a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

August 2003 FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE

Strategic Workforce 

Planning Can Help 

USAID Address 

Current and Future 

Challenges

GAO-03-946
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff directly 

implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-hire staff oversee 

the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992, the number of USAID U.S. 

direct-hire staff declined by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID 

programs almost doubled and, over the last 2 years, program funding increased 

more than 50 percent. As a result of these and other changes in its workforce 

and its mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several 

human capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign 

service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes led to 

the deployment of staff who lack essential skills and experience. The agency 

also lacks a “surge capacity” to respond to evolving foreign policy priorities and 

emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff managing more 

programs in more countries, USAID’s ability to oversee the delivery of foreign 

assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. 

USAID has taken steps toward developing a workforce planning and human 

capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges 

and achieve its mission in response to the President’s Management Agenda, but 

it needs to do more. For example, USAID has begun its workforce analysis but it 

has not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of the skills and 

competencies of its current workforce and has not yet included its civil service 

and contracted employees in its workforce planning efforts. Because USAID has 

not adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning, it cannot ensure that it 

has addressed its workforce challenges appropriately and identified the right 

skill mix to carry out its assistance programs. 

USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 

 

USAID U.S. direct hires 1992 2002 

Percentage 

change 

Total number 3,163 1,985 (37) 

Number assigned overseas 1,082 631 (42) 

Number of countries receiving USAID 

assistance with U.S. direct-hire 

presence 66 71 7 

Number of countries receiving USAID 

assistance with no U.S. direct-hire 

presence 16 88 450 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

The U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) oversees 

humanitarian and economic 

assistance—an integral part of the 

U.S. global security strategy—to 

more than 160 countries. GAO 

recommended in 1993 that USAID 

develop a comprehensive 

workforce plan; however, human 

capital management continues to 

be a high-risk area for the agency. 

GAO was asked to examine how 

changes in USAID’s workforce over 

the past 10 years have affected the 

agency’s ability to deliver foreign 

aid and to assess its progress in 

implementing a strategic workforce 

planning system. 

To help USAID plan for changes in 

its workforce and continue 

operations in an uncertain 

environment, we recommend that 

the USAID Administrator develop 

and institutionalize a strategic 

workforce planning and 

management system that takes 

advantage of strategic workforce 

planning principles. 

USAID noted that our report 

captured its complex workforce 

issues and agreed with our findings 

and recommendations. USAID also 

referred to a recently formed team 

that will carry out a comprehensive 

workforce analysis and planning 

effort to identify and address its 

workforce needs. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-946.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-946, a report to 

congressional requesters 

August 2003 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help 

USAID Address Current and Future 

Challenges 
Page i GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

USAID’s Changing Workforce Affects Ability to Deliver Foreign 

Assistance 6

USAID’s Progress in Implementing Strategic Workforce Planning 

Principles Is Limited 15

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 22

Scope and Methodology 22

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendix I Selected Reports Related to USAID’s Workforce 

Planning 25 

Appendix II USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs 

Locations 27 

Appendix III Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 31 

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 32 

GAO Contacts 32

Acknowledgments 32

Table 

Table 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 

2002 11 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Figures 

Figure 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Workforce and Program Funding 

Levels, Fiscal Years 1990-2003 7

Figure 2: USAID’s Workforce Profile as of December 31, 2002 8

Figure 3: Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning 15

Abbreviations 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

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Page 1 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

August 22, 2003 

The Honorable Christopher Shays, Chairman 

The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich, Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

 International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Humanitarian and economic development assistance is an integral part of 

U.S. global security strategy, particularly as the United States seeks to 

diminish the underlying conditions of poverty and corruption that may be 

linked to instability and terrorism. Since 1962, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) has managed more than $273 billion 

in such assistance.1

 In fiscal year 2003, Congress appropriated almost 

$11.5 billion to USAID, and the agency managed programs in almost 160 

countries. Agency staff often work in difficult environments and under 

evolving program demands. More will be demanded of USAID’s staff as 

they implement large-scale relief and reconstruction programs in 

Afghanistan and Iraq while continuing traditional long-term development 

assistance programs. 

USAID administers foreign aid through a decentralized staffing structure, 

with its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and missions located 

throughout the world. In 1993, we recommended that USAID develop a 

comprehensive workforce planning and management system to better 

identify staffing needs and requirements.2

 However, human capital 

management continues to be a high-risk area at USAID and throughout 

much of the federal government.3

 According to the Office of Management 

Budget (OMB), the federal government—including USAID—significantly 

 1

U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and 

Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2001. Figure 

equals $541 billion in fiscal year 2003 dollars and includes USAID’s Food for Peace and title 

II section 416 emergency and development programs. 

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic Direction and 

Continued Management Improvements Needed, GAO/NSIAD-93-106 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 11, 1993). 

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2001). 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

downsized its workforce during the 1990s through across-the-board cuts 

rather than targeted reductions aligned with agency missions, and human 

resources planning remains weak in most agencies. The President’s 

Management Agenda, issued in fiscal year 2002, represents the 

administration’s effort to improve the performance of federal departments 

and agencies through 14 initiatives, including human capital management. 

OMB concluded that without proper planning, the skill mix of the federal 

workforce will not reflect tomorrow’s missions.4

In light of USAID’s long-standing workforce planning and management 

problems, you expressed concern about its ability to manage and oversee 

its foreign assistance programs. In particular, you expressed concern 

about USAID’s apparent inability to identify and readily address staffing 

requirements. At your request, we examined (1) the changes in USAID’s 

workforce since fiscal year 1990 and their effect on the agency’s ability to 

deliver foreign assistance and (2) USAID’s progress in developing and 

implementing a strategic workforce planning system. 

To accomplish our objectives, we analyzed personnel data and workforce 

planning documents and interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials 

representing the agency’s regional, technical, and management bureaus in 

Washington, D.C. We conducted fieldwork at seven overseas missions—

the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and the 

West Africa Regional Program in Mali. We also evaluated USAID’s 

strategic workforce planning efforts in terms of workforce planning 

principles used by leading organizations: ensuring the involvement of 

agency leadership, employees, and stakeholders; determining current 

skills and competencies and those needed; implementing strategies to 

address critical staffing needs; and evaluating progress in achieving human 

capital goals. 

