area handbook series

Russia

a country study



Russia

country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Glenn E. Curtis Research Completed

July 1996
On the cover: "The Bronze Horseman," statue of Peter

the Great in St. Petersburg, symbol of Russian autocracy and subject of a fantasy short story by Aleksandr

Pushkin

First Edition, First Printing, 1998.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Russia: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library

of Congress ; edited by Glenn E. Curtis.—1st ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA Pam; 550-115)

"Research completed July 1996." Includes bibliographical references (pp. 621-665) and

index.

ISBN 0-8444-0866-2 (he : alk. paper)

1. Russia (Federation). I. Curtis, Glenn E. (Glenn

Eldon), 1946- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research

Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-115.

DK510.23.R883 1997 97-7563

947.086-dc21 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-115

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C 20402
Dedicated to the memory of Ray Zickel, with deep appreciation

for his painstaking work on Soviet Union: A Country Study,

the predecessor to the current volume.

iii

Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared

by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress

under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this

book list the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and

national security systems and institutions, and examining the

interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written

by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors

seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society,

striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular

attention is devoted to the people who make up the society,

their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and

extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should

not be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have

sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.

Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Robert L. Worden

Acting Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, DC 20540-4840

E-mail frds@loc.gov

v

Acknowledgments

The authors are indebted to numerous individuals and organizations who gave their time, research materials, and expertise

on affairs in the Russian Federation to provide data, perspective, and material support for this volume. Thanks go to Raymond Zickel, who organized the early stages of the book's

preparation, including the selection of chapter authors, and

who contributed the lacquer-box chapter illustrations. The

research process was supported by the work ofJoseph Rowe

and David Osborne, who identified numerous valuable

sources. The publications office of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Washington, D.C.,

and Charles Yost of the International Trade Commission also

contributed useful material. Ray Brandon lent invaluable

research, editorial, and writing assistance as intern to the book

editor.

Thanks also go to Ralph K. Benesch, former monitor of the

Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department

of the Army, under whose guidance the plan for the six volumes on the post-Soviet states was formulated. In addition, the

authors appreciate the advice and guidance of Sandra W. Meditz, Federal Research Division coordinator of the handbook

series. Special thanks go to Marilyn L. Majeska, who supervised

editing; to Andrea T Merrill, who performed the final prepublication editorial review and managed production; to Wayne

Home, who designed the book cover and the title page illustra- tions for the ten chapters; and to David P. Cabitto, who provided graphics support and, together with the firm of

Maryland Mapping and Graphics, prepared the maps and

charts. Vincent Ercolano andJanet Willen edited the chapters,

and Helen Fedor was responsible for assembling and organizing the book's photographs. The numerous individuals who

contributed photographs are acknowledged by name in the

photograph captions.

The contributions of the following individuals are gratefully

acknowledged as well: Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson,

who did the word processing and initial typesetting; Janie L. Gilchrist and Stephen C. Cranton, who prepared the cameraready copy; andJoan C. Cook, who prepared the Index.

vii

Contents

Page

Foreword v Acknowledgments vii Preface xix

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xxi

Country Profile xliii Introduction liii Chapter 1. Historical Setting: Early History to 1917 ..... 1 Zenon E. Kohut and David M. Goldfrank

EARLY HISTORY 5

The Inhabitants of the East European Plain 5 The East Slavs and the Varangians 6

The Golden Age of Kiev 6

The Rise of Regional Centers 8

The Mongol Invasion 10

MUSCOVY 11 The Rise of Muscovy 11 The Evolution of the Russian Aristocracy 12

Ivan IV 13

The Time of Troubles 14

The Romanovs 17

Expansion and Westernization 18

EARLY IMPERIAL RUSSIA 20

Peter the Great and the Russian Empire 20

The Era of Palace Revolutions 23

Imperial Expansion and Maturation: Catherine II . . 24

RULING THE EMPIRE 28

War and Peace, 1 796-1 825 28

Reaction under Nicholas I 31

TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH

CENTURY 33

Economic Developments 33

ix
Reforms and Their Limits, 1855-92 34

Foreign Affairs after the Crimean War 37

The Rise of Revolutionary Movements 40

Witte and Accelerated Industrialization 41

Radical Political Parties Develop 42

Imperialism in Asia and the RussoJapanese

War 43

THE LAST YEARS OF THE AUTOCRACY 44

Revolution and Counterrevolution, 1905-07 45

The Stolypin and Kokovtsov Governments 46

Active Balkan Policy, 1906-13 48

Russia at War, 1914-16 49

The Fatal Weakening of Tsarism 51

Chapter 2. Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991 53

Thomas Skallerup and James P. Nichol

REVOLUTIONS AND CIVIL WAR 57

The February Revolution 57

The Period of Dual Power 58

The Bolshevik Revolution 60

Civil War and War Communism 62

THE ERA OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY. 65

Lenin's Leadership 66

Stalin's Rise to Power 68

Foreign Policy, 1921-28 69

Society and Culture in the 1920s 70

TRANSFORMATION AND TERROR 70

Industrialization and Collectivization 71 The Purges 72

Mobilization of Society 74

Foreign Policy, 1928-39 75

THE WAR YEARS 76

Prelude to War 77

The Great Patriotic War 78

RECONSTRUCTION AND COLD WAR 81

Reconstruction Years 81

Onset of the Cold War 82

The Death of Stalin 85

THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA 85

Collective Leadership and the Rise of Khrushchev 86

x
Foreign Policy under Khrushchev 88

Khrushchev's Reforms and Fall 90

THE BREZHNEV ERA 91

Collective Leadership and the Rise of Brezhnev ... 92

Foreign Policy of a Superpower 93

The Economy under Brezhnev 95

Culture and the Arts in the 1960s and 1970s 97

The Death of Brezhnev 98

THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION PERIOD 99

The Andropov Interregnum 99

The Chernenko Interregnum 100

THE GORBACHEV ERA 101

Gorbachev's First Year 101

New Thinking: Foreign Policy under Gorbachev . . 102

Gorbachev's Reform Dilemma 109

Nationality Ferment 112

The August Coup and Its Aftermath 117

Chapter 3. Physical Environment and Population 121

Glenn E. Curtis and David McClave

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 1 25

Global Position and Boundaries 125

Administrative and Territorial Divisions 126

Topography and Drainage 126

Climate 134

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 136

Environmental Conditions 136

The Response to Environmental Problems 148

POPULATION 153

Demographic Conditions 154

Migration 161

FUTURE PROSPECTS 167

Chapter 4. Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting 169

Glenn E. Curtis and Marian Leighton

ETHNIC COMPOSITION 172

The Russians 173

Minority Peoples and Their Territories 1 74

Other Ethnic Groups 191

Movements Toward Sovereignty 194

RELIGION 202

xi
The Russian Orthodox Church 203

Other Religions 210

Religion and Foreign Policy 220

THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE 220

LITERATURE AND THE ARTS 222

Literature 222

Music 228

Ballet 230

Architecture and Painting 232

OUTLOOK 234

Chapter 5. The Society and Its Environment 237

Glenn E. Curtis and Marian Leighton

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 239

Social Stratification 240

Wages and Work 245

Rural Life 247

Social Organizations 248

The Family 250

The Role of Women 251

Sexual Attitudes 255

EDUCATION 258

The Soviet Heritage 258

The Post-Soviet Education Structure 259

Higher Education 264

Education and Society 266

HEALTH 267

Health Conditions 267

The Health System 274

HOUSING 280

The Soviet Era 280

Post-Soviet Conditions 281

Land Reform and Private Enterprise 284

SOCIAL WELFARE 285

Pensions 286

Worker Protection and Benefits 288

The Homeless 292

Chapter 6. The Economy 295

William Cooper

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 299

xii
The Eras of Lenin and Stalin 300

The Postwar Growth Period 301

Reform and Resistance 302

The Perestroika Program 304

Unforeseen Results of Reform 306

ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE 1990s 307

The Yeltsin Economic Program 308

Monetary and Fiscal Policies 309

Privatization 314

Economic Conditions in Mid-1996 318

NATURAL RESOURCES 321

AGRICULTURE 323

Crops 325

Agricultural Policy 325

Agricultural Production 330

ENERGY. 331

Exploitation and Consumption 331

Oil 332

Natural Gas 335

Coal 336

Nuclear Energy 337

Conventional Power Generation 338

Foreign Investment in Oil and Gas 338

BANKING AND FINANCE 340

The Soviet Financial System 340

The Financial Sector in the 1990s 341

Taxation 345

THE LABOR FORCE 347

Unemployment 348

Wages 349

MANUFACTURING 350

Ferrous Metallurgy 351

Nonferrous Metallurgy 352

The Automotive Industry 352

Machine Building 354

Light Industry 354

Chemicals 355

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS .... 356

Transportation 356

Telecommunications 367

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 372

xiii
Foreign Trade 373

Foreign Investment 377

Foreign Debt 379

THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 380

Chapter 7. Government and Politics 383

James P. Nichol

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 385

THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 391

The Executive Branch 391

The Parliament 400

The Judiciary 406

LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 408

The Federation Treaty and Regional Power 409

The Separatism Question 413

POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS ... 415

The Elections of 1993 415

The Elections of 1995 417

CIVIL RIGHTS 419

General Civil Rights Guarantees 420

Criminal Justice Protections 421

THE MEDIA 422

The Print Media 423

The Broadcast Media 424

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK 426

Chapter 8. Foreign Relations 429

James P. Nichol

THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 433

The Search for Objectives 434

The State of the Federation Speeches 436

THE FOREIGN POLICYMECHANISM 438

The President 439

The Security Council 440

The Parliament 442

The Government (Cabinet) 444

REGIONAL POLICIES 447

The Near Abroad 447

The United States 454

Western Europe 461

xiv
NATO 463

Central Europe 465

China 469

Japan 471

Other Asian States 473

The Third World 477

The Middle East 478

Latin America 481

FOREIGN POLICY PROSPECTS 483

Chapter 9. The Armed Forces 487

William Baxter

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 490

MILITARY DOCTRINE 494

Soviet Doctrine 495

The Doctrine of 1993 496

THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 501

Chechnya 502

The Commonwealth of Independent States 504

Kaliningrad 509

China 510

The NATO Issue 512

Nuclear Arms Issues 513

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 515

Structure and Conditions 516

The Defense Budget 518

New Weaponry Acquisitions 518

Foreign Arms Sales 520

Prospects for the Defense Industry 523

FORCE STRUCTURE 524

Command Structure 525

Ground Forces 527

Naval Forces 531

Air Forces 535

Air Defense Forces 537

Strategic Rocket Forces 538

Airborne Troops 539

PERFORMANCE 541

Troop Support Elements 542

Crime in the Military 545

Training 547

xv
Reform Plans 548

PROSPECTS FOR THE MILITARY 551

Chapter 10. Internal Security 553

Amy W. Knight

INTERNAL SECURITYBEFORE 1991 555

SUCCESSOR AGENCIES TO THE KGB 559

Ministry of Security (MB) 560

Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) 562

Federal Security Service (FSB) 563

Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) 564

Main Guard Directorate (GUO) 566

Federal Border Service and Border Security 567

SECURITY OPERATIONS IN CHECHNYA 570

CRIME 571

Crime in the Soviet Era 571

The Crime Wave of the 1990s 572

THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 577

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 578

The Procuracy 582

Criminal Law Reform in the 1990s 583

Secrecy Laws 585

How the System Works 586

PRISONS 588

OUTLOOK 591

Appendix. Tables 593

Bibliography 621

Glossary 667

Index 681

Contributors 725

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Russia, 1996 Hi 2 The Principalities of Kievan Rus', 1136 8 3 Territorial Expansion of Muscovy and the Russian

Empire, 1550-1917 16

4 Red Army Line, March 1920 64

xvi
5 Military Operations Against Germany, 1941-45 80

6 Topography and Drainage 128

7 Economic Regions, 1996 322

8 Major Mineral Deposits, 1996 324

9 Energy Facilities, 1996 334

10 Major Roads, 1996 358

11 Major Railroads, 1996 362

12 Major Maritime Ports, Airports, and Sea Routes,

1996 366

13 Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1996 526

14 Military Districts and Fleets, 1996 528

15 Organization of the Ground Forces, 1996 530

16 Organization of the Naval Forces, 1996 534

17 Organization of the Air Forces, 1996 536

18 Organization of the Air Defense Forces, 1996 540

xvii

Preface

At the end of 1991, the formal dissolution of the Soviet

Union was the surprisingly swift result of decrepitude within

that empire. The Russian Federation was one of the fifteen

"new" nations that emerged from that process; in this form,

Russians retained much of the domination over nearby minority groups that they had exercised in the days of the Russian

Empire and the Soviet Union. But the major changes that have

occurred since 1991 fully justify the new subseries of Country

Studies describing all fifteen of the former Soviet republics in

their past and present circumstances. The present volume is the fifth in the six-volume series, which is the successor to the

one-volume Soviet Union: A Country Study, published in 1991.

The marked relaxation of Soviet-era information restrictions, which began in Russia in the late 1980s and accelerated

after 1991, allows the presentation of reliable, complete information on most aspects of life in the Russian Federation

including many of the negative aspects such as corruption,

environmental degradation, and deterioration of the military

that were reported only incompletely in earlier volumes. Scholarly articles and periodical reports have been especially helpful

in accounting for the years of independence in the 1990s and

in evaluating the earlier times that form the backdrop for the

most recent period. The authors have described the historical,

political, economic, and social background of Russia as the

context for their current portraits. In each case, the author's

goal was to provide a compact, accessible, and objective treat- ment of five main topics: historical background, the society and

its environment, the economy, government and politics, and

national security. Military insignia, a standard feature of the

Country Studies series, have not been included in this volume

because, at the time of preparation, the Ministry of Defense of

the Russian Federation was in the process of changing insigina,

and budget shortages delayed its publication of a comprehensive chart. Brief comments on some of the more useful, readily

accessible sources used in preparing this volume appear at the

end of each chapter. Full references to these and other sources used by the authors are listed in the Bibliography.

In most cases, personal names have been transliterated from

Russian according to the system approved by the United States

xix
Board on Geographic Names (BGN). In the case of widely

known individuals whose names appear frequently in Latin

alphabets, such as Joseph V. Stalin and Boris N. Yeltsin, the

widely used conventional form of the name has been chosen.

Geographical names are treated in the same way: places such as Moscow and St. Petersburg and geographical names such as Siberia and Lake Baikal are rendered in conventional form,

but all other geographical names appear in the transliteration

of the BGN system. Some Soviet-era place-names such as the

cities of Gor'kiy and Sverdlovsk have been changed in the

1990s (to Nizhniy Novgorod and Yekaterinburg, respectively, in

the case of these two examples), and the newest forms are used

in this book.

Organizations commonly known by their acronyms (such as IMF—the International Monetary Fund, and KGB—the Committee for State Security) are introduced in full form, supplemented with the vernacular form where appropriate.

Autonomous republics such as the Republic of Chechnya are introduced in full form in the detailed description of those

regions in Chapter 4, but short forms (in the case of this example, Chechnya) are used elsewhere.

Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion

table is provided in the Appendix. The Chronology at the

beginning of the book lists major historical events in Russia

from the founding of Kievan Rus' to the significant events of

the first nine months of 1997. To amplify points in the chapters, tables in the Appendix provide statistics on the environment, the population, economic conditions, political events,

and the military establishment.

The body of the text reflects information available as ofJuly

31, 1996. Certain other portions of the text, however, have

been updated. The Introduction and Chronology include

events and trends that have occurred since the completion of

research, the Country Profile includes updated information as available, the Bibliography lists recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the reader, and Table 23

includes newly available statistics.

xx
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description NINTH CENTURY

ca. 860

ca. 880 TENTH CENTURY

911

944

ca. 955

971 988 ELEVENTH CENTURY

1015

1019

1036

1037

1051 TWELFTH CENTURY

THIRTEENTH CENTURY

1219-11

1242

1253 FOURTEENTH CENTURY

1327

Rurik, a Varangian, according to earliest chronicle of Kievan Rus', rules Novgorod and founds Rurik Dynasty. Prince Oleg, a Varangian, first historically verified ruler of Kievan Rus'.

Prince Oleg, after attacking Constantinople, concludes

treaty with Byzantine Empire favorable to Kievan Rus'. Prince Igor' compelled by Constantinople to sign treaty adverse to Kievan Rus'. Princess Olga, while regent of Kievan Rus', converts to

Christianity. Prince Svyatoslav makes peace with Byzantine Empire.

Prince Vladimir converts Kievan Rus' to Christianity.

Prince Vladimir's death leads Rurik princes into fratricidal war that continues until 1036. Prince Yaroslav (the Wise) of Novgorod assumes throne of Kievan Rus'. Prince Yaroslav the Wise ends fratricidal war and later codifies laws of Kievan Rus' into Rus'ka pravda (Justice of

Rus'). Prince Yaroslav defeats Pechenegs; construction begins on

St. Sofia Cathedral in Kiev. Ilarion becomes first native metropolitan of Orthodox

Church in Kievan Rus'.

1113-25 Kievan Rus' experiences revival under Grand Prince Vladimir Monomakh.

1136 Republic of Novgorod gains independence from Kievan

Rus". 1147 Moscow first mendoned in chronicles. 1156 Novgorod acquires its own archbishop. 1169 Armies of Prince Andrey Bogolyubskiy of Vladimir-Suzdal'

sack Kiev, Andrey assumes dtle "Grand Prince of Kiev and all Rus'" but chooses to reside in Suzdal'.

Mongols invade: Kiev falls in 1240; Novgorod and Moscow

submit to Mongol "yoke" without resisdng. Aleksandr Nevskiy successfully defends Novgorod against

attack by Teutenic Knights. Prince Daniil (Danylo) of Galicia-Volhynia accepts crown

of Kievan Rus' from pope.

Ivan I, prince of Moscow, nicknamed Ivan Kalita ("Money

Bags"), affirmed as "Grand Prince of Vladimir" by Mongols; Moscow becomes seat of metropolitan of Russian Orthodox Church.
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1380 FIFTEENTH CENTURY

1462

1478 1485 SIXTEENTH CENTURY

1505

1510 1533

1547 1552

1556

1565

1571

1581 1584

1589

1596

1598 SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

1601 1605

1606

1610 1610-13 1611-12

1613

1631 1645

1648

1649

1654

1667

1670-71

1676

Dmitriy Donskoy defeats Golden Horde at Batde of Kuli- kovo, but Mongol domination continues undl 1480.

Ivan III (the Great) becomes grand prince of Muscovy and

first Muscovite ruler to use tides of tsar and "Ruler of all Rus'." Muscovy defeats Novgorod. Muscovy conquers Tver'.

Vasiliy III becomes grand prince of Muscovy. Muscovy conquers Pskov. Grand Prince Ivan IV named ruler of Muscovy at age

three. Ivan IV (the Terrible) crowned tsar of Muscovy.

Ivan IV conquers Kazan' Khanate.

Ivan IV conquers Astrakhan' Khanate.

Oprichnina of Ivan W creates a state within the state. Tatars raid Moscow. Yermak begins conquest of Siberia. Fedor I crowned tsar. Patriarchate of Moscow established. Union of Brest establishes Uniate Church.

Rurik Dynasty ends with death of Fedor; Boris Godunov named tsar; Time of Troubles begins.

Three years of famine begin. Fedor II crowned tsar; first False Dmitriy subsequently named tsar after Fedor IPs murder.

Vasiliy Shuyskiy named tsar. Second False Dmitriy proclaimed tsar. Poles occupy Moscow.

Forces from northern cities and Cossacks organize counterattack against Poles. Mikhail Romanov crowned tsar, founding Romanov

Dynasty. Metropolitan Mogila (Mohyla) founds academy in Kiev. Aleksey crowned tsar. Ukrainian Cossacks, led by Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy (Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyy), revolt against Polish land- owners and gentry. Serfdom fully established by law. Treaty of Pereyaslavl' places Ukraine under tsarist rule. Church council in Moscow anathemizes Old Belief but removes Patriarch Nikon; Treaty ofAndrusovo ends war

with Poland. Stenka Razin leads revolt. Fedor III crowned tsar.
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1682

1689

1696 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

1700 1703 1705-11

1708

1709

1710

1721

1722 1723-32

1725

1727 1730

1740

1741 1762

1768-74

1772 1773-74

1785

1787-92

1792

1793 and 1795

1796 NINETEENTH CENTURY

1801

1809

1812

Half brothers Ivan V and Peter I named co-tsars; Peter's half sister, Sofia, becomes regent. Peter I (the Great) forces Sofia to resign regency, Treaty of Nerchinsk ends period of conflict with China.

Ivan V dies, leaving Peter the Great sole tsar; port of Azov

captured from Ottoman Empire.

Calendar reformed; war with Sweden begins.

St. Petersburg founded; becomes capital of Russia in 1713. Bashkirs revolt. First Russian newspaper published. Swedes defeated at Battle of Poltava.

Cyrillic alphabet reformed.

Treaty of Nystad ends Great Northern War with Sweden

and establishes Russian presence on Baltic Sea; Peter

the Great proclaims Muscovy the Russian Empire; Holy

Synod replaces patriarchate. Table of Ranks established. Russia gains control of southern shore of Caspian Sea. Catherine I crowned empress of Russia. Peter II crowned emperor of Russia. Anna crowned empress of Russia. Ivan VI crowned emperor of Russia. Elizabeth crowned empress of Russia. Peter III crowned emperor of Russia; abolishes compulsory state service for the gentry, Catherine II (the Great) crowned empress of Russia after Peter Ill's assas- sination. War with Ottoman Empire ends with Treaty of KuchukKainarji. Russia participates in first par d don of Poland. Emel'yan Pugachev leads peasant revolt. Catherine II confirms nobility's privileges in Charter to the Nobility. War with Ottoman Empire ends with Treaty ofJassy Otto- mans recognize 1783 Russian annexation of Crimea. Government initiates Pale of Settlement, restricting Jews

to western part of the empire.

Russia participates in second and third partitions of Poland.

Paul crowned emperor of Russia; establishes new law of

succession.

Alexander I crowned emperor; conquest of Caucasus

region begins. Finland annexed from Sweden and awarded autonomous

status. Napoleon's army occupies Moscow but is then driven out

of Russia.
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1817-19

1825

1831 1833

1837

1840s and 1850s 1849

1853-56

1855

1858

1860

1861 1863

1864

1866

1869 1873-74

1875

1877-78

1879

1879-80

1881

1894

1898

TWENTIETH CENTURY

1903

1904-05

1905

Baltic peasants liberated from serfdom but given no land. Decembrist Revolt fails; Nicholas I crowned emperor.

Polish uprising crushed by forces of Nicholas I. "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality" accepted as guid- ing principles by regime.

First Russian railroad, from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoye

Selo, opens; Aleksandr Pushkin, foremost Russian

writer, dies in duel. Slavophiles debate Westernizers over Russia's future. Russia helps to put down anti-Habsburg Hungarian rebel- lion at Austria's request. Russia fights Britain, France, Sardinia, and Ottoman

Empire in Crimean War; Russia forced to accept peace

settlement dictated by its opponents. Alexander II crowned emperor.

Treaty of Aigun signed with China; northern bank of Amur River ceded to Russia. Treaty of Beijing signed with China; Ussuri River region awarded to Russia. Alexander II emancipates serfs. Polish rebellion unsuccessful.

Judicial system reformed; zemstva created. Crime and Punishment by Fedor Dostoyevskiy (1821-81)

published. War and Peace by Lev Tolstoy ( 1828-1910) published. Army reformed; Russian radicals go "to the people."

Kuril Islands yielded to Japan in exchange for southern

Sakhalin Island. War with Ottoman Empire ends with Treaty of San Ste- fano; independent Bulgaria proclaimed; Russia forced

to accept less advantageous terms of Congress of Berlin. Revolutionary society Land and Liberty splits; People's

Will and Black Reparation formed. The Brothers Karamazov by Fedor Dostoyevskiy published. Alexander II assassinated; Alexander III crowned

emperor.

Nicholas II crowned emperor.

Russian Social Democratic Labor Party established and

holds first congress in March; Vladimir I. Lenin one of

organizers of party.

Russian Social Democratic Labor Party splits into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. Russo-Japanese War ends with Russian defeat; southern

Sakhalin Island ceded to Japan. Bloody Sunday massacre in January begins Revolution of

1905, a year of labor and ethnic unrest; government

issues so-called October Manifesto, calling for parlia- mentary elections.

xxiv
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1906

1911 1914 1916

1917 March

April

July November

December

1918 January

February March

April July Summer

August November

1919 January March

1920 January

February

April

July

First Duma (parliament) elected. Petr Stolypin, prime minister since 1906, assassinated. World War I begins. Rasputin murdered.

February Revolution, in which workers riot in Petrograd; Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Depudes

formed; Provisional Government formed; Emperor

Nicholas II abdicates; Petrograd Soviet issues Order Number One.

Demonstrations lead to Aleksandr Kerenskiy's assuming

leadership in government; Lenin returns to Petrograd from Switzerland. Bolsheviks outlawed after attempt to topple government

fails. Bolsheviks seize power from Provisional Government;

Lenin, as leader of Bolsheviks, becomes head of state; Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Russian Republic) formed; Consdtuent Assembly elected. Cheka (secret police) created; Finns and Moldavians

declare independence from Russia; Japanese occupy

Vladivostok. Consdtuent Assembly dissolved; Ukraine declares its inde- pendence, followed, in subsequent months, by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Basmachi Rebellion begins in Central Asia; calendar changed from Julian to Gregorian.

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed with Germany, Russia loses Poland, Finland, Baldc lands, Ukraine, and other areas; Russian Social Democratic Labor Party becomes Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).

Civil War begins. Consdtudon of Russian Republic promulgated; imperial

family murdered. War communism established; intervendon in Civil War by

foreign expedidonary forces—including those of Brit- ain, France, and United States—begins. Attempt to assassinate Lenin fails; Red Terror begins. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk repudiated by Soviet government

after Germany defeated by Allied Powers.

Belorussia established as theoredcally independent Soviet

republic. Communist International (Comintern) formally founded

at congress in Moscow; Ukrainian Soviet established. Blockade of Russian Republic lifted by Britain and other

Allies. Peace agreement signed with Estonia; agreements with

Latvia and Lithuania follow. War with Poland begins; Azerbaijan Soviet republic established. Trade agreement signed with Britain.

XXV
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1921

1926

1927

October November

March

Summer

August

1922 March

April May

June

December

1924 January

February

Fall

1925 April November

December

April October

Fall

December

1928 January May

July

October

1929 January

April

Fall

Truce reached with Poland. Red Army defeats Wrangel's army in Crimea; Armenian

Soviet republic established. War with Poland ends with Treaty of Riga; Red Army

crushes Kronshtadt naval mutiny, New Economic Policy proclaimed; Georgian Soviet republic established. Famine breaks out in Volga region. Aleksandr Blok, foremost poet of Russian Silver Age, dies; large number of intellectuals exiled. Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic formed, uniting Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian

republics. Joseph V. Stalin made general secretary of party, Treaty of Rapallo signed with Germany.

Lenin suffers his first stroke.

Socialist Revolutionary Party members put on trial by State

Political Directorate; Glavlit organized with censorship

function. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) established, comprising Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian republics. Lenin dies; constitution of Soviet Union put into force. Britain recognizes Soviet Union; other European countries follow suit later in year. Regime begins to delimit territories of Central Asian

nationalities; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan elevated to Soviet republic status. Theoretician Nikolay Bukharin calls for peasants to enrich

themselves. Poet Sergey Yesenin commits suicide. Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) becomes Ail-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Grigoriy Zinov'yev ousted from Politburo. Leon Trotsky and Lev Kamenev ousted from Politburo. Peasants sell government less grain than demanded

because of low prices; peasant discontent increases; grain crisis begins. Fifteenth Party Congress calls for large-scale collectiviza- tion of agriculture. Trotsky exiled to Alma-Ata. Shakhty trial begins; first executions for "economic

crimes" follow. Sixth Congress of Comintern names socialist parties main enemy of communists. Implementation of First Five-Year Plan begins. Trotsky forced to leave Soviet Union. Law on religious associations requires registration of reli- gious groups, authorizes church closings, and bans reli- gious teaching. Red Army skirmishes with Chinese forces in Manchuria.

xxvi
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1930

1931

1932

October November

December

March

April November

March

August May

December

1932-33

1933 November

1934 August

Tajikistan split from Uzbek Republic to form separate

Soviet republic. Bukharin ousted from Politburo.

Stalin formally declares end of New Economic Policy and

calls for elimination of kulaks; forced industrialization

intensifies, and collectivization begins.

Collectivization slows temporarily. Poet Vladimir Mayakovskiy commits suicide. "Industrial Party" put on trial. Mensheviks put on trial. School system reformed.

Five-year plan against religion declared.

Internal passports introduced for domestic travel; peasants not issued passports. Terror and forced famine rage in countryside, primarily in southeastern Ukrainian Republic and northern Caucasus. Diplomatic relations with United States established. Union of Soviet Writers holds its First Congress.

September December

1935 February

May Summer

August

September

1936 June

August

September

October November

December

1937 January June

1938 March

Soviet Union admitted to League of Nations. Sergey Kirov assassinated in Leningrad; Great Terror

begins, causing intense fear among general populace, and peaks in 1937 and 1938 before subsiding in latter year. Party cards exchanged; many members purged from party

ranks. Treaties signed with France and Czechoslovakia. Seventh Congress of Comintern calls for "united front" of

political parties against fascism. Stakhanovite movement to increase worker productivity

begins. New system of ranks issued for Red Army.

Restrictive laws on family and marriage issued. Zinov'yev, Kamenev, and other high-level officials put on

trial for alleged political crimes. Nikolay Yezhov replaces Genrikh Yagoda as head of NKVD

(secret police); purge of party deepens.

Soviet Union begins support for antifascists in Spanish

Civil War. Germany and Japan sign Anti-Comintern Pact. New constitution proclaimed; Kazakstan and Kyrgyzia become Soviet republics; Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic splits into Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian Soviet republics.

Trial of "Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center." Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy and other military leaders executed. Russian language required in all schools in Soviet Union.

xxvii
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

July December

1939 May

1940

1942

1943

1944

August

September

October November

December

March

April June

August

1941 April May

June

August November

December May

July November

February

May

July September November

January May

June

October

Soviet and Japanese forces fight at Lake Khasan.

Lavrenti Beria replaces Yezhov as chief of secret police; Great Terror diminishes. Vyacheslav Molotov replaces Maksim Litvinov as commissar of foreign affairs; armed conflict with Japan at Hal- hin Gol in Mongolia continues until August.

Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact signed; pact includes

secret protocol.

Stalin joins Adolf Hitler in partidoning Poland.

Soviet forces enter Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Remaining (western) portions of Ukraine and Belorussia incorporated into Soviet Union; Soviet forces invade

Finland.

Soviet Union expelled from League of Nadons.

Finland sues for peace with Soviet Union.

Polish officers massacred in Katyn Forest by Soviet troops. New strict labor laws enacted; northern Bukovina and

Bessarabia seized from Romania and subsequendy

incorporated into Ukrainian Republic and newly cre- ated Moldavian Republic, respecdvely. Soviet Union annexes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; Trotsky murdered in Mexico.

Neutrality pact signed with Japan.

Stalin becomes chairman of Council of People's Commissars. Nazi Germany attacks Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. Soviet and British troops enter Iran. Lend-Lease Law of United States applied to Soviet Union.

Soviet counteroffensive against Germany begins. Red Army routed at Khar'kov, Germans halt Soviet offensive; treaty signed with Britain against Germany.

Battle of Stalingrad begins. Red Army starts winter offensive. German army units surrender at Stalingrad; 91,000 prisoners taken. Comintern dissolved. Germans defeated in tank battle at Kursk.

Stalin allows Russian Orthodox Church to appoint patri- arch. Tehran Conference held. Siege of Leningrad ends after 870 days. Crimea liberated from German army. Red Army begins summer offensive. Tuva incorporated into Soviet Union; armed struggle

against Soviet rule breaks out in western Ukrainian, western Belorussian, Lithuanian, and Latvian republics and continues for several years.
August

1946 March

Summer

1947 September

1948 June Summer

1949 January

August

1952 October

1953 January

March

April

August September

1955 February

May

1956 February

September November

1957 July August

October

1958 March

>.d) Chronology ofImportant Events

Stalin meets with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt at Yalta. Red Army captures Berlin. Potsdam Conference attended by Stalin, Harry S. Truman,

and Churchill, who later is replaced by Clement R

Atdee.

Soviet Union declares war on Japan; Soviet forces enter Manchuria and Korea. Regime abolishes Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (Uniate); Council of People's Commissars becomes Council

of Ministers. Beginning of "Zhdanovshchina," a campaign against West- ern culture. Famine in southern and central regions of European part of Soviet Union. Cominform established to replace Comintern.

Blockade of Berlin by Soviet forces begins and lasts into May 1949. Trofim Lysenko begins his dominadon of fields of biology and genetics that continues until 1955. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance formed; campaign against "cosmopolitanism" launched.

Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb.

All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) becomes Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); name of

Politburo is changed to Presidium. Kremlin "doctors' plot" exposed, signaling political infighting, new wave of purges, and and-Semitic campaign.

Stalin dies; Georgiy Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov form

troika (triumvirate); dtle of party chief changes from

general secretary to first secretary. "Doctors' plot" declared a provocation. Beria arrested and shot; Malenkov, Molotov, and Nikita S. Khrushchev form new troika. Soviet Union tests hydrogen bomb.

Khrushchev chosen CPSU first secretary; rehabilitadon of

Stalin's victims begins. Nikolay Bulganin replaces Malenkov as prime minister. Warsaw Pact organized. Khrushchev's "secret speech" at Twentieth Party Congress

exposes Stalin's crimes. Minimum wage established. Soviet forces crush Hungarian Revoludon.

"Andparty group" excluded from CPSU leadership.

First Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile tested successfully. World's first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, launched. Khrushchev named chairman of Council of Ministers.

Period Descripdon

XXIX
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1959 1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

October

September

May

April

July August October June

October November

August

October

August

February

April

April September

June

July

August

1969 March May

1970 October December

1972 May

1973

1974

1975

June

February

July

Nobel Prize for literature awarded to Boris Pasternak; campaign mounted against Pasternak, who is forced to decline award. Khrushchev visits United States. Soviet air defense downs United States U-2 reconnais- sance aircraft over Soviet Union. Cosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin launched in world's first manned orbital space flight. Khrushchev meets with President John F. Kennedy in Vienna.

Construction of Berlin Wall begins.

Stalin's remains removed from Lenin Mausoleum.

Workers' riots break out in Novocherkassk. Cuban missile crisis begins, bringing United States and

Soviet Union close to war. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's OneDay in the Life ofIvan Denisovich published in Soviet journal. Limited Test Ban Treaty signed with United States and

Britain. Khrushchev removed from power; Leonid I. Brezhnev becomes CPSU first secretary. Volga Germans rehabilitated. Dissident writers Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel tried and sentenced. Brezhnev's tide changes from first secretary to general sec- retary; name of Presidium is changed back to Politburo.

Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, defects to West. Crimean Tatars rehabilitated but not allowed to return home.

Andrey Sakharov's dissident writings published in samizdat. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) signed by Soviet Union.

Soviet-led Warsaw Pact armies invade Czechoslovakia.

Soviet and Chinese forces skirmish on Ussuri River. Major General Petr Grigorenko, a dissident, arrested and

incarcerated in psychiatric hospital. Jewish emigration begins to increase substantially. Solzhenitsyn awarded Nobel Prize for literature. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) result in signing of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and

Interim Agreement on the Limitadon of Strategic Offensive Arms; President Richard M. Nixon visits Moscow. Brezhnev visits Washington.

Solzhenitsyn arrested and sent into foreign exile. Apollo/Soyuz space mission held jointly with United

States.

XXX
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1976

1977

1979

1980

1981 1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

August December

June

October June December

January August

February June November

September

February March November

February-March

April

October December

1987 January December

1988 Winter May

May-June

June

June-July October

December

Helsinki Accords signed, confirming East European bor- ders and calling for enforcement of human rights. Sakharov awarded Nobel Prize for Peace. Helsinki watch groups formed to monitor human rights safeguards. Brezhnev named chairman of Presidium of Supreme

Soviet. New constitution promulgated for Soviet Union. Second SALT agreement signed but not ratified by United

States Senate.

Soviet armed forces invade Afghanistan. Sakharov exiled to Gor'kiy. Summer Olympics held in Moscow and boycotted by United States and other Western nations. CPSU holds its Twenty-Sixth Party Congress.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks begin. Brezhnev dies; \uriy V. Andropov named general secretary. Soviet fighter aircraft downs South Korean civilian airliner KAL 007 near Sakhalin Island. Andropov dies; Konstantin U. Chernenko becomes general secretary. Chernenko dies; Mikhail S. Gorbachev becomes general

secretary. Gorbachev meets with President Ronald W. Reagan in Geneva. CPSU holds its Twenty-Seventh Party Congress. Nuclear power plant disaster at Chernobyl' releases large amounts of radiadon over Russia, Ukraine, and

Belorussia. dasnost launched. Gorbachev and Reagan hold summit at Reykjavik. Ethnic riots break out in Alma-Ata. Gorbachev launches perestroika. Soviet Union and United States sign Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)

.

Ethnic disturbances begin in Caucasus.

Soviet authorides stop jamming Voice of America broadcasts. Reagan visits Moscow.

Millennium of establishment of Chrisdanity in Kievan Rus' celebrated in Moscow. CPSU's Nineteenth Party Conference tests limits of glasnost and perestroika in unprecedented discussions. Gorbachev replaces Andrey Gromyko as chairman of Pre- sidium of Supreme Soviet; Gromyko retires, and others

are removed from Politburo. Supreme Soviet dissolves itself, preparing way for new

elected parliament.

xxxi
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1989 February

March-April

April May

June

July August

September

October November

December

1990 January

February

March

Soviet combat forces complete withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Initial and runoff elections held for the 2,250 seats in Congress of People's Deputies (CPD); many reform candidates, including Boris N. Yeltsin, win seats. Soviet troops break, up rally in Tbilisi, Georgia, killing at least twenty civilians. CPD openly criticizes past and present regimes; Gor- bachev elected by CPD to new position of chairman of Supreme Soviet. Free elections in Poland begin rapid decline of Soviet Union's empire in Central Europe.

Coal miners strike in Russia and Ukraine.

Nationalist demonstrations in Chisinau, Moldavia, lead to reinstatement of Romanian as official language of

republic. Russians and Ukrainians living along Dnestr

River go on strike, demanding autonomy.

Soviet Union admits existence of secret protocols to 1939

Nazi-Soviet Nonagression Pact, which allotted to Soviet Union the Baltic countries, parts of then eastern Poland, and Moldavia. Mass exodus from East Germany begins. Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika (Rukh)

holds founding congress in Kiev. Mass protests take place in Berlin and Leipzig. Berlin Wall falls. Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov deposed. Communist party of Czechoslovakia falls from power.

Violent revolution in Romania. Nicolae Ceaucescu

arrested, tried, and shot. CPD condemns Nazi-Soviet Nonagression Pact and secret protocols. Lithuanian Communist Party leaves CPSU.

Latvian parliament deletes from its constitution reference

to communist party's "leading role." At hasty shipboard summit off Malta, Gorbachev and

United States president George H.W. Bush declare Cold War ended.

Azerbaijani demonstrators on Soviet side of border with

Iran dismande border posts. Gorbachev fails to heal rift with Lithuanian communists. Anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan. Gorbachev sends

troops to Baku.

Central Committee of CPSU votes to strike Article 6, which guarantees leading role of communist party, from Soviet constitution. In elections for Supreme Soviet of Russian Republic,

Yeltsin wins seat. Newly elected Lithuanian parliament declares independence. Estonian parliament declares itself in a state of transition

to independence.
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description May

June

July

August

October

November

December

1991 January

February March

Latvian parliament votes to declare independence after unspecified transition period.

Anti-Soviet demonstrations break out in and around Yerevan.

Yeltsin becomes chairman of Supreme Soviet of Russian

Republic. Communists in Russian Republic vote to form Communist

Party of the Russian Republic.

Russia, Uzbekistan, and Moldavia issue declarations of sovereignty. By October most of the other Soviet republics have done likewise. Twenty-Eighth Party Congress: Yeltsin quits CPSU; Polit- buro stripped of almost all meaning.

Meeting of Gorbachev and West German chancellor Hel- mut Kohl in Stavropol'. German unification within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secured.

Soviet government and republics open negotiations on a new treaty of union.

Russia and Lithuania sign agreement on trade and eco- nomic cooperation. Armenia declares independence.

Germany united; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) signed in Paris. Parliament of Russian Republic passes resolution pro- claiming that no Soviet law can take effect in the republic without republican parliamentary approval. Parliament of Russian Republic approves radical eco- nomic reform plan, thereby undercutting all-union Supreme Soviet's economic reform package. Gorbachev awarded Nobel Prize for peace. Violence breaks out in Moldavia between Moldavians and

Russian and Ukrainian separatists. Gorbachev proposes new union treaty. Eduard Shevardnadze resigns as minister of foreign

affairs, warning of oncoming dictatorship. Parliament of Russian Republic votes to contribute to Soviet budget less than one-tenth of central government's request. Soviet crackdown on Lithuanian and Latvian indepen- dence movements.

Soviet Ministry of Defense announces plan to send troops

to seven union republics to enforce military conscription and to round up draft dodgers. Russian Republic and the Baltic republics sign mutual

security pact.

Baltic countries hold nonbinding plebiscites as demonstration of their people's will to secede from Soviet Union.

Coal miners go on strike in Ukraine, Kazakstan, Arctic mines, and Siberia. Mass pro-Yeltsin rallies in Moscow.

xxxiii
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

April

May

June

July

August

October November

December

Referendum held on preservation of Soviet Union: 70 per- cent vote to remain in union, but Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia boycott. Warsaw Pact officially dissolves. Georgia declares independence.

Russian parliament grants Yeltsin emergency powers.

Yeltsin gains control over coal mines in Russian Republic. Russian government establishes foreign ministry and

internal security organization. Russian television begins

broadcasting on second all-union channel. By universal suffrage, Yeltsin elected president of Russian

Republic.

Last Soviet troops leave Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Gorbachev and leaders of seven Soviet republics sign draft union treaty. Yeltsin bans political acdvity at workplaces and govern- ment establishments in Russian Republic; Gorbachev

signs START I agreement in Moscow with United States president Bush.

Hard-line officials attempt to unseat Gorbachev govern- ment; coup fails after three days, elevating Yeltsin's prestige. Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Republic declare independence. Armenia

and Tajikistan follow in September, Turkmenistan in October, and Kazakstan in December. Dzhokar Dudayev elected president of newly declared Chechen Republic. Russian parliament grants Yeltsin sweeping powers to introduce radical economic reform. Yeltsin cuts off Russian funding of Soviet central ministries. Chechens demand independence. Ingush members of Chechen Nadonal Congress resign. Russia gains control of Soviet natural resources; Yeltsin places Russian economy above that of Soviet Union, ending possibility of Russia remaining in union. Gorbachev fails to win support of republics for new union

treaty. Presidents of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia meet in Minsk and proclaim initial Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS).

Yeltsin meets with Soviet defense officials and army com- manders to gain support for CIS. Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev asks United

States secretary of state James Baker to recognize inde- pendence of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Gorbachev announces that at year's end all central govern- ment structures will cease to exist. Eleven republics form CIS. Soviet Union ceases to exist. Russian flag rises over Kremlin. Control of nuclear arsenal handed over to Yeltsin.

xxxiv
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1992 January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

Russian government lifts price controls on almost all goods. Beginning of rift between Yeltsin and speaker of Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov and Russian vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy.

First United States-Russia summit.

International airlift of food and medical supplies to Russian cities begins. Fighting breaks out between Moldovan forces and Russian and Ukrainian separatists along Dnestr River. Eighteen of twenty autonomous republics within Russian Federation sign Federation Treaty. Tatarstan and Chechnya refuse. At first post-Soviet session of Russian CPD, Yeltsin fends off vote of no-confidence in his economic program. CPD

also changes name of Russian Socialist Federation of

Soviet Republics to Russian Federation.

Yeltsin calls for a referendum on new constitution that would abolish Russian CPD.

Formation of Russian armed forces. Army general Pavel Grachev appointed minister of defense. Ten of the eleven CIS presidents sign mutual security

treaty in Tashkent. Treaty acknowledges demise of unified CIS armed forces. United States and all four post-Soviet nuclear states vow to comply with START agreement.

Russiajoins International Monetary Fund (IMF). Russian Supreme Soviet establishes Republic of Ingushetia

within Russian Federation. Russian troops complete withdrawal from Republic of Chechnya.

General Aleksandr Lebed' takes command of 14th Army

in Moldova.

Yeltsin makes first appearance at Group of Seven (G-7)

meeting.

Russian Supreme Soviet ratifies CFE Treaty. Black Sea Fleet evacuates 1,700 Russians from Sukhumi in

civil-war-torn Georgia.

Russia completes troop withdrawal from Mongolia.

Russia launches privatization. Last Russian combat troops leave Poland.

Yeltsin declares state of emergency in North Ossetia and

Ingushetia in order to halt outbreak of ethnic conflicts. Russian troops attack Georgian forces deployed in AbkhaDecember

Russian troops enter Ingushetia. Seventh Russian CPD opens. Yeltsin and parliament clash over economic reform and powers. Viktor Chernomyrdin becomes prime minister. Yeltsin and congress agree

to hold referendum on presidential power. Part of same

deal grants \eltsin extraordinary powers.

XXXV
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1993 March

April

July

August

September

October

November

December

1994 January

Russia and China pull most of their troops back 100 kilo- meters along common border. CPD revokes December 1992 deal with Yeltsin, who then

attempts to impose special rule, but fails. Russian troops deployed in Tajikistan as part of CIS peace- keeping operation. Referendum approves Yeltsin as president and Yeltsin's social and economic programs.

Yeltsin and CPD issue differing draft versions of new Russian constitution. Constitutional assembly passes draft Russian constitution worked out by conciliatory committee.

Parliament annuls presidendal decrees on economic

reforms. Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, having resigned as com- mander in chief of CIS joint forces, hands over his launch authorization codes to Russian defense minister Grachev. Russian Central Bank (RCB) announces withdrawal from

circulation of Soviet and Russian banknotes issued between 1961 and 1992. Yeltsin eases some of RCB's

provisions.

Yeltsin counters parliament's suspension of privatization. Two weeks later, parliament again suspends privatization. Yeltsin issues decree continuing program.

Yeltsin formally requests that parliament hold early elections. Yeltsin suspends Vice President Rutskoy based on charges

of corruption.

Yeltsin dissolves the CPD and Supreme Soviet and sets date

for elections in December. Supreme Soviet votes to impeach Yeltsin and swears in Rutskoy as president; CPD confirms decisions. Clashes in Moscow between Yeltsin and Supreme Soviet supporters. Church mediation of government split collapses; further

clashes on Moscow streets. Top leaders of opposition surrender. Sniper fire continues

for several days. Russia officially asks for revisions to CFE Treaty.

Yeltsin suspends Constitutional Court and disbands city, district, and village Soviets. Russian troops land in Abkhazia. Parliamentary elections and referendum on new constitu- tion are held. Constitution approved. Chechnya does

not participate in elections.

Yeltsin and Turkmenistan's president Saparmyrat Niyazov

sign accord on dual citizenship, first such agreement

between Soviet successor states. Trilateral agreement among Russia, Ukraine, and United

States prepares for denuclearizing Ukraine's armed

forces.

xxxvi
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

February

April

June

July

August September

October

November

December

1995 January

April

June

July October

Chernomyrdin states that radical economic reform has come to an end in Russia. Reformers quit posts. West- ern advisers withdraw their services as advisers to Russian government.

United States Central Intelligence Agency arrests Aldrich Ames on charges of spying for Soviet Union and Russia.

State Duma (lower house of parliament beginning with 1993 election) grants amnesty to leaders of 1991 coup

against Gorbachev and leaders of parliamentary revolt of October 1993.

Yeltsin gives speech calling for continued radical restruc- turing of economy.

Russia and Belarus agree to monetary union.

Central Asian republics, Georgia, and Armenia allow Russian participation in patrolling their borders.

Political leaders meet to sign Civic Accord, which calls on

signatories to refrain from violence in pursuing politi- cal goals. Three of 248 participants refuse to sign, among them Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of Communist

Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).

Yeltsin accelerates market reforms. Foreign Minister Kozyrev signs NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) accord. Russian and United States troops conduct joint peace- keeping exercise in Orenburg, Russia. United States conducts maneuvers in Black Sea with Russia, Ukraine, and other Black Sea countries. Russian government issues statement that situation in Chechnya is getting out of control. Last Russian troops leave Germany, Estonia, and Latvia. Fighting breaks out in Chechnya between Dudayev's and

opposition forces. Ruble loses one-fifth of its value in one day. Chernomyrdin and Prime Minister Sangheli of Moldova

sign agreement on withdrawal of Russia's 14th Army

from Moldova. Dudayev proclaims martial law throughout republic and

mobilizes all men aged seventeen and older.

Yeltsin issues ultimatum to warring parties in Chechnya to

lay down their arms. Kozyrev suspends Russia's participation in PfP. Russian armored columns enter Chechnya.

Russia and Kazakstan agree to unify their armies by end of

1995. Human rights activist Sergey Kovalev estimates 10,000 Russian soldiers and 25,000 Chechen civilians killed in Chechnya since 1994.

State Duma votes no-confidence in Government (cabi- net). Second no-confidence vote fails in State Duma.

Yeltsin hospitalized, returns to work in August.

Yeltsin again hospitalized, reappears in November.

xxxvii
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

December

1996 January

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

In parliamentary elections, communists and nationalists gain strength, reformists split and in decline.

Yeltsin replaces Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev with Yev- geniy Primakov. Leading liberal reformists dismissed or

resign. After slowdown in privatization and increase in govern- ment spending, Russia granted loan agreement worth US$10 billion by IMF. Leaders of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus sign cus- toms union treaty in Moscow.

Russia and Belarus sign union treaty with substantial ele- ments of reunification. Dzhokar Dudayev killed in rocket attack in Chechnya. Chechens sign cease-fire agreement, whose terms are immediately violated; fighting resumes.

Yeltsin and Zyuganov, candidate of KPRF, finish first and

second, respectively, in first round of presidential elections, qualifying them for second round.

Yeltsin fires Grachev and other senior hard-line officials and appoints Lebed' chief of Security Council.

Yeltsin disappears from public view because of undisclosed

illness. Yeltsin defeats Zyuganov in second round of presidential

election, 54 percent to 40 percent. Fighting in Chechnya intensifies. Lebed' associate Igor' Rodionov named minister of

defense, promises military reform; Anatoliy Chubays named presidential chief of staff. Citing failure of Russian economic reform, IMF withholds

tranche of 1996 assistance package.

Yeltsin creates civilian Defense Council.

Pravda, voice of communism since 1912, renamed Pravda 5 and begins more objective reporting.

Yeltsin staff announces Yeltsin will rest for prolonged

period to recover from election campaign.

Chernomyrdin confirmed for second term as prime minister; Yeltsin names new Government with reformists in key positions. Chechen guerrillas recapture Chechen capital Groznyy, exposing weakness of Russian military, Lebed' achieves

cease-fire in direct talks with Chechen leaders. IMF resumes economic assistance payments.

Bellona Foundation report exposes mishandling of

nuclear materials in Arctic regions. As cease-fire terms hold, first Russian troops leave Chechnya. NATO offers Russia special terms of military cooperation.

Yeltsin announces he will undergo heart surgery, under

pressure, he temporarily cedes military command and

control of internal security agencies to Chernomyrdin.
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

October

October-December November

December

1997 January

February

February-March March

Controversy continues over locus of government

authority. Election cycle begins in subnationaljurisdictions, contin- ues through March 1997. Lebed' dismissed as Security Council chief; negotiations with Chechnya continue under Ivan Rybkin. United States secretary of defense William Perry rebuffed

in attempt to gain passage of START II by State Duma.

Government establishes emergency tax commission to improve tax collection; collection rate remains poor in ensuing months. Chubays begins campaign for compliance of regional laws with federal constitution. Escalating conflict between military and civilian defense

officials over military reform methods.

Russia's first bond issue on international market nets US$1

billion.

\feltsin undergoes successful open-heart surgery. Primakov visits China, Japan, and Mongolia to expand

markets. Third Kilo-class submarine sold to Iran.

\feltsin remains out of public view until February 1997, his administration inactive; opposition calls for impeach- ment on health grounds. Four-person Consultative Council formed to smooth dif- ferences between Government and parliament. Primakov agrees to negotiate charter giving Russia special

status with NATO.

Federation Council (upper house of parliament since 1993 elections) claims Ukrainian port of Sevastopol' as Russian territory, reopening dispute with Ukraine. Long-delayed new Criminal Code goes into effect. State Duma passes 1997 budget after long discussions and

amendments; experts call revenue projections unrealistic. Opposing military reform programs issued by Ministry of Defense and civilian Defense Council.

Presidential and legislative elections in Chechnya; moderate Asian Maskhadovwins presidency on independence

platform.

\eltsin approves Russia's participation in NATO's Bosnia peacekeeping force until 1998. IMF withholds loan payment because of continued tax sys- tem problems.

Last Russian troops leave Chechnya.

NATO talks with Russia bring modification of CFE Treaty demands on Russia, subject to ratification by members. NATO chiefJavier Solana visits several CIS nations, which

entertain closer NATO ties. Yeltsin reestablishes his leadership with vigorous state of

the federation speech.

xxxix
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

Government streamlining begins with appointments of Chubavs and Boris Nemtsov to powerful positions; Chernomyrdin's power wanes. Second issue of Russian bonds sold on international market; third issue scheduled. Nationwide labor action gains lukewarm participation; uncoordinated local actions intensify. At CIS summit, Yeltsin fails to reassert Russian domination

as several members take independent positions. Helsinki summit with President William J. Clinton yields some economic agreements, continued discord on NATO expansion.

Bilateral treaty reaffirms integration of Russia and Belarus. April Moscow summit with Chinese president Jiang Zemin

expresses disapproval of United States world domination, yields agreement to reduce troops along shared

border.

State Duma postpones ratification of Chemical Weapons

Convention following United States Congress ratifica- tion. Government proposal to limit government housing subsi- dies brings strong political opposition. Prompted by revenue shortages, Finance Minister Chubays submits budget revision to State Duma, cutting US$19 billion in spending. May Peace treaty signed by Russia and Chechnya (ChechnyaIchkeria); Chechen independence issue remains unresolved.

Igor' Sergeyev replaces Igor' Rodionov as minister of

defense following Rodianov's open conflict with other defense authorities. New privatization programs begin in housing, natural gas, railroads, and electric power.

Security Council issues new national security doctrine. Terms set for new pipeline from Tengiz oil fields (Kazakstan) to Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Russia signs "founding act" agreement with NATO, allow- ing participation in NATO decision making; Russia agrees to drop opposition to NATO expansion in Central Europe.

Yeltsin and Ukraine's president Leonid Kuchma sign treaty of friendship and cooperation, nominally settling dis- putes over territory and ownership of Black Sea Fleet. June State Duma recesses for summer without acting on budget-cut proposal, leaving determination of cuts to Gov- ernment.

Yeltsin names his daughter Tat'yana Dyachenko an official adviser. Yeltsin participates in Denver G-8 (formerly G-7) meeting

as full partner for first time. Government announces allocation of US$2.9 billion to pay long-overdue pensions.

Xl
Table A. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

Government announces sale of shares in six state-owned

oil companies to increase revenues. Under pressure from Yeltsin, Duma approves new tax code aimed at broadening government's revenue base. June-July Mishaps aboard Mir space station reinforce international doubts about Russia's space program.

July Yeltsin declares Russia's economy has "turned the corner" toward growth and stability, statistics show some

improvement. New CFE treaty reduces arms in Europe, does not limit NATO movement into Czech Republic, Hungary, and

Poland as Russia had demanded.

Russia offers Japan new conditions for development of dis- puted Kuril Islands; bilateral talks address Japanese

investment elsewhere in Russia's Far East. Constitutinal Court rejects Moscow's residency fees as unconstitutional.

Yeltsin announces large-scale program for military reform and streamlining.

First meeting of NATO-Russiajoint council establishes operational procedures.

Yeltsin vetoes law restricting activities of non-Orthodox

religions, after both houses of parliament had over- whelmingly passed it, Russian Orthodox Church sup- ported it, and human rights organizations condemned

it. Yeltsin's drive against official corruption thwarted as high

officials refuse to divulge personal finances. August Pro-Yeltsin party, Our Home Is Russia, shaken by resigna- don of parliamentary leader Sergey Belyayev. NATO's Sea Breeze 97 exercise in Ukraine modified from

military to humanitarian maneuver after protest by Russia. \feksin announces ruble reform for January 1998, drop- ping three zeros from denomination of currency. Government submits privatization plan for 1998 and draft 1998 budget to Sate Duma; budget calls for 2 percent growth in GDP and annual inflation of 5 percent. Russia and Armenia sign friendship and cooperation

treaty tightening military and economic ties. September Duma reconvenes; atop agenda are tax reform bill and

consideration of 1998 budget proposal. Shakeups of military establishment continue as Yeltsin dis- misses his Defense Council chief, Yuriy Baturin, and

reorganizes Rosvooruzheniye, the foreign arms sales

cartel. Overdue tax payments by Gazprom reach US$2.4 billion. Agreement with Chechnya sets terms for repair of Baku

(Azerbaijan)-Novorossiysk pipeline through Chechnya,

with October 1997 as completion deadline; negotiations continue on new pipelines from Central Asia west- ward.

Xli
Table A. (Continued) Chronobgy ofImportant Events

Period Description

Russia warns NATO against pressure on Bosnian Serb

Karadzic faction. Foreign trade figures for first half of 1997 announced;

overall surplus US$18.5 billion, down 3.9 percent from

first half 1996, including decrease of 11.7 percent in CIS trade. Duma passes land code without provision for sale of land by owner, frustrating Yeltsin's long campaign for reform

of land ownership. Worker protests spread across Russia as wage non-payment

continues, especially among coal, defense industry, and

scientific workers.

Yeltsin signs revised bill on religious organizations after "Christianity" added to list of Russia's "traditional," unrestricted faiths; human rights and religious groups

protest.

xlii
Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Russian Federation.

Short Form: Russia.

Term for Citizen(s): Russian (s). Capital: Moscow.

Flag: Three equal-sized horizontal bands of white (top), red,

and blue.

Geography

Size: 17,075,200 square kilometers.

Topography: Broad plain with low hills west of Urals in

European Russia and vast coniferous forests and tundra east of

Urals in Siberia. Uplands and mountains along southern

border regions in Caucasus Mountains. About 10 percent of

land area swampland, about 45 percent covered by forest. Climate: Ranges from temperate to Arctic continental. Winter

weather varies from short-term and cold along Black Sea to long-term and frigid in Siberia. Summer conditions vary from

warm on steppes to cool along Arctic coast. Much of Russia

covered by snow six months of year. Weather usually harsh and

unpredictable. Average annual temperature of European

Russia 0°C, lower in Siberia. Precipitation low to moderate in

most areas; highest amounts in northwest, North Caucasus,

and Pacific coast. Land Boundaries: Land borders extend 20,139 kilometers:

Azerbaijan 284 kilometers, Belarus 959 kilometers, China 3,645

kilometers, Estonia 290 kilometers, Finland 1,313 kilometers,

Georgia 723 kilometers, Kazakstan 6,846 kilometers,

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 19 kilometers, Latvia

217 kilometers, Lithuania 227 kilometers, Mongolia 3,441

kilometers, Norway 167 kilometers, Poland 432 kilometers, and

Ukraine 1,576 kilometers.

Water boundaries: Coastline makes up 37,653 kilometers of

xliii
border. Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific oceans touch shores.

Land Use: 10 percent arable, 45 percent forest, 5 percent

meadows and pasture, and 40 percent other, including tundra.

Society

Population: According to United States government estimates,

149,909,089. According to official 1996 Russian statistics,

148,200,000.

Ethnic Groups: According to 1989 census, Russian 81.5

percent, Tatar 3.8 percent, Ukrainian 3.0 percent, Chuvash 1.2

percent, Bashkir 0.9 percent, Belorussian 0.8 percent,

Mordovian 0.7 percent, and other 8.1 percent.

Languages: Official language Russian. Approximately 100

others spoken.

Religion: In 1996 about 75 percent of believers in Russia

considered themselves Russian Orthodox, 19 percent Muslim,

and 7 percent other. Religious activity increased sharply in

post-Soviet period, given official government and

constitutional sanction.

Education: About 98 percent of population over age fifteen

literate. Constitution guarantees right to free preschool, basic

general, and secondary vocational education. Basic general

education compulsory until age fifteen. In 1995 about 500

postsecondary schools in operation, including forty-two

universities. Postsecondary technical and vocational schools

now offer comprehensive education. Private schools and

universities emerging in mid-1990s.

Health: Health care free of charge in principle, but adequate

treatment increasingly depends upon wealth. Doctors poorly

paid and poorly trained, and hospitals decrepit. Shortages of

nurses, specialized personnel, and medical supplies and

equipment persist. National distribution of facilities and

medical personnel highly skewed in favor of urban areas,

especially politically sensitive cities. About 131 hospital beds

per 10,000 population and one doctor for every 275 citizens.

1994 life expectancy 57.3 years for males, 71.1 years for

females, having dropped sharply since 1990. Officially reported

infant mortality rate 19.9 per 1,000 live births in 1994. Poor

quality of water and air in many areas and excessive smoking

xliv
and alcohol use exacerbate poor health of nation.

Labor Force: About 57 percent of population working age.

Work force relatively well-educated but ill-suited for challenges

of post-Soviet economy. In 1994 some 37 percent of labor force

worked in services, 27.7 percent in industry, 14.9 percent in

agriculture, 10.9 percent in construction, and 7.6 percent in

transport and communications. More than 16 percent of labor

force works for government.

Economy

Salient Features: After years of double-digit declines, gross

domestic product (GDP) shrank by only 4 percent in 1995.

GDP per capita in 1995 US$4,224. Unemployment rising

steadily, to estimated 8.5 percent in 1996; official Russian

numbers about half that amount. Inflation, very high in 1994,

under much better control under new government policy in

1995-96; April 1997 rate 1.2 percent. Economy increasingly

dependent on foreign investment, multilateral loan agencies,

and rescheduling of foreign debt. Privatization nearly

complete but meeting political opposition to transformation of

large state firms. Most prices determined by market. Role of

organized crime significant, and much economic activity

officially unaccounted for. Agriculture: 6.3 percent of GDP in 1994. Major products grain,

sugar beets, sunflower seeds, vegetables, fruits, meat, and milk.

Manufacturing: 28.3 percent of GDP in 1994. Principal

products machine tools, rolling mills, high-performance

aircraft, space vehicles, ships, road and rail transportation

equipment, communications equipment, agricultural

machinery, tractors and construction equipment, electricpower generating and transmitting equipment, medical and

scientific instruments, and consumer durables.

Services: 50 percent of GDP in 1994. Tourism important

source of foreign currency. Expansion of financial,

communications, and information enterprises contributes to growth. Shipping services also major foreign-exchange earner. Mining: Considerable mineral wealth, especially iron ore, copper, phosphates, manganese, chromium, nickel, platinum,

diamonds, and gold. Production declined steadily 1990-95.

Energy: Russia self-sufficient in fuels and energy production.

xlv
Natural gas and oil main fuels exploited, coal production

declining but still significant; long-distance fuel transportation

a significant problem. Main electricity sources: coal 18 percent,

nuclear 13 percent, hydroelectric 19 percent, and natural gas

42 percent. Industry consumes 61 percent of energy

production. Generation capacity 188 gigawatts. Energy exports

most important source of foreign exchange.

Foreign Trade: Trade liberalization ongoing, abolishing export

duties, restructuring import tariffs, and ending export

registration in 1996. Main trading partners Germany, Italy, the

Netherlands, Switzerland, Britain, the United States, Ukraine,

Kazakstan, Belarus, China, and Japan. Exports for 1995

estimated at US$77.8 billion, imports US$57.9 billion. Balance

of payments US$13.1 billion in 1995. Capital flight expected to drop to US$1 billion in 1996. Foreign investment strongly

encouraged in some sectors, but unpredictable commercial

conditions hinder growth. Outstanding Soviet-era debt by

Third World countries, between US$100 and US$170 billion,

could make Russia creditor country on balance.

Currency and Exchange Rate: Ruble. In July 1997, US$1

equaled 5,790 rubles.

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Transportation and Telecommunications

Roads: 934,000 kilometers in service in 1995, of which 725,000

kilometers paved or gravel and of which 445,000 kilometers

serve only specific industries or farms. Automobile travel

expanding, but roads inadequate in quality and quantity.

Railroads: 154,000 kilometers wide-gauge in 1995, of which

87,000 kilometers for common carrier service. 49,000

kilometers diesel, and 38,000 kilometers electrified. Proportion

of cargo shipping by rail high by Western standards. System in

need of large-scale repair.

Civil Aviation: 2,517 airports, of which fifty-four with paved

runways over 3,047 meters. In 1990s hundreds of private

airlines formed. Aeroflot, the state monopoly of Soviet Union,

now joint-stock company with majority of stock held by

government. Major international airports include

Sheremet'evo in Moscow and Pulkovo in St. Petersburg. Flights

to most major world capitals and major cities within

xlvi
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Ports and Shipping: Main ports Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan',

Kaliningrad, Kazan', Khabarovsk, Kholmsk, Krasnoyarsk,

Magadan, Moscow, Murmansk, Nakhodka, Nevel'sk,

Novorossiysk, Petropavlovsk, Rostov-na-Donu, Sochi, St. Petersburg, Tuapse, Vladivostok, Volgograd, Vostochnyy, and

Vyborg. Merchant fleet 800 vessels in 1995. Some 235 ships

operating under Maltese, Cypriot, Liberian, Panamanian, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Honduran, Marshall Islands,

Bahamian, and Vanuatu registry.

Inland waterways: Total navigable routes in general use

101,000 kilometers.

Pipelines: Crude oil, 48,000 kilometers; petroleum products,

15,000 kilometers; natural gas, 140,000 kilometers.

Telecommunications: 24,400,000 telephones; 20,900,000 in

urban areas and 3,500,000 in rural areas in 1995. Development

of modern communications lines and acquisition of advanced

equipment slow. Diversity in radio and television programming

increasing since late 1980s. Access to Internet and cellular

phones expanding, but poor state of telecommunications

hinders country's modernization.

Government and Politics

Government: Democratic, federative form of government

under 1993 constitution. Divided into executive, legislative,

and judicial branches. President, elected to four-year term, sets basic tone of domestic and foreign policy, represents state at home and abroad. Prime minister appoints Government

(cabinet) to administer executive-branch functions. Forty

ministries, state committees, and services; reduction in

Government size planned late 1996. Prime minister

administers policy according to constitution, laws, and

presidential decrees. New Government named August 1996

following presidential election, retaining some key members

from previous administration. Boris N. Yeltsin president, first elected 1991. Viktor Chernomyrdin prime minister, reappointed August 1996. Parliament, bicameral Federal Assembly,

has lower house, State Duma, with 450 members serving fouryear terms; last election December 1995. Upper house, Federation Council, has 178 seats (two members representing the

executive and legislative bodies of each of the eighty-nine

xlvii
subnational jurisdictions). Three highest judicial bodies Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Superior Court of Arbitration. Judges appointed by president with confirmation from

the Federation Council required. Jurisprudence advancing

slowly toward Western standards; jury trials held only in some

regions.

Politics: Largest party representation in State Duma by

Communist Party of the Russian Federation, LiberalDemocratic Party of Russia, Our Home Is Russia, and Yabloko

coalition. More than a dozen other parties have representation

in State Duma. Personal connections, personalities retain

impact in politics as national parties develop slowly,

government figures avoid party affiliation; shifting coalitions

typical in State Duma. Seventy-eight nominal independents in

State Duma.

Administrative Divisions: Twenty-one autonomous republics,

forty-nine oblasts (provinces), six territories (kraya; sing., kray),

ten autonomous regions (okruga; sing., okrug), one autonomous oblast. Cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg with separate

status at oblast level. Foreign Relations: In early 1990s, basically pro-Western, drastic

change from Soviet era. Russia cofounded Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS) in 1991 and assumed Soviet Union

seats in many international organizations. Dependence on

foreign assistance greatly increased in 1990s. Beginning in

1993, substantial domestic political pressure mitigated stance

toward participation in Western-dominated organizations and

treaties, reemphasis of independent national power. So-called

Eurasianism assumes unique role in world affairs and primary concerns in Asia rather than Europe. Chechnya crisis and

nuclear transactions with Iran bring international criticism,

although summits with United States president continue, 1997.

Policy toward successor states marked by interest in reintegration of CIS countries and well-being of Russians living

outside borders of Russian Federation. Expansion of North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Central Europe

major issue in 1996. Other key issues include improvement of

relations with China and insistence on strict interpretation of

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty). Member of

Council of Europe, European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (EBRD), International Labour Organisation

(ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International

xlviii
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), NATO Partnership

for Peace (PfP), United Nations (UN) and its Security Council,

and World Bank.

National Security

Armed Forces: Approximately 1.5 million personnel in 1996,

but sharp cuts and reorganization forecast. Term of active duty

two years. Units filled mainly by conscription, with some

contract personnel. Women may serve if they possess

specialized skills. Armed forces divided into ground forces,

naval forces, air forces, air defense forces, strategic rocket

forces. Ground forces personnel 670,000 (210,000 conscripts);

naval forces 200,000 (40,000 conscripts); air forces 130,000

(40,000 conscripts); air defense forces 200,000 (60,000

conscripts); strategic rocket forces 100,000 (50,000 conscripts).

Military Presence Overseas: Transcaucasus Group of Forces

9,000 personnel in Armenia, with one air defense MiG-23

squadron. 22,000 personnel in Georgia, with one air force

composite regiment of thirty-five aircraft. Azerbaijan refuses

Russian troop presence. Forces in other former Soviet

republics: Moldova 6,400 personnel, Tajikistan 12,000

personnel, Turkmenistan 11,000 personnel, and several

thousand each in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Contributions to UN missions in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq/

Kuwait, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Rwanda, and

Western Sahara. Signal and intelligence personnel in Vietnam,

Syria, Cuba, Mongolia, and parts of Africa.

Military Budget: 1997 defense budget submitted August 1996

allots 100.8 trillion rubles (about US$19 billion), of 260 trillion rubles requested by Ministry of Defense. Anticipated 1998

budget somewhat higher. Maintenance and salaries far below

required levels. Anti-inflationary budget restraints cause

dissension among ministries and continued military morale

decline.

Internal Security Forces: Reorganized after fall of Soviet Union

but with many extraconstitutional functions ongoing and only

partial transparency. Power, but not effectiveness, grows as crime wave continues in mid-1990s. Ministry of Internal Affairs

had 540,000 troops, including regular police and special units,

in 1996. Federal Border Service, 135,000 troops in 1994, then

augmented substantially. Main Guard Directorate (presidential

xlix
guard), 20,000 troops, 1994. Troops of Federal Security Service

and Ministry of Internal Affairs heavily involved in Chechnya

conflict, 1994-96.

1


Introduction

RUSSIA IS THE LARGEST of the fifteen geopolitical entities

that emerged in 1991 from the Soviet Union. Covering more

than 17 million square kilometers in Europe and Asia, Russia

succeeded the Soviet Union as the largest country in the world.

As was the case in the Soviet and tsarist eras, the center of Russia's population and economic activity is the European sector,

which occupies about one-quarter of the country's territory.

Vast tracts of land in Asian Russia are virtually unoccupied.

Although numerous Soviet programs had attempted to populate and exploit resources in Siberia and the Arctic regions of

the Russian Republic, the population of Russia's remote areas decreased in the 1990s. Thirty-nine percent of Russia's terri- tory but only 6 percent of its population in 1996 was located

east of Lake Baikal, the geographical landmark in south-central

Siberia. The territorial extent of the country constitutes a major economic and political problem for Russian governments lacking the far-reaching authoritarian clout of their

Soviet predecessors.

In the Soviet political system, which was self-described as a democratic federation of republics, the center of authority for

almost all actions of consequence was Moscow, the capital of

the Russian Republic. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in

1991, that long-standing concentration of power meant that

many of the other fourteen republics faced independence

without any experience at self-governance. For Russia, the end

of the Soviet Union meant facing the world without the considerable buffer zone of Soviet republics that had protected and

nurtured it in various ways since the 1920s; the change

required complete reorganization of what had become a thoroughly corrupt and ineffectual socialist system.

Under those circumstances, Russia has undergone an agonizing process of self-analysis and refocusing of national goals.

That process, which seemingly had only begun in the mid1990s, has been observed and commented upon with more

analytic energy than any similar transformation in the history

of the world. As information pours out past the ruins of the

Iron Curtain, a new, more reliable portrait of Russia emerges,

but substantial mystery remains.

liii
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GERMANY

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Volo.Mi.nl ( .tt) Astrakhan' (27) Saratov (28)

Ural (8) Vladimir (19) Orenburg (31) Kemerovo (43) Belgorod (9) Ryazan' (20) Arkhangelsk (32) Irkutsk (44) Voirtlivhtim Ni:l.nivNo\ooio.l(.'1> Mumunsk (.1.11 Chita (411 Kirov (22) Vologda (34) Amur (46)

, 28 X. 30 >/ >^ /

KAZAKSTAN

JURISDICTIONS

Magadan (47) Chelyabinsk (36) Sakhalin (48) Kurgan (37) Kamchatka (49) Sverdlovsk (38) Autonomous C Tyumen' (39) Birobidzhan (50. " <(40) Khabarovsk Oblast)

Khanty-Mansi (54. Tyumen' Oblast) Permyak (55. Perm' Oblast) Aga Buryat (56. Chita Oblast) Ust-Orda Buryat (57,

< Oblast) UlVanovsk (29) Novosibirsk (41) Autonomous Regions: Taymyr (58. Krasnoyarsk Territory) Ingushetia (67)

Dagestan (72) Karelia (62) Kalmykia (73) Adygea (63) Udmurlia (74) Karachayevo-Cherkessia (64) Talarstan (75) Kabardino-Balkaria (65) North Osselia

i-Nenats (52.

{ Oblast) s(53, i Arkhangelsk Oblast)

, Krasnoyarsk Territory) Chechnya (68)' Koryak (60. Kamchatka Oblast) Mordovia (69) Chukchi (61. Magadan Oblast)

I El (71)

Gorno-Altay (78) Primorskiy (88) Khakassia (79) ._ . . Tyva(BO) Boundary b

Buryat,a(81) Chechnya a Sakha (82) Ingushetia

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions ofRussia, 1996

lii

In a history-making year, the regime of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union was mortally injured by an

unsuccessful coup in August 1991. After all the constituent

republics, including Russia, had voted for independence in the

months that followed the coup, Gorbachev announced in

December 1991 that the nation would cease to exist. In place of

the monolithic union, there remained the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS—see Glossary), a loose confederation

of eleven of the former Soviet republics, which now were independent states with an indefinite mandate of mutual cooperation. By late 1991, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU—see Glossary) and the Communist Party of the Russian

Republic had been banned in Russia, and Boris N. Yeltsin, who

had been elected president of the Russian Republic in June

1991, had become the leader of the new Russian Federation.

In the late 1980s, Yeltsin's appeals for political reform gained

him the enmity of the communist hierarchy, including Gorbachev, but he won the support of a Russian public whose self- expression had been liberated by Gorbachev's own policy of

glasnost (literally, public voicing—see Glossary). In that period,

the atmosphere of Russia, especially its main cities, Moscow

and Leningrad, was one of expectation that significant political

changes finally would occur after the sclerotic decades of the

Brezhnev regime (1964-82). The first years of Yeltsin's presidency, which began with an overt challenge to the Soviet

Union's authority over Russian affairs, brought a surge of activity that promised economic and political reform and an end to the economic stagnation and social malaise of the 1980s. Both

Russians and Westerners hoped that Russia could make a short,

painless transformation to democratic rule and free-market

economics. Although events of the first five post-Soviet years

provided some reasons for optimism, all observers soon realized that whatever transformation Russia was to experience

would require much more time, and would yield much less predictable results, than initially expected.

At the time it became independent, the Russian Federation

included nineteen autonomous republics, ten autonomous

regions, and one autonomous oblast, each designated for a

particular ethnic group. The ethnically Russian population was (and remains) the largest group in all but a handful of the

republics and autonomous regions; most of the exceptions,

where the local ethnic groups constitute a majority, are located

in the North Caucasus.

liv
In 1989 the Baltic republics' declarations of sovereignty

within the Soviet Union began a cascade of similar declarations

byjurisdictions within Russia. In the second half of 1990 alone,

ten of Russia's autonomous republics declared sovereignty.

When Russia became an independent state, perceptions of

Moscow's weakness further encouraged separatist movements,

which in turn prompted a long-term campaign by the Yeltsin

government to maintain the federation intact. Although some

experts predicted that the Russian Federation ultimately would

suffer the same fragmentation as the Soviet Union, little evi- dence of such an outcome has been seen in the first five years

of the post-Soviet era. In 1992 Moscow began the struggle to preserve the federation by inducing all but two autonomous republics (Chechnya

and Tatarstan) to sign the Federation Treaty defining the

respective areas ofjurisdiction of the national and regional

governments. The treaty included definitions of sovereignty over natural resources and other economic assets. Since the

treaty was signed, Moscow's hegemony has been threatened in

several other instances, the most notable being the Republic of

Chechnya's fulfillment of its 1991 declaration of independence

by a coup against the republic's Russian-controlled government

in 1993. Chechnya's defiance and the hapless military response

that Russia initiated against the republic in 1994 encouraged

other regions to seek more power. In most cases, including oil- rich Tatarstan and diamond-rich Sakha (Yakutia), the Yeltsin

government has signed compromise bilateral treaties assuaging

local demands, which are mostly economic. Some of Russia's

fifty-five lesser jurisdictions—the six territories and the fortynine oblasts—have made similar demands. Because the federal

government has not been able to enforce its policies on a number of issues, the jurisdictions have taken varying approaches to economic and political reform, creating a patchwork effect

that has inhibited interregional cooperation.

The military failure in Chechnya was the most obvious indication of a grave overall decline in post-Soviet Russia's military

establishment. The Soviet military earned society's gratitude by

its performance in the Great Patriotic War (as World War II is commonly called in Russia), a costly but unified and heroic

defense of the homeland against invading Nazi armies. In the

postwar era, the Soviet military maintained its positive image

and budgetary support in good part because of incessant govlv
ernment propaganda about the need to defend the country

against the capitalist West.

