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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES SANFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEL TACO, INC. dba DEL TACO

#140; YUTAKA MIURA and MARY

MIURA; and DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-04-1337 DFL CMK

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

The parties bring cross-motions for summary judgment on

plaintiff James Sanford’s (“Sanford”) claims against defendants

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and related

state statutes. For the reasons stated below, the court: (1)

GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the exterior

door; (2) GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

restaurant seating; and (3) DECLINES to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Sanford’s remaining state law claims.

I.

Sanford is a disabled person who uses a motorized wheel

chair and a specially equipped van to travel. (Compl. ¶ 7.) 

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Sanford alleges that architectural barriers within and around the

Del Taco restaurant located at 2200 Arden Way (“restaurant”) 

denied him equal access to the restaurant and deterred him from

visiting it. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20, 21.) Sanford claims that he

visited the restaurant four or five times during the past two

years. (Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PSUF”) 6.) 

On July 13, 2004, Sanford filed this suit. He brings claims

under: (1) the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.); (2) the Disabled

Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq.); (3) the Unruh Civil

Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq.); (4) California Health

and Safety Code § 19955; (5) the California Unfair Competition

Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.); and (6) Negligence

Per Se (Cal. Civ. Code § 1714). (Compl. ¶ 26-96.) 

On September 1, 2005, defendants moved for summary judgment. 

On November 11, 2005, the court: (1) denied defendants’ motion

for summary judgment without prejudice; (2) granted Sanford’s

request for a Rule 56(f) continuance to allow for a site

inspection; and (3) granted defendants’ motion to amend their

answer to plead the affirmative defense that any alterations are

not readily achievable. (11/11/2005 Order at 5-6.)

On December 1, 2005, Sanford’s expert conducted a second

site inspection of the restaurant. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) On

December 15, 2005, defendants moved for summary judgment.

II.

A. ADA Claims

Defendants assert that summary judgment is appropriate

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because they have removed all of the barriers that Sanford

encountered or had knowledge of when the complaint was filed. 

(Defs.’ Reply and Opp’n at 3.) Sanford concedes that his claim

is limited to barriers that he actually encountered or knew about

when he filed the complaint and that defendants have remedied all

of the barriers except the exterior door pressure and the

restaurant seating. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) Sanford cross-moves for

summary judgment on these two barriers.

1. Exterior Door Pressure

Defendants argue that Sanford’s claim fails for two reasons. 

First, the ADAAG does not specify a maximum door opening force

for exterior doors. (Defs.’ Reply and Opp’n at 5-6; Casper

Decl., ¶¶ 6.) In support of their argument, defendants note that

ADAAG § 4.13.11(2)(a) specifically reserves the maximum door

opening force for exterior doors. (Defs.’ Reply and Opp’n at 5.) 

Second, defendants state that, in September 2005, they replaced

the exterior doors with doors that require less than five pounds

of force to open. (Albright Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Sanford acknowledges that the ADAAG does not define a

maximum door opening force, but he argues that the exterior door

does not meet the standard established by the California Building

Code, Cal. Code Regs. Title 24 (“CBC”). (Pl.’s Reply at 3.) 

Sanford notes that the Technical Assistance Manual (“TAM”) from

the DOJ states that “architectural barriers are physical elements

of a facility that impede access by people with disabilities.” 

Sanford claims that an exterior door that exceeds the maximum

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 However, Sanford’s expert does not specify how much more 1

than five pounds of force the exterior door required to open.

 Even though the court granted Sanford’s request for a 2

56(f) continuance, he fails to provide evidence that the exterior

door continues to be a barrier to his access following

replacement of the door by defendants.

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pressure under California State law is a “physical element of a

facility that impedes access.” (Pl.’s Reply at 4.) Sanford

alleges that he could not open the entrance door to the

restaurant because the pressure was too great. (Sanford Decl. ¶

9.) In addition, Sanford states that his expert re-inspected the

restaurant on December 1, 2005 and found that the entrance door

required more than five pounds of force to open. (Card Decl. ¶ 1

3(a)).

Because the ADAAG does not define the requirement for

exterior door pressure, Sanford has the burden to show that the

door created a barrier to his access. Although Sanford provides

an affidavit stating that the entrance door impeded his access to

the restaurant, defendants introduce evidence that they installed

a new entrance door that requires less force to open. While the

five pound requirement under the CBC may be evidence of what

constitutes a barrier to access, Sanford has failed to provide an

affidavit stating that the door was a barrier to his access after

defendants replaced it in September 2005. Therefore, Sanford 2

has not met his burden and the court GRANTS defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on the claim for exterior door pressure. 