Since 1990, USAID has continued to evolve from an agency in which U.S. 

direct-hire foreign service employees directly implemented development 

projects to one with a declining number of direct-hire staff that oversee 

the contractors and grantees who carry out most of its day-to-day 

activities. Personal services contractors—chiefly foreign national staff at 

overseas missions—play an increasing role in managing the development 

 4

Office of Management and Budget, The President’s Management Agenda, Fiscal Year 

2002. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

activities that are designed, implemented, and evaluated mainly by thirdparty contractors and grantees. As direct-hire staff levels decreased by 

37 percent since fiscal year 1992, the number of countries with USAID 

programs almost doubled, and program funding recently increased more 

than 57 percent—from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to almost 

$11.5 billion in fiscal year 2003. As a result of the decreases in U.S. directhire foreign service staff levels, increasing program demands, and a mostly 

ad hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID now faces several human 

capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of its more experienced 

foreign service officers, difficulty in filling overseas positions, and limited 

opportunities for training and mentoring have sometimes led to (1) the 

deployment of direct-hire staff who lack essential skills and experience 

and (2) the reliance on contractors to perform most overseas functions. In 

addition, USAID lacks a “surge capacity” to enable it to respond quickly to 

emerging crises and changing strategic priorities. As a result, according to 

USAID officials and a recent overseas staffing assessment, the agency is 

finding it increasingly difficult to manage the delivery of foreign 

assistance. 

In response to the President’s Management Agenda, USAID has taken 

steps toward developing a comprehensive workforce planning and human 

capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its 

challenges and achieve its mission, but progress has been limited. In 

evaluating USAID’s efforts in terms of proven strategic workforce planning 

principles, USAID has more to do. For example: 

• The involvement of USAID leadership, employees, and stakeholders in 

developing and communicating a strategic workforce plan has been 

mixed. USAID’s human resource office is drafting a human capital 

strategy, but it has not yet been finalized or approved by such stakeholders 

as OMB and the Office of Personnel Management. As a result, we cannot 

comment on whether USAID employees and other stakeholders will have 

an active role in developing and communicating the agency’s workforce 

strategies. 

• USAID has begun identifying the core competencies its future workforce 

will need and is conducting a workforce analysis and planning pilot at 

three headquarters units that will include an analysis of current skills and 

will eventually cover the entire workforce. However, it has not yet 

conducted a comprehensive assessment of the critical skills and 

competencies of its current workforce. USAID is in the process of 

determining the appropriate information technology instrument and 
Page 4 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

methodology that will permit the assessment of its current workforce 

skills and competencies. 

• USAID’s strategies to address critical skill gaps are not comprehensive and 

have not been based on a critical analysis of current capabilities matched 

with future requirements. USAID has begun hiring foreign service officers 

and Presidential Management Interns to replace staff lost through attrition. 

However, the agency has not completed its civil service recruitment plan 

and has not yet included personal services contractors—the largest 

segment of its workforce—in its agencywide workforce analysis and 

planning efforts. 

• USAID has not created a system to monitor and evaluate its progress 

toward reaching its human capital goals and ensuring that its efforts 

continue under the leadership of successive administrators. 

Because it has not yet institutionalized a comprehensive workforce 

planning and management system, USAID cannot ensure that it has the 

essential skills needed to carry out its ongoing and future programs. 

To help USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue operations 

in an uncertain environment, we recommend that the USAID 

Administrator develop and institutionalize a strategic workforce planning 

and management system that takes advantage of strategic workforce 

planning principles. 

USAID is the lead U.S. agency for administering humanitarian and 

economic assistance to about 160 countries. The USAID Administrator 

reports to the Secretary of State and receives overall foreign policy 

guidance from the Department of State. USAID operates its foreign 

assistance programs from its offices in Washington, D.C., and from 

missions and offices around the world. 

In 1993, we reported that USAID had not adequately managed changes in 

its overseas workforce and recommended that USAID develop a 

comprehensive workforce planning and management system to better 

identify staffing needs and requirements.5

 5

GAO/NSIAD-93-106. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

In the mid-1990s, USAID reorganized its activities around strategic 

objectives and began reporting in a results-oriented format but had made 

little progress in personnel reforms.6

 In July 2002, we reported that USAID 

could not quickly relocate or hire the staff needed to implement a largescale reconstruction and recovery program in Latin America, and we 

recommended actions to help improve USAID’s staffing flexibility for 

future disaster recovery requirements.7

 Appendix I summarizes several 

reports and studies prepared by GAO and others since 1989 that address 

USAID workforce planning and human capital management issues. 

Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that highly 

successful service organizations in both the public and private sectors use 

effective strategic management approaches to prepare their workforces to 

meet present and future mission requirements. We define strategic 

workforce planning as focusing on long-term strategies for acquiring, 

developing, and retaining an organization’s workforce and aligning human 

capital approaches that are clearly linked to achieving programmatic 

goals. Based on work with the Office of Personnel Management, other U.S. 

government agencies, the National Academy for Public Administration, 

and the International Personnel Management Association, we identified 

strategic workforce planning principles used by leading organizations. 

According to these principles, an organization’s strategic workforce 

planning and management system should (1) involve senior management, 

employees, and stakeholders in developing, communicating, and 

implementing the workforce plan; (2) determine the agency’s current 

critical skills and competencies and those needed to achieve program 

results; (3) develop strategies to address gaps in critical skills and 

competencies; and (4) monitor and evaluate progress and the contribution 

of strategic workforce planning efforts in achieving program goals. 

 6

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of USAID’s Reforms, GAONSIAD-241-BR (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 1996); Foreign Assistance: USAID’s 

Reengineering at Overseas Missions, GAO/NSIAD-97-194 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 

1997). 

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program 

Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its 

Response Capability, GAO-02-787 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002). 
Page 6 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

USAID has changed from an agency of U.S. direct-hires that largely 

provided direct, hands-on implementation of development projects to one 

that manages and oversees the activities of contractors and grantees. 

During the past decade, this trend has affected USAID’s ability to 

implement its foreign assistance program as the number of U.S. direct-hire 

foreign service officers declined and much of USAID’s direct-hire 

workforce was replaced by foreign national personal services contractors. 

In addition, while program funding remained relatively stable from fiscal 

year 1990 through fiscal year 2000, it increased from $7.3 billion in fiscal 

year 2001 to $11.5 billion in fiscal year 2003, and USAID’s fewer direct 

hires are now responsible for programs in more countries with little or no 

resident U.S. direct-hire presence. Moreover, USAID operates in a difficult 

and uncertain environment that presents unique challenges to its ability to 

plan and manage its overseas workforce. Because USAID did not have a 

strategic workforce planning system while these changes were underway, 

several human capital vulnerabilities have surfaced. For example, an 

across-the-board reduction in force for both the foreign service and the 

civil service, followed by a 5-year decline in the number of U.S. directhires, has left the agency with critical shortages of experienced mid-level 

staff and in the pipeline of junior staff. In addition, 37 positions remain 

vacant, and opportunities for training and mentoring staff are limited, 

sometimes forcing the placement of staff who may lack essential skills and 

experience. USAID also lacks a “surge” capacity to help it deal with 

emerging crises and changing strategic priorities. According to USAID 

documents and our discussions with agency officials, these vulnerabilities 

are making it increasingly difficult for the agency to adequately manage 

and oversee its foreign assistance activities. 