The demise of the Soviet Union also ended much of the

threat of military confrontation between Russia and the West

that had characterized the Cold War. Already in the mid-1980s,

however, Soviet military doctrine had begun shifting to a more

defensive posture in recognition of the country's economic

limitations, even as Soviet occupation of the Warsaw Pact (see

Glossary) nations and of Afghanistan continued. Beginning in

1988, the Soviet military establishment suffered a series of

major blows. The military operation in Afghanistan, which had

little success against fervid guerrilla forces, was declared a fail- ure in 1988, and Soviet forces withdrew after nearly ten years of

combat. In 1989 the Warsaw Pact alliance began to disintegrate

as all the East European member nations rejected their communist governments; the alliance dissolved in 1991, and by

1994 all Russian forces had left Eastern Europe.

The third blow, the end of the Soviet Union itself, required

withdrawal of troops stationed in the other fourteen republics;

in this process, much equipment and weaponry was left behind

and claimed by the newly independent states. The successive

return of large numbers of troops into Russia after each of

these three events caused an enormous logistical problem for

the military; furthermore, the morale of the institution was

seriously eroded by withdrawals of unprecedented magnitude

from regions assumed to be permanent parts of the Soviet

domain. At the same time, serious examples of corruption were exposed at the highest command levels of the armed

forces.

In 1992 the Russian Federation inherited the bulk of the

Soviet Union's armed forces as well as all of their problems. In

the early 1990s, there were new ramifications of the morale and

command problems that had surfaced earlier. In a new social

environment of permissiveness and diversification, increasing

numbers of Russia's youth rejected military service as a patriotic duty, many top individuals in the junior officer corps

resigned because of poor pay and housing, and the incidence

of crime increased significantly. At the same time, corruption

and politicization destroyed the unity that had characterized

the senior officer corps during the Soviet era. These changes

all occurred as the need for a new set of national security

guidelines became increasingly evident. Within a few years,

both the geopolitical and the budgetary conditions of Russia's

lvi
military had changed dramatically without appropriate adjustments in military doctrine. Although the size of the military was reduced between 1992 and 1996 from about 2.8 million

personnel to about 1.5 million, reductions were disproportionately high in the enlisted ranks, leaving a bloated officer corps.

In 1996 both the military doctrine (which was updated fragmentarily in 1993) and military equipment still reflected the

Soviet-era priority of large-scale mechanized land war and/or

nuclear war to be fought on the continent of Europe.

In 1996 elements of a new military doctrine appeared, but

fundamental conflict remained between reformers and hardliners in the policy-making establishment. The strong positions

taken by the opposing sides suggested that enacting a comprehensive new doctrine would involve a long struggle. Despite

the diminished capability of Russia's economy to support the

military, hard-liners insisted that major reductions would damage national security. As budgetary support of routine military

readiness has shrunk drastically in the mid-1990s, calls for

large-scale reform have intensified. Among the main reform

elements cited are downsizing the armed forces, shifting their

emphasis to mobile warfare, eliminating much of the corrupt

and flabby corps of senior officers, relying more heavily on contract volunteers rather than conscripts, and discarding the concept of military parity with the United States. In July 1996, the

State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament) began

hearings on reform measures. In December the Duma recom- mended the formation of a federal department to set military

reform guidelines through 2005, together with a 25 percent

increase in the military budget.

The condition of the military forces remains an important

part of Russia's national self-image. The Chechnya conflict, the

first post-Soviet test of those forces, revealed shocking insufficiencies even in elite units. In mid-1996 the dismissal of Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, upon whom the most blame for

Chechnya had been heaped, produced no visible improvement. In August 1996, the sudden loss of the Chechen capital

of Groznyy, from which Russian forces had driven the Chechen

guerrillas in 1995, forced the withdrawal of Russian forces

under the terms of the cease-fire that followed.

In the second half of 1996, ultimate responsibility for military policy remained balanced uncertainly between civilian and

military authorities, as it was when Grachev was minister of

defense. In November 1996, a call for a new military doctrine

lvii
by Yeltsin's civilian Defense Council met stiff resistance from

the Ministry of Defense.

Grachev's successor, Igor' Rodionov, inherited a force with

plummeting morale, gravely deteriorating materiel support,

minimal training, and no clear doctrine. In the second draft

call of 1996, an estimated 37,000 men out of a target number of

215,000 conscripts failed to report. This was the largest

recorded episode of draft dodging since the establishment of

the Soviet Union. The budget passed in January 1997 added

only token amounts to the 1996 allotment of US$19 billion.

The budget provided for only about 38 percent of the Ministry

of Defense's budget request and made no allowance for inflation. The 1997 budget package caused Rodionov to curse the

Ministry of Finance as Grachev had, intensifying tensions

among the "power ministries" of the Government (cabinet).

Meanwhile, in the last months of 1996 the pay arrears of the

Ministry of Defense mounted steadily, and there were rumors

that military strike committees had been formed. Already in

August, an estimated US$2.8 billion was owed to Russia's military personnel. Rodionov also repeated Grachev's complaint

that military units of the internal security agencies received

funding that should go to the Ministry of Defense. The exact

troop levels of those units are unknown, but in the second half

of 1996 some estimates exceeded 1 million.

Rodionov predicted that the grandiose plans of Yeltsin and

others for military restructuring and modernization would be

frustrated without significant expenditures in the transition

period. The plans included large-scale force reduction, a new

military doctrine matching Russia's less stressful post-Cold-War

geopolitical position, and possibly an all-volunteer force. In

January 1997, the Ministry of Defense submitted a reform plan

whose first step was increased funding. The Defense Council

submitted a rival, long-term plan extending beyond 2005 and

calling for 30 percent reductions in defense and non-defense

troop levels as the first reform step, citing the country's low

financial resources. The conflicting emphasis of the two plans

exacerbated the existing disagreements in the defense establishment, specifically between Rodionov and Defense Council

chief Yuriy Baturin, over the direction of reform.

Meanwhile, accusations of corruption and incompetence in

the military establishment continued, with Duma Defense

Committee chairman Lev Rokhlin, a retired general, levying

the most serious charges. Those charges combined with the

lviii
military's abject failure in Chechnya to further erode the

authority of the Ministry of Defense under Rodionov. In

December 1996, Yeltsin forced Rodionov to resign his commission in order to move the ministry toward civilian rather than

military control.

As Russia's military deteriorated, the arms export activities of its defense industries continued to grow. In 1995 Russia

exported more arms to developing countries than any other

producer; China was its best customer. Total 1995 sales were

estimated at US$6 billion, an increase of 62 percent over 1994.

At the end of 1996, defense authorities announced that foreign arms sales would play a prominent role in financing military

reform in coming years. In early 1997, Russia angered the West

by selling S-300 missile systems to the Republic of Cyprus and

by selling a third Kilo-class diesel submarine to Iran. Some of the most visible domestic products of the arms

industry suffered production delays in 1996. In November construction began on the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, the first in the new

Severodvinsk class of strategic missile submarines described as superior to any existing model and expected to carry Russia's

sea-based nuclear missiles after 2000. Plans had called for three

such boats to go into production in 1996. The Petr Velikiy, a powerful, heavily armed cruiser whose keel was laid in 1986,

finally took its maiden voyage in October 1996 after years of

production delays. In March 1997, the Moscow Aviation Production Association (MAPO) postponed serial production of an advanced multifunctional fighter, targeting instead the

MiG-35 fighter destined for overseas sales. The agencies of internal security have fared better than the

military in the post-Soviet era. Throughout the Soviet period,

these agencies were among the most firmly entrenched and

respected national institutions. A succession of internal security agencies, ending with the Committee for State Security

(Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti—KGB; see Glossary),

struck fear in the Soviet population by thoroughly penetrating

all of society and launching periodic purges (the most violent

of which occurred in the 1930s) against elements of society

deemed harmful to the socialist state. In the post-Soviet era, internal security agencies generally

have received more solid support from the Yeltsin government

than the armed forces, although specific agencies have been

favored. The Federal Security Service (FSB), the most direct successor to the KGB, has a broad mandate for intelligence

lix
gathering inside Russia and abroad when national security is threatened, and no concrete governmental oversight is prescribed in legislation. Human rights advocates in Russia and

elsewhere, sensitive to the precedent of unbridled KGB power,

have criticized the direct presidential control of internal security agencies such as the FSB, and human rights violations have

been documented. Armed units of the FSB and the Ministry of

Internal Affairs (MVD) were heavily involved in the Chechnya

campaign.

Russia's still-powerful internal security agencies also were hit

by scandal in 1996 when the former financial head of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information

(FAPSI) was imprisoned by its sister agency, the FSB, for

embezzling large sums from the FAPSI budget. Although the

affair received no official acknowledgment, the independent

press reported a major power struggle between powerful suc- cessor agencies of the KGB. Such a scenario would continue a

series of rearrangements of the former KGB agencies that have

occurred in the 1990s because of political power struggles

rather than security considerations.

Rampant, well-publicized corruption in the security agencies

has eroded public confidence in all of Russian law enforcement. In July 1996, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)

reported that 1,400 employees of the regular police (militia)

had been arrested in 1995 for various types of criminal activity,

including participation in crimes by criminal organizations of

the mafiya. That report was the result of the MVD's Clean

Hands Campaign, a highly publicized public-confidence program begun in 1995 to purge law enforcement agencies of dis- honest members. But, according to most accounts, the 1995

arrests removed only a very small part of Russia's internal security corruption.

Russia has experimented cautiously with Western-style jurisprudence and penal reform. In the mid-1990s, jury trials were

introduced in some regions, and the rights of accused persons

and prison inmates were stipulated more concretely. Nevertheless, major elements of the Soviet system remain in the jurisprudence of the Russian Federation. For example, procurators

(public prosecutors) still have both investigative and prosecutorial functions, and expansion of the jury system has met substantial resistance among entrenched Soviet-era judges and

procurators. In addition, prison conditions have deteriorated

substantially because Russia's crime wave has increased the

Ix
prison population but funding is not available for new facilities. In early 1997, more than one-quarter of the prison population was awaiting trial, and pretrial detention lasted as long as three

years for some individuals. Russia's procurator general, Yuriy

Skuratov, reported that his office had been overwhelmed in

1996 with 1.2 million court cases, for which it had only about

7,000 investigators. He noted that the same trend was continuing in 1997.

After many delays and amendments, a new Criminal Code

went into effect onJanuary 1, 1997. An estimated 150,000 criminal cases were expected to require review based on the new

code, and many prisoners will be released because the laws

under which they were convicted no longer exist. A separate

criminal correction code defining conditions in the prison sys- tem was scheduled to go into effect in July 1997.

Compounding Russia's other problems are deteriorating

environmental conditions, the extent of which became clear

only gradually during the 1990s. Among the most serious hazards in Russia are pollution of ground water and bodies of

water in most of European Russia; air pollution from the vent- ing of unprocessed industrial by-products; large concentrations

of waste chemicals from industry and agriculture; and actual

and potential radiological pollution from civilian and military

nuclear installations.

In August 1996, the Bellona Foundation of Oslo, long a vocal critic of Russia's nuclear waste procedures, issued a damning report on the threat posed to Arctic regions by Russia's

nuclear waste disposal practices and at least thirty-six decommissioned nuclear submarines at anchor near Murmansk with

their reactors on board. Bellona described the Murmansk

region as having the world's largest concentration of active and

defunct nuclear reactors, many of which are not maintained or disposed of properly. According to the report, the FSB

obstructed the foundation's investigation and imprisoned Aleksandr Nikitin, the retired Russian naval officer who was a key

author of the report. As Nikitin's trial was delayed repeatedly,

his case attracted international protests.

Meanwhile, the interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety, headed by senior environmental authority Aleksey

Yablokov, continued releasing shocking statistics about Russia's

environmental quality. For example, in 1996 one in five tapwater samples failed to meet public health chemical standards,

and about 40 percent of sewage was being dumped untreated

lxi
into bodies of water, with Moscow and St. Petersburg among

the regions most affected. In the second half of 1996, Yablokov

lobbied Yeltsin unsuccessfully to expand the ecological safety

commission and its funding.

Russian environmentalists won a battle in December 1996

when a regional referendum soundly rejected completion of

the Kostroma Nuclear Power Station, on which construction

had been suspended after the Chernobyl' disaster of 1986. This was Russia's first referendum on such an issue; the 59 percent

turnout made the vote legally binding. In February 1997, the

Republic of Sakha announced plans to conserve one-quarter of

its vast Siberian territory, including the world's largest tract of

virgin forest, protecting several endangered species and the

shrinking indigenous population of Evenk nomads. That plan

bypassed national authorities—an increasingly frequent trend

in environmental and other matters. The Sakha government

received a support grant directly from a Swiss environmental

organization.

The "social umbrella" of the Soviet Union's socialist system,

which nominally had guaranteed all citizens employment,

health care, child care, pensions, and universal, high-quality

education, also encountered problems. By the 1980s, many of

the more than 200 million citizens covered by the umbrella

began receiving fewer benefits or benefits of lesser quality. The

Soviet education and health systems, which offered top-quality

service only to the country's political, scientific, and cultural

elite, were undermined by the infrastructural and organizational failures inherent in such centrally planned systems. The

Soviet concept of guaranteed employment eroded the national

economy by encouraging slipshod labor and malingering.

In the 1990s, the state's social welfare system retained the

bureaucratic complexities of the Soviet era, but it did not keep

pace with the needs of society. As runaway inflation devalued

the fixed payments of the pension system, many citizens

depending on fixed incomes fell below the official poverty line,

which in late 1996 was about US$67 per month. In 1996 an esti- mated 30 percent of those with fixed incomes and about 24

percent of the total population were in that category. The government's failure to index welfare programs also reduced the

value of a wide variety of other entitlements that had provided

Soviet workers with substantial savings in the cost of living. Nevertheless, Soviet-era programs such as maternity leave, child

care, free medical facilities, and housing subsidies remained

lxii
substantially unchanged in the mid-1990s, continuing expectations that increasingly strained the federal budget.

Reforms such as pension indexation and differentiation of

individual contributions to pension funds were only beginning

to appear in the mid-1990s. By that time, the government's

inability to collect taxes and other obligated funds had had a major impact on social programs. In the fall of 1996, an esti- mated US$3 billion in pension payments were overdue. At that

point, the Pension Fund, which is administered by the Ministry

of Social Protection, was owed US$8.5 billion by the enterprises

that are the main contributors. The federal budget also owed

money to the fund, which by mid-1996 had exhausted its commercial bank credits by taking loans to make pension payments.

Russia's health care system also deteriorated substantially in

the 1990s. Equipment and medicines are in increasingly short

supply, aging facilities have not been replaced, and existing

facilities often are inaccessible. Medical personnel generally

are not trained as rigorously as their contemporaries in the

West, and chronic failures to pay doctors and nurses have exac- erbated shortages in those professions. The 1997 national budget allocated US$1.6 billion for health, an increase of US$158

million over 1996, but most of the new money was targeted for

medical centers in large cities. The 1997 figure was 2.6 percent

of the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), compared

with the World Health Organization's recommended minimum share of 5 percent.

Failures in health care are one aspect of an increasingly

grave health crisis afflicting the Russian population as a whole

in the 1990s. Other elements of the crisis include widespread

and acute environmental pollution of various types, which government programs and nongovernmental "green" organizations have not been able to ameliorate; the continued heavy

use of tobacco and alcohol and a growing narcotics addiction

problem; and poor hygiene and nutrition practices among

large portions of the population.

In the first ten months of 1996, confirmed cases of human

immunodeficiency virus (HIV) were four times more numerous than in all of 1995, with drug addicts accounting for about

70 percent of cases. Although the official estimate of HIV cases was fewer than 2,000 in 1996, other estimates placed the number at ten times that many. The Ministry of Health reported

that only 50,000 of Russia's estimated 2 million drug addicts

lxiii
were under treatment for their addiction in 1996. In 1996

health experts identified alcoholism as the number-one cause

of premature death in Russia, a situation exacerbated by the

estimated 68 percent of alcohol products that contain foreign

substances. By 1995 Russia's average life expectancy had fallen

to only fifty-seven years for males and seventy-one for females,

and natural population growth has been negative since 1992.

In the first nine months of 1996, the population showed a net

decrease of 350,000, dropping to 147.6 million according to the State Committee for Statistics. Russia's education system has suffered from the same shortages and lack of support as its health system. And education,

accorded high value in Soviet society, seems to have lost some

of its esteem in a fragmented Russian society where many traditional institutions are viewed with unprecedented skepticism. In the 1990s, the centralized, rigid Soviet education system has

given way to a system that gives localities substantial autonomy

in shaping curricula and hiring teachers. This opportunity for

creativity has been hampered, however, by two conditions:

because many Soviet-trained Russian educators do not understand individual initiative and autonomy, many schools have

perpetuated the rote memorization methods of the past; and,

as in other aspects of Russian social policy, funding for personnel and infrastructure has been woefully inadequate. Teachers,

always underpaid in the Soviet system, have been impoverished

by the Russian system, and many have left the profession since

1992. In this atmosphere, private schools have begun to offer

creative curricula to students who can afford to eschew public

schooling. According to Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Ilyushin,

by October 1996 education and culture had received only 65

percent and 30 percent, respectively, of the 1996 budget funds

allotted to them. In late 1996 and early 1997, the highest proportion of striking workers were teachers.

Beginning in the late 1980s, religion assumed a more important role in the lives of many Russians, and in the life of the

Russian state as well. Russian Orthodoxy, the dominant reli- gion of Russia since the ruler Vladimir accepted Christianity in

A.D. 988, was subservient to the state from the time of Peter the

Great (r. 1682-1725) until 1917; nevertheless, it exerted a powerful influence on the spiritual lives of most Russians. In the

Soviet period, the activities of the church were further

restricted as most churches and monasteries were closed and

religious observances strongly discouraged.

Ixiv
In the late 1980s, the Gorbachev regime began to restore the

church's property and rights; official observance of the millennium of Russian Orthodoxy in 1988 was a watershed event in

that process. Beginning in 1992, the Russian Orthodox patriarchate, which had been restored in 1917 only to be repressed

for the next seventy years, assumed growing influence in state as well as spiritual affairs. Many churches were built and

restored, and in the early 1990s millions of Russians returned

to regular worship. However, by early 1997 Orthodox Russians

attended church at about the same rate as religious believers in

West European countries. In the 1990s, politicians have eagerly

sought the opinion of the church on most important issues,

and in 1996 even the communist presidential candidate, Gennadiy Zyuganov, made an appearance with Patriarch Aleksiy II an important element of his campaign.

Other religious groups also have enjoyed relative freedom in

the post-Soviet period, with some limitations. Mainstream Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Muslim groups are fully accepted

by the state and the Orthodox Church, but the Orthodox hierarchy often has used its dominant position to discourage or block the activities of their congregations. The new freedom of

the Gorbachev era brought a wave of Western evangelical

groups whose proselytizing the Orthodox hierarchy viewed

with alarm and hostility. In mid-1996 the State Duma passed

legislation establishing a state committee to monitor the activity of such groups. The law was introduced by nationalist allies of the Orthodox Church and opposed by democratic factions

as unconstitutional. The Jewish community, whose religious

and cultural activities have blossomed in Russia in the 1990s,

still experiences subtle forms of discrimination.

The problems of post-Soviet Russia also are based directly in

economic circumstances. Some of the reasons for Russia's uneven progress are found in the legacy of the Soviet era, others in post-Soviet economic policies. For the majority of Russian citizens, the ballyhooed economic reforms of the 1990s

did not improve the quality of life; indeed, in 1996 the "shock"

of Russia's transition to a free-enterprise system seemed to be

intensifying rather than subsiding, as unemployment figures rose and more Russians slipped below the official poverty line. In the first half of 1996, the number of registered unemployed

workers increased by 16 percent, totaling 2.7 million—but a much higher number of Russians remained unemployed and

failed to register for meager state benefits. According to an offilxv
cial report, average real incomes decreased by about 40 percent between 1991 and October 1996.

Russia's society has become increasingly divided according

to economic categories. As the majority of Russian citizens

struggle to remain above the poverty line, a small minority

have prospered through high-risk economic ventures that

often involve connections with the mafiya, Russia's pervasive

network of organized criminal organizations. Members of the

successful minority increasingly are distinguished from the

majority of society by conspicuous consumption, which has

engendered strong feelings of resentment. Another type of

post-Soviet success story is demonstrated by former members

of the Soviet official elite, the nomenklatura, who have used

Soviet-era connections to gain access to financial resources and

influential enterprise positions in the new system. By 1997

experts had identified a new oligarchy—the post-Soviet entre- preneurs who have built personal empires and strong ties with

the government at the expense of their fellow Russians. Russian society also is increasingly divided by generations. Older

Russians have found adapting to the complexities and challenges of post-Soviet society much more difficult than have

their younger compatriots, so the former often preserve as much as possible of their former lives, garnished with nostalgia

for an idealized Soviet past

Moscow has become the center of Russia's economic activity,

both personal and corporate, far outstripping St. Petersburg,

which in the Soviet era was the more cosmopolitan city. Many

foreign investors have concentrated their activity in Moscow,

where all of Russia's large banks are headquartered and where

the energetic Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov has fostered rapid commercial expansion with active government participation. Meanwhile, the luxurious life of the new Moscow upper class has

spread very little to the hinterlands.

The increasing availability of land and materials has enabled

some individuals to escape dependency on the old housing

subsidy system (which nevertheless remained active in 1997).

In the transition to a fully privatized housing system that began

in 1992, the scarcity of resources and high inflation drove pri- vate housing prices beyond the reach of most Russians; in the

mid-1990s, the slow, uneven progress of housing reform meant

the continued existence of long waiting lists and very crowded

housing conditions, especially in the cities.

Ixvi
The Soviet and Russian economies have been supported by

one of the richest supplies of natural resources in the world.

Fuels, minerals, timber, and a well-educated labor force always

have been strong principal assets of industry. But the location

of Russia's raw materials often has presented a transportation

problem. As the industrial centers of European Russia used up

nearby fuels and other resources, the more distant supplies of

Siberia have become critical but expensive alternatives. The

sheer volume of available raw materials encouraged tremendous waste in the Soviet system; central planning took into

account neither the possibility of running out of materials nor

the grave environmental damage caused by uncontrolled

exploitation.

Economic policy in the Soviet Union was the exclusive

domain of planners in the central government, whose quotas

and distribution decisions ruled virtually all economic activity

in Russia and the other Soviet republics. Resource apportionment in that system favored heavy industry and the militaryindustrial complex at the expense of consumer production,

token revival of which was attempted sporadically beginning

with the regime of Nikita S. Khrushchev (in office 1953-64).

The services sector remained underdeveloped, and agricultural production policy precluded private landownership and

relied almost entirely on collective farms (see Glossary) and

state farms (see Glossary). Central allocation of resources and

price establishment created an inflexible economic system

whose production and consumption sides had no relation to each other. The basic unit of planning, the five-year plan (see

Glossary), set long-term goals whose basis in real economic

conditions often was nonexistent by the end of the period. The

Soviet planning system also produced a substantial class of state bureaucrats, many of whom preserved their influential and

highly profitable positions in state enterprises (and hence their

stubborn opposition to economic reform) well into the postSoviet era. The Soviet state also had full control of foreign trade. The

vast majority of Russia's overseas commercial activity was con- ducted with the nations of the Community for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary), all of which

followed the Soviet model of the centrally planned economy,

and all of which were governed by Comecon's artificial system

for allocation of production responsibilities. This closed commercial system included a high percentage of barter arrangelxvii
ments. The system was supplemented by equally regimented

commercial links among the republics of the Soviet Union. An

important result was that Russian products were exposed to very little genuine competition in world markets, despite periodic efforts to cultivate commercial relationships outside

Comecon.

By 1980 the Soviet economy had entered a decline from

which it never was to emerge. It became obvious that the strong

central controls that traditionally guided economic development had failed to promote the creativity and productivity

urgently needed in a highly developed, modern economy. As one of the two world superpowers, the Soviet Union was acutely

conscious that the West, and especially the United States, was

bypassing it in many areas outside the military field. So, beginning in the mid-1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in

office 1985-91) experimented with unprecedented economic

reforms, including limited application of free-market principles, in a policy called perestroika (rebuilding—see Glossary).

However, the Gorbachev concessions were too small and too

late, so the system's inherent flaws remained. The standard of

living and productivity both continued to fall until the Soviet

Union dissolved and central planning was discredited in 1991.

As president of the Russian Republic, Boris Yeltsin already

had advocated substantial economic reform prior to Russia's

independence, in order to begin resurrecting Russia's econ- omy from the crisis of the last Soviet years. For the new Russian

Federation, the Yeltsin administration set ambitious economic

reform goals in 1992: strict limitation of government spending

to cut inflation; redirection of state investment from the military-industrial complex and heavy industry toward consumer

production; a new tax system to redistribute financial resources

to more efficient sectors; cutting of government subsidies for

enterprises and eliminating government price controls; and

lifting of government control of foreign trade. Privatization of

the major sectors of production, still virtually state monopolies

in 1991, was another primary goal. In 1992 worsening economic conditions brought a confrontation with the Supreme Soviet (legislature) over economic

policy. The clash forced Yeltsin's dismissal of reform Prime

Minister Yegor Gaydar and a general modification of reform

goals under Gaydar' s pragmatic successor, Viktor Chernomyrdin. At that point, failing enterprises still received easy credit

from the banking system and from other enterprises—a continlxviii
uation of Soviet-style fiscal management and a crucial flaw that

began to be corrected only in 1995.

Many of the goals of the Yeltsin program were met at least

partially in the first five post-Soviet years, depending on which

statistics are used to define economic trends. Foreign trade has

been liberalized significantly, and the list of Russia's trading

partners now is dominated by West European rather than East

European and former Soviet countries. The course of foreign

investment has been uneven. Although Western and Japanese

firms have shown great interest in joint ventures with Russian

enterprises, Russia's unfinished and uncertain commercial and

legal infrastructure has limited foreign participation, and protectionist laws restrict foreign activity in industries such as communications and automobiles. International lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), the

Paris Club of Western government lenders, and the London

Club of international commercial banks have provided substantial aid, with the caveat that Russia must improve economic

indicators such as its inflation rate and budget deficits. In 1993

and 1994, soaring inflation and government deregulation of

prices robbed consumers of much of their purchasing power

before a government tight-money policy brought inflation

under control in 1995 and 1996. In December 1996, prices rose by 1.4 percent, although wage arrears made that figure irrelevant for many Russians.

The Yeltsin privatization program began with small enterprises, a large proportion of which were in private hands by

1995. Sales of larger enterprises, accomplished in several

phases, encountered substantial difficulties, however. In 1995

allegations of corruption slowed the process, as did persistent

opposition from the antireform State Duma factions. Privatization was virtually halted during the 1996 presidential election

campaign, but in July 1996 the administration announced new

goals and a reformed system for ownership transition. Initially

positive, Western evaluations of Russia's privatization program

were tempered in 1996 by continued government favoritism

toward former state enterprises, by the sale of investment

shares to banks and other institutions with close state connections rather than to the public, and by the program's distinct

slowdown in 1996. In October 1996, the government had collected only 14 percent of the year's targeted privatization reve- nue of US$2.2 billion. In November the planned public sale of

stock in two major state-owned telecommunications firms, Roslxix
telekom and Svyazinvest, was canceled in favor of stock sales to two large banks that had financed Yeltsin's 1996 campaign, heralding a new privatization scandal. The 1997 national budget

set a privatization income goal for 1997 at US$1.1 billion, but

already in February Vladimir Potanin, head of the privatization revenue collection commission, expressed doubt that the goal

could be met.

Tax collection remained a major problem for Russia as of

early 1997. Although some nominal tax reforms were put in

place, tax collection remained inept, and the system still failed to promote private initiative or foreign investment. Despite

constant government pleas, promises, and reform blueprints,

and despite substantial pressure from the IMF, in 1997 taxation

remained the main obstacle to budgetary solvency.

The government lost large amounts of tax revenue because

unofficial and illegal commerce is widespread and because the

State Taxation Service inspires so little respect from legitimate

businesses. According to an official 1996 estimate, only 16 percent of Russia's 2.6 million firms were paying taxes regularly,

and at least twice that number paid no taxes at all. On three dif- ferent occasions, the IMF postponed installments of a US$10.1

billion loan to Russia because of the taxation problem—twice

in the second half of 1996 and again in February 1997.

When the official tax shortfall reached US$24.4 billion in

October 1996, the government began televising appeals for tax- law compliance. A new emergency tax commission, headed by

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Chief of Staff Anatoliy Chubays, targeted seventeen of Russia's largest companies for bankruptcy proceedings if their huge tax arrears were not paid

immediately. Among the most delinquent enterprises were

three subsidiaries of Chernomyrdin's extremely wealthy former

company, the State National Gas Company (Gazprom), which

reportedly owed US$2.1 billion. Many large enterprises failed

to comply, and much of Russia's extensive so-called shadow

economy remained beyond the reach of the commission. Critics characterized the emergency commission as a stopgap tactic

that delayed fundamental reform in the tax system. According

to government statistics, in 1996 some 20,000 collection orders were issued for back taxes amounting to US$15.7 billion; the

orders yielded only US$3.8 billion to the state budget. Early in

1997, Minister of Finance Aleksandr Livshits drafted a new tax code that would have saved the government an estimated

US$30 billion annually. But the plan's anticipated closing of

lxx
profitable loopholes attracted sharp resistance. In February

1997, Minister of Internal Affairs Anatoliy Kulikov, known as a

hard-liner, was given the task of cracking down on tax violators.

Yeltsin removed Livshits from his position during the Government reorganization of March 1997.

In March the Government threatened bankruptcy proceedings against a new group of ninety nonpaying enterprises,

many of them quite large, hoping to encourage public sales of

shares that would dislodge Soviet-era managers in favor of out- side investors. At the same time, privatization chief Al'fred

Kokh was given control of the inept State Taxation Service.

Besides the chronic tax collection failure, institutional

remains of the Soviet era also continue to plague economic

progress. In many large plants, the economic reforms of the

early 1990s left control with the same managers who had run

the plants for the state. In the post-Soviet years, managers have

taken advantage of Russia's new free-market atmosphere, and

the lack of effective commercial legislation, to line their own

pockets—often in cooperation with criminal organizations

while paying little attention to plant productivity. In 1996 the

Government increased subsidies to some major automobile

and defense plants, reversing the direction of privatization and

further diminishing incentives.

Another obstacle to economic stability is the pervasive influ- ence on economic activity of the mafiya—as commonly used in

Russia, a term including gangsters, dishonest businesspeople,

and corrupt officials. In the 1990s, Russia is suffering the

effects of an increasingly prosperous national network of criminals who extort protection money from an estimated 75 percent of businesses and banks. Individuals refusing such

payments often are the victims of violent crimes. In 1995 gangs

controlled an estimated 50,000 private and state enterprises

and had full ownership of thousands more. Unlike organized

criminal groups in the West, which specialize in illegal activity

such as drug trafficking and prostitution, Russia's mafiya spans

the entire range of the economy, discouraging private enterprise and siphoning off 10 to 20 percent of enterprise profits

that are neither taxed nor reinvested in legitimate business.

Organized crime also has been involved in the movement of a huge amount of capital—estimated at US$1 to US$2 billion per

month—out of Russia in the mid-1990s. Such activity has prospered mainly because of strong links with corrupt officials; an

lxxi
estimated 30 to 50 percent of organized crime's proceeds is spent on bribes to procurators, police, and bureaucrats.

This connection is not new in the post-Soviet era; already in

the Brezhnev era, officials took bribes from the underworld as the black market responded to gaps in Soviet production. In

the early post-Soviet years, reformers implicitly condoned such

activity in the hope that it would hasten the development of a

legitimate private-enterprise sector. In 1993, however, government measures against criminals were stimulated by publicity

about Russia's crime wave and by the success of ultranationalist

political groups who stressed the crime issue. Many of the

Yeltsin administration's law enforcement decrees of 1993 and

1994 were of questionable constitutionality, and they have had

little overall effect in the mid-1990s because law enforcement

agencies remain corrupt.

As Russia has attempted to meet the standards for inflation

and budget deficits set by international lenders, a key element

has been limiting the money supply, which was poorly controlled until 1995. The more stringent policies established that

year brought loud complaints from regional governments, an

increase in noncurrency payments that hampered the collection of state revenue, and continued wage arrears in state and

private enterprises suffering cash shortages. Although the

annual inflation rate for 1996 was 22 percent, compared with

131 percent in 1995, authorities in the Government and else- where blamed a new economic downturn on the tight-money

policy because private enterprises lacked capital with which to expand their operations.

The 1997 monetary plan of the Russian Central Bank (RCB)

called for increasing the money supply by 22 to 30 percent during that year, a level not projected to raise inflation above the

12 percent annual increase forecast by the 1997 national budget. At the end of 1996, the RCB planned for a ruble depreciation of 9 percent during 1997, which would maintain the

exchange rate at between 5,750 and 6,350 rubles per United

States dollar at the end of the year. During 1996 the exchange

rate moved from 4,640 rubles to the dollar to 5,560, an

increase of nearly 20 percent.

A Government goal for 1997 was reducing the interest rate

for domestic bank loans to 20 or 25 percent to provide working

capital for stagnant enterprises and limit the haphazard,

uncontrolled interenterprise loans and in-kind payments that

had proliferated as capital became scarce. However, shares in

lxxii
most enterprises remained unavailable to the general public,

and the high-interest bonds sold by the Government in 1996

had attracted large amounts of bank capital away from more

risky investment in private ventures. The Government's draft 1997 budget, which had been

revised by a conciliation commission of legislators and Government representatives, was approved by the State Duma in January after the four readings required by law. After the first two

drafts were rejected, the Government added about US$6 bil- lion in spending and new tax breaks to stimulate economic

activity. The changes swung the votes of the Communist Party

of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya partiya

Rossiyskoy Federatsii—KPRF) and its allies, who had lobbied

for additional government spending, but democratic parties

such as Yabloko voted against the budget because of inadequate fiscal restraint. The Federation Council (the upper

house of the parliament) approved the budget but expressed

serious doubts about the realism of its revenue projections.

As approved, the budget was based on projections of 11.8

percent annual inflation and GDP growth of 2 percent for

1997. The planned budget deficit of about US$16.5 billion

would be 3.5 percent of the projected GDP figure. However,

Russian and Western experts, including Russia's minister of

economics, Yevgeniy Yasin, called the GDP projection greatly

exaggerated. Yasin's ministry forecast zero GDP growth for

1997, with recovery beginning in 1998 at the earliest. The budget did not include a 10 percent increase in Russia's minimum

wage that went into effect in January 1997 and that would

entail additional state spending. In 1996 the government's

issue of bonds with interest rates exceeding 100 percent had

complicated the budget-balancing process by tripling the government borrowing of 1995 and inflating the public debt from

16 to 26 percent of GDP.

Economic indicators for the first half of 1996 were mostly

negative. According to an independent Russian survey, compared with December 1995 the real volume of production and

services dropped by 11 percent, the number of employed per- sons dropped by 4 percent, the real volume of capital investment dropped by 54 percent, the average prices of

manufactured products and purchased products rose by 14

percent and 25 percent, respectively, and the average wage rose by 10 percent. In the first nine months of 1996, total GDP

dropped by 6 percent, and industrial output dropped by 5 perlxxiii
cent compared with the same period in 1995. Light industry,

construction materials, and machine building showed the

sharpest drops in production, and domestic investment

declined by 17 percent.

In the first nine months of 1996, agricultural production

dropped by 8 percent. Russia's 1996 grain harvest was 69 million tons, one of the smallest in the last thirty years and only a 9

percent improvement over the disastrously low harvest of 1995.

An estimated three-quarters of farms lost money, and only twothirds of 1996 budget allotments for farm support were paid

out. As of early 1997, the restructuring of the agricultural sys- tem was one of the major unfulfilled promises of Yeltsin's presidency.

Russia's foreign trade position did not improve significantly

in 1996. Membership in the World Trade Organization

(WTO—see Glossary), a top priority for acceptance in the

international free market, continued to be delayed. Although

some aspects of Russia's trade policy have been liberalized substantially, the WTO cited continuing price controls on oil, state subsidies to major industries, protective import duties, and

abrupt changes in tariff and tax policies for foreign companies

as defects that precluded Russia's membership. According to the WTO, stability and transparency were the major missing

elements in Russia's trade policy. Although the United States

pledged support for Russia's admittance in 1998, prospects were unclear in early 1997.

Foreign investment for 1996 was forecast to reach only

slightly more than half the 1995 figure (US$1.5 billion), mainly

because of continuing uncertainty in Russia's standards for tax- ation, accounting, and property rights. In October 1996, an

international market consulting firm placed Russia below Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and Venezuela in desirability as an emerging market opportunity for investors. Corruption, fraud,

and bureaucratic delays were cited as the main factors in that

ranking. In November the failure of a Russian space mission to Mars lost foreign investors about US$180 million, as well as damaging the stature of a key remaining high-technology

industry. In April the space program suffered further damage

with the delay of the new Russia-United States International

Space Station because the Government had not funded a criti- cal aerospace contractor. On the positive side, in October foreign investors paid

nearly US$450 million for shares in Gazprom, the natural gas

lxxiv
monopoly. About forty joint ventures were active in the oil

industry in 1996, accounting for about 8 percent of Russia's

total extraction. Foreign investment in Russia's extraction

industries was expected to expand significantly beginning in

1997 as the State Duma expedited approval of the productionsharing agreements that are the basis of foreign participation.

In November 1996, Russia issued its first set of bonds on the

European market after receiving an unexpectedly high bond

rating from Western credit agencies. Following Russia's first bond rating since 1917, the bonds drew US$1 billion from

United States, European, and South Korean investors attracted

by the 9.25 percent interest rate. A place in the bond market

was expected to help Russia raise money from other international sources. In March 1997, the issue of a second set of

bonds, this time denominated in German marks, fetched

US$1.2 billion. A third issue was planned for later in 1997; like

the second, it was designated to pay overdue pensions and salaries.In late 1996 and early 1997, labor groups showed some signs

of ending their remarkably passive reaction to the chronic

wage arrears in many of Russia's industries. (In March 1997,

the total wage debt was estimated at US$8.5 billion.) Through

most of 1996, with a few notable exceptions such as the coal

workers, labor in Russia followed the Soviet pattern of expecting the government rather than enterprise managers to remedy their plight.

The older trade unions, many of whose leaders had been

hand-picked by plant managers in the Soviet era, generally dis- couraged strong actions against employers in the early and

mid-1990s. Unions formed after 1985 suffered from Russia's

total lack of labor legislation, which allowed the government

and enterprise officials to ignore union claims on behalf of the

workers. Experts pointed to the lack of pressure from a united

labor movement as a key reason the Yeltsin government failed

to address the problem of overdue wages.

In the second half of 1996, strike activity intensified somewhat. According to government statistics, 356,000 workers at more than 3,700 enterprises participated in strikes in the first nine months of 1996, with the largest number of strikes in educational institutions and coal mines. (Doctors, miners, nurses, and teachers were the workers hardest hit by wage arrears.)

In November 1996 and March 1997, nationwide strikes and

demonstrations called by the Federation of Independent Trade

lxxv
Unions of Russia (Federatsiya nezavisimikh profsoyuzov

Rossii—FNPR), the largest such organization in the country,

failed to galvanize widespread support. In the March action, an

estimated 2 million workers struck or demonstrated, but more

than 80 percent of those were teachers, and the FNPR had predicted substantially heavier participation. Observers attributed

the low turnout to apathy, lack of trust in the FNPR, and the

expectation that Yeltsin's recent government reorganization

would improve the situation.

The democratization of the political system has followed an

equally bumpy path in Russia's first post-Soviet years. As with

economic reform, some elements of political reform appeared

under Gorbachev in the late 1980s. The policy of glasnost

allowed public discussion of hitherto taboo subjects, including

the wisdom of government economic policy in a time of serious

economic decline. As the Soviet Union's regional jurisdictions

clamored for various degrees of sovereignty, Boris Yeltsin led

Russia's challenge to Soviet authority in a number of areas. In

1991 Russians elected Yeltsin president of their republic in a

free election; the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 made

Yeltsin the most powerful man in Russia, which shortly became

an independent state. From the very beginning, Yeltsin's attempts to promulgate

reform programs from the office of the presidency encountered stiff opposition from antireform factions in the legislative

branch. Beginning in 1994, that opposition was centered in the

State Duma. After Yeltsin used military force to overcome an open rebellion against his dismissal of the parliament in October 1993, he achieved passage of a new constitution that prescribed a strong executive and reduced the powers of the

legislative branch. However, the first two legislative elections, in

1993 and 1995, seated large numbers of deputies from the

KPRF, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (Liberal'nodemokraticheskaya partiya Rossii—LDPR), and other nationalist and antireform groups. Under worsening economic conditions, a seemingly unstoppable crime wave, and a highly

unpopular war in Chechnya, Yeltsin's popularity plummeted in

1995 and early 1996. His response was a contradictory series of

personnel and agency shifts at top government levels, together

with presidential decrees that often reversed the movement

toward democratic governance. By early 1996, virtually all reformist officials had been removed from positions of influence, and a group of hard-liners, led by presidential security

lxxvi
chief Aleksandr Korzhakov, Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, and Minister of Internal Affairs Anatoliy Kulikov, seemingly had the president's ear. By that time, Yeltsin's authoritarian use of executive power

had combined with the Chechnya imbroglio to lose him the

support of the democratic and reformist factions that had been

active promoters of early reform policies. As he engaged in an

uphill presidential campaign, Yeltsin made lavish promises of

government aid to unemployed workers and state enterprises,

and allegations of corruption in the latest phase of the privatization program forced him to remain silent about that aspect

of his administration.

The 1996 presidential campaign yielded two distinctly

opposed theories of governance: the KPRF's frank appeal for

return to the central rule of Soviet days and Yeltsin's sometimes

timid commitment to democratization and economic reform.

In general, however, the national party system remained quite

fluid. Although a large number of parties with national constituencies emerged, much shifting occurred among the smaller

parties as coalitions formed and dissolved. Some forty-three

parties and coalitions registered for the 1995 legislative elections. In 1995 Yeltsin attempted to dominate party politics by

forming two nominally opposed parties with essentially proadministration positions, but his strategy was unsuccessful. The

one major party that emerged from his manipulations, Our

Home Is Russia, captured relatively few seats in the State Duma

in 1995 but retained national standing as a major party because

of its identification with Chernomyrdin.

Of the proreform opposition groups, the Yabloko coalition

remained the strongest in 1996, but its influence was limited

because it refused to join forces with other reform parties. The

candidates of Yabloko and other reformist groups fared poorly

in the first round of the 1996 presidential election. Meanwhile,

the KPRF had developed a unified and loyal following among

Russians disillusioned with Yeltsin and nostalgic for the Soviet

past.

As the presidential campaign developed, the KPRF candidate, former CPSU functionary Gennadiy Zyuganov, emerged

as the prime competitor of Yeltsin. The president used his access to broadcast and print media (which feared the repression that would result from a KPRF victory) to climb steadily in

the polls. In the first round, Yeltsin defeated Zyuganov narrowly. Before the second-round faceoff with Zyuganov, Yeltsin

lxxvii
dismissed the most visible hard-liners in his administration,

added popular third-place finisher Aleksandr Lebed' to his

administration, and coaxed lukewarm endorsements from

Yabloko and other reformist parties. In the second round, Yeltsin easily defeated Zyuganov, a dull

campaigner who could not convince undecided voters that a KPRF victory would not mean a return to the days of Soviet

repression. In what amounted to a contest between anti-Yeltsin

and anticommunist sides, Yeltsin attracted an estimated 17 million voters who had voted for Lebed' or Yabloko candidate

Grigoriy Yavlinskiy in the first round, and for whom Yeltsin now

was the lesser of two evils. To gain acceptance as the main opposition faction at the

national level, after the presidential election the KPRF

attempted to broaden its constituency by forming a coalition

called the National Patriotic Union of Russia. The coalition

included the leftist and nationalist groups that had supported

Zyuganov's 1996 presidential bid. To improve its national

image from one of disruption to one of constructive cooperation, the coalition softened its antigovernment rhetoric. A

prime example of the new approach was KPRF support of the

Chernomyrdin government's draft budget in the State Duma

deliberations of December 1996-January 1997.

The KPRF found this position tenable while Yeltsin was ill and the moderate Chernomyrdin had a strong position in the

Government. However, the Government reorganization of

March 1997 gave new power to reformists with whom the KPRF

shared little common ground. The party also showed signs of a

split between moderates and radicals who rejected compromise. Meanwhile, young Russians showed little interest in joining the KPRF, which offered few constructive ideas about

Russia's future and whose membership increasingly was based on an old guard of Soviet-era activists. Beginning his second term, Yeltsin filled his new cabinet

with individuals with reformist credentials. Free-market advocate Aleksandr Livshits was appointed minister of finance, and

reformist Yevgeniy Yasin retained his position as minister of the

economy. In another indication that economic reform would

continue, Yeltsin named reformist Al'fred Kokh as deputy

prime minister for privatization. Retained from the previous

Government were Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeniy Primakov (a 1996 appointee), recently appointed Minister of

lxxviii
Defense Igor* Rodionov, and hard-line Minister of Internal

Affairs Anatoliy Kulikov.

The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural

Resources was redesignated the Ministry of Natural Resources;

environmental issues were shifted to a new, subcabinet agency,

the State Environmental Protection Committee, headed by Viktor Danilov-Danil'yan, who had been minister of environmental

protection and natural resources in the first Yeltsin administration. The only minister affiliated with the KPRF was Aman

Tuleyev, a strong proponent of reintegration of the CIS states, who was appointed to head the Ministry of CIS Affairs.

In August 1996, Chernomyrdin listed among the new Government's goals a dramatic reduction of the state bureaucracy,

including the elimination of twenty-four ministries and agencies. However, no streamlining occurred until March 1997,

when Yeltsin dropped three of his deputy prime ministers and

announced a large-scale Government reorganization as a remedy for what Yeltsin admitted was poor performance by his sec- ond-term appointees. The new, smaller Government was to include eight deputy prime ministers (compared with twelve

previously), twenty-three ministries (three of which were headed by deputy prime ministers, and a reduction of one

from the previous organization), sixteen state committees

(compared with seventeen previously), and twenty other federal agencies.

A key appointment in this period was Boris Nemtsov as deputy prime minister in charge of social issues (including the cri- sis of wage and pension arrears) and the extremely problematic reform of state monopolies and housing subsidies. As

governor of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, Nemtsov had gained

international recognition for his brilliant regional economic

reforms. Nemtsov's reputation for honesty also was expected to improve the tarnished image of Yeltsin's administration.

The Government reorganization process required much

more time than expected because factions struggled to gain

coveted posts and no qualified persons could be found for others. Reportedly at least twelve individuals refused appointments

to head ministries and committees. The reorganization also

sharpened the power struggle between the Government and

the State Duma, the main political bastion of numerous special

interests that the initiatives of Chubays and Nemtsov promised

to attack, and whose patron, Chernomyrdin, now was fading.

lxxix
In June 1996, the appointment of former general Aleksandr

Lebed' as head of the Security Council improved the prospects

of an already promising political figure. In this position, Lebed'

remained in the public eye by making controversial speeches

on matters of policy and by negotiating what turned out to be

the conclusive cease-fire of the Chechen conflict. Lebed1 had a base of avid supporters who craved charismatic, assertive leadership. Unlike most other Russian government figures, he cre- ated a positive image on television, which by 1996 was the most

important source of news for most Russians. In October Yeltsin

responded to continued criticism from Lebed' by dismissing

him from the Security Council. In the months that followed his

dismissal, Lebed' polished his public image in Russia and

abroad. He began preparations for a future presidential campaign by seeking funds for future political activities, and by

traveling to the United States and Western Europe. Although

he virtually disappeared from the pro-Yeltsin television net- works after his dismissal, in early 1997 polls indicated that

Lebed' remained the most popular political figure in Russia. In March he established a new opposition party, the Russian People's Republican Party, which he described as an alternative to the KPRF and the ruling elite. Early in Yeltsin's second term, the urgency of the Chechnya

conflict receded as the two sides negotiated the long-term conditions of the so-called Khasavyurt accords that Lebed' had

achieved in August 1996. The cease-fire was met with great

relief by the Russian people as the end of a long ordeal, and

this attitude contributed to the enduring popularity of Lebed'.

In October the Khasavyurt accords survived the dismissal of

their architect; the Chechens reluctantly continued negotiations after the moderate Ivan Rybkin was named to replace

Lebed' as Security Council chief and head negotiator on the

Russian side. In November Yeltsin announced the withdrawal

of the two Russian brigades that had been designated for permanent occupation of Chechnya, a concession upon which

Chechen negotiators had adamantly insisted. By February

1997, all Russian units had been withdrawn. After six Red Cross

workers and six Russian civilians were murdered—apparently

by renegade guerrillas—near Groznyy in December 1996, all international aid organizations except for the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE—see Glossary)

removed their personnel from Chechnya. Unreconciled

Chechen guerrilla groups continued kidnappings in 1997,

lxxx
however, and the resettlement of Russian emigres from Chechnya promised to strain the already meager resources of Russia's

Federal Migration Service.

In late 1996, Russia took an increasingly conciliatory negotiating approach with the Chechens, offering agreements restor- ing trade, communications, customs relations, and road links

and resuming oil and gas refining and transport. Russia's best

hope of keeping Chechnya in the federation in 1997 was eco- nomic leverage, because the war had left the republic decimated and without international ties and because the

infrastructure already existed for Russia to restore Chechnya's

most vital industry, oil refining. The main Russian economic

negotiator was Boris Berezovskiy, a controversial automotive

and banking mogul who had contributed a large sum to

Yeltsin's reelection campaign.

The ultimate status of Chechnya and the payment of war

reparations remained unresolved in early 1997. The Khasavyurt

accords called for a five-year waiting period before deciding

the independence issue, but Russia insisted that the territorial

integrity of the federation must not be threatened. In January

1997, Chechnya conducted its first presidential and legislative

elections; international observers described the election procedure as fair and open, although refugees from Chechnya,

including an estimated 350,000 Russians, were not permitted

to vote. Russia's foreign policy establishment saw Asian

Maskhadov, the former military leader who easily won the presidency, as a potential partner in further negotiations, unlike

the more radical presidential candidates. However, all sixteen

presidential candidates based their platforms on Chechnya's

full independence under the name "Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeria," and Maskhadov refused to take his rightful seat as a republic governor in Russia's Federation Council. Russia's offi- cial response to the January elections was muted; by March, the

terms of a treaty of "peace and agreement" were under serious

discussion.

As Yeltsin began his second term, the strength of the president's political position and the nature of his intentions

remained unclear. Yeltsin ended his first term on an ominous

note by retreating completely from public view immediately

after his election victory. The heart attack that Yeltsin suffered

between the two rounds of the election was identified only later

as the cause of his disappearance.

lxxxi
Beginning with the first round of the presidential election,

Yeltsin's physical condition exerted a growing influence over

the political atmosphere in Russia. In the fall of 1996, news of

the president's very serious heart condition intensified speculation about the identity of likely successors. As Yeltsin maintained a limited public schedule in that period, three figures,

Chernomyrdin, Lebed', and Moscow's very popular mayor,

Yuriy Luzhkov, jockeyed openly for advantage in the anticipated post-Yeltsin era—although Chernomyrdin clearly lacked

the political appeal of his potential rivals. Those maneuvers

continued after Yeltsin's heart surgery in November.

By early 1997, Russia's apparent lack of leadership caused

intense concern and speculation in the international community, and Yeltsin's popularity again plummeted as workers and

pensioners remained unpaid. In March 1997, Yeltsin used his

annual state of the federation speech to the State Duma to reas- sure domestic and foreign opinion and to reassert his presidential power—a goal that he achieved by delivering a forceful and

coherent speech. Accusing the Government of failing to exe- cute his commands, Yeltsin repeated his unfulfilled 1996 promises of wage and pension payments, accelerated economic

reform, and more efficient government.

During Yeltsin's absence, another figure bore the brunt of

opposition attacks on the administration. In 1995 and early

1996, Yeltsin had dismissed reform economist Anatoliy Chubays from two high-level economic positions in response to strong criticism from antireform factions. However, after

directing Yeltsin's successful 1996 presidential campaign, Chubays was rewarded with the chief of staff position in Yeltsin's

second administration, at the same time increasing the prospects that the pace of reform would increase.

Although too unpopular to have a realistic chance at the

presidency, Chubays maneuvered effectively within the Yeltsin

administration. He formed an alliance with Yeltsin's ambitious

daughter, Tat'yana Dyachenko, who was rumored to have substantial influence over her father's policy decisions. The work

of Chubays was widely seen in the dismissal of the Aleksandr

Korzhakov coterie in June and of Aleksandr Lebed' in October.

Chubays was credited with maintaining some sort of order during Yeltsin's convalescence in the early stages of the second

administration, even as Chubays's many enemies spread rumors of illegal campaign funding and links with organized

crime.

lxxxii
Despite speculation that Yeltsin would limit Chubays's power

by increasing the prestige of rivals—a technique Yeltsin had

used throughout his presidency—in the Government reorganization of March 1997 Yeltsin advanced Chubays to the positions

of deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs and

minister of the economy. Chubays now had direct control of

the governmental restructuring that Yeltsin prescribed to end

bureaucratic gridlock, and the new faces that Yeltsin appointed

at that time improved the prospect that the new minister would

be able to accelerate economic reform in 1997.

In July 1996, experts had seen Yeltsin's creation of a civilian

advisory Defense Council as an effort to balance the power that

Lebed' had gained as chief of the Security Council. In October

the head of the Defense Council, Yuriy Baturin, supplanted

Lebed' as the primary architect of military reform, dismissing

six top generals and reassigning several who remained. By the

end of 1996, Baturin was in a bitter battle with defense minister

Rodionov for authority over reform policy. By March 1997,

Rodionov's position in the administration was reported to be

quite tenuous.

Late in 1996, another extraconstitutional organ was formed

in the Yeltsin administration: a permanent, four-member Consultative Council that included the president, the prime minister, and the speakers of the two houses of the Federal Assembly.

The council was to meet twice a month in an effort designed to smooth differences between the two branches of government.

The inclusion of the State Duma speaker brought a prominent

KPRF deputy, Gennadiy Seleznev, into a top advisory group—

a

move calculated by Yeltsin and Chubays to either divide or conciliate the strongest of the opposition parties. The fourth member of the council was Yegor Stroyev, speaker of the Federation

Council and usually a Yeltsin supporter. During Yeltsin's ill- nesses, Chubays represented the president at council meetings.

Already in the mid-1990s, the executive branch contained

numerous directorates and commissions answering only to the

president. In 1996 the addition of extraconstitutional governing bodies such as the Defense Council and the Consultative

Council continued Yeltsin's propensity to govern by decree and

outside constitutionally prescribed lines of power. According to some experts, the existence of seemingly redundant presidential policy-making groups was a new manifestation of Russia's

long tradition of arbitrary rule; according to others, such

Ixxxiii
organs were necessary to circumvent the gridlock of opposition

in the State Duma.

In the fall of 1996, Yeltsin's illness brought demands from all political factions for clarification of the 1993 constitution's

vague language on replacing a disabled head of state: the conditions for such replacement are listed in the constitution, but

the authority to make the decision is not specified. In this case, Yeltsin responded by temporarily delegating to Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin his authority as commander in chief of the

armed forces, head of internal security, and custodian of the

codes needed to unleash a nuclear attack. Within hours of his

successful heart bypass surgery in November, Yeltsin publicly

reclaimed full control, apparently seeking to end the impression of a power vacuum in Moscow. In the months that fol- lowed, however, government assurances of Yeltsin's continued

competence met increasing skepticism as the president

appeared only in carefully edited news film. In the first months

of 1997, KPRF deputies introduced motions in the State Duma

to impeach Yeltsin on health grounds, and the Duma discussed

constitutional amendments limiting the powers of the president.

Between September 1996 and March 1997, Yeltsin's administration faced a new political challenge when a series of regional

elections provided the KPRF and its nationalist allies another

opportunity to weaken Yeltsin's political base. Fifty-two of Russia's eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions were to elect chief

executives during that period, and all of those executives are ex

officio members of the Federation Council, the upper house of

parliament and a bastion of Yeltsin support until 1997. (The

chief executives of republics are called presidents; those of

other jurisdictions carry the title governor or administrative

head.)

Before the elections began, experts identified fifteen of

those constituencies, primarily in the "Red Belt" along the

southern border from the North Caucasus to the Far East, as sure to elect communist leaders. At the end of 1996, a Yeltsinappointed incumbent chief executive had been defeated in

twenty-four of the forty-four elections decided to that point.

The KPRF had backed fifteen of the new officials, and six had

had Yeltsin's support. Among the victors were former vice president and outspoken Yeltsin critic Aleksandr Rutskoy, who was

elected governor of Kursk Oblast, and Vasiliy Starodubtsev, a

central figure in the 1991 coup against the Gorbachev governlxxxiv
ment, who was elected governor of Tula Oblast. In most cases, successful candidates took less partisan positions and were more ready to negotiate with their opposition than experts had

predicted when the elections began. Incumbents generally

fared better in northern and urban regions where economic

conditions were the most favorable. Yeltsin's doubtful health

and the rescinding of his 1996 campaign spending promises

hampered some progovernment candidates. All the chief executives elected in 1996 were expected to wield greater political

power because they now had direct mandates rather than presidential appointments, and that legitimacy also would bolster

the power of the Federation Council vis-a-vis the State Duma in

the Federal Assembly.

In 1996 the central government's economic and legislative

control of subnational jurisdictions continued to slip away as the power of regional chief executives increased proportionally. Governors such as Yevgeniy Nazdratenko of strategically

vital Maritime (Primorskiy) Territory on the Pacific coast and

Eduard Rossel' of Sverdlovsk Oblast in the Urals already had

established personal fiefdoms outside Moscow's control.

Nazdratenko openly challenged the national administration on

a number of issues, including the transfer of a small parcel of

his territory's land to China as part of a Sino-Russian border

treaty. In 1993 Sverdlovsk Oblast briefly declared itself a republic under Rossel'. As ofJanuary 1997, Moscow had signed bilat- eral agreements, establishing a wide variety of power-sharing

relationships, with twenty-six subnational jurisdictions.

By 1996 regional governments raised 50 percent of taxes and

accounted for 70 percent of government spending in Russia.

Although only fifteen of eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions were net contributors to the federal budget and sixty-seven

relied on federal subsidies for pensions, in 1996 Moscow still had no centralized system to account for movement of funds

between the federal government and the regions. Many jurisdictions complained that the 1997 budget did not allocate suf- ficient funds to them to compensate for their tax payments to Moscow. As of March 1997, no subnational jurisdiction had

received a full allotment of federal pension funds, and only ten

jurisdictions had paid their federal taxes in full. In October 1996, the emergency tax committee was forced

to withdraw its threat of bankruptcy proceedings against the

Kama Automobile Plant (KamAZ), one of the Republic of

Tatarstan's largest industries, for nonpayment of federal taxes.

lxxxv
Citing the 1994 power-sharing treaty between the republic and

the federal government, Tatarstan's president Mintimer

Shaimiyev convinced Chernomyrdin that ending KamAZ's

favorable tax status would intrude on the republic's economic

sovereignty.

Experts predicted that tensions between Moscow and the

subnational governments would intensify during the shaping

of Russia's new federal system, especially as that system

addresses the question of who controls the country's vast

national resources. After the regional elections, a loose coalition ofjurisdictions that were net contributors to the federal

budget ("donor regions") was in a position to gain significant

economic concessions from the federal government. At the

same time, the eight regional economic associations, which

include all of Russia's eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions

except Chechnya, showed new cohesiveness and also were

expected to gain greater autonomy and attention from Moscow

in 1997. Those associations are: the Far East and Baikal Association; the Siberian Accord Association; the Greater Volga Association; the Central Russia Association; the Cooperation

Association of North Caucasus Republics, Territories, and

Oblasts; the Black Earth Association; the Urals Regional Association; and the North-West Association.

In October presidential chief of staff Chubays began a cam- paign to reverse the movement toward regional autonomy.

Chubays called for a review of the many regional laws that con- travene the national constitution, in an effort to curtail the

autonomy that such legislation encourages. (Several of the

regional constitutions adopted after 1991 contain language

contradicting the national constitution, and the electoral laws

of some twenty-seven regions reportedly violate federal law.)

However, the project was postponed because regional procurators, who would be responsible for such an investigation, lack

sufficient authority over regional officials. After the elections of

1996-97 gave most regional leaders a popular mandate, the

lack of federal sanctions on subnational jurisdictions violating

federal law became a more significant threat to the integrity of

the federation as well as to human rights and the balance of

political power within jurisdictions. Meanwhile, local and

municipal administrations chafed under restrictions imposed

by regional jurisdictions, just as the latter complained about

Moscow's restrictions.

lxxxvi
In the post-Soviet period, Russia's foreign policy has shifted

significantly, most often in response to domestic rather than

foreign conditions. The early Yeltsin administration, represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, sought to bring Russia fully into the community of nations—especially

Western nations—and to dispel the aura of the Evil Empire.

The military and economic competition of the Cold War was

replaced by a series of cooperative agreements with Western

powers, including disarmament treaties, that brought eco- nomic and humanitarian aid to Russia. The vast set of Soviet

commitments that spanned the world in the 1980s was reduced

in an effort to concentrate limited resources in the most useful

areas. However, a strong nationalist faction in the parliament and

elsewhere saw such complaisance as the surrender of the preeminent, rightful role in world politics that had been won in

the Soviet era. This faction, which has been compared with the

nineteenth-century Slavophile movement that sought to protect Russian culture from the harmful intrusion of Western civ- ilization, has urged that Russia recapture as much influence as possible in the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet

empire in Central Europe. This process would discourage the

influence of the West in those regions, countering the ostensible drive of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO

see Glossary) to push Russia out of the continent of Europe.

For many advocates of this position, the preferred area of

closer foreign relations is Asia, and a new anti-Western alliance

with China is the focal point.

In the early and mid-1990s, Yeltsin had improved Russia's

international image by participating in several meetings of the

Group of Seven (G—7—see Glossary) as well as his regular summit conferences with United States presidents. In maintaining

such contacts, Yeltsin attempted to walk a line between making

concessions to the West that would anger Russian nationalists

and taking independent positions that would weaken the West- ern commitment to aid Russia during its transition period. As a

result of these conflicting demands, in the mid-1990s Russia's

foreign policy positions have been inconsistent, and Yeltsin,

Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeniy Primakov, Chernomyrdin,

and other official spokesmen often have issued contradictory

statements on important issues. On issues such as Chechnya and human rights in Russia,

Western diplomats refrained in 1996 from criticizing Yeltsin for

lxxxvii
fear of damaging his prestige at home. Before the August 1996

cease-fire in Chechnya, the IMF offered Russia the second-largest loan in the bank's history, and the Council of Europe (see

Glossary), considered a guardian of human rights in Europe,

admitted Russia to its membership despite numerous reports

of atrocities in Chechnya and noncompliance with the council's policy on capital punishment.

However, Yeltsin received substantial criticism from the West

for some policies that failed to comply with international stan- dards. Among them were the sale of nuclear reactors, submarines, and other critical items to Iran in violation of

international sanctions; continued dumping and careless handling of nuclear materials by Russia's civilian and military agencies (criticism coming mainly fromJapan and the Scandinavian

countries, which were most directly affected) ; and Russia's fail- ure to comply with the arms limitations of the Conventional

Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty—see Glossary). Most of

the summit meetings of the mid-1990s discussed some or all of

those questions, but few solutions emerged. Early in 1997, Russia's relationship with Iran had become closer, its nuclear safety

policies remained unchanged, and CFE Treaty modifications were under discussion.

In the mid-1990s, the major point of conflict in the struggle over Western influence in Russia was the projected expansion

of NATO into former Warsaw Pact nations of what is now called

Central Europe. In 1995 and 1996, numerous statements by the

Russian government rejected the possibility that countries such

as Poland and Hungary could enter NATO without dire conse- quences. Russia's statements predicted that, by isolating and

impoverishing Russia, a NATO presence would in fact reacti- vate the Cold War. During 1996 government spokesmen threatened a variety of diplomatic and military reprisals if NATO

membership were enlarged. Most experts labeled Russia's

behavior as gamesmanship aimed at gaining the most advantageous possible position once an inevitable first round of NATO

expansion occurred.

Despite Russia's threats, in 1996 eleven European countries,

including the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—reiterated their enthusiasm for gaining NATO membership. In early 1997, Bulgaria declared its desire to join, and

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine sought closer cooperation with

the alliance.

lxxxviii
A potentially important change appeared in the Russian

position at the end of 1996. In September the United States

had proposed a charter that would give Russia a special relationship with NATO, in an attempt to relieve tensions over the

expansion issue. In January 1997, Primakov began to negotiate

such an agreement with NATO secretary general Javier Solana.

As negotiations proceeded, two of Russia's key goals emerged:

obtaining more favorable terms in the CFE Treaty and limiting

the NATO military presence in any new member nation in

Central Europe. In keeping with Russia's position that NATO is an anachronistic leftover of the Cold War, Primakov and Chernomyrdin demanded a binding treaty obligating NATO to reform itself from a military to a "political" organization.

As conceived in the West, the agreement would offer Russia

consultation but no veto on NATO expansion decisions;

increased presence of Russian observers at various NATO com- mand levels; and modification of existing arms reduction

agreements to suit Russia's demands. At the March 1997 Helsinki summit, Yeltsin backed the agreement as a way around the

issue of NATO expansion, which he still called "a mistake." By

that time, Primakov and Solana had agreed on most of the

charter's terms, including a permanent consultative council for

discussion of issues such as nuclear security, crisis management,

and peacekeeping operations. However, Primakov insisted on

restricting the presence of NATO forces in any new member

nation, a concession that NATO refused because it would interfere with the alliance's basic commitment to mutual defense.

Because NATO had set a target date ofJuly 1997 for the first official invitations to new member nations, little time was avail- able for conflicting views to be mediated. (Russia demanded

that the signing of the Russia-NATO charter precede and be

separate from the NATO summit that would announce the invi- tations.)

During his first term in office, Boris Yeltsin continued the

tradition, begun by Mikhail Gorbachev, of holding regular

summit meetings with United States presidents. The second

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II—see Glossary) was

a product of a 1993 summit with President George H.W. Bush.

Western experts saw the drastic nuclear arms reductions of

START II as a way for Russia to cut military expenses without

sacrificing national security, at a time when nuclear parity was an increasingly expensive proposition. But as Russia's conventional military forces deteriorated and funding declined in the

lxxxix
mid-1990s, nuclear strike capability assumed a more prominent

place in national security planning. Therefore, by late 1996

Russian authorities were demanding greater limitations on sea- based nuclear warheads, in which the United States has a dis- tinct advantage; greater latitude for deployment of land-based

missiles, in which Russia is strongest; and revision of the START

II restrictions on the multiple-warhead weapons that Russia

considers its most formidable threat. In October 1996, United States secretary of defense William

Perry met strong resistance when he tried to convince the State Duma and Ministry of Defense officials in Moscow that START

II ratification would benefit both sides. At the same time, Russia also delayed finalizing an agreement on classification of

anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), indicating continuing sensitivity

about the prospect of the United States building a missile interception system that would negate much of Russia's nuclear

strike capacity. Early in 1997, Western defense experts began

formulating a START III proposal that might leapfrog the

START II deadlock by eliminating at least some of the most

serious obstacles. But the largest obstacle was the NATO issue:

already in 1995, nationalists and many moderates in the State

Duma refused to even consider START II without assurances that NATO would not move eastward, and this linkage

remained in early 1997.

In the early stages of Yeltsin's second term, high-level diplomatic contact with the West was fitful and unproductive. In September a Moscow visit by German chancellor Helmut Kohl,

Yeltsin's most vocal supporter among Western leaders, failed to bridge the two countries' differences on sanctions on Iraq

(which Russia opposed), NATO expansion, and conditions for

expanded German investment in Russia. In late December, the

first foreign leader to confer with Yeltsin after his convales- cence was China's prime minister Li Peng rather than a Westerner. At that time, Russia and China signed new bilateral

agreements on cooperation in banking, nuclear power plant

construction, and the sale of two naval destroyers to China. In

early 1997, visits by Kohl and French president Jacques Chirac

to Moscow produced no breakthrough on the NATO expansion issue.

The Helsinki summit, the first such meeting since April

1996, yielded agreements on a range of economic matters; Russia was promised an increased role in the G—7, whose annual

meetings were to be renamed the Summit of the Eight, and

xc
Yeltsin received United States commitments for enhanced

investment and integration of Russia in global markets and

support for much-coveted entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO—see Glossary) in 1998. Yeltsin pledged renewed

support for passage of START II in the State Duma, and he supported a START III agreement that would further reduce stra- tegic arms. The two presidents pledged support for ratification

of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which faced stiff opposition in the legislatures of both countries. Yeltsin also

unexpectedly accepted an understanding of the Anti-Ballistic

Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty—see Glossary) that would allow

the United States to continue developing a limited ABM sys- tem.

Yeltsin's robust performance at the summit also allayed the

health fears that had haunted his second administration. The

president received strong criticism from communist and

nationalist factions for the substantive output of the summit,

but experts noted that Russia's position in the meeting provided little negotiating leverage.

Russia and NATO did cooperate successfully in Bosnia. In

September 1996, Primakov expressed Russia's willingness to extend the assignment of Russian troops to the NATO international peacekeeping force, IFOR, with which they had functioned smoothly for more than a year. Russia's continued

participation was conditioned on the lifting of international

sanctions against Serbia. The sanctions ended in October; Russia took an active part in planning the next phase of the peacekeeping operation. In January 1997, Yeltsin approved

extending Russia's participation through July 1998.

Recovery of the empire of the Soviet Union became a foreign policy goal of increasing importance in the mid-1990s. In

the Duma elections of December 1995, every party and group

mentioned reintegration of the CIS states in its foreign policy

platform. In 1996 nationalists used a variety of strategies to encourage the government to extend Russia's influence in the

CIS countries. In three former Soviet states plagued with internal conflict—Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan—Russian

troops remained in ostensibly peacekeeping roles, and Russian

negotiators continued to sponsor talks between hostile groups.

Many experts called the diplomatic activity an insincere effort

to achieve stability in areas where continued conflict was the

onlyjustification for a Russian military presence.

xci
In late 1996, the State Duma overwhelmingly approved a permanent Russian force in the breakaway Dnestr Moldavian

Republic (Transnistria) in Moldova, claiming erroneously that

most of the republic's citizens are Russian and thus require

protection. (A 1994 treaty with Moldova, which the State Duma

never ratified, provided for withdrawal of all Russian forces.)

Early in 1997, Russian officials promised that forces would be

withdrawn when the Transnistria question was settled, while at the same time encouraging the separatists to push for full independence.

In December 1996, a Federation Council resolution officially

claimed the city of Sevastopol', located on Ukraine's Black Sea

coast, as Russian territory. This claim continued Russia's postSoviet dispute with Ukraine over control of the Black Sea Fleet

that the two countries had inherited from the Soviet Union.

Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, hoping to gain national stature for future political advancement, became a main spokesman

for the claim on Sevastopol'. In 1996 Yeltsin and Ukraine's president Leonid Kuchma had negotiated terms for dividing the

fleet, but the new claims by Russian nationalists threatened to sour the recently improved relations between Russia and

Ukraine. Spurred by Russia's territorial claims, in January 1997

Ukraine proposed a "special partnership" with NATO, ratifica- tion of which was expected at the midyear NATO summit.

The bitter border disputes that had erupted with Estonia

and Latvia at the time of those republics' declarations of independence continued into 1997, although in both cases some

concessions were made in late 1996 and early 1997. As progress was made on territorial issues, the main sticking point in 1997

was Russia's requirement that the two Baltic states change their

policy against granting dual citizenship to their Russian populations.

Russia also struggled to maintain as much as possible of its Soviet-era access to the rich natural resources of the Caspian

Sea, against the claims of former Soviet republics Azerbaijan,

Kazakstan, and Turkmenistan. Allied with Iran, Russia called

for joint jurisdiction of resources by all adjoining states rather

than allocation according to national borders. The latter sys- tem, advocated by the other three former republics, would

place most Caspian oil fields outside the jurisdiction of Iran

and Russia. In October 1996, Russia amended its previous

hard-line approach somewhat, but the issue promised to be

under negotiation for an extended period.

xcii
Early in 1996, a customs union agreement was concluded

among Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, significantly

reducing trade barriers within that group (and simplifying the

smuggling of narcotics from Central Asia into Russia). In

November 1996, Russia reversed its recent policy of reducing

credits to other CIS countries, increasing its credit allotment

for CIS partners by about fifteen times in the 1997 draft budget. Those credits are limited, however, to the purchase of Russian goods. The total debt of CIS countries to Russia was

estimated at US$6 billion, plus US$3 billion in unpaid energy

bills, prior to the credit extension. Russia's CIS trade figures for

early 1997 showed a decline in most categories, with natural

gas accounting for the bulk of exports within the commonwealth.

Russia's stature in the CIS suffered setbacks in the 1990s as other CIS nations took independent positions on a variety of

issues. From the beginning, charter members Turkmenistan

and Azerbaijan took very independent positions: contrary to Russia's desire to maintain a military presence throughout the

CIS, Azerbaijan allowed no Russian troops at all on its soil, and

Turkmenistan maintained joint command of all military units.

Kazakstan and Turkmenistan continued to seek Western support in bypassing the Russian pipelines upon which they previously had depended for their oil and natural gas shipments in

the Soviet system. Early in 1997, Kazakstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev, a consistent and influential advocate of eco- nomic integration of the newly independent states, criticized

Russia's leadership of the CIS, calling for diversification of control in order to energize the moribund organization.

Belarus, whose president, Alyaksandr Lukashyenka, had

pushed his country toward reunification with Russia, suffered a

constitutional crisis late in 1996. Lukashyenka's bid for authoritarian power provoked strong nationalist opposition in the parliament of Belarus. It also brought unfavorable international

attention to Russia's dominant position in the new bilateral

relationship established by the 1996 Community of Sovereign

Republics treaty. Unsuccessful in mediating the dispute

between Lukashyenka and the Belarusian parliament, Russia

continued staunch support for Lukashyenka in early 1997,

although Russia's reform factions opposed closer relations that

would require Russia to support Belarus's backward economy.

A new agreement signed by Yeltsin and Lukashyenka in March

1997 reaffirmed the 1996 treaty but increased the controversy

xciii
in Moscow between reformers—including Chubays and most

of Yeltsin's new top-level Government appointees—and nationalists, who saw union with Belarus as the first step in restoring

the Soviet Union.

In 1996 Uzbekistan, the strongest of the five Central Asian

CIS states, began a concentrated effort to cultivate commercial

and diplomatic relations with Western countries and Israel. In

May 1996, Uzbekistan's president Islam Karimov criticized the

Economic Cooperation Organization of Islamic nations, of

which Uzbekistan is a member, for its anti-Israeli and antiUnited States positions; then he made a state visit to the United

States to improve bilateral relations. In January 1997, Karimov

voiced support for expansion of NATO.

In November Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

announced plans for a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion to be used in United Nations-sponsored operations and to be

trained within NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP—see Glossary) program. The new unit's Western connections were a signal that the wealthiest Central Asian countries wished to reduce Russia's role in regional security. Russia responded by

seeking joint action with the Central Asian republics in defending against infiltration by Afghanistan's aggressively fundamentalist Taliban movement. The Russian gambit gained support

from Karimov and Tajikistan's president Imomali Rahmonov.

At the CIS summit in March 1997, Yeltsin attempted to foster

unity and to reassert Russia's dominance, but Georgia, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan reiterated their individual

national concerns, complained about the CIS's ineffectiveness,

and defended their right to form relationships outside the context of the full organization. Yeltsin's chief vehicle for eco- nomic reintegration was to be his Concept for Integrated

Economic Development of the CIS, which CIS foreign ministers refused to discuss pending modification.

In February 1997, NATO secretary general Javier Solana

received a warm reception when he visited Georgia and Moldova. Moldova's president Petru Lucinschi requested a NATO

security guarantee for the borders of his neutral country, showing concern for the continued presence of Russian forces in

Transnistria. Georgia's president Eduard Shevardnadze was

frustrated after more than two years of fruitless Russia-brokered negotiations with Georgia's separatist republic, Abkhazia. The failure to resolve territorial and refugee issues there

postponed Georgia's unification and, ultimately, its indepenxciv
dence from Russian military assistance. Georgia concluded sev- eral bilateral military agreements with NATO member

countries in 1996. In his talks with Solana, Shevardnadze characterized Georgia as an integral part of the new European zone

of security to be formed once NATO expanded. (Early in 1997,

the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus began withdrawing units from Georgia into Russia as part of the overall

military downsizing program.)

Of the countries Solana visited, only Armenia continues to seek extensive military assistance from Russia. In 1997 Armenia

still was under blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, traditionally

hostile Muslim states that nearly surround the country, and

Russia supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

with Azerbaijan—factors that made Russia Armenia's only alter- native for regional economic and security assistance.

The appointment of the Arabist Primakov as minister of for- eign affairs in January 1996 continued the turn of Russia's for- eign policy from West to East, and diplomatic activity in the

East increased in 1996—despite official protestations that Russia seeks a balance between East and West. By the end of 1996,

Russia and China had resolved several of the issues that had

split the major communist powers for several decades, and

both sides seemed intent on forming additional ties in 1997.

Meanwhile, accelerated commercial activity in Russia's Maritime (Primorskiy) Territory encouraged new agreements

between Russia and the two Koreas, and progress was made in

late 1996 in resolving the fifty-year stalemate with Japan over Russian occupation of four of the Kuril Islands. New initiatives

also went to the prosperous member nations of the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), expanding the drive to make Russia a Pacific Rim commercial power. In November

1996, Primakov visited China, Japan, and Mongolia with the

stated goal of improving Russia's position in vital Asian markets. Primakov visited Iran the following month. Russia also felt that establishing its identity as an Asian power was crucial

because it had been excluded from several prosperous Pacific

Rim trading groups and from talks on Korean unification.

China's rapid emergence as a world economic power also was a primary concern.

In 1996 Russia saw the presence of Primakov in the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Western sanctions against Iraq, and the election of a hard-line government in Israel as creating conditions

in the Middle East that would favor a return to the Soviet

xcv
Union's role as champion of the Arab countries in the region.

