NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0793n.06 F iled: October 24, 2006 No. 05-6587 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. STE WART SI MMO NS, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R

T H E M ID D LE DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

B EF OR E: ME RRI TT , SU TT ON , a nd GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Def endant- appellant St ewa

rt Simm ons pleade d g uilty to one count of posse ssion with int ent to dis tr ibute mor e tha

n 50 0 g ra ms of c oc a ine in vio latio n of 21 U. S.C. § 84 1( a )( 1)
. He no w a pp e a ls the orde r of the district c ourt denying his motion to suppr ess evidenc e found in a vehicle a fter he was stopped and ticke ted for spe eding . Def endant pur

portedly consente d to a war

rantless sea

rch of the
car , which yielded two kilog rams of c ocaine in a suitcase in the backse at of the c ar. D efe ndant does not challeng e the district cour t’s finding s that there w as proba ble cause for the traf

fic stop and that the leng th of the stop was re asonable . I n s t ead, de fenda nt claims that his alleg ed “c onsent” wa s ambig uous and equivoc al and, thus, an inva lid just ification for the war rantless sea

rch. F urther, heNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

- 2 - asser ts that his alle ged consent, if de emed leg itimate, did not ex tend to a sea rch of the closed
su itc a se . F or

the re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , w e a ff

ir m. I. On F e br ua ry 17 , 2 00 5, a t app ro xima te ly 8:5 0 a. m., de fe nd ant, wh ile tr a ve lin g we stb ound in a F ord Expedition on I nterstate 24 in Ruther ford County , Tenne ssee, passed an unmar ked patr ol car
a t a sp e e d in e xce ss o f 8 2 mi le s p e r h our, in vi ol ati on of th e 70 mil e s- pe r- ho ur sp e e d li mit
. Rutherford County

Deputy L ee Y oung activate d his lights and pulled defe ndant over to the s ide of the hig hway . Deputy

Young , who was tra ined in druginterdiction, was unifor med, ar med, and
acc ompanied by a drug- detec tion dog
. The patrol car was e quipped with video and a udio equipment that Deputy

Young activate d prior to stopping de fenda nt’s vehicle. Deputy Young approa ched the driver’ s-side d o o r. When defe ndant lower ed the window, De pu ty Yo un g wa s o ve rw he lm ed by th e str on g od or of a ir fr e sh e ne r a

nd ob se rv e d mu lti ple a ir fre shener s hang ing f

rom the mirror. Deputy

Young eng ag ed in conve rsation with defe ndant, who was the sole oc cupant of

the vehicle, reg arding the rea son for the stop. De puty Young explained the violation and reque sted identification. De fenda nt produce d his valid d river’ s license a nd car reg istration, which was in a nother pe rson’s name . Def endant infor

med Deputy Young that he had bo rr ow e d th e ve hic le fr om a fr ie nd to us e for f

ive or six da y s w hil e vis iti nghis da

ug hte r i n Kentucky
. Se ve ra l ob se rv a tio ns aro us e d De pu ty Yo un g ’s su sp ic ion s that il le g a l a c tiv ity mig ht b e a fo ot. When defe ndant produc ed his driver ’s license , he wa s, by Deputy Young’s acc ount, nervous andNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

I t is un dis pute d th a t de fe nd ant a dmi tte d to De pu ty Yo un g that he e xce e de d th e sp e e d li mit , 1 telling the deputy that he was trave ling with his cruise control set at approximately 78 miles per hour.
- 3 - shaking . The odor f

rom the air f

reshe ners wa s breathtaking a nd, in Deputy

Young ’s experienc e, ind ic a te d that de fe nd ant mig ht be a tte mpt ingto d isguis e the od or of ill e g a l na rc oti c s. I n th e c ours e of looking for the reg istration, defe ndant pulled down the visor, whic h reve aled a booking c ard f

rom Ge or g ia wi th a ph oto of a bla c k mal e on it. De pu ty

Yo un g ob se rv e d th a t de fe nd ant s ur re pti tio us ly
c los ed th e vis or . F ina lly , D e pu ty Yo un g fo un d it

unus ua l th a t su c h a

n im ma c ulate ly -k e pt v e hic le would be loane d out to another individual for a n extended period of time. De pu ty Yo un g re ta ine d de fe nd ant’ s lic e ns e and dir e c te d de fe nd ant to m ov e his ve hic le on to the g rass shoulder for safe ty rea sons. He then had defe ndant stand betwee n the two vehicles, in fr ont
o f th e p a tr o l c ar , w h e r e th e v id e o an d a u d io r e c o r d e d th e ir im a g e s an d c o n v e r s a ti o n . St an d in g n e xt to defe ndant, Young wrote out a speedingcitation. Whil e doing so, he questioned de fenda nt about 1 wh e re he wa s g oin g , w hy

