to neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. The capital

also has two lower-power television transmitters and one fre- quency modulation (FM) station. The number of radios

increased from 350,000 in 1980 to 520,000 in 1990.

The first domestic television service was established in 1983,

and the second, in 1988, broadcasting from Savannakhet.

179
Laos: A Country Study

Southern Laos receives transmissions from Thailand, and all of

Laos receives satellite-relayed transmissions from a ground sat- ellite station linked to Intersputnik. There were about 31,000

television sets in 1990.

International communications improved greatly with the

installation in 1990 of a new satellite ground station. In 1991

agreements were concluded with China and France to relay

their broadcasts to Laos by satellite. Public Finance

The Budget Deficit

Laos ran a fiscal deficit throughout the 1980s. The deficit

expanded greatly in the second half of the decade, from about

12 percent of GDP in 1985 to between 25 percent and 30 percent of GDP in 1988 and 1989. This deficit was fueled by both a sharp decrease in non-tax revenue (mainly from surpluses of

state-owned enterprises) and a large jump in expenditures, particularly for wages and salaries (see table 8, Appendix). By

1990, however, the deficit had decreased (relatively) to about

17 percent of GDP and was continuing to decrease as previously implemented reforms, especially of taxes and the banking system, took effect. Government Revenue

From the outset of the founding of the LPDR in 1975, development expenditures depended primarily on foreign aid, continuing a pattern begun in the 1950s. In July 1990, more than

half of the state's total revenue came from foreign aid and

loans. Until 1988 the bulk of current government revenue

excluding capital receipts—came from non-tax sources, mainly

from surpluses of state-owned enterprises. Revenue increased

nearly four times between 1984 and 1986, and again by more

than one-half between 1986 and 1988, almost entirely from

non-tax sources. Tax collection is difficult because of the widely

dispersed population and poor organization and management

of the collection process.

An annual rice tax was assessed on all paddy land. The tax collected was in principle divided between provincial and

national budgets, but in practice much was retained in the dis- trict of collection for in-kind salary support of local officials

and military personnel. Where villages had schools, a portion

180
The Economy

of the tax collected was delivered to the local teachers(s). The

paddy tax rate varied between sixty and 120 kilograms per hectare, depending on the quality of the land and was reduced to forty to 100 kilograms per hectare in the early 1990s. The

paddy tax rate amounted to roughly 5 percent of the seasonal

yield but could be forgiven in the event of a crop failure. A separate, lower tax was assessed on swidden rice fields. Collection

from more remote villages without road access was always problematic. Since March 1993, the land tax has been assessed in

cash. The rates vary between 500 to 6,000 kip per hectare,

depending on land quality and productivity. Between 1983 and

1986, an improved system of business taxation was implemented; despite this, by 1987 the share of non-tax sources had

exceeded 90 percent of current revenue, from about 70 percent in the early 1980s.

Substantial qualitative changes in fiscal management beginning in 1988 were introduced at most levels of government,

and the implementation of limited tax reforms changed the fis- cal situation dramatically, with 75 percent of state revenue coming from taxes. Non-tax revenues declined by 62 percent,

however, as the traditional revenue source—profits from the

state-owned enterprises—continued to decrease; thus, current revenue increased only by 42 percent. To increase revenue,

Decree 47—on the national tax and customs system—was promulgated in June 1989; the decree broadened the tax base by

expanding coverage of personal income and corporate taxes

and improving collection and revenue administration methods. Import, profit, and turnover taxes were also increased. Fis- cal revenue responded positively to the new tax reforms,

increasing substantially from 1989, to about 11 percent of GDP

in 1990; revenue from taxes alone increased by 62 percent.

Transfers from public enterprises rose by 63 percent in 1990

over 1989 figures, and other non-tax revenue increased as well,

including lease payments to the government and overflight

charges. The composition of revenue remained about 75 percent tax-based through the early1990s.

Government revenue actually dropped from 11 percent of

GNP in 1986 to 9.6 percent in 1990. However, its annual

growth rate increased dramatically, from 9 percent in 1987 to 63 percent in 1990—partially a rebound from the drop in reve- nue in 1989. GNP also is subject to dramatic fluctuations, fall- ing from almost US$2.4 billion in 1985 to about US$600

million in 1988. By 1991 GNP had increased to approximately

181
Laos: A Country Study

US$1 billion, from approximately US$863 million the previous

year. Government Expenditure

Capital expenditures rose slowly throughout the 1980s, from

about 55 percent of total expenditures in 1983 to about 66 percent in 1988; however, by 1989 they had begun to decrease as a

result of limited absorptive capacity, a critical factor in the eco- nomic picture because it seriously affects economic development. Wages and salaries accounted for the largest portion of

expenditures, increasing from 11 percent of expenditures in

1983 to 42 percent in 1988. A substantial amount of this portion in the late 1980s was spent on salary increases and arrears payments: many civil servants had not been paid for up to two

years. Subsidies to state-owned enterprises make up most of the

remainder of expenditures, but by the end of the decade these

subsidies were cut back in response to the reforms of 1988 and

1990. Expenditures for operation and maintenance of basic

infrastructure remained inadequate throughout the 1980s.

Defense expenditure is an important part of the government

budget; however, no figures are available (see The Defense

Budget, ch. 5).

Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased

from 10.7 percent in 1986 to 14.2 percent in 1990; capital

expenditure increased from 7.7 percent to 12.1 percent in the

same period. However, although the growth rate of total government expenditure increased from 8.3 percent in 1987 to 65

percent in 1990 as wage and salary payments increased, growth

in capital expenditure slowed dramatically, from 14.9 percent

to slightly negative growth in the same period, because of limited absorptive capacity and decreased aid from nonconvertible currency area countries.

Policy

A new "vertical management system" for budgetary allocation was implemented in 1991, directed by the Ministry of

Finance. Under this system, all revenue collected by provincial

and local authorities is integrated into the national budget,

and all expenditures are linked to a national budget expenditure plan. The primary purpose of the system is to ensure that

local-level expenditures are consistent with national planned

expenditures.

182
The Economy

The Financial Sector

The Banking System

In March 1988, Decree 11 on the reform of the banking sys- tem was passed, separating commercial bank functions from

central bank functions. The Vientiane branch of the old State

Bank, the Banque d'Etat de la Republique Democratique Populaire du Laos (RDPL), became the central monetary agency.

In June 1990, the Central Banking Law was passed, establishing

the Bank of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, or Central

Bank, to replace the State Bank. Under this law, the Central

Bank assumes responsibility for regulation and supervision of

commercial and regional banks; maintenance of foreign

exchange reserves; issuance and supervision of money for cir- culation; licensing, supervision, and regulation of financial ser- vices; and management of the monetary and credit system. The

Central Bank has about ninety regional branches; as of 1991,

the government was considering separating these branches

into three regional banks, serving the southern, northern, and

central regions.

Other branches of the former State Bank were transformed

into autonomous commercial banks to promote private investment. These banks are responsible for accepting savings deposits from enterprises, government departments, and individuals,

and for granting credit to state entities, joint ventures, and

individuals for capital investment and business start-ups or expansion. Commercial banks are prohibited from granting

credit to economic units experiencing deficits and losses.

These banks do not receive subsidies, although they do render

60 percent of their profits to the government.

By 1991 Laos had seven commercial banks, including the

Joint Development Bank—a Lao-Thai joint venture—and six

wholly state-owned banks. Government policy encourages

privatization of these six banks. However, in part because of the

absence of laws governing banking activities and in part

because of the relatively small size of the economy, foreign

bankers have not expressed much interest in these ventures.

The Foreign Trade Bank (Banque pour le Commerce

Exterieur Lao—BCEL), a subsidiary of the Central Bank, is the

country's foreign exchange and foreign trade bank. By Decree

48 ofJuly 1989, the Central Bank is assigned sole responsibility

for setting and managing the exchange rate. BCEL was granted

183
Laos: A Country Study

autonomy in November 1989 and was charged with handling

foreign exchange transactions relating to trade; as of 1991,

BCEL had arrangements with sixty-four banks internationally

However, a Foreign Exchange Decree was scheduled to go into

effect soon after 1991, allowing all commercial banks already

authorized to deal in foreign exchange to carry out foreign

exchange transactions themselves, thus removing BCEL's

monopoly on such activities. Information on the status of this

decree was unavailable as of mid-1994.

Responsibility for state-owned enterprise debts was trans- ferred to the commercial banks, giving them enormous liquidity problems. To alleviate the precarious situation, in 1989 the

government allowed foreign banks to begin operations in Laos.

That October the Joint Development Bank became the first private commercial bank permitted to operate since 1975, fol- lowed soon thereafter by the Thai Military Bank. In addition,

new reform measures stipulate that enterprises will have to clear all debts owed to the banks before being considered for

new loans. In 1990 the Asian Development Bank granted Laos

a soft loan of US$25 million to recapitalize the banking system.

Interest rates on commercial bank deposits with the Central

Bank are uniform across the country and are generally higher

than rates for enterprises depositing at the commercial banks.

Since August 1989, only minimum interest rates have been set by authorities; banks are allowed to set specific rates on their own. Interest rates on deposits vary from bank to bank,

depending on the type and currency of deposits. The annual

rate on kip deposits at the end of 1991 was between zero and

1.2 percent for most banks; fixed deposits in kip earned

between 16 and 24 percent annually, and deposits in United

States dollars at some banks, including BCEL, earned 7 percent

annually. Rates for loans depend on the term and currency of

the loan and on the sector for which the investment is intended. Loans for the agriculture and forestry sectors carry

rates ranging from 7 to 12 percent, for example, and loans for

the services sector carry rates between 12 and 30 percent.

Money and Prices

By Decree 14 of March 1988, prices of most goods are no

longer set by the government; exceptions include basic utility

and mineral prices. Instead, a new system of "unified prices"

free market prices—was instituted. As a result, prices of

184
A street scene in Vientiane

A motorized cart—typical means of transportation in

Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

185
Laos: A Country Study

rationed and subsidized goods such as rice, sugar, cloth, and

petroleum increased, and procurement prices were raised by

50 percent to 100 percent.

In addition, in 1988 the wages of state employees, previously

paid through coupons redeemable for subsidized goods at state stores, began to be gradually remonetized. Very high inflation rates soon caused a real drop in annual wages, however, and

low rates of tax collection gave the government less revenue to spend on wages. As a result, large arrears built up on salaries

that are quite small. In 1990 salaries were increased by 83 percent, and arrears began to be paid off, contributing to the

increase of 65 percent in government expenditure. Once paid,

however, salaries almost immediately go again into arrears. Moreover, the salary increase is not sufficient for state employees to recoup real losses from inflation.

Money Supply and Inflation

Money supply—measured by both Ml (demand deposits

and currency outside banks) and M2 (Ml plus quasi-money

such as checking accounts) —expanded between 1980 and

1989 (statistics are available only from 1980 on), in part

because of the remonetization of government salaries, rising

wage and price levels in industry, and extension of credit to indebted state-owned enterprises. World Bank figures indicated that money supply as measured by M2 increased at an

annual rate of between 35 and 75 percent—except for 1984,

when money supply was steady—until 1987, when, fueled by

increases in domestic credit to public enterprises and foreign

currency deposits from public enterprises, it jumped by over 300 percent. During the next two years, the money supply con- tinued to grow rapidly, reaching a growth rate close to 90 percent in 1989.

The average annual inflation rate was about 11.5 percent

from 1985 to 1989. In 1989, however, inflation increased dramatically, to 52 percent, fueled by the massive increase in the

money supply and a devaluation of the kip and exacerbated by

a reduction in foreign exchange caused by the ban on forestry

exports and the temporary reduction in exports of hydroelectricity to Thailand. Monetary policy was tightened in 1990;

credit allocated to unprofitable state-owned enterprises was

restricted through Decree 17 and through higher interest

rates. As a result, growth in M2 was held to just 2.3 percent in

186
The Economy

1990. Lower food prices as a result of good harvests in 1989

and 1990 following the years of drought also helped to slow

inflation to about 20 percent; inflation continued to decline

slowly through 1994—to about 9 percent.

The Balance of Payments

The Foreign Exchange Rate

In June 1976, the "liberation kip" replaced the old kip at a

rate of twenty to one. Three years later, following a massive col- lapse of the value of the currency, a "new kip," or National

Bank kip, was introduced, worth 100 liberation kip, and the

official exchange rate was fixed at thirty-five new kip to one

United States dollar. A system of multiple exchange rates has

been implemented in an effort to control inflation; different

rates are applied to the transactions of businessmen, tourists,

senders of remittances, and aid agencies. In September 1987,

however, with a devaluation of the commercial rate of roughly

900 percent relative to the United States dollar, the multiple

rates were abandoned in favor of a single floating exchange

rate applicable to all transactions.

The exchange rate is adjusted periodically relative to the dollar. In 1988 it stabilized at about K340 to the dollar, in part

because the government stopped accepting United States dollars and Thai baht in payment for commercial or customs

taxes, thus reducing holdings of kip. By late 1989, the kip had

been devalued by 100 percent—relative to the 1987 rate

where it remained stable at about K700 to the dollar through

1992. The exchange rate was K721 to the dollar in June 1994

in part because of the government's decision to allow the free

exchange of hard currencies.

In September 1990, Decree 53 ordered that all transactions

within the country be conducted exclusively in kip; in practice,

however, foreign currencies remain in daily use because con- sumers do not have enough confidence in their own currency.

The kip, Thai baht, and United States dollar are used interchangeably. Under Decree 16, state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are allowed to maintain accounts in both kip

and foreign exchange.

Foreign Trade

Foreign trade figures for Laos do not reflect the large vol187
Laos: A Country Study

ume of illegal trade in opium and other products, mostly with

Thailand; some estimates put smuggling at half of all trade,

legal and illegal. Although Laos continued to run a trade deficit throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the volume of trade

increased substantially during the latter half of that period.

The increase was the result of increased production of exportable goods, the shift in trade patterns from the Soviet bloc to the convertible currency bloc, especially Thailand, and the

removal of many regulations on trade, as the government continues to implement the orders of the New Economic Mechanism. Despite these improvements, however, by 1990 exports

still financed only about 40 percent of imports (see table 9,

Appendix).

Exports

According to World Bank and International Monetary Fund

(IMF—see Glossary) estimates, merchandise exports grew

from about US$40.0 million in 1982—the first year statistics

were available—to about US$64.3 million in 1987, when

droughts and lower prices for Thailand—the only buyer—cut revenue from exports of hydroelectricity by 40 percent (see

table 10, Appendix). As a result, the value of exports dropped

to US$57.8 million by 1988 but recovered the following year

and continued to expand, reaching US$77.9 million in 1991

an overall increase in exports of 95 percent from 1982 to 1991.

Between 1982 and 1988—when they decreased by 10 percent

exports grew at an average annual rate of 6.8 percent; however,

after trade reforms were enacted, the growth rate increased

to 10.7 percent between 1988 and 1991; Exports increased

again in 1992 and 1993 to an estimated US$133 million (free

on board) and US$203 million, respectively.

Principal exports are hydroelectricity and timber and wood

products. In addition, much smaller quantities of coffee, gypsum, and tin concentrates are exported. The composition of

major export commodities did not change throughout the

1980s; however, the relative importance of the commodities

did. In 1987 lower export earnings from hydroelectricity precipitated a shift toward exports of forestry products. The value

of hydroelectricity exports decreased from US$30 million in

1986 to US$12 million in 1987, while the value of timber and

wood exports increased from US$8 million to US$33 million.

Timber and wood products thus replaced hydroelectricity as the major export, and despite restrictions on logging and high

188
The Economy

export taxes implemented in 1989—which decreased its share

of total exports by 36 percent—timber and wood products

remained the major export through 1992.

Imports

Although the level of imports remained relatively stable

beginning in the mid-1980s, droughts and the subsequent

need to import rice influenced import totals. Principal imports

include manufactured goods, including transport equipment;

food items, including rice; and fuel. According to 1986 UN sta- tistics, manufactured goods accounted for 53.5 percent of

imports—of which 14.1 percent was transport equipment; food

items for 20.8 percent—of which 16.2 percent was cereals,

including rice; and 18.9 percent for petroleum. Limited information shows that the composition of imports did not change

significantly through 1989. A substantial portion of imports is linked to aid programs, although a government source indicated that these imports accounted for a slowly decreasing

share of total imports, from about 40 percent in 1982 to about

28 percent in 1987.

Trade Partners Although the overall composition of trade did not change

significantly throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the direction of trade did change. Until 1989 major trading partners were from nonconvertible currency areas—mainly China, the

Soviet Union, and Vietnam; Laos also traded with Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, and Poland. From 1984—the first year with accurate data—to 1988, the nonconvertible currency

area accounted for over half of all imports. Although the nonconvertible currency area never had a monopoly on exports

(mostly because the largest export until 1987, hydroelectricity, was sold only to Thailand) it accounted for over half of the

total trade volume through the end of the decade. However,

following the easing of some trade restrictions in 1988 and the

improvement of relations with Thailand, including a reduction

in the Thai list of 273 strategic goods in which trade has been

prohibited, the pattern of trade began to shift in favor of the

convertible currency area. Bilateral trade with Thailand

increased 26 percent over 1987, and imports from the nonconvertible currency area dropped to about 35 percent of total

imports.

189
Laos: A Country Study

Eager to avoid Thai domination of its foreign trade, Laos

sought to improve relations with China, and in December 1989

the two countries signed their first bilateral agreement in a decade, including notes on cross-border trade. As a result,

trade with China grew by roughly 40 percent in 1990. Despite

the positive effect of this move on the growth of regional trade,

new agreements with members of the former Soviet bloc work

against the trend. In 1990, at a Soviet-Lao Cooperation Commission meeting, it was determined that henceforth Soviet

exports and loans would be paid for in convertible currencies

at world prices. Previously, payments had been made in nonconvertible currencies and often on barter terms. Trade with

Vietnam also shifted to a hard currency basis, in addition, the

eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union clinched the shift

in trade patterns toward the convertible currency area: in 1991

trade with the nonconvertible area accounted for just 2 to 3

percent of total imports and total exports. The convertible cur- rency area was more than able to make up for this loss: trade

volume actually increased that year, although by only 4.3 percent. Major trading partners from the convertible currency area include Britain, France, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Of these, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand accounted

for roughly 45 percent of imports from 1970 to 1978; their

share increased to about 51 percent by 1987. Similarly, Japan's

share of imports from the convertible currency area increased

from 7 percent in 1978 to 19 percent in 1987. The United

States accounted for less than 1 percent of imports from the

convertible currency area in 1987, although the LPDR's first trade mission to the United States in 1991 signaled its eager- ness to expand trade. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand

accounted for 65 percent of Laos's exports to the convertible

currency area in 1987, up from 43 percent in 1978. This

increase in regional trade made up for the decrease in the

shares in exports from the United States and Japan: from 33

percent to 6 percent for Japan, and from 9 percent to 4 percent

for the United States. Thailand's removal of the ban on trade

in strategic goods in late 1989 gave regional trade another

boost.

Trade Balance

The trade deficit increased from US$92.2 million in 1982 to US$114.9 million in 1991, reaching a decade high of US$151.9

190
Construction of a Thai

bank, Vientiane

Courtesy Gina Merris

Gasoline station,

Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

million in 1987, the first year of the drought (see table 11,

Appendix). Before 1987 the deficit had increased by an aver- age annual rate of 10.9 percent. However, after the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism and subsequent

loosening of many restrictions on trade, it actually began to decrease at an annual average of 7 percent, although in 1991 it increased slightly, by 3.2 percent. The deficit was largely

financed through external assistance, including direct grants

and highly concessional loans, and constituted approximately

16 percent of GDP in 1989-90. As the deficit decreased in

response to increasing export volumes, the country's trade

position also improved in terms of import financing. Between

1982 and 1987, exports financed less than one-third of imports,

but beginning in 1990, import financing improved considerably, with exports financing over 40 percent of imports. This

fact put Laos in a more secure position in view of sharply

decreased foreign aid from the nonconvertible currency area.

191
Laos: A Country Study

Trade Policy

Trade policy prior to the introduction of the New Economic

Mechanism had been highly restrictive, revolving around the

centralized allocation of goods for export. In 1988, however, in

line with the New Economic Mechanism, the government

began to progressively decentralize some of its trade-oriented

responsibilities, including planning and arranging trade contracts with foreign suppliers. Trade, controlled by the ministries of trade and finance, is conducted by about twenty-four

state trading companies and some provincial trading companies. Several measures promulgated in March 1988 modified

trade policy. According to Decree 16, the government became

the sole exporter through state import-export organizations.

Under Decree 13, the State Committee for Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade, provincial administrative committees, and

municipalities are empowered to supervise the management

and control of import and export activities. The decree also

authorizes trade agents at TPDR embassies worldwide to make

direct trade contacts. Decree 18 identifies a number of "strategic" goods, including coffee, tobacco, wood products (such as timber, sawn wood,

pressed wood, and rattan), other forestry products (such as benzoin and sticklac) , and minerals, for which the state has an

export monopoly: in short, all the major export commodities.

Only the central government's import-export organization, the

Lao Import-Export Company (Societe Lao Import-Export),

and certain provincial and state enterprises are permitted to export these goods to fulfill national trade agreements with the

nonconvertible currency area. All importing units are required

to submit plans for their trading operations to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in order to formulate the national import-export plan. However, importers are permitted to trade in all commodities not on the strate- gic or restricted lists. Under Decree 18, export businesses are permitted to export goods on the strategic list directly, after

national requirements have been met. The decree thus considerably liberalizes trade regulations. The main reason for the

restriction on trade in strategic goods is that the government

has to plan its supply of export goods to coincide with its multiyear trade arrangements with the nonconvertible currency

area countries. After 1990, however, this issue was moot

because the trade volume with these countries dropped to a negligible amount.

192
The Economy

The import of certain items, including automobiles and military vehicles, fertilizers, drugs, and "decadent cultural products and pictures," is subject to quotas and other restrictions. In

addition, trade in certain goods is entirely prohibited, including poisons, weapons, and other goods related to national security.At the end of the 1980s, the authority of the Lao ImportExport Company had begun to diminish because importexport licenses were being granted to increasing numbers of

private organizations. By 1991 the national trade company was

slated for privatization.

Transit

Because Laos is a landlocked country, its foreign trade volume is highly dependent on transit routes through neighboring countries. Bangkok serves as the major port, but the

Vietnamese ports of Da Nang—the most distant from Vientiane at 1,000 kilometers—and Cua Lo—the closest to Vientiane at 460 kilometers—are also used. The Express Transit

Organization of Thailand has a monopoly on the LPDR's transit business through Thailand, initially imposed as a way to regulate trade in strategic goods. Transshipment of goods through

Vietnam and especially Thailand increases the prices of Laos's goods greatly—by as much as 60 percent, or, according to some

sources, as much as 300 percent—severely reducing the competitiveness of export commodities on the world market. In

December 1991, and again in the fall of 1993, Cambodia

offered Laos the use of its seaport at Kompong Som, but Cambodia's poor infrastructure and lawlessness make this an empty

gesture.

As of 1991, limitations on trade resulting from transshipment began to ease. Plans were made to establish a Thai-Lao

joint venture responsible for handling transit goods to Laos,

with the potential of cutting transit costs in half. To further

reduce the Thai company's monopoly on transshipment of

goods to Laos, Thai import duties on more than twenty agricultural goods, including one of Laos's major exports, coffee, were reduced from a 40 to 80 percent range to a maximum of 20

percent. By 1991 Thailand had expanded from three to eight

the number of approved border transit points with Laos. Completion of the first bridge over the Mekong, which opened in

April 1994, is likely to further encourage regional trade.

193
Laos: A Country Study

Direct Foreign Investment

Policy

The Foreign Investment Law ofJuly 1988 is modeled on legislation that has already been adopted in Vietnam and China.

Laos seeks to encourage foreign investment as a means of facil- itating economic development as called for by the New Economic Mechanism. The government hopes that foreign

investment projects will help to shift the economy from a subsistence to a commodity production basis by improving the

management skills of the labor force; introducing advanced

technology to the manufacturing sector; fostering economic,

scientific, and technological cooperation with other countries;

and increasing the production of goods for export.

The Foreign Investment Law allows investors to enter into

three types of investment arrangements. The first type of

arrangement, contractual or cooperative businesses, entails

investment in existing state or private companies, or with Laotian individuals; in this way, the law is more liberal than comparable legislation in either Vietnam or China. The second type

of arrangement, joint ventures, requires foreigners to invest a minimum of 30 percent of total capital. In general, terms for

either of these arrangements are not to exceed twenty years.

The third type of arrangement, private ventures, requires for- eigners to invest 30 percent of total capital, up to a maximum

of 100 percent. Terms are generally limited to fifteen years. Tax

exemptions or reductions for joint ventures and private enter- prises are available for two to six years after the first year of

profit, depending on the size of the investment, the volume of

goods exported as a result of the project, the location of the

project, and the sector on which it focuses.

Tax incentives—a reduction of 2 to 5 percent in the profit

tax—are also used to encourage foreign investment. In order

to qualify for the reduction, a foreign investment project has to meet three of the following criteria: the project will export

more than 70 percent of the goods it produces; will obtain

domestically more than 70 percent of the raw materials it uses;

will use advanced technology; will aim to overcome unfavorable natural or socioeconomic conditions; will contribute to national economic development despite low profit margins; or

will be established before 1995. The Foreign Investment Law

allows foreign investors to remit profits to the countries of their

194
The Economy

choice; in addition, it prohibits the nationalization of their capital and property.

Other laws also seek to facilitate foreign investment. In early

1989, Decree 27 established the Foreign Investment Management Committee to centralize foreign investment approval

procedures, thus enabling the Foreign Investment Law to be

implemented. The Lao Chamber of Commerce was established

in January 1990 to assist in attracting new business ventures.

Private domestic and foreign investments have been encour- aged by the gradual improvement of the legal environment,

including the passage of laws regarding property rights (1990),

contractual obligation (1990), inheritance (1990), crime

(1990), civil procedures (1990), and labor (1991). The 1991

approval of the constitution, which protects the right to private

ownership, is also an important factor in encouraging foreign

investment. Also, as of late 1993, an arbitration law was being

drafted that will provide a legal mechanism for the settlement

of disputes. There was an informal arbitration procedure, but

the lack of a law or decree made decisions nonbinding.

Investment Projects

Decree 20 of 1988 identifies sectors open to foreign investment under the Foreign Investment Law: these include agriculture and forestry; industry; communication, transportation,

and construction; and services and tourism. Five criteria are used to judge the desirability of investment projects: whether

the project uses advanced techniques, technology, and scientific management to produce goods that could compete in the

world market and make efficient use of energy, raw materials,

and equipment; provides export merchandise or services that

generate foreign-exchange earnings and use domestic raw

materials as much as possible; has low labor requirements but

provides managerial and/or technical training; involves infrastructure development, especially of roads, bridges, and irrigation; and is deemed by the government to be important to economic development. Projects are discouraged if they do not

conform to economic and social development, or disturb the

sovereignty, order, or security of the country; seriously damage

the environment; make long-run use of imported materials

and do not promote import substitution; create large debts; or

are prohibited by the government.

The law spurred a steady increase in foreign direct investment. Within one year of the law's promulgation, Laos received

195
Laos: A Country Study

124 investment proposals, of which sixty were approved that

same year. As of 1992, some 109 proposals had been accepted out of a

total of about 200, worth about US$231 million, of which the

government share is roughly 3 percent; most are worth less than US$5 million each. Almost 50 percent of the proposals were signed with Thai companies. Most proposed investment is in foreign trade, manufacturing, handicrafts, services, tourism,

and the agriculture, forestry, and mining sectors. About ten

proposals were subsequently canceled, usually because of a fail- ure to receive expected financing.

Despite the positive response of foreign investors to liberalization measures, in the early 1990s, foreign investment is still handicapped. Hindrances include the poor infrastructure, the

unskilled labor force, and the lack of an intellectual property

rights law, although regulations on patents and industrial property have been drafted.

Foreign Aid

Between 1975 and 1990, total foreign aid to Laos, including

grants and loans, was approximately US$2.3 billion. Of this

sum, only 65 percent had been spent as of 1989, of which

grants and loans made up approximately equal quantities.

Fifty-five percent of spent aid derived from the nonconvertible

currency area, 17.8 percent from convertible currency area

countries, and 27.2 percent from international organizations

and financial institutions (see table 12, Appendix).

According to the World Bank and the IMF, long-term loans

increased nearly threefold, from about US$38.8 million in

1982 to about US$111.4 million in 1988. Drawings on loans

received from the nonconvertible currency area had averaged

73 percent of the total annually through 1988; in 1989, however, drawings from the area dropped to 23 percent of the

total, and by 1991 they were nonexistent. In January 1991, the

Soviet Union suspended all its aid and credits to Laos although

loan repayments were postponed until the end of the decade.

Drawings from the convertible currency area during this

period increased, but not enough to support spending at the

level of the mid-1980s; by 1991 drawings on all loans received

had dropped nearly 50 percent from 1988. In response, grants

from the convertible currency area, which had decreased from

196
Women in the market at Talat, Louangphrabang, selling water buffalo legs, ears, and innards

Courtesy Gina Merris

approximately US$45.4 million in 1985 to just US$14.7 million

in 1989, spiraled to US$63.9 million in 1991.

Aid from the nonconvertible currency area was primarily

from the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Until 1991 Soviet aid constituted over half of all aid to Laos, including the stationing of

over 1,000 Soviet technical personnel in Laos, and donations of

construction equipment, vehicles, and aircraft. The second

largest donor was Vietnam, which sent roughly 5,000 advisers

and technicians to the country and participated in the joint

exploitation of mineral and forest resources. The cutback in aid from the nonconvertible currency area caused Laos to seek improved ties with Western nations. Australia, Japan, and Sweden accounted for virtually all foreign aid

from the convertible currency area until 1988; but by 1990,

their combined share had dropped to about 78 percent

because other developed nations began to increase their aid

programs to Laos. Japan and France became more important

aid donors in the early 1990s. The United States does not have an "aid program" in the traditional sense because Laos is a communist country and is prohibited from receiving aid under

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended). The crop

197
Laos: A Country Study

substitution program, begun in October 1989 following reas- sessment of the country's involvement in the world opium

trade, is possible because of separate legislative authority. In

December 1990, following an improvement in Chinese-Laotian

relations, China pledged a US$9.3 million credit for a five-year

economic and technical cooperation program in Laos.

Other aid is provided by international organizations such as the UNDP, the Asian Development Bank, the International

Development Association, and the IMF. Multilateral organizations provide large loans in support of government reforms; in

1990 and 1991, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank

made loans worth US$37 million for this purpose.

Aid to Laos covers a wide range of activities, including technical and capital assistance for such projects as hydroelectric

power stations (Sweden), a livestock vaccination program (the

UNDP), and scholarships for agricultural study (Thailand).

The IMF approved a US$50 million loan in 1993 in support of

economic development, inflation reduction, and compensation for depleted reserves. Other loans have been granted for

such infrastructure development as road construction, hydropower projects, and telecommunications systems. Aid has also

been extended for irrigation projects and forestry and fisheries

programs.

Other types of aid include loan forgiveness: in 1991 Japan

and Germany forgave loan liabilities worth US$32.3 million.

Despite the country's continued striving to reach food self-suf- ficiency, it relies on food aid for its domestic needs during years

of poor harvest. In 1988 and 1989, for example, 140,000 tons of

food aid were donated or sold to Laos to make up for shortfalls

caused by drought. Food aid in cash or in kind was donated to Laos in 1991 by the Food and Agriculture Organization and

the UNDP, and by the United States, Australia, Thailand, and

the Netherlands.

Although foreign grants and loans remain sufficient to

finance Laos's trade deficit and development expenditure, at

least for the medium term, poor absorptive capacity, the result

(in part) of a poorly educated and trained labor force, reduces

its ability to make efficient use of the available funds. The bal- ance of payments actually went into surplus in 1989 and 1990.

However, there remains the question of whether flows from the

convertible currency area will continue to increase enough to make up for the losses from the nonconvertible currency area.

198
The Economy

Because the country's fiscal and trade position is not likely to improve dramatically in the early 1990s, this is an important

concern.

External Debt

The total external debt grew by an average annual rate of

22.5 percent from 1985 to 1989, slowing to 8.5 percent annually through 1991. Debt to the nonconvertible currency area is large but difficult to quantify, in part because available statistics often use different ruble-to-dollar exchange rates. World Bank

figures showed that between 68 and 77 percent of the external

debt was held by countries from the nonconvertible currency

area through 1991. However, debt service to nonconvertible

currency area countries as a percentage of total debt service

decreased from about 33 percent of the total in 1984 to less than 10 percent in 1990. Debt service as a ratio of total exports

increased from 10.2 percent in 1984 to a high of 16 percent in

1988, when it began a slow decline to nearly 10 percent in

1990, as exports increased (see table 13, Appendix). Although

statistics on debt as a percentage of GDP are highly variable, sources agree that external debt constituted considerably more

than 60 percent of GDP throughout the 1980s, surpassing total GDP in 1987 or 1988.

Through mid-1987, Laos was able to meet its non-ruble debt

repayment schedule mainly because many multilateral loans

had been made on highly concessional terms—about 99 percent of all long-term debt throughout the 1980s. Japan, which

accounted for approximately 33 to 45 percent of all debt to bilateral donors in the convertible currency area in the late

1980s, eased debt pressures by forgiving parts of its debt. In the

nonconvertible currency area, the Soviet Union allowed trade

deficits of up to 400 percent of the value of imports annually;

deficits at year's end were then converted into long-term loans.

In 1991 the Soviet Union agreed to reschedule some of its long-run debt payments and to continue accepting repayments

in commodities, rather than switching over to a hard currency

basis as had previously been agreed by the Soviet-Lao Cooperation Commission.

Prospects for Growth

By the start of the 1990s, Laos had obtained some impressive

results from the implementation of economic reforms under

199
Laos: A Country Study

the New Economic Mechanism. Although the experiment in

cooperative farming had ended as an ideological failure, rice

harvests had reached self-sufficiency levels in favorable weather

conditions. New decrees also guarantee farmers the right to long-term use and transfer of property. In response to the

encouragement of the manufacturing and services sectors

through privatization, investment promotion, and other

means, these sectors have slowly begun to supplant agriculture's share of GDP. The private retail sector has blossomed.

Removal of restrictions on interregional transit and improvement of foreign relations with Thailand have fueled growth in

the transport subsector, simplified trade activities, and are

likely to reduce the prices of many goods. The potential for

tourism as a foreign exchange earner has brightened as foreign

investors join with Laotian companies to provide improved avi- ation and tourism services. The opening of the Friendship

Bridge between Thailand and Laos symbolizes the new relationship with countries outside the former Soviet bloc: trade

with and aid from both developed and neighboring countries

have increased. Despite an inflationary surge in the late 1980s,

the reduction of credit to money-losing state-owned enterprises

and a tight monetary policy helped to bring inflation down to more manageable levels in the early 1990s. Tax reform has also

worked to slow the increase in the fiscal deficit. Despite these successes, however, many of the troubles that

saddled Laos at the beginning of the 1990s remain. Perhaps

the two most crucial constraints continue to be a poorly educated and trained labor force and a limited, poorly maintained

transportation network with endemic problems. Many of Laos's most experienced and educated citizens fled the country in the

late 1970s, and the poorly run and underfunded educational

system is inadequate to make up for this important loss of managerial and technical skill. Similarly, insufficient investment in

operations and maintenance over the years has resulted in a road system poorly equipped to handle the increased traffic

that liberalization precipitated. Without a better educated and

trained labor force and an improved infrastructure, measures

to increase foreign investment and encourage export-oriented

production are not likely to yield sustainable economic

progress. Even the push to privatize state-owned enterprises

and encourage efficient, profit-oriented production depends

upon the availability of trained managers to direct production.

Thus, the sustainability of reforms implemented by the start of

200
The Economy

the 1990s depends, at least in part, upon the ability of the government to turn its attention to the long-term infrastructure

and human capital requirements of a market-based economy.

* * * Writing about the LPDR economy presents special challenges because the measurement of crucial variables such as population, size of the labor force, GDP, trade and aid flows,

and other economic indicators differs from source to source. In addition, information is often out of date; most of the few

important books that cover the economy, such as Martin Stu- art-Fox's Laos: Politics, Economics, and Society, were published

before the New Economic Mechanism was introduced.

Among the most useful sources available are various World

Bank publications, including World Tables, and especially Historically Planned Economies, A Guide to the Data, as well as the IMF's

Balance ofPayments Statistics Yearbook. Frequently conflicting statistical information is given in such publications as the Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development's

Geographical Distribution ofFinancial Flows to Developing Countries,

and the UN's The Least Developed Countries Report. Three

extremely useful publications with a wide variety of statistics

that frequently coincide with those of other sources are the

UN's Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific and Economic and

Social Survey ofAsia and the Pacific, and the Asian Development

Bank's Asian Development Outlook. Of these publications, the first

is perhaps the only up-to-date publication with reasonably

detailed sectoral and production time series. For a more historical perspective on the growth of various economic sectors, the

Asian Economic Handbook and the Laos government's 10 Years of

Socio-Economic Development in the Lao People's Democratic Republic are very informative, if not always in agreement with other

sources. For information on specific sectors, a number of publications provide very useful data. The World Resources Institute's

World Resources statistical tables contain otherwise scarce information on forestry and agricultural activities, deforestation,

energy, and pollution. Two publications are indispensable for

information on trade and investment: the UN's Traders' Manual

for Asia and the Pacific: Lao People's Democratic Republic and Laurence J. Brahm and Neill T. Macpherson's Investment in the Lao

People's Democratic Republic. A collection of papers from the

Asian Development Bank and the Thai-Canada Economic Co201
Laos: A Country Study

operation Foundation's Thai-Lao Forum on Investment and Trade

Opportunities in Lao PDR provide some excellent sectoral background information.

A number of excellent, although brief, surveys of the econ- omy are available, including Martin Stuart-Fox's article "Laos in

1991: On the Defensive" and the section on Laos in TheFar East

and Australasia; the latter publication also contains some useful

statistical tables. For the most wide-ranging, up-to-date information, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Profile and

Country Report series for Indochina are essential; see also Asian

Survey's annual summary and the annual Asia Yearbook series.

The increase in foreign investment in Laos and the general

upswing in private activity in the marketplace may result in the

dissemination of more accurate, comprehensive, and timely

information about the economy. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

202
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Parallel dragonsform the sides of long steps leading to Wat Houa Xieng in Louangphrabang.
AS A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY until 1975, Laos was a conservative monarchy, dominated by a small number of powerful

families. In 1975 it was transformed into a communist oligarchy, but its social makeup remained much the same. In the 600-

year-old monarchy, the Lao king ruled from Louangphrabang

(Luang Prabang), while in other regions there were families

with royal pretensions rooted in the royal histories of Champasak (Bassac), Vientiane (Viangchan), and Xiangkhoang

(Tran Ninh) . They were surrounded by lesser aristocrats from

prominent families, who in turn became patrons to clients of

lower status, thus building a complex network of allegiances.

The king reigned from Louangphrabang but did not rule over much of the outlying regions of the country. In December 1975, with the declaration of the Lao People's

Democratic Republic (LPDR, or Laos), the king abdicated.

Although Laos was reorganized as a communist "people's

democracy," important vestiges of traditional political and

social behavior remained. The aristocratic families were shorn

of their influence, but a new elite with privileged access to the

communist roots of power emerged, and clients of lower status searched them out as patrons. In addition, some of the old

families who had links to the new revolutionary elite managed

to survive and wield significant influence. As newly dominant

elites replaced the old, they demanded a similar deference.

