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OCS Report

MMS 2002-059

Investigation of Fatality,

Pipe Rack Finger Failure and Fall

South Marsh Island Block 93

OCS-G 21618

October 13, 2001

Gulf of Mexico

Off the Louisiana Coast

U.S. Department of the Interior

Minerals Management Service

Gulf of Mexico OCS Regional Office
OCS Report

MMS 2002-059

Investigation of Fatality,

Pipe Rack Finger Failure and Fall

South Marsh Island Block 93

OCS-G 21618

October 13, 2001

Gulf of Mexico

Off the Louisiana Coast

Buddy Stewart

Tom Basey

Johnny Serrette

Melinda Mayes

U.S. Department of the Interior

Minerals Management Service New Orleans

Gulf of Mexico OCS Regional Office October 2002
ii

Contents 

Investigation and Report

Authority, 1

Procedures, 1

Introduction

Background, 3

Brief Description of the Accident, 3

Findings

Preliminary Activities, 4

Description of Accident, 4

Subsequent Activities, 5

Description of Pipe Rack Fingers, 5

Post-Accident Inspection of the Derrick and Pipe Rack Fingers, 6

MMS Regulations and Industry Inspection Standards, 8

Drilling Contractor Policies and Procedures for Derrick Inspection, Repair, and

 Maintenance, 8

Conclusions

The Accident, 11

Causes, 11

Contributing Causes, 11

Possible Contributing Causes, 12

Recommendations

Safety Alert, 13

Study, 14

Appendix

Attachment 1, Location of Lease OCS-G 21618, South Marsh Island, Block 93

Attachment 2, Pride Arizona: Location of Pipe Rack Fingers in the Derrick

Attachment 3, Fallen Pipe Rack Finger on Derrick Floor

Attachment 4, A Nine-stand Pipe Rack Finger Removed from the Pride Arizona after the

Accident (not the one involved in the accident)

Attachment 5, Example of How the Base End of a Pipe Rack Finger Was Attached to the

Derrick on the Pride Arizona at the Time of the Accident.

Attachment 6, Pipe Rack Fingers and Chains, Secured Position on the Pride Arizona

Attachment 7, Example of Pipe Rack Finger Holding Pipe on the Pride Arizona at the

Time of the Accident.

Attachment 8, Example of a Cracked Weld on a Pipe Rack Finger Installed on the Pride

Arizona at the Time of the Accident.

Attachment 9, Base-End of the Broken Pipe Rack Finger Still Attached to the Derrick

after the Accident.

Attachment 10, Base-End of the Broken Pipe Rack Finger Removed from the Derrick

after the Accident.

Attachment 11, Broken End of the Pipe Rack Finger – Part that Fell from the Derrick.
1

Investigation and Report 

Authority On October 13, 2001, during the drilling of Well A-1, an accident that resulted in one

fatality and one injury occurred on Marine/Pride Offshore’s (hereinafter referred to as

“Contractor”) jack-up rig the Marine15/Pride Arizona. The rig was located on

Remington Oil and Gas Corporation’s (hereinafter referred to as “Operator”) South

Marsh Island Block 93, Lease OCS-G 21618 in the Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of the

State of Louisiana. (Note: Following the spudding of the subject well on August 8, 2001,

the ownership of the jack-up rig changed from Marine to Pride Offshore, and the rig was

renamed Pride Arizona from the previous Marine 15.)

