UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MUHAMMAD TANVIR, JAMEEL 

ALGIBHAH, and NAVEED SHINWARI,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FNU TANZIN, et al.,

 Defendants.

13-CV-6951 (RA)

OPINION & ORDER

RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and Naveed Shinwari brought this action 

to remedy alleged violations of their constitutional and federal statutory rights. Specifically, they 

allege that, in an effort to bolster intelligence gathering in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) placed or kept them on 

the Terrorist Screening Center’s No Fly List in retaliation for their refusal to act as informants by

spying on members of Muslim communities, and in order to pressure them to reconsider. Plaintiffs 

claim that they refused to gather information about their fellow Muslims because doing so would 

have contravened their sincerely held religious beliefs, and that the FBI agents’ efforts thus 

substantially burdened their religious exercise in violation of federal law.

The suit initially named agents of the federal government in their official capacities, and 

sought Plaintiffs’ removal from the No Fly List. Plaintiffs have since been removed from the No 

Fly List, and the sole remaining claims are against Defendant FBI agents in their individual 

capacities for money damages available under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000bb, et seq. (“RFRA”). Namely, Plaintiffs seek damages from Defendants FNU (“First Name 

Unknown”) Tanzin, Sanya Garcia, Francisco Artousa, John LNU (“Last Name Unknown”), Steven 
2

LNU, John C. Harley III, Michael LNU, Gregg Grossoehmig, Weysan Dun, James C. Langenberg, 

and John Does 1–6.1 Now before the Court is Defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss the 

remaining claims in the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim and under the doctrine of 

qualified immunity. 

The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs, who claim that, despite never posing a threat to 

aviation security, they were, for years, unable to visit ailing loved ones outside of the United States, 

burdened financially with the loss of job opportunities which required them to travel, and 

repeatedly forced to endure the basic indignity of being denied boarding passes for flights to which 

they had legitimately purchased tickets. Accepting their allegations as true, Plaintiffs were 

subjected to this treatment by way of the FBI’s misuse of the No Fly List simply because they 

were Muslim, and because they refused to spy on other members of their faith.

Nevertheless—and notwithstanding varied criticisms of the doctrine of qualified immunity, 

see, e.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 

certiorari); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)—the Court 

is required to apply the law faithfully to the issues before it. Accordingly, for the reasons that 

follow, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

The allegations of the tactics undertaken by the FBI giving rise to this action are by now 

familiar to counsel and the parties. In the main, Plaintiffs allege that they were “among the many 

innocent people” who were “swept up” in the years since 9/11 by the federal government’s 

1 Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order filed July 24, 2014, Defendants FNU Tanzin, John LNU, Steven LNU, 

Michael LNU, and John Does 1–6 are currently proceeding under the pseudonyms specified in the Amended 

Complaint. See Dkt. 30 ¶¶ 1–2. John Doe 2 is proceeding as John Doe 2/3. See id. ¶ 1(f). A fourth Plaintiff, Awais 

Sajjad, did not assert claims under RFRA, see Dkt. 15, and thus is no longer party to the remaining claims in this 

action. Accordingly, there are no longer pending claims against Defendants John Does 9–13, Michael Rutowski, or 

William Gale. Finally, John Does 7 and 8 were previously dismissed from this action. See Dkt. 104 at 36.
3

“secretive watch list dragnet.” Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs claim that the process for placing individuals

on the No Fly List, which is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (“TSC”), id. ¶ 40–41, is 

“shrouded in secrecy and ripe for abuse,” id. ¶ 63. “To be properly placed on the No Fly List, an 

individual must be a ‘known or suspected terrorist’” and “there must be some additional 

‘derogatory information’ demonstrating that the person ‘poses a threat of committing a terrorist 

act with respect to an aircraft.” Id. ¶ 42. Despite never posing a threat—or even being accused of 

posing a threat—to aviation safety, Plaintiffs allege that they were each either placed or kept on 

the List merely for refusing to become informants for the FBI against fellow Muslims. Id. ¶¶ 8–

9, 65–67, 68, 118, 145. They urge that their inclusion on the No Fly List was thus the product of 

abusive investigative practices by the FBI which violated their clearly established constitutional 

and statutory rights, including under RFRA. Id. ¶¶ 205–15.

I. Plaintiff Muhammad Tanvir

Muhammad Tanvir is a lawful permanent resident of the United States who last resided in 

Queens, has family in Pakistan, and is Muslim. Id. ¶¶ 14, 68. Tanvir interacted with Defendants 

FNU Tanzin, John Doe 1, John Doe 2/3, Garcia, and John LNU. Id. ¶¶ 68–113. He was first 

approached by Defendants Tanzin and John Doe 2/3 in February 2007 at his workplace in the 

Bronx, and was asked about a former acquaintance who they claimed had attempted to enter the 

country illegally. Id. ¶ 69. Two days later, Tanvir was contacted by Tanzin who asked him “what 

people in the Muslim community generally discussed, and whether there was anything that he 

knew about within the American Muslim community that he ‘could share’ with the FBI.” Id. ¶ 70. 

Tanvir told Tanzin that “he did not know of anything that would concern law enforcement.” Id. 

Initially, Tanvir’s life continued unaltered following these early interactions with the FBI. 