he wa s g oin g the re , w ho ow ne d th e ve hic le , and wh a t his e mpl oy me nt w a s. Deputy Young advised defe ndant that he not only enfor ced tr aff

ic violations, but also investigate d “sec ondary

crimes” in vehicles a

nd asked defenda

nt if there was any illega l contra band in the ca

r,
su c h a s f ir e arm s, ill e g a l dr

ug s, or larg e sums o f m on e y . D e fe nd ant d e nie d tr ans po rt ingsu c h it e ms. De p u t y Yo u n g n ex ti n qu i re d

wh et h er d ef en d an to r a n y o n e a s s o ci at edwi t h t h e c ar u s edi l l ega l dru gs that the deputy ’s drugdog might “hit on,” a nd defe ndant answe red “no.” D eputy Young then aske d defe ndant, “Do you have a ny problem wit h me s ear ching ? ” De fenda nt responded that he had “ noNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

- 4 - problem” w ith such a sea

rch. Immediately

there afte r, defendant consented to a body sear ch, which yielded no illeg al items or wea pons. De pu ty Yo un g se arc he d th e ve hic le by fi rs t op eni ng th e drive r’ s d oo r. Ha vin g fo un d, in pr e vio us ins tanc e s, na

rc oti c s in ve hic le do or

wa y s, De pu ty You ng soug ht t o r oll do wn the e le c tr ic windows, but had to retur n to defe ndant to retri ev e t he key s in order to star t the car to open the windows. Def

endant g ave him the ke y s without pro t es t , and De puty Young sear ched the front compar tment of the vehic le. He the n turned his attention to t h e b ac k s eat area , wher e he f ound a suitcase. He opened it up by undoing the zipper and f ound a var iety

of clothes a

nd two taped packa g es containing a compre ssed white powder , ultimately deter mined to be two kilogr ams of
coca ine. Deputy You n g re t urned to de fenda nt and place d him under ar rest. While handcuf

fing de fe nd ant, De pu ty

Yo un g a dv ise d h im o f h is Miranda rig hts and moved d ef endant off to the side of the c ar be y ond the visual rang e of the video. The deputy asked de fenda

nt whether

he wa s car

rying the drug s for friends or family ; de fenda nt r esponded “no” and reque sted an attorney
. Deputy Young then asked two additional questions, to which defenda nt provided short a

nswers a nd ag ain re quested an attorne y . At this ti me, all questioning cea sed. De fe nd ant w a s c ha

rg e d in fed e ra l c ourt

wi th o ne c ount o f p os se ssi on wi th t he int e nt t o distribute more t han 500 g rams of coca ine, i n violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Defe ndant filed a motion to suppress the evidenc e and statements obtained during the traff ic stop, alleg ing that he did not voluntarily

consent to the sea

rch of the vehicle and suitcase
.No. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

As the evide ntiary

hear ing r ecor d indicates, the a udio sy stem appar ently

was not func tioning 2 proper ly during the t raf

fic stop. Althoug h some of the c onversation between D eputy Young and defe ndant was compre hensible, the district c ourt relied on D eputy Young ’s testimony

reg ardingthe dialog ue. The district c ourt’s suppression of defe ndant’s statements is not an issue on appea l before 3 thi s c ourt
. - 5 - On J une 20, 2005, the district cour t held an evide ntiary

hear ing on de fenda

nt’s motion. The evidenc e pre sented at the hear ing consisted of the testimony of Deputy Young and the videotape a nd audio of the t raf

fic stop, which wa s play ed duringDeputy Young ’s testimony
. The videota pe 2 display ed the c ontinuous running time of the events in question. The district cour t found, consistent with the times indicated on the video, that no more than five minutes pa ssed betwe en the time that Deputy Young stopped defe ndant’s ca r and the time defe ndant g ave his c onsent to sear ch the ve hicle. At the conclusion of the hear ing, the district c ourt denied defe ndant’s motion to suppress the
coca ine seized following the war rantless sea

rch of th e ca r an d the suitcase, but or dere d that de fe nd ant’ s su

pp re ssi on mot ion be g ra nte d w ithreg ard to the state me nts ma de by de fe nd ant t o Deputy Young a ft er he re quested c ounsel. I n its oral decision, the district cour t found there was 3 probable cause for the tr aff ic stop. The c ourt furthe r found that the le ng th of the stop was minimal and re asonable and did not amount to a Four th Amendment violation. The cour t further held that defe ndant conse nted to the sea rch – f irst verba lly