Pursuant to Section 208, Subsection 22 (d), (e), and (f), of the Outer Continental Shelf

(OCS) Lands Act, as amended in 1978, and the Department of the Interior regulations 30

CFR 250, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) is required to investigate and

prepare a public report of this accident. By memorandum dated November 27, 2001, the

following MMS personnel were named to the investigative panel:

Buddy Stewart, Chairman – Lafayette District, GOM OCS Region

Tom Basey – Lafayette District, GOM OCS Region

Johnny Serrette – Lafayette District, GOM OCS Region

Melinda Mayes – Engineering and Operations Division, Herndon, Virginia

Procedures On the morning of October 13, 2001, personnel from the MMS Lafayette District visited

the site of the accident to assess the situation and begin gathering information, initiating

MMS’s investigation of the incident. On that morning, a representative from the USCG

also visited the site of the accident. The USCG obtained and provided to MMS written

statements from the night tool pusher, the driller, one of the floorhands, and an inspector
2

for Universal Marine Inspections. On November 15, 2001, three panel team members

examined the pipe rack finger that fell during the accident and conducted interviews at

Pride Offshore’s office in Houma, Louisiana. The following people were interviewed:

Pride Offshore safety supervisor

Offshore installation manager

On November 26, three panel members conducted a telecom with Universal Marine

Inspections located in Beaumont, Texas. On February 20, 2002, three panel members

traveled to the Marine 15/Pride Arizona rig that was stacked at West Cameron 38 to

review documents and examine the installation of the new pipe rack fingers on the rig.

On February 21, 2002, three panel members interviewed Pride Offshore’s drilling

superintendent.

The panel met at various times and gathered information from a variety of sources. After

having considered all of the information available, the panel produced this report.
3

Introduction 

Background Lease OCS-G-21618 covers approximately 5,000 acres and is located in South Marsh

Island Block 93, Gulf of Mexico, offshore, Louisiana. (For lease location, see

Attachment 1.) The lease is currently owned jointly by Remington Oil and Gas

Corporation, Magnum Hunter Production, Inc., and The Wiser Oil Company. The lease

was originally issued to Remington Oil and Gas Corporation and Magnum Hunter

Production, Inc., effective May 1, 2000. Remington Oil and Gas Corporation became the

designated operator of the lease on April 1, 2001.

Brief On October 13, 2001, stands of pipe were being racked into the derrick pipe rack fingers

Description

of the during a trip out of the hole. As a third stand of pipe was being racked into the nineAccident

stand pipe rack finger, the pipe rack finger broke loose and fell approximately 85 feet to

the rig floor. As it fell, the pipe rack finger struck one man on the crown of his hard hat,

killing him, and then hit another on the right forearm, injuring him.
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Findings 

Preliminary At 0315 hours, the crew was pulling out of the hole with a tapered (5-inch and 31⁄2-inch)

Activities

drill pipe. Weather conditions were fair, partly cloudy, with visibility of five miles and

air temperature of approximately 80 degrees. The wind was from the east at

approximately 25 miles per hour with seas running 6-8 feet, causing the rig to rock

evenly.

The night tool pusher indicated that the crew had been pulling pipe since approximately

2000 hours. He had remained on the drill floor until the bottomhole assembly was up

into the cased section of the hole. It was a normal trip out of the hole and no problems

were encountered.

One hundred-two stands of 5-inch drill pipe and 41 stands of 31⁄2-inch drill pipe had been

pulled out of the hole and racked into the derrick pipe rack fingers. The drill crew

consisted of the driller, three floorhands F-1, F-2, and F-3, and a derrickman.

Description F-1 was working the backup/make-up tongs; F-2 was working the spinning tongs,

of Accident

and F-3 was working the break-out tongs. Two stands of 31⁄2-inch pipe had been racked

into a nine-stand pipe rack finger. A third stand of pipe had just been broken out of the

drill pipe string. F-2 spun out the stand of pipe and removed the spinning tongs from the

pipe. He was holding the spinning tongs out of the way as F-1 and F-3 were moving

toward the rotary to position the pipe to be racked back.
5

F-1 was standing between the stand of pipe and the mousehole when the nine-stand pipe

rack finger holding the two stands of previously racked 31⁄2-inch drill pipe fell

approximately 85 feet to the rig floor (see Attachment 2). The pipe rack finger fell and

apparently struck F-1 on the crown of his hard hat; hit F-2 on the right forearm, then fell

onto the drill floor (see Attachment 3). F-1 fell onto the rotary table.

