Air University

Joseph J. Redden, Lt Gen, Commander

Air War College

Lance L. Smith, Maj Gen, Commandant

Ronald J. Kurth, PhD, Dean

Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Editor

Grant T. Hammond, PhD, Essay Series Advisor

Air University Press

Robert B. Lane, Director

Richard Bailey, PhD, Content Editor

Carolyn J. McCormack, Copy Editor

Prepress Production: Linda C. Colson

Cover Design: Daniel Armstrong

Please send inquiries or comments to:

Editor

The Maxwell Papers

Air War College

Bldg 1401

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427

Tel: (334) 953-7074

Fax: (334) 953-4028

Internet: lagrinter@max1.au.af.mil
AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Seller Beware

US International Technology Transfe

and Its Impact On National Security

Wayne M. Johnson

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 16

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

December 1998
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are s

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any US government age

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

As was the case during the cold war, the national m

tary strategy of the United States relies on technologica

superior forces to achieve our objectives when the arm

forces are called on to protect the United States and 

interests. However, as the military downsizes, preservin

technologically superior force while also maintaining a 

bust defense industrial base becomes more difficult. O

means the United States uses to preserve the indust

base is to maintain demand by selling our military goods 

other countries. While foreign military sales (FMS) alo

will not keep the US industrial base viable, they have 

come more significant than in the days of larger US 

fense procurements. In 1996, for example, FMS exceed

$10 billion. Indeed, FMS can spell the difference betwe

continued existence and bankruptcy for some of our 

fense contractors. The perceived need to sell overseas wh

safeguarding US advanced technologies appears to b

conflicting goal because of the technology transfer 

volved.

In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, US

argues that systematic tightening of interagency coope

tion and better work on defining sensitive technology p

hibitions are needed to maintain the US technologi

edge. He also maintains that the US government require

new and disciplined export control process—not the c

rent mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives t

came out of the cold war, but a process that provide

revamped, systemic approach with consistent implemen

tion. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defin

which technologies the United States is willing to trans

(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that natio

security objectives do not take a backseat to economic 

pediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better 

teragency cooperation as a first step leading to a m

centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technol

transfer and how it impacts US national security.

Recent events concerning missile technology transf

point out the timeliness of this debate. These recommen 

tions deserve to be read by a wide Department of D efe

iii
audience, as the United States evaluates its policies to 

termine if short-term interests in selling high-technol

arms to foreign countries can actually weaken rather th

strengthen our national security.

LANCE L. SMITH

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Wayne M. Johnson, USAF, is a command p

with experience in B-52s, T-38s, and B-1s. His former 

signments include a joint tour in the Strategic Target Pla

Division at US Strategic Command, and he has been 

acquisition program manager in the B-1 and F-16 Progr

Offices.

Colonel Johnson is a 1996 graduate of the Defense S

tems Management College and a 1998 graduate of the 

War College.

v
The Dilemma

America’s national military strategy relies on technolo

cally superior forces to achieve its objectives when the m

tary is called on to protect the nation and its interests. T

common strategy is to protect this technology from pot

tial adversaries and competitors. Competing with this n

to maintain technological superiority is the need to p

serve our defense industrial base, which has been redu

and consolidated due to military downsizing and the 

creased demand for military goods. Without sufficient 

mand for their products, many defense contractors can

remain in business. “Free market” forces will not s

them, because technologies that are exclusive to milit

use cannot remain viable if there is no market. 1

One procedure being used to maintain that technol

and industrial base is to encourage the sale of US milit

goods to other countries as a means to expand the mar

for US military goods. The perceived need to sell overs

and the need to safeguard technology are often at oppos

ends of the debate. In the post-cold-war era, there h

been a concern that the current policies and strateg

regarding exports are obsolete and need overhauling. 2

 

incidentally, the call for reexamining the policies is be

championed alternately by those who want export contr

and policies relaxed and those who believe we may alrea

be transferring too much sensitive technology to poten

adversaries. The question at the heart of the dilemma 

this: Can the United States maintain a technologically 

perior force while it expands the defense industrial b

beyond the needs of our military?

The debate will only become more heated in the twen

first century. According to the Defense Intelligence Agen

(DIA), competition for access or control of resources, m

kets, and technologies among major and regional pow

beyond the year 2010 will increase. 3

 The overall threa

US interests will be complicated by the proliferation of 

vanced technologies. The DIA acknowledges that k

trends in military technology have the potential to chan

the nature of warfare and the characteristics of that thre

1
Proliferation of advanced technology will have an imp

on the US economic competitive position as well as 

level of military threats to our security. Indicators mo

tored by the National Science Foundation show that 

United States can expect competition for global mar

shares to escalate. Asia, not just Japan, is expanding a

trading partner and competitor with the United State

The US technological lead in many areas, both civilian a

military, will not remain secure in the twenty-first centu

While US and Western militaries are seen to have 

edge in integrating various technologies, the greatest ch

lenge may come from rogue nations or a subnational gro

possessing a critical system or technology that provides 

asymmetrical edge or negates our advantage. 5

 This pa

examines the debate regarding whether and how to chan

current export controls and policies, discusses the curr

policies with an emphasis on how they relate to the defen

industry, and concludes by looking at the strategic ch

lenges facing the United States on technology transfer. O

strategy to deal with this world has changed, but not i

revolutionary fashion. At this point, we must look at h

the strategy has evolved from our cold war mind-set.

How the United States Got Here

The US national security strategy goals broadly outl

the role of technological advances and transfer of techn

ogy to other friendly nations. Those goals include bolst

ing America’s economic prosperity and enhancing our 

curity through the export of high-technology goods. To t

end, the United States has been largely successful. T

president proclaims the United States as a leading expor

in aviation, semiconductors, and software.6

 Yet, at 

same time, the strategy acknowledges the existence of d

gers in the technology revolution. More particularly, th

dangers include “reverse engineering” and licensed prod

tion of US goods. In preparing for the twenty-first centu

America must confront the reality that other countr

could use US technology against the United States.

US national security strategy seeks to retain our su

rior technological and military capabilities.7

 To do this, 
ministrations past and present have sought to limit acc

to sensitive equipment and technologies. Balancing t

need with overall economic and national political goals i

delicate, but necessary, task.