He was able to fly to Pakistan in July 2008, for instance, and to return in December 2008. Id. ¶ 71. 
4

But after returning from Pakistan, Tanvir alleges that his passport was confiscated by government 

officials, he was detained for five hours at the airport, and was given an appointment with the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to retrieve his passport. Id. Before the date of that 

meeting, however, Tanzin and John Doe 2/3 came to his new workplace in Queens and asked him 

to accompany them to the Manhattan office of the FBI. Id. ¶¶ 73–74. 

There, he was brought to an interrogation room and subjected to questioning about terrorist 

training camps near the village where he grew up, whether he had trained with the Taliban, and 

whether he would work as a government informant in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Id. ¶¶ 75–78. To 

incentivize Tanvir to work as an informant, the agents offered him financial assistance, including 

for his parents in Pakistan so that they could go on religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia; 

nevertheless, Tanvir refused, telling them that he was “afraid” and that working as a “United States 

government informant” in Pakistan would be “very dangerous.” Id. ¶¶ 76–78. 

The next day, Tanvir alleges that Tanzin called and “threatened” him, saying he would 

“authorize the release of [Tanvir’s] passport if [he] agreed to become an informant,” but that, if he 

declined, he “would be deported if he went to the airport to pick up his passport.” Id. ¶ 79. Tanvir 

again refused, and was able to retrieve his passport notwithstanding the threats of deportation. Id. 

¶¶ 79–80. In the weeks that followed, Tanvir was repeatedly called by agents who urged him to

become an FBI informant. Id. ¶¶ 82–84. Time and again, Tanvir refused. Id. Tanzin and John 

Doe 2/3 eventually asked him to take a polygraph test and threatened to arrest him if he declined. 

Id. ¶¶ 86–87. He declined, and the agents left without placing him under arrest. Id.

In key part, Tanvir alleges that he repeatedly refused to serve as an FBI informant because 

he had “sincerely held religious and personal objections to spying on innocent members of his 

community,” and that the agents had placed “significant pressure on [him] to violate his sincerely 
5

held religious beliefs.” Id. ¶ 84. Speaking to Tanvir’s religious objections more generally, as well 

as those of the other Plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint alleges that: 

Many American Muslims, like many other Americans, and many followers of other 

religions, have sincerely held religious and other objections against becoming 

informants in their own communities, particularly when they are asked to inform 

on the communities as a whole rather than specific individuals reasonably suspected 

of wrongdoing. Acting as an informant would require them to lie and would 

interfere with their ability to associate with other members of their communities on 

their own terms. For these American Muslims, the exercise of Islamic tenets 

precludes spying on the private lives of others in their communities.

Id. ¶ 65. 

After his interactions with Defendants Tanzin and Doe 2/3, Tanvir discovered that he had 

been placed on the No Fly List. “Upon information and belief,” he alleges that he was “placed on 

the No Fly List . . . because he refused to become an informant against his community and refused 

to speak or associate further with the agents.” Id. ¶ 90. In October 2010, while traveling for work, 

he made plans to fly from Atlanta to New York City but was told by an airline employee that he 

was unable to fly when he tried to check in for the flight. Id. ¶ 91. FBI agents then approached 

him at the airport, told him that he should contact the agents in New York with whom he had 

previously spoken, and escorted him to a bus station in Atlanta, where Tanvir was forced to take a 

24-hour bus ride to return home to New York. Id. ¶ 93. Two days later, Tanvir was contacted by 

Defendant Garcia, who told him that his name could be removed from the No Fly List if he would 

agree to speak with her and answer her questions. Id. ¶ 94. Tanvir insisted that he had repeatedly 

answered the FBI’s questions and that he did not wish to speak with agents of the FBI again. Id. 

Tanvir next purchased airline tickets when he was trying to visit his sick mother in Pakistan

in November 2011. Id. ¶¶ 98–100. The day before his scheduled departure, however, Garcia 

contacted him again, informing him that he would not be permitted to fly the next day because he 

had “hung up on her” in October 2010. Id. She again insisted that he would not be able to fly 
6

without answering her questions. Id. Tanvir reluctantly agreed to meet Garcia and John LNU at 

a restaurant in Queens, where he was again questioned about his family, religion, and politics; 

Tanvir answered their inquiries, believing that he needed to do so in order to be able to fly to 

Pakistan. Id. ¶ 101. Although Garcia initially told Tanvir that she would obtain a one-time waiver 

to allow him to travel because he had answered the FBI’s questions, she called the next day to 

inform him that he would not be able to travel after all. Id. ¶ 102. Instead, Garcia now insisted 

that her offer of a one-time waiver was contingent on Tanvir going to FBI headquarters to take a 

polygraph test. Id. ¶ 104. He cancelled his flight to Pakistan thereafter. Id. 

Tanvir again bought a ticket to see his mother in Pakistan in December 2011, after engaging 

counsel to file a Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (“TRIP”) complaint, but was again denied 

boarding because he was on the No Fly List. Id. ¶ 109. Tanvir learned that, despite his TRIP 

complaint, no changes or corrections would be made to the List, and appealed that determination. 

Id. ¶¶ 110, 112. In November 2012, he again purchased a ticket to travel to Pakistan, and once 

again was denied boarding. Id. ¶ 113. This time, Tanvir was approached by an FBI agent and told 

that he would need to meet once again with Garcia in order to be removed from the List. Id.

On March 28, 2013, Tanvir finally received a response to his TRIP appeal indicating that 

the government had “made updates” to its records based on his complaint. Id. ¶ 114. Tanvir then 

successfully flew to Pakistan from New York on June 27, 2013. Id. ¶ 115. He did not receive 

official confirmation of his removal from the No Fly List, however, until June 2015, after filing 

the present action. Dkt. 92. 