Subsequent The operation was shut down and the night tool pusher was called over the PA

Activities

system to come to the rig floor. When he arrived on the rig floor, he noticed that F-1 was

not responding to calls of his name. The night tool pusher went downstairs and notified

the offshore installation manager (OIM) and the company man. The company man called

a helicopter. The OIM arrived on the rig floor and asked the night tool pusher to call the

drilling superintendent, and the safety superintendent for Pride Offshore Inc. The OIM

began CPR on F-1.

F-1 failed to respond to CPR after 21⁄2 hours and was pronounced dead on the rig floor by

Air Med emergency medical technicians. Both F-1and F-2 were evacuated to Terrebonne

General Hospital in Houma, Louisiana.

Description A typical nine-stand pipe rack finger on the Marine 15/Pride Arizona consists of

of Pipe

Rack Fingers an 8-foot long by 11⁄4-inch diameter solid bar that is attached and hinged to a 12-inch long

by 11⁄4-inch diameter machined bolt. A piece of flat iron approximately 3-inch by 3-inch

is welded at approximately the midway point onto the machined bolt. The machined bolt

equipped with the flat plate and a companion piece of flat plate, washer, and nut anchor

the pipe rack finger to an 8-inch thick “I” beam, which is bolted to the derrick (see

Attachment 4 and 5). The overall weight of the pipe rack finger is approximately 60-70

pounds. The hinge allows the pipe finger to be raised and secured out of the way when
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not in use (see Attachment 6). When in use, the pipe rack finger is lowered at the hinge.

As each stand of pipe is racked against the pipe finger, it is chained to the finger. Each

pipe rack finger is also supposed to be equipped with a safety chain attaching the pipe

rack finger to the derrick. This safety chain is installed to prevent the pipe rack finger

from falling from the derrick should the pipe rack finger break or become detached from

the derrick (see Attachment 7).

Post- On October 14, 2001, Universal Marine Inspections conducted a derrick

Accident

Inspection inspection and the following are the results of their findings:

of the

Derrick and • All the bolts attaching the derrick legs to the shoes show severe corrosion; base shoe

Pipe Rack

Fingers bolts are also badly corroded; some have been changed out with studs and nuts; all

bolts in the derrick are corroded; a large number of the bolts are too short; the locks

on lock nuts are not making sufficient contact to properly lock.

• Braces in the space above the V-door need replacing.

• At least two other fingers appear to be cracked in the same area as the one that fell

(see Attachment 8).

• Most of the fingers have been repaired or worked on.

The Universal Marine Inspections report recommended:

• A complete new set of bolts be installed within 90 days,

• Braces in spacing above the V-door be replaced, and

• A complete new set of fingers be installed.

The Universal Marine Inspections report indicated that the condition of the pipe fingers

was a dangerous situation and that while pipe was being put back in the hole, great care

should be taken.
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Universal Marine Inspections also conducted a magnetic-particle inspection of all the

pipe rack fingers that were installed on the rig at the time of the accident and summarized

the results as follows:

• Derrick – Finger pin welds (Fwd) – all welds cracked at pin;

• Derrick – Finger pin welds (Aft) – all welds are cracked and some have been 

 repaired using all-thread rod that was welded to existing stock.

The Contractor’s drilling superintendent indicated that all of the pipe rack fingers were

replaced on the Marine 15/Pride Arizona after the accident. He also indicated that a new

pipe racking system would be installed in the future.