During the cold war, the Coordinating Committee 

Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was the main ve

cle to limit technology transfer to communist countr

Established in 1947 COCOM operated on a consensus 

sis with all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi

tion (NATO) (minus Iceland), Japan, and Australia. 8

 W

not perfect, it did limit technology transfer to potential 

versaries in the Communist bloc. When communism f

more markets opened and Western technology exports 

celerated. COCOM had lost its basic function with teleco

munications exports and the blurring of potential adv

saries.9

 The world was no longer viewed as “East vers

West.” With proposals forwarded by representatives of 

Clinton administration, the charter members agreed to d

band COCOM in 1994 and replace it with another exp

control organization. Will this new organization protect 

technology the same way that COCOM did? Is it realistic 

believe that it can?

The New Forum

The current administration’s strategy seeks to develo

replacement regime based on the Wassenaar Arrangem

(WA) on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Du

Use Goods and Technologies of 1995. 10 This new reg

will broadly focus on conventional weapons exports a

sensitive dual-use technologies.11 The founding nati

have held numerous meetings since 1995. However, 

United States did not publish an updated Department 

Commerce Commodity Control List to reflect the W

senaar Arrangement control list until January 1998, ev

though the WA was inaugurated in July 1996 so that 

control lists would be effective in November 1996. 12 T

development of this regime has been slow and is not co

plete despite ever-increasing exports of sensitive and pos

bly dangerous technologies.
The Wassenaar Arrangement, initially known as the N

Forum, has four separate elements or groups. Each gro

is assigned various functions to develop guidelines a

administration and a secretariat to run the overall N

Forum administration and the exchange of data submit

by members. The WA control lists, which include an ext

sive array of critical military technologies and goods, wo

seem to offer an excellent control mechanism for su

items. But unlike COCOM, in which other nations h

“veto power” over the export of a system or even the abi

to evaluate a licensing application before its internal 

proval, the WA operates on “national discretion.” 13 Vest

each nation with sole responsibility for determining 

exportability of a particular system or technology crea

many problems. Therefore, the United States should 

deceive itself into believing that the New Forum is a o

for-one replacement for COCOM and that it will autom

ically provide protection of leading technologies. Other 

tions have the same concerns.

For example, the approval of many exports is subject 

economic consideration as much as national security 

plications. In fact, member nations have continually 

cused the United States of putting economic interests f

in exporting computers. In other examples of potential c

flict, the United States has been concerned with the tra

fer of machine tools and data encryption. 14 Left unresolv

these and other areas of contention could undermine 

arrangement and jeopardize the WA even before it is fu

implemented.

The current US administration strategy also states t

the United States is working to harmonize national exp

control policies with international forums and agreemen

Additionally, the United States is committed to engagem

with other militaries to build coalitions. Tools used in t

engagement strategy include FMS and International M

tary Education and Training (IMET).15 Coincidentally, 

of the chief means of strengthening those relationships 

selling modern weapons compatible with US systems. T

procedure enhances interoperability and standardizat

with allies, allows formation of workable coalitions in c

of future conflicts, and maintains a good working relati
ship through military-to-military communication.16 H

ever, the US national security strategy objective 

strengthening ties with other militaries makes it difficul

harmonize internal export policies and international 

rums. Moreover, a strategy of technological superiority 

unilateral, yet both the national security strategy and 

tional military strategy assume the United States will fi

within a coalition—and that requires interoperability 

standardization. How significant is this paradox?

Technology and National Strategy

Overall, US national security strategy relies heavily 

superior technology to offset decreases in military fo

structure due to downsizing. In short, we expect our qu

ity to offset an adversary’s quantity. Put another way, 

prefer to pit firepower against manpower, much the sa

strategy we used during the cold war. The national secu

strategy seeks to maintain technological superiority of 

forces by selectively increasing the modernization fund

in some areas to field new systems as they reach the end 

their service life. This heavy reliance on technologies 

woven throughout the documents that outline the natio

military strategy.

In Joint Vision 2010 the operational concepts underl

that technologically superior equipment is essential to 

military success.17 The chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

Staff acknowledges that many potential adversaries a

possess modern technology.18 The United States expe

technology to offset smaller forces in the deterrence 

prosecution of any future conflict. This assumption i

cornerstone of our strategy for the US military as we 

proach the twenty-first century.

This strategy is not new, however. Indeed, it is much 

same as the long-standing strategy the United States h

during the cold war: the United States expected numeri

superiority enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact to be offset 

United States and allied technological superiority. T

same approach is seen as viable in the post-cold-war e

Instead of large force-on-force numbers, the US milit

will rely on new technologies and concepts to win any 
ture conflict.19 Nonetheless, this advantage of technolo

cally superior US military capabilities to establish natio

directives is not without complications and drawbacks.

One complication arises from the need to include al

and coalitions into future military planning. In this ca

one of the main strategies is sharing US technology w

these allies. For example, allies as well as our Air For

Navy, and Marines Corps can purchase such new weapo

systems as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 20 With a plan

first delivery by fiscal year 2008, the JSF is one of the fi

major weapons systems being designed for completion 

the twenty-first century. Its development will repres

leading-edge technology. Another concern is in the inf

mation arena, where the Defense Intelligence Agency (D

estimates that increased foreign military space capabilit

will erode the relative advantage the United States has 

satellite communications, surveillance, and navigation o

the next decade.21 Recent concerns regarding satellite te

nology transfer to China and its possible military use h

made this DIA estimate even more timely. 22

An additional challenge highlights the need to maint

a viable defense industrial base in light of downsized 

military procurement. From 1985 to 1997 US defense p

curement decreased by more than 60 percent. 23 In term

lost experience, an estimated 2.5 million defense work

have been laid off from the beginning of the defense dra

down.24 A viable, robust defense industrial base provide

means to procure the technologically superior weapo

America needs to control unit costs. This article will sh

that maintaining industrial base, controlling costs, a

protecting technology are independent but interrelated f

tors.

