(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

DOLAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 04–848. Argued November 7, 2005—Decided February 22, 2006 

Under the Postal Reorganization Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(FTCA) applies to “tort claims arising out of [Postal Service] activities.” 39 U. S. C. §409(c). The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign immunity in certain cases involving negligence committed by federal 

employees in the course of their employment, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), 

making the United States liable “in the same manner and to the 

same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” §2674. 

However, the sovereign immunity bar remains as to, inter alia, “[a]ny 

claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of 

letters or postal matter.” §2680(b). Consequently, the United States 

may be liable if postal workers commit torts under local law, but not 

for claims defined by the exception. Petitioner Dolan filed an FTCA 

suit against the Postal Service for injuries she suffered when she 

tripped and fell over mail left on her porch by postal employees. The 

District Court dismissed the suit, and the Third Circuit affirmed, 

both concluding that, although the FTCA generally waives sovereign 

immunity as to federal employees’ torts, Dolan’s claims were barred 

by §2680(b)’s exception. 

Held: Because the postal exception is inapplicable in this case, Dolan’s 

claim may go forward. This Court assumes that under the applicable 

state law a person injured by tripping over a package or bundle negligently left by a private party would have a cause of action for damages. The question is whether §2860(b)’s exception preserves sovereign immunity in such a case. Considered in isolation, “negligent 

transmission” could embrace a wide range of acts. However, interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the statute’s purpose and context. Here, both 

context and precedent require reading the phrase so that it does not 
2 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

Syllabus 

go beyond negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address. Starting with context, “negligent transmission” follows the terms “loss” and “miscarriage,” which 

limit the reach of transmission. Mail is “lost” if it is destroyed or 

misplaced and “miscarried” if it goes to the wrong address. Since 

both terms refer to failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in 

a timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if “negligent 

transmission” swept far more broadly to include injuries caused by 

postal employees but involving neither failure to transmit mail nor 

damage to its contents. This interpretation is supported by Kosak v. 

United States, 465 U. S. 848, where this Court noted that one of the 

FTCA’s purposes was to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents involving postal 

trucks delivering—and thus “transmitting”—the mail. Nothing in 

the statutory text supports a distinction between negligent driving, 

which the Government claims relates only circumstantially to the 

mail, and Dolan’s accident, which was caused by the mail itself. In 

both cases the postal employee acts negligently while transmitting 

mail. In addition, focusing on whether the mail itself caused the injury would yield anomalies, perhaps making liability turn on, e.g., 

whether a mail sack was empty or full. It is more likely that Congress intended to retain immunity only for injuries arising because 

mail either fails to arrive or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at 

the wrong address, since such harms are primarily identified with 

the Postal Service’s function of transporting mail. The Government 

claims that, given the Postal Service’s vast operations, Congress 

must have intended to insulate delivery-related torts from liability, 

but §2680(b)’s specificity indicates otherwise. Had Congress intended 

to preserve immunity for all delivery-related torts, it could have used 

sweeping language similar to that used in other FTCA exceptions, 

e.g., §2860(i). Furthermore, losses of the type for which immunity is 

retained under §2680(b) are at least to some degree avoidable or 

compensable through postal registration and insurance. The Government raises the specter of frivolous slip-and-fall claims inundating

the Postal Service, but that is a risk shared by any business making 

home deliveries. Finally, the general rule that a sovereign immunity 

waiver “will be strictly construed . . . in favor of the sovereign,” Lane 

v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192, is “unhelpful” in the FTCA context, 

where “unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the 

risk of defeating” the central purpose of the statute, Kosak, supra, at 

853, n. 9, which “waives the Government’s immunity from suit in 

sweeping language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 

547. Pp. 4–11. 

377 F. 3d 285, reversed and remanded. 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Syllabus 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. 

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., took no part in the 

consideration or decision of the case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–848 

BARBARA DOLAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

POSTAL SERVICE ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

[February 22, 2006] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Each day, according to the Government’s submissions 

here, the United States Postal Service delivers some 660 

million pieces of mail to as many as 142 million delivery 

points. This case involves one such delivery point— 

petitioner Barbara Dolan’s porch—where mail left by 

postal employees allegedly caused her to trip and fall. 

