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RIGHTSIZING TSA BUREAUCRACY AND 

WORKFORCE WITHOUT COMPROMISING SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 28, 2012 

Serial No. 112–80 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois, Vice Chair 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

VACANCY

AMANDA PARIKH, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

VACANT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Rear Admiral David Nicholson (USCG–Ret.), Assistant Administrator for Finance and Administration, Chief Financial Officer, Transportation Security 

Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 13 

Mr. Christopher L. McLaughlin, Assistant Administrator for Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Major General Sean J. Byrne (USA–Ret.), Assistant Administrator for Human 

Capital, Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. James G. Duncan, Assistant Administrator for Professional Responsibility, Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Letter ..................................................................................................................... 23 

(1) 

RIGHTSIZING TSA BUREAUCRACY AND WORKFORCE WITHOUT COMPROMISING SECURITY 

Wednesday, March 28, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Rogers, Cravaack, Jackson Lee, Davis, 

and Richmond. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to examine the increasing staff 

levels at the Transportation Security Administration. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

I want to welcome all of the witnesses for being here today and 

apologize for the delay that votes had on all of your schedules. I 

appreciate your accommodation, and I look forward to your testimony. I know it takes time to prepare this and it is not always 

easy to schedule being here, but it is helpful to us. 

The growth of TSA’s bureaucracy has outpaced the number of 

travelers the agency was designed to protect. The goal of this hearing is to more fully understand why this is the case and hear what 

steps TSA plans to take to address this problem. Securing our Nation’s transportation system is paramount, and for that reason we 

must ensure that every dollar TSA spends directly addresses that 

goal. 

We all appreciate the incredible microscope TSA and its employees are under. There are very few Federal Government entities 

that interact with as many Americans on a daily basis as TSA 

does. However, this hearing goes beyond the behavior or mistakes 

made by TSA personnel. Today’s hearing is about understanding 

why TSA’s bureaucracy has expanded so dramatically and learning 

what steps need to be taken to prevent further unnecessary expansion. 

Given the challenging economic climate we are facing, TSA 

should be making personnel decisions and many decisions that impact spending with a keen eye toward their impact on enhancing 

and improving security. Any dollar that does not enhance security 

should not be spent by TSA. 
2 

With an annual budget approaching $8 billion, we need to ask 

the question of whether the TSA staffing model is efficient and effective. We all need to learn to do more with less, and I believe 

TSA is capable of doing just that without compromising security. 

In the years following 9/11, we all supported the rapid expansion 

of TSA as both necessary and justified. However, the growth now 

appears to be limitless. We need to examine how it is possible that 

we need more screeners when we have fewer people screened. 

TSA has evolved significantly since its formation after 9/11. I am 

supportive of Administrator Pistole’s efforts to make TSA a more 

risk-based, counterterrorism-focused agency. The initial implementation of PreCheck, TSA’s risk-based passenger screening initiative, 

thus far appears to be successful, and I look forward to seeing it 

expanded. 

Having said that, my concern and the concern of many of my colleagues is that TSA does not view risk-based screening and other 

initiatives as a means to a more efficient staffing model. Instead, 

the bureaucracy continues to grow, despite the tangible benefit that 

risk-based screening could help us realize in the way of fewer 

screeners. 

The fiscal year 2013 request for personnel compensation and benefits for airport screeners is more than $3 billion. This figure represents roughly 40 percent of TSA’s total budget. Without oversight 

and intervention, this number has the potential to skyrocket even 

higher. We need to learn today why that number is so high, what 

TSA’s overtime costs look like, and how we can keep that number 

from expanding without tangible security need. 

Today I look forward to hearing directly from the leadership of 

the Transportation Security Administration about the steps TSA 

plans to take to curb the growth of its bureaucracy and ways that 

we can reduce the burdens on taxpayers. 

[The statement of Mr. Rogers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MIKE ROGERS

MARCH 28, 2012 

I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing and thank all of our witnesses. 

We look forward to your testimony and greatly appreciate your time. 

The growth of TSA’s bureaucracy has outpaced the number of travelers the agency was designed to protect. The goal of this hearing is to more fully understand why 

this is the case, and hear what steps TSA plans to take to address this problem. 

Securing our Nation’s transportation systems is paramount, and for that reason we 

must ensure that every dollar TSA spends directly addresses that goal. 

We all appreciate the incredible microscope TSA and its employees are under. 

There are very few Federal Government entities that interact with as many Americans on a daily basis as TSA does. 

However, this hearing goes beyond the behavior or mistakes made by TSA personnel. Today’s hearing is about understanding why TSA’s bureaucracy has expanded so dramatically, and learning what steps need to be taken to prevent further 

unnecessary expansion. 

Given the challenging economic climate we are facing, TSA should be making personnel decisions and any decisions that impact spending with a keen eye towards 

their impact on enhancing and improving security. Any dollar that does not enhance 

security should not be spent by TSA. 

With an annual budget approaching $8 billion, we need to ask the question of 

whether TSA’s staffing model is efficient and effective. We all need to learn to do 

more with less, and I believe TSA is capable of doing just that without compromising security. 
3 

In the years following 9/11, we all supported the rapid expansion of TSA as both 

necessary and justified; however, that growth now appears to be limitless. We need 

to examine how it is possible that we need more screeners when we have fewer people to be screened. 

TSA has evolved significantly since its formation after 9/11. I am supportive of 

Administrator Pistole’s efforts to make TSA a more risk-based counter-terrorism focused agency. The initial implementation of Pre-Check, TSA’s risk-based passenger 

screening initiative, thus far appears to be successful, and I look forward to seeing 

it expand. 

Having said that, my concern, and the concern of many of my colleagues is that 

TSA does not view risk-based screening and other initiatives as a means to a more 

efficient staffing model. Instead, the bureaucracy continues to grow, despite the tangible benefit that risk-based screening could help us realize in the way of fewer 

screeners. 

The fiscal year 2013 request for Personnel, Compensation, and Benefits for airport 

screeners is more than $3 billion; this figure represents roughly 40% of TSA’s total 

budget. Without oversight and intervention, this number has the potential to skyrocket even higher. We need to learn today why that number is so high, what TSA’s 

overtime costs look like, and how we can keep that number from expanding without 

a tangible security need. 

Today, I look forward to hearing directly from the leadership of the Transportation Security Administration about the steps TSA plans to take to curb the growth 

of its bureaucracy; and ways we can reduce the burden on taxpayers. 

Mr. ROGERS. With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member 

and my friend from Texas, the gentlelady, Ms. Jackson Lee, for her 

opening statement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I really do look forward to working with you on what are some enormously vital 

issues. 

I think we do have a slight disagreement, however, because I believe that the matrix through which we look through, particularly 

TSA, involves the responsibility of TSO officers to be in place, regardless of the flow of passengers, for the security of the aviation 

infrastructure at airports and elsewhere. In addition, if you look to 

some of our privatized airports—say, for example, San Francisco— 

they have the same number of privatized individuals that would be 

if it was TSO officers. 

So we need to look at this question. I want to tell my friends that 

all offsets—as someone said all progress is not good, all offsets are 

not good, as well. So I look forward to the discussion. The Chairman and I have always had ways of coming together on these 

issues, and I look forward to a vigorous discussion. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope to quickly go through my opening statement, but I am troubled, and because we are in a transportation 

security hearing, I want to start by acknowledging the efforts undertaken by the passengers and flight crew yesterday aboard 

JetBlue Flight 191 from New York City to Las Vegas. Their brave 

and astute course of action mitigated what could have been an unforgettable tragedy. I want to particularly note two former NYPD 

police. They were magnificent. 

But unfortunately this is not the first time an incident like this 

has threatened passengers in the sky. Just hours after this particular incident took place, the media reported that a passenger 

was arrested for being disruptive aboard a flight. Earlier this 

month, passengers subdued an American Airlines flight attendant 

after she became disruptive. A co-pilot a couple years ago was reportedly removed from Air Canada. As we recall, the famous incident with a flight attendant exiting with a beer can. Then, of 
4 

course, the enormous acts of passengers on December 25, 2009, the 

Christmas day bomber. 

I want to thank all those folks. I am not maligning individuals 

who have issues dealing with their health. But what I am saying 

is that we deal with security, homeland security, and obviously 

these could have resulted in dastardly results. 

I understand by news reports that the restraints that JetBlue 

had on its plane disintegrated, didn’t work, broke, and they had to 

actually sit on this individual. There are instances where immediate passenger and flight crew response was critical to ensuring 

the security of the aircraft and passengers. 

So I really believe this is an issue. Too many of these opens us 

up to others who may speculate what they could do, and result in 

something that none of us would want to see happen. We know 

that mass transit and airlines still remain an attractive target for 

terrorists. Let’s not give them the suggestion that it is an easy 

process and an easy action. So I am very, very interested in conducting an oversight on cabin security. 

I will turn quickly and summarize my remarks on the hearing 

today. I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us. I look forward to hearing how TSA determines its staffing level needs and 

where efficiencies that do not compromise security may be found. 

In these tight budgetary times, it is incumbent upon all of us to 

find ways to be more efficient without compromising security. 

As the Chairman and other Members are aware, a lapse in our 

transportation security could have devastating consequences. Before calling for a reduction in the number of front-line employees 

at TSA, we should ensure that all other means of achieving cost 

efficiencies are explored. We must ask whether TSA is wisely investing its resources in new technologies. We must ask whether or 

not encouraging the outsourcing of screening operations to contractors at a cost premium is fiscally prudent. We must ask whether 

TSA, as some have suggested, is top-heavy and employs excessive 

headquarters staff. 

I am pleased that the chief financial officer for TSA is here today 

to answer questions about how TSA’s headquarters is organized 

and staffed. I look forward to hearing from him on TSA’s on-going 

headquarters reorganization, how it will reduce cost inefficiencies. 

In conclusion, I am also looking forward to hearing from the representatives of the Human Capital Office and Office of Security Operations on how they have implemented DHS Inspector General 

and GAO recommendations for determining appropriate staffing 

level at airports. Time and again, terrorists have targeted our aviation sector. 

So, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for this and to indicate, in 

conclusion, that we can’t have a desire for short-term savings to 

cloud our decision-making about the allocation of resources for securing our Nation’s rail, mass transit, and aviation systems. Doing 

so would be penny-wise and pound-foolish. As you know, Mr. 

Chairman, I am committed, as we have done, to working with you 

to ensure that TSA is as effective and cost-efficient as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesies. I yield back. 