Russia had a special interest in freeing Iraq from economic

sanctions because Iraq was to begin repaying its substantial

debt to Russia once oil exports resumed, and lucrative new

bilateral deals were negotiated in 1996. For this reason, in September 1996 the United States bombing of Iraqi targets and

the threat of extended international sanctions brought harsh

criticism from Moscow.

Meanwhile, Russia continued cultivating relations with Iran,

another international pariah. A third Kilo-class submarine

went from Russia to Iran in November 1996, and the transfer of

nuclear-reactor technology continued despite Western objections. In the second half of 1996, as another token of Russia's

importance in the region, Primakov also sought a more active

role in Arab-Israeli peace talks. Whatever its relations with foreign countries, however, no

foreign power threatened Russia's security in the 1990s, and

domestic conditions were the key determinant of Russia's

future. In the 1990s, Russian society, until recently held

together by the forced observance of Soviet power, seemed to lack any sort of glue that could be used to combat the forces of

economic fragmentation. In the early post-Soviet years, religion

re-emerged as an important factor in the lives of many Russians, but cultural and intellectual institutions showed signs of

decline (production of art, literature, and scientific books

dropped sharply in the mid-1990s, as did newspaper publication), and citizens showed little interest in forming independent civic groups. Despite guarantees of equal rights in the

1993 constitution, minority ethnic groups have experienced

serious discrimination and even violence in Russia's cities, and

hints of religious intolerance have emerged as well. Social

resentments have festered as the economic status of most Russians deteriorated and a new elite flaunted its wealth.

The emigre sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh observed in

1996 that personal gain had become the most important value

in Russian society and that the newly democratized government institutions offered little authority against dishonest

behavior because those institutions are themselves rife with

corruption. The inability of government to maintain law and

order through its democratic institutions has provoked authoritarian behavior by the Yeltsin administration, whose security

agencies have maintained a large share of their Soviet-era

autonomy.

xcvi
Optimists point to the next generation of Russians, who will

have formed their civic habits independent of Soviet influence,

as the basis of democratic renewal and a new civil society. The

three orderly and fair national elections of 1993-96 offer some

hope for this prognosis. The relative calm with which Russians

have accepted the agonies of transition has provided an opportunity for new institutions to develop, but such a passive public

attitude may not bode well for participatory democracy. West- ern influences, which were vital to the postcommunist progress

of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have penetrated

Russia only in random fashion, and they met increasing resis- tance in the mid-1990s. That resistance has dampened the government's commitment to economic and political reform and

obscured the prognosis for the transition process.

By 1996 the reforms envisioned in 1992 had reached a plateau quite short of their final goals. Cynicism, corruption, and

the president's long period of inactivity had sapped the

momentum of reform programs, and an entrenched bureaucracy blocked further initiatives. In 1997 Russia remained an

international power in some respects, but its search for ways to preserve that status was increasingly uncertain.

March 31, 1997

* * *

In the months following the preparation of this manuscript,

several events of importance occurred. In April 1997, shortly

after the United States Congress ratified the controversial

Chemical Weapons Convention outlawing the manufacture

and sale of chemical weapons, the State Duma refused passage

on the grounds that the cost of destroying Russia's chemical

weapons supply, the largest in the world, was prohibitively high.

Although the Duma promised to reconsider the measure in the

fall of 1997, its decision caused consternation in the United

States, which had expected reciprocity on that issue.

In the spring of 1997, Russia continued to affirm its commitment to craft a foreign policy independent of international

opinion. In April an official Moscow visit by Iranian head of

parliament Ali Akbar Nateq-Noori—one day after a German

court had found Iran guilty of assassinating exiled dissidents

was met by expressions of friendship from President Yeltsin.

There were indications that Russia's military and economic

xcvii
deals with Iran, criticized sharply in the West because of Iran's support for terrorist groups, would continue or expand. Yeltsin

and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeniy Primakov also

expressed support for Syria's position in peace talks with Israel,

expanding Russia's effort to reestablish influence in the Middle

East.Shortly thereafter, a Moscow summit meeting with Jiang

Zemin, president of China, produced a statement reinforcing

the two nations' "multipolar" foreign policy as a balance against

United States domination of the post-Soviet world. The leaders

signed an agreement to reduce troops and equipment along

the Sino-Russian border by 15 percent. The troop maximum

was set at 130,000 for each side. Neighboring countries Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan also signed the agreement.

Yeltsin announced that military-industrial entrepreneur Arkadiy Vol'skiy would head the Russian delegation to a new SinoRussian standing committee on friendship, peace, and development scheduled to go into operation sometime in 1997. In

April Russia also announced that two new guided-missile

destroyers, previously intended for the Russian naval forces,

would be delivered to China in 1997. However, despite official

rhetoric and new agreements, in mid-1997 a substantial part of

Russia's foreign policy establishment saw China as a stopgap

partner until permanent relationships could be forged with the

United States, Western Europe, and/or Japan. In May 1997,

Japan and Russia began high-level defense talks, Japan

dropped its objection to Russia's membership in the G-7 organization, and Russia showed some signs of compromise in the

continuing dispute over four Russian-held islands in the Kuril

chain north ofJapan. Based onJapan's change of policy, Yeltsin

participated as a full member in the June meeting of the newly

renamed G—8. In May Primakov's long negotiations with NATO officials

yielded an agreement defining special status for Russia in

NATO in return for Russia's acceptance of a first round of

NATO expansion into Central Europe. The most difficult

obstacle, Russia's demand that no nuclear or conventional

NATO forces be deployed in new NATO member nations, was overcome by a general statement that neither nuclear nor con- ventional forces would be deployed under normal circumstances. Both sides claimed that the agreement vindicated their

position, although NATO made no firm commitment not to deploy forces. The centerpiece of the agreement, which Yeltsin

xcviii
signed in Paris on May 27, is a permanent council consisting of

the secretary general of NATO, a Russian ambassador, and a

representative of the full NATO membership. Although Yeltsin

described this council as giving Russia a veto over NATO decisions, only specific security issues are to be discussed in the new

body. The alliance's major political decision-making process

remains separate. The first meeting of the council took place in

JulyThe agreement, officially termed a "founding act," is not

legally binding and did not require ratification by the parliaments of the signatory countries. Having signed the act, Russia

officially ended its objections to full NATO membership for the

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which are expected to become full NATO members in 1999. The agreement also

improved the prospect that the Russian economy would benefit

from closer contacts with the West. Public reaction in Russia was muted, although nationalist politicians claimed that Russia

had sustained a serious diplomatic defeat.

Meanwhile, the status of international arms treaties

remained unclear. In July talks among the thirty signatory

nations of the CFE Treaty—including Russia and all the NATO

countries—yielded Russia some concessions on the ratio of

NATO to Russian conventional arms in Europe. However, four

CIS countries—Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

had objected that relaxation of CFE restrictions on Russia's

flank quotas for troop deployment in or near CIS countries

would threaten their national security. The final treaty modification made overall force reductions in Europe but did not

include the limitations on NATO forces in Central Europe that

Russia had demanded in return for approval of NATO expansion.

As ofJune 1997, Yeltsin had not made a renewed effort to gain State Duma ratification of the START II agreement,

although he had promised President Clinton at the Helsinki

summit that he would do so. At Helsinki the United States had

eased some terms of START II to improve the treaty's prospects

for passage in the Duma.

In May President Asian Maskhadov of Chechnya (ChechnyaIchkeria) signed a peace treaty with Russia. In the very brief

treaty, both sides renounced the use of force against the other.

The official categorization of the agreement as a peace treaty was a concession by Russia, which earlier had refused to sign

such a treaty with what it considered an integral part of the fedxcix
eration. The document did not mention independence for the

breakaway republic—a potentially divisive issue that both sides

avoided in the interest of achieving peace—but the form of the

treaty was that used between two equal states subject to international law, hence a tacit recognition of Chechnya-Ichkeria's

independence.

Russia also signed agreements for economic aid to Chechnya, and Yeltsin's negotiator Boris Berezovskiy offered several

major concessions, including an official apology for all of Russia's historical incursions into Chechnya, in an effort to stave off full independence. Meanwhile, radical Chechen groups

continued kidnappings and terrorist acts, casting doubt on the

authority of the Maskhadov government.

Chechnya continued to occupy a critical position in Russia's

pipeline politics, which became increasingly complex in the

mid-1990s as more countries sought participation in the oil

wealth of Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. As its price for allowing oil to flow through Chechnya en route to export from Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, Chechnya demanded recognition as a full partner in the endeavor. Because an alternative line

through Georgia and Turkey would eliminate both Novorossiysk and Chechnya—hence all Russian participation—from

lucrative new shipments, in July Russia signed a trilateral agreement with Azerbaijan and Chechnya, granting Chechnya an

equal role. Income from oil shipments was expected to be an

important element in stabilizing Chechnya's still rocky internal

security situation.

The international Caspian Pipeline Consortium, founded in

1992 to bring oil from Kazakstan to the West, has been plagued

by internal friction among partner companies, which represent

six countries (Britain, Italy, Kazakstan, Oman, Russia, and the

United States). In early 1997, however, the consortium showed

signs of agreement on the Russian section of a new line that

would deliver oil from Kazakstan's Tengiz fields to Novorossiysk. In April Yeltsin signed the December 1996 agreement on

division of shares among the consortium partners. Increased

United States activity in the region's new oil fields was a major

reason that Russia signed the trilateral pipeline agreement

Russia's relations with other CIS countries continue to be

unsettled. In April both houses of Russia's Federal Assembly

ratified the treaty permitting long-term deployment of Russian

forces in Armenia. This move caused alarm in neighboring

Azerbaijan (still fighting and negotiating with Armenia over

c
Nagorno-Karabakh), Georgia (through which additional Russian troops would pass en route to Armenia), and Turkey (near

whose border additional Russian troops might be stationed).

Disclosures of secret deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia in

1994-96 already had alarmed Azerbaijan, and the military

treaty seemingly committed Armenia to a long term as a Russian satellite. However, the terms of the July 1997 treaty with

Azerbaijan implicitly reduced the prospect of future Russian

support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In May

a friendship treaty with Ukraine resolved division of the Black

Sea Fleet and jurisdiction in Sevastopol', the fleet's largest port,

among other treaty provisions.

Meanwhile, other CIS countries continued to deemphasize

CIS (largely Russian) investment and trade agreements in favor

of Western andJapanese deals with more favorable conditions.

According to an April 1997 report, 90 percent of Kazakstan's

enterprises had at least some investments from non-CIS

sources. Because Kazakstan's president Nazarbayev was a staunch supporter of CIS integration, this statistic was especially bad news for Russia's efforts to bind together and dominate the organization. In 1997 Russian authorities also were alarmed by an incipient trilateral agreement among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine, which began cooperating in sev- eral critical areas of security and economics where Russia had

enjoyed substantial influence.

In May 1997, Yeltsin's Security Council completed a longawaited national security doctrine. The document, unpublished but leaked extensively, included economic, foreign-policy, and military elements in a general description of Russia's

present security situation and its primary goals. Improvement

of domestic economic and social conditions, rather than geopolitical advancement, was listed as the primary requirement

for enhanced national security. The most aggressive element of

the statement was a revocation of Mikhail Gorbachev's pledge

that the Soviet Union never would initiate the use of nuclear

weapons in a war. The new stance was described by Western

experts as a volley in the diplomatic conflict over NATO expansion and a reflection of the acute deterioration of Russia's conventional forces. Because the legislative branch had not been

consulted in the creative process, experts doubted that the

anti-Yeltsin State Duma would grant the approval necessary for

the doctrine to become official.

ci
Russia's defense establishment remained unsettled in mid1997 after Yeltsin, long dissatisfied with the pace of military

reform, fired Chief of Staff Viktor Samsonov and Minister of

Defense Igor' Rodionov. General Igor' Sergeyev was named to replace Rodionov. At the same time, Yeltsin created two new

military reform commissions. The first, headed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, was to deal with military construction; the

second, headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Chubays, was to deal with military finances. Experts saw these moves as a victory

for civilian officials who advocated reassigning the military's

"hidden reserves" rather than allocating additional funds for

military reform. In July Yeltsin outlined a comprehensive plan

for reducing the military and consolidating the five branches

into two, again emphasizing reallocation of existing resources. The drafting procedure and content of the plan attracted

strong criticism from government and military officials. Russia's internal security situation also remained unstable in

mid-1997 as the country's crime wave continued. The Ministry

of Internal Affairs (MVD) reported a reduction of 12 percent

in overall crime in the first quarter of the year, with substantial

drops in murders, assaults, thefts, and robberies. However,

there was no evidence of a reduction in mafiya protection activity and the corruption and crime associated with it. The 7,500

murders committed in 1996 were the most ever for a single

year. Meanwhile, the MVD's "Clean Hands Campaign" reported

that in 1996 some 21,000 police officials had been fired

because of misconduct, including mafiya connections. Capital

punishment continued to be a sensitive political issue:

although Russia was obligated by its 1996 admission to the

Council of Europe to end capital punishment, the crime wave continued to bolster strong public feeling against such a change. Human rights organizations estimated that 140 people were executed in 1996, the fourth-largest total in the world.

The prison system continued to suffer grave problems in

1997. In April an Amnesty International report listed torture,

lack of bail, acute crowding, epidemics of tuberculosis, and

long periods of pretrial detention as frequent conditions in

Russia's prisons and jails. An estimated 300,000 prisoners (up

from 233,000 in 1994) were in pretrial custody, which lasted for an average of ten months. In mid-1997 the Government

announced an amnesty program that would affect as many as 440,000 Russian prisoners, targeting mainly those in pretrial

detention. Because Russia's incarceration rate was about ten

cii
times that of West European nations, its 1997 prison budget

was much higher than its health care budget. Prison reform

received little support either from Minister of Internal Affairs

Anatoliy Kulikov or from the majority of State Duma deputies.

Overdue wages were another continuing result of the

national budget deficit. By midyear Russia's workers were owed

an estimated US$9.5 billion, and the amount continued to grow. Although the nationwide labor shutdowns called by

unions in November 1996 and March 1997 had failed to attract wide support, the number of local shutdowns increased noticeably in the first half of 1997. Miners, doctors, and teachers

blockaded roads and railroads and occupied administrative

buildings to protest continued wage arrears. Teacher strikes

affected nineteen of Russia's eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions, and only fifteen jurisdictions did not owe money to their

teachers.

Partly because of low budget allocations for health, in 1997

new reports indicated that Russia's health crisis was worsening.

Although the life expectancy for males increased from 57.3

years to 59.6 years between 1994 and 1996, the drinking and

smoking habits of Russians, together with continued air pollution in many areas, kept mortality rates from cardiac and circulatory diseases more than twice as high as those in the United

States. The incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases con- tinued to increase. Although a major diphtheria vaccination

program in 1995-96 radically reduced the incidence of that

disease, tuberculosis cases increased sharply, especially in Russia's prisons. In 1997 the minister of health predicted that sex- ual promiscuity and drug addiction would cause 800,000 new

cases of HIV infection by the year 2000.

Meanwhile, the official government population prediction

for 2010 called for a decrease of 7.3 million people, and one

Russian expert predicted a decrease of 12 million by that year. In that period, fertility was expected to decline because of

health problems among women of childbearing age and

because of the overall aging of the population.

The overall economic situation continued to be overshadowed by the Government's inability to balance its budget. Continuing its effort to improve tax collection—the most often

cited way of paying overdue state salaries and pensions—in May

the Chernomyrdin government submitted a new tax code to the State Duma for approval. Under Yeltsin's implicit threat to dissolve the Duma, the body gave preliminary approval to the

ciii
code in June. Meanwhile, major enterprises continued to avoid

full tax payment. According to an April 1997 State Taxation

Service report, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly, used 140

separate bank accounts to shelter its assets. Of the Government's list of eighty leading tax-evading enterprises, fifty-three were in the fuel and energy industry.

Only 57 percent of projected revenues were collected in the

first quarter of 1997, leaving arrears of US$12 billion, and only

63 percent of budgeted expenditures were made. By May the

Government owed an estimated US$2.2 billion in pensions,

US$2.3 billion in wages to state workers, and US$1.4 billion in

child support allowances. The shortfall also reduced economic

investment, which in the first half of 1997 was only about 95

percent of the amount invested in the same period of 1996.

In response to the shortfall, Minister of Finance Anatoliy

Chubays submitted a proposal to the State Duma for sequestration of allotted funds, warning that the Government could not

continue functioning if major cuts were not made. The revisions called for reducing spending by US$19 billion. Despite

strong and widespread opposition to the level and allocation of

the cuts, in June the Duma adjourned for its summer vacation

without submitting an alternative plan.

Meanwhile, the "capital flight" of hard currency (see Glossary) from Russia continued at a rapid rate in 1997. International police authorities estimated that US$1 to US$2 billion

dollars left the country every month, much of it connected

with illegal activity and invested abroad by Russian emigres.

Experts identified this trend as a sign of continuing low confidence in the domestic economy.

For the first six months of 1997, Russia's GDP shrank by 0.2

percent, casting doubt on Yeltsin's July assertion that the econ- omy had "turned the corner." Positive economic news of early

1997 included the continuing reduction of inflation, which

reached an annual rate of 14.5 percent in June—the lowest

rate since Russia's independence. Also, the reorganization of

the Government in March caused the IMF to resume monthly

payments on Russia's US$10 billion loan, which had been sus- pended since December. The World Bank also announced a two-year loan of US$6 billion to help pay overdue wages and

pensions.

In April a series of presidential decrees moved Government

policy closer to privatization in some sectors, although strong

political support for the giant monopolies in the State Duma

civ
guaranteed that Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov would

have a hard struggle in breaking them down. According to the

new privatization goals, Government subsidies of housing and

municipal services, which were budgeted at US$27 billion in

1997, were to be reduced. (The average Russian paid only 27

percent of such costs in 1997.) According to a sliding scale,

subsidies would reach zero in 2003, although some state housing support would remain for the neediest individuals. In the

spring of 1997, local increases in utility and housing costs brought demonstrations in St. Petersburg, and Moscow's powerful mayor, Yuriy Luzhkov, objected strongly to the national

proposal.

Provisions were made for substantial modification of the

pricing and/or structure of the state-controlled electric power

industry and the railroad network, and Yeltsin ordered the sale

of 49 percent of the telecommunications giant Svyazinvest, divi- sion of which was one of the most controversial privatization

issues. In July 25 percent of total Svyazinvest shares were won at auction by a group including Russia's Uneximbank and German and United States investors. Because of the backward state of Russia's telephone system, telecommunications is considered potentially one of Russia's largest growth industries. The

results of the Svyazinvest auction, which Boris Nemtsov touted

as fully free and equitable, set off loud protests from the powerful business interests that failed to acquire shares. The issue

threatened to split the large-business bloc that had supported

Yeltsin before and after the 1996 election.

Russia's nineteen railroad companies, which accounted for

78 percent of freight traffic and 40 percent of passenger traffic in 1997, were to be removed from direct control of the Ministry

of Transportation, under whose management fast-rising rail- road fees had added enormous amounts to the overhead of

railroad-dependent industries such as steel and coal. At the same time, rail customers owed the lines an estimated US$1.1

billion in 1997, and the companies' equipment was in desperate need of modernization.

In May Yeltsin announced that Gazprom henceforth would

be run by a state commission, depriving the gas monopoly of

the financial freedom that had gained it billions of dollars of

untaxed profits. Yeltsin already had stripped Gazprom of its exclusive right to develop new natural gas deposits, and the

Government now expected to recover much of Gazprom's

unpaid taxes through the new commission. Prime Minister

cv
Chernomyrdin remained a protector of the industry's special

status, however.

In April Yeltsin renewed his appeal for Russia's consumers to "buy Russian" to support the domestic economy in the face of

increased consumption of imported consumer goods. However, Russian manufacturers faced a circular dilemma: consistently low quality kept the demand for Russian goods from

expanding, but firms were unable to improve quality without

new profits or increasingly scarce government subsidies.

In politics, reformist members of the Kremlin's younger generation advanced in Yeltsin's Government reorganization. Boris

Nemtsov, thirty-seven, gained immediate popularity with ordinary Russians in his new post as deputy prime minister by

attacking monopolies and bureaucratic corruption; in April

Nemtsov supplanted Aleksandr Lebed' as Russia's most trusted

politician in two nationwide polls, although most experts called

his reform program virtually impossible. Experts in Russia

already were speaking of Nemtsov as the likely presidential can- didate of the "young reformers" in 2000. In April forty-threeyear-old Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, who had gained wide approval

as Yeltsin's press secretary, was named deputy chief of staff and

foreign policy coordinator while retaining his previous position.

The struggle for power continued at the echelon of government immediately below Yeltsin. The resignation of Chernomyrdin protege Petr Rodionovfrom his post as Minister of Fuel

and Energy deprived the prime minister of his most important

Government ally. However, Chernomyrdin's position still gave

him substantial power vis-a-vis Chubays, an important factor in

Yeltsin's ongoing policy of checking the ambitions of his most

powerful subordinates. (Experts also considered the presence

of Nemtsov and Valentin Yumashev, whom Yeltsin made his

chief of staff in March, as additional factors preventing Chubays and his powerful business allies from dominating the

reform agenda.)

Human rights continued to have strong political ramifications in mid-1997 when both houses of the Federal Assembly

passed a law restricting the activities of all but four "traditional"

religions. The Russian Orthodox Church received special sta- tus; no other Christian religions were included in the "traditional" category The law, successor to legislation introduced

unsuccessfully by nationalist and communist factions earlier in

the 1990s, attracted strong condemnation from the Vatican

cvi
and human rights groups and strong support from the Russian

Orthodox hierarchy and the Communist Party of Russia. In

July Yeltsin vetoed the law—which experts saw as evidence of

growing anti-Western sentiment in Russian society—as a violation of the constitution's human rights guarantees. The fate of

that law, and the unresolved disputes between the executive

and legislative branches over budget cuts, privatization, military reform, and tax collection were signs that Yeltsin's new

government team still faced complex problems in their reform

campaign.

August 20, 1997 Glenn E. Curtis

cvii

Chapter 1. Historical Setting: Early History

to 1917
A beautiful princess, transformedfrom a white swan, presents herself to Gui- don, son of Tsar Saltan (design from lacquer box made in village ofMstera).
EACH OF THE MANY NATIONALITIES of Russia has a separate history and complex origins. The historical origins of the

Russian state, however, are chiefly those of the East Slavs, the

ethnic group that evolved into the Russian, Ukrainian, and

Belorussian peoples. The major pre-Soviet states of the East

Slavs were, in chronological order, medieval Kievan Rus', Muscovy, and the Russian Empire. Three other states—Poland,

Lithuania, and the Mongol Empire—also played crucial roles

in the historical development of Russia.

The first East Slavic state, Kievan Rus', emerged along the

Dnepr River valley, where it controlled the trade route between

Scandinavia and the Byzantine Empire. Kievan Rus' adopted

Christianity from the Byzantine Empire in the tenth century,

beginning the synthesis of Byzantine and Slavic cultures that

defined Russian culture for the next thousand years. Kievan

Rus' ultimately disintegrated as a state because of the armed

struggles among members of the princely family that collectively possessed it. Conquest by the Mongols in the thirteenth

century was the final blow in this disintegration; subsequently,

a number of states claimed to be the heirs to the civilization

and dominant position of Kievan Rus'. One of those states,

Muscovy, was a predominantly Russian territory located at the

far northern edge of the former cultural center. Muscovy gradually came to dominate neighboring territories, forming the

basis for the future Russian Empire.

Muscovy had significant impact on the civilizations that fol- lowed, and they adopted many of its characteristics, including

the subordination of the individual to the state. This idea of

the dominant state derived from the Slavic, Mongol, and Byzantine heritage of Muscovy, and it later emerged in the unlimited power of the tsar. Both individuals and institutions, even

the Russian Orthodox Church, were subordinate to the state as

it was represented in the person of the autocrat. A second characteristic of Russian history has been continual territorial expansion. Beginning with Muscovy's efforts to consolidate Russian territory as Tatar control waned in the fif- teenth century, expansion soon went beyond ethnically Russian areas; by the eighteenth century, the principality of

Muscovy had become the huge Russian Empire, stretching

from Poland eastward to the Pacific Ocean. Size and military

3
Russia: A Country Study

might made Russia a major power, but its acquisition of large

territories inhabited by non-Russian peoples began an enduring pattern of nationality problems.

Expansion westward sharpened Russia's awareness of its backwardness and shattered the isolation in which the initial stages of expansion had taken place. Muscovy was able to develop at its own pace, but the Russian Empire was forced to adopt Western technology to compete militarily in Europe.

Under this exigency, Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) and subsequent rulers attempted to modernize the country. Most such

efforts struggled with indifferent success to raise Russia to European levels of technology and productivity. The technology that Russia adopted brought with it Western cultural and

intellectual currents that changed the direction in which Russian culture developed. As Western influence continued, native

and foreign cultural values began a competition that survives

in vigorous form in the 1990s. The nature of Russia's relationship with the West became an enduring obsession of Russian

intellectuals.

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56) triggered

another attempt at modernization, including the emancipation

of the peasants who had been bound to the land in the system

of serfdom. Despite major reforms enacted in the 1860s, however, agriculture remained inefficient, industrialization proceeded slowly, and new social problems emerged. In addition

to masses of peasants seeking land to till, a new class of industrial workers—the proletariat—and a small but influential

group of middle-class professionals were dissatisfied with their

positions. The non-Russian populations resented periodic offi- cial Russification campaigns and struggled for autonomy. Successive regimes of the nineteenth century responded to such

pressures with a combination of halfhearted reform and

repression, but no tsar was willing to cede autocratic rule or share power. Gradually, the monarch and the state system that

surrounded him became isolated from the rest of society. In

the last decades of the nineteenth century, some intellectuals

became more radical, and groups of professional revolutionaries emerged.

In spite of its internal problems, Russia continued to play a major role in international politics. However, unexpected

defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 sparked a revolution in 1905. At that stage, professionals, workers, peasants,

minority ethnic groups, and soldiers demanded fundamental

4
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

reforms. Reluctantly, Nicholas II responded to the first of Russia's revolutions by granting a limited constitution, but he

increasingly circumvented its democratic clauses, and autocracy again took command in the last decade of the tsarist state. World War I found Russia unready for combat but full of patriotic zeal. However, as the government proved incompetent and

conditions worsened, war weariness and revolutionary pressures increased, and the defenders of the autocracy grew fewer.

Early History

Many ethnically diverse peoples migrated onto the East

European Plain, but the East Slavs remained and gradually

became dominant. Kievan Rus', the first East Slavic state,

emerged in the ninth century A.D. and developed a complex

and frequently unstable political system that flourished until

the thirteenth century, when it declined abruptly. Among the

lasting achievements of Kievan Rus1 are the introduction of a

Slavic variant of the Eastern Orthodox religion and a synthesis

of Byzantine and Slavic cultures. The disintegration of Kievan

Rus' played a crucial role in the evolution of the East Slavs into

the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples.

The Inhabitants of the East European Plain

Long before the organization of Kievan Rus1 , Iranian and

other peoples lived in the area of present-day Ukraine. The

best known of those groups was the nomadic Scythians, who

occupied the region from about 600 B.C. to 200 B.C. and

whose skill in warfare and horsemanship is legendary. Between

A.D. 100 and A.D. 900, Goths and nomadic Huns, Avars, and

Magyars passed through the region in their migrations.

Although some of them subjugated the Slavs in the region,

those tribes left little of lasting importance. More significant in

this period was the expansion of the Slavs, who were agriculturists and beekeepers as well as hunters, fishers, herders, and

trappers. By A.D. 600, the Slavs were the dominant ethnic

group on the East European Plain.

Little is known of the origin of the Slavs. Philologists and

archaeologists theorize that the Slavs settled very early in the

Carpathian Mountains or in the area of present-day Belarus. By

A.D. 600, they had split linguistically into southern, western,

and eastern branches. The East Slavs settled along the Dnepr

River in what is now Ukraine; then they spread northward to

5
Russia: A Country Study

the northern Volga River valley, east of modern-day Moscow,

and westward to the basins of the northern Dnestr and the

western Bug rivers, in present-day Moldova and southern

Ukraine. In the eighth and ninth centuries, many East Slavic

tribes paid tribute to the Khazars, a Turkic-speaking people

who adopted Judaism about A.D. 740 and lived in the southern

Volga and Caucasus regions.

The East Slavs and the Varangians

By the ninth century, Scandinavian warriors and merchants,

called Varangians, had penetrated the East Slavic regions.

According to the Primary Chronicle, the earliest chronicle of

Kievan Rus', a Varangian named Rurik first established himself

in Novgorod, just south of modern-day St. Petersburg, in about

860 before moving south and extending his authority to Kiev.

The chronicle cites Rurik as the progenitor of a dynasty that

ruled in Eastern Europe until 1598. Another Varangian, Oleg,

moved south from Novgorod to expel the Khazars from Kiev

and founded Kievan Rus' about A.D. 880. During the next

thirty-five years, Oleg subdued the various East Slavic tribes. In A.D. 907, he led a campaign against Constantinople, and in

911 he signed a commercial treaty with the Byzantine Empire

as an equal partner. The new Kievan state prospered because it controlled the trade route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea

and because it had an abundant supply of furs, wax, honey, and

slaves for export. Historians have debated the role of the Varangians in the establishment of Kievan Rus'. Most Russian histori- ans—especially in the Soviet era—have stressed the Slavic

influence in the development of the state. Although Slavic

tribes had formed their own regional jurisdictions by 860, the

Varangians accelerated the crystallization of Kievan Rus'. The Golden Age of Kiev

The region of Kiev dominated the state of Kievan Rus' for

the next two centuries (see fig. 2). The grand prince of Kiev

controlled the lands around the city, and his theoretically subordinate relatives ruled in other cities and paid him tribute.

The zenith of the state's power came during the reigns of

Prince Vladimir (r. 978-1015) and Prince Yaroslav (the Wise; r. 1019-54). Both rulers continued the steady expansion of

Kievan Rus' that had begun under Oleg. To enhance their

power, Vladimir married the sister of the Byzantine emperor,

and Yaroslav arranged marriages for his sister and three daugh6
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

ters to the kings of Poland, France, Hungary, and Norway.

Vladimir's greatest achievement was the Christianization of

Kievan Rus', a process that began in 988. He built the first great

edifice of Kievan Rus', the Desyatinnaya Church in Kiev. Yaroslav promulgated the first East Slavic law code, Rus'ka pravda

(Justice of Rus'); built cathedrals named for St. Sophia in Kiev

and Novgorod; patronized local clergy and monasticism; and is said to have founded a school system. Yaroslav's sons developed

Kiev's great Peshcherskiy monastyr' (Monastery of the Caves),

which functioned in Kievan Rus' as an ecclesiastical academy.

Vladimir's choice of Eastern Orthodoxy reflected his close

personal ties with Constantinople, which dominated the Black

Sea and hence trade on Kiev's most vital commercial route, the

Dnepr River. Adherence to the Eastern Orthodox Church had

long-range political, cultural, and religious consequences. The

church had a liturgy written in Cyrillic (see Glossary) and a cor- pus of translations from the Greek that had been produced for

the South Slavs. The existence of this literature facilitated the

East Slavs' conversion to Christianity and introduced them to rudimentary Greek philosophy, science, and historiography

without the necessity of learning Greek. In contrast, educated

people in medieval Western and Central Europe learned Latin.

Because the East Slavs learned neither Greek nor Latin, they were isolated from Byzantine culture as well as from the European cultures of their neighbors to the west. In the centuries that followed the state's foundation, Rurik's

purported descendants shared power over Kievan Rus'.

Princely succession moved from elder to younger brother and

from uncle to nephew, as well as from father to son. Junior

members of the dynasty usually began their official careers as rulers of a minor district, progressed to more lucrative principalities, and then competed for the coveted throne of Kiev.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the princes and their

retinues, which were a mixture of Varangian and Slavic elites

and small Finno-Ugric and Turkic elements, dominated the

society of Kievan Rus'. Leading soldiers and officials received

income and land from the princes in return for their political

and military services. Kievan society lacked the class institutions and autonomous towns that were typical of West European feudalism. Nevertheless, urban merchants, artisans, and

laborers sometimes exercised political influence through a city

assembly, the veche, which included all the adult males in the

population. In some cases, the veche either made agreements

7
Russia: A Country Study

POLOVTSIANS

HUNGARY KQ(/

The twelve principalities

of Kievan Rus' in 1100

200 Kilometers r

(Bfac^ Sea

VOLGA

BULGARS

Source: Based on information from David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A

History ofRussia and the Soviet Union, Chicago, 1987, 61.

Figure 2. The Principalities ofKievan Rus', 1136

with their rulers or expelled them and invited others to take

their place. At the bottom of society was a small stratum of

slaves. More important was a class of tribute-paying peasants,

who owed labor duty to the princes; the widespread personal

serfdom characteristic of Western Europe did not exist in

Kievan Rus', however.

The Rise of Regional Centers

Kievan Rus' was not able to maintain its position as a power8
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

ful and prosperous state, in part because of the amalgamation

of disparate lands under the control of a ruling clan. As the

members of that clan became more numerous, they identified

themselves with regional interests rather than with the larger

patrimony. Thus, the princes fought among themselves, fre- quently forming alliances with outside groups such as the

Polovtsians, Poles, and Hungarians. The Crusades brought a

shift in European trade routes that accelerated the decline of

Kievan Rus'. In 1204 the forces of the Fourth Crusade sacked

Constantinople, making the Dnepr trade route marginal. As it declined, Kievan Rus' splintered into many principalities and

several large regional centers. The inhabitants of those

regional centers then evolved into three nationalities: Ukraini- ans in the southeast and southwest, Belorussians in the northwest, and Russians in the north and northeast.

In the north, the Republic of Novgorod prospered as part of

Kievan Rus' because it controlled trade routes from the Volga

River to the Baltic Sea. As Kievan Rus' declined, Novgorod

became more independent. A local oligarchy ruled Novgorod;

major government decisions were made by a town assembly,

which also elected a prince as the city's military leader. In the

twelfth century, Novgorod acquired its own archbishop, a sign

of increased importance and political independence. In its political structure and mercantile activities, Novgorod resembled the north European towns of the Hanseatic League, the

prosperous alliance that dominated the commercial activity of

the Baltic region between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, more than the other principalities of Kievan Rus'. In the northeast, East Slavs colonized the territory that eventually became Muscovy by intermingling with the Finno-Ugric

tribes already occupying the area. The city of Rostov was the

oldest center of the northeast, but it was supplanted first by

Suzdal' and then by the city of Vladimir. By the twelfth century,

the combined principality of Vladimir-Suzdal' had become a major power in Kievan Rus1 . In 1169 Prince Andrey Bogolyubskiy of Vladimir-Suzdal'

dealt a severe blow to the waning power of Kievan Rus' when

his armies sacked the city of Kiev. Prince Andrey then installed

his younger brother to rule in Kiev and continued to rule his

realm from Suzdal'. Thus, political power shifted to the northeast, away from Kiev, in the second half of the twelfth century.

In 1299, in the wake of the Mongol invasion, the metropolitan

9
Russia: A Country Study

of the Orthodox Church moved to the city of Vladimir, and

Vladimir-Suzdal' replaced Kievan Rus1 as the religious center. To the southwest, the principality of Galicia-Volhynia had

highly developed trade relations with its Polish, Hungarian,

and Lithuanian neighbors and emerged as another successor

to Kievan Rus1 . In the early thirteenth century, Prince Roman

Mstislavich united the two previously separate principalities,

conquered Kiev, and assumed the title of grand duke of Kievan

Rus'. His son, Prince Daniil (Danylo; r. 1238-64) was the first ruler of Kievan Rus' to accept a crown from the Roman papacy,

apparently doing so without breaking with Orthodoxy. Early in

the fourteenth century, the patriarch of the Orthodox Church

in Constantinople granted the rulers of Galicia-Volhynia a metropolitan to compensate for the move of the Kievan metropolitan to Vladimir.

However, a long and unsuccessful struggle against the Mongols combined with internal opposition to the prince and for- eign intervention to weaken Galicia-Volhynia. With the end of

the Mstislavich Dynasty in the mid-fourteenth century, GaliciaVolhynia ceased to exist; Lithuania took Volhynia, and Poland

annexed Galicia.

The Mongol Invasion

As it was undergoing fragmentation, Kievan Rus' faced its greatest threat from invading Mongols. In 1223 an army from

Kievan Rus', together with a force of Turkic Polovtsians, faced a Mongol raiding party at the Kalka River. The Kievan alliance was defeated soundly. Then, in 1237-38, a much larger Mongol

force overran much of Kievan Rus'. In 1240 the Mongols

sacked the city of Kiev and then moved west into Poland and

Hungary Of the principalities of Kievan Rus', only the Republic of Novgorod escaped occupation, but it paid tribute to the

Mongols. One branch of the Mongol force withdrew to Saray

on the lower Volga River, establishing the Golden Horde (see

Glossary). From Saray the Golden Horde Mongols ruled

Kievan Rus1 indirectly through their princes and tax collectors.

The impact of the Mongol invasion on the territories of

Kievan Rus' was uneven. Centers such as Kiev never recovered

from the devastation of the initial attack. The Republic of

Novgorod continued to prosper, however, and a new entity, the

city of Moscow, began to flourish under the Mongols. Although

a Russian army defeated the Golden Horde at Kulikovo in

1380, Mongol domination of the Russian-inhabited territories,

10
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

along with demands of tribute from Russian princes, continued

until about 1480.

Historians have debated the long-term influence of Mongol

rule on Russian society. The Mongols have been blamed for the

destruction of Kievan Rus', the breakup of the "Russian"

nationality into three components, and the introduction of the

concept of "oriental despotism" into Russia. But most histori- ans agree that Kievan Rus' was not a homogeneous political,

cultural, or ethnic entity and that the Mongols merely accelerated a fragmentation that had begun before the invasion. Historians also credit the Mongol regime with an important role

in the development of Muscovy as a state. Under Mongol occupation, for example, Muscovy developed its postal road net- work, census, fiscal system, and military organization.

Kievan Rus' also left a powerful legacy. The leader of the

Rurik Dynasty united a large territory inhabited by East Slavs

into an important, albeit unstable, state. After Vladimir

accepted Eastern Orthodoxy, Kievan Rus' came together under

a church structure and developed a Byzantine-Slavic synthesis

in culture, statecraft, and the arts. On the northeastern periphery of Kievan Rus', those traditions were adapted to form the

Russian autocratic state. Muscovy

The development of the Russian state can be traced from

Vladimir-Suzdal' through Muscovy to the Russian Empire. Muscovy drew people and wealth to the northeastern periphery of

Kievan Rus'; established trade links to the Baltic Sea, the White

Sea, and the Caspian Sea and to Siberia; and created a highly

centralized and autocratic political system. Muscovite political

traditions, therefore, exerted a powerful influence on Russian

society.

The Rise of Muscovy

When the Mongols invaded the lands of Kievan Rus 1 , Moscow was an insignificant trading outpost in the principality of

Vladimir-Suzdal'. The outpost's remote, forested location

offered some security from Mongol attack and occupation, and

a number of rivers provided access to the Baltic and Black seas and to the Caucasus region. More important to Moscow's development in what became the state of Muscovy, however, was its rule by a series of princes who were ambitious, determined,

11
Russia: A Country Study

and lucky. The first ruler of the principality of Muscovy, Daniil

Aleksandrovich (d. 1303), secured the principality for his

branch of the Rurik Dynasty. His son, Ivan I (r. 1325-40),

known as Ivan Kalita ("Money Bags"), obtained the title "Grand

Prince of Vladimir" from his Mongol overlords. He cooperated

closely with the Mongols and collected tribute from other Russian principalities on their behalf. This relationship enabled

Ivan to gain regional ascendancy, particularly over Muscovy's

chief rival, the northern city of Tver'. In 1327 the Orthodox

metropolitan transferred his residency from Vladimir to Moscow, further enhancing the prestige of the new principality.

In the fourteenth century, the grand princes of Muscovy

began gathering Russian lands to increase the population and

wealth under their rule (see table 2, Appendix). The most suc- cessful practitioner of this process was Ivan III (the Great; r. 1462-1505), who conquered Novgorod in 1478 and Tver' in

1485. Muscovy gained full sovereignty over the ethnically Russian lands in 1480 when Mongol overlordship ended officially,

and by the beginning of the sixteenth century virtually all those

lands were united. Through inheritance, Ivan obtained part of

the province of Ryazan', and the princes of Rostov and Yaroslavl' voluntarily subordinated themselves to him. The northwestern city of Pskov remained independent in this period, but

Ivan's son, Vasiliy III (r. 1505-33), later conquered it. Ivan III was the first Muscovite ruler to use the titles of tsar and "Ruler of all Rus'." Ivan competed with his powerful northwestern rival Lithuania for control over some of the semi-independent former principalities of Kievan Rus' in the upper

Dnepr and Donets river basins. Through the defections of

some princes, border skirmishes, and a long, inconclusive war

with Lithuania that ended only in 1503, Ivan III was able to push westward, and Muscovy tripled in size under his rule.

The Evolution of the Russian Aristocracy

Internal consolidation accompanied outward expansion of

the state. By the fifteenth century, the rulers of Muscovy considered the entire Russian territory their collective property.

Various semi-independent princes still claimed specific territories, but Ivan III forced the lesser princes to acknowledge the

grand prince of Muscovy and his descendants as unquestioned

rulers with control over military, judicial, and foreign affairs. Gradually, the Muscovite ruler emerged as a powerful, autocratic ruler, a tsar. By assuming that title, the Muscovite prince

12
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

underscored that he was a major ruler or emperor on a par

with the emperor of the Byzantine Empire or the Mongol

khan. Indeed, after Ivan Ill's marriage to Sophia Paleologue,

the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, the Muscovite court

adopted Byzantine terms, rituals, titles, and emblems such as the double-headed eagle. At first, the term autocrat connoted

only the literal meaning of an independent ruler, but in the

reign of Ivan IV (r. 1533-84) it came to mean unlimited rule.

Ivan IV was crowned tsar and thus was recognized, at least by

the Orthodox Church, as emperor. An Orthodox monk had

claimed that, once Constantinople had fallen to the Ottoman

Empire in 1453, the Muscovite tsar was the only legitimate

Orthodox ruler and that Moscow was the Third Rome because

it was the final successor to Rome and Constantinople, the centers of Christianity in earlier periods. That concept was to reso- nate in the self-image of Russians in future centuries.

Ivan IV

The development of the tsar's autocratic powers reached a peak during the reign of Ivan IV, and he became known as the

Terrible (his Russian epithet, groznyy, means threatening or dreaded). Ivan strengthened the position of the tsar to an

unprecedented degree, demonstrating the risks of unbridled

power in the hands of a mentally unstable individual. Although

apparently intelligent and energetic, Ivan suffered from bouts

of paranoia and depression, and his rule was punctuated by

acts of extreme violence.

Ivan IV became grand prince of Muscovy in 1533 at the age

of three. Various factions of the boyars (see Glossary) competed for control of the regency until Ivan assumed the throne

in 1547. Reflecting Muscovy's new imperial claims, Ivan's coro- nation as tsar was an elaborate ritual modeled after those of the

Byzantine emperors. With the continuing assistance of a group

of boyars, Ivan began his reign with a series of useful reforms.

In the 1550s, he promulgated a new law code, revamped the

military, and reorganized local government. These reforms

undoubtedly were intended to strengthen the state in the face

of continuous warfare.

During the late 1550s, Ivan developed a hostility toward his

advisers, the government, and the boyars. Historians have not

determined whether policy differences, personal animosities, or mental imbalance cause his wrath. In 1565 he divided Muscovy into two parts: his private domain and the public realm.

13
Russia: A Country Study

For his private domain, Ivan chose some of the most prosper- ous and important districts of Muscovy. In these areas, Ivan's agents attacked boyars, merchants, and even common people,

summarily executing some and confiscating land and possessions. Thus began a decade of terror in Muscovy. As a result of

this policy, called the oprichnina, Ivan broke the economic and

political power of the leading boyar families, thereby destroying precisely those persons who had built up Muscovy and were

the most capable of administering it. Trade diminished, and

peasants, faced with mounting taxes and threats of violence,

began to leave Muscovy. Efforts to curtail the mobility of the

peasants by tying them to their land brought Muscovy closer to legal serfdom. In 1572 Ivan finally abandoned the practices of

the oprichnina.

Despite the domestic turmoil of Ivan's late period, Muscovy

continued to wage wars and to expand. Ivan defeated and

annexed the Kazan' Khanate on the middle Volga in 1552 and

later the Astrakhan' Khanate, where the Volga meets the Caspian Sea. These victories gave Muscovy access to the entire

Volga River and to Central Asia. Muscovy's eastward expansion

encountered relatively little resistance. In 1581 the Stroganov

merchant family, interested in fur trade, hired a Cossack (see

Glossary) leader, Yermak, to lead an expedition into western

Siberia. Yermak defeated the Siberian Khanate and claimed

the territories west of the Ob' and Irtysh rivers for Muscovy (see

fig. 3).

Expanding to the northwest toward the Baltic Sea proved to be much more difficult. In 1558 Ivan invaded Livonia, eventually embroiling him in a twenty-five-year war against Poland,

Lithuania, Sweden, and Denmark. Despite occasional successes, Ivan's army was pushed back, and Muscovy failed to secure a coveted position on the Baltic Sea. The war drained

Muscovy. Some historians believe that Ivan initiated the oprichnina to mobilize resources for the war and to quell opposition

to it. Regardless of the reason, Ivan's domestic and foreign policies had a devastating effect on Muscovy, and they led to a period of social struggle and civil war, the so-called Time of

Troubles (Smutnoye vremya, 1598-1613).

The Time of Troubles

Ivan IV was succeeded by his son Fedor, who was mentally

deficient. Actual power went to Fedor's brother-in-law, the

boyar Boris Godunov. Perhaps the most important event of

14
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

Fedor's reign was the proclamation of the patriarchate of Moscow in 1589. The creation of the patriarchate climaxed the evo- lution of a separate and totally independent Russian Orthodox

Church.

In 1598 Fedor died without an heir, ending the Rurik

Dynasty. Boris Godunov then convened a zemskiy sobor, a

national assembly of boyars, church officials, and commoners,

which proclaimed him tsar, although various boyar factions

refused to recognize the decision. Widespread crop failures

caused a famine between 1601 and 1603, and during the ensu- ing discontent, a man emerged who claimed to be Dmitriy,

Ivan IV's son who had died in 1591. This pretender to the

throne, who came to be known as the first False Dmitriy, gained

support in Poland and marched to Moscow, gathering followers among the boyars and other elements as he went. Histori- ans speculate that Godunov would have weathered this crisis,

but he died in 1605. As a result, the first False Dmitriy entered

Moscow and was crowned tsar that year, following the murder

of Tsar Fedor II, Godunov's son. Subsequently, Muscovy entered a period of continuous

chaos. The Time of Troubles included a civil war in which a

struggle over the throne was complicated by the machinations

of rival boyar factions, the intervention of regional powers

Poland and Sweden, and intense popular discontent. The first False Dmitriy and his Polish garrison were overthrown, and a boyar, Vasiliy Shuyskiy, was proclaimed tsar in 1606. In his

attempt to retain the throne, Shuyskiy allied himself with the

Swedes. A second False Dmitriy, allied with the Poles,

appeared. In 1610 that heir apparent was proclaimed tsar, and

the Poles occupied Moscow. The Polish presence led to a patriotic revival among the Russians, and a new army, financed by

northern merchants and blessed by the Orthodox Church,

drove the Poles out. In 1613 a new zemskiy sobor proclaimed the

boyar Mikhail Romanov as tsar, beginning the 300-year reign of

the Romanov family.

Muscovy was in chaos for more than a decade, but the insti- tution of the autocracy remained intact. Despite the tsar's persecution of the boyars, the townspeople's dissatisfaction, and

the gradual enserfment of the peasantry, efforts at restricting

the power of the tsar were only halfhearted. Finding no institutional alternative to the autocracy, discontented Russians ral- lied behind various pretenders to the throne. During that

period, the goal of political activity was to gain influence over

15
Russia: A Country Study
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

the sitting autocrat or to place one's own candidate on the

throne. The boyars fought among themselves, the lower classes

revolted blindly, and foreign armies occupied the Kremlin (see

Glossary) in Moscow, prompting many to accept tsarist absolutism as a necessary means to restoring order and unity in Muscovy. The Romanovs

The immediate task of the new dynasty was to restore order.

Fortunately for Muscovy, its major enemies, Poland and Sweden, were engaged in a bitter conflict with each other, which

provided Muscovy the opportunity to make peace with Sweden

in 1617 and to sign a truce with Poland in 1619. After an unsuccessful attempt to regain the city of Smolensk from Poland in

1632, Muscovy made peace with Poland in 1634. Polish king

Wladyslaw IV, whose father and predecessor Sigismund III had

manipulated his nominal selection as tsar of Muscovy during

the Time of Troubles, renounced all claims to the title as a condition of the peace treaty.

The early Romanovs were weak rulers. Under Mikhail, state affairs were in the hands of the tsar's father, Filaret, who in

1619 became patriarch of the Orthodox Church. Later,

Mikhail's son Aleksey (r. 1645-76) relied on a boyar, Boris

Morozov, to run his government. Morozov abused his position

by exploiting the populace, and in 1648 Aleksey dismissed him

in the wake of a popular uprising in Moscow.

The autocracy survived the Time of Troubles and the rule of

weak or corrupt tsars because of the strength of the government's central bureaucracy. Government functionaries continued to serve, regardless of the ruler's legitimacy or the boyar

faction controlling the throne. In the seventeenth century, the

bureaucracy expanded dramatically. The number of government departments (prikazy; sing., prikaz) increased from twentytwo in 1613 to eighty by mid-century. Although the departments often had overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions, the

central government, through provincial governors, was able to control and regulate all social groups, as well as trade, manufacturing, and even the Orthodox Church.

The comprehensive legal code introduced in 1649 illustrates

the extent of state control over Russian society. By that time,

the boyars had largely merged with the elite bureaucracy, who

were obligatory servitors of the state, to form a new nobility,

the dvoryanstvo. The state required service from both the old

17
Russia: A Country Study

and the new nobility, primarily in the military. In return, they

received land and peasants. In the preceding century, the state had gradually curtailed peasants' rights to move from one landlord to another; the 1649 code officially attached peasants to their domicile. The state fully sanctioned serfdom, and run- away peasants became state fugitives. Landlords had complete

power over their peasants and bought, sold, traded, and mortgaged them. Peasants living on state-owned land, however, were

not considered serfs. They were organized into communes,

which were responsible for taxes and other obligations. Like

serfs, however, state peasants were attached to the land they

farmed. Middle-class urban tradesmen and craftsmen were

assessed taxes, and, like the serfs, they were forbidden to change residence. All segments of the population were subject

to military levy and to special taxes. By chaining much of Muscovite society to specific domiciles, the legal code of 1649 curtailed movement and subordinated the people to the interests

of the state. Under this code, increased state taxes and regulations exac- erbated the social discontent that had been simmering since

the Time of Troubles. In the 1650s and 1660s, the number of

peasant escapes increased dramatically. A favorite refuge was

the Don River region, domain of the Don Cossacks. A major

uprising occurred in the Volga region in 1670 and 1671. Stenka

Razin, a Cossack who was from the Don River region, led a

revolt that drew together wealthy Cossacks who were well established in the region and escaped serfs seeking free land. The

unexpected uprising swept up the Volga River valley and even

threatened Moscow. Tsarist troops finally defeated the rebels

after they had occupied major cities along the Volga in an operation whose panache captured the imaginations of later generations of Russians. Razin was publicly tortured and executed.

Expansion and Westernization

Muscovy continued its territorial growth through the seven- teenth century. In the southwest, it acquired eastern Ukraine,

which had been under Polish rule. The Ukrainian Cossacks,

warriors organized in military formations, lived in the frontier areas bordering Poland, the Tatar lands, and Muscovy.

Although they had served in the Polish army as mercenaries,

the Ukrainian Cossacks remained fiercely independent and

staged a number of uprisings against the Poles. In 1648 most of

Ukrainian society joined the Cossacks in a revolt because of the

18
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

political, social, religious, and ethnic oppression suffered

under Polish rule. After the Ukrainians had thrown off Polish

rule, they needed military help to maintain their position. In

1654 the Ukrainian leader, Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy (Bohdan

Khmernyts'kyy), offered to place Ukraine under the protection

of the Muscovite tsar, Aleksey I, rather than under the Polish

king. Aleksey's acceptance of this offer, which was ratified in

the Treaty of Pereyaslavl', led to a protracted war between

Poland and Muscovy. The Treaty of Andrusovo, which ended

the war in 1667, split Ukraine along the Dnepr River, reuniting

the western sector with Poland and leaving the eastern sector

self-governing under the suzerainty of the tsar. In the east, Muscovy had obtained western Siberia in the six- teenth century. From this base, merchants, traders, and explorers pushed eastward from the Ob' River to the Yenisey River,

then to the Lena River. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Muscovites had reached the Amur River and the outskirts

of the Chinese Empire. After a period of conflict with the Manchu Dynasty, Muscovy made peace with China in 1689. By the

Treaty of Nerchinsk, Muscovy ceded its claims to the Amur Valley, but it gained access to the region east of Lake Baikal and

the trade route to Beijing. Peace with China consolidated the

initial breakthrough to the Pacific that had been made in the

middle of the century.

Muscovy's southwestern expansion, particularly its incorporation of eastern Ukraine, had unintended consequences.

Most Ukrainians were Orthodox, but their close contact with

the Roman Catholic Polish Counter-Reformation also brought

them Western intellectual currents. Through Kiev, Muscovy

gained links to Polish and Central European influences and to the wider Orthodox world. Although the Ukrainian link stimulated creativity in many areas, it also undermined traditional

Russian religious practices and culture. The Russian Orthodox

Church discovered that its isolation from Constantinople had

caused variations to creep into its liturgical books and practices. The Russian Orthodox patriarch, Nikon, was determined

to bring the Russian texts back into conformity with the Greek

originals. But Nikon encountered fierce opposition among the

many Russians who viewed the corrections as improper foreign

intrusions, or perhaps the work of the devil. When the Orthodox Church forced Nikon's reforms, a schism resulted in 1667.

Those who did not accept the reforms came to be called the

Old Believers (starovery); they were officially pronounced here19
Russia: A Country Study

tics and were persecuted by the church and the state. The chief

opposition figure, the archpriest Awakum, was burned at the

stake. The split subsequently became permanent, and many

merchants and peasants joined the Old Believers.

The tsar's court also felt the impact of Ukraine and the West.

Kiev was a major transmitter of new ideas and insight through

the famed scholarly academy that Metropolitan Mogila

(Mohyla) founded there in 1631. Among the results of this

infusion of ideas into Muscovy were baroque architecture, liter- ature, and icon painting. Other more direct channels to the

West opened as international trade increased and more foreigners came to Muscovy. The tsar's court was interested in the

West's more advanced technology, particularly when military

applications were involved. By the end of the seventeenth century, Ukrainian, Polish, and West European penetration had

undermined the Muscovite cultural synthesis—at least among

the elite—and had prepared the way for an even more radical

transformation.

Early Imperial Russia

In the eighteenth century, Muscovy was transformed from a

static, somewhat isolated, traditional state into the more

dynamic, partially Westernized, and secularized Russian

Empire. This transformation was in no small measure a result

of the vision, energy, and determination of Peter the Great.

Historians disagree about the extent to which Peter himself

transformed Russia, but they generally concur that he laid the

foundations for empire building over the next two centuries.

The era that Peter initiated signaled the advent of Russia as a major European power. But, although the Russian Empire

would play a leading political role in the next century, its reten- tion of serfdom precluded economic progress of any significant degree. As West European economic growth accelerated

during the Industrial Revolution, which had begun in the sec- ond half of the eighteenth century, Russia began to lag ever far- ther behind, creating new problems for the empire as a great

power.

Peter the Great and the Russian Empire

As a child of the second marriage of Tsar Aleksey, Peter at

first was relegated to the background of Russian politics as vari- ous court factions struggled to control the throne. Aleksey was

20
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

succeeded by his son from his first marriage, Fedor III, a sickly

boy who died in 1682. Peter then was made co-tsar with his half

brother, Ivan V, but Peter's half sister, Sofia, held the real

power. She ruled as regent while the young Peter was allowed

to play war games with his friends and to roam in Moscow's for- eign quarters. These early experiences instilled in him an abiding interest in Western military practice and technology,

particularly in military engineering, artillery, navigation, and

shipbuilding. In 1689, using troops that he had drilled during

childhood games, Peter foiled a plot to have Sofia crowned.

When Ivan V died in 1696, Peter became the sole tsar of Muscovy. War dominated much of Peter's reign. At first Peter

attempted to secure the principality's southern borders against

the Tatars and the Ottoman Turks. His campaign against a fort

on the Sea of Azov failed initially, but after he created Russia's

first navy, Peter was able to take the port of Azov in 1696. To

continue the war with the Ottoman Empire, Peter traveled to Europe to seek allies. The first tsar to make such a trip, Peter

visited Brandenburg, Holland, England, and the Holy Roman

Empire during his so-called Grand Embassy. Peter learned a great deal and enlisted into his service hundreds of West European technical specialists. The embassy was cut short by the

attempt to place Sofia on the throne instead of Peter, a revolt

that was crushed by Peter's followers. As a result, Peter had

hundreds of the participants tortured and killed, and he publicly displayed their bodies as a warning to others.

Peter was unsuccessful in forging a European coalition

against the Ottoman Empire, but during his travels he found

interest in waging war against Sweden, then an important

power in northern Europe. Seeing an opportunity to break

through to the Baltic Sea, Peter made peace with the Ottoman

Empire in 1700 and then attacked the Swedes at their port of

Narva on the Gulf of Finland. However, Sweden's young king,

Charles XII, proved his military acumen by crushing Peter's army. Fortunately for Peter, Charles did not follow up his vic- tory with a counteroffensive, becoming embroiled instead in a

series of wars over the Polish throne. This respite allowed Peter

to build a new, Western-style army. When the armies of the two

leaders met again at the town of Poltava in 1709, Peter defeated

Charles. Charles escaped to Ottoman territory, and Russia subsequently became engaged in another war with the Ottoman

Empire. Russia agreed to return the port of Azov to the Otto21
Russia: A Country Study

mans in 1711. The Great Northern War, which in essence was

settled at Poltava, continued until 1721, when Sweden agreed

to the Treaty of Nystad. The treaty allowed Muscovy to retain

the Baltic territories that it had conquered: Livonia, Estonia,

and Ingria. Through his victories, Peter acquired a direct link

with Western Europe. In celebration, Peter assumed the title of

emperor as well as tsar, and Muscovy officially became the Russian Empire in 1721.

Peter achieved Muscovy's expansion into Europe and its transformation into the Russian Empire through several major

initiatives. He established Russia's naval forces, reorganized the

army according to European models, streamlined the government, and mobilized Russia's financial and human resources. Under Peter, the army drafted soldiers for lifetime terms from

the taxpaying population, and it drew officers from the nobility

and required them to give lifelong service in either the military or civilian administration. In 1722 Peter introduced the Table

of Ranks, which determined a person's position and status according to service to the tsar rather than to birth or seniority.

Even commoners who achieved a certain level on the table were ennobled automatically.

Peter's reorganization of the government structure was no

less thorough. He replaced the prikazy with colleges or boards

and created a senate to coordinate government policy. Peter's reform of local government was less successful, but his changes

enabled local governments to collect taxes and maintain order.

As part of the government reform, the Orthodox Church was

partially incorporated into the country's administrative structure. Peter abolished the patriarchate and replaced it with a

collective body, the Holy Synod, led by a lay government official.Peter tripled the revenues of the state treasury through a

variety of taxes. He levied a capitation, or poll tax, on all males

except clergy and nobles and imposed a myriad of indirect

taxes on alcohol, salt, and even beards. To provide uniforms

and weapons for the military, Peter developed metallurgical

and textile industries using serf labor.

Peter wanted to equip Russia with modern technology, insti- tutions, and ideas. He required Western-style education for all male nobles, introduced so-called cipher schools to teach the

alphabet and basic arithmetic, established a printing house,

and funded the Academy of Sciences (see Glossary), which was

established just before his death in 1725 and became one of

22
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

Russia's most important cultural institutions. He demanded

that aristocrats acquire the dress, tastes, and social customs of

the West. The result was a deepening of the cultural rift between the nobility and the mass of Russian people. The best

illustration of Peter's drive for Westernization, his break with

traditions, and his coercive methods was his construction in

1703 of a new, architecturally Western capital, St. Petersburg,

situated on land newly conquered from Sweden on the Gulf of

Finland. Although St. Petersburg faced westward, its Westernization was by coercion, and it could not arouse the individualistic spirit that was an important element in the Western ways

Peter so admired.

Peter's reign raised questions about Russia's backwardness,

its relationship to the West, the appropriateness of reform from

above, and other fundamental problems that have confronted

many of Russia's subsequent rulers. In the nineteenth century,

Russians debated whether Peter was correct in pointing Russia

toward the West or whether his reforms had been a violation of

Russia's natural traditions.

The Era of Palace Revolutions

Peter changed the rules of succession to the throne after he

killed his own son, Aleksey, who had opposed his father's

reforms and served as a rallying figure for antireform groups. A

new law provided that the tsar would choose his own successor, but Peter failed to do so before his death in 1725. In the

decades that followed, the absence of clear rules of succession

left the monarchy open to intrigues, plots, coups, and countercoups. Henceforth, the crucial factor for obtaining the throne was the support of the elite palace guard in St. Petersburg.

After Peter's death, his wife, Catherine I, seized the throne.

But when she died in 1727, Peter's grandson, Peter II, was crowned tsar. In 1730 Peter II succumbed to smallpox, and

Anna, a daughter of Ivan V, who had been co-ruler with Peter,

ascended the throne. The clique of nobles that put Anna on

the throne attempted to impose various conditions on her. In

her struggle against those restrictions, Anna had the support of

other nobles who feared oligarchic rule more than autocracy.

Thus the principle of autocracy continued to receive strong

support despite chaotic struggles for the throne.

Anna died in 1740, and her infant grandnephew was proclaimed tsar as Ivan VI. After a series of coups, however, he was

replaced by Peter the Great's daughter Elizabeth (r. 1741-62).

23
Russia: A Country Study

During Elizabeth's reign, which was much more effective than

those of her immediate predecessors, a Westernized Russian

culture began to emerge. Among notable cultural events were

the founding of Moscow University (1755) and the Academy of

Fine Arts (1757) and the emergence of Russia's first eminent

scientist and scholar, Mikhail Lomonosov.

During the rule of Peter's successors, Russia took a more

active role in European statecraft. From 1726 to 1761, Russia was allied with Austria against the Ottoman Empire, which

France usually supported. In the War of Polish Succession

(1733-35), Russia and Austria blocked the French candidate to the Polish throne. In a costly war with the Ottoman Empire

(1734-39), Russia reacquired the port of Azov Russia's greatest

reach into Europe was during the Seven Years' War (1756-63),

which was fought on three continents between Britain and

France with numerous allies on both sides. In that war, Russia

continued its alliance with Austria, but Austria shifted to an alli- ance with France against Prussia. In 1760 Russian forces were at the gates of Berlin. Fortunately for Prussia, Elizabeth died in

1762, and her successor, Peter III, allied Russia with Prussia

because of his devotion to the Prussian emperor, Frederick the

Great.

Peter III had a short and unpopular reign. Although he was

a grandson of Peter the Great, his father was the duke of Holstein, so Peter III was raised in a German Lutheran environment. Russians therefore considered him a foreigner. Making

no secret of his contempt for all things Russian, Peter created

deep resentment by forcing Prussian military drills on the Russian military, attacking the Orthodox Church, and depriving

Russia of a military victory by establishing his sudden alliance

with Prussia. Making use of the discontent and fearing for her

own position, Peter Ill's wife, Catherine, deposed her husband

in a coup, and her lover, Aleksey Orlov, subsequently murdered

him. Thus, in June 1762 a German princess who had no legitimate claim to the Russian throne became Catherine II, empress of Russia.

Imperial Expansion and Maturation: Catherine II Catherine IPs reign was notable for imperial expansion,

which brought the empire huge new territories in the south

and west, and for internal consolidation. Following a war that

broke out with the Ottoman Empire in 1768, the parties agreed

to the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji in 1774. By that treaty, Russia

24
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

acquired an outlet to the Black Sea, and the Crimean Tatars were made independent of the Ottomans. In 1783 Catherine

annexed Crimea, helping to spark the next war with the Ottoman Empire, which began in 1787. By the Treaty ofJassy in

1792, Russia expanded southward to the Dnestr River. The

terms of the treaty fell far short of the goals of Catherine's

reputed "Greek project"—the expulsion of the Ottomans from

Europe and the renewal of a Byzantine Empire under Russian

control. The Ottoman Empire no longer was a serious threat to Russia, however, and was forced to tolerate an increasing Russian influence over the Balkans.

Russia's westward expansion under Catherine was the result

of the partitioning of Poland. As Poland became increasingly

weak in the eighteenth century, each of its neighbors—Russia,

Prussia, and Austria—tried to place its own candidate on the

Polish throne. In 1772 the three agreed on an initial partition

of Polish territory, by which Russia received parts of Belorussia

and Livonia. After the partition, Poland initiated an extensive

reform program, which included a democratic constitution

that alarmed reactionary factions in Poland and in Russia.

Using the danger of radicalism as an excuse, the same three

powers abrogated the constitution and in 1793 again stripped

Poland of territory. This time Russia obtained most of Belorussia and Ukraine west of the Dnepr River. The 1793 partition led

to an anti-Russian and anti-Prussian uprising in Poland, which

ended with the third partition in 1795. The result was that

Poland was wiped off the map.

Although the partitioning of Poland greatly added to Russia's territory and prestige, it also created new difficulties. Having lost Poland as a buffer, Russia now had to share borders

with both Prussia and Austria. In addition, the empire became

more ethnically heterogeneous as it absorbed large numbers of

Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Jews. The fate of the

Ukrainians and Belorussians, who were primarily serfs,

changed little at first under Russian rule. Roman Catholic

Poles resented their loss of independence, however, and

proved to be difficult to integrate. Russia had barredJews from

the empire in 1742 and viewed them as an alien population. A

decree ofJanuary 3, 1792, formally initiated the Pale of Settle- ment, which permitted Jews to live only in the western part of

the empire, thereby setting the stage for anti-Jewish discrimination in later periods (see Other Religions, ch. 4). At the same

time, Russia abolished the autonomy of Ukraine east of the

25
Russia: A Country Study

Dnepr, the Baltic republics, and various Cossack areas. With

her emphasis on a uniformly administered empire, Catherine

presaged the policy of Russification that later tsars and their successors would practice.

Historians have debated Catherine's sincerity as an enlightened monarch, but few have doubted that she believed in government activism aimed at developing the empire's resources and making its administration more effective. Initially, Catherine attempted to rationalize government procedures through

law. In 1767 she created the Legislative Commission, drawn

from nobles, townsmen, and others, to codify Russia's laws.

Although the commission did not formulate a new law code,

Catherine's Instruction to the Commission introduced some

Russians to Western political and legal thinking.

During the 1768-74 war with the Ottoman Empire, Russia

experienced a major social upheaval, the Pugachev Uprising.

In 1773 a Don Cossack, Emel'yan Pugachev, announced that he

was Peter III. Other Cossacks, various Turkic tribes that felt the

impingement of the Russian centralizing state, and industrial

workers in the Ural Mountains, as well as peasants hoping to escape serfdom, all joined in the rebellion. Russia's preoccupation with the war enabled Pugachev to take control of a part of

the Volga area, but the regular army crushed the rebellion in

1774.

The Pugachev Uprising bolstered Catherine's determination

to reorganize Russia's provincial administration. In 1775 she

divided Russia into provinces and districts according to population statistics. She then gave each province an expanded

administrative, police, and judicial apparatus. Nobles no

longer were required to serve the central government, as they

had since Peter the Great's time, and many of them received

significant roles in administering provincial governments.

Catherine also attempted to organize society into welldefined social groups, or estates. In 1785 she issued charters to nobles and townsmen. The Charter to the Nobility confirmed

the liberation of the nobles from compulsory service and gave

them rights that not even the autocracy could infringe upon.

The Charter to the Towns proved to be complicated and ulti- mately less successful than the one issued to the nobles. Failure

to issue a similar charter to state peasants, or to ameliorate the

conditions of serfdom, made Catherine's social reforms incomplete.

26
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

The intellectual westernization of the elite continued during

Catherine's reign. An increase in the number of books and

periodicals also brought forth intellectual debates and social

criticism (see Literature and the Arts, ch. 4). In 1790 Aleksandr

Radishchev published his Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, a

fierce attack on serfdom and the autocracy. Catherine, already

frightened by the French Revolution, had Radishchev arrested

and banished to Siberia. Radishchev was later recognized as the

father of Russian radicalism.

Catherine brought many of the policies of Peter the Great to fruition and set the foundation for the nineteenth-century

empire. Russia became a power capable of competing with its European neighbors on military, political, and diplomatic

grounds. Russia's elite became culturally more like the elites of

Central and West European countries. The organization of

society and the government system, from Peter the Great's central institutions to Catherine's provincial administration,

remained basically unchanged until the emancipation of the

serfs in 1861 and, in some respects, until the fall of the monarchy in 1917. Catherine's push to the south, including the establishment of Odessa as a Russian port on the Black Sea,

provided the basis for Russia's nineteenth-century grain trade.

Despite such accomplishments, the empire that Peter I and

Catherine II had built was beset with fundamental problems. A

small Europeanized elite, alienated from the mass of ordinary

Russians, raised questions about the very essence of Russia's

history, culture, and identity. Russia achieved its military preeminence by reliance on coercion and a primitive command

economy based on serfdom. Although Russia's economic development was almost sufficient for its eighteenth-century needs,

it was no match for the transformation the Industrial Revolution was causing in Western countries. Catherine's attempt at organizing society into corporate estates was already being

challenged by the French Revolution, which emphasized individual citizenship. Russia's territorial expansion and the incorporation of an increasing number of non-Russians into the

empire set the stage for the future nationalities problem.

Finally, the first questioning of serfdom and autocracy on

moral grounds foreshadowed the conflict between the state and the intelligentsia that was to become dominant in the nineteenth century.

27
Russia: A Country Study

Ruling the Empire

During the early nineteenth century, Russia's population,

resources, international diplomacy, and military forces made it one of the most powerful states in the world. Its power enabled

it to play an increasingly assertive role in Europe's affairs. This

role drew the empire into a series of wars against Napoleon,

which had far-reaching consequences for Russia and the rest of

Europe. After a period of enlightenment, Russia became an

active opponent of liberalizing trends in Central and Western

Europe. Internally, Russia's population had grown more

diverse with each territorial acquisition. The population

included Lutheran Finns, Baltic Germans, Estonians, and some

Latvians; Roman Catholic Lithuanians, Poles, and some Latvi- ans; Orthodox and Uniate (see Glossary) Belorussians and

Ukrainians; Muslim peoples along the empire's southern border; Orthodox Greeks and Georgians; and members of the

Armenian Apostolic Church. As Western influence and opposition to Russian autocracy mounted, the regime reacted by cre- ating a secret police and increasing censorship in order to

curtail the activities of persons advocating change. The regime

remained committed to its serf-based economy as the means of

supporting the upper classes, the government, and the military

forces. But Russia's backwardness and inherent weakness were

revealed in the middle of the century, when several powers

forced the surrender of a Russian fortress in Crimea.

War and Peace, 1796-1825

Catherine II died in 1796, and her son Paul (r. 1796-1801)

succeeded her. Painfully aware that Catherine had planned to bypass him and name his son, Alexander, as tsar, Paul instituted

primogeniture in the male line as the basis for succession. It was one of the few lasting reforms of Paul's brief reign. He also

chartered a Russian-American company, which eventually led

to Russia's acquisition of Alaska. Paul was haughty and unstable, and he frequently reversed his previous decisions, creating

administrative chaos and accumulating enemies.

As a major European power, Russia could not escape the wars involving revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Paul

became an adamant opponent of France, and Russia joined

Britain and Austria in a war against France. In 1798-99 Russian

troops under one of the country's most famous generals, Aleksandr Suvorov, performed brilliantly in Italy and Switzerland.

28
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

Paul reversed himself, however, and abandoned his allies. This

reversal, coupled with increasingly arbitrary domestic policies,

sparked a coup, and in March 1801 Paul was assassinated.

The new tsar, Alexander I (r. 1801-25), came to the throne

as the result of his father's murder, in which he was implicated.

Groomed for the throne by Catherine II and raised in the spirit

of enlightenment, Alexander also had an inclination toward

romanticism and religious mysticism, particularly in the latter period of his reign. Alexander tinkered with changes in the

central government, and he replaced the colleges that Peter

the Great had set up with ministries, but without a coordinating prime minister. The brilliant statesman Mikhail Speranskiy,

who was the tsar's chief adviser early in his reign, proposed an

extensive constitutional reform of the government, but Alexander dismissed him in 1812 and lost interest in reform.

Alexander's primary focus was not on domestic policy but on

foreign affairs, and particularly on Napoleon. Fearing Napoleon's expansionist ambitions and the growth of French power,

Alexander joined Britain and Austria against Napoleon. Napoleon defeated the Russians and Austrians at Austerlitz in 1805

and trounced the Russians at Friedland in 1807. Alexander was

forced to sue for peace, and by the Treaty of Tilsit, signed in

1807, he became Napoleon's ally. Russia lost little territory

under the treaty, and Alexander made use of his alliance with

Napoleon for further expansion. He wrested the Grand Duchy

of Finland from Sweden in 1809 and acquired Bessarabia from

Turkey in 1812.

The Russo-French alliance gradually became strained. Napoleon was concerned about Russia's intentions in the strategically vital Bosporus and Dardenelles straits. At the same time,

Alexander viewed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the French-controlled reconstituted Polish state, with suspicion. The requirement ofjoining France's Continental Blockade against Britain was a serious disruption of Russian commerce, and in 1810

Alexander repudiated the obligation. In June 1812, Napoleon

invaded Russia with 600,000 troops—a force twice as large as the Russian regular army. Napoleon hoped to inflict a major

defeat on the Russians and force Alexander to sue for peace. As

Napoleon pushed the Russian forces back, however, he became

seriously overextended. Obstinate Russian resistance combined

with the Russian winter to deal Napoleon a disastrous defeat,

from which fewer than 30,000 of his troops returned to their

homeland.

29
Russia: A Country Study

As the French retreated, the Russians pursued them into

Central and Western Europe and to the gates of Paris. After the

allies defeated Napoleon, Alexander became known as the sav- ior of Europe, and he played a prominent role in the redrawing of the map of Europe at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In

the same year, under the influence of religious mysticism, Alexander initiated the creation of the Holy Alliance, a loose agreement pledging the rulers of the nations involved—including

most of Europe—to act according to Christian principles. More

pragmatically, in 1814 Russia, Britain, Austria, and Prussia had

formed the Quadruple Alliance. The allies created an international system to maintain the territorial status quo and prevent

the resurgence of an expansionist France. The Quadruple Alli- ance, confirmed by a number of international conferences,

ensured Russia's influence in Europe.

At the same time, Russia continued its expansion. The Congress of Vienna created the Kingdom of Poland (Russian

Poland), to which Alexander granted a constitution. Thus,

Alexander I became the constitutional monarch of Poland

while remaining the autocratic tsar of Russia. He was also the

limited monarch of Finland, which had been annexed in 1809

and awarded autonomous status. In 1813 Russia gained terri- tory in the Baku area of the Caucasus at the expense of Persia.

By the early nineteenth century, the empire also was firmly

ensconced in Alaska.

Historians have generally agreed that a revolutionary move- ment was born during the reign of Alexander I. Young officers

who had pursued Napoleon into Western Europe came back to Russia with revolutionary ideas, including human rights, representative government, and mass democracy. The intellectual

Westernization that had been fostered in the eighteenth century by a paternalistic, autocratic Russian state now included

opposition to autocracy, demands for representative government, calls for the abolition of serfdom, and, in some

instances, advocacy of a revolutionary overthrow of the government. Officers were particularly incensed that Alexander had

granted Poland a constitution while Russia remained without

one. Several clandestine organizations were preparing for an

uprising when Alexander died unexpectedly in 1825. Following

his death, there was confusion about who would succeed him

because the next in line, his brother Constantine, had relinquished his right to the throne. A group of officers commanding about 3,000 men refused to swear allegiance to the new

30
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

tsar, Alexander's brother Nicholas, proclaiming instead their

loyalty to the idea of a Russian constitution. Because these

events occurred in December 1825, the rebels were called

Decembrists. Nicholas easily overcame the revolt, and the

Decembrists who remained alive were arrested. Many were

exiled to Siberia.

To some extent, the Decembrists were in the tradition of a long line of palace revolutionaries who wanted to place their

candidate on the throne. But because the Decembrists also

wanted to implement a liberal political program, their revolt

has been considered the beginning of a revolutionary move- ment. The Decembrist Revolt was the first open breach

between the government and liberal elements, and it would

subsequently widen.

Reaction under Nicholas I Nicholas completely lacked his brother's spiritual and intellectual breadth; he saw his role simply as one paternal autocrat

ruling his people by whatever means were necessary. Having

experienced the trauma of the Decembrist Revolt, Nicholas I was determined to restrain Russian society. A secret police, the

so-called Third Section, ran a huge network of spies and

informers. The government exercised censorship and other

controls over education, publishing, and all manifestations of

public life. In 1833 the minister of education, Sergey Uvarov,

devised a program of "autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality"

as the guiding principle of the regime. The people were to show loyalty to the unlimited authority of the tsar, to the traditions of the Orthodox Church, and, in a vague way, to the Russian nation. These principles did not gain the support of the

population but instead led to repression in general and to suppression of non-Russian nationalities and religions in particular. For example, the government suppressed the Uniate

Church in Ukraine and Belorussia in 1839.

The official emphasis on Russian nationalism contributed to a debate on Russia's place in the world, the meaning of Russian

history, and the future of Russia. One group, the Westernizers,

believed that Russia remained backward and primitive and

could progress only through more thorough Europeanization.

Another group, the Slavophiles, idealized the Russia that had

existed before Peter the Great. The Slavophiles viewed old Russia as a source of wholeness and looked askance at Western

rationalism and materialism. Some of them believed that the

31
Russia: A Country Study

Russian peasant commune, or mir, offered an attractive alternative to Western capitalism and could make Russia a potential

social and moral savior. The Slavophiles, therefore, represented a form of Russian messianism.