2. Restaurant Seating

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Sanford argues that seating in the restaurant violates the

ADA in four ways. First, Sanford asserts that defendants must

provide accessible booth seating in the restaurant. (Pl.’s Reply

at 5.) Sanford contends that, although the ADAAG does not

address booth seating, in § 5.4 it states that “all dining areas

. . . shall be accessible.” (Id.) Sanford asserts that the use

of the term “all” includes booth seating. (Id.) However,

Sanford fails to provide evidence that the booths constitute a

distinct “dining area” such that ADAAG 5.4 applies to them. See

Wilson v. Norbreck, No. 04-0690, 2005 WL 3439714, at *5-6 (E.D.

Cal. Dec. 14, 2005). The record here reveals that the restaurant

has a single dining area, part of which is made up of booth

seating. Because the “dining area” includes accessible seating,

the court rejects Sanford’s argument that the booth seating

violates the ADA. 

Second, Sanford argues that the restaurant has tables that

are too small to accommodate a companion and that this violates

ADAAG § 4.32.2. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; Card Decl. ¶ 3c.) ADAAG §

4.32.2 states “if seating spaces for people in wheelchairs are

provided at fixed tables or counters, clear floor space complying

with 4.2.4 shall be provided. Such clear floor space shall not

overlap knee space by more than 19 in (485 mm).” Because none of

the ADAAG regulations Sanford cites require tables large enough

to accommodate a companion at the very same table, the court

rejects Sanford’s claim that this alleged aspect of the tables

violates the ADA. It should be noted that Del Taco is a fast

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food restaurant with utilitarian seating. The tables are closely

set, and a party of two could converse easily even if seated at

separate tables.

Third, Sanford argues that chairs obstruct the required 30

inch by 48 inch clear space around two tables designated as

accessible, which violates ADAAG §§ 4.3.3, 4.32.2, 4.32.3 and

4.2.4.1. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; Card Decl. 3d.) ADAAG §§ 4.2.4.1

and 4.32.2 require a minimum clear floor space of 30 inches by 48

inches around fixed counters or tables. ADAAG § 4.3.3 states

“the minimum clear width of an accessible route shall be 36 in

(915 mm) except at doors (see 4.13.5 and 4.13.6). If a person in

a wheelchair must make a turn around an obstruction, the minimum

clear width of the accessible route shall be as shown in Fig.

7(a) and (b).” ADAAG § 4.32.3 states “if seating for people in

wheelchairs is provided at tables or counters, knee spaces at

least 27 in (685 mm) high, 30 in (760 mm) wide, and 19 in (485

mm) deep shall be provided (see Fig. 45).”

Defendants note that they have removed all chairs located in

the approach to the accessible tables. (Defs.’ Reply and Opp’n

at 5; Albright Decl. in Support of Reply ¶ 3.) At oral argument,

Sanford did not contest this fact. Therefore, the court rejects

Sanford’s argument that chairs obstruct the required 30 inch by

48 inch clear space around two tables designated as accessible. 

Finally, Sanford argues that other tables obstruct the path

to the tables designated as accessible, which violates ADAAG §§

4.32.3, 4.2.4.1, and 4.3.3. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; Card Decl. 3e.) 

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ADAAG § 4.3.3 states that the minimum clear width of an

accessible route shall be 36 inches. Card’s declaration states

that there is not a minimum clear width of 36 inches for the

access aisle to the tables designated as accessible. (See Card

Decl. 3e.) However, he does not mention other tables obstructing

the path. The site inspection report includes a photo of Card

measuring the width of the path from the edge of one removable

chair to another. (Ex. B to Card Decl. at 5.) 

Defendants respond that they have relocated all chairs in

the approach path to the accessible tables and that the path is

greater than 36 inches wide, complying with ADAAG 4.3.3. (Defs.’

Reply and Opp’n at 5; Albright Decl. in Support of Reply ¶¶ 3,

4.) At oral argument, Sanford did not contest defendants’

statement that they had removed the chairs on the path to the

accessible seating. Because defendants have removed the chairs,

Sanford’s final argument for a violation of the ADA based on the

seating in the restaurant is moot. Therefore, the court GRANTS

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Sanford’s ADA claim. 

B. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that the court should decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Sanford’s remaining state law

claims. (Defs.’ Reply and Opp’n at 13.) Federal courts may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: (1) if the claim

raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) if the claim

substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which

the district court has original jurisdiction; (3) if the district

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court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction; or (4) if in exceptional circumstances, there are

other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c). 

Sanford’s remaining state law claims raise novel and complex

issues of state law. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966) (“Needless decision of state law

should be avoided as a matter of comity.”); Molski v. Mandarin

Touch Restaurant, 359 F.Supp.2d 924, 936 (C.D. Cal. 2005)

(finding that the law for recovering damages under state

disability statutes is poorly defined). Therefore, the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims. 

III.

For the reasons stated above, the court: (1) GRANTS

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the exterior door; (2)

GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the restaurant

seating; and (3) DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Sanford’s remaining state law claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/12/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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