[The statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:] 
5 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SHEILA JACKSON LEE

MARCH 28, 2012 

Before I begin discussing the topic of today’s hearing in depth, I would like to 

start by acknowledging the efforts undertaken by the passengers and flight crew 

yesterday aboard JetBlue Flight 191 from New York City to Las Vegas. Their brave 

and astute course of action mitigated what could have been an unforgettable tragedy. 

Unfortunately this is not the first time an incident like this threatened passengers in the sky. Just hours after this particular incident took place; the media 

reported that a passenger was arrested for being disruptive aboard a flight. Earlier 

this month passengers subdued an American Airlines flight attendant after she became disruptive. A couple of years ago, a co-pilot was reportedly removed from an 

Air Canada flight after experiencing mental problems. 

And as we all recall, on December 25, 2009, passengers subdued the Christmas 

day bomber. These are instances where immediate passenger and flight crew response was critical to ensuring the security of the aircraft and its passengers. 

I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, to ensure that we conduct 

oversight of in cabin security. 

Turning to the hearing today, I would like thank the witnesses for joining us. I 

look forward to hearing how TSA determines its staffing level needs and where efficiencies that do not compromise security may be found. In these tight budgetary 

times, it is incumbent upon all of us to find ways to be more efficient without compromising security. 

As the Chairman and other Members are aware, a lapse in our transportation security could have devastating consequences. Before calling for a reduction in the 

number of front-line employees at TSA, we should ensure that all other means of 

achieving cost efficiencies are explored. 

We must ask whether TSA is wisely investing its resources in new technologies. 

We must ask whether encouraging the outsourcing of screening operations to contractors at a cost premium is fiscally prudent. 

And we must ask whether TSA, as some have suggested, is top-heavy and employs excessive headquarters staff. I am pleased that the chief financial officer for 

TSA is here today to answer questions about how TSA’s headquarters is organized 

and staffed. I look forward to hearing from him on how TSA’s on-going headquarters 

re-organization will reduce costs and create efficiencies, if at all. 

I am also looking forward to hearing from the representatives from the Human 

Capital Office and Office of Security Operations on how they have implemented 

DHS inspector general and GAO recommendations for determining appropriate 

staffing levels at airports. 

Time and again, terrorists have targeted our aviation sector. We must not allow 

the desire for short-term savings to cloud our decision making about the allocation 

of resources for securing our Nation’s rail, mass transit, and aviation systems. 

Doing so would be penny-wise and pound-foolish. 

As you know Mr. Chairman, I am committed to working with you to ensure TSA 

is as effective and cost-efficient as possible. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. 

Other Members are reminded that they may submit statements 

for the record as well. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 28, 2012 

Ensuring the security of our Nation’s transportation systems is a vital Federal responsibility—a responsibility that the Members of this committee take seriously. 

Unfortunately, other committees continue to attempt to encroach on this committee’s jurisdiction over the Transportation Security Administration. Those committees 

have gone so far as including provisions regarding TSA’s operations within legislation such as the FAA Re-Authorization Act. 

As the authorizing committee for TSA, we have the responsibility of ensuring that 

taxpayer funds for transportation security are used wisely. 

Accordingly, a review of TSA staffing levels is an appropriate area to explore and 

this is the appropriate committee to explore it. 
6 

However, I find the Majority’s focus on whether TSA’s front-line workforce is the 

right size inconsistent with their calls to privatize screeners. 

According to TSA, contracting out screening operations to private screening companies costs taxpayers 3 to 9 percent more than if the entire system was Federalized. 

We should consider ‘‘right-sizing’’ TSA’s front-line workforce by in-sourcing screening operations and saving taxpayer dollars. 

Additionally, taxpayers would be well-served if we required TSA to provide scientific validation of programs before they are expanded. 

According to GAO, TSA has yet to scientifically validate the Screening Passengers 

by Observational Technique program. 

Despite the lack of scientific validation or evidence of effectiveness, this program—known as SPOT—has been expanded Nation-wide. 

We have spent $800 million dollars on this unproven program since 2007. 

I still think that $800 million is a great deal of money. 

I look forward to hearing from Mr. McLaughlin, the Assistant Administrator for 

Security Operations, on why Congress should continue to provide support for this 

program. 

I am also interested in hearing from Mr. Nicholson on how the on-going headquarters re-organization at TSA will produce savings. 

Without creating savings and operational improvements, this reorganization will 

simply move around people without achieving a purpose. 

We cannot focus on moving boxes on an organization chart when terrorists still 

seek to do us harm. 

Before yielding back, I would point out that the TSA Authorization bill introduced 

by the Chairman and considered by this subcommittee considered last September, 

contains a provision that would require TSA to develop a plan to reduce its workforce by 5 percent by the end of fiscal year 2013. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on the feasibility of achieving such 

reductions without compromising security. 

Additionally, any light the Chairman may be able to shed on when that legislation 

may be considered by the full committee would be appreciated. 

Mr. ROGERS. We have a great panel today. 

We first have Mr. David Nicholson, who is the Assistant Administrator for Finance and Administration and the Chief Financial 

Officer of TSA. Before coming to TSA, Mr. Nicholson served as the 

resource director for the Under Secretary of Border and Transportation Security at DHS. Prior to joining the Department, Mr. Nicholson worked in the private sector as chief strategic analyst with 

Soza & Company. Additionally, from 1973 to 2001, Mr. Nicholson 

served in the U.S. Coast Guard, attaining the rank of rear admiral. 

During his career at the Coast Guard, Mr. Nicholson commanded 

three cutters and served as a squadron commander for joint U.S. 

and international operations. 

Next, we have Mr. Christopher McLaughlin, who is the Assistant 

Administrator for Security Operations at TSA. Prior to his appointment to the position, Mr. McLaughlin was Federal security director 

at Denver International and Fort Collins-Loveland Airports. Before 

joining TSA in 2009, Mr. McLaughlin was a senior director and director of station operations with Frontier Airlines. 

We also have Mr. Sean Byrne, who was named the Assistant Administrator for Human Capital for TSA in December 2010. Mr. 

Byrne joined TSA after a distinguished 36-year career in the U.S. 

Army. He retired as a major general, most recently serving as the 

commanding general of the Army Human Resources Command at 

Fort Knox, Kentucky. Mr. Byrne’s military service included five 

command postings, both international and National locations, and 

staff assignments at the Pentagon and White House, where he 

served as the Vice President’s military assistant and later as the 

President’s military aide. 
7 

Finally, we have Mr. James Duncan, who was appointed to Assistant Administrator for TSA’s Office of Professional Responsibility in 2011. Mr. Duncan has more than 16 years of experience 

supervising and handling employee misconduct cases at the Office 

of Professional Responsibility in the Department of Justice. He 

served as the associate counsel of that office until 2003 and was 

responsible for hundreds of investigations involving DOJ employees. While at DOJ, Mr. Duncan also served as a senior assistant 

counsel, assistant counsel, and special assistant to the U.S. attorney in the Eastern Division of Virginia. 

So I want to thank all of you for being here. 

At this time, the Chairman will recognize Mr. Nicholson for his 

opening statement of 5 minutes to summarize your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID NICHOLSON (USCG– 

RET.), ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the 

Transportation Security Administration’s workforce- and resourcerelated issues. 

In February 2002, TSA had less than 50 employees. By November, it had over 56,000. Since its first year of existence, TSA has 

had a large workforce dominated by transportation security officers 

[TSOs]. Over the years, the composition and number of the TSOs 

has changed considerably, and today we have nearly 51,700 officers, of which about 25 percent are part-time. 

Not counting the Federal Air Marshal Service, we have about 

62,000 employees, and their work has likewise changed. The nature of our work has driven the changes. TSA employs risk-based, 

intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the vulnerability of the Nation’s transportation system to terrorism and to provide the most effective security in the most efficient manner. 

We continue to evolve our security approach by examining the 

procedures and technologies we use and how the screening is conducted. Today, TSA conducts security operations in about 450 airports divided into 6 regions and 26 Federal Air Marshal offices. We 

have a 7×24 National operations center and two vetting centers, 

with credentialing and enrollment centers throughout the country. 

We have a systems integration facility and two supply and logistics 

facilities and our Federal Air Marshal Training Center. Our headquarters is located in Arlington, Virginia. 

We have nearly 16,000 pieces of checkpoint and baggage-screening equipment at our airports. Our 37 VIPR teams provide a 

deployable capability ready to respond to intelligence and provide 

search capability for protecting or restoring the transportation security. 

Our international programs: We have 29 TSARs in 19 countries 

responding to 100 international governments. We have 920 canine 

teams and law enforcement agreements with over 300 local law enforcement authorities. 
8 

I view our workforce in five large categories. We have a security 

inspector force of over 2,000. Our airport operational command, 

control, and support personnel total about 3,000. We have our Federal Air Marshal Service. We have about 4,500 operational support 

personnel, including about 2,800 which I associate with the traditional portfolio of agency headquarters duties. 

As I mentioned at the start of my remarks, our TSOs and about 

1,200 TSO managers have experienced substantial change during 

our brief history. In 2005, we had 45,000 TSO FTEs conducting security operations, focused on the basic duties of screening people at 

the checkpoints and screening bags. We had no additional layers, 

such as travel-document checkers TSO is devoting to pushing security out from the checkpoint and to bomb-appraisal officers. We had 

a few BDOs in a prototype program. There was no career progression, and we were suffering from high attrition. 

In 2007, our funded TSOs dropped to 42,700 FTEs. By 2010, we 

had 43,800 TSO FTEs, or 1,200 below our fiscal year 2005 level. 

At the same time, with the support of Congress, we restructured 

our TSO workforce. We took about 2,500 FTE savings related to 

EDS in-line systems, applied 2,000 FTEs gained through efficiency 

initiatives, and received funding for over 2,400 new FTEs. 

These resources resulted in new security layers, closing 

vulnerabilities, and evolving our security workforce. Recently, the 

adjustments to the TSO levels in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 

2012 are mostly linked to the introduction of our advanced imaging 

technology. 

Similar to the adjustments in our TSO workforce, we have emphasized other security programs, such as air cargo, inspections, 

international programs, vetting, credentialing and intelligence, canine programs, and screening technology investments. Most recently, under TSO’s risk-based security philosophy, you have heard 

of pilot programs such as TSA PreCheck, Crew Pass, screening procedures for children under 12, and our new pilot for screening people over 75. 