Claiming injuries as a result, Dolan filed a claim for administrative relief from the Postal Service. When her 

claim was denied, she and her husband (whose claim for 

loss of consortium the Dolans later conceded was barred 

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies) filed suit 

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting that the Postal Service’s 

negligent placement of mail at their home subjected the 

Government to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§1346(b)(1), 2674. The District Court 

dismissed Dolan’s suit, and the Court of Appeals for the 

Third Circuit affirmed, 377 F. 3d 285 (2004). Both courts 

concluded that, although the FTCA generally waives 

sovereign immunity as to federal employees’ torts, Dolan’s 
2 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

Opinion of the Court 

claims were barred by an exception to that waiver, 28 

U. S. C. §2680(b). We disagree and hold that Dolan’s suit 

may proceed. 

I 

Under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. §101 et 

seq., the Postal Service is “an independent establishment

of the executive branch of the Government of the United 

States,” §201. Holding a monopoly over carriage of letters, 

the Postal Service has “significant governmental powers,” 

including the power of eminent domain, the authority to 

make searches and seizures in the enforcement of laws 

protecting the mails, the authority to promulgate postal

regulations, and, subject to the Secretary of State’s supervision, the power to enter international postal agreements. 

See Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540 

U. S. 736, 741 (2004) (discussing 39 U. S. C. §§101, 401, 407, 

601–606). Consistent with this status, the Postal Service 

enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver. See 

ibid.; cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a 

waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit”). 

Although the Postal Reorganization Act generally

“waives the immunity of the Postal Service from suit by

giving it the power ‘to sue and be sued in its official

name,’ ” Flamingo Industries, supra, at 741 (quoting 39 

U. S. C. §401(1)), the statute also provides that the FTCA 

“shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the 

Postal Service,” §409(c).

The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign immunity in two 

different sections of the United States Code. The first 

confers federal-court jurisdiction in a defined category of 

cases involving negligence committed by federal employees

in the course of their employment. This jurisdictional 

grant covers: 

“claims against the United States, for money dam-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

ages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury 

or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused 

by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 

employee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, 

would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the 

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 

28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1). 

As to claims falling within this jurisdictional grant, the 

FTCA, in a second provision, makes the United States liable 

“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 

individual under like circumstances,” though not “for 

interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”

§2674; see generally United States v. Olson, 546 U. S. ___ , 

___ (2005) (slip op., at 1). 

The FTCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for 

certain categories of claims (13 in all). If one of the exceptions applies, the bar of sovereign immunity remains. The 

13 categories of exempted claims are set forth in 28 

U. S. C. §2680, and the relevant subsection for our purposes, pertaining to postal operations, is §2680(b). It 

states: 

“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of 

this title shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising out 

of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of

letters or postal matter.” 

As a consequence, the United States may be liable if postal 

employees commit torts under local law, but not for claims 

defined by this exception.

This was the provision relied upon by the District Court 

and Court of Appeals to dismiss Dolan’s suit. The Court of 

Appeals’ decision created a conflict with a decision of the 

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Raila v. 

United States, 355 F. 3d 118, 121 (CA2 2004). We granted 
4 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

Opinion of the Court 

certiorari. 544 U. S. ___ (2005). 

II 

We assume that under the applicable state law a person 

injured by tripping over a package or bundle of papers 

negligently left on the porch of a residence by a private

party would have a cause of action for damages. See 28 

U. S. C. §§1346(b)(1), 2674. The question is whether, 

when mail left by the Postal Service causes the slip and 

fall, the §2680(b) exception for “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter” preserves 

sovereign immunity despite the FTCA’s more general 

statements of waiver. 

If considered in isolation, the phrase “negligent transmission” could embrace a wide range of negligent acts 

committed by the Postal Service in the course of delivering 

mail, including creation of slip-and-fall hazards from 

leaving packets and parcels on the porch of a residence. 

After all, in ordinary meaning and usage, transmission of 

the mail is not complete until it arrives at the destination. 