USAID’s U.S. direct-hire workforce decreased from about 8,600 in 1962 to 

about 3,162 in 1990. USAID could not continue its hands-on project 

approach as the number of U.S. direct hires, including foreign service staff, 

declined and responsibilities for planning, financing, and monitoring 

projects shifted to contractors, grantees, and host country governments. 

As figure 1 shows, this trend has continued as the number of U.S. directhire staff further decreased to 1,985 by December 2002. The number of 

foreign national employees—both direct-hires and personal services 

contractors—also decreased from 5,211 in fiscal year 1995 to 4,725 in 

fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, while program funding levels remained 

relatively stable for most of this period, program funding increased 

57 percent from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $11.5 billion in fiscal year 

2003. 

USAID’s Changing 

Workforce Affects 

Ability to Deliver 

Foreign Assistance 

USAID Staff Functions 

Have Evolved from 

Implementation to 

Management 
Page 7 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Figure 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Workforce and Program Funding Levels, Fiscal Years 1990-2003 

Notes: Workforce data exclude the Office of the Inspector General. 

U.S. direct-hire data for fiscal year 2003 are as of December 31, 2002. 

Program funding information is in constant fiscal year 2003 appropriated dollars. Program funding 

includes supplementals and money appropriated to the U.S. Department of Agriculture for Title II and 

Title III food programs administered by USAID. Fiscal year 1990 also includes Title I funding, but after 

January 1, 1991, the funds were administered by the Department of Agriculture. Program funding 

does not include operating expenses and is not adjusted for deobligations/reobligations, rescissions, 

transfers, or miscellaneous trust funds. 

As numbers of U.S. direct-hire staff declined, mission directors began 

relying on other types of employees, primarily foreign national personal 

services contractors, to manage mission operations and oversee 

development activities implemented by third parties. In December 2002, 

according to USAID’s staffing report, the agency’s workforce totaled 7,741, 
Page 8 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

including 1,985 U.S. direct hires.8 Personal services contractors made up 

more than two-thirds of USAID’s total workforce, including 4,653 foreign 

national contractors (see fig. 2). Of the 1,985 U.S. direct hires, 974 were 

foreign service officers, about 65 percent of whom were posted overseas. 

Figure 2: USAID’s Workforce Profile as of December 31, 2002 

Note: “Other” includes fellows and U.S. government staff from other agencies employed under 

participating agency service agreements and resource support service agreements. 

For our analysis, we used the workforce definition developed by USAID’s 

1990 Workforce Planning Working Group. This group defined the agency’s 

workforce as those who have a direct employer-employee relationship 

with USAID. This includes the following staff categories: 

• U.S. citizen direct-hire civil service in Washington, D.C.; 

• U.S. citizen direct-hire foreign service, most of whom serve at overseas 

missions; 

 8

All figures exclude the staff of USAID’s Office of the Inspector General, which includes 95 

foreign service officers (51 posted overseas) and 76 civil service staff in Washington, D.C. 
Page 9 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

• foreign national (non-U.S. citizen) direct hires, whom USAID can employ 

overseas for any foreign service-related mission, program, or activity;9

 and 

• personal services contractors, both U.S. and foreign nationals, who are 

individuals on contract with USAID for the specific services of that 

individual only.10

In addition, USAID includes in its monthly staffing report other types of 

nondirect-hire staff with an employer-employee relationship, such as staff 

detailed from a number of organizations and other U.S. government 

agencies and centrally contracted technical advisors. 

Other individuals not directly employed by USAID also perform a wide 

range of services in support of the agency’s programs. These individuals 

include employees of institutional or services contractors, private 

voluntary organizations, and grantees.11 Last year, we reported that USAID 

relies heavily on nongovernmental organizations to deliver foreign 

assistance.12 In fiscal year 2000, USAID directed about $4 billion of its 

$7.2 billion assistance funding to nongovernmental organizations, 

including at least $1 billion to private voluntary organizations (charities) 

working overseas. We further noted that, although USAID generally 

chooses funding mechanisms that delegate a large amount of program 

control to implementing organizations, it has not compiled data on its use 

of specific types of funding or evaluated their effectiveness. In addition to 

hiring third parties to implement its programs, USAID also contracts with 

outside organizations to provide contract management and oversight of 

large programs. As we reported in July 2002,13 the agency hired several 

 9

Most foreign national direct-hire staff have been converted to personal services 

contractors. 

10The Federal Acquisition Regulations define a personal services contract as one that 

makes the contractor appear as a government employee by the nature of the relationship 

that is established. USAID is authorized by section 636(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act 

of 1961, as amended, to contract with individuals for personal services abroad. USAID’s 

personal services contractors may be U.S. citizens, host-country nationals, or third-country 

nationals. 

11In 1990, USAID estimated that this extended workforce was approximately 10,000 

individuals. For this report, USAID was unable to provide an estimate. 

12U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: USAID Relies Heavily on 

Nongovernmental Organizations, but Better Data Needed to Evaluate Approaches, 

GAO-02-471 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2002). 

13GAO-02-787. 
Page 10 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

firms to manage and oversee some of the contractors and grantees 

conducting USAID hurricane reconstruction activities in Latin America. At 

present, USAID is also planning to hire outside parties to oversee the 

large-scale contracts recently awarded for reconstruction activities in Iraq. 

Despite the reliance on personal services and institutional contractors, 

USAID officials maintain that the direct-hire foreign service officer is still 

the core of mission staffing. He or she works toward achieving U.S. foreign 

policy goals, gives direction to the country program, brings corporate 

knowledge and a better understanding of agency guidance to the mission, 

and provides the authority needed to work effectively with host country 

counterparts and other U.S. government agencies. The quality and 

deployment of foreign national contractors can vary among missions and 

regions. U.S. personal services contractors are an important means for 

filling mission positions when U.S. direct hires are not available. 

According to USAID regulations, the terms of their contracts essentially 

allow personal services contractors to perform almost the same duties as 

U.S. government employees. About two-thirds work in technical positions, 

but many serve as program and project development officers, controllers, 

executive officers, and, occasionally, temporary mission directors—

positions that USAID considers inherently governmental. According to 

USAID officials, as a matter of policy, the agency rarely delegates 

inherently governmental functions. 

According to mission officials, U.S. and foreign national contractors are an 

integral part of the mission workforce, but they cannot replace the agency 

commitment and experience that U.S. direct-hire foreign service officers 

bring to the mission. In addition to filling in for U.S. direct-hire staff, 

contractors, particularly foreign nationals, typically make a career at 

USAID and provide needed continuity and corporate knowledge of the 

country programs. However, officials noted that, compared to direct-hire 

staff, personal services contractors generally do not have the same level of 

agency commitment; do not fully understand how the agency works and 

the political pressures that it faces in Washington, D.C.; are not subject to 

the same degree of accountability; and have limited administrative and 

decisional authorities. Furthermore, contractors cannot supervise U.S. 

direct-hire staff, even if the contractor is very experienced and the directhire is new to USAID. This further limits the training and mentoring 

opportunities for new staff. 

