The New NATO Policy Guidelines on 

Counterterrorism: Analysis, Assessments, and Actions

by Stefano Santamato

with Marie-Theres Beumler

Strategic Perspectives 13

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy, and Conflict Records 

Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who 

comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by 

conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in 

conferences, policy support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary 

of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified 

Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU 

and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the 

broader national security community. 

Cover: NATO E-3A Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 

aircraft flies mission over southern Germany, September 2012.

On October 8, 2001, NATO launched its first antiterror operation,

Eagle Assist, whereby AWACS aircraft were sent to help patrol

the skies over the United States for 8 months.

Photo by Bennie J. Davis III (U.S. Air Force)
The New NATO Policy Guidelines on

Counterterrorism

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

February 2013

By Stefano Santamato

with Marie-Theres Beumler

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on

Counterterrorism: Analysis,

Assessment, and Actions
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please go to the

National Defense University Web site at: www.ndu.edu/inss.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, February 2013
Contents

Executive Summary ...........................................................................................1

Introduction........................................................................................................3

Evolution of the Transnational Terrorist Threat.............................................4

NATO’s Response ...............................................................................................7

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism.............................9

Conclusion ........................................................................................................25

Appendix A. NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism—

Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future (May 21, 2012)...............27

Appendix B. Overview of National and International Response...............31

Appendix C. Key NATO Documents ............................................................36

Notes ..................................................................................................................39

About the Authors............................................................................................47

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The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

Executive Summary

The history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will say that the first, and so 

far only, time NATO has called upon its Article 5 collective defense clause was on September 12, 

2001, following a terrorist attack on one of its members. Yet, until the agreement by NATO Heads 

of State and Government on the new policy guidelines on counterterrorism on May 20, 2012, 

NATO did not have an agreed policy to define its role and mandate in countering terrorism.

In the 11 years that have followed the 9/11 attacks on the United States, NATO has opted 

for a pragmatic approach to the fight against terrorism and succeeded in identifying its added 

value. The result has been a series of substantial counterterrorism activities. Their impact, however, has been mitigated by the lack of an agreed policy defining NATO’s rightful place among 

international counterterrorism actors. The evolving nature of the terrorist environment and of 

the global responses required has made it necessary to reassess the threat posed by terrorism 

and its implications for the Alliance. The new NATO policy guidelines on counterterrorism 

are the result of a comprehensive intellectual and political process that started with the 2010 

Strategic Concept and led to the conclusion that in an era in which emerging challenges blend 

collective defense with the broader concept of collective security, the lens of collective interest 

must replace the prism of national perspectives. With this in mind, the overall judgment on the 

new policy guidelines can and should be positive.

Conceptually, the guidelines translate the notions of prevention and resilience into NATO 

policy and anchor its counterterrorism activities to the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defense, 

crisis management, and cooperative security.

In substance, the new policy guidelines focus on NATO’s strengths, such as intelligencesharing, capacity-building, special operations forces, training, and technology and capabilities. 

In doing so, the guidelines inaugurate a new phase of NATO’s engagement in countering terrorism, predicated around the three principles of compliance with international law, NATO 

support to Allies, and nonduplication and complementarity in addition to focusing on the three 

key areas of awareness, capabilities, and engagement.

There are, however, three persisting shadow areas that may hinder the policy’s potential. 

One is the vague and qualified notion of NATO cooperation with the European Union. The 

second is the need to reconcile the horizontal and cross-cutting nature of the terrorist threat 

with the vertical reality of Alliance policies and structures. The third area is the need to establish 

a clearer and more direct link between NATO’s broader efforts and Allies’ homeland security, 

intended here as the fundamental bond between sovereignty and the body public.
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

In this respect, the guidelines represent only a necessary first step. The challenge ahead for 

NATO policymakers is to define an Action Plan that ensures the implementation of the policy 

guidelines while, and by, addressing these issues. To this end, this paper suggests six crosscutting proposals that should find their way into the proposed Action Plan:

■ apply “Net Assessment” to counterterrorism

■ develop effective counterterrorism strategic communications

■ establish a homeland security constituency in NATO and foster the executive role of the 

Terrorism Task Force

■ promote a NATO Border Security Initiative

■ develop a “functional” Counterterrorism Partnership Framework

■ contribute to the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

While certainly not sufficient, these six initiatives may well be necessary conditions to help 

place counterterrorism at the center of NATO’s post–International Security Assistance Force 

agenda and offer a new template for NATO’s role in facing the emerging security environment 

in an unpredictable world.
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The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

Introduction

In April 2012, the North Atlantic Council agreed on the new North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) policy guidelines on counterterrorism. On May 20, 2012, the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government endorsed the policy guidelines at their summit in 

Chicago and tasked the North Atlantic Council to “prepare an Action Plan to further enhance NATO’s ability to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism by identifying initiatives 

to enhance threat awareness, capabilities, and engagement.”1

What may appear as routine NATO business—the agreement of a policy and the development of an implementation plan—is in fact groundbreaking news for the Alliance. Until now, 

NATO did not have an agreed policy to define its role and mandate in countering the terrorist 

threat, notwithstanding the fact that a terrorist attack was the origin of its first and only invocation of the Article 5 collective defense clause.

In the 11 years that followed the 9/11 attacks on the United States, NATO opted for a pragmatic approach to its contribution to the fight against terrorism, aware of the political, historical, and sometimes ideological differences among Allies. On the ground, NATO’s contribution 

has been substantial; the Alliance has engaged in all areas of work related to terrorism—political, operational, conceptual, military, technological, and scientific. Yet the evolving nature of the 

terrorist environment, and of the global response, has made it necessary to reassess the threat 

posed by terrorism and its implications for the Alliance.

This trend was first captured by the new Strategic Concept, adopted by NATO Heads of 

State and Government at the Alliance’s Lisbon Summit in November 2010. For the first time, 

terrorism was specifically included among the direct threats to NATO’s security and a renewed 

emphasis placed on the Alliance’s role in fighting it.2

 By focusing on threat analysis, partner 

consultations, capability development, and training, the Strategic Concept also indicated the 

way ahead. Against these premises, the Allied nations acknowledged the need to reinvigorate 

NATO’s role in, and contribution to, the fight against terrorism.

The new NATO policy guidelines on counterterrorism are the result of a comprehensive 

intellectual and political process that started with the 2010 Strategic Concept, passed through 

the analysis of the evolving terrorist environment, and ended with an assessment of NATO’s 

contribution to the fight against terrorism. In this respect, the guidelines should not be considered as the snapshot of an endstate but rather as a fresh start for a contribution to countering 

terrorism. The development of an Action Plan on counterterrorism will translate policy into 

action and provide answers to questions left open.
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

The logical deduction of this process is that against the evolving nature of an increasingly 

global and interconnected terrorist threat, an “across the board” approach to fighting terrorist 

networks becomes both sensible and necessary. Broad international counterterrorist alliances 

become part of the solution. Defining NATO’s own role in countering terrorism becomes a 

compelling need.

Evolution of the Transnational Terrorist Threat

Today, terrorism has become more dispersed, decentralized, and multifaceted. In a word, 

it has become complex. One can adopt a “methods and motives”3

 approach or attempt to make 

a distinction between national and international terrorism and still not be able to define a single 

framework to capture all aspects of the challenge. As a direct consequence of al Qaeda’s attacks 

on the United States, NATO’s involvement with countering terrorism has focused on its international dimension “over and above” national efforts and beyond national borders.

Well before the demise of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, experts concurred that there 

was no longer a wide global network run directly by al Qaeda. Thanks also to the successes 

in disrupting its leadership and network, al Qaeda–like operations are increasingly dependent 

on local “franchises,” such as in Yemen, Somalia, the Middle East, and North Africa.4

 While 

potentially diminishing the scope and reach of al Qaeda’s activity, this evolution cannot be considered a strategic victory. A scattered al Qaeda network becomes more difficult to pin down. 

Its leadership decreases in influence but spreads in numbers. Front lines become more blurred 

and terrorist tactics diversify and blend. Terrorism becomes a principal tactic incorporated by 

states and nonstate actors within a “new” category of “hybrid” threats.5

On the operational and tactical side, five interconnected trends confirm an evolution of 

the terrorists’ strategy and modus operandi: the established connection between terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, and international organized crime; the emergence of homegrown 

terrorists and “lone wolves”; reliance on complex funding mechanisms; use of sophisticated 

propaganda; and access to advanced technologies and fascination with unconventional highimpact operations.

While not an absolute first in terrorism history, the growing nexus among terrorist organizations, insurgents, and international crime is possibly the starkest reminder that national and 

international actors cannot deal with terrorism in watertight compartments.6

Military and law enforcement operations become part of a continuum in the counterterrorism response. In some cases, terrorist and illegal activities merge to finance their organizations’ operations.7

 Specifically, the link between terrorist entities and drug trafficking is 
5

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

a well-known concern, with connections stretching from South America to West and North 

Africa, Europe, the Balkans, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.8

 Among others, these activities and 

connections give terrorists wider autonomy, making them less dependent on “external” support 

from sponsor nations, reducing the reach and leverage of any international response.

Besides financial support, it is the operational cooperation between these various criminal organizations that is most worrisome. Training, experience, and lessons learned are often 

shared between these groups to improve tactics, techniques, and materiel.9

 This phenomenon is 

particularly present in so called ungoverned spaces,10 which are used by nonstate actors to establish training camps to pursue indoctrination and develop operational capacity. Ungoverned 

or undergoverned spaces attract criminal groups, insurgents, and terrorists alike, and states 

harboring such territories are either unwilling or unable to disrupt or interfere with the groups’ 

activities, albeit claiming sovereignty before international law. The exploitation of this “sovereignty gap” poses increasing threats to the international community due to rapidly developing 

communications and travel patterns, as the history of Afghanistan under Taliban rule most 

infamously proves.

In the last 5 years, another growing concern has been the emergence of homegrown terrorists. In the words of Lucio Caracciolo, “terrorists don’t have to come to us. They already are 

among us.”11 Homegrown terrorists may range from lone-wolf individuals to “self-recruited, 

self-trained, and self-executing” groups with few or no connections to an international conspiracy, to groups living in a particular country who have trained with and maintained connections 

to the al Qaeda network, and finally to al Qaeda “sleeper cells” aiming to conduct medium- or 

long-term actions in a particular country.12

Homegrown terrorists are difficult to identify, detect, and stop. The fact that they engage 

in suicide attacks is a matter of greater concern to national governments.13 Their threat is comparatively low, but their impact on the public psyche is high.14 Through isolated, unrelated, 

low technology, and low-cost actions, terrorists achieve devastating societal effects well beyond 

their immediate victims.15 Stressed neighborhoods lose confidence in the very authorities in 

charge of their protection, the rhetoric becomes polarized, and escalating resentment fuels terrorist recruitment.16

In terms of finance, the growing nexus between terrorism and organized crime offers terrorist entities new and alternative financing opportunities.17 While remarkable results have 

been achieved in countering terrorism funding thanks to increased bilateral and multinational 

cooperation of law enforcement agencies and organizations,18 the suppression of funding channels traceable to terrorist groups remains particularly difficult due to their constant technical 
6 

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evolution and dissemination.19 In recent years, income deriving from smuggling, money laundering, and human trafficking has grown steadily, and kidnapping of foreigners has become one 

of the most lucrative funding sources for international terrorists.