and then, a fter the sea rc h h ad commence d,
no nv e rb a lly by tur

nin g ov e r the c ar k e y s. Th e c ourt he ld t hat th is c on se nt w a s v olu

nta ry , n oti ngthat,
as re flec ted in the videotape , the questi oning by Deputy Young was not coer cive or overbe aring , but po lit e and bu sin e ss- lik e . T he c ourt

fu rt he r a dju dg e d, fr om the tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s, that “ inNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

Although de fenda

nt sugg est s that de novo re view of both the f actua l findings a

nd leg al 4 c on c lus ion s is a

pp ro pr iate , w e de c lin e to d e viate fr om t he we ll- e sta

bli sh e d “ c le arl y

e rr on e ou s” standard in this ca se, whe re the centr al issue, the voluntarine ss of defe ndant’s conse nt to a sear ch, is a question of fac t to be deter mined by the totality

of the c ircumstance s. United States v. W orley , 193 F.3d 380, 384- 85 (6th Cir. 1999).
- 6 - th e c o n te xt o f th is c a s e w h e r e th e o f f ic e r ma d e it c le ar h e w an te d to s e ar c h f o r drug s[,] that the
sear ch of the suitcase wa s within the scope of the consent.” On July 18 , 200 5, de fe nd ant en te re d a ple a of g uil ty to the ind ic tme nt, re se rv inghis ri g ht t o appea l the district court’s de nial of his motion to s uppress the e vidence . On Oct o b er 7, 2005, the court sente nced de fenda

nt to a five-year

term of imprisonment. Def endant now timely

appea ls. II. Def endant f irst contends that the dist ri ct court erre d in denying his motion to suppress the evidenc e bec ause the g overnme nt did not meet it s burden of proving by clea r and positive testimony that defe ndant g ave D eputy Young unequivoca l and spec ific conse nt to searc h his vehicle. I n revie wing the denial of a motion to suppress, this c ourt revie ws the district court’s fa ctual finding s for c lear

err or and its leg al conclusions de novo. United States v. Carter , 378 F.3d 584, 587 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc ). I n such a re vie w, thi s c ourt c on sid e rs the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t 4 favor able to the gove rnment. Un ite d Sta te s v . Ca ru the rs , 458 F.3d 459, 464 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “‘A fa c tua l f ind ingwi ll o nly

be c le arl y

e rr on e ou s w he n, a lth ou g h th e re may be e vid e nc e to s up po rt

it, the re viewing court on the entire evide nce is lef t with the definite and f

irm conviction that a mistakeNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

- 7 - has bee n committed.’” Un ite d Sta te s v . P ru itt , 4 5 8 F. 3 d

4 7 7 , 4 8 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Navarro-Camacho , 186 F.3d 701, 705 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). As previously noted, defendant does not challeng e the district court’s findings that ther e wa s probable cause for the tr aff ic stop and that the leng th o f t h e s top was re asonable . Def endant’ s argument focuse s solely on the vi ability of his consent to the sea rch. A s expl ained in United States

v . E rwi n , 155 F.3d 818 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (en ba nc): A law e nforc ement off

icer does not violate the F ourth Amendment mer ely by a pp ro a c hin g an in div idu a l, e ve n w he n th e re is n o r e a so na ble su sp ic ion

tha t a c ri me ha s b e e n c omm itt e d, and a sk ing him wh e the r he is w ill ingto a ns we r s ome qu e sti on s. Th is i nc lud e s a

re qu e st f or c on se nt to se arc h the ind ivi du a l’ s veh ic le
. . . . An d, thi s consent is not vit iated mer ely beca use the va lid suspicion of wrong doing f or which an indi vi du al has b e e n s top pe d p ro ve s to be un fo un de d o r d oe s n ot r e su lt i n prosec ution and the i ndividual is fre e to g o befor e being asked. Of course, when a l aw e n f o r c e m e n t o f

f i c e r n o l o n g e r h a s an y r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o no f

c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y, the detaine d individual is constitutionally fre e to le ave, a nd if the off

icer reje cts the individual’s indication that he would like to l ea v e, v alid consent c an no long er be ob ta ine d. Th e fr

uit s o f a se arc h c on du c te d und e r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s w ou ld h a ve to be suppre ssed. Id . at 823 (c itations omi tted). Whether conse nt to a sear ch wa s in fact voluntar y or wa s the product of