Despite the repressions of this period, Russia experienced a flowering of literature and the arts. Through the works of Aleksandr Pushkin, Nikolay Gogol', Ivan Turgenev, and numerous

others, Russian literature gained international stature and rec- ognition. Ballet took root in Russia after its importation from

France, and classical music became firmly established with the

compositions of Mikhail Glinka (1804-57) (see Literature and

the Arts, ch. 4). In foreign policy, Nicholas I acted as the protector of ruling

legitimism and guardian against revolution. His offers to suppress revolution on the European continent, accepted in some

instances, earned him the label of gendarme of Europe. In

1830, after a popular uprising had occurred in France, the

Poles in Russian Poland revolted. Nicholas crushed the rebellion, abrogated the Polish constitution, and reduced Poland to the status of a Russian province. In 1848, when a series of revo- lutions convulsed Europe, Nicholas was in the forefront of

reaction. In 1849 he intervened on behalf of the Habsburgs

and helped suppress an uprising in Hungary, and he also

urged Prussia not to accept a liberal constitution. Having

helped conservative forces repel the specter of revolution,

Nicholas I seemed to dominate Europe.

Russian dominance proved illusory, however. While Nicholas was attempting to maintain the status quo in Europe, he

adopted an aggressive policy toward the Ottoman Empire.

Nicholas I was following the traditional Russian policy of resolving the so-called Eastern Question by seeking to partition the

Ottoman Empire and establish a protectorate over the Orthodox population of the Balkans, still largely under Ottoman

control in the 1820s. Russia fought a successful war with the

Ottomans in 1828 and 1829. In 1833 Russia negotiated the

Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi with the Ottoman Empire. The major

European parties mistakenly believed that the treaty contained

a secret clause granting Russia the right to send warships

through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. By the London

Straits Convention of 1841, they affirmed Ottoman control

over the straits and forbade any power, including Russia, to send warships through the straits. Based on his role in suppressing the revolutions of 1848 and his mistaken belief that he

32
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

had British diplomatic support, Nicholas moved against the

Ottomans, who declared war on Russia in 1853. Fearing the

results of an Ottoman defeat by Russia, in 1854 Britain and

France joined what became known as the Crimean War on the

Ottoman side. Austria offered the Ottomans diplomatic support, and Prussia remained neutral, leaving Russia without

allies on the continent. The European allies landed in Crimea

and laid siege to the well-fortified Russian base at Sevastopol'.

After a year's siege the base fell, exposing Russia's inability to defend a major fortification on its own soil. Nicholas I died

before the fall of Sevastopol', but he already had recognized

the failure of his regime. Russia now faced the choice of initiat- ing major reforms or losing its status as a major European

power.

Transformation of Russia in the Nineteenth Century

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were

times of crisis for Russia. Not only did technology and industry

continue to develop more rapidly in the West, but also new,

dynamic, competitive great powers appeared on the world

scene: Otto von Bismarck united Germany in the 1860s, the

post-Civil War United States grew in size and strength, and a modernized Japan emerged from the Meiji Restoration of

1868. Although Russia was an expanding regional giant in Central Asia, bordering the Ottoman, Persian, British Indian, and

Chinese empires, it could not generate enough capital to support rapid industrial development or to compete with

advanced countries on a commercial basis. Russia's fundamental dilemma was that accelerated domestic development risked

upheaval at home, but slower progress risked full economic

dependency on the faster-advancing countries to the east and

west. In fact, political ferment, particularly among the intelli- gentsia, accompanied the transformation of Russia's economic

and social structure, but so did impressive developments in lit- erature, music, the fine arts, and the natural sciences.

Economic Developments

Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century, Russia's

economy developed more slowly than did that of the major

European nations to its west. Russia's population was substantially larger than those of the more developed Western countries, but the vast majority of the people lived in rural

33
Russia: A Country Study

communities and engaged in relatively primitive agriculture.

Industry, in general, had greater state involvement than in

Western Europe, but in selected sectors it was developing with

private initiative, some of it foreign. Between 1850 and 1900,

Russia's population doubled, but it remained chiefly rural well

into the twentieth century. Russia's population growth rate

from 1850 to 1910 was the fastest of all the major powers except

for the United States. Agriculture, which was technologically

underdeveloped, remained in the hands of former serfs and

former state peasants, who together constituted about fourfifths of the rural population. Large estates of more than fifty

square kilometers accounted for about 20 percent of all farmland, but few such estates were worked in efficient, large-scale

units. Small-scale peasant farming and the growth of the rural

population increased the amount of land used for agricultural

development, but land was used more for gardens and fields of

grain and less for grazing meadows than it had been in the

past.

Industrial growth was significant, although unsteady, and in

absolute terms it was not extensive. Russia's industrial regions

included Moscow, the central regions of European Russia, St. Petersburg, the Baltic cities, Russian Poland, some areas along

the lower Don and Dnepr rivers, and the southern Ural Mountains. By 1890 Russia had about 32,000 kilometers of railroads

and 1.4 million factory workers, most of whom worked in the

textile industry. Between 1860 and 1890, annual coal production had grown about 1,200 percent to over 6.6 million tons,

and iron and steel production had more than doubled to 2 million tons per year. The state budget had more than doubled,

however, and debt expenditures had quadrupled, constituting

28 percent of official expenditures in 1891. Foreign trade was inadequate to meet the empire's needs. Until the state introduced high industrial tariffs in the 1880s, it could not finance

trade with the West because its surpluses were insufficient to cover the debts.

Reforms and Their Limits, 1855-92

Tsar Alexander II, who succeeded Nicholas I in 1855, was a conservative who saw no alternative but to implement change.

Alexander initiated substantial reforms in education, the government, the judiciary, and the military. In 1861 he proclaimed

the emancipation of about 20 million privately held serfs. Local

commissions, which were dominated by landlords, effected

34
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

emancipation by giving land and limited freedom to the serfs. The former serfs usually remained in the village commune, but

they were required to make redemption payments to the government over a period of almost fifty years. The government

compensated former owners of serfs by issuing them bonds.

The regime had envisioned that the 50,000 landlords who

possessed estates of more than 110 hectares would thrive without serfs and would continue to provide loyal political and

administrative leadership in the countryside. The government

also had expected that peasants would produce sufficient crops

for their own consumption and for export sales, thereby helping to finance most of the government's expenses, imports,

and foreign debt. Neither of the government's expectations was realistic, however, and emancipation left both former serfs and their former owners dissatisfied. The new peasants soon

fell behind in their payments to the government because the

land they had received was poor and because Russian agricultural methods were inadequate. The former owners often had

to sell their lands to remain solvent because most of them

could neither farm nor manage estates without their former

serfs. In addition, the value of their government bonds fell as the peasants failed to make their redemption payments.

Reforms of local government closely followed emancipation.

In 1864 most local government in the European part of Russia was organized into provincial and district zemstva (sing., zemstvo), which were made up of representatives of all classes and

were responsible for local schools, public health, roads, prisons, food supply, and other concerns. In 1870 elected city

councils, or dumy (sing., duma), were formed. Dominated by

property owners and constrained by provincial governors and

the police, the zemstva and dumy raised taxes and levied labor to support their activities. In 1864 the regime implemented judicial reforms. In major

towns, it established Western-style courts with juries. In general,

the judicial system functioned effectively, but the government

lacked the finances and cultural influence to extend the court

system to the villages, where traditional peasant justice continued to operate with minimal interference from provincial officials. In addition, the regime instructed judges to decide each

case on its merits and not to use precedents, which would have

enabled them to construct a body of law independent of state authority.

35
Russia: A Country Study

Other major reforms took place in the educational and cul- tural spheres. The accession of Alexander II brought a social

restructuring that required a public discussion of issues and

the lifting of some types of censorship. When an attempt was made to assassinate the tsar in 1866, the government reinstated

censorship, but not with the severity of pre-1855 control. The

government also put restrictions on universities in 1866, five

years after they had gained autonomy. The central government

attempted to act through the zemstva to establish uniform cur- ricula for elementary schools and to impose conservative policies, but it lacked resources. Because many liberal teachers and

school officials were only nominally subject to the reactionary

Ministry of Education, however, the regime's educational

achievements were mixed after 1866.

In the financial sphere, Russia established the State Bank in

1866, which put the national currency on a firmer footing. The

Ministry of Finance supported railroad development, which

facilitated vital export activity, but it was cautious and moderate

in its foreign ventures. The ministry also founded the Peasant

Land Bank in 1882 to enable enterprising farmers to acquire

more land. The Ministry of Internal Affairs countered this policy, however, by establishing the Nobles' Land Bank in 1885 to

forestall foreclosures of mortgages.

The regime also sought to reform the military. One of the

chief reasons for the emancipation of the serfs was to facilitate the transition from a large standing army to a reserve army by

instituting territorial levies and mobilization in times of need.

Before emancipation, serfs could not receive military training

and then return to their owners. Bureaucratic inertia, however,

obstructed military reform until the Franco-Prussian War

(1870-71) demonstrated the necessity of building a modern

army. The levy system introduced in 1874 gave the army a role

in teaching many peasants to read and in pioneering medical

education for women. But the army remained backward

despite these military reforms. Officers often preferred bayonets to bullets, expressing worry that long-range sights on rifles would induce cowardice. In spite of some notable achievements, Russia did not keep pace with Western technological

developments in the construction of rifles, machine guns, artil- lery, ships, and naval ordnance. Russia also failed to use naval

modernization as a means of developing its industrial base in

the 1860s.

36
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

In 1881 revolutionaries assassinated Alexander II. His son Alexander III (r. 1881-94) initiated a period of political reaction, which intensified a counterreform movement that had

begun in 1866. He strengthened the security police, reorganizing it into an agency known as the Okhrana, gave it extraordinary powers, and placed it under the Ministry of Internal

Affairs. Dmitriy Tolstoy, Alexander's minister of internal affairs,

instituted the use of land captains, who were noble overseers of

districts, and he restricted the power of the zemstva and the

dumy. Alexander III assigned his former tutor, the reactionary

Konstantin Pobedonostsev, to be the procurator of the Holy

Synod of the Orthodox Church and Ivan Delyanov to be the

minister of education. In their attempts to "save" Russia from

"modernism," they revived religious censorship, persecuted

non-Orthodox and non-Russian populations, fostered antiSemitism, and suppressed the autonomy of the universities.

Their attacks on liberal and non-Russian elements alienated

large segments of the population. The nationalities, particularly Poles, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians,

reacted to the regime's efforts to Russify them by intensifying

their own nationalism. ManyJews emigrated or joined radical

movements. Secret organizations and political movements con- tinued to develop despite the regime's efforts to quell them.

Foreign Affairs after the Crimean War

After the Crimean War, Russia pursued cautious and well-cal- culated foreign policies until nationalist passions and another

Balkan crisis almost caused a catastrophic war in the late 1870s.

The 1856 Treaty of Paris, signed at the end of the Crimean War,

had demilitarized the Black Sea and deprived Russia of south- ern Bessarabia and a narrow strip of land at the mouth of the

Danube River. The treaty gave the West European powers the

nominal duty of protecting Christians living in the Ottoman

Empire, removing that role from Russia, which had been designated as such a protector in the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. Russia's primary goal during the first phase of Alexander

IPs foreign policy was to alter the Treaty of Paris to regain naval

access to the Black Sea. Russian statesmen viewed Britain and

Austria (redesignated as Austria-Hungary in 1867) as opposed

to that goal, so foreign policy concentrated on good relations

with France, Prussia, and the United States. Prussia (Germany

as of 1871) replaced Britain as Russia's chief banker in this

period.

37
Russia: A Country Study

Following the Crimean War, the regime revived its expansionist policies. Russian troops first moved to gain control of

the Caucasus region, where the revolts of Muslim tribesmen

Chechens, Cherkess, and Dagestanis—had continued despite

numerous Russian campaigns in the nineteenth century. Once

the forces of Aleksandr Baryatinskiy had captured the legendary Chechen rebel leader Shamil in 1859, the army resumed

the expansion into Central Asia that had begun under Nicholas I. The capture of Tashkent was a significant victory over the

Quqon (Kokand) Khanate, part of which was annexed in 1866.

By 1867 Russian forces had captured enough territory to form

the Guberniya (Governorate General) of Turkestan, the capital

of which was Tashkent. The Bukhoro (Bukhara) Khanate then

lost the crucial Samarqand area to Russian forces in 1868. To

avoid alarming Britain, which had strong interests in protecting nearby India, Russia left the Bukhoran territories directly

bordering Afghanistan and Persia nominally independent. The

Central Asian khanates retained a degree of autonomy until

1917.

Russia followed the United States, Britain, and France in

establishing relations with Japan, and, together with Britain

and France, Russia obtained concessions from China conse- quent to the Second Opium War (1856-60). Under the Treaty

of Aigun in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing in 1860, China

ceded to Russia extensive trading rights and regions adjacent

to the Amur and Ussuri rivers and allowed Russia to begin

building a port and naval base at Vladivostok. Meanwhile, in

1867 the logic of the balance of power and the cost of developing and defending the Amur-Ussuri region dictated that Russia

sell Alaska to the United States in order to acquire muchneeded funds.

As part of the regime's foreign policy goals in Europe, Russia

initially gave guarded support to France's anti-Austrian diplomacy. A weak Franco-Russian entente soured, however, when

France backed a Polish uprising against Russian rule in 1863.

Russia then aligned itself more closely with Prussia by approving the unification of Germany in exchange for a revision of

the Treaty of Paris and the remilitarization of the Black Sea.

These diplomatic achievements came at a London conference

in 1871, following France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.

After 1871 Germany, united under Prussian leadership, was the

strongest continental power in Europe. In 1873 Germany

formed the loosely knit League of the Three Emperors with

38
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

Russia and Austria-Hungary to prevent them from forming an

alliance with France. Nevertheless, Austro-Hungarian and Russian ambitions clashed in the Balkans, where rivalries among

Slavic nationalities and anti-Ottoman sentiments seethed. In

the 1870s, Russian nationalist opinion became a serious domestic factor in its support for liberating Balkan Christians from

Ottoman rule and making Bulgaria and Serbia quasi-protectorates of Russia. From 1875 to 1877, the Balkan crisis escalated

with rebellions in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, which

the Ottoman Turks suppressed with such great cruelty that Serbia, but none of the West European powers, declared war. In early 1877, Russia came to the rescue of beleaguered Ser- bian and Russian volunteer forces when it went to war with the

Ottoman Empire. Within one year, Russian troops were near- ing Constantinople, and the Ottomans surrendered. Russia's

nationalist diplomats and generals persuaded Alexander II to force the Ottomans to sign the Treaty of San Stefano in March

1878, creating an enlarged, independent Bulgaria that

stretched into the southwestern Balkans. When Britain threatened to declare war over the terms of the Treaty of San Ste- fano, an exhausted Russia backed down. At the Congress of

Berlin in July 1878, Russia agreed to the creation of a smaller

Bulgaria. Russian nationalists were furious with Austria-Hungary and Germany for failing to back Russia, but the tsar accepted a revived and strengthened League of the Three

Emperors as well as Austro-Hungarian hegemony in the west- ern Balkans.

Russian diplomatic and military interests subsequently

returned to Central Asia, where Russia had quelled a series of

uprisings in the 1870s, and Russia incorporated hitherto independent amirates into the empire. Britain renewed its concerns in 1881 when Russian troops occupied Turkmen lands

on the Persian and Afghan borders, but Germany lent diplomatic support to Russian advances, and an Anglo-Russian war was averted. Meanwhile, Russia's sponsorship of Bulgarian

independence brought negative results as the Bulgarians,

angry at Russia's continuing interference in domestic affairs,

sought the support of Austria-Hungary. In the dispute that arose between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Germany took a firm position toward Russia while mollifying the tsar with a

bilateral defensive alliance, the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887

between Germany and Russia. Within a year, Russo-German

acrimony led to Bismarck's forbidding further loans to Russia,

39
Russia: A Country Study

and France replaced Germany as Russia's financier. When Kai- ser Wilhelm II dismissed Bismarck in 1890, the loose RussoPrussian entente collapsed after having lasted for more than

twenty-five years. Three years later, Russia allied itself with

France by entering into a joint military convention, which

matched the dual alliance formed in 1879 by Germany and

Austri a-Hungary. The Rise of Revolutionary Movements

Alexander II's reforms, particularly the lifting of state censorship, fostered the expression of political and social thought.

The regime relied on journals and newspapers to gain support

for its domestic and foreign policies. But liberal, nationalist,

and radical writers also helped to mold public opinion that was opposed to tsarism, private property, and the imperial state. Because many intellectuals, professionals, peasants, and workers shared these opposition sentiments, the regime regarded

the publications and the radical organizations as dangerous.

From the 1860s through the 1880s, Russian radicals, collectively known as Populists (Narodniki), focused chiefly on the

peasantry, whom they identified as "the people" (narod).

The leaders of the Populist movement included radical writers, idealists, and advocates of terrorism. In the 1860s, Nikolay

Chernyshevskiy, the most important radical writer of the

period, posited that Russia could bypass capitalism and move

directly to socialism (see Glossary). His most influential work,

What Is to Be Done? (1861), describes the role of an individual of

a "superior nature" who guides a new, revolutionary generation. Other radicals such as the incendiary anarchist Mikhail

Bakunin and his terrorist collaborator, Sergey Nechayev, urged

direct action. The calmer Petr Tkachev argued against the

advocates of Marxism (see Glossary), maintaining that a centralized revolutionary band had to seize power before capitalism could fully develop. Disputing his views, the moralist and

individualist Petr Lavrov made a call "to the people," which

hundreds of idealists heeded in 1873 and 1874 by leaving their

schools for the countryside to try to generate a mass movement

among the narod. The Populist campaign failed, however, when

the peasants showed hostility to the urban idealists and the government began to consider nationalist opinion more seriously.

The radicals reconsidered their approach, and in 1876 they

formed a propagandist organization called Land and Liberty

(Zemlya i volya), which leaned toward terrorism. This orienta40
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

tion became stronger three years later, when the group

renamed itself the People's Will (Narodnaya volya), the name

under which the radicals were responsible for the assassination

of Alexander II in 1881. In 1879 Georgiy Plekhanov formed a propagandist faction of Land and Liberty called Black Repartition (Chernyy peredel), which advocated redistributing all land to the peasantry. This group studied Marxism, which, paradoxically, was principally concerned with urban industrial

workers. The People's Will remained underground, but in

1887 a young member of the group, Aleksandr Ul'yanov,

attempted to assassinate Alexander III, and authorities arrested

and executed him. The execution greatly affected Vladimir

Ul'yanov, Aleksandr's brother. Influenced by Chernyshevskiy's

writings, Vladimir joined the People's Will, and later, inspired

by Plekhanov, he converted to Marxism. The younger Ul'yanov

later changed his name to Lenin.

Witte and Accelerated Industrialization

In the late 1800s, Russia's domestic backwardness and vulnerability in foreign affairs reached crisis proportions. At home

a famine claimed a half-million lives in 1891, and activities by

Japan and China near Russia's borders were perceived as threats from abroad. In reaction, the regime was forced to adopt the ambitious but costly economic programs of Sergey

Witte, the country's strong-willed minister of finance. Witte

championed foreign loans, conversion to the gold standard,

heavy taxation of the peasantry, accelerated development of

heavy industry, and a trans-Siberian railroad. These policies were designed to modernize the country, secure the Russian

Far East, and give Russia a commanding position with which to exploit the resources of China's northern territories, Korea,

and Siberia. This expansionist foreign policy was Russia's ver- sion of the imperialist logic displayed in the nineteenth century by other large countries with vast undeveloped territories

such as the United States. In 1894 the accession of the pliable

Nicholas II upon the death of Alexander III gave Witte and

other powerful ministers the opportunity to dominate the government.

Witte's policies had mixed results. In spite of a severe eco- nomic depression at the end of the century, Russia's coal, iron,

steel, and oil production tripled between 1890 and 1900. Railroad mileage almost doubled, giving Russia the most track of

any nation other than the United States. Yet Russian grain pro41
Russia: A Country Study

duction and exports failed to rise significantly, and imports

grew faster than exports. The state budget also more than doubled, absorbing some of the country's economic growth. West- ern historians differ as to the merits of Witte's reforms; some

believe that domestic industry, which did not benefit from subsidies or contracts, suffered a setback. Most analysts agree that

the Trans-Siberian Railroad (which was completed from Moscow to Vladivostok in 1904) and the ventures into Manchuria

and Korea were economic losses for Russia and a drain on the

treasury. Certainly the financial costs of his reforms contributed to Witte's dismissal as minister of finance in 1903.

Radical Political Parties Develop

During the 1890s, Russia's industrial development led to a

significant increase in the size of the urban bourgeoisie and

the working class, setting the stage for a more dynamic political

atmosphere and the development of radical parties. Because

the state and foreigners owned much of Russia's industry, the

working class was comparatively stronger and the bourgeoisie

comparatively weaker than in the West. The working class and

peasants were the first to establish political parties because the

nobility and the wealthy bourgeoisie were politically timid.

During the 1890s and early 1900s, abysmal living and working

conditions, high taxes, and land hunger gave rise to more fre- quent strikes and agrarian disorders. These activities prompted

the bourgeoisie of various nationalities in the empire to develop a host of different parties, both liberal and conservative.Socialists of different nationalities formed their own parties.

Russian Poles, who had suffered significant administrative and

educational Russification, founded the nationalistic Polish

Socialist Party in Paris in 1892. That party's founders hoped

that it would help reunite a divided Poland with the territories

held by Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. In 1897 Jewish

workers in Russia created the Bund (league or union), an

organization that subsequently became popular in western

Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, and Russian Poland. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party was established in 1898.

The Finnish Social Democrats remained separate, but the

Latvians and Georgians associated themselves with the Russian

Social Democrats. Armenians, inspired by both Russian and

Balkan revolutionary traditions, were politically active in this

period in Russia and in the Ottoman Empire. Politically

42
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

minded Muslims living in Russia tended to be attracted to the

pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements that were developing

in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. Russians who fused the

ideas of the old Populists and urban socialists formed Russia's

largest radical movement, the United Socialist Revolutionary

Party, which combined the standard Populist mix of propaganda and terrorist activities. Vladimir I. Ul'yanov was the most politically talented of the

revolutionary socialists. In the 1890s, he labored to wean young

radicals away from populism to Marxism. Exiled from 1895 to 1899 in Siberia, where he took the name Lenin from the

mighty Siberian Lena River, he was the master tactician among

the organizers of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. In

December 1900, he founded the newspaper Iskra (Spark). In

his book What Is to Be Done? (1902), Lenin developed the theory that a newspaper published abroad could aid in organizing

a centralized revolutionary party to direct the overthrow of an

autocratic government. He then worked to establish a tightly

organized, highly disciplined party to do so in Russia. At the

Second Party Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor

Party in 1903, he forced the Bund to walk out and induced a

split between his majority Bolshevik (see Glossary) faction and

the minority Menshevik (see Glossary) faction, which believed

more in worker spontaneity than in strict organizational tactics. Lenin's concept of a revolutionary party and a worker-peasant

alliance owed more to Tkachev and to the People's Will than to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the developers of Marxism.

Young Bolsheviks, such as Joseph V. Stalin and Nikolay

Bukharin, looked to Lenin as their leader.

Imperialism in Asia and the Russo-Japanese War

At the turn of the century, Russia gained room to maneuver

in Asia because of its alliance with France and the growing

rivalry between Britain and Germany. Tsar Nicholas failed to orchestrate a coherent Far Eastern policy because of ministerial conflicts, however. Russia's uncoordinated and aggressive moves in the region ultimately led to the Russo-Japanese War

(1904-05).

By 1895 Germany was competing with France for Russia's

favor, and British statesmen hoped to negotiate with the Russians to demarcate spheres of influence in Asia. This situation

enabled Russia to intervene in northeastern Asia after Japan's

victory over China in 1895. In the negotiations that followed,

43
Russia: A Country Study

Japan was forced to make concessions in the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur in southern Manchuria. The next year, Witte used French capital to establish the Russo-Chinese Bank.

The goal of the bank was to finance the construction of a rail- road across northern Manchuria and thus shorten the TransSiberian Railroad. Within two years, Russia had acquired leases

on the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur and had begun

building a trunk line from Harbin in central Manchuria to Port

Arthur on the coast. In 1900 China reacted to foreign encroachments on its terri- tory with an armed popular uprising, the Boxer Rebellion. Russian military contingents joined forces from Europe, Japan,

and the United States to restore order in northern China. A

force of 180,000 Russian troops fought to pacify part of Manchuria and to secure its railroads. TheJapanese were backed by

Britain and the United States, however, and insisted that Russia

evacuate Manchuria. Witte and some Russian diplomats

wanted to compromise with Japan and trade Manchuria for

Korea, but a group of Witte's reactionary enemies, courtiers,

and military and naval leaders refused to compromise. The tsar favored their viewpoint, and, disdaining Japan's threats

despite the latter's formal alliance with Britain—the Russian

government equivocated until Japan declared war in early

1904.

In the war that followed, Japan's location, technological

superiority, and superior morale gave it command of the seas, and Russia's sluggishness and incompetent commanders

caused continuous setbacks on land. In January 1905, after an eight-month siege, Russia surrendered Port Arthur, and in

March the Japanese forced the Russians to withdraw north of

Mukden. In May, at the Tsushima Straits, the Japanese

destroyed Russia's last hope in the war, a fleet assembled from

the navy's Baltic and Mediterranean squadrons. Theoretically,

Russian army reinforcements could have driven the Japanese

from the Asian mainland, but revolution at home and diplomatic pressure forced the tsar to seek peace. Russia accepted

mediation by United States president Theodore Roosevelt,

ceded southern Sakhalin Island to Japan, and acknowledged

Japan's ascendancy in Korea and southern Manchuria.

The Last Years of the Autocracy

The Russojapanese War was a turning point in Russian his- tory. It led to a popular uprising against the government that

44
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

forced the regime to respond with domestic economic and

political reforms. In the same period, however, counterreform

and special-interest groups exerted increasing influence on the

regime's policies. In foreign affairs, Russia again became an

intrusive participant in Balkan affairs and in the international

political intrigues of the major European powers. As a conse- quence of its foreign policies, Russia was drawn into a world war for which its domestic policies rendered it unprepared.

Severely weakened by internal turmoil and lacking leadership,

the regime ultimately was unable to overcome the traumatic

events that would lead to the fall of tsarism and initiate a new

era in Russian and world history.

Revolution and Counterrevolution, 1905-07

The Russo-Japanese War accelerated the rise of political

movements among all classes and the major nationalities,

including propertied Russians. By early 1904, Russian liberal

activists from the zemstva and from the professions had formed

an organization called the Union of Liberation. In the same

year, they joined with Finns, Poles, Georgians, Armenians, and

Russian members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party to form

an antiautocratic alliance.

InJanuary 1905, Father Georgiy Gapon, a Russian Orthodox

priest who headed a police-sponsored workers' association, led

a huge, peaceful march in St. Petersburg to present a petition

to the tsar. Nervous troops responded to the throng with gunfire, killing several hundred people and initiating the Revolution of 1905. This event, which came to be called Bloody

Sunday, combined with the embarrassing failures in the war

with Japan to prompt more strikes, agrarian disorders, army

mutinies, and terrorist acts organized by opposition groups.

Workers formed a council, or soviet, in St. Petersburg. Armed

uprisings occurred in Moscow, the Urals, Latvia, and parts of

Poland. Activists from the zemstva and the broad professional

Union of Unions formed the Constitutional Democratic Party,

whose initials lent the party its informal name, the Kadets.

Some upper-class and propertied activists called for compromise with opposition groups to avoid further disorders. In late 1905, Witte pressured Nicholas to issue the so-called October

Manifesto, which gave Russia a constitution and proclaimed

basic civil liberties for all citizens. In an effort to stop the activity of liberal factions, the constitution included most of their

demands, including a ministerial government responsible to

45
Russia: A Country Study

the tsar, and a national Duma (see Glossary) —a parliament to be elected on a broad, but not wholly equitable, franchise.

Those who accepted this arrangement formed a center-right

political party, the Octobrists, and named Witte the first prime

minister. Meanwhile, the Kadets held out for a ministerial government and equal, universal suffrage. Because of their political principles and continued armed uprisings, Russia's leftist parties were undecided whether to participate in the Duma

elections, which had been called for early 1906. At the same

time, rightist factions actively opposed the reforms. Several new

monarchist and protofascist groups also arose to subvert the

new order. Nevertheless, the regime continued to function

through the chaotic year of 1905, eventually restoring order in

the cities, the countryside, and the army. In the process, terrorists murdered several thousand officials, and the government

executed an equal number of terrorists. Because the government had been able to restore order and to secure a loan from

France before the first Duma met, Nicholas was in a strong

position that enabled him to replace Witte with the much less independent functionary Petr Stolypin.

The First Duma was elected in March 1906. The Kadets and

their allies dominated it, with the mainly nonparty radical leftists slightly weaker than the Octobrists and the nonparty center-rightists combined. The socialists had boycotted the

election, but several socialist delegates were elected. Relations

between the Duma and the Stolypin government were hostile

from the beginning. A deadlock of the Kadets and the government over the adoption of a constitution and peasant reform

led to the dissolution of the Duma and the scheduling of new

elections. In spite of an upsurge of leftist terror, radical leftist parties participated in the election, and, together with the nonparty left, they gained a plurality of seats, followed by a loose

coalition of Kadets with Poles and other nationalities in the

political center. The impasse continued, however, when the

Second Duma met in 1907.

The Stolypin and Kokovtsov Governments

In 1907 Stolypin instituted a series of major reforms. InJune

1907, he dissolved the Second Duma and promulgated a new

electoral law, which vastly reduced the electoral weight of

lower-class and non-Russian voters and increased the weight of

the nobility. This political coup had the desired short-term

result of restoring order. New elections in the fall returned a

46
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

more conservative Third Duma, which Octobrists dominated.

Even this Duma quarreled with the government over a variety

of issues, however, including the composition of the naval staff, the autonomous status of Finland, the introduction of zemstva

in the western provinces, the reform of the peasant court sys- tem, and the establishment of workers' insurance organizations

under police supervision. In these disputes, the Duma, with its appointed aristocratic-bureaucratic upper house, was sometimes more conservative than the government, and at other

times it was more constitutionally minded. The Fourth Duma,

elected in 1912, was similar in composition to the third, but a

progressive faction of Octobrists split from the right andjoined

the political center. Stolypin's boldest measure was his peasant reform program.

It allowed, and sometimes forced, the breakup of communes as well as the establishment of full private property. Stolypin

hoped that the reform program would create a class of conservative landowning farmers loyal to the tsar. Most peasants did

not want to lose the safety of the commune or to permit outsiders to buy village land, however. By 1914 only about 10 percent

of all peasant communes had been dissolved. Nevertheless, the

economy recovered and grew impressively from 1907 to 1914,

both quantitatively and through the formation of rural cooperatives and banks and the generation of domestic capital. By

1914 Russian steel production equaled that of France and Austria-Hungary, and Russia's economic growth rate was one of the

highest in the world. Although external debt was very high, it was declining as a percentage of the gross national product

(GNP—see Glossary), and the empire's overall trade balance was favorable.

In 1911 a double agent working for the Okhrana assassinated Stolypin, and Finance Minister Vladimir Kokovtsov

replaced him. The cautious Kokovtsov was very able and a supporter of the tsar, but he could not compete with the powerful

court factions that dominated the government.

Historians have debated whether Russia had the potential to develop a constitutional government between 1905 and 1914.

The failure to do so was partly because the tsar was not willing

to give up autocratic rule or share power. By manipulating the

franchise, the government obtained progressively more conservative, but less representative, Dumas. Moreover, the regime

sometimes bypassed the conservative Dumas and ruled by

decree.

47
Russia: A Country Study

During this period, the government's policies waivered from

reformist to repressive. Historians have speculated about

whether Witte's and Stolypin's bold reform plans could have

"saved" the Russian Empire. But court politics, together with

the continuing isolation of the tsar and the bureaucracy from

the rest of society, hampered all reforms. Suspensions of civil liberties and the rule of law continued in many places, and neither workers nor the Orthodox Church had the right to organize themselves as they chose. Discrimination against Poles,

Jews, Ukrainians, and Old Believers was common. Domestic

unrest was on the rise while the empire's foreign policy was becoming more adventurous.

Active Balkan Policy, 1906-13

Russia's earlier Far Eastern policy required holding Balkan

issues in abeyance, a strategy Austria-Hungary also followed

between 1897 and 1906. Japan's victory in 1905 had forced Russia to make deals with the British and the Japanese. In 1907

Russia's new foreign minister, Aleksandr Izvol'skiy, concluded

agreements with both nations. To maintain its sphere of influ- ence in northern Manchuria and northern Persia, Russia

agreed to Japanese ascendancy in southern Manchuria and

Korea, and to British ascendancy in southern Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The logic of this policy demanded that Russia

and Japan unite to prevent the United States from establishing a base in China by organizing a consortium to develop Chinese

railroads. After China's republican revolution of 1911, Russia

and Japan recognized each other's spheres of influence in

Outer Mongolia. In an extension of this reasoning, Russia

traded recognition of German economic interests in the Ottoman Empire and Persia for German recognition of various Russian security interests in the region. Russia also protected its strategic and financial position by entering the informal Triple

Entente with Britain and France, without antagonizing Germany.

In spite of these careful measures, after the Russo-Japanese

War Russia and Austria-Hungary resumed their Balkan rivalry,

focusing on the Kingdom of Serbia and the provinces of Bosnia

and Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary had occupied since

1878. In 1881 Russia secretly had agreed in principle to Austria's future annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But in

1908, Izvol'skiy foolishly consented to support formal annexation in return for Austria's support for revision of the agree48
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

ment on the neutrality of the Bosporus and Dardanelles—

a

change that would give Russia special navigational rights of passage. Britain stymied the Russian gambit by blocking the revision, but Austria proceeded with the annexation. Then, backed

by German threats of war, Austria-Hungary exposed Russia's

weakness by forcing Russia to disavow support for Serbia.

After Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia became a major part of the increased tension and

conflict in the Balkans. In 1912 Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and

Montenegro defeated the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan

War, but the putative allies continued to quarrel among themselves. Then in 1913, the alliance split, and the Serbs, Greeks,

and Romanians defeated Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War.

Austria-Hungary became the patron of Bulgaria, which now

was Serbia's territorial rival in the region, and Germany

remained the Ottoman Empire's protector. Russia tied itself more closely to Serbia than it had previously. The complex sys- tem of alliances and Great Power support was extremely unstable; among the Balkan parties harboring resentments over past

defeats, the Serbs maintained particular animosity toward the

Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In June 1914, a Serbian terrorist assassinated Archduke

Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, which

then held the Serbian government responsible. Austria-Hungary delivered an ultimatum to Serbia, believing that the terms were too humiliating to accept. Although Serbia submitted to the ultimatum, Austria-Hungary declared the response unsatisfactory and recalled its ambassador. Russia, fearing another

humiliation in the Balkans, supported Serbia. Once the Ser- bian response was rejected, the system of alliances began to operate automatically, with Germany supporting Austria-Hungary and France backing Russia. When Germany invaded

France through Belgium, the conflict escalated into a world

war. Russia at War, 1914-16

Russia's large population enabled it to field a greater number of troops than Austria-Hungary and Germany combined,

but its underdeveloped industrial base meant that its soldiers were as poorly armed as those of the Austro-Hungarian army.

Russian forces were inferior to Germany's in every respect

except numbers. In most engagements, the larger Russian

49
Russia: A Country Study

armies defeated the Austro-Hungarians but suffered reverses

against German forces.

In the initial phase of the war, Russia's offensives into East

Prussia drew enough German troops from the western front to allow the French, Belgians, and British to stop the German

advance. One of Russia's two invading armies was almost totally

destroyed, however, at the disastrous Battle of Tannenberg

the same site at which Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian troops

had defeated the German Teutonic Knights in 1410. Meanwhile, the Russians turned back an Austrian offensive and

pushed into eastern Galicia, the northeastern region of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Russians halted a combined

German-Austrian winter counteroffensive into Russian Poland,

and in early 1915 they pushed more deeply into Galicia. Then

in the spring and summer of that year, a German-Austrian

offensive drove the Russians out of Galicia and Poland and

destroyed several Russian army corps. In 1916 the Germans

planned to drive France out of the war with a large-scale attack

in the Verdun area, but a new Russian offensive against AustriaHungary once again drew German troops from the west. These

actions left both major fronts stable and both Russia and Germany despairing of victory—Russia because of exhaustion, Germany because of its opponents' superior resources. Toward the

end of 1916, Russia came to the rescue of Romania, which had

just entered the war, and extended the eastern front south to the Black Sea. Wartime agreements among the Allies reflected the Triple

Entente's imperialist aims and the Russian Empire's relative

weakness outside Eastern Europe. Russia nonetheless expected

impressive gains from a victory: territorial acquisitions in east- ern Galicia from Austria, in East Prussia from Germany, and in

Armenia from the Ottoman Empire, which joined the war on

the German side; control of Constantinople and the Bosporus

and Dardanelles straits; and territorial and political alteration

of Austria-Hungary in the interests of Romania and the Slavic

peoples of the region. Britain was to acquire the middle zone

of Persia and share much of the Arab Middle East with France;

Italy—not Russia's ally Serbia—was to acquire Dalmatia along

the Adriatic coast; Japan, another ally of the entente, was to control more territory in China; and France was to regain

Alsace-Lorraine, which it had lost to Germany in the FrancoPrussian War, and to have increased influence in western Germany.

50
Historical Setting: Early History to 1917

The Fatal Weakening of Tsarism

The onset of World War I exposed the weakness of Nicholas

II's government. A show of national unity had accompanied

Russia's entrance into the war, with defense of the Slavic Serbs

the main battle cry. In the summer of 1914, the Duma and the

zemstva expressed full support for the government's war effort. The initial conscription was well organized and peaceful, and

the early phase of Russia's military buildup showed that the

empire had learned lessons from the Russojapanese War. But

military reversals and the government's incompetence soon

soured much of the population. German control of the Baltic

Sea and German-Ottoman control of the Black Sea severed

Russia from most of its foreign supplies and potential markets.

In addition, inept Russian preparations for war and ineffective

economic policies hurt the country financially, logistically, and

militarily. Inflation became a serious problem. Because of inadequate materiel support for military operations, the War Industries Committee was formed to ensure that necessary supplies

reached the front. But army officers quarreled with civilian

leaders, seized administrative control of front areas, and

refused to cooperate with the committee. The central government distrusted the independent war support activities that were organized by zemstva and cities. The Duma quarreled with

the war bureaucracy of the government, and center and centerleft deputies eventually formed the Progressive Bloc to create a genuinely constitutional government.

After Russian military reversals in 1915, Nicholas II went to the front to assume nominal leadership of the army, leaving

behind his German-born wife, Alexandra, and Rasputin, a member of her entourage, who exercised influence on policy

and ministerial appointments. Rasputin was a debauched faith

healer who initially impressed Alexandra because he was able

to stop the bleeding of the royal couple's hemophiliac son and

heir presumptive. Although their true influence has been

debated, Alexandra and Rasputin undoubtedly decreased the

regime's prestige and credibility.

While the central government was hampered by court

intrigue, the strain of the war began to cause popular unrest. In 1916 high food prices and fuel shortages caused strikes in some

cities. Workers, who had won the right to representation in sec- tions of the War Industries Committee, used those sections as organs of political opposition. The countryside also was becoming restive. Soldiers were increasingly insubordinate, particu51
Russia: A Country Study

larly the newly recruited peasants who faced the prospect of

being used as cannon fodder in the inept conduct of the war. The situation continued to deteriorate. In an attempt to alle- viate the morass at the tsar's court, a group of nobles murdered

Rasputin in December 1916. But the death of the mysterious

"healer" brought little change. Increasing conflict between the

tsar and the Duma weakened both parts of the government

and increased the impression of incompetence. In early 1917,

deteriorating rail transport caused acute food and fuel shortages, which resulted in riots and strikes. Authorities summoned

troops to quell the disorders in Petrograd (as St. Petersburg

had been called since 1914, to Russianize the Germanic name).

In 1905 troops had fired on demonstrators and saved the monarchy, but in 1917 the troops turned their guns over to the

angry crowds. Public support for the tsarist regime simply evaporated in 1917, ending three centuries of Romanov rule.

* * * Three excellent one-volume surveys of Russian history are Nicholas Riasanovsky's A History of Russia, David MacKenzie

and Michael W. Curran's A History ofRussia and the Soviet Union,

and Robert Auty and Dmitry Obolensky's An Introduction to Russian History. The most useful thorough study of Russia before

the nineteenth century is Vasily Kliuchevsky's five-volume col- lection, The Course ofRussian History. Good translations exist,

however, only for the third volume, The Seventeenth Century, and

part of the fourth volume, Peter the Great. For the 1800-1917

period, two excellent comprehensive works are the second volume of Michael T. Florinsky's Russia: A History and Interpretation

and Hugh Seton-Watson's The Russian Empire, 1801-1917. The

roots and nature of Russian autocracy are probed in Richard

Pipes's controversial Russia under the Old Regime and Geroid

Tanquary Robinson's Rural Russia under the Old Regime, and

Franco Venturi describes the development of populist and

socialist movements in Russia in Roots of Revolution. Barbara

Jelavich's A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 studies

the foreign relations of the last century of the autocracy. Jer- ome Blum treats social history in Lord and Peasant in Russiafrom

the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century. Cultural history is discussed in

James H. Billington's The Icon and the Axe and in Marc Raeffs

Russian Intellectual History. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

52
Chapter 2. Historical Setting: 191 7 to 1991
Tsarevich Ivan pondering how he can obey hisfather and marry a frog. Fortunately for Ivan, thefrog turns into Vasilisa the Wise and Clever, a maiden

more beautiful than anyone had ever seen (design from lacquer box made in

village ofFedoskino).
THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA between 1922 and 1991 is essentially the history of the Soviet Union (the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics—USSR). This ideologically based empire

was roughly coterminous with the Russian Empire, whose last monarch, Tsar Nicholas II, ruled until 1917. The Soviet Union

was established in December 1922 by the leaders of the Russian

Communist Party (Bolshevik). At that time, the new nation

included the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian republics.

A spontaneous popular uprising in Petrograd, in response to the wartime decay of Russia's physical well-being and morale,

culminated in the toppling of the imperial government in

March 1917. Replacing the autocracy was the Provisional Government, whose leaders intended to establish democracy in

Russia and to continue participating on the side of the Allies in

World War I. At the same time, to ensure the rights of the working class, workers' councils, known as Soviets, sprang up across the country. The radical Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir I. Lenin,

agitated for socialist revolution in the Soviets and on the streets. They seized power from the Provisional Government in

November 1917. Only after the long and bloody Civil War of

1918-21, which included combat between government forces

and foreign troops in several parts of Russia, was the new communist regime secure. From its first years, government in the Soviet Union was

based on the one-party rule of the communists, as the Bolsheviks called themselves beginning in March 1918. After unsuccessfully attempting to centralize the economy in accordance

with Marxist dogma during the Civil War, the Soviet government permitted some private enterprise to coexist with nationalized industry in the 1920s. Debate over the future of the

economy provided the background for Soviet leaders to con- tend for power in the years after Lenin's death in 1924. By

gradually consolidating his influence and isolating his rivals

within the party, Joseph V. Stalin became the sole leader of the

Soviet Union by the end of the 1920s.

In 1928 Stalin introduced the First Five-Year Plan for building a socialist economy. In industry the state assumed control over all existing enterprises and undertook an intensive program of industrialization; in agriculture the state appropriated

55
Russia: A Country Study

the peasants' property to establish collective farms. The plan's

implementation produced widespread misery, including the

deaths of millions of peasants by starvation or directly at the

hands of the government during forced collectivization. Social

upheaval continued in the mid-1980s, when Stalin began a purge of the party; out of this process grew a campaign of ter- ror that led to the execution or imprisonment of untold millions from all walks of life. Yet despite this turmoil, the Soviet

Union developed a powerful industrial economy in the years

before World War II. Although Stalin tried to avert war with Germany by concluding the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in 1939, in 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Red Army stopped the

Nazi offensive at the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943 and drove

through Eastern Europe to Berlin before Germany surren- dered in 1945. Although ravaged by the war, the Soviet Union

emerged from the conflict as an acknowledged great power.

During the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union first rebuilt and then expanded its economy, with control always

exerted exclusively from Moscow. The Soviet Union consolidated its hold on Eastern Europe, supplied aid to the eventually victorious communists in China, and sought to expand its influence elsewhere in the world. This active foreign policy

helped bring about the Cold War, which turned the Soviet

Union's wartime allies, Britain and the United States, into foes. Within the Soviet Union, repressive measures continued in

force; Stalin apparently was about to launch a new purge when

he died in 1953.

In the absence of an acceptable successor, Stalin's closest

associates opted to rule the Soviet Union jointly, although a struggle for power took place behind the facade of collective

leadership. Nikita S. Khrushchev, who won the power struggle

by the mid-1950s, denounced Stalin's use of terror and eased

repressive controls over party and society. Khrushchev's

reforms in agriculture and administration, however, were generally unproductive, and foreign policy toward China and the

United States suffered reverses. Khrushchev's colleagues in the

leadership removed him from power in 1964.

Following the ouster of Khrushchev, another period of rule

by collective leadership ensued, lasting until Leonid I. Brezh- nev established himself in the early 1970s as the preeminent

figure in Soviet political life. Brezhnev presided over a period

of detente with the West while at the same time building up

56
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

Soviet military strength; the arms buildup contributed to the

demise of detente in the late 1970s. Another contributing fac- tor was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

After some experimentation with economic reforms in the

mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership reverted to established means

of economic management. Industry showed slow but steady

gains during the 1970s, while agricultural development continued to lag. In contrast to the revolutionary spirit that accompanied the birth of the Soviet Union, the prevailing mood of the

Soviet leadership at the time of Brezhnev's death in 1982 was one of aversion to change.

Two developments dominated the decade that followed: the

increasingly apparent crumbling of the Soviet Union's eco- nomic and political structures, and the patchwork attempts at reforms to reverse that process. After the rapid succession of

Yuriy V. Andropov and Konstantin U. Chernenko, transitional

figures with deep roots in Brezhnevite tradition, the energetic

Mikhail S. Gorbachev made significant changes in the econ- omy and the party leadership. His policy of glasnost (see Glossary) freed public access to information after decades of

government repression. But Gorbachev failed to address the

fundamental flaws of the Soviet system; by 1991, when a plot by

government insiders revealed the weakness of Gorbachev's

political position, the end of the Soviet Union was in sight.

Revolutions and Civil War

The chaos and hardship that resulted from Russia's entry

into World War I in 1914 were exacerbated in the years that fol- lowed. Russians saw the fall of the Romanov Dynasty, which had

ruled for more than 300 years, followed by a long struggle for

power between the Bolsheviks and a series of disparate armies,

known collectively as the Whites, supported by Russia's erst- while wartime allies. The combination of military occupation

and economic disorder bled the country for three years until

the Bolsheviks triumphed and began to establish a new order.

The February Revolution

By early 1917, the existing order in Russia was verging on

collapse. The country's involvement in World War I had

already cost millions of lives and severely disrupted Russia's

already struggling economy. In an effort to reverse the worsening military situation, Nicholas II took personal command of

57
Russia: A Country Study

Russian forces at the front, leaving the conduct of government

in Petrograd (St. Petersburg before 1914; Leningrad after

1924; St. Petersburg after 1991) to his unpopular wife and a

series of incompetent ministers. As a consequence of these

conditions, the morale of the people rapidly deteriorated.

The spark to the events that ended tsarist rule was ignited on

the streets of Petrograd in February 1917 (according to the

Julian calendar then still in use in Russia; according to the

modern Gregorian calendar, which was adopted in February

1918, these events occurred in March). Driven by shortages of

food and fuel, crowds of hungry citizens and striking workers

began spontaneous rioting and demonstrations. Local reserve

troops, called in to suppress the riots, refused to fire on the

crowds, and some soldiers joined the workers and other rioters.

A few days later, with tsarist authority in Petrograd disintegrating, two distinct groups emerged, each claiming to represent

the Russian people. One was the Executive Committee, which

the Duma (see Glossary), the lower house of the Russian parliament, had established in defiance of the tsar's orders. The

other body was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'

Deputies.

With the consent of the Petrograd Soviet, the Executive

Committee of the Duma organized the Provisional Government on March 15. The government was a cabinet of ministers

chaired by aristocrat and social reformer Georgiy L'vov. A legislature, the Constituent Assembly, also was to be created, but

election of the first such body was postponed until the fall of

1917. Delegates of the new government met Nicholas that

evening at Pskov, where rebellious railroad workers had

stopped the imperial train as the tsar attempted to return to the capital. Advised by his generals that he lacked the support

of the country, Nicholas informed the delegates that he was

abdicating in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. When

Michael in turn refused the throne, imperial rule in Russia

came to an end.

The Period of Dual Power

The collapse of the monarchy left two rival political institutions—the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet

to share administrative authority over the country. The Petrograd Soviet, drawing its membership from socialist deputies

elected in factories and regiments, coordinated the activities of

other Soviets that sprang up across Russia at this time. The

58
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

Petrograd Soviet was dominated by moderate socialists of the

Socialist Revolutionary Party and by the Menshevik (see Glossary) faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The

Bolshevik (see Glossary) faction of the latter party provided the

opposition. Although it represented the interests of Russia's

working class, the Petrograd Soviet at first did not seek to undermine the Provisional Government's authority directly.

Nevertheless, the Petrograd Soviet's first official order, which

came to be known as Order Number One, instructed soldiers

and sailors to obey their officers and the government only if their orders did not contradict the decrees of the Petrograd

Soviet—a measure formulated to prevent continuation of Russia's war effort by crippling the Provisional Government's control of the military.

The Provisional Government, in contrast to the socialist

Petrograd Soviet, chiefly represented the propertied classes.

Headed by ministers of a moderate or liberal bent, the new

government pledged to convene a constituent assembly that

would usher in a new era of bourgeois democracy modeled on

European constitutionalism. In the meantime, the government

granted unprecedented rights—full freedom of speech, press, and religion, as well as legal equality—to all citizens. The government did not take up the matter of land redistribution,

however, leaving that issue for the Constituent Assembly. Even

more damaging, the ministers favored keeping Russia's military

commitments to its allies, a position that became increasingly

unpopular as the war dragged on. The government suffered its first crisis in the "April Days," when demonstrations against the

government's war aims forced two ministers to resign, an event

that led to the appointment of Aleksandr Kerenskiy—the only

socialist among the government's ministers—as war minister.

Quickly assuming de facto leadership of the government,

Kerenskiy ordered the army to launch a major offensive in

June. After early successes, that offensive turned into a

full-scale retreat in July.

While the Provisional Government grappled with foreign

foes, the Bolsheviks, who were opposed to bourgeois democracy, gained new strength. Lenin, the Bolshevik leader,

returned to Petrograd in April 1917 from his wartime residence in Switzerland. Although he had been born into a noble

family, from his youth Lenin espoused the cause of the com- mon workers. A committed revolutionary and pragmatic Marxist thinker, he astounded the Bolsheviks in Petrograd with his

59
Russia: A Country Study

April Theses, in which he boldly called for the overthrow of the

Provisional Government, the transfer of "all power to the Soviets," and the expropriation of factories by workers and of land

belonging to the church, the nobility, and the gentry by peasants. Lenin's dynamic presence quickly won the other Bolshevik leaders to his position, and the radicalized orientation of

the Bolshevik faction attracted new members.

Inspired by Lenin's slogans, crowds of workers, soldiers, and

sailors took to the streets of Petrograd in July to wrest power

from the Provisional Government. But the spontaneity of the

'July Days" caught the Bolshevik leaders by surprise, and the

Petrograd Soviet, controlled by moderate Mensheviks, refused

to take power or to enforce Bolshevik demands. After the uprising had died down, the Provisional Government outlawed the

Bolsheviks and jailed Leon Trotsky, leader of a leftist Menshevik faction. Lenin fled to Finland.

In the aftermath of the 'July Days," conservatives sought to reassert order in society. The army's commander in chief,

General Lavr Kornilov, who protested the influence of the Soviets on both the army and the government, appeared as a coun- terrevolutionary threat to Kerenskiy, now prime minister.

Kerenskiy dismissed Kornilov from his command, but Kornilov,

disobeying the order, launched an extemporaneous revolt on

September 10 (August 28). To defend the capital, Kerenskiy

sought help from all quarters and relaxed his ban on Bolshevik

activities. Railroad workers sympathetic to the Bolsheviks

halted Kornilov's troop trains, and Kornilov soon surrendered,

ending the only serious challenge to the Provisional Government from the right.

The Bolshevik Revolution

Although the Provisional Government survived the Kornilov

revolt, popular support for the government faded rapidly as the national mood swung to the left in the fall of 1917. Workers

took control of their factories through elected committees;

peasants expropriated lands belonging to the state, church,

nobility, and gentry; and armies melted away as peasant sol- diers deserted to take part in the land seizures. The Bolsheviks,

skillfully exploiting these popular trends in their propaganda,

achieved domination of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets by

September. Trotsky, freed from prison after the Kornilov revolt, was recruited as a Bolshevik and named chairman of the Petro- grad Soviet.

60
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

Realizing that the time was ripe to seize power by force,

Lenin returned to Petrograd in October and convinced a majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee, which had hoped

to take power legally, to accept armed uprising in principle.

Trotsky won the Petrograd garrison over to the soviet, depriving the Provisional Government of its main military support in

Petrograd.

The actual insurrection—the Bolshevik Revolution—began

on November 6, when Kerenskiy ordered the Bolshevik press

closed. Interpreting this action as a counterrevolutionary

move, the Bolsheviks called on their supporters to defend the

Petrograd Soviet. By evening, the Bolsheviks had taken control

of utilities and most government buildings in Petrograd, thus

enabling Lenin to proclaim the downfall of the Provisional

Government on the morning of the next day, November 7. The

Bolsheviks captured the Provisional Government's cabinet at its Winter Palace headquarters that night with hardly a shot fired

in the government's defense. Kerenskiy left Petrograd to organize resistance, but his countercoup failed and he fled Russia.

Bolshevik uprisings soon took place elsewhere; Moscow was under Bolshevik control within three weeks. The Second Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd to ratify the Bolshevik take- over after moderate deputies (mainly Mensheviks and rightwing members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party) quit the

session. The remaining Bolsheviks and left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries declared the Soviets the governing bodies of Russia

and named the Council of People's Commissars (Sovet narodnykh kommissarov—Sovnarkom) to serve as the cabinet. Lenin

became chairman of this council. Trotsky took the post of commissar of foreign affairs; Stalin, a Georgian, became commissar

of nationalities. Thus, by acting decisively while their opponents vacillated, the Bolsheviks succeeded in effecting their

coup d'etat. On coming to power, the Bolsheviks issued a series of revolutionary decrees ratifying peasants' seizures of land and workers'

control of industries, abolished laws sanctioning class privileges, nationalized the banks, and set up revolutionary tribunals in place of the courts. At the same time, the

revolutionaries now constituting the regime worked to secure power inside and outside the government. Deeming Western

forms of parliamentary democracy irrelevant, Lenin argued for a "dictatorship of the proletariat" based on single-party Bolshevik rule, although for a time left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries

61
Russia: A Country Study

also participated in the Sovnarkom. The new government cre- ated a secret police agency, the VChK (commonly known as the

Cheka), to persecute enemies of the state (including bourgeois

liberals and moderate socialists) . Having convened the Constituent Assembly, which finally had been elected in November

with the Bolsheviks winning only a quarter of the seats, the

Soviet government dissolved the assembly in January after a one-day session, ending a short-lived experiment in parliamentary democracy

In foreign affairs, the Soviet government, seeking to disengage Russia from World War I, called on the belligerent powers

for an armistice and peace without annexations. The Allied

Powers rejected this appeal, but Germany and its allies agreed

to a cease-fire. Negotiations began in December 1917. After

dictating harsh terms that the Soviet government would not

accept, however, Germany resumed its offensive in February

1918, meeting scant resistance from disintegrating Russian

armies. Lenin, after bitter debate with leading Bolsheviks who

favored prolonging the war in hopes of precipitating class warfare in Germany, persuaded a slim majority of the Bolshevik

Central Committee that peace must be made at any cost. On

March 3, Soviet government officials signed the Treaty of

Brest-Li tovsk, relinquishing Poland, the Baltic lands, Finland,

and Ukraine to German control and giving up a portion of the

Caucasus region to Turkey. With the new border dangerously

close to Petrograd, the government was soon transferred to Moscow. An enormous part of the population and resources of

the Russian Empire was lost by this treaty, but Lenin understood that no other alternative could ensure the survival of the

fledgling Soviet state.

Civil War and War Communism

Soon after buying peace with Germany, the Soviet state found itself under attack from other quarters. By the spring of

1918, elements dissatisfied with the radical policies of the communists (as the Bolsheviks started calling themselves) established centers of resistance in southern and Siberian Russia.

Beginning in April 1918, anticommunist forces, called the

Whites and often led by former officers of the tsarist army,

began to clash with the Red Army, which Trotsky, named commissar of war in the Soviet government, organized to defend

the new state. A civil war to determine the future of Russia had

begun.

62
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

The White armies enjoyed varying degrees of support from

the Allied Powers. Desiring to defeat Germany in any way possible, Britain, France, and the United States landed troops in

Russia and provided logistical support to the Whites, whom the

Allies trusted would resume Russia's struggle against Germany

after overthrowing the communist regime. (In March 1918, the

Russian Social Democratic Labor Party officially was renamed

the Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik].) After the Allies

defeated Germany in November 1918, they opted to continue

their intervention in the Russian Civil War against the communists, in the interests of averting what they feared might

become a world socialist revolution.

During the Civil War, the Soviet regime also had to deal with

struggles for independence in regions that it had given up

under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (which the regime immediately repudiated after Germany's defeat by the Allies in November 1918). By force of arms, the communists established Soviet

republics in Belorussia (January 1919), Ukraine (March 1919),

Azerbaijan (April 1920), Armenia (November 1920), and

Georgia (March 1921), but they were unable to take back the

Baltic region, where the independent states of Estonia, Latvia,

and Lithuania had been founded shortly after the Bolshevik

Revolution. In December 1917, the Soviet government recognized the independence of Finland as a gesture of support to the Finnish Reds. However, that strategy failed when Finland

became a parliamentary republic in 1918. Poland, reborn after

World War I, fought a successful war with Soviet Russia from

April 1920 to March 1921 over the location of the frontier

between the two states. During its struggle for survival, the Soviet state relied heavily

on the prospect that revolution would spread to other European industrialized countries. To coordinate the socialist move- ment under Soviet auspices, Lenin founded the Communist

International (Comintern) in March 1919. Although no suc- cessful socialist revolutions occurred elsewhere immediately

after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Comintern provided the

communist leadership with the means for later control of for- eign communist parties.

By the end of 1920, the communists had clearly triumphed

in the Civil War. Although in 1919 Soviet Russia had shrunk to the size of sixteenth-century Muscovy, the Red Army had the

advantage of defending the heartland with Moscow at its center

(see fig. 4). The White armies, divided geographically and with63
Russia: A Country Study

International boundary

National capital Area under communist

control Red Army line, March 1920

denikin White army general

*etrograd

/yUDENICH

'Baltic Sea r-- ^mrvm <A

.LITH- . -f

Kotlas I Tobol'sk COMMUNIST- Tyumen'.} CONTROLLED

^ ("Minsk

\ ^POLAND j/^fa

^ r/ /Kiev

f' \ DENIKIN

Kazan Samara

Chelyabinsk

Ufa

Orenburg

X

ROMANIA

JULGARM WRAi^tpgpr

(Btaci Sea mstantinople

mrot. Sjeo}

Source: Based on information from David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History ofRussia and the Soviet Union, Chicago, 1987, 611. Figure 4. Red Army Line, March 1920

out a clearly defined cause, went down to defeat one by one. Hopes of restoring the monarchy ended effectively when communists executed the imperial family in July 1918. The Allied

governments, lacking support for intervention from their

nations' war-weary citizenry, withdrew most of their forces by

1920. The last foreign troops departed Siberia in 1922, leaving

the Soviet state unchallenged from abroad.

During the Civil War, the communist regime took increasingly repressive measures against its domestic opponents. The

constitution of 1918 deprived members of the former "exploiting classes"—nobles, priests, and capitalists—of civil rights.

Left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, formerly partners of the

Bolsheviks, became targets for persecution during what came

to be known as the Red Terror, which followed an attempt on

Lenin's life in August 1918 and lasted into 1920. In those desperate times, both Reds and Whites murdered and executed

64
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

without trial large numbers of suspected enemies. The party

also took measures to ensure greater discipline among its members by tightening its organization and creating specialized

administrative organs.

In the economic life of the country, too, the communist

regime sought to exert control through a series of drastic measures that came to be known as war communism. To coordinate

what remained of Russia's economic resources after years of

war, in 1918 the government nationalized industry and subordinated it to central administrations in Moscow. Rejecting

workers' control of factories as inefficient, the regime brought

in expert managers to run the factories and organized and

directed the factory workers as in a military mobilization. To

feed the urban population, the Soviet government requisitioned quantities of grain from the peasantry.

The results of war communism were unsatisfactory. Industrial production continued to fall. Workers received wages in

kind because inflation had made the ruble practically worthless. In the countryside, peasants rebelled against payments in

valueless currency by curtailing or consuming their agricultural

production. In late 1920, strikes broke out in the industrial

centers, and peasant uprisings sprang up across the land as famine ravaged the countryside. To the Soviet government,

however, the most disquieting manifestation of dissatisfaction

with war communism was the rebellion in March 1921 of sailors at the naval base at Kronshtadt (near Petrograd), which had

earlier won renown as a bastion of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Although Trotsky and the Red Army succeeded in putting

down the mutiny, it signaled to the party leadership that war communism had to end. The harsh economic policies of the

Civil War period, however, would have a profound influence on

the future development of the country.

The Era of the New Economic Policy

The period of war communism was followed in the 1920s by

a partial retreat from Bolshevik principles. The New Economic

Policy (Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika—NEP; see Glossary)

permitted certain types of private economic activity, so that the

country might recover from the ravages of the Civil War. The

interval was cut short, however, by the death of Lenin and the

sharply different approach to governance of his successor, Joseph Stalin.

65
Russia: A Country Study

Lenin's Leadership

With the Kronshtadt base rebelling against war communism,

the Tenth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party

(Bolshevik) met in March 1921 to hear Lenin argue for a new

course in Soviet policy. Lenin realized that the radical

approach to communism (see Glossary) was unsuited to exist- ing conditions and jeopardized the survival of his regime. Now

the Soviet leader proposed a tactical retreat, convincing the

congress to adopt a temporary compromise with capitalism

under the NEP program. Under the NEP, market forces and

the monetary system regained their importance. The state scrapped its policy of grain requisitioning in favor of taxation,

permitting peasants to dispose of their produce as they

pleased. The NEP also denationalized service enterprises and

much small-scale industry, leaving the "commanding heights"

of the economy—large-scale industry, transportation, and for- eign trade—under state control. Under the mixed economy

called for under the NEP, agriculture and industry staged

recoveries, with most branches of the economy attaining pre- war levels of production by the late 1920s. In general, standards

of living improved during this time, and the "NEP man"—the

independent private trader—became a symbol of the era. About the time that the party sanctioned partial decentralization of the economy, it also approved a quasi-federal struc- ture for the state. During the Civil War, the non-Russian Soviet

republics on the periphery of Russia were theoretically independent, but in fact they were controlled by the central government through the party and the Red Army. Some communists

favored a centralized Soviet state, while nationalists wanted

autonomy for the borderlands. A compromise between the two

positions was reached in December 1922 with the formation of

the USSR. The constituent republics of this "Soviet Union"

(the Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian

republics—the last combining Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) exercised a degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy,

while the communist, predominantly Russian, leadership in

Moscow retained political authority over the entire country.

The giant Central Asian territory was given republic status piecemeal, beginning with the inclusion of the Turkmen and

Uzbek republics in 1924 and concluding with the separation of

Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1936. By that year, the Soviet

Union included eleven republics, all with government struc66
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

tures and ruling communist parties identical to the one in the

Russian Republic.

The party consolidated its authority throughout the country,

becoming a monolithic presence in state and society. Potential

rivals outside the party including prominent members of the

abolished Menshevik faction and the Socialist Revolutionary

Party, were exiled. Within the party, Lenin denounced the for- mation of factions, particularly by radical-left party members.

Central party organs subordinated local Soviets to their authority. Party members perceived as less committed periodically

were purged from the rosters. The Politburo (Political

Bureau), which became the elite policy-making agency of the

nation, created the new post of general secretary for the supervision of personnel matters and assigned Stalin to this office in

April 1922. A minor member of the party's Central Committee

at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin was thought to be a rather lackluster personality and therefore well suited to the routine work required of the general secretary.

From the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and into the early

NEP years, the actual leader of the Soviet state was Lenin.

Although a collective of prominent communists nominally

guided the party and the Soviet Union, Lenin commanded

such prestige and authority that even such brilliant theoreticians as Trotsky and Nikolay Bukharin generally yielded to his

will. But when Lenin became temporarily incapacitated after a

stroke in May 1922, the unity of the Politburo fractured, and a

troika (triumvirate) formed by Stalin, Lev Kamenev, and Grigoriy Zinov'yev assumed leadership in opposition to Trotsky.

Lenin recovered late in 1922 and found fault with the troika,

and particularly with Stalin. In Lenin's view, Stalin had used

coercion to force non-Russian republics to join the Soviet

Union, he was uncouth, and he was accumulating too much

power through his office of general secretary. Although Lenin

recommended that Stalin be removed from that position, the

Politburo decided not to take action, and Stalin still was in

office when Lenin died in January 1924.

As important as Lenin's activities were to the establishment

of the Soviet Union, his legacy to the Soviet future was perhaps

even more significant. By willingly changing his policies to suit

new situations, Lenin had developed a pragmatic interpretation of Marxism (later called Marxism-Leninism—see Glossary) that implied that the party should follow any course that

would ultimately lead to communism. His party, while still per67
Russia: A Country Study

mitting intraorganizational debate, insisted that its members

adhere to the organization's decisions once they were adopted,

in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism.

Finally, because the party embodied the dictatorship of the

proletariat, organized opposition could not be tolerated, and

adversaries would be prosecuted. Thus, although the Soviet

regime was not totalitarian when he died, Lenin had nonetheless laid the foundation upon which such a tyranny would later

arise.

Stalin's Rise to Power

After Lenin's death, two conflicting schools of thought about

the future of the Soviet Union arose in party debates. Left-wing

communists believed that world revolution was essential to the

survival of socialism in the economically backward Soviet

Union. Trotsky, one of the primary proponents of this position,

called for Soviet support of a permanent world revolutionary

movement. As for domestic policy, the left wing advocated the

rapid development of the economy and the creation of a socialist society. In contrast to these militant communists, the right

wing of the party, recognizing that world revolution was

unlikely in the immediate future, favored the gradual development of the Soviet Union through continuation of pragmatic

programs like the NEP. Yet even Bukharin, one of the major

right-wing theoreticians, believed that socialism could not tri- umph in the Soviet Union without assistance from more eco- nomically advanced socialist countries.

Against this backdrop of contrasting perceptions of the

Soviet future, the leading figures of the Ail-Union Communist

Party (Bolshevik) —the new name of the Russian Communist

Party (Bolshevik) as of December 1925—competed for influ- ence. The Kamenev-Zinov'yev-Stalin troika, although it supported the militant international program, successfully

maneuvered against Trotsky and engineered his removal as commissar of war in 1925. In the meantime, Stalin gradually

consolidated his power base and, when he had sufficient

strength, broke with Kamenev and Zinov'yev. Belatedly recognizing Stalin's political power, Kamenev and Zinov'yev made

amends with Trotsky in order to join against their former partner. But Stalin countered their attacks on his position with his

well-timed formulation of the theory of "socialism in one country." This doctrine, calling for construction of a socialist society

in the Soviet Union regardless of the international situation,

68
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

distanced Stalin from the left and won support from Bukharin

and the party's right wing. With this support, Stalin ousted the

leaders of the "Left Opposition" from their positions in 1926

and 1927 and forced Trotsky into exile in 1928. As the NEP era ended, open debate within the party became increasingly limited as Stalin gradually eliminated his opponents.

Foreign Policy, 1921-28

In the 1920s, as the new Soviet state temporarily retreated

from the revolutionary path to socialism, the party also

adopted a less ideological approach in its relations with the rest of the world. Lenin, ever the practical leader, having become

convinced that socialist revolution would not break out in

other countries in the near future, realized that his government required normal relations with the Western world for it to survive. Not only were good relations important to national

security, but the economy also required trade with the industrial countries. Blocking Soviet attainment of these objectives were lingering suspicions about communism on the part of the

Western powers and concern over foreign debts incurred by

the tsarist government, which the Soviet government had unilaterally repudiated. In April 1922, the Soviet commissar of for- eign affairs, Georgiy Chicherin, circumvented these difficulties

by achieving an understanding with Germany, the other pariah

state of Europe, in the Treaty of Rapallo. Under the treaty, Germany and Russia agreed on mutual recognition, cancellation of

debt claims, normalization of trade relations, and secret cooperation in military development. Soon after concluding the

treaty, the Soviet Union obtained diplomatic recognition from

other major powers, beginning with Britain in February 1924.

Although the United States withheld recognition until 1933,

private American firms began to extend technological assis- tance and to develop commercial links in the 1920s.

Toward the non-Western world, the Soviet leadership limited

its revolutionary activity to promoting opposition among the

indigenous populations against "imperialist exploitation." The

Soviet Union did pursue an active policy in China, aiding the

Guomindang (Nationalist Party), a non-Marxist organization

committed to reform and national sovereignty. After the tri- umph of the Guomindang in 1927, a debate developed among

Soviet leaders concerning the future status of relations with

China. Stalin wanted the Chinese Communist Party to join the

Guomindang and infiltrate the government from within, while

69
Russia: A Country Study

Trotsky proposed an armed communist uprising and forcible

imposition of socialism. Although Stalin's plan was finally

accepted, it came to naught when in 192V the Guomindang

leader Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Chinese communists massacred and Soviet advisers expelled.

Society and Culture in the 1920s

In many respects, the NEP period was a time of relative freedom and experimentation in the social and cultural life of the

Soviet Union. The government tolerated a variety of trends in

these fields, provided they were not overtly hostile to the

regime. In art and literature, numerous schools, some traditional and others radically experimental, proliferated. Communist writers Maksim Gor'kiy and Vladimir Mayakovskiy were

active during this time, but other authors, many of whose works were later repressed, published work lacking socialist political

content (see Literature and the Arts, ch. 4). Filmmaking, as a means of influencing a largely illiterate society, received

encouragement from the state; much of legendary cinematographer Sergey Eisenstein's best work dates from this period.

Under Commissar Anatoliy Lunacharskiy, education entered

a phase of experimentation based on progressive theories of

learning. At the same time, the state expanded the primary

and secondary school systems and introduced night schools for

working adults. The quality of higher education suffered, however, because admissions policies gave preference to entrants

from the proletarian class over those with bourgeois backgrounds, regardless of qualifications.

In family life, attitudes generally became more permissive.

The state legalized abortion, and it made divorce progressively

easier to obtain. In general, traditional attitudes toward such

institutions as marriage were subtly undermined by the party's

promotion of revolutionary ideals.

Transformation and Terror

The gradual accession of Stalin to power in the 1920s eventually brought an end to the liberalization of society and the

economy, leading instead to a period of unprecedented government control, mobilization, and terrorization of society in

Russia and the other Soviet republics. In the 1930s, agriculture

and industry underwent brutal forced centralization, and Russian cultural activity was highly restricted. Purges eliminated

70
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

thousands of individuals deemed dangerous to the Soviet state by Stalin's operatives.

Industrialization and Collectivization

At the end of the 1920s, a dramatic new phase in economic

development began when Stalin decided to carry out a program of intensive socialist construction. To some extent, Stalin

pressed economic development at this point as a political

maneuver to eliminate rivals within the party. Because

Bukharin and some other party members would not give up

the gradualistic NEP in favor of radical development, Stalin

branded them "right-wing deviationists" and during 1929 and

1930 used the party organization to remove them from influential positions. Yet Stalin's break with the NEP also revealed that

his doctrine of building "socialism in one country" paralleled

the line that Trotsky had originally supported early in the

1920s. Marxism supplied no basis for Stalin's model of a planned economy, although the centralized economic controls

of the war communism years seemingly furnished a Leninist

precedent. Between 1927 and 1929, the State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyy planovyy komitet—Gosplan) worked

out the First Five-Year Plan (see Glossary) for intensive eco- nomic growth; Stalin began to implement this plan—his "revo- lution from above"—in 1928.

The First Five-Year Plan called for rapid industrialization of

the economy, with particular emphasis on heavy industry. The

economy was centralized: small-scale industry and services were nationalized, managers strove to fulfill Gosplan's output

quotas, and the trade unions were converted into mechanisms

for increasing worker productivity. But because Stalin insisted

on unrealistic production targets, serious problems soon arose. With the greatest share of investment put into heavy industry,

widespread shortages of consumer goods occurred, and inflation grew.

To satisfy the state's need for increased food supplies, the

First Five-Year Plan called for the organization of the peasantry

into collective units that the authorities could easily control.

This collectivization program entailed compounding the peasants' lands and animals into collective farms (kolkhozy; sing.,

kolkhoz—see Glossary) and state farms (sovkhozy; sing., sovkhoz—

see Glossary) and restricting the peasants' movement from

these farms. The effect of this restructuring was to reintroduce

a kind of serfdom into the countryside. Although the program

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Russia: A Country Study

was designed to affect all peasants, Stalin in particular sought

to eliminate the wealthiest peasants, known as kulaks. Generally, kulaks were only marginally better off than other peasants,

but the party claimed that the kulaks had ensnared the rest of

the peasantry in capitalistic relationships. In any event, collectivization met widespread resistance not only from the kulaks

but from poorer peasants as well, and a desperate struggle of

the peasantry against the authorities ensued. Peasants slaughtered their cows and pigs rather than turn them over to the col- lective farms, with the result that livestock resources remained

below the 1929 level for years afterward. The state in turn forcibly collectivized reluctant peasants and deported kulaks and

active rebels to Siberia. Within the collective farms, the authorities in many instances exacted such high levels of procurement that starvation was widespread.

By 1932 Stalin realized that both the economy and society were under serious strain. Although industry failed to meet its production targets and agriculture actually lost ground in comparison with 1928 yields, Stalin declared that the First Five-Year

Plan had successfully met its goals in four years. He then proceeded to set more realistic goals. Under the Second Five-Year

Plan (1933-37), the state devoted attention to consumer

goods, and the factories built under the first plan helped

increase industrial output in general. The Third Five-Year Plan,

begun in 1938, produced poorer results because of a sudden

shift of emphasis to armaments production in response to the

worsening international climate. In general, however, the

Soviet economy had become industrialized by the end of the

1930s. Agriculture, which had been exploited to finance the

industrialization drive, continued to show poor returns

throughout the decade.

The Purges

The complete subjugation of the party to Stalin, its leader,

paralleled the subordination of industry and agriculture to the

state. Stalin had assured his preeminent position by squelching

Bukharin and the "right-wing deviationists" in 1929 and 1930.

To secure his absolute control over the party, however, Stalin

began to purge leaders and rank-and-file members whose loyalty he doubted.

Stalin's purges began in December 1934, when Sergey Kirov, a popular Leningrad party chief who advocated a moderate

policy toward the peasants, was assassinated. Although details

72
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

remain murky, many Western historians believe that Stalin

instigated the murder to rid himself of a potential opponent.

In any event, in the resultant mass purge of the local Leningrad

party, thousands were deported to camps in Siberia. Zinov'yev

and Kamenev, Stalin's former political partners, received

prison sentences for their alleged role in Kirov's murder. At the same time, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del—NKVD), the secret police

agency that was heir to the Cheka of the early 1920s, stepped

up surveillance through its agents and informers and claimed

to uncover anti-Soviet conspiracies among prominent

long-term party members. At three publicized show trials held

in Moscow between 1936 and 1938, dozens of these Old Bolsheviks, including Zinov'yev, Kamenev, and Bukharin, confessed to improbable crimes against the Soviet state. Their

confessions were quickly followed by execution. (The last of

Stalin's old enemies, Trotsky, who supposedly had masterminded the conspiracies against Stalin from abroad, was mur- dered in Mexico in 1940, presumably by the NKVD.)

Coincident with the show trials of the original leadership of the

party, unpublicized purges swept through the ranks of younger

leaders in party, government, industrial management, and cul- tural affairs. Party purges in the non-Russian republics were

particularly severe. The Yezhovshchina ("era of Yezhov," named

for NKVD chief Nikolay Yezhov) ravaged the military as well,

leading to the execution or incarceration of about half the offi- cer corps. The secret police also terrorized the general populace, with untold numbers of common people punished after

spurious accusations. By the time the purges subsided in 1938,

millions of Soviet leaders, officials, and other citizens had been

executed, imprisoned, or exiled.

The reasons for the period of widespread purges, which

became known as the Great Terror, remain unclear. Western

historians variously hypothesize that Stalin created the terror

out of a desire to goad the population to carry out his intensive

modernization program, or to atomize society to preclude dis- sent, or simply out of brutal paranoia. Whatever the causes, the

purges must be viewed as having weakened the Soviet state. In 1936, just as the Great Terror was intensifying, Stalin

approved a new Soviet constitution to replace that of 1924.

Hailed as "the most democratic constitution in the world," the

1936 document stipulated free and secret elections based on

universal suffrage and guaranteed the citizenry a range of civil

73
Russia: A Country Study

and economic rights. But in practice the freedoms implied by

these rights were denied by provisions elsewhere in the constitution that indicated that the basic structure of Soviet society

could not be changed and that the party retained all political

power.

The power of the party, in turn, now was concentrated in the

persons of Stalin and the members of his handpicked Politburo. As if to symbolize the lack of influence of the party rank

and file, party congresses were convened less and less frequently. State power, far from "withering away" after the revolution as Karl Marx had prescribed, instead grew. With Stalin

consciously building what critics would later describe as a cult

of personality, the reverence accorded him in Soviet society

gradually eclipsed that given to Lenin.

Mobilization of Society

Concomitant with industrialization and collectivization, society also experienced wide-ranging regimentation. Collective

enterprises replaced individualistic efforts across the board.

Not only did the regime abolish private farms and businesses,

but it collectivized scientific and literary endeavors as well. As

the 1930s progressed, the revolutionary experimentation that

had characterized many facets of cultural and social life gave

way to conservative norms.

