Disclaimer 

The views in this paper are entirely those of the author expressed under Air University 

principles of academic freedom and do not reflect official views of the School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, Air University, the U.S. Air Force, or the Department of Defense. In 

accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the 

United States Government 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

LIST OF FIGURES iii 

LIST OF TABLES iii 

ABSTRACT vi 

Chapter 

1. IMPORTANT PROCESSES FOR TOUGH QUESTIONS 1 

2. IMPROVING DEFENSE PLANNING 11 

Section 1: The case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Objectives - Budget 

Links 

Section 2: The Case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Long-Range 

Planning 

3 .IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 28 

Section 1: The Case for vesting the JROC with Milestone 0 Authority 

Section 2: The Case for a Pure Mission Need Statement, No Early 

Acquisition Category, and the JROC for All Mission 

Need Statements 

Section 3: The Case for Operational Planners Leading Phase 0 

4. CONCLUSION 54 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 58 

ii 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 

1. Defense and Development Planning 3 

2. Defense Planning Process 17 

3. Strategies-to-Tasks 18 

4. Strategies-to-Tasks for Long-Term Defense Planning 24 

5. Milestones and Phases of Development Planning and Acquisition 31 

6. Mission Need Statement Flows (Major Programs) 34 

7. Operational Requirements Approval and Phase 0 45 

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 

1. Memberships of the JROC, DAB, and DPRB 36 

2. Acquisition Categories 42 

3. Problems and Recommendations 55 

iii 
Abstract 

Operational requirements generation and system concepts generation are the crucial 

processes by which the US decides what weapon systems it needs to develop and acquire to 

sustain the military national instrument of power for the sake of achieving national security 

objectives. This paper asserts that the current operational requirements and system concept 

generation processes can and should be significantly improved. To develop that assertion, the 

paper examines the evolution of the processes since the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on 

Defense Management (the "Packard Commission") made its recommendations in 1986. 

Examining this evolution reveals fundamental problems that have been alleviated to some extent 

by recent reforms but remain to such a degree that further improvement is warranted. Therefore, 

this paper makes six major recommendations for improving the operational requirements and 

system concepts generation processes. First, the DOD should fully institutionalize the strategiesto-tasks hierarchy to establish and maintain adequate links between national objectives and DOD 

budget requests. Next, the strategies-to-tasks hierarchy should be the basis for a master road map 

of future defense requirements and operational concepts to achieve better long- range defense 

planning. Third, the DOD should vest Milestone 0 approval authority in the Joint Requirements 

oversight Council (JROC) instead of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). This would 

streamline as well as increase CINC representation in the operational requirements process. 

Fourth, the Mission Need Statement (MNS) should be a pure requirements document with no 

place for potential solutions as is currently required. Formulation of potential solutions should be 

saved for the subsequent system concepts generation. Further, and fifth, the JROC should review 

all MNSs for Milestone 0 approval, not just those MNSs that the originators believe might lead 

to the largest of major acquisition programs. This would obviate the need to prematurely 

estimate the ultimate development and procurement costs of potential development and 

iv 
acquisition programs before the associated operational requirements are even validated at the 

DOD level. Finally, operational (vice acquisition) planners should have the lead in Phase 0 

system concept formulation and evaluation activities to facilitate better cost-scheduleperformance trade-offs in development planning. 

The implementation of these recommendations holds promise for significantly improving 

the nation's defense planning so as to better create a defense posture that is appropriate in type, 

quality, and quantity to meet the nation's military needs of the future. 

v 
BIOGRAPHY 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Dillman (BS Texas Tech; MS University of Southern 

California) is a Developmental Engineer. A recent graduate of the inaugural class of the School 

of Advanced Airpower Studies, he was just assigned to Space Systems Division, Los Angeles 

AFB, California. Also a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, he was previously 

Executive Officer to the Commander, Munitions Systems Division, Eglin AFB, Florida. Previous 

assignments were in ASAT programs at Peterson AFB, Colorado; ASTRA at the Pentagon; and 

laser weapons development at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. 

vi 
Chapter 1 

Important Processes for Tough Questions

"Problems with the present Defense acquisition system begin with the 

establishment of approved 'military requirements'..." 

The Packard Commission April 1986 

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the current DOD operational requirements 

and system concepts generation processes might be improved. Indeed, the thesis of this paper is 

that these processes suffer from persistent problems that can and should be further resolved. 

Decisions about developing and acquiring new weapon systems have always hinged on 

three critical assessments: operational requirements, technological feasibility, and financial 

capability. 1

 These assessments prompt the critical questions: Do we really need a new weapon 

system? Can we build the new weapon system in a timely manner? Can we afford the new 

weapon system? These are exactly the tough questions that the operational requirements and 

system concepts generation processes must always strive to do a better job of answering. The 

first question is the focus of the operational requirements generation process; the second and 

third questions are the focus of the system concepts generation process. A sound answer to the 

first question is a prerequisite to answering the second and third questions. It is also a 

prerequisite for adequate justification for Congressional authorization and appropriation for 

weapons development and acquisition to fulfill an operational requirement. 

Operational requirements and system concepts generation are the processes by which the 

DOD determines that new weapons development is necessary, what new weapons it should 

develop, how many it should acquire, and when those systems should be deployed. For the sake 

of clarity, operational requirements are derived from deficiencies in operational capabilities --

mission needs --a capability that US military forces need but lack.2

 Thus, the purpose of the 

1 
operational requirements generation process is to determine military deficiencies or needs and 

their priorities; the output of the process is an approved, documented military need that requires 

development and acquisition of a new weapon system to fulfill the need. Operational 

requirements are not to be confused with system requirements which are the desired performance 

and supportability characteristics of a specific weapon system concept. In other words, an 

operational requirement describes a problem, system requirements describe the characteristics of

system concepts which are potential solutions to the problem. It follows then, that the purpose of 

the system concepts generation process is to formulate and evaluate system concept alternatives 

to fulfill approved military needs; the output of this process is one or a very few system concepts 

deemed best suited for further development and future acquisition. 

The operational requirements and system concepts generation processes constitute what

will be called in this paper, development planning. Thus, development planning is the 

determination of operational requirements and the formulation of operational concepts which 

describe how people and systems will operate to fulfill those requirements. Development 

planning should not, of course occur in a vacuum. Indeed, development planning is a subset of 

national defense planning. In defense planning, the nation determines how it will use the military

instrument of power in conjunction with the political and economic instruments to achieve 

national security objectives. Figure 1 depicts the relationship of defense and development 

planning. 

2 
Defense and development planning, and more specifically, the operational requirements 

and system concepts generation processes, are important and warrant continued examination and 

improvement for two fundamental reasons. First, they are the initial steps in the overall 

acquisition process and are thus the first steps in determining the future national defense 

capabilities of the US. Second, these operational planning processes are major inputs into the 

decisions regarding how a large portion of the nation's resources will be spent. In fact, the 

allocations for DOD Research, Development, and Acquisition (RD&A) and procurement for the 

3 
past five years (FY 87-91) have ranged from $99 billion to $118 billion. This represents from 36 

to 42 percent of the total DOD budget for those years.3 

Due to the high costs and major implications for national defense capabilities, decisions 

about developing and acquiring weapon systems (what kind, how many different types, how 

many of each type, when) and allocating resources for those systems have been and always will 

be important, but also difficult and contentious. These decisions are further complicated by 

uncertainty and risk. In fact, uncertainty and risk are quite probably more prevalent in weapons 

requirements, concepts, and acquisition decisions than in any other economic activity.4 The 

international arena with its ever-changing threats to US interests, variances in domestic policies, 

the accelerating evolution of technology, and tightening fiscal constraints all contribute to the 

uncertainty and risk, and thus, the difficulty, inherent in major weapon acquisition decisions. 

Because of their importance and difficulty, the DOD processes of determining 

operational requirements and systems concepts have been subjected to much scrutiny and 

revision in recent years, especially since the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 

Planning (the "Packard Commission") started their work in 1985. Therefore, the Packard 

Commission provides an excellent starting point from which to track the evolution and 

understand the problems of the operational requirements and system concept generation 

processes. 

Since 1985, there have been five major works that have directly influenced the 

operational requirements and system concepts generation processes: the Packard Commission 

reports issued from February to June 1986; the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 

219, issued April 1986; the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986, enacted October 1986; the Defense Management Report (DMR) issued by the Secretary of 

4 
Defense to the President in July 1989; and Rand Corporation's Frameworks for Defense Planning 

and for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, released August 1989 and November 1991 

respectively. 

On July 15, 1985, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12526, entitled "President's

Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management." The Executive Order directed the 

establishment of a small commission of highly qualified persons in the areas of commerce, 

industry, government and national defense to examine and make recommendations for improving 

the DOD acquisition process.5

 The President's establishment of the Packard Commission was 

prompted by suggestions that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service secretaries were 

ineffective and dominated by Service bureaucracies, and that even the influence of the Secretary 

of Defense in these bureaucracies was tenuous at best. 