In parallel, to face the national and international response and maintain support and recruitment, the volume and sophistication of al Qaeda’s communications have increased. There 

are now thousands of Web sites, in many languages, devoted to “virtual proselytism.” Terrorist 

groups have abandoned old tape or DVD production and dissemination and turned to the use 

of the Internet to radicalize their followers around the globe and instruct them on the means of 

violence.20

This extensive use of the Internet has led counterterrorism experts to consider al Qaeda 

and its affiliates as primary “customers” of Web forums and social media, and therefore not keen 

to engage in disruptive actions that could affect their own ability to reach out to members and 

recruits. However, as technology is evolving and becoming more available, the terrorist threat 

to cyber space is also increasing. In a video presented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, al Qaeda calls 

for an “electronic jihad,” urging “covert mujahidin” to launch cyber attacks against American 

critical infrastructure.21

The renewed interest in cyber-terrorist activities is consistent with al Qaeda’s use of, and 

fascination with, high-impact operations. In this respect, al Qaeda’s longstanding interest in 

acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), specifically of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) nature, is also well known. So far, the efforts of terrorist groups to 

acquire or use these weapons and materials have been sporadic and mostly unsuccessful.22 For 

the foreseeable future, militant jihadist groups will only be able to produce rudimentary radiological weapons (that is, “dirty bombs”) that would cause great panic and disruption but only 

limited casualties. However, even if the use of WMDs remains confined to the high end of the 

threat spectrum, in the words of Harold Agnew, “If you believe that it is easy to make an improvised nuclear weapon, you are wrong. But if you believe it is impossible for a terrorist group to 

make an improvised nuclear bomb, you are dead.”23

With terrorism becoming increasingly globalized and hybrid, unity of effort and comprehensive approaches become the key paradigms for all counterterrorism actors. Put differently, global terrorist networks take advantage of national and international legal loopholes 

and operational gray areas. In a field as dynamic as counterterrorism, the lens of collective 

interest must replace the prism of national perspectives. Efforts should be joined in mutually 

reinforcing ways, beyond political entrenchments and doctrinal boundaries. In the decade-plus 
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The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

that followed the 9/11 attacks, NATO proved its ability to contribute to the global fight against 

terror. Mindful of its assets and mandates, NATO has succeeded in identifying its added value 

to specific aspects of the terrorism challenge. The result has been a series of substantial counterterrorism activities whose impact, however, has been mitigated by the lack of an agreed policy 

defining NATO’s rightful place among international counterterrorism actors.

NATO’s Response

At the core of NATO’s reticence in codifying its decade-long contribution to the fight 

against terrorism in an agreed policy lies a definition challenge. The incidence, nature, scope, 

and, above all, perception of the threat posed by terrorists vary enormously among countries 

and regions.24 To provide a common definition of what constitutes a terrorist is an exercise of 

drafting acrobatics, impossible even for the most skilled and experienced NATO policymaker.

Yet the very nature of NATO—a political-military organization for the collective defense 

of its members’ territories and populations from external attacks—drives its need to identify 

where an attack is coming from and who the enemy is. In the case of the fight against terrorism, 

the Alliance instinctively needs to define who and where the terrorists actually are. Terrorism, 

like war, is ultimately a means to an end, not an end per se. For many years, in the collective 

psyche of NATO’s integrated structure, to fight against terrorism without identifying the adversary was like fighting war itself. The lack of a clear opponent denied planners and diplomats 

a critical element of NATO’s defense paradigm. Consistent with this logic, the 1999 Strategic 

Concept made only indirect reference to acts of terrorism as one of many security challenges 

and risks together with sabotage, organized crime, and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.25 On the other hand, the nature of terrorist acts has long been perceived, especially 

in Europe, as deriving from “internal” motives—from separatism to political extremism and 

anarchism.

It is therefore not surprising that, beyond its solidarity significance, at the basis of NATO’s 

Article 5 invocation following the 9/11 attacks was the determination that the strikes were directed from abroad. Al Qaeda’s claim of responsibility and the Taliban regime’s refusal to hand 

over Osama bin Laden to U.S. authorities provided incarnation and direction to the global terrorist threat.

This acted as a potent catalyst for NATO’s contribution to the global fight against terrorism. However, NATO has preferred to avoid a potentially loaded political debate on its role 

in counterterrorism, opting for a more pragmatic approach. Through its operational commitments—first and foremost in Afghanistan but also in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Indian 
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Ocean and, not to be overlooked, in protecting high-visibility events such as the Greek Olympic 

Games in 2004 and the NATO summit in Riga in 200626—NATO has accumulated considerable cross-cutting experience in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, intelligence-sharing, and 

technology development.

In 2001, NATO launched its first ever antiterror operation—Eagle Assist, whereby NATO 

AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft were sent to help patrol the skies over 

the United States for 8 months. In 2002, the Alliance launched its second counterterrorism operation, Active Endeavour, which is ongoing. In May 2002, NATO foreign ministers decided at 

their meeting in Reykjavik that the Alliance would operate when and where necessary to fight 

terrorism, therefore settling the out-of-area debate and paving the way for future engagements 

with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Action on the ground was accompanied by capacity initiatives. At the Alliance’s 2002 

Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government adopted a package aimed at adapting NATO to 

the challenge of terrorism and including the following: a Military Concept for Defense against 

Terrorism;27 a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T); five nuclear, biological, and 

chemical defense initiatives; protection of civilian populations including a Civil-Emergency 

Planning Action Plan; the NATO Response Force; and the Prague Capabilities Commitment. 

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the Allies endorsed the creation of the Defense Against Terrorism 

(DAT) Program of Work (POW) to improve the response to new security challenges posed by 

asymmetric threats. Intelligence-sharing was enhanced including through the establishment of 

a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, which became part of the new intelligence structure that 

was set up as part of NATO’s ongoing intelligence reform efforts.

Meanwhile, the increasing complexity and inevitable realization that the fight against 

global terror was a long-term struggle pushed NATO policymakers to look at terrorism from a 

different perspective.

In endorsing the Comprehensive Political Guidance at the Riga Summit in November 2006, 

NATO recognized that “terrorism . . . and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely 

to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years.”28 With the 2010 Strategic 

Concept agreed at Lisbon in November 2010, NATO has completed its intellectual and political 

evolution vis-à-vis the terrorist threat. Terrorism is no longer an operational or tactical dimension of asymmetric warfare; it has become a “direct threat to the citizens of NATO countries 

and to international stability and prosperity, more broadly.”29 Collective defense blends with the 

broader concept of collective security, opening new perspectives for NATO in the fight against 

terrorism and placing new emphasis on the need to define the Alliance’s role and contribution.
9

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

At the basis of the policy guidelines rests the clear mandate from the Lisbon Summit. The 

guidelines reiterate the Strategic Concept statement that terrorism constitutes a direct threat 

to the security of the citizens of NATO countries and to international stability and prosperity 

more broadly and that it will remain a threat in the Allies’ territory as well as in areas of strategic 

importance to NATO.30

In terms of NATO’s role in counterterrorism, the guidelines implicitly acknowledge the 

absence of a specific policy since NATO’s post-9/11 engagement in the global fight against terrorism, while claiming NATO’s significant contribution.31

The guidelines place an accent on the danger that “conducive environments” present in 

terms of the spread of terrorism and terrorist safe havens, extremist ideologies, intolerance, 

and fundamentalism. They also focus on terrorists’ use of conventional and unconventional 

means, as well as on the risk of terrorist access to CBRN materials and weapons. In doing so, 

the guidelines manage to ably define their realm of application in terms of terrorist means 

and center of gravity without entering into a controversial attempt to provide a shared definition of terrorism.

The Good News

As the new guidelines unfold, describing and defining the operational framework in which 

the Alliance will develop its contribution to countering terrorism, they translate into policy 

NATO’s innovative approach to security introduced by the 2010 Strategic Concept.

To begin with, the guidelines have the great merit of not shying away from the intrinsic 

complexity of dealing with the terrorist threat and recognize from the outset that the primary 

responsibility in countering terrorism rests with “civilian” law enforcement and judicial authorities. The key word in this respect is complementarity. With its new policy guidance, NATO accepts that its role in countering the threat complements, and is complemented by, the mandates 

of other national and international organizations.32

Another important aspect of the guidelines is the introduction of a broader concept of 

countering terrorism, through the inclusion of the notions of prevention and resilience.33 In enlarging the concept, the guidelines expand the extent of NATO’s contribution to countering terrorism, as defined by the Lisbon Summit Declaration, beyond deterrence, defense, disruption, 

and protection.34 This is also consistent with NATO’s approach to emerging security challenges, 

as introduced by the Alliance Cyber-Defense policy.35
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Also worthy of notice is the inclusion, at the end of paragraph 4, of the guidelines’ goal to 

enable a more effective use of NATO resources through clear direction, enhanced coordination, 

and greater consistency of efforts. This reference is intended to meet the Strategic Concept’s 

commitment to “continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so 

that our [NATO] taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defense.”36

The stated aim of NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism is to move beyond a 

mere restatement of the Strategic Concept and to avoid defining NATO’s role in counterterrorism in a way that may limit its contribution. The aim is to anchor NATO’s counterterrorism 

activities to its stated core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and collective security, 

thus reaffirming its ideological adherence to a comprehensive approach to crisis management.37

This is an important aspect of the guidelines. As pointed out by Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO’s Deputy 

Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, “The Alliance has learned to 

work with the United Nations and its agencies on the ground to integrate civilian priorities 

into military tasks [emphasis added].”38 The new policy guidelines on counterterrorism confirm 

NATO’s ambition to extend both the concept and the practice of its Comprehensive Approach 

to emerging security challenges.

In terms of concept, the guidelines recognize civilian leadership in countering terrorism, 

thus inverting the Comprehensive Approach equation to focus on NATO’s value added to nonmilitary priorities.39 In practice, the guidelines’ aim is to focus not only on improved “awareness” of the threat and on providing “adequate capabilities” to address it, but also on “engaging” 

with other partners at the national or international level. To quote Dr. Shea again, in the future, 

“NATO’s military organization and capabilities . . . will need to be coordinated with domestic police, health, and emergency management agencies and organizations like the European 

Union. So, NATO’s progress in practically embracing the new challenges will depend upon its 

capacity for effective networking [emphasis added].”40

Against these premises, the new approach of the policy guidelines consists in providing 

strategic and risk-informed direction to NATO’s counterterrorism activities based on clearly 

identified principles and value-added initiatives to enhance prevention and resilience.

As far as principles are concerned, the policy guidelines rest on three pillars: compliance 

with international law, NATO support to Allies, and nonduplication and complementarity.41

Compliance with International Law. From the United Nations (UN) Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights down to the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Conventions, Protocols, and Resolutions, NATO’s counterterrorism policy remains on safe ground by 

referencing to the UN legal framework.42 The key message is that NATO’s counterterrorism 
11

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

strategy will remain firmly anchored to the principles of adherence to international rule of law 

and respect of human rights. Introducing compliance to international law as the first principle 

guiding NATO’s counterterrorism policy represents not only a legal commitment, but also an 

important political statement of values.

NATO Support to Allies. In this case, the accent of the new policy guidelines rests on 

NATO’s supporting role. As it has been clear from the outset in the guidelines,43 the Alliance 

does not aspire to a lead role in counterterrorism, recognizing the primary responsibility of 

individual nations, in this case NATO’s allied members, for protecting their populations and 

territories. This approach has been directly imported from NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning, 

from whom the Alliance’s approach to counterterrorism derives many of its principles, experience, and expertise.44 Indicative of this “subsidiary” role is the explicit provision that NATO’s 

support can be provided only upon specific request. There is therefore no automaticity in what 

NATO can do or when it can do it.45

Nonduplication and Complementarity. This last principle is further elaborated by the 

policy’s commitment to coordinate and leverage NATO resources with those of other nations 

and international organizations. The focus of NATO activities is shifted to targeted programs 

and areas in which NATO has unique assets that can support Allies’ efforts in the fight against 

terrorism. This provides the guidelines with a logical segue from defining the aim and principles 

of NATO’s role in countering terrorism to the substance of its key areas of engagement.46

The guidelines accomplish this by recalling decades of NATO expertise and experience, 

developed in many areas such as civil defense, critical infrastructure protection, intelligencesharing, air defense, airspace and maritime security, nonproliferation and CBRN response, special operations, and force protection.

This time, the good news introduced by the policy is not one of innovation, but one of 

consistency and consolidation. For many years, NATO’s contribution to counterterrorism has 

been ancillary to “mainstream” activities. Following the 9/11 attacks, NATO’s response included 

the decision, taken at the 2002 Prague Summit, to “adapt” the Alliance to the challenge of terrorism and make its assets and capabilities available to the fight against terrorism.47 This has 

been the case, for instance, with Civil Emergency Planning (CEP), the discipline that—with the 

exclusion of NATO’s operational engagements—has supported the Alliance’s counterterrorism 

efforts more than any other. Specifically, the CEP contribution, in terms of CBRN response and 

consequence management, is the direct fallout of its civil defense role in mitigating the effects 

of a possible nuclear, biological, or chemical war. Equally, most of the planning capacity and 

advances in the area of critical infrastructure protection are due to CEP’s role in supporting war 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

effort logistics and in ensuring the continuity of civil society. Similar considerations belong to 

NATO’s role in air-space management and maritime security, which are immediately linked to 

the primary military defense mandate of the Alliance.