Considerations of order and discipline dominated social policy, which became an instrument of the modernization effort. Workers came under strict labor codes demanding punctuality

and discipline, and labor unions served as extensions of the

industrial ministries. At the same time, higher pay and privileges accrued to productive workers and labor brigades. To

provide greater social stability, the state aimed to strengthen

the family by restricting divorce and abolishing abortion.

Literature and the arts came under direct party control during the 1930s, with mandatory membership in unions of writ- ers, musicians, and other artists entailing adherence to established standards. After 1934 the party dictated that creative works had to express socialistic spirit through traditional

forms. This officially sanctioned doctrine, called "socialist real- ism," applied to all fields of art. The state repressed works that were stylistically innovative or lacked appropriate content.

The party also subjected science and the liberal arts to its scrutiny. Development of scientific theory in a number of fields

had to be based upon the party's understanding of the Marxist

74
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

dialectic, which derailed serious research in certain disciplines.

The party took a more active role in directing work in the

social sciences. In the writing of history, the orthodox Marxist

interpretation employed in the late 1920s was modified to include nationalistic themes and to stress the role of great leaders to create legitimacy for Stalin's dictatorship.

Education returned to traditional forms as the party discarded the experimental programs of Lunacharskiy after 1929.

Admission procedures underwent modification: candidates for

higher education now were selected on the basis of their aca- demic records rather than their class origins. Religion suffered

from a state policy of increased repression, starting with the

closure of numerous churches in 1929. Persecution of clergy was particularly severe during the purges of the late 1930s,

when many of the faithful went underground (see The Russian

Orthodox Church, ch. 4).

Foreign Policy, 1928-39

Soviet foreign policy underwent a series of changes during

the first decade of Stalin's rule. Soon after assuming control of

the party, Stalin oversaw a radicalization of Soviet foreign policy that paralleled the severity of his remaking of domestic policy. To heighten the urgency of his demands for modernization, Stalin portrayed the Western powers, particularly France,

as warmongers eager to attack the Soviet Union. The Great

Depression, which seemingly threatened to destroy world capitalism in the early 1930s, provided ideological justification for

the diplomatic self-isolation practiced by the Soviet Union in

that period. To aid the triumph of communism, Stalin resolved

to weaken the moderate social democratic parties of Europe,

which seemed to be the communists' rivals for support among

the working classes of the Western world.

Conversely, the Comintern ordered the Communist Party of

Germany to aid the anti-Soviet National Socialist German

Workers' Party (Nazi Party) in its bid for power, in the hopes

that a Nazi regime would exacerbate social tensions and produce conditions that would lead to a communist revolution in

Germany. In pursuing this policy, Stalin thus shared responsibility for Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933 and its tragic con- sequences for the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

The dynamics of Soviet foreign relations changed drastically

after Stalin recognized the danger posed by Nazi Germany.

From 1934 through 1937, the Soviet Union tried to restrain

75
Russia: A Country Study

German militarism by building coalitions hostile to fascism. In

the international communist movement, the Comintern

adopted the "popular front" policy of cooperation with socialists and liberals against fascism, thus reversing its line of the

early 1930s. In 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League of

Nations, where Maksim Litvinov, the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, advocated disarmament and collective security

against fascist aggression. In 1935 the Soviet Union formed

defensive military alliances with France and Czechoslovakia,

and from 1936 to 1939 it gave assistance to antifascists in the

Spanish Civil War. The menace of fascist militarism to the

Soviet Union increased when Germany and Japan (which

already posed a substantial threat to the Soviet Far East) signed

the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. But the West proved unwilling to counter German provocative behavior, and after France

and Britain acceded to Hitler's demands for Czechoslovak ter- ritory at Munich in 1938, Stalin abandoned his efforts to forge

a collective security agreement with the West.

Convinced now that the West would not fight Hitler, Stalin

decided to come to an understanding with Germany. Signaling

a shift in foreign policy, Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin's loyal assis- tant, replaced Litvinov, who was Jewish, as commissar of foreign

affairs in May 1939. Hitler, who had decided to attack Poland

despite the guarantees of Britain and France to defend that

country, soon responded to the changed Soviet stance. While

Britain and France dilatorily attempted to induce the Soviet

Union to join them in pledging to protect Poland, the Soviet

Union and Germany engaged in intense negotiations. The

product of the talks between the former ideological foes—the

Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (also known as the MolotovRibbentrop Pact) of August 23, 1939—shocked the world. The

open provisions of the agreement pledged absolute neutrality

in the event one of the parties should become involved in war, while a secret protocol partitioned Poland between the parties

and assigned Romanian territory as well as Estonia and Latvia

(and later Lithuania) to the Soviet sphere of influence. With

his eastern flank thus secured, Hitler began the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939; Britain and France

declared war on Germany two days later. World War II had

begun.

The War Years

The security that Stalin bought with the German treaty was

76
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

short-lived. Hitler repudiated the agreement in 1941, and Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian territory subsequently

became the scene of fierce righting and the eventual repulsion

of a huge Nazi invasion force. Stalin was able to rally patriotic

support for the war effort, and Soviet forces entered Berlin tri- umphantly in April 1945. Together with the United States, the

Soviet Union entered the postwar era as a superpower.

Prelude to War

When German troops invaded Poland, the Soviet Union was

ill prepared to fight a major war. Although military expenditures had increased dramatically during the 1930s and the

standing army was expanded in 1939, Soviet weaponry was inferior to that of the German army. More important, eight of the

nation's top military leaders, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy, had been executed in 1937 in the course of Stalin's

purges; thus the armed forces' morale and effectiveness were

diminished. The time gained through the pact with the Nazis was therefore critical to the recovery of Soviet defenses, particularly because Hitler's forces had overrun much of Western

Europe by the summer of 1940. To strengthen its western frontier, the Soviet Union quickly secured the territory located in

its sphere of interest. Soviet forces seized eastern Poland in

September 1939; entered Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in

October 1939; and seized the Romanian territories of Bessarabia (later incorporated into the Moldavian Republic) and

northern Bukovina (later added to the Ukrainian Republic) in

June 1940. Only Finland resisted Stalin's program of expansion, first by refusing to cede territory and then by putting up a determined defense along the Mannerheim Line when the

Red Army invaded in November 1939. The Soviet-Finnish War

(also known as the Winter War) of 1939-40 exposed grave deficiencies in Soviet military capabilities, which Hitler undoubtedly noted.

As the European war continued and the theaters of the conflict widened, Hitler began to chafe under his pact with the

Soviet Union. The German dictator refused to grant Stalin a

free hand in the Balkans, instead moving the German forces

deeper into Eastern Europe and strengthening his ties with

Finland. Hitler thus prepared for war against the Soviet Union

under a plan that he officially approved in December 1940. At

this point, however, Stalin still apparently believed that the

Soviet Union could avert war by appeasing Germany. To

77
Russia: A Country Study

achieve this goal, regular shipments of Soviet materials to Germany continued, and the Soviet armed forces were kept at a low stage of readiness. But despite Stalin's efforts to mollify Hitler, Germany declared war on the Soviet Union just as 180 German divisions swept across the border early on the morning of

June 22, 1941.

The Great Patriotic War

The German blitzkrieg, known as Operation Barbarossa,

nearly succeeded in breaking the Soviet Union in the months

that followed. Caught unprepared, the Soviet forces lost whole

armies and vast quantities of equipment to the German

onslaught in the first weeks of the war. By November the German army had seized the Ukrainian Republic, besieged Leningrad, the Soviet Union's second largest city, and threatened

Moscow itself (see fig. 5). The Great Patriotic War, as the Soviet

Union and then Russia have called that phase of World War II, thus began inauspiciously for the Soviet Union.

By the end of 1941, however, the German forces had lost

their momentum. German movements were increasingly

restricted by harsh winter weather, attacks from bands of parti- sans, and difficulties in maintaining overextended supply lines. At the same time, the Red Army, after recovering from the initial blow, launched its first counterattacks against the invaders

in December. To ensure the army's ability to fight the war, the

Soviet authorities moved thousands of factories and their key

personnel from the war zone to the interior of the country

often to Central Asia—where the plants began producing war

materiel. Finally, the country was bolstered by the prospect of

receiving assistance from Britain and the United States. After a lull in active hostilities during the winter of 1941-42,

the German army renewed its offensive, scoring a number of

victories in the Ukrainian Republic, Crimea, and southern Russia in the first half of 1942. Then, in an effort to gain control of

the lower Volga River region, the German forces attempted to capture the city of Stalingrad (present-day Volgograd) on the

west bank of the river. Here, Soviet forces put up fierce resis- tance even after the Germans had reduced the city to rubble.

Finally, Soviet forces led by General Georgiy Zhukov sur- rounded the German attackers and forced their surrender in

February 1943. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad proved decisive; after losing this battle, the Germans lacked the strength to sustain their offensive operations against the Soviet Union.

78
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

After Stalingrad, the Soviet Union held the initiative for the

rest of the war. By the end of 1943, the Red Army had broken

through the German siege of Leningrad and recaptured much

of the Ukrainian Republic. By the end of 1944, the front had

moved beyond the 1939 Soviet frontiers into Eastern Europe.

With a decisive superiority in troops and weaponry, Soviet

forces drove into eastern Germany, capturing Berlin in May

1945. The war with Germany thus ended triumphantly for the

Soviet Union.

In gaining the victory, the Soviet government had to rely on

the support of the people. To increase popular enthusiasm for

the war, Stalin reshaped his domestic policies to heighten patriotic spirit. Nationalistic slogans replaced much of the communist rhetoric in official pronouncements and the mass media.

Active persecution of religion ceased, and in 1943 Stalin

allowed the Russian Orthodox Church to name a patriarch

(see Glossary) after the office had stood vacant for nearly two

decades. In the countryside, authorities permitted greater freedom on the collective farms. Harsh German rule in the occu- pied territories also aided the Soviet cause. Nazi administrators

of conquered Soviet territories made little attempt to exploit

the population's dissatisfaction with Soviet political and eco- nomic policies. Instead, the Nazis preserved the collective farm

system, systematically carried out genocidal policies against

Jews, and deported others (mainly Ukrainians) to work in Germany. Given these circumstances, the great majority of the

Soviet people chose to fight and work on their country's behalf,

thus ensuring the regime's survival.

The war with Germany also brought about a temporary alli- ance with the two greatest powers in the "imperialist camp,"

namely Britain and the United States. Despite deep-seated mistrust between the Western democracies and the Soviet state,

the demands of war made cooperation critical. The Soviet

Union benefited from shipments of weaponry and equipment

from the Western allies; during the course of the war, the

United States alone furnished supplies worth more than US$11

billion. At the same time, by engaging considerable German

resources, the Soviet Union gave the United States and Britain

time to prepare to invade German-occupied Western Europe.

Relations began to sour, however, when the war turned in

the Allies' favor. The postponement of the European invasion

to June 1944 became a source of irritation to Stalin, whose

country meanwhile bore the brunt of the struggle against Ger79
Russia: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History ofRussia and the Soviet Union, Chicago, 1987, 742.

Figure 5. Military Operations Against Germany, 1941-45

many. Then, as Soviet armies pushed into Eastern Europe, the

question of the postwar order increased the friction within the

coalition. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin

clashed with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill over Stalin's plans to extend Soviet influ- ence to Poland after the war. At the same time, however, Stalin

promised to join the war against Japan ninety days after Germany had been defeated. Breaking the neutrality pact that the

Soviet Union had concluded with Japan in April 1941, the Red

Army entered the war in East Asia several days before Japan

surrendered in August 1945. Now, with all common enemies

80
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

defeated, little remained to preserve the alliance between the

Western democracies and the Soviet Union.

The end of World War II saw the Soviet Union emerge as one of the world's two great military powers. Its battle-tested

forces occupied most of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union had

won island holdings from Japan and further concessions from

Finland (which had joined Germany in invading the Soviet

Union in 1941) in addition to the territories seized as a conse- quence of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. But these

achievements came at a high cost. An estimated 20 million

Soviet soldiers and civilians perished in the war, the heaviest

loss of life of any of the combatant countries. The war also

inflicted severe material losses throughout the vast territory

that had been included in the war zone. The suffering and

losses resulting from the war made a lasting impression on the

Soviet people and leaders that influenced their behavior in the

postwar era. Reconstruction and Cold War

The end of the common cause again exposed the underlying

hostility between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union.

And the favorable position in which the Soviet Union finished

World War II rapidly made it the prime postwar threat to world

peace in the eyes of Western policy makers. The so-called Cold

War that emerged from that situation featured Soviet domination of all of Eastern Europe, the development of nuclear

weapons by the Soviet Union, and dangerous conflicts and

near-conflicts in several areas of the world.

Reconstruction Years

Although the Soviet Union was victorious in World War II, its economy had been devastated in the struggle. Roughly a quarter of the country's capital resources had been destroyed, and

industrial and agricultural output in 1945 fell far short of pre- war levels. To help rebuild the country, the Soviet government

obtained limited credits from Britain and Sweden but refused

assistance proposed by the United States under the economic

aid program known as the Marshall Plan (see Glossary).

Instead, the Soviet Union compelled Soviet-occupied Eastern

Europe to supply machinery and raw materials. Germany and

former Nazi satellites (including Finland) made reparations to the Soviet Union. The Soviet people bore much of the cost of

81
Russia: A Country Study

rebuilding because the reconstruction program emphasized

heavy industry while neglecting agriculture and consumer

goods. By the time of Stalin's death in 1953, steel production

was twice its 1940 level, but the production of many consumer

goods and foodstuffs was lower than it had been in the late

1920s.

During the postwar reconstruction period, Stalin tightened

domestic controls, justifying the repression by playing up the

threat of war with the West. Many repatriated Soviet citizens

who had lived abroad during the war, whether as prisoners of

war, forced laborers, or defectors, were executed or sent to prison camps. The limited freedoms granted in wartime to the

church and to collective farmers were revoked. The party tightened its admission standards and purged many who had

become party members during the war. In 1946 Andrey Zhdanov, a close associate of Stalin, helped

launch an ideological campaign designed to demonstrate the

superiority of socialism over capitalism in all fields. This campaign, colloquially known as the Zhdanovshchina ("era of

Zhdanov"), attacked writers, composers, economists, histori- ans, and scientists whose work allegedly manifested Western

influence. Although Zhdanov died in 1948, the cultural purge

continued for several years afterward, stifling Soviet intellectual development. Another campaign, related to the

Zhdanovshchina, lauded the real or purported achievements

of past and present Russian inventors and scientists. In this

intellectual climate, the genetic theories of biologist Trofim

Lysenko, which were supposedly derived from Marxist principles but lacked a scientific foundation, were imposed upon

Soviet science to the detriment of research and agricultural

development. The anticosmopolitan trends of these years

adversely affected Jewish cultural and scientific figures in particular. In general, a pronounced sense of Russian nationalism,

as opposed to socialist consciousness, pervaded Soviet society.

Onset of the Cold War

Soon after World War II, the Soviet Union and its Western

allies parted ways as mutual suspicions of the other's intentions

and actions flourished. Eager to consolidate influence over a number of countries adjacent to the Soviet Union, Stalin pursued an aggressive policy of intervention in the domestic affairs of these states, provoking strong Western reaction. The United

82
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

States worked to contain Soviet expansion in this period of

international relations that came to be known as the Cold War.

Mindful of the numerous invasions of Russia and the Soviet

Union from the West throughout history, Stalin sought to cre- ate a buffer zone of subservient East European countries, most

of which the Red Army (known as the Soviet army after 1946)

had occupied in the course of the war. Taking advantage of its military occupation of these countries, the Soviet Union

actively assisted local communist parties in coming to power. By

1948 seven East European countries—Albania, Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia

had communist governments. The Soviet Union initially maintained control behind the "Iron Curtain" (a phrase coined by

Churchill in a 1946 speech) through the use of troops, security

police, and the Soviet diplomatic service. Inequitable trade

agreements with the East European countries permitted the

Soviet Union access to valued resources. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe generated hostility among

the Western states toward their former ally, but they could do

nothing to halt consolidation of Soviet authority in that region

short of going to war. However, the United States and its allies had greater success in halting Soviet expansion in areas where

Soviet influence was more tenuous. British and American diplomatic support for Iran forced the Soviet Union to withdraw

its troops from the northeastern part of that country in 1946.

Soviet efforts to acquire territory from Turkey and to establish a communist government in Greece were stymied when the

United States extended military and economic support to those countries under the Truman Doctrine, a policy articulated by President Harry S. Truman in 1947. Later that year, the United States introduced the Marshall Plan for the eco- nomic recovery of other countries of Europe. The Soviet

Union forbade the countries it dominated from taking part in

the program, and the Marshall Plan contributed to a reduction

of Soviet influence in the participating West European nations.

Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union

became especially strained over the issue of Germany. At the

Potsdam Conference ofJuly-August 1945, the Allied Powers

confirmed their decision to divide Germany and the city of

Berlin into zones of occupation (with the eastern sectors

placed under Soviet administration) until such time as the

Allies would permit Germany to establish a central government. Disagreements between the Soviet Union and the West83
Russia: A Country Study

ern Allies soon arose over their respective occupation policies

and the matter of reparations. In June 1948, the Soviet Union

cut off the West's land access to the American, British, and

French sectors of Berlin in retaliation for steps taken by the

United States and Britain to unite Germany. Britain and the

United States thereupon sponsored an airlift that kept the

beleaguered sectors provisioned until the Soviet Union lifted

the blockade in May 1949. Following the Berlin blockade, the

Western Allies and the Soviet Union divided Germany into two

countries, one oriented to the West, the other to the East. The

crisis also provided the catalyst for the Western countries in

1949 to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO

see Glossary) , a collective security system under which conventional armies and nuclear weapons would offset Soviet forces.

While the Soviet Union gained a new satellite nation in the

German Democratic Republic (East Germany), it lost its influ- ence in Yugoslavia. The local communists in Yugoslavia had

come to power without Soviet assistance, and their leader, Josip

Broz Tito, refused to subordinate the country to Stalin's control. Tito's defiance led the Communist Information Bureau

(Gominform—founded in 1947 to assume some of the functions of the Comintern, which had been abolished in 1943) to expel the Yugoslav party from the international communist

movement in 1948. To avert the rise of other independent

leaders, Stalin purged many of the chief communists in other

East European states. In Asia the Chinese communists, headed by Mao Zedong

and assisted by the Soviet Union, achieved victory over the

Guomindang in 1949. Several months afterward, in 1950,

China and the Soviet Union concluded a mutual defense treaty

against Japan and the United States. Hard negotiations over concessions and aid between the two communist countries

served as an indication that China, with its independent party

and enormous population, would not become a Soviet satellite,

although for a time Sino-Soviet relations appeared particularly

close. Elsewhere in Asia, the Soviet Union pursued a vigorous

policy of support for national liberation movements, especially

in Malaya and Indochina, which were still colonies of Britain

and France, respectively. Thinking that the West would not

defend the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Stalin allowed or encouraged the Soviet-equipped forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) to invade South Korea

in 1950. But forces from the United States and other members

84
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

of the United Nations came to the aid of South Korea, leading

China to intervene militarily on behalf of North Korea, probably at Soviet instigation. Although the Soviet Union avoided

direct participation in the conflict, the Korean War (1950-53)

motivated the United States to strengthen its military capability

and to conclude a peace treaty and security pact with Japan.

Chinese participation in the war also strengthened China's

independent position relative to the Soviet Union.

The Death of Stalin

In the early 1950s, Stalin, now an old man, apparently permitted his subordinates in the Politburo (enlarged and

renamed the Presidium in October 1952) greater powers

within their respective spheres. Also at the Nineteenth Party

Congress, the name of the party was changed from the All- Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) to the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union (CPSU—see Glossary), Indicative of the

Soviet leader's waning strength was top aide Georgiy Malenkov's presentation of the political report to the congress in Stalin's stead. Although the general secretary took a smaller part

in the day-to-day administration of party affairs, he maintained

his animosity toward potential enemies. In January 1953, the

party newspaper announced that a group of predominantly

Jewish doctors had murdered high Soviet officials, including

Zhdanov. Western historians speculate that the disclosure of

this "doctors' plot" may have been a prelude to an intended

purge directed against Malenkov, Molotov, and secret police

chief Lavrenti Beria. When Stalin died in March 1953, under

circumstances that remain unclear, his inner circle, which for

years had lived in dread of their leader, secretly rejoiced.

During his quarter-century of dictatorial control, Stalin had

overseen impressive development in the Soviet Union. From a comparatively backward agricultural society, the country had

been transformed into a powerful industrial state. But in the course of that transformation, many millions of people had

been killed, and Stalin's use of repressive controls had become

an integral function of his regime. The extent to which Stalin's

system would be maintained or altered would be a question of

vital concern to Soviet leaders for years after his passing.

The Khrushchev Era

The end of the Stalin era brought immediate liberalization

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Russia: A Country Study

in several aspects of Soviet life. Party leader Nikita S. Khrushchev denounced Stalin's tyrannical reign in 1956, signaling a sharp break with the past. Because Khrushchev lacked the all- encompassing power of Stalin, his time in office was marked by

continuous maneuvering against political enemies much more

real than Stalin's had been. Party control of cultural activity

became much less restrictive with the onset of the first "thaw"

in the mid-1950s. Khrushchev attempted reforms in both

domestic and foreign policy, with mixed results. During his ten- ure (1953-64), world politics became much more complex as the insecurities of the Cold War persisted; Khrushchev ulti- mately was undone by a combination of failed policy innovations in agriculture, party politics, and industry.

Collective Leadership and the Rise of Khrushchev

Stalin died without naming an heir, and none of his associ- ates had the power to make an immediate claim to supreme

leadership. At first the deceased dictator's colleagues tried to rule jointly, with Malenkov holding the top position of prime

minister. The first challenge to this arrangement occurred in

1953, when the powerful Beria plotted a coup. However, Beria,

who had made many enemies during his bloody term as security chief, was arrested and executed by order of the Presidium.

His death reduced the inordinate power of the secret police,

although the party's strict control over the state security organs

ended only with the demise of the Soviet Union itself (see

Internal Security Before 1991, ch. 10).

After the elimination of Beria, the succession struggle

became more subtle. Malenkov found a formidable rival in

Khrushchev, whom the Presidium elected first secretary (Stalin's title of general secretary was abolished after his death) in

September 1953. Of peasant background, Khrushchev had

served as head of the Ukrainian party organization during and

after World War II, and he was a member of the Soviet political

elite during the late Stalin period. The rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev manifested itself publicly in the contrast

between Malenkov's support for increased production of con- sumer goods and Khrushchev's stand-pat backing for continued development of heavy industry. After a poor showing by

light industry and agriculture, Malenkov resigned as prime

minister in February 1955. Because the new prime minister,

Nikolay Bulganin, had little influence or real power, the depar86
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

ture of Malenkov made Khrushchev the most important figure

within the collective leadership.

At the Twentieth Party Congress, held in February 1956,

Khrushchev further advanced his position within the party by

denouncing Stalin's crimes in a dramatic "secret speech." Khrushchev revealed that Stalin had arbitrarily liquidated thousands

of party members and military leaders, thereby contributing to the initial Soviet defeats in World War II, and had established

what Khrushchev characterized as a pernicious cult of personality. With this speech, Khrushchev not only distanced himself

from Stalin and from Stalin's close associates, Molotov, Malenkov, and Lazar Kaganovich, but he also abjured the dictator's use of terror as an instrument of policy. As a direct result of the

"de-Stalinization" campaign launched by Khrushchev's speech,

the release of political prisoners, which had begun in 1953, was stepped up, and some of Stalin's victims were posthumously

rehabilitated. Khrushchev intensified his campaign against Sta- lin at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961, winning

approval to remove Stalin's body from the Lenin Mausoleum,

where it had originally been interred. De-Stalinization encour- aged many in artistic and intellectual circles to speak out

against the abuses of the former regime. Although Khrushchev's tolerance for critical creative works varied during his

tenure, the new cultural period—known as the "thaw"—represented a clear break with the repression of the arts under Stalin.After the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev continued

to expand his influence, although he still faced opposition. His

rivals in the Presidium, spurred by reversals in Soviet foreign

policy in Eastern Europe in 1956, potentially threatening eco- nomic reforms, and the de-Stalinization campaign, united to vote him out of office in June 1957. Khrushchev, however,

demanded that the matter be put to the Central Committee of

the CPSU, where he enjoyed strong support. The Central Committee overturned the Presidium's decision and expelled Khrushchev's opponents (Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich),

whom Khrushchev labeled the "antiparty group." In a departure from Stalinist procedure, Khrushchev did not order the

imprisonment or execution of his defeated rivals but instead

placed them in relatively minor offices. Khrushchev moved to consolidate his power further in the

ensuing months. In October he removed Marshal Zhukov (who

had helped Khrushchev squelch the "antiparty group") from

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Russia: A Country Study

the office of defense minister, presumably because he feared

Zhukov's influence in the armed forces. Khrushchev became

prime minister in March 1958 when Bulganin resigned, thus

formally confirming his predominant position in the state as well as in the party.

Despite his rank, Khrushchev never exercised the dictatorial

authority of Stalin, nor did he ever completely control the

party, even at the peak of his power. His attacks on members of

the "antiparty group" at the Twenty-First Party Congress in

1959 and the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 suggest

that his opponents retained support within the party. Khrushchev's relative political insecurity probably accounted for

some of his grandiose pronouncements, for example his 1961

promise that the Soviet Union would attain communism by

1980. His desire to undermine opposition and mollify critics explained the nature of many of his domestic reforms and the

vacillations in his foreign policy toward the West.

Foreign Policy under Khrushchev

Almost immediately after Stalin died, the collective leadership began altering the conduct of Soviet foreign policy to permit better relations with the West and new approaches to the

nonaligned countries. Malenkov introduced a change in tone

by speaking out against nuclear war as a threat to civilization.

Khrushchev initially contradicted this position, saying capitalism alone would be destroyed in a nuclear war, but he adopted

Malenkov's view after securing his domestic political position.

In 1955, to ease tensions between East and West, Khrushchev

recognized permanent neutrality for Austria. Meeting President Dwight D. Eisenhower in Geneva later that year, Khrushchev confirmed a Soviet commitment to "peaceful

coexistence" with capitalism. Regarding the developing

nations, Khrushchev tried to win the goodwill of their national

leaders, instead of following the established Soviet policy of

shunning the governments while supporting local communist

parties. Soviet influence over the international alignments of

India and Egypt, as well as of other Third World countries,

began in the middle of the 1950s. Cuba's entry into the socialist

camp in 1961 was a coup for the Soviet Union.

With the gains of the new diplomacy came reversals as well. By conceding Yugoslavia's independent approach to communism in 1955 as well as by his de-Stalinization campaign, Khrushchev created an opening for unrest in Eastern Europe, where

88
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

the policies of the Stalin era had been particularly onerous. In Poland, riots brought about a change in communist party leadership, which the Soviet Union reluctantly recognized in October 1956. A popular uprising against Soviet control then broke

out in Hungary, where the local communist leaders, headed by

Imre Nagy, called for a multiparty political system and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), the defensive alli- ance founded by the Soviet Union and its East European

satellites in 1955. The Soviet army crushed the revolt early in

November 1956, causing numerous casualties. Although the

Hungarian Revolution hurt Soviet standing in world opinion, it demonstrated that the Soviet Union would use force if neces- sary to maintain control over its satellite states in Eastern

Europe.

Outside the Soviet sphere of control, China grew increasingly restive under Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao

Zedong. Chinese discontent with the new Soviet leadership

stemmed from low levels of Soviet aid, feeble Soviet support for

China in its disputes with Taiwan and India, and the new Soviet

doctrine of peaceful coexistence with the West, which Mao

viewed as a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. Against Khrushchev's wishes, China embarked on a nuclear arms program,

declaring in 1960 that communism could defeat "imperialism"

in a nuclear war. The dispute between militant China and the

more moderate Soviet Union escalated into a schism in the

world communist movement after 1960. Albania left the Soviet

camp and became an ally of China, Romania distanced itself from the Soviet Union in international affairs, and communist

parties around the world split over whether they should be ori- ented toward Moscow or Beijing. The monolithic bloc of world

communism had shattered.

Soviet relations with the West, especially the United States,

seesawed between moments of relative relaxation and periods

of tension and crisis. For his part, Khrushchev wanted peaceful

coexistence with the West, not only to avoid nuclear war but

also to permit the Soviet Union to develop its economy. Khrushchev's meetings with President Eisenhower in 1955 and Pres- identJohn F. Kennedy in 1961 and his tour of the United States in 1959 demonstrated the Soviet leader's desire for fundamentally smooth relations between the West and the Soviet Union

and its allies. Yet Khrushchev also needed to demonstrate to Soviet conservatives and the militant Chinese that the Soviet

Union was a firm defender of the socialist camp. Thus, in 1958

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Russia: A Country Study

Khrushchev challenged the status of Berlin; when the West

would not yield to his demands that the western sectors be

incorporated into East Germany, he approved the erection of

the Berlin Wall between the eastern and western sectors of the

city in 1961. To maintain national prestige, Khrushchev can- celed a summit meeting with Eisenhower in 1960 after Soviet

air defense troops shot down a United States reconnaissance

aircraft over Soviet territory. Finally, mistrust over military

intentions clouded East-West relations during this time. The

West feared the implications of Soviet innovations in space

technology and saw in the buildup of the Soviet military an emerging "missile gap" in the Soviet Union's favor. By contrast, the Soviet Union felt threatened by a rearmed

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), by a United

States alliance system that seemed to be encircling the Soviet

Union, and by the West's superior strategic and economic

strength. To offset the United States military advantage and

thereby improve the Soviet negotiating position, Khrushchev

in 1962 tried to install nuclear missiles in Cuba, but he agreed

to withdraw them after Kennedy ordered a blockade around

the island nation. After coming close to war during the Cuban

missile crisis, the Soviet Union and the United States took steps to reduce the nuclear threat. In 1963 the two countries established a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow to provide

instant communication that would reduce the likelihood of

accidental nuclear war. In the same year, the United States,

Britain, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban

Treaty, which forbade nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere.

Khrushchev's Reforms and Fall Throughout his years of leadership, Khrushchev attempted

to carry out reform in a range of fields. The problems of Soviet

agriculture, a major concern of Khrushchev's, had earlier

attracted the attention of the collective leadership, which introduced important innovations in this area of the Soviet econ- omy. The state encouraged peasants to grow more on their

private plots, increased payments for crops grown on collective

farms, and invested more heavily in agriculture. In his dramatic

Virgin Lands campaign in the mid-1950s, Khrushchev opened

vast tracts of land to farming in the northern part of the Kazak

Republic and neighboring areas of the Russian Republic.

These new farmlands turned out to be susceptible to droughts,

90
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

but in some years they produced excellent harvests. Later innovations by Khrushchev, however, proved counterproductive.

His plans for growing corn and increasing meat and dairy production failed miserably, and his reorganization of collective

farms into larger units produced confusion in the countryside.

Khrushchev's attempts at reform in industry and administrative organization created even greater problems. In a politically

motivated move to weaken the central state bureaucracy, in

1957 Khrushchev did away with the industrial ministries in

Moscow and replaced them with regional economic councils.

Although he intended these economic councils to be more

responsive to local needs, the decentralization of industry led

to disruption and inefficiency. Connected with this decentralization was Khrushchev's decision in 1962 to recast party organizations along economic, rather than administrative, lines. The

resulting bifurcation of the party apparatus into industrial and

agricultural sectors at the oblast (province) level and below

contributed to the disarray and alienated many party officials at all levels. Symptomatic of the country's economic difficulties was the abandonment in 1963 of Khrushchev's special

seven-year economic plan (1959-65) two years short of its completion.

By 1964 Khrushchev's prestige had been damaged in a number of areas. Industrial growth had slowed, while agriculture

showed no new progress. Abroad, the split with China, the Berlin crisis, and the Cuban fiasco hurt the Soviet Union's international stature, and Khrushchev's efforts to improve relations

with the West antagonized many in the military. Lastly, the 1962

party reorganization caused turmoil throughout the Soviet

political chain of command. In October 1964, while Khrushchev was vacationing in Crimea, the Presidium voted him out

of office and refused to permit him to take his case to the Central Committee. Khrushchev retired as a private citizen after his successors denounced him for his "hare-brained schemes,

half-baked conclusions, and hasty decisions." Yet along with his

failed policies, Khrushchev must also be remembered for his

public disavowal of Stalinism and the greater flexibility he

brought to Soviet leadership after a long period of monolithic

terror. The Brezhnev Era

The regime that followed Khrushchev took a much more

conservative approach to most problems. Stalinism did not

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Russia: A Country Study

return, but there was less latitude for individual expression.

Foreign relations continued to roller-coaster, with the invasion

of Afghanistan in 1979 constituting a major setback for relations with the West. The Soviet economy continued to falter,

reaping no apparent benefit from the end of Khrushchev's eco- nomic experimentation.

Collective Leadership and the Rise of Brezhnev

After removing Khrushchev from power, the leaders of the

Politburo (as the Presidium was renamed in 1966 by the

Twenty-Third Party Congress) and Secretariat again established a collective leadership. As was the case following Stalin's

death, several individuals, including Aleksey Kosygin, Nikolay

Podgornyy, and Leonid I. Brezhnev, contended for power

behind a facade of unity. Kosygin accepted the position of

prime minister, which he held until his retirement in 1980.

Brezhnev, who took the post of first secretary, may have been

viewed originally by his colleagues as an interim appointee.

Born to a Russian worker's family in 1906, Brezhnev became

a Khrushchev protege early in his career and through his

patron's influence rose to membership in the Presidium. As his

own power grew, Brezhnev built up a coterie of followers whom

he, as first secretary, gradually maneuvered into powerful positions. At the same time, Brezhnev slowly demoted or isolated

possible contenders for his office. For instance, in December

1965 he succeeded in elevating Podgornyy to the ceremonial

position of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,

the highest legislative organization in the government, thus

eliminating him as a rival. But Brezhnev's rise was very gradual;

only in 1971, when he succeeded in appointing four close asso- ciates to the Politburo, did it become clear that his was the

most influential voice in the collective leadership. After several

more personnel changes, Brezhnev assumed the chairmanship

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1977, confirming his

primacy in both party and state. The years after Khrushchev were notable for the stability of

the cadres, groups of activists in responsible and influential

positions in the party and state apparatus. By introducing the

slogan "Trust in Cadres" in 1965, Brezhnev won the support of

many bureaucrats wary of the constant reorganizations of the

Khrushchev era and eager for security in established hierarchies. Indicative of the stability of the period is the fact that

nearly half of the Central Committee members in 1981 were

92
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

holdovers from fifteen years earlier. The corollary to this stability was the aging of Soviet leaders; the average age of Politburo

members rose from fifty-five in 1966 to sixty-eight in 1982. The

Soviet leadership (or the "gerontocracy," as it was referred to in

the West) became increasingly conservative and ossified.

Conservative policies characterized the regime's agenda in

the years after Khrushchev. Upon assuming power, the collective leadership not only reversed such Khrushchev policies as the bifurcation of the party, it also halted de-Stalinization.

Indeed, favorable references to the dead dictator began to appear. The Soviet constitution of 1977, although differing in

certain respects from the 1936 Stalin document, retained the

general thrust of the latter. In contrast to the relative cultural

freedom permitted during the early Khrushchev years, Brezh- nev and his colleagues continued the more restrictive line of

the later Khrushchev era. The leadership was unwilling or unable to employ Stalinist means to control Soviet society;

instead, it opted to use repressive tactics against political dissi- dents even after the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Accords

of 1975, which bound signatory nations to higher standards of

human rights observance. Dissidents persecuted during this

time included writers and activists in outlawed religious,

nationalist, and human rights movements. In the latter part of

the Brezhnev era, the regime tolerated popular expressions of

anti-Semitism. Under conditions of "developed socialism" (the

historical stage that the Soviet Union attained in 1977, according to the CPSU), the precepts of Marxism-Leninism were

taught and reinforced as a means to bolster the authority of the

regime rather than as a tool for revolutionary action.

Foreign Policy of a Superpower

A major concern of Khrushchev's successors was to reestablish Soviet primacy in the community of communist states by

undermining the influence of China. Although the new leaders originally approached China without hostility, Mao's con- demnation of Soviet foreign policy as "revisionist" and his

competition for influence in the Third World soon led to a worsening of relations between the two countries. The

Sino-Soviet relationship reached a low point in 1969 when

clashes broke out along the disputed Ussuri River boundary in

the Far East. Later, the Chinese, intimidated by Soviet military

strength, agreed not to patrol the border area claimed by the

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Russia: A Country Study

Soviet Union; but strained relations between the two countries

continued into the early 1980s.

Under the collective leadership, the Soviet Union again used

force in Eastern Europe, this time in Czechoslovakia. In 1968

reform-minded elements of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia rapidly began to liberalize their rule, loosen censorship, and strengthen Western ties. In response, Soviet and

other Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia and installed a new regime. Out of these events arose the so-called Brezhnev

Doctrine (see Glossary), which warned that the Soviet Union

would act to maintain its hegemony in Eastern Europe (see

Central Europe, ch. 8). Soviet suppression of the reform move- ment reduced blatant gestures of defiance on the part of

Romania and served as a threatening example to the Polish

Solidarity trade union movement in 1980. But it also helped

disillusion communist parties in Western Europe to the extent

that by 1977 most of the leading parties embraced Eurocommunism, a pragmatic approach to ideology that freed them to pursue political programs independent of Soviet dictates.

Soviet influence in the developing world expanded some- what during the 1970s. New communist or left-leaning governments having close relations with the Soviet Union took power

in several countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique,

and Nicaragua. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union vied for

influence by backing the Arabs in their dispute with Israel. After the June 1967 War in the Middle East, the Soviet Union

rebuilt the defeated Syrian and Egyptian armies, but it suffered

a setback when Egypt expelled Soviet advisers from the country

in 1972 and subsequently entered into a closer relationship

with the United States. The Soviet Union retained ties with

Syria and supported Palestinians' claims to an independent

state. But Soviet prestige among moderate Muslim states suf- fered in the 1980s as a result of Soviet military activities in

Afghanistan (see The Middle East, ch. 8). Attempting to shore

up a communist government in that country, Brezhnev sent in

Soviet armed forces in December 1979, but a large part of the

Afghan population resisted both the occupiers and the Marxist

Afghan regime. The resulting war in Afghanistan continued to be an unresolved problem for the Soviet Union at the time of

Brezhnev's death in 1982.

Soviet relations with the West first improved, then deteriorated in the years after Khrushchev. The gradual winding down

of United States involvement in the war in Vietnam after 1968

94
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

opened the way for negotiations between the United States and

the Soviet Union on the subject of nuclear arms. The Treaty on

the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly known

as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—NPT; see Glossary)

went into effect in 1970, and the two countries began the Stra- tegic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) the following year. At the

Moscow summit meeting of May 1972, Brezhnev and President

Richard M. Nixon signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM

Treaty—see Glossary) and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Both agreements essentially

froze the two countries' existing stockpiles of strategic defensive and offensive weapons. A period of detente, or relaxation

of tensions, between the two superpowers emerged, with a fur- ther agreement concluded to establish ceilings on the number

of offensive weapons on both sides in 1974. The crowning

achievement of the era of detente was the signing in 1975 of

the Helsinki Accords, which ratified the postwar status quo in

Europe and bound the signatories to respect basic principles of

human rights. In the years that followed, the Soviet Union was found to be in substantial violation of the accords' human

rights provisions.

But even during the period of detente, the Soviet Union

increased weapons deployments, with the result that by the end

of the 1970s it achieved nuclear parity with—or even superiority to—the United States. The Soviet Union also intensified its condemnation of the NATO alliance in an attempt to weaken

Western unity. Although a second SALT agreement was signed

by Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter in Vienna in 1979,

after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Carter administration withdrew the agreement from consideration by the United

States Senate, and detente effectively came to an end. Also in

reaction to the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the United

States imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union and boycotted the Moscow Summer Olympics in 1980. Tensions

between the United States and the Soviet Union continued up

to Brezhnev's death.

The Economy under Brezhnev

Despite Khrushchev's tinkering with economic planning, the

economic system remained dependent on central plans drawn

up with no reference to market mechanisms. Reformers, of

whom the economist Yevsey Liberman was most noteworthy,

advocated greater freedom for individual enterprises from out95
Russia: A Country Study

side controls and sought to turn the enterprises' economic

objectives toward making a profit. Prime Minister Kosygin

championed Liberman's proposals and succeeded in incorporating them into a general economic reform program

approved in September 1965. This reform included scrapping

Khrushchev's regional economic councils in favor of resurrect- ing the central industrial ministries of the Stalin era. Opposition from party conservatives and cautious managers, however, soon stalled the Liberman reforms, forcing the state to abandon them.

After Kosygin' s short-lived attempt to revamp the economic

system, planners reverted to drafting comprehensive centralized plans of the type first developed under Stalin. In industry,

plans stressed the heavy and defense-related branches, slighting the light consumer-goods branches (see The Postwar

Growth Period, ch. 6). As a developed industrial country, the

Soviet Union by the 1970s found it increasingly difficult to maintain the high rates of growth in the industrial sector that it had enjoyed in earlier years. Increasingly large investment and

labor inputs were required for growth, but these inputs were becoming more difficult to obtain. Although the goals of the

five-year plans of the 1970s had been scaled down from previ- ous plans, the targets remained largely unmet. The industrial

shortfalls were felt most sharply in the sphere of consumer

goods, where the public steadily demanded improved quality

and increased quantity. Agricultural development continued to lag in the Brezhnev years. Despite steadily higher investments

in agriculture, growth under Brezhnev fell below that attained

under Khrushchev. Droughts occurring intermittently

throughout the 1970s forced the Soviet Union to import large

quantities of grain from Western countries, including the

United States. In the countryside, Brezhnev continued the

trend toward converting collective farms into state farms and

raised the incomes of all farmworkers. Despite the wage

increases, peasants still devoted much time and effort to their

private plots, which provided the Soviet Union with a disproportionate share of its agricultural goods (see Agriculture, ch.

6).

The standard of living in the Soviet Union presented a problem to the Brezhnev leadership after the growth of the late

1960s stalled at a level well below that of most Western industrial (and some East European) countries. Although certain

appliances and other goods became more accessible during

96
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

the 1960s and 1970s, improvements in housing and food supply were slight. Shortages of consumer goods encouraged pilferage of government property and the growth of the black

market. Vodka, however, remained readily available, and alcoholism was an important factor in both the declining life expectancy and the rising infant mortality rate that the Soviet

Union experienced in the later Brezhnev years (see Health

Conditions, ch. 5).

Culture and the Arts in the 1960s and 1970s

Progress in developing the education system was mixed during the Brezhnev years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the percentage

of working-age people with at least a secondary education

steadily increased. Yet at the same time, access to higher education grew more limited. By 1980 the percentage of secondaryschool graduates admitted to universities had dropped to only

two-thirds of the 1960 figure. Students accepted into universities increasingly came from professional families rather than

worker or peasant households. This trend toward the perpetuation of the educated elite was not only a function of the superior cultural background of elite families but also, in many

cases, a result of their power to influence admissions procedures (see The Soviet Heritage, ch. 5).

Progress in science also was variable under Brezhnev. In the

most visible test of its advancement—the race with the United

States to put a man on the moon—the Soviet Union failed, but

through persistence the Soviet space program continued to make headway in other areas. In general, despite leads in such

fields as metallurgy and thermonuclear fusion, Soviet science

lagged behind that of the West, hampered in part by the slow

development of computer technology.

In literature and the arts, a greater variety of creative works

became accessible to the public than had previously been avail- able. As in earlier decades, the state continued to determine

what could be legally published or performed, punishing persistent offenders with exile or prison. Nonetheless, greater

experimentation in art forms became permissible in the 1970s,

with the result that more sophisticated and subtly critical work

began to be produced. The regime loosened the strictures of

socialist realism; thus, for instance, many protagonists of the

novels of author Yuriy Trifonov concerned themselves with

problems of daily life rather than with building socialism. In

music, although the state continued to frown on such Western

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Russia: A Country Study

phenomena as jazz and rock, it began to permit Western musical ensembles specializing in these genres to make limited

appearances. But the native balladeer Vladimir Vysotskiy,

widely popular in the Soviet Union, was denied official recognition because of his iconoclastic lyrics (see Literature and the

Arts, ch. 4).

In the religious life of the Soviet Union, a resurgence in popular devotion to the major faiths became apparent in the late 1970s despite continued de facto disapproval on the part of the

authorities. This revival may have been connected with the generally growing interest of Soviet citizens in their respective

national traditions (see The Russian Orthodox Church, ch. 4).

The Death of Brezhnev

Shortly after his cult of personality began to take root in the

mid-1970s, Brezhnev began to experience periods of ill health.

After Brezhnev suffered a stroke in 1975, Politburo members

Mikhail Suslov and Andrey Kirilenko assumed some of the

leader's functions for a time. Then, after another bout of poor

health in 1978, Brezhnev delegated more of his responsibilities to Konstantin U. Chernenko, a longtime associate who soon began to be regarded as the heir apparent. His prospects of

succeeding Brezhnev, however, were hurt by political problems

plaguing the general secretary in the early 1980s. Not only were economic failures damaging Brezhnev's prestige, but

scandals involving his family and political allies also were

undermining his stature. Meanwhile, Yuriy V. Andropov, chief

of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy

bezopasnosti—KGB; see Glossary), apparently also began a campaign to discredit Brezhnev. Andropov took over Suslov's

functions after Suslov died in 1982, and he used his position to promote himself as the next CPSU general secretary. Although

he suffered another stroke in March 1982, Brezhnev refused to relinquish his office. He died that November.

The Soviet Union paid a high price for the stability of the

Brezhnev years. By avoiding necessary political and economic

change, the Brezhnev leadership ensured the economic and

political decline that the country experienced during the

1980s. This deterioration of power and prestige stood in sharp

contrast to the dynamism that had marked the Soviet Union's

revolutionary beginnings.

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Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

The Leadership Transition Period

By 1982 the decrepitude of the Soviet regime was obvious to the outside world, but the system was not yet ready for drastic

change. The transition period that separated the Brezhnev and

Gorbachev regimes resembled the former much more than the

latter, although hints of reform emerged as early as 1983.

The Andropov Interregnum

Two days passed between Brezhnev's death and the

announcement of the election of Andropov as the new general

secretary, suggesting to many outsiders that a power struggle

had occurred in the Kremlin. Once in power, however,

Andropov wasted no time in promoting his supporters. In June

1983, he assumed the post of chairman of the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet, thus becoming the ceremonial head of state. Brezhnev had needed thirteen years to acquire this post. During his short rule, Andropov replaced more than one-fifth of

the Soviet ministers and regional party first secretaries and

more than one-third of the department heads within the Central Committee apparatus. But Andropov's ability to reshape

the top leadership was constrained by his poor health and the

influence of his rival Chernenko, who had previously supervised personnel matters in the Central Committee.

Andropov's domestic policy leaned heavily toward restoring

discipline and order to Soviet society. He eschewed radical

political and economic reforms, promoting instead a small

degree of candor in politics and mild economic experiments

similar to those that had been associated with Kosygin in the

mid-1960s. In tandem with such economic experiments,

Andropov launched an anticorruption drive that reached high

into the government and party ranks. Andropov also tried to boost labor discipline. Throughout the country, police stopped

and questioned people in parks, public baths, and shops during working hours in an effort to reduce the rate ofjob absenteeism.

In foreign affairs, Andropov continued Brezhnev's policy of

projecting Soviet power around the world. United States-Soviet

relations, already poor since the late 1970s, began deteriorating more rapidly in March 1983, when President Ronald W.

Reagan described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire . . . the

focus of evil in the modern world," and Soviet spokesmen

responded by attacking Reagan's "bellicose, lunatic anticom99
Russia: A Country Study

munism." In September 1983, the downing of a South Korean

passenger airplane by a Soviet jet fighter resulted in the deaths

of many United States citizens and further chilled United

States-Soviet relations. United States-Soviet arms control talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe were sus- pended by the Soviet Union in November 1983 in response to the beginning of United States deployments of intermediaterange nuclear weapons in Europe. The next month, Soviet offi- cials also walked out of negotiations on reducing the number

of strategic nuclear weapons.

Whether Andropov could have found a way out of the

depths to which United States-Soviet relations had fallen, or whether he could have managed to lead the country out of its stagnation, will never be known. The Andropov regime was to last only fifteen months. The general secretary's health

declined rapidly during the tense summer and fall of 1983, and

he died in February 1984 after disappearing from public view

for several months.

Andropov's most significant legacy to the Soviet Union was

his discovery and promotion of Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Beginning in 1978, Gorbachev advanced in two years through the

Kremlin hierarchy to full membership in the Politburo. His

responsibilities for the appointment of personnel allowed him

to make the contacts and distribute the favors necessary for a future bid to become general secretary. At this point, Western

experts believed that Andropov was grooming Gorbachev as his successor. However, although Gorbachev acted as a deputy to the general secretary throughout Andropov's illness, Gorbachev's time had not yet arrived when his patron died early in

1984.

The Chernenko Interregnum

At seventy-two, Konstantin Chernenko was in poor health

and unable to play an active role in policy making when he was chosen, after lengthy discussion, to succeed Andropov. But

Chernenko's short time in office did bring some significant

policy changes. The personnel changes and investigations into

corruption undertaken by the Andropov regime came to an

end. Chernenko advocated more investment in consumer

goods and services and in agriculture. He also called for a reduction in the CPSU's micromanagement of the economy

and greater attention to public opinion. However, KGB repression of Soviet dissidents also increased. Stalin was rehabilitated

100
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

as a diplomat and a military leader, and there was discussion of

returning the name Stalingrad to the city whose name had

been changed back to Volgograd during the anti-Stalinist wave

of the 1950s. The one major personnel change that Chernenko

made was the firing of the chief of the General Staff, Nikolay

Ogarkov, who had advocated less spending on consumer goods

in favor of greater expenditures on weapons research and

development.

Although Chernenko had called for renewed detente with

the West, little progress was made toward closing the rift in

East-West relations during his rule. The Soviet Union boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, retaliating

for the United States boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in

Moscow. In the late summer of 1984, the Soviet Union also prevented a visit to West Germany by East German leader Erich

Honecker. Fighting in Afghanistan also intensified, but in the

late autumn of 1984 the United States and the Soviet Union

did agree to resume arms control talks in early 1985.

The poor state of Chernenko's health made the question of

succession an acute one. Chernenko gave Gorbachev high

party positions that provided significant influence in the Politburo, and Gorbachev was able to gain the vital support of For- eign Minister Andrey Gromyko in the struggle for succession.

When Chernenko died in March 1985, Gorbachev was well

positioned to assume power.

The Gorbachev Era

In contrast to the uncertain handling of leadership vacancies

in 1982 and 1984, upon the death of Chernenko the Politburo

acted within hours to choose unanimously the healthy and rela- tively youthful Gorbachev as general secretary. In his speech

before the Central Committee, Gorbachev announced that he

would emphasize policies of labor discipline and increased productivity, calling for a "scientific and technological revolution"

to revive heavy industry.

Gorbachev's First Year

Gorbachev quickly changed the composition of the highest

CPSU and government bodies, eliminating Brezhnev-era

appointees and promoting allies. Among the major changes in

the July 1985 Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev promoted Georgian party first secretary Eduard Shevardnadze to

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Russia: A Country Study

full membership in the Politburo and nominated him as minister of foreign affairs, while Boris N. Yeltsin made his national

political debut as one of two members added to the CPSU Secretariat. In December Yeltsin advanced again, this time as first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party.

At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February 1986,

Gorbachev reaffirmed much of the existing CPSU doctrine and

policies, giving little indication of future reforms. While calling

for "radical reforms" in the economy, he merely reemphasized

the need to increase production and to use more advanced

technology in heavy industry. The new party program contained no surprises, and the congress made few changes in

high-level CPSU bodies. Among the significant changes that

did occur were the appointment to the Central Committee Secretariat of Aleksandr Yakovlev, an advocate of radical reform

and the exposure of Stalin's crimes, and the promotion of

Yeltsin to candidate membership in the Politburo. It was at this party gathering that Yeltsin first offended conservatives by

denouncing the hidden privileges of the party elite. New Thinking: Foreign Policy under Gorbachev

"New Thinking" was Gorbachev's slogan for a foreign policy

based on shared moral and ethical principles to solve global

problems rather than on Marxist-Leninist concepts of irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and communism. Rather

than flaunt Soviet military power, Gorbachev chose to exercise

political influence, ranging from the enhancement of diplomatic relations and economic cooperation to personally greeting the public in spur-of-the-moment encounters at home and

abroad. Gorbachev used the world media skillfully and made

previously unimaginable concessions in the resolution of

regional conflicts and arms negotiations. In addition to helping the Soviet Union gain wider acceptance among the family

of nations, the New Thinking's conciliatory policies toward the

West and the loosening of Soviet control over Eastern Europe

ultimately led to the collapse of communism and the end of

the Cold War.

United States-Soviet relations began to improve soon after

Gorbachev became general secretary. The first summit meeting

between Reagan and Gorbachev took place in Geneva in

November 1985. The following October, the two presidents dis- cussed strategic arms reduction in Reykjavik, without making

significant progress. In the late summer of 1987, the Soviet

102
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

Union yielded on the long-standing issue of intermediaterange nuclear arms in Europe; at the Washington summit that

December, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty—see Glossary), eliminating all intermediate- and shorter-range missiles from

Europe. In April 1988, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an

accord, with the United States and Soviet Union as guarantors,

calling for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan by

February 1989. The Soviet Union subsequently met the

accord's deadline for withdrawal.

Gorbachev also assiduously pursued closer relations with

China. Improved Sino-Soviet relations had long depended on

the resolution of several issues, including Soviet support for the

Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the large numbers of Soviet troops

and weapons deployed along China's northern border. Soviet

moves to resolve these issues led the Chinese government to agree to a summit meeting with Gorbachev in Beijing in May

1989, the first since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s.

Soviet relations with Europe improved markedly during the

Gorbachev period, mainly because of the INF Treaty and Soviet

acquiescence to the collapse of communist rule in Eastern

Europe during 1989-90. Since the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union had adhered to the Brezh- nev Doctrine upholding the existing order in socialist states. Throughout the first half of Gorbachev's rule, the Soviet Union

continued this policy, but in July 1989, in a speech to the Council of Europe (see Glossary), Gorbachev insisted on "the sover- eign right of each people to choose their own social system," a formulation that fell just short of repudiating the Brezhnev

Doctrine. By then, however, the Soviet Union's control over its outer empire already was showing signs of disintegration.

That June the communist regime in Poland had held relatively free parliamentary elections, and the communists had

lost every contested seat. In Hungary the communist regime

had steadily accelerated its reforms, rehabilitating Imre Nagy,

the reform communist leader of the 1956 uprising, and dismantling fortifications along Hungary's border with Austria. At

the end of the summer, East German vacationers began escaping to the West through this hole in the Iron Curtain. They also

poured into the West German embassy in Prague. The East

German state began to hemorrhage as thousands of its citizens

sought a better and freer life in the West.

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Russia: A Country Study

With the East German government under increasing pres- sure to stem the outflow, East Germans who stayed behind

demonstrated on the streets for reform. When the ouster of

East German communist party leader Honecker failed to restore order, the authorities haphazardly opened the Berlin

Wall in November 1989. The same night the Berlin Wall fell, the Bulgarian Communist Party deposed its longtime leader,

Todor Zhivkov. Two weeks later, Czechoslovakia embarked on

its "Velvet Revolution," quietly deposing the country's communist leaders. At an impromptu summit meeting in Malta in

December 1989, Gorbachev and United States president

George H.W. Bush declared an end to the Cold War.

Throughout 1990 and 1991, Soviet-controlled institutions in

Eastern Europe were dismantled. At the January 1990 Council

for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary)

summit, several East European states called for disbanding that

fundamental economic organization of the Soviet empire, and

the summit participants agreed to recast their multilateral ties. At the next summit, in January 1991, Comecon dissolved itself. In March 1990, Gorbachev called for converting the Warsaw

Pact to a political organization, but instead the body officially

disbanded in July 1991. Soviet troops were withdrawn from

Central Europe over the next four years—from Czechoslovakia

and Hungary by mid-1991 and from Poland in 1993. By midsummer 1990, Gorbachev and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl had worked out an agreement by which the Soviet

Union acceded to a unified Germany within NATO.

By the June 1990 Washington summit, the United States- Soviet relationship had improved to such an extent that Gorbachev characterized it as almost a "partnership" between the

two countries, and President Bush noted that the relationship

had "moved a long, long way from the depths of the Cold War."

In August 1990, the Soviet Union joined the United States in

condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and supported

United Nations resolutions to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. In

November 1990, the United States, the Soviet Union, and most

of the European states signed the Conventional Forces in

Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty—see Glossary), making reductions

in battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and fighter

aircraft "from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains."

During the Gorbachev years, improvements in United States- Soviet relations were not without complications. For example,

in 1991 Soviet envoy Yevgeniy Primakov's attempted mediation

104
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

of the Kuwait conflict threatened to undercut the allied coalition's demand that Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait.

After the signing of the CFE Treaty, disputes arose over Soviet

compliance with the treaty and the Soviet military's efforts to redesignate weapons or move them so that they would not be

subject to the treaty's terms. United States pressure led to the

resolution of these issues, and the CFE Treaty entered into

force in 1992. The Soviet crackdown on Baltic independence

movements in January 1991 also slowed the improvement of

relations with the United States. By the summer of 1991, the United States-Soviet relationship

showed renewed signs of momentum, when Bush and Gorbachev met in Moscow to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty (START I—see Glossary). Under START, for the first time large numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles were

slated for elimination. The treaty foresaw a reduction of

approximately 35 percent in United States ballistic missile war- heads and about 50 percent in Soviet ballistic missile warheads

within seven years of treaty ratification. Gorbachev recently had

attended the Group of Seven (G-7; see Glossary) summit to discuss his proposals for Western aid. Gorbachev also established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, South Korea,

and, in the waning days of the Soviet Union's existence, Israel. Gorbachev's foreign policy won him much praise and admiration. For his efforts to reduce superpower tensions around

the world, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1990.

Ironically, as a result of frequent rumors of a conservative

coup, the leader of the Soviet empire, whose previous rulers

had kept opposition figures Lech Walesa and Audrey Sakharov

from collecting their Nobel prizes, was unable to collect his

own until June 1991.

Perestroika

Domestic policy in the Gorbachev era was conducted primarily under three programs, whose names became household

words: perestroika (rebuilding—see Glossary), glasnost (public

voicing—see Glossary), and demokratizatsiya (democratization—see Glossary) . The first of these was applied primarily to the economy, but it was meant to refer to society in general.

Over the course of Soviet rule, society in the Soviet Union had

grown more urbanized, better educated, and more complex.

Old methods of exhortation and coercion were inappropriate,

yet Brezhnev's government had denied change rather than

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Russia: A Country Study

mastered it. Despite Andropov's efforts to reintroduce some

measure of discipline, the communist superpower remained

stagnant. Once Gorbachev began to call for bolder reforms,

the "acceleration" gave way to perestroika.

Throughout the early years of his rule, Gorbachev spoke of

perestroika, but only in early 1987 did the slogan become a full- scale campaign and yield practical results. At that time, measures were adopted on the formation of cooperatives and joint

ventures (see The Perestroika Program, ch. 6). At a plenum of

the CPSU Central Committee in January 1987, Gorbachev

explicitly applied the label to his program to devolve economic

and political control. In economics, perestroika meant greater

leeway in decision making for plant managers, allowance for a

certain degree of individual initiative and the chance to make a

profit.

In January 1988, the new Law on State Enterprises went into

effect, allowing enterprises to set many of their own prices and

wages. Results were disappointing, however, because workers

demanded steep wage increases. As the government printed

more money, products fetched higher prices outside the offi- cial economy. Thus, goods usually sold in state stores at fixed

prices quickly disappeared as speculators snatched them up or producers ceased making deliveries. By September 1988, many

staple products could not be found even in Moscow. During

1988-89 Gorbachev also issued orders to the oblast party committees to cease interfering in the economy, and he cut the

staffs of state committees and ministries involved in the econ- omy in order to prevent them from further tampering with it. Without the state and the party to hold it together and guide it, the economy went into free-fall (see Unforeseen Results of

Reform, ch. 6). In the summer of 1990, Yeltsin, who had been elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic in May,

backed a radical economic reform plan that would have spelled

the end of many special interests within the party. Gorbachev

in turn presented a much less extreme "Presidential Plan,"

which the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed. Yeltsin

threatened that the Russian Republic would proceed with the

initial radical plan, but shortly thereafter he suspended it. In January 1991, Gorbachev replaced Prime Minister

Nikolay Ryzhkov, who had become identified with the regime's

economic failures, with Valentin Pavlov, an opponent of radical

reform. Pavlov immediately created a mass panic by withdraw106
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

ing large-denomination banknotes from circulation and limiting the public's ability to convert them to lower-denomination

notes. The move, designed to reduce the vast sums of money

circulating and to punish "black marketeers" hoarding large

banknotes, only intensified the people's mistrust of the Soviet

government. The economy continued to spiral downward, and

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had to ask the West for financial

aid in order to stave off collapse. Gorbachev's retreat marked

the last time economic reform dominated the agenda of a

Soviet government.

Glasnost

As perestroika was failing, the two policies designed to promote it, glasnost and demokratizatsiya, were moving out of control. To mobilize the populace in support of perestroika,

Gorbachev and his aide Aleksandr Yakovlev introduced glasnost, a policy of liberalized information flow aimed at publicizing the corruption and inefficiency of Brezhnev's policies and

colleagues—qualities that the Russian public long had recognized and accepted in its leadership but that had never been

acknowledged by the Kremlin. Like perestroika, this policy had

unintended results. Gorbachev had meant to shape the new

information emanating from his government in a way that

would encourage political participation in support of his eco- nomic and social programs. Instead, the process of calling into

question the whole Stalinist system inevitably led to questions

about the wisdom of Lenin, the man who had allowed Stalin to rise in the first place. Because Lenin was the undisputed

founder of the Soviet Union, the process then moved even far- ther as open questioning signified that somehow the Soviet

Union, supposedly immune to such doubts, had lost its raison

d'etre. The official announcement of glasnost, scheduled for mid1986, was overtaken by an event that lent new meaning to the

term. In April 1986, a reactor explosion at the Chernobyl'

Nuclear Power Station, located in northern Ukraine, covered

Belorussia, the Baltics, parts of Russia, and Scandinavia with a cloud of radioactive dust (see table 3, Appendix). The efforts to contain the accident and its attendant publicity were handled with exceptional ineptitude, setting glasnost back by six

months as official news sources scrambled to control the flow

of information to the public.

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Russia: A Country Study

Despite the clumsy reaction of the Soviet government to the

Chernobyl' episode, Gorbachev turned the accident in his

favor by citing it as an example of the need for economic pere- stroika. Taking their cue from Gorbachev, throughout the

Soviet Union the news media reported numerous examples of

mismanagement of resources, waste, ecological damage, and

the effects of this damage on public health. In the Soviet

republics, these revelations had the unintended effect of accelerating the formation of popular fronts pushing for autonomy

or independence.

The officially controlled phase of glasnost began the examination of "blank pages" in Soviet history. Literary journals

filled up with long-suppressed works by writers such as Anna

Akhmatova, Joseph Brodsky, Mikhail Bulgakov, Boris Paster- nak, and Andrey Platonov. Newspapers and magazines carried

stories of Stalin-era acts of repression, concentration camps,

and mass graves. The works of Marxist theoretician Nikolay

Bukharin, shot in 1938 for alleged rightist deviation, appeared.

By revealing communist party crimes against the Soviet peoples, and the peasants in particular, glasnost further undermined Soviet federalism and contributed to the breakup of the

Soviet Union.

Demokratizatsiya

By 1987 Gorbachev had concluded that introducing his

reforms required more than discrediting the old guard. He

changed his strategy from trying to work through the CPSU as

it existed and instead embraced a degree of political liberalization. In January 1987, he appealed over the heads of the party

to the people and called for demokratizatsiya, the infusion of

"democratic" elements into the Soviet Union's sterile, monolithic political process. For Gorbachev, demokratizatsiya meant

the introduction of multicandidate—not multiparty—elections

for local party and soviet offices. In this way, he hoped to rejuvenate the party with progressive personnel who would carry

out his institutional and policy reforms. The CPSU would

retain sole custody of the ballot box.

Despite Gorbachev's intentions, the elements of a multiparty

system already were crystallizing. In contrast to previous Soviet

rulers, Gorbachev had permitted the formation of unofficial

organizations. In October 1987, the newspaper of the CPSU

youth, Komsomol'skaya pravda, reported that informal groups,

so-called neformaly, were "growing as fast as mushrooms in the

108
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

rain." The concerns of these groups included the environment,

sports, history, computers, philosophy, art, literature, and the

preservation of historical landmarks. In August 1987, forty- seven neformaly held a conference in Moscow without interfer- ence from the authorities. In fact, one of the unofficial attendees was Yeltsin. In early 1988, some 30,000 neformaly existed in

the Soviet Union. One year later, their number had more than

doubled. These informal groups begot popular fronts, which

in turn spawned political parties. The first of those parties was

the Democratic Union, formed in May 1988.

Gorbachev's Reform Dilemma

Gorbachev increasingly found himself caught between criti- cism by conservatives who wanted to stop reform and liberals

who wanted to accelerate it. When one of these groups pressed

too hard, Gorbachev resorted to political methods from the

Brezhnev era. For example, when Yeltsin-spoke out in 1987

against the slow pace of reform, he was stripped of his Politburo and Moscow CPSU posts. At the party meeting where

Yeltsin was removed from his post, Gorbachev personally subjected him to verbal abuse reminiscent of the Stalin era. Despite some setbacks, reform efforts continued. In June

1988, at the CPSU's Nineteenth Party Conference, the first held since 1941, Gorbachev launched radical reforms meant to reduce party control of the government apparatus. He again

called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and party first secretaries and insisted on the separation

of the government apparatus from party bodies at the regional

level as well. In the face of an overwhelming majority of conservatives, Gorbachev still was able to rely on party discipline to force through acceptance of his reform proposals. Experts

called the conference a successful step in promoting partydirected change from above.

At an unprecedented emergency Central Committee plenum called by Gorbachev in September 1988, three stalwart

old-guard members left the Politburo or lost positions of

power. Andrey Gromyko retired from the Politburo, Yegor

Ligachev was relieved of the ideology portfolio within the Secretariat, and Boris Pugo replaced Politburo member Mikhail

Solomentsev as chairman of the powerful Party Control Committee. The Supreme Soviet then elected Gorbachev chairman

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. These changes meant

that the Secretariat, until that time solely responsible for the

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Russia: A Country Study

development and implementation of party policies, had lost

much of its power.

Meaningful changes also occurred in governmental structures. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet approved formation of a Congress of People's Deputies, which constitutional

amendments had established as the Soviet Union's new legislative body. The Supreme Soviet then dissolved itself. The

amendments called for a smaller working body of 542 members, also called the Supreme Soviet, to be elected from the

2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies. To ensure a communist majority in the new parliament, Gorbachev reserved

one-third of the seats for the CPSU and other public organizations.

The March 1989 election of the Congress of People's Deputies marked the first time that voters of the Soviet Union ever chose the membership of a national legislative body. The

results of the election stunned the ruling elite. Throughout the

country, voters crossed off the ballot unopposed communist

candidates, many of them prominent party officials, taking

advantage of the nominal privilege of withholding approval of

the listed candidates. However, the Congress of People's Deputies that emerged still contained 87 percent CPSU members.

Genuine reformists won only some 300 seats. In May the initial session of the Congress of People's Deputies electrified the country. For two weeks on live television,

deputies from around the country railed against every scandal

and shortcoming of the Soviet system that could be identified.

Speakers spared neither Gorbachev, the KGB, nor the military.

Nevertheless, a conservative majority maintained control of the

congress. Gorbachev was elected without opposition to the

chairmanship of the new Supreme Soviet; then the Congress of

People's Deputies elected a large majority of old-style party

apparatchiks to fill the membership of its new legislative body.

Outspoken party critic Yeltsin obtained a seat in the Supreme

Soviet only when another deputy relinquished his position.

The first Congress of People's Deputies was the last moment of

real control for Gorbachev over the political life of the Soviet

Union.

In the summer of 1989, the first opposition bloc in the Congress of People's Deputies formed under the name of the Inter- regional Group. The members of this body included almost all of the liberal members of the opposition. Its cochairmen were

Yeltsin, Andrey Sakharov, historian Yuriy Afanas'yev, economist

110
Boris Yeltsin appears before crowds during 1991 coup, Moscow.

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

111
Russia: A Country Study

Gavriil Popov, and academician Viktor Pal'm. Afanas'yev

summed up the importance of this event, saying, "It is difficult

for Gorbachev to get used to the thought that he is no longer

the sole leader of perestroika. Other forces are already fulfilling

that role." Afanas'yev had in mind not only the Interregional

Group. He also was referring to the miners striking in Ukraine,

Kazakstan, and Siberia, and the popular fronts in the Baltics,

which were agitating for independence. In January 1990, a group of reformist CPSU members announced the formation

of Democratic Platform, the first such CPSU faction since

Lenin banned opposition groups in the 1920s.

A primary issue for the opposition was the repeal of Article 6

of the constitution, which prescribed the supremacy of the

CPSU over all the institutions in society. Faced with opposition

pressure for the repeal of Article 6 and needing allies against

hard-liners in the CPSU, Gorbachev obtained the repeal of

Article 6 by the February 1990 Central Committee plenum.

Later that month, before the Supreme Soviet, he proposed the

creation of a new office of president of the Soviet Union, to be

elected by the Congress of People's Deputies rather than the

people. Accordingly, in March 1990 Gorbachev was elected for

the third time in eighteen months to a position equivalent to Soviet head of state. Former first deputy chairman of the

Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Luk'yanov became chairman of the

Supreme Soviet.

By the time of the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress in July

1990, the CPSU was regarded by liberals, intellectuals, and the

general public as anachronistic and unable to lead the country.

The CPSU branches in many of the fifteen Soviet republics

began to split into large pro-sovereignty and pro-union factions, further weakening central party control.

In a series of humiliations, the CPSU had been separated

from the government and stripped of its leading role in society

and its function in overseeing the national economy. For sev- enty years, it had been the cohesive force that kept the union

together; without the authority of the party in the Soviet center,

the nationalities of the constituent republics pulled harder

than ever to break away from the union.

Nationality Ferment

The issue Gorbachev understood least of all was that of the

nationalities. Stalin, a Georgian, had been a commissar for

nationalities, Khrushchev had built his career suppressing

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Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

Ukrainian nationalism, and Brezhnev had risen through his

work in Ukraine and Moldavia. Gorbachev was a Russian whose

political background included little time outside Russia proper.

His policies of glasnost and demokratizatsiya, which loosened

authoritarian controls over society, facilitated and fueled the

airing of national grievances in the republics. As the peoples of

the Soviet Union began to assert their respective national characters, they clashed with ethnic minorities within their republics and with Soviet authorities (see table 4, Appendix).

As early as 1985, reports of clashes between Estonian and

Russian students began seeping into the West. By 1987 the Baltic republics all had developed popular fronts and were calling

for the restoration of their independence. In November 1988,

Estonia issued a declaration of sovereignty, claiming that all Estonian laws superseded Soviet laws. Lithuania and Latvia fol- lowed with their own declarations of sovereignty in May and

July 1989, respectively.

The first major flare-up of ethnic violence came in December 1986, when Gorbachev replaced the first secretary of the

Communist Party of Kazakstan with an ethnic Russian. A large

crowd gathered in the Kazakstani capital, Alma-Ata (renamed

Almaty after independence), to protest the move. When a

force of 10,000 Soviet troops was deployed in Alma-Ata to dis- perse the crowds, demonstrators rioted.

In 1987 citizens of the autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, a landlocked enclave of Armenians inside Azerbaijani

territory, petitioned the Central Committee, requesting that

the region be made part of the Armenian Republic. The Central Committee's rejection of this petition was followed by demonstrations in the autonomous oblast and similar displays of

sympathy in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. A promise by Gorbachev to establish a commission to study the Karabakh issue

provoked outrage in Azerbaijan. After an anti-Armenian

pogrom took place outside Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, largescale fighting erupted between Armenians and Azerbaijanis,

with both groups claiming to have been victimized by the

Soviet regime in Moscow. In both republics, people rallied

around popular fronts, which later became movements for

independence from the Soviet Union. By the end of 1988,

Georgia had developed its own popular front as well. In April

1989, more than twenty Georgians were killed as Soviet troops

brutally dispersed demonstrators in the Georgian capital,

Tbilisi.

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Russia: A Country Study

Ethnic violence became a frequent occurrence throughout

the Soviet Union—in Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley between

Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks, and in Georgia, when that

republic's Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast sought status as separate Soviet republics. Wherever Soviet forces intervened, they either failed to master the situation or contributed to the violence. In January

1990, the Armenian Supreme Soviet enacted a measure giving

its own legislation supremacy over Soviet law In the Armenian

government's view, this meant that the Soviet demarcation of

autonomous jurisdictions such as Nagorno-Karabakh no longer was binding on Armenians in that enclave. That vote caused

rioting to break out in Azerbaijan. When the Soviet government imposed a state of emergency in the Azerbaijani capital

of Baku and deployed 11,000 troops to end the anti-Armenian

and anticommunist riots, at least eighty-three Azerbaijanis were

killed. As it had in the republics along the Soviet southern perimeter, national consciousness reawakened in Ukraine and

Belorussia. In Ukraine the first popular front, the Ukrainian

Popular Movement for Perestroika, known as Rukh, held its founding congress in September 1989. On March 4, 1990,

Ukraine and Belorussia elected new legislatures. In both cases, opposition movements and coalitions made good showings

despite ballot tampering and legal obstacles erected by authorities.In March 1990, Lithuania declared independence, and Gorbachev imposed a partial economic blockade in response. That same year, riots also took place in Tajikistan and in the Kyrgyz

city of Osh, leading to hundreds of deaths and the imposition

of a state of emergency in several areas of Kyrgyzstan. The Moldavian government also declared a state of emergency when

Gagauz separatists tried to declare the independence of their

region, prompting Gorbachev to deploy troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moldavia. Violence between ethic

Romanian Moldavians and Russians broke out in the Transnistria region of the republic a few weeks later. In October 1990,

multiparty legislative elections in Georgia resulted in victory

for the pro-independence bloc, and the new Supreme Soviet in

Tbilisi began to move toward declaring independence. The

major challenge to Gorbachev, however, came not from the

non-Russian constituent republics but from Russia itself.

114
Tanks on Red Square during 1991 coup, Moscow

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

Many institutions that existed in the other constituent

republics did not exist in Russia. Russia had no television sta- tions addressing specifically Russian interests. Unlike other

republics, the Russian Republic had no academy of sciences

(see Glossary). It also lacked a ministry of internal affairs, a

republic-level KGB, and a Russian communist party. Between

1918 and 1925, the GPSU had been called the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), but it was known as the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) from 1925 until 1952 when Stalin

changed the name to the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union.

Such a policy by the communists had aimed at tying the Russian people as closely as possible to the Soviet state. The strat- egy was based on the belief that, lacking internal security forces

and the political base that would be furnished by a Russian

communist party, the Russians would be unlikely to engage in

115
Russia: A Country Study

opposition to the system. By 1990, however, Russians were

beginning to think differently. Although the predominantly

Russian CPSU promoted policies of Russification to facilitate

its rule and to placate the large Russian population, in the late 1980s average Russians increasingly saw the CPSU's efforts to co-opt and coerce the other nationalities as debasing the Russian language and culture and depleting Russian natural and

financial resources. Gorbachev viewed this growing body of

opinion with fear, but Yeltsin, who had been learning from the

Baltic republics' struggle, saw it as providing an opportunity.

Yeltsin took up the cause of Russia's rights within the union,

making alliances with both Russian nationalists and Russian lib- erals. In July 1990, Gorbachev finally acceded to the founding of

the Russian Communist Party, which became a bastion of Russian nationalist conservatism and opposition to Gorbachev.

The party failed to gain control of the Russian Republic's legislative bodies, however. Instead, it faced formidable competition in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which by

that time was dominated by Yeltsin. Yeltsin's May 1990 election

as chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet had made him the

de facto president of the Russian Republic, just as Gorbachev's

election as chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet

Union had made him de facto president of the country in

1989.

Yeltsin's new position enabled him to pose a serious challenge to Gorbachev. OnJune 11, 1990, Russia issued its declaration of sovereignty, the first republic to do so after the Baltic

states. This move challenged Soviet jurisdiction over the very

heart of the union. By the end of November, another nine

republics had followed Russia's lead. The last instance of cooperation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev in this period was their

effort in the fall of 1990 to draft a common economic policy.

However, Gorbachev's desire to protect the favored position of

the military-industrial establishment caused the effort to founder and the two men's relationship to deteriorate rapidly.

As the leader of the most populous and richest union republic, Yeltsin became the champion of all the republics' rights

against control from the center. However, he did not advocate

the breakup of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin originally hoped for

the creation of a new federation anchored by bilateral and multilateral treaties between and among the union republics, with

Russia as the preeminent member. When Soviet forces cracked

116
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

down on the Baltic states in January 1991, Yeltsin went to Esto- nia in a show of support for the Baltics, signing agreements

with the Baltic states that recognized their borders and promising assistance in the event of an attack on them from the Soviet

center. InJune 1990, Gorbachev already had initiated talks on a new

union treaty. The Supreme Soviet debated provisions of a draft

union treaty throughout 1990 and into 1991. With tensions

increasing between the center and the constituent republics,

Gorbachev scheduled a national referendum in March 1991.

The Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldavia refused to participate. In the Russian referendum, Yeltsin included a question on the creation of a Russian presidential post. The

overall referendum vote gave approval to Gorbachev's position

on preserving the union, but the voters in Russia also approved

Yeltsin's call for a president elected directly by the people. On

June 12, Yeltsin, whose popularity had risen steadily as Gorbachev's plummeted, was elected president of the Russian

Republic with 57 percent of the vote. The August Coup and Its Aftermath

Gorbachev hoped that he could at least hold the union

together in a decentralized form. However, in the eyes of the

remaining CPSU conservatives, he had gone too far because

his new union treaty dispersed too much of the central government's power to the republics. On August 19, 1991, one day

before Gorbachev and a group of republic leaders were due to sign the union treaty, a group calling itself the State Emergency

Committee attempted to seize power in Moscow. The group

announced that Gorbachev was ill and had been relieved of his state post as president. Soviet Union vice president Gennadiy

Yanayev was named acting president. The committee's eight

members included KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, Inter- nal Affairs Minister Pugo, Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov, and

Prime Minister Pavlov, all of whom had risen to their posts

under Gorbachev.