Weapons development and acquisition were often put forth as examples supporting these 

assertions.6

 Contributing to the perceived need for improvement in the development and 

acquisition processes were the revelations of spare parts overpricing and defense contractor 

scandals that appeared to corroborate charges of waste and mismanagement.7 Even the failure of 

the Iranian hostage rescue attempt and the blunders made in the Grenada invasion (although the 

latter was generally considered a success) highlighted system interoperability problems among 

the Services which cast a disparaging light on the development planning and acquisition 

processes.8

 

Several of the commission's objectives specified in the Executive Order 12526 related 

directly to the operational requirements and system concepts generation processes. Among these 

objectives were the review of "the adequacy of the defense acquisition process"; review of the 

roles and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified and Specified Commands in 

5 
providing joint military advice and force planning and development within a resourceconstrained environment; review of "the procedures for developing and fielding military systems 

incorporating new technologies in a timely fashion"; and recommendations for improving "the 

effectiveness and stability of resources allocation for defense..."9 As a result of Executive Order 

12526, a sixteen member commission chaired by Mr. David Packard, was established. The 

Commission issued its first preliminary findings by the end of February 1986 in "An Interim

Report to President" and made its final report to the President on June 30, 1986. The 

Commission's review and recommendations constitute the basis for the subsequent implementing 

vehicles: NSDD 219, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the DMR. 

On April 1, 1986, close on the heels of the Packard Commission's Interim Report, the 

President issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, the first of the three 

implementing vehicles for the Packard Commission's recommendations. This directive 

implemented all of the Packard Commission's recommendations that were within the purview of 

the Executive branch. The President's purposes in issuing NSDD 219 included improving 

military strategic planning at the national level; strengthening "command, control and military 

advice"; and improving acquisition management. 10 

On October 1, 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986, more commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, into Public 

Law 99-433. Congress derived much of this legislation directly from the Packard Commission's 

recommendations. Congress' intentions in passing this law included improving the military 

advice to the president, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense about the 

development and uses of US forces; increasing "attention to the formulation of strategy..." and 

more clearly linking that strategy to DOD budget requests; and providing for "more efficient 

6 
use" of DOD resources.11 About three years later, the Secretary of Defense issued the third 

implementor of the Packard Commission's recommendations, the Defense Management Report. 

In February 1989, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to 

further improve the DOD acquisition process. The President's direction included the full 

implementation of the Packard Commission's recommendations. 12 The resulting "Defense 

Management Report" (DMR) clarified and expanded the roles and responsibilities of key 

acquisition positions and groups. By the time the Secretary issued the DMR, Rand Corporation 

had already started work on their first framework for further improving the DOD planning and 

acquisition processes. The Frameworks for Defense Planning and for Enhancing Operational 

Capabilities provide recommendations for improving the entire defense planning and systems 

acquisition processes from the top-down direction and guidance at the national level down to the 

selection and acquisition of systems for development and procurement. The Rand Frameworks 

are the latest in the series of the five major works that directly pertain to the operational 

requirements and system concept generation processes. Together, these five works identify and 

address six major problem areas of these processes and each of these problems fit under one of 

the two planning areas mentioned earlier: defense planning and its subset, development planning. 

The first problem in the area of defense planning is the inadequate linkage between 

national security objectives and DOD budget requests for weapon system development and 

procurements. Contributing to this problem is the fact that many, if not all, sub-organizations 

(e.g., the military Services) take on identities, norms, and standard operating procedures within 

themselves that function to sustain the sub-organization. 13 Thus, decisions made within these 

sub- organizations are frequently tilted toward optimization and preservation of that suborganization even though the decisions may be sub-optimal for the overall organization (e.g., the 

7 
nation). The most clear examples occur when a sub-organization decision requires resources that 

could be better used somewhere else in the overall organization. In the US military, much of the 

traditional interservice rivalry can be and is viewed in this way. The current defense planning 

processes appear to have provided good systems that are consistent with national objectives and 

strategies but Congress' perception is that too often, the military Services allow Service 

objectives to take precedence over national considerations meaning that the fit is more by chance 

than by good planning.14 

The second problem is that defense planning is too near- sighted and lacks a basis in 

long-term planning. This has led to "defense management by fits and starts" due to a lack of 

understanding of the long-term effects of defense decisions and of changes in the domestic and 

international arenas. 15 As a result, weapons development and procurement takes too much 

money and too much time. 

Focusing on development planning, there are four interrelated problems that warrant 

attention. First, the operational requirements and system concepts processes need to be 

streamlined --they are too cumbersome and lack clear delineation of purpose between themselves 

and between the subsequent acquisition processes. This occurs primarily due to top-level 

acquisition groups and individuals having predominant roles and responsibilities in development 

planning before an acquisition program has even been initiated. Closely related, the second 

problem is an inadequate degree of operational perspective in development planning due to less 

than needed representation of the warfighting commands. This condition can and has led to 

domination by cost and schedule considerations in acquisition programs at the expense of system 

performance --that which counts in battle. This leads to the third problem, poorly made costschedule-performance trade-offs. 

8 
Finally, the operational requirements generation process also requires the premature 

formulation of system concepts as potential solutions before the requirements are even validated 

and approved. These premature solutions can become accepted as "the solution" and thus 

preclude the formulation of potentially superior solutions in the systems concepts process. 

As will be seen, each of these problems has been alleviated to some extent by revisions in 

defense and development planning in recent years. But all of them still remain to such a degree 

that there is a need for more improvement. Indeed, there are solutions to further improve each. 

9 
Notes Chapter 1 

1. Michael Howard, ìMilitary Science in an Age of Peace,î Journal of royal United Service 

Institute for Defense Service 119, no 1 (1 March 1974): 5 

2. DOD Directive 5000.1, Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Program (Washington 

D.C.: GPO, 23 February 1991), 2-2 -2-3. 

3. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress 

(Washington D.C.: GPO, January 1991), 109. 

4. Merton J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer, "The Unique Environment of Uncertainty in 

weapons Acquisition,î The Weapons acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (1962): 

17-54. Peck and Scherer offer the following definitions. Uncertainty: "... the relative 

unpredictability of the outcome of a contemplated action." Risk: "... the level of the 

consequences of a wrong prediction." 

5. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, An 

Interim Report to the President (Washington D.C.: GPO, 19B6), 5. 

6. Mackubin T. Owens, Lt Col, USMCR, "Defense Organization: Proposals and Issues," Marine 

Corps Gazette 70 (February 19B6): 42-45. 

7. John T. Correll, "A Choice of Roads to Procurement Reform," Air Force Magazine, August 

19B9, 26; Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress: 

Fiscal Year 19B7 (Washington D.C.: GPO, February 19B6), 107-10B. 

8. James E. Dougherty, JCS Reorganization and U.S. Arms Control Policy, (Institute for Foreign 

Policy Analysis, Inc., Washington [National security Paper 5], 1986), 1-31. 

9. Interim Report to the President, 27-28. 

10. Ibid., 33-35 

11. Public Law 99-433 [H.R. 3622], Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986, 993-994. 

12. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Defense Management: Report to the President

(Washington D.C.: GPO, July 1989), i (letter of transmittal) 

13. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Harvard:

Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), 89-94. 

14. Congress, Senate, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: 

the Need for Change, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, Senate Print 99-86, p. 537-538. 

15. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, 

Quest for Excellence: final Report to the President (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986), xviii. 

10 
Chapter 2 

Improving Defense Planning

Section 1 

The Case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Objectives-Budget Links 

Problem and Previously Proposed Remedies 

Congress has rightly deemed that compelling operational requirements are essential to 

justify budget requests for new weapons systems. To be compelling, operational requirements 

and the associated system concepts and acquisition budget requests must clearly and significantly 

contribute to national security objectives. The Packard Commission recognized the significance 

of this link between national objectives and DOD budget requests and made recommendations to 

strengthen it, but the Commission's reports shed little light on the background of Congress'

discontent in this regard. 1

 

According to an October 1985 Congressional staff report to the Armed Services 

Committee, many new operational requirements (and the associated weapon systems) do fit the 

national military strategy; Congress' question, the staff report asserts, is if that fit occurs due to 

good planning or due to chance. A related question is whether the requirements and systems are 

optimal for national objectives or for Service objectives. The report states, "The issue is whether 

the platforms and weapons that are identified as new requirements are the most appropriate 

platforms and weapons to execute an integrated, unified military approach, not the approach of a 

single Service."2

 The National Military Strategy is cast as an "integrated, unified approach" to 

achieve national objectives. Therefore, any operational requirement and system concept that does 

not reflect an "integrated, unified military approach" lacks clear linkage to the national military 

11 
strategy and is likely the product of a Service's desire for self-preservation or for maintaining its 

parochial norms as opposed to optimally contributing to national level objectives. With this 

perspective, one can see that Congressional concern about inadequate linkage between national 

objectives and operational requirements is perpetuated by such issues as lack of weapon system

commonality among the Services, interservice rivalry over roles/missions and the associated 

requirements/systems, resistance to joint programs, and lack of interservice coordination. 