With the inclusion in the 2010 Strategic Concept of terrorism as one of the defining challenges of NATO’s security environment, the Alliance has achieved conceptual consolidation by 

moving the fight against terrorism from the margins of its strategic debate to the center of its 

security agenda.48 With the policy guidelines, the Alliance has achieved consolidation. The new 

counterterrorism guidelines close the strategy loop by bringing all counterterrorism activities 

under a single policy umbrella. The potential of this approach is significant if we consider that 

the new policy guidelines concentrate the Alliance’s efforts in three areas where NATO has a 

long track record of success in supporting its members and partners: awareness, capabilities, 

and engagement.49

Consistent with the guidelines’ ambition to cover the whole spectrum of the terrorist 

threat from prevention to resilience, NATO realizes the importance of shared awareness among 

Allies. The ability to anticipate intentions and mitigate effects of terrorist attacks depends on the 

capacity to understand the real nature of the terrorist threat against potential national and international targets and the vulnerabilities therein.50 By its own nature, NATO provides a privileged 

forum of engagement in which Allies can carry out consultations, exchange intelligence, and 

share and receive assessments on the terrorist threat environment.51 The key word in this case 

is trust, and admittedly there are few if any multilateral organizations and forums as reliable as 

NATO when it comes to sharing sensitive information and analysis. NATO’s ability to make its 

structures and processes available to its members and partners is indeed an opportunity not to 

be missed.

Decades of military engagements, policy, planning, and collective defense experience make 

NATO a unique multiplier of Allies’ and partners’ capabilities. This is as valid for NATO operations as it is for the Alliance contribution to countering terrorism. Capability development and 

technological innovation, as a result of addressing emerging hybrid threats and facing out-ofarea challenges, are not endstates. The policy guidelines recognize this, as well as NATO’s value 

added in developing, maintaining, and providing adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against, 

and respond to terrorist threats on the basis of the level of ambition defined by NATO’s Political 

Guidance. In doing so, a critical and direct connection is established between NATO’s role in 

countering terrorism and NATO’s Defense Planning Process (NDPP).52 It is the NDPP that allows 

NATO to identify, develop, and muster the necessary capabilities to fulfill its missions. The NDPP 

represents the indispensable interface between the individual capability planning of the Allies and 
13

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

NATO’s security mandates. Extending the NDPP to include capabilities in support of countering 

terrorism ensures substance to the guidelines’ policy aspirations.

The enduring and evolving nature of this effort is further reinforced by the policy commitment to maintain NATO’s counterterrorism operational capacity through lessons learned; the 

development of training, education, and exercises based on threat scenarios; and the expansion 

of niche capabilities such as those available through NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters 

(NSHQ).53 Importantly, the inclusion of nonmilitary capabilities in support of Civil Emergency 

Planning or critical infrastructure protection completes the range of unique NATO assets in 

support of countering terrorism.54

At the crossroads between sharing awareness and providing capabilities stands NATO’s 

commitment to engage with partners and the international community. At a meeting prior to 

the 2012 summit in Chicago, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh-Rasmussen and President 

Barack Obama agreed that NATO has become a hub for a global network of security partners that have served alongside NATO forces in Afghanistan, Libya, and Kosovo. Recognizing 

the important contributions provided by partner nations, the Secretary General and President 

Obama welcomed the recent decision by Allies to invite 13 partner nations to Chicago for an 

unprecedented meeting to discuss ways to further broaden and deepen NATO’s cooperation 

with partner nations.55 As NATO will look for specific areas of engagement, counterterrorism 

becomes an unquestionable candidate.

Committed to a holistic approach to countering terrorism, NATO places a premium on its 

ability to strengthen outreach and cooperation among Allies, with partners both close and far, 

and between international organizations, specifically the United Nations, European Union, and 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).56

While this is no real news and NATO’s archives are full of unfulfilled vows of increased 

cooperation and coordination, the policy guidelines introduce an element of healthy realism 

by remaining on the safe but reachable ground of enhanced consultations and more systematic 

practical cooperation with partners. Recognizing indirectly the current limits of NATO’s institutional cooperation, the new policy guidelines offer to engage with partners “in accordance 

with existing mechanisms” and “consistently with NATO policies” in areas such as capacitybuilding, training, preparedness and crisis management, and scientific cooperation.57

Finally, the policy guidelines devote their last two paragraphs to NATO’s response. The 

first, paragraph 13, essentially reaffirms the North Atlantic Council’s authority in providing 

guidance to NATO’s counterterrorism efforts and activities, and tasks the Terrorism Task Force 

to report on implementation on an annual basis.
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

More consequential is the last paragraph. In it, three short sentences reveal first-class policy and drafting skills by capturing the essence of four key assumptions of NATO’s response 

to counterterrorism. First, terrorism has never been a static challenge, and NATO’s efforts to 

counter it will remain dynamic and adaptive. Second, while recognizing the primacy of other 

national and international organizations, NATO will always be ready to lead counterterrorism 

efforts, in general or in specific areas, should the situation warrant. Third, notwithstanding the 

many facets of NATO’s actual and potential contribution, it is Allies’ capabilities that will make 

the difference in its response to terrorism, something that NATO defense planners will need to 

keep in mind when applying the concepts and principles of Smart Defense to the full spectrum 

of Alliance capabilities.

Fourth and final, the last 11 words of the document open and close a sensitive debate that 

is germane to the whole of NATO’s emerging security challenges, from cyber defense to energy 

security: the extent to which the Article 5 collective defense commitment applies to the terrorist 

threat. In the case of cyber attacks, Allies have stumbled against the “attribution” hurdle. In the 

case of energy security, the nonmilitary nature of possible energy coercion or intimidation has 

led more than one Ally to question the very competence and mandate of NATO. When it comes 

to terrorism, both arguments may apply, with the additional temptation of setting magnitude 

thresholds for an attack to “be eligible” for Article 5 invocation.

In this case, however, NATO brings to the table the power of precedent. NATO has invoked 

Article 5 following a terrorist attack. In fact, the September 12 declaration is the only occasion 

in the history of the Alliance of Article 5 invocation.58 Therefore, when the policy guidelines 

state, in the very last sentence, that “collective defense remains subject to decision by the North 

Atlantic Council,” one should not be misguided in thinking that Allies have decided to delay the 

debate through an if and when approach. The contrary is true. The sheer mention of collective 

defense in NATO’s policy guidelines on counterterrorism should be read like a stark warning to 

enemies and a reassurance to allies: if NATO did it once, it can do it again.

The Bad News

The overall judgment on the new policy guidelines can, and should, be positive. However, 

three “shadow areas” remain and will need to be clarified for the policy to express all its potential. Unsurprisingly, one of them is related to NATO cooperation, or lack thereof, with the European Union (EU). The second is a challenge common to all emerging security challenges, from 

nonproliferation to cyber defense: the need to reconcile the horizontal and cross-cutting nature 

of the terrorist threat with the vertical reality of NATO’s structures. The third is the Alliance’s 
15

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

need to establish a clearer link between its political-military nature and the fundamentally nonmilitary, counterterrorism constituencies within nations.

The Looming Shadow of NATO-EU Cooperation. These are the days when almost every 

debate on the future of NATO, European defense, or transatlantic relations writ large includes 

in its title “in an age of austerity.” Experts concur that the lack of real cooperation between 

the two organizations generates the single largest waste of transatlantic defense resources, 

and worse, of security capital. At regular intervals, summits and ministerial communiqués 

call for stronger NATO-EU cooperation.59 However, no solutions appear on the horizon due 

to a mix of political obstruction, bureaucratic resignation, and leadership hesitation. NATO’s 

Chicago Summit Declaration confirms this deadlock. While recognizing the importance of 

strengthening the NATO-EU strategic partnership, the Chicago Declaration steers away from 

clear commitments or taskings, focusing instead on operational cooperation and capability 

development. While aspiring to “broaden political consultations,” the inter-institutional dialogue has been reduced to an individual relationship between the NATO Secretary General 

and the EU High Representative.60

The accepted narrative is that NATO-EU relations work well on the ground and that the 

lack of strategic dialogue is compensated for by more pragmatic approaches at the operational 

level, from Kosovo to Afghanistan and from the Gulf of Aden to Libya. However, such an approach would be particularly risky in the realm of counterterrorism. It is clear that terrorists 

do not operate as self-contained individuals or groups. Be it the result of strategic partnerships or simple shared approaches,61 the growing link among terrorist groups, insurgents, and 

international criminality requires a networked effort by security, law enforcement, and justice 

authorities at both the national and international level. The risk is that NATO-EU theaterlevel cooperation may not work outside NATO-led operations, where the Alliance is engaged 

with thousands of deployed forces. In other words, it would be extremely difficult to promote 

NATO-EU practical cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, where the EU and its 

member states are not demandeurs of NATO’s contribution. To make things more complicated, the policy guidelines further inhibit NATO’s engagement ambitions with the EU by introducing, in footnote and in text, the condition that NATO’s activities related to international 

organizations will be conducted “in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action 

Plan (CAAP) and the relevant decisions.”62 The reference to the CAAP is code language for 

another standard proviso of NATO-EU official texts known as “the agreed framework,” limiting the cooperation between the two organizations to the areas and conditions determined 

by the Berlin Plus Agreement63 and the related Security Agreement and Exchange of Letters. 
16 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

The agreed framework de facto excludes Cyprus from any possible exchange of classified information between the two organizations.64 On the EU side, the political and legal argument 

that the European Union is a “single entity” that includes Cyprus prevents variable geometry 

relations. The resulting deadlock does not bode well for any substantial cooperation beyond 

mere exchange of information on activities such as training and exercises, protection of civilian populations against CBRN attacks, and civil emergency planning.

Unfortunately, there is no easy way out of this situation and NATO and EU staffs’ creativity 

will have to adapt to the pace of political evolution, hoping that breakthroughs are not preceded 

by loud explosions or images of chaos and suffering innocents.

A Round Peg in a Square Hole: The Challenges of a “Matrix Management” Approach to 

Counterterrorism. To segue into the second challenge the policy guidelines did not address, 

one could paraphrase a famous Henry Kissinger remark on Europe. The establishment of a 

counterterrorism section at NATO headquarters should answer the question: “Whom do I call 

when I want to speak to counterterrorism in NATO?” However, this leaves the door open to 

another European-inspired telephone joke: “Dial one for critical infrastructure protection; dial 

two for civil emergency planning; dial three for intelligence-sharing,” and so on. In other words, 

the policy guidelines do not support conceptual and strategic consolidation with structural 

amalgamation and executive consistency. The guidelines make no reference to the existence and 

role of NATO’s counterterrorism section and leave to the Terrorism Task Force (TTF) the task 

to report to council. Given that the TTF is an informal coordinating body with no real executive powers,65 it does not introduce a “matrix management”66 approach to NATO’s counterterrorism activities.67 NATO remains essentially a functional organization, and the policy leaves a 

management vacuum that reflects the enduring territorial resistance among various parts of the 

NATO International Staff organization and the struggle to reconcile the horizontal and crosscutting nature of the terrorist threat with the vertical reality of NATO’s structures. Unless specified elsewhere, NATO’s counterterrorism section has no authority to define or at least deconflict 

activities and resources68 for the execution of the policy guidelines across the NATO spectrum. 

To use a fitting military analogy, the guidelines do not clarify NATO’s command and control 

structure for counterterrorism. The long-term risk of this approach is that counterterrorism 

activities will remain byproducts of other, predominantly military, mainstream activities of the 

Alliance, reducing the overall impact of NATO’s counterterrorism policy.