See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 

2429 (1971) (defining “transmission” as “an act, process, or 

instance of transmitting” and “transmit” as “to cause to go 

or be conveyed to another person or place”). In large part

this inference—transmission includes delivery—led the 

District Court and Court of Appeals to rule for the Government. See 377 F. 3d, at 288; App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a– 

6a. The definition of words in isolation, however, is not 

necessarily controlling in statutory construction. A word 

in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of

its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word or 

phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, 

considering the purpose and context of the statute, and 

consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the 

analysis. Here, we conclude both context and precedent 

require a narrower reading, so that “negligent transmis-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

sion” does not go beyond negligence causing mail to be lost 

or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong 

address. See Raila, supra, at 121 (holding the postal 

exception covers “damages and delay of the postal material itself and consequential damages therefrom”). The 

phrase does not comprehend all negligence occurring in 

the course of mail delivery. 

Starting with context, the words “negligent transmission” in §2680(b) follow two other terms, “loss” and “miscarriage.” Those terms, we think, limit the reach of 

“transmission.” “[A] word is known by the company it 

keeps”—a rule that “is often wisely applied where a word 

is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of 

unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. 

G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Dole 

v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990) (“[W]ords grouped in 

a list should be given related meaning” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Here, as both parties acknowledge, mail 

is “lost” if it is destroyed or misplaced and “miscarried” if 

it goes to the wrong address. Since both those terms refer 

to failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a 

timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if 

“negligent transmission” swept far more broadly to include 

injuries like those alleged here—injuries that happen to be 

caused by postal employees but involve neither failure to

transmit mail nor damage to its contents. 

Our interpretation would be less secure were it not for a 

precedent we deem to have decisive weight here. We refer 

to Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984). In Kosak, 

an art collector alleged in an FTCA suit that artworks he 

owned were damaged when the United States Customs 

Service seized and detained them. Id., at 849–850. The 

question was whether the Government retained immunity 

based on §2680(c), a provision that has since been 

amended but at the time covered: 
6 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

Opinion of the Court 

“[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or 

collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention 

of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs 

or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.” Id., at 

852, n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In its opinion concluding the exception did apply and thus 

that the United States retained sovereign immunity, the 

Court gave specific consideration to the postal exception. 

In a part of the opinion central to its holding, the Court 

contrasted what it called the “generality of §2680(c)” with

the “specificity of §2680(b),” id., at 855. The Court observed: 

“One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort 

Claims Act was to waive the Government’s immunity 

from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents in which employees of the Postal System were

at fault. In order to ensure that §2680(b), which governs torts committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress

was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the 

provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct

for which the Government was not assuming financial 

responsibility—namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter’— 

thereby excluding, by implication, negligent handling 

of motor vehicles.” Ibid. 

In the present case neither party suggests Kosak’s conclusion regarding negligent operation of postal motor

vehicles should be ignored as dictum. In light of Kosak’s 

discussion, we cannot interpret the phrase “negligent 

transmission” in §2680(b) to cover all negligence in the 

course of mail delivery. Although postal trucks may well 

be delivering—and thus transmitting—mail when they 

collide with other vehicles, Kosak indicates the United 

States, nonetheless, retains no immunity. 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Seeking to distinguish postal auto accidents from Dolan’s fall, the Government argues that negligent driving 

relates only circumstantially to the mail, whereas Dolan’s 

accident was caused by the mail itself. Nothing in the

statutory text supports this distinction. Quite the contrary, if placing mail so as to create a slip-and-fall risk 

constitutes “negligent transmission,” the same should be 

true of driving postal trucks in a manner that endangers 

others on the road. In both cases the postal employee acts 

negligently while transmitting mail. In addition, as the 

Second Circuit recognized and as the Government acknowledged at oral argument, focusing on whether the 

mail itself caused the injury would yield anomalies, perhaps making liability turn on whether a mail sack causing 

a slip-and-fall was empty or full, or whether a pedestrian 

sideswiped by a passing truck was hit by the side-view 

mirror or a dangling parcel. See Raila, 355 F. 3d, at 122– 

123. 

We think it more likely that Congress intended to retain 

immunity, as a general rule, only for injuries arising, 

directly or consequentially, because mail either fails to 

arrive at all or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at 

the wrong address. Illustrative instances of the exception’s operation, then, would be personal or financial

harms arising from nondelivery or late delivery of sensitive materials or information (e.g., medicines or a mortgage foreclosure notice) or from negligent handling of a 

mailed parcel (e.g., shattering of shipped china). Such 

harms, after all, are the sort primarily identified with the 

Postal Service’s function of transporting mail throughout

the United States. 