To help strengthen the link of national objectives to DOD budgets, the Packard 

Commission recommended a top-down defense planning and budgeting process based on an 

annual, comprehensive statement of national security objectives issued by the President along 

with a provisional five-year defense budget. From these, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (CJCS), with the assistance of the JCS and the Unified and Specified Commanders in Chief

(CINCS), would determine fiscally constrained strategies to achieve the President's national 

security objectives. These strategies would include options for fulfilling new operational 

requirements identified in the process. The President would then choose among the strategies and 

options to establish the basis for his defense budget submission to Congress.3

 

Implementation and Current Status 

A major thrust of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the establishment of clear and direct 

links between national security objectives, strategic planning, and defense budgets.4 So the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, in accord with the Packard Commission's recommendations, mandated 

several high-level, periodic reports. Primary among these was a new report, the President's 

annual National Security Strategy Report to Congress. 5

 As implied by the title, this Presidential 

report to Congress is a comprehensive statement of the national security strategy of the United 

States. It is submitted each year to Congress along with the President's budget for the next fiscal 

12 
year. The report states and discusses "the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United 

States that are vital to the national security of the United States... The proposed short-term and 

long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power... The 

adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the National Security Strategy..."6

Thus, the National Security Strategy Report shows how the military works in conjunction with 

the other instruments of national power to achieve national objectives; serves as the top-level 

link between national objectives, military strategies, and DOD budget requests; and provides the 

basis from which military needs are derived. To ensure that the link between national objectives 

and military needs is maintained, the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary of Defense to 

base his Annual Secretary of Defense Report to Congress and his annual Guidance to the DOD 

components and the CJCS on the National Security Strategy Report.7 

The Annual Secretary of Defense Report to Congress focuses on the near-term major 

military missions, strategies, and associated force structures in terms of meeting the national 

security strategy. The report contains descriptions, explanations of the relationships, and 

justifications for the military missions, strategies, and force structures applicable to the next 

fiscal year.8

 This report further establishes the link between military needs and near-term budget 

requests as does the Secretary's annual guidance to the DOD components and the CJCS. For the 

DOD components, the Secretary's guidance --the "Defense Guidance" --must state the national 

security objectives and policies based on the President's report, provide a prioritization of 

military missions, and project funding levels expected from the next budget. With this guidance, 

the DOD components prepare program recommendations to fulfill military needs and establish 

their associated budget proposals.9

 For the CJCS, the Secretary's guidance must provide direction 

regarding specific force levels and the projected funding levels expected from the next budget.10 

13 
Thus, the Secretary provides near-term, fiscally constrained guidance on which the DOD 

components base their program planning and on which the Unified and Specified CINCs 

(represented by the CJCS) base their contingency planning for the subsequent fiscal year. Since 

the Secretary's guidance is derived from the President's National Security Strategy Report, it 

contributes to a more direct relationship between national objectives and the military programs, 

plans, and budgets proposed to achieve those objectives. 

In addition to the top-level reports which the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated, the DMR 

reemphasized the criticality of the link between national strategy and the budget by establishing 

the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB) chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

DPRB membership includes the CJCS, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 

(USD(A)) and other senior operational and acquisition officials. Generally, the DPRB provides 

top- level guidance to the military departments and agencies on defense planning topics and 

issues including those related to establishing operational requirements and system concepts. In 

carrying out these responsibilities, the DMR specifically charged the Deputy Secretary, through 

the DPRB, to "help develop stronger links between our national policies and the resources 

allocated to specific programs and forces. "11 

However, despite the intents of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the increased DOD 

emphasis, congressional concern about the lack of a clear relation between national objectives 

and defense budget requests has only increased. 

Recommendations for Improvement

Lt Gen Glenn A. Kent, USAF (Ret), of the Rand Corporation, points out that despite 

improvements in the requirements generation process, "Members of Congress are increasingly 

concerned that military strategies and military budgets [driven by requirements] are not clearly 

14 
linked and, in fact, may not be linked at all."l2 To help remedy this, in A Framework for Defense 

Planning, General Kent recommended two more reports in addition to the President's National 

Security Strategy Report and the Secretary's Annual Report to Congress and guidance to DOD 

components and the CJCS: the "National Military Strategy Report" by the CJCS, and 

"Presidential guidance on national military strategy and fiscal constraints."l3 The National 

Military Strategy Report would provide the President with alternative national and regional 

military strategies along with provisional budget levels and the associated near-term and longterm effectiveness toward achieving national objective, with this report, the President would 

choose a national military strategy and, based on that choice, issue his guidance on national 

military strategy and fiscal constraints.14 These additional reports would serve to document and 

tighten the link between military strategies and national objectives by consolidating at the 

Presidential level the formulation of national objectives and the selection of the fiscally 

constrained national military strategy that best fulfills those objectives. In fact, these additional 

reports would formally implement recommendations made by the Packard Commission.15

On 30 January 1990, the year after Rand published A Framework for Defense Planning, 

the CJCS issued Memorandum of Policy (MOP) number 7 which implemented a "significant 

revision" of the JCS Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) .16 

According to MOP 7, "The JSPS is the formal means by which the Chairman, in 

consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, carries out his 

statutory responsibilities to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing 

strategic direction of the armed forces ..." which includes providing advice on operational 

requirements, acquisition programs, and budgets.17 A key product of this revised system is the 

National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). The NMSD is the Chairman's recommendation 

15 
to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary regarding the national military 

strategy and the fiscally constrained force structure required to achieve the national security 

objectives. The NMSD includes: 

-Assessments of the threat, US defense policies, and current US military 

capabilities and requirements, 

-Recommended national military objectives based upon national security 

objectives, 

-Military strategy and force options to frame the President's decision on the 

national military strategy, 

-The recommended National Military Strategy.18 

Thus, regardless of whether or not it was prompted by A Framework for Defense Planning, the 

current NMSD appears to fulfill General Kent's proposal for a "National Military Strategy 

Report." 

The final NMSD goes to the Secretary of Defense for review and comment and then to 

the President for decision and approval. The approved NMSD is then included in the Secretary's 

subsequent Defense Planning Guidance.19 In the current defense planning process, the 

presidentially approved NMSD appears to fulfill General Kent's proposed "presidential guidance 

on national military strategy and fiscal constraints." Figure 2 shows how the National Security 

Strategy report, the NMSD, and the DPG constitute the top levels of defense planning. 

16 
The President's approval of military strategy and the Secretary's Defense Guidance 

complete the top levels of planning needed to derive operational tasks, operational concepts and, 

in turn, to develop the acquisition programs for systems to carry out the operational tasks. The 

Framework for Defense Planning proposes a framework which provides a coherent way of 

tracking the downward evolution of the linkage between national security objectives and 

operational requirements. This framework is termed "strategies-to-tasks" (although the 

subsequent Framework for Enhancing Operational Capabilities implies that "objectives- totasks" would be the more appropriate term) .20 Figure 3 illustrates this "strategies-to-tasks" 

hierarchy of defense planning and its relation to operational requirements, system concepts and 

acquisition programs. The following definitions

17 
are helpful understanding the strategies-to-tasks framework. National security objectives are the 

desired outcomes from applying the political, economic, and military instruments of national 

power. National military objectives are the desired outcomes from applying the military 

instrument of national power. Operational objectives are the desired military outcomes in a 

specific region of the world. Operational tasks are the tasks that are necessary to achieve an 

operational objective. Operational concepts describe how people and systems will accomplish an 

operational task. 

System concepts, derived from operational concepts, describe a specific weapon system, 

its performance parameters and projected cost and schedule for development and procurement.21

18 
As the figure shows, the focus of development planning should be operational tasks and 

concepts; that is, development planning should not focus on just the hardware at the system

concept level. Indeed, the operational focus is the centerpiece of the framework.22 Interestingly, 

the "strategies-to-tasks" concept is already institutionalized to some degree. The newest version 

of Air Force Regulation 57-1, "Air Force Needs and Operational Requirements Process," 

specifically cites "strategies-to- tasks" for determining operational requirements.23 However, the 

DOD 5000 series directives and instructions for defense acquisition, management policies and 

procedures do not include this or any other methodology for linking national objectives to 

operational requirements and DOD budgets. 

Strategies-to-tasks is an effective method for establishing and maintaining clear links 

from the national strategy level all the way down to budget requests for specific weapon systems 

to fulfill operational requirements. The DOD 5000 series directives and instructions should 

specifically include the strategies-to-tasks methodology and mandate its institutionalization. 

These directives and instructions should also emphasize that not only must this linkage be 

established and maintained, it must also be demonstrated as a regular part of any advocacy for 

fulfilling an operational requirement via an acquisition program. It follows, therefore, that the 

strategies-to-tasks linkage should be a mandatory part of every milestone approval decision 

which certainly includes Milestones 0 and I. This linkage must also, of course, be a standard part 

of the budget requests for each weapon system acquisition program regardless of where that 

program is in the acquisition cycle. 

There is another argument for thoroughly institutionalizing the strategies-to-tasks 

approach for maintaining a clear national objectives link to budget requests. The Packard 

Commission strongly recommended that Congress change its budget review process from the 

19 
minutiae of line items to one focused at the operational concepts level.24 During the time when 

the Commission was doing its work, Senator Barry Goldwater, then Chairman of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, provided candid insight to the reason for this recommendation when 

he observed, "The budget process distorts the nature of congressional oversight by focusing 

primarily on the question of how much before we answer the key questions of what for, why, and 

how well."25Recall that operational concepts describe how people and systems will accomplish 

operational tasks which contribute to achieving operational objectives. With an operational 

concept focus, Congress would gain a far better understanding of how their budget adjustments 

affect operational capabilities --the "what for, why, and how well." It may be unrealistic to 

expect Congress to make such a major change in their budget process, but if they ever do, it will 

be because the DOD demonstrated that such a focus is not only viable, but better. Therefore, the 

DOD should adopt strategies-to- tasks with its operational concepts focus and consistently apply 

it in defense budget advocacy activities. Only then will there be any significant probability for 

Congress to switch from the current line item budget review approach. 

As a final point, it would be absurd to presume that a clear objectives-budget link via 

strategies-to-tasks (or any other method) would transcend all or even some of the political 

machinations to which a defense development and acquisition program can be subjected. 

Nevertheless, a sound link is a fundamental step in achieving a viable weapon system acquisition 

program --it is essential. 