In addition to having reduced the number of U.S. direct hires, USAID now 

manages programs in more countries with no U.S. direct-hire presence, 

and its overseas structure has become more regional. Table 1 illustrates 
Page 11 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

the changes in USAID’s U.S. direct-hire overseas presence between fiscal 

years 1992 and 2002. In fiscal year 1992, USAID managed activities in 88 

countries with no U.S. direct-hire presence. According to USAID, in some 

cases, activities in these countries are very small and require little 

management by USAID staff. However, in 45 of these countries USAID 

manages programs of $1 million or more, representing a more significant 

management burden on the agency. USAID also increasingly provides 

administrative and program support to countries from regional service 

platforms, which have increased from 2 to 26 between fiscal years 1992 

and 2002.14 Appendix II contains a complete list of the countries in which 

USAID operates. 

Table 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 

USAID U.S. direct hires 1992 2002

Percentage 

change 

Total number 3,163a 1,985b (37) 

Number assigned overseas 1,082a 631b(42) 

Number of countries receiving USAID 

assistance with U.S. direct-hire presence 66c

 71d 7 

Number of countries receiving USAID 

assistance with no U.S. direct-hire presence 16c

 88d450 

Sources: USAID and GAO. 

a

USAID’s Monthly Workforce Profile Report, data as of September 30, 1992. 

b

USAID’s Quarterly Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report, data as of December 31, 2002. 

c

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: A Profile of the Agency for International 

Development, GAO/NSIAD-92-148 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3, 1992). 

d

USAID’s Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination data provided in May 2003. USAID staff 

cautioned that this information was gathered last year and may not be up to date. 

Our data collection efforts in the field and at headquarters revealed the 

unique environment in which USAID missions operate and its effect on 

workforce planning and management efforts. With the exception of Egypt, 

the missions we visited did not prepare formal and separate workforce 

plans. USAID missions tend to be relatively small—mission directors and 

 14Services include legal, executive office, financial/controller, procurement, and program 

and project development support services. Services vary among the 26 platforms due to 

security, ease of travel, and other local concerns. For example, the regional office in Kenya 

provides all services to up to 14 countries, while the Honduras mission simply shares a 

contracts officer with Nicaragua. 

USAID’s Environment 

Affects Workforce 

Planning Capabilities 
Page 12 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

office heads have almost daily contact with the staff and are familiar with 

their skills and capabilities. Missions conduct their workforce planning 

and staffing projections in conjunction with their long-term—normally 5-

year—country development strategies. Missions provide information on 

resource needs in their annual reports and budget submissions to their 

respective regional bureaus. USAID’s Bureau for Policy and Program 

Coordination allots staff years and funding to the regional bureaus, which 

then apportion these resources among their headquarters offices and 

overseas missions. According to the bureau, the average mission has six 

U.S. direct-hire staff. 

Officials noted the difficulties in adhering to a formal workforce plan 

linked to country strategies in an uncertain foreign policy environment. 

For example, following the events of September 11, 2001, the Middle East 

and sub-Saharan African missions we visited—Egypt, Mali, and Senegal—

received additional work not anticipated when they developed their 

country development strategies. Mali was seeking two additional personal 

services contractors during the time of our visit, including one to manage a 

new hunger initiative for Africa, and Egypt was in the process of 

determining the staff needed to implement the Middle East Partnership 

Initiative. In addition, the mission in Ecuador had been scheduled to close 

in fiscal year 2003. However, this decision was reversed due to political 

and economic events in Ecuador, including a coup in 2000, the collapse of 

the financial system, and rampant inflation. Program funding for Ecuador 

tripled from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2000, while staffing was reduced 

from 110 to 30 personnel and the budget for the mission’s operating 

expenses was reduced from $2.7 million to $1.37 million. 

Other factors unique to USAID’s overseas work environment can affect its 

ability to conduct workforce planning and attract and retain top staff. 

These factors vary from country to country and among regions. For 

example: 

• USAID officials in Mali told us that hardship missions find it much more 

difficult to attract U.S. staff.15 Foreign service staff in Mali receive a 

hardship pay differential rate of 25 percent and an additional 15 percent 

incentive pay. According to mission officials, these pay incentives are 

essential for attracting high-quality staff to Mali, and many of the staff with 

 15USAID considers selected missions in sub-Sahara Africa and other areas “difficult to staff” 

missions. To entice staff to take these assignments, USAID provides a differential pay 

incentive of 15 percent in addition to the regular pay differential for hardship missions. 
Page 13 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

whom we met acknowledged that the extra pay was a factor when they 

decided to bid on the Mali positions. 

• At several missions we visited—Egypt, Mali, and Peru—USAID officials 

told us that the salaries set for foreign national employees by the 

respective embassies make it difficult for missions to recruit and retain the 

country’s top professional talent.16 This was particularly true in the poorest 

countries with limited human resource capacities, such as Mali, where the 

mission director stated that it is becoming increasingly difficult to 

compete with international financial institutions and other donor 

organizations for the country’s most highly qualified professionals. 

• Officials at all the missions we visited said that lengthy clearance 

processes make it difficult to obtain staff in a timely manner and manage 

their workforces. U.S. direct-hire staff and personal services contractors 

must obtain both a security clearance and a medical clearance before they 

report to work. As we reported in July 2002,17 in many cases it took 6 

months to a year to hire personal services contractors for the emergency 

hurricane reconstruction program in Latin America, and much of that time 

was spent waiting for clearances. 

• USAID officials in several countries—particularly Ecuador, Mali, and 

Senegal—also cited the agency’s separately appropriated operating 

expense budget as a factor in their ability to support and train U.S. directhire staff.18 USAID missions are supposed to pay for all U.S. direct-hire 

local expenses—such as housing, dependents’ education, travel, and 

training—from its operating expense budgets and not from program funds. 

According to mission officials, operating expense funds have not kept 

pace with rising fixed costs, such as rent, facilities management, and 

foreign national salaries and benefits. As a result, missions often opt for 

contractor staff who can be paid from program funds. In addition, tight 

operating expense funds and the limited number of U.S. direct-hire staff on 

board have led some missions to restrict training opportunities for U.S. 

direct-hire staff. Officials at the Mali and Senegal missions cited 

availability of training for direct-hire staff as one of their major workforce 

challenges. 

 16Embassies generally set the grading and pay scales for foreign national employees. 

Embassies’ local hires are generally lower-graded personnel, such as administrative staff, 

maintenance workers, and drivers, while USAID must employ these staff as well as seniorlevel economists and other technical experts and professionals. 

17GAO-02-787. 