The Stakes

In the post-cold-war environment, US military strat

hinges on fielding superior operational capability while 

ducing the life-cycle costs of the weapon. 25 To manage 

US defense industrial base to maintain its viability, 

United States must strike a delicate balance betwe

downward budget pressures and obtaining the technolo
cally superior weapons it needs at an affordable cost. In 

unconstrained market, costs would be lowered by hig

unit production, but US military requirements are decre

ing. In addition, technology transfer from the United Sta

could be strictly controlled (i.e., very limited) if that is 

deed the only consideration. If unit costs were not a fact

the industrial base could be maintained more easily 

simply keeping the production line open, but near id

However, unit costs are a factor, so this is not a via

option. A systematic, strategic approach is required to b

ance the declining defense budget, the defense indust

base, and the role of FMS in supporting that industrial bas 

US Defense Industrial Base

With US military downsizing, the US defense indus

looks to foreign military sales and direct commercial sa

(DCS)26 as an important means to stay in business. As 

military budget shrinks, the only way to lower the u

costs of newly acquired systems is to amortize the set

and development costs over a proportionally larger num

of units. Just as the cost of the first 20 television s

would have been astronomical if they had been the o

ones produced, the costs associated with producing 20 B

bombers are prohibitive by most measures in the po

cold-war era. The problem then is how to maintain 

industrial base capable of sustaining a technologically 

perior military.

Declining Defense Budget

There is no foreseeable relief in the constrained si z

the defense budget. Over the past 10 years, the Air Fo

budget authority for procurement has declined an aver

of 9.1 percent each year.27 While the security threat rema

uncertain in a multipolar world, the defense-spending tr

continues its downward spiral. According to Dr. P

Kaminski, former undersecretary of defense for acqu

tion and technology, the US defense industrial sector w 

decrease another 10 percent (in dollars) before bottom

out in the next few years. 28 Clearly, US military requ
ments alone will not generate enough production to s

tain America’s aerospace industrial base.

The Use of Foreign Military Sales

To reach the goals of cost-effective weapons systems, 

United States is looking toward FMS and DCS. The Uni

States has three well-grounded reasons for seeking co

erative arms efforts with its allies. 29 First, these progra

will help to strengthen military and industrial relationsh

that bring nations together. Second, any future conflict w

most likely involve coalition forces that require interop

able equipment and logistics needs. Third, FMS will al

the United States to maintain its industrial base. Acco

ing to Dr. Kaminski, “What we cannot afford individua

may be affordable with a common effort.” 30 Finally, ther

the challenge of keeping production lines open. US defen

contractors have depended on a consistent size and 

quency of US military procurement to survive. With 

number and frequency of these purchases diminishi

these contractors must look to modification work and 

ternational sales to survive; without it many compan

would fail.

Dual-use technologies offer a unique set of opportunit

and problems. The Defense Department is increasingly 

pendent on commercial and dual-use technologies, pr

ucts, and processes. Because technological advances 

increasing rapidly, the commercial sector is ahead of p

military applications in many areas, including electron

computers, information processing, and communi

tions.31 Developing the technology in a laboratory is not 

sole concern. In a technology-rich environment, fut

military success will gravitate towards the nation that ca

talizes on commercial as well as military technology a

rapidly incorporates advances into fielded weapons s

tems.32 The speed with which a nation can integrate su

advances may be the critical element in deterring conf

or, failing that, achieving victory.

What is at stake as America copes with this aspect of 

post-cold-war environment is how to maintain a viable 

fense industrial base while not transferring technology t
could be used against the United States or could negat

technological advantage. While a cooperative strategy 

designing and procuring weapons systems has clear 

vantages, the loss of a bipolar world has complicated 

ability of the United States to employ existing safegua

against unintentional transfer of sensitive technology. 

turn this situation has rendered obsolete many assum

tions regarding technology control.

Given that outcome, we must ask, are current sa

guards enough to protect US technology and interests

believe the answer is no, and a review of the present c

trols and some problems presented by the multipolar wo

provides an idea of the strategic course the United Sta

needs to pursue.

Conflicting Policy Objectives

Revealing or uncovering controlled military informat

is called disclosure.33 Information disclosure can oc

through various means, including licensed product

(sometimes called coproduction), cooperative research a

development (R&D), discussions, visits, professional m

ings and technical publications, and DCS or FMS. 34 For t

context, our focus will be DCS, FMS, and coproduction.

Items determined to have a military application fall i

two categories. The State Department licenses munitio

items, the first category, for release. The second categ

includes dual-use items that have both commercial a

military applications. The Commerce Department mana

these items under its Control List, which falls under 

Export Administration Act. While both categories h

similar functions, they are governed by different regu

tions. The State and Commerce Departments approach 

question of releasability (disclosure) for these categor

with different mind-sets.

The primary authority governing the State Departmen

release of technology is the Arms Export Control 

(AECA), as amended. The AECA directs the State Depa

ment to use export controls primarily to protect US 

tional interests. The State Department also applies the 

ternational Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) a
establishes the munitions list with Defense Departm

concurrence. This authority protects the US military te

nological advantage and can be exercised without cons

eration of economic or commercial interests. 35 Within 

changing world environment, technology transfer has a

assumed increased importance as a political instrume

Therefore, the State Department sees FMS as a fore

policy tool instead of viewing it primarily as an econom

tool.36

In contrast to the national security focus of the St

and Defense Departments, the Commerce Departm

weighs primarily economic and trade considerations alo

with national security concerns in determining whether 

release products and technology to international custo

ers. It uses the Export Administration Act to control 

export of dual-use items. While Commerce Departm

controls are also designed to protect national security, t

are targeted at controlling exports to specific countries, 

cluding China, instead of broadly controlling a particu

technology to export.37 The differing decision-mak

strategies of the State and Defense Departments as 

posed to the Commerce Department create uncertainty 

garding the consistency of decisions. They also highli

the importance of whether an item is “dual-use” (as det

mined by the Commerce Department) or “military” (as 

termined by State with Defense concurrence). 38 Occasi

ally, the State Department will have jurisdiction o

particularly sensitive technologies that Commerce cons

ers dual-use. However, the influence of the State Depa

ment in this regard may be decreasing. Control by 

Commerce Department over aircraft engine hot sectio

(critical to high-performance aircraft) and communicati

satellites are recent examples where control of technolog

with a clear military application was taken from the St

and Defense Departments and handled by the Comme

Department.