Large public demonstrations against the coup leaders took

place in Moscow and Leningrad, and divided loyalties in the

defense and security establishments prevented the armed

forces from crushing the resistance that Yeltsin led from Russia's parliament building. On August 21, the coup collapsed,

and Gorbachev returned to Moscow.

117
Russia: A Country Study

Once back in Moscow, Gorbachev acted as if he were oblivi- ous to the changes that had occurred in the preceding three

days. As he returned to power, Gorbachev promised to purge

conservatives from the CPSU. He resigned as general secretary

but remained president of the Soviet Union. The coup's failure

brought a series of collapses of all-union institutions. Yeltsin

took control of the central broadcasting company and key eco- nomic ministries and agencies, and in November he banned

the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party.

By December 1991, all of the republics had declared independence, and negotiations over a new union treaty began

anew. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had recognized the independence of the Baltic republics in September.

For several months after his return to Moscow, Gorbachev and

his aides made futile attempts to restore stability and legitimacy

to the central institutions. In November seven republics agreed

to a new union treaty that would form a confederation called

the Union of Sovereign States. But Ukraine was unrepresented

in that group, and Yeltsin soon withdrew to seek additional

advantages for Russia. In the absence of the CPSU, there was no way to keep the Soviet Union together. From Yeltsin's perspective, Russia's participation in another union would be

senseless because inevitably Russia would assume responsibility

for the increasingly severe economic woes of the other republics.On December 8, Yeltsin and the leaders of Belarus (which

adopted that name in August 1991) and Ukraine met at Minsk,

the capital of Belarus, where they created the Commonwealth

of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary) and annulled the

1922 union treaty that had established the Soviet Union.

Another signing ceremony was held in Alma-Ata on December

21 to expand the CIS to include the five republics of Central

Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Georgia did notjoin until 1993;

the three Baltic republics never joined. On December 25, 1991,

the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Exactly six years after Gorbachev had appointed Boris Yeltsin to run the Moscow city

committee of the party, Yeltsin now was president of the largest successor state to the Soviet Union.

* * * A number of comprehensive texts cover the history of the

Soviet Union through 1985. Most worthy of recommendation

118
Historical Setting: 1917 to 1991

to the nonspecialist is A History ofRussia and the Soviet Union by

David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran. A thoughtful survey can be found in Geoffrey A. Hosking's The First Socialist Society.

Other general works covering the Soviet period include Robert

V. Daniels's Russia: The Roots of Confrontation, Donald W.

Treadgold's Twentieth Century Russia, and Adam B. Ulam's A

History ofSoviet Russia. Several excellent books cover the various

phases of Soviet history. The recognized classic on the revolutionary and Civil War period is William H. Chamberlin's The

Russian Revolution, 1917-1921. Recommended for the Stalin era is Stalin: The Man and His Era by Adam B. Ulam. For Khrushchev, the reader is referred to Carl A. Linden's Khrushchev

and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964. Khrushchev's two-volume

memoir, Khrushchev Remembers, makes fascinating reading.

Harry Gelman's The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline ofDetente

treats the Brezhnev period in detail. Significant overviews of all or part of the post-Brezhnev era include Donald R. Kelley's Soviet Politics from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, Stephen White's Gorbachev in Power, and John B. Dunlop's The Rise ofRussia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Important

articles include Amy Knight's "Andropov: Myths and Realities";

Marc Zlotnik's "Chernenko Succeeds"; and Jerry Hough's

"Andropov's First Year." Other useful sources are Martin Malia's

The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991,

David Remnick's Lenin's Tomb, and Helene Carrere

d'Encausse's The End of the Soviet Empire. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

119

Chapter 3. Physical Environment and Population
A peasant named Ivan rides a humpbacked pony, which has very long ears, on

a quest to the Palace of the Moon (designfrom lacquer box made in village of

Palekh).
CURVING AROUND THE NORTH POLE in a huge arc, Russia (the Russian Federation) spans almost half the globe from

east to west and about 4,000 kilometers from north to south.

Divided into eleven time zones, Russia is by far the world's larg- est country. It occupies much of Eastern Europe and northern

Asia. The country's terrain is diverse, with extensive stands of

forest, numerous mountain ranges, and vast plains. On and

below the surface of the land are extensive reserves of natural resources that provide the nation with enormous potential

wealth. Russia ranks sixth in the world in population, trailing

China, India, the United States, Indonesia, and Brazil. The

population is as varied as the terrain. Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) are the most numerous of the more than

100 European and Asiatic nationalities.

The Ural Mountains, which extend more than 2,200 kilometers from north to south, form the boundary separating the

unequal European and Asian sectors of Russia. The continental divide continues another 1,375 kilometers from the south- ern end of the Ural Mountains through the Caspian Sea and

along the Caucasus Mountains. Asian Russia is about as large as China and India combined, occupying roughly three-quarters

of the nation's territory. But it is the European western quarter

that is home to more than 75 percent of Russia's inhabitants.

This acutely uneven distribution of human and natural

resources is a striking feature of Russian geography and population. Despite government attempts to settle people in

sparsely populated Asian areas abundant in resources, this

imbalance persists. Meanwhile, depletion of water and fuel resources in the European part outpaces exploitation of

resource-rich Siberia, the famously forbidding land stretching

from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean. From 1970 to 1989, the

campaign to settle and exploit western Siberia's plentiful fuel

and energy supplies was expensive and only partially successful.

Since glasnost (see Glossary), revelations of extreme environmental degradation have tarnished the image of the Siberian

development program.

The Soviet and Russian environmental record has been generally dismal. Seven decades of Soviet rule left irradiated landscapes and marine ecosystems, a desiccated inland sea, befouled rivers, and toxic urban air as reminders of the conse123
Russia: A Country Study

quences of seeking industrialization at any price. Russia and

the other Soviet republics responded to the pressures of the

long and costly Cold War by developing a defense-oriented,

production-obsessed economy amid ecological devastation.

Without a genuine environmental movement until its final

years, the Soviet Union left in its wake an environmental catas- trophe that will take decades and perhaps trillions of dollars to repair even partially.

During the Soviet period, natural and geopolitical phenomena shaped the characteristics of Russia's population. In that

period, wars, epidemics, famines, and state-sanctioned mass

killings claimed millions of victims. Before the 1950s, each

decade brought to the population of the former Russian

Republic some form of cataclysmic demographic event.

Demographers have calculated that a total of 33.6 million people died from a brutal collectivization process and the famine

that ensued in the 1920s and 1930s, the Great Terror ofJoseph

V. Stalin (in office 1927-53) in the 1930s, and World War II (see Transformation and Terror, ch. 2). Although those events

ended more than fifty years ago, such disasters have had significant long-term effects. In age-groups above forty-five, women

greatly outnumber men.

In the 1990s, demographers and policy makers are con- cerned about alarming trends such as a plummeting birthrate,

increasing mortality among able-bodied males, and declining

life expectancy. Another demographic concern is the millions

of Russians remaining in the other newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union, called by policy makers the

"near abroad." These Russians or their forebears resettled

under a variety of conditions. Russian authorities fear that

social and ethnic upheaval in those states could trigger the mass migration of Russians into the federation, which is ill equipped to integrate such numbers into its economy and society. By the early 1990s, Russia had already become the destination of greatly increased numbers of immigrants.

In 1995 the population of the Russian Federation was esti- mated at slightly less than 150 million. Whereas Russians had

accounted for only about 50 percent of the Soviet Union's population, in Russia they are a clear majority of 82 percent of the

population in what remains a distinctively multicultural, multinational state (see Ethnic Composition, ch. 4).

124
Physical Environment and Population

Physical Environment

Russia's topography includes the world's deepest lake and

Europe's highest mountain and longest river. The topography

and climate, however, resemble those of the northernmost portion of the North American continent. The northern forests

and the plains bordering them to the south find their closest

counterparts in the Yukon Territory and in the wide swath of

land extending across most of Canada. The terrain, climate,

and settlement patterns of Siberia are similar to those of Alaska

and Canada.

Global Position and Boundaries

Located in the northern and middle latitudes of the North- ern Hemisphere, most of Russia is much closer to the North

Pole than to the equator. Individual country comparisons are of little value in gauging Russia's enormous size (slightly less than twice that of the United States) and diversity. The country's 17.1 million square kilometers include one-eighth of the

earth's inhabited land area. Its European portion, which occupies a substantial part of continental Europe, is home to most

of Russia's industrial and agricultural activity. It was here,

roughly between the Dnepr River and the Ural Mountains, that

the Russian Empire took shape after the principality of Muscovy gradually expanded eastward to reach the Pacific Ocean

in the seventeenth century (see Expansion and Westernization,

ch. 1).

Russia extends about 9,000 kilometers from westernmost

Kaliningrad Oblast, the now-isolated region cut off from the

rest of Russia by the independence of Belarus, Latvia, and

Lithuania, to Ratmanova Island (Big Diomede Island) in the

Bering Strait. This distance is roughly equivalent to the distance from Edinburgh, Scotland, east to Nome, Alaska.

Between the northern tip of the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya

to the southern tip of the Republic of Dagestan on the Caspian

Sea is about 3,800 kilometers of extremely varied, often inhospitable terrain.

Extending for 57,792 kilometers, the Russian border is the

world's longest—and, in the post-Soviet era, a source of substantial concern for national security. Along the 20,139-kilometer land frontier, Russia has boundaries with fourteen

countries. New neighbors are eight countries of the near abroad—Kazakstan in Asia, and, in Europe, Estonia, Latvia,

125
Russia: A Country Study

Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Other

neighbors include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(North Korea), China, Mongolia, Poland, Norway, and Finland. And, at the far northeastern extremity, eighty-six kilometers of the Bering Strait separate Russia from a fifteenth

neighbor—the United States (see fig. 6).

Approximately two-thirds of the frontier is bounded by

water. Virtually all of the lengthy northern coast is well above

the Arctic Circle; except for the port of Murmansk, which

receives the warm currents of the Gulf Stream, that coast is locked in ice much of the year. Thirteen seas and parts of three oceans—the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific—wash Russian shores.

Administrative and Territorial Divisions

With a few changes of status, most of the Soviet-era administrative and territorial divisions of the Russian Republic were

retained in constituting the Russian Federation. In 1996 there were eighty-nine administrative territorial divisions: twenty-one

republics, six territories (kraya; sing., kray), forty-nine oblasts

(provinces), one autonomous oblast, and ten autonomous

regions (okruga; sing., okrug). The cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg have separate status at the oblast level. Population

size and location have been the determinants for a region's

designation among those categories. The smallest political divi- sion is the rayon (pi., rayony), a unit roughly equivalent to the

county in the United States. The republics include a wide variety of peoples, including

northern Europeans, Tatars, Caucasus peoples, and indigenous

Siberians. The largest administrative territorial divisions are in

Siberia. Located in east-central Siberia, the Republic of Sakha,

formerly known as Yakutia, is the largest administrative division

in the federation, twice the size of Alaska. Second in size is Krasnoyarsk Territory, which is southwest of Sakha in Siberia.

Kaliningrad Oblast, which is somewhat larger than Connecticut, is the smallest oblast, and it is the only noncontiguous part

of Russia. The two most populous administrative territorial

divisions, Moscow Oblast and Krasnodar Territory, are in European Russia.

Topography and Drainage

Geographers traditionally divide the vast territory of Russia

into five natural zones: the tundra zone; the taiga, or forest, zone; the steppe, or plains, zone; the arid zone; and the moun126

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Physical Environment and Population

tain zone. Most of Russia consists of two plains (the East European Plain and the West Siberian Plain), two lowlands (the

North Siberian and the Kolyma, in far northeastern Siberia),

two plateaus (the Central Siberian Plateau and the Lena Plateau to its east) , and a series of mountainous areas mainly concentrated in the extreme northeast or extending intermittently

along the southern border.

Topography

The East European Plain encompasses most of European

Russia. The West Siberian Plain, which is the world's largest,

extends east from the Urals to the Yenisey River. Because the

terrain and vegetation are relatively uniform in each of the nat- ural zones, Russia presents an illusion of uniformity. Nevertheless, Russian territory contains all the major vegetation zones

of the world except a tropical rain forest. About 10 percent of Russia is tundra, or treeless, marshy

plain. The tundra is Russia's northernmost zone, stretching

from the Finnish border in the west to the Bering Strait in the

east, then running south along the Pacific coast to the north- ern Kamchatka Peninsula. The zone is known for its herds of

wild reindeer, for so-called white nights (dusk at midnight,

dawn shortly thereafter) in summer, and for days of total dark- ness in winter. The long, harsh winters and lack of sunshine

allow only mosses, lichens, and dwarf willows and shrubs to sprout low above the barren permafrost (see Glossary).

Although several powerful Siberian rivers traverse this zone as they flow northward to the Arctic Ocean, partial and intermittent thawing hamper drainage of the numerous lakes, ponds,

and swamps of the tundra. Frost weathering is the most important physical process here, gradually shaping a landscape that was severely modified by glaciation in the last ice age. Less than

1 percent of Russia's population lives in this zone. The fishing

and port industries of the northwestern Kola Peninsula and the

huge oil and gas fields of northwestern Siberia are the largest

employers in the tundra. With a population of 180,000, the

industrial frontier city of Noril'sk is second in population to Murmansk among Russia's settlements above the Arctic Circle.

The taiga, which is the world's largest forest region, contains

mostly coniferous spruce, fir, cedar, and larch. This is the largest natural zone of the Russian Federation, an area about the

size of the United States. In the northeastern portion of this

belt, long and severe winters frequently bring the world's cold129


Russia: A Country Study

est temperatures for inhabited areas. The taiga zone extends in a broad band across the middle latitudes, stretching from the

Finnish border in the west to the Verkhoyansk Range in northeastern Siberia and as far south as the southern shores of Lake

Baikal. Isolated sections of taiga also exist along mountain

ranges such as the southern part of the Urals and in the Amur

River valley bordering China in the Far East. About 33 percent

of Russia's population lives in this zone, which, together with a band of mixed forest to its south, includes most of the European part of Russia and the ancestral lands of the earliest Slavic

settlers. The steppe has long been depicted as the typical Russian

landscape. It is a broad band of treeless, grassy plains, interrupted by mountain ranges, extending from Hungary across Ukraine, southern Russia, and Kazakstan before ending in

Manchuria. Most of the Soviet Union's steppe zone was located

in the Ukrainian and Kazak republics; the much smaller Russian steppe is located mainly between those nations, extending

southward between the Black and Caspian seas before blending into the increasingly desiccated territory of the Republic of

Kalmykia. In a country of extremes, the steppe zone provides

the most favorable conditions for human settlement and agriculture because of its moderate temperatures and normally

adequate levels of sunshine and moisture. Even here, however,

agricultural yields are sometimes adversely affected by unpredictable levels of precipitation and occasional catastrophic

droughts.

Russia's mountain ranges are located principally along its continental divide (the Urals), along the southwestern border

(the Caucasus), along the border with Mongolia (the eastern

and western Sayan ranges and the western extremity of the

Altay Range), and in eastern Siberia (a complex system of

ranges in the northeastern corner of the country and forming

the spine of the Kamchatka Peninsula, and lesser mountains

extending along the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea ofJapan).

Russia has nine major mountain ranges. In general, the eastern

half of the country is much more mountainous than the west- ern half, the interior of which is dominated by low plains. The

traditional dividing line between the east and the west is the

Yenisey Valley. In delineating the western edge of the Central

Siberian Plateau from the West Siberian Plain, the Yenisey runs from near the Mongolian border northward into the Arctic

Ocean west of the Taymyr Peninsula.

130
Physical Environment and Population

The Urals are the most famous of the country's mountain

ranges because they form the natural boundary between

Europe and Asia and contain valuable mineral deposits. The

range extends about 2,100 kilometers from the Arctic Ocean to the northern border of Kazakstan. In terms of elevation and

vegetation, however, the Urals are far from impressive, and

they do not serve as a formidable natural barrier. Several low

passes provide major transportation routes through the Urals

eastward from Europe. The highest peak, Mount Narodnaya, is 1,894 meters, lower than the highest of the Appalachian Mountains. To the east of the Urals is the West Siberian Plain, which covers more than 2.5 million square kilometers, stretching about

1,900 kilometers from west to east and about 2,400 kilometers

from north to south. With more than half its territory below

500 meters in elevation, the plain contains some of the world's

largest swamps and floodplains. Most of the plain's population

lives in the drier section south of 55° north latitude.

The region directly east of the West Siberian Plain is the

Central Siberian Plateau, which extends eastward from the

Yenisey River valley to the Lena River valley. The region is divided into several plateaus, with elevations ranging between

320 and 740 meters; the highest elevation is about 1,800

meters, in the northern Putoran Mountains. The plain is bounded on the south by the Baikal mountain system and on

the north by the North Siberian Lowland, an extension of the

West Siberian Plain extending into the Taymyr Peninsula on

the Arctic Ocean.

Truly alpine terrain appears in the southern mountain

ranges. Between the Black and Caspian seas, the Caucasus

Mountains rise to impressive heights, forming a boundary

between Europe and Asia. One of the peaks, Mount Elbrus, is the highest point in Europe, at 5,642 meters. The geological

structure of the Caucasus extends to the northwest as the

Crimean and Carpathian mountains and southeastward into

Central Asia as the Tian Shan and Pamirs. The Caucasus Mountains create an imposing natural barrier between Russia and its neighbors to the southwest, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

In the mountain system west of Lake Baikal in south-central

Siberia, the highest elevations are 3,300 meters in the Western

Sayan, 3,200 meters in the Eastern Sayan, and 4,500 meters at Mount Belukha in the Altay Range. The Eastern Sayan reach

nearly to the southern shore of Lake Baikal; at the lake, there is

131
Russia: A Country Study

an elevation difference of more than 4,500 meters between the

nearest mountain, 2,840 meters high, and the deepest part of

the lake, which is 1,700 meters below sea level. The mountain

systems east of Lake Baikal are lower, forming a complex of

minor ranges and valleys that reaches from the lake to the

Pacific coast. The maximum height of the Stanovoy Range,

which runs west to east from northern Lake Baikal to the Sea of

Okhotsk, is 2,550 meters. To the south of that range is southeastern Siberia, whose mountains reach 2,800 feet. Across the

Tatar Strait from that region is Sakhalin Island, where the highest elevation is about 1,700 meters.

Northeastern Siberia, north of the Stanovoy Range, is an

extremely mountainous region. The long Kamchatka Peninsula, which juts southward into the Sea of Okhotsk, includes

many volcanic peaks, some of which still are active. The highest

is the 4,750-meter Klyuchevskaya Volcano, the highest point in

the Russian Far East. The volcanic chain continues from the

southern tip of Kamchatka southward through the Kuril

Islands chain and into Japan. Kamchatka also is one of Russia's

two centers of seismic activity (the other is the Caucasus). In

1994 a major earthquake largely destroyed the oil-processing

city of Neftegorsk.

Drainage

Russia is a water-rich country. The earliest settlements in the

country sprang up along the rivers, where most of the urban

population continues to live. The Volga, Europe's longest river,

is by far Russia's most important commercial waterway. Four of

the country's thirteen largest cities are located on its banks:

Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, Kazan', and Volgograd. The Kama

River, which flows west from the southern Urals to join the

Volga in the Republic of Tatarstan, is a second key European

water system whose banks are densely populated.

Russia has thousands of rivers and inland bodies of water,

providing it with one of the world's largest surface-water

resources. However, most of Russia's rivers and streams belong

to the Arctic drainage basin, which lies mainly in Siberia but

also includes part of European Russia. Altogether, 84 percent

of Russia's surface water is located east of the Urals in rivers

flowing through sparsely populated territory and into the Arctic and Pacific oceans. In contrast, areas with the highest concentrations of population, and therefore the highest demand

for water supplies, tend to have the warmest climates and high132
Physical Environment and Population

est rates of evaporation. As a result, densely populated areas such as the Don and Kuban' river basins north of the Caucasus

have barely adequate (or in some cases inadequate) water

resources. Forty of Russia's rivers longer than 1,000 kilometers are east of the Urals, including the three major rivers that drain Siberia

as they flow northward to the Arctic Ocean: the Irtysh-Ob' sys- tem (totaling 5,380 kilometers), the Yenisey (4,000 kilometers),

and the Lena (3,630 kilometers). The basins of those river sys- tems cover about 8 million square kilometers, discharging

nearly 50,000 cubic meters of water per second into the Arctic

Ocean. The northward flow of these rivers means that source

areas thaw before the areas downstream, creating vast swamps

such as the 48,000-square-kilometer Vasyugane Swamp in the

center of the West Siberian Plain. The same is true of other

river systems, including the Pechora and the North Dvina in

Europe and the Kolyma and the Indigirka in Siberia. Approximately 10 percent of Russian territory is classified as swampland.

A number of other rivers drain Siberia from eastern mountain ranges into the Pacific Ocean. The Amur River and its main tributary, the Ussuri, form a long stretch of the winding

boundary between Russia and China. The Amur system drains

most of southeastern Siberia. Three basins drain European

Russia. The Dnepr, which flows mainly through Belarus and

Ukraine, has its headwaters in the hills west of Moscow. The

1,860-kilometer Don originates in the Central Russian Upland

south of Moscow and then flows into the Sea of Azov and the

Black Sea at Rostov-na-Donu. The Volga is the third and by far

the largest of the European systems, rising in the Valday Hills

west of Moscow and meandering southeastward for 3,510 kilometers before emptying into the Caspian Sea. Altogether, the

Volga system drains about 1.4 million square kilometers.

Linked by several canals, European Russia's rivers long have

been a vital transportation system; the Volga system still carries

two-thirds of Russia's inland water traffic (see Transportation,

ch. 6).

Russia's inland bodies of water are chiefly a legacy of extensive glaciation. In European Russia, the largest lakes are Ladoga and Onega northeast of St. Petersburg, Lake Peipus on

the Estonian border, and the Rybinsk Reservoir north of Moscow Smaller man-made reservoirs, 160 to 320 kilometers long, are on the Don, the Kama, and the Volga rivers. Many large res133
Russia: A Country Study

ervoirs also have been constructed on the Siberian rivers; the

Bratsk Reservoir northwest of Lake Baikal is one of the world's

largest.

The most prominent of Russia's bodies of fresh water is Lake

Baikal, the world's deepest and most capacious freshwater lake. Lake Baikal alone holds 85 percent of the freshwater resources of the lakes in Russia and 20 percent of the world's total. It extends 632 kilometers in length and fifty-nine kilometers

across at its widest point. Its maximum depth is 1,713 meters.

Numerous smaller lakes dot the northern regions of the European and Siberian plains. The largest of these are lakes Beloye,

Topozero, Vyg, and Il'men' in the European northwest and

Lake Chany in southwestern Siberia.

Climate

Russia has a largely continental climate because of its sheer

size and compact configuration. Most of its land is more than

400 kilometers from the sea, and the center is 3,840 kilometers

from the sea. In addition, Russia's mountain ranges, predominantly to the south and the east, block moderating temperatures from the Indian and Pacific oceans, but European Russia

and northern Siberia lack such topographic protection from

the Arctic and North Atlantic oceans. Because only small parts of Russia are south of 50° north lati- tude and more than half of the country is north of 60° north

latitude, extensive regions experience six months of snow cover over subsoil that is permanently frozen to depths as far as sev- eral hundred meters. The average yearly temperature of nearly

all of European Russia is below freezing, and the average for

most of Siberia is freezing or below. Most of Russia has only two

seasons, summer and winter, with very short intervals of moderation between them. Transportation routes, including entire

railroad lines, are redirected in winter to traverse rock-solid

waterways and lakes. Some areas constitute important exceptions to this description, however: the moderate maritime cli- mate of Kaliningrad Oblast on the Baltic Sea is similar to that

of the American Northwest; the Russian Far East, under the

influence of the Pacific Ocean, has a monsoonal climate that reverses the direction of wind in summer and winter, sharply

differentiating temperatures; and a narrow, subtropical band

of territory provides Russia's most popular summer resort area on the Black Sea.

134
Collective farm in Kultuk, at southern tip ofLake Baikal

Courtesy Donna Kostka

In winter an intense high-pressure system causes winds to blow from the south and the southwest in all but the Pacific

region of the Russian landmass; in summer a low-pressure sys- tem brings winds from the north and the northwest to most of

the landmass. That meteorological combination reduces the

wintertime temperature difference between north and south.

Thus, average January temperatures are -8°C in St. Petersburg,

-27°C in the West Siberian Plain, and -43°C at Yakutsk (in east- central Siberia, at approximately the same latitude as St. Peters- burg), while the winter average on the Mongolian border,

whose latitude is some 10° farther south, is barely warmer. Summer temperatures are more affected by latitude, however; the

Arctic islands average 4°C, and the southernmost regions aver- age 20°C. Russia's potential for temperature extremes is typified by the national record low of -94°C, recorded at Verkhoyansk in north-central Siberia and the record high of

38°C, recorded at several southern stations.

The long, cold winter has a profound impact on almost

every aspect of life in the Russian Federation. It affects where

and how long people live and work, what kinds of crops are grown, and where they are grown (no part of the country has a year-round growing season). The length and severity of the

winter, together with the sharp fluctuations in the mean sum135
Russia: A Country Study

mer and winter temperatures, impose special requirements on

many branches of the economy. In regions of permafrost,

buildings must be constructed on pilings, machinery must be

made of specially tempered steel, and transportation systems

must be engineered to perform reliably in extremely low and

extremely high temperatures. In addition, during extended

periods of darkness and cold, there are increased demands for

energy, health care, and textiles. Because Russia has little exposure to ocean influences, most

of the country receives low to moderate amounts of precipitation. Highest precipitation falls in the northwest, with amounts

decreasing from northwest to southeast across European Russia. The wettest areas are the small, lush subtropical region

adjacent to the Caucasus and along the Pacific coast. Along the

Baltic coast, average annual precipitation is 600 millimeters,

and in Moscow it is 525 millimeters. An average of only twenty

millimeters falls along the Russian-Kazak border, and as little as fifteen millimeters may fall along Siberia's Arctic coastline.

Average annual days of snow cover, a critical factor for agriculture, depends on both latitude and altitude. Cover varies from

forty to 200 days in European Russia, and from 120 to 250 days

in Siberia.

Environmental Problems

With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow and

the Russian Federation escaped direct responsibility for some

of the world's worst environmental devastation because many

of the Soviet disaster sites were now in other countries. Since

then, however, the gravity and complexity of threats to Russia's

own environment have become clear. During the first years of

transition and reform, Russia's response to those conditions was sporadic and often ineffectual.

Only in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a linkage identified between the increasingly poor state of human health and

the destruction of ecosystems in Russia. When that linkage was

established, a new word was coined to sum up the environmental record of the Soviet era—"ecocide."

Environmental Conditions

In the Soviet system, environmentally threatening incidents

such as the bursting of an oil pipeline received little or no public notice, and remedial actions were slow or nonexistent. Gov136
Physical Environment and Population

ernment officials felt that natural resources were abundant

enough to afford waste, that the land could easily absorb any

level of pollution, and that stringent control measures were an

unjustifiable hindrance to economic advancement. In the

1990s, after decades of such practices, the government categorized about 40 percent of Russia's territory (an area about

three-quarters as large as the United States) as under high or moderately high ecological stress. Excluding areas of radiation

contamination, fifty-six areas have been identified as environmentally degraded regions, ranging from full-fledged ecological disaster areas to moderately polluted areas. Major Crises

Dangerous environmental conditions came to the attention

of the public in the Soviet Union under the glasnost policy of

the regime of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in office 1985-91), which

liberated the exchange of information in the late 1980s. The

three situations that gripped public attention were the April

1986 nuclear explosion at the Chernobyl1 Nuclear Power Sta- tion in Ukraine, the long-term and ongoing desiccation of the

Aral Sea between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, and the irradiation of northern Kazakstan by the Semipalatinsk (present-day

Semey) nuclear testing site. The overall cost of rectifying these

three disasters is staggering, dwarfing the cost of cleanups else- where, such as the superfund campaign to eliminate toxic

waste sites in the United States. By the time the Soviet Union

dissolved in 1991, such conditions had become symbols of that

system's disregard for the quality of the environment.

Since 1990 Russian experts have added to the list the following less spectacular but equally threatening environmental cri- ses: the Dnepropetrovsk-Donets and Kuznets coal-mining and

metallurgical centers, which have severely polluted air and

water and vast areas of decimated landscape; the Urals industrial region, a strip of manufacturing cities that follows the

southern Urals from Perm' in the north to Magnitogorsk near

the Kazak border (an area with severe air and water pollution

as well as radioactive contamination near the city of Kyshtym);

the Kola Peninsula in the far northwest, where nonferrous mining and metallurgical operations, centered on the region's

nickel reserves, have created air pollution that drifts westward

across northern Scandinavia; the Republic of Kalmykia, where

faulty agricultural practices have produced soil erosion, desertification, and chemical contamination; and the Moscow area,

137
Russia: A Country Study

which suffers from high levels of industrial and vehicular air

pollution and improper disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The experts also named five areas of severe water pollution: the

Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Sea of Azov north of the Black

Sea, the Volga River, and Lake Baikal.

Each of Russia's natural zones has suffered degradation of

specific kinds. In the tundra, the greatest damage stems from

extraction and transportation of mineral resources by crude

techniques. In delicate tundra habitats, oil spills, leaks in natural gas pipelines, and the flaring of natural gas destroy north- ern marshland ecosystems, which take many years to purify

naturally. Also endangered are reindeer grazing lands, upon

which indigenous peoples traditionally have depended for

their livelihood. In the permafrost zones that constitute about

40 percent of Russia's territory, lower air, water, and ground

temperatures slow natural self-cleansing processes that mitigate

contamination in warmer regions, magnifying the impact of

every spill and leak. In the taiga, or forest, zone, the overcutting of trees poses

the greatest threat, particularly in northern European Russia,

the Urals, and the Angara Basin in south-central Siberia.

Uncontrolled mining operations constitute the second major

source of damage in the taiga. In the broad-leafed forest zone,

irrational land use has caused soil erosion on a huge scale.

Urbanization and air and water pollution also are problems.

The forest-steppe and steppe regions are subjected to soil

exhaustion, loss of humus, soil compacting, and erosion, creat- ing an extremely serious ecological situation. The soil fertility

of Russia's celebrated black-earth (chernozem—see Glossary)

region has deteriorated significantly in the postwar period.

Overgrazing is the main problem in the pasturage regions of

the Russian steppe and has severely affected the Republic of

Kalmykia in southwestern Russia and the region east of Lake

Baikal. In Russia's limited semiarid and arid territories, poorly

designed irrigation and drainage systems have caused salinization, pollution, and contamination of surface and underground water, but not to the degree that these problems exist

in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakstan.

Air Quality

Although reductions in industrial production caused air

quality indexes to improve somewhat in the 1990s, Russia's air

still rates among the most polluted in the world. According to

138
Physical Environment and Population

one estimate, only 15 percent of the urban population breathes

air that is not harmful. Experts fear that a return to full industrial production will mean even more dangerous levels of air

pollution given Russia's current inefficient pollution control

technology. Of the 43.8 million tons of pollutants discharged

into the open air in 1993, about 18,000 industrial enterprises

generated an estimated 24.8 million tons. Vehicle emissions

added 19 million tons

In the early 1990s, Russia's Hydrometeorological Service,

which monitors air quality, reported that 231 out of 292 cities exceeded maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs) for

particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, or carbon

monoxide. Pollution levels in eighty-six cities exceeded MPCs

by a factor of ten. The most polluted cities are centers of heavy

industry (ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, petroleum refining, chemicals, and pulp production). Not surprisingly, the

largest industrial cities head the list. In European Russia, these are Moscow and St. Petersburg; the Ural manufacturing centers of Yekaterinburg, Nizhniy Tagil, Magnitogorsk, and Ufa;

and Astrakhan', Samara, and Volgograd on the lower Volga. In Asian Russia, the heaviest air pollution is in Omsk and

Novokuznetsk in southwestern Siberia, Irkutsk on Lake Baikal,

the Noril'sk industrial center in northwestern Siberia, and Khabarovsk in the Far East. Levels of airborne sulfur, nitrogen, and

lead remain high.

Most vehicles in Russia continue to burn leaded fuel. In the

early 1990s, motor vehicles contributed about one-third of total hazardous emissions in urban and industrial areas. Throughout the Soviet period and into the 1990s, trucks were the greatest vehicular polluters because privately owned vehicles were

relatively scarce. As Russia adopts the culture of the privately

owned vehicle, however, it is likely that transportation will

increase its share of total emissions.

Water Quality

Soviet leaders took little action to protect the nation's inland

bodies of water or surrounding oceans and seas from pollution,

and Soviet planners gave low priority to risk-free treatment and

transport of water. As a result, 75 percent of Russia's surface

water is now polluted, 50 percent of all water is not potable

according to quality standards established in 1992, and an esti- mated 30 percent of groundwater available for use is highly

polluted. The most serious water pollution conditions relative

139
Russia: A Country Study

to demand and availability of clean water are in the industrial

regions of Krasnodar and Stavropol' territories north of the

Caucasus, Rostov and Novosibirsk oblasts, the Republic of

Chechnya, and the city of Moscow. In Krasnodar and

Stavropol', inherent water shortages exacerbate the situation.

The quality of drinking water is a major concern. Poor water

management standards have raised health concerns in many

cities, and water safety also is doubtful in the countryside,

where 59 percent of the population draws water from common

wells affected by groundwater pollution. Unsanitary runoff

from populated places and agricultural sites contributes heavily

to pollution of sources that ultimately provide water for domestic use; the quality of drinking water declines noticeably during

spring floods, when such runoff is heaviest. Rudimentary portable filters are not widely available. An estimated 8 percent of

wastewater is fully treated prior to dumping in waterways; most

water treatment facilities are obsolete, inefficient, and generally overwhelmed by the volume of material that now passes

through them, but funding is not available to replace them.

In recent years, officials have identified many of Russia's riv- ers as carriers of waterborne diseases, epidemics of which were

especially frequent in 1995. In July 1995, Moscow city health

officials reported an outbreak of cholera-causing bacteria in

the Moscow River. Officials have warned of increasing outbreaks of sewage-related diseases—including cholera, salmonella, typhoid fever, dysentery, and viral hepatitis—in many

other Russian rivers. Citizens have been instructed to boil all water before use. In some areas, clean water is so scarce that

water is imported from other regions. The highest consumption of imported water is in the republics of Sakha (Yakutia)

and Kalmykia, Kamchatka and Magadan oblasts in the Far East,

and Stavropol' Territory.

Among the chemicals and contaminants dumped frequently

and indiscriminately have been compounds containing heavy

metals, phenols, pesticides, and pathogenic bacteria. Chemical

pollution was dramatized when fires ignited spontaneously on

the Iset' River in Sverdlovsk (present-day Yekaterinburg) in

1965 and on the Volga River in 1970. Russian agriculture, like

industry subject to centralized control and quota fulfillment in

the Soviet era, continues to cause severe water pollution by

overuse and improper handling and storage of toxic chemical

fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. During the Soviet era, dioxin, a carcinogen, was used routinely as an agricultural

140
Power plant discharging effluents into Amur River and into

atmosphere, Khabarovsk

Courtesy Donna Kostka

insecticide, and it heavily tainted rural wells. In 1990 Soviet

authorities declared that dioxin, which enters the body

through drinking water, was the most serious health threat

from pollution.

In 1992 the Russian Federation's Committee on Fishing

reported 994 cases in which bodies of water were "completely

contaminated" by agricultural runoff. Runoff from fields

results in fish kills and groundwater contamination. Among the

largest river systems in European Russia, the Volga and Dnepr

rivers suffer from acute eutrophication—depletion of dissolved

oxygen by overnutrition of aquatic plant life—which distorts

natural life cycles. Large-scale fish kills have occurred in the

Kama, Kuban', North Dvina, Oka, and Ural rivers. Pollution in the Gulf of Finland, the easternmost extension

of the Baltic Sea, includes untreated sewage from St. Peters141
Russia: A Country Study

burg, where heavy metals and other chemical substances are not properly removed prior to dumping. In late 1995, St. Petersburg city officials signed an agreement with a French

water purification company to process the city's drinking water; the Finns hope that such a move also will improve the overall

quality of the city's effluent water. Water quality in Lake Ladoga, Europe's largest freshwater

lake, came to the attention of government authorities in the

mid-1990s. Factories on the lake, which is just east of St. Peters- burg, have discharged tons of heavy metals and other toxic substances into local rivers. The shores of Lake Ladoga and Lake

Onega to its east have been storage sites for fertilizers, livestock

waste, and chemicals as well as for radioactive military waste. When local rivers emanating from the lakes reach the Gulf of

Finland, their chemical burden changes the oxygen balance in

the gulf. Similar situations affect the Arctic Ocean, into which

Siberian rivers flow after passing through numerous industrial

and power-generating centers, and the Baltic Sea, into which

large amounts of military waste and chemical weapons were

discarded from Poland and the Baltic republics during the

Soviet era. Marine biologists report that only five species of fish remain

in the Black Sea, which once was a highly diverse marine eco- system with twenty-six species. Between 1985 and 1994, the

total fish catch in the Black Sea dropped from 675,000 to 45,000 kilograms. According to environmentalists, the entire sea is in danger of "dying" because only about 10 percent of its near-surface volume contains enough oxygen to support life. Deoxygenation is caused primarily by large-scale infusions of

hydrogen sulfide, which comes mainly from the Danube, Don,

South Bug, and Dnepr rivers that flow into the sea from the

north and the west. Large amounts of mercury, cadmium,

arsenic, and oil have been identified as well. In 1992 the littoral states of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and

Ukraine signed an agreement to take specific measures against

pollution of the Black Sea and the tributary rivers that flow

through their territory. Conflicting goals and positions among

the states involved, however, have hindered environmental

cooperation.

The Caspian Sea is also beset with chemical pollution and

the loss of indigenous species, and it now faces the danger that

1 million hectares of its coastline, including Russia's Volga

River delta, will be flooded. According to a 1996 report,

142
Public beach on AmurRiver, downstream from polluting power plant,

Khabarovsk

Courtesy Donna Kostka

800,000 hectares in Dagestan already had been inundated. By

1993 the average water level of the sea had risen by more than

two meters. Scientists blame the rise on the 1977 Soviet damming of the Garabogaz Gulf on the Caspian coast of Turkmenistan. Previously, the waters of the gulf intermixed with those of

the Caspian, acting as the main thermal regulator and volume

stabilizer of the larger body. In 1996 the Russian government

allocated US$38 million for Caspian Sea conservation, to be

matched by US$34 million from local budgets.

Water quality problems are most severe in European Russia,

especially in the Volga Basin, where about 60 million people

live. Of all water withdrawn from natural sources in Russia, 33

percent comes from the Volga. About half of that water returns

to the Volga as polluted discharge, accounting for 37 percent

of the total volume of such material generated in Russia. The

Volga's water does not meet the norms for drinking water and

143
Russia: A Country Study

is unsuitable for fish farming or irrigation. In the late 1980s

and early 1990s, numerous government committees were formed to clean up the Volga. Few of the resulting restorative

programs have been implemented, however, and the Volga

remains under ecological stress. Lake Baikal, a water resource of world importance located in

south-central Siberia, long was the focal point of Soviet environmental efforts to end the pollution that the pulp and paper

plants caused in the lake's watershed. A series of comprehensive Soviet and post-Soviet plans yielded limited success in protecting the lake's water and shoreline, which gradually have

succumbed to chemical stresses. In 1995 the World Bank (see

Glossary) and the European Union (EU—see Glossary)

granted funds for cleaning up Lake Baikal, and in 1996 the

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission announced United States

plans to aid Russia in overhauling paper plants in the Baikal

region (see The United States, ch. 8).

Soil and Forests Russia devotes about 10 percent of its land to agriculture,

but land quality is declining. Erosion carries away as much as

1.5 billion tons of topsoil every year (see Agriculture, ch. 6). In

the past twenty-five years, Russia's arable land area has

decreased by an estimated 33 million hectares, with much of

that loss attributable to poor land management. Experts fear

that agricultural land management may deteriorate further

under Russia's new land privatization as individual farmers try to squeeze short-term profit from their new property. In the

early 1990s, an estimated 50 percent of arable land needed

remediation and improved management for agricultural productivity to improve. Russia's southern regions, especially the

Republic of Kalmykia, are losing about 6,400 hectares of agricultural land yearly to desertification. To the east, desiccation

of the Aral Sea and expansion of the Qizilqum Desert in Kazakstan have a climatic drying effect that exacerbates desertification in Russia to the north and west. In Russia an estimated 74 million hectares of agricultural

land have been contaminated by industrial toxic agents, pesticides, and agricultural chemicals. Considerable land also is lost in the extraction of mineral resources. Unauthorized dumping

of hazardous industrial, chemical, and household waste takes

land out of production. Flooding is a problem near the Cas144
High-rise apartment buildings on eroding sandstone banks of

Amur River, Khabarovsk

Courtesy Fbyd Reichman

pian Sea and in Stavropol' Territory, where the construction of

reservoirs has removed land from use. In 1994 about 22 percent of the world's forests and 50 percent of its coniferous forests were in Russia, covering an area

larger than the continental United States. Of the 764 million

hectares of forested area, 78 percent was in Siberia and the Far

East. At that time, vast stands of Siberian forest remained

untouched. Such broad expanses have an important role in the

global carbon cycle and in biodiversity. In the 1990s, the atmosphere of economic stress and political decentralization has the

potential to accelerate drastically Russia's rate of deforestation

and land degradation, especially in remote areas. Environmentalists fear that timber sales will be used as a short-term stimulus to regional economies; already, Chinese, Mongolian, and

145
Russia: A Country Study

North and South Korean companies have taken advantage of

looser restrictions and the critical need for hard currency (see

Glossary) to begin clear-cutting Siberian forests. Timber harvesting by Russian firms decreased dramatically in the 1990s,

from 375 million cubic meters in 1989 to 110 million cubic

meters in 1996.

Aleksey Yablokov, head of the nongovernmental Center for

Russian Environmental Policy, has estimated that Siberia is los- ing 16 million hectares of forest annually to cutting, pollution,

and fires—an amount six times the official government esti- mate and higher than the rate of loss in the Amazon rain forests. Fires, which normally improve biodiversity and long-term

stability, cause excessive damage because of poor fire control measures. Large tracts of Russian forest, most notably 136,000

hectares in the vicinity of Chernobyl1 , have suffered radioactive

contamination, which also increases the likelihood of forest

fires. Because forests cannot be decontaminated, the distribution of radioactive particles in the trees remains constant over many years. Inefficient lumbering procedures cause unnecessary loss of

timber; as much as 40 percent of Russia's harvested trees never go to the mill, and unsystematic clear-cutting prevents productive regrowth. Forest management has improved gradually in

the post-Soviet era. In 1993 the Supreme Soviet, then the lower

house of Russia's parliament, passed the Principles of the Forest, national laws that include guidelines for management and

protection. Because implementation of these laws has been

quite slow, many regional jurisdictions have adopted their own

management standards.

Acid rain from European and Siberian industrial centers

and from power generation plants has reduced the Siberian

forests by an estimated 730,000 hectares. Hydroelectric dams

on Siberian rivers raise significantly the temperature of air and

water, destabilizing the growing conditions of adjacent forests. Because of the enormous oxygen production and carbon dioxide absorption of the Russian forests (a capacity estimated to be

second only to that of the Amazon rain forest), removal of

large sections of those forests would have a drastic effect on the

quality of land in Russia and the quality of air over the entire

world.

Radioactive Contamination

Beginning with glasnost in the mid-1980s and continuing

146
Physical Environment and Population

with the establishment of an independent Russia in 1991,

much disturbing information has become available about

Soviet and Russian nuclear practices and mishaps. These disclosures have included deadly accidents on land and aboard

naval vessels, a network of secret cities designed specifically for

nuclear weapons production and material processing, detonation of nuclear blasts for "peaceful" purposes, and the dumping of nuclear waste at sea and its injection into subterranean

cavities. More than any other event, the Chernobyl 1 disaster

prompted greater scrutiny and candor about Soviet nuclear

programs. Although much of the contamination from Chernobyl' occurred in the now-independent countries of Ukraine

and Belarus, the present-day Russian Federation also received

significant fallout from the accident. Approximately 50,000

square kilometers of the then Russian Republic, particularly

the oblasts of Bryansk, Orel, Kaluga, and Tula, were contaminated with cesium-137 (see table 3, Appendix). The total population of the nineteen oblasts and republics receiving fallout

from Chernobyl' was 37 million in 1993.

The Soviet, now Russian, navy's disposal and accidental vent- ing of radioactive materials pose particular problems. Beginning in 1965, twenty nuclear reactors, most with their fuel rods

still inside, were dumped from nuclear submarines and an icebreaker into the Arctic Ocean north of Russia. In 1994 the

Oslo-based Bellona Foundation estimated that radioactive

dumping in the Kara Sea north of western Siberia and adjacent

waters constituted two-thirds of all the radioactive materials

that ever have entered the world's oceans. In 1996 Bellona

identified fifty-two decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines that were scheduled for scrapping but were still afloat near Murmansk with nuclear fuel on board; a timetable for dis- mantling them has fallen far behind.

Japan has been engaged in a long struggle to stop Russia's

Pacific Fleet from dumping radioactive waste into the Sea of

Japan (see Japan, ch. 8). In 1994 Russia complied with Japan's

demand to cease dumping entirely; after a long series of negotiations, in January 1996 Russia andJapan agreed on construction of a floating nuclear waste recycling plant and expansion

of an existing facility to process nuclear waste generated by the

Pacific Fleet. The United States andJapan are to fund the first project, and the United States and Norway the second. In the

mid-1990s, Russia still was seeking methods of storing and dis147
Russia: A Country Study

posing of first-generation radioactive waste in many regions,

including the European Arctic. Under these conditions,

experts predict that the country will be hard-pressed to comply

with the requirements of the arms reduction agreements for

disposal of waste from thousands of nuclear weapons scheduled for destruction later in the 1990s (see Nuclear Arms

Issues, ch. 9). On the eve of the Group of Seven (G—7; see Glossary) nuclear safety summit meeting in Moscow in April 1996,

Aleksey Yablokov and the Bellona Foundation complained that

continued operation of Chernobyl'-type reactors presented an

unacceptable risk to the Russian public. The Western leaders at the G-7 meeting generally muted their criticism on the issue to avoid embarrassing President Boris N. Yeltsin during his presidential campaign. Yablokov announced the formation of a new

lobby of Russian nongovernmental organizations for greater

government disclosure on the issue.

The Response to Environmental Problems

In the half-decade that began with the Chernobyl' disaster

and culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, substantial changes took place in the public's attitudes toward environmental crises. The public engaged in unprecedented

discussion about the dangers the state's environmental policies

posed to public health. According to surveys, the public's main

concerns were local problems having immediate impact, such

as polluted water supplies, violation of public health regulations, and air pollution. Russians were much less interested in

more general and fundamental issues such as loss of biodiversity, deforestation, and acid rain. In 1989 a national poll placed

environmental pollution fifth among citizens' major concerns,

but only one-third of respondents expressed their willingness

to sacrifice economically to improve the situation. Nevertheless, a substantial green movement arose in the late 1980s.

Fragmented by disagreement over politicization and national versus local agendas, parts of the movement branched into

other areas of activism such as human rights and regional

autonomy, and no single green party emerged.

Public enthusiasm for environmental improvement followed

the same curve as enthusiasm for democratic and economic

reform; by 1992 economic hardship began to wilt the zeal for

reform, and the vast majority of Russians remained skeptical of

political change throughout the early 1990s. As worsening eco- nomic conditions heightened short-term insecurity, issues such

148
Physical Environment and Population

as environmental protection paled, especially in cases where

the shutting of a polluting plant threatened the livelihood of a town or city.

Politicians and government policy generally followed the same pattern as citizen concern in the early and mid-1990s. In

1988 the initial groundswell of environmental concern stimulated the Gorbachev government to form the State Committee

for the Protection of Nature (Gosudarstvennyy komitet po

okhrane prirody—Goskompriroda), an agency given broad

responsibilities similar to those of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. In 1992 the Russian Federation

used Goskompriroda as the model for a new Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, which received a

similar mandate.

In the 1990 elections for Russia's local legislative bodies

(soviets) and the republic-level Congress of People's Deputies,

virtually every candidate, whether democrat or communist,

made the environment a major campaign issue, thus promoting the electorate's awareness that severe problems exist. In

1990 Yablokov was appointed to an influential position as environmental adviser to the president of Russia (a position he

continued to hold in the Russian Federation after 1991), and

powerful environmental commissions were formed in the local

Soviets of Moscow and other cities. In the early 1990s, such Sovi- ets blocked many large, environmentally dubious projects of

the central government, such as the activation of the Northern

Thermoelectric Center near Moscow, and of various local jurisdictions tied to national monopolies, such as the State Construction Committee (Goskomstroy) and the Ministry of

Atomic Energy (Minatom).

By the time of the parliamentary elections of 1993, however,

the political atmosphere had changed. Most environmental

activists either abstained from political activity or merged their

single-issue efforts with coalitions that might exceed the 5 percent threshold needed for a party to gain representation in the

State Duma. Neither strategy had political impact because environmental views were lost in the coalitions' agendas. Among

the major parties, only the Yabloko coalition had a separate

department for environmental issues. Another major reformminded party, Russia's Choice, which gained seventy-six seats in

1993, advocated environmental protection through market

reform; Russia's minister of environmental protection and nat- ural resources, former communist functionary Viktor Danilov149
Russia: A Country Study

Danil'yan, was a member of Russia's Choice. However, neither

in the campaign nor after assuming office did DanilovDanil'yan press the party's nominal program of tax stimulation

for energy conservation and pollution control. In the 1995 legislative elections, Russia's Democratic Choice (the new name of

Russia's Choice) declined dramatically, gaining only nine seats in the new State Duma, although Danilov-Danil'yan remained

head of his ministry.

A crucial event was the 1992 appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin as prime minister to replace Yegor Gaydar, head of Russia's Choice. Chernomyrdin, former head of the State Natural

Gas Company (Gazprom), has made the reinvigoration of Russian industry, and especially the fuel industries, a top priority. A

second important event was President Yeltsin's dismissal of the

local Soviets in his 1993 struggle to consolidate presidential

power and curb the growth of regional autonomy. The local

dumas that replaced the Soviets have been much more solici- tous of local economic ambitions.

In the parliamentary elections of 1995, the Kedr (Cedar)

coalition (which also had presented a slate in the 1993 election) was the only group among forty-three parties calling itself environmental; however, the party was dominated by businesspeople rather than environmental activists. Kedr candidates

received less than 1 percent of the vote and no seats in the new

State Duma. Some nongovernmental groups have continued to have political impact, and in 1995 Yablokov hailed a new wave

of the green movement. The annual Days of Defense Against

Environmental Hazards, which began modestly in 1993,

became a national phenomenon the next year and included a speech by President Yeltsin. Public organizations played a major role in establishing the All-Russian Congress for the Protection of Nature under the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources. The national congress is preceded

each year by eighty-nine regional congresses, one in each of

Russia's political subdivisions. In late 1993, the new Commission on Ecological Security went into operation under the

Security Council, with the assignment of assessing the most

serious environmental problems as they endanger national

security (see The Security Council, ch. 8). Although it was formed with great fanfare, the commission received little funding in its first three years. In 1994 the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources employed about 21,000 people. In addition, the

150
Research vessels on Lake Baikal

Courtesy Paul Hearn

official Russian environmental protection system included

environmental agencies in each of the eighty-nine subnational

jurisdictions and also several state committees responsible for

the use of mineral, water, and forest resources. In 1993 some 65

percent of the ministry's expenditures went for protection of

water quality and 26 percent for protection of air quality. However, the ministry's actions against major polluters remained

infrequent despite the 1993 constitution's guarantee of the

people's right to a clean environment, to receive information

about environmental conditions, and to get compensation for

damage to health and property that results from negative ecological conditions. In 1995 Danilov-Danil'yan reported that

only twenty-two cases had been brought against alleged polluters in the previous year. In 1993 Russia's total investment in environmental preservation was about US$2.3 billion, less than 4 percent of the

national budget category entitled "industrial construction," in

which environmental expenditures are included. That figure

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Russia: A Country Study

was 20 percent less than the 1990 investment. The structure of

environmental spending remained substantially the same as it was in 1980: some 58 percent went for protection of water

resources, 24 percent for prevention of air pollution, 7 percent

for forest management, and only 0.04 percent for nature preserves and species protection (see table 5, Appendix). In most

subnational jurisdictions, water pollution receives the most

investment because of uniformly serious water conditions.

In 1993 state enterprises and organizations paid 39 percent

of environmental costs. As state budget deficits occurred in

subsequent years, the amounts from those sources decreased,

but the percentage did not because the only other funding

sources were local budgets and private environmental foundations. Budgets of subnational jurisdictions often suffered the same deficits as the federal government, and private organizations contributed only 1.4 percent of total investments in 1993.

Meanwhile, local economic conditions have combined with

weak enforcement funding to promote corruption among

local authorities and to encourage poaching, especially in the

fishing industry.

In 1991 Yeltsin signed Russia's first comprehensive environmental law, On Environmental Protection. Modeled after a

similar Soviet law, it made many general statements about the

environmental rights of citizens without setting any specific

goals. The law also defined numerous environmental functions

for every level of government as well as for citizens and nongovernmental organizations, and it specified environmental regulation of every aspect of society, from health resorts to

electromagnetic radiation. The sheer inclusiveness of such provisions made practical enforcement impossible. The other

major obstacle to enforcement has been the slow development

of Russia's judiciary, which was only a rubber-stamp branch of

government in the Soviet system and which totally lacked experience in the area of environmental law (as well as the general

theory of Western-style jurisprudence) (see The Criminal Justice System, ch. 10). Before any enforcement could begin, the

1991 law stipulated that numerous other laws had to be passed.

The same complex situation has existed at the regional and

local government levels. In early 1995, the State Duma passed a law requiring environmental impact assessments for a variety of

construction and development projects, including large-scale

industrial development, large-scale use of natural resources,

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Physical Environment and Population

city planning, creation of new technology and materials, and

modification of existing commercial facilities. Russia is a signatory of most major international environmental treaties. Among them are the International Tropical

Timber Agreement (1983), the Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973), the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), and the

Montreal Protocol controlling substances harmful to the ozone

layer.

Population

The population in what is now the Russian Federation has

undergone several major shocks in the twentieth century,

including large-scale rural famines in the 1920s and 1930s and

the loss of millions of citizens in World War II. According to demographic experts, the early 1990s may be the start of a more gradual but potentially powerful new shift. Beginning in

1992, the population has suffered a net loss that is projected to continue at least through the first decade of the next century

This phenomenon is caused by a combination of economic,

political, and ethnographic factors. In the mid-1990s, Russians constituted about 82 percent of

the population of the Russian Federation, and they dominate

virtually all regions of the country except for the North Caucasus and parts of the middle Volga region (see Minority Peoples

and Their Territories, ch. 4). The major ethnic minorities are

Tatars (3.8 percent), Ukrainians (3.0 percent), Chuvash (1.2

percent), Bashkirs (0.9 percent), Belarusians (0.8 percent),

and Mordovians (0.7 percent). The total population of the

twenty-one ethnic republics, all designated for one or more of

the minority groups in the federation, was about 24 million.

However, only in eight of the republics was the population of

the titular group (or groups, in the case of Kabardino-Balkaria

and Karachayevo-Cherkessia) larger than the population of

Russians, and Russians constitute more than half the population in nine republics. One other ethnic jurisdiction, the

Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region in the West Siberian Plain,

has a population of more than 1 million; however, two-thirds of

the autonomous region's population are Russian settlers, and

the Khanty and Mansi, the tribes for which the region is named, together constitute less than 2 percent of the population.

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Russia: A Country Study

Demographic Conditions

The range of estimates for Russia's 1995 population is between 147.5 and 149.9 million. Roughly 78 percent of Russia's population lives in the European part of Russia; most of

the industrial cities with over 1 million inhabitants are located

in the European part. In order of size, the largest Russian cities are Moscow (8.7 million people in 1992), St. Petersburg (4.4

million), Novosibirsk (1.4 million), Nizhniy Novgorod (1.4 million), Yekaterinburg (1.4 million), Samara (1.2 million), Omsk

(1.2 million), Chelyabinsk (1.1 million), and Kazan' (1.1 million). Of those cities, only Novosibirsk and Omsk are located

east of the Urals. In 1995 Russia's population density was 8.7

persons per square kilometer, but distribution varies from

more than 200 persons per square kilometer in parts of European Russia, to 0.03 person per square kilometer in the Evenk

Autonomous Region of Siberia.

According to most sources, the population of the present

Russian Federation peaked in 1991 at 148,689,000. Even with

significant increases in immigration in the early 1990s, the Russian population has been shrinking since 1992; according to projections by the Center for Economic Analysis of the Russian

Federation, immigration will make a very small dent in a con- tinued negative natural increase through the year 2005. Thus,

for the period 1985-2005, projected total immigration is 3.3

million, whereas the natural population will decrease by 12.9

million. The annual rate of population change, which dropped

from 0.7 percent in 1985 to its first negative figure of -0.3 percent in 1992, is projected to reach -0.6 percent in 1998 and to continue at that level through 2005.

Several reasons are given for the decline in Russia's population. First, the postwar baby boom, which began echoing in a secondary population rise in many Western countries in the

early 1990s, had much less demographic impact in Russia. Second, a long history of Soviet ecological abuse has planted still unquantifiable seeds of demographic decline throughout the

population, especially in areas of concentrated industry, military installations, and intensive agriculture. Third, post-Soviet

Russia has experienced a general decline in health conditions

and health care (see Health, ch. 5). In addition, the prolonged economic downturn of the early

and mid-1990s, in which an estimated 31 percent of the population (46.5 million people) had incomes below the poverty

level, has increased the incidence of malnutrition, which in

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Physical Environment and Population

turn lowers resistance to common ailments. Only individuals

who have their own gardens are assured a regular supply of

fruits and vegetables (see table 6, Appendix) . Even under the

Soviet system, the average Russian's diet was classified as deficient, so the population now shows the cumulative effects of

earlier living conditions as well as current limitations. Poor eco- nomic prospects, together with low confidence in the state's family benefits programs, discourage Russians from planning

families; the least positive "reproductive attitudes" have been

found in the Urals and in northeastern Siberia.

Experts have identified a number of general demographic

trends that are likely to prevail between 1996 and 2005. Contrary to the trend in Western countries of a shrinking working

population supporting an expanding community of retired

individuals, in Russia a declining life expectancy and a declining birthrate will increase marginally the proportion of active

workers in the population. The actual number of such people

is not likely to rise appreciably, however, and some analyses

project a decline in this figure as well. In 1992, for every 1,000

people of working age, 771 people were outside working age;

the Center for Economic Analysis projects that in 2005 that

proportion will drop to 560 per 1,000. The declining birthrate

is projected to cause the ratio of younger-than-working-age

individuals in the population to decrease dramatically from the

1992 figure of 421 per 1,000 in the working-age group to only

241 per 1,000 in 2005. According to that scenario, the overall

percentage of the population in the working-age group would

increase from 56.5 to 64.1.

Most of the demographic disasters that have beset Russia in

the twentieth century have affected primarily males. In 1992

the sex ratio was 884 males per 1,000 females; in the years

between 1994 and 2005, the imbalance is projected to increase

slightly to a ratio of 875 males per 1,000 females (see table 7, Appendix). Gender disparity has increased because of a sharp

drop in life expectancy for Russian males, from sixty-five years

in 1987 to fifty-seven in 1994. (Life expectancy for females

reached a peak of 74.5 years in 1989, then dropped to 71.1 by

1994.) Projected changes in life expectancy are negative for

both sexes, however. Mortality figures that the Ministry of

Labor released in mid-1995 showed that if the current conditions persist, nearly 50 percent of today's Russian youth will not

reach the retirement ages of fifty-five for women and sixty for men.

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Russia: A Country Study

The process of urbanization of the Russian population,

ongoing since the 1930s, began a gradual reversal in 1991,

when a peak of 74 percent of the population was classified as urban. This marked a significant increase from the 1970 figure

of 62 percent. In 1995 the urban share fell below 73 percent.

Meanwhile, rural areas continued to lose significant portions

of their population. Between 1960 and 1995, about two-thirds

of Russia's small villages (those with fewer than 1,000 residents)

disappeared; of the 24,000 that remained in the mid-1990s,

more than half the population was older than sixty-five and

only 20 percent was younger than thirty-five (see Rural Life, ch.

5). Migration has exacerbated the negative population trend of

lower marriage and birthrates in many rural settlements. As the

young have left rural Russia, large rural sections of the country's central region have been deserted. As their aged inhabitants die, thousands more Russian villages are disappearing.

Proposals have been put forth for resettling some of the Russian immigrants from the "near abroad" in rural areas in order

to revive local economies, but in the mid-1990s migration

authorities had little authority and few resources with which to organize such a program.

A particular demographic concern of the Russian government, as well as governments of the other states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary), is the

loss of highly skilled personnel. This problem had existed in

the last decade of the Soviet Union; in 1989 some 2,653

employees of the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences left the

country, five times more than in 1988. A 1990 sociological forecast predicted that 1.5 million specialists would leave the country in the 1990s if conditions did not improve.

The easing of emigration restrictions in the early 1990s

resulted in a significant increase in Russia's "brain drain." In

the early 1990s, China, North Korea, the Republic of Korea

(South Korea), Iran, Iraq, and several Latin American countries offered jobs to scientists in Russia, especially those with

nuclear backgrounds. (Russia also loses scientific know-how

when its scientists move into the growing financial and commercial fields; in 1994 the newspaper Moskovskiye novosti

reported than one in three leaders of commercial structures was a former scientist or technical specialist.) An ongoing eco- nomic crisis and political uncertainty encourage individuals

with marketable skills to leave Russia. A high percentage of

immigrants from other CIS republics possess the same type of

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Physical Environment and Population

skills as those being lost, but in the mid-1990s Russia lacked a program for settling and apportioning the newcomers so that

their presence would compensate for emigration losses.

Fertility

With the exception of a few ethnic groups in the North Caucasus, birthrates for all nationalities in Russia have generally

declined in the postwar period (see Ethnic Composition, ch.

4) . Throughout the Soviet period, urbanization was rapid, and

urban families generally had fewer children than rural ones. The urbanization process ended in 1992, when for the first time in the postwar period a smaller percentage of the Russian

population lived in cities than the year before. By that time,

however, substantial reasons existed for Russians to limit the

size of their families. The population decline of the Russians

has been especially pronounced in comparison with other ethnic groups. In many of the twenty-one republics, the titular

nationalities have registered higher birthrates and larger aver- age family sizes than the Russian populations.

The birthrate of Russians already was falling dramatically in

the 1960s, moving from 23.2 per 1,000 population at the beginning of the decade to 14.1 in 1968. By 1983 the rate had recov- ered to 17.3 per 1,000, stimulated by a state program that

provided incentives for larger families, including increased

maternity benefits. Another decline in the birthrate began in

1987, and by 1993 the rate was only 9.4 per 1,000. According to the projections of the Center for Economic Analysis, after

reaching its lowest point (8.0 per 1,000) in 1995, the birthrate

will rise gradually to 9.7 per 1,000 in 2005.

In the turnaround year of 1992, the number of births in Russia dropped by 207,000 (13 percent) compared with 1991, and

the number of deaths increased by 116,000 (7 percent). The

fertility rate has dropped in both urban and rural areas. In the

early 1990s, the lowest rates were in the northwest, especially

St. Petersburg and in central European Russia. The disparity

between birth and death rates was especially pronounced in

the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and in the European

oblasts of Pskov, Tula, Tver', Belgorod, Leningrad, Novgorod,

Yaroslavl', Moscow, Tambov, and Ivanovo. In 1992 natural population growth occurred only in the republics of Kalmykia,

Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, North

Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Gorno-Altay, Sakha, and Tyva,

and in Tyumen' and Chita oblasts of western and eastern Sibe157
Russia: A Country Study

ria, respectively. However, although fertility rates in the predominantly Muslim republics of the North Caucasus and the

Volga region continued to exceed those of the Slavic population, by 1995 the rate was declining even in Dagestan, the

republic with the highest birthrate in Russia.

For Russians the total fertility rate, which is the average number of children a woman of childbearing age will have at cur- rent birthrates, fell from 2.0 in 1989 to 1.4 in 1993. The State

Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) estimates that the rate

will decline further to 1.0 by the year 2000. Roughly half as many children were born in 1993 as in 1987. In 1994 the population of Russia fell by 920,000.

The sharp decline in the fertility rate in the 1990s was linked

to the social and economic troubles triggered by the rapid transition to a market economy and resulting unemployment. Families have been destabilized, and living standards for many have

fallen from even the modest levels of the Soviet era (see The

Family, ch. 5). Under such circumstances, decisions on marriage and childbearing often are postponed. Particularly in the

cities, housing has been extremely hard to acquire, and the

percentage of working wives has increased significantly in the

post-Soviet era (see The Role of Women, ch. 5). The number of

common-law marriages, which produce fewer children than

traditional marriages, has increased since the 1960s, as has the

percentage of babies born to unattached women.

History also has affected the absolute number of births. The

birthrate during World War II was very low, accounting for part

of the low birthrate of females in the 1960s, which in turn lowered the rate in the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1993, the number

of women in the prime childbearing age-group decreased by

1.3 million, or 12 percent, making a major contribution to the

27 percent decline in births during that period. Between 1990

and 1994, the government's official estimate of the infant mortality rate rose from 17.4 per 1,000 live births to 19.9, reflecting

deterioration of Russia's child care and nutrition standards.

But Russia has not used international viability standards for

newborns, and one Western estimate placed the 1995 rate at 26.3. Between 1992 and 1995, the official maternal mortality

rate also rose from forty-seven to fifty-two deaths per 100,000

births.

Abortion

Fertility in Russia has been adversely affected by the com158
Physical Environment and Population

mon practice of using abortion as a primary means of birth

control. In 1920 the Soviet Union was the first country to legalize abortion. Sixteen years later it was prohibited, except in cer- tain circumstances, to compensate for the millions of lives lost in the collectivization of agriculture and the widespread famine

that followed in the 1930s. The practice was fully legalized once

again in 1968, and an entire industry evolved offering abortion

services and encouraging women to use them. Although abortions became easily available for most women, an estimated 15

percent of the Soviet total were performed illegally in private

facilities. Because of the persistent lack of contraceptive devices

in both Soviet and independent Russia (and the social taboo

on discussion of contraception and sex in general, which con- tinued in the 1990s), for most women abortion remains the

only reliable method of avoiding unwanted pregnancy (see

Health Conditions; Sexual Attitudes, ch. 5). Russia continues

to have the highest abortion rate in the world, as did the Soviet

Union. In the mid-1990s, the Russian average was 225 terminated pregnancies per 100 births and ninety-eight abortions

for every 1,000 women of childbearing age per year—a yearly

average of 3.5 million. An estimated one-quarter of maternal

fatalities result from abortion procedures.

Mortality

The social and economic crises that gripped Russia in the

early 1990s are reflected in increased mortality and declining

life expectancy, especially among able-bodied males. Contributing to Russia's long-term population decline is a projected mortality rate increase from 11.3 per 1,000 population in 1985 to 15.9 per 1,000 in 2005. Russia's mortality rate reached its lowest

level, 10.4 per 1,000 population, in 1986 (for which a state antialcohol campaign received substantial credit) ; then the figure rose steadily in the ensuing decade. The largest jump was from

12.2 to 14.6 per 1,000 between 1992 and 1993; after having

reached 15.7 per 1,000 in 1995, the rate was projected to remain virtually flat over the next decade.

According to 1994 statistics, the life expectancy for Russian

males had reached 57.3 years and for females 71.1 years. These

are the lowest figures and the largest disparity by sex for any

country reporting to the World Health Organization, and they

are a sharp decline from the 1987 levels of 64.9 years for males

and 74.6 years for females. In 1990 the Russian Republic

ranked only seventh in this statistic among the fifteen republics

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Russia: A Country Study

of the Soviet Union. The lag in the average life expectancy of

males was attributed to alcohol and tobacco abuse; to unsafe

conditions at work, on the road, and in the home; and to declining heath care. Mortality rates are especially high for able-bodied males in

rural areas. Served poorly by the health care system and lacking basic sanitary facilities and conveniences, many farming

communities have been transformed into enclaves for the elderly, the indigent, and the sick. Moreover, indigenous nationalities such as the Evenks and the Nenets have suffered

catastrophic declines in life expectancy and high rates of sick- ness and death that have prompted speculation that some of

those groups may become extinct. Geographically, the lowest

average life expectancy in Russia is in the Siberian Republic of

Tyva, and the highest figures are in the Caucasus Republic of

Dagestan and in the Volga region. In the first half of the 1990s,

the imbalance between the birth and death rates was especially

acute in major cities. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, the number of deaths in 1992 was almost double the number of births.

Since 1987 mortality from accidents, injuries, and poisonings has risen significantly, from 101 to 228 per 100,000 population. Contributing to that figure are an estimated 8,000 fatal workplace accidents per year, largely the result of aging equipment, the proliferation of risky jobs in the unofficial "shadow

economy," and the deterioration of work discipline. For the

period between 1990 and 1994, the suicide rate rose by 57 percent to a total of nearly 62,000, putting Russia in third place

among eighty-four developed countries. The stress of the tran- sition period is one explanation for this rising statistic. The

homicide rate rose by more than 50 percent in the same period

(see Crime, ch. 10). In 1994 Russia's 35,000 motor vehicle

deaths nearly equaled the 40,000 in the United States,

although Russia has less than 1 percent as many automobiles.

Deteriorating roads and declining police discipline are the

main causes of that fatality statistic. The chief natural cause of death is diseases of the circulatory

system, which accounted for 769 deaths per 100,000 population in 1993. The next causes in order of frequency are cancer and respiratory diseases. Among people of working age, 41 percent of deaths are attributable to unnatural causes; the proportion of such deaths was highest in Leningrad Oblast, the

Permyak Autonomous Region, the Republic of Tyva, and the

Evenk Autonomous Region. The number of alcohol-related

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Physical Environment and Population

deaths also climbed in the mid-1990s; the 1994 figure was 25

percent higher than the 1993 total. In some regions, alcoholism has assumed epidemic proportions; in the Bikin Rayon of

Khabarovsk Territory on the Pacific coast, nearly half the

deaths between 1991 and 1995 were alcohol related (see

Health Conditions, ch. 5)

The overall aging of the population also is an important fac- tor in the higher mortality rate. Between 1959 and 1989, the

percentage of retirees in the population and the percentage of

Russians eighty or older nearly doubled, although declining

life expectancy already was reducing the impact of that trend in

the mid-1990s.

Migration

For most of the postwar period, the state tightly controlled

migration into and emigration from the Soviet Union and

movement within the nation. Nevertheless, in each year of the

1980s, about 15 million citizens changed their place of residence within the Soviet Union, and large numbers of some ethnic groups, most notablyJews, Germans, and Armenians, were

successful in emigrating. An estimated 2 million Jews left the

Soviet Union between 1945 and 1991 (see Other Religions, ch.

4). Overall, external migration played a relatively minor role in

the structure of the Russian Republic's population.

With the introduction of the policies of glasnost and perestroika (see Glossary) in the late 1980s, migration policy began

to change. In 1985 just 2,943 persons received official permission to emigrate. By 1990 the figure had risen to more than

100,000. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, legislative and administrative changes brought about new policies

with respect to migration. First, the traditional internal pass- port (propiska) that conferred permission to work and live in a

specific place was nominally abolished, enhancing freedom of

movement within Russia. Second, the general right to emigrate was written into law in the 1993 constitution.

Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, major his- torical internal migration paths were from the western parts of

Russia and the Soviet Union to the northern and eastern

regions. In contrast to the American experience, Russia has

had difficulty in stabilizing the population in newly settled east- ern and northern areas of the federation, where the climate

and living conditions are harsh. Despite pay and benefit incentives, turnover has continued to hamper the operations of the

161
Russia: A Country Study

giant territorial production complexes, especially in the key

energy sector. In the Soviet period, immigration was not a problem

because the Soviet Union was not a destination of preference

for any class of refugee. For that reason, in the early 1990s Russia was not equipped with agencies or laws for dealing with a

large-scale influx of asylum seekers and returning Russians. In

light of new demographic movements in the 1990s, however,

respected academician Dmitriy Likhachev has warned that in

the next decade immigration may become a national concern

of the same magnitude as national defense.

Issues and Procedures

In 1993 Russia signed the United Nations Convention on

Refugees, which reclassified it as a "country of first resort" for

foreigners fleeing countries outside the CIS. Under the 1951

United Nations convention, this status entails an international

obligation to care for such individuals. At the same time, the

decline in border security since the dissolution of the Soviet

Union has made illegal immigration easier in many areas. In

the early 1990s, the number of official refugees swelled when

students from Third World nations, particularly Afghanistan,

refused to leave Russia when their studies were completed.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about 28,000 foreign refugees were living ille- gally in Moscow in 1994; figures for other parts of Russia are not available. The UNHCR's Moscow total was divided among

20,000 Afghans, 6,000 Iraqis, 2,000 Somalis, and smaller numbers of Angolans, Ethiopians, and Zairians. A 1995 Moscow

press report, however, estimated that 100,000 illegal immigrants were living in Moscow, including 50,000 Chinese and

15,000 Afghans.

The first major influx of refugees into the Russian Republic

occurred in 1988 and 1989, when Azerbaijanis and Armenians

(mainly the latter) fled the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

between their respective countries, and when Meskhetian

Turks fled Uzbekistan following a massacre in that republic in

1989. However, only in 1992 did the Russian government establish its first agency for dealing with such conditions, the Federal Migration Service (FMS). That service monitors refugees

and other migrants from both outside and within the CIS, but

it is underfunded and understaffed. In 1994 UNHCR transit

camps in Moscow had a capacity of 1,000, leaving a large num162
Physical Environment and Population

ber of Moscow's refugee population to live in primitive conditions. Given the FMS's limited resources, several international

social and charitable organizations are active in aiding refugees

and migrants, although their work has not been well coordinated with the FMS or among themselves. An additional complication in the early 1990s was the influx of tens of thousands

of Russian military personnel withdrawn from former Warsaw

Pact member nations and from other CIS nations.

In response to Russia's new status as a country of first resort, a series of laws on refugees and forced migrants were passed in

1993 and 1994. The laws define various categories of migrants,

particularly refugees and forced migrants, according to the

conditions and motivations that prompted their movement as well as the responsibilities of the state to care for them.

Local branches of the FMS conduct registration of refugees

and forced migrants and are responsible for providing material

support until they are classified. Individuals in both categories

theoretically have some input in their new place of residence;

the FMS provides a list of permissible urban destinations, or

relatives may accept them elsewhere. Legally, the FMS is obliged to help find suitable employment, schools, and social

security and to aid in compensation for lost property. FMS

activities receive funding from the Russian state budget, other

countries and international organizations according to bilateral agreements, and private donations. Russian citizenship is granted automatically to individuals who were permanent resi- dents of the federation before the Law on Citizenship was

passed in February 1992; migrants from elsewhere in the CIS

(particularly the 25 million Russians in other former Soviet

republics) also have a guarantee of Russian citizenship upon

arrival, provided they are not already citizens of another state. A 1993 refinement of FMS regulations added compulsory

annual reregistration and stricter requirements for proof of

forced migrant status. It also modified the temporary housing

guarantee.

As of mid-1996, however, little of the system for carrying out

the laws' guarantees had been worked out. Transportation aid

is available only in extreme cases, and financial support at the

time of settlement is offered only to individuals and families

below the poverty line. The FMS reported that, to comply with

all aspects of the refugee law, each individual should receive

about US$10,000, a sum far beyond the resources of the

agency.

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Russia: A Country Study

Most illegal immigrants enter the country on tourist visas; some take advantage of leaky borders and vague visa requirements. Most claim to be in transit to another country, usually in

the West. Profitable businesses have sprung up smuggling refugees through Russia and then to the West. In 1994 Russian

authorities announced plans for a central data bank to monitor

all immigration and emigration and a new refugee agency, but

no such system was in place in mid-1996. Meanwhile, the prospects of moving large numbers of immigrants to Western countries diminished with new immigration restrictions imposed

there; at the same time, the United Nations convention substantially limits Russia's options by forbidding deportation of

immigrants to "countries of persecution." The FMS has optimistically planned to deal with 400,000 refugees per year, but

some estimates projected that as many as 2 million would immigrate in 1996 alone.

The proportion of non-Russian immigrants declined noticeably after 1992. In 1995 the estimated share of Russians was 63

percent of refugees and 75 percent of forced migrants, fol- lowed by overall immigration shares of 7 to 9 percent each for

Armenians, Ossetians, and Tatars, 3 percent for Ukrainians,

and 1 percent each for Georgians and Tajiks. Non-Slavic immigrants have encountered hostile attitudes from most Russian

authorities. For example, beginning in 1993 Moscow authorities mounted "cleansing" campaigns to rid the city of individuals lacking residence permits; because immigrants from the

Caucasus and Central Asia are easily distinguishable from Slavs,

such campaigns have detained and deported disproportionately large numbers from those ethnic groups. International

human rights organizations have criticized Moscow for such

practices.

The Soviet-era internal passport system, which required documentary proof of an individual's place of residence for that

person to receive housing, was simplified theoretically in October 1993 to allow an individual to take residence in any area without proof of registration in that location. However, local

authorities have ignored this change, especially in cities such as Moscow that are chief targets of migration. In continuing the

Soviet registration system, local authorities can restrict housing, education, and social security benefits to migrants, whatever their origin. In the mid-1990s, strict, "temporary" local

restrictions on initial admittance of migrants spread rapidly to most of the oblast capitals, often with conditions in clear viola164
Physical Environment and Population

tion of the human rights provisions of the 1993 constitution,

with the official backing of the FMS. Continued local limitations have had the effect of discouraging housing construction

and employment, hence exacerbating the situation of nonresidents.

Such a discrimination policy has not stemmed the tide of

migration into Russia's cities from other CIS states or from

within the federation. Because the Soviet system usually

allowed migrants to eventually register, find work, and settle at their destination, continuation of that system also has continued the expectations and the demographic movement that it promoted. As a result, the number of homeless people in Russia's cities has increased dramatically (see Social Welfare, ch.

5).