Lao Loum (lowland Lao; see Glossary) families continue to wield the greatest influence (see Lowland Lao Society, ch. 2).

Despite the rhetoric of the revolutionary elite concerning ethnic equality, Lao Theung (midland Lao; see Glossary) and Lao

Sung (upland Lao; see Glossary) minorities are low on the

scale of national influence, just as they were in pre-1975 society.

However, the power of the central government over the outlying regions has remained tenuous; the government still relies

upon bargains with tribal chieftains to secure the loyalty of

their peoples.

Although manifesting many of the characteristics of a traditional Lao monarchy dominated by a lowland Lao Buddhist

elite, the country also has exhibited many of the characteristics

of other communist regimes. It has shown a similar heavy

bureaucratic style, with emphasis within the bureaucracy on

205
Laos: A Country Study

political training and long sessions of criticism and self-criti- cism for its civil servants. Laos imported from its Vietnamese

mentor the concept of reeducation centers or "seminar

camps," where, during the early years of the LPDR, thousands

of former Royal Lao Government (RLG—see Glossary) adversaries were incarcerated. This communist overlay on traditional

society, however, has been moderated by two important factors:

Lao Buddhism and government administrative incompetence

in implementing socialist doctrine. Thus, what emerged in

Laos has been a system aptly labeled by Prince Souvanna

Phouma, former prime minister of the RLG, as "socialisme a la laotienne" (Lao-style socialism).

The melange of traditional politics, accompanied by patronclient relations, with communist-style intra-institutional competition, has produced a unique political culture. Power centers

tend to cluster around key personalities, and those in power

become targets of opportunity for members of their extended

family and friends (see Leadership, this ch.)

The Lao People's Revolutionary Party

Whereas communist parties in the former Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe have crumbled, in Laos, the ruling communist

party, the Phak Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party—LPRP; see Glossary) has retained undiluted political

control. The constitution, adopted in August 1991, notes simply in Article 3 that the LPRP is the "leading nucleus" of the

political system. LPRP statutes, revised following the Fifth Party

Congress held in 1991, leave no doubt regarding the dominant

role of the party:

The party is . . . the leading core of the entire political system, hub of intelligence, and representative of

the interest of the people of all strata. The party for- mulates and revises the major lines and policies on

national development in all spheres; finds solutions

to major problems; determines the policies regarding personnel management, training of cadres, and

supplying key cadres for different levels; controls and

supervises activities of party cadres and members,

state agencies and mass organizations.

Origins of the Party

The LPRP has its roots in the Indochinese Communist Party

206
Government and Politics

(ICP), founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. (Ho Chi Minh led the

struggle for Vietnamese independence and was the president

of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from

1945 until his death in 1969.) The ICP, composed entirely of

Vietnamese members in its early years, formed the Committee

for Laos (or a "Lao section") in 1936. Only in the mid-1940s

did the Vietnamese communist revolutionaries step up active

recruitment of Laotian members. In 1946 or early 1947, Kay- sone Phomvihan, a law student at the University of Hanoi, was

recruited, and Nouhak Phoumsavan, engaged in a trucking

business in Vietnam, joined in 1947.

In February 1951, the Second Congress of the ICP resolved

to disband the party and to form three separate parties representing the three states of Indochina (see The Pathet Lao, ch.

1). However, it was not until March 22, 1955, at the First Party

Congress, that the Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party

LPP) was formally proclaimed. (The name LPRP was adopted

at the Second Party Congress in 1972.) It seems likely that from

1951 to 1955, key Laotian former members of the ICP provided

leadership for the "resistance" movement in Laos, under the

tutelage of their Vietnamese senior partners. In 1956 the LPP

founded the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front—LPF), the

political party of the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation—see Glossary), to act as the public mass political organization. Meanwhile, the

LPP remained clandestine, directing the activities of the front.

The Vietnamese communists provided critical guidance and

support to the growing party during the revolutionary period.

They helped to recruit the leadership of the Laotian communist movement; from its inception, the LPRP Political Bureau

(Politburo) was made up of individuals closely associated with

the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese furnished facilities and guid- ance for training not only the top leadership, but also the

entire Laotian communist movement. The Vietnamese

assigned advisers to the party, as well as to the military forces of

the LPF. Under the guidance of North Vietnamese mentors,

LPRP leaders shaped a Marxist-Leninist party, political and

mass organizations, an army, and a bureaucracy, all based upon

the North Vietnamese model.

From their perspective, Laotian communists had not compromised their legitimacy as a nationalist movement by their

dependence on Hanoi. During the revolutionary period prior

to 1975, when LPRP leaders looked to the North Vietnamese

207
Laos: A Country Study

CO

UJ

LU LU

^ 2

oloo

id

If

< z

DC O

I-Q LU

2 Q

< z O <

£ >

9- 1— O DC

DC <

0- CL

kO

DC LU ^°^ 7r -7

-T- < 2

f= o o

u- b t

LU °- £

Egg

o o x

lu DC ill >oopo

b LU —

J

<h^O cc<ujg ^ Z IS <

Q < O Q- < o

z z<

z

<o

h- z

ID LU LU CO

CO

<

< ^

X O I <

> * 51

co O

<oo?

1 I- X CO S < a. o

=3 -J ^ z 02<0 X O X X O CO * H

UJ Si

u. S

O O

^<

t2

COz Z

ATIO UCTIO JNION N

Z £x£

co tr z < z 3 O co o

cc O > d O o ^LTCOl

CO 5 < Z _

V/1

AC

VI

MO ATIOI TION 'OME RADE Z Z3^H

cc n ll u. CO o>oo

_J

LL LU Z Z

-1 b 11 o o

UJo £ LU < < > £ ^ 01 01

LL- 0- LU LU 1- O O Q Q

CC < LU LU LU < _J D_ LU LL Ol

95. o> CD £

o >> o

to 3 H_

C0 ^> X3

-* O §

CO <g CO

v. CO ci) >» o

J3 O E

o5 I o 111!

O (D ^ L

c o 1:0 o L ffl w

*" or— E S

c -o « £ o <e E c >>— LO O

CD CD <D .Q "O "O

-C £ = -2

4S <D O O

r N PI t

CO

cc

inm

5

LUs

0.cc

CL

210
Government and Politics

Since 1972 the genuine center of political power, as in other

communist parties, has resided in the Politburo. Membership

of the Politburo, and formerly that of the Secretariat, is drawn

from the Central Committee. A small group of men—seven in

1972 and eleven by 1993—have provided the critical leadership

of the communist movement in Laos. A signal attribute of this

group has been its remarkable cohesion and continuity. The

Politburo has been dominated for more than fifteen years of

communist rule by the same stalwart band of revolutionary vet- erans. The twenty-five Laotian former members of the ICP who

founded the LPP in 1955, and from whom the Politburo was

drawn, remained in almost identical rank until illness and age

began to take their toll in the 1980s. Kaysone was named secre- tary general of the then secret LPP upon its establishment, a post he retained until his death in 1992. Nouhak retained his

number-two position on the Politburo into 1993. It was not

until the Fifth Party Congress that Souphanouvong, Phoumi

Vongvichit, and Sisomphone Lovansai (ranking third, fourth,

and seventh, respectively) were retired with honorific titles as counselors to the Central Committee. Prime Minister Khamtai

Siphandon was promoted to succeed Kaysone as chief of the

party, and Phoun Sipaseut advanced a notch in rank. In 1991

the Politburo numbered ten, including only two new members.

Although the exact manner of Politburo decision making

has never been revealed, a collegiality, based on long years of

common experience, appears to have developed. In addition

to their powerful position on the Politburo, members exercise

additional political power—perhaps even more than in most

other communist systems—through important posts within the

governmental structure. In fact, for many years, five Politburo

members also held seats on the Secretariat.

At the Fifth Party Congress, the party abolished the nine-per- son Secretariat of the Central Committee and changed the designation of the head of the party (Kaysone) from secretary

general to chairman. Until it was abolished, the Secretariat

wielded influence second only to that of the Politburo. The

Secretariat issued party directives and acted on behalf of the

Central Committee when it was not in session, in effect managing the day-to-day business of the party. Khamtai Siphandon

became party chairman in November 1992, but it is not certain

whether he will accrue the same power and influence as his

predecessor.

211
Laos: A Country Study

Each of the sixteen provinces (khoueng—see Glossary) is directed by a party committee, chaired by a party secretary,

who is the dominant political figure in the province. At a lower

level are 112 districts (muang—see Glossary), further divided

into subdistricts (tasseng—see Glossary), each with their own

party committees. Administratively, subdistricts have been abolished in principle since around 1993, but implementation has

been uneven across provinces. It is unknown whether subdistrict-level party committees have also been abolished. At the

base of the country's administrative structure are more than

11,000 villages (ban—see Glossary), only some of which have

party branches.

Semisecrecy of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party

Unlike other communist regimes, the LPRP has long maintained a semisecrecy about its mode of operation and the identity of its rank-and-file members. However, the LPRP follows

the standard communist practice of planting party members

within all principal institutions of society—in government, in mass organizations, and, formerly, in agricultural collectives.

These individuals serve as leaders and transmit party policy.

They also act as the eyes and ears of the central party organization. Although party members are admonished not to reveal

themselves, it is not difficult for knowledgeable persons to pick

out the party members in their organization. In each ministry,

for example, the key power wielders are party members. All

party members do not, of course, hold positions of authority.

Some occupy the lower ranks, serving, for example, as messengers, drivers, and maintenance personnel.

By the late 1980s, some of the LPRP's semisecrecy had

eroded. Party leadership lists, which, during revolutionary and

early postrevolutionary days had been secret, were published.

But a quasi-clandestine attitude remains among the party rank

and file that can be explained by several factors. Clandestine

behavior is an old habit that is not easily shed. Secrecy adds to the party's mystery, inspires anxiety and fear, and contributes to control. In view of its long history of revolutionary activity,

party veterans fear infiltration and subversion. LPRP pronouncements during its first decade of rule frequently alluded

to "CIA and Thai-reactionary-inspired agents," and later, when

relations with China grew tense, to the danger of "big power

hegemonism." Moreover, party leaders appear to lack confi212
Government and Politics

dence in the quality of their membership, speaking from time

to time about "bad elements" within the party.

The LPRP is relatively small compared with other incumbent

parties. For example, the 40,000 members that the party

claimed in 1985 represented 1.1 percent of the population

(estimating 3.5 million inhabitants). In 1979 the Vietnamese

Communist Party had 1.5 million members in a population of

53 million, or approximately 3 percent.

Ideology of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party

When LPRP leaders came to power in 1975 as victorious rev- olutionaries guided by Marxism-Leninism, they retained a zeal

for creating a "new socialist society and a new socialist man."

They declared their twin economic goals as the achievement of

"socialist transformation with socialist construction." They

asserted that in establishing the LPDR in 1975, they had completed the "national democratic revolution." (The national

goal had been to expel the French colonialists and the United

States imperialists. The democratic goal was to overthrow "reac- tionary traitors, comprador bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, reactionaries, feudalists and militarists. . . .") The LPRP claimed that it had won the national democratic revolution by winning a "people's war" with a "worker-peasant" alliance, under the secret

leadership of the LPRP working through a national front. It proclaimed a commitment to "proletarian internationalism"

and the "law of Indochinese solidarity," and at the same time

defined Vietnam and the Soviet Union as friends and the

"unholy alliance" among United States imperialism, Chinese

"great power hegemonism," and Thai militarism as enemies.

By the late 1980s, as communism was undergoing a radical

transformation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Kay- sone and his colleagues on the Politburo still professed an adherence to Marxism-Leninism, but they emphasized the

necessity for Laos to pass through a stage of "state capitalism."

Following Mikhail Gorbachev's example of perestroika, Kay- sone proclaimed in 1989 that state enterprises were being sev- ered from central direction and would be financially

autonomous. V.I. Lenin's New Economic Policy was frequently

cited to legitimize the movement toward a market economy

and the necessity to stimulate private initiative. By the early 1990s, even less of the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric

remained. The party has continued to move internally toward

213
Laos: A Country Study

more free-market measures and externally toward reliance

upon the capitalist countries and the international institutions on which they depend for investment and assistance. The "law"

of Indochinese solidarity has been amended, and the LPDR's

"special relations" with its former senior partner are no longer

invoked, even though party spokesmen still insist that Laos

retains a solid friendship and "all-round cooperation" with

Vietnam (see Bilateral Relations, this ch.).

Despite this erosion of communist ideology, retaining exclusive political power remains a primary goal of the party. In a speech in 1990, Secretary General Kaysone asserted the basis of

legitimacy of the party:

The party is the center of our wisdom. It has laid

down the correct and constructive line, patterns, and

steps compatible with realities in our country and

hence has led the Lao people in overcoming difficulties and numerous tests to win victory after victory,

until the final victory. History has shown that our

party is the only party which has won the credibility

and trust of the people. Our party's leadership in our

country's revolution is an objective requirement and

historic duty entrusted to it by the Lao multiethnic

people. Other political parties which had existed in our country have dissolved in the process of historical transformation. They failed to win the control

and support of the people because they did not

defend the national interest or fight for the interests

and aspirations of the people.

Leadership

Internal Stability and External Influences

Since the LPDR was proclaimed in December 1975, its leadership has been remarkably stable and cohesive. The record of

continuous service at the highest ranks is equaled by few, if any, regimes in the contemporary world. Laotian leaders have an

equally impressive record of unity. Although outside observers

have scrutinized the leadership for factions—and some have

postulated at various times that such factions might be divided

along the lines of Marxist-Leninist ideologues versus pragmatists or pro-Vietnamese versus nationalists (or pro-Chinese),

there is no solid evidence that the leadership is seriously

divided on any critical issues.

214
Government and Politics

In 1975 the Laotian communist leaders, most of whom had

spent the revolutionary decade from 1964 to 1974 operating

from Pathet Lao headquarters in the caves of Sam Neua Province (now Houaphan), came down from the mountains to Vientiane to direct the new government. At the outset of their

accession to power, they were suspicious, secretive, and inaccessible, and lower-level cadres were maladroit in imposing heavy

bureaucratic controls. Travel within the country was limited,

personal and family behavior was monitored by newly organized revolutionary administrative committees, cadres were

assigned to disseminate propaganda, and seminars were held

to provide political education for all sorts of groups. During

these early years, the party squandered much of the goodwill

and friendly acceptance from a population tired of war and the

corruption of the old regime.

At first, Laotian communist leaders were committed to ful- filling their revolutionary goals of fundamentally altering society through "socialist transformation and socialist

construction." After 1979 the regime modified its earlier zeal- ous pursuit of socialism and pursued more liberal economic

and social policies, in much the same manner as Vietnam.

For more than a decade after 1975, the Vietnamese continued to exercise significant influence upon the Laotian leadership through a variety of party, military, and economic

channels. By the end of the 1980s, however—in particular fol- lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc in

1991 and diminishing assistance from the Soviet Union to Vietnam and Laos—Vietnam turned inward to concentrate on its own problems of development. This emboldened Laotians

leaders to jettison even more of their socialist ideological baggage, abandon agricultural collectivization, and move toward a market economy. Laos was also free to pursue an independent

foreign policy. The single most important vestige of the former

communist system was the solitary ruling party, the LPRP.

Key Leaders

Kaysone Phomvihan was preeminent leader of both the

party and the state until his death in November 1992. Kaysone's

unusual career had taken him through two decades of revolution and almost another two decades of independence. Born in

1920, Kaysone studied at the Faculty of Law at the University of

Hanoi where, in 1942, he joined the struggle against the

215
Laos: A Country Study

French colonialists, according to his official biography. Kay- sone was known in Hanoi by his Vietnamese name, Quoc.

For at least a decade after independence, Kaysone avoided

contact with the masses, Western diplomats, and journalists,

remaining heavily guarded and secretive, in some ways continuing an earlier shadowy revolutionary style. Kaysone's caution

may have been influenced by concern for his safety because

several attempts had been made on his life during the first few

years of his rule. During 1989 and 1990, however, Kaysone

moved about more freely in Laos and showed himself more

openly to the outside world. For the first time, he made state

visits to Japan, China, and Sweden. He gave interviews to West- ern journalists and was more available to meet with Western

officials. His public statements suggested that he was impressed

by the level of development he had seen in affluent nations

and that he was open to new techniques to bring economic

progress to Laos under the leadership of the LPRP.

Although the political careers of most communist leaders in

Europe and Asia had been terminated when fundamental new

policies were introduced to their regimes, Kaysone continued

his leadership without challenge, showing unusual political

agility and ideological flexibility. Kaysone had long embraced

Marxism-Leninism, following the pattern of his Vietnamese

and Soviet mentors. When evidence of change in the communist world began to appear, Kaysone propounded the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, invoking Lenin, but soon moved

control of state enterprises to autonomous firms, and by 1989

edged more deliberately toward a market economy (see Industrial Policy, ch. 3). Kaysone appeared to be a pragmatic communist leader, open to the ideas of outsiders and zealous for

although unsuccessful at producing—economic growth.

Upon Kaysone's death, the person who had been second in

party Politburo rank for as long as Kaysone had been first, Nouhak Phoumsavan, born in 1914, was passed over as party chairman—presumably for reasons of age and ill health—in favor of

the third-ranking member, General Khamtai Siphandon. In

keeping with the Laotian communist practice of maintaining

continuity and honoring seniority, however, Nouhak was promoted from deputy prime minister to president of state. As of 1994, the new LPRP chairman, Khamtai, also retained

his government post as prime minister, suggesting that he had

consolidated his role as the preeminent political leader. Born

216
Khamtai Siphandon, Prime

Minister, Lao People's

Democratic Republic

Courtesy Embassy of the Lao

People's Democratic

Republic, Washington

Nouhak Phoumsavan,

President, Lao People's

Democratic Republic

Courtesy Embassy of the Lao

People's Democratic

Republic, Washington

in 1924 in Champasak Province, Khamtai is the youngest sur- viving member of the group that founded the Neo Lao Issara (Free Laos Front—see Glossary) in 1950 and the LPP in 1955.

He is thought to have spent part of World War II (1939-45) in

India and was employed as a postal worker in southern Laos

after the war. He joined the Lao Issara (Free Laos—see Glossary) in 1946 and remained with the Pathet Lao group that

split with the Lao Issara in 1949 (see The Coming of Independence, ch. 1). Assigned to military and political functions in

the southern Laos sector, Khamtai was elected to the Central

Committee of the Neo Lao Issara in 1950. According to a biography published in the Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan (People), Khamtai was appointed chief of staff of the Lao People's

Liberation Army (LPLA—see Glossary) in 1954, and in 1957

217
Laos: A Country Study

he was elected to membership in the Central Committee of the

LPP. He directed the party's propaganda and training functions during 1959 and 1960 and in 1961 was named supreme

commander of the LPLA. In 1962 he was appointed to the

Standing Committee of the party's Central Committee and

named deputy secretary of the General Military Committee.

Khamtai moved steadily forward in the LPRP Politburo to the third ranking position, serving as minister of national

defense from 1975 to 1991 and as deputy prime minister

before his elevation to the post of prime minister in 1991.

Khamtai's background in the military establishment, which has

been a conservative force in Laotian politics, is thought to

make him particularly sensitive to security concerns. He has a reputation as a hardliner and appears to be more inclined

toward secrecy than Kaysone. Before assuming the post of

prime minister, he had little exposure to Westerners, although

his contacts increased when he took on his new task. The deputy prime minister for foreign affairs in 1994 was Phoun Sipaseut, a veteran Politburo member who headed the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs for seventeen years. Below him, in

the rank of minister of foreign affairs, was Somsavat Lengsavat,

who ranked fifty-first in the LPRP Central Committee. In Kaysone's time, an "inner cabinet" of six party leaders carried the

major decision-making responsibility for the government. Of

this group, only three members were living as of mid-1994

Nouhak, Khamtai, and Phoun. It is uncertain whether Kaysone's successors will continue the inner cabinet, but there

appears to be some generational conflict between the leaders

who were educated by service in the secret revolutionary party

and those who may have studied abroad—very likely in

France—before 1975 and whose membership in the party

came during a more open era. One of the vice ministers of for- eign affairs in 1992, for example, studied at the French military

academy, Saint Cyr, as did a former minister of external eco- nomic relations. The latter was dealing very adroitly in 1991

with foreign donors, and at the Fifth Party Congress, his rank

on the Central Committee rose from twenty-sixth to sixteenth.

His counterpart in the Ministry of Finance, however, a former

provincial governor with more than three decades of service in

the revolutionary movement, was propelled from forty-third to tenth in the Central Committee and gained membership in the

Politburo.

218
Government and Politics

The Constitution

Development of the Constitution

On August 14, 1991, sixteen years after the establishment of

the LPDR, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), the country's

highest legislative organ, adopted a constitution. Although the

SPA had been charged with drafting a constitution in 1975, the

task had low priority. It was not until the Third Party Congress

that party Secretary General Kaysone stated that the LPRP

should "urgently undertake the major task ... of preparing a

socialist constitution at an early date." Laotian press reports

subsequently revealed that a constitutional drafting committee

was working informally under the chairmanship of Politburo

member Sisomphone Lovansai, a specialist in party organization, with the help of East German advisers. Despite the proclaimed urgency of the task, only on May 22, 1984, did the SPA

Standing Committee formalize the appointment of Sisomphone to head a fifteen-person drafting committee.

Although the political institutions had functioned without a written constitution for fifteen years, the lack of a constitution

created serious drawbacks for the country. International development agencies were reluctant to invest in Laos given the

absence of a fixed, knowable law. Amnesty International, in a 1985 report on Laos, asserted that without a constitution or published penal and criminal codes, citizens were "effectively

denied proper legal guarantees of their internationally recognized human rights." Even the party newspaper, Xieng Pasason

(Voice of the People), commenting in June 1990 on the

absence of a constitution and a general body of laws, acknowledged that "having no laws is ... a source of injustice and violation, thus leading to a breakdown of social order and peace,

the breeding of anarchy, and the lack of democracy."

Reasons for the leisurely pace of constitution drafting,

unusually slow even for the plodding bureaucracy, were not

readily apparent. Vietnam had adopted a revised constitution

in 1980 and Cambodia in 1981, only two years after the ouster

of the Khmer Rouge. According to some reports, progress in

Laos had been blocked by differences within the Politburo over

certain substantive clauses. Perhaps most important, the party

leadership, accustomed to rule without question, may have

assigned a low priority to producing a document that might

219
Laos: A Country Study

eventually lead to challenging their authority, despite rhetoric

to the contrary. Further, the public seemed not to care. After the new SPA was elected in March 1989, it formally

appointed a seventeen-member constitutional drafting committee. The National Radio of Laos reported that the drafting

committee was working "under the close supervision of the

Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee." Six members of the drafting committee were members

of the Central Committee; two of these members also served

on the SPA, which also had six members on the drafting committee.

In April 1990, after securing approval of its document from

the LPRP Politburo and the Secretariat, the SPA finally made

public the draft constitution. With its publication, the party

Central Committee issued Directive Number 21, on April 30,

1990, calling for discussion of the draft, first among party and

government officials and then among the public. The discussions, although orchestrated by party cadres, did not always

please party authorities. An LPRP spokesman released a memo

complaining that "people in many major towns" had dwelled

too much on what the constitution had to say about the organization of the state. InJune a member of the Central Committee

cautioned against demonstrations to "demand a multiparty sys- tem" and warned that demonstrators would be arrested. Competing parties would not be tolerated, he asserted, adding that

"our multi-ethnic Lao people have remained faithfully under

the leadership of the LPRP." In a later pronouncement, he said

that "the Party has proved to the people in the last 35 years that

it is the only party that can take care of them" and he lectured

that "too many parties invite division." A Central Committee

directive, dated June 14, 1990, hinted at the quality of the public discussion, noting that "in many cases where people were convoked to a meeting, they were simply given question and

answer sheets to study."

Not all discussions of the draft constitution were perfunctory, however. Undoubtedly inspired by the examples of East- ern Europe and the Soviet Union—where the monopoly of

power by communist parties had crumbled—a group of some

forty government officials and intellectuals began criticizing

the country's one-party system in a series of letters and meetings in April 1990. Organized in the unofficial "Social Democratic Club," the group called for a multiparty system in Laos.

220
Government and Politics One member of the group, an assistant to the minister of sci- ence and technology, submitted a letter of resignation to Prime

Minister Kaysone in which he labeled Laos a "communist monarchy" and a "dynasty of the Politburo," declaring that the

country should "change into a multi-party system in order to bring democracy, freedom and prosperity to the people."

Criticism of the draft document gathered strength in the

succeeding months; Laotian students in Paris, Prague, and

Warsaw joined in the call for free elections. Criticism broadened as a group of young, educated party cadres associated

with nonparty bureaucrats—many educated in France and

Canada—targeted veteran party leaders. These groups charged

that the new policies of the old guard were fostering corruption and increased social and economic inequality. It was not

until October 1990 that the government finally cracked down

on these calls for democratic reforms, with the arrest of several

protesters, including a former vice minister in the State Planning Commission and a director in the Ministry ofJustice who

were sentenced to long prison terms in Houaphan.

Thus, although the constitution purports to guarantee freedom of speech and petition and its framers give lip service to the desirability of public discussion, the ruling party sent a

clear message with these arrests that it will not tolerate challenges to its exclusive exercise of power. Veteran party leaders were clearly more impressed by the political models of Vietnam

and China than by the examples of Eastern Europe and the

Soviet Union. Although willing to experiment with economic

liberalization, party leaders seemed determined to retain political domination—if they could—through a Leninist-style party.

Highlights of the Constitution

The 1991 constitution, which contains elements of an earlier

revolutionary orthodoxy, is clearly influenced by the economic

and political liberalization within Laos, as well as by the dramatic changes in the socialist world and the international bal- ance of forces. The constitution specifies the functions and

powers of the various organs of government and defines the

rights and duties of citizens. Several chapters prescribing the

structure of the state define the function and powers of the

National Assembly (the renamed SPA), the president, the government, the local administration, and the judicial system. The

constitution has little to say, however, about the limitations on

221
222
View of the Mekong Riverfrom Phousi courtyard, Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

223
Laos: A Country Study

government. In foreign policy, the principles of peaceful coexistence are followed.

The constitution legally establishes a set of authorities that

resembles the traditional differentiation among executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The delineation

does not imitate any particular model (neither Vietnamese, nor Russian, nor French), but it pays respect to the idea of a

basic blueprint of responsibilities lodged in designated institutions. There is room for evolution of government authority, but

there are also specific boundaries.

Government outside Vientiane has developed an independence over the years, reflecting the exigencies of the Pathet

Lao armed struggle and of economic self-reliance during the

postwar socialist pitfalls. The constitution eliminated elected

people's councils at the provincial and district level as neces- sary "no more," in an effort to fit the state apparatus to the

needs of building and developing the regime under "the actual

conditions of the country." Again, the will of the ruling party

determines which road the administration follows in regard to

local governance, but the constitution has left governors, mayors, and district and village chiefs free to "administer their

regions and localities without any assistance from popularly

elected bodies." The leading role of the party within the

administration of the nation overall is illustrated by the fact

that party Politburo members are found in state offices—the

offices of the president of state, and prime minister, deputy

prime ministers (two), chair of the National Assembly, minister

of defense, and chair of the Party and State Inspection Board.

The first words of the Preamble refer to the "multi-ethnic

Lao people," and frequent use of this term is made throughout

the text, a clear rhetorical attempt to promote unity within an

ethnically diverse society. The "key components" of the people

are specified as workers, farmers, and intellectuals. The Preamble celebrates a revolution carried out "for more than 60 years"

under the "correct leadership" of the ICR

The dominant role played by the LPRP, however, is scarcely

mentioned, and the constitution is almost silent about the

party's functions and powers. One brief reference to the ruling

party is made in Article 3, which states that the "rights of the

multi-ethnic people to be the masters of the country are exer- cised and ensured through the functioning of the political sys224
Government and Politics

tern with the Lao People's Revolutionary Party as its leading

nucleus."

Article 5 notes that the National Assembly and all other state organizations "function in accordance with the principle of

democratic centralism." This stricture is an obvious reference

to the Marxist-Leninist principle, which calls for open discussion within a unit but prescribes that the minority must accede

to the will of the majority, and lower echelons must obey the

decisions of higher ones. Article 7 calls upon mass organizations, such as the Lao

Front for National Construction, the Federation of Trade

Unions, the People's Revolutionary Youth Union, and the Federation of Women's Unions, to "unite and mobilize the people." The Lao Front for National Construction, the successor to the LPF, served as the political front for the party during the

revolutionary struggle. Its mandate is to mobilize political support and raise political consciousness for the party's goals

among various organizations, ethnic groups, and social classes

within society. Other mass organizations are assigned to pursue

these goals among their target populations of workers, youths,

and women.

The constitution proclaims that the state will respect the

"principle of equality among ethnic tribes," which have the

right to promote "their fine customs and culture." Further, the

state is committed to upgrading the "socio-economy of all ethnic groups."

Regarding religion, the state "respects and protects all lawful

activities of the Buddhists and of other religious followers."

Buddhist monks and other clergy are reminded that the state encourages them to "participate in the activities which are beneficial to the country" (see Buddhism, ch. 2).

The chapter on the socioeconomic system does not mention

the establishment of socialism, a principal goal of earlier

dogma. Instead, the objective of economic policy is to trans- form the "natural economy into a goods economy." Private

property appears to be assured by the statement that the "state protects the right of ownership," including the right of transfer

and inheritance. The state is authorized to undertake such

tasks as managing the economy, providing education, expanding public health, and caring for war veterans, the aging, and

the sick (see Health and Welfare, ch. 2). The constitution

225
Laos: A Country Study

admonishes that "all organizations and citizens must protect

the environment."

A chapter on the rights and obligations of citizens sets forth a cluster of well-known rights found in modern constitutions,

including freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly.

Women and men are proclaimed equal, and all citizens can

vote at age eighteen and hold office at twenty-one. In return,

citizens are obliged to respect the laws, pay taxes, and defend

the country, which includes military service (see Manpower

and Conditions of Service, ch. 5). In commenting on this chapter in 1990, Amnesty International, clearly concerned about

past human rights abuses, criticized the document for what was

not included. Amnesty International noted the absence of provisions for protecting the right to life, abolishing the death

penalty, guaranteeing the inalienability of fundamental rights,

prohibiting torture, safeguarding against arbitrary arrest and

detention, protecting people deprived of their liberty, and providing for a fair trial. No safeguards exist to protect the rights

to freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and

association, and independence of the judiciary.

Laos is made up of provinces, municipalities, districts, and

villages. The constitution gives no clear guidance on provincial

and district responsibilities except to specify that the leaders at each echelon must ensure the implementation of the constitution and the law and must carry out decisions taken by a higher

level. In spite of the party's inclination to centralize decision

making, provinces and localities have enjoyed a surprising

degree of autonomy in shaping social policy. This independence is partly a result of limited resources and poor communications with Vientiane. But the central government has also

encouraged direct contacts along the borders with China, Thailand, and Vietnam, and trading agreements with neighboring

jurisdictions.

Although it is unlikely that the constitution will immediately

change the embedded patterns of the Laotian political system

or threaten the dominant role of the party, it has the potential

to protect human rights and respect for the law, by the rulers as well as the ruled. The crumbling of communist regimes in East- ern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as strains in communist systems elsewhere, accompanied by widespread

movements for democracy, suggest that Laos will not be

226
Government and Politics immune to growing demands for a more dependable rule of

law. Government Structure

Bureaucratic Culture

The historical evolution of Laos created identifiable layers of

bureaucratic behavior. Traditional royal customs and Buddhist

practices set the foundation. Next, there was an overlay of

French influence, the product of colonial rule from 1890 to 1954. During this period, several generations of Laotian

bureaucrats were trained and often placed in subordinate rank

to French-imported Vietnamese civil servants. The administration used French as the official language and followed French

colonial administrative practices. From 1954 to 1975, there was an increase in United States influence, and the United States

provided training and educational opportunities for future

bureaucrats as well as employment in United States agencies.

Because of its brevity, however, the United States impact was far

less pervasive than the French.

When the communists seized power in 1975, a new layer of

bureaucrats—strongly influenced by North Vietnam and the

Soviet Union and its allies—was added. Many of the Frenchtrained and United States-influenced bureaucrats fled across the Mekong River. Of those who stayed, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 were sent to "seminar camps," or reeducation centers

(see "Seminar Camps" and the Death of Savang Vatthana, ch. 1; Detention Centers, ch. 5). The few Western-trained bureaucrats who remained possessed French- or English-language

skills and the technical competence needed to deal effectively

with the Western foreign aid donors so critical to the economy.

The Western-trained bureaucrats were essential because not

many of the new revolutionary cadres who moved into key positions of bureaucratic authority had much formal education,

knowledge of a foreign language, or competence in the technical and managerial skills necessary to run a national economy.

The few cadres in each ministry who were capable of managing

the economy were often unavailable because there were so many demands for their services: for example, meeting with

visiting foreign delegations, traveling to international meetings, and attending political training sessions.

227
Laos: A Country Study

Since its inception, the LPDR bureaucracy has been lethargic and discouraged individual initiative. It has been dangerous

to take unorthodox positions. Some officials have been

arrested on suspicion of corruption or ideological deviation:

for example, "pro-Chinese" sentiment. Initiative has been further constrained by the lack of legal safeguards, formal trial procedures, and an organized system of appeal. The beginnings of a penal code, which the SPA endorsed in 1989, and

the promulgation of a constitution in 1991, however, may solidify the system ofjustice and provide a clear definition as to what

constitutes a crime against socialist morality, the party, or the

state. The lethargy of the bureaucracy is understandable within

the cultural context of Laos. As a peasant society at the lower

end of the modernization scale, the LPDR has adopted few of

the work routines associated with modern administration. For- eign aid administrators frequently point out that Laotian

administrators have difficulty creating patterns or precedents, or learning from experience. Laotians are known for their

light-hearted, easy-going manner. This bo pink nyang (never

mind—don't worry about it) attitude is reflected in the languid

pace of administration. Official corruption has also been

acknowledged as problematic.

Kaysone acknowledged the bureaucracy's low level of competence. In his report to the Fourth Party Congress in 1986, he

chided those in authority who gave "preference only to (their

friends) or those from the same locality or race; paying atten- tion to only their birth origin, habits and one particular sphere

of education." Patronage is but one area that has come under

scrutiny and resulted in admonishments to strengthen inspection and control. Kaysone further railed against "dogmatism,

privatism, racial narrow-mindedness, regionalism and localism."

Executive

The president of the country is elected by a two-thirds vote

of the National Assembly for a term of five years. One surprising constitutional provision transforms the presidency from a ceremonial position to one with important political power. The

president appoints and can dismiss the prime minister and

members of the government, with the approval of the National

Assembly—parliamentary responsibility that has not yet

228
Government and Politics

occurred in the short life of the current constitutional regime.

He also presides over meetings of the government, "when necessary," and appoints and dismisses provincial governors and

mayors of municipalities as well as generals of the armed

forces, upon the recommendation of the prime minister. In

addition, the president receives and appoints ambassadors and

declares states of emergency or war. The powers accorded to the president grew perceptibly during the drafting process of the constitution, but the sudden

death of Kaysone, who had moved from prime minister to state president after the promulgation of the constitution, temporarily introduced doubts regarding the relative power potential

of the two offices. Nonetheless, the president of state heads the

armed forces and has the right and duty to promulgate laws

and issue decrees and state acts. The primary organization for administration is the government, which consists of the prime minister—its head—and

deputy prime ministers, ministers, and chairs of ministry-equivalent state committees. The prime minister, appointed by the

president with the approval of the National Assembly, serves a

five-year term. Duties of this office include the guidance and

supervision of the work of government ministries and committees, as well as of the governors of provinces and mayors of

municipalities. The prime minister appoints all the deputies at these levels of government, as well as the local district chiefs

(see fig. 9).

Legislature

The National Assembly, the country's supreme legislative

body, is to be elected every five years. Significantly, this designation was used in RLG and French colonial times, before the

introduction of the title "Supreme People's Assembly" in late

1975. It is located in a new building, far larger than the previ- ous structure built in colonial times, and contains an auditorium seating 800 persons.

The National Assembly makes decisions on fundamental

issues and oversees administrative and judicial organs. Its most

significant powers include electing and removing the president

of state, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and the

prosecutor general, "on the recommendation of the National

Assembly Standing Committee." Its prestige has been further

enhanced by the constitutional mandate to "make decisions on

229
Laos: A Country Study

UJ CO 2 "J fc a a. 3 aOO 3 UJ O

<0 Q- h

-i< CO

CL 1— z oc r; oc

PROVI COU

MUNK COU 5P

PiCO o

5 o

oc O -J ^ <

UJ " g OC O ? uj u

00 o

UJ O UJ CO §1S

T3 O ^

h- co o o Z a) c 2 £ co I o 9 V> © -a

</> *r ^ CD UJ ° « E £ © | © £ o °

o

H oc Z UJ UJQ &

m z

RE 2

a. UJ

UJ s o oc > L

> o

o

o 6

5 c o o c c c

CD 'co o 5 © -o % 1 1 S < 5

- © o

Q. Q) CO o "IP ° z cc

c g o cO CO ^

sis. -Q CO CO C O) o o. (0.CDQ W £ c S ©

« « & z

a. a. co

CO CO o c O CD co a5 T3 a

s I fc 5

CD GO -Q *=

o

*- g Li- CO o

O CO c £ zj co .2 3 E 2 <» u c o u m E Q_ 3 CO ©

CO O "O .f= o < O 111 LL LL

CO

1

8

2 E

© CD 8 CO © O © .2 "D o. .£

rrt c o ^ CD CL CDE

coc o

J. 3

©

O O O

"O "O CD CO CO ^

CQ CQ O

on

I

I

CO

230
Government and Politics

the fundamental issues of the country" and to "elect or remove

the President of state and the Vice President of state," by a twothirds vote, and to approve the removal of members of the government on the recommendation of the president of state. Its powers encompass amending the constitution, determining

taxes, approving the state budget, endorsing or abrogating

laws, and electing or removing the two top judicial figures in

the system. Members of the National Assembly have the "right

to interpellate the members of the government." The National

Assembly also ratifies treaties and decides questions of war and

peace. These powers may prove to be limited, however, by a provision in the constitution that the National Assembly will

generally meet in ordinary session only twice a year. The Standing Committee meeting in the interim may convene an

extraordinary session if it deems this necessary.

The constitution does not specify the number of members in

the National Assembly, whose candidates are screened by the

LPRP. The 1989 election placed seventy-nine members in this

body, representing districts of between 40,000 and 50,000 per- sons each. The election campaign lasted two months, and can- didates appeared before voters at night in local schools or pagodas. Voting consisted of crossing out unfavored candidates, and every ballot contained at least two candidates. The

number of party members elected by this process was officially

placed at sixty-five.

Between sessions, the Standing Committee of the National

Assembly, consisting of the president and the vice president

elected by the National Assembly and an unspecified number

of other members, prepares for future sessions and "supervise [s] and oversee [s] the activities of the administrative and

judicial organizations." It is empowered to appoint or remove

the vice president of the Supreme People's Court andjudges at

all levels of the lower courts. Its supervisory role can be reinforced by National Assembly committees established to consider draft laws and decrees and to help in the supervision and

administration of the courts. The special National Assembly

Law passed March 25, 1993, specifies five substantive areas for

National Assembly committees: secretarial; law; economic planning and finances; cultural, social, and nationalities; and for- eign affairs. The membership of the committees includes not

only National Assembly members but also chiefs and deputy

chiefs, who "guide the work," and technical cadres.

231
Laos: A Country Study

Judiciary

The development of the legal and judicial system did not

begin until almost fifteen years after the state was proclaimed.