Export control of dual-use items has been a matter 

jurisdictional contention between the State Departm

and the Commerce Department for years. As the defen

technology base declines, the resistance by some in ind

try to State Department control (that is, limiting disse
nation) of dual-use technologies is mounting. 39 Additi

ally, some problems have occurred in highly sensitive te

nology transfers because of these unclear jurisdiction a

interagency control issues. The Commerce and Defense 

partments have disagreed over dual-use items as well.

One of the most sensitive and critical technologies 

Air Force will rely upon in the twenty-first century will 

superiority in radar-evading stealth technology. Just 

importantly, the US military relies on enemy forces lack

the stealth technology that would negate our advanta

Stealth designs incorporate shapes, structures, materi

and processes that counter an enemy’s ability to det

and locate US combat aircraft. The US lead in stealth te

nology is a critical element in our policy to offset quan

with smaller, more capable forces. The Government 

counting Office (GAO) reported in May 1995 that “lax 

port controls and unclear jurisdiction at federal agenc

may put sensitive stealth technology into the hands of f

eign governments, enabling them to build weapons capa

of evading detection by US radar systems.” 40 This rep

highlights the danger of differing positions and intent c

cerning technology transfer and national security. T

GAO found that the Commerce Department’s rules for 

ferral of applications requests to other agencies did 

require either State or Defense review on several key ca

gories of stealth technology.

In essence, different criteria and lists increase the pos

bility for mistakes in technology transfer. By not mand

ing Defense involvement in the review process, the re

tionship between technology and national security may 

unrecognized, possibly compromising US stealth adv

tages. This problem is not a new one, and evidence s

gests it is getting worse.

The recent concerns over the export of missile and ot

technologies to China have also pointed to possible flaws 

the current system. The problem of economic conside

tions in conflict with national security concerns is evid

in the Loral-China connection. While Congress and oth

are investigating, the United States must ask if the co

mercial strategy of opening foreign markets to high-te

nology goods has been overshadowed by the specter 
creating national threats. Many analysts, within as well 

outside the government, are reported to believe it ha

The problem is not a simple question of whether that te

nology given to China’s satellite program could have a d

use. The question to be asked is this: Could unforese

proliferation, within China and from China to a third cou

try, lead to damage to US security interests that could 

prevented? Reports claim that the May 1998 nuclear de

nations in Pakistan were accomplished with assista

from China.42 Out of concern for US national security, 

House of Representatives quickly voted to ban further s

ellite technology transfers to China, for fear that such te

nology could find its way to Pakistan, one of China’s c

tomers for military hardware.43

The issue is complicated by the fact that much of w

transferred is dual use. The control over satellite technol

was taken from the State Department and given to the Co

merce Department in December 1995 by executive orde

The Central Intelligence Agency reports that the technol

is similar to that used in satellite launches and ballis

missiles.45 With the technology being the same for milit

and commercial uses, the overall strategy needs to be c

tralized. Can the current safeguards be adjusted to fix it?

Inside the Defense Department, the Defense Technol

Security Agency (DTSA) handles export policy. For the p

several years, DTSA has been working with the Sta

Commerce, and Defense Departments to strike a bala

between national security and the economic needs of 

nation’s defense industry to export.46 DTSA reviews 

export application (received from either from State or Co

merce) and forwards it to the affected service(s) and 

intelligence community for review. For many items, su

as electronic warfare items, the vast array of foreign pol

concerns and system capabilities makes it impossible 

implement a uniform export control policy. 47 Case-by-c

decisions on export releasability vary according to cou

tries and systems, making the review process complex a

at the same time, subject to error. Additionally, indus

has been pressing DTSA for relief from restrictions t

some companies believe are too proscriptive. 48
Within the Commerce, State, and Defense Departme

there are a mosaic of rules, guidelines, objectives, and p

spectives. To a defense industry trying to compete in 

tough international marketplace, the array of export bod

and regulations can be confusing and time consumi

With two regimes (munitions items controlled by the St

Department and dual-use items controlled by the Co

merce Department), exporters must determine un

which list their export item falls. When there is confusi

the exporter can ask State or Commerce to determine co

modity jurisdiction. Since State controls are generally m

restrictive than Commerce controls, an exporter could 

ply to Commerce to obtain license approval.

In summary, the competing views of the Commerce, D

fense, and State Departments have created a possible v

uum in US policy dealing with technology transfer a

national security. This view is not to suggest that the 

partments are not concerned with national security issu

only that they have differing views and perspectives. T

main purpose of the Commerce Department is expand

and promoting trade. The State Department has exp

enced pressures both for and against the transfer of te

nology as a political tool. The Defense Department is m

concerned with limiting technology transfer that could 

set the United States’ qualitative advantage on future b

tlefields. While all three departments have important ro

to play, they often work at cross-purposes. The differ

control systems are complex, but complexity does not n

essarily mean safer and greater effectiveness. As the co

plexity increases, the chances of a department accidenta

exporting some process, technology, or system does 

decrease. In fact, the chances of a department makin

mistake frequently increase, and additional costs are 

volved. As the saying goes, in business, time is mon

Complying with these complex sets of rules costs bu

nesses time and money, particularly when a company d

not know the appropriate controlling agency. Not only c

this lack of knowledge be wasteful, it can cause a compa

to lose its all-important competitive edge.

Contradiction and Competition
As the United States exports military hardware, it m

actually be building competition as well as selling pr

ucts. That contradictory scenario causes competition 

tween US firms and the foreign companies they create. T

United States must weigh the benefits and drawbacks 

its policy more fully. Pressures exist to expand the exp

market for the US defense industry. In June 1996, 

example, Dr. Kaminski reported to a meeting of the NA

Workshop on Political-Military Decision-making in W

saw, Poland, that someone needed to address the inter

tional environment for armaments cooperation. He sta

that the Defense Science Board (DSB) has been tasked 

help prepare the United States for the twenty-first centu

The DSB will identify methods to ensure effective two-w

access (between United States and its allies) to critical m

tary technologies, methods to assure maximum use 

commercial advances, and methods to develop a model 

twenty-first-century armaments cooperation among all

The challenge will enable the United States to create co

eration that preserves effective competition among ind

tries in different countries.49 This will be a difficult task.