18We plan to issue a separate report on the use of USAID’s operating expense account. 
Page 14 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Because USAID has not responded to its changing workforce requirements 

with a strategic workforce planning approach, its ability to carry out its 

mission has been weakened. In response to a combination of poor 

technology investments and other budgetary pressures in the mid-1990s, 

USAID implemented a reduction in force and froze hiring. However, the 

downsizing was conducted across the board and was not linked to a 

strategic vision or skills analysis. The agency lost a cadre of experienced 

foreign service officers and 5 years elapsed before new staff were hired to 

replace them. USAID officials noted that the downsizings of the last 

decade have resulted in an insufficient pipeline of junior and mid-level 

staff with the experience to take on senior positions. As a result, several 

human capital vulnerabilities have surfaced but have not been 

systematically addressed. For example: 

• Increased attrition of U.S. direct hires since the reduction in force in the 

mid-1990s led to the loss of the most experienced foreign service officers, 

while the hiring freeze stopped the pipeline of new hires at the junior level. 

The shortage of junior and mid-level officers to staff frontline jobs and a 

number of unfilled positions have created difficulties at some overseas 

missions. 

• Having fewer U.S. direct hires managing more programs in more countries 

has resulted in a workforce that is overstretched, raising concerns about 

USAID’s ability to provide effective accountability for program results and 

financial management. As of December 31, 2002, USAID reported it had 

631 U.S. direct-hire staff overseas compared to 1,082 at the end of fiscal 

year 1992. However, USAID has not conducted a comprehensive workload 

analysis to determine the extent to which staff may be overburdened or 

unable to perform all required tasks. 

• USAID does not have a “surge capacity” to respond to emergencies; postconflict situations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq; or new strategic 

priorities, such as Pakistan and the Middle East. 

• USAID has generally recruited staff for their technical and development 

expertise, but they spend a significant portion of their time managing 

contracts and grants, a responsibility for which some staff have limited 

skills or training. 

• Funding limitations and the shortage of U.S direct hires at USAID missions 

have curtailed opportunities for on-the-job and formal training and 

mentoring for both new staff and those taking on the most senior mission 

positions. Those who have the knowledge and experience have little time 

for training and mentoring, and the missions do not have enough staff who 

Inadequate Attention to 

Workforce Planning Has 

Affected USAID’s Ability to 

Deliver Foreign Assistance 
Page 15 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

can cover the tasks of those in training. This has forced USAID to assign 

increasing numbers of less experienced staff overseas who may not have 

the essential skills. 

• According to senior USAID officials, the reductions in direct-hire foreign 

service staff have limited the agency’s ability to plan for emerging 

development issues because staff must spend most of their time preparing 

paperwork and monitoring activities. For example, USAID did not have 

adequate staff with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to quickly deal with 

such emerging issues as famine and human immunodeficiency 

virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome. Although the agency 

eventually caught up with these issues, its ability to anticipate 

development trends and demands has decreased. 

USAID does not have a systematic method for determining its workforce 

needs and for implementing strategies that will enable its staff to meet the 

agency’s numerous challenges and accomplish its strategic mission. 

USAID is making limited progress in addressing the four principles for 

effective strategic workforce planning that we identified as key practices 

(see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning 

USAID’s Progress in 

Implementing 

Strategic Workforce 

Planning Principles Is 

Limited 
Page 16 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

USAID’s senior management is developing a human capital strategy to 

respond to the President’s Management Agenda, but it has not identified 

how it will significantly involve employees and other stakeholders in 

developing and communicating the workforce strategies that result from 

its efforts. We found that strategic workforce planning is most likely to 

succeed if an agency’s leadership sets the overall direction and goals and 

involves employees and stakeholders in developing, communicating, and 

implementing workforce and human capital strategies. During the 1990s, 

USAID’s downsizing efforts and budgetary constraints took precedence 

over strategic workforce planning. Its human resource office was 

understaffed and lacked experience in strategic workforce planning, 

focusing mostly on collecting workforce data and hiring to replace staff 

lost through attrition. 

USAID’s leadership has attempted to reform its management systems. It 

established the Business Transformation Executive Committee in 

February 2002 to comply with the President’s Management Agenda’s 

initiatives, and it appointed a Chief Human Capital Officer in May 2003 as 

required by the Chief Human Capital Officers Act of 2002.19 In December 

2002, the business transformation committee formed a human capital 

subcommittee, consisting of senior program and human resource officials, 

to develop USAID’s human capital strategy. USAID’s human capital 

strategy has not been finalized or approved by the Office of Management 

and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management. In addition, we were 

unable to determine whether the draft human capital strategy is linked to 

the agency’s overall strategic plan, as we recommended in 1993. USAID’s 

strategic plan for fiscal years 2004 through 2009—a joint plan with the 

State Department—is also in draft and not planned for issuance until the 

end of fiscal year 2003. 

In addition to its human capital strategy development, as part of the effort 

to comply with the President’s Management Agenda, the USAID 

Administrator established a group in January 2003 to develop criteria for 

overseas staffing and to rationalize the deployment of foreign service 

officers overseas. The group subsequently developed—and the 

Administrator approved—a template for staffing overseas missions that 

gives most weight to the dollar size of the country program but also 

considers the relative performance of the host governments and provides 

some flexibility to the regional bureaus as necessary. 

 19Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002. 

Involvement of Agency 

Leaders, Employees, and 

Stakeholders in Strategic 

Workforce Planning Is 

Limited 
Page 17 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Involving employees and stakeholders in the strategic workforce planning 

process is also important to encourage support and understanding for its 

outcomes. According to a USAID senior official, the human capital 

subcommittee has involved some internal groups in the planning process 

through the use of working groups that include senior and mid-level 

employees. In addition, according to USAID officials, the Administrator 

has discussed his human capital initiatives and answered questions at 

“town hall” meetings with USAID employees. However, because the 

strategy is still in draft, we cannot comment on the extent to which agency 

staff will be involved in implementing the strategy. Historically, USAID has 

established many internal committees to analyze workforce planning 

problems but has not always followed through in implementing their 

recommendations.20 In addition, according to senior USAID officials, the 

agency has not included nongovernmental organizations and other 

implementing partners in the development of its human capital strategy. 

USAID has begun to identify the core competencies needed by its 

workforce, and it recently established a working group to conduct 

workforce analysis and planning related to core USAID competencies. 

However, it has not documented the critical skills and competencies of its 

current workforce, and its personnel information system does not always 

provide reliable and timely data. USAID must determine the critical skills 

and competencies required to meet its current and anticipated strategic 

program goals. This is especially important as changes in national security, 

technology, and other factors alter the environment within which foreign 

policy agencies operate. In addition, like many other federal agencies, 

USAID’s workforce is increasingly eligible for retirement, creating an 

opportunity to refocus its workforce competencies to those geared toward 

the critical skills and competencies it will need in the future. To meet 

these challenges effectively, USAID needs to know its present workforce 

skills and competencies and identify those that are critical to achieving its 

strategic goals. 