In November 1989, a criminal code and laws establishing a

judicial system were adopted. In 1993 the government began

publishing an official gazette to disseminate laws, decrees, and

regulations.

In 1990 the judicial branch was upgraded. New legislation

provided a draft of a criminal code, established procedures for

criminal cases, set up a court system, and established a law

school. Moreover, the Ministry ofJustice added a fourth year of

studies to a law program for training magistrates and judges.

Also in 1990, the functions of the Supreme People's Court

were separated from those of the Office of the Public Prosecutor General. Until then, the minister ofjustice served as both

president of the court and director of public prosecutions.

Although the implementation ofjudicial reforms proceeded

slowly and had not significantly improved the administration of

justice by mid-1994, the new legal framework offers the possibility of moving away from the arbitrary use of power toward

the rule of law. In late 1992, however, the government sus- pended the bar until it formulates regulations for fees and

activities of (the few) private lawyers who are able to advise in

civil cases. Lawyers are not allowed to promote themselves as attorneys-at-law. Theoretically, the government provides legal

counsel to the accused, although in practice persons accused

of crimes must defend themselves, without outside legal counsel. This situation is changing, however, and the assessors (legal

advisers) —who are often untrained—and the party functionaries are being increasingly replaced by professional personnel

trained at the Institute of Law and Administration.

The constitution empowers the National Assembly to elect or remove the president of the Supreme People's Court and

the public prosecutor general on the recommendation of its Standing Committee. The Standing Committee of the National

Assembly appoints or removes judges (previously elected) of

the provincial, municipal, and disuict levels. Further evidence of an attempt to shift toward a professional

judicial system is found in the public prosecution institutes provided for at each level of administration. The task of these insti- tutes is to control the uniform observance of laws by all

232
Government and Politics

ministries, organizations, state employees, and citizens. They

prosecute under the guidance of the public prosecutor general, who appoints and removes deputy public prosecutors at

all levels. Challenges to the Regime

Human Rights

Human rights have been gaining a measure of respect in

Laos. In the early years of the LPDR, party authorities arbitrarily sent people labeled as social deviants—"prostitutes,

addicts, gamblers, hippies, thieves, and lost children"—to semi- nar camps. Political opponents associated with the former

RLG—perhaps as many as 30,000 to 50,000—were also confined to these camps.

By the late 1980s, there was a slight liberalization in the

granting of human rights. Many, although not all, of the semi- nar camps had been closed, and some former inmates were

assigned to labor and construction units and collective farms

near the camps. It became easier for a citizen to travel within

the country and gain permission to cross the Mekong River to Thailand or travel abroad. As of April 1994, any Laotian with an identification card and foreigners with valid visas were permitted to travel anywhere in the country—with specific travel

papers—except to a few unspecified "restricted areas." Restrictions on Buddhist religious practices became more relaxed,

and even high-level government officials routinely attended

Buddhist functions. The number of Buddhist monks increased,

with some 30,000 reported to be practicing in 1991 (see Buddhism, ch. 2). The agents of state internal security, principally

the police and other cadres of the Ministry of Interior, seemed

less oppressive. In 1991 twenty-five detainees who had been

held at seminar camps since 1975 were released. The number

the government was known to be holding as of 1993 had diminished to fewer than twelve, all former officials or military offic- ers of the RLG. The LPDR claimed that the remaining

detainees were free to travel in Houaphan Province, where they were confined.

Nonetheless, many freedoms remain inaccessible. The government controls most large public gatherings, and, except for

religious, athletic, and communal events, generally organizes

them. Political demonstrations, protest marches, and other

233
Laos: A Country Study

"destabilizing subversive activities" are expressly banned by the

new penal code. The constitution guarantees the freedoms of

speech and the press, but the exercise of these freedoms is subject to a wide range of government controls (see Mass Media,

this ch.).

Insurgents

A small-scale insurgency that has existed since 1975 contin- ues in the early 1990s, although at a much lower level than in

previous years. This insurgency has never seriously threatened

the regime, but it is troublesome because the insurgents commit sabotage, blow up bridges, and threaten transport and

communications. The great majority of insurgents are Hmong

(see Glossary), led by ex-soldiers from United States Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA)-supported units who fought against

Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops in the 1960s. Hmong

groups, most of them formerly associated with the RLG, draw

recruits and support from Hmong refugee camps and operate

from bases in Thailand with the cooperation of local Thai military officers. As relations between Thailand and Laos continued to improve in the 1990s, support for this insurgent activity

declined (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). Resistance spokesmen

claim that their principal source of funds for weapons and supplies comes from Laotian expatriate communities overseas, including the 180,000 Laotians in the United States. Even though the government lacks widespread public support, insurgency is less a measure of discontent than evidence

of a serious ethnic problem. The LPDR, like the RLG that preceded it, has been dominated by lowland Lao. The two governments exemplify the traditional Lao disdain for upland

peoples, in spite of Pathet Lao rhetoric in favor of ethnic equality. On the one hand, because many Hmong fought on the side

of the "American imperialists," government leaders feel additionally suspicious of them. On the other hand, Hmong and

other upland minorities who served with the United States-supported forces have been suspicious and uncomfortable under

their former enemies. Thus, a core of insurgents, composed

largely of ethnic minorities, continues to fight against the

authorities. It will be extremely difficult—perhaps impossible—for the government to pacify them, especially without

help from Vietnamese military units, if the insurgents enjoy

access to sanctuary in Thailand along the easily crossed, 1,000-

kilometer Mekong River border.

234
Government and Politics

In the early 1980s, Hmong insurgents claimed that the Lao

People's Army (LPA—see Glossary) was using lethal chemical

agents against them. The Hmong refugees in Thailand often

referred to the chemical agents as "poisons from above;" for- eign journalists used the term "yellow rain." The government

vehemently denied these charges. The United States Department of State noted in 1992 that "considerable investigative

efforts in recent years have revealed no evidence of chemical

weapons use" in the post-1983 period.

Refugees

From 1975 to 1985, after the communists had seized power

and were consolidating their hold, some 350,000 persons fled across the Mekong River to Thailand and, in most cases, reset- tled in third countries. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, this

outflow had declined substantially. In 1990, for example, an

estimated 1,000 to 2,000 lowland Lao and 4,000 to 5,000

upland Lao departed illegally for Thailand. The Thai government refused to admit these refugees as immigrants. Emigrants

who claim to be "victims of communism" may face more problems being accepted for third-country resettlement as a result

of the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Laos has become more

liberal in granting exit permits to those desiring to emigrate.

By the early 1990s, almost as many Laotians were returning

to Laos as were leaving. Under a voluntary repatriation program worked out in 1980 by Laos and the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR—see Glossary), nearly

19,000 Laotians had voluntarily returned to their homeland by

the end of 1993, and an estimated 30,000 more had returned

without official involvement. Most of the returnees are lowland

Lao. Of the approximately 30,000 Laotian refugees remaining

in camps in Thailand in 1993, the majority are upland Lao.

Approximately 1,700 Laotian refugees remain in China. Emigres who had resettled in third countries are returning in

increasing numbers to visit relatives and, in a few cases, to sur- vey business opportunities in the more liberal economy.

Political Opposition

Over the centuries, residents of the Laotian Buddhist kingdom developed gentle techniques of accommodation, often

searching for more powerful patrons either outside the country or within. Authorities governed during the early years after

235
Laos: A Country Study

1975 with little popular support, but most Laotians simply submitted to their authority because they had little alternative.

However, the authorities were not harsh compared to other

communist regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, most of which—by

mid-1994—had toppled.

The relatively passive Laotian political culture inspires few

direct challenges to one-party domination, and party authorities firmly assert the limits of political dissent. LPRP spokesmen

invoke a litany of explanations to justify the party's monopoly

of power—for example, the country is too underdeveloped

and the people too little educated to permit more than one

party. Further, there are too many ethnic groups, and open

political participation would lead to disunity and chaos. Political stability, provided by the leadership of a single party, is said

to be necessary for economic growth. The LPRP has also

pointed out the corrupt multiparty system of the RLG. An abiding political reality, however, is that those who have power wish

to retain it. Restrictions on political opposition do not appear to be a serious issue among a majority of the population, although a small number of educated Laotians in intellectual, student,

and bureaucratic circles have raised a few protests. Despite the

toll of age and failing health among the aged Politburo members, the leadership governs without active opposition. Even

when communist leaders were unceremoniously dumped in

Eastern Europe, vigorously challenged in the Soviet Union,

and confronted by students in China, communist leaders in

Laos retained their hold as they guided the regime into the

uncharted realm of reform. It is not clear why there was so little challenge to these aging leaders. They maintained a cohesion

among themselves, perhaps a product of their many years as comrades in revolution, living in caves and dodging United

States bombs. They may also have earned an enduring respect

from party stalwarts who followed them during twenty-five years

of revolution. Whether the government will encounter political

opposition from a broader segment of Laotian society as it moves to a more market-oriented economy and increasingly

opens its doors to Western influence remains to be seen. Mass Media

Information and communication have been tightly controlled in Laos since the days of French colonialism. During

236
Main entrance of the Royal Palace, Louangphrabang with an honor guard

at rest infront of the doors in 1975. The palace is now a national museum.

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn

237
Laos: A Country Study

the years of revolutionary struggle against the RLG, the LPRP

relied heavily upon radio broadcasts in the Lao and Hmong

languages. Starting in 1960, with technical assistance from

North Vietnam, these radio broadcasts, lasting four hours a

day, reached a largely illiterate and mountain-dwelling audi- ence. Press operations, oriented to the towns of the Mekong

Valley, were conducted secretly, if at all, by the clandestine

Pathet Lao. Radio broadcasters never mentioned the official

name of the party until a few months before the seizure of

power in December 1975.

Given such a heritage of party control, it is not surprising

that the postrevolutionary operation of the mass media is a

tightly controlled party monopoly without private participation. The joint party-government organization of the media is reflected in the Ministry of Information and Culture and the

State Board of News Agency, Newspaper, Radio, and Television.

The party maintains the more narrowly focused Propaganda

and Training Committee, whose chairman is also the head of

the state board. The overall goal of the press is stated as making

the mass media into a link among the party, the state, and the

masses.

In mid-1994 the official media consisted of the party-sponsored daily newspaper, Xieng Pasason (The Voice of the People), in Lao language only. Khaosan Pathet Lao (Lao News

Agency), a news service of the Committee of Information,

Press, Radio and Television Broadcasting, distributes daily bulletins in Lao, English, and French. The National Radio of Laos,

the state-owned radio service, has a national network and seven regional stations that broadcast in Lao and tribal languages.

The four government-owned Laotian television stations broadcast daily for a few hours each. Regional stations broadcast in

Lao and in tribal languages.

Other media are specialized for particular audiences. For

example, the daily Vientiane Mai (Vientiane News), covers local

matters of significance to the party. The journal Sangkhom

Thoulakit (Society and Business), in Lao, targets readers interested in Vientiane business and society. A theoretical quarterly,

Aloun Mai (New Dawn), established in 1985, appears with some

regularity to disseminate major speeches by party leaders,

among other official pronouncements. An arts and letters

monthly, Vannasin, is surviving, but the print output of various mass organizations such as the People's Revolutionary Youth

238
Government and Politics

Union's Noum Lao (Lao Youth), a fortnightly journal, or those

of the Federation of Women Unions is only intermittent. Lao

Dong (Labor) is the fortnightly journal of the Federation of

Trade Unions.

Laotian media output is sporadic and relatively insignificant

compared with the impressions made by Thai television, radio,

and commercials, and the daily newspapers carried into Vientiane by international travelers. Given the proximity of Thai

radio and television, Thailand both remains an open window

to a different economic system and provides a perspective on

the news. Further, outside information and culture have

proven to be too pervasive to be worth eradicating by surveillance or jamming.

So far as publishing is concerned, the Ministry of Information and Culture held a seminar in 1992, which reviewed its activities over the previous sixteen years and worked out a "plan

of action" for the coming period that included "provisional regulations on publication, printing, and distribution in the Lao

PDR." Reinforcement of this type of intellectual planning is achieved through periodic conferences with delegations from

the official news agencies of Vietnam and Cambodia, and

through visits to China. A delegation of Thai writers was also

entertained.

Foreign Policy

More than most countries, Laos suffers the constraints of

physical location in shaping its foreign policy. Historically, the

landlocked Laotian kingdom of Lan Xang, situated along the

middle stretch of the Mekong River, had to contend with the

predatory kingdoms of Burma to the north, Vietnam to the

east, and Siam (present-day Thailand) to the west. After these

kingdoms' seventeenth-century period of ascendancy, the lowland Lao kingdom broke up into the principality of Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang), which survived by offering tribute

to both east and west, and Vientiane and Champasak (Bassac),

which were reduced by the end of the eighteenth century to tributaries of Siam. Vietnam then asserted suzerainty over Xiangkhoang and Khammouan to the west (see Early History,

ch. 1). Thus, the foreign relations of the Laotians reflected

their geography—landlocked and narrowly confined by valleys

and mountains that supported a limited, overwhelmingly agricultural population exposed to more numerous and produc239
Laos: A Country Study

tive neighbors. In addition, the lack of national cohesion

among various tribal groups subsisting in the mountains diminished the thrust of Laotian statehood.

Starting in 1893, Laotian kingdoms were subjected to the

"protection" of France, which reasserted Vietnamese claims

against Siam to all Laotian territories east of the Mekong River

and in Xaignabouri and Champasak. This period of subordination was followed by the intervention of the United States and

Thailand after 1954, succeeded by the Vietnamese communists

after 1975. More recently, since 1989, foreign policy has veered

back toward more independence, in relinquishing both Marxist-Leninist ideology and the special influence of Vietnam.

The geographical and demographic confines of Laos have

not been the only constraints on its foreign policy. Given the

weakness of the state, the international environment has

largely determined both the opportunities and the limits of

national strategy. The most obvious recent example is the eco- nomic collapse and political breakup of the Soviet Union and

the consequent retrenchment of its economic assistance

throughout Indochina. This series of events helped cause Vietnam's withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia and Laos by

1990, which encouraged Thailand to reenter Indochina as a

field for business. In turn, Vietnam sought to normalize relations with China, which also withdrew its military support from

Cambodia.

These policy shifts redefined the conceivable strategies for a government concerned with economic development and political leeway. The shibboleths of Marxism-Leninism and state- organized agriculture and industry were no longer appropriate. In need of economic advice and investment, Laos looked

beyond Vietnam and the Soviet bloc to the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP—see Glossary) and other

international organizations and to aid from a few Western

nations and Japan. Besides increasing dramatically the pres- ence of Thai traders and investors, Laos responded positively

to suggestions from the International Monetary Fund (IMF

see Glossary) and advice from various United Nations (UN)

agencies (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3). At the same time, it began to establish a legal foundation for the protection of business risk- takers. Thus, the road to "national uplift" no longer stretched

through the alien fields of Soviet/Vietnamese collectivism;

people in Mekong Valley towns could see more products in

240
Government and Politics

their markets, and peasants began to believe that communal

agriculture was a government imposition not likely to return. Despite the security gained during the French protectorate,

Laos lost ground economically because of its slowness in

absorbing European technology and in developing trade

beyond its borders. By and large, it failed to tap the mineral

resources beneath its mountains, except for tin, which was mined by the French, and to investigate its oil potential. It did

next to nothing to build an infrastructure for international

trade. Even if a railroad system and reliable roads had been

built, Laos still would have confronted potential controls over

its access to the sea from Thailand or Vietnam. The hydroelectric capacity of the country has, however, provided a major

export that Thailand cannot afford to do without (see Industrial Output and Employment, ch. 3).

Because the rugged Annamite Mountains separate the

Mekong Valley from Vietnamese population centers to the east, physical communication with the Thai nation to the west has

always been easier than communication with Vietnam, even

before the Friendship Bridge across the river was completed in

April 1994. Thus, the threat of Thai intervention across the

Mekong River cannot be treated lightly by the LPDR's military

planners, particularly under dry season conditions. At the same

time, the ease of Vietnamese infiltration through the Annamite

Mountains was thoroughly demonstrated during the years of

the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which led across southeastern Laos into

the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

Basic Goals

The basic goals of foreign policy have not differed from one

regime to another. National security or survival are fundamental concerns, and both the RLG and the LPDR have striven to preserve a Laotian state, even though their philosophies for

organizing and serving the people differed fundamentally. In

the 1990s, ideology shifted away from relentless MarxismLeninism to "state capitalism" and single-party "democracy."

Such formulations place Laos outside any rigid ideological

camp and leave the national agenda open to the general promise of economic development. Officially, the government has

dedicated itself to a foreign policy of peace, "independence,

friendship and non-alignment," with the instrument for achieving those conditions being the LPRP.

241
Laos: A Country Study

In the 1940s, the ICP provided the most assertive challenge

to colonialism. With the ending of French and United States

dominance over the Laotian peoples, the communist-inspired

LPRP has wrestled with the next challenge—economic and

national development. The success of that undertaking and the

survival of the party that has assumed it remains in the balance

in the 1990s. The key to success, however, lies in developing

and maintaining fruitful foreign relations.

Bureaucratic Complications

A serious need for skilled technical and economic personnel

still hinders the government's dealings with international agencies and businesspeople. Thousands of the most trained and

enterprising citizens fled the country after 1975. A related

problem for foreign policy makers is the relative lack of young

university graduates who are fluent in English and familiar with

international economics. The several thousand Laotian stu- dents sent between 1975 and the late 1980s to the Soviet Union

and its East European allies for several years of training often

have returned without tangible or relevant skills. The hundreds

of training years provided in the Soviet Union did not produce

a solid base ofjunior diplomatic officers intellectually prepared

to move easily among UN economic development agencies or

in Western state capitals. In the 1990s, education in Western

states has become essential for advancement. As the horizon

broadened for Laotian diplomats and businesspersons, elite

families in Laos sought training in United States or Australian

universities. Thailand is also willing to pick up some of the

demand for educational opportunity, and other Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—-see Glossary) states are also a potential source for scholarships.

Recruitment of a professional foreign service is no easier in

these circumstances. Moreover, party experience seems to count more heavily than sophistication in language and diplomatic training, even in the realm of foreign relations.

Economic Factors

The retarded economic diversification and development of

Laos has constrained its foreign policy opportunities and generated its dependency in succession upon France, the United

States, and the Soviet bloc. Following the economic collapse of

the Soviet Union, Laos has become heavily dependent upon

242
Grand Presidential Palace, Vientiane

Courtesy Gina Merris

the advice and contributions of UN agencies and the readiness

of regional states such as Australia, Japan, and Thailand to invest in its economy. Sweden has also made significant eco- nomic contributions.

There has been a dramatic shift away from maintaining basic

solidarity with a military/political bloc of mentors—first, the

United States regional security alliance and then the "special

relations" of Vietnamese-influenced Marxism-Leninism—to maximizing donor-recipient relations with UN agencies, state donors, and private investors. Although the universe of relations has not essentially grown, especially with Russia cutting

back on its assistance, the expectation of genuine economic

progress has begun to creep into economic dealings with outsiders. By moving resolutely and responding to Thai and Chi- nese gestures, Laos has broadened its range of donors, trading

243
Laos: A Country Study

partners, and investors. The presence of Thai traders and

investors has increased dramatically.

The degree to which Laos has depended upon outside

donors and investors, and which ones, has been a function not

only of need but also of political choice, a dependence that was

carefully controlled during Kaysone Phomvihan's tutorship.

Without his pervasive leadership, foreign economic relations

might have fallen victim to internal rivalries between ministries

and factions within the party.

Through legislation enacted by the National Assembly in

1991 of a basic criminal and investment code and the creation

of a judiciary, however, Laos opened its doors wider to serious

investors. In addition, the stabilization of foreign exchange

rates and inflation signaled major steps toward engaging constructively with countries outside the ideological blocs within

which it used to confine itself. The new institutions require a few years of serious testing, but a Burma-like return to stagnation seems unlikely, even with Kaysone's departure from the

helm. The tantalizing images of Thailand's growth and prosperity, conveyed by television along the Mekong border, and

increasingly easier travel across the river—in both directions

make the economic policy of openness seem all but irreversible. Bilatera! Relations

Relations urith Vietnam

Relations with Vietnam had secretly set the strategy for the

LPRP during the struggle to achieve full power, and the "sudden" opportunity to establish the LPDR in 1975 left no leeway

to consider foreign policy alignments other than a continuation of the "special relations" with Vietnam. The relationship

cultivated in the revolutionary stage predisposed Laos to Indochinese solidarity in the reconstruction and "socialist construction" phases and all but ensured that relations or alignments with China and Thailand would be wary and potentially

unfriendly. Further, the LPRP, unlike the Cambodian communists under Pol Pot, was far too accustomed to accepting Vietnamese advice to consider striking out on its own. The final

seizure of power by the hitherto secret LPRP in 1975 brought

both a public acknowledgment of the previously hidden North

Vietnamese guidance of the party and genuine expressions of

gratitude by the LPRP to its Vietnamese partners. The chal244
Government and Politics

lenge facing the ruling group—the construction of a socialist

society—was seen as a natural extension of past collaboration

with North Vietnam. The revolution was simply entering a new

phase in 1975, and the LPRP leaders congratulated themselves

upon ousting the "imperialists" and looked forward to advice

and economic as well as military support, which was not avail- able from any neighbor or counterrevolutionary state. LPRP leaders were accustomed to discussing policies as well

as studying doctrine in Hanoi. They formalized governmental

contacts with their mentors at biannual meetings of the foreign

ministers of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam starting in 1980 and

through the joint Vietnam-Laos Cooperative Commission,

which met annually to review progress of various projects.

Other levels of cooperation between Laos and Vietnam existed,

for example, party-to-party meetings and province-to-province

exchanges, as well as mass organizations for youths and

women. Meetings of the commission were held regularly.

The primary channels for Vietnam's influence in Laos, however, were the LPRP and the LPA (see Structure and Administration of the Armed Forces, ch. 5). In the LPRP, long-standing

collaboration and consultation at the very top made special

committees unnecessary, whereas in the LPA, the Vietnamese

advisers, instructors, and troops on station constituted a pervasive, inescapable influence, even though they scrupulously

avoided public exposure by sticking to their designated base

areas. Cooperation in the military field was probably the most

extensive, with logistics, training, and communications largely

supplied by Vietnam throughout the 1970s and 1980s (heavy

ordnance and aircraft were provided by the Soviet Union).

The phrase "special relations" came into general use by

both parties after 1976, and in July 1977, the signing of the

twenty-five-year Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation legitimized the stationing of Vietnamese army

troops in Laos for its protecdon against hostile or counterrevolutionary neighbors. Another element of cooperation involved

hundreds of Vietnamese advisers who mentored their Laotian

counterparts in virtually all the ministries in Vientiane. Hundreds of LPRP stalwarts and technicians studied in institutes of

Marxism-Leninism or technical schools in Hanoi.

The resources that Vietnam was able to bestow upon its revo- lutionary partner were severely limited by the physical destruction of war and the deadening orthodoxy of its economic

245
Laos: A Country Study

structures and policies. It could, however, put in a good word

for its Laotian apprentices with the Soviet Union, which in turn

could recommend economic assistance projects to its East

European satellite states. Yet, Vietnam's influence on Laos was determined by economic assistance and ideology as well as by

geographical and historical proximity. The two nations fit together, as the leaders liked to say, "like lips and teeth." Vietnam provided landlocked Laos a route to the sea, and the

mountainous region of eastern Laos provided Vietnam a forward strategic position for challenging Thai hegemony in the

Mekong Valley.

During the 1980s, Vietnam's regional opponents attributed

to it a neocolonial ambition to create an "Indochina Federation." This phrase can be found in early pronouncements of

the ICP in its struggle against the French colonial structures in

Indochina. The charge, exaggerated as it was, lost its currency once Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989 and

subsequently from Laos. Laos's dependence on Vietnam since

1975 could then be perceived as a natural extension of their

collaboration and solidarity in revolution rather than as domination by Vietnam.

With the departure of Vietnamese military forces—except

for some construction engineers—and the passing of most

senior Vietnamese revolutionary partners, the magnetism of

the special relationship lost its grip. Further, Vietnam was never

able to muster large-scale economic aid programs. It launched

only 200 assistance projects between 1975 and 1985, whereas

the Soviet Union generated considerably more in the way of

contributions. In 1992 the long-standing Vietnamese ambassador to Laos, a veteran of fourteen years' service, characterized

the relationship as composed "d'amitie et de cooperation multiforme entre les pays" (of friendship and diverse cooperation

between the two countries). This pronouncement was far less compelling than the "objective law of existence and development" formulation sometimes expressed in the past.

Although Vietnam's historical record of leadership in the

revolution and its military power and proximity will not cease

to exist, Laos struck out ahead of Vietnam with its New Economic Mechanism to introduce market mechanisms into its economy. In so doing, Laos has opened the door to rapprochement with Thailand and China at some expense to its special

dependence on Vietnam. Laos might have reached the same

246
One of the royal elephants in a New Year's parade in

Louangphrabang in 1975,

ridden by its Lao Theung

handler

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn

point of normalization in following Vietnam's economic and

diplomatic change, but by moving ahead resolutely and

responding to Thai and Chinese gestures, Laos has broadened

its range of donors, trading partners, and investors independent of Vietnam's attempts to accomplish the same goal. Thus,

Vietnam remains in the shadows as a mentor and emergency

ally, and the tutelage of Laos has shifted dramatically to development banks and international entrepreneurs.

Relations with Thailand

In some respects, Thailand can be seen as a greater threat to the country's independence than Vietnam because of its closer

cultural affinity (Theravada Buddhism—see Glossary), its easier access, and its control over the railroad and highway routes

to the sea. The Mekong River, which both sides have an interest

in making a "river of true peace and friendship"—as their

respective prime ministers called for in 1976—also provides a north-south artery during the rainy season. Relations with Thailand have been uneven. An alarming

patrol boat shooting incident occurred in 1980, but this brief

encounter was overshadowed by the border disputes and military clashes of 1984 and 1987 in Xaignabouri Province west of

the Mekong. These conflicts originated in rival claims to forest

247
Laos: A Country Study

resources based on maps from the early days of the French protectorate. The determination in 1988 of Thai prime minister Chatichai

Choonhaven to open up the Indochina market abruptly

turned a deadly conflict into a wave of goodwill gestures and

business ventures. Kaysone paid an official visit to Bangkok in

1989, his first since the brief 1979 rapprochement with Prime

Minister General Kriangsak Chomanand. These gestures were

followed by official visits by Princess Maha Chakkri in March

1990 and Crown Prince Maha Wachirolongkon in June 1992.

An irony of this process of reacquaintance was the dropping

from the Politburo in 1992 of Army Chief of Staff General Sisavat Keobounphan, who had dealt closely and effectively with

the Thai military command in restoring neighborly relations,

but who apparently was considered by his party colleagues to have indulged in personal gains. Indeed, this corruption of a senior party leader symbolizes the fear among some Laotian

leaders that Thailand, with its materialism and business

strength and greed, "wants to eat us." Two political issues slowed rapprochement during the 1980s:

first, the continuing issue of Laotian migrants and refugees

remaining in temporary camps—whom Thailand had no

desire to accept as immigrants—and second, Laotian and

Hmong resistance groups who used the camps as a base. The

Hmong constituted half of the camp dwellers and were

expected to avoid repatriation the longest, out of fear of

reprisal and hope for national autonomy. Thailand announced

in July 1992, however, that Laotian refugees who have not

returned home or found third-country resettlement by 1995

will be classified as illegal immigrants and face deportation.

In the first few years of rapprochement, Thai businesspersons have not threatened to buy up long-term economic opportunities in Laos because they seem to seek shorter-term

commercial ventures. Yet the possibility of heavy interdependence generated by Thai investors remains. A Thai business

presence in Laos will probably depend on the continuing demonstration of Laos's independence from Vietnam.

The persistence of a resistance movement since 1975 is attributable to permissive policies on the part of Thailand on

behalf of their former Laotian cohorts. With the demise of the

Cold War, the motivation to harass the LPDR and its Vietnamese military partners has dwindled. The Ministry of Foreign

248
Government and Politics

Affairs will continue to press the Thai military command to live up to its March 1991 agreement to disarm rebels and discourage Laotian sabotage operations. At the same time, Thailand

has made clear its unwillingness to assimilate Hmong refugees.

The threat of a return of Vietnamese troops remains as a cautionary note to the Thai military, who prefer to keep Laos

as a buffer rather than a military line of contact with the Viet- namese. The Friendship Bridge should open the interior to more foreign trucking and commerce and more openly reveal

any foreign military presence in Laos.

The exodus of tens of thousands of middle-class lowland Lao

and mountain dwelling Hmong across the Mekong into Thailand created a tense border that Thailand preferred to close

off to commerce of any kind. Future Laotian-Thai relations,

however, have a visible path toward mutually beneficial trade

and investment, which need not be obscured by refugees or economic migrants, by one-sided economic dealings of an

exploitative kind, or by inflamed border disputes. An improved

trade relationship has been achieved in spite of past feelings of

superiority or victimization, and growing interdependence may

make the path easier to follow.

Relations with China

Relations with China have traditionally consisted of trade

and aid, largely in road construction in the northern provinces

of Laos, without directly challenging the interests of Thailand

or Vietnam in the central and southern regions. However, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 to unseat then

prime minister Pol Pot, which provoked China into a limited

invasion of Vietnam—approximately nineteen kilometers

deep—to "teach Vietnam a lesson," put Laos in a dangerous

bind. It did not want to further provoke China, but it was not

able to oppose its special partner, Vietnam. The Laotian leadership survived the dilemma by making slightly delayed pronouncements in support of Vietnam after some intraparty

debate and by sharply reducing diplomatic relations with

China to the charge d'affaires level—without a full break. The

low point in Sino-Laotian relations came in 1979, with reports

of Chinese assistance and training of Hmong resistance forces

under General Vang Pao in China's Yunnan Province (see

Internal Threats and Resistance Movements, ch. 5).

249
Laos: A Country Study

This hostile relationship gradually softened, however, and in

1989 Prime Minister Kaysone paid a state visit to Beijing. In

1991 Kaysone chose to spend his vacation in China rather than

make his customary visit to the Soviet Union. Diplomatic and

party-to-party relations were normalized in 1989. Trade

expanded from the local sale of consumer goods to the granting of eleven investment licenses in 1991—including an automotive assembly plant. Following the establishment of the

Laotian-Chinese Joint Border Committee in 1991, meetings

held during 1992 resulted in an agreement delineating their

common border. China's commercial investments and trade

with Laos expanded quietly, but not dramatically, in 1993 and

early 1994.

Unlike its other neighbors, China has not historically dominated the Laotians. In the final analysis, China represents the

most powerful remaining communist state to which Laos might

turn for support against Thai or Vietnamese hegemony.

Relations zirith the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc involvement with Laos

originated as a secondary element in the East-West contest over the communist-led revolution in Vietnam and in the SinoSoviet rivalry that this contest exacerbated. Even though the

Laos subtheater was formally neutralized by the Geneva Agreement of 1962, the superpower involvement in Laos continued

in the form of military supplies, advice, and diplomatic and

propaganda support to the opposing sides up to the end of the

war. The succeeding period of coalition government in Vientiane lasted fewer than two years and left the Soviets not only

enjoying the prestige of supporting the winning party—the

Marxist-Leninist LPRP, which by then had publicly revealed

itself—but also holding the bag of vast economic development

needs in a nation losing its most skilled persons across the border to the West. The Soviet Union had helped its friends prevail over the opponents of the revolution, but the MarxistLeninist model for building up an overwhelmingly agricultural

nation was not effective with the complaisant Lao peasantry.

Since 1989, aid from the Soviet Union and its successor

states—which once accounted for more than half the aid to Laos and approximately 1,500 technicians and advisers—has

slowly dwindled. The memorial to Soviet efforts in Laos lies in

dozens of projects such as bridges, roads, airports, hospitals,

and broadcast facilities; in tons of military equipment, includ250
Boats on the Mekong River, Louangphrabang

Courtesy Gina Merris

ing MiG jet fighters and air transports; and in the hundreds of

students with a faltering command of the Russian language,

some of whom are trained for such jobs as railroad operator or

circus clown, for which Laos has no market.

The Laotian leadership has resolutely sought to take up the

slack among its previous bilateral and multilateral donors. By

1990 bilateral external assistance disbursed by Russia was down

to 36 percent of the total, from a previous 60 percent; Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Mongolia, and Vietnam contributed a mere 3.7 percent. The

number of student fellowships to the Soviet Union—usually

300 per year—decreased dramatically. The downward spiral

continued as the Russians shifted their dwindling influence in

the region to cooperation with the five permanent members of

the UN in settling the war in Cambodia. And, in a further move

away from dependence, the coming generation of national

leaders was eager to obtain useful education in the West for

their children, even if they could still get by with Vietnamese

and French.

Relations with the United States Relations with the United States suffered some of the same

251
Laos: A Country Study

cutbacks as those experienced by Vietnam and Cambodia after

the United States withdrawal from Indochina in 1973, but

there were important differences. After 1975 Laos provided the

United States the only official window to its former enemy

states in Indochina. The United States was also willing to treat

all departing Laotians as political refugees entitled to asylum,

with hopes that third countries might eventually accept them

for resettlement. And, in spite of the full economic and diplomatic embargo imposed by the United States on Vietnam and

Cambodia in 1975, United States diplomatic relations with

Laos facilitated such occasional humanitarian aid projects as food and prosthetics. In this manner, the door to full diplomatic relations was kept ajar.

Diplomatic relations with the United States were never broken, even though the United States Agency for International

Development (AID) and the United States Information Agency

(USIA) both withdrew, under harassment, and diplomatic representation in Vientiane and in Washington was reduced to the

level of charge d'affaires, with a limit of twelve persons and no

military attaches. Relations eventually were reciprocally

restored to the ambassadorial level in the summer of 1992.

A tentative agreement to allow United States Peace Corps

personnel in Laos fell through in the spring of 1992. The

admission of Peace Corps workers was initially approved but

then rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apparently

some party leaders feared that the volunteers might have a subversive impact on the Laotians, especially if deployed outside

Vientiane. As of 1993, a country agreement was on the table,

and the Peace Corps remained interested in sending volunteers but was waiting for Laos to initiate a program.

Other United States agencies run small programs in Laos. In

1992 AID made a US$1.3 million grant for a prosthetics

project. Because AID does not have an office in Laos, the program is administered from AID's office in Bangkok. The

United States Information Service, the overseas branch office

of the USIA, reopened a one-officer post in Vientiane in October 1992. The post concentrates on supporting English-language teaching activities and publications, press activities, and

cultural and educational exchanges. Two Laotian Fulbright

grantees were in the United States in 1993.

Since the establishment of the LPDR, Laos and the United

States have cooperated in varying degrees on two major issues

252
Government and Politics

of high priority to the United States. One is the search for

information on the more than 500 United States servicemen

listed as missing in action (MIA) in Laos (see The Origins of

the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Question, ch. 1; Relations with the United States, ch. 5). This problem has proved to be a surprisingly durable issue, which delayed an otherwise

uncomplicated and mutually beneficial rapprochement

between the two countries. Starting in 1985, Laos treated the

MIA issue seriously enough to undertake joint searches of

known wartime crash sites of United States aircraft. However,

the United States Senate Select Committee on Prisoner of

War/MIA Affairs concluded in January 1993 that "The current

leaders of Laos, who are the successors to the Pathet Lao forces

that contended for power during the war, almost certainly have

some information concerning missing Americans that they

have not yet shared." Further cooperation has brightened the

atmosphere of Laos-United States relations, even though a full accounting of United States military personnel lost in the Laos

theater of war can probably never be achieved.

The second long-standing issue is the production and export

of opium. In April 1993, Laos received a national interest certi- fication on the issue of cooperation in counternarcotics activities. Opium traffic out of Laos is a tangible irritant to relations,

however, particularly because of the suspicion that high-ranking Laotian officials, especially those in the military, are involved in protecting the trade. The United States Drug

Enforcement Administration worked with the LPDR to maintain Laos's eligibility—despite its opium trade—as a potential

United States aid recipient. In 1990 an economic aid project

worth US$8.7 million was provided to help the hill tribes that

grow poppies turn to substitute crops. Thus, the legal barriers

to expanding Laos-United States consultation and commerce

were essentially removed. Yet most-favored-nation treatment

for imports such as coffee from Laos might conceivably have to await the full release of the last of the political prisoners held in

the mountainous eastern provinces since 1975.

An irritant in Laos-United States relations was the United

States charge in 1981 that Laos had engaged in aerial spraying

with deadly toxins—yellow rain—against Hmong villages. The

United States government adopted the position that chemical

weapons were used in Laos in the late 1970s through 1983.

Such reports lost credibility after 1984, however, when the

253
Laos: A Country Study

United States stationed scientific personnel in Bangkok to test any incoming evidence, which never appeared.

Capitalist Donor States Laotian leaders have increased their visibility among capitalist nations. A small coterie of dedicated government officials,

including President Kaysone, has taken advantage of a sympathetic attitude toward Laos within the key international governmental organizations. Similarly, the UN, Australia, and Japan

saw an opportunity in the opening of Laos. The Australianfunded Friendship Bridge over the Mekong River at Nong

Khai, Thailand, and the generation of 280 foreign investment

ventures from twenty-four countries during 1988-92 testify to creative communication in proper channels. Germany and

France each supplied approximately US$6 million of aid in

1990.

Australia, Japan, and Sweden have established significant

economic aid relationships with Laos. In 1992 the Laos Roundtable for bilateral aid and pledges recorded approximately

US$134.62 million for eight bilateral projects led by Australia,

Japan, and Sweden. France has also begun to increase its aid to Laos, beginning with projects worth approximately

US$900,000 in 1989 and increasing to approximately US$5.2

million in 1993.

Australia has established itself as a special friend, even though not in a "special relationship" with Laos. The Friendship Bridge, authorized in October 1991 and opened in April

1994, is expected to stimulate trade and stable relations

between Laos and its neighbors. Australia has sustained a generosity toward Laos that put it in first place among aid-pledging

nations in March 1992, even though Australian political interests in the nation are far from vital. In addition to its pledge of

US$45 million in aid in 1992, Australia is hosting more than

100 Laotian university students.

Japan is also responding to the economic needs of Laos, providing almost 12 percent of disbursed bilateral aid in 1990. In

1992 Japan made the third largest pledge of bilateral economic

assistance at an aid-pledging conference of the UNDP in

Geneva. Among the projects Japanese assistance has provided

are buses and a bus terminal in Vientiane and health and food

production projects. The somewhat modest Japanese investments in Laos were likely raised by Kaysone and Nouhak dur254
Man transporting bamboo; posters, removed around 1990, proclaim the New Economic Mechanism and urge a stop to United States bombing.

Courtesy Gina Merris

ing their historic state visits to Japan in November 1989 and

January 1992, respectively. Kaysone's trip to Tokyo was his first to an industrialized capitalist state, and it preceded by a month

a similar visit to France.

Multilateral Donors

The international governmental organizations active in Laos

constitute a distinguished list, and, in a sense, Laos has become

one of their star pupils. The World Bank (see Glossary), IMF,

UNDP, and Asian Development Bank (see Glossary) work

closely with the small coterie of economic planners within Laos

and can point to notable economic progress in the 1990s as a

result of the application of their advice. The national currency,

the kip, has remained stable at its official rate since 1990, for- eign reserves have grown, and inflation has fallen dramatically.

The party leadership undertook tough measures such as reducing government employment, encouraging privatization, and

ending special subsidies, in line with advice from international

advisers. The resident IMF representative received private tele- phone calls from the president in search of economic counsel.