Defense downsizing is widespread and is affecting m

kets worldwide. Indeed, competition among nations to 

arms in the global marketplace is creating a “buyer’s m

ket.” Consequently, many nations with smaller technol

bases are demanding a piece of the ever-decreasing 

fense industry pie. In their quest to carve out or preserv

military industry for their own country, these nations s

coproduction agreements with US contractors as an “

set” for doing business in their country. An offset is a fo

of industrial compensation a company offers for that cou

try’s defense-related purchase by either FMS or DCS. 

production is a specific type of offset where a portion of 

weapons system is manufactured outside the Uni

States. For aircraft manufacture, this may mean that 

wings, portions of the engines, or certain avionics 

manufactured, under license, in the foreign country. A m

jor downside to this arrangement occurs when the F

agreement merchandises not only the product but also 

process by which the product is made. This procedure 
lows the United States to lose some control over the we

ons system manufacturing process.50

An example of coproduction is the ultimate US jet figh

for export, the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Designed as an exp

fighter and a mainstay for the US Air Force, the F-16 or

nally was coproduced in the United States and in NA

Europe. Later, as FMS was emphasized and expanded, 

F-16 was coproduced in countries as diverse as Korea a

Turkey. This type of technology transfer is becoming co

mon and may be the wave of the future. Coproduction m

encourage countries to invest in the American defense 

dustry. However, a US firm clearly will benefit less wh

for example, half of a fighter is built overseas, instead 

having the entire aircraft manufactured in the Uni

States. Concerns have surfaced recently over coproduct

offsets. In 1996 the Commerce Department’s undersec

tary for export administration, William Reinsch, ackn

ledged a tentative effort by the United States to rest

the use of these types of offsets i n international ar

exports. In May 1996 Secretary Reinsch told a defe

trade publication that growing demand in the Middle E

and Asia for technology transfer could result in long-te

problems for US industry by creating foreign competition

The irony of offsets is that the technology transfer t

makes many transactions possible today could put 

companies at a distinct disadvantage tomorrow. 52

A more insidious technology transfer involves softwa

As pressures to expand FMS continue, some foreign c

tomers are demanding access to the software used to 

velop the system (source code) as well as the software us

in the weapons system (object code) that traditionally h

been supplied. When a foreign country receives sou

code as a form of technology transfer, it then possesses 

only the product but the process as well. A foreign cou

needs a source code for many future changes in the a

craft capabilities and to correct discrepancies in its curr

operation. When a change to the aircraft software is 

quired, the change is accomplished by using the sou

code in a development center called a software main

nance facility.53 Once changes are made in the sou
code, which engineers can read, it is translated into obj

code, which is used by the weapon system.

In response to increased demand for this capability, 

policy may allow more aviation source code to be given 

or sold to friendly nations.54 In the case of aircraft avion

software, a country possessing the source code, main

nance facility, and trained personnel required to mod

source code could incorporate changes without US 

proval or assistance. One software change could add we

ons not intended by the United States, or even those not 

the US inventory when the aircraft was sold to a fore

country. For example, the country could add an air-to-s

capability that was previously denied. Or, it could add 

integrated electronic warfare system that could threa

US forces. The safeguards placed in the FMS process m

or may not cover these unintended consequences, wh

could change the complexion of the sale. Another examp

a defensive system could be given an offensive capabi

and range, and munitions loads could be enhanced. Wh

safeguards remain in place, the shift in emphasis allow

source code sales inevitably permits a proliferation of s

ware source code transfer.

In the face of these developments, the United Sta

should not deceive itself by trusting the effectiveness 

these safeguards. Hardware and software are difficult 

keep secure in the first place. A recent purchase of sup

computers by nuclear weapons labs in the Commonwea

of Independent States (CIS) provides a painful reminder 

how difficult it is to regulate technology transfer. Whe

balance between national security and economic comme

is attempted, the rules sometimes become confusing. Ci

ian customers (in CIS) can buy high-performance comp

ers without going through the expensive licensing proce

However, these customers cannot use these computers 

a nuclear weapons facility without US government 

proval and a strict licensing review.

According to recent reports, the Commonwealth of In

pendent States apparently circumvented these guideli

and installed 16 IBM computers in the closed city 

Arzamaz-16, where CIS had designed their hydrog

bomb. The United States is investigating the situation, b
Moscow has refused to allow investigators to interview a

CIS witnesses, under the guise of national security. T

administration relaxed these supercomputer export c

trols in 1995. However, anxiety over these recent sale

and a grand jury investigation into their legality—may s

a crackdown and greater scrutiny. This interest comes 

late in this case. The IBM computers, along with comp

ers sold earlier by Silicon Graphics under similar circu

stances, have not been retrieved. Questions have surfa

regarding whether some of the computers are even loca

in the Commonwealth of Independent States. 55

As alarming as this case is, some proponents of liber

ized trade are fighting efforts to restrict exports of co

puter technology. According to Commerce Undersecret

Reinsch, the administration is not happy with propo

congressional actions, since they would include a 180-d

review period. Such industry experts as John Scheib

vice president and general counsel for the Computer a

Communications Industries Association, fear the rest

tions and 180-day review period would prove advantage

for US competitors.56 Policy on release of the most sensi

source code is being studied on a case-by-case bas is.57

Even with all the new emphasis on FMS, will it prese

the strength of the US industry base? Notwithstanding 

implications of technology transfer, the current empha

on FMS leaves open the question whether arms sales c

help to preserve the defense industrial base.

FMS may not cure defense downsizing, but they lo

large in the US defense industry’s future. In 1993 F

sales were a staggering $32.4 billion. Although fore

military sales have declined in the past three years, 

1996 they were $10.5 billion, making these sales a sign

cant factor in US defense industry planning. 58 Nevert

less, even at that number, projected FMS will not offset 

American and European cuts in defense acquisition spe

ing.59 The good news tells us that the projected sales w

allow a more gradual decline, giving the United Sta

some much-needed time to review its options.

Many officials in government and industry do not se

national security concern with increased sales of hi

technology weaponry to foreign governments. For examp
sales of the F-4 and F-14 to Iran in the late 1970s are of

cited as proof that safeguards are effective. Therefo

when the Shah was overthrown in 1979, Iran had sta

of–the-art armament.