Resisting this conclusion, the Government emphasizes 

the Postal Service’s vast operations—the 660 million daily 

mailings and 142 million delivery points mentioned at the 

outset. See Brief for Respondents 36. As delivery to

mailboxes and doorsteps is essential to this nationwide 
8 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

Opinion of the Court 

undertaking, Congress must have intended, the Government asserts, to insulate delivery-related torts from liability. If, however, doorstep delivery is essential to the postal 

enterprise, then driving postal trucks is no less so. And in 

any event, while it is true “[t]he §2680 exceptions are 

designed to protect certain important governmental functions and prerogatives from disruption,” Molzof v. United 

States, 502 U. S. 301, 311 (1992), the specificity of §2680(b), 

see Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855, indicates that Congress did 

not intend to immunize all postal activities.

Other FTCA exceptions paint with a far broader brush. 

They cover, for example: “[a]ny claim for damages caused 

by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system,” 28 U. S. C. §2680(i); “[a]ny 

claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of 

war,” §2680(j); “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” 

§2680(k); “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the 

Tennessee Valley Authority,” §2680(l), or “the Panama 

Canal Company,” §2680(m); and “[a]ny claim arising from 

the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives,” §2680(n). Had 

Congress intended to preserve immunity for all torts 

related to postal delivery—torts including hazardous mail 

placement at customer homes—it could have used similarly sweeping language in §2680(b). By instead “carefully 

delineat[ing]” just three types of harm (loss, miscarriage, 

and negligent transmission), see Kosak, supra, at 855, 

Congress expressed the intent to immunize only a subset 

of postal wrongdoing, not all torts committed in the course 

of mail delivery. 

Further supporting our interpretation, losses of the type 

for which immunity is retained under §2680(b) are at least 

to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal 

registration and insurance. See United States Postal 

Service, Domestic Mail Manual pt. 609.1.1 (Nov. 10, 2005), 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/609.htm (as 

visited Jan. 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case 

file) (allowing indemnity claims for loss or damage of

“insured, collect on delivery (COD), registered with postal 

insurance, or Express Mail”); 39 CFR §111.1 (2005) (incorporating by reference the Domestic Mail Manual). The 

same was true when Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946. 

See 39 U. S. C. §245 (1940 ed. and Supp. V) (setting rates 

and conditions for mail insurance); 39 U. S. C. §381 (1946 

ed.) (“For the greater security of valuable mail matter the 

Postmaster General may establish a uniform system of 

registration, and as a part of such system he may provide 

rules under which the senders or owners of any registered 

matter shall be indemnified for loss, rifling, or damage 

thereof in the mails . . .”). As Kosak explains, one purpose

of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid “extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were 

already available,” 465 U. S., at 858—an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to claims of mail damage 

or delay covered by postal registration and insurance. 

While the Government suggests other injuries falling 

outside the FTCA are also subject to administrative relief, 

even assuming that is true the provision the Government 

cites permits only discretionary relief, not an automatic 

remedy like postal insurance. See 39 U. S. C. §2603 (indicating the Postal Service “may adjust and settle” personalinjury and property-damage claims “not cognizable” under 

the FTCA’s administrative relief provision); see also 31 

U. S. C. §224c (1940 ed.) (indicating that “[w]hen any 

damage is done to person or property by or through the 

operation of the Post Office Department . . . the Postmaster General is invested with power to adjust and settle any 

claim for such damage when his award for such damage in 

any case does not exceed $500”); Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, §424(a), 60 Stat. 846–847 (repealing 

§224c as to negligence claims cognizable under the FTCA). 
10 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

Opinion of the Court 

The Government raises the specter of frivolous slip-andfall claims inundating the Postal Service. It is true that, 

in addition to other considerations we have identified, 

Kosak describes “avoiding exposure of the United States to 

liability for excessive or fraudulent claims” as a principal 

aim of the FTCA exceptions, 465 U. S., at 858. Slip-andfall liability, however, to the extent state tort law imposes 

it, is a risk shared by any business that makes home 

deliveries. Given that “negligent transmission,” viewed in 

context and in light of Kosak, cannot sweep as broadly as

the Government claims, ordinary protections against 

frivolous litigation must suffice here, just as they do in the 

case of motor vehicle collisions. 