In the early 1990s, an unusual level of satisfaction with the Laotian leadership's willingness to receive economic advice from

255
Laos: A Country Study

experts could be found among international governmental

organizations' personnel in Laos.

In 1990 the UNDP coordinated approximately US$12.3 million in economic assistance from various UN financial and

development agencies, and thirteen international governmental organizations disbursed approximately US$4.1 million (see

Foreign Aid, ch. 3). The most active among these were the

UNHCR, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF—see Glossary), the UN Drug Control Program, and the Food and

Agriculture Organization. In March 1992, the Laos Roundtable

for bilateral aid and pledges recorded approximately US$472

million in project aid from international governmental organizations. In 1992 and 1993, the Asian Development Bank was funding such projects as road construction, hydropower, and

water supply.

Nongovernmental organizations have tried to make an

impact on Laos, particularly in the lives of villagers outside the

privileged Mekong Valley towns adjacent to prospering Thailand. Twenty-two such organizations disbursed approximately

US$3,259 million in 1990, with the American Friends Service

Committee (Quakers) and the Mennonite Central Committee

(Mennonites) contributing approximately 15 percent and 10

percent of the total, respectively, and concentrating on health

and agricultural programs. From 1990 to 1993, the American

Friends Service Committee budgeted slightly more than

US$2.3 million for programs in Laos. These included smallscale irrigation and rice-based integrated farming system

projects, women's development and veterinary vaccination programs, and emergency relief projects that include assisting

internally-displaced communities. The Mennonite Central

Committee contributed approximately US$1.2 million during

the 1990-93 period for programs in agriculture and integrated

development, emergency assistance, education, health, and

social services, economic and technical assistance, and "material resources in kind."

Constraints on foreign policy nonetheless remain in the

ideological commitment, pronounced since 1975, to the socialist road to social welfare, mapped out exclusively by the party.

This theoretical baggage, however, has not precluded generous

foreign aid from Australia, Japan, and Sweden, or Laos's atten- dance at conferences of the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary). The country's obtaining of observer status in ASEAN in

256
Government and Politics

1992 also was constructive and points toward possible membership in that organization before the end of the century. But the

punitive seminar camps and the unrecorded death of the

sequestered former King Savang Vatthana have left a negative

impression on democratic nations that Laos cannot afford to disregard or exacerbate as it seeks investors and donors among

the capitalist states. In the early 1990s, the possibility that a domineering neighbor might arise from the competing rivalries of the regional

states seemed unlikely, and Laos's policy of encouraging the

economic engagement of many states in its economy appeared

to suit the circumstances. That Thailand, Vietnam, or China

would consider aligning with Laos, thereby creating tension

with their neighbors, also seemed unlikely. It was easier to fore- see the gradual assimilation of Laos into ASEAN and the

regional states continuing to compete for Laos's dormant and

modest market.

* * * Few books dealing exclusively with contemporary Laos have

been published since the establishment of the LPDR in 1975.

Among those with political analyses are MacAlister Brown and

Joseph J. Zasloffs Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist

Movement in Laos, 1930-1985, which includes examinations of

the LPDR's leadership and ruling party, political institutions

and policies, economic policies and political doctrine, social

politics, and external relations. A more recent volume is Laos:

Beyond the Revolution, edited by Zasloff and Leonard Unger,

which contains essays on politics, economics, society, external

relations, and United States policy toward Laos. Two books

written or edited by the Australian scholar Martin Stuart-Fox

are also useful: Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic has essays on various

subjects by international experts, and Laos: Politics, Economics

and Society provides a succinct, insightful account of the social,

political, and economic systems of the country and its domestic

and foreign policies.

For the reader who wishes information in English about politics in Laos since 1975, the following periodicals with occasional articles on Laos are helpful: Asian Survey, Current History,

Southeast Asian Affairs, and Indochina Issues. The best journalistic coverage of Laos is found in the weekly Far Eastern Economic

Review, and its annual Asia Yearbook. The United States govern257
Laos: A Country Study

ment provides two valuable sources of translations from the

Lao media: the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily

Report: East Asia, and the Joint Publications Research Service's

Report: East Asia/Southeast Asia. Summaries of important items

on Laos appearing in these two publications are found in the

quarterly Indochina Chronology. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

258
Chapter 5. National Security
The Anousavari, on Lan Xang Avenue in Vientiane, built to commemorate

those who died in the prerevolutionary wars, was begun in the early 1 960s and

completed in 1 969.
LAOS HAS HISTORICALLY FACED a number of unique problems in national defense and internal security, stemming from

its central position in mainland Southeast Asia and its historically stronger neighbors. This continued to be true after the

Phak Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party

LPRP; see Glossary) came to power and proclaimed the Lao

People's Democratic Republic (LPDR, or Laos) in December

1975. By mid-1994, however, Laos had succeeded in stabilizing

its relations with its neighbors, so it faced no immediate foreign

threat and only a small continuing internal threat.

Laos is geopolitically vulnerable, a landlocked nation sur- rounded by more powerful neighbors. Its closest foreign ally

has been Vietnam, with whom it signed a twenty-five-year

mutual security treaty in July 1977. Laos is also on close terms

with China, whose long-term interest in Laos is to limit Vietnam's ambitions in Southeast Asia while sharing with Hanoi

and Vientiane (Viangchan) a common aim in maintaining

Marxist-Leninist single-party regimes in power. In view of the

strong presence of senior military officers in the top ranks of

the party and government, it is not surprising that the country

maintains close ties with the military-controlled State Law and

Order Restoration Council in Burma. Relations are also close

with the royal government of war-torn Cambodia. With Thailand, relations have changed over the years. Prior to 1975,

Thailand saw Laos as a buffer against an expansionist Vietnam,

but by 1994 Thailand looked upon Laos as the likeliest place

for commercial expansion of its own. The country shares with

Burma and Thailand possession of the Golden Triangle, the area where a significant portion of the world's heroin traffic

originates.

Laos is also vulnerable because its small population—esti- mated at approximately 4.7 million people as ofJuly 1994

limits its ability to deter foreign intervention in the event of a

crisis. Furthermore, the significant population of ethnic minorities—about 50 percent of the total—is always a potential factor

for instability. In 1994 ethnic minorities continued to suffer dis- crimination in terms of their representation in the country's

institutions and their access to government services, although

to what extent this discrimination feeds political and cultural

261
Laos: A Country Study

tension vis-a-vis the government in Vientiane is speculative.

The situation is complicated by the fact that although 1.5 million ethnic Lao reside in Laos, ten times that number live in

northeastern Thailand. Similarly, Hmong (see Glossary) and

Mien (Yao) tribes live in southern China, and Hmong and

many tribal mountain Tai reside in northwestern Vietnam.

Other factors contribute to the vulnerability of Laos. The

underdeveloped state of the economy and the lack of adequate

means of transportation and communication encourage

regionalism, which facilitates insurgent movements against the

government. Additionally, the mountains and jungles of Laos

provide an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare because the

terrain and lack of infrastructure inhibit the concentration of

military forces to counter guerrilla action. Such forces, moreover, expose themselves to ambush in narrow mountain defiles

if guerrillas control the surrounding high ground. There are few places in Laos where a conventional army does not risk a

siege such as that of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. If the insurgents

have bases outside permeable borders, they are virtually secure from pursuit and are able to mount raids with impunity.

The Armed Forces

The Lao People's Army (LPA—see Glossary), the armed

forces of the country, is the product of the successful transition

from a guerrilla army in the 1950s and 1960s to a conventional

military organization with three branches of service (ground,

air, and water). The term "liberation" was dropped from the

nomenclature of the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA

see Glossary) after the army was restructured in 1976.

Historical Background

Historically, Laos was subject to the will of its stronger neighbors, enforced by military means. By force of circumstances in

warding off repeated foreign invasions, Laotians developed

battle skills using elephants and compiled a history full of warlike deeds. Lan Xang, or the Kingdom of the Million Elephants, the first state in the recorded history of Laos,

maintained a standing army of 150,000 men (see The Founding of Lan Xang, ch. 1). Regiments included cavalry, infantry,

and an elephant corps. Prince Fa Ngum, Lan Xang's founder,

redeveloped the old Mongol model of an army composed of

units of 10,000, which gave rise to the name of the successive

262
National Security

reign, Sam Sen Thai, or 10,000 Thai. The army's strength

enabled Fa Ngum to expand Lan Xang's borders to the western

escarpment of the Khorat Plateau, the crest of the Annamite

Chain in the east, and the northern edge of Khmer and Cham

civilizations in the south. To the north and east especially, however, mountain tribes resisted absorption and maintained a degree of independence.

Following Fa Ngum's death, struggles with Siamese and Bur- mese states in which his successors became embroiled sapped

the strength of the army and led to the decline and eventual

splitting up of Lan Xang. In 1778 the capital of the Vientiane

kingdom was attacked and destroyed for the first time by a Siamese army. By the 1820s, Laos had reestablished sovereignty over its own borders, enough so that the king of Vientiane

launched a disastrous military expedition against Siam

(present-day Thailand). Laotian forces were overwhelmed by

the superior firepower and strategy of the Siamese army, which

attacked and destroyed Vientiane for a second time in 1828.

The Colonial Era

Following the destruction of Vientiane, Laotian affairs were dominated militarily by Siam, although the Vietnamese also

involved themselves over the mountains (see Developments in

the Nineteenth Century, ch. 1). It was not until 1884, when

France guaranteed Annam the integrity of its territorial

domain, that Siamese hegemony over the left bank of the

Mekong encountered a new challenge. Using Annam's claims

to Laotian territories as a diplomatic pretext, France forced

Siam to renounce all claims to territory east of the Mekong and

even to islands in the river by successive treaties between 1893

and 1907.

To preserve order in the new administrative structure and to reinforce their security forces, which up to the twentieth century consisted largely of Vietnamese militia, the French formed

local Laotian police and military constabulary units and provided them with some modern weapons, equipment, and rudimentary training. The Laotian units, whose salaries were paid

for by the royal house of Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang),

pledged allegiance to the monarchy, establishing a military tra- dition that ended only in 1975.

Between 1901 and 1907, France's colonial forces in Laos

directed their attention to putting down a group of southern

263
Laos: A Country Study

mountain Mon-Khmer rebels who had become angered over

France's suppressing their customary slave-trading activities.

Bandits from China's Yunnan Province also kept the colonial

army occupied in the north between 1914 and 1916. The

army's final major action—from 1919 to 1921—was led by Pa

Chai against the Hmong, who were conducting raids on the

Lao and other groups in Houaphan and Xiangkhoang provinces with the aim of expelling the French and establishing an independent Hmong kingdom.

The first entirely Laotian military unit was formed by the

French in 1941 and was known as the First Battalion of Chasseurs Laotiens (light infantry). It was used for internal security

and did not see action until after the Japanese coup deforce of

March 9, 1945, when Japan occupied Laos. The unit then went

into the mountains, supplied and commanded by Free French

agents who had received special jungle training in camps in

India and who had parachuted into Laos beginning in December 1944 with the aim of creating a resistance network.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the temporary absence of

French authority in the towns, the Lao Issara (Free Laos—see Glossary) government armed itself to defend the Laotian independence it claimed on behalf of the people (see World War II and After, ch. 1). For the most part, effective components of

the Lao Issara armed forces consisted of Vietnamese residents

of the towns of Laos, who either had received weapons given

them by the surrendering Japanese troops—sold by the Chi- nese Nationalist soldiers who occupied northern Laos under

the 1945 Potsdam Conference agreements—or looted from

French arsenals. In the Battle of Thakhek (Khammouan) in

March 1946, which decided the issue of sovereignty in Laos in

favor of the French, the Lao Issara used mortars and light

machine guns against French armored vehicles and planes.

One of the main preoccupations of the members of the Lao

Issara government exiled in Bangkok between 1946 and 1949

was to procure weapons to fight back against the French.

French efforts to train and expand the Royal Lao Army con- tinued during the First Indochina War (1946-54), by which

time Laos had a standing army of 15,000 troops (see The Coming of Independence, ch. 1). The French knew the lightly

equipped Royal Lao Army was not in a position to defend Laos

against Viet Minh (see Glossary) regular forces formed by

General Vo Nguyen Giap. To counter Viet Minh invasions of

264
National Security

Laos in 1953 and 1954, the French Union High Command

diverted regular colonial units from the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam (North Vietnam) into Laos; Giap exploited this

weakness to disperse French Union forces. The French originally picked Dien Bien Phu as the site of a major strong point

because it blocked a main invasion route into Laos, which they

felt they had to defend at all costs in order to preserve their

credibility with the king of Louangphrabang, who sought

France's protection. Some of the most effective fighters against

the Viet Minh were Hmong from Xiangkhoang whom the

French recruited and formed into guerrilla units; one of these

units, under a sergeant named Vang Pao, was on the march to Dien Bien Phu when the garrison fell in May 1954.

Under the terms of the armistice signed at the Geneva Conference on Indochina on July 20, 1954, by the French Union

High Command and the Viet Minh, all Viet Minh troops had to withdraw from Laos within 120 days. Laos was prohibited from

having foreign military bases or personnel on its soil and from

joining any military alliance. The agreements provided for the

regrouping of Pathet Lao (Lao Nation—see Glossary) guerrillas in the provinces of Houaphan and Phongsali and their integration into the Royal Lao Army. The Pathet Lao, however,

taking advantage of their easy access across the border to North

Vietnam, immediately began to expand their guerrilla army,

the first unit of which, the Latsavong detachment, had been

formed in 1949 by Kaysone Phomvihan.

The Royal Lao Army

With the end of the war, Laos was no longer under the

French Union but entirely sovereign. The country was divided

into five military regions. The chain of command of the Royal

Lao Army was placed under the Ministry of Defense in Vientiane.

To meet the threat represented by the Pathet Lao, the Royal

Lao Army depended on a small French military training mission, headed by a general officer, an exceptional arrangement

permitted under the Geneva agreement. Military organization

and tactical training reflected French traditions. Most of the

equipment was of United States origin, however, because early

in the First Indochina War, the United States had been supplying the French with war materiel ranging from guns to aircraft. A small United States legation in Vientiane kept Washington

informed about the status of the Royal Lao Army. There was

265
Laos: A Country Study

real concern that Laotians were not maintaining their equipment properly and that much of it was becoming useless under

the tropical sun and rain. The question also arose of who was to pay the salaries of the Royal Lao Army because France was no

longer responsible for Laos's finances.

It seemed evident to the legation that only United States personnel in Laos could ensure that the Royal Lao Army was capable of meeting the threat posed by the Pathet Lao backed by

North Vietnam. To circumvent the prohibition against foreign

military personnel imposed by the 1954 Geneva agreement

which the United States had pledged to honor—the Department of Defense in December 1955 established a disguised military mission in Laos called the Programs Evaluation Office

(PEO). The PEO worked under the cover of the civilian aid

mission and was staffed by military personnel and headed by a general officer who wore civilian clothes. Over the 1955-61

period, the PEO gradually supplanted the French military mission in providing equipment and training to the Royal Lao

Army. With increasing numbers of Laotian officers receiving

training in Thailand and at staff schools in the United States,

there was a perception that the French military mission in Laos

was a relic of colonialism. By 1959 the PEO had more than 100

members on its staff, and the United States was paying the

entire cost of the Royal Lao Army's salaries. The prohibition against joining any military alliance prevented Laos from joining the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO—see Glossary), formed by Australia, Britain,

France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and

the United States in September 1954. A protocol to the treaty,

however, designated Laos as a country to which its mutual security provisions would apply in the event it became the victim of

aggression. When fighting broke out along Laos's border with

North Vietnam in July-September 1959 following the collapse

of efforts to integrate two battalions of Pathet Lao into the

Royal Lao Army, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) wanted to appeal to SEATO for help. The RLG was dissuaded from doing

so by the United States, which felt that such an appeal risked

involving United States troops in combat in Laos. The nature

of the fighting—by guerrillas belonging to ethnic tribes that

lived on both sides of the border—made the question of

aggression ambiguous. Similarly, in January 1961, when the

RLG proposed appealing to SEATO to counter North Viet266
Pathet Lao honor guard at Wat Ong Teu, Vientiane, in November

1974, participating in an annual ceremony during which the ranking

officials ofLaos pay homage to the king

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn

nam's intervention on behalf of the Pathet Lao and Kong Le, it was discouraged from doing so by the United States. Kong Le's coup d'etat on August 9, 1960, threatened to split

the army between Kong Le's Lao Neutralist Revolutionary

Organization—known as the Neuualists, whose troops' unofficial name was the Neutralist Armed Forces—and the rest of the

army under General Phoumi Nosavan, the former minister of

defense (see The Attempt to Restore Neutrality, ch. 1). PEO

headquarters in Vientiane became inactive because United

States diplomats were instructed to find a way to isolate the

rebellious paratrooper. Finally, aid was cut off. Meanwhile, the

PEO branch office in Savannakhet—Phoumi's headquarters

continued to supply and pay Phoumi's troops. After Phoumi

captured Vientiane, the Neutralists were compelled—for their

survival—to enter into an alliance with the Pathet Lao and

their North Vietnamese backers, on whom they thereafter

depended for supplies. In April 1961, the PEO was upgraded to a Military Assistance

Advisory Group (MAAG), and its members were allowed to wear uniforms. The MAAG was withdrawn in 1962 under the

267
Laos: A Country Study

terms of the Geneva Agreement, which was supposed to neutralize Laos (see International Pressure and the Advent of the

Second Coalition, ch. 1). Because the North Vietnamese did

not respect the withdrawal requirement, however, the United

States stepped up military aid to the RLG, but avoided sending

ground troops into Laos, which would have violated the agreement.

As part of this effort, United States Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) personnel operating from a base at Udon Thani,

Thailand, took over the support of 30,000 to 36,000 irregulars,

including Hmong guerrillas who bore the brunt of the fighting

in northern Laos. A CIA-chartered airline, Air America,

dropped rice and ammunition from its C-46s and C-47s to iso- lated Hmong outposts, which were sometimes behind enemy

lines. A variety of short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft used dirt

airstrips carved out of the jungle by the Hmong. The irregulars

were instrumental in helping to rescue a large number of

United States airmen who were shot down over Laos. By this

time, the Hmong leader Vang Pao had risen to the rank of general in the Royal Lao Army and commanded the Second Military Region.

In October 1964, in response to an offensive by the Pathet

Lao and North Vietnamese to expel the Neutralists from the

Plain ofJars, the United States began providing air support

against Pathet Lao positions and North Vietnamese supply

lines. However, it was not until March 1966 at Phoukout, northwest of the Plain ofJars, that the Pathet Lao started to win

major battles against the Royal Lao Army. In July 1966, the

Pathet Lao won another major battle in the Nambak Valley in

northern Louangphrabang Province by overrunning a Royal

Lao Army base and inflicting heavy casualties. These victories

gave the Pathet Lao new momentum in the war for control of

Laos.

Meanwhile, in southern Laos, where the North Vietnamese

had been working steadily every dry season to expand the Ho

Chi Minh Trail network leading into the Republic of Vietnam

(South Vietnam), the intensity of the air war also grew. The air war in Laos operated under a complicated command-and-control system that involved the United States embassy in Vientiane, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam in Saigon,

Royal Thai air bases in Thailand, the commander in chief,

Pacific, in Honolulu, and sometimes even the White House.

268
National Security

The United States ambassador in Vientiane had the final say on

target selection, using criteria that included taking into

account the distance of targets from civilian habitations and

the types of ordnance to be expended. The ambassador also was to keep the RLG informed so as to avoid, or at least minimize, the latter' s embarrassment vis-a-vis the British and Soviet

embassies in Vientiane and the heads of the Indian, Canadian,

and Polish delegations to the International Control Commission, who were jointly responsible for enforcing the 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva.

During the June 1969 rainy season, the Pathet Lao and two

North Vietnamese battalions, using Soviet tanks, pushed the

Royal Lao Army and the Neutralists out of their base at Muang

Souy northwest of the Plain ofJars. Fighting continued during

the monsoon season. In September 1969, Vang Pao's Hmong,

supported by United States bombing, launched a series of sur- prise attacks against key points on the Plain of Jars. A new

North Vietnamese army division joined the battle shortly thereafter and by February 1970 had regained all of the devastated

plain.

In 1970, despite eight years of ground offensives by the

Royal Lao Army and massive United States air support, the

Pathet Lao had grown into an army of 48,000 troops and was prepared to challenge Royal Lao Army forces on their own ter- ritory by mounting large offensives in the south, engaging an

even greater number of North Vietnamese forces. The introduction of Soviet-made long-range 130-mm artillery pieces

onto the battlefield in that year allowed the Pathet Lao and

North Vietnamese to neutralize to some extent the Royal Lao

Army's advantage of air superiority.

In 1970 the combat elements of the Royal Lao Army were

organized into fifty-eight infantry battalions and one artillery

regiment of four battalions. The largest tactical unit was the

battalion, which was composed of a headquarters, a headquarters company, and three rifle companies. Royal Lao Army units were devoted primarily to static defense and were stationed near population centers, lines of communication, depots, and

airfields. These units were complemented by military police

and armored, engineer, and communications units. Between

1962 and 1971, the United States provided Laos with an esti- mated US$500 million in military assistance, not including the

cost of equipping and training irregular and paramilitary

269
Laos: A Country Study

forces. During the 1971-75 period, it added about seventy-five

T-28 light-strike or training aircraft, about twenty C-47s in

both transport and gunship configurations, fewer than ten H34 helicopters, and some small U-l and U-17 aircraft. In February 1971, a major offensive by the South Vietnamese army, with United States logistical and air support, sent two

divisions into Laos in the vicinity of Xepon with the objective of

cutting North Vietnamese supply lines. However, once inside

Laos, South Vietnamese commanders were separated from

their resupply bases by long logistics lines, resulting in an early

termination of the offensive. By December 1971, the Pathet

Lao had taken Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau and had sur- rounded the main Hmong base at Longtiang. Communist

advances continued into 1972 and encircled Thakhek on the

Mekong, and Vientiane.

The cease-fire of February 22, 1973, ended United States

bombing and temporarily halted ground offensives. The Pathet

Lao, however, following their usual practice, used the cessation

of military operations to resupply their forces over the long

and exposed roads from North Vietnam. In further fighting in

the spring of 1975, the Pathet Lao finally broke the resistance

of Vang Pao's Hmong, blocking the road junction linking Vientiane, Louangphrabang, and the Plain ofJars. Under the watch

of two battalions of Pathet Lao troops, which had been flown

into Vientiane and Louangphrabang on Soviet and Chinese

planes for neutralizing those towns under the cease-fire agreement, the communists organized demonstrations to support

their political and military demands, leading to the final,

bloodless seizure of power in the towns held by the RLG up to then.

Structure and Administration of the Armed Forces

As of mid-1994, the most powerful military officer in Laos

was Lieutenant General Choummali Saignason, concurrently

minister of national defense and commander in chief of the

LPA. In addition to his military position, he was also the sev- enth highest ranking member of the ruling LPRP Political

Bureau (Politburo). He took over as chief of the LPA in 1991

when General Khamtai Siphandon was elevated to prime minister (see The Lao People's Revolutionary Party, ch. 4). As a ranking member of the Politburo, Choummali is responsible

for formulating both government and military policy. As com270
National Security

mander in chief, he has absolute power over all internal and

external security matters. All state security personnel, commanders of the air and naval forces, and police officials report

to Choummali.

Lao People's Army

The Pathet Lao guerrillas became the LPLA in October

1965; in 1976 it was renamed the LPA. In the beginning, the

LPLA consisted of regular forces organized under a central

military command, with regionally recruited units and local

forces operating on a part-time basis at the village level as a people's militia. These three levels of the armed forces were

derived from the wartime structure of the main force units and

regional and local guerrillas.

In December 1975, the LPA had a total strength of about

60,000 personnel, including 35,000 Pathet Lao troops and dis- sident Neutralists (see table 14, Appendix). In a January 20,

1976 broadcast, government authorities outlined five principal

tasks for the LPA in defending the nation against Thai reactionaries and exiled Laotian counterrevolutionaries. The first task was to heighten vigilance in preserving peace and public

order. The second was to raise political and ideological understanding in the armed forces, improve discipline, and implement government policy. The third and fourth tasks were to reinforce traditions of solidarity with the people and raise the

quality of the army through political and military study. Finally,

the army was called upon to strengthen its organization and

improve internal defense.

By 1976 the LPA was organized along North Vietnamese military lines, with approximately 42,500 troops in sixty-five infantry battalions, divided among four military regions. By 1979

there were as many as 50,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos, advising and working side by side with their Laotian counterparts to suppress the remaining opposition forces. In the mid-1980s,

Vietnamese troops began their withdrawal; by late 1988, all operational elements had been withdrawn. It is likely, however,

that a few Vietnamese military technical specialists remained in

Laos as of mid-1994.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the armed forces were reequipped with military hardware, including MiG jet fighters

from the Soviet Union. Despite the influx of new equipment,

however, the bleak economic situation of the country pre271
Laos: A Country Study

vented the allotment of a large enough military budget for a modern fighting force. In the absence of military support from

the former Soviet Union and with limited equipment purchases from China and Vietnam, the LPA had embarked on

private business ventures to support itself. In the early 1990s,

aging equipment and lack of funds precluded further modernization.

Dependence on direct foreign military aid ended with the

withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and Soviet and Vietnamese

military advisers in the mid- to late 1980s. The mutual security

treaty with Vietnam, however, allows Vietnamese troops to reenter Laos in case of need.

By mid-1994, the LPA had approximately 33,000 troops,

divided into four military regions. The LPA headquarters in

Vientiane controls all four military regions, which in turn are responsible for LPA elements in the provinces. Military Region

One is headquartered in Louangphrabang, Louangphrabang

Province; Military Region Two, in Muang Phonsavan,

Xiangkhoang Province; Military Region Three, in Xeno, Savannakhet Province; and Military Region Four, in Pakxe, Champasak Province.

The LPA ground component consists of five infantry divisions. The First Division is situated in the Vientiane area. The

Second Division monitors the Laos-Thailand border and northcentral Laos. The Third Division monitors the Laos-China border. The Fourth Division and the Fifth Division patrol southern

Laos.

LPA ground equipment generally is of vintage Soviet design,

with PT-76s (light tanks); T-34/85s and T-54/55s (main battle tanks); and 122mm and 130mm artillery (see table 15,

Appendix). For the most part, United States-made equipment

captured from the Royal Lao Army in 1975 has been retired

from active service.

By the early 1990s, because of the lack of any real external

threats, the armed forces were largely responsible for internal

security, support against dissidents, and border patrol against

incursions from Thailand-based resistance elements. The LPA

also played a significant role in combatting the armed Laotian

resistance movement, especially those troops stationed along

the Thai border. And, presumably, the LPA is responsible for

any further border conflicts such as occurred with Thailand in

272
National Security

1988 (see The Confrontational Relationship with Thailand,

this ch.; Bilateral Relations, ch. 4).

Lao People's Air Force

In 1975 the LPA took possession from the Royal Lao Air

Force of an inventory of 150 United States-made aircraft ranging from T-28 ground attack to UH-34 helicopters. Without

an air force of its own, the LPA had to rebuild the United

States-backed and United States-trained Royal Lao Air Force.

In order to do so, Laos turned to Vietnam and the Soviet

Union.

By the end of 1976, Vietnamese advisers had laid the foundation for the Lao People's Air Force. Vietnamese technicians

developed and implemented the training of Laotian cadres for

command and operational positions. With the exception of

new aircraft, Vietnam also provided the majority of equipment

needed by the air force for day-to-day functioning. Laotian air

force officers of promise were sent to schools in Vietnam for

specialized training. Vietnamese and Soviet technical advisers

had withdrawn from Laos by 1990.

In 1977, in order to modernize and make the transition

from a United States-supplied counterinsurgency air force into one capable of providing air-to-air intercepts, a high-level Laotian military delegation visited the Soviet Union. Later that

year, Laos received ten MiG—21 fighter aircraft, six An-24 trans- port aircraft, and four Mi-8 helicopters from the Soviet Union,

along with in-country technical expertise. In addition, the Soviets funded construction of air bases and radar sites. Together,

the Soviets and Vietnamese constructed a large air force base at Muang Phonsavan on the Plain ofJars, 240 kilometers north of

Vientiane, and rebuilt the former French air base at Xeno,

near Savannakhet. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviets

built early-warning radar systems in northern and western Laos

to monitor Vietnamese, Chinese, and Thai aircraft movements.

Over time, the air force inventory measurably decreased. In

1975 there were 150 aircraft. By the mid-1980s, however, the

inventory had been reduced to seventy aircraft of predominantly Soviet design. In the 1988-94 period, budgetary problems further reduced the air force inventory to approximately

fifty aircraft. Few of the former Royal Lao Air Force's United

States-made aircraft are still in use. As of mid-1994, there were

approximately twenty-nine MiG-21s armed with AA-2 Anab

273
Laos: A Country Study

air-to-air missiles that provided Laos with a credible air defense

against its neighbors and principal adversaries, Cambodia and

Thailand. However, the MiG—21 force, assessed as moderately

capable in the mid-1980s, has deteriorated from age and poor

maintenance and is marginal at best. Funds for replacing air- craft are not available. There were approximately 3,500 per- sons in the air force as of mid-1994.

Lao People's Navy

In 1975 the Lao People's Navy was established with the remnants of the Royal Lao Navy. Composed of approximately

twenty United States-made river patrol boats and sixteen

amphibious landing craft, the navy in mid-1994 had a personnel strength of around 500. As with the air force, Vietnamese

advisers helped organize the Lao People's Navy and trained

Laotian cadres in river operations and boat maintenance. The

force is responsible for maintaining the security of inland

waterways, which includes controlling the movement of resis- tance forces from their sanctuaries in Thailand, across the

Mekong River. In the early 1980s, the navy received six used

Soviet Shmel patrol boats and at least twelve more river patrol

boats, bringing its total inventory to around thirty-one patrol

boats. By mid-1994, the navy had a total of fewer than fifty river

patrol boats and continued to provide a marginal level of security for inland waterways.

Other Military Units

The LPA is augmented by provincial forces, numbering

20,000 to 30,000 men and women, and the local militia, or

Irregular People's Army, estimated at somewhat more than

100,000 men and women. Provincial forces receive little pay, have few weapons, and are minimally trained. They are under

the operational control of provincial authorities for border

control and internal security. The militia is lightly armed and

receives no pay and little or no military U aining. The irregular

forces are organized in their workplaces and local villages, have

a role in local security, and act as a reserve for the regular

armed forces. Promising recruits from the provincial forces

and militia units frequently advance to regular army duty.

Manpower and Conditions of Service

As of mid-1994, there were approximately 37,000 persons, or

slightly more than 4 percent of the labor force of approxi274
New Year's parade in Louangphrabang, 1975; royal elephant and

marchers accompanied by Royal Lao Police on left and Royal Lao Army

soldier on right

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn

mately 1,574,100 males and females between the ages of thir- teen and thirty-two, in the military. There is an eighteen-month

minimum military conscription draft for males seventeen to twenty-six years. Most draftees serve the minimum time. The

ground forces are the primary destination for draftees. The

other, smaller services seem to get sufficient numbers of voluntary recruits to fill their ranks.

Life in the LPA is austere. Pay is low, and there is a shortage

of uniforms and equipment, including most basic supplies.

Consequently, it is not a popular career path for most young

Laotian males. In late 1989, LPRP chairman Kaysone Phomvihan in a major speech to senior LPA officers complained that

"Our youths throughout the country have failed to associate

275
Laos: A Country Study

with the army and failed to use the army as a school to carry

out practices as they were expected to do in the past." Seminars were held in many districts during 1989-90 to discuss requiring

local authorities to help enforce compliance with draft laws,

which many Laotian youths were actively seeking to avoid.

During the Pathet Lao's struggle against the RLG, women

for the most part voluntarily—played a significant role fighting

alongside men in combat units. Women also served in a medical corps and as porters for combat units. Since 1975, however,

the role of women in the armed forces has changed significantly. Although not subject to the draft, women are part of the

active armed forces but perform only minor administrative

functions. Women do, however, serve in police and militia

forces.

The Defense Budget

As of mid-1994, Laos had the smallest defense budget in

Southeast Asia, but it also is one of the region's poorest countries. Since 1975, Laos has relied heavily on Vietnamese and

Soviet military aid; by the early 1990s the loss of this aid had

affected military capabilities.

There is little available information on the defense budget

(see table 16, Appendix). In the late 1970s and early 1980s,

Laos undertook a concerted effort to eliminate internal armed

resistance and was preoccupied with a continuous border conflict with Thailand (see The Confrontational Relationship with

Thailand, this ch.). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however,

a noticeable improvement in the security situation, marked by

better relations with its neighbors and a reduced internal security threat from resistance groups, enabled the leadership to reduce the defense budget. In 1992 military expenditures

which included public security—were approximately US$102.2

million, or 11.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP—

see Glossary). In 1993 military expenditures had increased

slightly to about US$104.9 million, approximately 12.4 percent

of the US$1.3 billion estimated GDP.

Threats to National Security

Internal Threats and Resistance Movements

After December 1975, the newly formed LPDR was faced

with disarming and neutralizing former rightist soldiers and

276
National Security

police, countering armed resistance efforts by those who had

fled to Thailand and by their supporters who had remained in

Laos, and preventing Thailand from interfering in political

developments in Laos. The ease with which the Pathet Lao had

managed to neutralize the rightist armed forces and police and

form a coalition government reflected how tired the Laotians were of war. The prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be

general relief that the civil war was over. Even most middle- and

lower-ranking officers in the Royal Lao Army—who had spent

their adult lives fighting the insurgents of the Neo Lao Hak Xat

(Lao Patriotic Front—LPF; see Glossary) —were prepared to cooperate in building a united and socialist Laos. When opposition to the new regime materialized, it came mainly from

across the Mekong River in Thailand. Insurgents found sanctuary across the 1,000-kilometer boundary with Thailand, where,

under the new, strongly anticommunist government, the military provided them with supplies and intelligence data.

The armed resistance movement—a shadow force of several

thousand persons—never gained enough momentum to

become any more than a nuisance to the communist government because the combination of approximately 50,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in Laos and the LPA ensured

adequate protection against this relatively minor threat. Broad

security measures, including control of the media, were implemented.

The armed resistance was led mainly by individuals who had

played a military role during the hostilities of the 1970s.

Former members of the Royal Lao Army and the special guerrilla units supported by the CIA intermittently harassed government installations such as police stations and army posts,

blasted bridges, ambushed vehicles, and blocked roads. The

honeymoon period following the communist takeover ended

abruptly when thousands of members of the previous government and military apparatus failed to be released from remote

reeducation centers or "seminar camps" (see "Seminar Camps"

and the Death of King Savang Vatthana, ch. 1).

In cooperation with Vietnamese forces in Laos, the government launched a military campaign intended to control dissi- dents, notably the irregular forces—made up of ethnic tribes

who had long resisted Vietnamese and Laotian communists

from their mountain hideouts. The military campaign, along

with deteriorating economic conditions and government

277
Laos: A Country Study

attempts to enforce political control, prompted an exodus of

lowland Lao and Hmong in the early years of LPDR rule.

About 10 percent of the population—approximately 300,000

persons—fled Laos after 1975, passing through refugee camps

in Thailand on their way to receiving refugee status and taking

up residence in the United States, France, Australia, and other

countries. Those who remained in the refugee camps in Thailand provided the recruits for the resistance movements, supported by funds sent from their friends and relatives who had

resettled abroad. Resistance forces continued operating from

sanctuaries in refugee camps across the border in Thailand

with numerous reports of cross-border resistance actions

much as the Pathet Lao had originally operated from sanctuaries in North Vietnam. Resistance forces are perceived as a stumbling block for the repatriation of individuals in refugee camps

in Thailand.

The deteriorating political situation between China and

Laos in 1980 worked in favor of the resistance forces. And, fol- lowing the outbreak of hostilities between China and Vietnam,

China took a greater interest in the Laotian resistance move- ment by providing sanctuary, military training, and equipment

to various resistance elements, including Kong Le's Neutralists.

China's involvement was intended both to tie up the Vietnamese troops stationed in Laos and to provide China with intelli- gence on Vietnamese troop movements along the border.

China also supported the political activity of Laotian exiles and

reportedly established insurgent training camps in Yunnan

Province for as many as 3,000 Laotian resistance fighters.

Despite training and equipment from China, the newly trained

resistance fighters were no match for the LPA and Vietnamese

troops. The resistance was relegated to committing acts of sabotage against government facilities and mounting small unit

attacks on troops. China cut off support to the resistance when

moves toward normalization of relations between Laos and

China began in 1986.

In 1985 the resistance movement escalated its military campaign against the government. Laodan resistance groups based

in Thailand claimed to have as many as 7,000 to 8,000 members

in 1985. These groups were active in mounting limited guerrilla operations, such as harassing LPA transportation routes

and sabotaging military supply depots, and reportedly bombed

the Wattai Airport in Vientiane in 1985. In April 1985, the

guerrillas reportedly downed a helicopter, killing several senior

278
National Security

LPA officers, as well as three Soviet military advisers and two

Vietnamese major generals. General Phoumi Nosavan's death

in exile in Thailand in November 1985, however, left a significant leadership void and caused a serious setback to the resis- tance movement.

Although the resistance movement was losing momentum in

the early 1990s, and resistance operations did not appear to threaten the stability of the communist government in Vientiane, incidents continued. In March 1992, fighting between

resistance forces and Laotian troops took place at Ban Tak

Huai Sao. Scores of people on both sides were wounded and

killed by artillery and small arms fire. In June 1992, there were

reports of 300 Laotian rebels attacking LPDR military positions

in Muang Sanakham across the Mekong from Chiang Khan,

Thailand. In July 1992, Thai military officials reported sporadic

antigovernment activities and skirmishes in different parts of

Laos, especially in the remote mountainous border areas with

Thailand.

Laos continued to seek Thai action against rebel forces

remaining in Thailand, and the decline in resistance activity was attributable both to an improvement in relations between

Laos and Thailand and to the once isolationist LPDR's successful negotiations with the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees (see Glossary) to close refugee camps in Thailand

and repatriate the remaining inmates, mostly Hmong tribespeople. Not only did these negotiations cut off the sanctuaries,

but they also cut off the traditional sources of new recruits and

arms. Further, the Thai government began steps in 1992 to stop anti-LPDR forces from using Thailand as a base to stage

attacks into Laos. Also, the United States pressured Thailand to cut back on tacit military assistance to Hmong resistance ele- ments. As a result of these developments, armed resistance was reduced by mid-1994 to isolated incidents of little more than

armed banditry—hardly a threat to the stability of Laos.

As of the early 1990s, it remained difficult to garner and con- firm information about the strength of the various resistance

forces and their activities because of the nature of their operations and the remoteness of their locations. The main resistance forces are the Lao National Liberation Movement (also

known as the United Lao National Liberation Front) and the

Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos. The former resistance

movement, remnants of the Hmong irregulars led by Vang Pao,

279
Laos: A Country Study

is estimated to have approximately 2,000 members in the early

1990s and is a bitter enemy of the latter. The Lao National Liberation Movement continues to work toward replacing the government with a coalition of opposition groups.

The Ethnic Liberation Organization ofLaos

The Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos is the largest

opposition group. The organization grew out of a major

Hmong resistance group, the Chao Fa (Lords of the Sky, or God's Disciples). The Chao Fa was organized in 1975 by Zhong

Zhua Her (Pak Au Her, or Pa Kao Her), a senior resistance

fighter who had received aid from the United States in his fight

against Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces.