Connecting to the Homeland Constituency. On the opposite side of the command and 

control spectrum sits the third unresolved challenge of NATO’s policy guidelines on counterterrorism: the absence within NATO of a homeland security constituency. Currently at NATO, 
17

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

only the Civil-Emergency Planning Committee and its subgroup on Civil Protection provide a 

forum for a number of national homeland security representatives. However, representation in 

these bodies is not very homogeneous, ranging from civil defense organizations, to civil protection agencies, to homeland security departments. The result is a lack of a coherent vision of the 

mandate of these committees and, as far as counterterrorism is concerned, the absence of authoritative national counterparts. The importance of this aspect should not be underestimated 

for at least two reasons. First, counterterrorism is intrinsically linked to a nation’s territory and 

populations. Citizens expect their national and local authorities to protect their lives and property from terrorist attacks. Conversely, one of the destabilizing aims of terrorist actions is to undermine national sovereignty, seen as the government’s ability to control the national territory 

and to guarantee security. This creates a responsibility and trust relationship between nations 

and their citizens that cannot—and should not—be transferred to a “third party” multinational 

organization. It therefore becomes crucial for NATO to establish a closer relationship between 

the support it provides to the counterterrorism efforts of Allies and partners and their respective populations.

The second important aspect is related to the nature of NATO as an organization. Even in 

its primary military defense responsibility, NATO has no direct access to all the necessary capabilities. With few exceptions, most notably for political consultations and command and control, NATO’s assets and capabilities belong to its members. It is therefore not a coincidence that 

its planning process (the NDPP) represents one of the pillars of its integrated military structure. 

Through the NDPP, nations coordinate and apportion their capabilities to the Alliance’s level of 

ambition. In case of need, a Transfer of Authority (ToA) mechanism allows national forces to 

fall under the control of NATO’s Supreme Commander. In recent years, as a result of NATO’s 

operational experience and the development of a comprehensive approach to operations, the 

NDPP was expanded to include selected nonmilitary capabilities, mainly in the area of logistics, 

stabilization, and reconstruction. However, no provisions have been implemented concerning 

the possible transfer of these capabilities under NATO command should a situation warrant. 

If and when they are made available by national organizations, civilian capabilities will always 

remain under national control. This requires a considerable effort to ensure national contributions to NATO’s requirements,69 and this challenge would extend also to counterterrorism assets. While the policy guidelines succeed in establishing a fundamental link between NATO’s 

counterterrorism capabilities and the NDPP, they fall short of creating the equally important 

nexus between NATO and those organizations responsible for implementing national policies 

and controlling national assets. Mediated access through NATO’s Defense Policy and Planning 
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Committee, the Deputy Permanent Representatives Committee, or the Policy and Partnership 

Committee would load this relationship with the burden and challenges of national interagency 

processes.

More Good News?

None of these shortcomings should belittle the contribution of the policy guidelines on 

counterterrorism efforts to NATO’s continuous transformation process into a collective security 

organization. The mere fact that the Allies reached consensus on a role for NATO in countering 

terrorism is possibly the best news of all, irrespective of the caveats and nuances included in the 

guidelines.

More importantly, the guidelines jump-started a dynamic process that will culminate with 

the development of an “Action Plan to further enhance NATO’s ability to prevent, deter and 

respond to terrorism” through initiatives that will improve NATO’s threat awareness, capabilities, and engagement.70 As work on the Action Plan progresses along these lines, many ongoing 

activities, already mentioned by the policy itself, will be consolidated into a single consistent 

program. Others will require new approaches and initiatives, and in identifying these, NATO 

policymakers have the opportunity to design new activities and adapt structures to optimize 

NATO’s contribution to counterterrorism.

Awareness, capability, and engagement are mutually reinforcing dimensions of a broad 

counterterrorism effort. Partnerships multiply these capabilities and increase international 

awareness. Shared intelligence and strategic communications require outreach. Training and 

education are the result of continuous analysis and assessment. Naturally, some initiatives will 

fall under one category or the other. However, the opposite is also true. Much of NATO’s value 

added in countering terrorism rests in the Alliance ability to bring together awareness, capabilities, and engagement so that the total is larger than the sum of its parts.

In line with these considerations, this report will focus on six cross-cutting proposals that 

should find their way into the Action Plan. The table on page 19 summarizes the potential value 

added of the proposals to the three dimensions of NATO’s counterterrorism policy guidelines.

Apply Net Assessment to Counterterrorism. Shared awareness is a critical component of 

any counterterrorism strategy. We need to understand the terrorists’ motives and anticipate 

their intentions if we are to plan effective prevention and response campaigns. We need to also 

be aware of our societal and material vulnerabilities to design effective mitigation and resilience 

plans. More importantly, all these components must be cross-analyzed to identify weaknesses, 

allocate resources, and create opportunities. This exercise of comparative analysis is inspired by 
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The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

Table. Counterterrorism Policy Guidelines Key Areas and Potential Value Added

Awareness Capabilities Engagement

Net Assessment Increased shared 

awareness and 

prevention. Develop 

scenarios and assess 

impact of terrorist 

threat.

Feed CT-related 

capabilities into 

NATO Defense 

Planning Process.

Collaborative effort 

involving CTS, SAC, 

IU, CCOMC, ACT, 

DAT-CoE, nations. 

Training and 

exercises.

Strategic 

Communications

Increased shared 

awareness and 

prevention. Effective 

messaging.

ACT Human 

Environment 

Capabilities project.

Outreach to 

ACT, DAT-CoE, 

HUMINT CoE, 

civil and military 

expertise, and public 

opinion.

Homeland Security 

Constituency/

Executive Role for the 

Terrorism Task Force

Homeland Security 

Committee. Engage 

national civil CT 

authorities in Ally 

and partner nations.

Feed CT-related 

capabilities into 

NATO Defense 

Planning Process. 

Access to national 

civil resources.

Engage national 

civil CT authorities 

in Ally and partner 

nations. Best 

practices. Training 

and exercises.

Border Security 

Initiative

Increased 

information-sharing 

among participants.

Maritime security 

operations. Support 

FRONTEX, OSCE, 

and UNODC.

Capacity-building. 

Best practices. 

Practical engagement 

with the EU.

Post-ISAF 

Counterterrorism 

Partnership 

Framework

Increased shared 

awareness and 

prevention. 

Coordinate strategies.

Capacity-building. 

Resource multiplier. 

Feed CT-related 

capabilities into 

NATO Defense 

Planning Process. 

Transfer COIN 

experience into CT.

Innovative 

“functional” 

partnership 

framework. Over 50 

Allies and partners. 

Best practices. 

Training and 

exercises.

Participate in GCTF Increased shared 

awareness and 

prevention. 

Coordinated 

strategies.

Resource multiplier. 

Innovative 

solutions.

Over 30 nations 

+ EU involved. 

Opportunity to 

engage indirectly 

with EU. Best 

practices. Capacitybuilding. Training 

and exercises.
20 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

the concept of Net Assessment, developed in the United States during the Cold War to “provide 

an even-handed look at both sides of complex military competitions.”71 While applying Net Assessment to asymmetric threats such as terrorism in a multilateral environment is a complex 

effort, it has the potential to yield significant results for NATO’s contribution to countering terrorism. Successful Net Assessment is the synthesis of close-hold and open source data. It relies 

on intelligence input, expert analysis, and public information. In this respect, NATO is most 

certainly a privileged environment where intelligence-sharing, cross-cutting expertise, and lessons learned come together. Threat and vulnerability scenarios can be developed in support of 

national preparedness efforts and multinational exercises designed to improve responses and 

consequence management.

The policy guidelines have already indicated that enhanced intelligence-sharing and 

strategic analysis will be at the center of NATO’s strategy. The Alliance has greatly improved 

the quantity and quality of its intelligence analysis through a reform that culminated in 2010 

with the establishment of the Intelligence Steering Board (ISB) and the creation of an Intelligence Unit (IU) at NATO headquarters. Downstream from intelligence, NATO’s Strategic 

Analysis Capability has introduced Net Assessment methodologies in staff work, although its 

focus is still more “geographical” than functional. A number of NATO organizations, such 

as the headquarters’ Situation Center and the Allied Command Operations’ Civil-Military 

Fusion Center have the ability to collect and combine large amounts of open-source information. Greater effort should go to ensuring that all these assets work together consistently and 

coherently.

The Action Plan should ensure that coordinated net assessments of the global terrorist 

threat and of NATO’s response (and potential responses) are produced on a yearly basis. These 

reports should also become the basis for designing regular counterterrorism training and exercises and act as an authoritative contribution to the NDPP.

Develop Effective Counterterrorism Strategic Communications. The policy guidelines 

contemplate strategic communications as a contribution to “promote common understanding 

of [NATO’s] counterterrorism role as part of a broader international effort.”72 As important and 

innovative as it is to increase a shared awareness of NATO’s contribution, the role of strategic 

communications in NATO’s counterterrorism efforts should not be limited to mere outreach.

As a means to an end, terrorism is often used to spread a destabilizing message. Its impact 

on public opinion is immediate. Social media and the 24/7 news cycle provide terrorists with 

unprecedented opportunities to disseminate their narrative, boast about their successes, and 

expose their victims’ vulnerabilities. Media coverage of terrorist acts becomes an unintentional 
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The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

ally of terrorist groups, forcing national and international authorities into defensive postures to 

maintain public confidence and support.

In countering terrorism, much like countering insurgency, strategic communications become the instrument to fight for and win public opinion.73 Terrorist actions and rhetoric aim to 

provoke overreactions that undermine the authorities’ credibility and weaken the democratic 

foundations of nations. The counterterrorism message must be unwavering and unequivocal. 

Above all, it should be credible. NATO should develop a Counterterrorism Strategic Communications Strategy that speaks with equal force to Allies’ public opinion and to possible adversaries. As counterterrorism and counterinsurgency share methodologies and lessons learned, 

NATO’s experience in marshalling public support within and for its operations could be an asset 

in countering terrorists’ propaganda. Mindful of General David Petraeus’s “under-promise and 

over-deliver” guidance for Afghanistan,74 NATO’s Counterterrorism Strategic Communications 

Strategy should bring together the doctrinal and conceptual contributions of NATO’s Center of 

Excellence for the Defense Against Terrorism (CoE/DAT) in Ankara, Turkey,75 as well as those 

of national civilian counterterrorism organizations. In doing so, NATO must engage with its 

target audience in a two-way communications process through “strategic listening” opportunities.76 NATO’s Allied Command Transformation project on Human Environment Capabilities 

is a clear example of the importance of bringing together strategic communications, civil-military interaction, cultural advisors, and the Comprehensive Approach when facing emerging 

security challenges.77

Establish a Homeland Security Constituency in NATO and Foster the Executive Role of 

the Terrorism Task Force. Elsewhere in this paper, the lack of a “homeland security” constituency at NATO and the challenges of applying matrix management to counterterrorism have 

been described as policy shortfalls with possible negative effects not only on the process, but 

also on the substance of NATO’s contribution to countering terrorism. This is valid at the decisionmaking and executive levels. The guidance does not identify or indicate which NATO 

bodies will receive delegated authority from the North Atlantic Council to oversee the implementation of the policy. In parallel, at staff level, NATO headquarters’ Terrorism Task Force is 

only tasked to report on implementation.78 Execution remains the responsibility of functional 

divisions, such as Operations, overseeing civil emergency planning activities; Political Affairs 

and Security Policy, responsible for political dialogue and outreach; Defense Policy and Planning, in charge of capability planning; and Defense Investment, leading on armament planning 

and procurement. This functional approach applied to counterterrorism raises a challenge of 

ambiguous authority.79 Even with a well-defined Action Plan, the resources and efforts of these 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

divisions will focus on their primary functions and customers, to the detriment of NATO’s 

counterterrorism effort.

In a recent article, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, 

Ambassador Gabor Iklody, stated that NATO “must work to break down the bureaucratic stovepipes that stand in the way of consistent action.”80 The cross-functional nature of today’s emerging security challenges calls for a new and more decisive application of the matrix management 

principles to disciplines such as cyber defense or counterterrorism. Matrix environments are 

more conducive to innovation and cross-pollination but require clarity of roles and reporting 

structures.

To support this transformation and minimize risks for NATO’s role in countering terrorism, the Action Plan should propose two distinct management solutions.