Here, the Achilles’ heel of the Iranian Air Force (a

what is held up as evidence that FMS safeguards work

was Iranian dependence on the United States for sp

parts and maintenance.60 However, we should not tot

rely on this lesson on how safeguards worked. Other cou

tries have learned this lesson also. FMS and DCS agr

ments now include provisions for maintenance and sp

parts, giving the FMS customer increased sustaining ca

bility. In cases involving several F-16 FMS program

where intrinsic depot capability is being added, depe

ence on continuous US support (and perhaps enhan

ments) is decreased even more dramatically. As fore

governments’ dependence on US support decreases, 

does US leverage.61

US industries are not the only areas of concern rega

ing technology transfer that have hurt our national se

rity. Perhaps the most political concern was the Japan

and Norwegian sale of advanced milling machine equ

ment to the former Soviet Union in the 1980s. This equ

ment allowed the Soviets to build quieter nuclear subm

rines that were more difficult for the United States 

detect.62 Another, less publicized, case was the Dutch s

of night-vision equipment to Iraq just four months bef

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.63 International agreements a

organizations can counter some of these sales, but 

United States must start the countermovement by sear

ing its own soul. America must continually ask itself if 

short-term interest in selling high-technology arms t

foreign country can weaken our national security rat

than strengthen it.

A Natural Conflict between

Marketing and Security

In looking at any potential transfer of technology, 

must keep in mind the objectives of the safeguards alrea

in place. This observation comes as industry and ma
government officials press for “reform” of such safegua

and policies. The debate is fierce, the stakes are high.

The cost of R&D resources required to field advan

technology weapons quickly could become cost-prohibit

For example, the original plan to buy more than 100 B

made the more than $30 billion in R&D justifiable to o

cials at the Pentagon. In the post-cold-war era, the cos

the 21 B-2s actually manufactured make the case for th

who say new weapons are too expensive. Spreading hi

technology R&D costs over the production of numerica

significant production lowers the overall unit product

costs.64 The B-2 unit cost more than quadrupled after 

number to be purchased was cut, with some estima

showing the B-2 aircraft costing $2.2 billion a copy. T

defense industry typically pushes overseas sales to g

economies of scale. Although no one is advocating sell

B-2s abroad, we must consider candidates in other s

tems, subsystems, and technologies.

Nowhere is the debate more important than in the a

of electronic warfare (EW). Many in the EW industry cla

that US rules are placing US defense industries at a dis

vantage in the world marketplace. Countries employ

American EW systems want to have access to the softw

source code so they can make changes to their threat da

base without having to rely on the United States. 65 

across-the-board review of software release policies p

viously mentioned is being extended to EW software. 66

In understanding the impact on national security, 

should ask two questions. First, are US defense industr

being blocked from competing with foreign countries? S

ond, if not blocked, what obstacles exist to inhibit US 

fense industries from competing in the international m

ket? It appears the perception of the Department 

Defense (DOD) regarding blocking arms sales is false. 

cording to Dave Tarbell, director of the Defense Technol

Security Agency, DOD rejected only 3 percent of the mu

tions cases and 9 percent of the dual-use cases it review

in 1994.67 If this data is accurate, does industry hav

basis for complaints?

According to some industry analysts, perhaps one pr

lem lies with the US defense industry’s culture since 
late 1940s. During the cold war, the US military provide

large, ready market for high-technology hardware and s

ware. US industries came to depend on this stable mark

This dependency has left US defense industries ill prepa

to compete in the small-scale international market. 68 E

so, in the EW international marketplace, US firms cont

an estimated 70 percent of the market share. 69 This sh

results from the large number of US systems curren

fielded by the United States and its allies and not based 

the control policies in place.

The other problem lies in the maze of rules and 

decentralized focus between the Commerce, Defense, a

State Departments. As pointed out, the confusion that 

sults can hinder US businesses and slow the review p

cess, but it will not limit undesired technology transfer.

A Look to the Future

Many challenges are associated with the change from 

bipolar to a multipolar world. The United States can

define a single adversary, nor should it assume gove

ments that are allies and “like governments” today w

remain that way. Sometimes it is necessary to comp

with one’s allies and even cooperate with one’s adversar

National interests remain relatively constant, but al

come and go. As Germany and Japan illustrated ear

this century, allies can change places rather quickly.

Where the United States Is Today

Democratic reversals are not unknown in history. Exa

ples include the overthrow of the liberal Italian governm

in the 1920s and the democratic Weimar Republic in G

many in the 1930s. The aborted coup attempt in the Sov

Union in August 1991 reminds us that the United Sta

needs to protect its technological edge. 70 Many foreign c

tomers of US firms need military assistance for the sa

reasons that make technology transfer a concern. Th

governments exist in an unstable environment.

With the demise of COCOM and rise of the Wassen

Arrangement, attempts to reach international agreeme
on technology transfer have become complex. The WA d

not yield the same discipline or the control as did previo

agreements. More players and thus more disagreeme

are present in the new environment. Since the new 

rangement does not require any member country to ho

another member country’s denial to export a technolo

there is no real control nor any way to circumvent denia

This arrangement makes it imperative that each mem

country coordinate and approve any move to deny techn

ogy transfers by the other countries. US attempts to imp

ment a stronger policy have failed so far. Therefore, 

United States cannot simply impose its will on the ot

members.