In the late 1970s, the Chao Fa boasted of having 20,000

members; however, only 2,000 to 4,000 were armed. By the

mid-1980s, the number of armed Chao Fa was probably around

2,000. Because it had been subjected to years of attacks by government and Vietnamese forces, the group was split and forced

to flee into China, which provided it with assistance.

By late 1984, China had sent Laotian resistance groups back

across the border. In 1985 Zhong Zhua Her reorganized the

Chao Fa under the banner of the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos and set up his base camp in Xaignabouri Province near the border with Thailand. From his base, Zhong Zhua

Her attempted to organize resistance elements in the northern

provinces of Laos and sought to establish an autonomous

region for the Hmong.

In 1990 the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos reportedly had 3,000 members in armed units and another 6,000 per- sons trained but without weapons. Individual weapons

reportedly were variants of the AK-47, a few M-79 grenade

launchers, RPG-2s, RPG-7s, and a few 60mm mortars. In the

early 1990s, the group concentrated on mounting small-unit

operations and consolidating support. Beginning in 1992, rela- tions with the other resistance groups were poor to nonexistent. This fact greatly hampered efforts of resistance movements

to organize a broader agenda and larger operations, as did

closer relations between Laos and Thailand. As of mid-1994,

the strength of the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos was

estimated at approximately 2,000 persons.

280
Royal Lao Army soldier standing guard at the Royal Palace,

Louangphrabang, 1975

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn

The Hmong

The Hmong are one of the principal ethnic minorities

inhabiting the higher elevations of Laos, living in mountain vil- lages situated above 1,000 meters where they grow rice and

corn using swidden (shifting, or slash-and-burn) agriculture,

raise livestock, and grow opium as a cash crop. Several million

Hmong also live in Thailand, Vietnam, and China (see Population, ch. 2). The Hmong traditionally have aggressively protected their independent life-style, and their independence has

kept them at odds with the central government.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Hmong maintained

their tradition of rebellion. In the 1920s, successful Hmong

uprisings against the French colonial power in northeastern

Laos led to negotiated settlements rather than defeat. The

French colonial government later used the Hmong to help subjugate lowland Lao dissidents. In the mid-1960s, the United

States, recognizing the Hmong's tenacious fighting ability and

superior knowledge of mountainous terrain, employed them as irregular mercenary units against the Pathet Lao (see The

"Secret War," ch. 1). Hmong forces, trained and supplied by

the United States, fought alongside the Royal Lao Army and

were used extensively in many of the most pitched battles of

281
Laos: A Country Study

the Indochina wars. As a consequence, a disproportionate

number of Hmong were wounded and/or died in combat (see

Historical Background, this ch.).

After the disastrous defeat of two major Hmong armies in

March and April 1975 at Sala Phou Khoun by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, the United States evacuated Vang

Pao from Longtiang to Thailand on May 14, 1975. Thousands

of his followers were left to their fate because the United States evacuation aircraft requested by Vang Pao did not materialize.

The vast majority of Hmong who made it safely to Thailand did

so on their own. This defeat left the Hmong who had not fled

to Thailand in great disarray. One group of Hmong, after a long and dangerous march through hostile countryside, fled to Thailand, where 25,000 persons reached safety. But a larger

group of some 60,000 persons retreated to the heights of the

Phou Bia Massif south of the Plain ofJars, where they set up

defensive positions. Aside from occasional harassing attacks by

Pathet Lao forces, no serious attempt was made to interfere

with the Hmong for more than a year after the communist

takeover.

In 1977 Vietnamese troops backed by Soviet 130mm longrange artillery encircled and attacked the Hmong sanctuary in

the Pho Bia Massif. Hmong defenses held and drove off the

attackers. Later that same year, however, Vietnamese forces,

unable to penetrate the Hmong ground defenses, began to overfly the redoubt, reportedly dropping napalm, gas, and a mycotoxin known as trichothecene, or "yellow rain," on

Hmong villages (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). An unknown

number of Hmong died, while others tried to escape into Thailand.

As a result of decades of warfare, dislocation, and a campaign mounted against them by Vietnamese and RLG forces in

the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Hmong population was

reduced to approximately 200,000 in Laos and about the same

number in Thailand in the early 1990s. From their sanctuary in

Thailand, the Hmong continued their armed resistance efforts

against the communists throughout the 1980s and into the

1990s. Many thousands of other Hmong, however, had sided

with the Pathet Lao and were living peacefully in Laos, particularly in the northeastern provinces; others went to Thailand

and on to the United States. Nevertheless, by 1992, cross-border Hmong raids into Laos were reduced to little more than

282
National Security

banditry—a casualty of wavering Thai support and apathy

among the Hmong themselves.

In 1992 a major Hmong refuge, the Ban Vinai Hmong refugee camp in Thailand, was closed as part of a Thai effort to close all camps holding Laotian refugees. In late 1992, there were an estimated 30,000 Laotian refugees in Thailand and

about 1,700 in China. In March 1993, Thailand announced

that it was closing two more refugee camps, one in Nakhon

Phanom Province, the other in Phayao Province. These two

camps held more than 27,000 Laotians, the majority of whom

were Hmong. Although the government is making attempts to reintegrate the Hmong, the lack of resources limits these

efforts. Continuing participation of Hmong in resistance activi- ties poses no threat to the stability of the government of Laos,

but it does complicate the repatriation process.

Foreign Military Presence

Since 1975 Laos has maintained a special relationship with

Vietnam, formalized by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in July 1977. Article 1 of the treaty states that "the

two parties undertake to deploy all of their efforts to safeguard

and develop the special relationship between Laos and Vietnam, to reinforce their solidarity and mutual confidence, their

long-term cooperation and mutual aid in all domains in a spirit

of proletarian internationalism." Article 4 of the treaty stipulates that "the two sides affirm their determination to build the

Vietnamese-Lao border into a border of lasting friendship and

fraternity."

The treaty is much more than its name implies because it gives Vietnam almost carte blanche in the internal affairs of

Laos, especially in the military. Vietnamese military forces have

been continuously present in Laos since 1961, if not earlier.

The strength of these forces has varied over the years from

30,000 to 50,000 troops in the 1975-83 period, to several hundred advisers in late 1987. In November 1988, the LPDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally announced that all Vietnamese

troops had been withdrawn from Laos. Although Western intelligence sources initially doubted the claim of total withdrawal,

later they reportedly confirmed that it was true. Indeed, there was no Vietnamese presence in the two border conflicts

between Laos and Thailand in the late 1980s. Moreover, expatriate employees of international organizations working in

283
Laos: A Country Study

Vientiane had noticed the removal of many Vietnamese technical and advisory personnel from the capital. It is likely that a

full withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and a reduction of aid personnel occurred in order to advance economic agreements

between Vietnam and China.

Vietnamese troops performed a variety of functions during

their long stay in Laos. They fought alongside Pathet Lao insurgents in their struggle to overthrow the RLG. They trained

and, along with the Soviets, equipped the military. Vietnamese

cadres played a primary role in combatting the insurgency

against the LPDR, undertaking security tasks such as guarding

access to airport perimeters, controlling important road junctions, and patrolling sensitive areas. They performed border

patrol duties and carried outjoint military maneuvers with LPA

units along the Cambodian, Chinese, and Thai borders to demonstrate strong Laotian-Vietnamese military cooperation.

These maneuvers were especially evident during periods of

border tension between Vietnam or Laos and their neighbors.

The Vietnamese also rendered valuable engineering services

such as building roads and improving infrastructure damaged

by years of war. The Confrontational Relationship with Thailand

Despite cultural and linguistic ties between Laos and Thailand, after 1975 relations between these two countries were

often marked by severe strains (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4).

Such strains often resulted in exchanges of gunfire followed by

border closures.

Relations between Laos and Thailand entered a new phase

of tension in the middle of 1984 after a period of relative calm.

Thai Army roadbuilding crews encountered three remote vil- lages whose location on available maps they apparently took to favor Thai sovereignty. The LPDR government and army

thought otherwise, and a military and diplomatic standoff

ensued for several months. Laos took the dispute to the United

Nations (UN), where Thailand was striving for election to the

Security Council. In keeping with such aspirations, Thailand

announced that it would remove its troops from the three vil- lages and seek a peaceful settlement through a resurvey of the

watershed border.

Further complicating the border situation, in late 1984 Thailand accused Vietnam of meddling in Laotian affairs by push284
National Security

ing Laos into hostilities with Thailand in order to draw

attention away from the situation in Cambodia. Thailand also

complained that Laos was harboring Thai communists belonging to a new organization called Green Star, whose cadres numbered 2,000 and who were said to be training in six insurgent

camps along the Laos-Thailand border. Little came of Thai

accusations because world attention was focused on Vietnam's

activity in Cambodia, not on Laos.

Following the mid-1984 incident and until early 1986, rela- tions were tense. However, by mid-1986 tension began to ease

as both sides attempted to downplay the various minor border

incidents. For example, in mid-July 1986, approximately thirtyfive Laotian ethnic minority refugees were killed in Thailand.

Thailand alleged that LPA troops had attacked a refugee settle- ment near the village of Ban Huai Pong, Phayao Province, kill- ing the refugees. The government said Thailand fabricated the

accusation. Previously, less significant border incidents had

become contentious; this time, however, after Laos and Thailand traded vitriolic charges in both countries' media, the issue

died down, foreshadowing an improvement in cross-border

relations.

In late 1986, relations between Laos and Thailand moved

forward when several delegations were exchanged in order to work out border differences. Of significance were discussions

between military and police delegations, who exchanged information on problems with resistance groups, infiltration, smuggling, and bandit gangs. Laos was concerned with the embargo

Thailand had placed on strategic goods crossing Thailand for

import into the country. As a landlocked country, Laos is dependent upon goods transiting from and through its neighbors. Negotiations ended the embargo on these goods, excluding some military-related items. Laos was also concerned about

restrictions on commercial goods.

Between 1986 and 1990, the number of border incidents

along the Laos-Thailand border declined significantly. There

was, however, a major border dispute in December 1987. A

cease-fire was proclaimed in February 1988, ending the fighting that had resulted in 1,000 deaths, and meetings were held

to defuse the conflict (see Developments in the Lao People's

Democratic Republic, ch. 1).

Other factors helped to soften the confrontational relationship. Thailand's criticism of Laotian-Vietnamese military ties

285
Laos: A Country Study

lessened after 1988, when the majority of Vietnamese troops

had departed Laos. Commercial trade continued to be a stabilizing force. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were normal but wary. The fact that resistance fighters operated from refugee camps in Thailand, however, remained a constant source of irritation.

In 1991 several high-level Laotian-Thai military delegations were exchanged in hopes of resolving remaining border incidents. These talks resulted in agreements in which both sides

agreed to withdraw military forces from disputed areas in

Xaignabouri Province. The withdrawals, which took the form

of a mutually supervised pullback, created several unpopulated

demilitarized zones. Thailand also promised to help curtail the

illegal activities of Laotian refugees and exiles residing in Thailand. Specifically, it agreed to cooperate in disarming and

arresting any armed individuals apprehended crossing the border. In 1992 Thailand reportedly made good on its promise to arrest border violators, and the brother of General Vang Pao

and a group of Hmong were taken into custody in northern

Thailand as they were attempting to stage a cross-border incursion.

In August 1992, Laos again called for increased Laotian-Thai

cooperation to suppress anti-LPDR activity by ethnic resistance

fighters. Cooperation was to include tougher restrictions on

exiled Hmong wishing to travel to and within Thailand. Vientiane wanted Bangkok to strengthen its screening procedures

of visa applications from exiled and ethnic Lao living in third

countries of resettlement. It was also seeking Thai cooperation

in patrolling the common border to combat the resistance

movement. In 1993 the LPDR's ambassador to Thailand,

Bounkeut Sangsomsak, summed up the resistance problem

when he noted that the two countries still needed to resolve

the problem, that both sides had been consulting each other at government and military levels, but that stringent measures

were needed to further disrupt resistance efforts. Relations with the United States

Since the mid-1980s, relations between the United States

and Laos have been largely concerned with accounting for

those persons classified as prisoner of war/missing in action

(POW/MIA) in Laos from the Indochina wars (1946-75) and

on counternarcotics issues (see Narcotics and Counternarcot286
A group of senior Royal Lao Government officials in November 1974.

At the center is Prince Saykham Southakakaoumal, then governor of

Xiangkhoang Province.

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn

ics Issues, this ch.; The Origins of the Prisoner of War/Missing

in Action Question, ch. 1; Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). In February 1985, a Laotian-United States team conducted the first joint

excavation of a plane crash site, resulting in the identification

of the remains of thirteen missing servicemen. Progress in

Laos-United States relations accelerated after 1988, with Laos

agreeing to expand POW/MIA activities. The two countries

have conducted numerous site surveys and recovery operations

since January 1989.

National Police and Paramilitary Forces

One of the first priorities for the LPDR was restructuring

defense and security forces and improving effectiveness in

these new roles. After the major Mekong River towns were lib- erated, soldiers were assigned police duties, although they

lacked the necessary training. As the pace of political change

quickened and the government became increasingly con- cerned about security, the public expressed dissatisfaction with

heavy-handed military controls, Pathet Lao arrogance, and the

excesses committed by some guerrillas.

The emphasis on discipline, training, and reorganization

reflected the difficulties encountered by the former Pathet Lao

cadres in converting from a guerrilla insurgency into a national

security force. Men taught to think of urban-dwelling lowland

Lao as their bitter enemies found it difficult at first to treat them as liberated brothers (see Lowland Lao Society, ch. 2).

287
Laos: A Country Study

Also, most young Pathet Lao guerrillas brought in to keep

order in the Mekong towns were members of upland minorities who had never before been confronted with the temptations of city life (see Upland Lao Society, ch. 2). Consequently,

there were reports of abuses such as extortion and robbery by

drunken Pathet Lao police officers.

By the end of 1976, an effective police force had been established. Its mission was simple: to maintain basic law and order

and strictly enforce government policies, often with little regard for human rights. A police academy was established at the former United States-built police school at Ban Donnoun,

ten kilometers east of Vientiane, where Vietnamese and Soviet

instructors began teaching Laotian cadres basic police procedures. The crime rate reportedly was very low.

The academy also trained a Laotian secret police organization similar to the Vietnamese internal security apparatus. The

secret police were to provide internal security for the party and

to look for dissidents within the population, that is, those individuals who disagreed with the LPRP's pro-Vietnamese line and

who expressed pro-Chinese or Laotian nationalist sentiments

that could be construed as anti-Vietnamese. By late 1978, there were reportedly 800 Vietnamese secret police in Laos engaged

in military and civilian surveillance activities. By the late 1980s,

their presence had been reduced to a few senior advisers.

The Criminal Justice System

Civil Liberties and Human Rights

The criminal justice system, like every aspect of life in Laos,

is controlled by the party and the government. There are few

legal restraints on the often arbitrary actions—including

arrests—by the government, and dissent is handled by suppressing basic civil rights. Although the constitution provides

for the freedoms of worship, speech, and press, as of the early

1990s, citizens did not feel free to exercise these rights fully.

There are no legal safeguards, and people are frequently

arrested on vague charges. Although a penal code and a constitution that guarantee certain civil liberties have been promulgated, implementation is another matter, particularly where

freedom of political expression is concerned. And, the media

are state-controlled (see Mass Media, ch. 4).

288
National Security

Nonetheless, there is a system for prosecuting criminal

behavior. Common crimes are evaluated at the local village

level. More serious cases, especially politically sensitive ones,

are referred to higher authorities. People's tribunals operate at

district and provincial levels with judges appointed by the government.

Both Laotian journalists and Western officials are critical of

the limitations on personal freedoms. In 1987 a Laotian journalist living in Thailand noted that there was little popular support for the government, but that most Laotians accepted its authority because they had little choice. In 1988 a Laotian journalist protested that open criticism of the government was for- bidden and noted that one of his friends had been imprisoned

after he complained about the continuing lack of a constitution. In 1988 Western diplomats reported that hundreds—perhaps thousands—of individuals were being held in detention

centers around the country and that people still were being

arrested and held for months without being charged.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government instituted

the New Economic Mechanism, a series of sweeping economic

reforms geared toward establishing a market-oriented economy. Along with these economic reforms came a slight opening

to the West, which provided some opportunity for scrutiny of

human rights violations. However, few foreign journalists are allowed to visit Laos, and travel by diplomats and foreign aid

workers is restricted. Both domestic and foreign travel by Laotians also is subject to scrutiny and restriction.

The Ministry of Interior is the main instrument of state control and guardianship over the criminal justice system. Ministry

of Interior police monitor both Laotians and foreign nationals

who live in Laos, and there is a system of informants in workplace committees and in residential areas. According to the

United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1993, both the party and state monitor vari- ous aspects of family and social life through neighborhood and

workplace committees. These committees are responsible for

maintaining public order and reporting "bad elements" to the

police, as well as carrying out political training and disciplining

employees.

The criminal justice system is deficient in the area of legal

precedent and representation. Trials are not held in public,

although trial verdicts are publicly announced. Although there

289
Laos: A Country Study

is some provision for appeal, it does not apply to important

political cases. Under the constitution, judges and prosecutors

are supposed to be independent and their decisions free from

outside scrutiny. In practice, however, the courts appear to accept recommendations of other government agencies, especially the Ministry of Interior, in making their decisions. Theoretically, the government provides legal counsel to the accused.

In practice, however, defendants represent themselves without

outside counsel. The government suspended the bar in late

1992, pending new rules on the activities of private lawyers,

thereby paving the way for private lawyers to practice in Laos.

Meanwhile, persons accused of crimes have to defend themselves. In 1992 the government launched a campaign to disseminate the new constitution, adopted by the National Assembly in

1991. The leadership touted its efforts at developing a legal sys- tem with a codified body of laws and a penal code. By most

Western accounts, however, as of mid-1994, there had been lit- tle, if any, progress in implementing the freedoms provided for

in the constitution. Although the National Assembly had

enacted a criminal code and laws establishing a judiciary in

November 1989, as of mid-1994 these codes still had not been

implemented. Individuals are still being held without being

informed of the charges or their accusers' identities.

Detention Centers

There were four categories of persons held in confinement.

Aside from common criminals, there were political, social, and

ideological deviants. The crimes of the three latter groups were

often vaguely defined, their arrests arbitrary, and their length

of confinement ambiguous.

The LPDR established four different types of detention centers: prisons, reeducation centers or seminar camps, rehabilitation camps, and remolding centers. Social deviants or common

criminals were considered less threatening to the regime than

persons accused of political crimes, who were considered

potential counterrevolutionaries. Social deviants were confined

in rehabilitation camps. According to MacAlister Brown and

Joseph J. Zasloff, prisons were primarily for common criminals,

but political prisoners also were held there for short periods,

usually six to twelve months. Ideologically suspect persons were

sent to remolding centers. Reeducation centers were for those

290
National Security

deemed politically risky, usually former RLG officials. Political

prisoners usually served three- to five-year terms or longer. As

at the prisons, inmates worked hard under rugged conditions

and had limited supplies of food. Oddly, there was little political indoctrination. Bribery in order to secure food and medicine was reported.

In 1986 Brown and Zasloff also reported that prisoners were

not tried but were incarcerated simply by administrative fiat. Former inmates said that they were arrested, informed by the

security officials that they had been charged with crimes, and

then sent off to camps for indeterminate periods. Typically,

prisoners were told one day prior to their release to prepare for

departure.

The status of the detention centers also is vague. In 1984

Vientiane declared that all reeducation centers had been

closed. At that time, Amnesty International estimated 6,000 to 7,000 political prisoners were held in these centers. The government acknowledged that there were some former inmates

in remote areas but claimed that their confinement was voluntary. In the late 1980s, the government released most of the

detainees. As of mid-1994, the exact number of political prisoners was unknown.

In 1989 Laos took steps to reduce the number of political

prisoners, many of whom had been held since 1975. Several

hundred detainees, including many high-ranking officials and

officers from the former United States-backed RLG and Royal

Lao Army, were released from reeducation centers in the

northeastern province of Houaphan. Released prisoners

reported that hundreds of individuals remained in custody in

as many as eight camps. Included among those in custody were

at least six generals and former high-ranking members of the

RLG. These individuals reportedly performed manual labor

such as cutting logs, repairing roads, and building irrigation

systems. In 1993 Amnesty International reported human rights

violations in the continued detention of three "prisoners of

conscience"— detained since 1975 but not sentenced until

1992—as well as those held under restrictions or the subjects of

unfair trials according to international standards.

As of 1993, reports indicated that some high-ranking offi- cials of the RLG and military remained in state custody. Those

accused of hostility to the regime are subject to arrest and con- finement for long periods of time. Prison conditions are harsh,

291
Laos: A Country Study

and prisoners are routinely denied family visitation and proper

medical care. Prisons are not independently monitored.

Narcotics and Counternarcotics Issues

Laos is the world's third largest producer of opium—primarily in the northern provinces. Narcotics trafficking in Laos is difficult to control because of the remoteness of many border

areas, their attendant lack of communications, and the scarcity

of resources, all of which which make stationing officials at many of the border crossings difficult. Nevertheless, several

counternarcotics policy initiatives have been undertaken.

During the late 1980s, narcotics control became an important United States concern because Laos is a major producer of

opium and marijuana. In 1987 Laos began to cooperate with

the United States in drug control efforts when it requested

assistance in providing a viable crop alternative to opium farmers. Increased efforts on counternarcotics cooperation have

been evident since January 1990 when a memorandum of

understanding on the Bilateral Cooperation of Narcotics Issues was signed. This agreement focused on ways for the United

States to provide antinarcotics programs. The United States

provided narcotics-related training to a number of Laotian offi- cials in June 1990 and again in August 1991. And, in 1992

United States Customs Service officials held a training session

in Vientiane for Laotian customs officers and other officials. Since then, Laotian officials have also traveled to Australia,

Japan, and Europe for counternarcotics cooperation training.

In late 1992, as part of the continuing counternarcotics

effort, the LPDR Customs Department set up an antismuggling

unit in Vientiane. The Council of Ministers approved the for- mation of this counternarcotics police unit, operationally

under the Ministry of Interior but with policy controlled by the

Lao National Committee on Drug Control and Supervision.

Progress in the configuration of the unit was negligible. As of

mid-1993, however, the United States was working with the

LPDR to provide support and training for the unit, and the site for the unit was being renovated.

Estimated opium production has declined annually since

1989, largely through successful crop reduction and replacement programs that target specific areas and are funded and

initiated by the United States and the UN Drug Control Program. Laos has facilitated these crop substitution programs

292
United States landing craft on land along the Mekong River in

Vientiane, now used as storage containers

Courtesy Gina Merris

aimed at developing alternative crops and occupations—in

Houaphan, Vientiane, and Xiangkhoang provinces. In 1989

there were an estimated 42,130 hectares of land deemed

"potentially harvestable" for cultivating opium. By 1993 there were approximately 26,040 hectares. The potential opium yield

declined from 380 tons in 1989 to 230 tons in 1992 and to 180

tons in 1993. The United States government estimated that

opium production in Laos had declined some 27 percent in

1990 over the previous year, approximately 13 percent from

1991 to 1992, and about 22 percent from 1992 to 1993, the lat- ter mainly as a result of adverse weather because the estimated

hectarage under cultivation did not decrease.

Decreased opium cultivation and production are also the

result of increased law enforcement efforts, narcotics-related

arrests and crop seizures, and a greater effort to disseminate

information on the disadvantages of drug trafficking. Although

the government tends to deny that it has a domestic drug problem, a public awareness program stressing the dangers of drug

use and trafficking has been established, and, as part of the

information and education campaign, there has been

increased publicity on penalties for offenses.

In April 1993, Laos was certified ("with explanation") for

narcotics cooperation in 1992 by the United States Department

of State. (Certification is granted for performance in narcotics

cooperation in the previous calendar year and is categorized by

cooperation or certification, noncooperation or decertification, and national interest waiver.) Certification guarantees

Laos increased United States cooperation and funding of coun293
Laos: A Country Study

ternarcotics programs. Certification (with explanation), however, stipulates that in order to receive full United States

support. Laos has to take visible, significant, and continuing

action to improve the enforcement of antinarcotics laws, which were first enacted in November 1989. Other reasons for the

designation certification with explanation include the slow

pace of cooperation with officials from the United States Drug

Enforcement Administration and allegations of involvement in

drusr trafficking bv higrh-level members of the government.

In April 1994, the United States granted Laos a national

interest waiver for certification of narcotics cooperation in

1993. It was determined that the waiver was preferable to decertification or certification and was in the United States

national interest in order to exact continued cooperation on

the POW ML\ issue.

Previous efforts—although modest—to curb the drug trade

continue. At the same time, however, corruption among Chilian and military personnel and their collusion in narcotics

activities reportedly continue as well. In 1993 the prime minister ordered the provinces to organize antidrug committees and

cooperate with the Lao National Committee on Drug Control

and Supervision. Cooperation is to take the form of publicizing

existing laws and regulations and educating the public on the

dangers of drugs.

For the foreseeable future, drug production and trafficking

will likely remain serious problems. Still, the 27 percent drop in

opium cultivation, coupled with the arrests of drug traffickers

and the government's stated commitment to take further

action on enforcement, are encouraging. Laos has also signed

a memorandum of understanding with China and Thailand on

strengthening regional cooperation in controlling illicit drugs.

In the near term, the United States will probably continue to

assist Laos in efforts to decrease opium cultivation and production through crop substitution programs.

This improvement in the narcotics arena is indicative of the

overall improvement in the country's national security situation. Since 1988 Laos has experienced a period of relative calm

in its turbulent historv. It has been at peace with its neighbors,

and its internal armed resistance movement has been reduced

to a mere annoyance. It is doubtful, however, that the armed

forces will modernize much in the 1990s, unless the country's

overall economic situation improves or a new political patron

294
National Security

emerges. It is more likely that the military will lag farther and

farther behind its stronger neighbors.

One of the last holdouts of communist ideology in the

world, Laos has slowly opened its doors to the West in order to improve its economic situation. In mid-1994, however, Laos was

still a long way from providing its citizens with the basic civil rights fundamental to Western societies: there are few personal

freedoms, no freedom of the press or assembly, and harsh

prison conditions for citizens who deviate from the party line. * * * Detailed and current reference material on the military

forces and judicial and penal systems is difficult to obtain. Several books written in the mid- to late 1980s are recommended

for a good overview of the security situation. These include

Martin Stuart-Fox's Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and

Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and MacAlister

Brown and Joseph Zasloffs Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-85. Written information on military training and equipment is sparse. The Institute for

Strategic Studies' annual Military Balance is the best source of

information on the status of military equipment. The Asia Year- book also yields some information on national security issues.

The United States Department of State's annual publications,

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, provide yearly updates on narcotics

production, counternarcotics operations, and human rights.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

295

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Estimated Population by Province, 1992

3 Population by Ethnic Group, 1985

4 Production of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90

5 Yields of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90

6 Industrial Production, Selected Years, 1980-90

7 Value of Major Manufactures, Selected Years, 1980-90

8 Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90

9 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985-91

10 Major Exports, 1985, 1987, and 1989

11 Balance of Trade in Convertible and Nonconvertible Currencies, Selected Years, 1982-91

12 Foreign Aid Statistics, Selected Years, 1984-91

13 External Debt, Selected Years, 1985-91

14 Armed Forces Personnel, Selected Years, 1974-93

15 Major Equipment of the Armed Forces, 1994

16 Military Expenditures Compared with the Gross National

Product, Selected Years, 1974-93

297

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches

0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles

2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit and add 32

299
Laos: A Country Study

Table 2. Estimated Population by Province, 1992

Province Population

Attapu 83,000 Bokeo1 104,000 Bolikhamxai 151,000 Champasak 477,000 Houaphan 232,000 Khammouan 258,000 LouangNamtha 125,000 Louangphrabang 355,000 Oudomxai1 188,000 Phongsali 149,000 Saravan 237,000 Savannakhet 673,000 Xaignabouri 195,000 Xekong 59,000 Xiangkhoang 191,000

Vientiane 321,000

Vientiane Municipality 489,000

Special zone

2 73,000 TOTAL 4,360,000

1 The populations of Bokeo and Oudomxai provinces have been adjusted to reflect the redistricting of Paktha and Pha Oudom districts from Oudomxai Province to Bokeo Province in 1992.

2 The special zone consists of Hongsa and Xianghon districts, formerly of Xaignabouri Province. Source: Based on information from Laos, State Statistical Centre, Committee for Plan- ning and Cooperation, Basic Statistics about the Socio-economic Development in thi Lao P.D.R, Vientiane, 1993, 26.

300
Appendix

Table 3. Population by Ethnic Group, 1985

Ethnic Group

Subgroup

Lao Loum

Lao 1,804,101 PhuThai 441,497 Lue 102,760

Total Lao Loum 2,348,358 Lao Theung Kammu 389,694 Katang 72,391 Makong 70,382

Suai 49,049 Nyuan 33,240 Loven 28,057

Ta-oi 24,577

Taliang 23,665

Chali 20,902 Phong 18,165 Lavae 16,434 Katu 14,676 Lamet 14,355 Htin 13,977 Alak ; 13,217 Pako 12,293 Oi 11,194 Ngae 8,917 Chaeng 4,540 Nyaheun 3,960 Yang 3,447 Yae 3,376 Saek 2,459 SamTao 2,359 SingMun 2,164 Turn 2,042 Mon 2,022

Bit 1,530

Sila 1,518 Nguan 988

Lolo 842

Hayi 727

Lawi 584 Sedang 520 Khmer 169

Kri.. 110

301
Laos: A Country Study

Table 3. Population by Ethnic Group, 1985

Ethnic Group „ . . „ , r Population Subgroup r

Numbri 67

Total Lao Theung 868,609 Lao Sung

Hmong 231,168 Akha 57,500 Phu Noi . 23,618 Mien(Yao) 18,091 Lahu '. 9,200 Kui 6,493 Ho 6,361

Total Lao Sung 352,431 Other

Vietnamese 12,086 Chinese 2,624 Thai 1,459 Cambodian 274 Burmese 185

Indian 44

French 13

Total Other 16,685 TOTAL 3,586,083 Source: Based on information from Laos, National Committee of Plan, Population Census of 1985, Vientiane, 1986.

302
Appendix

Table 4. Production ojMajor Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90

(in thousands of tons)

Crop 1980 1985 1987 1989 19901

Cardamom n.a

2 n.a. 0.4 1.7 2.7 Coffee3 4.4 6.1 7.0 5.4 5.3 Corn 28.4 33.3 35.7 43.8 81.9 Cotton 4.9 2.9 4.0 4.4 5.0 Fruit 15.2 48.0 32.2 53.0 55.0 Mung beans 1.6 1.5 1.9 3.1 3.2 Peanuts 7.9 5.2 5.8 5.9 8.0 Rice 1,053.1 1,395.2 1,232.5 1,404.0 1,508.4 Soybeans 3.3 2.1 3.4 4.9 4.5 Sugarcane 24.1 73.0 81.8 126.0 111.9 Sweet potatoes 80.3 85.4 103.5 159.2 162.8 Tobacco4 16.6 15.7 22.7 33.5 58.4 Vegetables 42.6 39.4 40.6 65.7 60.7

Estimated.

2 n.a.—not available.

3 In dried beans.

4 In green leaves. Source: Based on information from Environment, Natural Resources, and the Future Devel- opment ofLaos and Vietnam: Papers from a Seminar, Fairfax, Virginia, 1991, 32.

303
Laos: A Country Study

Table 5. Yields ofMajor Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90

(in tons per hectare)

Crop 1980 1985 1987 1989 19901

Cardamom na 2 n.a.

2 0.21 0.30 0.26 Coffee3 68 0.49 0.48 0.34 0.31 Corn 1 00 1 94 1.44 1.44 1.70 Cotton 0.70 0.56 0.71 0.61 0.72

Fruit 6.06 6.15 10.49 10.60 10.00 Mung beans 0.56 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.70 Peanuts 0.74 0.78 1.23 0.97 0.95 Rice 1.44 2.10 2.16 2.32 2.30

Soybeans 0.69 0.67 0.60 0.81 0.81 Sugarcane 26.73 27.66 27.73 32.93 27.83 Sweet potatoes 8.80 8.37 7.05 5.81 9.32 Tobacco4 4.16 4.30 4.11 4.14 4.86 Vegetables 8.14 5.70 6.79 8.54 7.70

Estimated.

2 n.a.—not available.

3 In dried beans.

4 In green leaves. Source: Based on information from Environment, Natural Resources, and the Future Devel- opment ofLaos and Vietnam: Papersfrom a Seminar, Fairfax, Virginia, 1991, 32.

304
Appendix

Table6. Industrial Production, Selected Years, 1980-90

1980 1983 1985 1987 1989 1990 Wood products (in thousands

of cubic meters)

04.

D

n.a. 1/11 K 141.i> oOO.U 9Q1 Q 3Uy.4 119 n.a. 41.7 55 114 7ft 1 o.tA

n.a. n.a. 143. U OOO.U i.uoy.u ^ can i*k 1 ,OoU.U Cigarettes (in millions) . .

.

1,100 1,100 1,125 1,200 n.a. n.a. Metal products (in tons) .

.

489.2 472.4 138.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. Tin plate (in thousands of

sheets) 981 820 664 n.a. n.a. n.a. Food (in tons) 1,037 7422 1,255 n.a. n.a. n.a. Beverages (in thousands of

hectoliters) 21.9 22.8 19.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Clothing (in thousands of 260 363 440 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Hydroelectricity (in millions of kilowatt-hours) 930 1,030 1,000 1,050 1,095 n.a.

Mining and quarrying .... Tin (in tons) , 400 362 520 450 n.a. n.a. Gypsum (in thousands of 30 70 100 70 n.a. n.a. tons)

Salt (in tons) n.a. 6.5 9.1 12.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 750 1,000 1,550 n.a. n.a.

n.a.—not available.

2 Excludes fish. Source: Based on information from Edu H. Hassing, "Potential for Private Sector Investments in the Industrial and Mining Sector," in Asian Development Bank

and The Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on

Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand, Bangkok, 1991.

305
Laos: A Country Study

Table 7. Value ofMajorManufactures, Selected Years, 1980-90

(in millions of kip) 1

1980 1986 1988 1990

Wood products (except furniture) 3,246 6,253 8,830 14,692 Tobacco products 2,746 3,224 1,082 5,417 Metal products 2,701 3,965 1,298 4,200 Food and beverages 1,229 2,193 2,117 3,626 Clothing 833 461 1,662 2,468

For value of the kip—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Edu H. Hassing,. "Potential for Private Sector Investments in the Industrial and Mining Sector," in Asian Development Bank

and The Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on

Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3—4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand, Bangkok, 1991.

Table 8. Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90

(in millions of kip) 1

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990

Revenues

Taxes .'. 98 775 1,669 1,755 21,474 44,270 Nontax revenues ... . 650 1,980 3,278 16,748 7,057 13,975

Total revenues .... 748 2,755 4,947 18,503 28,531 58,245 Expenditures Current 1,028 2,259 4,126 14,803 28,038 65,877

Capital 749 3,216 4,258 11,732 47,006 66,080

Total expenditures . 1,777 5,475 8,384 26,535 75,044 131,957 BALANCE -1,029 -2,720 -3,437 -8,032 -46,513 -73,712

For value of the kip—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 1991-92, London, 1991, 54; and United

Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1991, Bangkok, 1991, 214.

306
Appendix

Table 9. Balance ofPayments, Selected Years, 1985-91

(in millions of United States dollars)

1985 1987 1989 1991

74.9 90.5 93.4 109.2 -219.3 -233.8 -233.9 -249.5 Trade balance -144.4 -143.3 -140.5 -140.3

Official transfers and grants (net) 50.6 29.1 25.0 88.5 Current account balance -93.8 -114.2 -115.5 -51.8

47.7 56.4 42.8 24.1 Other 50.2 55.0 83.2 17.5 Capital account balance 97.9 111.4 126.0 41.6

19.3 -5.3 1.6 -6.7 Balance of payments 23.4 -8.1 12.1 -16.9 Foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) . 25.3 20.6 16.1 n.a.

1

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Tables, 1992, Baltimore, 1992,

371; and International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1992, Pt 1, 43, Washington, 1992, 405.

Table 10. MajorExports, 1985, 1987, and 1989

(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity 1985 1987 1989

Hydroelectricity 26 12 15 Timber and wood products 11 33 21 Coffee 9 9 9 Tin concentrates 1 2 2 Gypsum 1 2 n.a.

] Other2 6 6 n.a. TOTAL 54 64 47

n.a.—not available.

2 Includes gemstones, gold, and clothing. Source: Based on information from The Asia and Pacific Review, 1991-1992: The Economic and Business Report, Saffron, Walden, United Kingdom, 1991, 106; Economist

Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia [London]

,

No. 1, 1992, 5; and Edu H. Hassing, "Potential for Private Sector Investments

in the Industrial and Mining Sector," in Asian Development Bank and The

Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on Invest- ment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand, Bangkok, 1991.

307
Laos: A Country Study

Table 11. Balance of Trade in Convertible and Nonconvertible

Currencies, SelectedYears, 1982-91

(in millions of United States dollars)

1982 1985 1988 1991

Merchandise exports Convertible currencies n.a.

1 34.6 36.8 75.5 Nonconvertible currencies n.a. 19.0 21.0 2.4 Total merchandise exports 40.0 53.6 57.8 77.9 Merchandise imports

Convertible currencies n.a. 77.6 90.4 188.6 Nonconvertible currencies n.a. 115.6 97.6 4.2 Total merchandise imports 132.2 193.2 188.0 192.8 Balance of trade -92.2 -139.6 -130.2 -114.9 Percentage of imports financed by exports . . . 20.3 27.7 30.7 40.4

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Tables, 1992, Baltimore, 1992,

371; and International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1992, Pt. 1, 43, Washington, 1992, 405.

Table 12. Foreign Aid Statistics, SelectedYears, 1984-91

(in millions of United States dollars)

1984 1985 1988 1990 1991

Long-term loans Drawings on loans received Convertible currencies 10.1 12.1 23.7 49.2 34.5 Nonconvertible currencies 30.2 50.0 44.2 2.6 0.0 Total drawings on loans received 40.3 62.1 67.9 51.8 34.5 Remaining balance on loans received 10.9 -31.8 43.5 n.a.

1 n.a. Total long-term loans 51.2 30.3 111.4 n.a. n.a. Grants

Convertible currencies 26.7 45.4 21.0 22.6 63.9 Nonconvertible currencies 15.4 4.2 4.5 0.8 5.3 Total grants 41.2 49.6 25.5 23.4 69.2 TOTAL 92.4 79.9 136.9 n.a. n.a.

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Tables, 1992, Baltimore, 1992, 371 ; and International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1992, Pt. 1, 43, Washington, 1992, 406.

308
Appendix

Table 13. ExternalDebt, Selected Years, 1985-91

(in millions of United States dollars)

1985 1987 1989 1991

External debt

Convertible currency 135.0 190.0 252.0 n.a.

1 Comecon2 342.0 536.0 695.0 n.a. Total external debt3 476.0 726.0 947.0 n.a. Debt service Convertible currency 5.0 11.0 12.0 n.a. Other 4.0 2.0 1.0 n.a. Total debt service 9.0 13.0 13.0 n.a. Debt service as a percentage of exports 12.0 14.4 13.9 n.a.

n.a.—not available Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Dissolved January 1991

.

Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Paul Marer et al., Historically Planned Economies, Washington, 1992, 171.

Table 14. Armed Forces Personnel, Selected Years, 1974-93

Year Army Navy Air Force

1974 1 60,000 500 2,300 19762 40,000 500 2,000 1980 46,000 550 2,000 1982 46,000 1,700 1,000 1984 50,000 1,700 2,000 1986 50,000 1,000 2,000 1988 52,500 1,000 2,000 1990 52,500 6003 2,000

1991 50,000 6003 2,000 1992 33,000 5003 3,500 1993 33,000 5003 3,500

Royal Armed Forces; 35,000 Pathet Lao troops, including dissident Neutralists.

