THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF TEKAS 

AUNTIN. - 16711 

July 10, 1974 

The Honorable Norman Manning 

County Attorney 

Williamson County 

Georgetown, Texas 78626 

Opinion No. H- 343 

Re: Whether a district court 

may designate the county 

attorney as registry of the 

court to receive child rupport 

paymentr. 

Dear Mr. Manning: 

You have requested our opinion an to whether a district court 

may designate anyone other than the district clerk am registry of the court 

to receive child support payments and, if so, whether the county attorney 

may be so designated. You alro ask whether a county attorney has any 

duty to act under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 5 0 21.01 

et meq.,Family Code, V.T. C.S. 

In a judicial district or county not having a domestic relation0 

court, the district court generally exercises jurisdiction in cages of 

divorce and in other cases which may affect the parent-child relationship. Articles 1906, 1907, V. T. C.S., and see §ll.Ol, Family Code, 

V. T. C. S. Section 14.05 of the Family Code provides that in such cases 

the court may order either or both parents to make periodic payments or 

a lump-sum payment, or both, for the support of the child until he is 18 

years of age “in the manner and to the persons specified by the court in 

the decree. I’ This provision confers broad discretion upon the district 

court in determining to whom child support payments will be made, and 

under it the court ,may appoint someone other than the district clerk to 

;;;;;-*-‘; such payments. 

You ask whether the county attorney could be appointed in that 

capacity to receive child support payments. The Texas Constitution in 

p. 1601 
’ 

The Honorable Norman Manning page 2 (H-343) 

Art. 5. s 21 provides that where a county is included in a district in which 

there is a district attorney the respective duties of the district attorney 

and county attorney are to be regulated. by the Legislature. The courtn 

have taken the position that by virtue of this provision the powers of a 

county attorney are strictly limited and thata county attorney has no 

authority to perform an act in respect to which no duty has been made to 

devolve upon him by the Legislature. Duncan v. State, 67 S. W. 903 (Tex. 

Civ. App. 1902, no writ): see also A.B. C. Rendering, Inc. v. State, 342 

S. W. 2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App., Houston, 1961, no writ) and Wexler v. State, 

241 S. W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App., Galveston, 1922, no writ). 

The primary duty assigned to county attorneys by the Legislature 

is to represent the state in all criminal proceedings under examination 

in courts in their respective counties below the grade of district court. 

Art. 2.02, V. T. C. C. P. As a rerult the county attorney ordinarily is 

obligated to represent the state in a prosecution for the class A mirdemeanor of criminal nonsupport. See 0 25.05, V. T. P. C. 

But to our knowledge there is no statute or other law which gives 

the county attorney the duty to receive child support payments ordered by 

a court under 314.05 of the Family Code. Since the legislature has never 

given the county attorney the duty to receive such payments, it is our 

opinion that he is not authorized to do so and that a district court may 

not confer this rerponsibility upon him. 

Your third and final question is whether a county attorney has any 

duty to act under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 

§ 0 21.01 et seq., Family Code, V. T. C. S. In Attorney General Opinion 

C-636 (1966) this office held that when there was also a district attorney 

in his county a county attorney had no duty to act as prosecuting attorney 

under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act as then written. 

But in 1973 the 63rd Legislature enacted a new version of that Act which 

changed the definition of “prosecuting attorney” upon which that opinion 

was founded. Under the current version of the Act “prosecuting attorney” 

is defined in 5 21.03 (15) as “the criminal district attorney or county attorney, 

or the district attorney where there is no criminal district attorney or 

county attorney. ” Thus, when there is no criminal district attorney, as in 

p, 1602 
The Honorable Norman Manning page 3 -(H-343) 

Williamson County, the county attorney now bar the duty to act as “proaecuting attorney” in proceedings brought under the Uniform Reciprocal 

Enforcement of Support Act. See Seer. 21.26 and 21.33, Family Code, 

V. T. C. S. 

SUMMARY 

While 0 14.05 of the Family Code confera broad 

discretion upon the district court in determining to 

whom child support payments will be made, the court 

may not require the county attorney in that capacity 

to receive such payments. In proceedings under the 

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act the 

county attorney of Williamson County har the duty to 

act as “prosecuting attorney. ” 

Very t?y& 

f 

JOHN L. HILL 

Attorney General of Texas 

DAVID M. KENDALL. Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 1603