I look forward to answering your questions on the evolution of 

our security programs and workforce. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Nicholson. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. McLaughlin for his open 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER L. MC LAUGHLIN, ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Both in the field and at headquarters, TSA’s workforce is vigilant 

in strengthening the security of our Nation’s vast transportation 

networks. Our goal at all times is to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the travel 

and flow of people and commerce. 

TSA’s workforce responsibilities include security screening of 

passengers and baggage at 450 airports in the United States, facilitating air travel for 1.8 million people per day. We also conduct in-
9 

spections and enforcement activities for security regulation compliance at airports, cargo, and other transportation facilities throughout the United States and at last points of departure internationally. 

TSA is committed to improving transportation security in the 

most cost-effective manner possible. Last fall, my office redesigned 

our field oversight structure by consolidating TSA’s 12 area directors into 6 regional directors with broad management and oversight 

responsibility over TSA’s security operations across our Nation. 

TSA’s new regional structure is designed to more effectively ensure 

accountability for TSA’s operational performance and drive uniformity and consistency in executing the agency’s strategic priorities. 

Through advancements in workforce efficiency, TSA has also accommodated the increased workload resulting from airline checked 

baggage fees; the restrictions on liquids, aerosols, and gels we implemented to counter a known terrorist threat; and a significant increase in electronics carried by passengers. 

We are also re-examining the Screening Partnership Program 

[SPP] through the lens of the new requirements in the FAA Modernization Reform Act of 2012. Last Thursday, TSA released a new 

SPP application on our public website which incorporates the new 

language from the FAA legislation. 

Whether at an SPP or a Federal airport, it is our people who determine the success of TSA’s operations, and an effective workforce 

must be engaged and properly trained. This year, TSA began teaching a tactical communications course for our front-line workforce. 

This training focuses on active listening, empathy, and verbal communication techniques and will be complete by the end of 2012. 

We also recognize that, in order to be successful, our front-line 

officers need real-time information and engagement. Our management teams engage with our workforce through shift briefings several times a day to share timely and critical operational information. TSA’s field intelligence officers also provide timely, pertinent, 

and responsive intelligence support to our Federal security directors and coordination centers. Currently, more than 8,000 of our officers, supervisors, and security managers have a security clearance. 

Our new field oversight structure and workforce engagement initiatives are some of the key aspects of TSA’s security framework 

that provide part of the backbone for our overall risk-based security 

strategy. This strategy demonstrates our commitment to move 

away from a one-size-fits-all security model. While this approach 

was necessary after 9/11 and has been effective over the past decade, key enablers now allow TSA to move toward a more intuitive 

solution. 

Perhaps the most widely-known RBS initiative is TSA PreCheck. 

To date, approximately 600,000 passengers have experienced expedited screening through PreCheck. By the end of 2012, we expect 

to offer passengers in 35 of our Nation’s busiest airports the benefits of this program. In addition to eligible frequent fliers and members of CBP’s Trusted Traveler Programs, we just expanded 

PreCheck to include active-duty U.S. military traveling out of 

Reagan National Airport. 
10 

In addition to PreCheck, last fall we implemented new screening 

procedures for children 12 and under, allowing them to leave their 

shoes on and go through a less-intrusive security screening process. 

Just last week, at a few airports, we began testing similarly modified procedures for passengers 75 and older. We are also supporting 

efforts to test identity-based screening for airline pilots. So far, 

over 470,000 uniformed pilots have cleared security through the 

Known Crewmember program. 

These initiatives have allowed us to expedite the screening process for children, our military, many frequent fliers, and now, in 

testing, the elderly. They have resulted in fewer divestiture requirements and a significant reduction in pat-downs while allowing 

us more time to focus on travelers we believe are more likely to 

pose a risk to the transportation network, including those on a terrorist watch list. 

None of this would be possible without the people who implement 

these programs. Whether it is for business or for pleasure, the freedom to travel is fundamental to our way of life, and to do so securely is a goal to which everyone at TSA is fully committed. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. McLaughlin. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Byrne for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL SEAN J. BYRNE (USA–RET.), 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR HUMAN CAPITAL, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

General BYRNE. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, and other distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the 

programs and objectives of the Office of Human Capital within the 

Transportation Security Administration. 

TSA’s Office of Human Capital is responsible for providing 

human capital strategies and services to build, develop, and sustain a high-performing and diverse TSA workforce tasked with protecting the Nation’s transportation systems. In my role as the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Human Capital, I oversee 

targeted workforce strategies and services that are delivered across 

TSA in recruitment and staffing, compensation and benefits, position management, succession planning, and employee relations. My 

office also manages TSA’s human capital policy agenda and oversight of the Federal human resources regulations. 

As was indicated earlier, I joined TSA approximately a year-anda-half ago in my current position, following a career with the 

United States Army. 

The focus of our efforts is to provide the best possible support to 

our 60,000-plus employees and to synchronize our efforts and DHS 

initiatives with Administrator Pistole’s vision of TSA as a high-performing counterterrorism organization focused on developing and 

deploying risk-based and intelligence-driven security initiatives. 

Actions are taken and programs are focused on his three agencywide priorities: Risk-based security, workforce engagement, and efficiencies throughout the organization. 
11 

Ours is truly a dynamic and diverse workforce. Approximately 43 

percent of the TSO workforce has at least some college education, 

with 41⁄2 percent having earned associate degrees, 111⁄2 percent 

with bachelor’s degrees, and 11⁄2 percent with master’s, professional, or Ph.D. degrees. 

Additionally, TSA is partnering with local community colleges to 

provide transportation security officers across the Nation the opportunity to work toward a TSA certificate of achievement in homeland security and, further, to work toward an associate degree in 

homeland security or a related field. The objective of this program 

is to increase the professional qualifications and education of the 

workforce and to invest in and further engage the workforce. 

The pilot program was launched in 2008, with the National rollout in the fall of 2010. Presently, the program is available in all 

50 States and is currently at over 80 airports, with over 70 colleges 

joining the associate’s program. We have over 2,700 student participants, and at the completion of the current term, over 700 will receive TSA certificates of achievement. 

Approximately 23 percent of our workforce are veterans, and that 

number is increasing as we continue to target our recruiting efforts, working closely with the DOD, veterans groups, and other 

outside agencies. 

Low attrition rates continue to be a good-news story. Overall attrition, including full-time and part-time employees, was 7.2 percent in fiscal year 2011. This is a significant decrease from 18 percent in fiscal year 2004. The agency is now 10 years old, and the 

average TSO has been with TSA nearly 6 years, with 531⁄2 percent 

of them having more than 5 years of experience on the job. 

The Office of Human Capital also manages TSA’s workmen’s 

compensation program. Under this program, the injury case rate 

has been reduced by approximately 20 percent between fiscal years 

2010 and 2011 and has reduced the injury rate by 5 percent yearly 

since 2006. With the reduction of 26 percent of workmen’s compensation costs since 2006, TSA is leading the Government in overall cost reductions. 

TSA is also an agency that listens to its employees. At TSA, leadership and employees partner to promote innovative workplace 

policies and practices. We have a very proactive National Advisory 

Council and Diversity Advisory Council, which act as advisory 

groups to our senior management. They are comprised of TSA airport front-line employees, supervisors, and management. They 

work in close partnership with senior leadership, headquarters 

staff, airport leadership, and field personnel to improve the workplace environment and organizational effectiveness by enhancing 

two-way communications, utilizing cooperative problem-solving, 

and fostering innovation. They provide sound ideas and recommendations that are acted on by the senior leadership. 

In closing, I would like to reinforce our priorities for the Office 

of Human Capital: Risk-based security, employee engagement, and 

efficiencies throughout the agency. 

Once again, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Byrne. 
12 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Duncan for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES G. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. DUNCAN. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. 

The Office of Professional Responsibility, or OPR, was created to 

promote consistency, timeliness, and accountability into the TSA 

disciplinary process. OPR is an independent office within TSA that 

reports directly to the Administrator and to the Deputy Administrator. 

OPR performs three primary responsibilities within TSA through 

a combination of direct adjudication and oversight. 

First, OPR adjudicates all allegations of misconduct involving 

senior-level employees and law enforcement personal. This includes 

the members of the Transportation Security Executive Service, the 

Federal security directors and their leadership at the airports, all 

employees in the K through M pay bands, the transportation security area representatives assigned overseas, and our agency’s law 

enforcement employees, the Federal Air Marshals. 

OPR officials also review all reports of investigation from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General, 

regardless of the pay grade or seniority of the employee investigated. OPR reviews the evidence and determines whether to bring 

charges against the employee and what penalty is appropriate. 

Second, OPR adjudicates the appeals of adverse actions, removals, and suspensions of 14 days or more taken against the uniformed workforce. The uniformed workforce includes all transportation security officers, or TSOs, lead TSOs, supervisory TSOs, and 

master and expert TSOs assigned as behavior detection officers and 

security training instructors. The OPR Appellate Board, a unit 

within OPR, rules on these appeals. 

Third, OPR has review and oversight responsibility over all misconduct cases adjudicated in the field by officials outside of OPR. 

Working with Assistant Administrator Byrne at the Office of 

Human Capital, we developed a database which will allow OPR 

and the Office of Human Capital to review all final discipline decisions to ensure fairness and consistency across the country and 

throughout the agency. 

OPR has promoted greater consistency and transparency in the 

entire TSA disciplinary system by creating a table of offenses and 

penalties. The table provides ranges of penalties for each type of 

offense and guides the decisions of officials, both at OPR and in the 

field. 

OPR has also worked to promote greater efficiency and timeliness for disciplinary actions by introducing specific time lines for 

investigating and for adjudicating allegations of misconduct. These 

innovations have promoted integrity and efficiency in the disciplinary system. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 
13 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Nicholson, Mr. 

McLaughlin, General Byrne, and Mr. Duncan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER L. MCLAUGHLIN, DAVID NICHOLSON, SEAN

J. BYRNE, AND JAMES G. DUNCAN

MARCH 28, 2012 

Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today about the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) workforce. 

Both in the field and at headquarters, the TSA workforce is vigilant in ensuring 

the security of people and commerce that flow through our Nation’s vast transportation networks. TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent 

terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation’s transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all times is to maximize transportation security to 

stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the 

flow of legitimate travel and commerce. TSA’s security measures create a multi-layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our 

security approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use, how specific security procedures are carried out, and how screening is conducted. 