2 Royal Armed Forces disbanded; figures for Lao People's Army.

3 Estimated. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance (annuals 1974—1975 through

1993-1994), London, 1974-93.

309
Laos: A Country Study

Table 15. Major Equipment of the Armed Forces, 1994

Type and Description In Inventory

Ground forces Tanks Main battle tanks: T-54-55, T-34/85

Light tanks: PT-76 Armored personnel carriers: BTR-40/-60/-152

Artillery 75mm (towed): M-l 16 pack

105mm (towed): M-101 122mm (towed): M-1938 and D-30 130mm (towed): M-46 155mm (towed): M-l 14 Mortars 81mm

82mm

107mm: M-2A1 and M-1938

120mm: M-43

Recoilless guns 57mm:M-18/Al

75mm: M-20

106mm: M-40

107mm: B-ll

Air defense guns 14.5mm: ZPU-1/-4 23mm: ZU-23 and ZSU-23-4 SP 37mm: M-1939 57mm: S-60

Surface-to-air missiles: SA-3, SA-7

Naval forces

Patrol craft PCI LCM

Boats

Air forces

Fighters, ground attack MiG-21

Transports An-24

An-26

Yak-iO

Helicopters3 MiMi^8

3025

70

1224 40-50

310
Appendix

Table 15. Major Equipment of the Armed Forces, 1994

Type and Description In Inventory

Trainers MiG-21U 2*

Air-to-air missiles AA-2 Atoll —1

1 Numbers not reported.

2 Reported as "some."

3 No armed helicopters.

4 The Asian DefenceJournal reports four MiG-21Us. The International Institute for Strategic Studies counts

these training craft as combat capable. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 181-82; and Asian DefenceJournal [Kuala Lumpur] , January 1993, 108.

Table 16. Military Expenditures Compared with the Gross National

Product, Selected Years, 1974-93

(in millions of United States dollars)

Year Military Expenditures GNP

1974 27.0 n.a.

1 1977 42.0 256

1978 29.0 2602 1979 37.9 n.a. 1980 21.0 400

1982-88 .

r n.a.

3 n.a. 1989 18.92

n.a. 1992 102.24

n.a. 1993 104.94 n.a.

n.a.—not available.

2 Estimated.

3 Military assistance estimated at US$125 million in 1983.

4 Includes public security budget. Source: Based on information from T/ie Military Balance (annuals 1974-1975 through

1993-1994), London, 1974-93.

311

Bibliography

Chapter 1 Adams, NinaS., and Alfred W. McCoy (eds.). Laos: War and Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

Boyle, Andrew J. Senior Officers Oral History Program. Washington: U.S. Military History Institute, 1971.

Breazeale, Kennon, and Snit Smuckarn. A Culture in Search of

Survival: The Phuan of Thailand and Laos. (Southeast Asian

Studies, Monograph Series, No. 31.) New Haven: Yale University, 1988.

Briggs, Lawrence P. "The Appearance and Historical Usage of

the Terms Tai, Thai, Siamese and Lao," Journal of the Ameri- can Oriental Society, 69, No. 2, April-June 1949, 60-73.

Brown, MacAlister, andJosephJ. Zasloff. Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-1985. Stanford:

Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Bui Quang Tung. "Chao Anou, roi de Vientiane, a travers les documents vietnamiens," Bulletin de la Societe des Etudes

Indochinoises [Saigon], 33, No. 4, 1958, 401-06.

Caply, Michel. "Le Japon et l'independance du Laos (1945),"

Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale [Paris], 1971,

67-S1.

Castle, Timothy N. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military

Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1993.

Cordell, Helen (comp.). Laos. (World Bibliographical Series,

No. 133.) Oxford, United Kingdom: Clio Press, 1991.

Dengler, Dieter. Escape from Laos. Novato, California: Presidio

Press, 1979.

De Pelacot. "Le Tran Ninh historique," Revue Indochinoise

[Hanoi], Nouvelle Serie, Tome IV, 34, May 30, 1906.

Deuve, Jean. Le Laos 1945-1949: Contribution a I'histoire du mouvement Lao Issala. Montpellier: Universite Paul Valery, 1992.

Deuve, Jean. Le Royaume du Laos 1949-1965 (Histoire evenementielle de l'independance a la guerre americaine) . Paris: EFEO,

1984.

313
Laos: A Country Study

Dommen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization.

New York: Praeger, 1971.

Dommen, Arthur J., and George W. Dalley. "The OSS in Laos:

The 1945 Raven Mission and American Policy," Journal of

Southeast Asian Studies [Singapore], 22, No. 2, September

1991,327-46.

Dore, Amphay. "Aux sources de la civilisation Lao (Contribution ethno-historique a la connaissance de la culture

Louang-Phrabanaise)." Paris: Cercle de culture et de recherches laotiennes, 1987. Mimeographed.

Furuta, Motoo. "The Indochina Communist Party's Division

into Three Parties: Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward

Cambodia and Laos, 1948-1951." Pages 143-63 in Masaya

Shiraishi and Motoo Furuta (eds.), Indochina in the 1940s and

1950s. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell

University, 1992.

Goscha, Christopher E. "Thailand and the Vietnamese Resistance Against the French." (Master's thesis.) Canberra: Australian National University, 1991.

Gunn, Geoffrey C. Political Struggles in Laos (1930-1954): Viet- namese Communist Power and the Lao Struggle for National Independence. Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1988.

Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1993.

Heintges, John A. Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army Military History Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Senior Officers

Oral History Program, 1974.

Hirshfield, Claire. "The Struggle for the Mekong Banks, 1892-

1896," Journal of Southeast Asian History [Singapore], 9, No. 3,

March 1968, 25-52.

Jumsai, M.L. Manich. History of Laos. Bangkok: Chalermnit,

1971.

Kaysone Phomvihane. Revolution in Laos: Practice and Prospects.

Moscow: Progress, 1981.

Le Boulanger, Paul. Histoire du Laosfrancais. Paris: Plon, 1931.

Levy, Paul. Histoire du Laos. (Que Sais-Je? No. 1549.) Paris:

Presses universitaires de France, 1974.

314
Bibliography

Lindell, Kristina, Hakan Lundstrom, Jan-Olof Svantesson, and

Damrong Tayanin. The Kammu Year: Its Lore and Music. London: Curzon Press, 1982.

Long, Lynellyn D. Ban Vinai, The Refugee Camp. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1993.

Neo Lao Haksat. A Quarter Century of Grim and Victorious Struggle. Sam Neua: Laos: 1970.

Ngaosyvathn, Mayoury, and Pheuiphanh. "Lao Historiography

and Historians: Case Study of the War Between Bangkok and

the Lao in 1827," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies [Singapore], 20, No. 1, March 1989, 55-69.

O'Neill, Thomas. "The Mekong: A Haunted River's Season of

Peace," National Geographic, 183, No. 2, February 1993, 2-35.

Osborne, Milton E. River Road to China: The Mekong RiverExpedition, 1866-73. New York: Liveright, 1975.

Quincy, Keith. Hmong: History of a People. Cheney, Washington:

Eastern Washington University Press, 1988.

Randle, Robert . F. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese

War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.

Sage, William W., and Judith A.N. Henchy (comps.). Laos: A

Bibliography. (Library Bulletin No. 16.) Singapore: Institute

of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986.

Scott, Joanna C. Indochina's Refugees: Oral Histories from Laos,

Cambodia, and Vietnam. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 1989.

Shiraishi, Masaya, and Motoo Furuta. "Two Features ofJapan's

Indochina Policy During the Pacific War." Pages 55-85 in

Masaya Shiraishi and Motoo Furuta (eds.), Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program,

Cornell University, 1992.

Sila Viravong, Maha. Phongsavadan Lao (History of Laos). New

York: Paragon Books, 1964.

Sirikrai, Surachai. "Thai-American Relations in the Laotian Crisis of 1960-1962." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Binghamton: State

University of New York, 1979.

Stieglitz, Perry. In a Little Kingdom. Armonk, New York: M.E.

Sharpe, 1990.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. Laos: Politics, Economics, and Society. Boulder,

Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1986.

315
Laos: A Country Study

Stuart-Fox, Martin, and Mary Kooyman. Historical Dictionary of

Laos. Metuchen, NewJersey: Scarecrow Press, 1992.

Tarling, Nicholas (ed.). The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia,

1: From Early Times to c. 1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Toye, Hugh. Laos: Buffer State or Battleground. London: Oxford

University Press, 1968.

United States. Congress. 103d, 1st Session. Senate. Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. POW/MIAs: Report of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Washington: GPO, January

13,1993.

United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1952-54, 13: Indochina, Pt. 1. Washington: 1982.

United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1955-1957, 21: East Asian Security; Cambodia,

Laos. Washington: 1990.

United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1958-1960, 16: East Asia-Pacific Regions; Cambodia, Laos. Washington: 1992.

Wyatt, David K. "Siam and Laos 1767 —1827," Journal of Southeast

Asian History [Singapore], 4, No. 2, 1963, 13-21.

Chapter 2

Archaimbault, Charles The New Year Ceremony at Bassac. (Southeast Asian Studies, Data Paper No. 78.) Ithaca, New York:

Cornell University, 1971.

Archaimbault, Charles. "Religious Structures in Laos," Journal

of the Siam Society [Bangkok], 51, No. 1, April 1964, 57-74.

Barber, Martin John Philip. "Migrants and Modernisation: A

Study of Change in Lao Society." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Hull,

United Kingdom: University of Hull, 1979.

Barney, George L. "The Meo of Xieng Khouang Province,

Laos." Pages 271-94 in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy

(eds.), Laos: War and Revolution. New York: Harper Colophon, 1978.

Bernatzik, Hugo Adolf. Akha and Miao: Problems of Applied Ethnography in Farther India. (Trans., Alois Nagler.) New Haven:

Human Relations Area Files, 1970.

Chanda, Nayan. "Economic Changes in Laos, 1975-80." Pages

116-28 in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.), Contemporary Laos: Studies

316
Bibliography

in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

Clement-Charpentier, Sophie, and Pierre Clement. L'habitation

Lao: Dans les regions de Vientiane et de Louang Prabang, 1 . Paris:

Peeters Press, December 1990.

Condominas, Georges. "Essai sur la societe rurale Lao de la region de Vientiane." Vientiane: Commissariat des affaires

rurales, 1962. Mimeographed.

Condominas, Georges. "The Lao." Pages 9-28 in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy (eds.), Laos: War and Revolution.

New York: Harper Colophon, 1978.

Condominas, Georges. "Phiban Cults in Rural Laos." Pages

252-77 in G. William Skinner and A. Thomas Kirsch (eds.),

Change and Persistence in Thai Society. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1975.

Conquergood, Dwight, Paja Thao, and Xa Thai. I Am a Shaman:

A Hmong Life Story with Ethnographic Commentary." (Southeast

Asian Refugee Studies, Occasional Papers No. 8.) Minneapolis: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, University of Minnesota, 1989.

Cooper, Robert G. Resource Scarcity and the Hmong Response: Patterns of Settlement and Economy in Transition. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1984.

Cooper, Robert G. "Sexual Inequality among the Hmong."

Pages 174-86 in John McKinnon and Wanat Bhruksasri

(eds.), Highlanders of Thailand. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Damrong Tayanin. Being Kammu: My Village, My Life. Ithaca,

New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992.

Damrong Tayanin. "Environment and Nature Change in

Northern Laos." Pages 131-47 in Ole Broun and Anne Kalland (eds.), Asian Perceptions of Nature. (Nordic Proceedings

in Asian Studies, No. 3.) Copenhagen: Nordic Institute for

Asian Studies, 1992.

Damrong Tayanin and Kristina Lindell. Hunting and Fishing in a Kammu Village. London: Curzon Press, 1991.

Evans, Grant. Agrarian Change in Communist Laos. (Occasional

Paper No. 85.) Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988.

317
Laos: A Country Study

Evans, Grant. Lao Peasants under Socialism. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1990.

Evans, Grant. "Reform or Revolution in Heaven? Funerals

among Upland Tai," Australian Journal of Anthropology [Sydney]^, No. 1, 1991,81-97.

Evans, Grant. "'Rich Peasants' and Cooperatives in Socialist

Laos," Journal of Anthropological Research, 44, No. 3, Fall 1988,

229-50.

Geddes, William Robert. Migrants of the Mountains: The Cultural

Ecology of the Blue Mieo (Hmong Njua) of Thailand. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1976.

Godley, G. McMurrie, and Jinny St. Goar. "The Chinese Road

in Northwest Laos, 1961-73." Pages 285-314 in Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard Unger (eds.), Laos: Beyond the Revolution New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Gunn, Geoffrey C. Political Struggles in Laos (1930-1954): Viet- namese Communist Power and the Lao Struggle for National Independence. Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1988.

Gunn, Geoffrey C. Rebellion in Laos: Peasant and Politics in a Colonial Backwater. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.

Hakangard, Agneta. Road 13: A Socio-Economic Study of Villagers,

Transport and Use ofRoad 13 S, Lao PD.R Stockholm: Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, 1992.

Halpern, Joel Martin. Economy and Society of Laos. (Southeast

Asia Studies Monograph No. 4.) New Haven: Yale University,

1964.

International Fund for Agricultural Development. Bokeo Food

Security Project: Beneficiary Needs Assessment. Rome: 1993.

International Fund for Agricultural Development. "Hmong

Farming Systems and Social Organization in Nong Het District, Xieng Khouang." North Caulfield, Australia: International Development Support Services, 1991. Mimeographed.

International Fund for Agricultural Development. "Xieng

Khouang Agricultural Development Project: Project Preparation Report." Rome: 1990. Mimeographed.

Ireson, Carol. "Nutrition Survey of Six Lao Villages." Vientiane:

International Voluntary Service, 1969. Mimeographed.

Ireson, Carol. "Women's Forest Work in Laos," Society and Natural Resources, 4, No. 1, 1989, 23-36.

318
Bibliography

Ireson, Carol J., and W. Randall Ireson. "Ethnicity and Development in Laos," Asian Survey, 31, No. 10, October 1991, 920-

37.

Ireson, W. Randall. "Hmong Demographic Changes in Laos:

Causes and Ecological Consequences." (Paper presented at annual conference of Northwest Regional Consortium for

Southeast Asian Studies, Eugene, Oregon, November 8-10,

1991.)

Ireson, W. Randall. "Laos: Building a Nation under Socialism,"

Indochina Issues, No. 79, February 1988.

Ireson, W. Randall. "Patterns of Agricultural Cooperation in

Pre-revolutionary Laos." (Paper presented at annual meeting of Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies, Vancouver, British Columbia, October 1989.)

Ireson, W. Randall. "Peasant Farmers and Community Norms:

Agricultural Labor Exchange in Laos," Peasant Studies, 10,

No. 2, 1992, 67-92.

Ireson, W. Randall, and Carol J. Ireson. "Laos: Marxism in a Subsistence Rural Economy," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 21, Nos. 2-4, April-December 1989, 59-75.

Izikowitz, Karl Gustav. Lamet: Hill Peasants in French Indochina.

(Ethrografiska Studier No. 17) Goteborg, Sweden:

Etnografiska Museet, 1951.

Johns, Brenda, and David Strecker (eds.). The Hmong World.

(Council on Southeast Asia Studies.) New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1986.

Kacha-ananda, Chob. "Le systeme de la famille Yao," Journal of

the Siam Society [Bangkok], 60, No. 1, January 1972, 187-94.

Keen, F.G.B. "Ecological Relationships in a Hmong (Meo)

Economy." Pages 210-21 in Peter Kundtedter, E.C. Chapman, and Sanga Sabhasri (eds.), Farmers in the Forest: Economic Development and Marginal Agriculture in Northern

Thailand. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978.

Keyes, Charles F. "Millenialism, Theravada Buddhism and Thai

Society," Journal of Asian Studies, 36, No. 2, February 1977,

283-302.

Lafont, Pierre-Bernard. "Buddhism in Contemporary Laos."

Pages 148-62 in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.), Contemporary Laos:

Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic

Republic. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

319
Laos: A Country Study

Laos. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. "Development Strat- egies on Shifting Cultivation Stabilization and Environment

Protection." (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Symposium on Forestry and Environment.) Vientiane: October 18-

23, 1989. Mimeographed.

Laos. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. "Lao People's Democratic Republic Tropical Forestry Action Plan (First Phase)

Main Report." Vientiane: 1990. Mimeographed.

Laos. National Committee of Plan. Population Census of 1985.

Vientiane: 1986.

Laos. State Statistical Centre. Committee for Planning and Cooperation. Basic Statistics about the Socio-economic Development

in the Lao RD.R Vientiane: Ministry of Economy, Planning,

and Finance, 1992.

Laos. State Statistical Centre. Committee for Planning and Cooperation. Basic Statistics about the Socio-economic Development

in the Lao RD.R Vientiane: Ministry of Economy, Planning,

and Finance, 1993.

Laos. Statistical Centre. Lao People's Democratic Republic Multiround Vital Statistics Survey: Population, Size, Distribution and

Growth. Vientiane: 1991.

Laos. State Statistical Centre. Lao People's Democratic Republic

Multiround Vital Statistics Survey: Preliminary ResultsJuly 1987-

December 1988. Vientiane: 1988.

LeBar, Frank M., Gerald C. Hickey, and John K. Musgrave. Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Human

Relations Area Files, 1964.

Lee, Gary Yia. "Minority Policies and the Hmong." Pages 199-

219 in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.), Contemporary Laos: Studies in

the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

Lemoine, Jacques. Un village Hmong vert du Haut Laos. Paris:

Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1972.

Lewis, Paul, and Elaine Lewis. Peoples of the Golden Triangle. London: Thames and Hudson, 1984.

Lindell, Kristina, Rolf Samuelsson, and Damrong Tayanin.

"Kinship and Marriage in Northern Kammu Villages: The

Kinship Model," Sociologies [Berlin], 29, No. 1, 1979, 60-54.

320
Bibliography

Lindell, Kristina, et al. The Kammu Year: Its Lore and Music.

(Studies on Asian Topics, No. 4.) London: Curzon Press,

1982.

Morechand, Guy. "Le Chamanisme des Hmong," Bulletin de

I'Ecole Francaise d''Extreme Orient [Paris], 54, 1968, 53-294.

Morechand, Guy. "Principaux traits du chamanisme Meo Blanc en Indo-chine," Bulletin de I'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient

[Paris], 47, 1955.

Murdoch, John B. "The 1901-1902 'Holy Man's' Rebellion,"

Journal of the Siam Society [Bangkok], 62, No. 1, January 1974,

47-66.

O'Neill, Thomas. "The Mekong: A Haunted River's Season of

Peace," National Geographic, 138, No. 2, February 1993, 2-35.

Ovesen, Jan. "Anthropological Reconnaissance in Central

Laos: A Survey of Local Communities in a Hydropower

Project Area," Uppsala Research Reports in Cultural Anthropology

[Uppsala] , No. 13, 1993.

Phouy Vongkhamchanh, and Jan van der Heide. "Discussion

Paper on Land Use in Forestry." Vientiane: Tropical Forestry

Action Plan, 1989. Mimeographed.

Savina, F.M. Histoire des Miao. Hong Kong: Societe des missions

etrangeres de Paris, 1930.

Shifting Cultivation Project. Agriculture Programme 1990-1991

Technical Report. (Annex 2.) Vientiane: World Conservation

Union, 1992.

Southeast Asian Universities Agroecosystem Network. Swidden

Agroecosystems in Sepone District Savannakhet Province, Lao PDFL

Khon Kaen: SUAN Regional Secretariat, 1991.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "The First Ten Years of Communist Rule in

Laos," Asia Pacific Community [Tokyo], No. 31, Winter 1986,

55-81.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "The Initial Failure of Agriculture Collectivization in Laos," Asia Quarterly [Brussels], 4, 1980, 273-99.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. Laos: Politics, Economics, and Society. London:

Frances Pinter, 1986.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Marxism and Theravada Buddhism: The

Legitimization of Political Authority in Laos," Pacific Affairs

[Vancouver], 56, No. 3, Fall 1983, 428-54.

321
Laos: A Country Study

Stuart-Fox, Martin (ed.). Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

Stuart-Fox, Martin, and Rod Bucknell. "Politicization of the

Buddhist Sangha in Laos," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

[Singapore], 13, No. 1, March 1982, 60-80.

Taillard, Christian. "Les berges de la Nam Ngum et du

Mekong: Systemes economiques villageois et organisation de

l'espace dans la plaine de Vientiane (Laos)," Etudes Rurales

[Montrouge Cedex], 53-56, January-December 1974, 119—

68. Taillard, Christian. "De la campagne a la ville: Le paysage bati

de la region de Vientiane," Asie du Sud-est et Monde Insulindien

[Paris], 11, Nos. 1-4, 1980, 239-64.

Taillard, Christian. "Le dualisme urbain-rural au Laos et la recuperation de l'ideologie traditionnelle," Asie du Sud-est et Monde Insulindien [Paris], 10, Nos. 2-4, 1979, 91-108.

Taillard, Christian. "Essai sur la bi-polarisation autour du vat et de l'ecole des villages Lao de la plaine de Vientiane: Le

bouddhisme populaire confronte au developpement

economique," Asie du Sud-est et Monde Insulindien [Paris], 5,

No. 3, 1974, 91-104.

Taillard, Christian. Le Laos: Strategies d'un etat-tampon. Montpellier: Reclus, 1989.

Taillard, Christian. "Le village Lao de la region de Vientiane:

Un pouvoir local face au pouvoir etatique," L

1Homme: Revue

francaise d 'anthropologic [Paris], 17, Nos. 2-3, April-September 1977, 71-100.

Tapp, Nicholas. Sovereignty and Rebellion: The White Hmong of

Northern Thailand. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Thao, T. Christopher. "Hmong Customs on Marriage: Divorce

and the Rights of Married Women." Pages 74-98 in Brenda

Johns and David Strecker (eds.), The Hmong World. (Council

of Southeast Asia Studies.) New Haven: Yale Center for

International and Area Studies, 1986.

Trankell, Ing-Britt. "On the Road in Laos: An Anthropological

Study of Road Construction and Rural Communities," Uppsala Research Reports in Cultural Anthropology [Uppsala], No.

12, 1993.

322
Bibliography

United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Statistical Division. Statistical Yearbook, 1990-91. New York: 1993.

United Nations Children's Fund. An Analysis of the Situation of

Children and Women in the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Vientiane: 1992.

United Nations Children's Fund Children and Women in the Lao

People's Democratic Republic. Vientiane: 1992.

United Nations Development Programme. Development Cooperation: Lao People's Democratic Republic, 1991 Report. Vientiane:

1992.

United Nations Development Programme. The Implications of

HIV/AIDS on Social and Economic Development in the Lao People's

Democratic Republic. (Conference Report.) Vientiane: 1992.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Statistics Concerning Indo-Chinese in East and South-East Asia for the Month of

December 1992. Geneva: January 1993.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees. "Voluntary

Repatriation to Laos as of 31 December 1992." Vientiane:

1993.

Westermeyer, Joseph. Poppies, Pipes, and People: Opium and Its Use in Laos. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

Wyatt, David K. Thailand: A Short History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Zago, Marcel. Rites et ceremonies en milieu bouddhiste Lao. Rome:

Universita Gregoriana Editrice, 1972.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and Leonard Unger (eds.). Laos: Beyond the Revolution. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Chapter 3

Almazan, Alec. "Laos: Government Ready to Privatise 670 State

Enterprises," Business Times [Singapore], January 31, 1992.

The Asia and Pacific Review 1991-1992: The Economic and Business

Report. Saffron Walden, United Kingdom: World of Information, 1991.

Asia Yearbook, 1992. Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review,

1992.

Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Outlook, 1991.

Manila: 1991.

323
Laos: A Country Study

Asian Development Bank and The Thai-Canada Economic

Co-operation Foundation. Thai-Lao Forum on Investment and

Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok,

Thailand. Bangkok: 1991.

Asian Economic Handbook. London: Euromonitor, 1987.

Ballantyne, Tom. "Indo China: Barriers Still Exist to Prevent

Laos and Cambodia from Becoming a Major Air Transport

Market," Airline Business [London], June 1, 1992, 42.

Baluyut, Elvira A. A Regional Survey of the Aquaculture Sector in

East Asia, including Brunei Darussalam, China, Hong Kong,

Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of

Korea, Laos, Macau, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan Province of

China and Viet Nam. (Aquaculture Development and Coordination Programme, ADCP/REP/88/31.) Rome: United

Nations Development Programme, Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations, 1989.

Bogdan, Michael. "Legal Aspects of the Re-Introduction of a Market Economy in Laos," Review of Socialist Law [Leiden],

17, No. 2, 1991, 101-23.

Boonsong Kositchotethana. "Laos Welcomes Private Power

Utility Investment," Bangkok Post [Bangkok], November 5,

1992, 22.

Bourdet, Yves. Laos: Reforming Laos' Economic System. Stockholm:

Swedish International Development Authority, 1991.

Brahm, Laurence J., and Neill T. Macpherson. Investment in the Lao People's Democratic Republic: A Specially Commissioned

Report, White Plains, New York: The Longman Group, 1991.

Clark, Allen L., James P. Dorian, and Wayne A. Hudders. "Mineral Development Prospects of the Indochina Area: Potential Exceeds Problems," Natural Resources Forum: A United

NationsJournal, 15, No. 1, February 1991, 26-39.

Cummings, Joe. Laos: A Travel Survival Kit. Berkeley: Lonely

Planet, 1994.

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Indochina: Vietnam,

Laos, Cambodia, 1991-92. London: 1991.

Environment, Natural Resources, and the Future of Development of

Laos and Vietnam: Papers from a Seminar. (Ed., Nguyen Manh

Hung.) (Indochina Institute Papers Series.) Fairfax, Virginia: The Indochina Institute, George Mason University,

1991.

324
Bibliography

Europa. The Far East and Australasia, 1992. London: 1992.

Evans, Grant, and Kelvin Rowley. Red Brotherhood at War: Viet- nam, Cambodia and Laos since 1975. London: Verso, 1990.

Fernando, P.N. "Power Subsector Developments in the Lao

PDR and Implication to the Private Sector." In Asian Development Bank and The Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation

Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand.

Bangkok: 1991.

"Foreign Aid, Loans in Past 15 Years Cited," Vientiane KPL,

September 4, 1990. Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-90-178.) September 13,

1990, 64.

Fujisaka, Sam. A Diagnostic Survey of Shifting Cultivation in Northern Laos: Targeting Research to Improve Sustainability and Productivity. (IRRI Social Science Division Papers, No. 90-42.)

Manila: Social Science Division, International Rice Research

Institute, 1990.

Germany. Statistisches Bundesamt. Ldnderbericht Laos, 1990.

Wiesbaden: Metzler/Poeschel for Statistisches Bundesamt,

October 1990.

Gunn, Geoffrey C. "Laos in 1989: Quiet Revolution in the Marketplace," Asian Survey, 30, No. 1, January 1990, 81^87.

Hassing, Edu H. "Potential for Private Sector Investments in

the Industrial and Mining Sector." In Asian Development

Bank and The Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on Investment and Trade Opportunities

in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand. Bangkok:

1991.

International Monetary Fund. Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1992, Pt. 1, 43. Washington: 1992.

Ireson, Carol J., and W. Randall Ireson. "Ethnicity and Development in Laos," Asian Survey, 31, No. 10, October 1991, 920-

37.

Laos. Ministry of Science and Technology. Lao People's Democratic Republic National Report to UNCED, 1992: United Nations

Conference on Environment and Development. Vientiane: 1991.

Laos. State Planning Committee. State Statistical Centre. 10

Years of Socio-Economic Development in the Lao People's Democratic

Republic. Vientiane: State Statistical Centre, 1985.

325
Laos: A Country Study

"Laos: New Policy Helps Stimulate Economy," Bangkok Post

[Bangkok], December 2, 1992, 19. Leung, Wayne. "Laos: Learning from China," China Trade

Report [Hong Kong], 28, July 1990, 6-7.

Marer, Paul, Janos Arvay, John O'Connor, Martin Schrenk, and

Daniel Swanson. Historically Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data. Washington: World Bank, 1992.

Mehta, Harish. "Laos Takes Steps to Boost Investor Confidence," Business Times [Singapore], December 16, 1992.

Min Tang. A Survey of the External Debt Situation in Asian and

Pacific Developing Countries 1989-1992. (Report No. 15.)

Manila: Economics and Development Resource Center,

Asian Development Bank, June 1991.

Morrison, Charles E., and Robert F. Dernberger (eds.).

Asia-Pacific Report, Focus: China in the Reform Era. Honolulu:

East-West Center, 1989.

Nielsen, Preben. "The Changing Face of the Transport System

in Lao PDR and Thailand: Implications for the Private Sector." In Asian Development Bank and The Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on

Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October

1991, Bangkok, Thailand. Bangkok: 1991.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Geographical Distribution ofFinancial Flows to Developing

Countries: Disbursements, Commitments, Economic Indicators,

1987-1990. Paris: 1992.

Phiane Philakone. "The Banking Sector in the Lao PDR." In

Asian Development Bank and The Thai-Canada Economic

Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on Investment and

Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok,

Thailand. Bangkok: 1991.

Radetzki, Marcus. "From Communism to Capitalism in Laos:

The Legal Dimension," Asian Survey, 34, No. 9, September

1994, 799^806.

Shinawatra, Thaksin. "Potential Lao PDR/Thailand Joint Telecommunication Development Projects: A Private Industry

Perspective." In Asian Development Bank and The

Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao

Forum on Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4

October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand. Bangkok: 1991.

326
Bibliography

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Laos 1991: On the Defensive." Pages

174-77 in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1992. Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, 1992.

"Thailand: Tourism Agreement Signed with Laos," Business

Times [Singapore], February 25, 1992.

United Nations. Conference on Trade and Development. The

Least Developed Countries, 1990 Report. New York: 1990.

United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and

the Pacific. Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific,

1990. New York: 1990.

United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and

the Pacific. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1991.

Bangkok: 1991.

United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and

the Pacific. Traders' Manualfor Asia and the Pacific: Lao People's

Democratic Republic. New York: 1991.

United Nations Development Programme. Report on Development Cooperation: Lao People 's Democratic Republic, 1987 Report.

Vientiane: 1988.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1990: A Reference Aid. Washington: 1990.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook,

1994. Washington: 1994.

United States. Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines.

Minerals Yearbook, 1987, 3: Area Reports: International. Washington: 1987.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International

Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report. Washington: April 1994.

Vannothone S. Thongsith. "Tourism = The Untapped Potential

in Lao PDR." In Asian Development Bank and The

Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao

Forum on Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4

October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand. Bangkok: 1991.

World Bank. Social Indicators ofDevelopment, 1991-92. Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

World Bank. Trends in Developing Economies, 1991. Washington:

1991.

World Bank. World Debt Tables, 1992-93: External Finance for

Developing Countries, 2, Country Tables. Washington: 1993.

327
Laos: A Country Study

World Bank. World Development Report, 1992: Development and the Environment, World Development Indicators. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1992.

World Bank. World Tables, 1992. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1992.

World Resources Institute. World Resources, 1990-91: A Guide to the Global Environment. New York: Oxford University Press,

1990.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and MacAlister Brown. "Laos 1990: Socialism

Postponed but Leadership Intact." Pages 147-50 in Southeast

Asian Affairs, 1991. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, 1991.

Zola, Anthony M. "Agribusiness Opportunities in Laos." In

Asian Development Bank and The Thai-Canada Economic

Cooperation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on Investment and

Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok,

Thailand. Bangkok: 1991.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in

the preparation of this chapter: Asian Survey, 1991-94; Economist Intelligence Unit; Country Report: Indochina: Vietnam, Laos,

Cambodia [London], 1991-94; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, 1993-94.)

Chapter 4

American Friends Service Committee. Annual Reports, 1990-93.

Philadelphia: 1990-94.

Amnesty International. Background Paper on the Democratic People 's Republic of Laos Describing Current Amnesty International

Concerns. (AI 26/04/85.) New York: April 1985.

Asia Yearbook, 1990. Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review,

1990.

"Birth Commemorated in Vientiane, Souphanouvong Speech,"

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia

and Pacific. January 18, 1977.

Brown, MacAlister. "Anatomy of a Border Dispute: Laos and

Thailand," Pacific Focus [Inchon], 11 No. 2, 1987, 5-30.

Brown, MacAlister. "Laos: Bottoming Out," Current History, 82,

No. 483, April 1983, 154-57, 180-82.

328
Bibliography

Brown, MacAlister. "Laos in 1975: People's Democratic

Revolution-Lao Style," Asian Survey, 16, No. 2, February

1976, 193-99.

Brown, MacAlister, andJosephJ. Zasloff. Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-85. Stanford:

Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. Communism in

Indochina: New Perspectives. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975.

Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. "Dependency in

Laos," Current History, 75, No. 442, December 1978, 202-07,

228.

Brown, MacAlister, andJoseph J. Zasloff. "Laos 1976: Faltering

First Steps Towards Socialism," Asian Survey, 17, No. 2, February 1977, 107-15.

Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. "Laos 1977: The Realities of Independence," Asian Survey, 18, No. 2, February

1978, 164-74.

Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. "Laos 1978: The Ebb

and Flow of Adversity," Asian Survey, 19, No. 2, February

1979, 95-103.

Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. "New Stages of Revolution in Laos," Current History, 71, No. 422, December 1976,

218-21, 228-29.

Butwell, Richard. "From Feudalism to Communism in Laos,"

Current History, 69, No. 411, December 1975, 223-26, 246.

Chanda, Nayan. "An Undisputed Leader with a Taste for

Secrecy," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], May 28,

1982, 24.

Chi Do Pham (ed.). Economic Reforms in the Laos PDR: Current

Trends and Perspectives. Vientiane: International Monetary

Fund, April 1992.

Cordell, Helen (comp.). Laos. (World Bibliographical Series,

No. 133.) Oxford, United Kingdom: Clio Press, 1991.

Dore, Amphay. "The Three Revolutions in Laos." Pages 101-15

in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.), Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. St

Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982.

Evans, Grant. Lao Peasants under Socialism. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1990.

329
Laos: A Country Study

Evans, Grant. "Planning Problems in Peripheral Socialism: The

Case of Laos." Pages 84-130 in Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard

Unger (eds.), Laos: Beyond the Revolution. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Evans, Grant, and Kelvin Rowley. "Laos: The Eclipse of 'Neutralist' Communism." Pages 59-80 in Red Brotherhood at War:

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos since 1975. London: Verso, 1990.

Everingham, John. "The Pathet Lao Make it Official," Far East- ern Economic Review [Hong Kong], September 5, 1975, 39-40.

Fletcher, Don, and Geoffrey C. Gunn. Revolution in Laos: The

'Fourth Generation' of People's War? Townsville, Australia:

James Cook University, 1981.

Gunn, Geoffrey C. "Resistance Coalitions in Laos," Asian Survey,

23, No 3., March 1983, 316-40.

Halpern, Joel Martin. Government, Politics, and Social Structure of

Laos: A Study in Tradition and Innovation. Christiansburg, Virginia: Dalley Book Service, 1990.

Hannah, Norman B. The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War. Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1987.

Hiebert, Murray. "Socialist Transformation in Laos," Current

History, 79, No. 461, December 1980, 175-79, 194-95.

Huxley, Andrew. "The Draft Constitution of the Laotian People's Democratic Republic," Review of Socialist Law [Leiden],

17, No. 1, 1991, 75-78.

Johnson, Stephen T. "The Lao People's Democratic Republic at Fifteen." (Paper presented at a conference at Columbia University, May 14, 1990.) New York, Columbia University, 1990.

Johnson, Stephen T. "Laos in 1992: Succession and Consolidation," Asian Survey, 33, No. 1, January 1993, 75-82.

Kamm, Henry. "The Greying of Vientiane," New York Times Magazine, May 20, 1979, 29, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86.

Kaysone Phomvihan. "Political Report Presented by Mr. Kay- sone Phomvihan at the National Congress of the People's

Representatives in Laos (December 1, 1975, condensed),"

Journal of'Contemporary Asia, 6, No. 1, 1976, 110-19.

"Kaysone Phomvihan," Pravda [Moscow], December 22, 1988.

"Kaysone Phomvihan Addresses 12 October Viengsay Rally,"

Radio Pathet Lao in Lao, October 1, 1975. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, October 15, 1975.

330
Bibliography

Langer, Paul F., and Joseph J. Zasloff. North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

McBeth, John. "Squeezing the Vietnamese: Dissident Lao Confirm that some Anti-Pathet Lao Forces Are Receiving Arms

and Training from the Chinese," Far Eastern Economic Review

[Hong Kong], December 19, 1980, 9. Meng, Ng Shui. "Laos in 1986: Into the Second Decade of

National Reconstruction," Southeast Asian Affairs [Singapore], 1987, 177-93.

Norindr, Chou. "Political Institutions of the Lao People's Democratic Republic." Pages 39-61 in Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.),

Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao

People's Democratic Republic. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982.

"Oudom Katthi-nga Reports Revision of Party Rules," Vientiane

Pasason in Lao, March 29, 1991. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-9 1-071-2.)

April 12, 1991.

Panaristis, Andrea. "Yellow Rain: A Vanishing Trail?" Indochina

Issues, No. 47, June 1984.

Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn. "Political Report to Fourth Party

Congress by Secretary General Kaysone Phomvihan." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Supplement, January 6, 1987, 37.

Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn. "Thai-Lao Relations: A Lao View,"

Asian Survey, 25, No. 12, December 1985, 1242-59.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Roundup in Vientiane: Silence Surrounds

Reports of a Purge Against Corrupt Government Officials,"

Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], June 30, 1982, 36.

Quinnjudge, Paul. "A Soft-Shoe Shuffle: Overlord of the Economy Steps Aside as Laos Brings in the Technocrats," Far East- ern Economic Review [Hong Kong], September 24, 1982, 32-

34.

Radetzki, Marcus. "From Communism to Capitalism in Laos:

The Legal Dimension," Asian Survey, 34, No. 9, September

1994, 799-806.

Robinson, Julian, Jeanne Guillemin, and Matthew Meselson.

"Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses," Foreign Policy, No. 68, Fall 1987, 100-17.

331
Laos: A Country Study

Sarasin Viraphol. "Reflections on Thai-Lao Relations," Asian

Survey, 25, No. 12, December 1985, 1260-76.

Southeast Asian Affairs, 1974. Singapore: Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, 1974.

Souvannaphouma, Mangkra. L'agonie du Laos/Prince Mangkra

Souvannaphouma. Paris: Plon, 1976.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "The Constitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic," Review of Socialist Law [Leiden], 17, No. 4,

1991, 299-317.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Lao Foreign Policy: The View from Vientiane," Journal of Contemporary Asia [London], 11, No. 3,

1981, 351-66.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Laos in 1988: In Pursuit of New Directions," Asian Survey, 29, No. 1, January 1989, 81-88.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. Laos: Politics, Economics, and Society. London:

Frances Pinter, 1986.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Politics and Patronage in Laos," Indochina

Issues, No. 70, October 1986.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Reflections on the Lao Revolution," Contemporary Southeast Asia [Singapore], 3, No. l,June 1981, 41-

57. Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Socialist Construction and National Security in Laos," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 13, No. 1, January-March 1981, 61-71.

Stuart-Fox, Martin (ed.). Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

Toye, Hugh. Laos: Buffer State or Battleground. London: Oxford

University Press, 1968.