20 
Section 2 

The Case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Long-Range Planning 

Problem and Previously Proposed Remedies 

The Packard Commission reported to the President that "... there is a need for more and 

better long-range planning to bring together the nation's security objectives, the forces needed to 

achieve them, and the resources available to support those forces."26 The Commission also 

stipulated that long-range planning should be fiscally constrained, based on sound military 

advice and, of course, forward looking.27 The Packard Commission's recommendations for 

improving long-range planning encompassed several of the recommendations to improve other 

areas. As a vehicle for tieing together the national security objectives, forces, and resources, the 

Commission recommended the top-down planning process with the President's National Security 

Strategy Report followed by the Secretary's Defense Guidance based on the President's choice 

from national military strategy options formulated by the Secretary and the CJCS. Each of these 

options would be fiscally constrained by provisional five-year budget levels, also formulated by 

the Secretary and the CJCS. Integral to the military strategy options would be future projections 

of threats to U.S. interests and corresponding U.S. military capabilities to counter those threats.28 

Implementation and Current Status 

NSDD-219 adhered to the Commission's recommendations for long-range planning by 

directing the Secretary of Defense to recommend procedures for developing five-year 

provisional budgets upon which the CJCS, with the other members of the JCS and the CINCs, 

would formulate military strategy options.29 The Goldwater-Nichols Act did not mandate a 

specific process for long-range defense planning but it did, as seen, mandate the President's 

annual National Security Strategy Report and the Secretary's report to Congress along with 

Defense guidance to DOD components and the CJCS.. The Act also charged the Secretary of 

21 
Defense with ensuring that this planning and guidance was based on national security, strategy 

and policies, and was fiscally constrained by projected budget levels.30 

Despite the implementation of the President's National Security Strategy Report and the 

Secretary's Defense Guidance based on that report, three years later the DMR cited long- range 

planning as insufficient. To help remedy this, the DMR bolstered the Secretary's Defense 

Guidance (renamed the "Defense Planning Guidance") by including "... a rough, 20- year 'road 

map' of the modernization needs and investment plans of DOD...against realistic levels of future 

funding." 31 

Currently, the Secretary's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) based on the President's 

National Security Strategy Report provides the basis for the DOD's long-range planning. Fiscal 

constraints are provided by provisional budget levels that the DOD has extended to six instead of 

five years to better fit the biennial budgeting process which, under Congressional mandate, the 

DOD started in 1988.32 Additionally, the Chairman's NMSD serves as a major input to longrange defense planning. Annex G of the NMSD is titled "Long-Range Planning Guidance" and 

contains plausible projections of international and domestic factors that influence defense 

planning. These projections extend 14 years beyond the six year defense planning period and 

include international political, social, economic, technological and threat trends. Associated with 

these projections are proposed military strategies that provide a basis from which the CINCs can 

assess the adequacy their future plans and operational requirements. 

Recommendations for Improvement

A long-range plan can be an invaluable tool for better understanding the systemic and 

long-term effects that decisions will have on resources and capabilities. Such a plan can also 

provide insight regarding how changes in the international and domestic environments might 

22 
affect those decisions. This is especially true in cases where the results of the decision won't 

come to fruition for a long period as in major weapon systems which typically take seven to 

fifteen years from conception to deployment. Of course, the nation cannot afford to get locked 

into a long-range plan that is so rigid that it precludes flexibility to compensate for changes in 

military needs or to accommodate new, significant opportunities afforded by technological 

advances. A long-range plan should and must be a living instrument ready to account for the 

changes which the pertinent military, political, economic and technological actors and factors of 

the domestic and international environments impose. This is much more palatable when one 

remembers that it is not the plan itself that is of the most value, but rather, the planning process 

that affords the most benefit. Since the planning process identifies the actors and factors that 

constitute the spectrum of threats and derives operational concepts and requirements to counter 

those threats, the process is a mechanism that provides insight to the relation between threat 

variables and operational requirements with their associated system concepts. Long- range plans 

also serve the same purpose in accounting for changes in domestic policies as well as changes in 

approval and funding of weapon systems. Therefore, a long-range plan is the best vehicle for 

predicting the long-term effects of current decisions and how changes in the environment affect 

those predictions. 

Institutionalizing the strategies-to-tasks methodology for linking national objectives to 

DOD budget requests would afford an excellent structure for the DOD's long-term defense 

planning since it depicts the interrelationships among national security objectives, threats, 

resources, and military forces. Implementation of this recommendation would provide a 

common, long-range planning framework for all DOD components and should include a master 

road-map based on strategies-to-tasks, projected 20 years out, and kept by the Strategic Plans and 

23 
Policy Directorate (J-5) of the Organization of the JCS (OJCS). As shown in Figure 4, this 

master road map would be a 20 years projection of the major levels of the strategies-to-tasks 

framework from national military strategies to operational concepts. Note that the focus of this 

road map is at the operational level; while 

• Operational road maps account for variables in the international and domestic 

environments including threats, fiscal constraints, and national policies. 

"modernization" road maps for system technology and hardware have their place, they should be 

derived from and secondary to those for operational objectives. 

This master road map should be a standard part of all program milestone decisions and 

24 
DOD budget avocations before Congress since it would show how systems and associated 

budgets fit within the overall defense plan over time. This is particularly appropriate for systems 

in the early phases of development planning or acquisition since these systems won't be deployed 

until well beyond the six year defense planning period. 

Institutionalizing strategies-to-tasks throughout the DOD defense planning process would 

provide an excellent method for establishing and demonstrating the linkage between national 

objectives and DOD budget requests. It would also significantly improve the DOD's long-range 

planning as well as other aspects of development planning. There are other recommendations 

which would also improve the operational requirements and system concepts generation 

processes involved in development planning. 

25 
Notes Chapter 2 

1. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, A 

Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986), 10-14. 

2. Congress, Senate, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: 

the Need for Chang, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, Senate Print 99-86, p. 537-538. 

3. Quest for Excellence, 13-14. 

4. Public Law 99-433 [H.R. 3622], Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 999-1000. 

5. Ibid., 1074 -1075. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Ibid., 1075. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid., 996. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Defense Management: Report to the President 

(Washington D.C.: GPO, July 1989), 5. 

12. Glenn A. Kent, A. Framework for Defense Planning (Rand Corporation Report, 1989. R3721-AF/OSD), 1. 

13. Ibid., 3-9. 

14. Ibid., 5 -7. 

15. Quest for Excellence,13-14. 

16. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of policy (MOP) No.7, Joint strategic 

Planning System (30 January 1990), Cover Letter, 1. 

17. Ibid., 1. 

18. Ibid., 32 -34. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Glenn A. Kent and William E. Simons, A Framework for Enhancing Operational Capabilities 

(Rand Corporation Report, 1991. RAND/R-4043- AF), 10-15. 

21. Framework for Defense Planning, 12-15. 

22. Ibid. 

23. Air Force Regulations 57-1, Air Force Mission Needs and Operational Requirement Process 

(Washington D.C.: DOD, 15 November 1991), 8. 

24. Quest for Excellence, 29. 

25. Ibid., xviii 

26. Quest for Excellence, 10. 

26 
27. Ibid.,xvii 

28. Ibid., 10-12 

29. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, A 

Quest for Excellence: Appendix: Final Report to the President (Washington D.C.: GPO, 

1986), 34-35. 

30. Goldwater-Nichols, 999-1000. 

31. Defense Management Report, 5-6. 

32. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 

1988 (Washington D.C.: GPO, January 1987), 117. 

27 
Chapter 3 

Improving Development Planning

Section 1 

The Case for Vesting the JROC with Milestone 0 Approval Authority 

Problems and Previously Proposed Remedies 

Among the Packard Commission's objectives was the review of "the responsibilities of 

the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing for joint military advice and force 

development within a resource-constrained environment. "l In this regard, the Commission 

believed that the CINCs were not adequately represented in the operational requirements and 

system concepts generation processes and pointed out that there was no "one uniformed officer" 

responsible for integrating the views of the CINCs and the Service Chiefs -- the warfighters and 

acquirers.2

 Indeed, the CINCs are the nation's warfighting commanders. They are closest to the 

threats, directly tasked to counter those threats, and thus, have the best expertise and experience 

for determining what they need to achieve their missions. The Services, on the other hand, are 

tasked by law to train, organize and equip forces for the warfighting commands. 

In the past, the Services have had the predominant roles in the operational requirements 

and system concepts generation processes. To give the CINCs a greater voice in these processes, 

the Packard Commission recommended that the responsibilities of the CJCS include representing 

the CINCs in operational requirements and other JCS decisions. To assist in this responsibility, 

the Commission recommended the creation of a new JCS position, the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).3

 This stronger representation, the Commission believed, would 

better facilitate the Chairman's impartial and objective integration of the CINCs' and Service 

Chiefs' views in operational requirements, system concepts, and other JCS decisions.4

 

Another primary role of the Vice Chairman would be to review the need for new weapon 

28 
systems by challenging the necessity of newly identified operational requirements. These roles of 

CINC representation and requirements review would be formalized in a restructured Joint 

Requirements and Management Board (JRMB). At the time, the JRMB dealt solely with 

operational requirements, procedures, and issues for multi-Service or "joint" programs. 5

 The 

restructured JRMB, however, was to ensure the validity and necessity of all new operational 

requirements (not just joint requirements) for major programs and was to achieve a balance 

between programmatics (program cost and schedule) and operational warfighting requirements 

(system performance, including supportability) in making decisions about new operational 

requirements and associated system concepts.6 To achieve this balance, the restructured JRMB 

would be co-chaired by the VCJCS and another new position which the Commission 

recommended, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A). The USD(A) "would 

be a full-time Defense Acquisition Executive" with authority to set policy and supervise "the 

entire acquisition system" including research, development, and procurement.? In addition to the 

inadequate CINC representation in development planning, the Packard Commission was also 

concerned about the overly long acquisition cycle. 