The TSA workforce occupies the front-line in executing the agency’s transportation security responsibilities in support of the Nation’s counterterrorism efforts. 

These responsibilities include security screening of passengers and baggage at 450 

airports in the United States that facilitate air travel for 1.8 million people per day; 

vetting more than 14 million passengers and over 13 million transportation workers 

against the terrorist watch list each week; and conducting security regulation compliance inspections and enforcement activities at airports, for domestic and foreign 

air carriers, and for air cargo screening operations throughout the United States 

and at last point of departure locations internationally. 

TSA also ensures the security of surface transportation operations. We have 25 

multi-modal Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams working in 

transportation sectors across the country to prevent or disrupt potential terrorist 

planning activities. Since late 2005, we have conducted over 25,000 VIPR operations, with over 16,300 occurring in surface modes. And, since 2006, TSA has completed more than 230 Baseline Assessments for Security Enhancement for transit, 

which provides a comprehensive assessment of security programs in critical transit 

systems. We are seeing the benefits of how these important steps—combined with 

our well-trained and highly motivated workforce and our multiple layers of security 

including cutting-edge technology—keep America safe every day. 

TSA is committed, not only to improving the effectiveness of security, but to doing 

so in the most cost-effective manner possible. Through advancements in workforce 

efficiency, TSA has been able to accommodate the increased workload that has accompanied the current practice of many airlines to charge fees for all checked baggage, the restrictions on liquids, aerosols, and gels we had to implement to counter 

a known terrorist threat, and the screening required for the significant increase in 

the number of laptops carried by passengers. By employing smarter security practices in developing and deploying our people, processes, and technologies we are delivering more effective security in a more efficient manner, and we will continue to 

do so. 

ADOPTING A RISK-BASED SECURITY STRATEGY

Last fall, TSA began developing a strategy for enhanced use of intelligence and 

other information to enable a more risk-based security (RBS) in all facets of transportation, including passenger screening, air cargo, and surface transportation. At 

its core, the concept of RBS demonstrates a progression of the work TSA has been 

doing throughout its first decade of service to the American people. RBS is an acknowledgment that risk is inherent in virtually everything we do, and TSA is not 

in the business of eliminating all risk associated with traveling from point A to 

point B. Our objective is to mitigate risk in a way that effectively balances security 

measures with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties concerns while both promoting 

the safe movement of people and commerce and guarding against a deliberate attack 

against our transportation systems. 

RBS in the passenger screening context allows our dedicated Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to focus more attention on those travelers we believe are more 

likely to pose a risk to our transportation network—including those on the U.S. 
14 

known or suspected terrorist watch list—while providing expedited screening, and 

perhaps a better travel experience, to those we consider pose less risk. 

Through various RBS initiatives, TSA is moving away from a one-size-fits-all security model and closer to its goal of providing the most effective transportation security in the most efficient way possible. While a one-size-fits-all approach has been 

effective over the past decade, and was necessary after 9/11, two key enablers—technology and intelligence—are allowing TSA to move toward a RBS model. 

TSA PRECHECK PROGRAM

Perhaps the most widely-known risk-based security enhancement we are putting 

in place is TSA PreCheckTM. Since first implementing this idea last Fall, the program has been expanded to 12 airports, making it possible for passengers flying 

from these airports to experience expedited security screening through TSA 

PreCheckTM. The feedback we’ve been getting is consistently positive. 

Under TSA PreCheckTM, individuals volunteer information about themselves prior 

to flying in order to potentially expedite the travel experience. By changing procedures for those travelers we know more about, through information they voluntarily 

provide, and combining that information with our multi-layered system of aviation 

security, TSA can better focus our limited resources on higher-risk and unknown 

passengers. This new screening system holds great potential to strengthen security 

while significantly enhancing the travel experience, whenever possible, for passengers. 

TSA pre-screens TSA PreCheckTM passengers each time they fly through participating airports. If the indicator embedded in their boarding pass reflects eligibility 

for expedited screening, the passenger is able to use the PreCheckTM lane. Currently, eligible participants include certain frequent flyers from American Airlines 

and Delta Air Lines as well as existing members of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s trusted traveler programs, such as Global Entry, who are U.S. citizens and 

are flying domestically on participating airlines. TSA is actively working with other 

major air carriers such as United Airlines, US Airways, Jet Blue, Hawaiian Airlines, and Alaska Airlines to expand both the number of participating airlines and 

the number of airports where expedited screening through TSA PreCheckTM is provided. In February 2012, Secretary Napolitano and TSA Administrator Pistole announced the goal to have TSA PreCheckTM rolled out and operating at 35 of the 

busiest domestic airports by the end of 2012. 

TSA PreCheckTM travelers are able to divest fewer items, which may include leaving on their shoes, jacket, and light outerwear, and may enjoy other modifications 

to the standard screening process. As always, TSA will continue to incorporate random and unpredictable security measures throughout the security process. At no 

point are TSA PreCheckTM travelers guaranteed expedited screening. 

PEOPLE DEFINE PROGRAMMATIC SUCCESS

The success of RBS and initiatives like TSA PreCheckTM depend upon people. A 

dedicated TSA workforce assures the traveling public that they are protected by a 

multi-layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk. An effective 

workforce must be properly trained. Good management and decent pay are key ingredients in preserving a motivated and skilled workforce. To this end, TSA has implemented employee development initiatives like the Leaders at Every Level (LEL), 

through which TSA identifies high-performing employees and fosters commitments 

to excellence and teamwork, and the Associates Degree Program, which builds morale and provides the workforce an opportunity to enhance technical and non-technical skills through formal training and education programs. The implementation of 

a new four-tier performance management program for non-TSOs enables the workforce to actively engage in developing their annual performance goals in collaboration with their supervisors, while promoting two-way communication between employees and their supervisors throughout the performance year. Providing a mechanism to proactively identify opportunities to improve their performance has increased employee morale. 

Every day, the TSA workforce, including front-line workers and managers both in 

the field and at headquarters, strives to ensure our operational planning and decision-making process is timely, efficient, well-coordinated, and based on intelligence. 

Management communicates with our front-line officers through shift briefings held 

several times a day. 

We also work to share critical information with key industry stakeholders whenever appropriate. Thanks to the effective partnerships we’ve forged with industry 

stakeholders, with our airline and airport partners, and with law enforcement colleagues at every level, TSA has achieved a number of significant milestones during 
15 

its first 10 years of service. These include screening 100 percent of all passengers 

flying into, out of, and within the United States for terrorism through the Secure 

Flight program, screening all air cargo transported on passenger planes domestically, and working closely with our international partners every day to screen 100 

percent of high-risk inbound cargo on passenger planes. Our goal is that by the end 

of 2012, 100 percent of inbound cargo on passenger aircraft must be screened according to TSA-approved protocols. We are also improving aviation security through 

innovative technology that provides advanced baggage screening for explosives. 

CONCLUSION

As we review and evaluate the effectiveness of TSA’s aviation security enhancements, we must always be cognizant of the fact that these enhancements are only 

as good as the people who operate, staff, and manage them. As we strive to continue 

strengthening transportation security and improving, whenever possible the overall 

travel experience for all Americans, we must always remember that our success is 

defined in the final analysis by our people. Whether it is for business or for pleasure, the freedom to travel from place to place is fundamental to our way of life, and 

to do so securely is a goal to which everyone at TSA is fully committed. Thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. We will be happy to address any 

questions you may have. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I thank all of you. Those were very helpful 

and informative. 

I now recognize myself for the opening questions. 

Mr. McLaughlin, since 2007, the number of airport screeners has 

increased by more than 5,000 people, an 11 percent increase. This 

is striking to me because, during the same period, we saw 40 million fewer passengers. 

How do you reconcile these numbers, particularly given the testimony we just had about how you all have gone to a more riskbased system? We now have in-line baggage screening. We have 

put a lot of technology in place. It would seem to me that, with this 

smarter approach and the aid of this new technology and 40 million fewer passengers, you would need fewer workers. 

So how do you reconcile those? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you, sir. 

So the TSA is committed to providing the most effective security 

in the most efficient way. Over the last couple months, I would just 

say, since the fall of this year, we have really begun moving forward with PreCheck, as you suggested, which we believe, as we 

continue to work with that program, it is beginning to show some 

efficiencies that we believe, as the program grows, if it grows, and 

the population base grows, will provide some of the efficiencies that 

you are looking for. 

Since 2007, we have achieved some savings with our in-line baggage system. But we have also been required to layer some of those 

savings back into our security for reasons such as the 2006 liquids 

plot out of England, which changed our procedures in the United 

States. We have increased the BDO program in that time. Then 

more recently, in response to the Christmas day 2009 attack with 

Abdulmutallab, we have deployed a large number of AITs across 

the country as well. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah, but, see, I would think those things would aid 

your efficiencies. 

I would draw your attention to the graph up on the board. You 

were all provided with these before we left for our last series of 

votes. You see, particularly in years 2009, 2010, and 2011, a dramatic drop-off in passenger activity, but you can see in the red line 
16 

how spending has continued to stay way above, at levels of passengers from 2005 until the economy went south in 2008. 

You know, it is hard for me to defend that with taxpayers back 

home that we are asking to take cuts in a variety of programs that 

matter to them and they look at that and say, ‘‘How do you explain 

it, Mike?’’, because I can’t. So what you just said does not reconcile 

those numbers. 

Can anybody else take a shot at it? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, sir, I will give it a try. 

As Mr. McLaughlin mentioned, in the series of events that took 

place, first with the 2006 liquids plot, then with an intelligencedriven increase in our TSO security workforce in 2008 related to 

improvised explosive devices and the need to improve our detection 

capabilities and to look for different methods other than being what 

we used to refer to as ‘‘chained to the checkpoint’’ and not thinking 

of different ways and different approaches, drove an increase to 

provide an enhancement in security both in terms of the layers and 

number of people that we had devoted to that. We had the technology, but the increase in the behavior detection office was more 

to get toward an assessment of intent by some individuals. So that 

represented the growth in those programs. 

More recently, the AIT, from the beginning, the increase in staffing was realized with AIT. For the first 1,000 units that we had, 

to get the full benefit of the capabilities of that technology and be 

able to use it and apply it to enhance the security required a staff 

increase of five people per machine. 

Mr. ROGERS. See, I have never liked those machines, by the way. 