First, establish a Homeland Security Committee (HSC) under the direct authority of the 

North Atlantic Council. Unpopular as it may sound in an age of austerity and organizational 

rationalization, unless an HSC is established at NATO, the Alliance will not be able to engage 

with authoritative national counterparts and effectively deliver a value-added contribution to 

the global counterterrorism effort. Under the authority of the HSC, the network provided by 

NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning could be more fully realized to plug into national civilian 

organizations and resources.

Second, define clear Terms of Reference for the Terrorism Task Force that elevate the body 

at the Assistant Secretary General level to act as a matrix guardian to ensure that the principles 

of matrix management are applied correctly81 and include tasking and oversight authority over 

the implementation of the Action Plan. The Chairman of the TTF should also be the Chair of 

the Homeland Security Committee to ensure dialogue, transparency, and accountability between staff action and policy decisions. On behalf of the TTF, the counterterrorism section 

should become NATO’s executive agent for counterterrorism-related issues. Its mandate should 

include an advisory role for counterterrorism resource requirements and allocation.

Promote a NATO Border Security Initiative. The nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks has further blurred the lines between national responsibility and international response. The patterns of illicit trafficking and proliferation activities overlap with illegal immigration routes and international criminal hubs. Inevitably, sovereign prerogatives and national 

border controls grow at odds with the global nature of the terrorist threat. Ungoverned and undergoverned spaces on the margins of NATO’s territory—from North Africa to the Balkans—expose 

large parts of Europe to the risk of penetration by terrorist groups, many of whom tailor their 

logistics to fit the different legislative frameworks.82 In 2011, NATO’s Allied Maritime Strategy rec-
23

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

ognized that the world’s seas are an increasingly accessible environment for transnational criminal 

and terrorist activities,83 and included support to law enforcement and preventing the transport 

and deployment of weapons of mass destruction among the roles of NATO maritime security.84

NATO assets and contributions in patrolling the maritime environment are well known. Today’s 

global financial challenges advocate smarter approaches to pooling capabilities and managing resources. NATO should encourage the launch of a Border Security Initiative (BSI) as a way to 

increase its value added in an area that is critical to Alliance efforts in countering terrorism 

and promote closer engagement with partners, especially the European Union and OSCE. The 

BSI should follow the same template offered by the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)85 as a 

flexible and voluntary framework for participating nations to share information, enhance individual and collective capabilities, and promote capacity-building. Its focus should be on disrupting illegal immigration and trafficking networks, supporting interdiction efforts, collecting 

and sharing lessons learned, and developing best practices. The BSI would also offer NATO an 

indirect opportunity to cooperate with, and support, the European border protection agency, 

FRONTEX.86 As FRONTEX is dependent on voluntary commitments by the EU member states, 

NATO cooperation through a BSI has the potential to complement European capacities and 

increase the effectiveness of FRONTEX operations.

Develop a “Functional” Counterterrorism Partnership Framework. The history of NATO 

demonstrates the Alliance’s unparalleled capacity to form and sustain operational coalitions. 

The consistence and duration of ISAF, with more than 50 participating nations and over 10 

years of operations, or the speed with which NATO has assembled a coalition around Operation 

Unified Protector in regard to Libya, are but two testimonies of NATO’s partnership vocation. It 

is therefore not a coincidence that two of the most tangible deliverables of NATO’s summit in 

Chicago in May 2012 are partnerships-related. The first, which is intrinsic to ISAF, is NATO’s 

successful effort in persuading “ISAF nations [to] reaffirm their enduring commitment to Afghan security beyond 2014.”87 In other words, ISAF partners will continue to work together 

even after their combat troops have left Afghanistan. The second, more explicit deliverable was 

a meeting with 13 NATO operational partners.88 Indeed, in this case, the form not the substance 

of the meeting was the true deliverable since it indicated a new way to enhance partnership 

cooperation within NATO.

The significance of these two decisions is a confirmation that partnerships are a key element of the Cooperative Security paradigm and of the growing post-ISAF notion of the Alliance 

as the ultimate operational enabler.89 It is not a coincidence that in assessing the Chicago Summit, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Senior Director for Europe at the National Security Council, 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

reiterated President Obama’s vision of NATO as the emerging hub of a network of global security partners. In her words, “although NATO is regionally-based, we face global challenges, and 

so partners can play an increasingly important role in ensuring that the Allies can advance their 

shared interests.”90 Against this backdrop, counterterrorism becomes an immediate candidate 

to integrate partners more fully into NATO activities and a new functional Counterterrorism 

Partnership Framework (CTPF) could provide natural continuity to the deep operational relationship developed with partners through a decade of cooperation in Afghanistan. 

The CTPF should move beyond the platform provided by NATO’s Partnership Action Plan 

against Terrorism to become a peer-to-peer counterterrorism forum along the conceptual lines 

illustrated by the Connected Forces Initiative introduced at Chicago.91 CTPF should not be 

an “element” of other partnership initiatives but an example of NATO’s enhanced flexibility 

to address partnership issues in a demand- and substance-driven way.92 The CTPF would be 

self-selecting and organized along the principles of voluntary participation, active contribution 

(including financial), and functional commitment. In return, the CTPF would allow for more 

inclusive decisionmaking mechanisms beyond the current Political-Military Framework regulating partners’ participation in NATO-led operations.93 Through the CTPF, Allies and partners 

would bolster NATO as a standard-setting and -enabling platform by bringing together regional 

approaches and functional solutions.94 Above all, the CTPF would allow NATO to preserve and 

expand its outreach to Asia-Pacific partners who have proven crucial in Afghanistan and will be 

central to facing emerging security challenges.

Contribute to the Global Counterterrorism Forum. NATO should also contribute to 

existing communities of interest working on specific counterterrorism initiatives, and in 

particular to the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) launched in September 2011.95

Cochaired by the United States and Turkey, the GCTF recognizes that countering terrorism 

requires a truly global approach and aims at establishing network-like, dynamic international 

cooperation to counter terrorism. While facilitating information exchange, the GCTF is intended to improve international and national coordination of counterterrorism efforts and 

knowledge exchange. Activity of the GCTF is organized around five working groups addressing various related issues such as border security, capacity-building, and the support of weak 

states and countering radicalization and extremism.96 NATO’s participation in the GCTF 

would enhance the relevance of the Alliance’s counterterrorism efforts and bring NATO’s 

expertise and experience to the forum. 

In principle, NATO’s involvement in the GCTF should not be controversial. GCTF cochairs are NATO Allies. Of the 30 GCTF founding members, only Nigeria, China, Colombia, 
25

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

and South Africa do not engage in cooperation or in some sort of dialogue with NATO. The 

presence of the European Union97 among the GCTF members should not be a showstopper 

given Turkey’s cochairmanship of the forum.98 Opposition by either of these members to NATO’s participation in GCTF activities would be difficult to justify politically. Even the argument, 

common to all emerging security challenges, that NATO’s involvement would imply a militarization of the issue is unconvincing when applied to counterterrorism. The militarization of 

terrorism has long preceded any involvement of national or international armed forces or the 

global War on Terror. Local terrorists have always borrowed tactics and techniques from asymmetric warfare. Insurgents have often joined forces with international terrorism. From training 

camps to improvised explosive devices, from recruitment to command and control, and to the 

use of failed, weak, or rogue states, history tells us that the militarization of terrorism is a tactical reality and that denying it would be a strategic mistake. In other words, NATO’s engagement 

with the GCTF is an opportunity neither party should miss.

On a practical level, NATO could contribute to the GCTF while maintaining a low profile. 

For example, it could participate in selected activities as an observer in accordance with the 

GCTF assumption that “regional and sub-regional bodies, and non-government experts, will 

be invited to participate in the appropriate working group(s) and/or working group activities.”99

Capacity-building, training and exercises, research and technology, best practices, and lessons 

learned are all areas where NATO has the potential to add value.

Conclusion

The six initiatives mentioned above are only a few examples of the many areas and activities that the Action Plan will have to cover. From intelligence-sharing to capacity-building, from 

SOF to training, technology, and capabilities, the new NATO policy guidelines mark the beginning of a new phase of NATO’s engagement in countering terrorism. However, these initiatives 

may well be necessary conditions to place counterterrorism at the center of NATO’s post-ISAF 

agenda and NATO at the forefront of the international counterterrorism effort. This does not 

mean that NATO seeks a leading counterterrorism role, and the policy guidelines are very clear 

in this respect. Rather, it means that NATO’s contribution should be acknowledged and accepted for the added value it brings to the common endeavors. Eleven years after 9/11 and the 

commencement of operations in Afghanistan, the Allies have come to accept the notion that 

NATO cannot be the main player in countering terrorism, but it is a player nonetheless. 

By recalling the Alliance’s many achievements, the policy guidelines formulate a compelling argument for NATO’s continued role in counterterrorism and indicate the way ahead. In 
26 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

doing so, the guidelines mark a successful milestone in the implementation of NATO’s 21stcentury vision as defined by the 2010 Strategic Concept.

The guidelines, however, represent only a necessary first step into a new era of NATO 

counterterrorism engagement. Specifically, they define a process, not an endstate. The challenge 

ahead for NATO policymakers is to define an Action Plan that is more than just a compilation 

of relevant but discrete initiatives; to assure executive drive and oversight of the policy implementation; to recognize the importance of bringing into NATO a homeland security constituency to establish a direct link between NATO’s broader efforts and the Allies’ territories and 

populations; and finally, to better integrate NATO’s contribution into the wider national and 

international counterterrorism effort.

The importance of succeeding in this effort goes beyond the fight against international 

terrorism. As a common denominator to counterinsurgency, nonproliferation, cyber-defense, 

and asymmetric warfare, NATO’s policy guidelines in countering terrorism offer a new template 

for its role in facing emerging security challenges and evolving hybrid threats that define the 

modern security environment in an increasingly unpredictable world.100
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The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

Appendix A. NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Aware, 

Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future (May 21, 2012)*

I. Introduction

1. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to 

international stability and prosperity more broadly and will remain a threat for the foreseeable 

future. Terrorists have demonstrated their ability to cross international borders, establish cells, 

reconnoitre targets and execute attacks. The threat is exacerbated by terrorist groups and individuals that continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, including Allies’ own territory. Modern technology increases the potential impact of terrorist attacks 

employing conventional and unconventional means, particularly as terrorists seek to acquire 

chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and cyber abilities. Instability 

or conflict can create an environment conducive to the spread of terrorism, including by fostering extremist ideologies, intolerance and fundamentalism.

2. NATO’s response to terrorism has been largely shaped by the terrorist attacks of 11 

September 2001, which prompted Allies to launch Operation Active Endeavour, to adopt the 

Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MC472) and to initiate various capability and 

institutional changes. In the past decade, NATO has made considerable progress in areas of 

importance to the Alliance such as operations, enhanced intelligence exchange and the development of technology solutions through the Defense against Terrorism Program of Work and the 

Science for Peace and Security Program.

3. Through the Alliance Strategic Concept, Allies reaffirmed that the Alliance must “deter 

and defend against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security 

of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.” Allies have, therefore, decided to review NATO’s 

approach to counter-terrorism and to enhance both the political and the military aspects of 

NATO’s contribution to national and international efforts.

4. Allies will do so by capitalizing on NATO’s distinct cross-cutting strengths and by 

identifying the Alliance’s value-added contribution to the broad, UN-led international effort to combat terrorism. In defining NATO’s overarching approach to terrorism, Allies 

recognize that most counter terrorism tools remain primarily with national civilian and 

judicial authorities. Allies acknowledge that other International Organizations have mandates and capabilities that could enhance Allies’ efforts to counter terrorism. NATO will 

* Source: Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87905.htm?>.
28 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

place particular emphasis on preventing terrorist attacks and enhancing resilience through 

contributing to national and international efforts while avoiding unnecessary duplication 

and respecting the principles of complementarity. Clear direction, enhanced coordination 

and greater consistency of efforts and activities will enable NATO to use its resources more 

effectively.

II. Aim

5. The aim of these policy guidelines is to:

■ Provide strategic and risk-informed direction to the counter-terrorism activities ongoing across the Alliance as part of NATO’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

■ Identify the principles to which the Alliance adheres.