II. Plaintiff Jameel Algibhhah

Jameel Algibhah is a United States citizen, resides in the Bronx, has a wife and three 

daughters in Yemen, and is Muslim. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 118. He alleges that he interacted with 
7

Defendants Artousa, John Doe 4, and John Doe 5 between 2009 and 2013. Id. ¶¶ 119–40. Artusa 

and John Doe 4 first tried to recruit Algibhah to serve as an informant in Muslim communities, 

including in his own neighborhood, by approaching him at his workplace and asking him to 

accompany them to an FBI van. Id. ¶¶ 119–20. After Aglibhah answered their initial questions, 

they specifically asked that he infiltrate a mosque in Queens, and that he act like an “extremist” in 

online Islamic forums. Id. ¶ 121. Algibhah claims he refused because doing so violated his 

sincerely held religious and personal beliefs and would have required him to act in a deceptive 

manner in his community. Id. ¶ 122; see also id. ¶ 65 (alleging there are “Islamic tenets 

preclud[ing] spying on” fellow Muslims). Upon information and belief, he alleges that, in 

retaliation for his refusal to act as an informant for the FBI, and in order to pressure him to 

reconsider his decision, he was placed on the No Fly List shortly after this encounter. Id. ¶ 124. 

Algibhah attempted to visit his wife and daughters in Yemen in May 2010, but was denied 

a boarding pass at JFK International Airport and told that he was not permitted to fly. Id. ¶ 125. 

Algibhah filed a TRIP complaint, and attempted again to fly to Yemen in September of the same 

year, but was again denied a boarding pass. Id. ¶¶ 126–27. 

In June 2012, after seeking assistance from his elected representatives, Algibhah was 

stopped by Artusa and John Doe 5 who allegedly said: “Congressmen can’t do shit for you; we’re 

the only ones who can take you off the list.” Id. ¶ 131. Artusa told Algibhah that he would need 

to answer more questions from the FBI, and that if he chose to cooperate, he would be removed 

from the No Fly List. Id. After answering their questions, however, Algibhah was told that in 

order to be removed from the List, he would need to work as an informant, including by going on 

Islamic websites and “act[ing] extremist.” Id. ¶ 133. Algibhah retained counsel, to whom Artusa 

reiterated the same offer: Algibhah’s name could be removed from the List, but only if he would 
8

agree to go onto Islamic websites to seek out “extremist” discussions and undertake “aggressive 

information gathering.” Id. ¶ 136. When Artusa called Algibhah directly once again in May 2013, 

Algibhah directed him to his counsel. Id. ¶ 139–40. 

Like Tanvir, Algibhah did not receive confirmation that he had been removed from the No 

Fly List until June 2015, after filing this action. Dkt. 92. 

III. Plaintiff Naveed Shinwari

Naveed Shinwari is a lawful permanent resident living in Connecticut, has family in 

Afghanistan, and is Muslim. Id. ¶¶ 16, 145. He alleges that he interacted with Defendants Steven 

LNU, Harley, Grossoehmig, Michael LNU, John Doe 6, Dun, and Langenberg in 2012. Id. 

¶¶ 146–64. In February 2012, Shinwari was traveling with his mother from Kabul, Afghanistan 

to Omaha, Nebraska, where he was living at the time, when he was denied boarding on his 

connecting flight departing from Dubai and told that he needed to contact the U.S. embassy before 

he would be permitted to fly. Id. ¶ 146. 

The next day, Shinwari met with Defendants Steven LNU and Harley at the U.S. consulate

in Dubai, where he was taken to an interrogation room and questioned for several hours about 

whether he had visited any “training camps” while in Afghanistan and whether he was associated 

with “bad guys.” Id. ¶ 148. He was also questioned about his mosque and religious activities, 

asked to take a polygraph test, and told that doing so would allow him to return home to Nebraska. 

Id. ¶ 149. Several days later, Shinwari was permitted to fly after purchasing new tickets on a U.S.-

based airline. Id. ¶¶ 150–51. After landing at Dulles International Airport in Virginia, Shinwari 

was interrogated for two hours by Defendants Michael LNU and Grossoehmig, who said that they 

needed to “verify” what he had told the other agents in Dubai. Id. ¶¶ 152–53. After he answered 

their questions, Shinwari was released and flew home to Omaha. Id. ¶ 154. 
9

The next month, in March 2012, Defendants Michael LNU and John Doe 6 appeared at 

Shinwari’s home, and again questioned him about his religion and personal background. Id. ¶ 155. 

This time, the agents said that they knew Shinwari was then unemployed, and offered to pay him

to work as an informant with the FBI. Id. ¶ 156. Based on his sincerely held religious and personal 

beliefs, Shinwari alleges, he declined the invitation to work as an informant. Id. ¶¶ 156–57; see 

also id. ¶ 65 (asserting that many Muslims “have sincerely held religious and other objections 

against becoming informants in their own communities”).

When Shinwari tried to board a flight from Omaha to Orlando for temporary work later 

that month, he was denied a boarding pass and approached by police officers who told him that he 

was on the No Fly List. Id. ¶ 158. His placement on the List caused Shinwari significant financial 

hardship, as he was unable to take the temporary job, and was also prevented from visiting his

family in Afghanistan. Id. ¶160. After Shinwari emailed Harley for help in getting removed from 

the No Fly List, Michael LNU and Doe 6 returned to his home and again asked that he become an 

informant, telling him that if he helped the FBI, the FBI would “help” him. Id. ¶ 161. Shinwari 

declined to serve as an informant, although he understood the agents to be offering to remove him 

from the No Fly List. Id. 