But we were told that it was going to decrease the staff requirements when we paid that huge amount of money per machine for 

those. In fact, it has gone the other way. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, sir, I can tell you that our budget presentation tried to make that very clear, that each machine would 

come with a cost of training and TSO workforce for the first 1,000 

of five people. That was not five people per machine that you would 

add to a checkpoint, but those five people would be essentially one 

person per shift, with a 7-day-a-week operation and about two-anda-half shifts a day. So that is how you got that number. 

But to realize the capability of the machine, we knew that there 

was going to be that additional cost associated with people to derive the benefit. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. 

Mr. Byrne, do you want to take a shot at it? Your microphone 

needs to be turned on. 

General BYRNE. I would have to enforce Mr. Nicholson’s comments. But it has been basically, as missions have expanded, there 

have been some increases. I think that in the long run, as we go 

through the risk-based security program and the PreCheck and all 

other programs that we have on-going, we will be able to harvest 

savings. But we have not yet seen all of those savings. 

Mr. ROGERS. So if, over the next 2 years, we see passenger travel 

drop another 50 million passengers, you don’t think we are going 

to see a corresponding reduction in our cost per screening. 

General BYRNE. Sir, I really can’t address the specifics on that. 

I have not seen the figures that have indicated that the passenger 
17 

travel will drop anywhere near that level. I had heard that the expectation is that, if anything, passenger travel would increase in 

the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. I hope the economy turns around so they start traveling. 

My time has expired. I recognize my colleague from Illinois, Mr. 

Davis, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Byrne, let me ask you, TSA has consistently ranked as one 

of the least hospitable work environments, not only within DHS, 

but within the Federal Government. It is clear at this point that 

whatever has been done in the past to increase morale at TSA has 

failed. What approaches do you intend to take that you think will 

help the situation? 

General BYRNE. Sir, we have a number of initiatives on-going. 

Quite honestly, we pay very close attention to those survey results. 

But I will tell you up front, the surveys are very interesting in the 

sense that they ask very specific questions on pay and subjective 

questions on leadership, but one thing they don’t really talk about 

is: What is the quality of morale of the people that are working? 

What do they think about their mission? How are they excited 

about what they are doing? When you talk to our employees, our 

TSOs, you see a different result. 

I will have to acknowledge that in some places our working conditions may not be the best, because in some cases we are caught 

up in whatever the conditions are available at the airports, which 

may not be the most positive. Break areas may not be close to 

where the screeners are working, and situations such as that. 

I will tell you some of the initiatives we have on-going. We have 

recently stood up a directorate, the Training and Workforce Engagement, with an assistant administrator of equivalent rank of 

the four of us sitting here. His focus is on standardizing training 

throughout, standardizing leader development throughout. I think 

that is going to make a major difference. 

Additionally, he has oversight and will have oversight of internal 

communications, where we are going to do a better job of talking 

to the employees, informing the employees of what is going on. 

In my initial comments, I talked about the National Advisory 

Council and the Diversity Advisory Council. Those are two key 

groups that are giving the senior leadership advice. They are offering dialogue, telling us some things they see in the field that we 

may not be picking up on. They are also taking a look at programs 

that we have on-going, assisting Mr. McLaughlin and his group 

with some of the risk-based security procedures at the checklines 

to make things more efficient. 

We are a learning organization. But believe you me, we are paying attention, and we are actively promoting programs that will 

change the perspective and give our employees better workforce, 

better workplace conditions. 

Mr. DAVIS. Of course, last year, last June, the TSOs voted to be 

represented by the American Federation of Government Employees. How do you view working with the union? I mean, how do you 

see the union fitting into this? 
18 

General BYRNE. Well, I fully support the administrator’s directive and decision to offer all our TSOs the opportunity for union 

representation. I believe working with the AFGE will offer us a 

great opportunity. It will offer outside eyes to give us advice, to 

help us have consistency through the force. 

I think there are a lot of plusses. Naturally, we have to be very 

careful. The administrator gave his directive where there are some 

issues that we are not willing to bargain over, those being primarily in the security arena. 

But I think, working together with the AFGE—and, you know, 

we are currently involved in the collective bargaining process right 

now; we do not have a contract—but working with the AFGE and 

President Gage I think offers a lot of great opportunities. 

Mr. DAVIS. Have you been directly involved in those negotiations? 

General BYRNE. I have an office that works for me called the 

Partnership Office. They are basically the liaison. I am not a member of the collective bargaining team. 

Mr. DAVIS. Do you have any idea about how far away we might 

be to a contract? 

General BYRNE. Well, the guidance that—we went through the 

initial stages, the ground rules. We got the ground rules resolved. 

Basically, the contract is supposed to be resolved within 90 days, 

which would be the 9th of May. However, there could be an extension past that for another 30 days, which would take us into the 

June time frame. 

They are working very hard. We have a number of issues that 

we need to work our way through. We at TSA, I think, have a very 

dynamic team, headed by an FSD out of Detroit who has previous 

corporate experience involvement with the unions. We have great 

representation from the staff and from the field. I think things are 

going positive. 

But they are still in the collective bargaining stages. I have high 

hopes that we will make the dates that I gave you just a few moments ago. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes my friend and colleague from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the time. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

Mr. McLaughlin, thank you for coming back. I have a couple 

more questions. Last Monday, I asked you why DHS was proposing 

to cut the FFDO program, and you said, ‘‘I can’t really discuss the 

topic because it is really outside my area at the TSA.’’ 

Now, I agree with you that the FFDO program should be separately managed. I actually agree with you on that. I would like to 

see it actually in the Department of Justice. But the fact is, right 

now the program is housed at TSA and under the Federal Air Marshals, which is under your purview. 

So I will ask you again, why are you proposing to cut a program 

that you now say is your responsibility? 
19 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you, sir. Just for clarification, my office 

is the Office of Security Operations, which has oversight for our operations on the ground across the country. The Federal Air Marshal Service is a separate directorate. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So you have nothing to do with them whatsoever? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I have no jurisdiction over the FFD program 

or over the Federal Air Marshals service. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. That will be a conversation for a different 

panel then. So I appreciate that. 

Let me ask you this question, though. I just got an earful from 

a constituent going through TSA. They took her bag from her, separated her from the bag, put it on a counter, and she had to stand 

over in a corner for 5 minutes. She finally had to grab a TSA and 

say: Why am I here? They said: Well, your bag is being searched. 

Why is my bag being searched? They refused to answer her questions. 

Now, that is the type of—and then made her stand there some 

more, until finally she left again to go find a supervisor, someone 

with, she said, more stripes on their shoulder, and said: Why am 

I standing here? 

Okay. So my question to you is: What is your instruction to your 

people? You know, before a police officer makes an arrest or pats 

a person down, they are telling them, you know, hey, patting you 

down for your safety, my safety, that kind of thing. Now, how do 

you respond to that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. First of all, I regret the experience that the 

customer had. At TSA, one of the things that we really do focus on 

with our officers is the advisements that they are to make before 

they engage in any security activity. 

As I stated during my opening comment, one of the things that 

we are actively involved with this year is a specialized training 

that has been developed that focuses specifically on active listening 

skills, on empathy, on verbal communication skills that our officers 

can use. I think I testified to this on Monday, but I would say that 

some of the feedback that we are getting from officers is truly that 

it is helping them be better at that kind of soft skill, the interaction with customers as they come through. 

So I certainly hope over the next 12 months as we roll—or I 

should say about 7 more months, 8 more months, as we roll this 

program out, that we will continue to see progress in that area. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. How do we—I have another big question, but 

how do we empower a passenger if they feel that they have been 

treated unfairly? You know, because, basically, you surrender certain personal rights when you go through the TSA line. If a passenger feels that they have been treated unfairly, what do they do? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Passengers have a number of avenues available to them. I mean, my personal hope, as someone who wants to 

see people’s travel facilitated at the checkpoint, is that if they have 

an experience that doesn’t sit well with them, that they would immediately, as this individual did, engage a supervisor, and if that 

is not successful, a manager to try to resolve that situation in real 

time. 

If that is not possible, of course we do have, either through our 

website or through an 800 number, the opportunity for the cus-
20 

tomer to report their experience so that we can follow up. As a 

former FSD, I can tell you that we do actively follow up to ensure 

that our officers get better and better at engaging the public. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I would appreciate that, because I hate it when 

they call their Congressman. You know, if it gets to my level, it is 

like, wow, you know—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. We would certainly rather—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK [continuing]. That person is pretty upset. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Yeah. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Yeah. 

Okay. Well, if we could have—oh, the graph is up there. Okay. 

According to what TSA provided to the committee, since 2005 the 

number of entry-level TSO band D and E, I believe they are called, 

has declined by 2,920 people. However, during the same time period, the number of managerial and supervisory and lead TSOs, 

bands F, G, H, and I, has increased by 2,051. 

What is the reason for the huge shift from the entry-level, which, 

you know, boots on the ground, front-line troops, supposed to be, 

to the screeners in the management position? Can you tell me that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Sure. First I would suggest, just from the 

graph, at the F band, that is a lead TSO, who I would suggest truly 

still represents that front-line workforce. They are actively engaged 

in screening processes as they go through their day. 

As you look at the evolution—and I think your questions are actually tied together—one of the things that a new organization has 

to do is define that right level of leadership of supervision to ensure that the front-line workforce is properly engaged and motivated to be successful. 

I can tell you that today at TSA and over the last couple years 

we have a very robust model that includes direct supervision ratios, both at the supervisor level and the management level, that, 

from my experience in private industry or else, is competitive with 

any other industry that I have been involved with. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. 

Well, I see my time has expired, and I will yield back for now. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes my colleague from Louisiana, Mr. 

Richmond, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RICHMOND. I will pick up a little bit from where my colleague, Mr. Cravaack, left off. But is there signage or postings that 

informs passengers of a hotline or a 1-800 number that you can call 

when there is an issue? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Yeah, so we have signage all throughout the 

airport, in terms of what the procedures that we are going to conduct, you know, as the screening force, and also what customers 

are entitled to do and what their, sort of, rights are. We have a 

very active and robust website, TSA.gov, that folks can access as 

well. 