■ Identify key areas in which the Alliance will undertake initiatives to enhance the prevention of and resilience to acts of terrorism with a focus on improved awareness of the 

threat, adequate capabilities to address it and engagement with partner countries and 

other international actors.1

Following the adoption of these Policy Guidelines, an Action Plan for Implementation will be 

developed.

III. Principles

6. Compliance with International Law: NATO will continue to act in accordance with 

international law, the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, International Conventions and Protocols 

against terrorism and relevant UN Resolutions provide the framework for all national and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism, including those conducted by the Alliance.

7. NATO’s Support to Allies: Individual NATO members have primary responsibility 

for the protection of their populations and territories against terrorism. Cooperation through 

NATO can enhance Allies’ efforts to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. NATO, upon request, may support these efforts.

8. Non-Duplication and Complementarity: NATO will promote complementarity with 

and avoid unnecessary duplication of existing efforts by individual nations or other International 
29

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

Organizations. NATO will seek to coordinate and leverage its expertise and resources and will focus on targeted programs where it can contribute to and/or reinforce the actions of Allied nations 

and other international actors, as appropriate.

IV. Key Areas 

9. NATO, as an international organization, has unique assets and capabilities that can support Allied efforts in the fight against terrorism. As set out in the aim of these Policy Guidelines, 

NATO will contribute more effectively to the prevention of terrorism and increase resilience to 

acts of terrorism. To this end, the Alliance will coordinate and consolidate its counter-terrorism 

efforts and focus on three main areas, awareness, capabilities and engagement. 

10. Awareness: NATO will ensure shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities among Allies through consultations, enhanced sharing of intelligence, continuous 

strategic analysis and assessments in support of national authorities. This will enable Allies 

and the Alliance to prepare effectively and to take possible mitigating action in the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks. NATO will also promote common understanding of 

its counter-terrorism role as part of a broader international effort through engagement and 

strategic communications. 

11. Capabilities: NATO has acquired much valuable expertise in countering asymmetric 

threats and in responding to terrorism. NATO’s work on airspace security, air defense, maritime 

security, response to CBRN, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and protection of critical infrastructure is well established. The Alliance will strive to ensure that it has 

adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats, based on the 

level of ambition as defined in the Political Guidance.2

 It will do so by considering capability 

developments, innovative technologies and methods that address asymmetric threats in a more 

comprehensive and informed way, including through the Defense Against Terrorism Program 

of Work. NATO will also strive to maintain its operational capacity and capitalize on the lessons learned in operations, including experience gained through Special Operations Forces. 

Training, education and exercises based on different threat scenarios will continue to improve 

interoperability by assimilating lessons learned and best practices. These capabilities may also 

be offered to Allies in support of civil emergency planning and the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may relate to counter-terrorism, as requested. 

12. Engagement: The challenge of terrorism requires a holistic approach by the international community, involving a wide range of instruments. To enhance Allies’ security, NATO 

will continue to engage with partner countries and other international actors in countering 
30 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

terrorism. The Alliance will strengthen its outreach to and cooperation with partner countries as well as international and regional organizations, in particular the UN, EU and OSCE, 

in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, to promote common understanding of the terrorist threat and to leverage the full potential of each stake-holder engaged 

in the global counter terrorism effort. NATO will enhance consultations and ensure a more 

systematic approach to practical cooperation with partner countries3

 using existing mechanisms, including scientific cooperation on technological innovation for improved security.4

Particular emphasis will be placed on raising awareness, capacity building, civil-emergency 

planning and crisis management in order to respond to specific needs of partner countries 

and Allied interests. This will advance partners’ preparedness and protection as well as their 

identification of vulnerabilities and gaps and help partner countries to fight terrorism more 

effectively themselves. Counter-terrorism training, education and support for capacity building will be consistent with the objectives and priorities of NATO’s policy on partnerships.

V. NATO’s Response

13. The North Atlantic Council will guide NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts and implementation of these Policy Guidelines. The Terrorism Task Force will report on an annual basis 

on the implementation of these Policy Guidelines. 

14. NATO will maintain flexibility as to how to counter terrorism, playing a leading or 

supporting role as required. Allies’ capabilities represent an essential component of a potential 

response to terrorism. Collective defense remains subject to decision by the North Atlantic 

Council (NAC).

Notes

1 NATO will undertake all its activities related to partners and other international organizations in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the relevant decisions, including those taken at the Lisbon Summit.

2 Any possible emerging requirements for NATO common funding will be considered in accordance with standard processes.

3 A good example is the Cooperative Airspace Initiative within the framework of the NRC.

4 One example of such cooperation is the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) multi-year NRC 

project on “Program for Stand-off Detection of Explosives (STANDEX).”
31

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

Appendix B. Overview of National and International Response*

The United States

The United States has various policies and programs aimed at countering terrorism domestically and overseas. Engaged in the fight against terrorism is the U.S. Counterterrorism 

Team composed of the White House; the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and 

Homeland Security; Central Intelligence Agency; Office of the Director for National Intelligence; National Counterterrorism Center; and U.S. Agency for International Development. 

With regard to U.S. efforts overseas, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) 

coordinates and supports the development and implementation of all U.S. Government policies and programs. The mission of the office is to develop and lead worldwide efforts to combat 

terrorism using all the instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law 

enforcement, and military. The guiding principles are formulated in the National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism (2003): defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad. Strategically, the S/CT aims at 

applying all elements of national power in conjunction with international partners, allies, and 

like-minded nonstate actors. It aims at building trusted networks that undermine, marginalize, and isolate the enemy as well as at finding alternatives to extremism. The strategy further 

attacks the terrorist enemy’s three-part “threat complex”: leadership, safe havens (physical safe 

havens, cyber safe havens, and ideological safe havens), and underlying conditions which terrorists exploit. It responds on four levels (global, regional, national, and local) over an extended 

timeframe to isolate the threat, defeat the isolated threat, and prevent its reemergence in the 

long run. 

United Kingdom

The Office for Security and Counter-terrorism (OSCT), which is part of the Home Office, provides strategic direction to the UK’s work to counter the threat from international terrorism. The OSCT reports to the Home Secretary and the Minister of State for Security and 

Counter-Terrorism. The main responsibilities are to support the Home Secretary and other 

Ministers in directing and implementing the UK counterterrorism strategy CONTEST adopted 

in 2003, which was revised once in 2009 and once in 2011. CONTEST aims to reduce the risk 

*This appendix was developed by Elisa Oezbeck and updated by Marie-Theres Beumler.
32 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism. Thereby, it focuses on four 

work streams: pursue (stop terrorist attacks), prevent (to stop people from becoming terrorist 

or supporting violent extremism), protect (to strengthen protection against terrorist attacks), 

and prepare (where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact). OSCT also delivers aspects through legislation, guidance, and funding and sets the strategic government response to 

terrorism-related crises through the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms mechanism. It manages the 

Home Secretary’s statutory relationship with Security Services as well as the large public safety 

and security program. 

Other European Countries

Unlike Americans, Europeans regard terrorism primarily as a criminal act. European nations have therefore tasked their national security apparatus to counter terrorism 

through legislative measures. In most European countries, the ministries of Interior and 

Justice are the leading and coordinating entities against terrorism in close cooperation 

with national police, intelligence services, and border security agencies. Differences in approaches are primarily visible in different emphasis on aspects in regard to the fight against 

terrorism—for example, France underlines the “pursue” pillar whereas the UK stresses the 

“prevent” pillar—due to national experiences. Depending on memberships, international 

cooperation may vary among European nations (G8, NATO, Financial Action Task Force). 

All are, however, actively engaged in the framework of the UN and its Global Strategy 

Against Terrorism (2006). 

United Nations

Within the framework of the United Nations system, there are 16 universal instruments 

that have been elaborated relating to specific terrorist activities. In order to consolidate and enhance activities throughout the UN system, the General Assembly adopted the United Nation’s 

Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006. In September 2010, this strategy was reconfirmed 

by the General Assembly. The resolution marks the first time that all member states of the 

United Nations have agreed to a common strategic and operational framework to fight terrorism. The strategy forms a basis for a concrete plan of action: address the conditions conducive 

to the spread of terrorism, prevent and combat terrorism, take measures to build state capacity 

to fight terrorism, and ensure the respect of human rights for all as well as the rule of law as 

the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation 

Task Force (CTITF) provides the necessary policy support and spreads in-depth knowledge 
33

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

of the Strategy, and wherever necessary, expedites delivery of technical assistance. CTITF was 

established in 2005 to enhance coordination and coherence of counterterrorism efforts of the 

UN system. Currently, the Task Force consists of 31 international entities that by virtue of their 

work have a stake in counterterrorism efforts. 

UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) calls upon member states to implement a 

number of measures intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability to counter terrorist activities, including steps to criminalize the financing of terrorism; freeze without delay 

any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism; deny all forms of financial support; 

suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance, and support for terrorists; share information with governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition, and prosecution 

of those involved in such acts; and criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in 

domestic law. 

UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) pertains to incitement to commit acts of 

terrorism, calling on UN member states to prohibit it by law, prevent such conduct, and deny 

safe haven to anyone “with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information giving 

serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such conduct.”

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) was adopted by member states on September 8, 2006. The strategy represents a unique global instrument that is designed to enhance 

national, regional, and international efforts to counter terrorism. The strategy discusses “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,” “measures to prevent and combat terrorism,” “measures to build capacity and to strengthen the role of the UN,” and “measures to ensure respect 

for human rights and the rule of law.” 

Relevant Bodies include the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, UN Counter-Terrorism 

Executive Directorate, UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and UN Office on 

Drugs and Crime.

The OSCE’s Action Against Terrorism Unit (ATU) was established in 2002 as the coordinating focal point and facilitator of OSCE counterterrorism activities. The Unit assists OSCE 

participating states in implementing counterterrorism commitments, thereby enhancing their 

overall capacities to prevent and combat terrorism. The Bucharest Plan of Action (2001) and 

the Porto Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (2002) constitute the organization’s blueprint for combating terrorism. ATU programs include promoting international legal frameworks, enhancing international cooperation in criminal matters, enhancing passport/

travel document security, promoting public-private partnerships, combating the use of the 

Internet for terrorist purposes, enhancing container/supply-chain security, countering violent 
34 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

extremism and radicalization, and protecting critical energy infrastructures. Furthermore, the 

ATU established an OSCE Counter-Terrorism Network.

Relevant Bodies: Action Against Terrorism Unit

European Union. In December 2005, the European Union (EU) adopted a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which continues to be the main framework for EU action in the field of counterterrorism. It recognizes that member states have the primary responsibility for combating 

terrorism, but identifies four ways in which the EU can add value: strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European cooperation, developing collective capability, and promoting 

international partnerships. 

The objectives of the EU Strategy are to 1) increase cooperation with third countries and 

provide them assistance; 2) respect human rights; 3) prevent new recruits to terrorism; 4) better protect potential targets; 5) investigate and pursue members of existing networks; and 6) 

improve the capacity to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. The EU 

strategy rests on four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond.

The “prevent” pillar aims to combat radicalization and the recruitment of terrorists by 

identifying the methods, propaganda, and instruments terrorists use through the coordination 

of national policies, the development of best practices, and the sharing of information. 

The “protect” pillar aims to reduce the vulnerability of targets and limit the resulting impact of attack. It encourages collective action for border security, transport, and other crossborder infrastructure. 

The “pursue” pillar focuses on pursuing terrorists across borders, cutting off access to attack materials, disrupting terrorist networks and recruitment agents, and tackling the misuse 

of nonprofit associations. The second aim of “pursue” is to put an end to sources of terrorist financing by carrying out inquiries, freezing assets, and impeding money transfers. The third aim 

is to halt the planning of terrorist activities by impeding the communication and dissemination 

of terrorists’ technical knowledge. 

The “respond” pillar brings together issues such as civilian response capacity to deal with 

the aftermath of a terrorist attack, early warning systems, crisis management in general, and 

assistance to victims of terrorism. 

The EU strategy to combat terrorism is complemented by four added values: strengthening 

national capabilities, facilitating European cooperation, developing collective capabilities, and 

international cooperation. The EU aims to engage with partners more effectively and in a more 

structured way, both at the strategic and the practical levels. Such reinforced cooperation should 
35

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

not only focus on internal security aspects but also on third countries and regions identified as 

common priorities, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel region. 