United Nations Development Programme. Development Cooperation: Lao People's Democratic Republic, 1990 Report. Vientiane:

1991.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook,

1994. Washington: 1994.

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1992. (Report submitted to United States

Congress, 103d, 1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign

Relations, and House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washington: GPO, February 1993.

332
Bibliography

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1993. (Report submitted to United States

Congress, 103d, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washington: GPO, February 1994.

Wain, Barry. "Rulers of Laos Are Absorbing Hard Economic

Lessons," Bangkok Post [Bangkok], November 26, 1980.

Wurfel, David, and Bruce Barton. The Political Economy ofForeign

Policy in Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan, 1990.

"Yellow Rain in Laos: New Reports," Wall StreetJournal, June 13-

14, 1990.

Zasloff, Joseph J. "Lao People's Democratic Republic." In

Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.), Constitutions

of the Countries of the World. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, January

1992.

Zasloff, Joseph J. The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization.

Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1973.

Zasloff, Joseph J. "Political Constraints on Development in

Laos." Pages 3-39 in Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard Unger

(eds.), Laos: Beyond the Revolution. New York: St. Martin's

Press, 1991.

Zasloff, Joseph J. Politics in the New Laos, Pt. 1: Leadership and

Change. Pt. 2: The Party, Political 'Re-education' and Vietnamese

Influence. (American Universities Field Staff, Fieldstaff

Reports, Asia, Nos. 33-34.) Hanover, New Hampshire:

AUFS, 1981.

Zasloff, Joseph J. Postwar Indochina: Old Enemies and New Allies. Washington: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1988.

Zasloff, Joseph J. The Three-Village Dispute Between Laos and Thailand. (Universities Field Staff International, UFSI Reports,

No. 23.) Indianapolis: 1985.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and MacAlister Brown. Communist Indochina

and U.S. Foreign Policy: Postwar Realities. Boulder, Colorado:

Westview Press, 1978.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and MacAlister Brown. "Laos: Coping with

Confinement." Pages 211-28 in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1982.

Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and MacAlister Brown. "Laos 1990: Socialism

Postponed but Leadership Intact." Pages 147-50 in Southeast

333
Laos: A Country Study

Asian Affairs, 1991. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, 1991.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and MacAlister Brown. "Laos since the Communist Victory." Pages 87-121 in Joseph J. Zasloff and

MacAlister Brown (eds.), Communist Indochina and U.S. For- eign Policy: Postwar Realities. Boulder, Colorado: WestviewPress, 1978.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and Allan E. Goodman (eds.). Indochina in

Conflict: A Political Assessment. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1972.

Zasloff, Joseph J., and Leonard Unger (eds.). Laos: Beyond the Revolution. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in

the preparation of this chapter: Asian Survey, 1990-94; Current

History, 1990-94; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong],

1990-94; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report:

East Asia, 1990-94; Indochina Chronology, 1990-94; and Southeast

Asian Affairs [Singapore], 1990-94.)

Chapter 5

Adams, NinaS., and Alfred W. McCoy (eds.). Laos: War and Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report, 1993. New

York: 1993.

Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report, 1994. New

York: 1994.

Amnesty International. Laos. Freedom ofExpression Still Denied.

Multi-Party Advocates and Political Prisoners Sentenced after

Unfair Trials. London: Amnesty International Secretariat,

July 1993.

Anson, Robert Sam. "Again the Indochina Quagmire Beckons,"

New York Times, October 18, 1989, 1, 29.

Asia Yearbook, 1988. Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review,

1988.

Blaufarb, Douglas S. Organizing and Managing Unconventional

War in Laos. (R-919-ARPA.) Santa Monica, California: RAND,

January 1972.

Brown, MacAlister. "Easing the Burden of Socialist Struggle in

Laos," Current History, 86, April 1987, 152-55, 177.

334
Bibliography

Brown, MacAlister, andJosephJ. Zasloff. Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-1985. Stanford:

Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Castle, Timothy N. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military

Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1993.

"Communist Party Veterans Dropped by Laos Politburo," New

York Times, March 30, 1991, A9.

Conboy, Kenneth J. War in Laos, 1954-1975. Carrollton, Texas:

Squadron/Signal, 1994.

"Course on Drug Law Enforcement Held in Vientiane," Vientiane KPL, September 14, 1992. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-92-180.)

September 16, 1992, 24. Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. "Lao Communists Do an

About-Face," U.S. News & World Report, 107, July 3, 1989, 35-

36.

Cummings, Joe. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Berkeley: Lonely

Planet, 1991.

Defense andForeign Affairs Handbook. Washington: Perth, 1988.

Dommen, Arthur J. Laos: Keystone of Indochina. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.

"Envoy Calls for Thai Help to Suppress Ethnic Resistance,"

Nation [Bangkok], August 1, 1992, A3. Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia.

(FBIS-EAS-92-164.) August 3, 1992, 18. "Ethnic Lao's [sic] with U.S. Passports Arrested," Bangkok Post [Bangkok], October 21, 1992, 1. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-92-204.) October 21, 1992, 50-51.

"Fighting Between Government Troops, Rebels Noted,"

Bangkok Post [Bangkok], March 4, 1992, 5. Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia.

(FBIS-EAS-92-044.) March 5, 1992, 28.

Gunn, Geoffrey C. Rebellion in Laos: Peasant and Politics in a Colo- nial Backwater. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1990.

Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1993.

335
Laos: A Country Study

Hiebert, Murray. "Laotian Reforms Help Spur Economic,

Social Revival," Washington Post, January 2, 1988, 1. Hiebert, Murray. "The Road to Reform," Far Eastern Economic

Review [Hong Kong], 34, February 16, 1989, 18-20.

Ireson, W. Randall. "Laos: Building a Nation under Socialism,"

Indochina Issues, No. 79, February 1988.

Kamm, Henry. "Laos Is Courting New Benefactors," New York

Times, January 11, 1990, A6.

Kamm, Henry. "U.S. and Laos Are Getting Friendlier," New York

Times, January 31, 1990, A3.

Karniol, Robert. "Laotian Resistance Emerges from Mist," Inter- national Defense Review [Geneva], 23, No. 3, March 1990, 269-

72.

"Lao People's Democratic Republic: Biographic Information

on Officials." Joint Publications Research Service, Southeast

Asia Report (JPRS-SEA-89-020.) May 17, 1989, 1-121.

Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lao National Commission

for Drug Control and Supervision. Drug Control in 1991.

Vientiane: February 1992.

"Laotian Leader Gains with New Constitution," New York Times,

August 16, 1991, 37. Liebchen, Peter A.W. "MAP Aid to Laos 1959-1972," PACAF:

Project CHECO Report Reprint. Christiansburg, Virginia: Dalley, 1973.

Loetcharoenchok, Yindi. "Crackdown on Lao Rebels to Foster

Vientiane Ties," Nation [Bangkok], July 31, 1992, A6. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia.

(FBIS-EAS-92-148.) July 31, 1992, 37-38.

Meng, Ng Shui. "Laos in 1986: Into the Second Decade of

National Reconstruction," Southeast Asian Affairs [Singapore], 1987, 177-93.

The Military Balance (annuals 1974-1975 through 1994-1995).

London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974-

94.

"Military Courts Set Up in Six Northern Provinces," Vientiane

Vitthayou Hengsat Radio Network, November 15, 1992. For- eign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia.

(FBIS-EAS-92-221.) November 16, 1992, 36. "Police Concerned about Heroin Traffic from Laos," Bangkok

Post, October 8, 1989, 1.

336
Bibliography

Pratt, John C. "The Royal Laotian Air Force 1954-1970,"

PACAF: Project CHECO Report. Reprint. Christiansburg, Virginia: Dalley, 1970.

Ratnam, Perala. Laos and the Superpowers. New Delhi: Tulsi,

1980.

Sananikone, Oudone. The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice

and Support. (Indochina Monographs.) Washington: U.S.

Army Center of Military History, 1981.

Sesser, S. "Forgotten Country," The New Yorker, 66, August 20,

1990, 39-42.

Stuart-Fox, Martin. "Politics and Patronage in Laos," Indochina

Issues, No. 70, October 1986.

Stuart-Fox, Martin (ed.). Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

"Two More Refugee Camps to Close in 1994," Bangkok Radio

Thailand Network, March 20, 1993. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-93-054.)

March 23, 1993, 62.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook,

1992. Washington: 1992.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook,

1993. Washington: 1993.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook,

1994. Washington: 1994.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International

Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report. Washington: March 1992.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International

Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report. Washington: April 1993.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International

Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report. Washington: April 1994.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs.

Background Notes: Laos. (Department of State Publication No.

8874.) Washington: GPO, March 1991.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs.

"U.S.-Lao POW/MIA Technical Meeting Concludes," Department of State Bulletin, January 1988, 9.

337
Laos: A Country Study

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1992. (Report submitted to United States

Congress, 103d, 1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign

Relations, and House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washington: GPO, 1993.

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1993. (Report submitted to United States

Congress, 103d, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washington: GPO, 1994.

United States. Embassy in Vientiane. Briefing Paper on Lao Narcotics Issues. Washington: February 1993.

United States. Embassy in Vientiane. Laos: 1993 World Refugee

Report, 3. Washington: February 1993.

United States. Embassy in Vientiane. Soldiers Guide: Laos. Washington: February 5, 1993.

Vongsavanh, Soutchay. RLG Military Operations and Activities in

the Laotian Panhandle. (Indochina Monographs.) Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981.

White, Peter T. "Laos," National Geographic, 171, No. 6, June

1987, 772-95.

Willwerth, J. "Excavating the Recent Past: Search for MIAs,"

Time, March 4, 1985, 32.

Wing, Roswell B., et al. Case Study of U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Laos, 1955-1962. McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis, 1964.

Zasloff, Joseph J. The Three-Village Dispute Between Laos and Thailand. (Universities Field Staff International, UFSI Reports,

No. 23.) Indianapolis: 1985.

Zasloff, Joseph J. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: Implications for

U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia. (Universities Field Staff International, UFSI Reports, No. 1.) Indianapolis: 1987.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in

the preparation of this chapter: Asian Defence Journal [Kuala

Lumpur], 1990-94; Asian Survey, 1978-94; Economist Intelli- gence Unit, Country Report: Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia

[London], 1990-94; Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Daily Report: East Asia, 1990-94; Indochina Chronology, 1982-94;

Indochina Digest, 1991 -93.

)

338
Glossary

Asian Development Bank—-Established in 1967, the bank assists in economic development and promotes growth and cooperation in developing member countries. The bank is owned by its forty-seven member governments, which

include both developed and developing countries in Asia

and developed countries in the West.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Founded in

1967 primarily for economic cooperation and consisting

of Brunei (since 1984), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Laos has had observer sta- tus since 1992 and applied for membership in July 1994.

ban—Village; grouped administratively into tasseng (q.v.) and

muang {q.v.).

dharma—Buddhist teaching or moral law; laws of nature, all that exists, real or imaginary.

fiscal year (FY)-—October 1 to September 30.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of

domestic goods and services produced by an economy

over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of

goods for final consumption and intermediate production

are assumed to be included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when

these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated,

the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates

that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have

not been made. Income arising from investments and possessions owned abroad is not included, only domestic production. Hence, the use of the word domestic to distinguish

GDP from gross national product (q.v.).

gross national product (GNP) —The gross domestic product

(GDP

q.v.) plus net income or loss stemming from trans- actions with foreign countries, including income received

from abroad by residents and subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP is the broadest measure- ment of the output of goods and services by an economy.

It can be calculated at market prices, which include indi- rect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at

339
Laos: A Country Study

factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

Hmong—Largest Lao Sung (q.v.) ethnic group of northern

Laos. This tribal group dwells at higher elevations than

other ethnic groups. During the period of the Royal Lao

Government (RLG

q.v.), the Hmong were referred to as Meo.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) —Established on July 22,

1944, the IMF began operating along with the World Bank

(q.v.) on December 27, 1945. The IMF is a specialized

agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes

responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The IMF's main business is the provision of

loans to its members when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that

require substantial internal economic adjustments by the

recipients. In 1994 the IMF had 179 members.

karma—Buddhist concept of the sum of one's past actions,

which affect one's current life and future reincarnations.

khoueng—Province; first-order administrative division.

kip(K)—Lao currency. In June 1994, US$1=K721.

Lao Issara (Free Laos) —Movement formed in 1945 to resist

any attempt to return to French colonial status. Lao Loum—Literally translated as the valley Laotian. Inclusive

term for people of Tai stock living in Laos, including lowland Lao and upland Tai. Group of lowland peoples comprising the majority population of Laos; generally used to refer to ethnic Lao, the country's dominant ethnic group

(approximately 66 percent of the population according to the 1985 census), and speaking Tai-Kadai languages,

including Lao, Lue, Tai Dam (Black Tai), and Tai Deng

(Red Tai).

Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) (Neo Lao Hak Xat) —Successor to Neo Lao Issara (q.v.), the political arm of the Pathet Lao

(q.v.) during the Indochina Wars (1946-75). The Lao People's Liberation Army (q.v.) is its military arm. Lao People's Army—Formed in 1976 when the Lao People's

Liberation Army (LPLA

q.v.) was restructured after the

establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in

December 1975.

Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA)—Official title of Pathet

Lao armed forces, more commonly known as the communist revolutionaries, or guerrilla forces. The LPLA originated with the Latsavong detachment, formed in January

340
Glossary

1949 by Kaysone Phomvihan, and steadily increased in

number to an estimated 8,000 guerrillas in 1960 and an

estimated 48,000 troops between 1962 and 1970.

Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) (Phak Pasason Pativat Lao) —Founded secretly in 1955 as the Phak Pasason

Lao (Lao People's Party—LPP); name changed in 1972.

Seized full power and became the ruling party of Laos in

1975. The LPRP Central Committee formulates party policy; it is dominated by the Political Bureau (Politburo) and

the Secretariat and maintains control by placing its members in key institutions throughout the government and

the army.

Lao Sung—Literally translated as the Laotian of the mountain

top—those who traditionally live in the high altitudes in

northern Laos. In official use, term denotes a category of

ethnic groups that speak Tibeto-Burmese, Miao-Yao languages; chiefly the Hmong (q.v.) group of highland or upland minorities but also the Mien (Yao) and Akha.

According to the 1985 census, these groups make up

approximately 10 percent of the population.

Lao Theung—Literally, Laotian of the mountain slopes;

group—including Kammu, Loven, and Lamet—that traditionally lives in medium altitudes, practices swidden, or

slash-and-burn agriculture, and speaks Mon-Khmer languages and dialects. According to the 1985 census, approximately 24 percent of the population. Regarded as original

inhabitants of Laos, formally referred to by ethnic Lao as kha, or slave. mandala—Indian geopolitical term referring to a variable circle

of power centered on a ruler, his palace, and the religious

center from which he drew his legitimacy.

muang (muong) —Administrative district; also an independent

principality; comprises several tasseng (q.v.), second-order

administrative divisions.

Neo Lao Issara (Free Laos Front) —Organization established

by former Lao Issara (Free Laos) (q.v.) to continue antiFrench resistance movement with the Viet Minh (q.v.); suc- ceeded by Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front—LPF)

(q.v.) in 1956.

net material product—Gross material output minus depreciation on capital and excluding "unproductive services."

According to the World Bank (q.v.), net material product

is "a socialist concept of national accounts."

341
Laos: A Country Study

Nonaligned Movement—Established in September 1961 with

the aim of promoting political and military cooperation

apart from the traditional East and West blocs. As of 1994,

there were 107 members (plus the Palestine Liberation

Organization), twenty-one observers, and twenty-one

"guests."

Pathet Lao (Lao Nation) —Literally, land of the Lao. Until

October 1965, the name for the Lao People's Liberation

Army (q.v.), the military arm of the Lao Patriotic Front

(q.v.).

Royal Lao Government (RLG) —The ruling authority in Laos

from 1947 until the communist seizure of power in

December 1975 and the proclamation of the Lao People's

Democratic Republic.

Sipsong Panna—Region in southern Yunnan Province, China,

from which migrated many groups that now inhabit Laos.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) —Established in

September 1954 as a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreements to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.

SEATO never had an active military role and was ultimately disbanded in June 1977 following the success of the

communist movements in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

in 1975. Original signatories to SEATO were Australia,

Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,

Thailand, and the United States. tasseng—Administrative unit; territorial subdivision of muang

{q.v.), subdistrict grouping of ten to twenty villages.

That Luang—Most sacred Buddhist stupa in Vientiane and site of annual festival on the full moon of the twelfth month.

Theravada Buddhism—Predominant branch of Buddhism

practiced in Laos, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) —Acronym

retained from predecessor organization, United Nations

International Children's Emergency Fund, established in

December 1946. Provides funds for establishing child

health and welfare services.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) —Created

by the United Nations in 1965, the UNDP is the world's

largest channel for multilateral technical and preinvestment assistance to low-income countries. It functions as an

overall programming, financing, and monitoring agency.

The actual fieldwork is done by other United Nations

agencies.

342
Glossary

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Established by the United Nations in 1949, it did not

become effective until 1951. The first world institution to aid refugees, the UNHCR seeks to ensure the humanitarian treatment of refugees and find a permanent solution

to refugee problems. The agency deals with the international protection of refugees and problems arising from

mass movements of people forced to seek refuge.

Viet Minh—Coalition of Vietnamese national elements formed

in May 1941 and dominated by the communists in their

movement calling for an uprising against the French colonial government.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International

Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Invest- ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established

in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans

at market-related rates of interest to developing countries

at more advanced stages of development. The IDA, a

legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of

the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those

of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956,

supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and

assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of

productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign

investment in developing countries against various non- commercial risk. The president and certain senior officers

of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four

institutions are owned by the governments of the countries

that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World

Bank group, member states must first belong to the Intentional Monetary Fund (IMF

q.v.).

343

Index

Abramov, Aleksandr N., 49 acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 140

Administrative Committee of the Party and State School for Political Theory, 209

Advisory Council, 21 Agency for International Development.

See United States Agency for International Development

Agreement on Cooperation for the Sus- tainable Development of the Mekong

River Basin (1995), xliii agricultural cooperatives, xxxiv, 156,

162-63, 215

agricultural policy, 1 62-63

agricultural production, 85, 154, 156, 158-59, 163

agricultural products (see also under indi- vidual crops), 99, 113, 155-56, 158-60,

162; coffee, 158; corn, 89, 158, 159; crop substitution for, xxxix, 197-98, 292-93; diversification of, 153, 158-

59; opium, 113, 159; rice, xxix, 89, 99, 112, 153, 154, 156, 158

agricultural reform, 162-63

agriculture: and the economic system, 153-54; foreign investment in, 196; labor exchange in, 101-2; loans for, 184; under New Economic Mechanism, 156, 161, 162; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 154; self-suffi- ciency in, 158; subsistence, 79; swid- den (slash-and-burn), xxxv, 82, 86, 89, 93,99, 104, 105, 106-7, 110, 111, 112, 118, 119-20, 155, 164; tax on, 162; in urban areas, 122; work force in, 154; work year, 119-20

agroforestry, xxxiii, 152 AID. See United States Agency for Inter- national Development

AIDS, See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

air force, 273-74 Akha people, 89, 110

Aloun Mai (New Dawn) , 238 American Friends Service Committee,

256 Amnesty International, xxxvii, 219, 226, 291 animism, xxxii, 79, 109, 117, 130-33 Annam, 10, 15, 263 Annamite Chain, 82, 241 armed forces (see also army; Pathet Lao; Royal Lao Army), 262-76; administration of, 270-74; budget, 182, 276; busi- ness ventures of, 272; conditions of

service, 275-76; conscription for, 275; corruption in, 294; development

projects of, xl; financial assistance for, 272; under French rule, 264; historical background, 262-70; materiel of, 271-

72, 284; militia, 274; missions of, 272; number of personnel in, xl, 274-75;

paramilitary, 287-88; party members

in, xxxvi; provincial, 274; reduced, xl; structure of, 270-74; training, 284; women in, 276 army (Lao People's Army), xl, 105, 262, 271-73; deployment of, 237, 272; joint ventures of, xl-xli, 194; Khamtai as chief of staff of, 217; training of, 245 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast

Asian Nations

Asian-African Conference (1955), 36 Asian Development Bank, xxxiv-xxxv,

169, 184, 198, 255-56

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), xxxviii, 256-57

Australia: financial assistance from,

xxxiv, 169, 197, 243, 254, 256; food aid from, 198; in SEATO, 266; study

abroad in, 242, 254

balance of payments, 152, 187-99 Ban Chiang people, xxix, 5 Bangkok, 193 banks and banking, 183-84 Banque d'Etat de la Republique

Democratique Populaire du Laos, 183

345
Laos: A Country Study

Banque pour le Commerce Exterieur

Lao. See Foreign Trade Bank

Ban Vinai Hmong refugee camp, 283 Battle of Thakhet (Khammouan)

(1946), 29, 264

Battle of Vientiane, 51-52 BCEL. See Foreign Trade Bank

Bilateral Cooperation of Narcotics Issues (1990), 292

birth control, 86, 87

blockades: of Bangkok, 16; by France,

16; by Thailand, 48,50

Bong Souvannavong, 34 border problems: with Thailand, xlii, 4, 73, 247-18, 283-284-86

borders, xxix, 81; with Burma, xxix, 82; with Cambodia, xxix, 19, 82; with

China, xxix, 74, 82; with Thailand,

xxix, xlii, 4, 73, 81, 247-48, 284-86;

with Vietnam, xxix, 73, 82 Boungnavath, 27 Bounkeut Sangsomsak, 286 Boun Khong, 16, 21 Boun Ma, 35 Boun Om, 51, 66 Boun Oum, 28, 31, 47, 51, 56 Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government, 55 Boun Phavet festival, 126-27 Bounphone Maekthepharak, 35, 69

Britain, 28, 31,48,54, 170, 190 Brown, MacAlister, 290, 291 Brown, Winthrop C, 48, 49 Buddhism (see also Buddhist clergy; wat),

xxxiii, 8, 21, 124-26, 128-30, 227; education under, 80, 102, 128, 133; gov- ernment control of, xxxii, 70, 124,

233; in village life, 101, 102, 145 Buddhism, Mahayana, 7, 124-25 Buddhism, Tantrie, 6 Buddhism, Theravada, xxxii, 5, 7, 8, 79, 124, 125-26 Buddhist clergy (sangha) , 70, 124, 125-

26, 128-29, 233

Buddhist Lent, 126 budget deficit. See government budget

Buell, Edgar "Pop", 40

Bulgaria: trade with, 189

bureaucracy. See civil service Burma, xliii; border with, xxix, 82; inva- sions from, 9; relations with, 239, 261

Cambodia: border with, xxix, 19, 82; in Mekong River Commission, xliii; rela- tions with, 261 Canada: in International Control Commission, 35, 269 Candapuri kingdom (see also Vientiane),

5 Canthaphanit, 7 census of 1985,86, 121 Central Bank, 183, 184

Central Banking Law (1990), 183

Central Committee, 161, 208-9

Central Intelligence Agency. See United

States Central Intelligence Agency

Cham empire, 3 Cham people, xxix, 5 Chamber of People's Representatives, 27 Champa, 9 Champasak, Kingdom of, 9, 19 Champasak, principality of, xxx, 239 Chao Anou, 9, 10, 11, 12 Chao Fa (Lords of the Sky), 280 Chao Hung, 14-15 Chao Noi, 11-12 ChaoXan, 12, 13

Chatichai Choonhaven, 248

chemical weapons, 235, 253-54, 282

children: custody of, 98, 116; household

tasks of, 100; mortality rate of, xxxiii, 81, 87, 137-38

China: migration from, 111; withdrawal

of troops by, 29 China, People's Republic of, xliii; aid from, xxxiv, xxxviii, 198, 249; border

with, xxix, 74, 82; Hmong in, 262, 283; investment by, 250; Mien in, 262; mili- tary support from, 278; political sup- port from, 48; refugees in, xxxviii, 235, 283; relations with, xxxviii, 42, 55,

74, 244, 246, 249-50; state visit to, 216, 250; trade with, xxxviii, 189, 190, 249, 250

China, Republic of (Taiwan), 42

Chinese People's Liberation Army: joint venture with, xl-xli, 194 Choummali Saignason, 270-71

Christianity, 117 CIA. See United States Central Intelli- gence Agency

Civil Air Transport. See United States

Civil Air Transport

civil aviation, 179

346
Index

civil rights, 288-90

civil service, 206, 227-28, 229; and budget deficit, 182; corruption in, 228; and foreign policy, 242; under French

rule, 21, 227; underJapanese rule, 22-

23; training of, 242; Vietnamese in, 23, 227; wages of, 182, 186

clans, 79, 107-8, 117

climate, xxix, 79, 82-85, 120, 156, 162

coffee, xxxiii, 188, 192, 193 Committee for the Defense of the

National Interests (CDNI), 41 Committee for the Propagation of Party

Policies, 209 Committee of Independence, 26 Committee of Information, Press, Radio and Television Broadcasting, 238 communications. See telecommunications communists. See Indochinese Communist Party; Lao People's Party; Lao

People's Revolutionary Party; Pathet Lao

Constituent Assembly, 30

constitution of 1947, xxx, 30, 47

constitution of 1991, xxxvi, 153, 219-21, 224-27; criticism and discussion of, 220-21; democratic centralism under,

225; drafting of, 219, 220; economic

policy under, 225; environment under,

226; ethnic groups under, 225; foreign investment under, 195; government

structure under, 221, 224; human

rights under, 288; legal system under,

290; legislature under, 229-31; mass

organizations under, 225; party under,

206, 224-25; political parties under, 220-21; private property under, 225;

religion under, 225; rights under, 225, 226, 288

construction, 172

contraception. See birth control Convention Modifying the Treaty Concluded on October 3, 1893 (1904), 19 Corporation for Agro-Forestry Develop- ment and Service, xl corruption, xxxvii, 72, 228, 248, 294 Counter Coup d'Etat Committee, 47 counternarcotics, 113; certification, xxxix-xl, 253, 286, 293-94; issues, 292-95; training, 292

coup deforce (1945) , 22, 264

coups d'etat: of 1286, 7; of 1960, xxxi, 45-46, 267

coups d'etat, attempted: of 1940, 21; of

1964,59; of 1974, 65

criminal code, 232, 288, 289, 290

criminal justice system, 288-92 Cua Lo, 193

currency, 187, 255 Customs Department, 292

Czechoslovakia: trade with, 189 Damrong Tayanin, 106, 108, 155 Da Nang, 193 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Protocol (1962), 57 Decouxjean, 20

defense spending, 182, 276 de Gaulle, Charles, 25 Democratic Party (Praxathipatay): in elections of 1951, 34; in elections of

1955, 37

demonstrations. Apolitical demonstrations Denmark: investment by, 1 69 Department of Geology and Mines, 170

detention centers. See seminar camps Deuane Sunnalath, 51, 57

diet, 106, 137, 138, 140

district centers, 94, 121

divorce, 98, 116

Dooley, Tom, 40 Doudart de Lagree, Ernest, 101 drought, 85, 153, 156, 162, 166, 168, 187,

188, 189, 191

drugs. See opium; narcotics

Dulles, John Foster, 35, 37, 38-39

Dvaravati kingdom, 5

East Germany. See German Democratic

Republic

economic planning (see also under indi- vidual plans) , 151 economic plans: First Five-Year Plan

(1981-85), 151-52; Second Five-Year Plan (1986-90), 152, 153; Third Five- Year Plan (1991-95), 153 economic reform, xxxiv, 151, 152, 199-

200 economy: command, xxxiii; market, 151, 162,213-14, 215, 216, 246

education (see also schools), xxxiii, 80-

81, 133-37, 145; Buddhist, 80, 102,

347
Laos: A Country Study

128, 133; under French rule, 133, 134; foreign, 135-36, 198, 242, 251, 254; as percentage of budget, 136-37; pri- mary, 134, 136; postsecondary, 136; problems in, 80, 135; religious, 80,

102, 128; in rural areas, 102, 135; sec- ondary, 135-36; spending on, 136-37;

textbooks, 137; in urban areas, 135

elections, 228; to Constituent Assembly,

30; to National Assembly, xxxvi-xxxvii,

34, 40, 229, 231; to Supreme People's

Assembly, xxxvi, 72; of 1951, 34; of

1955, 37; of 1958, 40-42; of 1960, 44-

45; of 1972, 60; of 1975, 67; of 1988,

72; of 1989, 72, 231; of 1992, xxxvii electric power (see also hydroelectric

power), 123, 168-69

energy resources (see also electric power;

see also under individual energy sources) , 167-70

environment, 152, 163-66, 226

ethnic groups (see also under individual

groups), xxxii, 81, 87, 89, 118, 261; clas- sification of, 87, 89; under constitu- tion of 1991, 225; discrimination

against, xxxii, 89, 110, 118, 261-62;

diversity of, 81, 87-91, 94, 104, 145; under French rule, 89; geographic dis- tribution of, 81 , 95 , 1 04, 1 1 0, 1 1

7

Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos, 279-80 exchange rate, 183, 187

executive branch, 228-29

exports (see also under individual products) , xxxiii, 152, 188-93; of coffee,

xxxiii, 188, 192; of forest products,

xxxiii, xxxv, 118, 161-62, 188-89; growth of, 188; of hydroelectricity,

xxxiii, xxxv, 166, 168, 186, 188, 241; production of, 188; state monopoly

on, 192 Express Transit Organization (Thailand), 193

external debt, 199

Fabre, (Major) , 24, 26

families: Hmong, 114; Lao Loum, 98; Lao Theung, 1 07 FaNgieo, 8 Fa Ngum, xxix, 8, 262-63 FAO. See United Nations Food and Agri- culture Organization

Fa Phi Fa, 8 Faydang Lobliayao, 28

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- many, Federal Republic of Federation of Women's Unions, 87, 225;

publications of, 239

financial sector, 183-84, 186-87

Finland: investment by, 169

First Battalion of Chasseurs Laotiens, 264

fishing, 99-100, 106, 154, 156, 160, 198

food, xxxiii, 86, 99, 120, 159, 160, 187 food aid, 156, 159, 198, 252; from Australia, 198; from the Netherlands, 198; from Thailand, 198; from the United

States, 198, 252

foreign assistance, xxxiv, 123, 151, 156, 196-99, 240, 243-44, 254; from Asian Development Bank, xxxiv-xxxv, 169, 198, 255-56; from Australia, xxxiv,

197, 254, 256; from China, xxxiv, xxxviii, 198, 249; dependence on, 180, 198-99, 244, 272, 276; from East Ger- many, 251; from France, xxxiv, 197, 254; from Germany, 198, 254; from

Hungary, 251; and imports, 189; from

International Monetary Fund, 255-56; from Japan, xxxiv, 197, 198, 240, 254-

55, 256; from Mongolia, 251; prob- lems with, 198-99; from Russia, xxxiv, 251; from the Soviet Union, xxxiv, 72, 137, 196, 197, 246, 250, 276; from Sweden, xxxiv, 197, 254, 256; from UNDP,

169, 198, 255-56; from the United

States, xxxi, 40, 46-47, 70-71, 252;

value of, 196-97; from Vietnam, xxxiv, 197, 251, 276, 284; from the World

Bank, xxxiv-xxxv, 255-56

foreign exchange, 161, 168, 187, 244

Foreign Exchange Decree, 184

foreign investment, xxxiv, 151, 152, 169, 194-96, 219, 244, 248, 250, 254; in agriculture, 196; by Australia, 169,

254; by China, 250; by Denmark, 169; encouragement of, 194-95; by Finland, 169; in forestry, 196; in hydroelectricity, 169; by Japan, 169; in manufacturing, 196; in mining, 196; under New Economic Mechanism,

194; by Norway, 169; in service sector, 196; by Sweden, 169; by Thailand, 169,

248; in tourism, 196

348
Index

Foreign Investment Law (1988), 194, 195 Foreign Investment Management Committee, 195

foreign policy, xxxv, xxxviii, xxxix, 239-

57; and economy, 242-44; goals of, 241-42; influences on, 240

foreign service, 242 Foreign Trade Bank (Banque pour le Commerce Exterieur Lao—BCEL),

183-84

forestry (see also agroforestry; timber), 160-62; foreign investment in, 196; loans for, 184; technical assistance for, 198

forests, 82; deforestation of, 160-61,

163-64; exports from, xxxiii, xxxv,

118, 161, 188-89; preservation of, 86;

rival claims to, 247-48

France: aid from, xxxiv, 197, 254; block- ade of Bangkok by (1893), 16; dependence on, 242; as enemy, 208, 213;

exploration by, 10; at Geneva Confer- ence (1954), 34-35; at Geneva Confer- ence (1961-62), 56; migration to, 92; and military mission, 42, 266; petro- leum exploration by, 170; relations

with, 30; trade with, 190 Franco-Lao General Convention (1949),

31 Franco-Laotian guerrillas, 22, 23, 24, 27-

29 Franco-Laotian Treaty of Protectorate between France and the Kingdom of Louangphrabang (1941), 20-21 Franco-Lao Treaty of Amity and Association (1953), 34

Franco-Siamese agreement (1946), 30

Franco-Siamese convention (1886), 16 Franco-Siamese treaty (1856), 15 Franco-Siamese treaty (1893), 16

Free Laos Front. SeeNeo Lao Issara French protectorate, xxx, 15-16, 19-21,

22, 23-24, 240, 263-66

French rule (see also Indochina, French),

xxx, 3^4, 15-16, 19-30, 34, 227, 266; education under, 133, 134; ethnic groups under, 89; opium production

under, 113 French Union High Command, 265 Friendship Bridge, xxxv, 178, 193, 249, 254

Funan,

5

Garnier, Francis, 10

gas, natural, 170 GDP. See gross domestic product General Military Committee: Khamtai

in, 218 Geneva Conference on Indochina

(1954), xxx, 34-35; armistice agree- ment, 4, 265 Geneva Conference on Laos (1961-62),

xxxi, 54, 56-57, 267-68 German Democratic Republic (East Ger- many): aid from, 251; study abroad in, 136 Germany, Federal Republic of: aid from,

198, 254 GNP. See gross national product

gold, 170, 171 Golden Triangle, 261 government (see also Lao People's Revolutionary Party), xxxvi, 229; export

monopoly of, 192; inner cabinet of, 218; structure of, 220, 224, 227-33 government, coalition (1957), xxxi, 38, 39 government, coalition (1962), xxxi, 56-

57 government, local, 212, 229; structure, under constitution, 224, 226 government budget and revenue, 180-

82 government spending, 182; on defense,

182; on education, 136-37; on health,

141; on infrastructure, 182 Green Star, 285

gross domestic product, percentage of: agriculture, 154; budget deficit, 180; defense budget, 276; external debt,

199; industry, 166; service sector, 172;

trade deficit, 191

gross national product, (GNP), 181-82; construction as percentage of, 172; per capita, xxxiii, 151 Group 100,43

Group 959, 43^4, 48, 65 gypsum, 170, 188 Harmand, Jules, 10 Harriman, W. Averell, 56; 58-59

health and health care, 81, 137-38, 140-

42; facilities, 122, 141; future of, 145;

349
Laos: A Country Study

government spending on, 141; hospitals, 141; and nutrition, 138-40; professionals, 40, 141-42; traditional, 142; of women, 87 Hmong guerrillas: anticommunist insur- gency of, 234, 248-49, 269, 279-80,

286; in First Indochina War, 27, 28, 29, 265, 281-83; offensives against, 60, 66, 235, 264; raids by, xxxvi, 118, 264; in Second Indochina War, 53, 58, 60, 279-80, 281-83; support for, 249, 268, 281 Hmong people (see also villages,

Hmong), 89, 110, 281-83; agriculture

of, 111, 113-14; in China, 262, 283;

clans, 114; emigration by, xxxvii-iii, 249, 278; evacuation of, 66, 282; festi- vals of, 120; gender roles of, 116-17; geographic distribution of, 281; households, 114; kinship, 114; live- stock of, 117; marriage, 114-16;

migration of, into Laos, 10, 111; New

Year of, 120, 132; occupations of, 117; opium farming by, 10, 159, 281; population of, 110, 111, 282; as refugees,

92, 110, 118, 234, 248-49, 278, 279,

283, 286; religion of, 117, 132; resettle- ment of, 89, 105, 118; in Second

Indochina War, 53-54, 62-63; social services for, 40; in Vietnam, 262;

wealth of, 117-18 Ho Chi Minh, 24, 207 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 44, 54, 58, 59, 62, 241, 268 Ho people, 14-15, 110

housing: lowland, 96, 102; midland, 1 05—

6; upland, 112 human rights, xxxvii, 233-34, 288-91 Hungary: aid from, 251 hunting, 99-100, 106

hydroelectric power, xxxiii, 256; export

of, xxxiii, xxxv, 166, 168, 186, 188, 241; installed capacity, 168, 241; investment in, 169; as source of for- eign exchange, 168; technical assis- tance for, 198

ICC. See International Control Commission ICR Indochinese Communist Party IMF. See International Monetary Fund

Imfeld, Hans, 23, 27, 28

imports, xxxiii, 189; duties on, 193; of

food, 153, 159, 189; of fuel, 170, 189; of manufactured goods, 189; restric- tions on, 193; from the Soviet Union,

170 Independent Party (Phak Seli): in elec- tions of 1955, 37; in elections of 1958, 40

India: in International Control Commission, 35, 269

Indochina, French (see also French rule), xxx, 4 Indochina War, First (1946-54) , xxx, 31,

34, 264; armistice agreement for, 34- 37

Indochina War, Second (1954-75), 52-

54; prologue to, 47-52, 57-58; refu- gees from, 50, 91, 121, 122, 164; truce

talks for, 54; United States involve- ment in, 4, 267, 268-69 Indochinese Communist Party (ICP),

xxx, 24, 32, 206-7, 242

Indochinese Federation, 20-21 Indravarman I, 6 industry, 152, 166-70; 172-74; employ- ment in, 166; as percentage of gross domestic product, 166; principal activities in, 166; state-owned, 167

infant mortality, xxxiii, 81, 87, 137, 138

inflation, 186-87, 244

infrastructure: development of, xxxv,

198; improvement of, 284; rural, 152; spending on, 182; technical assistance

for, 198, 250 Inpeng Suriyadhay, 51

Institute of Law and Administration, 232

Institute of Traditional Medicine, 142 insurgency (see also Hmong guerrillas; Pathet Lao), 234-35, 248-49, 276-83; defenses against, 262, 277-78; MonKhmer, 264; support for, 277, 278

intelligentsia, 92, 236

internal security (see also insurgency),

xxxvii, 276-83 International Control Commission

(ICC), 35, 54, 56, 73, 269

International Development Association

(IDA), 169, 198 International Monetary Fund (IMF),

xxxiv-xxxv, 198, 240, 255-56

investment: domestic, xxxiv, xxxv, 152;

foreign, xxxiv, 151, 152, 169, 194, 195,

350
Index

196, 219, 248, 250, 254

irrigation, xxxv, xl, 154, 156, 198, 256

Irwin, John N. 11,49

Israel: relations with, xxxix

Izikowitz, Karl Gustav, 104

Japan: coup de force by, 22; dependence

on, 243; financial assistance from,

xxxiv, 197, 198, 240, 254-55, 256; investment by, 169; state visits to, 216; trade with, 190 Japanese occupation, xxx, 22-23 Jayavarman Paramesvara, King, 8 Jayavarman VII, 7 JCS. See United States Joint Chiefs of

Staff Johnson, U. Alexis, 50

Joint Central Commission to Implement

the [Vientiane] Agreement, 64, 65 Joint Chiefs of Staff. See United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Commission, 35