Mr. RICHMOND. My experience is that, as I travel, that the longer 

the line is to get to the actual checkpoint, the more aggravated in 

every little thing that happens to them once they make it to that 

checkpoint, becomes more of a hassle because of either inadequate 

staffing or the fact that they have waited in line for 30 minutes 

just to get to the security checkpoint. 
21 

So is there a protocol on how long the wait should be, how many 

actual screeners you have at any particular time? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Certainly. We model our staff, our screening 

staff, the same way that I used to do it in the airline industry, 

which would be based on peak arrival curves of customers. As long 

as those curves that we expect show up when they are supposed 

to, we do very well at managing the line waits through—— 

Mr. RICHMOND. What happens when it doesn’t? Do they have the 

flexibility to call, let’s say, another gate, another terminal to say, 

hey, we are swamped over here, can you come help? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Absolutely. Again, as we evolve as an agency, 

and through the use of our coordination centers and other oversight, where we have multiple terminals, if we have an issue in one 

terminal, we on a daily basis move resources from one location to 

another to assist in that curve to get those folks processed. 

I would tell you that over the course of this year, similar to past 

years, a full 991⁄2 percent of all customers make it through TSA 

checkpoints in less than 20 minutes. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Well, maybe I am just unfortunate at not being 

in that 99 percent sometimes. 

But I will tell you some good news. That is, through my experience the other day traveling through the airport—and I normally 

don’t dress up to travel through the airport; I certainly don’t wear 

my Member pin. But I was stopped, and they went through my 

bags. The guy was—I was as aggravated as I could be when I got 

stopped. But he was so nice and explained so much, he actually 

made me feel bad for being upset when I didn’t take the liquids out 

of my bag. 

So whatever training you all are doing, I think it is working, because I will tell you, I left the gate laughing at the fact that I was 

aggravated and this young kid was just so nice and ignored my aggravation so well. So, the more we can do that, I think the better 

it is. 

I thought we passed something out of here, an amendment, last 

year that said that we would start looking at the goal of reducing 

the need for people to remove their shoes and some of the other 

burdens that come through flying. How are we and where are we 

on that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. You are referring to some of our risk-based security initiatives, and these are things that we are very proud of 

at TSA. 

As one example, our TSA PreCheck, I referred to it earlier, but 

so far some 600,000 customers have gone through TSA PreCheck. 

For those enrolled, what PreCheck allows you to do is leave your 

light outer garment on, leave your belt on, your shoes on, your 

laptop and your 3–1–1 liquids inside your bag. So it is a great experience. 

For children 12 and under, last fall we changed a policy allowing 

them to leave their shoes on. We modified another procedure that 

results in a significant reduction in pat-downs for children. 

Just as recently as last Monday, we have instituted in a pilot 

phase a very similar program to what we are doing with children, 

for individuals age 75 and older that we also—first of all, it will 
22 

allow them to leave their shoes on, and we expect will also result 

in a significant reduction in pat-downs. 

Just last Monday, we rolled out—or we included active-duty U.S. 

military traveling through Reagan National Airport into the 

PreCheck population of people. If memory serves, in the week that 

we have done this, some, you know, a thousand people or so have 

traveled through. Again, as we learn lessons from that and we 

make sure that we have everything right, we look forward to rolling that program out Nation-wide as well. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you for your time. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I would say that I don’t know if you fly 

through Atlanta, Mr. Richmond, but I do, and they have PreCheck 

there. It is wonderful. 

Mr. RICHMOND. I just flew out of Miami this weekend, and they 

had PreCheck, but I was not a PreCheck person. 

Mr. ROGERS. You need to talk to Administrator Pistole about fixing that. 

Mr. RICHMOND. So the only thing that the assistant leader, Jim 

Clyburn, and I could do was watch everyone else go through the 

PreCheck line. 

Mr. ROGERS. I bet if you all talk to Administrator Pistole, he will 

take care of that problem for you. It is a much more pleasant experience. It, frankly, is great for the passengers who don’t qualify, because it gets us out of their line so they can go through more quickly. 

All right. I wanted to ask a few more questions. We will do one 

more round. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Did you forget me? 

Mr. ROGERS. Oh, I am sorry. You have joined us. I recognize the 

Ranking Member. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That is 

okay. Thank you for your courtesies again. 

Let me just indicate that I think your duties and responsibilities, 

in light of this changing climate that we live in, this world of unknowns with respect to terrorism, continues to change—with technology, with PreCheck, so you are helping more citizens and others 

who meet those qualifications; with the various nuances that come 

with the new credentialing for our airplane personnel, first pilots, 

then of course the flight attendants, which is being discussed, flight 

deck officers—constantly changing in terms of the needs and the 

sophistication of TSO officers. 

In addition, as I just mentioned, this whole issue of cabin security. There may be some extra responsibilities that will come about 

from some of these seemingly—incidents that are happening more 

often than they should. 

So let me proceed with some questions. I would like to, Mr. 

Chairman, ask unanimous consent to place in the record a March 

26, 2012, letter that I wrote to the Comptroller General regarding 

issues of staffing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 
23 

1Transportation Security Administration. March 22, 2012. http://www.tsa.gov/approach/ 

tech/ait/index.shtm. 2Lord, Stephen. Testimony by the Government Accountability Office, GAO–10–484T, March 

17, 2010. http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/124207.pdf. March 22, 2012. 

LETTER FROM RANKING MEMBER SHEILA JACKSON LEE

MARCH 26, 2012. 

The Honorable GENE L. DODARO, 

Comptroller General, U.S. Accountability Office, 441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 

20548. 

DEAR MR. DODARO: We are willing to request an audit on the utilization of Advanced Imaging Technology by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), at our request, most recently identified a number of issues with the utilization of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). 

Furthermore, GAO identified a plan for TSA actions to improve current AIT utilization across our airports. We remain interested in learning more about TSA efforts 

to address GAO’s plan for improved utilization of AIT. 

Following the attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 2009, and the security 

breaches at Newark and JFK airports in 2010, it became clear to the public and 

Congress that vulnerabilities at airports continue to exist and that improved security policies, procedures, and technology are required. 

Following a preliminary review of the attempted attack on Christmas day, the 

President directed the Department to pursue ‘‘enhanced screening technologies, protocols, and procedures, especially in regard to aviation and other transportation sectors.’’ Democratic Members of the committee repeatedly requested, in public and private settings, that DHS ensure that the President’s mandate be carried out in a successful and efficient manner. 

According to a TSA deployment plan, throughout January 2009 and December 

2010, TSA deployed more than 400 AIT machines to airports across the Nation. The 

majority of AIT purchases were procured with the use of American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act funds. Today, there are more than 640 AIT machines deployed 

across approximately 165 airports.1 TSA has indicated that each machine costs 

around $170,000.2

A conservative estimate would indicate that to date, the Federal Government has 

invested more than $1 billion dollars in this technology, excluding software upgrades and staffing allocations. Therefore, we are keenly interested in the utilization 

concerns raised by your most recent report and would like to request a follow-up 

audit on TSA’s efforts to address utilization challenges identified in your previous 

work. 

If you have any questions, please contact Cherri Branson, Chief Counsel for Oversight. 

Sincerely, 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security. 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, House Committee on 

Homeland Security. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me raise this question with both Mr. 

McLaughlin and Mr. Nicholson. Earlier this week, in response to 

GAO’s recent findings on the low utilization of AIT at airports, I 

wrote to the Comptroller General requesting that further audits be 

conducted on the use of AIT machines. Some in Congress have expressed the desire to offset funding for other programs by reducing 

the funding for screeners by roughly $40 million. 

It is my understanding that the fiscal year 2013 staffing increase 

for TSOs in the President’s budget is intended to annualize screeners supporting the use of AIT. What would be the consequences of 

failing to annualize those TSOs? 

Then let me just add, I am not from this area, but I was in Orlando on some business dealing with the tragedy that occurred in 

Sanford, Florida. I did not have the opportunity to enjoy Orlando, 

but I did have to land in that airport. I take advantage, Mr. Chair-
24 

man, of the AITs whenever I can. I was shocked at the distinctive 

distinction between the old software and the sophisticated software, or the new technology, if you will, which happens to be at 

Bush Intercontinental. I almost thought I was in a cartoon show, 

in terms of the distinction. 

So this is a serious matter. Can both of you answer that question 

for me? Take into consideration, one of the busiest tourist points 

of destination in the United States doesn’t have this sophisticated 

AIT. I said I would make the request, and I will be working with 

Congresswoman Brown on this issue. 

Yes. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Let me start from the operational side and 

just speak to the AIT issue for a moment. 

I have read your letter and fully support further audits. Since 

the 2011 time frame where the GAO audit was conducted, I am 

really pleased to say that our utilization of AITs has gone up significantly. So just under 50 percent of customers, at this point, are 

going through AITs on any daily basis. 

In terms of the underutilized units that were reported in the 

GAO study, I can also confirm that that number has been reduced 

by some 200 percent. In fact, over a 2-month period from December 

into early February, just in that 2 months alone, we improved our 

utilization by some 45 percent just based on efforts that we are 

taking on within TSA to, again, improve our effectiveness and our 

efficiency, because we believe that tool is the most effective detection equipment that we have against both metallic and non-metallic threats. 

With regard to the older generation versus the newer generation 

in terms of the L–3 versus the Rapiscan or the ATR and the nonATR, we agree that ATR revolutionizes the quality of both that 

screening experience for the individual as well as the efficiency of 

the equipment. So we are working aggressively with Rapiscan to 

move forward with ATR with them, as we continue to move forward—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. McLaughlin—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN [continuing]. With other machines that have 

ATR. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. I appreciate that. Get to the impact on security of these. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. So, clearly, we believe the impact on security 

is significant. Again, we believe that these machines are the most 

effective tool we have against metallic and non-metallic threats. 

The fact that we have increased our utilization substantially 

means that more and more customers are going through them. In 

fact, I would also tell you that we are just now at 1 percent of customers who refuse to use them; 99 percent use them. The more 

people that go through them, the less invasive the experience 

is—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN [continuing]. For the majority of people that 

don’t mean any harm, and the better detection we have for that 

very, very small—— 
25 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But the TSO officers complement that increasing utilization, right? They are an important aspect to that increasing utilization? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. They are driving that utilization. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Nicholson. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, you are correct in your assumption; we 

are not asking for new positions for AIT in the fiscal year 2013 

budget. In fiscal year 2012, when you get your appropriation, it 

generally funds a portion of the year, assuming that you wouldn’t 

be able to hire and bring new people on for a full year. Fiscal year 

2013 annualizes those folks that we are hiring and bringing on for 

a part of the year. 