Finally, it should be noted that this case does not implicate the general rule that “a waiver of the Government’s 

sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of 

its scope, in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 

187, 192 (1996). As Kosak explains, this principle is “unhelpful” in the FTCA context, where “unduly generous 

interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating 

the central purpose of the statute,” 465 U. S., at 853, n. 9, 

which “waives the Government’s immunity from suit in 

sweeping language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 

U. S. 543, 547 (1951); see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (observing “[w]e have on 

occasion narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity where that was consistent with Congress’ 

clear intent, as in the context of the ‘sweeping language’ of 

the [FTCA]” (quoting Yellow Cab Co., supra, at 547)). 

Hence, “the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. §2680 is to 

identify ‘those circumstances which are within the words 

and reason of the exception’—no less and no more.” Kosak, supra, at 853, n. 9 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 

346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). Having made that inquiry here,

we conclude Dolan’s claims fall outside §2680(b). 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

The postal exception is inapplicable, and Dolan’s claim

falls within the FTCA’s general waiver of federal sovereign 

immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–848 

BARBARA DOLAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

POSTAL SERVICE ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

[February 22, 2006] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the Government’s sovereign immunity for civil suits seeking 

money damages 

“for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or 

death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 

within the scope of his office or employment, under 

circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance

with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), 

save several exceptions found in §2680. As relevant here, 

Congress reserved to the Government its sovereign immunity respecting “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” §2680(b) (postal exception).

Petitioner Barbara Dolan claims to have suffered personal injuries when she tripped over letters, packages, and 

periodicals that an employee of the United States Postal 

Service (Postal Service) negligently left on her porch. 

Today, the Court concludes that Dolan’s lawsuit may

proceed because her claim does not fall within the exception. I disagree. Dolan’s claim arises out of the Postal 
2 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Service’s “negligent transmission” of mail and is thus 

covered by the terms of the postal exception. Even if the 

exception is ambiguous, this Court’s cases require that 

ambiguities as to the scope of the Government’s waiver of 

immunity be resolved in its favor. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

The text of the postal exception, and every term therein, 

should be ascribed its ordinary meaning. See FDIC v. 

Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 477 (1994) (noting that we interpret 

a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary meaning 

when that term is not defined in the statute). The term in 

controversy here is “negligent transmission.” The crux of 

my disagreement with the majority is its failure to assign

the term “transmission” its plain meaning. That term is 

defined as the “[a]ct, operation, or process, of transmitting.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2692 (2d 

ed. 1934, as republished 1945). “Transmit” is defined as, 

inter alia, “[t]o send or transfer from one person or place 

to another; to forward by rail, post, wire, etc., . . . [t]o 

cause . . . to pass or be conveyed.” Id., at 2692–2693. 

There is no cause to conclude that Congress was unaware 

of the ordinary definition of the terms “transmission” and 

“transmit” when it enacted the FTCA and the postal exception in 1946. Nor is there textual indication that Congress intended to deviate from the ordinary meaning of 

these terms.1 Accordingly, I would interpret the term 

—————— 

1 In fact, this reading is supported by Congress’ routine definitional 

use of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” in both criminal and 

civil postal statutes to refer to the handling, processing, and delivery of 

mail to a final destination. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 43, §6, 5 

Stat. 734 (respecting deputy postmasters authorized “to transmit to any 

person or place” official letters or packages free of charge); 18 U. S. C. 

§§1696(b) and (c) (referring to unlawful “transmission” of letters); 

§§1716(b), (c), (d), and (e) (regulating and proscribing “transmission in 

the mails” of dangerous items (e.g., medicines) except when the “trans-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

“transmission” consistent, with its ordinary meaning, see 

ante, at 4, and conclude that the postal exception exempts 

the Government from liability for any claim arising out of 

the negligent delivery of the mail to a Postal Service patron, including Dolan’s slip-and-fall claim.