Thereafter, Shinwari retained counsel and submitted two TRIP complaints about his 

inclusion on the List. Id. ¶¶ 165–68. He did not receive confirmation that he had been removed 

from the List until June 2015, after filing this action. Dkt. 92.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As relevant to the present motion, this Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims, 

holding that the relief afforded by the statute—which provides that, where a person’s “religious 

exercise has been burdened,” that person “may assert that violation as a claim” and “obtain 
10

appropriate relief against a government,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c)—did not include money

damages against officials in their personal capacities. Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756, 780–

81 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Because the Court found that “appropriate relief” under RFRA did not 

provide for money damages, it did not address whether Defendants were entitled to qualified 

immunity.2

Plaintiffs appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed in part, determining RFRA “permits a 

plaintiff to recover money damages against federal officers sued in their individual capacities.” 

Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 2018). The Circuit remanded for this Court to

determine in the first instance whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, expressly 

noting that it was “sensitive to the notion that qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest 

possible stage in the litigation,” including “in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. at 472 (cleaned up). 

Prior to remand, however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 140 S. 

Ct. 550 (2019). It ultimately affirmed the Second Circuit’s statutory construction, holding that 

“appropriate relief” within the meaning of RFRA includes claims for money damages for officials 

sued in their individual capacities. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020). Like the Court 

of Appeals before it, however, the Supreme Court expressly cautioned that Defendants may be 

entitled to qualified immunity—and indeed that Plaintiffs had themselves repeatedly argued as 

much on appeal—stating:

Both the Government and respondents agree that government officials are entitled 

to assert a qualified immunity defense when sued in their individual capacities for 

money damages under RFRA. Indeed, respondents emphasize that the “qualified 

immunity defense was created for precisely these circumstances,” Brief for 

2 The claims against Defendants in their official capacities were previously stayed on consent of all parties 

after Plaintiffs were apprised that they were no longer on the No Fly List. See Dkt. 92, 93. The Court also previously 

dismissed Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims brought against Defendants in their individual capacities, reasoning that 

the Supreme Court had “declined to extend Bivens to a claim sounding in the First Amendment.” Tanvir, 128 F. Supp. 

3d at 769. That determination was not appealed, and thus is not at issue on remand. See Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 

449, 457 (2d Cir. 2018). 
11

Respondents 22, and is a “powerful shield” that “protects all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who flout clearly established law,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 42, see 

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 , 589–91 (2018).

Id. at 492 n.2.

3

On remand, Defendants have thus filed a renewed motion to dismiss the remaining claims 

in the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim and under the doctrine of qualified 

immunity.4 Plaintiffs timely opposed the motion, after which the Court heard oral argument. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Cnty. of Erie v. Colgan Air, 

Inc., 711 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 2013). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 533, 570 

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

The Court need not accept “legal conclusions” or “threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause 

of action,” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and a plaintiff must provide “more than 

labels and conclusions” to make out a claim upon which relief can be granted, Twombly, 550 U.S. 

3 See also Tanzin v. Tanvir, Tr. of Oral Arg. at 35–36 (Oct. 6, 2020) (Justice Thomas asking counsel for 

Plaintiffs how an officer is to know whether the “burden they’re imposing is the least restrictive means of furthering 

a governmental interest,” and counsel answering, “that is, of course, an argument . . . that [Defendants] could have 

presented in . . . the qualified immunity defense that they made”); id. at 52–54 (counsel for Plaintiffs further explaining 

that “the law accounts for [this concern] . . . due to well-established and robust doctrine of qualified immunity,” and 

Justice Kavanaugh responding “that’s a good answer about qualified immunity”).

4 Defendants Steven LNU, Harley, Grossoehmig, Michael LNU, John Doe 6, Dun, and Langenberg also 

renewed their Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the 

Court concludes that, accepting all allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, none of the Defendants violated 

clearly established law, and thus are all entitled to dismissal under the doctrine of qualified immunity, it does not reach 

the jurisdictional question raised by this subset of Defendants.
12

at 555. 

“RFRA prohibits the government from ‘substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of 

religion’ unless ‘application of the burden . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 

interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’” 

Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b)). To 

establish a “prima facie RFRA violation, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they sought to engage 

in the exercise of religion and that the defendant-officials substantially burdened that exercise.” 

Id. The government then faces an “exceptionally demanding” burden to show “that it lacks other 

means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of 

religion by the objecting parties.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014).

In assessing whether officials are entitled to qualified immunity, a court conducts a twostep analysis, considering (1) whether the facts presented “make out a violation of a constitutional 

[or statutory] right, and (2) whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ when it was 

allegedly violated.” Torcivia v. Suffolk Cnty., 17 F.4th 342, 367 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). 

Although the Supreme Court previously required courts to consider the two prongs sequentially in 

all circumstances, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), courts are now free to use “sound 

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand,” Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Thus, where “prior case law has not clearly settled the right, and so 

given officials fair notice of it, the court can simply dismiss the claim for money damages.” 

Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011).