The Packard Commission cited the entire development and acquisition process as 

inordinately long (10-15 years from conception to deployment for major systems) and pointed 

out the pernicious aspects of this length. First, the longer the period for system development and 

acquisition, the higher the real cost since the defense contractors developing and producing a 

system must be retained over a longer period. "Time is money." Also, as a system takes longer to 

acquire, the technology used in the system is all that much closer to obsolescence when the 

system is finally deployed. Thus, we forfeit some or possibly all of the technological lead we 

may have started with. Another reason that long acquisition time is detrimental is that it compels 

29 
the user who originated the operational requirement to overstate the threat in hopes of 

compensating for long-term uncertainties about how the threat will evolve. This does two things. 

It puts additional demands on technology for system capabilities to meet the overstated threat. 

These additional demands cause even further increases in development time. Overstating the 

threat also fosters systems that possess some capabilities that are not actually worth the time and 

money needed to develop and procure them --what the Commission referred to as "goldplating."8

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an overly long acquisition time simply means that the 

user's operational need goes unfulfilled longer than necessary. 

In light of all the detrimental aspects of an overly long acquisition cycle, the Packard 

Commission made recommendations to streamline the acquisition process. Most of these 

centered on shortened and simplified command channels for the acquisition cycle that emulate 

commercial industry practices. These recommendations, however, were applicable to the postMilestone I acquisition activities and therefore, did not affect the development planning 

processes. Figure 5 shows the milestones and phases of the development planning and 

acquisition processes. Like the Packard Commission, NSDD-219 did not contain any specific 

direction for streamlining the operational requirements and concept generation processes; nor did 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act which left such matters in the hands of the DOD. 

Implementation and Current Status 

Among the Packard Commission's recommendations implemented by NSDD 219, one 

that bore directly on the requirements process was the restructuring of the JRMB with the 

VCJCS and the USD(A) as co-chairs.9

 But NSDD 219 could only set the stage for the new 

JRMB since the new positions 

30 
of the VCJCS and the USD(A) required legislation to become reality. 

The Goldwater-Nichols Act did, indeed, create the positions of the VCJCS and the 

USD(A) so that the DOD could implement the Packard Commission's recommendations that 

centered on these positions. To the credit of this legislation, the specifics of the Vice Chairman's

duties were left to the discretion of the CJCS with approval of the Secretary of Defense. ll The 

Vice Chairman's fundamental duties were, of course, already prescribed in the Packard 

Commission reports and in NSDD 219. Likewise, the USD(A) 's duties were left to the discretion 

of the Secretary of Defense with the Commission's recommendations and NSDD 219 providing 

the primary guidance.12 

31 
Among the responsibilities for the VCJCS was to represent the Commanders-in-Chief 

(CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands --the warfighters --in the operational 

requirements generation process.13 Toward this end, the role of this new position evolved in the 

subsequent months after NSDD 219 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act such that the VCJCS 

became the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). After the JRMB's

restructuring and assumption of its much broader role in development planning and acquisition, 

the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS formed the JROC to assume the JRMB' s former role in 

joint programs. Early in 1988, the restructured JRMB was reorganized and renamed the Defense 

Acquisition Board (DAB) with the USD(A) as chairman and the VCJCS as the vice-chairman.

14 

The JROC has the Service's Vice Chiefs of Staff as its permanent members. 15 With this 

membership and the VCJCS as chairman, the JROC is oriented toward operational 

considerations. As such, the JROC first served to "validate" operational requirements that were 

submitted as multi-Service or "joint."

16 

In addition to creating the VCJCS and USD (A) positions, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 

per the Commission's recommendations, designated the CJCS as "the principle military advisor 

to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."17 Three years 

later, the DMR reemphasized the expanded responsibilities which the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

vested in the CJCS as the principal top-level military advisor and as the spokesman for the JCS 

and the CINCs, "especially on the operational requirements of their commands."18 The DMR 

recognized the increasingly effective interaction between the JROC and the DAB for reviewing 

and approving joint operational requirements. Building on this, the DMR formalized the JROC's

validation and prioritization role for all operational requirements (not just joint requirements) 

prior to DAB consideration for Milestone 0 approval. Thus, the JROC considers all operational 

32 
requirements that represent potential major programs, regardless of source, for validation and for 

joint versus single-Service acquisition programs. The DMR also broadened the JROC's role to 

include the validation of performance goals and baselines of all major programs prior to DAB 

reviews for all subsequent milestones.19 

Currently, once a warfighting command or a Service has fully staffed a Mission Need 

Statement (MNS) that could potentially result in a major acquisition program, it goes to the 

JROC for validation and then to the DAB for Milestone 0 approval.20 This JROC/DAB 

validation and approval process has proven to be a viable arrangement, but the process can be 

improved. 

Recommendations for Improvement

Rand's Framework for Enhancing Operational Capabilities would eliminate the redundant 

JROC/DAB validation and approval process by making the JROC the Milestone 0 approval 

authority. This would achieve two things: it would streamline the Milestone 0 approval process 

and it would take the DAB out of the process.21 Taking the DAB, an acquisition oriented group, 

out of the requirements approval process is appropriate, the framework asserts, since system

concepts have not yet been defined and therefore, no acquisition program yet exists. Figure 6 

illustrates the removal of the DAB and the streamlining effect of this recommendation. In fact, 

for the sake of clarifying planning versus acquisition, the framework would designate Milestone 

0 as strictly a development planning function, not an acquisition function.22 The framework 

makes a similar argument for Milestone I. 

At Milestone I, a selected concept is approved or disapproved for implementation as an 

acquisition program.

23 Currently, this is a DAB decision but again, the framework identifies this 

DAB approval authority as premature and as a blurring of the delineation between systems 

33 
development planning and systems acquisition.24 Instead of the DAB, the framework proposes 

the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB) as the more appropriate forum for Milestone 

I approval 

since the DPRB is directly concerned with determining the most important military capabilities 

34 
to which resources should be allocated in conjunction with the Planning, Programming, and 

Budgeting System. 25 The DAB would then serve as approval authority for the three subsequent 

milestones that are clearly in the realm of acquisition. 

Should the JROC be the Milestone 0 approval authority and should the DPRB be the 

Milestone I approval authority vice the DAB in both cases? To answer these questions, a look at 

the membership of the JROC, DAB and DPRB is revealing. As shown in Table 1, the JROC is 

oriented toward operational considerations while the DAB leans more toward acquisition. The 

DPRB, on the other hand is more balanced between operational and acquisition representation, 

albeit, a higher level forum than the DAB or JROC. The recommendation to make the JROC the 

Milestone 0 approval authority instead of the DAB depends largely on how one answers the 

question, "Where does the planning process stop and acquisition begin?" The DOD 5000 series 

is not completely clear about this since DODD 5000.1, states that Milestone 0 is "the initial 

interface between the requirements generation and the acquisition management systems" and 

DODI 5000.2 says that Milestone I marks the start of a new acquisition program.

26 However, 

since Milestone 0 initiates Phase 0 for exploring alternative system concepts --a development 

planning function --the best answer appears to be in DODI 5000.2: Milestone I, not 0, marks the 

transition from planning to acquisition. Thus, for Milestone 0, a planning function which 

fundamentally serves as the approval point of an operational requirement and for the direction of 

system concept studies to fulfill that

35 
Table 1. Memberships of the JROC, DAB, and DPRB

Members JROC DAB DPRB

Dep Secretary of Defense (Chair)

- Operational Related Positions - 

Chairman of the JCS X 

Vice Chairman of the JCS (Chair) (V. Chair) X 

Service Chiefs of Staff X 

Vice Chiefs of Staff X 

Unified & Specified CINCs X 

- Acquisition Related Positions - 

USD (Acquisitions) (Chair) X 

MILDEP Secretaries X 

USD (Policy) X 

ASD (Prog Anal & Eval) X X 

Other ASDs X 

DOD Comptroller X X 

OMB Representative X 

Assistant to the President on 

National Security Affairs 

X

Director, Defense Research & 

Engineering (R&E) 

X

Director, Operational Test & 

Evaluation (OT&E) 

X

Service Acquisition Executives X 

requirement, the JROC's operational orientation appears most appropriate.27 It also seems 

36 
appropriate that the JCS, via the JROC, have full responsibility and authority for approving 

operational requirements for system concept studies vice the current JROC/DAB process which 

dilutes authority and accountability for these operational requirements decisions. Note that the 

JROC would not make recommendations for concepts to be studied as the DAB does now in the 

Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) that documents Milestone 0 approval. That 

narrowing of potential system concepts would be appropriately reserved for Phase 0, Concept 

Exploration and Definition. This serves to keep the pre-Milestone 0 activities focused purely on 

operational requirements and thus clearly delineates the requirements generation process from

the system concepts generation processes (post-Milestone 0). 

There is an issue, however, in recommending the JROC as the Milestone 0 approval 

authority --legality. By law, specifically, Sections 152(c) and 154(c) of Title 10, the CJCS and 

the VCJCS do not have command authority over the JCS or any of the armed forces.28 Therefore, 

is a Service obligated to respond to a JROC decision to conduct concept studies in Phase 0? Two 

factors make the answer to this question "yes." First, the JROC is co-chartered by the CJCS and 

the Secretary of Defense.29 Certainly, the Services are obligated to respond to the decisions of a 

Secretary of Defense chartered council. Second, Section 163 (b) (2) (D) of Title 10 states that the 

CJCS shall "...communicate, as appropriate, the requirements of the combatant commands to 

other elements of the Department of Defense." Such communication is obviously not just for 

information, it's for action on the part of the Services which are charged to organize, train, and 

equip the military forces. 