Rejecting the “ordinary meaning and usage” of “negligent transmission,” the majority concludes that the term 

covers only injury arising “directly or consequentially” 

from “negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, 

in damaged condition, or at the wrong address.” Ante, at 

5, 7. Thus, in the majority’s view, “negligent transmission” covers direct injury to the mail as well as personal 

injury arising from injury to the mail, but does not cover 

personal injury that does not arise from damage to the 

mail. For example, in the majority’s view, if a mail carrier 

negligently drops a mailbox containing glassware on a 

patron’s doorstep, causing the contents to shatter, and the 

patron later injures himself while attempting to handle 

the shards of glass, the postal exception would bar a claim

for damages for the destroyed item as well as a related 

claim for personal injury. That view is correct, as far as it 

goes. However, under the majority’s view, if the mail 

carrier negligently places a heap of mail on a patron’s 

front porch and the patron trips and falls over the mail as 

he walks out of his front door, his personal injury claim 

may go forward. There is no basis in the text for the line 

drawn by the majority. Indeed, the majority’s view is at 

odds with the broad language of the postal exception, 

which expressly applies to “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . 

negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” 

§2680(b) (emphasis added).

The majority rationalizes its view by concluding that the 

terms “loss” and “miscarriage” necessarily limit the term 

“transmission.” Ante, at 5. Applying the rule of noscitur a 

—————— 

mission” is “to,” “from,” or “between” specified individuals or entities).
4 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

sociis—that a word is known by the company it keeps—the 

majority reasons that because both “loss” and “miscarriage” refer to “failings in the postal obligation to deliver 

mail in a timely manner to the right address, it would be 

odd if ‘negligent transmission’ swept more broadly.” Ibid. 

But there is nothing “odd” about interpreting the term 

“negligent transmission” to encompass more ground than

the decidedly narrower terms “loss” and “miscarriage.” 

The rule of noscitur a sociis is intended to prevent ascribing to one word a meaning so expansive that it conflicts with other terms of the provision in a manner that 

gives “ ‘unintended breadth to an Act of Congress.’ ” 

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (quoting 

Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961)). 

That rule, however, “does not require [the Court] to construe every term in a series narrowly because of the meaning given to just one of the terms,” where, as here, nothing 

in the text demands a more limited construction. Gustafson, supra, at 586 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (emphasis

deleted). Indeed, to read Congress’ use of narrow terms in a 

list as limiting the meaning of broad terms in the same list 

“would defy common sense; doing so would prevent Congress from giving effect to expansive words in a list whenever they are combined with one word with a more restricted meaning.” Id., at 587. 

Nor does this Court’s opinion in Kosak v. United States, 

465 U. S. 848 (1984), support the majority’s narrow construction of the postal exception. In Kosak, this Court 

suggested that the postal exception does not apply to suits 

arising from the negligent handling of motor vehicles by 

Postal Service employees. Specifically, the Court stated 

that: 

“One of the principal purposes of the [FTCA] was to 

waive the Government’s immunity from liability for 

injuries resulting from auto accidents . . . . In order to 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

ensure that §2680(b) . . . did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most 

concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision 

carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which 

the Government was not assuming financial responsibility—namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent

transmission of letters or postal matter’. . . Id., at 855 

(emphasis added). 

That observation has no import beyond the recognition 

that the postal exception—whatever its scope may be— 

was carefully crafted so as not to undermine an undisputed principal purpose of the FTCA—to waive the Government’s immunity for injuries arising from auto accidents. It says nothing further about the acts Congress 

intended to capture when enacting the postal exception, 

and, thus, is unremarkable for purposes of construing the 

exception. 2 

—————— 

2 In an attempt to reconcile Kosak with this case, the majority argues 

that “one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid ‘extending 

coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already 

available,’ . . . an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to 

some claims of mail damage or delay covered by postal registration and 

insurance.” Ante, at 9 (quoting Kosak, 465 U. S., at 858). The majority, 

however, ignores the fact that, in most cases, such insurance covers 

only the sender, not the recipient, in which case recipients have no 

means of obtaining compensation for loss or damage to money, gifts, 

heirlooms, valuable papers, delayed medicine, or time-sensitive documents. See United States Postal Service, Mailing Standards of the 

