This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-1828

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Eric Lee Budreau, 

Appellant.

Filed August 18, 2014

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Cass County District Court

File No. 11-CR-13-23

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Christopher J. Strandlie, Cass County Attorney, Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Assistant 

County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, F. Richard Gallo, Jr., Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and 

Rodenberg, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

Eric Lee Budreau pleaded guilty to robbery. On direct appeal, he argues that his 

plea is invalid on the ground that it is inaccurate because it is not supported by a proper 

factual basis. We affirm.

FACTS

This appeal arises from an incident that occurred in the city of Cass Lake during 

the early-morning hours of September 11, 2012. The state alleged that Budreau and three 

other men robbed a man at gun-point after beating him with a bat, which caused him to 

lose consciousness. A person who lives nearby told police that he was awakened by a 

noise and saw “four guys beating up one guy” and that they were “kicking him and 

punching him.” The four men took numerous items from the victim, including his boots, 

sweatshirt, shirt, wallet, jewelry, and cellular telephone. The victim told police that he 

had seen Budreau before the assault and believed that Budreau was the man who hit him 

with the bat. 

In December 2012, the state charged Budreau with one count of first-degree 

aggravated robbery, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2012); one count of

aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, 

subd. 1, and Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2012); and one count of simple robbery, in 

violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2012). In May 2013, Budreau and the state entered 

into an agreement by which Budreau agreed to enter an Alford/Goulette plea to simple 

robbery and a straight plea to an unrelated firearms charge in a different case. In 
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exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the aggravated-robbery charges and an unrelated 

controlled-substance charge. The state also agreed to recommend the presumptive 

guidelines sentence for the simple-robbery charge and to recommend that it be served 

concurrently with the sentence on the unrelated firearms charge. 

At the plea hearing, Budreau’s attorney asked him whether he had reviewed the 

evidence, whether he had reviewed the police reports and the statements of witnesses, 

and whether he agreed that “if this matter went in front of a jury and the jury -- and 

people testified consistently at that trial with what they have said in the documents and 

the jury saw the evidence that the state possesses that there’s a substantial likelihood that 

[he] would be convicted of simple robbery.” Budreau responded in the affirmative. 

Budreau’s attorney then stated, “I just want to be clear here because you’re pleading 

guilty on an Alford basis.” He again asked Budreau whether he had reviewed the 

evidence in the case, whether he had reviewed the statement of the alleged victim, and 

whether he agreed that “if a jury heard the testimony of [the victim] and believed that the 

evidence that the state has against [him] that there’s a substantial likelihood that [he]

would be convicted of simple robbery at trial.” Budreau again responded in the 

affirmative to each of the questions. Budreau’s attorney then asked, “You want the Court 

to accept these pleas?” Budreau responded, “Yes.” 

The district court accepted Budreau’s guilty plea and imposed the agreed-upon 

presumptive guidelines sentence of 43 months of imprisonment, to be served 

concurrently with the sentence on the unrelated firearms charge. Budreau appeals. 
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D E C I S I O N

Budreau argues that his guilty plea to the simple-robbery charge is invalid. We 

note that Budreau did not present this argument to the district court. Nonetheless, the 

caselaw permits him to make the argument for the first time on appeal from his 

conviction and sentence. The supreme court has stated that, “by pleading guilty, a 

defendant does not waive the argument that the factual basis of his guilt was not 

established.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003). The supreme court 

also has stated that a defendant “is free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of 

conviction and contend that the record made at the time the plea was entered is 

inadequate” to establish the requirements of a valid plea. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 

180, 182 (Minn. 1989). Thus, this court must review the validity of Budreau’s guilty plea 

even though he did not ask the district court to do so. We apply a de novo standard of 

review to the validity of a guilty plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).

A guilty plea is invalid if it is not “accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” State v. 

Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). As the supreme court has explained,

The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a 

defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than 

he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.

Other possible benefits of the accuracy requirement include 

assisting the court in determining whether the plea is 

intelligently entered and facilitating the rehabilitation of the 

defendant. The purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to 

insure that the defendant is not pleading guilty because of 

improper pressures. The purpose of the requirement that the 

plea be intelligent is to insure that the defendant understands 

the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading 

guilty, and understands the consequences of his plea.
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State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). If a guilty plea fails to meet any of 

these three requirements, the plea is invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn.