What the United States Needs to Do

What the United States needs to do falls broadly i

two categories, domestic and international. Domestica

the United States needs to work towards a strong, cent

focus. The differing guidelines among State, Defense, a

Commerce can confuse industry. Additionally, this syst

offers incentives for exporters to apply to the Comme

Department on items not controlled by the State Depa

ment and not reviewed by the Defense Department due 

broader guidelines for approval. Therefore, the Uni

States needs to pull back dual-use technologies under o

organization. Because of the national security issues 

volved, I recommend this organization be an interagen

group headed by the State Department. There are sur

political as well as technical concerns involved in imp

menting this recommendation. I do not want to sugg

that Commerce and Defense are not capable of impleme

ing balanced controls over critical technologies. But 

Commerce Department and the Defense Department ea

has its own philosophy; and none of the philosophies c

rently appears to hold an answer to where the ultim

responsibility should lie. Many of the rules that Comme

uses to limit distribution of technology are based on 

bipolar world. The current bureaucracy with the dual-u

items controlled by the Commerce Department may well 

our Achilles’ heel.
Controlling items simply by initial destination is not 

fective in a post-cold-war environment. International tr

today means that once a technology leaves the country, 

United States has limited control over its destination 

use. We may attempt to impose restrictions on the sale 

exported items to third countries, but we have had li

success when it comes to processes and subcomponen

There is little we can do to enforce our intentions once 

technology has left our hands. Licensing decisions ma

on narrow evaluation factors have a great potential for 

ing shortsighted. The State Department adds its own b

to the process. If it becomes exceedingly difficult to h

the State Department head up this effort, then anot

alternative would be for a separate forum of decision-m

ers from different agencies to resolve contentious issu

and oversee the process. In any event, interagency co

eration must be strengthened to ensure a balanced foc

with national security as a paramount consideration.

The United States cannot take the same strategy used 

the cold war and apply it to today’s environment. Becau

of the number of licenses and the level of effort, the ove

strategy needs a fresh look. Defense industry participat

is crucial, but the US strategy cannot be based solely 

economic issues. In many cases technology transfer agr

ments are conditions of the sale. In aerospace/defense, 

vast majority of offset agreements require technol

transfer, often as much as 50 percent or more of the 

set.71

Clearly, there are political hurdles to overcome in dev

oping a centralized control under the supervision of 

State Department, but we need to work in that directi

The Defense Department, and specifically DTSA, need

larger role in the review process of FMS, DCS, and du

use sales.

Better interagency cooperation using today’s structur

a good first step, but should the United States stop the

According to Dave Tarbell, director of DTSA, the Uni

States must continue to have a disciplined export cont

process, and legislation must maintain the flexibility of 

Executive Branch in dealing with controls and limits ba

on the changing environment.72 This is good, but 
United States must ask if the strategy has a serious fla

According to an Executive Branch working group’s ini

report on “Issues and Policy in International Technolog

the government does not “have a comprehensive und

standing of the effects on US national interests” of techn

ogy transfer.73 Industry participation in any new strateg

essential, but inherent dangers must be recognized. Ind

try will be concerned primarily with its business base. 

should not expect industries to police themselves exc

sively, for they cannot be the lone driving force in det

mining how technology transfer affects national secur

There are some good reasons to permit certain technol

transfers, and to deny others, both for our interests a

the interests of our allies. Central control, with a strate

view, needs to be the long-term domestic goal.

Internationally, the United States needs to work w

members of the WA to develop tighter controls and 

means to police the agreements. The WA will not guaran

that technology transfer will not occur that is adverse 

the United States and its allies, since each member cou

try may have a different view of the relative importance 

the technology. Therefore, the United States must deve

a complete strategy to determine which technologies 

worth protecting and work with the international comm

nity to harmonize various meanings regarding “very sen

tive” technologies. While the development of various “lis

is important, it does not provide a solution to the proble

This is particularly true if member nations do not all v

the lists with the same vigilance in their controls of te

nology.

The rapid pace of technology advances and the incre

ingly complicated world of dual-use technologies mak

imperative that our technology transfer strategy contin

to evolve. No country can maintain an edge in all techno

gies. The United States must identify those technolog

most critical to maintaining its military edge and th

maintain superiority in industries involved with th

technologies.74 This strategy will provide us with ch

points to control the spread of technologies that can aff

national security. To make those choke points viable, 

strategy must include other members of the WA.
While one key will be whether Defense has a voice 

controlling military arms and dual-use technologies, ot

pressures will be felt within the Defense Department. T

secretary of defense has issued strong guidance on int

national armaments cooperation to achieve sta

ardization among “possible” coalition partners and to lev

age US resources through cost sharing and economies 

scale in weapons systems programs.75 A critical question 

how much influence Defense holds over export controls.

A Final Word

The future involves more bilateral and multilateral 

maments cooperation because partnerships will be ess

tial. Fewer nations and companies can afford to stay 

business or build expensive, but infrequently purchas

defense systems. US military downsizing also will mean 

increased likelihood of joint or coalition operations as 

budgets decrease and threats become varied in the m

tipolar environment.76 Teaming, collaborations, merge

and acquisitions are becoming increasingly common 

aerospace defense.

The fact remains that the lack of a single, well-defin

enemy in the post-cold-war era will make it difficult for 

US government to justify large expenditures that influe

the US defense industry. Clearly, free market forces alo

will be insufficient to save the defense industrial bas

Foreign military sales will remain an important part of 

overall US strategy.

The US government needs to shape the debate by lo

ing at ways to define what technologies (military and d

use) we are willing to transfer and ensure that natio

security objectives are not given a back seat to econom

expediency. We must strengthen our national security 

seeking international agreements to regulate technol

transfers and arms sales. Most of all, we must continua

evaluate the environment and shape our strategy based 

the future and not solely on past decisions. Modification 

cold war methodologies may be insufficient or ineffective

Is it time to streamline our internal labyrinth of contr

and centralize oversight and policy responsibilities? C
tral control under the State Department could be effect

if direction from the Executive Branch addressed the 

sues brought out in this paper. This would be a ma

undertaking. But a central voice, providing “one-stop sh

ping” for allies and US industry alike for answers and p

icy guidance, would enhance our ability to control techn

ogy transfer to meet national objectives of economic a

military security. The fact that a certain technology can 

transferred does not suggest that it should be transferre

Is the current technology review and export control s

tem broken? The COCOM regime has ended, but the W

senaar Arrangement does not provide a total replaceme

In the void between the two, critical technologies can f

to potential competitors and adversaries. The United Sta

cannot afford the road of inaction. The small cuts 

United States suffers now could soon be a hemorrha

Even when completely implemented, the Wassenaar 

rangement will not protect our technology edge. Peaceti

vigilance in this area is a fundamental aspect of milit

preparedness. We can ill afford to export the means of o

future defeat.

Notes

1. Dual-use technologies with both commercial and military app

tions are more survivable in a free market, but they create concerns 

proliferation if sold to potential adversaries.