So, to not get that annualization would have a couple of different 

consequences. It could affect—we would have to attrit out people 

that we have brought on board and hired already, assuming that 

they would be annualized in fiscal year 2013 as they were supported in fiscal year 2012. If you took that approach, then you are 

either going to go back to underutilizing the AIT machines because 

you won’t have the staff sufficient to operate them the entire day 

so you would operate them at a lower rate, or if you did choose to 

operate them, as Chris has said, the most effective technology that 

we have for that detection capability, then you would have to walk 

people away from other layers of security and other duties that you 

have established also. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am going to yield back, but let me just get 

a quick—just because you didn’t finish the circle. So to use the resources that you are asking for to say, let’s offset, we are in a tight 

budget year, in actuality it would hurt and undermine what you 

are trying to do in terms of ensuring the resources necessary that 

you have assessed, using real efficiency, for protecting the Nation’s 

airports. These are not additions; these are to maintain this level 

of security. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am. The decision that was taken on 

the resource and the capability last year, to be fully realized, would 

have to have the follow-on capability that the annualization provides in fiscal year 2013. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you, Mr. Nicholson. 

I am going to yield back at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. McLaughlin, I understand you have a flight to catch. I wanted to let you know we appreciate you being here, and you are excused. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. But I do want the other witnesses to know that now 

when we ask a question, you can’t say, oh, that is his expertise, he 

just left. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, may I—Mr. McLaughlin, I 

didn’t mean to cut you off, but I wanted you to get to that circle. 

So thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, thank you for being here. 

Mr. Byrne, you talked a little while ago about attrition rates, and 

I was very pleased to hear you talk about the improvement in attrition rates and morale. But you talked globally. One of the things 
26 

that you didn’t make reference to is at the more senior-level positions. We have had a terrible problem within the entire Department keeping senior folks. Have you seen improvement at that 

level as well? 

General BYRNE. We don’t see the attrition at the senior levels as 

a serious problem at TSA. 

Mr. ROGERS. It was. So it is not down? 

General BYRNE. At the current time, it is not. 

Mr. ROGERS. Good. 

General BYRNE. I believe that we have great stability at the midlevel and the senior level within the organization. As this organization continues to grow, I think that continuity is going to grow as 

we continue to develop our leaders and they move up in the ranks. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

I want to point out to you that the next panel that we have talks 

about compensation and benefits of employees relative to the number of employees. As you will notice, from 2008, 2009, 2010, and 

2011, we saw the compensation costs at a much higher level than— 

and you can look up on the panels. Can you see those from where 

you are sitting? I think you have copies. 

General BYRNE. Not quite as clearly as I would like to. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have a copy at your desk there? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. But, anyway, can you account for that disparity? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, sir, I think so. 

One of the things that we did when we were talking about the 

challenges—and it gets to your question on attrition just before— 

is that the attrition that we had back in the 2005–2006 time line— 

and on a previous chart we talked about the D- and E-band TSOs. 

To give a little context for those not as familiar with the banding 

system, which is somewhat unique to TSA and the FAA and Federal Government, is—it is about—the D-band is about the GS–4, 

GS–5 level. That is what is normally associated with an entrylevel, secretary-type of payment. 

So our attrition was so substantial, in excess of 50 percent in 

fact, in the part-time employees that we had to restructure and create a career opportunity to get after the problem and extend benefits. So what we did and what you are seeing in those lines with 

respect to the compensation level is a reflection of a very deliberate 

on-budget attempt that we made to change the restructuring and 

the banding level of our TSOs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

There is one more panel. Can you put this one up? I don’t know 

how you are referring to it. 

There it is. Again, you see the big disparity between the number 

of passengers and the costs for our screening. Can you take another 

shot at trying to help me understand why we are having that 

delta? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, sir. There is a little bit of a fluctuation 

that it goes up and down, and there are so many moving parts to 

this. So I will give a shot at a couple of different angles to it. 

When you go back to start at number 4 and you see the growth, 

if you were to assume that the staffing level was right for the pas-
27 

senger volumes back in 2004, then when you got the growth in 

2005 and 2006, staffing levels should have gone up markedly. 

What happens is you have some flexibility within wait times into 

how you plan your wait times, and that will drive some of your 

staffing. If your wait times start to go up, what it drives you toward is opening lanes earlier than you might normally open. That 

comes with a fixed cost in terms of personnel to be able to do the 

security. 

So, later on, as you see things like the impact on the baggage fee 

to passengers, as they start driving more things—you might have 

fewer passengers, but the electronics between 2008 and 2010 went 

up almost 7 percent a year. That is a whole additional screenshot 

that a TSO has to judge as they go through the carry-on baggage 

check. The clutter in the baggage from the baggage as you move 

up takes a longer period of time to resolve those bags. 

So to keep your flow going, even though the passenger level 

might have dropped, the amount of time it took to clear an individual passenger, on average, went up. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Let me change gears a little bit. There is a bipartisan concern— 

and I have talked with Administrator Pistole about this—with this 

committee about TSA’s deficiency when it comes to public relations. 

While I can appreciate the effort, TSA’s blog is not necessarily 

what many of us had in mind when it came to fixing this problem. 

Here are a few examples of what I am talking about. On AIT, 

TSA’s blogger writes that it is one of the best tools we have to detect, ‘‘things that go boom.’’ In another posting, TSA’s blogger suggests, after reading the blog, one should be sure to, ‘‘lather, rinse, 

and repeat.’’ No. 3, there is another official posting called ‘‘TSA 

Says Yes to the Dress,’’ in which TSA instructs women on how they 

can bring their wedding dress through security. 

Another posting reported on an incident at Norfolk Airport, 

where several items were detected under a sewn-in patch in a 

carry-on bag. TSA’s official blog says the incident, ‘‘sounds like the 

beginning of a joke.’’ ‘‘So this razor, a saw blade, and a garrote 

walk into a bar... ’’. 

You all see where I am going with this. I mean, TSA has enough 

image problems. I hope that you can give me some assurance that 

this is not acceptable in your view and that there is going to be 

some effort to remedy this. 

Don’t all jump at one time. I know he left the room, so—— 

General BYRNE. Well, sir, two points. 

Clearly, these were probably steps that were taken to put a humorous spin on things. Obviously, they have not been received very 

well. We will take that message back. We will work with our Public 

Affairs Office to ensure that the right message is getting out, a constructive message is getting out. 

We have done a little bit of reorganization, just for your information. I spoke earlier about our Training and Workforce Engagement. We are basically splitting the responsibilities out so that our 

Public Affairs will be more direct involved with external relations, 

and then the TWE will be making sure the message gets out to our 

employees. 
28 

But we will very clearly go back and have a little better scrutiny 

on some of these issues that could be taken the wrong way in an 

effort to be humorous, where obviously it may not be in some people’s eyes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Davis for his next set of questions. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Nicholson, in March 2009, DHS launched a Department-wide 

efficiency review. What efficiencies and cost savings have been 

identified during this review? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Well, sir, I can talk to the efficiencies that 

we have found in TSA. One of them we have in our budget request 

for this year. 

It is things like looking at our contracts that we have for large 

expenditures of funds. If you look at our IT contract overall, you 

see that it went down about $30 million this year in our budget request. That is due to some efficiencies that we intend both in terms 

of contracting and better management of resources and better assessment of the data we have on the usability of the resource. 

Another example might be in our technology equipment. As we 

negotiate our maintenance contracts and our purchase contracts, 

those pieces of equipment came with a 1-year warranty. So we 

didn’t have to pick up the maintenance costs per unit until it had 

completed 1 year of operations. When we looked at the data, we 

found that our failure rate and problems in that second year of operations was very, very small. So we were effectively paying for a 

year of maintenance capability on a machine that had a very small 

failure rate in the second year. So we looked at that and got together with vendors and renegotiated the terms of the warranty for 

2 years, and that saved us about $17 million. 

So things like that, plus additional controls on travel and purchasing, are where we are getting our efficiencies. 

Mr. DAVIS. The Office of Security Operations uses what is known 

as a staffing allocation model to determine the number of screeners 

needed at airports. Is headquarters staffing also based on a formula that aims to match the mission with the size? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. That is a bit tricker. It is trickier—to give 

an example, some folks look at acquisitions and purchases as lending itself toward numbers of transactions that you might have. So 

if you—and I think that is good if you have comparable agencies 

for transaction-based costing. But you could have one transaction 

that is a very complicated procurement that might occupy several 

people’s time, and your data or your metric on a per-person would 

be very difficult to match up. 

So, while we have various councils within the support service 

community to take a look and share best practices on that, a hard, 

fast metric on it that is comparable is difficult just because of the 

difference in business models that we use. 

Probably a clearer example of that: The Customs and Border Protection does its human resources almost wholly in-house and has 

a very large infrastructure to do all the transactions and basic 

functioning in that support area. Conversely, TSA has outsourced 

and contracted much of that transaction work. So they may have 
29 

people doing the actual transactions that are lower-graded, so their 

grade level might look lower, where we have people that are managing contracts that have expertise in the area, and the grade level 

might be higher and a much smaller number of people. 

Mr. DAVIS. Would you agree that, before reducing the number of 

front-line screeners and baggage checkers, that you might want to 

look at supervisory personnel and see how that stacks up or 

matches? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, sir, that is something that we look at 

very carefully in the staffing model. So when you take a look at the 

supervisory ratios at the airports—and Mr. McLaughlin mentioned 

it earlier in his testimony—and you get the folks that are actually 

at the point of operations and you compare that number to people 

that you might think were more of a supervisor foreman rather 

than a hands-on foreman and then a manager on top of that, those 

numbers get to be less than 10,000 people working with a 40,000- 

person workforce. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from Texas is now recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Let me just say, I associate myself with the Chairman on that 

random list of non-humorous quotations. I would only say this: Unless you are talking about communications among fellow employees, where you are trying to be spirited in the relationship, I would 

almost ask Public Affairs to cease and desist on comedy with TSO 

to the general public. I think there are so many other places that 

can be comedic—Health and Human Services maybe, I am not 

sure. But I think the Federal Government errs more on the side 

of professionalism. When you are talking about security, it is not 

funny. So I would go a step further and just say that I like a good 

joke, but I would just join in that cease and desist. 

Let me just throw this out for Mr. Byrne, even though it deals 

with personnel. I have always been concerned, as I indicated earlier, about rail and mass transit. So I am just wondering, are you 

using some of these TSOs—are you beginning to look at moving 

some to secure surface transportation? This question is just about 

personnel. Have there been any thoughts about transportation security inspectors going over in that direction? Any planning that is 

going on? 

Mr. Byrne or anyone else that can answer that? 