duress or c oerc ion is a question of fact t o be determined from the t otality of the c ircumstance s. Id. This court will not
re v er s e t h e district court’s finding s in this reg ard a bsent clea r er ror. W orley, 1 9 3 F
. 3 d

a t3 8 4
. In
o r d e r t o j u s t i f y a s e ar c h b y c o n s e n t , t h e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t p r o v e b y “ c l e ar an d p o s i t i v e t e s t i m o n y” that the conse nt was voluntary and “une quivocally , specific ally , and intellige ntly g iven, uncontaminated by

any duress a nd coer cion.” Id. at 385-86 (interna l c itations omitted). Fa ctors that the cour t should consider in assessingthe vali d i ty of conse nt include the ag e, intellige nce, a ndNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

- 8 - e du c a tio n o f t

he ind ivi du a l; w he the r t

he in di vi du a l un de rs tand s th e ri g ht t o r e fu se to c on se nt; whether the i ndividual understands his constitutional rig hts; the l eng th and nature of dete ntion; and, the us e of coer cive or punishing conduct by the police. Id. at 386. “The defe ndant’s knowledg e of his right to re fuse to conse nt is a fac tor, but the g overnme nt ne ed not prove that the de fenda nt had such knowledg e to establish that conse nt was voluntary .” Er win , 155 F.3d at 823. The core of defe ndant’s argument is that D eputy Young ’s serie s of investig atory questions – ( 1) do y ou

have dr ug s in the c ar?; (2 ) d o you

have re a so n to thi nk

the re is a sc e nt my

do g wo uld “hit on”? ; and, (3) do y ou have a problem with me sear ching ? – wer e posed in suc h a manner that the y we re a mbi g uo us and

g e ne rate d a

n ambi g uo us re sp on se fr om d e fe ndant. A c c or din g to defe ndant, the second question indicated that Deputy Young wanted to c onduct a sniff sear ch using his drug dog and, whe n this second quer y is considere d in conjunction with the third question, it was
rea so na ble fo r d e fe nd ant t o b e lie ve that th e te rm “ se arc hin g ” re fe rr e d to a sn if f s e arc h, no t a

fu llblow n v e h ic le in s p e c ti o n . D e f e n d an t c o n te n d s th a t h is “ n o p r o b le m” r e p ly is th u s rende red equivoca l by the s equenc e of the questi ons and is open to seve ral re asonable interpre tations, none of which de monstrate spec ific and une quivocal conse nt: either def endant h ad n o p ro blem with a sniff sea rch, he was de ny ing guilt, or he sim p l y wa s acc eding to authority and “c onveying a

n expression of futility

in resistanc e to authority or acquiescingin the office r[’s] reque st” bec ause the
o ff i ce r i n dicated that the sear ch wa s ong oing. W orley , 193 F.3d at 386. Using the analog y of a contra ctual ag ree ment, defe ndant asser ts that the verba l exchang e does not de monstrate a me eting of the minds reg ardingthe intended action of the deputy and def endant’ s concomitant ac quiesce nce.No. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

- 9 - I t t here for e do e s n ot c on sti tut e “ c le ar a nd po sit ive pr oo f” of

the vo lun tary

c on se nt n e c e ssa

ry to justify a wa rr an t l es s s ear ch of the interior of the vehicle. D efe ndant adds that De puty Young dominated the phy sical situation – he was unifor med and a

rm ed , he aske d and phra sed all of the questions, and he c ontinued to detain de fenda nt when he que stioned him. Defenda nt notes that De pu ty Yo un g ne ith e r i nf

or me d d e fe nd ant o f h is r ig ht t o w ith ho ld c on se nt n or uti lize d h is depar tment’s prepr inted consent for m. Under the totality

of t he circumstance s, howeve r, the re cord r evea ls none of the ambiguities
su g g e ste d b y

de fe nd a nt. De fe nd ant, a mid dle -a g e d mal e , e ng a g e d in an in te lli g e nt c on ve rs a tio n w ith Deputy Young , descr ibing, a

mong othe r thing s, the location of his home, his health, the circ umstances of his spe eding violation, as well as his outrig ht denial of the posse ssion of drug s or larg e quantities of money in his vehicle. De puty