While often invoked as a defense to constitutional claims, qualified immunity may also be 

invoked against statutory claims. See Harlow v. Fizgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). More 
13

specifically, qualified immunity may apply to actions brought under RFRA. See Sabir, 52 F.4th 

at 58–60; Fazaga v. FBI, 965 F.3d 1015, 1061 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 

2720 (2021); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 557 (4th Cir. 2012); Walden v. Centers for Disease 

Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 533 

n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in this very action, Plaintiffs 

have themselves conceded that “government officials are entitled to assert a qualified immunity 

defense” under RFRA. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 492 n.2.

DISCUSSION

In their effort to allege that Defendants here violated clearly established law, such that they 

are not entitled to qualified immunity, Plaintiffs make two main arguments. First, they assert that 

caselaw existing at the time of their interactions with the FBI articulated a general “right to be free 

from government pressure that forces an individual to violate sincerely held religious beliefs,” and 

that such precedent provided clear notice that Defendants’ alleged conduct violated RFRA. Opp.

at 36. Second, they argue that, in any event, “the RFRA statute itself”—given its general 

prohibition against imposing a “substantial burden” on religious exercise—is sufficient to have 

put Defendants on notice of the purported illegality of their alleged conduct. See Opp. at 36–37.

For the reasons articulated below, the Court disagrees. Accepting each of the factual 

allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, a reasonable officer in Defendants’ position would 

not have known—much less “known for certain,” Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017)—

that their conduct would impose a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise and thus 

violate RFRA. Defendants are accordingly entitled to qualified immunity, and the renewed motion 

to dismiss the Amended Complaint is granted.
14

I. Clearly Established Law Analysis

To be clearly established, the contours of the right at issue must be “sufficiently clear that 

every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” 

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 

664 (2012)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established 

law at a high level of generality.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 

731, 742 (2011)). Instead, “the dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular 

conduct is clearly established.” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mullenix, 

577 U.S. at 12); see also Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (“The ‘clearly established’ standard . . . requires 

that the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before 

him.”). 

The inquiry regarding whether a right was clearly established must therefore be 

“undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” 

Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. While there need not be “a case directly on point,” “existing precedent 

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. “It is not enough 

that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. In other words, 

“[t]he precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish 

the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id.; see also Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d 

Cir. 2015) (to determine whether a right is clearly established, courts look to prior Supreme Court 

and circuit precedent “directly addressing the right at issue” or “clearly foreshadow[ing] a 

particular ruling on the issue”). An officer is immune from liability if “a reasonable officer might 

not have known for certain that the conduct was unlawful.” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1867. “Put 

simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate 
15

the law,” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (cleaned up), and affords “breathing room to make reasonable 

but mistaken judgments about open legal questions,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743; accord Wesby, 138 

S. Ct. at 589 (2018).

As a threshold matter, the Court must evaluate the parties’ competing definitions of the 

particular right at issue. Defendants define the right as the right not to be “recruit[ed] as [a] 

confidential government informant[] through the retaliatory or coercive use of the No Fly List.” 

Mot. at 22. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, articulate it as the “right to be free from government pressure 

that forces an individual to violate sincerely held religious beliefs.” Opp. at 36. By characterizing

the right in such a generalized and vague fashion, however, Plaintiffs render their definition legally 

meaningless. The Supreme Court has held that “clearly established law must be particularized to 

the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017). “Otherwise, plaintiffs would be 

able to convert the rule of qualified immunity into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply 

by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 438 U.S. 

635, 639 (1987)); see also Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12.

Unsurprisingly, then, courts considering qualified immunity defenses against claims 

brought under RFRA regularly delineate the right at issue with a considerable degree of 

particularity—and much more narrowly than Plaintiffs propose. See, e.g., Smadi v. Michaelis, 

2020 WL 7491296, at *4–6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2020) (the “right to accommodation for an inmate’s 

idiosyncratic dietary restrictions associated with his religion”); Fernandez-Torres v. Watts, 2017 

WL 9485591, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 

1173923 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2017) (the right for prisoners to receive “religious property from 

outside sources when the religious items available through authorized means are not sufficient to 

meet the prisoner’s religious needs”). Indeed, considering—and ultimately rejecting—claims 
16

similar to those presented here, the district court in El Ali v. Barr construed the complaint to 

concern the right not to be subjected to “persistent inquiry into [one’s] religious beliefs and 

practices” with “pressure . . . to modify or violate those beliefs or risk being subjected to the pattern 

of detentions and interrogations in connection with their travel.” 473 F. Supp. 3d 479, 526 (D. 

Md. 2020).

The Court therefore construes the right presented by Plaintiffs’ claims here as the right not 

to be pressured by law enforcement to inform on members of their religious communities through 

the coercive or retaliatory use of the No Fly List. So understood, for the reasons set forth below, 

the Court concludes that such a right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged 

violations. Even if the right were defined more broadly, such as the right not to be pressured to 

inform on members of one’s religious community through the coercive or retaliatory use of any

governmental tool, the Court nevertheless concludes that such a right was still not clearly 

established at the time of the events giving rise to the Complaint. 

A. Precedent at the Time Did Not Clearly Establish that Defendants Violated RFRA

At the time of Defendants’ alleged activity, no federal court had addressed claims—let 

alone actually held—that law enforcement pressuring individuals to inform on members of their 

religious communities through retaliatory or coercive means substantially burdened their religious 

exercise in violation of RFRA. Plaintiffs point to four cases in an attempt to make out their claim 

of clearly established law at the time of the alleged violations, but each of those cases are plainly 

distinguishable. 

First, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), involved Establishment Clause challenges to 

prayer held during a public school graduation ceremony. Observing that “there are heightened 

concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary 
17

and secondary public schools,” id. at 592, the Supreme Court in Weisman found an Establishment 

Clause violation because “young graduates who object [to the prayer] [we]re induced to conform,” 

id. at 599; see also id. (“No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a 

student to participate in a religious exercise.”). It was the specific context of the “prayer exercises 

in public schools” which the Court found carried a “particular risk of indirect coercion.” Id. at 

592. While acknowledging that the “heightened concern” of such coercion “may not be limited to 

the context of schools,” the Court observed that “it is most pronounced there.” Id. 

None of the allegations in the Complaint here, of course, concern the purported coercion 

of school-age children to engage in religious exercise, nor do Plaintiffs contend that they were 

coerced to engage in prayer to which they objected. Rather, their particular complaint is that they 

were “placed or kept on the [No Fly] List when [they] refused to become []informant[s] for the 

FBI against fellow American Muslims” because informing on their fellow Muslims would have 

violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. Opp. at 2. Plaintiffs’ attempt to stretch Weisman’s 

holding to fit the facts alleged in the Complaint is unavailing, as the Supreme Court has plainly 

instructed that the clearly established inquiry must be “undertaken in light of the specific context 

of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (cleaned up). Weisman, 

put simply, does not place the statutory question of whether Defendants were violating RFRA 

“beyond debate.” Id. 

The Second Circuit’s decision in DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 

397 (2d Cir. 2001), is also inapposite, as it concerned state funding of a treatment facility that 

hosted Alcoholics Anonymous sessions which were religious in nature. In that case, the Circuit 

found that the mere inclusion of A.A. programs in services offered by the state-funded facility did 

not violate the Establishment Clause, nor, moreover, did the facility employees’ “strong[] 
18

urg[ing]” and “actively encourage[ment]” of client participation in the programs. Id. at 408–10. 

The Court found that, to the extent there were facts sufficient to establish that employees were 

involved in the “inculcation of religious beliefs,” such facts could constitute governmental 

indoctrination in violation of the Establishment Clause, but that factual questions remained about 

whether the staff’s behavior rose to the level of “inculcation.” Id. at 420.

5

 

Here, there is no suggestion that Defendants’ actions were in any way “designed to 

inculcate the views of a particular religious faith” or to “indoctrinate.” Id. at 411, 414. Rather,

Defendants were engaged in the discrete task of seeking intelligence about Muslim adherents in 

the interest of national security, by, among other things, encouraging Plaintiffs to attend services 

or engage in conversation in online Islamic chatrooms. And, as DeStefano itself held, “[u]rging 

people to attend [religious] meetings or explaining to them why, in the view of the speaker, it is in 

their best interests to attend [such meetings] is not, without more, indoctrination.” Id. at 415. Such 

encouragement “does not imbue clients with [a religious] point of view, nor does it inculcate or 

impress [] beliefs upon the mind of the listener by frequent instruction or repetition.” Id. (cleaned 

up).

Third, the seminal case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), involved the wholly 

unrelated application of state compulsory education laws to Amish students whose religious beliefs 

prevented them from attending school beyond the eighth grade. In fact, the Supreme Court’s 

holding in Yoder was as much grounded in the so-called Meyer-Pierce line of cases establishing 

parents’ due process rights to control their children’s upbringing as it was a case about religious 

5 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim that DeStefano held that “[p]ressure from government officials rises to the level 

of a substantial burden when it prevents an individual from participating in religious activity as a matter of a genuine 

personal choice,” Opp. at 36, the Second Circuit expressly declined to “decide the issue of coercion,” finding that it 

“ha[d] not been squarely presented,” 247 F.3d at 411. Any discussion of “coercion” was therefore dicta, and cannot 

be construed as clearly established law. See, e.g., Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214, 226 n.7 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]e do 

not rely on any dicta . . . for the purpose of determining clearly established law.”).
19

liberty. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232–33 (“Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390

[(1923)], we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 

parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”); see 

also id. at 233 (“However read, the Court’s holding Pierce [v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 

(1925)] stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their 

children.”). To the extent that the case established any broad right of religious exercise, it was, at 

most, limited to the “power of the State to promulgate reasonable” educational standards which 

did not “impair[] the free exercise of religion” for schoolchildren. Id. at 236.6 It had nothing to 

do with law enforcement officers pressuring religious adherents to inform on co-religionists. 

Yoder thus did not “directly address[] the right at issue,” and did not “clearly foreshadow[] a 

particular ruling” on Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims. Garcia, 779 F.3d at 92. 

It is thus unsurprising that the Ninth Circuit, considering claims analogous to those at issue 

here, determined that “it was not clearly established in 2006 or 2007 that covert surveillance 

conducted on the basis of religion would meet the RFRA standards for constituting a substantial 

burden on individual congregants.” Fazaga, 965 F.3d at 1061. Considering the state of the law at 

a time long after Weisman and Yoder were decided, it held that “[t]here simply was no case law in 

2006 or 2007 that would have put the Agent Defendants on notice that covert surveillance on the 

basis of religion could violate RFRA.” Id.

Finally, Plaintiffs insist that the general definition of a religious “burden” used by the 

6 Given the emphasis Yoder placed on the unique position of Amish children in American life, it is unclear 

what, if any, applicability the case has in in the context of other religious communities. See, e.g., id. at 235 (observing 

that, given a unique “history of three centuries as an identified religious sect and a long history as a successful and 

self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of 

their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, [and] the vital role that belief and daily 

conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization”). The Court 

need not address that question here. 
20

Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)

(and restated by the Second Circuit in Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996)) was 

alone sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the purported illegality of their requests. See Oral 

Arg. Tr. at 29 (counsel seemingly changing their argument and stating “I don’t think you need to 

use” the three cases relied upon in Plaintiffs’ brief and discussed above, and arguing, instead, “you 

can rely on the Supreme Court precedent of Thomas and the Second Circuit precedent of Jolly”). 