Since Milestone I marks the transition from development planning to acquisition, having 

an acquisition oriented approval authority --the DAB --does not confuse the distinction between 

development planning (pre-Milestone I) and acquisition (post-Milestone I). Should the DPRB 

37 
have Milestone I approval authority instead of the DAB? Note in Table 2 that the DPRB and the 

DAB share some key membership, most notably, the CJCS or the VCJCS for CINC 

representation, the USD(A), the ASD(PA&E), and the DOD Comptroller. Because of this 

common membership, the CINC representation in the DAB by the VCJCS (which would have 

approved the initial requirement at Milestone 0), and the necessary tilting toward acquisition due 

to the transition to an acquisition program, there appears little, if any, utility in replacing the 

DAB with the higher level DPRB as Milestone I approval authority. Substantiating this position 

is the DOD policy that milestone approval be delegated to the lowest level deemed appropriate 

by the USD(A) .30 

In sum, while the DAB appears appropriate as the Milestone I approval authority, vesting 

Milestone 0 approval authority in the JROC holds promise for significantly improving 

development planning. Not only would it streamline the Milestone approval process, it would 

also more clearly delineate development planning from the acquisition program process. But 

most importantly, it would strengthen the JROC's, and hence the CINCs', role and responsibility 

in challenging and approving operational requirements --a role for which the JROC is best 

suited. 

38 
Section 2 

The Case for a Pure Mission Need Statement, No Early Acquisition Category, and the 

JROC for All Mission Need Statements 

Problem and Past Remedies 

Despite the Packard Commission's criticisms about determining operational requirements 

and system concepts -- overstating requirements which leads to "goldplated" concepts --the 

Commission did not specifically address the interface between these needs (operational 

requirements) and solutions (system concepts). That is, where does determining needs end and 

formulating solutions begin? NSDD-219 and the Goldwater- Nichols Act did not address the 

need/solution interface either. The DMR reemphasized the necessity for continuing 

improvements in the operational requirements process and in determining system concepts to 

meet those requirements but again, made no mention of the need/solution interface. 

The primary vehicle for stating operational requirements has traditionally been a 

document generated by the user (a Unified or Specified Command or a Service major command 

such as the Air Force's Tactical Air Command or Strategic Air Command) or other DOD 

components that have recognized a deficiency in military capability or a technological 

opportunity to significantly increase military capability or efficiency. In the past, this document 

has been known by various names including Statement of Need (SON), Joint Statement of 

Operational Requirements (JSOR), Required Operational Capability (ROC), and Mission 

Element Need Statement (MENS) .31 Currently, that document is called the Mission Need 

Statement (MNS) regardless of its source within the DOD. The generation of a MNS marks the 

initial steps in the operational requirements generation process.32 However, the MNS is not the 

pure operational requirements document that it should be. 

39 
Current Status 

The current operational requirements and system concepts generation processes are 

fundamentally flawed since they require premature consideration of solutions and perhaps even 

invite writing requirements around preconceived solutions. This blurred interface between 

determining needs and formulating solutions is detrimental to the requirements and concepts 

decision processes since it potentially precludes the formulation and consideration of a 

comprehensive set of alternative solutions. 

Lieutenant General Glenn A. Kent, USAF, retired, points out that the MNS format still 

requires proposed solutions from the originators.33 DOD Manual 5000.2-M, "Defense 

Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports," February 1991, prescribes the purpose & 

format for all MNSs. This manual provides that any DOD Component may prepare and submit a 

MNS (Unified and Specified Commands, Service major commands, DOD agencies, etc) .34 This 

is as it should be since the quest for deficiencies should be open to all in the DOD. 5000.2-M 

also states that a MNS is "a nonsystem-specific statement of operational capability need.î35 This 

nonsystem- specific approach is reiterated in the format description for Section 2 of a MNS, 

"Mission and Threat Analysis" which states, "Do not discuss the need in terms of equipment or 

system specific performance characteristics." Section 3 of the MNS format requires the preparing 

organization to describe why nonmateriel alternatives --changes in doctrine, operational 

concepts, tactics, organization, training --are inadequate for satisfying the need.36 Although this 

section gets into the realm of solutions, it is appropriate since it compels the originator to think 

hard in terms of potential nonmateriel solutions before submitting the MNS for a "materiel" 

solution --a new system. 

Section 4, however, belies the "nonsystem" approach that MNSs are supposed to adhere 

40 
to. Section 4 is titled "Potential Materiel Alternatives" and requires the originator to identify any 

known deployed systems or development programs for similar needs and/or potential areas of 

study for Phase 0, Concept Exploration and Definition.37 The MNS is not the place for stating 

potential alternatives since it compels the originator to think in terms of solutions before the 

operational requirement is even validated or approved. Also, the proper forum for formulating 

potential solutions to an operational requirement includes not only operational expertise but also 

technological and programmatic (cost, schedule, and contracting) expertise as well. The 

originator of a MNS most often does not have the benefit of such a complete forum in the 

requirements generation process. In addition to stating potential solutions, the originator of a 

MNS is also required to estimate if the operational need will potentially result in initiation of a 

new major program versus a non-major program.

38 In the current process, this estimate is needed 

to determine the validation and subsequent milestone approval authorities. More specifically, 

DOD Instruction 5000.2 directs a MNS originator to determine what Acquisition Category 

(ACAT) the future program will come under. ACAT I represents the largest programs and 

requires JROC/DAB validation and approval for Milestones 0 and I. Lesser ACAT programs (II, 

III and IV) have milestone approval authorities a lower DOD and Service levels.39 So how does 

the originator of a MNS make such a determination? Both DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2 state 

that this preliminary determination is "highly subjective. "40 The guidance these directives and 

instructions provide for determining the ACAT is general and solution oriented. For example, "... 

an identified need should be considered as acquisition category I when...it could potentially 

result in a capability that may require the use of new, leading edge technologies and an extensive 

development effort..."41 Actually, ACATs are much more specifically defined and are based 

primarily on cost estimates as shown in Table 2. 

41 
Requiring an ACAT estimate with a MNS compels the originator to think in terms of

solutions well before the operational requirement is even validated or approved. If the MNS 

originator believes that lower cost programs are more likely to survive the budget process, the 

originator might be inclined toward citing certain solutions in the MNS that would potentially 

stay below the ACAT I or II thresholds. 

Table 2. Acquisition Categories 42

ACAT I ACAT II 

Total RDT&E >$200M >$75M 

 or 

Total Procurement >$1B >$300M 

(Fiscal year 1980 constant $; ACAT III and IV fall below the ACATII $ thresholds)l 

The final determination of acquisition category is made at the right point --Milestone I --

after system concepts have been formulated and evaluated, but the requirement for preliminary 

ACAT estimates coupled with potential solutions in the MNS is a flaw in the initial 

requirements/concepts processes that should be corrected.43 It is a flaw worthy of correction 

because it burdens the MNS originator with developing potential solutions and rough acquisition 

cost estimates before requirements approval; it confuses the distinction between the operational 

requirements process and the system concepts process; and, perhaps most importantly, it denies 

the JROC better and centralized control over the spectrum of new operational requirements 

throughout the DOD. 

Recommendations for Improvement

The MNS should be a pure operational requirements document with no place for 

potential solutions and no ACAT estimate to accompany it. This would relieve MNS originators 

from the burden of having to estimate the ACAT before the Phase 0 concept generation has even 

begun. It also affords a clear delineation between the operational requirements and system

42 
concepts processes. Without the ACAT estimate, no preliminary determination can or should be 

made as to the Milestone 0 authority. This, however, is more of an advantage than a drawback. 

The JROC should be the Milestone 0 approval authority for all MNSs, regardless of the 

source or potential acquisition program costs. In this way, the JROC, with a strategic perspective 

for interservice coordination, will have better control over the spectrum of new operational 

requirements from throughout the DOD and can better preclude redundant system concept, 

development and acquisition efforts among the services. What's more, this centralized control 

and approval of all operational requirements would not inordinately increase the JROC's work 

load since the JROC already has to review all new operational requirements for potential joint 

program application regardless of potential ACATs.44 

The Rand Framework for enhancing Operational Capabilities recommends that operators 

(unified and specified commanders or Service chiefs) should have the authority to determine and 

approve their own operational requirements and initiate Phase 0 within a Service. The Service 

would then produce system concept and acquisition plan packages for presentation to the 

Milestone I approval authority. However, this approach appears to lack a centralized control 

mechanism for early interservice coordination and would potentially lead to Service 

parochialism and/or redundancy of system concept (Phase 0) efforts among the Services. This 

process would leave it to the Milestone I approval authority to sort out the potential parochialism

and redundancy at the Milestone I decision point. This is the type of activity that invites Service 

objectives and parochialism to take precedence over national military objectives in development 

planning --a result which, as shown earlier, Congress is more wary and less tolerant of. As the 

Milestone 0 approval authority for all MNSs, the JROC would designate the appropriate Service 

or Agency responsible for Phase 0 and determine a funding source for Phase 0 activities but 

43 
would make no recommendations for system concepts that should be pursued in Phase 0. Note 

that in the current Milestone 0 process, the approval authority directs the study of a minimum set 

of materiel alternatives for Phase 0. This direction does not preclude the study of other 

alternatives. There is a danger, however, that after certain alternatives have been cited as 

potential solutions by the MNS originator and directed for study by the Milestone 0 approval 

authority, those alternatives might become sacrosanct as "the solution" at the expense of other 

possibly better solutions. The proposed process would avoid this danger since no potential 

solutions would be formulated prior to Phase 0. 

