IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-714

No. COA21-685

Filed 1 November 2022

Macon County, No. 18 CRS 000493

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

DANIEL LUCAS, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 2 February 2021 by Judge 

William H. Coward in Macon County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

10 August 2022.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. 

Green, Jr., for the State

Lindsay Law, PLLC, by Nicholas A. White, Mary Ann J. Hollocker, and 

Stephen P. Lindsay, for Defendant-Appellant.

CARPENTER, Judge.

¶ 1 Daniel Lucas (“Defendant”) appeals from final judgments entered upon a plea 

agreement to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during 

the warrantless search of his Franklin, North Carolina home (the “Home”). On 

appeal, Defendant argues the search violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13)

because the State failed to show that the officers reasonably believed Defendant’s

Home was probationer Samantha Green’s (“Ms. Green”) premises, and that the 
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search was “directly related” to Ms. Green’s probation supervision. Defendant further 

argues the trial court erred in concluding the search warrant was issued on a 

sufficient showing of probable cause. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the 

order (the “Order”) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

¶ 2 This case concerns the warrantless search of Defendant’s Home conducted 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13). The search was initiated following

positive drug screening and drug possession by probationer, Ms. Green, who was 

reported on multiple occasions by her supervising probation officer as being 

Defendant’s live-in girlfriend. On 25 February 2019, Defendant filed a “Verified 

Motion to Suppress” seeking to suppress any and all evidence obtained during the 

search of his Home and property on or about 15 August 2018. On 12 February 2020, 

Defendant filed a “Supplemental Verified Motion to Suppress.”

¶ 3 Beginning on 18 February 2020, Defendant’s motions were heard in Macon 

County Superior Court before the Honorable William H. Coward, judge presiding. 

Testimony from the hearing revealed the following: In September of 2017, the Macon 

County District Court placed Ms. Green on supervised probation with a North 

Carolina Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) probation office following the entry of

a judgment against Ms. Green related to misdemeanor larceny and forgery offenses. 

The back of the judgment form stated the regular and special conditions of Ms. 
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Green’s probation, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343. The conditions included, 

inter alia, Ms. Green: 

1. [c]ommit no criminal offense in any jurisdiction.

. . . .

10. [s]ubmit at reasonable times to warrantless searches by 

a probation officer of [her] person and [her] vehicle and 

premises while [she] is present, for purposes directly 

related to the probation supervision, but [she] may not be 

required to submit to any other search that would 

otherwise be unlawful.

. . . .

12. [n]ot use, possess, or control any illegal drug or 

controlled substance unless it has been prescribed for [her] 

by a licensed physician and is in the original container with 

the prescription number affixed on it; not knowingly 

associate with any known or previously convicted users, 

possessors, or sellers of any such illegal drugs or controlled 

substances; and not knowingly be present at or frequent 

any place where such illegal drugs or controlled substances 

are sold, kept, or used.

¶ 4 On or about 15 September 2017, Ms. Green’s supervising probation officer, 

Officer Alise Sutton of DPS, conducted an initial intake appointment wherein Ms. 

Green provided Defendant’s Home address as her “premises” address. On the same 

date, Officer Sutton provided Ms. Green with form DCC-117 – Regular Conditions of 

Probation – G.S. 15A-1343, which was consistent with the regular probation 

conditions found on the back of the judgment form. Ms. Green initialed by each 

condition and signed the form.
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¶ 5 Officer Sutton testified that, as a probation and parole officer, her duties 

include making unannounced visits at probationers’ homes and performing 

discretionary warrantless searches of probationers’ homes. A warrantless search by 

a probation officer is usually a “plain view” search of the home unless something 

suspicious is found, in which case, a “deeper search” may be performed by the officer. 

Early on in a probation case, a probation officer determines the areas of the residence 

in which the probationer does not have access or does not have a privacy interest. As 

part of a probation case plan, a probation officer performs an initial visit to a 

probationer’s residence, or “home contact,” “to determine if the defendant [is] home.” 

Additionally, a probation officer conducts regular, at least once per month, “offender 

management contacts” in the probation office, and the first question the probation 

officer asks the probationer is whether their address has changed.

¶ 6 On 17 September 2017, Officer Sutton performed an initial home contact at the

Home. Officer Sutton knocked on the glass door and observed Defendant approach 

the door, and Ms. Green head in another direction. As Ms. Green walked away, she 

appeared to be hiding something in the sofa. When Officer Sutton told Ms. Green 

she, Officer Sutton, was going to see what was hidden, Ms. Green admitted to 

“smoking a pill” and hiding the remaining “burnt foil” in the sofa. Officer Sutton 

warned Defendant, whom Officer Sutton noted in her report as being the “boyfriend 

who owns the house,” and Ms. Green that she cannot behave in this manner during 
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subsequent home contacts as the behavior creates a safety concern for the officer and 

the probationer. Officer Sutton further advised Defendant of two conditions of Ms. 

Green’s probation: (1) that she consent to warrantless searches of her home; and (2) 

that she has no firearms in her home. Defendant responded he “had no problems” 

meeting either requirement.

¶ 7 In December 2017, a criminal judgment was entered against Ms. Green in

Macon County Superior Court related to pending drug possession charges that 

preexisted Ms. Green’s placement on regular probation. The new judgment included 

a conditional discharge sentence under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-96 as well as a 

probationary sentence with special conditions.

¶ 8 On 28 December 2017, Officer Sutton performed a warrantless search of 

Defendant’s Home in the presence of Defendant and Ms. Green. During this visit, 

Officer Sutton walked through the general areas of the Home as well as the hallway 

and bedroom. Ms. Green showed Officer Sutton her daughter’s bedroom and the 

master bedroom, which Ms. Green described as the bedroom she shared with 

Defendant. Ms. Green informed Officer Sutton that her friend was sleeping in her 

daughter’s bedroom. Officer Sutton recognized the name of Ms. Green’s friend and 

advised Ms. Green that her friend is a “known drug user.” Officer Sutton further 

explained that it was a violation of Ms. Green’s probation for a known drug user to 

be in the home.
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¶ 9 To balance caseloads within the probation office, Officer Sutton transferred 

Ms. Green’s file on 8 May 2018 to Officer Christie Kinsland, who became Ms. Green’s

primary supervising probation officer. On 4 June 2018, Ms. Green confirmed while 

in Officer Kinsland’s office that the Home was her residence. During June 2018, 

Officer Kinsland made multiple attempts to perform a “home contact” with Ms. 

Green. No one was available at the Home at the times of these visits. 

¶ 10 On 24 July 2018, Officer Kinsland visited the Home with another officer and 

spoke to Defendant. Defendant was upset and advised Ms. Green was not home nor 

had she been home for “several nights.” Officer Kinsland observed filled trash bags 

on the front porch, and Defendant stated he had placed Ms. Green’s belongings in 

those trash bags.

¶ 11 On 26 July 2018, Ms. Green reported to Officer Kinsland, as instructed. She 

notified Officer Kinsland that she “had worked everything out” with “her boyfriend” 

and would be returning to his Home that night. On 29 July 2018, Officer Kinsland

performed a home contact at the Home and found Ms. Green “standing in the front 

yard.” Ms. Green reported she and Defendant “were doing a lot better and . . . were 

working things out.” Officer Kinsland noted the trash bags of clothes were no longer 

visible on the porch. On 6 August 2018, Ms. Green visited Officer Kinsland’s office 

for an offender management contact where she confirmed her address as Defendant’s 

Home.
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¶ 12 On 15 August 2018, Ms. Green reported to Officer Kinsland to submit to a drug 

screen. The drug screen came back “positive for cocaine, THC, and opiates.” This 

was Ms. Green’s first drug screen that Officer Kinsland had “seen . . . test positive 

for cocaine.” Officer Kinsland performed a pat down search on Ms. Green’s person 

because she was acting nervously, and her behavior was “off.” Officer Kinsland found 

no drugs or contraband during this search. 

¶ 13 Officer Kinsland decided to search Ms. Green’s vehicle based on her suspicious 

behavior and drug screen results. Ms. Green admitted to having a pill in the glove 

compartment when Officer Kinsland asked if she had any drugs or weapons in the 

vehicle. After the pill was found, Ms. Green stated she had pills in her purse, located 

in the back seat of the vehicle.

¶ 14 While Officer Kinsland and other officers performed the search of the vehicle, 

Officer Sutton observed Ms. Green “put[ting] her hands down the front of her pants.” 

Ms. Green then pulled a “baggie full of pills” from the front of her pants. Shortly 

thereafter, Ms. Green claimed to the officers that she was working as an informant 

for Detective Matthew Breedlove of the Macon County Sheriff’s Office. Officer Sutton 

called Detective Breedlove to the scene of the Macon County Courthouse. Detective 

Breedlove arrived and confirmed Ms. Green was not an informant.

¶ 15 Detective Breedlove observed the pills and “formed an opinion that [they were] 

an oxycodone illegal substance.” Officer Kinsland and Detective Breedlove 
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announced their plans to search Ms. Green’s premises. Officers Kinsland and Sutton, 

Probation Officer John Coker, Detective Breedlove, and Ms. Green headed to Ms. 

Green’s residence, the Home. When they arrived at the Home sometime between 5:00 

p.m. and dusk, Defendant was on his porch, and two Hispanic males were standing 

by a truck in the driveway. The two men claimed to be employees of Defendant. The 

officers “could smell the obvious [odor] of marijuana . . . emitting from the truck.” 

Detective Breedlove searched the vehicle and found “some green vegetable material 

[he] believed to be marijuana and some drug paraphernalia . . . .”

¶ 16 Officer Kinsland advised Defendant the officers were there to conduct a 

warrantless search of the Home as part of Ms. Green’s probation, and Defendant

stated he “understood.” Detective Breedlove remained outside on the deck of the 

Home for security reasons. As the officers entered the residence, they “immediately 

. . . detect[ed] . . . a strong odor of marijuana.” Officer Kinsland asked Ms. Green if 

she had any illegal drugs, controlled substances, or drug paraphernalia. Ms. Green 

directed Officer Kinsland to her bedroom and advised there was marijuana in the 

“bedside table on her side of the bed.” Officer Sutton and Defendant remained in the 

living room during the search. Detective Breedlove then entered the residence and 

recovered from a nightstand in the bedroom “a small amount” of what he believed to 

be marijuana, based on his training and experience.

¶ 17 Officer Kinsland and Officer Coker continued to clear the residence, looking in 
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places where a person could hide, and made their way down an unlocked stairwell 

leading to the basement. Defendant “saw [the officers] go down the steps.” From 

halfway down the staircase, Officer Kinsland “saw three long guns in the corner[,] up 

against the wall.” Officer Kinsland also found “a scale and some baggies” as she 

searched the room. At that point, Defendant objected to the search, contending the 

officers had no “right to search [the] area due to restricted access.” The officers 

stopped the search and cleared the home while Detective Breedlove headed to his 

office to prepare a search warrant. At no time prior to the search on 15 August 2018 

did Defendant inform the probation officers of any area that “was off limits or [had] 

limited access . . . .”

¶ 18 Officer Kinsland spoke with Ms. Green while Officer Kinsland waited for 

Detective Breedlove to return with the search warrant. Ms. Green confided in Officer 

Kinsland that “there [were] pounds of marijuana in the [basement gun] safe and there 

was a lot of money . . . and some opiates and some Xanax . . . .”

¶ 19 Detective Breedlove submitted his search warrant application at 9:22 p.m., and 

the search warrant was executed at 9:50 p.m. that night at Defendant’s Home. 

Detective Breedlove spoke with Defendant, provided him a copy of the executed 

search warrant, and read the warrant to him. The officers completed the search of 

the Home and recovered, inter alia, forty-two sealed, plastic freezer bags of 

marijuana; ammunition; a rifle; various pills; and a bag containing $42,594.00 in 
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United States currency. Both Defendant and Ms. Green were arrested.

¶ 20 On 26 November 2018, Defendant was indicted by a Macon County grand jury 

on the charges of trafficking in opium or heroin, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-

95(h)(4); trafficking in marijuana, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(1); and 

knowingly and intentionally maintaining a dwelling house used for keeping and/or 

selling a controlled substance, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-108(a)(7).

¶ 21 On 10 July 2020, the trial court entered its written suppression Order, denying 

Defendant’s 25 February 2019 Verified Motion to Suppress and his 12 February 2020 

Supplemental Verified Motion to Suppress. The trial court concluded, inter alia, (1) 

“the search of [Ms.] Green’s premises was directly related to the purposes of her 

[probation] supervision”; (2) “the probation officers who conducted the warrantless 

search on August 15, 2018 reasonably believed that [Defendant’s Home] was [Ms.] 

Green’s premises”; (3) “the probation officers’ viewing of [evidence, including digital 

scales, marijuana, baggies, and a large gun safe in Defendant’s basement] was proper, 

and was not a violation of Defendant’s statutory or constitutional rights”; and (4) the 

application of the search warrant complied with the applicable statutory and 

constitutional requirements and “was adequately supported by probable cause.”

¶ 22 On 2 February 2021, Defendant pled guilty to the charges of trafficking in

opium or heroin and trafficking in marijuana pursuant to a plea agreement, and the 

State dismissed the remaining charge. On 8 February 2021, Defendant filed written 
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notice of appeal. We note Defendant expressly reserved his right to appeal from the 

Order in the plea agreement. See State v. Pimental, 153 N.C. App. 69, 74, 568 S.E.2d 

867, 870 (2002) (explaining N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) requires a defendant to 

notify the State and the trial court during plea negotiations of his or her intention to 

appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress to avoid waiving the right to 

appeal following a guilty plea), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Killete, 2022-

NCSC-80, ¶ 16.

II. Jurisdiction

¶ 23 Defendant contends “Judge Coward’s order denying [his] Verified Motion to 

Dismiss and Supplemental Verified Motion to Dismiss is appealable to the Court of 

Appeals pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b).” We acknowledge Defendant’s

reference to motions to dismiss in the Statement of Grounds for Appellate Review 

section of his brief is a typographical error. Instead, Defendant’s appeal concerns his 

Verified Motion to Suppress and Supplemental Verified Motion to Suppress. We 

agree this Court has jurisdiction to address Defendant’s appeal from the Order 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) (2021).

III. Issues

¶ 24 The issues before this Court are whether the trial court erred in concluding: 

(1) a probation officer’s belief as to the location of probationer Ms. Green’s premises 

was reasonable, thereby supporting the officers’ authority to conduct a warrantless 
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search of Defendant’s Home under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13); (2) the search 

warrant was issued on a sufficient showing of probable cause where the officer did 

not include information about Ms. Green’s credibility as an informant or the source 

of her information; and (3) the warrantless search of Ms. Green’s premises was 

directly related to the purposes of her supervision, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

15A-1343(b)(13).

IV. Standard of Review

¶ 25 Our Court’s review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress “is strictly 

limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are 

supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on 

appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate 

conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). 

Unchallenged findings of fact “are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and 

are binding on appeal.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) 

(citation omitted). “Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full 

review.” Id. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878 (citation omitted and emphasis added).

¶ 26 At a hearing on a motion to suppress, “the burden is upon the [S]tate to 

demonstrate the admissibility of the challenged evidence[.]” State v. Powell, 253 N.C. 

App. 590, 595, 800 S.E.2d 745, 749 (2017) (quoting State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552, 557, 

229 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1983)).
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V. Analysis

¶ 27 Defendant’s principal argument on appeal is the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress. The State contends Defendant gave implied consent to the 

search of his home, the search warrant was based on probable cause, and the search 

was directly related to the supervision of Ms. Green’s probation; therefore, we should 

affirm the Order. After careful review, we agree with the State.

A. Reasonable Basis to Conduct Probationary Search of Defendant’s Home

¶ 28 Defendant challenges the portion of conclusion of law 9, which states, “the 

probation officers had a reasonable belief that [Defendant’s Home] was [Ms.] Green’s 

premises,” as not supported by findings of fact. He also challenges finding of fact 2, 

which similarly states this conclusion. Because we conclude finding of fact 2 is a 

conclusion of law, we review it as such, concurrently with conclusion of law 9. See 

State v. Campola, 258 N.C. App. 292, 298, 812 S.E.2d 681, 687 (2018) (“If the trial 

court labels as a finding of fact what is in substance a conclusion of law, we review 

that ‘finding’ de novo.”). 

¶ 29 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to 

the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects 

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see State 

v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 798, 488 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1997). 
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¶ 30 “Consent . . . has long been recognized as a special situation excepted from the 

warrant requirement, and a search is not unreasonable within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment when lawful consent to the search is given.” Smith, 346 N.C. at 

798, 488 S.E.2d at 213. “The question whether consent to a search was in fact 

‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, expressed or implied, is a 

question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” State v. 

Motley, 153 N.C. App. 701, 707, 571 S.E.2d 269, 273 (2002) (citation omitted). “The 

standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth 

Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable 

person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” State 

v. Stone, 362 N.C. 50, 53, 653 S.E.2d 414, 417 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 

U.S. 248, 251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803–04, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302 (1991)).

¶ 31 A warrantless search pursuant to a probation condition has also been found to 

satisfy the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches. United 

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 122 S. Ct. 587, 592, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 506 (2001). 

“Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, a 

court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender 

of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.” State v. Robinson, 148 N.C. App. 

422, 428, 560 S.E.2d 154, 158 (2002) (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S. Ct. at

591, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505).
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¶ 32 In North Carolina, a court may grant the condition of warrantless searches of

a probationer. NC. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13) (2021); see United States v. Midgette, 

478 F.3d 616, 624 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing how North Carolina has “narrowly 

tailored” the authorization of warrantless searches under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343 

to meet the State’s needs of supervising probation “to promote [probationers’]

rehabilitation and protect the public’s safety”), writ denied, 551 U.S. 1157, 127 S. Ct. 

3032, 168 L. Ed. 2d 749. Under the statute, a probationer must “[s]ubmit at 

reasonable times to warrantless searches by a probation officer of the probationer’s 

person and of the probationer’s vehicle and premises while the probationer is present, 

for purposes directly related to the probation supervision,” as a regular condition of 

probation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13).

¶ 33 In his first argument, Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343, nor does he contest that the warrantless search was made 

at a reasonable time or that Ms. Green was present for the search. Rather, he argues

the probation officer’s belief that his Home was Ms. Green’s “premises” was 

unreasonable. Defendant provides three reasons as support for this argument. We 

consider in turn each of Defendant’s arguments as to this conclusion of law.

¶ 34 First, Defendant argues “the facts and circumstances available to [Officer] 

Kinsland as of 15 August 2018 included notice that Ms. Green likely moved out of 

[his Home] because [Officer] Kinsland had formed that opinion as of 24 July 2018.” 
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We disagree.

¶ 35 While it is true the trial court found as fact that “[Officer] Kinsland concluded, 

from her conversation with Defendant on July 24, 2018 and from seeing the bags on 

the porch, that [Ms.] Green and Defendant had ‘parted ways,’” the trial court also

found as fact: (1) Officer Kinsland saw Ms. Green in Defendant’s front yard five days 

later, on 29 July 2018, during a home contact; (2) Ms. Green told Officer Kinsland 

during this 29 July 2018 visit that she and Defendant “were doing a lot better and 

were trying to work things out”; and (3) Ms. Green again verified her address as the 

Home on 6 August 2018. Based on the events subsequent to 24 July 2018, Officer 

Kinsland could reasonably conclude Ms. Green and Defendant had reconciled since 

24 July 2018, and the couple continued to cohabitate in late July 2018.

¶ 36 Second, Defendant argues Officer Kinsland failed to verify Ms. Green moved 

back in with Defendant before 15 August 2018 by speaking with Defendant, observing 

Ms. Green’s daughter in the house, verifying Ms. Green had a key to the house, or 

entering the house. We disagree and conclude such actions were not necessary for 

Officer Kinsland to form a reasonable belief that Defendant’s Home was Ms. Green’s 

premises.

¶ 37 Officer Kinsland not only confirmed with Ms. Green that she was living in 

Defendant’s Home at least three times between 24 July 2018 and 15 August 2018, 

but Officer Kinsland performed a home contact on 29 July 2018 where Officer 
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Kinsland found Ms. Green standing in the front yard of the Home. Additionally, Ms. 

Green told Officer Kinsland on a least two occasions she made up with Defendant. 

Therefore, it was reasonable for Officer Kinsland to conclude Defendant’s Home was 

Ms. Green’s premises on 15 August 2018.

¶ 38 Third, Defendant argues it was unreasonable for Officer Kinsland to rely on 

Ms. Green’s assertion of her home address because “Ms. Green had proven to be 

untruthful and uncredible.” We disagree.

¶ 39 Here, unchallenged findings of fact 9, 11, 18(a)-(f), 18(h)-(j), 18(l)-(m), 18(r), 

18(t), 18(v)-(x), 18(z), 19, 33, 35, 38, and 42 demonstrate that before 15 August 2018,

Ms. Green verified to her probation officer that her premises was Defendant’s Home 

on at least nine occasions; Ms. Green had never provided an address to her probation 

officer other than that of the Home from September 2017 to August 2018; Ms. Green 

never denied living at the Home; and Ms. Green’s supervising probation officer made 

at least one other warrantless search of the Home in the presence of Ms. Green and 

Defendant to which Defendant did not object. Moreover, Defendant replied he 

“understood” when Officer Kinsland advised him the officers were at his Home to 

perform a warrantless search on the evening of 15 August 2018. A reasonable person 

having such an exchange with another’s probation officer would have notified the

officer that the probationer no longer resided at the address—if that were true. See

Stone, 362 N.C. at 58, 653 S.E.2d at 417. Based on the totality of the circumstances, 
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Defendant’s response to Officer Kinsland indicated his implied consent to the search 

of his Home. See Motley, 153 N.C. App. at 707, 571 S.E.2d at 273. Lastly, the above

findings support the conclusion “the probation officers had a reasonable belief that 

the [Home] was [Ms.] Green’s premises”; therefore, finding of fact 2 and this portion 

of conclusion of law 9 are binding on appeal. See Cooke, 306 N.C. at 134, 291 S.E.2d 

at 619.

B. Substantial Basis for Concluding Probable Cause Existed

¶ 40 Next, Defendant challenges conclusion of law 21, which provides “[t]he 

affidavit prepared by Detective Breedlove was adequate to establish probable cause 

for a search of the Defendant’s residence,” on the basis it is not sufficiently supported 

by findings of fact. Likewise, Defendant argues finding of fact 61 is not supported by 

competent evidence. The State contends the trial court properly concluded the search 

warrant was based on probable cause by considering only the facts in the affidavit

that the trial court found to be “operative and competent,” and excluded the 

remaining facts. After careful review, we agree with the State.

¶ 41 “The common-sense, practical question of whether probable cause exists must 

be determined by applying a totality of the circumstances test.” State v. Benters, 367 

N.C. 660, 664, 766 S.E.2d 593, 597 (2014) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court

explained that under the totality of the circumstances test,

[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
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practical, common sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of 

persons supplying hearsay information, there is fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing 

court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 

“substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable cause 

existed.

State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 638, 319 S.E.2d 254, 257–58 (1984) (citation 

omitted). 

¶ 42 “The affidavit is sufficient if it supplies reasonable cause to believe that the 

proposed search for evidence probably will reveal the presence upon the described 

premises of the items sought and that those items will aid in the apprehension or 

conviction of the offender.” Id. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at 256 (citation omitted). 

“Reviewing courts should give great deference to the magistrate’s determination of 

probable cause and should not conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine 

whether probable cause existed at time the warrant was issued.” State v. Greene, 324 

N.C. 1, 9, 376 S.E.2d 430, 436 (1989) (emphasis added and citations omitted), vacated 

on other grounds by, 494 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 1465, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990).

¶ 43 In State v. Stinson, our Court considered the issue of whether the inclusion of 

an informant’s tip without a proper basis invalidated a search warrant affidavit 

where the affiant also included substantial personal observations. 39 N.C. App. 313, 

249 S.E.2d 891, disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 739, 254 S.E.2d 180 (1979). We reasoned
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it was not necessary to consider the reliability of the informant or understand where 

the informant obtained the information when it was clear “the affiant did not rely 

heavily on th[e] hearsay information, and the magistrate’s finding of probable cause 

could not have been based primarily on the hearsay.” Id. at 318, 249 S.E.2d at 894. 

“Where the affiant relies heavily on an informant’s tip[,] the two-prong test of Aguilar 

v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, [84 S. Ct. 1509], 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United 

States, 393 U.S. 410, [89 S. Ct. 584], 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), must be met.” Id. at

317, 249 S.E.2d at 893–94; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 

2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (replacing the two-prong test of Aguilar and Spinelli with 

the totality of the circumstances test). We vacated and remanded the order 

suppressing evidence, concluding the personal observations described in the search 

warrant affidavit provided the magistrate with sufficient facts and circumstances to 

establish probable cause. Stinson, 39 N.C. App. at 319, 249 S.E.2d at 894–95.

¶ 44 In the case sub judice, we conclude the affiant, Detective Breedlove, did not 

“rely heavily” on Ms. Green’s statements, and the trial court properly considered 

Detective Breedlove’s personal observations in concluding probable cause existed. 

See id. at 318, 249 S.E.2d at 894.

¶ 45 Here, the affiant, Detective Breedlove, described his approximate fourteen 

years in law enforcement, including his education, training, and experience. 

Detective Breedlove swore to have experience in investigating the distribution of 
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prescription medication, the manufacture of marijuana, and drug trafficking. He also 

swore to have “considerable training and experience in relation to the possession, sale 

and distribution of controlled substances in and around the Macon County and 

Western North Carolina area.”

¶ 46 The affidavit described Detective Breedlove taking a call from Officer Sutton 

who told him that Ms. Green made a voluntary statement to Officer Sutton that she 

was in possession of a large amount of opioids and $1,000.00 in cash. Although the

information from Officer Sutton was hearsay, a magistrate could have reasonably 

found Officer Sutton to be a credible source who obtained the knowledge regarding 

Ms. Green from her direct observations. See Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638, 319 S.E.2d 

at 257–58.

¶ 47 The affidavit indicated Detective Breedlove met with the probation officers and 

Ms. Green where they recovered a bag of pills, identified as “oxycodone hydrochloride 

30 mg tablets.” Detective Breedlove accompanied the probation officers to Ms. 

Green’s residence where they conducted a warrantless search and found a plastic bag 

“containing green vegetable like matter in a dresser.” In a downstairs room, the 

officers found in plain view a gun safe, “scales with marijuana,” and firearms. 

Thereafter, the officers confirmed Defendant was “a convicted felon out of Florida.”

¶ 48 Finally, the affidavit stated the probation officers “gained information from 

[Ms.] Green that she has known of large amounts of marijuana in the [H]ome,” she 
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“believes that . . . drugs are in the [H]ome currently,” and that Defendant is a 

convicted felon. We note, however, the affidavit does not consider the reliability of 

Ms. Green or the grounds upon which she formed her belief that drugs could be found 

in the Home on 15 August 2018. See Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638, 319 S.E.2d at 257–

58; see also State v. Crawford, 104 N.C. App. 591, 596, 410 S.E.2d 499, 501 (1991) (“If 

the affidavit is based on hearsay information, then it must contain the circumstances 

underlying the informer’s reliability and the basis for the informer’s belief that a 

search will uncover the objects sought by the police.”). 

¶ 49 Notwithstanding the inclusion of informant information lacking a proper basis, 

the affidavit demonstrates Detective Breedlove did not “rely heavily” on the hearsay 

information provided by Ms. Green; thus, we need not consider the propriety of these 

statements. See Stinson, 39 N.C. App. at 317, 249 S.E.2d at 893–94. Rather, 

Detective Breedlove details the personal observations he made as well as the direct 

observations of Officer Sutton, which prompted her call to Detective Breedlove. These 

observations provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for finding the 

existence of probable cause. See Stinson, 39 N.C. App. at 317, 249 S.E.2d at 893; 

Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638, 319 S.E.2d at 257–58.

¶ 50 Further, the trial court, which was charged with the duty of evaluating the 

facts and applying the appropriate legal standards, properly disregarded the 

information gained from Ms. Green’s hearsay statements. See State v. McKinney, 361 
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N.C. 53, 63, 637 S.E.2d 868, 875 (2006) (considering the trial court’s legal and factual 

basis for denying the defendant’s motion to suppress where the search warrant 

affidavit included tainted information). In its Order, the trial court made the 

following pertinent findings of fact:

59. Although the application for the search warrant 

contains a lot of other information, on its face, the operative 

and competent facts are (paraphrased):

a. That in the course of a warrantless probation 

search of the residence of [Ms.] Green, marijuana 

had been found in an upstairs bedroom before there 

([the Home]).

b. That in the course of the warrantless probation 

search, probation officers had opened an interior 

door that allowed access to the downstairs area of 

the home, and downstairs they had seen “digital 

scales with marijuana” on a bed in the basement.

c. That probation officers had seen a large gun safe 

in the basement.

d. That the owner of the house is a convicted felon.

e. That individuals in the driveway of the residence 

admitted to possession of marijuana in the truck 

parked with them in the driveway.

60. The operative and competent facts stated above are 

based in part on what was told to Detective Breedlove by 

probation officers.

61. The operative and competent facts stated above do not 

include, and are not based upon, statements by [Ms.] Green 

as to what she believed to be in the house, because she did 

not state how she came to know such information and her 
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credibility is highly questionable.

¶ 51 The trial court then made the following pertinent conclusions of law:

21. The affidavit prepared by Defendant Breedlove was 

adequate to establish probable cause for a search of 

Defendant’s residence.

. . . .

23. It was acceptable for Detective Breedlove to base his 

affidavit on statements by fellow probation officers as to 

what they personally saw in plain view.

24. The court concludes that the application for the search 

warrant in this matter complied with the requirements of 

[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15A-244, the Fourth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 20 of the 

North Carolina Constitution, and related case law, and 

that the search warrant was adequately supported by 

probable cause.

(Citations omitted). 

¶ 52 These findings and conclusions tend to show the trial court considered the facts 

and circumstances set forth in the affidavit, and properly determined the weight to 

be given to Ms. Green’s statements. See Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638, 319 S.E.2d at 

257–58. In finding of fact 61, the trial court identified Ms. Green’s statements as 

hearsay, found Ms. Green’s credibility “highly questionable,” and found Ms. Green 

did not provide the source of her information. The officers’ testimonies regarding Ms. 

Green and the search warrant affidavit support finding of fact 61. See Cooke, 306 

N.C. at 134, 291 S.E.2d at 619.
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¶ 53 Finding of fact 59 outlines the “operative and competent facts” considered by 

the trial court, which provided probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot

in the Home. See Arlington, 311 N.C. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at 256. Moreover, finding 

of fact 59 is not challenged on appeal; thus, it is “deemed to be supported by competent 

evidence and [is] binding on appeal.” See Biber, 365 N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding Detective Breedlove’s personal 

observations set out in the search warrant affidavit were sufficient to establish 

probable cause for a search of the Home. See Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638, 319 S.E.2d 

at 257–58; Stinson, 39 N.C. App. at 318, 249 S.E.2d at 894.

C. Warrantless Search Directly Related to Probation Supervision

¶ 54 Finally, Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding the warrantless 

search of his Home was “directly related” to the purposes of Ms. Green’s probation 

supervision, as mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13). Relying on State v. 

Powell, 253 N.C. App. 590, 800 S.E.2d 745 (2017), Defendant further argues the 

search was unlawful because the officers’ testimonies revealed their “warrantless 

search included a purpose of investigating potential criminal conduct from which new 

charges against Ms. Green could be derived.” (Emphasis added). The State argues 

the warrantless search was directly related to Ms. Green’s probation supervision 

because ascertaining whether and to what extent Ms. Green was not in compliance 

with the terms and conditions of her probation were the duties of the supervising 
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probation officer. We agree with the State. 

¶ 55 Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343, a probation officer may search a 

probationer’s premises as a regular condition of probation when the probationer is 

present and “for purposes directly related to the probation supervision . . . .” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13) (emphasis added). In Powell, this Court interpreted the 

General Assembly’s 2009 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13), changing 

the phrase “for purposes reasonably related to the probation supervision” to “for 

purposes directly related to the probation supervision . . . .” Powell, 253 N.C. App. at 

599–00, 800 S.E.2d at 751 (emphasis added) (“The word “directly” has been defined 

as “in unmistakable terms.”). The Powell Court explained that this amendment 

demonstrated the General Assembly’s intent “to impose a higher burden on the State 

in attempting to justify a warrantless search of a probationer’s home than that 

existing under the former language of this statutory provision.” Id. at 600, 800 S.E.2d 

at 751 (emphasis removed).

¶ 56 In Powell, the defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of his home. Id. at 593, 800 

S.E.2d at 748. Specifically, he argued the warrantless search was not “directly 

related” to the supervision of his probation, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343 

(b)(13). Id. at 591, 800 S.E.2d at 746–47. This Court concluded the search was 

unlawful because the State failed to meet its burden of showing the warrantless 
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search complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13). Id. at 605, 800 S.E.2d at 

754. To reach that conclusion, we carefully considered the testimonies of the officers 

who searched the defendant’s home since this was the evidence upon which the State 

relied to argue the search was valid. Id. at 595, 800 S.E.2d at 749. The testimony 

revealed the search of the defendant’s home was initiated by a United States

Marshal’s Service task force as part of an ongoing operation “targeting violent

offenses involving firearms and drugs.” Id. at 604, 800 S.E.2d at 753 (emphasis 

removed). The record did not show the “[d]efendant’s own probation officer was even 

notified—much less consulted—regarding the search of [the d]efendant’s home.” Id.

at 604 n.3, 800 S.E.2d at 753 n.3. Additionally, the officers were not aware of the 

defendant engaging in any illegal activity prior to or at the time of the search. Id. at 

597, 800 S.E.2d at 750. Importantly, the testimony failed to show the search was 

“directly related” to the supervision of the defendant’s probation. Id. at 605, 800 

S.E.2d at 754. Thus, the warrantless search was investigatory in nature rather than 

“supervisory” and was therefore unlawful. Id. at 604–05, 800 S.E.2d at 754.

¶ 57 In this case, the record evidence and testimony at the suppression hearing 

show Ms. Green was placed on supervised probation for eighteen months in 

September 2017, pursuant to a judgment entered by the Macon County District 

Court. In December 2017, the Macon County Superior Court entered a judgment 

against Ms. Green for the conditional discharge of felony drug possession charges, 
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pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-96(a1). The conditional discharge included twelve 

months of supervised probation under regular probation conditions as well as special 

conditions, including Ms. Green enroll in a “drug education school.” On 15 August 

2018, Ms. Green tested positive for cocaine, THC, and opiates—violating an express 

regular condition of her probation: to “[n]ot use, possess, or control any illegal drug 

or controlled substance . . . .” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(15) (2021). According 

to Officer Kinsland, Ms. Green was acting nervously and tested positive for cocaine 

for the first time while under Officer Kinsland’s probation supervision. During the 

search of Ms. Green’s vehicle, a bag of oxycodone pills was found on her person, which 

led Officer Kinsland to search Ms. Green’s premises. 

¶ 58 The facts of the instant case are readily distinguishable from Powell because 

here, Ms. Green’s probation officer prompted the search in direct response to Ms. 

Green’s actions, which not only violated her probation conditions but were also 

unlawful. Conversely, in Powell, a distinct law enforcement agency task force 

initiated the search, using “a random selection of offenders,” to further its own goals. 

Powell, 253 N.C. App. at 592, 597, 800 S.E.2d at 747, 750; see also State v. Jones, 267 

N.C. App. 615, 625–26, 834 S.E.2d 160, 167–68 (2019) (distinguishing the facts of the 

case from State v. Powell partly because the search in Powell was conducted by a 

separate law enforcement agency serving its own purpose). Furthermore, Officer 

Kinsland had reason to believe Ms. Green was engaging in illegal activity and 
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violating the conditions of her probation following her positive drug screen and 

vehicle search. These events caused Officer Kinsland to expand the scope of her 

search to Ms. Green’s premises to determine the nature and extent of Ms. Green’s 

probation violations. 

¶ 59 In reviewing the testimony of the officers, Detective Breedlove testified he was 

present at the search of the Home to both “investigate new criminal behavior” and

“to assist probation.” He did not actually take part in the search of the Home or enter 

the residence until contraband was found. Although the search may have served two 

purposes, (1) to further the supervisory goals of probation, and (2) to investigate other 

potential criminal behavior, we conclude the dual purpose of the search did not make 

the search unlawful under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1343(b)(13).

¶ 60 When asked on cross examination if she had training as to the meaning of 

“directly related to the probation supervision,” Officer Sutton testified:

Well, yes. And that would be, like you said, [Ms. Green] 

was on probation for larcenies and for forgery. It is well 

established early that she had drug addiction, which that 

addiction could have been related to these larcenies, could 

have been related to these forgeries. 

So when [Ms. Green] presented a problem with the drug 

addiction, she was referred to treatment, and we made 

proper steps. Then on the day in question, the 15th of 

August when she came in and she not only failed her drug 

screen, but she possessed an illegal substance on her at 

that time, to me that just opened the door on into the 

residence.
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¶ 61 Officer Kinsland testified it is common for probation officers to request law 

enforcement assistance when drugs are found or when there is evidence of a crime 

because probation officers cannot bring charges—they can only enter probation 

violations, which are later approved by the chief probation officer and served on the 

probationer. Officer Kinsland, Ms. Green’s supervising probation officer, led the 

search of the Home although other officers, including Detective Breedlove and Officer 

Sutton, were present at the Home. Officer Kinsland testified on cross examination 

that she and the other officers “just upped the search” to Ms. Green’s premises 

following the positive drug screen and the search of Ms. Green’s vehicle, where “a 

trafficking amount” of opiate pills was found.

¶ 62 Further, we note Detective Breedlove’s and the deputies’ presence at the scene 

of the warrantless search of the premises did not invalidate the search under N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 1343(b)(13). See State v. Howell, 51 N.C. App. 507, 509, 277 S.E.2d 112, 

114 (1981) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the presence of police officers to 

help with the warrantless search pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1343(b) made the 

search unreasonable). 

¶ 63 Lastly, Defendant does not challenge finding of fact 33, which states Officer 

Kinsland’s purpose in performing the warrantless search of Ms. Green’s premises was

to “determin[e] if [Ms.] Green was trafficking in controlled substances, with the goal 

of minimizing recidivism and helping her successfully complete her probation . . . .” 
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The trial court also made findings, not challenged on appeal, regarding the events 

that led to the officers’ decision to search her premises, including the positive drug 

screen and vehicle search incident, which are not challenged on appeal. Therefore, 

these findings “are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding 

on appeal.” See Biber, 365 N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878. The findings in turn 

support the trial court’s conclusion “that the search of [Ms. Green’s] premises was

directly related to the purposes of her supervision.” Id. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878.

¶ 64 Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding the warrantless search of

Ms. Green’s premises was “directly related” to her probation supervision under

Officer Kinsland. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1343(b)(13); see also Powell, 253 N.C. App. at 

595, 800 S.E.2d at 749.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 65 We hold the trial court did not err in concluding the warrantless search of the 

Home was authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1343(b)(13) because the State met its 

burden of showing that the Home was Ms. Green’s premises and that the search was 

directly related to Ms. Green’s probation supervision. In addition, we hold the trial 

court did not err in concluding the affidavit prepared by Detective Breedlove was 

adequate to establish probable cause for a search of Defendant’s Home. Accordingly, 

we affirm the Order.

AFFIRMED.
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Judges MURPHY and JACKSON concur.