2007). 

Budreau argues that his guilty plea is invalid because it is not accurate. A guilty 

plea is inaccurate if it is not supported by a proper factual basis. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 

716. Generally, a factual basis exists if there are “‘sufficient facts on the record to 

support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires 

to plead guilty.’” Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 349 (quoting Kelsey v. State, 298 Minn. 531, 

532, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1974)). “The factual basis of a plea is inadequate when the 

defendant makes statements that negate an essential element of the charged crime 

because such statements are inconsistent with a plea of guilty.” Id. at 350 (citing

Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 20, 162 N.W.2d 698, 703 (1968); State v. Jones, 267 

Minn. 421, 426-27, 127 N.W.2d 153, 156-57 (1964)).

In this case, the parties agree that Budreau entered an Alford/Goulette plea. In an 

Alford/Goulette plea, a defendant maintains his or her innocence but nonetheless pleads 

guilty because of a belief that the state has sufficient evidence and is likely to obtain a 

conviction. See State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977) (citing North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970)). The factual basis of an 

Alford/Goulette plea is particularly important because the plea “is not supported by the 

defendant’s admission of guilt, and is actually contradicted by his claim of innocence.” 

Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. Accordingly, a defendant submitting an Alford/Goulette plea 

must “agree[] that evidence the State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict” and 
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should “specifically acknowledge on the record at the plea hearing that the evidence the 

State would likely offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt 

standard, to find the defendant guilty.” Id. at 649. This standard is not satisfied if a 

defendant admits that there is a “mere risk” that a jury will convict him. Id. at 650

(quotation marks omitted). If the defendant has made the requisite acknowledgment, the 

district court must independently determine whether there is a factual basis in the record 

for the conclusion that there is a strong probability that a jury would find the defendant 

guilty. Id. at 649.

Budreau’s argument has two parts. First, he contends that he did not adequately

acknowledge that the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find him guilty. Budreau relies 

on the highlighted language in the following excerpts from the transcript of the plea 

hearing:

Do you believe that if this matter went in front of a jury and 

the jury -- and people testified consistently at that trial with 

what they have said in the documents and the jury saw the 

evidence that the state possesses that there’s a substantial 

likelihood that you would be convicted of simple robbery; is 

that true?

. . . .

You agree that if a jury heard the testimony of [the 

victim] and believed that the evidence that the state has 

against you that there’s a substantial likelihood that you 

would be convicted of simple robbery at trial?

(Emphasis added.) Budreau contends that his acknowledgement was conditioned on two 

contingent events (the state’s witnesses giving testimony consistent with prior statements 
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and the jury’s believing the witnesses) such that he “at most acknowledg[ed] a mere risk 

that a jury would convict him.” 

In general, an Alford/Goulette plea is based on the assumption that witnesses will 

give testimony that is consistent with their statements to law enforcement. In Goulette,

the supreme court endorsed the use of witness statements to develop a factual basis, 

which implies that the witness statements can be taken at face value. 258 N.W.2d at 761. 

Budreau separately acknowledged his awareness that the state would be required to prove 

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649; Williams v. State, 

760 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). Thus, in this 

case, the conditional nature of the questions that Budreau’s attorney posed to him does 

not diminish his acknowledgment of the strength of the state’s evidence and the 

likelihood of a conviction.

Second, Budreau contends that the district court erred by not making any findings 

as to whether he made a sufficient acknowledgement that the evidence is sufficient for a 

jury to find him guilty and that there is a strong factual basis to support the guilty plea. 

Budreau does not cite any authority for the proposition that a district court has an 

obligation to make findings of that type. We do not believe that any such authority 

exists. A district court’s obligation is only to “ensure that an adequate factual basis has 

been established in the record.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; see also Theis, 742 N.W.2d 

at 647; Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251-52; Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12. This court conducts a 

de novo review of the adequacy of the factual basis of the plea by reviewing the record of 

the plea hearing. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Budreau could have asked the district court 
8

to expressly analyze the adequacy of the factual basis by moving to withdraw his plea 

pursuant to rule 15.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, but he chose not to 

do so. Thus, the district court did not err by not making findings that confirmed the 

validity of Budreau’s plea.

Budreau has not identified any other reasons why his plea is invalid. Thus, the 

district court did not err by accepting Budreau’s Alford/Goulette plea to simple robbery.

Affirmed.