Under the proposed process, during the initial stages of phase 0, the designated Service or 

Agency would assemble a team comprised of operational planners, operators, technologists 

(scientists and engineers), and programmatic personnel (for cost estimates, acquisition schedules, 

and contracting). The operators and all other participants would then have ample opportunity to 

submit a spectrum of concept ideas for consideration in this forum specifically chartered and 

equipped for the purposes of concept formulation and evaluation. The Phase 0 team would then 

evaluate and adjust the potential concepts by making the appropriate cost-schedule-performance 

trade-offs, and narrow the field of concepts to one or a very few for Milestone I approval. Since 

the Phase 0 team would determine a projected acquisition program cost and schedule for each 

proposed concept, the Milestone I approval authority and ACAT are then readily determined 

based on sound concept planning and the current guidelines in the DOD 5000 series directives 

and instructions. Figure 7 provides a comparative depiction of the current and proposed 

processes. 

In summary, three fundamental and related changes would significantly improve 

development planning by eliminating premature solutions in the requirements generation 

44 
process: make the MNS a pure operational requirements document by removing the "Potential 

Materiel Alternatives" section; eliminate the early ACAT estimate which is currently submitted 

in conjunction with a MNS; and give the JROC Milestone 0 approval authority over all MNSS 

regardless of source or potential acquisition program costs. 

45 
Section 3 

The Case for Operational Planners Leading Phase 0 

Problems and Previously Proposed Remedies 

Among the Packard Commission's directed objectives was to review "the procedures for 

developing and fielding military systems incorporating new technologies in a timely fashion. "45

Toward this end, the Commission cited the two most common approaches of originating 

requirements: "user pull" and "technology push. "46 User pull refers to an operational 

requirement prompted by an inadequacy of current military systems to achieve a specified 

mission; technology push occurs when new technology affords a significant improvement in 

combat capability or efficiency (e.g., reduced operating costs). Unfortunately, according to the 

Commission, both approaches foster "goldplating" --"the inclusion of features that are desirable 

but whose cost far exceeds their real value." As mentioned earlier, the commission found that 

overstating the threat leads to goldplating since such overstatements thwart adequate trade off 

decisions between cost, schedule, and performance early in the system concepts generation 

process; specifically, in Phase 0.47 The lack of such trade-offs reflected a fundamental flaw in the 

charter of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) which advised the 

Secretary of Defense on new acquisition program decisions at Milestones I and II. Specifically, 

the DSARC was chartered to review if proposed system concepts would meet the user's

operational requirements and to determine if the estimated acquisition program costs and 

schedules were credible.48 The fundamental flaw was that the DSARC, or any other group, was 

not chartered to first challenge the essential nature of requirements (Do we really need a new 

weapon system?) and then to ensure adequate trade-offs among system performance, acquisition 

cost and program schedule (Can we build the new weapon system in a timely manner? Can we 

afford the new weapon system?) .49 The Commission therefore recommended the restructured 

46 
JRMB, co-chaired by the VCJCS and the USD(A), to replace the DSARC. As mentioned earlier, 

the new JRMB would provide a balanced combination of CINC requirements representation (i.e., 

performance, supportability), via the VCJCS, and programmatic expertise (i.e., cost, schedule), 

via the USD(A), that would hold much greater potential for challenging requirements and 

approving only those requirements that provide significant increases in combat capability or 

efficiency while avoiding goldplating. The JRMB would determine the "affordability" of

fulfilling a new requirement by making cost-performance trade-off and "make-or- buy" 

decisions; that is, whether to develop a new item or buy commercially available items "off the 

shelf. "50 Thus, according to the Commission, the restructured JRMB in conjunction with the 

Commission's other recommendations would significantly improve the efficiency of resource 

expenditures toward achieving the associated defense plans. The President and Congress agreed. 

Implementation and Current Status 

As recommended by the Packard Commission, NSDD 219 directed the restructured 

JRMB would be responsible for challenging and defining weapons requirements, selecting 

programs for development, and making early cost-performance trade-off decisions.51 The

Goldwater-Nichols Act specifically charged the CJCS with the responsibility of assessing 

operational requirements, a function which the VCJCS was to focus upon.52 The VCJCS and 

USD(A) positions instituted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act therefore served, among the other 

things, to help fulfill Congress's intent "to provide for more efficient use of defense resources" 

via the JRMB's charter to challenge operational requirements and strike a balance between 

operational and acquisition considerations in formulating and evaluating system concepts.53 The 

mechanism for this balance would be the early cost-schedule-performance trade-offs 

recommended by the Packard Commission and reflected in NSDD-219. 

47 
The JRMB is not mentioned in the DMR since, by then, the JRMB had evolved into the 

JROC and the DAB. The DMR specifically charged these two groups to challenge the validity of 

requirements and to ensure that sensible cost- schedule-performance trade-offs were achieved in 

the operational requirements, concepts, and acquisition processes.54 DODD 5000.1 reflects these 

roles and processes and also points out that the operators Operational Requirements Document 

(ORD), which specifies the minimum acceptable system performance requirements, constitutes 

the basis for cost-schedule-performance trade-offs.55 

The operational perspective, via CINC representation, is provided in both the JROC and 

the DAB by the VCJCS which serves as chairman and vice-chairman of the two respective 

groups. However, the CINCs (operators) could and should have more of a leading role in the 

system concepts generation and selection that occurs in Phase 0, Concept Exploration and 

Definition, vice the acquisition organizations that traditionally have the lead in this phase. 

Recommendations for Improvement

As shown earlier, giving the JROC Milestone a approval authority would further enhance 

the CINC's representation in the requirements generation process. In addition to this, the Rand 

Framework for Enhanced Operational Capabilities asserts that the operators should have a larger 

role in formulating, evaluating, and demonstrating new weapon concepts to meet operational 

needs. The Framework, therefore, proposes that "operators and operational planners" be the key 

players in Phase 0. According to the framework, operational planners should lead the Phase a 

activities while other operators would participate in Phase 0. In these leadership and participative 

roles, the operational planners and operators would be the key players that provide the 

operational perspectives to formulating, evaluating, and demonstrating new system concepts.56 

In the current process, the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) which the 

48 
USD(A) issues from the DAB's Milestone 0 approval designates one or more of the Military 

Departments (the Services) or Defense Agencies --not the Unified and Specified Commands --to 

conduct the system ;concept studies in Phase 0.57 The Military Departments or Defense Agencies 

then normally assign the system concept studies to their respective acquisition organizations such 

as the Air Force's Systems Command (to become the Air Materiel Command as of 1 July 1992). 

The operators participate in Phase 0 by providing an Operational Requirements Document 

(ORD) which specifies the minimum acceptable system requirements, i.e., performance 

characteristics, for each system concept that goes before the DAB for Milestone I approval.58

Additionally, DODI 5000.2 states, "The user or user's representative will participate with the 

lead organization(s) during [Phase 0] to assist in evaluating potential materiel alternatives and 

identifying opportunities for cost-schedule-performance trade-offs within and among the various 

alternatives."

59 

Should this be changed to put operational planners in the lead of Phase 0 efforts? From

the perspective of strengthening CINC representation in the concept generation process, the 

answer is "yes." Indeed, the operational perspective is most important for system concept 

generation since it bears most directly on the operational tasks and strategies to be achieved --the 

operators do bear the ultimate consequences of system concept decisions since they must use the 

end product. This is probably justification enough for an operational planner to lead system

concept activities; more justification is provided when considering the cost-scheduleperformance trade-offs that are the crux of Phase 0. 

Earlier, the question was posed if DODD 5000.1 should be changed so that the operator 

leads instead of "assists" in the Phase 0 effort. Actually, this question is somewhat misleading. 

The crux of phase 0 is really about a proper blending of operational, technical, and programmatic 

49 
(cost, schedule, and contracting) expertise to make balanced cost-schedule-performance tradeoffs in formulating and evaluating operational and system concepts. So the real question is will 

the operator being in the lead better facilitate achievement of sensible balance in making the 

critical trade- offs when formulating and evaluating system concept alternatives? The answer to 

this question is "yes" if, historically, cost and schedule have received the preponderance of 

consideration, thus upsetting the balance. This appears to be the case. 

As already mentioned, the operational perspective is the most important for formulating 

and evaluating system concepts to fulfill operational requirements. However, cost and schedule, 

not operational considerations, tend to dominate the planning and acquisition process.6O From

another point of view, the operator is concerned about the output --the new weapon system --

while the Services' bureaucratic planning and acquisition processes are more geared to 

controlling the inputs --money, time, and technology --which have tended to dominate. 61

Therefore, it appears reasonable that an operational planner leading a phase 0 team would be in 

better position to ensure proper cost-schedule-performance balances in the end product --system

concepts. Would this tip the scale too far toward performance? Possibly, but the operator must be 

sensitive to cost and schedule issues since it is the operating commands that must advocate new 

systems and associated budget requests in the programming and budgeting processes and the 

operators certainly want new capabilities in a timely manner. In short, development planning will 

be better with operational planners leading the Phase 0 system concept generation process. 

Furthermore, operational planners leading Phase 0, in conjunction with the previously covered 

improvements, would make development planning the purview of operators --as it should be. 

Operators bear the ultimate consequences of development planning in the form of fielded 

systems, and so should have the dominant role and responsibility in that planning process. 