Migration Patterns The increased numbers of Russians arriving from other CIS

nations create both logistical and political problems. As in the

case of non-Russian refugees, statistical estimates of intra-CIS

migration vary widely, partly because Russia has not differentiated that category clearly from the refugee category and partly

because actual numbers are assumed to be much higher than

official registrations indicate. Many newly arrived Russians

(like non-Russians) simply settle with friends or relatives without official registration.

During Russia's problematic economic transition period, the

movement of comparatively large numbers of migrants has cre- ated substantial social friction, especially over the distribution

of scarce urban housing. Nationalist extremist political groups

have inflamed local resentment toward refugees of all types.

Friction is exacerbated by the state's meager efforts to support

migrant populations. Skilled immigrants show particular

resentment against a state that fails to provide opportunities

and even enough resources to survive, and these people often

have drifted into progressively more serious types of criminal

activity. Local populations uniformly resent resources provided

to migrants in their midst, and they attribute their own eco- nomic difficulties to the "strangers" among them, especially if those people are not of the same nationality. Particular tension

has been evident in North Ossetia, whose 17 percent immigration statistic is by far the highest in the Russian Federation, in

Stavropol' and Krasnodar territories, and in Orenburg, Kaluga,

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Russia: A Country Study

Voronezh, and Saratov oblasts, all of which have numbers of

migrants exceeding 1 percent of their populations.

By 1992 the International Red Cross had estimated that

about 150,000 ethnic Russians had migrated from CIS states, and at the end of 1993 the head of the FMS estimated that 2

million Russians and non-Russians had arrived from the near abroad in the first two post-Soviet years. As many as 300,000 of

the 375,000 Russians in Tajikistan left that country in the first years of the civil war that began in 1992, and in 1994 more than

half the Russian arrivals came from Chechnya, Azerbaijan,

Georgia, and Tajikistan. However, the structure of this group

changes according to security and political conditions in the

CIS states; by the end of 1994, almost 60 percent of Russian

arrivals came from Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan,

driven not by armed conflict but by local discrimination, and

the share of arrivals from the conflict states had declined to one-third. The official FMS estimate for 1995 was 963,000 people arriving in Russia from other CIS states, slightly lower than

the 1994 total. The number offorced migrants rose by 300,000

in 1995, however. The states of origin showing the largest

increases in 1995 were Kazakstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan,

and the Central Asian republics continued to account for more

than half the total CIS migrants.

Refugees and migrants from outside the federation have set- tled in most of the territory of Russia except for parts of the Far

North and ethnic republics such as Sakha, Chechnya, and Adygea. The largest numbers of settlers are in the North Caucasus,

the southern part of the chernozem agricultural zone of European Russia, the Volga region, and the industrial cities of the

adjacent Ural Mountains. Forced migrants show a decided

preference for cities. In the north and the east, almost 100 percent of all migrants settle in urban regions, but more than half

of migrants to south-central European Russia, the North Caucasus, and the Urals settle in rural areas. Because there has

been no state program for distributing forced migrants, they

have chosen destinations according to accessibility from their

starting point and the location of relatives. Russian refugees

seldom settle in an ethnic republic or a region with a high proportion of non-Russians, such as Orenburg Oblast; for that rea- son, their share of total refugees in the republics is less than 10

percent. Armenian refugees, mainly from the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave of Azerbaijan, are concentrated in the North Caucasus and Saratov Oblast, as well as the large cities and

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Physical Environment and Population

Kaliningrad Oblast on the Baltic Sea. Islamic refugees, mainly

Tatar, Bashkir, Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz, prefer the republics of

Tatarstan and Bashkortostan and adjacent regions with large

numbers of Tatars. National groups also have varying longterm intentions. Russians and Tatars tend to remain permanently in their new locations; Chechens mostly plan to return

to their homeland once conditions improve; and Armenians

and Germans are predominantly transit migrants en route to another country.

Future Prospects

The Russian Federation possesses a unique variety and scale

of geographic features, even after the collapse of the larger

Soviet Union, but it faces grave problems in managing its abundant natural resources. Although the potential remains for

constructive exploitation of Russia's environment, the eco- nomic and political condition of the country does not bode

well for an organized effort in that direction. Meanwhile, a large percentage of Russia's population is threatened by

numerous grave ecological hazards left behind by Soviet

regimes as well as by the tolerance the post-Soviet government

has for most of those conditions. In the mid-1990s, those

threats combine with other health problems, a low birthrate,

and a declining life expectancy to give Russia one of the least

positive demographic profiles in the world.

* * * Two classic authorities on the geography of Russia are Paul

E. Lydolph's Geography of the U.S.S.R. and David Hooson's The

Soviet Union: People and Regions. A post-Soviet treatment of the

topic is found in Russian Regions Today: Atlas of the New Federation, published in 1994 by the International Center in Washington, D.C. Environmental problems are discussed at length in

D.J. Peterson's Troubled Lands: The Legacy ofSoviet Environmental

Destruction and in Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under

Siege, edited by Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly. Information on the current demographic crisis is provided by Valentina

Bodrova's "Reproductive Behaviour of Russia's Population in

the Transition Period" and Penny Morvant's "Alarm over Fall- ing Life Expectancy." (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

167


The Firebird tears herselffrom the grasp of Tsarevich Ivan, who manages to retain one ofher beautiful tailfeathers (designfrom lacquer box made in vil- lage ofPakkh).
THE RUSSIAN STATE HAS EMERGED from the Soviet era dominated by an ethnic group, the Russians, whose language

prevails in most educational and government institutions, and

a religion, Russian Orthodoxy, that is professed by the vast majority of those citizens who admit to a religious preference.

In some respects, Russia's relative homogeneity in language

and religion is the result of the uniformity imposed by Soviet

rule. As they had in the centuries of tsarist rule, Russians con- tinued in the twentieth century to occupy a percentage of governing positions disproportionate even to their lopsided ethnic

majority. Enforced use of the Russian language was a chief

means of preserving Moscow's authority in the far-flung

regions of the Russian Republic, as it was in the other fourteen

Soviet republics. Although it was not spared the persecution

meted out to all faiths practiced in the Soviet Union, Russian

Orthodoxy retained its preeminence among religiously observant Russians throughout the seven decades of officially prescribed atheism.

In the 1990s, Russians continue to constitute the largest ethnic group in all but a handful of the Russian Federation's nominally ethnic republics, but leaders in many of the republics

and smaller ethnic jurisdictions have pressed the central government to grant measures of autonomy and other concessions

in the name of indigenous groups. The breakaway Republic of

Chechnya has taken the process to its furthest extreme, but in

the mid-1990s other republics—in the North Caucasus, Siberia,

and the Volga and Ural regions—were pushing hard to achieve

the local autonomy to which Soviet governments had only paid

lip service.

Meanwhile, the Russian Orthodox Church, long forced to rubber-stamp the cultural decisions of Soviet governments, has

moved rapidly in the 1990s toward a more balanced partnership in the governance of Russia's spiritual and secular life. Post-Soviet Western influences have brought new variety to the

spectrum of religious practice, but the loyalty to Orthodoxy of

average Russians and of the Russian government has become

clear as the church has added millions of professed believers in

the 1990s and the government has sought church advice on

many critical decisions. This renewed alliance has posed a chal171
Russia: A Country Study

lenge to the freedom of religion nominally guaranteed in the

1993 constitution.

The issue of language diversity has risen in parallel with

issues of local sovereignty. The Russian language retains its tra- ditional dominance in official communications and in the education system; however, the increasing unofficial use of the

federation's many minority languages shows that they survived

Soviet repression with the capacity to flourish anew as the central government's power has diminished.

Ethnic Composition

Russia is a multinational state that has inherited many of the

nationality problems that plagued the Soviet Union. The last official Soviet census, conducted in 1989, listed more than 100

nationalities. Several of those groups now predominantly

inhabit the independent nations that formerly were Soviet

republics. However, the Russian Federation—the most direct successor to the Soviet Union—still is home to more than 100

national minorities, whose members coexist uneasily with the

numerically and politically predominant Russians (see table 8, Appendix)

.

Besides the Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians),

who account for about 85 percent of Russia's population, three

main ethnic groups and a handful of isolated smaller groups

reside within the federation. The Altaic group includes mainly

speakers of Turkic languages widely distributed in the middle

Volga, the southern Ural Mountains, the North Caucasus, and

above the Arctic Circle. The main Altaic peoples in Russia are the Balkars, Bashkirs, Buryats, Chuvash, Dolgans, Evenks,

Kalmyks, Karachay, Kumyks, Nogay, and Yakuts. The Uralic

group, consisting of Finnic peoples living in the upper Volga,

the far northwest, and the Urals, includes the Karelians, Komi,

Mari, Mordovians, and Udmurts. The Caucasus group is con- centrated along the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains; its main subgroups are the Adyghs, Chechens, Cherkess,

Ingush, and Kabardins, as well as about thirty Caucasus peoples

collectively classified as Dagestani (see Minority Peoples and

Their Territories, this ch.).

In the Soviet Union, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist

Republic (RSFSR) contained thirty-one autonomous, ethnically based administrative units. When the Russian Federation

proclaimed its sovereignty in the wake of the Soviet Union's

collapse in late 1991, many of those entities also declared their

172
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

sovereignty. Of the thirty-one, sixteen were autonomous republics, five were autonomous oblasts (provinces), and ten were autonomous regions (okruga; sing., okrug), which were part of

larger subnational jurisdictions. During the Soviet era, the

autonomy referred to in these jurisdictions' official titles was more fictitious than real—the executive committees that

administered the jurisdictions had no decision-making authority. All major administrative tasks were performed by the central government or, in the case of some social services, by

industrial enterprises in the area. In postcommunist Russia,

however, many of the autonomous areas have staked claims to more meaningful sovereignty as the numerically superior Russians continue to dominate the center of power in Moscow (see

The Federation Treaty and Regional Power, ch. 7) . Even in the

many regions where Russians are in the majority, such claims

have been made in the name of the indigenous ethnic group

or groups.

According to the 1989 Soviet census, Russians constituted

81.5 percent of the population of what is now the Russian Federation. The next-largest groups were Tatars (3.8 percent),

Ukrainians (3.0 percent), Chuvash (1.2 percent), Bashkirs (0.9

percent), Belorussians (0.8 percent), and Mordovians (0.7 percent). Other groups totaling more than 0.5 percent of the population each were Armenians, Avars, Chechens, Germans, Jews,

Kazaks, Mari, and Udmurts. In 1992 an estimated 7.8 million

people native to the other fourteen former Soviet republics were living in Russia.

The Russians

The ethnic group that came to be known as the Russians

sprang from the East Slavs, one of the three groups into which

the original Slavic people divided sometime before the seventh

century A.D. The West Slavs eventually became differentiated

as the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks; the South Slavs divided into

the Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. The East Slavic

tribes settled along the Dnepr River in present-day Ukraine in

the first centuries A.D. From that region, they then spread

northward and eastward. In the ninth century, these tribes constituted the largest part of the population of Kievan Rus1 , the

medieval state ruled by a Varangian dynasty from Scandinavia

(see The East Slavs and the Varangians, ch. 1).

The East Slavs became more politically united in the tenth

century when they adopted Christianity as the state religion of

173
Russia: A Country Study

Kievan Rus'. Nevertheless, tribal and regional differences were

exacerbated in subsequent centuries as the state expanded,

bringing the East Slavs into contact with other ethnic groups

on their borders. Thus, Baltic and Finno-Ugric tribes mixed

with the East Slavs to the northwest and the northeast, respectively. By the time the state of Kievan Rus1 began disintegrating

into independent principalities in the twelfth century, the East

Slavs had begun to evolve into three peoples with distinct lin- guistic and cultural characteristics: the Russians to the north

and northeast of Kiev, the Belorussians to the northwest of

Kiev, and the Ukrainians in the Kiev region and to its south and

southwest. In the thirteenth century, the invasion of the Mongols brought the final collapse of Kievan Rus' as a political

entity, accelerating differentiation and consolidation of the

three ethnic groups (see The Golden Age of Kiev, ch. 1).

Although the three groups remained related culturally, linguistically, and religiously, each of them also was influenced by dif- ferent political, economic, religious, and social developments

that further separated them.

Building a state of increasing vitality as the Mongol occupation weakened in the fourteenth century, the principality of

Muscovy became the base from which the Russian cultural and

political systems expanded under a series of strong rulers. By

the end of the nineteenth century, Russians had settled the

remote stretches of Siberia to the Pacific Ocean and colonized

Central Asia and the Caucasus, becoming in the process the

most numerous and ubiquitous of the Slavic peoples (see Ruling the Empire, ch. 1).

Minority Peoples and Their Territories

With a few changes in status in the post-World War II period,

the autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic retained the classifications assigned to them in the 1920s or

1930s. In all cases, the postcommunist Russian government

officially changed the term "autonomous republic" to "republic" in 1992. According to the 1989 Soviet census, in only fif- teen of the thirty-one ethnically designated republics and

autonomous regions were the "indigenous" people the largest

group. Of the twenty-one republics existing in Russia in the

mid-1990s, nine fell into this category, with the smallest percentages of Russians in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and

North Ossetia. Each region designated by ethnic group is

174
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

home to the majority of Russia's population of that group (see

table 9, Appendix).

The border-drawing process that occurred in tsarist times

and in the first decades of Soviet rule sometimes divided rather

than united ethnic populations. The Buryats of southern Siberia, for example, were divided among the Buryat Autonomous

Republic and Chita and Irkutsk oblasts, which were created to the east and west of the republic, respectively; that population

division remains in the post-Soviet era. By contrast, the Chechens and Ingush were united in a single republic until 1992, and

smaller groups such as the Khanty and the Mansi were grouped

together in single autonomous regions.

Of the sixteen autonomous republics that existed in Russia

at the time of the Soviet Union's breakup, one (the ChechenIngush Autonomous Republic) split into two in 1992, with

Chechnya subsequently declaring full independence as the

Republic of Chechnya and with Ingushetia gaining recognition

as a separate republic of the Russian Federation. Three Soviet- era autonomous oblasts (Gorno-Altay, Adygea, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia) were granted republic status under the Federation Treaty of 1992, which established the respective powers of

the central and republic governments. Two republics, Chechnya and Tatarstan, did not sign the treaty at that time. Most

provisions of the Federation Treaty were overtaken by provisions of the 1993 constitution or by subsequent bilateral agreements between the central government and the republics.

After the changes of the immediate post-Soviet years, twenty- one nationality-based republics existed in the Russian Federation and were recognized in the constitution of 1993 (see table

10, Appendix). They are Adygea, Bashkortostan, Buryatia,

Chechnya, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Gorno-Altay, Ingushetia,

Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Karelia, Khakassia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, North Ossetia, Sakha

(Yakutia), Tatarstan, Tyva (Tuva), and Udmurtia.

Besides the republics, the constitution recognizes ten autonomous regions, whose status, like that of the republics, is based

on the presence of one or two ethnic groups. These jurisdictions typically are sparsely populated, rich in natural resources, and inclined to seek independence from the larger units to which they belong. The existence and configuration of Russia's

other jurisdictions are determined by geographical or political

factors rather than ethnicity. The ten autonomous regions are the Aga Buryat, Chukchi, Evenk, Khanty-Mansi, Koryak,

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Russia: A Country Study

Nenets, Permyak, Taymyr, Ust'-Orda Buryat, and YamaloNenets autonomous regions. A Jewish Autonomous Oblast

(Yevreyskaya avtonomnaya oblast', now known as Birobidzhan) was established in 1934. Russians are the majority of the population in all but the Aga Buryat Autonomous Region (whose

population is 55 percent Buryats) and the Permyak Autonomous Region (whose population is 60 percent Komi-Permyak, one of the three subgroups of the Komi people). More typical

is the Evenk Autonomous Region in Siberia west of the Republic of Sakha, where the Evenks are outnumbered by Russians

17,000 to 3,000. In fact, the Evenks, originally a nomadic and

clan-based group whose society was nearly destroyed by Soviet

collectivization in the 1930s, are among the indigenous peoples of Russia whose survival experts fear is endangered.

The North Caucasus

The region of Russia adjoining the north slope of the Caucasus range includes eight republics—Adygea, Chechnya,

Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia. The North Caucasus

retains its historical reputation as a trouble spot, although the

majority of the region's republics are relatively peaceful and

undeveloped.

The Adygh (or Adygey) Autonomous Oblast was established

in 1922 as part of Krasnoyarsk Territory; between 1922 and

1928, it was known as the Cherkess (Adygh) Autonomous

Oblast. It was redesignated as the Republic of Adygea in 1992.

A landlocked sliver of land, Adygea occupies 7,600 square kilometers just inland from the northeast coast of the Black Sea,

reaching southward to the northern foothills of the Caucasus

Mountains. The oblast was formed by the early Soviet government for the Adygh people, who are one of three branches of

the Cherkess, or Circassian, tribes—the other two being the

Cherkess and the Kabardins. The general group from which

these three peoples descend has occupied the northern border

of the Caucasus Mountains at least since the Greeks began

exploring beyond the Black Sea in the eighth century B.C. The

Adyghs, most of whom accepted Islam early in the nineteenth

century, speak a Caucasian language.

In 1995 the Adyghs constituted 22 percent of the population

of Adygea, which was estimated at 450,400. The rest consisted

of 68 percent Russians, 3 percent Ukrainians, and 2 percent

Armenians. Adygea is the only Muslim republic of the Russian

176
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

Federation where the Muslim share of the population has

decreased in the last two decades. The official languages are Russian and Adygh. Rich soil is the basis for an agricultural

economy specializing in grains, tobacco, sugar beets, vegetables, fruits, cattle, poultry, and beekeeping. Processing of

meats, tobacco, dairy products, and canned goods is an important industry. The republic's only substantial mineral resource under exploitation is an extensive natural gas and oil deposit.

The capital city, Maykop, is the main industrial center, with

metallurgical, machine-building, and timber-processing plants.

Chechnya has been the scene of the most violent of the separatist movements against the Russian Federation (see Movements Toward Sovereignty, this ch.; Chechnya, ch. 9; Security

Operations in Chechnya, ch. 10). The Chechens and Ingush

belong to ancient Caucasian peoples, mainly Muslim, who have

lived in the same region in the northern Caucasus Mountains

since prehistoric times. The two groups speak similar languages

but have different historical backgrounds. The ChechenIngush Autonomous Oblast was established in 1934 by combining two separate oblasts that had existed since the early 1920s.

In 1936 the oblast was redesignated an autonomous republic,

but both ethnic groups were exiled to Central Asia in 1944 for

alleged collaboration with the invading Germans.

The republic was reinstated in 1957, and what was left of the

original population was allowed to return. In the three decades

following their return, the Chechen and Ingush populations

recovered rapidly, accounting in 1989 for 66 percent of the

population of their shared republic. At that time, the Chechen

population was about 760,000, the Ingush about 170,000. This

proportion reflects approximately the relative size of the two

regions after they split into separate republics in 1992. (Ingushetia occupies a sliver of land between Chechnya and North

Ossetia; in 1995 its population was estimated at 254,100.) In

1989 Russians constituted about 23 percent of the combined

population of Chechnya and Ingushetia, their numbers having

declined steadily for decades.

The most important product of what now is known as the

Republic of Chechnya (and officially called the Republic of

Chechnya-Ichkeria within the republic) is refined petroleum.

The capital, Groznyy, was one of the most important refining

centers in southern Russia prior to its virtual annihilation in

the conflict of 1995-96. Several major pipelines connect

Groznyy refineries with the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, and

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Russia: A Country Study

Russian industrial centers to the north. The republic's other

important industries are petrochemical and machinery manufacturing and food processing. When the Chechen-Ingush

Autonomous Republic split in June 1992, Chechnya retained

most of the industrial base.

Both the Chechens and the Ingush remain strongly attached

to clan and tribal relations as the structure of their societies.

Primary use of their respective North Caucasian languages has

remained above 95 percent, despite the long period that the

two groups spent in exile. Chechnya was fully converted to Islam by the seventeenth century, Ingushetia only in the nineteenth century. But the region has a two-century history of holy war against Russian authority. When the indigenous populations were exiled in 1944, Soviet authorities attempted to expunge Islam entirely from the region by closing all mosques.

Although the mosques remained closed when the Chechens

and Ingush returned, clandestine religious organizations

spread rapidly.

Despite the close ethnic relationship of the Ingush and

Chechen peoples, the Ingush opted to remain within the Russian Federation after Chechnya initially declared its sovereignty

in 1991. In June 1992, Ingushetia declared itself a sovereign

republic within the Russian Federation. At that time, Ingushetia claimed part of neighboring North Ossetia as well. When

hostilities arose between the Chechens and the Ingush following their split, Russian troops were deployed between the two

ethnic territories. Ingushetia opposed Russia's occupation of

Chechnya, but it supported the regime of President Boris N.

Yeltsin on other issues in the mid-1990s. The capital of Ingushetia is Nazran.

The Republic of Dagestan, formerly the Dagestan (or

Daghestan) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Dagestan

ASSR), occupies 50,300 square kilometers along the western

shore of the Caspian Sea, from the border with Azerbaijan in

the south to a point about 150 kilometers south of the Volga

River delta in the north. Arriving along the Volga, Russians first settled the area in the fifteenth century, but Dagestan was not

annexed by the Russian Empire until 1813. During 1920-22

most of the Dagestani people joined the Chechens in a widespread revolt against Soviet power; some of the secret Islamic

orders that led the revolt continued to practice terrorism

through the Soviet period. Designated an autonomous republic in 1921, Dagestan lost some of its territory in 1941 and 1957;

178
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

most of the original republic was restored in 1957. In the Soviet

period, the Muslim majority suffered severe religious repression.

Unlike the other autonomous republics, Dagestan does not

derive its existence from the presence of one particular group.

Besides its Russian population (9.2 percent of the total in

1989), Dagestan is home to an estimated thirty ethnic groups

and eighty nationalities, who speak Caucasian, Iranian, and

Turkic languages and account for more than 80 percent of the

population. The ten non-Slavic groups identified by Soviet censuses within the population of about 2 million are, in order of

size, Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Laks, Tabasarans, Nogay,

Rutuls, Tsakhurs, and Aguls. Colonies of Azerbaijanis (4.2 percent in 1989) and Chechens (3.2 percent) also exist. Knowledge of Arabic and the teachings of Islam are more widespread

in Dagestan than in any other Russian republic. In the 1990s,

tension has existed among the many ethnic groups, accompanied by a debate over whether the republic should be organized on a unitary or federative basis. The Avars, known for their warrior heritage, live mostly in

the isolated western part of the republic, retaining much of

their traditional village lifestyle. Numbering nearly 600,000,

the Avars are by far the largest ethnic group in Dagestan. The

Lezgins (also seen as Lezghins and Lezgians) are the dominant

group in southern Dagestan; because of the Lezgins' location,

their society has been more affected by foreign cultural influ- ence than the other groups. Like the Avars, the Dargins,

divided into several distinct groups, maintain their village communities in relative isolation. The Kumyks, the largest Turkic

group in the republic, are descendants of the Central Asian

Kipchak tribes; they inhabit northern Dagestan.

The Laks, a small, homogeneous group, occupy central Dagestan; their region was the original center of Islam on the

upper Caspian coast. The Tabasarans, who live in southern

Dagestan, are strongly influenced by the more numerous Lezgins, although folk practices such as vendettas persist. The

steppe-dwelling Nogay of Dagestan, the second Turkic group in

the republic, are descendents of one of two Nogay hordes of

the Middle Ages; the second and larger group settled to the

west, in Stavropol' Territory, and speaks a different language.

The Tsakhurs, Rutuls, and Aguls are small, isolated groups of

mountain people who lack a written language and largely have

preserved their traditional social structures. The capital city,

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Russia: A Country Study

Makhachkala, is located in southern Dagestan, on the Caspian

Sea, in a region dominated by the Lezgins.

Most of the rural population raises livestock in the republic's

hilly terrain. Dagestan is rich in oil, natural gas, coal, and other

minerals; swift rivers offer abundant hydroelectric-power

potential. The polyglot nature of Dagestan has made linguistic

unity impossible; among the major groups, only the Nogay language is said to be declining in usage. Besides Azerbaijani and

Russian, six languages were recognized as official languages in

the late Soviet period.

Kabardino-Balkaria, the territory of the Kabardin and Balkar

peoples, is located along the north-central border of Georgia

and the northern slope of the Caucasus Mountains. Occupying

about 12,500 square kilometers, the autonomous republic was

established in 1936 after fourteen years as an autonomous

oblast. In 1944 the Balkars, like certain other North Caucasus

groups, were deported to Central Asia because of their alleged

collaboration with the Nazis, and the region was renamed the

Kabardin Autonomous Oblast. Republic status was restored in

1957 when the Balkars were allowed to return. In 1992 both

the Kabardins and the Balkars opted to establish separate

republics within the Russian Federation, using an ethnic

boundary established in 1863, but the incumbent parliament

of the republic declared the separation unlawful. Since that

time, the issue of the republic's configuration has awaited a ref- erendum. In 1994 Kabardino-Balkaria signed a bilateral treaty

with Russia defining respective areas ofjurisdiction within the

federation. In the fifteenth century, Crimean Tatars and Ottoman Turks

brought Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school to the territory that

is now Kabardino-Balkaria, but Muslim precepts have been

observed rather superficially since that time. A small group of

Christian Kabardins remains. Despite Russian immigration into

the republic, the Muslim Kabardins and Balkars now constitute

nearly 60 percent of the republic's population, which was esti- mated at 800,000 in 1995. Of that number, 48 percent were

Kabardin, 9 percent Balkar, and 32 percent Russian, according

to the 1989 census. Although the tribal system of the Kabardins disappeared

with the first contact with Russians, some aspects of the traditional clan system persist in society, and family customs are

carefully preserved. Unlike other ethnic groups in the region,

the Kabardins were strongly pro-Russian in tsarist times; they

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

did not participate in the numerous uprisings of Caucasus peoples between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. This

affinity survived into the Soviet period despite the dominant

position of the aristocracy in Kabardin society.

The economy of Kabardino-Balkaria is based on substantial

deposits of gold, chromium, nickel, platinum, iron ore, molybdenum, tungsten, and tin. The main industries are metallurgy,

timber and food processing, the manufacture of oil-drilling

equipment, and hydroelectric power generation. The republic's capital is Nalchik.

The former Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

(Kalmyk ASSR) is located in the Caspian Lowland, on the

northwestern shore of the Caspian Sea. It has an area of 75,900

square kilometers and a population of about 350,000 (in

1995).

The Kalmyks, also known as the Oirots, were seminomadic

Mongol people who migrated from Central Asia in the six- teenth century. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

much of the Kalmyk population was dispersed or extinguished

by Russian authorities, and the nomadic lifestyle largely disappeared during this period.

The republic was established in 1920 as an autonomous

oblast. The Kalmyk ASSR was established in 1935, dissolved in

1943, then reconstituted in 1958, when its indigenous people were allowed to return from the exile imposed in 1944 for

alleged collaboration with the Nazis. The republic officially

changed its name to Kalmykia in February 1992. In 1989 the

republic's population was 45 percent Kalmyk, 38 percent Russian, 6 percent Dagestani peoples, 3 percent Chechen, 2 percent Kazak, and 2 percent German. The Kalmyk economy is based on the raising of livestock, particularly sheep, and the

population is mainly rural; the capital and largest city, Elista,

had about 85,000 people in 1989.

Until 1992 an autonomous oblast, the Republic of

Karachayevo-Cherkessia occupies 14,100 square kilometers

along the northern border of Georgia's Abkhazian Autonomous Republic. A single autonomous region was formed in

1922 for the Cherkess (Circassian) and Karachay peoples; then

separate regions existed between 1928 and 1943. The regions

were recombined in 1943 as an autonomous oblast. The

Cherkess converted to Islam after contacts with Crimean Tatars

and Turks; the Karachay are an Islamic Turkic group. The

Cherkess are the remnants of a once-dominant Circassian

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Russia: A Country Study

group of tribes that were dispersed, mostly to the Ottoman

Empire, by the Russian conquest of the Caucasus region in the

early nineteenth century. The original Cherkess now inhabit

three republics, divided among five tribal groups: the Adyghs,

Kabardins, Balkars, Karachay, and Cherkess (who inherited the

original generic name).

The Balkars and the Karachay belong to the same overall

Turkic group, although the latter live in the Republic of

Karachayevo-Cherkessia immediately west of KabardinoBalkaria on the north slope of the Caucasus Mountains. Like

the Chechens and the Ingush, the Karachay were exiled to Central Asia during World War II. The Cherkess and the

Karachay were reunited when the latter were returned from

exile in 1957. Established in 1992, the republic is mainly rural,

with an economy based on livestock breeding and grain cultivation. Some mining, chemical, and wood-processing facilities also exist. The population, which was estimated at 422,000 in

1990, was 42 percent Russian, 31 percent Karachay, and 10 percent Cherkess. The capital city is Cherkessk.

North Ossetia, called Alania in the republic's 1994 constitution, is located along the northern border of Georgia, between

the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia. The Ossetians are of Iranian and Caucasian origin, and they speak an

Iranian language. In the first centuries A.D., Ossetia was occu- pied by the Alani tribe, ancestors of the modern Ossetians. In

the thirteenth century, the Tatars drove the Alani into the

mountains; Russian settlers began arriving in the eighteenth

century. Russia annexed Ossetia in 1861. In 1924 North Ossetia

became an autonomous region of the Soviet Union; in 1936 it was declared an autonomous republic. In 1992 the campaign

for separation waged by Georgia's South Ossetian Autonomous

Oblast directly to the south drew significant support from compatriots to the north. North Ossetia is the only Caucasus republic of the Russian Federation to give official support to Russia's

occupation of nearby Chechnya.

In 1995 the republic's population was estimated at 660,000,

of which 53 percent were Ossetian, 29 percent Russian, 5 percent Ingush, 2 percent Armenian, and 2 percent Ukrainian.

The area of North Ossetia totals about 8,000 square kilometers.

The outputs of industry and agriculture were of approximately

equal value in 1993. The main industries, concentrated in the

capital city of Vladikavkaz, are metalworking, wood processing,

textiles, food processing, and distilling of alcoholic beverages.

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

The main crops are corn, wheat, potatoes, hemp, and fruit.

Lead, zinc, and boron are mined.

The Northern Republics

Karelia and Komi, the two northernmost republics of European Russia, occupy a sizable portion of the latitudes north of

Moscow. Both are rich in natural resources, exploitation of

which has caused considerable environmental damage.

At 172,400 square kilometers, Karelia is the fourth largest of

the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. The

republic shares a border with Finland from the Kola Peninsula

in the north to Lake Ladoga in the south. The Karelians are of

the same ethnic stock as the Finns. The status of Karelia has

changed several times in the twentieth century. When Karelia

first became an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union in

1923, it included only the territory known as Eastern Karelia,

which had been Russian territory since 1323. When Western

Karelia was gained from the Finns in 1940, the enlarged Karelia

became a full republic of the Soviet Union, called the KareloFinnish Republic. After World War II, the southwestern corner

of the republic, including its only stretch of open-water sea- coast on the Gulf of Finland, became part of the Russian

Republic. In 1956 the regime of Nikita S. Khrushchev (in office

1953-64) redesignated the artificial entity, which never came

close to having a Karelian majority, as the Karelian ASSR. In

1994 the republic's population of about 800,200 was 74 percent

Russian, only 10 percent Karelian, 7 percent Belarusian, and 4

percent Ukrainian. The dominant religion is Russian Orthodoxy.

In a region dominated by forests, lakes, and marshes, the

Karelian economy is supported mainly by logging, mining, and

fishing. The plentiful mineral resources include construction

stone, zinc, lead, silver, copper, molybdenum, aluminum,

nickel, platinum, tin, barite, and iron ore. Industries include

timber and mineral processing, and the manufacturing of furniture, chemicals, and paper. The capital of Karelia is Petrozavodsk.

The Republic of Komi extends westward from the northern

end of the Ural Mountains across the Pechora River basin; the

republic's westernmost extension is about 250 kilometers east of Arkhangelsk and the White Sea. The region, which as a republic occupies 415,900 square kilometers, was annexed by

the principality of Muscovy in the fourteenth century, princi183
Russia: A Country Study

pally because of its rich fur-trading potential. In the eighteenth

century, Russians began exploiting mineral and timber

resources. The Komi people, a Finno-Ugric group, traditionally

have herded reindeer, hunted, and fished. They nominally

accepted Russian Orthodoxy in the fourteenth century. In

1921 the Soviet government designated an autonomous oblast

for the Komi, and in 1936 the oblast became an autonomous

republic. The Komi include three ethnic subgroups: the Permyaks, who inhabit the Permyak Autonomous Region south of

the republic; the Yazua, who live in both the Republic of Komi

and the Permyak region; and the Zyryan, who account for the

majority of the republic's Komi population. Altogether, in 1994

the Komi constituted 23 percent of the 1.2 million people of

their republic, which had a 58 percent Russian majority. Long

isolated by the forbidding climate of their region, the Komi of

the north have intermixed with other ethnic groups only in

recent decades.

Located just southwest of the oil-rich YamalTeninsula, Komi

has become an important producer of oil and natural gas; in

1994 a pipeline leak caused extensive damage to the tundra

and rivers in the Pechora Basin. Vorkuta, in the far northeast- ern corner of the republic near the Kara Sea, is an important

Arctic coal-mining center. The capital of Komi is Syktyvkar.

The Volga and Ural Republics

Forming a crescent from the middle Volga to the southern

extent of Russia's Ural Mountains, six republics represent a

variety of ethnic and religious groups. Included in this group

are the republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, two of Russia's richest and most independent republics.

Bashkortostan is the name assumed in 1992 by the former

Bashkir ASSR, which also had been called Bashkiria. The

republic occupies an area of 143,600 square kilometers in the

far southeastern corner of European Russia, bounded on the

east by the Ural Mountains and within seventy kilometers of

the Kazakstan border at its southernmost point. The region was

settled by nomads of the steppe, the Turkic Bashkirs, during

the thirteenth-century domination by the Golden Horde (see

Glossary; The Mongol Invasion, ch. 1). Russians arrived in the

mid-sixteenth century, founding the city of Ufa, now the republic's capital. Numerous local uprisings broke out in opposition

to the settlement of larger Russian populations in the centuries

that followed. The Bashkirs finally give up nomadic life in the

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

nineteenth century, adopting the agricultural lifestyle that

remains their primary means of support. The traditional clanbased social structure has largely disappeared. The predominant religions of the Bashkir population are Islam—observed

by the majority—and Russian Orthodoxy. A major battleground of the Russian Civil War (1918-21), in 1919 Bashkiria was the first ethnic region to be designated an autonomous

republic of Russia under the new communist regime. The

republic declared its sovereignty within the Soviet Union in

1990, and in 1992 it declared full independence. Two years

later, Bashkortostan agreed to remain within the legislative

framework of the Russian Federation, provided that mutual

areas of competence were agreed upon.

The republic has rich mineral resources, especially oil, natural gas, iron ore, manganese, copper, salt, and construction

stone. The Soviet government built a variety of heavy industries

on that resource base, and the republic's economy is relatively

prosperous. The traditional Bashkir occupations of livestock

raising and beekeeping remain important economic activities. Bashkortostan's population was about 4 million in 1995. In

1989 the major ethnic groups were Russians (39 percent),

Tatars (28 percent), Bashkirs (22 percent), Chuvash (3 percent), and Mari (3 percent).

The Republic of Chuvashia, the former Chuvash ASSR, occupies about 18,000 square kilometers along the east bank of the

Volga River, about sixty kilometers west of the river's conflu- ence with the Kama River and some 700 kilometers east of Moscow. The Chuvash are a Turkic people whose territory first was

settled and annexed by Ivan IV (the Terrible; r. 1533-84) in the

sixteenth century (see Ivan IV, ch. 1). At that time, the Chuvash

already were a settled agricultural people. In 1920 Chuvashia

became an autonomous oblast, and in 1925 it was redesignated an autonomous republic. The republic declared its sovereignty

within the Soviet Union in 1990. The primary economic activities are agricultural; grain and fruit production and logging are emphasized. Except for phosphates and gypsum, Chuvashia

lacks significant amounts of minerals and fuels. The Chuvash speak a unique Turkic language and are

believed to have descended from the same stock as the modern

Bulgarians, whose ancestors migrated from the area. The Chuvash also are the only Turkic ethnic group in Russia to have

converted en masse to Russian Orthodoxy. In 1995 the Chuvash constituted 68 percent of the population of their republic,

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Russia: A Country Study

which totaled about 1.4 million. Other groups are Russians (27

percent), Tatars (3 percent), and Mordovians (1 percent). The

capital city is Cheboksary.

The Republic of Mari El, formerly the Mari ASSR, is located

in the middle Volga Basin on the north shore of the river,

directly east of the city of Nizhniy Novgorod (formerly

Gor'kiy). The Finno-Ugric Mari people, also known as Cheremiss, first came into contact with the Russians in the sixteenth

century, when the major Tatar outpost of Kazan', just downstream from the current republic, fell to Ivan IV. The autonomous oblast of Mari was established in 1920; an autonomous

republic was designated in 1936. The economy is based mainly

on timber products, agriculture, and machine building; the

region is not rich in mineral resources. In 1989 the largest ethnic group was the Russians, who make up 48 percent of the

population, with Mari constituting 45 percent and Tatars 6 percent. The predominant religion is Russian Orthodoxy,

although some traces of animism remain in the Mari population. The total population in 1995 was 754,000, about 60 percent of whom dwell in cities. The republic's area is 23,300

square kilometers. The capital city is Yoshkar Ola.

Formerly the Mordovian (or Mordvinian) ASSR, Mordovia

(or Mordvinia) is located at the southwestern extreme of the

middle Volga cluster of autonomous republics that also

includes Tatarstan, Mari El, Udmurtia, and Chuvashia. Belonging to the Finno-Ugric ethnic group, the Mordovians were tra- ditionally agriculturalists, known especially as beekeepers. The

first Russians reached the area in the twelfth century, and Muscovy had taken full control of Mordovia by the seventeenth century. After receiving the status of autonomous oblast in 1930,

Mordovia was declared an autonomous republic in 1934.

Although the Mordovians nominally accepted Russian Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, they retain significant remnants of their pre-Christian beliefs, as well as national costumes

and social practices. In 1995 Russians constituted about 61 percent of the republic's population of approximately 964,000. Another 33 percent were Mordovians, and 5 percent were Tatars. The total area of

Mordovia is 26,200 square kilometers. The republic's economy

is based mainly on agriculture, especially the cultivation of

grains, tobacco, hemp, and vegetables. Industry includes some

machine building and chemical manufacturing, as well as

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

enterprises based on timber and metals. The capital of Mordovia is Saransk.

Located in the middle Volga east of Mari El and Chuvashia

and west of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan was established as an autonomous republic in 1920 for one segment of the large and

widespread Tatar population of the Russian Republic. In the

1980s, less than one-third of Russia's Tatars lived in the republic designated for them. Extensive populations of Tatars, who

are predominantly Muslim, are scattered throughout Russia as well as most of the other former Soviet republics. In the late

Soviet period, numerous Tatars migrated to the Central Asian

republics, in particular Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The population of Tatarstan, about 3.8 million in 1995, is second only to that of Bashkortostan among Russia's republics. According to the 1989 census, the population was 49 percent Tatar, 43 percent Russian, 4 percent Chuvash, 1 percent Ukrainian, and 1 percent Mordovian.

The Tatars are a Turkic people whose language belongs to the Kipchak group and has several regional dialects. The

region of present-day Tatarstan was occupied by the Mongols

when the Golden Horde swept across the middle Volga region

in the early thirteenth century. When the Mongol Empire fragmented two centuries later, one of its constituent parts, the

Tatar Kazan' Khanate, inherited the middle Volga and held the

region until its defeat by Ivan IV. Shortly thereafter, Russian

colonization began.

Tatarstan has a diversified, well-developed economy that has

been the basis of bold claims of independence from the Russian Federation beginning in 1992 (see Movements Toward

Sovereignty, this ch.). The first World Congress of Tatars was

held in the republic's capital, Kazan', in June 1992. About 1,200

delegates attended from Tatarstan and the Tatar diaspora to discuss the republic's status. In 1994 a bilateral agreement with

the Yeltsin administration satisfied some of the republic's

claims to sovereignty.

In 1995 the discovery of a large oil field in northern Tatar- stan promised to boost the sagging local economy; oil extrac- tion already was Tatarstan's most important industry. Other

major industries include chemical manufacturing, machine

building, and the manufacture of vehicles and paper products.

The agricultural sector produces grains, potatoes, sugar beets,

hemp, tobacco, apples, dairy products, and livestock.

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Russia: A Country Study

Udmurtia, formerly the Udmurt ASSR, occupies 42,100

square kilometers north of Tatarstan on the lower reaches of

the Kama River, northeast of the confluence of the Kama and

the Volga. The Udmurts are a Finno-Ugric people whose terri- tory was occupied by the Kazan' Khanate in the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries, then passed to Russian control when Ivan

IV captured Kazan' in 1552. Originally established as the Votyak

Autonomous Oblast in 1920, the territory was renamed for the

Udmurts in 1932, then redesignated an autonomous republic

in 1934. In 1995 the republic's population was about 1.5 million, of which 59 percent was Russian, 31 percent Udmurt, 7

percent Tatar, 1 percent Ukrainian, and 1 percent Mari.

Located in the industrial zone of the south Ural Mountains,

Udmurtia has a substantial and diversified industrial economy

that emphasizes locomotives and rolling stock, metallurgy,

machine tools, construction materials, clothing, leather, and

food processing. The capital city, Izhevsk, is also the largest

industrial center. The most important agricultural products are

grains, vegetables, and livestock.

The Republics of Siberia

Of the five republics located east of the Urals in Asian Russia, four—Buryatia, Gorno-Altay, Khakassia, and Tyva—extend

along Russia's southern border with Mongolia. The fifth, Sakha

(formerly Yakutia), is Russia's largest subnational jurisdiction

and the possessor of a large and varied supply of valuable natural resources. The Republic of Buryatia, formerly the Buryat ASSR, occupies 351,300 square kilometers along the eastern shore of Lake

Baikal and along the north-central border of Mongolia. The

Buryats, a nomadic herding people of Mongolian stock, first faced colonization by Russian settlers in the seventeenth century. After initially resisting this intrusion, most of the Buryats

eventually adapted to life in farming settlements, which contin- ues to be the predominant mode of existence. In 1989 the

Buryats constituted only about 24 percent of the republic's

population; Russians made up about 70 percent. The total

Buryat population of the Soviet Union in the 1980s was about

390,000, with about 150,000 living in the adjacent oblasts of

Chita and Irkutsk. In 1994 the population of the republic was

1.1 million, of which more than one-third lived in the capital

city, Ulan-Ude.

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

Buryatia possesses rich mineral resources, notably bauxite,

coal, gold, iron, rare earth minerals, uranium, manganese,

molybdenum, nickel, and tungsten. Livestock raising, fur farming, hunting, and fishing are important economic pursuits of

the indigenous population. The main industries derive from

coal extraction, timber harvesting, and engineering.

Gorno-Altay was established in 1922 as the Oirot Autonomous Oblast, for the Mongol people of that name. In 1948 the

region was renamed the Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast.

Redesignated a republic in 1992, the region took its present

name—the Republic of Gorno-Altay, or simply Altay (the ver- nacular term omits gorno, which means mountainous in Russian) —in that year. Occupying 92,600 square kilometers on the

north slope of the Altay Range on the northeast border of

Kazakstan, Gorno-Altay had a population in 1995 of 200,000, of

whom 60 percent were Russian and 31 percent Altay. About 83

percent of Russia's total Altay population lives in the Republic

of Gorno-Altay. The Altay people comprise several Turkicspeaking tribes living in the Altay and Kuznetsk Alatau mountains. Several collective terms have been applied to the overall

group, including "Oirot," which was used in tsarist times. The

Altays first came into contact with Russians in the eighteenth

century, when colonization of the region began. Some conversion to Christianity occurred in the nineteenth century, but

substantial numbers of Altays returned to their previous Mongolian Lamaism in the early twentieth century, as part of a general movement against Russian domination. In the post-Soviet

era, most of the republic's population is Orthodox Christian.

The economy of Gorno-Altay is primarily agricultural, supported mainly by livestock raising in the hillsides and valleys

that dominate the republic's landscape. Gold and other precious and nonprecious minerals—especially the rare earth

minerals tantalum and cesium—support a small mining industry, and Gorno-Altay possesses rich coniferous forests. The

main industries, mostly based on local resources, are the manufacture of clothing, footwear, and foods, and the processing of

chemicals and minerals. The capital of the republic is GornoAltaysk.

Khakassia, an autonomous oblast that was redesignated an autonomous republic in 1992, is located about 1,000 kilometers west of Lake Baikal on the upper Yenisey River. Before the

arrival of the first Russians in the seventeenth century, Khakassia was a regional power in Siberia, based on commercial links

189
Russia: A Country Study

with the khanates of Central Asia and with the Chinese Empire.

The sparsely populated republic (total population in 1995 was about 600,000) occupies 61,900 square kilometers of hilly ter- rain at the far northwestern end of the Altay Range. The Khakass people are a formerly nomadic Turkic Siberian group

whose modern-day sedentary existence depends on sheep and

goat husbandry. Russians now constitute nearly 80 percent of

the population of Khakassia, although in 1989 more than

three-quarters of oblast residents spoke Khakass. The Khakass

population is 11 percent of the total. The republic produces

timber, copper, iron ore, gold, molybdenum, and tungsten.

The capital of Khakassia is Abakan.

Sakha, whose name was changed from Yakutia in 1994, is by

far the largest of the republics in size. It occupies about 3.1 million square kilometers that stretch from Russia's Arctic shores

in the north to within 500 kilometers of the Chinese border in

the south, and from the longitude of the Taymyr Peninsula in

the west to within 400 kilometers of the Pacific Ocean in the

east. Sakha was annexed by the Russian Empire in the first half

of the seventeenth century. Russians slowly populated the val- ley of the Lena River, which flows northward through the heart

of Sakha. In the nineteenth century, most of the nomadic

Yakuts adopted an agricultural lifestyle.

Formed as the Yakut Autonomous Republic in 1922, Sakha

had a population of 1.1 million in 1994, of which 50 percent were Russian, 33 percent Yakut, 7 percent Ukrainian, and 2

percent Tatar. The Yakuts are a Mongoloid people who originated through the combination of local tribes with Turkic

tribes that migrated northward before the tenth century.

Climatic conditions preclude agriculture in most of Sakha.

Where agriculture is possible, the main crops are potatoes,

oats, rye, and vegetables. The republic's economy is supported

mainly by its extensive mineral deposits, which include gold,

diamonds, silver, tin, coal, and natural gas. Sakha produces

most of Russia's diamonds, and natural gas deposits are thought to be large. The capital of Sakha is Yakutsk.

Tyva was called the Tuva ASSR until the new Russian constitution recognized Tyva, the regional form of the name, in

1993. The republic occupies 170,500 square kilometers on the

border of Mongolia, directly east of Gorno-Altay. After being

part of the Chinese Empire for 150 years and existing as the

independent state of Tannu Tuva between 1921 and 1944, Tyva

voluntarily joined the Soviet Union in 1944 and became an

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

autonomous oblast. It became an autonomous republic in

1961. The Tuvinians are a Turkic people with a heritage of rule

by tribal chiefs. The republic's predominant religion is Tibetan

Buddhism. In 1995 the population of about 314,000 was 64 percent Tuvinian and 32 percent Russian.

Tyva is mainly an agricultural region with only five cities and

a predominantly rural population. The main agricultural activ- ity is cattle raising, and fur is an important product. Gold,

cobalt, and asbestos are mined, and the republic has extensive

hydroelectric resources. The capital is Kyzyl.

Other Ethnic Groups

Besides the ethnic groups granted official jurisdictions in

the Russian Republic and later in the Russian Federation, sev- eral minority groups have played an important role at some

stage of the country's development. Among those that exist in

significant numbers in parts of post-Soviet Russia are Germans,

Koreans, and Roma.

Germans

According to the Soviet census of 1989, a total of 842,000

Germans lived in Russia. The remains of a large enclave that was settled along the Volga River beginning in the time of Peter

the Great (r. 1682-1725), the "Volga Germans" were the ethnic

basis of an autonomous republic before World War II. When

Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, Joseph V. Stalin

(in office 1927-53) dissolved the republic and dispersed the

German population into Central Asia and Siberia. Although

some German prisoners of war remained in the Soviet Union

after the war, many others returned to Germany in the decades

that followed. By 1991 less than half of the German Russians

claimed German as their first language.

Because of the discrimination suffered by the Volga Germans, the postwar constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) granted ethnic Germans in Russia the

right to citizenship if they moved to Germany. Russia's German

population began lobbying for reestablishment of the prewar

Volga German Autonomous Republic in 1990. In 1991 President Yeltsin began discussions with the German government

on creation of a German autonomous republic on the lower

Volga near Volgograd. A protocol of cooperation signed in

1992 arranged for such a republic in exchange for significant

financial aid from Germany. However, the proposed German

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Russia: A Country Study

enclave encountered strong local resistance from populations

that would have been displaced by the Germans on the lower

Volga; official discussion of the issue ended in 1993. In 1995

about 75,000 Russian Germans settled in Germany.

Koreans

An increasing percentage of the approximately 321,000

Koreans living in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, in

particular Uzbekistan, began migrating to the Russian Federation in 1992 when various forms of discrimination against nonindigenous peoples increased in those republics. Most of these

migrants to Russia have settled in Maritime (Primorskiy) Territory, where their commercial activities have competed with

local merchants and stirred numerous anti-Korean incidents.

In 1996 about 36,000 Koreans also were living on Sakhalin

Island.

When economic conditions deteriorated in the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in the mid-1990s,

the North Korean government allowed thousands of carefully

chosen guest workers to find manual jobs in Vladivostok and

other parts of the Russian Far East. As North Korean guest

workers have sought asylum in Russia, the question of their

repatriation has caused Russia a difficult diplomatic problem

in its relations with North Korea and the Republic of Korea

(South Korea), in view of Russia's intensified efforts to expand

commercial ties with South Korea without alienating putative

ally North Korea. Korean arrivals in Russia from Central Asia

and from North Korea receive support from the Association of

Ethnic Koreans and from South Korea. Another Korean emigre organization, the United Confederation of Koreans in Russia, lends vocal support to North Korea in its disputes with

South Korea. Tensions between the two Korean populations were very strong by 1996. Russian migration officials feared a much larger influx of North Koreans if the North Korean government collapsed.

Roma

The 1989 Soviet census indicated that Russia was home to about 153,000 Roma, commonly known as Gypsies. However,

the actual size of the population is unknown because many

Roma do not register their nationality; experts assume that the

true number is much higher than the official estimate. Most of

the Roma currently in Russia are descended from people who

192
Members of Korean community gather at Korean Cultural Center, Vladivostok.

Courtesy Youn-Cha Shin Chey

migrated from Europe in the eighteenth century; they now call themselves Russka Roma. Another group, called the Vlach

Roma, arrived after 1850 from the Balkans. Other Roma travel

seasonally to Moscow from Moldova and Romania and back.

Members of this group are often seen begging on Moscow

streets; this activity has figured largely in the negative stereo- type of the Roma among ethnic Russians.

Most Roma have been unable or unwilling to gain employment in any but a few occupations. In the Soviet era, metalworking was a designated Roma trade, but street commerce

selling whatever goods become available—remains the most

common occupation. Roma were much involved in the blackmarket trade of the last Soviet decades. Roma musical ensembles have prospered in Soviet and post-Soviet times, but few

individuals have access to such a profession.

In general, post-Soviet Russian society has included the

Roma with other easily identified non-Slavic groups, particu193
Russia: A Country Study

larly those from the Caucasus, who are accused of exploiting or worsening the economic condition of the majority population.

In the 1990s, violence has erupted between Russians and Roma

on several occasions. The wide dispersion of the Russian Roma

population—there are at least six distinct groups, with little contact among them—has limited their ability to organize. In

the 1990s, some Russian Roma have participated in international movements to gain support abroad. The various groups

have widely varying political views. The elite musical performers and intelligentsia, for example, supported the socialism of

the Soviet Union, but the wealthy Lovari group, which the government persecuted in Soviet times, is strongly antisocialist.

Movements Toward Sovereignty

Beginning in 1990, many of the constituent autonomous

republics and regions, delineated at various stages of tsarist or

Soviet control, used the chaos and centrifugal force created by

the breakup of the Soviet Union to move toward local sovereignty. The legislatures of most republics made official declarations of sovereignty over their land and natural resources between August and October 1990. Although the declaration

of full independence by the Chechen Autonomous Republic

was the most extreme result of such moves, some observers felt that the political and economic stability of the Russian Federation was threatened by the separatism of regions that were valuable because of their strategic location or natural resources

(see The Separatism Question, ch. 7). Furthermore, Russia,

acutely conscious of having lost its "near abroad"—the fourteen republics that constituted the Soviet Union together with

the RSFSR—could ill afford the second blow to national self- image that the loss of ethnically based jurisdictions would

inflict. Occupying about three-quarters of the territory of the

former Soviet Union, Russia is the largest country in the world.

It never has existed as a country within its present borders,

however. Intent upon preserving the territorial integrity of the

Russian Federation, the government in Moscow maintains an

uneasy relationship with the non-Russian (and particularly the

non-Slavic) nationalities. This relationship stems from Russian

racial, religious, and cultural stereotypes (for example, perceptions of the dark-skinned Muslims in the midst of whiteskinned, Orthodox Slavs), a historical tendency toward xeno- phobia among Russian commoners and parts of the Russian

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

intelligentsia, and a legacy of forcible incorporation of various

ethnic and nationality groups into the Russian Empire and the

Soviet Union. Further complicating the relationship is the fact

that many of Russia's abundant natural resources lie in the ter- ritories of various regions now proclaiming exclusive sover- eignty over those resources. Although some tensions in ethnic and nationality relations

stem from a desire for union between peoples on both sides of an internal or international border arbitrarily drawn by the

tsars or by Soviet authorities, other motivations also underlie

the assertiveness of national minorities in the federation. In the

more liberal post-Soviet atmosphere, people no longer must

suppress their anger over Soviet political and economic subjugation and Russification campaigns. Accordingly, non-Russian

nationalities seek recompense for long periods of colonial-style

exploitation of their indigenous resources for the benefit of

the regime in Moscow. Another cause of dissatisfaction is the

perceived failure of the Russian government to provide adequate support and protection for native schools and cultures.

Finally, the end of the Russian government's monopolization

and censorship of the news media acquainted minority groups

with political trends, such as the spread of nationalism, with

which the rest of the world has been familiar for some time.

Other tensions result from Russian policies that non-Russian

groups perceive as discriminatory or confiscatory. Examples

include unfair tax practices and the refusal of the Russian government to let various ethnic groups reap the income from sale of their indigenous products and natural resources. Separatist agitation in many areas of Russia already had

begun in the Soviet Union's twilight years. A full year before

the Soviet Union's demise, more than half the autonomous

republics in the RSFSR had adopted declarations of sovereignty. Every region of the vast RSFSR was affected by this

trend, which was more an indication of the central government's waning authority—even in regions relatively close to Moscow—than it was an indication of intent by those declaring

sovereignty.

In May 1990, the Tuva ASSR witnessed civil strife between

the Russian and Tuvinian populations. Charging that Russia

had failed to provide them with employment opportunities or

suitable housing and had sought to eradicate their indigenous

culture, the Tuvinians attacked Russian neighborhoods, setting

fire to homes and forcing about 3,000 Russians to flee.

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In October 1990, the Chuvash ASSR declared itself a full republic of the Soviet Union, a status that would have given it equal status with Russia, Ukraine, and the other thirteen Soviet

republics. Although the announcement stated that Chuvashia

would remain part of the Russian Federation, the republic

would exercise complete control over all its natural resources and would make Chuvash equal with Russian as an official language. Also in 1990, the Mari ASSR, about 500 kilometers east of Moscow, proclaimed itself a full Soviet republic whose natural resources would become the exclusive property of its people and whose state languages would be Mari and Russian. The

republic adopted the new vernacular name "Mari El," meaning

"Mari Territory," and that name won official approval from the

government in Moscow.

Also in 1990, the Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast and the

Adygh Autonomous Oblast unilaterally upgraded themselves to autonomous-republic status. While declaring 'their intention to remain part of the RSFSR, these jurisdictions asserted the right to local control of their land and natural resources. Still another declaration of sovereignty came from the Buryat

ASSR. The Buryats declared that their republic's laws henceforth would take precedence over those of the RSFSR.

In northwestern Russia, secessionist sentiment manifested

itself among the ethnic minorities of the Karelian and Komi

ASSRs. In the autumn of 1990, local Karelian authorities protested insufficient food shipments by refusing to deliver timber

and paper products to Russia. Many Karelians, ethnically close

to the Finns, want their republic to become part of Finland.

During the period leading to the collapse of the Soviet

Union, local officials in the oil-rich Bashkir ASSR (renamed

Bashkortostan in 1992) declared sovereignty, and the Chukchi

Autonomous Region, which faces Alaska across the Bering

Strait, declared itself autonomous and demanded control over

its reindeer and fish resources. Commenting on the rash of

separatist activity, an adviser to President Mikhail S. Gorbachev

remarked, "It's getting to the point where sooner or later some- one is going to declare his apartment an independent state." In October 1991, the legislature of the Tatar ASSR, some 600

kilometers east of Moscow, adopted a declaration of independence from Moscow, and in 1992 Tatarstan approved a constitution that described the republic as being on an equal footing

with the Russian Federation. And, in what was to become the

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

most troublesome of the ethnic autonomy movements of the

1990s, Chechnya proclaimed its sovereignty in October 1991.

Among these nominally separatist political units, the transition from words to deeds has been uneven. In some cases, ethnic and nationality groups appear content with the mere form

of sovereignty; in others, efforts are under way to give substance to the words of separatism. In republics such as Mordovia, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, relations with

Russia are the defining issue among opposing political groups.

Other republics, such as pro-Russian Kalmykia and independence-minded Bashkortostan, are firmly under the control of a

single leader.

The enormous Republic of Sakha in north-central Siberia,

rich in diamonds and other minerals, exemplifies the threat

that secession poses to the Russian Federation. Sakha has

declared that its local laws supersede those imposed from Moscow and that it will retain all revenues generated by the sale

and use of its resources. The republic also has accepted substantial direct development investment from Japan and China.

Many members of Sakha's Russian majority have sided with the

indigenous population in supporting self-government or full independence. Experts believe that such regions as Sakha,

Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan theoretically have sufficient natural wealth to become viable independent entities. According to estimates, these regions' secession from the Russian Federation

would deprive Russia of half of its oil, most of its diamonds, and

much of its coal, as well as a substantial portion of such industries as automobile manufacturing.

Against the backdrop of ethnic and nationality tensions, a

tug-of-war developed in the early 1990s over the respective powers of the federal and local governments in Russia (see Local

and Regional Government, ch. 7). In March 1992, representatives of all but two of the republics (Chechnya and Tatarstan)

and most of the smaller ethnic jurisdictions signed the Federation Treaty, which was an attempt to forestall further separatism and define the respective jurisdictions of central and

regional government. The treaty failed to resolve differences in

the key areas of taxation and control of natural resources, however. In some cases, self-proclaimed independent entities in

Siberia and elsewhere in the Russian Federation have forged

links with foreign countries. Commercial and cultural accords

between Turkey and Turkic republics such as Bashkortostan

and Chuvashia especially worry the central government.

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The Chechnya Dilemma

The only autonomous jurisdictions that refused to sign the

1992 Federation Treaty were Chechnya and Tatarstan, both of

which are rich in oil. In the spring of 1994, President Yeltsin

signed a special political accord with the president of Tatarstan

granting many of the Tatar demands for greater autonomy.

Yeltsin declined to carry out serious negotiations with Chechnya, however, allowing the situation to deteriorate into full- scale war at the end of 1994 (see Chechnya, ch. 9). In the first half of 1996, Chechnya continued to pose the biggest obstacle

to the quelling of separatism among the components of the

Russian Federation.

Chechnya long has had a reputation in Russia as a center of

organized crime and corrupt business practices; the Chechen

maftya has a particularly fierce reputation. The proportion of

Chechens and other Caucasians in Russia's emerging market

economy is much higher than the representation of these

nationalities in the population as a whole. In its propaganda

campaign to justify military action against Chechnya, the Russian government played upon the stereotypes of the criminal

and the dishonest businessman. It also illustrated the brutal

practices of the Chechen rebels by broadcasting photos of the

severed heads of victims along the roads in the breakaway

republic. Meanwhile, Russians adopted the habit of including

all individuals of non-Slavic appearance under the heading

"Chechen," widening the existing strain of racism in Russia's

society.

The first Russian invasion of Chechnya occurred during the

time of Peter the Great, in the early eighteenth century. After a long series of fierce battles and bloody massacres, Chechnya

was incorporated into Russia in the 1870s. In 1936 Stalin cre- ated the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. In 1943,

when Nazi forces reached the gates of the Chechen capital,

Groznyy, Chechen separatists staged a rebellion against Russian

rule. In response, the next year Stalin deported more than 1 million Chechens, Ingush, and other North Caucasian peoples

to Siberia and Central Asia on the pretext that they had collaborated with the Nazis. The remaining Muslim people of the

Chechnya region were resettled among neighboring Christian

communities. Stalin's genocidal policy virtually erased Chechnya from the map, but Soviet first secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev permitted the Chechen and Ingush peoples to return

to their homeland and restored their republic in 1957.

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

The series of events since the Soviet Union's collapse flowed

naturally from the Chechens' long-standing hatred of the Russians. In September 1991, the government of the ChechenIngush Autonomous Republic resigned under pressure from

the proindependence Congress of the Chechen People, whose

leader was former Soviet air force general Dzhokar Dudayev.

The following month, Dudayev won overwhelming popular

support to oust the interim, central government-supported

administration and make himself president. Dudayev then

issued a unilateral declaration of independence. In November

1991, President Yeltsin dispatched troops to Groznyy, but they were withdrawn when Dudayev's forces prevented them from

leaving the airport.

The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic split in two in

June 1992. After Chechnya had announced its initial declaration of sovereignty in 1991, Ingushetia joined the Russian Federation; Chechnya declared full independence in 1993. In

August 1994, when an opposition faction launched an armed

campaign to topple Dudayev's government, Moscow supplied

the rebel forces with military equipment, and Russian aircraft

began to bomb Groznyy. In December, five days after Dudayev

and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev of Russia had agreed to avoid the further use of force, Russian troops invaded Chechnya.The Russian government's expectations of a quick surgical

strike followed by Chechen capitulation were misguided. The

protracted war in Chechnya, which generated many reports of

violence against civilians, ignited fear and contempt toward

Russia among many other ethnic groups in the federation.

Experts believe that the inability of Russian forces to subdue

the Chechen "bandits" also might encourage other ethnic

groups to defy the central government by proclaiming and

defending their independence. As the war was reported to the

Russian public on television and in newspaper accounts, the

rising protests from Russia's independent news media and vari- ous political and other interest groups soon came to threaten

Russia's democratic experiment. Chechnya was one of the

heaviest burdens Yeltsin carried during the 1996 presidential

election campaign.

In January 1996, the destruction of the Dagestani border vil- lage of Pervomayskoye by Russian forces in reaction to Chechen hostage taking brought strong criticism from the

hitherto loyal Republic of Dagestan and escalated domestic dis199
Russia: A Country Study

satisfaction. Chechnya's declaration that it was waging a jihad

(holy war) against Russia also raised the specter that Muslim

"volunteers" from other regions and even outside Russia would

enter the fray. However, Russia feared that a move to end the war short of victory would create a cascade of secession

attempts by other ethnic minorities and present a new target to extreme nationalist Russian factions.

Some fighting occurred in Ingushetia in 1995, mostly when

Russian commanders sent troops over the border in pursuit of

Chechen rebels. Although all sides generally observed the dis- tinction between the two peoples that formerly shared the

autonomous republic, as many as 200,000 refugees from

Chechnya and neighboring North Ossetia strained Ingushetia's

already weak economy. On several occasions, Ingush president

Ruslan Aushev protested incursions by Russian soldiers, even

threatening to sue the Russian Ministry of Defense for damages

inflicted.

Meanwhile, the war in Chechnya spawned a new form of separatist activity in the Russian Federation. Resistance to the con- scription of men from minority ethnic groups to fight in

Chechnya was widespread among other republics, many of

which passed laws and decrees on the subject. For example, the

government of Chuvashia passed a decree providing legal protection to soldiers from the republic who refused to participate

in the Chechnya war and imposing limits on the use of the Russian army in ethnic or regional conflicts within Russia. Some

regional and local legislative bodies called for a prohibition on

the use of draftees in quelling internal uprisings; others

demanded a total ban on the use of the armed forces in domestic conflicts.

The Caucasus Region in the Federation

The oil-rich region around Chechnya, between the Black

Sea and the Caspian Sea, forms a southwestern corridor of Russian territory bounded on the west by Ukraine and the Black

Sea, on the south by Georgia and Azerbaijan, and on the east by the Caspian Sea and Kazakstan. The region north of the

Caucasus includes seven ethnic republics and four "Russian"

jurisdictions: the territories of Krasnodar and Stavropol' and

the oblasts of Rostov and Astrakhan'. With the thirty ethnically

and linguistically distinct communities of Dagestan the most

extreme example of the region's ethnic diversity, much of the

region surrounding Chechnya is a cauldron of nationality and

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

ethnic conflicts among warlike mountain clans. On the opposite slope of the Caucasus, the former Soviet republic of Georgia likewise includes a number of ethnic groups, two of

which—the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians—declared outright independence in the early 1990s.

Tsarist Russia conducted a centuries-long process of expansion into the Caucasus region, subduing the nationalities of the area gradually and often at great expense. The region has

assumed particular importance in the contemporary era because of its oil, its location astride Russia's transportation

and communications arteries leading to the Middle East, and

the central government's fear of resurgent Islam along the

southern border of the former Soviet Union.

Not far from Chechnya, a self-styled Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus emerged in 1992 in southwestern Russia, where the borders of the Russian Federation

abut the Transcaucasian republics of the former Soviet Union.

That confederation, including representatives from Russia's seven republics bordering the Caucasus, aspires to establish a chain of independent, predominantly Muslim states along the

federation's southern periphery. It also has provided a forum

for Chechen leaders to enlist support against Russia and for

separatist leaders from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to enlist

support against Georgia. Terrorist acts in Chechnya and else- where have been attributed to confederation members.

Responses and Prospects

In the mid-1990s, the relationship of Russia's central government to its regional jurisdictions remains tentative; the Yeltsin

administration's failure to contain separatist movements is a

favorite target of the president's nationalist critics. The Yeltsin

government's policy toward separatism grew from the theory

that compromises made with individual ethnic groups would

satisfy the need to express national identity. Such an approach

rests on the proposition that the diverse inhabitants of the Russian Federation ultimately will identify closely enough with the

federation to ensure its continuing territorial integrity, and

that centrifugal impulses will not lead Russia to the fate suffered by the Soviet Union.

Theoretically, the secession of one component of the Russian Federation could encourage the movement of others in an

irrational but uncontrollable domino effect. On the one hand,

Russia's inability to reverse secession despite the deployment of

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Russia: A Country Study

a large-scale force in Chechnya is cited by experts as an inducement to other national units to break away. On the other hand,

the fact that no minority ethnic group constitutes more than 4

percent of the federation's population militates against breakaway jurisdicdons attaining the critical mass and political lever- age needed to secede and function successfully as independent

nations. In many respects, Russia's ethnic republics, many of

which lie deep within the boundaries of the federation, remain

heavily dependent on the center, especially in economic matters. For example, under the conditions of the mid-1990s,

Tatarstan's oil cannot be processed or transported to the outside world without the utilization of facilities lying outside its borders, in Russia proper. Thus, the threat of secession has now

been established as a bargaining chip in the struggle with the

central government for political and economic advantage, but

it is a threat of limited practical value.

Religion

The chief religion of Russia is Russian Orthodox Christianity, which is professed by about 75 percent of citizens who

describe themselves as religious believers. Because the concept

of separation of church and state never took root in Russia, the

Russian Orthodox Church, a branch of Eastern Orthodoxy, was

a pillar of tsarist autocracy. During the communist era, the

church, like every other institution in the Soviet Union, was

completely subordinate to the state, achieving a modus vivendi

by ceding most of its autonomous identity. Under the officially

atheist regimes of the Soviet Union, no official figures on the

number of religious believers in the country were available to Western scholars. According to various Soviet and Western

sources, however, more than one-third of the citizens of the

Soviet Union regarded themselves as believers in the 1980s,

when the number of adherents to Russian Orthodoxy was esti- mated at more than 50 million—although a high percentage of

that number feared to express their religious beliefs openly.

Islam, professed by about 19 percent of believers in the mid1990s, is numerically the second most important religion in

Russia. Various non-Orthodox Christian denominations and a dwindling but still important Jewish population complete the

list of major religious groups in the Russian Federation. In general, Russians of all religions have enjoyed freedom of worship

since the collapse of the communist regime in 1991, and large

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

numbers of abandoned or converted religious buildings have

been returned to active religious use in the 1990s.

The Russian Orthodox Church

The Russian Orthodox Church has a thousand-year history

of strong political as well as spiritual influence over the inhabitants of the Russian state. After enduring the Soviet era as a

state-controlled religious facade, the church quickly regained

both membership and political influence in the early 1990s.

Beliefs and Ritual

Orthodox belief holds that the Orthodox Church is Christianity's true, holy, and apostolic church, tracing its origin

directly to the institution established byjesus Christ. Orthodox

beliefs are based on the Bible and on tradition as defined by

seven ecumenical councils held by church authorities between

A.D. 325 and 787. Orthodox teachings include the doctrine of

the Holy Trinity and the inseparable but distinguishable union

of the two natures of Jesus Christ—one divine, the other

human. Among saints, Mary has a special place as the Mother

of God. Russian Orthodox services, noted for their pageantry,

involve the congregation directly by using only the vernacular

form of the liturgy. The liturgy itself includes multiple elaborate systems of symbols meant to convey the content of the

faith to believers. Many liturgical forms remain from the earli- est days of Orthodoxy. Icons, sacred images often illuminated

by candles, adorn the churches as well as the homes of most

Orthodox faithful. The church also places a heavy emphasis on

monasticism. Many of the numerous monasteries that dotted

the forests and remote regions of tsarist Russia are in the process of restoration. The Russian Orthodox Church, like the

other churches that make up Eastern Orthodoxy, is autonomous, or self-governing. The highest church official is the

patriarch. Matters relating to faith are decided by ecumenical

councils in which all member churches of Eastern Orthodoxy

participate. Followers of the church regard the councils' decisions as infallible. Church History

The Russian Orthodox Church traces its origins to the time

of Kievan Rus', the first forerunner of the modern Russian

state. In A.D. 988 Prince Vladimir made the Byzantine variant

of Christianity the state religion of Russia (see The Golden Age

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of Kiev, ch. 1). The Russian church was subordinate to the

patriarch (see Glossary) of Constantinople (present-day Istan- bul), seat of the Byzantine Empire. The original seat of the

metropolitan, as the head of the church was known, was Kiev.

As power moved from Kiev to Moscow in the fourteenth century, the seat moved as well, establishing the tradition that the

metropolitan of Moscow is the head of the church. In the Middle Ages, the church placed strong emphasis on asceticism,

which evolved into a widespread monastic tradition. Large

numbers of monasteries were founded in obscure locations

across all of the medieval state of Muscovy. Such small settle- ments expanded into larger population centers, making the

monastic movement one of the bases of social and economic as well as spiritual life. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Russian

Orthodox Church evolved into a semi-independent (autocephalous) branch of Eastern Christianity. In 1589 the metropolitan

of Moscow received the title of patriarch. Nevertheless, the Russian church retained the Byzantine tradition of authorizing the

head of state and the government bureaucracy to participate

actively in the church's administrative affairs. Separation of

church and state thus would be almost unknown in Russia.

As Western Europe was emerging from the Middle Ages into

the Renaissance and the Reformation, Russia remained isolated from the West, and Russian Orthodoxy was virtually

untouched by the changes in intellectual and spiritual life being felt elsewhere. In the seventeenth century, the introduction by Ukrainian clergy of Western doctrinal and liturgical

reforms prompted a strong reaction among traditionalist

Orthodox believers, resulting in a schism in the church.

In the early eighteenth century, Peter the Great modernized, expanded, and consolidated Muscovy into what then

became known as the Russian Empire. In the process of redefining his power as tsar, Peter curtailed the minimal secular

influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was functioning principally as a pillar of the tsarist regime. In 1721

Peter the Great went so far as to abolish the patriarchate and

establish a governmental organ called the Holy Synod, staffed

by secular officials, to administer and control the church. As a

result, the church's moral authority declined in the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the monastic

tradition produced a number of church elders who gained the

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205
Russia: A Country Study

respect of all classes in Russia as wise counselors on both secular and spiritual matters. Similarly, by 1900 a strong revival

movement was calling for the restoration of church autonomy

and organizational reform. However, few practical reforms had

been implemented when the October Revolution of 1917

brought to power the Bolsheviks (see Glossary), who set about

eliminating the worldly and spiritual powers of the church.

Ironically, earlier in 1917 the moderate Provisional Government had provided the church a few months of restoration to

its pre-Petrine stature by reestablishing the patriarchate and

independent governance of the church. In the decades that

followed, the communist leadership frequently used the

restored patriarch as a propaganda agent, allowing him to meet with foreign religious representatives in an effort to cre- ate the impression of freedom of religion in the Soviet Union.

Karl Marx, the political philosopher whose ideas were nominally followed by the Bolsheviks, called religion "the opiate of

the people." Although many of Russia's revolutionary factions

did not take Marx literally, the Bolshevik faction, led by

Vladimir I. Lenin, was deeply suspicious of the church as an

institution and as a purveyor of spiritual values. Therefore,

atheism became mandatory for members of the ruling Russian

Communist Party (Bolshevik). To eliminate as soon as possible

what was deemed the perverse influence of religion in society,

the communists launched a propaganda campaign against all forms of religion.

By 1918 the government had nationalized all church property, including buildings. In the first five years of the Soviet

Union (1922-26), twenty-eight Russian Orthodox bishops and

more than 1,200 priests were executed, and many others were

persecuted. Most seminaries were closed, and publication of

most religious material was prohibited. The next quarter-century saw surges and declines in arrests, enforcement of laws

against religious assembly and activities, and harassment of

clergy. Antireligious campaigns were directed at all faiths;

beginning in the 1920s, Buddhist and Shamanist places of worship in Buryatia, in the Baikal region, were destroyed, and their

lamas and priests were arrested (a practice that continued until

the 1970s). The League of the Militant Godless, established in

1925, directed a nationwide campaign against the Orthodox

Church and all other organized religions. The extreme position of that organization eventually led even the Soviet government to disavow direct connection with its practices. In 1940 an

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

estimated 30,000 religious communities of all denominations

survived in all the Soviet Union, but only about 500 Russian

Orthodox parishes were open at that time, compared with the

estimated 54,000 that had existed before World War I. In 1939 the government significantly relaxed some restrictions on religious practice, a change that the Orthodox Church

met with an attitude of cooperation. When Germany invaded

the Soviet Union in 1941, the government reluctantly solicited

church support as it called upon every traditional patriotic

value that might resonate with the Soviet people. According to witnesses, active church support of the national war effort drew

many otherwise alienated individuals to the Soviet cause. Beginning in 1942, to promote this alliance, the government

ended its prohibition of official contact between clergy and for- eign representatives. It also permitted the traditional celebration of Easter and temporarily ended the stigmatization of

religiosity as an impediment to social advancement.

The government concessions for the sake of national

defense reinvigorated the Russian Orthodox Church. Thousands of churches reopened during the war. But the Khrushchev regime (1953-64) reversed the policy that had made

such a revival possible, pursuing a violent six-year campaign

against all forms of religious practice. Although the church

retained its official sanction throughout that period, Khrushchev's campaign was continued less stringently by his successor, Leonid I. Brezhnev (in office 1964-82). By 1975 the

number of operating Russian Orthodox churches had been

reduced to about 7,000. Some of the most prominent members

of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy and religious activists were

jailed or forced to leave the church. Their place was taken by a

docile clergy whose ranks were sometimes infiltrated by agents

of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy

bezopasnosti—KGB; see Glossary) . Under these circumstances,

the church espoused and propagated Soviet foreign policy and

furthered the Russification of non-Russian believers, such as Orthodox Ukrainians and Belorussians.

Despite official repression in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev

years, religious activity persisted. Although regular church

attendance was common mainly among women and the elderly, special occasions such as baptisms and Easter brought

many more Russians into the churches. An increase in church

weddings in the 1950s and 1960s stimulated the establishment

of secular "marriage palaces" offering the ceremonial trap207
Russia: A Country Study

pings of marriage devoid of religious rites. When applications

for seminary study increased significantly in the 1950s, the

Communist Youth League (Komsomol) forced aspiring seminarians to endure interrogations that discouraged many and

that succeeded, by 1960, in sharply reducing the number of

candidates.

The general cultural liberalization that followed Stalin's

death in 1953 brought a natural curiosity about the Russian

past that especially caught the interest of younger generations;

the ceremonies and art forms of the Russian Orthodox

Church, an inseparable part of that past, attracted particular

attention, to the dismay of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev

regimes. Historian James Billington has pointed out that in

that period religious belief was a form of generational rebellion by children against doctrinaire communist parents.

Although the Russian Orthodox Church did not play the

activist role in undermining communism that the Roman Catholic Church played in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern

Europe, it gained appreciably from the gradual discrediting of

Marxist-Leninist ideology in the late Soviet period. In the mid1980s, only about 3,000 Orthodox churches and two monasteries were active. As the grip of communism weakened in that

decade, however, a religious awakening occurred throughout

the Soviet Union. Symbolic gestures by President Gorbachev

and his government, under the rubric of glasnost (see Glossary), indicated unmistakably that Soviet policy was changing.

In 1988 Gorbachev met with Orthodox leaders and explicitly

discussed the role of religion in the lives of their followers.

Shortly thereafter, official commemoration of the millennium

of Russian Orthodoxy sent a signal throughout Russia that reli- gious expression again was accepted. Beginning in 1989, new

laws specified the church's right to hold private property and to distribute publications. In 1990 the Soviet legislature passed a new law on religious freedom, proposed by Gorbachev; at the same time, some of the constituent republics began enacting

their own laws on the same subject. In the fall of 1990, a new

deputy to the parliament of the Russian Republic, the Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin, guided the passage of an extraordinarily liberal law on religious freedom. That law remained in

force when Russia became a separate nation the following year. (Yakunin was defrocked in 1994, however, for criticizing the

church hierarchy.)