In addition to the strategy, the EU also has an Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, 

which was adopted in June 2004 and has since been updated. The plan includes 140 action items 

grouped under the four pillars of prevent, protect, pursue, and respond. 

Partner Countries (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and Contact Countries). While all partner countries work together 

in the framework of the United Nations to fight terrorism, NATO’s global partners have formulated and implemented national counterterrorism programs and strategies. These differ in their 

emphasis on aspects in the fight against terrorism and in their means—operational, political, legal, financial, military—due to national experiences and regional circumstances. The Kingdom 

of Morocco has adopted a counterterrorism strategy with an emphasis on judicial, military, and 

international elements. Internationally, Morocco cooperates closely with Spain and the United 

States. The Moroccan Army has further established three specialized units that are focusing 

on illegal immigration, terrorism, and drug smuggling. Key components of the Saudi Arabian 

strategy are prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare programs. The government has launched a 

large education program about radical Islam and extremism. The centerpiece of the rehabilitation strategy is a comprehensive counseling program designed to re-educate violent extremists 

and sympathizers and to encourage extremists to renounce terrorist ideologies. The Ministry of 

Interior employs several initiatives to ensure that counseling and rehabilitation continue after 

release from state custody, including a halfway house program to ease release into society and 

programs to reintegrate returnees from Guantanamo Bay. Australia’s counterterrorism strategy 

has four key elements that are laid out in its 2010 White Paper: analysis, protection, response, 

and resilience. In the fight against terrorism, Egypt underlines the importance of distinguishing 

terrorism as political and not a religious issue. Russia’s counterterrorism strategy is laid out in 

the 1998 act “On Combating Terrorism” and the 2006 counterterrorism law that paved the way 

for institutional reorganization and more efficient intelligence and information-sharing. It also 

created the National Counter-terrorism Committee, which coordinates all federal-level antiterrorism policies and operations.
36 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

Appendix C. Key NATO Documents*

Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism

On September 26, 2002, the Military Committee agreed to adopt MC 472, NATO Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism. This concept addressed options for an expanded 

NATO role in the defense against terrorism to include Anti-Terrorism (AT) [defensive measures], Consequence Management (CM) [post attack recuperation], Counter-Terrorism (CT) 

[offensive measures], and Military Cooperation. (A sanitized version of the Military Concept 

for Defense Against Terrorism is on the NATO Web site.)

Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (2002)

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council member states adopted the Partnership Action 

Plan against Terrorism, undertaken to make all efforts within their power to prevent and 

suppress all terrorist acts in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Furthermore, the plan stressed the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional, and international levels to strengthen a global response to this threat to 

international security.

Defense Against Terrorism Program of Work (2004)

The Defense Against Terrorism Program of Work (DAT POW) was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in May 2004. It was approved at the Istanbul Summit. 

The DAT POW has focused on critical areas where technology can help prevent or mitigate the 

effects of terrorist attacks. With the increasing importance for the Alliance of countering nontraditional and emerging security challenges, the program was transferred to NATO’s Emerging 

Security Challenges Division in 2010 to offer the Alliance a broader, cross-cutting approach to 

address the most urgent capability needs in defending against terrorism. NATO’s DAT POW 

uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt, and defeat asymmetric threats 

under three capability umbrellas: Incident Management, Force Protection/Survivability, and 

Network Engagement.

*This appendix was developed by Elisa Oezbeck and updated by Marie-Theres Beumler.
37

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

NATO-Russia Joint Review of the 21st-century Common Security Challenges (2010)

NATO and Russia outlined shared views on key security questions to be addressed through 

practical cooperation. Counterterrorism and the fight against piracy was a further issue discussed 

for inclusion in NATO-Russia Council (NRC) cooperation. A NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism was developed in 2004 and updated in 2010 on the basis of the Joint Review. The NRC 

Foreign Ministers meeting held in Berlin on April 15, 2011, approved the updated NRC Action 

Plan on Terrorism.

NATO Policy Guidelines on Countering Terrorism (2012) 

The NATO Policy Guidelines on Countering Terrorism were agreed upon by the North 

Atlantic Council in April 2012 and endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the 

Chicago Summit on May 20, 2012. The guidelines provide a new framework to NATO’s role and 

activities in countering terrorism, based on the principles of Compliance with International Law, 

NATO’s Support to Allies, and Non-Duplication and Complementarity, and focused on Awareness, Capabilities, and Engagement.

39

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

Notes 1 Chicago Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 

the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago, May 20, 2012, paragraph 51, available at <www.

nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm>.

2 Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels: NATO, 2010), paragraph 10, available at 

<www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

3 Louise Shelley and John Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the Convergence of 

International Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Police Practice and Research 3 (2002), 305–318.

4 The most relevant groups include al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the 

Somali Islamist insurgent group al Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Lashkar-e-Taiba in 

Pakistan, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

5 According to the NATO Capstone Concept, NATO defines hybrid threats as “those posed by 

adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.” See Michael Miklaucic, “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” 

Allied Command Transformation Web site, September 23, 2011, available at <www.act.nato.int/topheadlines/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat>.

6 The crime-terror nexus was also discussed at the conference on Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on 

Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines: Dismantling Converging Threat Networks to Strengthen Global 

Security, June 25–26, 2012, at the National Defense University, Washington, DC. 

7 Europol, TE-SAT 2011, EU [European Union] Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, European 

Police Office, 2011, available at <www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/te-sat2011_0.pdf>.

8 Ibid.

9 For instance, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have become the primary weapon of choice 

of both terrorist and insurgent. Accordingly, they are increasingly referred to as IED “networks.” IED 

networks extend beyond the theater of operations and are often closely linked to criminal and terrorist 

networks on a global scale. The fight against these networks requires means beyond the military, including law enforcement and other governmental agencies. In order to enhance the ability to attack the 

network, it is essential to identify precisely what kind of areas should be covered by each of these bodies 

and consequently to establish priorities and develop mechanisms to share information.

10 Ungoverned spaces are here understood as areas in which the state is no longer willing or 

able to enforce law and order. Often, this is followed by an effective takeover of control by nonstate 

actors, such as warlords. These areas are typically at considerable distance from the capital. Edward Newman, “Weak States, State Failure and Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 

4 (2007); Angel Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks

(Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).

11 Lucio Caracciolo, “Terroristi di casa nostra,” Limes, December, 17, 2010.

12 “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack,” speech by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

Director Robert Mueller at City Club of Cleveland, June 23, 2006. Quoted in Kimberley L. Thachuk, 

Marion E. “Spike” Bowman, and Courtney Richardson, Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat Within

(Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2008).
40 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

13 Shirwa Ahmed, an ethnic Somali from Minneapolis, was the first American terrorist suicide 

attacker anywhere. He blew himself up in front of a government compound in northern Somalia on 

October 29, 2008, killing about 20 people including United Nations (UN) peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance workers. It is possible that 18-year-old Omar Mohamud of Seattle was the second. 

On September 17, 2009, two stolen UN vehicles loaded with bombs blew up at the Mogadishu airport 

killing more than a dozen peacekeepers of the African Union. The FBI suspects that Mohamud was one 

of the bombers.

14 In June 2011, Abu Yahya al Libi compared “one attack in the West to more than tens of attacks 

in faraway battlefields.” See Randall Blake, “The Next Chapter of Global Jihad,” The Brookings Institution, 

May 1, 2012, available at <www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/01-jihad-trends-blake>.

15 Ibid. Blake notes that “While spanning the motivational and ideological spectrum, Nidal 

Hassan, the 2007 Virginia Tech shooter, Norway’s Anders Breivik, and France’s Mohammed Merah have 

already proven the power of ‘unsophisticated’ DIY terror.”

16 Brian Jenkins, “The al Qaeda–Inspired Terrorist Threat,” Testimony presented before the 

Canadian Senate Special Committee on Anti-terrorism, December 6, 2010.

17 Europol, TE-SAT 2011, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.

18 Notably in the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

19 Terrorist means to finance activities are adaptive and able to exploit vulnerabilities to advantages. Such vulnerabilities can occur in charities; identity theft; tax havens; state sponsorship; income 

generation from legal businesses; trafficking of migrants, women, drugs; sales of small arms and light 

weapons; contributions from radicalized diasporas; informal money transfers utilizing the hawala system; Twitpay; Facebook credits; theft; smuggling; and corruption.

20 Bernard E. Selwan el Khoury, “Jihad and Arab Spring: How much 2.0 is al Qaeda?” Limes, 

May 16, 2012.

21 Jack Cloherty, “Al Qaeda video calls for ‘electronic jihad,’” May 22, 2012, ABC News, 

available at <abcnews.go.com/Politics/cyber-terrorism-al-qaeda-video-calls-electronic-jihad/

story?id=16407875>.

22 Blake notes that “Terrorist acquisition of chemical-biological devices in Syria can be game 

changers.”

23 Harold M. Agnew, a nuclear weapons engineer, became the third U.S. Los Alamos National 

Laboratory director in 1970. He also served as scientific advisor to NATO. 

24 In Europe, the terrorist threat varies greatly between separatist groups, politically motivated 

groups, and the ever-present Islamist threat. While some countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, 

and France have a history of separatism, others such as Italy, Germany, and even Greece suffered mainly 

from politically motivated terrorism. In 2011, the highest number of attacks on European soil was 

carried out by separatist groups, followed by extremist or anarchist groups. Spain and France were the 

countries most affected. See Europol, TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.

25 Paragraph 24 of NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_27433.htm>.

26 NATO Operations and Missions, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm>.

27 MC-472.
41

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

28 Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 

November 29, 2006, The Strategic Context, paragraph 2, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm>.

29 Active Engagement, Modern Defence, paragraph 10.

30 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer 

Future,” introduction, paragraph 1, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87905.htm?>.

31 Ibid., paragraph 2.

32 Ibid., paragraph 4.

33 Ibid.

34 “In accordance with the Strategic Concept, we will continue to enhance both the political and the military aspects of NATO’s contribution to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against this 

threat including through advanced technologies and greater information and intelligence sharing.” See 

paragraph 39 of the Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010. See also paragraph 8. Available at 

<www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm>.

35 “Defending the Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber Defense,” June 8, 2011, available at 

<www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefence.pdf>.

36 Active Engagement, Modern Defence, preface.

37 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism,” paragraph 5.

38 Jamie Shea, “Keeping NATO Relevant,” in Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment, April 2012, 2.

39 NATO’s Comprehensive Approach is predicated on the understanding that effective crisis 

management calls for the coordinated use of political, civilian, and military instruments. The concept 

was first introduced in 2005 into NATO’s debate by Denmark’s “Concerted Planning and Action” concept. The concept evolved to become NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and was ultimately endorsed 

at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest (Bucharest Summit Declaration, April 3, 2008, paragraph 11), 

available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm?selectedLocale=en>. Allied leaders 

agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 to “enhance NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach 

to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to 

contribute to stabilization and reconstruction.” See Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010, 

paragraph 9, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

40 Ibid., 13.

41 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism.”

42 Ibid. 

43 Ibid. 

44 In 2000, with the review of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO and the reform of the Senior 

Civil Emergency Planning Committee, nations agreed on the five roles for NATO Civil Emergency Planning: 

1) civil support for Alliance Article 5 (collective defense) operations, 2) support for non–Article 5 (crisis 

response) operations, 3) support for national authorities in civil emergencies, 4) support for national authorities in the protection of populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction, and 5) cooperation 

with partner countries in preparing for and dealing with disasters. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response 

Coordination Center is a disaster-response clearinghouse mechanism established by the Euro-Atlantic 

Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1998. Its main role is to coordinate requests and offers for assistance in the 
42 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

case of natural, technological, or man-made disasters. Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the 

center’s role was expanded to coordinate international assistance from EAPC countries to help deal with the 

consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, including terrorist attacks. 

Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49158.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

45 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism,” paragraph 7.

46 Ibid. 

47 The counterterrorism “package” adopted in Prague included a Military Concept for the 

Defense Against Terrorism; A Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism; five nuclear, biological, and 

chemical defense initiatives; protection of civilian populations including a Civil Emergency Planning 

Action Plan; Missile Defense; Cyber Defense; Cooperation with other International Organizations; and 

Intelligence Sharing, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_77646.htm?>.