From the investigators’ examination of the pipe racking area in the derrick and

examination of the pipe rack finger that failed, the investigators observed that the metal

rod attaching the finger to the derrick broke next to the 3x3 metal plate. This left the

plate and the rod attached to the “I” beam in the derrick (see Attachment 9). The break

showed irregularity along the face and indications of corrosion (see Attachment 10). A

piece of 1⁄2 inch by 3 feet angle iron was welded along the metal rod of the finger to keep

the rod from bending. A second short metal rod had been welded beneath the main rod

between the metal plate and the hinge. This rod also broke away from the metal plate as

shown in Attachments 9, 10, and 11. MMS requested copies from the Operator of any

metallurgical analyses that were done on the broken pipe rack fingers or other pipe rack

fingers that were removed after the accident. The only information given to MMS was

the results of post-accident magnetic particle inspection of the pipe fingers. These

inspection results did not provide any information as to the cause of the metal rod failure.
8

During the investigation, MMS investigators also discovered that there was no safety

chain attaching the pipe rack finger to the derrick. Thus, when the metal rod failed, the

pipe rack finger fell to the floor.

MMS The MMS does not have any regulations that address pipe rack fingers. There is also

Regulations

and Industry very little in the way of industry guidelines for inspection, maintenance, and

Inspection

Standards repair of pipe rack fingers. The investigators were able to find only one

industry standard document that addresses these issues. API RP 4F, Maintenance and

Use of Drilling and Well Servicing Structure, recommends periodic visual structural

inspections of the derrick or mast and substructure. Appendix A of API RP 4F includes a

report form, Report of Visual Field Inspection of Derrick or Mast and Substructure,

which can be used to document the inspection. This report form includes a visual

examination of the fingers for damage and cracked welds. However, the form does not

include any visual check for safety chains on the fingers.

Drilling The Contractor’s drilling superintendent indicated that it was standard company

Contractor

Policies and practice and policy to have a safety chain on all pipe rack fingers and to chain each

Procedures

for Derrick stand of pipe after it is placed in the finger. However, the team could not find

Inspection,

Repair, and this policy written in any specific policy document.

Maintenance

A visual check for pipe rack safety chains and individual pipe finger chains (for each

stand of pipe) was written in the Contractor’s monthly derrick inspection checklist. The

last monthly derrick inspection before the accident for which the team was able to find

documentation was conducted on September 19, 2001. Documentation for this visual

inspection consists of a checklist where the item is either initialed as being “OK” or is
9

marked “NO.” The inspection checklist included the following elements relating to the

pipe rack fingers:

• Pipe rack fingers attachment to derrick secure

• Safety chain/wire on each pipe finger

• Pipe racking finger chains in place – functional.

The Contractor’s drilling superintendent indicated that the individuals who conducted the

monthly derrick inspections were trained “on-the-job” for this inspection duty. They

would be looking for obvious problems, like cracks, safety chains, frayed belts, etc.

However, the Contractor did not specifically incorporate examination of the fingers for

damage and cracked welds in their inspection checklist, as is recommended in API RP

4F, Maintenance and Use of Drilling and Well Servicing Structure Appendix A.

The checklist for the September 19th inspection did not indicate any problems with the

pipe rack fingers or safety chains. In the investigation, the investigators were not able to

determine why there was no safety chain installed on the pipe rack finger at the time of

the accident. It is possible that the missing safety chain was overlooked in the monthly

derrick inspection that occurred in September 2001. Another possibility is that the chain

was present at the time of the September derrick inspection, but became detached or was

removed before the accident occurred.

Except for the three items documented on the monthly derrick inspection checklist, the

team was not able to find that the Contractor had any written policy for inspection,

maintenance, or repair and replacement of pipe rack fingers. Both the Contractor’s

drilling superintendent and one of the senior tool pushers indicated that repairs were
10

made to the pipe rack fingers whenever problems were noticed. However, the Contractor

does not routinely document maintenance repair work or replacement of the pipe rack

fingers. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the age or maintenance and repair

history of the pipe rack finger that failed or of the other pipe rack fingers installed on the

jack-up rig at the time of the accident.

Marine/Pride did have a written JSA worksheet for tripping. However, the JSA did not

identify any hazards or hazard management actions associated with the pipe rack fingers

during tripping operations.
11

Conclusions 

The Accident After a review of the information obtained during the investigation, it is the conclusion of

this panel that at approximately 0315 hours, while a stand of 31⁄2-inch drill pipe was being

racked during a trip, the nine-stand pipe rack finger broke and fell approximately 85 feet

to the rig floor, striking and killing one rig-floor worker and hospitalizing another.

Causes The accident was a result of the failure of the metal pipe rack finger rod and the absence

of a safety chain to prevent the pipe rack finger from falling to the rig floor. The

associated failure of the Contractor to detect the missing safety chain and the unsafe

condition of the pipe rack finger prior to the accident was also a cause of the accident.

Contributing The failure to detect the missing safety chain and the unsafe condition of the pipe rack

Causes

finger was the result of the Contractor’s lack of an effective program for maintaining,

inspecting, and documenting the integrity of the pipe rack fingers. The ineffectiveness of

the Contractor’s program is demonstrated by the following:

a. When examined after the accident, all of the other welds on the pipe fingers installed

on the jack-up rig were found to be cracked. Problems with the welds were not

identified in a derrick inspection conducted on September 19th, 24 days prior to the

accident.

b. At the time of the accident, there was no safety chain on the pipe rack finger. This

problem was not identified prior to the accident.

c. There was no comprehensive written policy for inspection, maintenance, repair, or

replacement of the pipe rack fingers.

d. There was no routine documentation of maintenance, repair, or replacement of the

pipe rack fingers.
12

Possible 1) The failure of the Contractor to include examination of the pipe rack fingers for

Contributing

Causes damage and cracked welds (as recommended by API RP 4F, Appendix A) in the

monthly inspection checklist for the derrick possibly contributed to the accident. The

magnetic particle examination of the pipe rack fingers conducted after the accident by

Universal Marine Inspections showed that all of the finger pin welds were cracked.

Although the cause of the failure of the pipe rack finger rod is not known, had the

Contractor included examination of the pipe rack fingers for damaged welds as

recommended in the inspection checklist, the cracked welds might have been specifically

looked for and identified, allowing remedial actions to be taken to repair or replace the

equipment.

2) The lack of an adequate Contractor job safety analysis (JSA) for tripping pipe

possibly contributed to the accident. The Contractor’s standard practice and policy

regarding the installation of safety chains on the pipe rack fingers was included in his

monthly derrick inspection checklist. However, in their JSA for tripping pipe, there was

no identification of the potential hazard caused by pipe rack fingers breaking off and

falling from the derrick. This failure to identify the potential hazard in the JSA meant

there were no required hazard management actions to alleviate the danger, such as

inspecting for the condition of pipe rack fingers and the presence of safety chains prior to

the tripping activity.
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Recommendations 

Safety Alert The Gulf of Mexico OCS Region should issue a Safety Alert recommending the

following:

1. Operators and contractors should immediately examine pipe rack fingers on their rigs

to ensure the integrity of the fingers and to ensure that adequate steps have been

taken to prevent them from falling from the derrick.

2. Operators and contractors should review the effectiveness of their programs for

ensuring the integrity of the pipe rack fingers. These programs should, at a

minimum, include the following:

a. Written policies and procedures for inspection, maintenance/repair, and

replacement of pipe rack fingers;

b. Use of safety chains or other devices/methods to secure all pipe rack fingers and

prevent them from falling from the derrick;

c. Inspection of pipe rack fingers for damage and cracked welds as recommended

by API RP 4F, Appendix A;

d. Incorporation of the potential for pipe rack fingers to fall from the derrick as a

hazard, along with adequate hazard management actions in the appropriate

JSA’s.

e. It should be an industry practice to secure each stand of drill pipe after being

placed in the pipe rack finger.
14

Study The Panel recommends that MMS should examine safety issues related to pipe rack

fingers to determine if development of MMS regulations or industry standards should be

considered.
15

Appendix