Joint Development Bank, 183, 184

joint ventures, xl-x'li, 194; with Thailand,

xxxv, xxxvi, 183, 194

judiciary, 231,232-33

Kammu language, 104 Kammu people, 88, 106, 107, 108; geo- graphic distribution of, 91, 104; population of, 104; religion of, 131;

resettlement of, 105 Katang people, 88 Katay Don Sasorith, 34, 36 Kaysone Phomvihan, 29-30, 31, 52, 207, 215-16, 219, 275; death of, xli; in Indochinese Communist Party, 32; as party secretary general, 211, 214; in Pathet Lao government, 32; in revolution, 67, 68, 265; secrecy of, 72, 216;

state visits by, 216, 248, 250 Kennedy, John R, 54, 56 Khamboui, Queen, 70 Khamchan Pradith, 69 Khammao Vilay. SeeXieng Mao

Khamsai Souphanouvong, 209 Kham Souk. See Zakarine Khamtai Siphandon, xli, 211, 216-18,

270 Khamu people. See Kammu people

Khanti, Prince, 15

KJiao Pathan Van (Daily News), 57

Khaosan Pathet Lao (Lao News Agency)

,

238 Khmer kingdom, xxix, 3, 6-7 Khmer people, 82 Khmu people. See Kammu people

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 56 Khun Borom, 6 Khun Cuang, 7 Khun Lo, 6 Kindavong, Prince, 22

King's Council, 38

Kissinger, Henry A., 63, 64 Kompong Som: as trade transit point, 193 Kong Le, 43, 48, 52, 57, 59; coup d'etat

by, xxxi, 45-46, 267

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea): cooperation projects

with, xxxix

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): cooperation projects with, xxxix Kou Abhay, 38, 44 Kou Voravong, 26, 34, 36 Kouprasith Abhay, 51 Kriangsak Chomanand, 248

Kui people, 110 Lahu people, 89, 110 Lamet people, 88, 104; clans of, 107-8; cooperation among, 107-8; language

of, 104; religion of, 131-32

land: arable, xxix, 82, 153; area, 81, 153; cultivated, 153; forested, 82; ownership, 145; pasture, 154; tenure, 106 language. See under Lao Loum; Lao

Sung; Lao Theung

Lan Xang, Kingdom of, xxix, 3, 8-10,

239; army of, 262-63 Lao Chamber of Commerce, 195 Lao Dong (Labor) , 239 Lao Federation of Trade Unions, xxxvii, 225, 239 Lao Front for National Construction,

225 Lao Import-Export Company (Societe Lao Import-Export), 192, 193 Lao Issara government, xxx, 4, 26-30,

31, 264; armed forces under, 264; in

exile, 29, 31 Lao Loum people ("lowland" Lao) {see also villages, lowland), xxxii, 79, 87-

88, 89, 95-96, 98-102, 104, 205; agri351
Laos: A Country Study

culture of, 87, 99, 155; education of, 133, 135, 136; ethnic groups of, 95;

families and households, 98-100, 101-

2; festivals of, 120; under French rule, 89; geographic distribution of, 87, 91;

in government, 95; kinship, 98; lan- guages of, 87; marriage of, 98, 131; meals of, 96, 99; migrations of, 88, 93, 121, 249, 278; as party members, 209;

as percentage of population, 87, 95;

religion of, 79, 102, 104, 128, 131 Lao National Council of Trade and

Industry, xxxiv Lao National Liberation Movement,

279-80 Lao Neutralist Revolutionary Organization, 267 Lao News Agency. &?<?Khaosan Pathet Lao

Lao Nhay. See Lao Renovation Movement

Lao Nhay (New Laos) , 21 Lao Patriotic Front. SeeNeo Lao Hak Xat Lao Pen Kang. See Neutralist Party Lao Pen Lao, 21 , 26; in elections of 1958, 40 Lao People's Army. See armed forces; army

Lao People's Democratic Republic: pro- claimed, xxxi, xxxv, 67-68, 205, 261 Lao People's Liberation Army. Smarmy

Lao People's Party (Phak Pasason Lao

LPP), xxx, 48; established, xxx, 33, 207, 208 Lao People's Revolutionary Party

(LPRP) {see also Central Committee;

government; Politburo), xxxi, xli, 68, 206-9, 211-18, 261; under constitution of 1991, 206, 224-25; control of media, 238; corruption in, xxxvii;

Fifth Party Congress (1991), xxxvii, 153, 163, 174, 208; First Party Congress (1951), 208; Fourth Party Congress (1986), 152, 162, 208; ideology

of, 213-14; members of, xxxvii, 208;

origins of, 206-8; Second Party Congress (1972), 208; secrecy in, 212-13, 215; structure of, 208-9, 211-12;

Third Party Congress (1982) , 208 Lao People's Revolutionary Youth

Union, xxxvi, 225; publications of, 238-39 Lao Renovation Movement (Lao Nhay),

21 Lao Rouam Lao. See Rally of the Lao People Lao Rouam Samphan. National Lao Union

Laos for the Lao. See Lao Pen Lao

Laos Roundtable (1992), 254 Lao Sung people ("upland" Lao) {see also villages, upland; Hmong), 79, 110-

119, 205; agriculture of 111, 112, 113-

14, 159; animism of, 117; and clan membership, 79; discrimination

against, xxxii, 89; education of, 135,

136; emigration by, 92; ethnic groups

of, 110, 117; families and households

of, 114, 116-17; geographic distribu- tion of, 110; in government, 91; lan- guages of, 88; migration of, 88-89,

111-12; in Pathet Lao, 90-91; percent- age of population, 88; rebellions by, 89-90; religion of, 79; resettlement of, 86, 89, 93; transportation of, 85 Lao Theung people ("midland" Lao) {see also villages, midland), 79, 104-10,

205; agriculture of, 104, 106-7, 110; animism of, 109; discrimination

against, xxxii, 89, 110; displacement

of, 89; education of, 135, 136; families and households of, 105, 107-9; gen- der roles of, 108-9; geographic distri- bution of, 110; in government, 91; languages of, 88, 104; migration of, 88; in Pathet Lao, 90-91; rebellions by, 89-90; religion of, 79 Laotian-Chinese Joint Border Committee, 250 Lao United Buddhists Association, 129 Lavae people, 104 Lawae people, 88

lawyers, 232, 290 Le Duan, 73

legal system. See criminal justice system

legislative branch, xxxvi, 229-31 Leuam Insixiengmay, 34

literacy, 134

Lithuania: relations with, xxxix

livestock, 82, 99, 112, 159-60; and

Hmong, 117; technical assistance for, 198 Louangphrabang (city), 93; electricity

in, 169; growth of, 121; population of, 93, 121

352
Index

Louangphrabang, Kingdom of {see also Muang Sua), xxx, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 19, 20, 25, 205; attack on Vientiane

by, 9; migration under, 3; relations of, with France, 20; and Siam, 10, 19 Louangphrabang, principality of, xxx, 239 Loven people, 88

LPP. See Lao People's Party LPRP. See Lao People's Revolutionary

Party Luang Prabang. See Louangphrabang Lue people, 95 MAAG. See Military Assistance Advisory

Group

McClintock, Robert, 34

magistrates, 232-33 Maha Ghakkri, 248 Maha Sila Viravong, 21 Maha Wachirolongkon, 248 Ma Khamphitay, 35 Makong people, 88

Malaysia: trade with, 190

mandala, xxix, 5, 6 Manta Thourath, 10 manufacturing, 166-67, 196

marriage: age, 116; bride-price, 98, 114, 116; bride stealing, 114-16; Hmong,

114-16; lowland, 98; and mandala, 5; midland, 107, 108; polygyny in, 98, 108, 116; restrictions on, 107; weddings, 98, 131 mass organizations: under constitution of 1991, 225; members of, xxxvi materiel: air force, 245, 273-74; army,

271-72; chemical weapons, 235, 253-

54; from France, 263, 265-66; navy, 274; police, 263; from the Soviet Union, 245, 250-51, 271-72; from the United States, 265, 266; from Viet- nam, xli, 245, 284 Matsuoka-Henry Pact (1940), 19 media, xxxvii, 236-38, 288

medicine. See health and health care Mekong River, 81, 82, 85; hydroelectric

potential of, 168; transportation on, 174,178

Mekong River Commission, xliii Mekong Valley, 81; power centers in, 5-7 men: roles and status of, 100, 108-9, 117 Mennonite Central Committee, 256

MIA. See missing in action Miao-Yao language group, 88 Mien people, 89, 110; in China, 262; festivals of, 1 20; migration of, 1 1

1

migration, xxix, 91; from China, 110, 111-12; and ethnic composition, 81; by Hmong, 10, 111-12; under Lan Xang kingdom, 3; by Lao Loum, 88, 121; from Laos, 92, 235, 242, 248-49;

by Lao Sung, 88-89; of refugees, 122, 235

military. See armed forces

military assistance: from China, 278; for Phoumi Nosavan, 267; from the Soviet Union, xxxi, 51, 52, 273, 276; from the United States, 37, 40-42, 48-49, 53-

54, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269-70, 281; from Vietnam, xli, 51 , 52-53, 272, 276 Military Assistance Advisory Group

(MAAG), 267-68

minerals (see also under individual minerals), 170-72, 184, 241 Minh Mang, 10-11, 12 mining, 170-72, 241; exploration, 170; foreign investment in, 196; potential, 170

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 166

Ministry of Communication, Transport,

Posts, and Construction, 175

Ministry of Defense, 265

Ministry of Education, 137

Ministry of Finance, 182, 192

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 248-49, 252

Ministry of Information and Culture,

137, 238, 239

Ministry of Interior, 233, 289, 290, 292

Ministry ofJustice, 232

Ministry of National Defense, xl Ministry of Public Health, 137, 141, 142

Ministry of Trade, 173, 192

missing in action (MIA) (see also POW/

MIA issues) , xxxix, 63, 253 money supply, 1 86-87 Mon-Khmer rebels, 264 Mon people, xxix Mongolia: aid from, 251; trade with, 189 Mongol rule, xxix, 7-9 Mourin d'Arfeuille, 10 Muang Phuan,8, 11, 12, 13-14, 15 Muang Sua {see also Louangphrabang;

Sri Sattanak), 6, 7, 8, 9

353
Laos: A Country Study

Nam Ngum dam, 168 Nam Ngum River, 1 68 Nam Ou River, 85; transportation on, 174 Nan-chao kingdom, 6 narcotics (see also counternarcotics;

opium): xxxix, 159, 292-93

National Assembly (see also Supreme People's Assembly), 30, 65, 231; building,

229; elections for, xxxvi-xxxvii, 34, 40, 229, 231; members of, 231; role of, xxxvii, 229-31

National Assembly Law (1993) , 231 National Committee for Social Welfare and War Veterans, 143 National Committee on Drug Control and Supervision, 292, 294

National Congress of People's Representatives, 67

National Forest Resource Conservation and Development Strategy, 166 National Lao Union (Lao Rouam Samphan) : in elections of 1 951 , 34

National Political Consultative Council,

65, 66, 67 National Progressive Party (Phak Xat Kao Na): in elections of 1951, 34; in elections of 1955, 37; in elections of 1958,40

National Radio of Laos, 238

National Railway Company, Ltd., xxxvi National Union Party, 37

natural resources, 86

navy (Lao People's Navy) , 274 Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front)

(see ako Pathet Lao), xxx, 38, 110, 207 Neo Lao Issara (Free Laos Front), 32, 217

Netherlands: food aid from, 198

Neutralist Armed Forces (see also Kong

Le),xxxi, 52, 55, 267

Neutralist Party (Lao Pen Rang), 55, 56,

57, 68 New Economic Mechanism (1986),

xxxiii-xxxiv, 96, 152, 240-41, 246;

agriculture under, 156, 162; foreign investment under, 194; forestry under,

161; industry under, 173; introduction

of, 4-5, 152, 216, 289; progress under, 199-200; trade under, 188, 191 New Economic Policy (Soviet) , 21

3

newspapers (see also media), 238

New Year, 120, 132 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 256 North Korea. See Korea, People's Democratic Republic of North Vietnam. See Vietnam, Democratic

Republic of Norway: investment by, 169 Nouhak Phoumsavan, 30, 43, 68, 207; at Geneva Conference (1954), 35; in Indochina War truce talks, 54; in Indochinese Communist Party, 32; in Pathet Lao government, 32; as presi- dent, xli, 211, 216 Noum Lao (Lao Youth) , 239 Numbri people, 104 Nyaheun people, 104

Office of the Central Committee, 209

oil (see also petroleum), 170, 241 opium, 26; as cash crop, 10, 113, 159, 281; crop substitution programs,

xxxix, 113, 159, 197-98, 253, 292-93; under French rule, 113; and international relations, 71-72, 253; production, xl, 71-72, 113, 119, 159,292, 293,

294; trade, 28, 177, 188, 253

Organization Committee, 209 OSS. United States Office of Strategic Services Ouan Ratikoun, 45, 50, 69 Oudone Sananikone, 21 Oun Huan, 9 Oun Kham, 10, 15, 16 Oun Sananikone, 21, 26 Pak Au Her. See Zhong Zhua Her

Pa Kao Her. See Zhong Zhua Her Paknam incident (1893), 16 Pakxe,93, 121

Pali language, 21, 126 Panya Khamphong, 7, 8 Panya Lang, 7

Parsons, J. Graham, 39, 49

Pathet Lao (see also Neo Lao Hak Xat),

xxxi, 4, 31-36, 38-39, 55-56, 110, 207, 269, 270, 271; anti-Hmong offensives, 60, 66; coalition with, xxx, 38, 39; at Geneva Conference (1954), 35, 265; at Geneva Conference (1961-62), 56; Latsavong detachment of, 31; and military, 287-88; negotiations of, with Royal Lao Government, xxx, 37-39,

354
Index

50; popular support for, 48, 110; power seized by, 3, 66-67, 270; propa- ganda by, 58; publications of, 238; reli- gion under, 128-29; in Royal Lao

Army, 38, 39, 42-43, 266; schools, 133;

villages controlled by, 48, 55-56, 67, 105, 270

Patriotic Neutralists, 57

Pavie, Auguste, 3,16 Paxa Sangkhom. See Social Party Peace Convention Between France and

Thailand (1941), 20 Peace Party (Santiphab), 40 PEO. See United States Programs Evaluation Office People's Committee, 27 Phak Pasason Lao. See Lao People's Party Phak Seli. See Independent Party Phak Xat Kao Na. See National Progressive Party Pham Van Dong, 36

pharmaceuticals, xli, 142 Phaya Khammao. SeeXieng Mao

Pheng Phongsavan, 54, 61, 69

Phetsarath, Prince, 21, 22, 23, 24-26, 31, 39,44

phi. See spirits Phone Chantaraj, 63 Phongsali Province: economy of, 151; Pathet Lao in, xxx

Phoui Sananikone: in elections of 1951,

34; at Geneva Conference (1954), 34, 56; government of, 42 Phoumi Nosavan, 26, 44-45, 46, 47, 59; anticommunist offensive under, xxxi, 50, 54; death of, 279; in elections of

1951, 34; in elections of 1960, 44-45;

lack of support for, 49-51, 56; military

support for, 267; in Phoui government, 42 Phoumi Vongvichit, 27, 51, 61; arrested,

43; in coalition government, 40; death

of, xli; at Geneva Conference (1961-

62), 56; in Pathet Lao government, 32; retirement of, 211 Phoun Sipaseut, xli, 43, 211, 218 Phu Noi people, 110 Phu Tai people, 95

Pibul Songkram, 20

PIP. See Public Investment Programme

Plain ofJars, 82

Po, Prince, 14

Poland: in International Control Commission, 35, 269; trade with, 189

police, national, xl, 263, 287-88; anti- smuggling unit, 292; counternarcotics

unit, 113; informants, 289

Politburo (Political Bureau), xxxvi; deci- sion making in, 211; Khamtai in, 218; members of, 68, 207, 211, 224

Political Bureau. See Politburo

political demonstrations: after coup of

1960, 45-46; procommunist, 66-67,

270

political reeducation. See seminar camps

political unrest: under French rule, 19,

21, 24

polygyny, 98, 108, 116

population, xxxii, 86-94, 153, 213, 261;

density, xxxiii, 79, 86-87; displace- ment of, 60, 121; ethnic distribution

in, 87, 88, 95; of Hmong, 110, 111,

282; of Ho, 110; of Kammu, 104; of Lao Loum, 87, 95; of Lao Sung, 88; of Lao Theung, 104; of Louangphrabang, 93, 121; of Pakxe, 93, 121; rural,

xxxiii, 93-94; of Savannakhet, 93, 121; urban, 93, 94, 121; of Vientiane, 93, 120; in villages, xxxiii, 93 population statistics: birth rate, 86, 87; child mortality rate, xxxiii, 81, 87, 137-38; death rate, 86; fertility rate, 86; growth rate, xxxii-xxxiii , 81, 86, 121; infant mortality rate, xxxiii, 81,

87, 137-38; life expectancy, xxxiii, 81, 137

postal service, 173 POW/MIA issues, xxxix, 253, 286, 287,

294; origins of, 63-65 POWs. See prisoners of war

Praxathipatay. See Democratic Party president (see also executive branch),

228-29

press (See media; newspapers)

prices, 162, 184-86, 187 prime minister (see also executive

branch) , 229

prison camps: conditions in, 63, 290, 291-92

prisoners, political, xxxvii, 233, 290-91

prisoners of war (POWs) (see also POW/

MIA issues), xxxix, 286-87, 294; demands for release of, 64; schedule

for release of, 63, 64

355
Laos: A Country Study

prisons, 290, 291-92

private sector, 153, 194

privatization, xxxiv, 151, 174, 255 Propaganda and Training Committee,

209, 238

prostitution, 140

provinces: capitals of, 121, 122; party committees in, 212

Provisional Government of National

Union. SeeSouvanna Phouma govern- ment, fourth Public Investment Programme (PIP), XXXV

Public Prosecutor General, 232

publishing, 137

Pushkin, Georgi M., 58-59 Quinim Pholsena, 51, 52; assassinated,

57; at Geneva Conference (1961-62), 56 Quoc. See Kaysone Phomvihan

radio, 179; state control of, xxxvii, 238; technical assistance for, 238; Thai

broadcasts, 239

railroads: construction of, xxxvi Rally of the Lao People (Lao Rouam

Lao), 40 Rama III, King of Siam, 10-11, 12 Rama IV, King of Siam, 14 Rama V, King of Siam, 15 Ramkhamhaeng, 7-8 Raynaud, Paul, 20

rebellions: by Lao Sung, 89-90; by Lao

Theung, 89-90; by Pathet Lao, 4, 36

refugee camps, 91, 283; geographic dis- tribution of, 91; in Thailand, xxxv,

xxxvii, 92, 110, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 286

refugees, 91-93, 235; asylum for, 252; in China, xxxviii, 235, 283; Hmong, 92, 110, 118, 234, 248-49, 278, 283, 286;

killed, 285; migration of, 122, 235;

repatriation of, xxxviii, 92-93, 235,

279; resettlement of, 91-92; in Thailand, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, 92, 110, 129, 234, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 286; in the United States, 252; Vietnamese, 122

religion (see also under individual sects), 3, 124-26, 128-33; animism, xxxii, 79, 109, 117, 130-33, 145; under constitu- tion of 1991, 225; of Hmong, 117;

under Lan Xang kingdom, 3; under

Louangphrabang kingdom, 3; resur- gence of, 145

religious ceremonies, 122-23, 130, 131, 132

religious festivals, xxxii, 122-23, 126,

128, 130

resettlement, 89, 93, 105, 113, 164; of

district centers, 121; of Hmong, 89, 105, 118; of Kammu, 105; of Lao

Sung, 86, 89; of refugees, 91-92

Revolutionary Committee, 47, 50, 52

Rheinart, 10

rice, 156-58; cultivation and harvest of, xxix, 5, 82, 89, 95, 112, 120, 122; imported, 153, 189; paddies, 95, 99, 113-14, 155; as percentage of agricul- tural production, 153, 156; production, 79, 99, 156-58; self-sufficiency in, 158; subsidies for, 186; swidden, 104, 106, 110, 155, 181; tax on, 180-81;

wet, xxix, 5

Riley, Herbert D., 49

roads, 85, 175-78; construction of, xxxv,

xl, 175-76, 177, 249, 256; improvements in, 85; maintenance of, xl, 176-

77 Royal Lao Army, 264, 265-70; clashes with Pathet Lao, 36-37, 48; created,

31; financial support for, 266; in First Indochina War, 264; missions Of, 269; number of troops in, 264; organization of, 269; Pathet Lao units in, 38,

39, 42-43, 266; political role of, 43, 44-45; preparedness of, 37; training

of, 264, 265, 266

Royal Lao Government, xxx; conflict of, with Pathet Lao, 4; negotiations of, With Pathet Lao, xxx, 37-39, 50; over- thrown, 27; Pathet Lao in, xxx, 38, 39; Pathet Lao threat to, 36-37

Royal Lao Navy, 274

rural areas (see also villages) , 94-120; development in, xxxv; electricity in, 169; infrastructure of, 152; population

in, xxxiii, 93-94; self-sufficiency in, 99, 142-43, 145; social welfare in, 142-44; work year in, 119-20

Russia (see also Soviet Union), xxxiv, 251 Russian Council of Trade and Industry, xxxiv

356
Index

Saisompheng Phomvihan, 209

Sali Vongkhamsao, xlii Sam Tao language, 104 Sangkhom Thoulakit (Society and Business), 238

Santiphab Party. See Peace Party SaritThanarat, 44-45, 46, 47, 50, 56 Savang Vatthana, King, 44, 49; abdication of, xxxi, 67, 205; as crown prince,

22, 34, 36, 37; death of, 70, 256

Savannakhet, 93, 121 Say Vongsavang, 70 schools, xxxiii; curriculum of, 133;

enrollments, xxxiii, 134, 135; Hmong,

40; locations of, 122; secondary, 135-

36; village, 134 SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Secretariat, 21

1

Sedange people, 104 seminar camps, xxxvii, 67, 68-70, 206, 233, 256, 277, 289, 290-92; civil ser- vants in, 227; closed, 233; monks in, 129; types of, 290 Sengsouvan Souvannarath, 59, 69

service sector, 172-73, 196 shamans, 79-80, 117 , 132-33 Siam (see also Thailand) , xxix-xxx, 3; attack on Ho by, 14; campaigns against

Vientiane by, 9-13, 263; and Lan

Xang, 239; and Louangphrabang, 10, 16; relations of, with Vietnam, 12 Siamese rule, xxix-xxx, 9-15; depopulation policy of, 13; emigration under,

13; end of, 15-16; resistance to, 13 Sikhottabong, 5 Singapore: trade with, 190 Sing Chanthakoummane, 69 Singkapo, 35, 43

Sing Ratanassamay, 27, 50, 54

Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 74, 278 Sipsong Panna, 6, 7

Sisana Sisan, 67

Sisavang Vong, King, xxx, 20, 26, 44; abdication of, 27; constitution under,

30; reinstatement of, 29

Sisavat Keobounphan, 35, 248 Sisomphone Lovansai: on constitution

drafting committee, 219; death of, xlii; retirement of, 21

1

Sisouk na Ghampasak, 66

Sithon Kommadan, 43

slave trade, 89, 264

Smith, Horace H.,42

Social Party (Paxa Sangkhom) , 45

social services, xxxiii, 80, 142-44

Societe Lao Import-Export. See Lao

Import-Export Company

Socio-economic Development Plan

(1993-2000), xxxv Somlat Ghanthamath, xli-xlii Somsanith, 45, 46 Somsavat Lengsavat, 218 Somseun Khamphithoun, 72

Soth Petrasy, 63, 64 Soukhan Vilaysan, 69

Souligna Vongsa, King, xxix Souphanouvong, 43, 67-68; in coalition government, 39, 56; death of, xlii; in

exile, 60; in Lao Issara government,

26, 31; negotiations of, with Vietnam,

24; in Pathet Lao government, 31; as president, xxxi, 68; retirement of, 211;

in revolution, 67 South Africa: relations with, xxxix Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO), 266-67

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of Souvanna Phouma, Prince, xxxi-xxxii;

in coalition government, 56; death of, 70; following coup of 1960, 45-46; in elections of 1951, 34; in elections of

1960, 45; meeting of, with Zhou Enlai, 59; negotiations of, with Pathet Lao,

50; resignation of, 39; in revolution,

67; in rival government, 55, 60; support for, 48; visit to Beijing and Hanoi

by, 38, 59; visits to Washington by, 39,

40, 57 Souvanna Phouma governments: first (1957), xxxi, 34, 37-38, 39; second

(I960), xxxi, 39; third (1962), xxxi,

46, 47-51, 54, 57; fourth (1975), xxxi, 65 Souvannarath, Prince, 30 Soviet-Lao Cooperation Commission,

190

Soviet Union (see also Russia): aid from,

xxxiv, 72, 137, 196, 197, 246, 250; dependence on, 242; imports from,

170; materiel from, 245, 250-51, 271-

72; military aid from, xxxi, 51, 52, 273, 276; relations with, 250-51; study abroad in, 136, 242, 251; trade with,

357
Laos: A Country Study

189, 190, 199

spirits {phi), 130-31; of ancestors, 109,

133; practitioners, 109, 131-32

Sri Sattanak, Kingdom of {see also Muang

Sua), 7 Standing Committee, 231, 232

State Bank, 183

State Board of News Agency, Newspaper,

Radio, and Television, 238

State Committee for Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade, 192

state enterprises, 167, 173; privatization

of, xxxiv, 151, 213, 216; revenue from,

181; subsidies for, 182; trade by, 172-

73

State Planning Commission, 154

State River Transport Company, 178

State Water Transport Company, 178

Stuart-Fox, Martin, 92, 128

subsidies, 182, 186, 255 Sukhothai empire, 3

Sullivan, William H., 58-59 Supreme People's Assembly {see also National Assembly), 153, 219, 229; appointments to, 231; elections to, xxxvi, 72 Supreme People's Court, 229, 232 Sweden: financial assistance from, xxxiv, 169, 197, 198, 243, 254, 256; state visits to, 216 swidden (slash-and-burn) farming, xxxv,

82, 86, 89, 93, 99, 104, 106-7, 110, 112, 155; destruction by, 155, 164; prohibited, 86, 118, 145, 152-53, 156, 164,

166; and relocation, 93, 105, 111, 118; schedules for, 119-20

Tai Dam language, 87

Tai Dam people, 95

Tai Deng language, 87

Tai Deng people, 95

Tai-Lao people, 89

Taillard, Christian, 104

Tai people, 262

Taiwan. See China, Republic of

taxes: on agriculture, 162, 180-81; col- lection of, 151, 180; on opium

exports, 28; as percentage of gross domestic product, 181; revenue from,

181

tax incentives, 194

tax reform, 181, 200

teachers, xxxiii, 134, 135 telecommunications, 175, 179-80; under New Economic Mechanism, 152, 173

telephones, 179

television, 179-80; state control of, xxxvii; Thai broadcasts, 239 Thai Isan people, 91 Thailand {see also Siam) , 137; blockade

by, 48, 50; border with, xxix, xxxv, 4, 81; border problems with, 4, 73, 247, 284-86; broadcasts from, 239; diplo- matic relations with, xxxv; electricity exported to, xxxv, 168, 186, 188, 241; embargo by, 285; food aid from, 198; Hmong in, 110, 234, 283; import

duties of, 193; insurgents in, 286;

investment by, 169, 243, 248; joint ventures with, xxxv, 183, 194; Lao in, 104, 262; in Mekong River Commission,

xliii; nationalist threat from, 19-20; refugee camps in, xxxv, xxxvii, 92,

110, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 286; refu- gees in, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, 92, 110,

129, 234, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 286;

relations with, xxxv, 73, 240, 244, 246, 247-49, 261,284-86; state visits to, 248; study abroad in, 242; support of, for

insurgents, 277; trade with, xxxv, 152,

188, 189, 190 Thai Military Bank, 184 Thammayano, 70 Tham Sayasithena, 21 Thao O Anourack, 29-30, 31 That Luang festival, 120, 128, 130 Thongdy Sounthonvichit, 21 Thongvin Phomvihan, 209 Tiantha Koumane, King, 14 Tiao Sisoumang Sisaleumsak, 51-52, 69

Tiao Souk Vongsak, 32 Tibeto-Burmese language group, 88 timber {see also forestry): export of,

xxxiii, xxxv, 118, 161, 188-89; logging

of, 160-62; industry, 167; state export

monopoly on, 192

tin, 170, 188, 241 Tin Lao (News of Laos) , 21 topography, 81-82 Touby Lyfoung, 27, 69

tourism, 173, 196 trade {see also balance of payments;

exports; imports), 187-93, 250; of

agricultural products, 162; control of,

358
Index

192; cooperation, xxxiv; deficit, 188, 190-91; foreign investment in, 196; and mandala, 5; opium, 177, 188; part- ners, 189-90, 249; pattern, 188; policy, 151, 192; private, 151, 172; regulations, 188; state-owned, 172-73; with Thailand, 152, 188; transit, 193; and

villages, 144; volume of, 188 Tran Ninh Phu Tarn Vien, 12

transportation, 174-79; air, 179; and cli- mate, xxix; of freight, 174, 175; motor

vehicles, 178; under New Economic

Mechanism, 152; price controls on,

173; roads, 175-78; routes, 85; upland,

177; water, 81,85,174, 178

travel: problems of, 120, 200; restrictions on, 123,215, 233,289

Treaty Between France and Siam (1907) , 19 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

(Laos and Vietnam) (1977), 73, 245,

261, 283

treaty of protectorate (France and

Annam) (1884), 15

trials, 289-90 Truman, Harry S., 25 Tu Due, 14 UN. See United Nations UNDP. See United Nations Development

Programme

Unger, Leonard, 46 UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF. See United Nations Children's Fund

United Nations, 36, 240, 243, 254 United Nations Children's Fund

(UNICEF), 137, 141,256

United Nations Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) , xxxix United Nations Development Pro- gramme (UNDP), xliii, 240; aid from,

169, 198, 255-56; crop substitution program, xxxix United Nations Drug Control Program,

256, 292 United Nations Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO), 198, 256 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), xxxviii, 92, 235,

256 United States: advisers from, 52, 58-60;

aid from, xxxi, 40, 46-47, 70-71 , 252; bombing by, 62; counternarcotics certification, xxxix-xl, 253, 286, 293-94;

covert missions of, 37, 46-47, 48, 58-

60, 266; crop substitution program,

xxxix, 197-98, 253, 292-93; diplo- matic missions of, 49-50; economic

relations with, xliii, 197-98; evacuation of Hmong by, 66, 282; exploration by, for petroleum products, 170; food aid from, 198, 252; at Geneva

Conference (1954), 35; at Geneva

Conference (1961-62), 56; influences

of, 227; and Kingdom of Laos, 31;

materiel from, 265, 266; migration to, 92; military assistance from, 37, 40^2,

48-49, 53-54, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269-

70, 281; and opium production, 71-

72, 253; policy, 38-39, 42-43, 48-50; POW/MIA issues, xxxix, 63, 64, 286-

87; refugees in, 252; relations with,

xxxix, 70-72, 240, 251-54, 286-87; in Second Indochina War, 4, 240; study abroad in, 242; trade with, 190 United States Agency for International Development (AID), 252 United States Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), 46, 58, 63, 234, 268 United States Civil Air Transport, 46 United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 253, 294 United States Information Agency

(USIA), 252 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 46 United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 24, 25 United States Peace Corps, 252 United States Programs Evaluation

Office (PEO), 37, 42, 266 urban areas, 79, 93-94, 120-24; agricul- ture in, 122; amenities and services in, 123; electricity in, 123; migration to, 123; percentage of population in, 121;

as provincial capitals, 93-94, 122 USIA. See United States Information

Agency

utilities, 173, 184 Vang Pao, 53, 60, 66, 249, 265, 268, 279-

359
Laos: A Country Study

80, 282

Vannasin, 238 Van Tuong. See Vientiane

Vessantara, 126-28

Viangchan. S<?<? Vientiane Vientiane (city): facilities in, 93; farming

in, 122; growth of, 121; population of, 93, 120

Vientiane, Kingdom of: destruction of, 9, 263; relations of, with Annam, 10; Siamese campaigns against, 9-10; under Siamese rule, 10-12; under

Vietnamese rule, 12 Vientiane, principality of {see also Candapuri),xxx, 5, 9, 239

Vientiane Agreement (1973) , 62-63, 64

Vientiane Mai (Vientiane News), 238

Viet Minh, 24; at Geneva Conference

(1954), 35; invasion by, in 1954, 34, 264-65; in Laos, 32; military operations of, 33-34, 43; withdrawal of, 265 Vietnam: conflicts with, xxix; immigration from, 4; invasions from, 9, 10; relations of, with Siam, 12; relations

with, 239, 263; as territorial threat, 3 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of: advis- ers from, 207-8, 245; aid from, xxxiv, 197, 251; border with, xxix, 73, 82; Hmong in, 110, 262; influence of, 215, 244-45; intervention by, 240; invasions

by, xxxi, 42-44, 241, 282; Lao in, 104; materiel from, xli, 245, 284; in Mekong River Commission, xliii; mili- tary aid from, xli, 51 , 52-53, 276; political support from, 48; propaganda by, 58; relations with, 42, 54, 73, 214, 239, 240, 244-47, 261, 283; secret police of, 288; study abroad in, 136; Tai in, 262; technical assistance from, 238; trade

with, 189; training by, 245, 273, 284; troops of, in Laos, 58, 65, 73, 240, 245,

265, 277, 283-84 Vietnam, North. See Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, People's Army of, Political and

Military Institute, xli Vietnam, Republic of: relations with, 42 Vietnam, South. See Vietnam, Republic

of Vietnamese people: anti-French activities of, 24; education of, 133; in Laotian

civil service, 23, 227; as refugees, 122

Vietnamese Communist Party, 213 Vietnam-Laos Cooperative Commission,

245

villages, xxxii, xxxiii, 79, 93-95; controlled by Pathet Lao, 48, 55-56; cooperation in, 144; location of, 122; party branches in, 212; poverty in, 143-44; relocation of, 60, 93, 95-96, 113; schools in, 134; self-sufficiency in, 143-44, 145; and social identity, 79;

social stratification in, 117, 145; social welfare in, 142; society, 79; and trade, 144; mat in, 128, 145

villages, Hmong: farming in, 112, 113-

14; geographic distribution of, 111; government, 117; houses in, 112; loca- tions of, 111; relocation of, 113, 119;

size of, 111; social stratification in, 117, 145

villages, Kammu, 105-6

villages, Lamet, 105-6

villages, lowland, 95-96, 98-102, 104; education in, 80; government of, 100-

101; household tasks in, 100; houses

in, 96, 102; labor exchange in, 101-2;

projects, 101; religion in, 101, 104;

self-sufficiency in, 99, 145; social status

in, 100; watin, 101, 102

villages, midland, 105-6; agriculture in, 106-7; geographic distribution of, 105; government of, 109; religion in, 109; relocation of, 105; size of, 105

villages, upland, 110-19; agriculture in, 111, 112, 113-14; ethnic relations in, 118; geographic distribution of, 111; government of, 118; houses in, 112;

relocation of, 111, 118; social stratifi- cation in, 117-18, 145 Vixakha Bouxa festival, 126 Vo Nguyen Giap, 264-65

wat, 126,128, 145 Wat Pho, 82 Whitehouse, Charles S., 71 widow(er)s, 98-99, 108 women: in armed forces, 276; education

of, 108; foreign aid for, 256; health of, 87; household tasks of, 100, 108-9,

116, 117; number of, as party members, 209; roles of, 108-9, 116-17 work force, 151; in agriculture, 154, 158, 163; in industry, 166; in manufactur360
Index

ing, 167; in service sector, 172 World Bank, 154; aid from, xxxiv-xxxv, 255-56 XamNua, 121 XatLao (The Lao Nation), 63 Xay Fong, 7 Xesetdam, 168 Xieng Dong Xieng Thong, 7 Xieng Mao (Khammao Vilay), 26, 29, 34

Xieng Pasason (Voice of the People), 219, 238 Yao people. S^Mien people

Zakarine (Kham Souk), 16

Zasloff, Joseph J., 290, 291 Zhong Zhua Her, 280 Zhou Enlai: at Geneva Conference

(1954), 35; support for agreements,

59

361

Contributors

Nicholas C. Auclair is a senior Asian military/political analyst

with the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

MacAlister Brown is Fairleigh S. Dickinson, Jr., Professor of

Political Science, Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts.

Arthur J. Dommen is Senior Associate, the Indochina Institute,

George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.

Joel M. Halpern is Professor Emeritus of Anthropology at the

University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Susannah Hopkins is a development consultant based in Vietnam, who works for multinational and nongovernmental

organizations.

W. Randall Ireson is a rural sociologist and independent development consultant based in Salem, Oregon.

Andrea Matles Savada is Supervisor, Asia/West Europe Unit,

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Joseph J. Zasloff is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

363

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-52 Ecuador

550-98 Albania 550-43 Egypt

550-44 Algeria 550-150 El Salvador

550-59 Angola 550-28 Ethiopia

550-73 Argentina 550-167 Finland

550-111 Armenia, Azerbaijan, 550-173 Germany, East and Georgia

550-169 Australia 550-155 Germany, Fed. Rep. of

550-176 Austria 550-153 Ghana

550-175 Bangladesh 550-87 Greece

550-170 Belgium 550-78 Guatemala

550-66 Bolivia 550-174 Guinea

550-20 Brazil 550-82 Guyana and Belize

550-168 Bulgaria 550-151 Honduras

550-61 Burma 550-165 Hungary

550-50 Cambodia 550-21 India

550-166 Cameroon 550-154 Indian Ocean

550-159 Chad 550-39 Indonesia

550-77 Chile 550-68 Iran 550-60 China 550-31 Iraq

550-26 Colombia 550-25 Israel

550-33 Commonwealth Carib- 550-182 Italy

bean, Islands of the 550-91 Congo 550-30 Japan

550-90 Costa Rica 550-34 Jordan

550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory 550-56 Kenya

Coast)

550-152 Cuba 550-81 Korea, North

550-22 Cyprus 550-41 Korea, South

550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-58 Laos

550-36 Dominican Republic 550-24 Lebanon

and Haiti

365
550-38 Liberia 550-180 Sierra Leone

550-85 Libya 550-184 Singapore

JJU— ssn 179 1 /z IVldidWl 550—86 oUllldlla cca /ic J JU—4J lvldidybld 550 cn J JU—^

J

oUULLl /\illCa

CCA jjU—101 Mauritania JjU—yJ ooviei union

550-79 Mexico 550-179 Spain

550-76 Mongolia 550-96 Sri Lanka

ccn ac\ jjU—4y Morocco J550ju—z97

/

Sudan

cca /oi J JU—04 Mozambique JJU 550-47t / ccn JJU—JJ Nepal and Bhutan JJU 550-69 —UZ Tomania

550-88 Nicaragua 550-53 Thailand

550-157 Nigeria 550-89 Tunisia ccn QA JJU— Oceania 550-80 Turkey

CCA /lO Pakistan 550-74 T ToanHn

C CA /I /C 550-46 Panama j550-Q7 jvj—y i ui ug uay

550-156 Paraguay 550-71 Venezuela

550-185 Persian Gulf States 550-32 Vietnam

CCA /lO Peru 550-183 Yemens, The

JjU— /

Z

r llllippillcb 550-99 Yugoslavia

j ju—1^9 ioz JrUldilU 550-67 Zaire

550-181 Portiicral 550-75 Zambia

550-160 Romania 550-171 Zimbabwe

550-37 Rwanda and Burundi

550-51 Saudi Arabia

550-70 Senegal

366





PIN: 004226-000