50 
Notes Chapter 3 

1. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, A 

Quest for Excellence: Appendix: Final Report to the President (Washington D.C.: GPO, 

1986), 27. 

2. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, An 

Interim Report to the President (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986), 9. 

3. Ibid., 57-58 

4. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, A 

Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1986), 53. 

5. JCS Joint Secretariat, "Charter for the Joint Requirements and Management Board" (20 March 

1984), 3. The JRMB was chartered by the JCS in 1984 and consisted of the Vice Chief of 

each of the four military services with the Director of the Joint Staff as chairman. The JRMB 

was ì... to provide for early linkup with the front end of the acquisition process in order to 

review potential system new starts for determination of joint program feasibility.î 

6. Quest for Excellence, 53 

7. Interim Report, 16. 

8. Quest for Excellence, xxiii 

9. Quest for Excellence: Appendix, 37. 

10. DOD Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Program Procedures (Washington D.C.: GPO, 

23 February 1991), 2-1. 

11 Public Law 99-433 [H.R. 3622), Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986, 997; 1008-1009. 

12. Ibid., 997. 

13. Quest for Excellence, 35. 

14. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 

1987 (Washington D.C.: GPO, February 1986), 107. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of 

Defense, Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1988 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 

January 198?), 114, 117. Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the 

Congress: Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington D.C.: GPO, February 1988), 134, 137. 

15. DOD Directive 5000.1, Major and Non-major Defense Acquisition Programs (Washington 

D.C.: GPO, 23 February 1991), 2-4. 

16. Annual Report to the Congress: 1988, 117. 

17. Goldwater-Nichols 1005. 

18. Ibid, 1013. 

19. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Defense Management: Report to the President 

(Washington D.C.: GPO, July 1989), 7; 17-18. 

20 DODD 5000.1 (1991), 2-4. 

51 
21. Glenn A. Kent and William E. Simons, A Framework for Enhancing Operation Capabilities 

(Rand corporation Report, 1991. RAND/R-4043-AF), 37. 

22. Ibid., 39. 

23. DODI 5000.2 (1991),2-2. 

24. Framework for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, 38-41. 

25. Ibid., 38. 

26. DODD 5000.1 (1991), 2-5; DODI 5000.2 (1991), 2-2. 

27. DODI 5000.2, 3-6. 

28. Title 10, United States Code, Section 152, ìChairman: appointment; grade and rank,î64; 

Section 154, ìVice Chairman, ì65. 

29. Goldwater-Nichols, 1013. 

30. 00DD 5000.2. (1991), 1-2. 

31. For ROC, Air Force Regulation 57-1, Policies, Responsibilities and Procedures for Obtaining 

New and Improved operational Requirements, (Washington D.C.: DOD, 17 August 1971), 

4. For SON and MENS, Air Force Regulation 57-1,Statement of Operation Needs (SON) 

(Washington D.C.: DOD, 12 June 1979), 1. For SON and JSOR, Air Force Regulation 57-1, 

Operational Needs, Requirements and Concepts, (Washington D.C.: DOD, 7 October 1988), 

3. 

32. DODD 5000.1 (1991), 2-3. 

33. Lt Gen Glenn A. Kent, interview by author, 19 October 1991, Maxwell AFB, notes. Lt Gen 

Glenn A. Kent, USAF (Ret), now works at the Rand Corporation and is the primary author 

of the Frameworks for Defense planning and for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. 

34. DOD Manual 5000.2-M, Defense Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports 

(Washington D.C.: GPO, 23 February 1991), 2-1. 

35. Ibid. 

36. Ibid., 2-1-1. 

37. Ibid. 

38. DODD 5000.1 (1991), 2-3. 

39. DODI 5000.2 (1991), 3-2 -3-4. 

40. DODD 5000.1 (1991), 2-3. DODI 5000.2, 3-2. 

41. DODI 5000.2 (1991), 3-2. 

42. Ibid., 2-3. 

43. Ibid., 2-2. 

44. DODI 5000.2 (L991), 3-3, 13-D-l 

45. Quest for Excellence: Appendix, 27. 

52 
46. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard, Chairman, A 

Formula for Action: A Report to the President on Defense Acquisition (Washington D.C.: 

GPO, 1986), 6. 

47. Ibid., 21. 

48. DOD Directive 5000.1, Major System Acquisitions (Washington D.C.: GPO, 12 March 

1986), 13-15; DOD Instruction 5000.2, Major System Acquisition Procedure (Washington 

D.C.: GPO, 12 March 1986), 19. The DSARC was chaired by the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE) with the following permanent members: 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Logistics (ASD(A&L)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force 

Management and Personnel (ASD(FM&P)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller 

(ASD(C)), the Director, . Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the Director, Program

Analysis and Evaluation (DPA&E), the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) or designee, 

and each Secretary of the Military Departments or designee for major acquisition programs

involving their department. DSARC reviews were normally held at Milestones I and II. 

49. Quest for Excellence, 57. 

50. Formula for Action, 21. 

51. Quest for Excellence: Appendix, 37. 

52. Goldwater-Nichols, 1007-1008; 1013. 

53. Ibid., 944. 

54. Defense Management Report, 17-18. 

55. DODD 5000.1 (1991), 2-4,2-5. 

56. Framework for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, 20. 

57. DODD 5000.1 (1991), 2-5. 

58. DOD Manual 5000.2-M, 3-1. 

59. DODI 5000.2 (1991), 4-B-4. 

60. Congress, Senate, Staff Report to the committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: 

the Need for Change, 99th cong., 1st sess., 1985, Senate print 99-86, p. 495. 

61. Ibid., 503. 

53 
Chapter 4 

Conclusion 

In all, this paper advocates the implementation of six recommendations to improve the 

DOD's operational requirements and system concepts generation processes. These 

recommendations are interrelated in addressing the identified problem areas. As established in 

the previous chapters and shown in Table 3, each recommendation helps remedy one or two of 

the six problem areas. 

Institutionalizing the strategies-to-tasks methodology throughout the DOD defense 

planning process would complete the linkage between national objectives and defense budget 

requests. A comprehensive long-range plan based on strategies-to-tasks and maintained by the 

OJCS J-S directorate would project the objectives-budget link into the future and serve as a 

baseline for determining how international and domestic changes affect long-range military 

decisions and plans. Both of these improvements would significantly enhance the sound 

advocacy of defense budget requests for new weapon systems development and acquisition. 

For development planning, vesting the JROC with Milestone 0 approval authority would 

streamline the operational requirements and system concepts generation processes by eliminating 

the DAB approval layer for Milestone 0; it would improve CINC representation in the process 

since the JROC is chaired by the VCJCS. JROC Milestone 0 approval would also clearly place 

complete responsibility and authority for challenging operational requirements from a joint 

operational perspective in the hands of the JCS instead of dividing that responsibility and 

authority with the acquisition oriented DAB. 

54 
Table 3. - - Problems and Recommendations 

Defense Planning Development Planning 

Problem Areas: Inadequate 

object

ives ñ 

budge

t link 

Lack of 

lon

g ñ 

ran

ge 

pla

nni

ng 

Need 

strea

m ñ 

lining 

& 

deline

ation 

Lack of 

CINC 

represent

ation 

Premature 

solution

s to 

unappro

ved 

require

ments

Poor 

cost/sched

/perf

trade-off 

Recommendation

Institutionalize 

Strategies-toTasks 

X

OJCS J-5 master 

Road map 

X

Give the JROC 

MS-0 

approval 

authority 

X X

Make MNS pure 

operational 

requirements 

w/o potential 

solutions

X X

JROC review of 

all MNSs ñ 

no ACAT 

estimates 

X X

Give operíl 

planners 

Phase 0 

team lead 

X X

Eliminating "Potential Materiel Alternatives" from the MNS format would make the 

MNS a pure operational requirements document. This would preclude the need for the MNS 

55 
originator to prematurely consider alternative system concepts before a requirement is approved 

at Milestone O. It would also reduce the possibility of premature concepts becoming accepted 

solutions prior to the start of Phase 0 during which other alternatives may have been deemed 

more viable. And since Phase 0 constitutes the designated time and the most complete forum for 

formulating and evaluating alternative system concepts, making the MNS a pure requirements 

document accommodates a clear delineation between the operational requirements process (preMilestone 0) and system concepts process (post-Milestone 0) and leaves Milestone 0 as a pure 

requirements approval event. The operational requirements process should direct JROC review 

of all MNSs regardless of the potential cost of associated future acquisition programs. This 

would eliminate the need for pre-Milestone 0 ACAT estimates which prompt MNS originators to 

prematurely consider (before Phase 0) materiel alternatives. Eliminating the need for premature 

ACAT estimates would also contribute to a clear delineation between the requirements and 

concepts processes. Finally, CINC representation in the operational requirements generation 

process would be increased since the JROC would review all MNSs instead of just those 

estimated to result in the largest major acquisition programs. 

Finally, giving operational planners the lead of Phase 0 teams would increase the CINC

representation in the system concept formulation and evaluation process. Since the operator must 

be sensitive to cost and schedule issues as well as performance, operational planner leadership of 

Phase 0 also holds the potential for facilitating better cost-schedule-performance trade-off 

decisions that are the crux of Phase 0. It would also be the last step needed to make development 

planning the purview of operators just as it should be. 

The implementation of these recommendations holds promise for significantly improving 

the nation's defense planning (and development planning) so as to better create a defense posture 

56 
that is appropriate in type, quality, and quantity to meet the nation's military needs of the future. 

These recommendations warrant implementation. 

57 
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59