48 By contrast, the 1999 Strategic Concept made only indirect reference to terrorism as one of 

many security challenges and risks. Not mentioned as a dimension of the evolving strategic environment, reference to terrorism appears only in the third sentence of paragraph 24: “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized 

crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources,” available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

49 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism.”

50 Ibid. 

51 Following the 2010–2011 comprehensive reform of NATO intelligence, a newly created Intelligence Unit absorbed and expanded the functions of the Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit. This has 

further enhanced the analytical approaches on terrorism and its links with other transnational threats. 

In particular, the current mechanism has enhanced cooperation among the NATO civilian and military 

intelligence components, and preserved the previously developed mechanisms that ensure coherent 

intelligence sharing with partners through the Intelligence Liaison Unit. Available at <www.nato.int/

cps/en/natolive/topics_77646.htm?>. 

52 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism,” paragraph 11.

53 Located at SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, Belgium, NSHQ was set up to coordinate NATO’s 

Special Operations and optimize the employment of Special Forces. Although the majority of what 

NSHQ does is at the strategic and operational level, the NATO Special Operations Headquarters is also 

the place for training and education for NATO and partner nations. Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/

natolive/news_84662.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

54 At Prague in 2002, a Civil Emergency Action plan was adopted for the protection of 

populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, an inventory of national 

capabilities for use in CBRN incidents (e.g., medical assistance, radiological detection units, aeromedical evacuation) has been developed. Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49158.

htm?selectedLocale=en>.

55 Readout of the meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and NATO Secretary 

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on May 9, 2012, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/09/readout-president-s-meeting-nato-secretary-general-rasmussen>.

56 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism,” Key Areas, paragraph 12.
43

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

57 Ibid.

58 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, September 12, 2001, “The Council agreed that if it 

is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as 

an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one 

or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_18553.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

59 Paragraph 20 of the Chicago Summit Declaration states: “NATO and the EU share common 

values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. Fully strengthening 

this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organizations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, 

is particularly important in the current environment of austerity; NATO and the EU should continue 

to work to enhance practical cooperation in operations, broaden political consultations, and cooperate 

more fully in capability development. . . . NATO also recognizes non-EU Allies’ ongoing concerns and 

their significant contributions to strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges.” Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

60 Ibid. 

61 Louise I. Shelley et al., Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism, report, U.S. Department of Justice, September 2005.

62 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism,” footnote 1 to paragraph 5, and Key Areas, 

paragraph 12.

63 The Berlin Plus Agreement has seven major parts: 1) NATO-EU Security Agreement, which 

covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules; 2) assured access 

to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (CMO); 3) availability of NATO 

assets and capabilities for EU-led CMOs, such as communication units and headquarters; 4) procedures 

for release, monitoring, return, and recall of NATO assets and capabilities; 5) Terms of Reference for 

DSACEUR and European Command options for NATO; 6) arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, in particular the incorporation within NATO’s defense planning of the 

military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations; 7) EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities. This 

comprehensive framework for NATO-EU relations was concluded on March 17, 2003, by the exchange of 

letters by EU High Representative Javier Solana and then–Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson.

64 Cyprus has no Security Agreement with NATO and therefore cannot access NATO “classified” information.

65 The NATO HQ Terrorism Task Force is a staff structure made up of representatives of NATO 

Headquarters International Staff and International Military Staff divisions and organizations dealing 

with terrorism-related issues.

66 J.R. Galbraith, “Matrix Organization Designs: How to combine functional and project 

forms,” Business Horizons, February 1971, 29–40.

67 According to Lawrence, Kolodny, and Davis (1977), organizations use matrices when they 

have 1) an absolute need for higher responsiveness toward two sectors: markets and technology; 2) a 

need for achieving greater flexibility, which a conventional, strictly hierarchical structure may not be 

able to provide, and “of reconciling this flexibility with the coordination and economies of scale that 
44 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

are historic strengths of large organizations”; 3) uncertainties that create high information processing 

requirements; 4) strong constraints on financial or human resources. Prakash K. Nair, “Demystifying the Matrix,” Leaderati Infosys Blog, October 3, 2011, available at <www.infosysblogs.com/leadership/2011/10/demystifying_the_matrix.html>.

68 In this context, the term resources is intended in its managerial connotation of funds, time, 

and personnel.

69 In this respect, the contribution provided by NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning’s five technical planning groups is remarkable. The groups bring together national experts from the public and 

private sectors and industry to coordinate planning in various areas of civil activity. The five planning 

groups are: Civil Protection, Transport, Public Health, Food and Water, and Industrial Resources and 

Communications. Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49158.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

70 Chicago Summit Declaration, issued by the heads of state and government participating in 

the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Chicago, May 20, 2012.

71 James Carafano, “Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050,” Richmond Independent 

News, September 13, 2002.

72 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism,” Key Areas, paragraph 10.

73 James T. Snyder, “Counterinsurgency Vocabulary and Strategic Success,” Military Review

(November–December 2011), 23–28.

74 General David H. Petraeus, USA, COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, Headquarters, 

International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces Afghanistan, July 27, 2010.

75 Of particular relevance is the study produced by the Strategic Communication for Combating Terrorism workshop conducted by the NATO Centre of Excellence—Defense Against Terrorism, 

on May 12–13, 2009, in Ankara, Turkey. Available at <www.coedat.nato.int/publications/StratComm/

StratComm2010.pdf>.

76 Ibid.

77 The Human Environment Capabilities project was launched by ACT in June 2012 and will 

engage experts from the military, industry, and academia to analyze the importance and impact of the 

human environment in modern operations. Available at <www.act.nato.int/innovationhub>.

78 “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism,” NATO Response, paragraph 14.

79 According to Prakash K. Nair, “Ambiguous authority happens when a member or members in 

a unit may have the responsibility of executing a task but may not have the authority to do it.” See Nair.

80 Gabor Iklody, “The Next Steps for NATO,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

June 5, 2012.

81 According to Ronald A. Gunn, “A ‘Matrix Guardian,’ also known as a ‘Matrix Manager,’ is an 

individual whose job it is to see to it that the matrix structure is functioning effectively and efficiently, 

and that the principles of matrix management are being applied correctly and fairly. The Matrix Guardian ensures that ‘good hygiene’ is being practiced throughout the matrix structure.” Among the functions of the Matrix Guardian is to “function as an ombudsman or arbiter in working through a variety 

of emerging issues such as chronic staff overwork/underwork or boundary disputes, for example.” See 

Ronald A. Gunn, “Matrix Manager and the Matrix Guardian,” Strategic Futures Blog, August 24, 2010, 

available at <www.strategicfutures.com/2010/08/matrix-management-and-the-matrix-guardian/>.
45

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

82 Jean-Louis Bruguiere, Ce que je n’ai pas pu dire: Entretiens avec Jean-Marie Pontaut, ed. Robert Laffont (Paris: RAND Europe, 2009); Quick scan of post 9/11 national counter-terrorism policymaking 

and implementation in selected European countries (Leiden, 2002).

83 Alliance Maritime Strategy—The Maritime Security Environment, paragraph 6, March 18, 

2011, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

84 Ibid.

85 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states 

and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. Launched on May 31, 2003, U.S. involvement in the PSI 

stems from the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, issued in December 

2002. See U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation, available at 

<www.state.gov/documents/organization/60173.pdf>.

86 FRONTEX is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 

External Borders of the member states of the European Union. The agency was set up in 2004 to reinforce and streamline cooperation between national border authorities. FRONTEX promotes, coordinates, and develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter and 

applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. Available at <www.frontex.europa.eu>.

87 Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, issued by the heads of state and government 

of Afghanistan and Nations Contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), May 21, 2012, Beyond 2014, paragraph 12, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_

texts_87595.htm>.

88 The Group of 13 consisted of Australia, Austria, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, Republic of 

Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates.

89 Stefano Santamato, “More than Partners, not quite Allies—The ‘NATO Association’: a 

proposal for the Chicago Summit,” INSS Dynamic Dialogue, April 11, 2012, available at <www.inssblog.

wordpress.com/>.

90 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, The NATO Chicago Summit: Outcomes and Way Ahead (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, May 24, 2012), available at <www.acus.org>. Dr. Sherwood-Randall is 

Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe at the National Security Council.

91 The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) was introduced ahead of the NATO summit in 

Chicago on May 21–22, 2012. The CFI is mentioned in the Summit Declaration on Defense Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020, paragraph 11. According to it, through CFI, NATO “will expand 

education and training of our personnel, complementing in this way essential national efforts. We will 

enhance our exercises. We will link our networks together even more. We will strengthen the bonds 

between NATO Command Structure, the NATO Force Structure, and our national headquarters. We 

will also enhance cooperation among our Special Operations Forces including through NATO’s Special 

Operations Forces Headquarters. We will strengthen the use of the NATO Response Force, so that it 

can play a greater role in enhancing the ability of Alliance forces to operate together and to contribute 

to our deterrence and defense posture. As much as possible, we will also step up our connections with 

Partners, so that when we wish to act together, we can.” Available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm>.
46 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 13

92 Chicago Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 

the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on May 20, 2012, paragraph 24.

93 The NATO Political-Military Framework regulates partners’ participation in NATO-led 

operations. According to it, partners can only be involved in shaping decisions that, ultimately, will be 

taken only by Allies. 

94 Santamato.

95 Hillary Clinton launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) on September 22, 

2011. The GCTF is a multilateral counterterrorism body with 30 founding members (29 countries plus 

the EU). See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, available at 

<www.state.gov/j/ct/gctf/index.htm>. 

96 Initial GCTF working groups will focus on: 1) the criminal justice sector and rule of law, 

2) countering violent extremism, 3) capacity building in the Sahel, 4) capacity building in The Horn 

Region, and 5) capacity building in Southeast Asia. “Global Counter-terrorism Forum Fact Sheet,” September 9, 2011, available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/172010.htm>.

97 The 30 founding members of the GCTF are Algeria, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, 

Denmark, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, 

Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States, “Global 

Counter-terrorism Forum Fact Sheet.”

98 All the more considering that Turkey hosts NATO’s Center of Excellence for the Defense 

Against Terrorism.

99 “Global Counter-terrorism Forum Fact Sheet.”

100 Active Engagement, Modern Defence, paragraphs 1 and 4.
47

The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism

About the Authors

Stefano Santamato is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. His work focuses on U.S.–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relations through research, publications, and education 

for the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) and, prior to that, the Center for Transatlantic 

Security Studies. In addition, he serves as an Associate Editor for PRISM, the CCO journal. 

Mr. Santamato joined NATO in 2000, where he served for the Military Common–funded Resource Policy Unit, NATO Strategic Analysis Capability and Operations Division in the Civil 

Emergency Planning and Crisis Management Planning sections. His international experience 

includes working for the European Commission and collaboration with the Secretariat General 

of the European Parliament. Mr. Santamato served in the Italian air force between 1993 and 

1994. He is a graduate in Political Sciences and International Public Law from the University of 

Milan and holds a Master of Arts degree in International Politics from the Centre Européen de 

Recherches Internationales et Stratégiques in Brussels.

Marie-Theres Beumler worked as a Research Intern in INSS. Ms. Beumler earned a B.A. 

in Cultural Anthropology and an M.A. in Peace and Conflict Studies from the European 

Peace University in Stadtschlaining, Austria. During her studies, she focused on terrorism 

and insurgencies, working mainly in the context of Central Asia and the Middle East. Prior 

to her work in INSS, Ms. Beumler completed an internship at the International Institute for 

Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. She is fluent in German, Spanish, French, and English.

u u u

The authors would like to acknowledge the invaluable research and

analysis contributions of Julie Cairns and Elisa Oezbeck to this paper.

Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

Col kris bauman, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

Ms. M. Elaine Bunn

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. John A. Cope

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Rozlyn C. Engel

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. FRANK G. Hoffman

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Andre Le Sage

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III

Distinguished Research Fellow 

Mr. Leo G. Michel

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. John Parker

Visiting Research Fellow

Dr. James J. Przystup

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Nicholas Rostow

Senior Director

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Judith S. Yaphe

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher Yung

Senior Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm.