FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THEODORE MAROPULOS; DONNA 

MAROPULOS; DANIELLE JACOBO;

NATHAN MAROPULOS; ELIZABETH

MAROPULOS; AARON MAROPULOS;

KATHERINE MAROPULOS; SHANNON

MAROPULOS; THOMAS MAROPULOS, No. 07-55873

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

D.C. No.

v.  CV-04-01171-TJH

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LEE OPINION

BACA,

Defendants,

and

STEVE LANKFORD,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 4, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed March 24, 2009

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Pamela Ann Rymer, and

Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

3757
COUNSEL

Raymond W. Sakai, Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, PC,

Glendale, California, for the defendant-appellant. 

Dale K. Galipo, Law Offices of Dale K. Galipo, Woodland

Hills, California, for the plaintiffs-appellees. 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Steve Lankford

appeals the district court’s order denying him qualified immunity on an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by the

Maropulos family for violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. The Maropuloses claim that Lankford set

fire to their home, then hindered rescue efforts by firefighters.

Lankford argues that the Maropuloses failed to present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to proximate cause,

whether he set fire to the Maropuloses’ house, and whether he

knowingly or intentionally lied to firefighters such that his

statements violated any clearly established due process right.

MAROPULOS v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3759
As such, his appeal raises issues having to do with sufficiency

of the evidence over which we lack jurisdiction. Johnson v.

Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307, 319-20 (1995). Accordingly, we

dismiss. 

[1] Our jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from

denial of qualified immunity turns on the basis for denial.

Under Johnson, an order denying qualified immunity on the

ground that a genuine issue of material fact exists is not a

final, immediately appealable order. Id. at 313-20. Unfortunately, we cannot tell for sure on what basis the district court

denied qualified immunity, because it issued a summary order

without explanation. In these circumstances, we must either

try to discern from the record what the likely basis was, or

remand for the district court to explain its reasoning. Id. at

319; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996).

[2] In this case, we are satisfied from the arguments made

on appeal and our own examination of the record that the district court must have believed there were genuine issues of

material fact that precluded summary judgment on qualified

immunity. However, in the mine run of cases, we cannot

undertake appellate review effectively when forced to guess

what the district court did in order to determine whether we

even have jurisdiction. District courts are much better situated

than we are to sift through submissions of fact in order to

identify those that are genuinely disputed and material, or

alternatively, to isolate those that are not controverted or can

be assumed as true for the purpose of deciding sufficiency to

show a violation of a clearly established right. A clear statement of the basis for a decision by the district court not only

facilitates appellate review, but assists the parties in evaluating whether to take an appeal in the first place. In this way,

we mutually contribute to “the just, speedy, and inexpensive”

determination of disputes, as Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure directs. 

[3] Having experienced similar difficulties in determining

the scope of jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals from the

3760 MAROPULOS v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
denial of qualified immunity, our colleagues on the Third Circuit now require district courts ruling on summary judgment

motions based on qualified immunity where material facts are

in dispute to specify which facts are in dispute and why they

are material. See Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405,

409-10 (3d Cir. 2007); Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313

F.3d 144, 146, 148-51 (3d Cir. 2002). We embrace the principle, and encourage all district judges within the circuit to

articulate the basis upon which they deny qualified immunity

and, when it is for reasons of sufficiency of the evidence to

raise genuine issues of fact, to spell out the triable issues and

why they preclude immunity before trial. 

DISMISSED. 

MAROPULOS v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3761