Effective workforce planning and management require that human capital 

staff and other managers base their workforce analyses and decisions on 

complete, accurate, and timely personnel data. However, USAID’s 

personnel information system is not entirely accurate and does not 

contain all of the information USAID needs for sound workforce decision 

 20See appendix I for summaries of various studies related to USAID’s human capital issues. 

USAID’s Efforts to Identify 

Critical Skills and 

Competencies Are Limited 

by Inadequate Personnel 

Information 
Page 18 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

making. For example, a recent audit of USAID’s human capital data by its 

Inspector General found that the data collected through this automated 

process were not current, consistent, totally accurate, or complete.21

USAID is attempting to address its personnel information system problems 

through a recently implemented Web-based application that will allow for 

customized, centralized, and real-time reporting. As of mid-June 2003, 

about 85 percent of the missions had submitted data through the new 

system. Officials at the human resource office, in responding to a draft of 

this report, expect this new system to be fully operational in time to 

generate the September 30, 2003, worldwide staffing report. 

Nevertheless, USAID has no systematic or agencywide method to 

determine the skills and competencies of its current staff. Although the 

new personnel database will provide better information on the locations 

and position categories of its staff, it is not designed to identify current 

critical skills and competencies. According to officials from the human 

resource office, the new system will provide the position occupational 

code for all employees, but this will not include information on current 

skills and abilities. However, as part of its draft human capital strategy, in 

June 2003 USAID established a team to carry out a comprehensive 

workforce analysis and planning effort. The team will first develop a pilot 

workforce plan, including an analysis of current skills and future needs, in 

three headquarters offices—human resources, procurement, and global 

health. One of the working group’s tasks is to identify an appropriate tool 

to collect, store, and manage data on competencies, training, and career 

development. 

USAID’s overseas assessment team also developed findings and made a 

number of recommendations regarding USAID’s model for delivering 

assistance and the types of skills that the agency will need to meet future 

program needs.22 For example, according to the team’s study, USAID’s 

foreign service recruitment should focus more on basic agency operational 

skills such as program and project development, financial management, 

procurement, and legal expertise. The study notes that these abilities are 

essential for missions in developing programs, policies, and strategies; 

ensuring accountability; and representing U.S. government interests with 

 21USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID’s Human Capital Data, Audit Report 

9-000-03-002-P (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 

22U.S. Agency for International Development, Report of the Overseas Working Group, 

May 2003. 
Page 19 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

host government officials and other stakeholders. Furthermore, according 

to the study, due to the shortage of U.S. direct-hire foreign service staff, 

about 160 personal services contractors currently serve in these positions, 

which USAID considers inherently governmental functions and normally 

fills with U.S. direct-hire staff. 

Although USAID has implemented some recruitment strategies to address 

attrition concerns and staffing gaps, the strategies are limited to certain 

segments of the workforce. Furthermore, USAID cannot be certain that 

these measures will be effective, because the recruitment plans have not 

been based on analyses that match current skills with those needed to 

meet future strategic goals. Our strategic human capital model stresses the 

importance of developing human capital strategies—the programs, 

policies, and processes that agencies use to build and manage their 

workforces—that are tailored to agencies’ unique needs.23 Applying this 

principle to strategic workforce planning means that agencies consider 

how hiring, training, staff development, performance management, and 

other human capital strategies can be used to eliminate gaps and gain the 

critical skills and competencies needed in the future. 

USAID has implemented specific workforce strategies for some segments 

of its workforce to address shortages in critical skills and competencies, 

but these efforts are not comprehensive. Since fiscal year 1999, USAID has 

hired more than 200 mid-level foreign service officers through its New 

Entry Professionals program and 47 civil service employees through the 

Presidential Management Intern program. The agency recently reinstituted 

its International Development Intern program for junior foreign service 

officers and plans to make 15 offers in March 2004. According to USAID 

officials, the agency is hiring staff with updated technical and management 

skills. These measures are important efforts to bring in experienced midlevel staff and junior staff with new skill sets that can help shape the 

agency’s future as the current workforce becomes eligible for retirement. 

However, USAID has not developed a workforce plan for its civil service 

staff—a factor noted by OMB in its Presidential Management Agenda 

“scorecard” of USAID’s human capital management efforts. In responding 

to our draft report, USAID stated that it will not refine its civil service 

recruitment plan until its workforce analysis is complete. In the meantime, 

 23U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, 

GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 

USAID’s Strategies to 

Address Critical Skill Gaps 

Are Not Comprehensive 
Page 20 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

the current civil service plan calls for hiring about 15 Presidential 

Management Interns a year, allowing offices to replace civil service staff in 

accordance with approved reorganization plans, and hiring above 

established ceilings for critical staff needs, such as contracts officers. 

USAID also has not yet developed workforce plans for its personal 

services contractors, who make up the majority of its workforce, although 

USAID plans to do so in response to a recommendation by its Inspector 

General.24

In addition to its recruitment efforts, USAID has revived certain training 

programs that were halted during the 1990s, such as executive leadership 

training and management programs. However, these target mostly senior 

management, according to a USAID survey of civil service employees. In 

responding to our draft, USAID noted that its leadership training is 

conducted at three levels—emerging, senior, and executive—and that its 

challenge is to broaden such training and make it more available. USAID 

also noted that it needs to offer entry-level training to all staff, not just 

foreign service officers. In addition, the agency is revising its training 

curriculum to provide more online training opportunities for all staff. 

USAID’s personnel information system has not always provided accurate 

data, and the agency has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the 

skills and competencies of its current staff and matched this data to future 

requirements. As a result, USAID cannot ensure that its recruitment plans 

accurately reflect its hiring needs. Since 1999, missions have been required 

to submit staffing projections as part of USAID’s annual report and budget 

justification process. The human resource office uses this information to 

develop its annual foreign service recruitment and training plans. 

According to a human resource official, the recent overseas staffing 

assessment will result in better guidance to the field and to headquarters 

offices on reporting their staffing needs. 

Because USAID’s human capital strategy is still in draft and not yet 

approved, we cannot comment on whether its action plan will have 

specific timetables and indicators to evaluate its progress in meeting its 

human capital goals and to help ensure that these efforts continue under 

the leadership of successive administrators. Strategic workforce planning 

 24Inspector General report, 9-000-03-002-P. USAID employs 116 personal services 

contractors at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. and 5,124 at its overseas missions. 

USAID Has Not Created a 

System to Monitor and 

Evaluate Its Progress 
Page 21 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

entails the development and use of indicators to measure both the 

progress in achieving human capital goals and how the outcomes of these 

strategies can help an organization accomplish its mission and 

programmatic goals. USAID has had difficulties in defining practical, 

meaningful measures that assess the impact of human capital strategies on 

program results. For example, USAID’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan 

continues to emphasize the agency’s efforts to achieve activity-oriented 

goals, such as the number of employees hired or trained, but these 

measures do not help gauge how well USAID’s human capital efforts 

helped the agency achieve its programmatic goals. As a result, the link 

between specific human capital strategies and strategic program outcomes 

is not clear. 