2. Dave Tarbell, “Export Control Policies,” The DISAM Journal, 

1995, 13.

3. Lt Gen Patrick M. Hughes, USA, director, Defense Intellige

Agency, “A DIA Global Security Assessment,” The DISAM Journal, S

mer 1997, 91.

4. Frank H. T. Rhodes, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1

(Washington, D.C.: National Science Board, Government Printing Of

1996), 6–30.

5. Hughes, 97.

6. Executive Office of the President, A National Security Strategy f

New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997), ii.

7. Ibid., 1.

8. Richard F. Grimmett, “Military Technology and Conventional W

ons Export Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement,” Congressio

Research Service, 23 April 1996, 1.

9. Ibid., 2.

10. Executive Office, 8.

11. Grimmett, 3.
12. This information was provided by the Institute for Defense An

sis (IDA), Washington, D.C., in response to several questions posed by 

author.

13. Norman D. Jorstad, director, Technology Identification and An

ses Center, “Multinational Activities to Establish the Wassen

Arrangement on Export Controls,” Institute for Defense Analysis 1 (M

1997): II-28–29.

14. IDA.

15. Jorstad, 17.

16. Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition 

Technology, “The FY 1997 DOD Acquisition and Technology Progra

The DISAM Journal, Summer 1996, 89.

17. Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

1997), 11.

18. Ibid.

19. Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force (W

ington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, 1997), 3.

20. Air Force Issues Book, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Government P

ing Office [GPO], 1997), 62.

21. Hughes, 97.

22. Ronald Brownstein et al., “Red Scare?” U.S. News & World Re

8 June 1998, 20.

23. William J. Del Grego, The Diffusion of Military Technologie

Foreign Nations (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Stud

Air Command and Staff College, March 1996), 4.

24. Ibid., 3.

25. Kaminski, 80.

26. Direct commercial sales refers to commercial sales, under lice

directly to a foreign country, without the US procurement commu

managing the program as a “middleman” between industry and the 

eign government.

27. “Air Force Almanac 1997,” Air Force Magazine, May 1997, 42.

28. Paul G. Kaminski, “US Perspective on Defense Industrial B

Trends,” The DISAM Journal, Winter 1996/97, 96.

29. Kaminski, “Acquisition and Technology,” 89.

30. Ibid., 89.

31. Kaminski, “US Perspective,” 93.

32. Ibid.

33. Katherine V. Schinasi, Defense Industry: Trends in DOD Spend

Industrial Productivity, and Competition, GAO Report (Washington, D

General Accounting Office, 31 January 1997), 20.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 5.

36. The Clinton administration has reaffirmed foreign military s

(FMS) as a “legitimate instrument of US foreign policy,” making it a too

the State Department. See The Management of Security Assistance, 

ed. (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assista

Management, April 1996), 30–31.

37. Schinasi, 13.

38. Ibid., 6.
39. Ibid., 18.

40. David E. Cooper, director, Acquisition Policy, Technology, 

Competitiveness Issues, Export Controls: Concerns Over Stealth-Rel

Exports, GAO Report NSIAD-95-140 (Washington, D.C.: General Acco

ing Office, 10 May 1995).

41. Several months ago a US congressional committee began an 

vestigation into the selling of sensitive rocketry data by the L

Corporation to the Peoples Republic of China under a US governm

license. See Robert S. Greenberger, Jackie Calmes, and John Harw

“Shaken New World,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 May1998, 1; Washin

Post, 25 June 1998; and New York Times, 18 September 1998.

42. Robert Keatley, “How the Subcontinent Got the Bomb,” The 

Street Journal, 29 May 1998, A13.

43. Greenberger, 1.

44. Brian Duffy and Thomas Ricks, “Probe of Loral Aid to China C

Light on Clinton Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 May 1998, A16.

45. The Associated Press, “CIA: China’s Launchers, Missiles Simi

USA Today, 22 May 1998, 1.

46. Kaminski, “Acquisition and Technology,” 34.

47. Ibid., 36.

48. Zachary A. Lum, “Let the Walls Come Tumbling Down?” Journ

Electronic Defense, March 1995, 38.

49. Kaminski, “Acquisition and Technology,” 95.

50. Del Grego, 32.

51. In 1994 more than 40 percent of FMS sales were offset obl

tions. The trend is up from 35 percent in 1993. See Theresa Hitch

“U.S. Offset Initiative Leaves Allies Cold,” Defense News, 3–9 June 1

33.

52. Grant T. Hammond, Countertrade, Offsets and Barter in Inte

tional Political Economy (London: Pinter Publications, Ltd., 1990), 57.

53. The use of the term maintenance facility is misleading. The 

ware doesn’t wear out or require maintenance. The facility is used 

“modify” and test the software before loading it on an aircraft.

54. R. Noel Longuemare, memorandum, subject: Guidelines on In

national Transfers on Software Documentation (including source cod

April 1997, 2.

55. Jeff Gerth and Michael R. Gordon, “Russian Nuclear Lab Eva

Rules to Get Computers,” New York Times, 27 October 1997, 1.

56. Michael S. Lelyveld, “Computer Industry Wants Curbs Veto

Journal of Commerce, 28 October 1997, 3.

57. Lum, 34.

58. DSAA Comptroller, Financial Policy Division Report, 30 Septem

1996, 1.

59. James Miskel, “Domestic Industry and National Security,” St

gic Review, Fall 1991, 23.

60. Del Grego, 25.

61. Lum, 36.

62. Miskel, 26.

63. Ibid.
64. Barry M. Blechman and Ivan Oelrich, “B-2 Stealth Bomber C

in Perspective,” Strategic Review, Winter 1996, 7–16.

65. Lum, 34.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 38.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., 41.

70. Miskel, 24.

71. Hammond, 84–85.

72. Tarbell, 13.

73. Briefing, Meeting of the Committee for National Security Work

Group on Issues and Policy in International Technology for the Natio

Science and Technology Council, subject: “Progress Report Brief

Phase 1,” 28 April 1997.

74. Ibid., 26.

75. William S. Cohen, secretary of defense, “DOD International Ar

ments Cooperation Policy,” The DISAM Journal, Spring 1997, 70.

76. Kaminski, “Perspective on Defense,” 94–96.

77. Leighton, 36–37.