The Court is unpersuaded. 

To start, Thomas stated simply that “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important 

benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of 

conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to 

modify his behavior or violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.” 450 U.S. at 717–18. 

This broad proposition, however, says nothing about when such a “burden” becomes a “substantial 

burden”—let alone when such a substantial burden, within the meaning of RFRA (a statute not yet 

enacted when Thomas was decided), is no longer justified in “furtherance of a compelling 

governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b). Moreover, Thomas did not address factual 

circumstances even remotely akin to those presented here. Instead, it concerned whether a State’s

denial of unemployment benefits to an employee allegedly terminated because of his religious 

convictions violated his free exercise rights. See 450 U.S. 707–20. 

Although Jolly reiterated Thomas’s language in weighing a claimed RFRA violation some 

fifteen years later, the case’s procedural posture limits its reach. There, the Second Circuit held 

only that an inmate had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his RFRA 

claim, such that a district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction was not an abuse of 

discretion. See 76 F.3d at 471–73. But even if Jolly did constitute a decision on the merits of the 
21

RFRA claim, it too is distinguishable, as it involved a plaintiff-inmate who argued that his 

confinement to a “medical keeplock” for three-and-a-half years for refusing to submit to a test for 

tuberculosis based upon religious objections violated RFRA. Id. at 470–72. The clearly 

established law analysis must be “undertaken in light of the specific context of the case” in which 

qualified immunity has been asserted, and, at bottom, neither Thomas nor Jolly would have placed 

the statutory [] question” presented by Plaintiffs here “beyond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. 

Each of the two additional cases which Plaintiffs cite to make out their claim of clearly 

established law were decided after Defendants’ last alleged interactions with Plaintiffs in 

November 2011 (Tanvir), March 2012 (Shinwari), and May 2013 (Algibhah). See Burwell v. 

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Washington v. Gonyea, 538 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir. 

Sept. 10, 2013). Thus, even to the extent those cases squarely addressed the claimed violation of 

RFRA—and they do not—they could not possibly have provided any relevant notice to Defendants 

because they did not “exist[] at the time of the alleged violation.” Okin, 577 F.3d at 433. (Never 

mind, moreover, that the Second Circuit’s unpublished summary order in Washington could not 

constitute “precedent” for purposes of establishing clearly established law. See Cerrone v. Brown, 

246 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing an unpublished decision “does not determine whether 

a right was clearly established”)).

Even if given the benefit of all available precedent today, a decade after the last alleged 

violations in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants’ actions violated 

clearly established law would likely still fail. For one, Burwell and Washington involved factual 

circumstances plainly distinguishable from the alleged violations in the Complaint. See Burwell, 

573 U.S. at 688–91 (holding that RFRA prohibited the Department of Health and Human Services 

from enforcing regulations requiring employers to provide health-insurance coverage for 
22

contraception against closely-held corporations whose owners had religious objections to 

contraception); Washington, 538 F. App’x at 26–27 (construing a pro se complaint to state a First 

Amendment retaliation claim where prison officials had allegedly denied religious services to the 

plaintiff for providing a Quran to another inmate); see also id. (observing that “the contours of the 

burden standard are not precisely drawn” for RFRA claims). 

Indeed, the only federal court to have directly addressed the claims at issue here rejected

the argument that they stated a RFRA violation. See El Ali v. Barr, 473 F. Supp. 3d 479, 527 (D. 

Md. 2020). In that case, as here, the plaintiffs claimed that “offers to act as informants for the FBI 

in exchange for resolution of their travel woes substantially burden[ed] their free exercise of 

religion,” because “their religious beliefs restrict[ed] bearing false witness and betraying the trust 

of their religious community,” and thus prohibited them from agreeing to serve as informants. Id. 

The district court held that law enforcement’s efforts to persuade the plaintiffs to serve as 

informants on their religious community members—even if accompanied by an offer of assistance 

to remove them from a watchlist—did not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. See 

id. A “mere ‘ask’ for assistance in exchange for favorable treatment,” it reasoned, “does not 

constitute a substantial burden on free exercise.” Id. The court continued:

As with all potential law enforcement informants, the relationship begins with an 

“ask,” and possible favorable treatment in exchange for helpful information. Also, 

as with many “asks,” they too begin with the potential informant having something 

to gain, and often something to lose, from saying yes. Suspects are sometimes paid 

for their testimony or “work off charges” in exchange for turning on their friends, 

coworkers, family, and community leaders. This Hobson’s choice is the same faced 

by scores of suspects who enter into cooperation agreements with the government 

on a daily basis. Plaintiffs’ choice is a variation on this theme.

Id. Finding the requests from law enforcement analogous to any number of standard requests for 

information, the court in El Ali “discern[ed] no principled reason to find the mere offer of a chance 

to cooperate as placing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion sufficient to support a RFRA 
23

violation.” Id; cf. Fikre v. FBI, 2019 WL 2030724, at *8–9 (D. Or. May 8, 2019) (expressing 

similar “concerns regarding the pleading adequacy of Plaintiff’s RFRA claim” where the 

complaint alleged that the defendants “attempted to use Plaintiff’s presence on the No-Fly List as 

leverage to coerce [him] into becoming an informant regarding activities in [his] mosque,” but 

ultimately rejecting claim on timeliness grounds).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that precedent did not clearly establish at the time of the 

alleged violations that pressuring an individual to inform on members of their religious 

community, in violation of their sincerely held beliefs, substantially burdened religious exercise 

in violation of RFRA.