USAID has evolved from an agency consisting primarily of U.S. direct-hire 

foreign service officers who directly implemented development projects to 

one in which foreign service officers manage and oversee development 

programs and projects carried out by institutional contractors and 

grantees. Since 1992, the number of U.S. direct-hire staff has decreased by 

37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs has almost 

doubled. In addition, USAID program funding increased 57 percent in 

fiscal years 2002 and 2003. As a result, USAID has increasingly relied on 

contractor staff—primarily personal services contractors—to manage its 

day-to-day activities overseas. In addition to having fewer U.S. direct-hire 

foreign service officers to provide direction and accountability for its 

foreign assistance programs, USAID operates in overseas environments 

that present unique challenges to its ability to manage a quality workforce. 

With fewer and less experienced U.S. direct-hire staff managing increasing 

levels of foreign assistance in more countries, along with expected 

increases in program funds for Afghanistan and Iraq, significant funding 

increases for the global initiative to fight human immunodeficiency 

virus/acquired immune deficiency, and potential USAID involvement in the 

Millennium Challenge Account, USAID’s ability to provide oversight over 

its foreign assistance activities and pursue U.S. foreign policy objectives is 

becoming increasingly difficult. Because USAID has not adopted a 

strategic approach to workforce planning and management, it cannot 

ensure that it has addressed these challenges appropriately and identified 

the right skill mix and competencies needed to carry out its development 

assistance programs. 

Conclusions 
Page 22 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

To help ensure that USAID can identify its future workforce needs and 

pursue strategies that will help its workforce achieve the agency’s goals, 

we recommend that the USAID Administrator develop and institutionalize 

a strategic workforce planning and management system that reflects 

current workforce planning principles. This effort should include the 

implementation of a reliable personnel information system, an agencywide 

assessment of staff’s skills and abilities, workforce strategies that address 

identified staffing gaps in the foreign and civil services, and a periodic 

evaluation of how these efforts contribute toward the achievement of the 

agency’s program goals. 

To determine how workforce changes have affected USAID’s ability to 

carry out its mission, we reviewed the agency’s workforce planning 

documents and a number of internal and external reports on USAID’s 

human capital and workforce planning issues. We also interviewed 

knowledgeable USAID officials representing the agency’s regional, 

technical, and management bureaus in Washington, D.C., and conducted 

fieldwork at seven overseas missions—the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 

Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and the West Africa Regional Program in Mali.25

To ensure consistency in our data collection efforts, we used the same 

data collection instrument at each location.26 We also administered a 

separate data collection instrument at USAID’s human resource office in 

Washington, D.C. In examining the changes in USAID’s workforce since 

1990, we analyzed personnel data provided by USAID and internal and 

external reports on the changing roles of USAID’s workforce. We did not 

formally verify the accuracy of USAID’s data; however, we noted in our 

findings that USAID’s personnel data were not entirely accurate, complete, 

or up to date. 

To examine USAID’s progress in developing and implementing a strategic 

workforce planning system, we evaluated the agency’s efforts in terms of 

principles used by leading organizations that we identified through our 

work with the Office of Personnel Management, other U.S. government 

agencies, the National Academy for Public Administration, and the 

 25We also examined mission workforce documents and interviewed officials at USAID’s 

mission to Indonesia. The mission was relocated to Arlington, Virginia, following its 

evacuation in October 2002. It has since been relocated back to Indonesia. 

26We did not use the data collection instrument on our visit to the Dominican Republic, 

which we visited in November 2002 to conduct survey work and test our audit approach. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 23 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

International Personnel Management Association. We analyzed USAID’s 

workforce planning documents, reviewed internal and external reports on 

its human capital and workforce planning efforts, and interviewed 

cognizant USAID officials at its Bureau for Management and its Bureau for 

Policy and Program Coordination. 

We conducted our work between July 2002 and June 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III). 

It concurred with our major findings and recommendations and noted that 

our work grasped the agency’s complex human capital situation. USAID 

also reiterated that it recently established a working group to carry out an 

integrated workforce analysis and planning effort. According to USAID, 

this effort will assess the critical skills and competencies of its workforce, 

identify the gaps between what the agency currently has and what it will 

need in the future, and design workforce strategies to fill those gaps. 

USAID also provided separate technical comments on our draft, which we 

have incorporated as appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report 

for 30 days from the date of the report unless you publicly announce its 

contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to interested 

congressional committees and to the Administrator, USAID; the Secretary 

of State; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will 

be available at no extra charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 24 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128 or at FordJ@gao.gov. Other contacts and staff 

acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV. 

Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 
Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to 

USAID’s Workforce Planning 

Page 25 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Report Findings Recommendations 

Quainton, Anthony C.E. and Fulmer, 

Amanda M., Human Capital Reform: 

 21st Century for USAID (Virginia, IBM 

Endowment for the Business of 

Government: March 2003). 

• USAID needs increased workforce 

planning, greater focus on recruitment, 

more training opportunities, and 

increased retention. 

• Human resources department is not 

effective. 

• Strengthen workforce planning and better 

link workforce planning to the agency’s 

mission. 

USAID Office of the Inspector General. 

Audit of USAID’s Human Capital Data, 

Audit Report Number 9-000-03-002-P 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 

• USAID’s human capital data collected 

and maintained was not up to date, 

consistent, totally accurate, or complete.

• Develop definitions and requirements so 

reported data is on time, consistent, 

accurate, and complete. 

• Provide training for staff members who 

enter and correct personnel data. 

• Develop procedures for missions to attest 

to the accuracy of their workforce data. 

• Institute process to collect data on the 

reasons for employee attrition. 

• Develop workforce plans for USAID’s civil 

and nondirect-hire workforce. 

USAID Office of the Inspector General, 

Audit of USAID’s Workforce Planning for 

Procurement Officers, Audit Report 

Number 9-000-03-001-P (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 13, 2002). 

• USAID has not developed a 

comprehensive workforce plan that 

covers its entire procurement workforce. 

• USAID needs to develop a comprehensive 

workforce plan for the USAID procurement 

workforce. 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign 

Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program 

Addressed Intended Purposes but USAID 

Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its 

Response Capability, GAO-02-787

(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002). 

• Start-up challenges and obstacles 

affected the initial pace of program 

implementation. 

• USAID lacked a “surge capacity” to 

quickly design and implement a largescale program with relatively short time 

frames. 

• Implement procedures to (1) allow USAID 

to quickly reassign key personnel, (2) allow 

missions to expedite the hiring of 

contractor staff, and (3) facilitate 

coordination with other U.S. government 

agencies involved in reconstruction. 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development, USAID’s Workforce 

Analysis (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2001). 