United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual, §§609.4.3(f) and 

(ae), pp. 1129, 1130 (rev. Jan. 6, 2005). The majority’s justification also 

fails to take into account the fact that postal patrons cannot insure 

against the loss of items of sentimental value. See id., §609.4.3, generally. With a more accurate depiction of registration and insurance 

coverage in hand, the Government’s claim that, like injuries arising 

from negligent transmission of mail, other injuries outside the reach of 

the FTCA are also amenable to administrative relief is not so easily 

dismissed. Ante, at 9. Specifically, 39 U. S. C. §2603, as the Government argues, provides for the settlement of claims, within the discre-
6 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

THOMAS, J., dissenting

 Even if Kosak does inform the outcome in this case, it 

does not support the majority’s interpretation of “negligent 

transmission.” As discussed above, the majority does not 

purport to limit the type of negligent act that may fall

under the postal exception; rather it limits the scope of the 

exception based on the type of consequence that the negligent act causes (damage to the mail, late delivery, etc.) 

But Kosak’s exclusion of the act of negligent driving— 

regardless of whether the consequence of that act is damage to the mail or injury to a person—from the scope of the 

postal exception implies, if anything, that the Kosak Court 

envisioned discrete acts as being covered, independently of

the nature of their consequences. See 465 U. S., at 855 

(excluding “negligent handling of motor vehicles” from the 

“types of misconduct” for which liability is barred by the 

postal exception). As such, Kosak does not support an 

interpretation of “negligent transmission” based upon the 

type of injury that is caused by the Postal Service’s negligent handling of the mail. 

II 

Assuming that the postal exception is ambiguous, as the

majority suggests, see ante, at 4–5, settled principles 

governing the interpretation of waivers of sovereign immunity require us to rule in favor of the Government. 

A court may only exercise jurisdiction over the Government pursuant to “a clear statement from the United 

States waiving sovereign immunity . . . together with a 

claim falling within the terms of the waiver.” United 

States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472 

—————— 

tion of the United States, for injuries caused by the Postal Service that 

are not otherwise cognizable, which would include claims like Dolan’s. 

The discretionary nature of such settlements does not alter the fact 

that §2603 undermines the Court’s position that the purported unavailability of administrative recovery for claims such as Dolan’s 

supports its proposed interpretation. 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

(2003). “[A] waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in 

favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192 

(1996). These settled legal principles apply not only to the 

interpretation of the scope of the Government’s waiver of 

immunity, but also to the interpretation of the scope of 

any exceptions to that waiver. See ibid. (explaining that,

consistent with rules of construction respecting waivers of 

sovereign immunity, ambiguities created by conditions on 

and qualifications of the waiver must be strictly construed 

in favor of sovereign immunity).

Thus, the majority is incorrect to conclude that “this 

case does not implicate the general rule that ‘a waiver of

the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly 

construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’ ” 

Ante, at 10. As this case clearly illustrates, the Government’s amenability to suit can only be ascertained after 

construing both the waiver of immunity and its exceptions. The well-established rationale for construing a 

waiver in favor of the sovereign’s immunity, thus, applies

with equal force to the construction of an exception to that 

waiver. Accordingly, even if I were to conclude that the 

majority’s interpretation of “negligent transmission” were 

as plausible as my own, I would still resolve this case in 

favor of the Government’s sovereign immunity as mandated by our canons of construction.3 

—————— 

3There is no canon of construction that counsels in favor of construing the ambiguity against the Government. Although we have “on 

occasion narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity,” we have done so in cases where Congress plainly waived the 

Government’s immunity for the particular claim at issue, and the only

question before the Court was the permissibility of the form of the suit. 

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (citing 

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951), and United 

States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366 (1949)). In cases 

where, as here, the question whether a particular claim is subject to an 

exception is disputed, we have construed FTCA exceptions broadly to 
8 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

* * * 

For these reasons, I would hold that a tort claim for 

personal injury arising out of negligent delivery of mail to

a postal patron is barred by 28 U. S. C. §2680(b), the 

postal exception. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

—————— 

preclude claims for actions Congress intended to except from the

FTCA’s general waiver of immunity. See Dalehite v. United States, 346

U. S. 15, 31 (1953); United States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807 (1976); 

Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984).