Young was in t h e proce ss of completing the
war ning c itation for speed i n g and wa s four minutes into a conve rsation with defe ndant when defe ndant conse nted to a sea rch of the vehicle
. There was no de lay bey ond the time nece ssary for Deputy Young to c omplete the purpose f or the tra ffic stop. In a straig htforwa rd and polite manne r, De pu ty Yo un g ma de c le ar, thr ou gh his qu e sti on s, that he wa s a sk ingfo r d e fe nd ant’ s c on se nt t o
se arc h th e ve hic le fo r i lle g a l dr ug s. Th e re was no equ ivoc atio n in de fe nd ant’ s “ no pr ob le m” response and no indication that def endant misunderstood the r equest. Def endant’ s relianc e on W

orley is misplaced. This court in W orley held that the def

endant’ s response to an offic er’ s reque st to searc h his bag was am b i gu o u s u n d er the totality of the
c ir c ums tanc e s, wh e n th e de fe nd ant re pli e d, “ Yo u’ ve g ot the ba dg e , I g ue ss you

c an. ” Th is r e sp on seNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

- 10 - differ s from the une quivocal and unambiguous ex chang e in the i nstant case . Her e, whe n defe ndant
was a sked if he ha d any objection t o the sea rch, he replied “ no problem.” H e then, upon r equest a nd without hesitation, provided the depu t y wi t h t h e car key s so that Deputy

Young could ac cess the int e ri or of the c ar t o r oll do wn

the wi nd ow s and se arc h th a t are a fo r i lle g a l c on tr a

ba nd . U nd e r t

he se circ umstances, de fenda

nt’s consent is “a

n unequivoca l statement of fre e and voluntary consent, not
mere ly a re sponse convey ing a

n expression of futility

in resistance to authority

or ac quiescingin the office r[’s] reque st.” Id . at 386. Given the district cour

t’s opportunity

to assess def

endant’ s consent by revie wing not only the testimony of the de puty , but the videotape a nd audio as we ll, con s i d er ab l e d efe renc e should be
acc orded to its fact u al fi n d i ng s. United States v. Lloyd , 10 F.3d 1197, 1209 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Def endant’ s argument that he was unfairly finessed into consenting by the ver bal g amesmanship of
an e xpe ri e nc e d o ff

ic e r i s th e re fo re wi tho ut m e ri t. III
. De fe nd ant n e xt co nte nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt erred in d e te rm ini ngtha

t th e sc op e of

his consent e x tended to the se arc h of the suitcase located in the ve hicle. We disag ree . B oth pa rt ie s p ro pe rl y

no te that th e re vie w s tand ard is o ne of ob je c tiv e re a so na

ble ne ss:

“ Whe n la w e n f o r c e m e n to f

f i c e r s r e l y u p o nc o n s e n ta s t h e b a s i s f o r a w ar r antl e ss sear ch, the sc o p e o f t he conse nt give n deter mines the permissible scope of the sear ch.” United States v. Gant , 112 F.3d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 1997). “The standard f or measuringthe scope of a suspect’s consent under the Four th Amendment is that of objective r easona

bleness . . . .” Florida v . Jimeno , 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). The proper question is “what would the ty pical rea sonable person have understood by the exchang e betwee n the office r and the suspect.” Id . Are a so na ble pe rs on

lik e ly wo uld have understood his c onsent to exclude a sea rch tha t would damag e his proper ty
. SeeNo. 05-6587

United States v. Simmons

- 11 - id. at 251-52. Ge nera lly , the expressed objec t of the sear ch def ines the scope of that sear ch. Id . at 251. United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 575- 76 (6th Cir. 2004). A defe ndant’s g ener al consent to se arc h a vehicle has been held to encompass the ve hicle’s g as tank, Garrido-Santana , 360 F.3d at 576, and Jimeno , 50 0 U. S. a t 25 2; a ve hicl e’s ven t pan e l, Un i t ed S t a t es v. Pe na , 9 2 0 F
. 2 d 1 5 0 9 , 1 5 1 4

- 1 5 ( 1 0 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 0 ) ; t

h e in te r io r

d o o r p an e l o f a c ar, Un ite d S ta tes v. Zap ata , 180 F.3d 1237, 1243 ( 11th Cir. 1999); and a c losed, unlocked c ontainer within another ba g , Gant , 112 F.3d at 242. He re , th e ty

pic a l r e a so na

ble pe rs on

wo uld have un de rs too d d e fe nd ant’ s “ no prob le m” response to t h e deputy ’s questions, coupled with the phy sical ac t of handingthe ca r key s to the deputy without protest, to cons t i t u t e a consent to sear ch the ve hicle and a ny container s within the vehicle that might hold illega l contraba nd. We t he re fo re a ff

ir m th e or de r o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

den y in g de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss evidenc e.