General BYRNE. I really can’t address that. I do know that there 

are some occasions in our VIPR program where we are doing some 

checks and whatnot. The TSOs will be fully engaged with local law 

enforcement in support of those types of operations or those types 

of reviews. 

I would have to defer and ask Mr. Nicholson if he knows anything further. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Nicholson. 

Thank you. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am, Mr. Byrne is correct. We will 

draw from that workforce, both in terms of TSOs and in terms of 

inspectors, to try to put packages together for our VIPR teams, to 
30 

draw on the expertise that they have gained inspecting in those 

modes of transportation. 

The other thing that we have is very ad hoc, maybe a couple of 

hours a month, that individual airports will do with mass transit 

agencies or a rail agency and so forth, just to keep their readiness 

up or keep a relationship going on. In the event that something 

were to occur to the transportation system, a natural disaster, that 

disrupted it and security became very important on auxiliary roads 

and different things and there was a concern that there may be additional damage, supporting that recovery type of operation or responding to intelligence or surge operations is done as a matter of 

routine. 

That is outside of the more formal VIPR program, where we have 

the teams that deploy in packages in different regions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are doing that in the context of the personnel you have now? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am. We—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I mean, you are sort of moving people and enhancing an effort or a team or your VIPR team, but within the context of who you have. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am. We have 37 VIPR teams, 15 of 

which are dedicated to surface transportation. The other 22 are 

intermodal, so they operate in both aviation and rail and mass 

transit and what have you. The other are more regional and specific to the airport and the location. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. This could be a numbers game, too. GAO has 

asked TSA to enhance its ability to identify the appropriate number of screeners and personnel at airports. Is anyone working on 

that to determine what is appropriate at the different airports? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. For the number of TSOs? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am. We are very confident in our 

screener allocation model. We have been using that to do staffing 

and assignments of personnel since before 2005. 

Originally, we found we had some challenges with it, that our experience wasn’t exactly what we thought. So we would send optimization teams out, and we identified where we found that people 

weren’t importing that data correctly so it was giving them an additional allowance where they shouldn’t have. Conversely, we found 

that the model didn’t accommodate some nuance of an individual 

airport, and we were able to modify those. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate that. I think that is important. 

Maybe you can tell the administrator to keep the chairperson and 

myself really continuously updated as you make these—if you have 

success stories that you have analyzed, right down to the very 

number that allows the American people to be secure but also indicates your sophistication and your recognition of the importance of 

efficiency. I think those are reports that I would like to have. 

Let me ask just a couple more questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Byrne, in the recently-released employee satisfaction survey, 

TSA ranked 232 out of 240 Federal agencies for best places to 

work. Now, I have traveled, as our Members have, on just a myriad 

of opportunities to go through airports, and want to say that I do 
31 

thank those professional employees, many of them ex-law enforcement, ex-military, college graduates now. 

I wanted to make the point that, in terms of the increasing salaries, Mr. Nicholson, I think that since 2004 there is seniority, there 

is people that I have encouraged you all to move and improve on 

professional development. I assume that is part of what has occurred. 

Can you just say ‘‘yes’’ to that? Is that part of what sees the salaries go up? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. With respect to Mr. Byrne, I see 

people out, and one of the things that they say is that you all have 

no promotion strategy, and so people can stay in the TSO forever 

and ever. So I would be concerned about that. 

I would also like to have a meeting with you to see what your 

diversity is in management. Because it seems that the minority 

TSOs stay where they are forever and ever without opportunities 

for advancement; women, as well. If that is the case, we really need 

to break that cycle. 

So I would appreciate if you would answer the question about the 

232. 

If Mr. Nicholson would follow up and recognize that—or, I recognize that TSA is top-heavy and employs an excessive number of 

headquarters staff who are compensated at an overly generous 

rate. How do you respond to those criticisms? 

Mr. Byrne first, please, on the ranking? 

General BYRNE. As far as the workplace surveys, I agree with 

you completely. We want to improve our status there because we 

want to make the workplace a better place for our employees. 

But I have to say up front, there are a lot of on-going actions inside of TSA to, in some cases, just better publicize some of the 

things we are doing, but to actually make a difference. 

I will also tell you—and I think you hit the nail on the head 

when you talked about your experiences going to airports. I, like 

the Representative that spoke earlier, when I travel to an airport, 

I go incognito. But I talk to the TSOs. They have no idea that I 

am part of TSA. But I will tell you, when you talk to those TSOs, 

they are enthusiastic about what they are doing. They are enthusiastic about their mission. They know where they fit into the security of the United States. 

The problem we have, in some cases, is we are straddled by the 

workplace conditions that we have—trying to find the break rooms 

that are close to where the screeners are working. 

Granted, as Dave indicated earlier, we are doing things to increase the pay. That is an issue. Mr. Nicholson didn’t mention, and 

I think we should, is that we have probably one of the most successful pay-for-performance programs in our PASS program, where 

our TSOs have the opportunity to get bonuses based on their performance and how well they do their job. 

We have just recently stood up—and I think this is very significant—a new directorate inside of TSA that is going to be headed 

by a peer of ours, another assistant administrator who was a previous deputy assistant for the Air Marshals. His function in life is 

to be in charge of training and workforce engagement. 
32 

As you go through those surveys, one thing that we continue to 

talk about that we need to do a better job of that comes up in the 

surveys is the leadership. I think we do an outstanding job in TSA 

of promoting people based on their technical skills. We have to ensure there is the link-up between that, ensuring they are trained, 

and there are qualified leaders. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Why don’t we continue, because I think I 

probably have more questions on this, with an opportunity to meet 

with you. 

General BYRNE. I would look forward to specifically talking about 

the diversity issues that you talked about earlier—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

General BYRNE [continuing]. Because I think we are making 

great progress there. We have some issues that we need to work 

with, as you indicated, on the promotions side. But I would look 

forward to meeting with you on that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will right now have a quiet disagreement, 

but will look forward to information on those numbers as it relates 

to minority employees. 

But, Mr. Nicholson, can you quickly just tell me about the topheaviness and the load that we are carrying in corporate headquarters? 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am. I think sometimes there are 

different views because of the way we present our budget and how 

we do things. 

So if you were to look at—we have an appropriation that is called 

the support appropriation. But within that support appropriation 

and the way our business model is, many of the numbers of people 

that you see in that support appropriation maybe will come to 

Washington, DC, once a year or maybe every couple of years. They 

are folks that are out in the field doing operational work, that if 

you were to look at another agency’s budget, a more traditional salaries and expenses type of model, you would see those folks working as really performing operational work. All of our intelligence 

personnel, for example, even the intelligence people that we have 

at 31 airports around the United States, show up as a headquarters type of operation. 

So you have that type of information, just by the nature of the 

presentation, that sometimes is misleading and makes it look bigger than it is. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me thank you for that. Why don’t we 

ask you to give us that back. I didn’t see that in your testimony, 

but that is very helpful. I would like to see that further explained, 

if you would. 

Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if he could submit it in writing to 

the committee. I would like to get a copy so that I could see that 

a lot more clearly and be able to understand it better. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So let me just conclude by thanking you and 

saying that I want to see you efficient, not so lean that we jeopardize the American people, but certainly efficient, certainly 

unprivatized, and working to ensure that you do the very best 

every day on behalf of the American people. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back. 
33 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. 

I have one last question, and that is this: Initially, when TSA 

proposed the use of the automated target recognition, the change 

in software, where instead of seeing the actual body you saw, like, 

a stickman or a gingerbread man, we were told that the software 

would reduce the number of airport screeners required to operate 

the AIT machines, advanced imaging technology machines. However, TSA now says the machines with ATR will require more 

screeners than previously anticipated. 

Can you please explain to me how just by changing the image 

that is displayed on the screen we have to have more people instead of less? I would take it from anybody. 

Admiral NICHOLSON. Yes, sir. It is the difference between reality 

of when we first fielded the AIT machines and what was presented 

in the budget in terms of an allowance to operate the machines. 

The assumption in the budget was one of a rosy forecast that the 

ATR, or automated target recognition, would come very quickly in 

the process. We also built in an assumption that there may be a 

little bit more time taken at the outset as you roll it out, but once 

the public got used to divesting and going through the machines 

and once the TSOs got familiar with the machines, that would 

progress very quickly. 

The latter happened. The public that uses it, flies frequently, 

gets it. The TSOs have become more efficient in processing people 

through. 

We still have just under 250 machines that don’t have ATR. That 

is in the process of being field-tested now. The reality of standing 

it up and fielding the machines to get the capability out there required an observation room. That position was over and above the 

five FTEs that we assigned to the machine. So what happened was, 

we allocated more people from existing resources to operate that. 

So if you were to ask the question of, what is it going to take 

to operate the machines when you first field them, in some cases 

we had, you know, 10, 12, 11 people because of the nature of a very 

big airport, many shifts a day, 7 days a week. They were diverting 

half a dozen people just to be able to operate the AIT full-time. 

When you got the ATR, you could walk those people back to their 

original purpose. 

So the budget number turned out to be right, as we looked at it. 

But the use of people from other layers of transportation took 

longer than we thought to get it fielded. We are still waiting for 

the qualification of the ATR on about 250 machines. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Do you have any more questions? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Davis, do you have any more questions? 

Mr. DAVIS. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. 

Well, thank you. Listen, I appreciate you all taking the time to 

be here and be helpful. 

To be perfectly candid, I am a little disappointed we didn’t get 

more clarity on the difference between the number of passengers 

and the cost. Mr. Nicholson and Mr. Byrne, you all have both made 

enormous sacrifices for our country; I appreciate your military serv-
34 

ice. But I will also point out, as a rear admiral and a major general, if you had asked one of your officers to explain that cost differential, I don’t think you would have been satisfied if they 

couldn’t explain it. 

So we are going to give you all some more questions in writing. 

I hope you all start thinking about the problem that we as Congress are going to have in dealing with this, because it is coming; 

we are going to be asked in this committee, working in an oversight role with DHS, how we can get by with less. One of the 

things we have to come to grips with is how we can deal with this 

disparity, that we have so many fewer people flying now but yet 

our costs are going up at a rate that is in the opposite direction. 

So, as you all ponder that when you get back, I hope you will be 

able to give us some insight and we can find some way to bring 

these two things together. Because if we do have a situation where, 

like you mentioned earlier, the economy gets better, we are going 

to see that passenger rate go back up. We need to be prepared to 

be able to deal with that. 

So, with that, thank you all for being here, and this hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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