B. The Statute Itself Does Not Clearly Establish that Defendants Violated RFRA

Plaintiffs alternatively insist, relying on the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Sabir v. 

Williams, 52 F.4th 51 (2d Cir. 2022), that the language of RFRA, itself, should have provided clear 

notice to the agents, such that their activity which is the subject of this action violated clearly 

established law. “Based on RFRA’s requirements” alone, they quote from Sabir, “it is not difficult 

for an official to know whether an unjustified substantial burden on religious exercise will be 

deemed reasonable.” Id. at 65 (cleaned up). 

By selectively quoting Sabir, Plaintiffs cite the case for a proposition broader than the one 

articulated by the Second Circuit. As an initial matter, Sabir concerned textbook violations of law 

clearly establishing that “preventing a prisoner from engaging in congregational prayer constitutes 

a substantial burden on the prisoner’s religious exercise.” 52 F.4th at 65 n.9; see also id. (“[W]e 

have consistently recognized that policies restricting access to group prayer impose a burden on 

prisoners’ free exercise rights.”) (citing Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993)). 

Moreover, in Sabir, unlike here, the plaintiffs specifically and repeatedly raised their religious 
24

objections to the defendant wardens’ conduct preventing them from participating in group prayer. 

See, e.g., 52 F.4th at 55–56. 

But even accepting Plaintiffs’ premise that Sabir also stands for the proposition that RFRA 

itself may, in some contexts, provide clear notice to would-be offenders, their reliance on the case 

remains unavailing. To be sure, statutory provisions in existence at the time of an individual’s 

conduct can create “fair warning” for the officer that their conduct would violate a plaintiff’s rights. 

Okin v. Village of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Department, 577 F.3d 415, 433–34 (2d Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, Sabir reasoned that there are “some contexts in which a higher degree of specificity 

is required to establish the law for purposes of qualified immunity than in others.” 52 F.4th at 65. 

“For example, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ is an 

‘abstract right[]’ because ‘it may be difficult for an officer to know whether a search or seizure 

will be deemed reasonable given the precise situation encountered.” Id. (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. 

Ct. at 1866). But the Circuit emphasized that “[n]o such concerns [were] present” in Sabir,

because, “[b]ased on RFRA’s requirements, it is not difficult for an official to know whether an 

unjustified substantial burden on religious exercise will be deemed reasonable.” Id. at 65 (cleaned 

up). “As the text of the statute itself explains: ‘Government may substantially burden a person’s 

exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a 

compelling governmental interest.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Because the prison wardens in 

Sabir denied the plaintiffs’ requests for group prayer “with no justification” whatsoever, RFRA 

itself provided clear warning that doing so—without justification—violated the law. Id. at 66. 

“Put another way, if an official substantially burdens a sincere religious exercise but cannot point 

to evidence that the application of the burden was in service of any interest—let alone a compelling 

one—the official has violated RFRA.” Id.
25

Accepting further that Defendants could have known from RFRA’s text, let alone “known 

for certain,” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1867, that their attempts to pressure Plaintiffs to inform on fellow 

Muslims “substantially burdened” their religious exercise, it cannot be said Defendants made the 

requests “with no justification,” Sabir, 52 F.4th at 66. Defendants, like the FBI and DHS more 

broadly, were actively engaged in an effort to gather intelligence related to national security in the 

aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Complaint itself acknowledges that the No Fly List 

existed to reduce “significant threats to aviation safety,” and was maintained by the TSC with the 

goal of “coordinating the government’s approach to terrorism screening.” Compl. ¶¶ 2, 20. Put 

differently, even to the extent that the Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants improperly 

burdened religious exercise, it does not allege that they did so with no justification whatsoever. 

Contra Sabir, 52 F.4th at 66 (where the wardens could not point to evidence “that the application 

of the burden was in service of any interest”). 

The text of RFRA itself is thus not dispositive to the question of whether clearly established 

law would have put Defendants on notice that their requests to Plaintiffs violated RFRA, and the 

Court must look to the state of Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent in existence at the 

time. See supra, pp. 16–21.

II. Leave to Amend

Finally, whether to grant leave to further amend a complaint is committed to the “sound 

discretion of the district court,” and may be denied when amendment would prove futile. 

McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007). For instance, “[g]ranting 

leave to amend is futile if it appears that plaintiff cannot address the deficiencies identified by the 

court and allege facts sufficient to support the claim.” Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, 

Inc., 347 F. App’x 617, 622 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiffs do not specifically seek leave for 
26

further amendment. The Court has concluded, given the state of the law at the time of the 

interactions at issue, that it was not clearly established that Defendants’ pressuring of Plaintiffs to 

inform on their fellow Muslims would have violated RFRA. Further amendment would thus be 

futile, as no amendment to the pleadings could change the state of the law then in existence. 

Accordingly, the Court thus finds dismissal with prejudice to be warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk of Court 

is respectfully directed to terminate the motions pending at docket entry 127, and to close this 

action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2023

New York, New York ________________________________

Hon. Ronnie Abrams

United States District Judge