• Short-term budget matters take 

precedence over long-term workforce 

planning needs. 

• Lack of training. 

• Limited hiring of entry-level staff. 

• Agency’s program budget increased, but 

its workforce decreased for 10 years. 

• Foreign and civil service new hires must 

possess managerial and analytical skills. 

• Agency must decide what skills should be 

hired and what should be contracted. 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Human Resources 

Business Area Analysis: Executive 

Summary (Washington, D.C.: August 

1995). 

• USAID has significant barriers to 

workforce planning. 

• Establish a workforce planning committee 

to identify program needs on a continuing 

basis. 

• Reduce the number of personnel 

backstops and develop qualifications in 

multiple skills categories. 

• Create an inventory of staff work history, 

experience, skills, and abilities. 

• Adopt a single unified personnel system. 

Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to 

USAID’s Workforce Planning 
Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to 

USAID’s Workforce Planning 

Page 26 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Report Findings Recommendations 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign 

Assistance: AID Strategic Direction and 

Continued Management Improvements 

Needed, GAO/NSIAD-93-106

(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1993). 

• Responsibilities of workforce are 

changing. 

• Workforce lacked needed skills. 

• USAID had not adequately planned for 

workforce needs. 

• Ineffective placement, training, and 

recruitment constrained workforce 

management. 

• Develop and implement a comprehensive 

workforce planning and management 

capability as a systematic, agencywide 

effort. 

• Institutionalize this capability to ensure its 

continuation by successive administrations. 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Workforce Planning 

Working Group Report (Washington, 

D.C.: 1991) 

• USAID does not have an effective 

workforce planning system. 

• Determine the desired general composition 

of the direct-hire workforce and develop a 

plan for reshaping the workforce along 

those lines. 

• Conduct an individual skills profile of the 

existing workforce and analyze it in the 

context of the desired general composition 

of the direct-hire workforce. 

• Restructure the personnel backstop 

system to simplify, reduce, and thereby 

broaden categories. 
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign 

Assistance Programs Locations 

Page 27 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence

Africa Region Angola 

Benin 

Democratic Republic of Congo 

Eritrea 

Ethiopia 

Ghana 

Guinea 

Kenya 

Liberia 

Madagascar 

Malawi

Mali 

Mozambique 

Namibia 

Nigeria 

Rwanda 

Senegal 

South Africa 

Tanzania 

Uganda 

Zambia 

Zimbabwe

Asia and the Near East Region Cambodia 

East Timor 

Egypt 

Indonesia 

Jordan 

Lebanon 

Mongolia

Morocco 

Nepal 

Pakistan 

Philippines 

Sri Lanka 

Thailand 

West Bank and Gaza 

Yemen

Europe and Eurasia Region Albania 

Armenia 

Azerbaijan 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Georgia 

Kazakhstan 

Kosovo 

Kyrgyzstan 

Moldova 

Romania 

Russia 

Former Yugoslav Republic of 

 Macedonia 

Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro 

Yugoslav Republic of Serbia 

Ukraine 

Uzbekistan 

Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign 

Assistance Programs Locations 
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign 

Assistance Programs Locations 

Page 28 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Latin America and the 

Caribbean Region 

Bolivia 

Brazil 

Colombia 

Dominican Republic 

Ecuador 

El Salvador 

Guatemala 

Guyana 

Haiti 

Honduras 

Jamaica 

Mexico 

Nicaragua 

Panama 

Paraguay 

Peru 

Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with No U.S. Direct-Hire Staff Presence 

Africa Region Botswana 

Burkina Faso 

Burundi 

Cameroon 

Cape Verdi 

Central Africa Republic 

Chad 

Comoros 

Congo (Brazzaville) 

Cote d’Ivoire 

Equatorial Guinea 

Gabon

Guinea Bissau 

Lesotho 

Mauritania 

Mauritius 

Niger 

Sao Tome 

Seychelles 

Sierra Leone 

Somalia 

Sudan 

Swaziland 

The Gambia 

Togo 

Asia and the Near East Region Algeria 

Bahrain 

China 

Djibouti 

Hong Kong 

Iraq 

Israel 

Kiribati 

Laos 

Malaysia 

Myanmar (Burma) 

Niue 

North Korea 

Oman 

Palau 

Papua New Guinea 

Samoa 

Singapore 

Solomon Islands 

South Korea 

Taiwan 

Tajikistan 

Tonga 

Tunisia 

Turkey 

Turkmenistan 

Vanuatu 

Vietnam 
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign 

Assistance Programs Locations 

Page 29 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Europe and Eurasia Region Belarus 

Cyprus 

Czech Republic 

Estonia 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland and Northern Ireland 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Poland 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Latin America and the 

Caribbean Region 

 

Anguilla 

Antigua and Barbuda 

Argentina 

Bahamas 

Barbados 

British Virgin Islands 

Belize 

Cayman Islands 

Chile 

Costa Rica 

Cuba 

Dominica 

Eastern Caribbean and Windward 

 Islands 

Grenada 

Montserrat 

St. Kitts and Nevis 

St. Lucia 

St. Vincent and the Grenadines 

Suriname 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Turks and Caicos Islands 

Uruguay 

Venezuela 

USAID Regional Service Platforms. Services include legal, executive office, financial/controller, 

procurement, and program and project development support services. Services vary among the 26 platforms; 

for example, the regional office in Kenya provides all services to up to 14 countries, while the Honduras 

mission simply shares a contracts officer with Nicaragua. 

Africa Region Benin 

Botswana - Regional Center for 

 Southern Africa 

Ghana 

Guinea 

 

Kenya - Regional Economic 

 Development Services Office for 

 East and Southern Africa 

Mali - West African Regional 

 Program 

Senegal 

South Africa 

Asia and the Near East Region Bangladesh 

Egypt 

India 

Indonesia 

Jordan 

Pakistan 

Philippines 

Thailand - Regional Development 

 Office (planned) 
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign 

Assistance Programs Locations 

Page 30 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Europe and Eurasia Region Georgia - Caucasus Regional Office 

Hungary - Regional Services Center 

Kazakhstan - Central Asia Regional Office 

Ukraine - West/Newly Independent States Regional Office 

Latin America and the 

Caribbean Region 

Bolivia (La Paz) 

Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) 

El Salvador (San Salvador) 

Guatemala (Guatemala City) 

Honduras (Tegucigalpa) 

Peru (Lima) 

 
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 

Page 31 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. 

Agency for International Development 
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 32 GAO-03-946 USAID Workforce Planning 

Albert H. Huntington, III (202) 512-4140 

Audrey Solis (202) 512-3042 

In addition to the above named individuals, Kimberley Ebner, Jeanette 

Espinola, and Rhonda Horried made key contributions to this report. 

Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Reid Lowe, and José M. Peña, III, 

provided technical assistance. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

(320136) 
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