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

According to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church,

Patriarch Aleksiy II, between 1990 and 1995 more than 8,000

Russian Orthodox churches were opened, doubling the number of active parishes and adding thirty-two eparchies (dioceses). In the first half of the 1990s, the Russian government

returned numerous religious facilities that had been confiscated by its communist predecessors, providing some assistance

in the repair and reconstruction of damaged structures. The

most visible such project was the building of the completely

new Christ the Savior Cathedral, erected in Moscow at an

expense of about US$300 million to replace the showplace

cathedral demolished in 1931 as part of the Stalinist campaign

against religion. Financed mainly by private donations, the new

church is considered a visible acknowledgment of the mistakes

of the Soviet past.

In the first half of the 1990s, the church's social services also

expanded considerably with the creation of departments of

charity and social services and of catechism and religious education within the patriarchy. Because there is a shortage of

priests, Sunday schools have been introduced in thousands of

parishes. An agreement between the patriarchy and the

national ministries of defense and internal affairs provides for

pastoral care of military service personnel of the Orthodox

faith. The patriarch also has stressed that personnel of other

faiths must have access to appropriate spiritual guidance. In

November 1995, Minister of Defense Grachev announced the

creation of a post in the armed forces for cooperation with reli- gious institutions.

Among the religious organizations that have appeared in the

1990s are more than 100 Russian Orthodox brotherhoods.

Reviving a tradition dating back to the Middle Ages, these

priest-led lay organizations do social and philanthropic work.

In 1990 they formed the Alliance of Orthodox Brotherhoods,

which organizes educational, social, and cultural programs and

institutions such as child care facilities, hostels, hospitals, and

agricultural communities. Although its nominal task is to foster

religious and moral education, the alliance has taken actively

nationalist positions on religious tolerance and political issues.

Public opinion surveys have revealed that the church

emerged relatively unscathed from its association with the communist regime—although dissidents such as Yakunin accused

Aleksiy II of having been a KGB operative. According to polls,

in the first half of the 1990s the church inspired greater trust

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Russia: A Country Study

among the Russian population than most other social and

political institutions. Similarly, Aleksiy II, elected to head the

church upon the death of Patriarch Pimen in 1990, was found

to elicit greater grassroots confidence than most other public

figures in Russia. The political leadership regularly seeks the

approval of the church as moral authority for virtually all types

of government policy. Boris Yeltsin's appearance at a Moscow

Easter service in 1991 was considered a major factor in his suc- cess in the presidential election held two months later. Patriarch Aleksiy officiated at Yeltsin's inauguration that year. Although the status of Russian Orthodoxy has risen considerably, experts do not predict that it will become Russia's offi- cial state religion. About 25 percent of Russia's believers

profess other faiths, and experts stated that in the mid-1990s

the church lacked the clerics, the organizational dynamism,

and the infrastructure to assume such a position.

Other Religions

Article 14 of the 1993 constitution stipulates that "the Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as the state religion or a compulsory religion. Religious

associations are separated from the state and are equal before

the law." However, such a constitutional guarantee existed even during the Stalinist era, when religious oppression was at its worst. In the 1990s, the Russian citizenry has shown that the

traditional, deeply felt linkage between Russian Orthodoxy and

the Russian state remains intact. That linkage has a palpable

effect on Russian secular attitudes toward religious minorities,

and hence on the degree to which the new constitutional guarantee of religious liberty is honored.

Even before the demise of the Soviet Union, the new openness of Russian society had attracted religious activists of many

persuasions from all over the world. In Moscow evangelists and

missionaries filled the airwaves and the streets. Notable among

them were German Lutherans, a Roman Catholic missionary

society, Swiss Protestant church groups, the Quakers, the Salvation Army, and the Sisters of Charity, a Roman Catholic order

of nuns headed by Mother Teresa. Also present were members

of such groups as the Hare Krishnas, the Unification Church,

and the Church of Scientology.

The activity of such groups, which paralleled Russia's new

enthusiasm for all things Western in the late 1980s and early

1990s, had begun to wane by 1994. However, it stimulated a

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

strong reaction among conservative political and religious

groups. In November 1992, the influential conservative wing of

the Russian parliament reacted to the influx of non-Russian

religious activists by proposing the creation of a so-called

Experts' Consultative Council of church representatives and

government officials. That body would have had the power to tighten the requirements for registration of a religious group

or missionary activity.

After a flurry of criticism from international human rights

and religious groups, President Yeltsin failed to sign the consultative council bill, which died in the fall of 1993. After a new

parliament convened, additional versions of the bill appeared.

In mid-1996 a somewhat milder bill requiring registration of

foreign missionary groups was passed by parliament. Meanwhile, some eighteen jurisdictions in the federation passed a

variety of bills restricting missionary activity or requiring registration. Non-Orthodox religious groups also found that the

purchase of land and the rental of building space were blocked

increasingly by local authorities.

In the 1990s, the Russian Orthodox hierarchy's position on

the issue of religious freedom has been muted but negative in

many respects, as church officials have seen themselves defending Russian cultural values from Western ideas. Patriarch Aleksiy lent his support to the restrictive legislation as it was being

debated in 1993, and Western observers saw an emerging alli- ance between the Orthodox Church and the nationalist factions in Russian politics. In another indication of its attitude

toward the proliferation of "foreign" religious activity in Russia,

the hierarchy has made little active effort to establish contacts

with new foreign religious groups or with existing groups, and

experts see scant hope that an ecumenical council of churches

will be established in the near future. In October 1995, the

Orthodox Church's governing Holy Synod refused to participate in a congress of Orthodox hierarchs because the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople had recognized the Orthodox

community in Estonia and an autocephalous Orthodox

Church in Ukraine.

In 1995 the Yeltsin administration formed a consultative

body called the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations, which included representatives from most of the major

denominations. On the council, the Russian Orthodox and

Roman Catholic churches and Islamic organizations have two

members each, with one representative each for Buddhist, Jew211
Russia: A Country Study

ish, Baptist, Pentecostal, and Seventh-Day Adventist representatives. Council decisions have only the status of

recommendations to the government.

Non-Orthodox Christian Religions

The Soviet Union was home to large numbers of Christians

who were not followers of the Russian Orthodox Church. Sev- eral other churches had numerous adherents, including the

Georgian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church

(also called the Armenian Orthodox Church), and the Ukrainian and Belorussian autocephalous Orthodox churches,

which, like the Russian Orthodox Church, were rooted in Byzantine rather than Roman Christianity. All of these faiths like- wise endured persecution by the Soviet state. A large number

of Roman Catholics and Protestants of various denominations

also resided in the Soviet Union. But, because the majority of

non-Orthodox Christians were concentrated in the Soviet

republics of Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the representation of non-Russian Orthodox groups in

post-Soviet Russia is much less than it was in the Soviet Union.

The first West European Protestants in Russia were German

Mennonites who arrived in the second half of the seventeenth

century. Throughout the twentieth century, the Baptists have

been by far the most active and numerous Protestant group.

During the repressive 1960s, enthusiastic Baptist groups

attracted numerous young Russians away from the official

Komsomol, and the fervor of the Baptists in a nominally atheist

society earned them admiration even among communist officials. The number of Protestants in the Soviet Union was esti- mated at 5 million in 1980; in 1993 an estimated 3,000 Baptist

communities were active under the administration of the Eurasian Federation of Unions of Evangelical Baptist Christians.

Within that structure, the Union of Evangelical Baptist

Churches includes about 1,000 communities and supports two

missionary groups and one publication. Headquarters is in

Moscow The Council of Churches of Evangelical Baptist Christians was founded in 1961 as a splinter group from what was

then the Union of Evangelical Baptist Christian Churches; it existed illegally in Russia until 1988 and is not registered offi- cially as a religious group. In the mid-1990s, the council

included 230 communities.

Other Protestant groups in Russia have far fewer members

than the Baptists. The Union of Evangelical Christian

212
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

Churches was founded in 1992 to continue the tradition of the

Union of Evangelical Christians, which had been founded in

Russia in 1909 and then banned under communist rule. Pentecostals first became active in Russia in the early twentieth century. In 1945 one faction reunited with the main Baptist

church; then in 1991 the remaining group formed the Union

of Christians of the Evangelical Faith Pentecostal, which issues

several publications and supports missions.

The Seventh-Day Adventists formed a Russian union in 1909,

despite active government opposition. The church structure was largely destroyed during the Soviet period. Then, after

World War II, the Ail-Union League of Seventh-Day Adventists was established. The union was inactive from 1960 until 1990,

when it was included in the international General Assembly of

Adventists. About 600 communities were active in the mid1990s, with publications, one seminary, one religious school,

and a radio broadcast center. The Jehovah's Witnesses appeared in Russia in 1939; their

center in St. Petersburg and their missionary work in Russia are supported by the Jehovah's Witnesses Center in Brooklyn, New

York. Lutheranism appeared in Russia in the seventeenth century; in the mid-1990s, only a few churches were active. A few

groups of Methodists, Presbyterians, Mormons, and Evangelical Reformed believers also are active in Russia.

The size of the Roman Catholic population of Russia has var- ied greatly according to the territorial extent of the country.

For example, after the partitions of Poland at the end of the

eighteenth century, large numbers of Polish Catholics became

subjects of the Russian Empire. Accordingly, from the eighteenth century until 1917 a papal legate, or nuncio, represented the Vatican in St. Petersburg. A Roman Catholic

academy operated in St. Petersburg, and a mission was established in Astrakhan*. After World War II, the absorption of the

Baltic states added many Catholics to the Soviet Union's population, but relatively few of those individuals entered the Russian Republic. In 1993 twenty-nine Roman Catholic dioceses were active in the Russian Federation, with those in the European sector administered from Moscow and those in the Asian

sector from Novosibirsk.

The 1990 establishment of new Roman Catholic dioceses in

Russia has caused tension with the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. The two churches have an understanding that neither will

proselytize in the "territory" of the other, so representatives of

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Russia: A Country Study

the patriarch have condemned expanding Catholic influence

as an unwelcome Western intrusion.

Islam

In the 1980s, Islam was the second most widespread religion

in the Soviet Union; in that period, the number of Soviet citi- zens identifying themselves as Muslims generally totaled

between 45 and 50 million. The majority of the Muslims

resided in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union,

which now are independent countries. In 1996 the Muslim

population of Russia was estimated at 19 percent of all citizens

professing belief in a religion. Major Islamic communities are concentrated among the minority nationalities residing

between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea: the Adyghs,

Balkars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Cherkess, Ingush, Kabardins,

Karachay, and numerous Dagestani nationalities. In the middle

Volga Basin are large populations of Tatars, Udmurts, and Chuvash, most of whom are Muslims. Many Muslims also reside in

Ul'yanovsk, Samara, Nizhniy Novgorod, Moscow, Perm', and

Leningrad oblasts (see Ethnic Composition, this ch.).

Virtually all the Muslims in Russia adhere to the Sunni

branch of Islam. In a few areas, notably Chechnya, there is a

tradition of Sufism, a mystical variety of Islam that stresses the

individual's search for union with God. Sufi rituals, practiced to give the Chechens spiritual strength to resist foreign oppression, became legendary among Russian troops fighting the

Chechens during tsarist times.

Relations between the Russian government and Muslim ele- ments of the population have been marked by mistrust and sus- picion. In 1992, for example, Sheikh Ravil Gainurtdin, the

imam of the Moscow mosque, complained that "our country

[Russia] still retains the ideology of the tsarist empire, which

believed that the Orthodox faith alone should be a privileged

religion, that is, the state religion." The Russian government,

for its part, fears the rise of political Islam of the violent sort that Russians witnessed in the 1980s firsthand in Afghanistan

and secondhand in Iran. Government fears were fueled by a 1992 conference held in Saratov by the Tajikistan-based Islamic

Renaissance Party. Representatives attended from several newly

independent Central Asian republics, from Azerbaijan, and

from several autonomous jurisdictions of Russia, including the

secessionist-minded autonomous republics of Tatarstan and

Bashkortostan. The meeting's pan-Islamic complexion created

214
Traditional wooden homes, with new mosque in background, Tyumen'

Courtesy G. W. Meredith, Jr.

concern in Moscow about the possible spread of radical Islam

into Russia from the new Muslim states along the periphery of

the former Soviet Union. For that reason, the Russian government has provided extensive military and political support to secular leaders of the five Central Asian republics, all of whom

are publicly opposed to political Islam. By the mid-1990s, the

putative Islamic threat was a standard justification for radical

nationalist insistence that Russia regain control of its "near

abroad" (see The Near Abroad, ch. 8).

The struggle to delineate the respective powers of the federal and local governments in Russia also has influenced Russian relations with the Islamic community. The Russian

Federation inherited two of the four spiritual boards, or muftiates, created during the Stalinist era to supervise the religious

activities of Islamic groups in various parts of the Soviet Union;

the other two are located in Tashkent and Baku. One of the

two Russian boards has jurisdiction in European Russia and

Siberia, and the other is responsible for the Muslim enclaves of

the North Caucasus and Transcaspian regions. In 1992 several

Muslim associations withdrew from the latter muftiate and

attempted to establish their own spiritual boards. Later that

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Russia: A Country Study

year, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan withdrew recognition from

the muftiate for European Russia and Siberia and created their

own muftiate.

There is much evidence of official conciliation toward Islam

in Russia in the 1990s. The number of Muslims allowed to make pilgrimages to Mecca increased sharply after the virtual

embargo of the Soviet era ended in 1990. Copies of the Quran

(Koran) are readily available, and many mosques are being

built in regions with large Muslim populations. In 1995 the

newly established Union of Muslims of Russia, led by Imam

Khatyb Mukaddas of Tatarstan, began organizing a movement

aimed at improving interethnic understanding and ending

Russians' lingering conception of Islam as an extremist reli- gion. The Union of Muslims of Russia is the direct successor to the pre-World War I Union of Muslims, which had its own fac- tion in the Russian Duma (see Glossary). The postcommunist

union has formed a political party, the Nur All-Russia Muslim

Public Movement, which acts in close coordination with Muslim clergy to defend the political, economic, and cultural rights

of Muslims and other minorities. The Islamic Cultural Center

of Russia, which includes a medrese (religious school), opened

in Moscow in 1991. The Ash-Shafii Islamic Institute in Dagestan

is the only such research institution in Russia. In the 1990s, the

number of Islamic publications has increased. Among them

are two magazines in Russian, Ekho Kavkaza and Islamskiy vest- nik, and the Russian-language newspaper Islamskiye novosti,

which is published in Makhachkala, Dagestan.

Judaism

Judaism began to have an influence on Russian culture and

social attitudes in the sixteenth century, shortly after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain by Queen Isabella in 1492. In the

centuries that followed, large numbers ofJews migrated to Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belorussia. Much of the antiSemitism that developed subsequently among Russian peasants

came from the identification ofJews with activities such as tax

collection and the administration of the large estates on which

the peasants worked, two of the few occupations Jews were

allowed to pursue in tsarist Russia. Anti-Semitism followed the

Jews from Western Europe, and already in the sixteenth century the culture of Muscovy contained a strong element of that

attitude. When Poland was partitioned at the end of the eighteenth century, large numbers ofJews came into the Russian

216
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

Empire, giving Russia the largest Jewish population (about 1.5

million) in the world. For the next 120 years, tsarist governments restricted Jewish settlements to what was called the Pale

of Settlement, established by Catherine II in 1792 to include

portions of the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belorussia, and the

northern shore of the Black Sea. During the nineteenth century, restrictions on the Jewish

population were alternately eased and tightened. Alexander II

(r. 1855-81), for example, relaxed restrictions on settlement,

education, and employment. Alexander's assassination in 1881

brought reimposition of all previous restrictions, which then

remained in force until 1917. During that period, Jews were

beaten and killed and their property destroyed in governmentsanctioned pogroms led by a group called the Black Hundreds.

Despite repressive conditions in Russia and high levels of emigration to the United States, the Jewish population grew rapidly in the nineteenth century; by the beginning of World War

I, an estimated 5.2 million Jews lived in Russia.

Within their areas of settlement, the Russian Jews developed

a flourishing culture, and many of them became active in the

revolutionary movements that sprang up in the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries. But much of the long period of

violence that began with World War I in 1914 and continued

until the Civil War ended in 1921 took place in the regions

inhabited by the Jews, many of whom were killed indiscriminately by the various armies struggling for power. After World

War I, parts of the western territory of the former Russian

Empire became the independent nations of Lithuania, Latvia,

and Poland, a development that left many Russian Jews outside

the borders of what now was the Soviet Union. By 1922 Russia's

Jewish population had been reduced by more than half. In the early years of the Soviet Union, Jews gained much

more freedom to enter the mainstream of Russian society.

Although relatively few supported the explicit program of the

Bolsheviks, the majority expected that the new state would

offer much greater ethnic and religious tolerance than had the

tsarist system. In the 1920s, hundreds of thousands ofJews were

integrated into Soviet economic and cultural life, and many

acquired prominent positions. Among them were communist

leaders Leon Trotsky, Lazar Kaganovich, Maksim Litvinov, Lev

Kamenev, and Grigoriy Zinov'yev; writers Isaak Babel',

Veniamin Kaverin, Boris Pasternak, Osip Mandel'shtam, and

Ilya Ehrenburg; and cinematographer Sergey Eisenstein. Spe217
Russia: A Country Study

cial Jewish sections were established in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Then, in the 1930s the purges initiated

by Stalin targeted groups for their ethnic and social identities.

As non-Russians stereotyped as intellectuals, the Jews were tar- gets in two categories. As part of Soviet ethnic policy, the Jewish

Autonomous Oblast (Yevreyskaya avtonomnaya oblast', later

called Birobidzhan) was established in 1934. But the oblast never was the center of the Soviet Union's Jewish population.

Only about 50,000 Jews settled in this jurisdiction, which is located along the Amur River in the farthest reaches of the

Soviet Far East. When Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941,

about 2.5 million Jews were killed by the Germans or by their

Slavic collaborators. Jews who escaped to areas untouched by

the Nazis often suffered from the resentment of local populations who envied their education or supposed wealth.

Between World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union,

Russia's Jewish population declined steadily, thanks to emigration, a low birth rate, intermarriage, and concealment of identity. In 1989 the official total was 537,000. Of the number

remaining at that point, only about 9,000 were living in theJewish Autonomous Oblast, and, by 1995, only an estimated 1,500

Jews remained in the oblast. The Jews of Russia always have

been concentrated overwhelmingly in the larger cities, especially Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Odessa—partly because of

the traditional ban, continued from tsarist times, on Jews owning land. Although 83 percent ofJews claimed Russian as their

native language in the 1979 census, the Soviet government rec- ognized Yiddish as the national language of the Jewish population in Russia and the other republics. In the early 1980s, the Kremlin's refusal to allowJewish emigration was a major issue of contention in Soviet-American

relations. In 1974 the United States Congress had passed the

Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which offered the Soviet Union

most-favored-nation trade status in return for permission for

Soviet Jews to emigrate. The Soviet Union responded by relaxing its restrictions, and in the years that followed there was a steady flow ofJewish emigrants from the Soviet Union to Israel. But the intensification of the Cold War in the years after the

1979 invasion of Afghanistan brought new restrictions that were not lifted fully until 1989, when a new surge of emigration

began. Between 1992 and 1995, the emigration ofJews from

Russia averaged about 65,000 per year, after reaching a peak of

218
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

188,000 in 1990. In 1996 the Russian government began cur- tailing the activity of the Jewish Agency, an internationally

funded organization that has sponsored Jewish emigration

since the 1940s.

The Soviet and Russian governments have always regarded

the Jews not only as a distinct religious group but also as a

nationality. This attitude persists in the post-Soviet era despite a

provision in Article 26 of the 1993 constitution prohibiting the

state from arbitrarily determining a person's nationality or forcing a person to declare a nationality.

Although official anti-Semitism has ceased and open acts of

anti-Semitism have been rare in Russian society since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Jews have remained mindful of their

history in Russia and skeptical of the durability of liberalized

conditions. Traditional anti-Semitism in the Russian Orthodox

Church and the increasing power of ultranationalist and neofascist political forces are the principal causes of concern; Jews

also fear that they might become scapegoats for economic diffi- culties. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s Judaism has shown a slow but sure revival, and Russia's Jews have experienced a growing interest in learning about their religious heritage. In

January 1996, a major event was publication in Russia of a Russian translation of a volume of the Talmud. The first such publication since before the Bolshevik Revolution, the volume

marks the start of a series of Talmudic translations intended to provide Russian Jews with information about their religion's

teachings, which until 1996 had been virtually unavailable in

Russia.

WithJews becoming more willing to identify themselves, offi- cial estimates of the Jewish population increased between 1992

and 1995, from 500,000 to around 700,000. TheJewish population of Moscow has been estimated in the mid-1990s at between

200,000 and 300,000. Of that number, about 15 percent are Sephardic (non-European).

The number ofJews participating in religious observances

remains relatively small, even though organizations such as the

Hasidic (Orthodox) Chabad Lubavitch actively encourage full observance of religious traditions. In Moscow the Lubavitchers,

whose activism has met with hostility from many Russians, run

two synagogues and several schools, including a yeshiva (academy of Talmudic learning), kindergartens, and a seminary for

young women. The organization also is active in charity work.

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Russia: A Country Study

In the 1990s, a number of organizations devoted to the fos- tering ofJewish culture and religion have been established in

Moscow. These include a rabbinical school, aJewish youth center, a union of Hebrew teachers, and a Jewish cultural and educational society. The orthodox Jewish community also

campaigned successfully for the return of the Shneerson

books, a collection of manuscripts that had been stored in the

Lenin State Library in Moscow since Soviet authorities confiscated them in the 1920s.

Religion and Foreign Policy

In the 1990s, there have been indications that religious considerations can influence certain areas of Russian foreign policy, as they have in the past. Relations with the newly

independent Muslim states of Central Asia are a case in point.

In all five republics of that region, the Russian government has

strongly supported secular, autocratic Islamic leaders whose

hold on power is justified in part by an ostensible threat of

Muslim political activism. However, only in Tajikistan has a fac- tion with any sort of connection to Islamic groups attempted to take power. There, a nominally secular Islamic party has played

a central role in a prolonged guerrilla war against the Russiansupported regime, with assistance from Afghan forces.

Beginning in 1992, the conflict between Muslims and Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina has tested the deeply

ingrained tradition within the Orthodox Church of protecting

coreligionists in the Middle East, the Balkans, and elsewhere

beyond Russia's borders (see Central Europe, ch. 8). Russia's

former minister of foreign affairs, Andrey Kozyrev, cautioned

against making the Orthodox religion a determinant of Russian foreign policy, lest such a policy promote a split in Russia

itself between Orthodox and Muslim believers. Nevertheless,

nationalist sentiment in Russia caused the Yeltsin government

to limit its participation in international sanctions and military

actions against Serbia.

The Russian Language

The Russian language has dominated cultural and official

life throughout the history of the nation, regardless of the pres- ence of other ethnic groups. Linguistic groups in Russia run

the gamut from Slavic (spoken by more than three-quarters of

the population) to Turkic, Caucasian, Finno-Ugric, Eskimo,

220
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

Yiddish, and Iranian. Russification campaigns during both the

tsarist and communist eras suppressed the languages and cul- tures of all minority nationalities. Although the Soviet-era constitutions affirmed the equality of all languages with Russian

for all purposes, in fact language was a powerful tool of Soviet

nationality policy. The governments of both the Soviet Union

and the Russian Federation have used the Russian language as a means of promoting unity among the country's nationalities,

as well as to provide access to literary and scientific materials

not available in minority languages. According to the Brezhnev

regime, all Soviet peoples "voluntarily" adopted Russian for use

in international communication and to promote the unity of

the Soviet Union.

Beginning in 1938, the Russian language was a compulsory

subject in the primary and secondary schools of all regions. In

schools where an indigenous language was used alongside Russian, courses in science and mathematics were taught in Russian. Many university courses were available only in Russian,

and Russian was the language of public administration in all jurisdictions in all fifteen Soviet republics. Nevertheless, the

minority peoples of the Russian Republic, as well as the peoples

of the other fourteen Soviet republics, continued to consider

their own language as primary, and the general level of Russian

fluency was low (see The Post-Soviet Education Structure, ch.

5). In the mid-1990s, in every area of the federation, Russian

remains the sole language of public administration, of the

armed forces, and of the scientific and technical communities.

Russian schools grant diplomas in only two minority languages,

Bashkir and Tatar, and higher education is conducted almost

entirely in Russian.

Although Russian is the lingua franca of the Russian Federation, Article 26 of the 1993 constitution stipulates that "each

person has the right to use his native language and to the free

choice of language of communication, education, instruction,

and creativity." Article 68 affirms the right of all peoples in the

Russian Federation "to retain their mother tongue and to cre- ate conditions for its study and development." Although such

constitutional provisions often prove meaningless, the nonSlavic tongues of Russia have retained their vitality, and they even have grown more prevalent in some regions. This trend is especially visible as autonomy of language becomes an important symbol of the struggle to preserve distinct ethnic identities. In the 1990s, many non-Russian ethnic groups have issued

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Russia: A Country Study

laws or decrees giving their native languages equal status with

Russian in their respective regions of the Russian Federation.

In the mid-1990s, some 80 percent of the non-Slavic nationalities—or 12 percent of the population of the Russian Federation—did not speak Russian as their first language.

Literature and the Arts

Russian civilization has produced classic works of art in all genres, including innovations of lasting significance in litera- ture, music, and ballet. The artistic process often has collided

with political dogma, and outside influences have combined

with "pure Russian" art forms in a sometimes uneasy harmony.

Literature In the course of Russia's thousand-year history, Russian liter- ature has come to occupy a unique place in the culture, politics, and linguistic evolution of the Russian people. In the

modern era, literature has been the arena for heated discussion of virtually all aspects of Russian life, including the place

that literature itself should occupy in that life. In the process, it has produced a rich and varied fund of artistic achievement.

The Beginnings

Literature first appeared among the East Slavs after the

Christianization of Kievan Rus' in the tenth century (see The

Golden Age of Kiev, ch. 1). Seminal events in that process were

the development of the Cyrillic (see Glossary) alphabet around

A.D. 863 and the development of Old Church Slavonic as a

liturgical language for use by the Slavs. The availability of litur- gical works in the vernacular language—an advantage not

enjoyed in Western Europe—caused Russian literature to develop rapidly. Through the sixteenth century, most literary

works had religious themes or were created by religious figures.

Among the noteworthy works of the eleventh through fourteenth centuries are the Primary Chronicle, a compilation of his- torical and legendary events, the Lay of Igor's Campaign, a

secular epic poem about battles against the Turkic Pechenegs,

and Zadonshchina, an epic poem about the defeat of the Mongols in 1380. Works in secular genres such as the satirical tale began to appear in the sixteenth century, and Byzantine liter- ary traditions began to fade as the Russian vernacular came

into greater use and Western influences were felt.

222
Folk dance performance,

Volgograd

Courtesy Robert Schlickezvitz

Written in 1670, the Life of the Archpriest Avvakum is a pioneering realistic autobiography that avoids the flowery church

style in favor of vernacular Russian. Several novellas and satires

of the seventeenth century also used vernacular Russian freely.

The first Russian poetic verse was written early in the seven- teenth century.

Peter and Catherine

The eighteenth century, particularly the reigns of Peter the

Great and Catherine the Great (r. 1762-96), was a period of

strong Western cultural influence. Russian literature was dominated briefly by European classicism before shifting to an

equally imitative sentimentalism by 1780. Secular prose tales

many picaresque or satirical—grew in popularity with the middle and lower classes, as the nobility read mainly literature

from Western Europe. Peter's secularization of the Russian

Orthodox Church decisively broke the influence of religious

themes on literature. The middle period of the eighteenth century (1725-62) was dominated by the stylistic and genre innovations of four writers: Antiokh Kantemir, Vasiliy Trediakovskiy,

Mikhail Lomonosov, and Aleksandr Sumarokov. Their work

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Russia: A Country Study

was a further step in bringing Western literary concepts to Russia.Under Catherine, the satirical journal was adopted from

Britain, and Gavriil Derzhavin advanced the evolution of Russian poetry. Denis Fonvizin, Yakov Knyazhnin, Aleksandr

Radishchev, and Nikolay Karamzin wrote controversial and

innovative drama and prose works that brought Russian litera- ture closer to its nineteenth-century role as an art form liberally furnished with social and political commentary (see

Imperial Expansion and Maturation: Catherine II, ch. 1). The

lush, sentimental language of Karamzin's tale Poor Lisa set off a

forty-year polemic pitting advocates of innovation against those

of "purity" in literary language.

The Nineteenth Century

By 1800 Russian literature had an established tradition of

representing real-life problems, and its eighteenth-century

practitioners had enriched its language with new elements. On

this basis, a brilliant century of literary endeavor followed.

Russian literature of the nineteenth century provided a congenial medium for the discussion of political and social issues

whose direct presentation was censored. The prose writers of

this period shared important qualities: attention to realistic,

detailed descriptions of everyday Russian life; the lifting of the

taboo on describing the vulgar, unsightly side of life; and a

satirical attitude toward mediocrity and routine. All of those

elements were articulated primarily in the novel and short

story forms borrowed from Western Europe, but the poets of

the nineteenth century also produced works of lasting value.

The Age of Realism, generally considered the culmination of

the literary synthesis of earlier generations, began around

1850. The writers of that period owed a great debt to four men

of the previous generation: the writers Aleksandr Pushkin,

Mikhail Lermontov, and Nikolay Gogol1 , and the critic Vissarion Belinskiy, each of whom contributed to new standards for

language, subject matter, form, and narrative techniques. Pushkin is recognized as the greatest Russian poet, and the critic

Belinskiy was the "patron saint" of the influential "social message" writers and critics who followed. Lermontov contributed

innovations in both poetic and prose genres. Gogol 1 is accepted as the originator of modern realistic Russian prose,

although much of his work contains strong elements of fantasy.

The rich language of Gogol1 was much different from the

224
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

direct, sparse lexicon of Pushkin; each of the two approaches

to the language of literary prose was adopted by significant

writers of later generations.

By mid-century a heated debate was under way on the appropriateness of social questions in literature. The debate filled

the pages of the "thick journals" of the time, which remained

the most fertile site for literary discussion and innovation into

the 1990s; traces of the debate appeared in the pages of much

of Russia's best literature as well. The foremost advocates of

social commentary were Nikolay Chernyshevskiy and Nikolay

Dobrolyubov, critics who wrote for the thick journal Sovremennik (The Contemporary) in the late 1850s and early 1860s.

The best prose writers of the Age of Realism were Ivan Turgenev, Fedor Dostoyevskiy, and Lev Tolstoy. Because of the

enduring quality of their combination of pure literature with

eternal philosophical questions, the last two are accepted as Russia's premier prose artists; Dostoyevskiy's novels Crime and

Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov, like Tolstoy's novels War

and Peace and Anna Karenina, are classics of world literature.

Other outstanding writers of the Age of Realism were the

playwright Aleksandr Ostrovskiy, the novelist Ivan Goncharov,

and the prose innovator Nikolay Leskov, all of whom were

closely involved in some way with the debate over social commentary. The most notable poets of mid-century were Afanasiy

Fet and Fedor Tyutchev.

An important tool for writers of social commentary under

strict tsarist censorship was a device called Aesopic language—

variety of linguistic tricks, allusions, and distortions comprehensible to an attuned reader but baffling to censors. The best

practitioner of this style was Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, a prose satirist who, along with the poet Nikolay Nekrasov, was

considered a leader of the literary left wing in the second half

of the century.

The major literary figure in the last decade of the nineteenth century was Anton Chekhov, who wrote in two genres:

the short story and drama. Chekhov was a realist who examined the foibles of individuals rather than society as a whole.

His plays The Cherry Orchard, The Seagull, and The Three Sisters continue to be performed worldwide.

In the 1890s, Russian poetry was revived and thoroughly

reshaped by a new group, the symbolists, whose most prominent representative was Aleksandr Blok. Two more groups, the

futurists and the acmeists, added new poetic principles at the

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Russia: A Country Study

start of the twentieth century. The leading figure of the former

was Vladimir Mayakovskiy, and of the latter, Anna Akhmatova.

The premier prose writers of the period were the realist writers

Leonid Andreyev, Ivan Bunin, Maksim Gor'kiy, Vladimir Korolenko, and Aleksandr Kuprin. Gor'kiy became the literary figurehead of the Bolsheviks and of the Soviet regimes of the

1920s and 1930s; shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, Bunin

and Kuprin emigrated to Paris. In 1933 Bunin became the first Russian to receive the Nobel Prize for Literature.

The Soviet Period and After

The period immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution was one of literary experimentation and the emergence of

numerous literary groups. Much of the fiction of the 1920s

described the Civil War or the struggle between the old and

new Russia. The best prose writers of the 1920s were Isaak

Babel', Mikhail Bulgakov, Veniamin Kaverin,- Leonid Leonov,

Yuriy Olesha, Boris Pil'nyak, Yevgeniy Zamyatin, and Mikhail

Zoshchenko. The dominant poets were Akhmatova, Osip Mandel'shtam, Mayakovskiy, Pasternak, Marina Tsvetayeva, and

Sergey Yesenin. But under Stalin, literature felt the same

restrictions as the rest of Russia's society. After a group of "proletarian writers" had gained ascendancy in the early 1930s, the

communist party Central Committee forced all fiction writers

into the Union of Soviet Writers in 1934. The union then established the standard of "socialist realism" for Soviet literature,

and many of the writers in Russia fell silent or emigrated (see

Mobilization of Society, ch. 2). A few prose writers adapted by

describing moral problems in the new Soviet state, but the

stage was dominated by formulaic works of minimal literary

value such as Nikolay Ostrovskiy's How the Steel Was Tempered and

Yuriy Krymov's Tanker Derbent. A unique work of the 1930s was

the Civil War novel The Quiet Don, which won its author, Mikhail

Sholokhov, the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1965, although

Sholokhov's authorship is disputed by some experts. The strict controls of the 1930s continued until the "thaw" following Stalin's death in 1953, although some innovation was allowed in

prose works of the World War II period.

Between 1953 and 1991, Russian literature produced a number of first-rate artists, all still working under the pressure of

state censorship and often distributing their work through a sophisticated underground system called samizdat (literally,

self-publishing). The poet Pasternak's Civil War novel, Doctor

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

Zhivago, created a sensation when published in the West in

1957. The book won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1958, but

the Soviet government forced Pasternak to decline the award.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, whose One Day in the Life oflvanDenisovich (1962) also was a watershed work, was the greatest Russian

philosophical novelist of the era; he was exiled from the Soviet

Union in 1974 and eventually settled in the United States. In

the 1960s and 1970s, a new generation of satirical and prose

writers, such as Fazil' Iskander, Vladimir Voinovich, Yuriy Kazakov, and Vladimir Aksyonov, battled against state restrictions on

artistic expression, as did the noted poets Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Andrey Voznesenskiy, and Joseph Brodsky. Aksyonov and

Brodsky emigrated to the United States, where they remained

productive. Brodsky won the Nobel Prize for Literature in

1987. The most celebrated case of literary repression in the

1960s was that of Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel, iconoclastic writers of the Soviet "underground" whose 1966 sentence to hard labor for having written anti-Soviet propaganda brought

international protest.

Another generation of writers responded to the liberalized

atmosphere of Gorbachev's glasnost in the second half of the

1980s, openly discussing previously taboo themes: the excesses of the Stalin era, a wide range of previously unrecognized

social ills such as corruption, random violence, anti-Semitism,

and prostitution, and even the unassailably positive image of

Vladimir I. Lenin himself. Among the best of this generation were Andrey Bykov, Mikhail Kurayev, Valeriy Popov, Tat'yana

Tolstaya, and Viktor Yerofeyev—writers not necessarily as tal- ented as their predecessors but expressing a new kind of "alter- native fiction." The glasnost period also saw the publication of

formerly prohibited works by writers such as Bulgakov,

Solzhenitsyn, and Zamyatin.

Beginning in 1992, Russian writers experienced complete

creative freedom for the first time in many decades. The

change was not entirely for the better, however. The urgent

mission of the Russian writers, to provide the public with a kind

of truth they could not find elsewhere in a censored society,

had already begun to disappear in the 1980s, when glasnost

opened Russia to a deluge of information and entertainment

flowing from the West and elsewhere. Samizdat was tacitly

accepted by the Gorbachev regime, then it disappeared

entirely as private publishers appeared in the early 1990s. Writers' traditional special place in society no longer is recognized

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Russia: A Country Study

by most Russians, who now read literature much less avidly

than they did in Soviet times. For the first time since their

appearance in the early 1800s, the "thick journals" are disregarded by large portions of the intelligentsia, and in the mid1990s several major journals went bankrupt. Under these cir- cumstances, many Russian writers have expressed a sense of

deep loss and frustration.

Music

Until the eighteenth century, Russian music consisted

mainly of church music and folk songs and dances. In the

1700s, Italian, French, and German operas were introduced to Russia, making opera a popular art form among the aristocracy.In the nineteenth century, Russia began making an original

contribution to world music nearly as significant as its contribution in literature. In the first half of the nineteenth century,

Mikhail Glinka (1804-57) initiated the application of purely

Russian folk and religious music to classical compositions. His

best operas, Ruslan and Lyudmila and A Lifefor the Tsar, are con- sidered pioneering works in the establishment of Russian

national music, although they are based on Italian models.

In 1859 the Russian Music Society was founded to foster the

performance and appreciation of classical music, especially

German, from Western Europe; the most influential figures in

the society were the composer Anton Rubinstein and his

brother Nikolay, who founded influential conservatories in

Moscow and St. Petersburg. Anton Rubinstein also was one of

the best pianists of the nineteenth century.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a group of

composers that came to be known as the "Mighty Five"—Miliy

Balakirev, Aleksandr Borodin, Cesar Cui, Modest Musorgskiy,

and Nikolay Rimskiy-Korsakov—continued Glinka's movement

away from imitation of European classical music. The Mighty

Five challenged the Russian Music Society's conservatism with a large body of work thematically based on Russia's history and

legends and musically based on its folk and religious music.

Among the group's most notable works are Rimskiy-Korsakov's

symphonic suite Scheherezade and the operas The Snow Maiden

and Sadko, Musorgskiy's operas Boris Godunov and Khovanshchina, and Borodin's opera Prince Igor'. Balakirev, a protege of

Glinka, was the founder and guiding spirit of the group.

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

Outside that group stood Peter Ilich Tchaikovsky (Chaykovskiy), who produced a number of enduring symphonies,

operas, and ballets more imitative of Western music. During his

lifetime, Tchaikovsky already was acknowledged as one of the

world's premier composers. Among his most-performed works

are the ballets Swan Lake, Sleeping Beauty, and The Nutcracker,

and his Sixth Symphony, known as the Pathetique. At the end

of the 1800s, the generation that followed the Mighty Five and

Tchaikovsky included talented and innovative figures such as Sergey Rachmaninov, a master pianist and composer who emigrated to Germany in 1906; Rimskiy-Korsakov's student Aleksandr Glazunov, who emigrated in 1928; and the innovator

Aleksandr Skryabin, who injected elements of mysticism and

literary symbolism in his works for piano and orchestra.

In the twentieth century, Russia continued to produce some

of the world's foremost composers and musicians, despite the

suppression by Soviet authorities of both music and perfor- mances. Restrictions on what musicians played and where they

performed caused many artists to leave the Soviet Union either

voluntarily or through forced exile, but the works of the emigres continued to draw large audiences whenever they were

performed. The Gorbachev era loosened the restrictions on

emigres returning. The pianist Vladimir Horowitz, who left the

Soviet Union in 1925, made a triumphal return performance

in Moscow in 1986, and emigre cellist Mstislav Rostropovich

made his first tour of the Soviet Union in 1990 as conductor of

the National Symphony Orchestra in Washington, D.C.

Igor' Stravinskiy, who has been called the greatest of the

twentieth-century Russian composers, emigrated permanently

in 1920 after having composed his three best-known works, the scores for the ballets The Firebird, Petrushka, and The Rite of

Spring. Stravinskiy enjoyed a productive career of several

decades in exile, making return visits to Russia in his last years. The composers Aram Khachaturyan, Sergey Prokofyev, and

Dmitriy Shostakovich spent their entire careers in the Soviet

Union; all three were condemned in 1948 in the postwar Stalinist crackdown known as the Zhdanovshchina (see Reconstruction and Cold War, ch. 2). Prokofyev, best known for his ballet

music, had achieved enough international stature by 1948 to avoid official disgrace. Shostakovich, who enjoyed triumph and

suffered censure during the Stalin era, wrote eleven symphonies and two well-known operas based on nineteenth-century

Russian stories, The Nose by Gogol' and Lady Macbeth ofMtsensk

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Russia: A Country Study

District by Leskov. He enjoyed substantial recognition after the

"thaw" that liberated artistic activities after 1953. Khachaturyan

based much of his work on Armenian and Georgian folk music.

Composers of modern music received much criticism in the

Soviet period for digressing from realistic or traditional styles.

Both official Soviet artistic standards and the traditional expectations of the Russian public restricted the creation and performance of innovative pieces. The most notable avant-garde

symphonic composer was Alfred Schnittke, who remained in

the Soviet Union, where his work won approval. Aleksey

Volkonskiy was a notable member of Schnittke's generation

who left the Soviet Union to compose in the West. The

restraints of the 1970s and 1980s stimulated a musical underground, called magnitizdat, which recorded and distributed for- bidden folk, rock, andjazz works in small batches. Two notable

figures in that movement were Bulat Okudzhava and Vladimir

Vysotskiy, who set their poetry to music and became popular

entertainers with a satirical message. Vysotskiy, who died in

1980, was rehabilitated in 1990; Okudzhava continued his career into the mid-1990s.

Jazz performances were permitted by all Soviet regimes, and

jazz became one of Russia's most popular music forms. In the

1980s, the Ganelin Trio was the best-known Russian jazz

combo, performing in Europe and the United States. Jazz

musicians from the West began playing regularly in the Soviet

Union in the 1980s.

Rock music was controlled strictly by Soviet authorities, with

only limited recording outside magnitizdat, although Russia's

youth were fascinated with the rock groups of the West. In the

more liberal atmosphere of the late 1980s, several notable

Soviet rock groups emerged with official approval as more

innovative, unsanctioned groups proliferated. The Leningrad

Rock Club, which became a national network of performance

clubs in 1986, was the most important outlet for sanctioned

rock music. In the 1990s, much of Russia's rock music lost the

innovative and satirical edge of the magnitizdat period, and

experts noted a tendency to simply imitate Western groups.

Ballet

Russia has made a unique contribution to the development

of ballet. Ballet was introduced in Russia together with other

aristocratic dance forms as part of Peter the Great's Westernization program in the early 1700s. The first ballet school was

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Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

established in 1734, and the first full ballet company was founded at the Imperial School of Ballet in St. Petersburg in

the 1740s. Italian and French dancers and choreographers predominated in that period, but by 1800 Russian ballet was assimilating native elements from folk dancing as nobles sponsored

dance companies of serfs. European ballet critics agreed that

the Russian dance had a positive influence on West European

ballet. Marius Petipa, a French choreographer who spent fifty

years staging ballets in Russia, was the dominant figure during

that period; his greatest triumphs were the staging of Tchaikovsky's ballets. Other noted European dancers, such as Marie

Taglioni, Christian Johansson, and Enrico Cecchetti, performed in Russia throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bringing new influences from the West.

The most influential figure of the early twentieth century was the impresario Sergey Diaghilev, who founded an innovative touring ballet company in 1909 with choreographer

Michel Fokine, dancer Vaslav Nijinksy, and designer Alexandre

Benois. After the staging of Stravinskiy's controversial The Rite

of Spring, World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution kept

Diaghilev from returning to Russia. Until Diaghilev died in

1929, his Russian dance company, the Ballet Russe, was headquartered in Paris. In the same period, the emigre dancer

Anna Pavlova toured the world with her troupe and exerted a huge influence on the art form.

After Diaghilev, several new companies calling themselves

the Ballet Russe toured the world, and new generations of Russian dancers filled their ranks. George Balanchine, a Georgian

emigre and protege of Diaghilev, formed the New York City

Ballet in 1948. Meanwhile, the Soviet government sponsored

new ballet companies throughout the union. After a period of

innovation and experimentation in the 1920s, Russia's ballet

reverted under Stalin to the traditional forms of Petipa, even changing the plots of some ballets to emphasize the positive

themes of socialist realism. The most influential Russian

dancer of the mid-twentieth century was Rudolf Nureyev, who

defected to the West in 1961 and is credited with establishing

the dominant role of the male dancer in classical ballet. A sec- ond notable emigre, Mikhail Baryshnikov, burnished an

already brilliant career in the United States after defecting

from Leningrad's Kirov Ballet in 1974. The large cities of Russia traditionally have their own symphony orchestras and ballet

and opera houses. Although funding for such facilities has

231
Russia: A Country Study

diminished in the 1990s, attendance at performances remains

high. The ballet companies of the Bol'shoy Theater in Moscow

and the Kirov Theater in St. Petersburg are world renowned

and have toured regularly since the early 1960s.

Architecture and Painting

Early Slavic tribes created handsome jewelry, wall hangings,

and decorated leather items that have been recovered from

burial mounds. The folk-art motifs made liberal use of animal

forms and representations of natural forces. Subsequently, the

strongest single influence on Russian art was the acceptance of

Christianity in A.D. 988. Transmitting the idea that the beauty

of the church's physical attributes reflects the glory of God,

Byzantine religious art and architecture penetrated Kiev, which

was the capital of the early Russian state until about 1100 (see

The Golden Age of Kiev, ch. 1). The northern cities of

Novgorod and Vladimir developed distinctive architectural

styles, and the tradition of painting icons, religious images usually painted on wooden panels, spread as more churches were

built. The Mongol occupation (1240-1480) cut Muscovy's ties with the Byzantine Empire, fostering the development of original artistic styles. Among the innovations of this period was the

iconostasis, a carved choir screen on which icons are hung. In

the early fifteenth century, the master icon painter Andrey

Rublev created some of Russia's most treasured religious art. As the Mongols were driven out and Moscow became the

center of Russian civilization in the late fifteenth century, a new

wave of building began in Russia's cities. Italian architects

brought a West European influence, especially in the reconstruction of Moscow's Kremlin, the city's twelfth-century

wooden fortress. St. Basil's Cathedral in Red Square, however,

combined earlier church architecture with styles from the

Tatar east. In the 1500s and 1600s, the tsars supported icon

painting, metalwork, and manuscript illumination; as contact

with Western Europe increased, those forms began to reflect

techniques of the West. Meanwhile, folk art preserved the

forms of the earlier Slavic tribes in house decorations, clothing,

and tools. Under Peter the Great, Russia experienced a much stronger

dose of Western influence. Many of the buildings in Peter's new capital, St. Petersburg, were designed by the Italian architects Domenico Trezzini and Bartolomeo Rastrelli under the

direction of Peter and his daughter, Elizabeth. The most pro232
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

ductive Russian architects of the eighteenth century, Vasiliy

Bazhenov, Matvey Kazakov, and Ivan Starov, created lasting

monuments in Moscow and St. Petersburg and established a base for the more Russian forms that followed.

The Academy of Fine Arts, founded by Elizabeth in 1757 to train Russia's artists, brought Western techniques of secular

painting to Russia, which until that time had been dominated

by icon painting. Catherine the Great (r. 1762-96), another

energetic patron of the arts, began collecting European art objects that formed the basis of the collections for which Russia

now is famous. Aleksey Venetsianov, the first graduate of the

academy to fully embrace realistic subject matter such as peasant life, is acknowledged as the founder of Russia's realistic

school of painting, which blossomed in the second half of the

1800s.

In the 1860s, a group of critical realists, led by Ivan Kramskoy, Il'ya Repin, and Vasiliy Perov, portrayed aspects of Russian

life with the aim of making social commentary. Repin's Barge

Haulers on the Volga is one of the most famous products of this

school. In the late 1800s, a new generation of painters emphasized technique over subject, producing a more impressionistic

body of work. The leaders of that school were Valentin Serov,

Isaak Levitan, and Mikhail Vrubel'. In 1898 the theatrical

designer Alexandre Benois and the dance impresario Sergey

Diaghilev founded the World of Art group, which extended the

innovation of the previous generation, played a central role in

introducing the contemporary modern art of Western Europe

to Russia, and acquainted West Europeans with Russia's art through exhibitions and publications.

In the nineteenth century, Russia's architecture and decorative arts combined European techniques and influences with

the forms of early Russia, producing the so-called Russian

Revival seen in churches, public buildings, and homes of that

period. The European-trained goldsmith, jeweler, and designer

Karl Faberge, the most notable member of a brilliant artistic

family, established workshops in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and

London. His work, including jeweled enamel Easter eggs produced for the Russian royal family, is an important example of

the decorative art of the period.

The Russian artists of the early twentieth century were

exposed to a wide variety of Russian and European movements.

Among the most innovative and influential of that generation were the painters Marc Chagall, Natal'ya Goncharova, Vasiliy

233
Russia: A Country Study

Kandinskiy, Mikhail Larionov, and Kazimir Malevich. The constructivists of the 1920s found parallels between their architectural and sculptural work and the precepts of the Bolshevik

Revolution. By the 1930s, the government was limiting all forms of artistic expression to the themes of socialist realism,

forbidding abstract forms and the exhibition of foreign art for

more than thirty years. An "unofficial" art movement appeared

in the 1960s under the leadership of sculptor Ernest Neizvestnyy and painters Mikhail Chemyakhin, Oskar Rabin, and Yev- geniy Rukhin. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, informal art exhibits were held in parks and social clubs. Like the other arts, painting and sculpture benefited from the policy of glasnost of

the late 1980s, which encouraged artistic innovation and the

exhibition of works abroad.

Outlook

In the mid-1990s, the Russian Federation remains an amalgam of widely varying ethnic groups and cultures. In fact, the

differentiation among groups has increased since the demise

of the Soviet Union. The much less repressive grasp of Russia's

central government has encouraged both cultural and political

autonomy, although ethnic Russians constitute about 80 percent of the population and about 75 percent of religious believ- ers are Russian Orthodox. Many minority groups maintain

their ethnic traditions, continue wide use of their languages,

and demand economic and political autonomy partially based on ethnic differences.

In the 1990s, Islam, which has the second largest body of

religious believers in Russia, has prospered among many of the

ethnic groups. The Russian Orthodox Church also has experienced a renaissance after emerging from Soviet repression; the

church's membership, secular influence, and infrastructure

expanded rapidly in the 1990s.

Russia's long and rich literary history came to a new cross- roads beginning in the late 1980s, as freedom of expression

seemingly ended the traditional role of literature as the antidote to authoritarian dogma. Like literature, other elements of

the federation's cultural and artistic life, all of them with notable past accomplishments, remained in a transitional stage in

the 1990s.

* * *

234
Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Setting

The Handbook ofMajor Soviet Nationalities, edited by Zev Katz,

is a somewhat dated but detailed listing of ethnic groups.

National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States ofEurasia, edited by Roman Szporluk, provides a discussion of the

unique viewpoints of all the major ethnic groups of the former

Soviet Union, including those remaining in the Russian Federation. In Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, Shirin Akiner lists and

describes all the Islamic ethnic groups in that category; that

book is supplemented by Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide by

Alexandre Bennigsen, Marie Broxup, and S. Enders Wimbush.

Religion as an ongoing element of Russian culture is described

in Russian Culture in Modern Times, edited by Robert R Hughes

and Irina Paperno; Michael Bourdeaux discusses religion in

post-Soviet Russia in The Politics ofReligion in Russia and the New

States ofEurasia. The evolution of Russian literature is discussed

in the introductions and explanatory texts of anthologies such

as Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles, and Tales, edited by Serge

A. Zenkovsky, and The Literature of Eighteenth-Century Russia,

edited by Harold B. Segel, and in Marc Slonim's The Epic ofRussian Literature from Its Roots Through Tolstoy and Edward J. Brown's Russian Literature since the Revolution. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

235

Chapter 5. The Society and Its Environment
The girl with the golden hair sits on a stone at the water's edge (design from

lacquer box made in village of Kholuy).
THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION in 1991 brought a measure of freedom to Russia's people, but at the same time

this change removed or severely weakened certain elements of

the social safety net, which for many years had included a guarantee of employment, basic medical care, and government subsidies for food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. For the

average citizen, social and economic conditions worsened considerably in the early postcommunist era. Although some components of state support remained close to their Soviet-era

levels, the government lacked the resources to compensate

Russia's citizens for the stresses of the transition period.

The end of the Soviet Union meant the disappearance of a

reliable, if mediocre, set of social expectations.for every Russian. Lacking such guidance, various elements of Russian society moved in very different directions. A small segment took

immediate action—both legal and illegal—to make the most of

its newfound range of opportunities for self-expression and

economic advancement. Although few such adventurers found

success, those who did coalesced into a new class of wealthy

Russians independent of the government. The vast majority,

however, met the prospect of reduced predictability in their

lives with suspicion, confusion, or resentment. Remembering

the security of Soviet life, many clung to symbolic or real remnants of that life, particularly in the workplace.

As the economic controls of centralized government were

eased, prices for basic necessities rose—sometimes precipitously—and society was buffeted by marked increases in crime,

infectious diseases, drug addiction, homelessness, and suicide.

Growing pollution and other environmental hazards added to the malaise.

Social Structure

In the mid-1990s, Russian society was in the midst of a wrenching transition from a totalitarian structure to a protodemocracy of unknown character. During most of the Soviet era, society was atomized, so that the communist regime and its "transmission belts" (officially sanctioned organizations and

institutions of every kind, from trade unions to youth groups)

could fully monitor and control each individual. Civil society

239
Russia: A Country Study

was nonexistent. The lines of control ran from the top down,

through a rigid hierarchy constructed and staffed by the ruling

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (GPSU—see Glossary).

Post-Soviet Russia is slowly striving to create a civil society

and restore the family and other basic institutions as functional

units within the society. In the mid-1990s, habits of trust, personal responsibility, community service, and citizen cooperation remained unformed in much of Russia's society, as the

social attitudes of previous decades remained intact. Those

holding such attitudes envisioned little between the extremes

of totalitarianism and social anarchy; having moved away from

the simplistic guidance of the former, much of society was

strongly tempted to embrace the latter. Social Stratification

Perhaps the most significant fact about Russia's social struc- ture is that ideology no longer determines social status. During

the Soviet era, membership in the CPSU was the surest path to career advancement and wealth. Political decisions rather than

market forces determined social status. Despite Marxist-Leninist (see Glossary) notions of a classless society, the Soviet Union

had a powerful ruling class, the nomenklatura, which consisted

of party officials and key personnel in the government and

other important sectors such as heavy industry. This class

enjoyed privileges such as roomy apartments, country dachas,

and access to special stores, schools, medical facilities, and rec- reational sites. The social status and income of members of the

nomenklatura increased as they were promoted to higher positions in the party.

The social structure of the Soviet Union was characterized

by self-perpetuation and limited mobility. Access to higher education, a prerequisite to political and social advancement, was

steadily constrained in the postwar decades. The so-called

period of stagnation that coincided with the long tenure of

CPSU chief Leonid I. Brezhnev (in office 1964-82) had social

as well as political connotations. Moreover, the sluggish econ- omy of that period reduced opportunities for social mobility,

thus accentuating differences among social groups and further

widening the gap between the nomenklatura and the rest of society.Members of the urban working class (proletariat), in whose

name the party purported to rule, generally lived in cramped

apartment complexes, spent hours each day standing in line to

240
The Society and Its Environment

buy food and other necessities, and attended frequent obligatory sessions of political indoctrination. Similarly, the peasantry eked out a meager existence, with little opportunity for

relief. Agricultural workers constituted the bottom layer of

Soviet society, receiving the least pay, the least opportunity for

social advancement, and the least representation in the nominally all-inclusive CPSU leadership.

Postcommunist society also is characterized by a wide disparity in wealth and privilege. Although there is no rigid class

structure, social stratification based on wealth is evident and

growing. The nomenklatura as it existed in Soviet times disappeared with the demise of the CPSU, but many of its members

used their continuing connections with industry and finance to enrich themselves in the emerging capitalist system. According

to a 1995 study conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences,

more than 60 percent of Russia's wealthiest millionaires, and

75 percent of the new political elite, are former members of

the communist nomenklatura, and 38 percent of Russia's businesspeople held economic positions in the CPSU. The wealth

of the new capitalists, who constitute 1 to 2 percent of the population, derives from the ownership of private property, which

was prohibited under the communist regime; from former

black-market transactions that now are pursued legally; and

from repatriation of funds that were secretly transferred

abroad during the Soviet era. Entrepreneurs have purchased

former state-owned enterprises privatized by the government

(often using connections with government authorities to gain

favorable treatment) and have opened banks, stock exchanges,

and other ventures typical of a market economy (see Banking

and Finance; Privatization, ch. 6). By the mid-1990s, Russia had

by no means established a full-fledged market economy, but

the era of capitalism, which the Bolshevik Revolution had cut

short, was ascendant.

The most successful of the new capitalists practice conspicu- ous consumption on an extravagant scale, driving flashy West- ern cars, sporting expensive clothing and jewelry, and

frequenting stylish restaurants and clubs that are far beyond

the reach of ordinary Russians. Russian biznesmeny with cashfilled briefcases purchase expensive real estate in exclusive

areas of Western Europe and the United States. Other areas of

the world, such as the city of Limassol, Cyprus, have been trans- formed into virtual Russian enclaves where illicit commercial

transactions help fuel the economy. Russian capitalists attempt241
Russia: A Country Study

ing to achieve at a high level using legitimate means must

nonetheless pay protection money to criminal groups, especially in the larger cities. In the first half of the 1990s, the gap between the richest and

poorest citizens of Russia grew steadily, and it became a source of social alienation because newly successful Russians are resented and often are assumed to have criminal connections.

In 1995 the World Bank (see Glossary) ranked Russia's dichotomy between the highest and lowest economic echelons on a par with the wide gaps between rich and poor in Argentina and

Turkey. However, by 1996 the gap had decreased slightly.

According to the State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat),

in 1995 the wealthiest 10 percent of Russians earned 13.5 times

as much as the poorest 10 percent. In 1996 the ratio had

shrunk to 12.8 percent, suggesting that more people were sharing in the wealth. According to reports in 1996, the flaunting

of luxurious automobiles, clothing, and other forms of material wealth became less prevalent in Russia's largest cities, especially Moscow, which is the center of the nouveau riche

population.

Nonreporting of incomes by the highest socioeconomic level

likely makes the real gap wider than the official statistics indicate. The overall decline in living standards in 1995 is revealed

by an 8 percent decrease in retail trade and by opinion surveys. For instance, in early 1995 some 56 percent of respondents said

that their material situation had declined, and 17 percent said

that it had improved. Another survey identified 68 percent of

respondents claiming to live below the poverty line in 1995,

compared with 56 percent the previous year. Such self-perceptions of victimization promote the platforms of antireform

political parties that promise a return to the guaranteed wellbeing of the Soviet era (see The Elections of 1995, ch. 7).

A subclass of young businesspeople, mainly bankers and

stockbrokers, runs the new trading and investment markets in

Moscow and St. Petersburg, remaining aloof from the tangled,

state-dominated manufacturing sector. This group, a very visi- ble part of life in the larger cities in the mid-1990s, has profited

from the youthful flexibility that enabled it to embrace an

entirely new set of rules for economic success, while Russia's

older generations—with the exception of the astute nomenklatura members who became part of the nouveau riche—were much less able to adapt to the post-Soviet world.

242
Puppeteer in Sokol'niki Park, Moscow

Courtesy A. James Firth, United States Department ofAgriculture

243
Russia: A Country Study

Conditions for the working class and the peasants are

sharply at variance with those of the new capitalist class. Politi- cal repression has eased, but economic privations have

increased. Although more goods are available, they are often

beyond the means of the average worker. Full employment, the

virtually guaranteed basis of survival under communism, no

longer is the norm (see Unemployment, ch. 6). At the lower

end of the social scale, the "working poor" toil predominantly

in agriculture, education, culture, science, and health, most of

which are considered middle-class fields of employment in the

West. State employees, who suffer especially from inflation

because of infrequent wage adjustments, often fall below the

official poverty line. Young parents with little work experience and more than

one child are especially likely to be members of the working

poor. In 1993 some 57 percent of families classified as poor by

the World Bank had one or more children, and 86 percent of

families with three or more children were classified in the lowest income group. Most single-parent families also belonged to

this group. In the lower- income groups, people with relatives

generally fare better than those with none (especially single

pensioners), as the informal subsistence networks formed during the Soviet era continue to provide support to a substantial

segment of society.

The glasnost (see Glossary) policy of the late 1980s brought a new youth culture that took up the nonconformist dress, drug

use, music, and antiestablishment stance of young people in

the West, while earnestly seeking answers to questions about

Russia's past and its potential future. The social and economic

stresses and disappointments of the 1990s have pushed the

majority of young Russians completely out of the youth culture,

while the few who have won some sort of success have moved to further extremes, such as hedonism and wild economic speculation. In the cities, clubs and bars, all making heavy protection

payments to the mafiya—as Russia's growing organized crime

groups are termed—are gathering places that feature a variety

of narcotics (including mushrooms gathered in the woods near

St. Petersburg), alcohol, and a form of Russian rock music that was full of protest in the late 1980s but has since been diluted

to widen its market appeal. This small but highly visible class of

youth is divided into hundreds of tusovki (sing., tusovka), mutually exclusive social circles that provide a sense of identity but

isolate their members from the rest of society. What the tusovki

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The Society and Its Environment

have in common are decadence, an appetite for risk, and a readiness to indulge in faddish forms of mass behavior.

Wages and Work

In the post-Soviet era, social mobility is unlimited in theory,

but in the mid-1990s economic factors play an important role

in restricting upward movement for most Russians. Those without an established source of wealth generally are unable to purchase land, real estate, or enterprises, or to take advantage of

other financial opportunities to increase their income and status. Because individuals under such limitations also lack opportunities to pursue higher education, they tend to remain at or below the socioeconomic level of their parents. In many cases, the younger generation has less earning power than the one

that preceded it. In 1995 official government estimates placed 39 million people, or 26 percent of the population, below the poverty line.

Living standards, which dropped drastically in 1992, recovered

somewhat in 1993 and 1994 before falling again in 1995 as the

government tightened its social support spending policy (see

Social Welfare, this ch.; table 11, Appendix). Other factors,

such as inflation, changes in the minimum wage and minimum

pension, and income from nonwage sources such as business

activity and property, also influence annual income in a given

period. Raised in mid-1994, then not again until April 1995,

the minimum wage has provided little protection against intermittent periods of high inflation. Official income statistics are skewed because many Russians underreport their incomes to avoid taxes and because such statistics ignore important nonincome sources of well-being such as property.

The real incomes of state-sector employees fell as much as 30

percent in the first three quarters of 1995. Wages in the private

sector have kept pace with inflation more consistently, unless an enterprise has financial difficulties such as debts owed to other enterprises. In both sectors, long-term failure to pay

wages has become a chronic problem; it affected an estimated

13 million people in mid-1995. Enterprises also have

responded to financial difficulties by laying off employees and

by shortening work weeks, pushing more workers below the

poverty line. Although many of the working poor retain the

housing, health, and free holidays associated with employment,

enterprises are rapidly withdrawing those Soviet-era privileges.

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Russia: A Country Study

The economic condition of many Russians is ameliorated by

earnings from additional jobs or by access to private plots of

land. In a 1994 survey, 47 percent of respondents reported

some form of additional material support, and 23 percent

reported having supplementary employment. In some cases, unofficial employment is quite profitable. Of the "working

unemployed," Russians who consider themselves out of work

but nevertheless hold some sort ofjob, 11 percent had incomes

at least three times higher than the average wage in 1994. The

large number of pensioners with unofficial jobs (approximately one in four) generally fare much better than those on

fixed incomes, generating a disparity of status within the oldest

segment of society. The easing of travel restrictions in postSoviet Russia and the overall diversification of the private sec- tor increased opportunities to earn supplementary income,

through such activities as buying goods abroad and selling

them inside Russia and offering a variety of private services

such as repair work, sewing, and translation. In general, these

opportunities are most accessible to young, well-educated Russians in large cities. But in many cases, well-educated individuals must sacrifice their social status by accepting unskilled jobs

to make ends meet.

Some professional positions that are accorded high prestige

carry a salary below that for certain categories of skilled labor.

The upper echelons of the political, artistic, and scientific elites form the top of the occupation pyramid in terms of status and

income. That category is followed by the professional, intellectual, and artistic intelligentsia; the most highly skilled industrial workers; white-collar workers; relatively prosperous

farmers; and average workers. The bottom of the status and pay

scales includes people employed as semiskilled or unskilled

workers in light industry, agriculture, food processing, education, health care, retail trade, and the services sector. Among the low-paying jobs are some that require higher or

specialized education and that carry some level of prestige.

Women predominate in these job categories, which include

engineers, veterinarians, agronomists, accountants, legal advisers, translators, schoolteachers, librarians, organizers of clubs

and cultural events, musicians, and even doctors. A 1994 World

Bank report identified an increasing likelihood that positions

offering lower wages would be filled by women, in most sectors and occupations of the Russian economy. Many women, however, reportedly accept jobs at lower levels of skill and remuner246
The Society and Its Environment

ation in exchange for nonmonetary benefits, such as short

commuting distances, minimum overtime hours, and access to child care or shopping facilities in the workplace (see The Role

of Women, this ch.).

Rural Life For rural society in both Soviet and post-Soviet times, agriculture has been the primary source of employment. Before

1992, however, the CPSU and its predecessors constituted the

sole form of political organization, and all village communities were organized around the economic institution of the collective farm (kolkhoz—see Glossary) or state farm (sovkhoz—see Glossary) and the village soviet (council) administration

organizations that employed the elite of rural society, nearly all of whose members were men.

As in the past, the post-Soviet nonpolitical elite includes

schoolteachers, agronomists, veterinary surgeons, and engineers. Teachers are held in high esteem, partly because of their

role in determining who in the next generation will have

upward social mobility. Despite this status, teachers receive low

pay and often must maintain private garden plots to support

themselves. Agricultural machinery specialists, including operators and mechanics, emerged as increasingly important and

well-paid members of rural society in the 1970s and 1980s. In

general, however, workers who remain in the countryside have

less possibility of upward mobility than do urban dwellers. Managers and white-collar workers in rural agricultural and other

organizations generally are brought in from outside.

Rural dwellers tend to spend more time in their homes than

residents of urban areas. Rural homes generally are larger than

those in the city and have private garden plots. The tastes of

country people are simpler and less Western-oriented than

those of their urban counterparts, and they have less money to spend on leisure pursuits. The routine of life in many rural vil- lages has scarcely changed over many generations; the central concerns continue to be the weather and the condition of

crops and livestock.

The end of Soviet rule cast a shadow over the villages' guarantee of medical care, job training, and entertainment, and

rural areas benefited much less from the increased pace of

information exchange characteristic of urban centers. Rural

young people continue to leave their families to seek a better

life elsewhere because village life has improved little since their

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Russia: A Country Study

grandparents were young. In this process, the family, the foundation of peasant society, has become fragmented. Villages

with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants are disappearing at a rapid

rate: between 1960 and 1995, the entire population of an esti- mated two-thirds of such villages either died or moved away. In

the remaining rural villages, health care and education are

increasingly inadequate, and essential commodities such as propane gas have become extremely expensive.

Many young people return to their rural homes after acquiring the type of education or technical training that is available

only in cities and that is increasingly necessary to run mechanized farming operations and agroindustrial enterprises. They

are joined by Russian emigres from former Soviet republics,

especially Central Asia, for whom it is easier to start life in Russia in a rural rather than an urban setting. However, most of

those additions to the rural population are only stopping temporarily until they find more satisfying situations elsewhere.

According to most experts, the long-term prospects of the tra- ditional Russian village became grim in the immediate postSoviet period.

Social Organizations

In the mid-1990s, the structure of Russia's civil society was

still in flux, but by that time the country had developed a large

and growing network of social organizations, including trade

unions, professional societies, veterans' groups, youth organizations, sports clubs, women's associations, and a variety of support groups. Whereas all types of organization during the

Soviet era functioned as "transmission belts" for the communist

party, in the years that followed the emergence of a large number of diverse, autonomous nongovernmental groups was an

important aspect of the growth of civil society.

The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia

(Federatsiya nezavisimykh profsoyuzov Rossii—FNPR) is one of

the largest trade union organizations. Created as the official

trade union movement was reconstituted following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the federation includes thirty-six

unions—many of them quite small in the mid-1990s—grouped

by type of occupation. Among the FNPR's activities is the collection of contributions to the Social Insurance Fund by Russia's enterprises, each of which is required to earmark 4.5

percent of its total payroll for the fund.

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The Society and Its Environment

Breaking the legal stranglehold of the Soviet-era trade union

structure on the provision of social security benefits was a complicated but essential stage in enabling new unions to gain

legitimacy in the eyes of workers. In the early 1990s, most workers saw the FNPR as representing the interests of management

and the government, so they relied more heavily on unofficial,

independent unions and a variety of worker-oriented organizations. However, in 1995 and early 1996 the FNPR, now a part- ner with top businesspeople in an umbrella party called Trade

Unions and Industrialists of Russia, played a central role in

organizing large-scale rallies and picketing actions to protest

chronic late wage payments by enterprises all over the Russian

Federation.

In the 1990s, substantial independent union activity has also

occurred in the coal industry. There, the Independent Miners'

Union (Nezavisimyy profsoyuz gornyakov—NPG) and the

Independent Trade Union of Workers in the Coal-Mining

Industry (Nezavisimyy profsoyuz rabochikh ugol'noy promyshlennosti—NPRUP), a reformed version of the official Soviet- era trade union, share power and have organized large-scale

strikes. In the 1990s, independent individuals and groups have

begun establishing professional, research, educational, and

cultural organizations. This activity has included a substantial

upswing in the number of voluntary charitable and philanthropic organizations. In 1995 about 5,000 nonprofit organizations and 550 formal charities were operating in Russia. In

Moscow more than 10,000 volunteers worked for these organizations in 1996. These numbers are low by Western standards,

and a legal framework for the existence of charities and nonprofit organizations still did not exist as of mid-1996. However,

the starting point in 1992 was nearly zero in both categories.

A significant token of citizen awareness is the proliferation

of local and regional ecological and environmental cleanup

groups throughout the Russian Federation (see The Response

to Environmental Problems, ch. 3) . For example, Epitsentr, an

umbrella organization in St. Petersburg, has spawned numerous smaller groups that focus on controlling pollution in the

city's water supply, stopping the construction of a controversial

dam in the Gulf of Finland, and preserving St. Petersburg's his- toric buildings and cultural monuments. Students at Moscow

State University and other educational institutions have played an important role in directing public attention to the massive

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Russia: A Country Study

environmental degradation that plagues Russia. The Socio-Ecological Union, which was founded at Moscow State University

in 1988, has become one of the Russian Federation's most

influential umbrella organizations committed to environmental protection.

The Family

As the Soviet Union became urbanized, families grew more

numerous and smaller in average size. Between the censuses of

1959 and 1989, the number of family units increased 41 percent, from 28.5 million to more than 40 million. Average family

size in the Russian Republic declined from 3.4 persons in 1970

to 3.1 in 1989. Already in the late 1970s, more than 80 percent

of urban families had two children or fewer. In 1989 some 87

percent of the population lived in families, of which about 80

percent were based on a married couple.

In the 1980s, the divorce rate in the Soviet Union was second

in the world only to that of the United States, although "unofficial divorces" and separations also were common. Crowded

housing and lack of privacy contributed heavily to the divorce

rate, especially for couples forced to live with the parents of

one spouse. Drunkenness and infidelity were other major

causes. Divorce procedures were relatively simple, although

courts generally attempted to reconcile couples. Custody of

children normally was awarded to the mother. In the first half

of the 1990s, the conditions contributing to the majority of

Russia's divorces did not change, and the divorce rate

increased. In post-Soviet attitudes, the family continues to be viewed as the most important institution in society. In a 1994 poll funded

by the Commission on Women's, Family, and Demographic

Problems, less than 3 percent of respondents named "living

alone without a family" as the best choice for a young person.

Although the size of the average Russian family has decreased

steadily over the past quarter-century, nearly 80 percent of

respondents named children as the essential element of a good

marriage. At the same time, about three-quarters of respondents said that a bad marriage should be terminated rather

than prolonged; the poll also showed that, generally, the Russian attitude toward divorce is more positive than it was in the

Soviet era. According to the 1994 survey, the dynamics of the average

Russian family have changed somewhat. Compared with 1989,

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The Society and Its Environment

about 3 percent fewer individuals characterized their marriages as in conflict, and 9 percent fewer called their marriages

"egalitarian" in the distribution of authority between the partners. The average distribution of common household tasks was shown to be far from equal, with women performing an aver- age of about 75 percent of cooking, cleaning, and shopping

chores. Between 1989 and 1994, women's expression of dissatis- faction with their family situation increased 13 percent, while

that of men rose only 2 percent. Women reporting family satis- faction were predominantly young or elderly, with adequate-tohigh incomes and at least a secondary education. According to experts, social and economic crises have caused Russians to

rely more heavily than ever on the family as a source of personal satisfaction. But these same crises have caused the stan- dard of living to fall, and they have required that more time be

spent at work to keep it from falling further, thus making it harder for families to sustain their most cherished attributes.

The Role of Women

In the post-Soviet era, the position of women in Russian society remains at least as problematic as it was in previous decades.

In both cases, a number of nominal legal protections for

women either have failed to address the existing conditions or have failed to supply adequate support. In the 1990s, increasing economic pressures and shrinking government programs

left women with little choice but to seek employment, although

most available positions were as substandard as in the Soviet

period, and generally jobs of any sort were more difficult to obtain. Such conditions contribute heavily to Russia's declining

birthrate and the general deterioration of the family. At the

same time, feminist groups and social organizations have

begun advancing the cause of women's rights in what remains a

strongly traditional society.

The Soviet constitution of 1977 stipulated that men and

women have equal rights, and that women have equal access to education and training, employment, promotions, remuneration, and participation in social, cultural, and political activity.

The Soviet government also provided women special medical

and workplace protection, including incentives for mothers to work outside the home and legal and material support of their

maternal role. In the 1980s, that support included 112 days of

maternity leave at full pay. When that allowance ended, a woman could take as much as one year of additional leave with251
Russia: A Country Study

out pay without losing her position. Employer discrimination

against pregnant and nursing women was prohibited, and

mothers with small children had the right to work part-time.

Because of such provisions, as many as 92 percent of women

were employed at least part-time, Soviet statistics showed.

Despite official ideology, Soviet women did not enjoy the same position as men in society or within the family. Average

pay for women in all fields was below the overall national aver- age, and the vaunted high percentage of women in various

fields, especially health care, medicine, education, and eco- nomics, did not hold true in the most prestigious and high-paying areas such as the upper management of organizations in

any of those fields. Women were conspicuously underrepresented in the leadership of the CPSU; in the 1980s, they constituted less than 30 percent of party membership and less than 5

percent of the party Central Committee, and no woman ever achieved full membership in the Politburo.

Most of the nominal state benefit programs for women con- tinued into the post-Soviet era (see Social Welfare, this ch.).

However, as in the Soviet era, Russian women in the 1990s predominate in economic sectors where pay is low, and they continue to receive less pay than men for comparable positions. In 1995 men in health care earned an average of 50 percent more

than women in that field, and male engineers received an aver- age of 40 percent more than their female colleagues. Despite

the fact that, on average, women are better educated than

men, women remain in the minority in senior management

positions. In the Soviet era, women's wages averaged 70 percent of men's; by 1995 the figure was 40 percent, according to the Moscow-based Center for Gender Studies. According to a 1996 report, 87 percent of employed urban Russians earning

less than 100,000 rubles a month (for value of the ruble—see Glossary) were women, and the percentage of women

decreased consistently in the higher wage categories.

According to reports, women generally are the first to be

fired, and they face other forms of on-the-job discrimination as well. Struggling companies often fire women to avoid paying

child care benefits or granting maternity leave, as the law still requires. In 1995 women constituted an estimated 70 percent

of Russia's unemployed, and as much as 90 percent in some

areas. Sociological surveys show that sexual harassment and violence against women have increased at all levels of society in

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The Society and Its Environment

the 1990s. More than 13,000 rapes were reported in 1994,

meaning that several times that number of that often-unreported crime probably were committed. In 1993 an estimated

14,000 women were murdered by their husbands or lovers,

about twenty times the figure in the United States and several

times the figure in Russia five years earlier. More than 300,000

other types of crimes, including spousal abuse, were committed

against women in 1994; in 1996 the State Duma (the lower

house of the Federal Assembly, Russia's parliament) drafted a law against domestic violence.

Working women continue to bear the "double burden" of a job and family-raising responsibilities, in which Russian husbands generally participate little. In a 1994 survey, about twothirds of women said that the state should help families by paying one spouse enough to permit the other to stay at home.

Most women also consider their role in the family more diffi- cult than that of their husband. Such dissatisfaction is a factor

in Russia's accelerating divorce rate and declining marriage

rate. In 1993 the divorce rate was 4.5 per 1,000 population,

compared with 4.1 ten years earlier, and the marriage rate

declined from 10.5 per 1,000 population in 1983 to 7.5 in 1993. In 1992 some 17.2 percent of births were to unmarried women.

According to 1994 government statistics, about 20 percent of

families were run by a single parent—the mother in 94 percent

of cases. Often women with families are forced to work because of

insufficient state child allowances and unemployment benefits.

Economic hardship has driven some women into prostitution. In the Soviet period, prostitution was viewed officially as a form

of social deviancy that was dying out as the Soviet Union

advanced toward communism. In the 1990s, organized crime

has become heavily involved in prostitution, both in Russia and

in the cities of Central and Western Europe, to which Russian

women often are lured by bogus advertisements for matchmaking services or modeling agencies. According to one esti- mate, 10,000 women from Central Europe, including a high

proportion of Russians, have been lured or forced into prostitution in Germany alone.

Independent women's organizations—a form of activity that was suppressed in the Soviet era—have been formed in large

numbers in the 1990s at the local, regional, and national levels. One such group is the Center for Gender Studies, a private

research institute. The center analyzes demographic and social

253
Russia: A Country Study

problems of women and acts as a link between Russian and

Western feminist groups. A traveling group called Feminist

Alternative offers women assertiveness training. Many local

groups have emerged to engage in court actions on behalf of

women, to set up rape and domestic violence awareness programs (about a dozen of which were active in 1995), and to aid

women in establishing businesses. Another prominent organization is the Women's Union of Russia, which focuses on jobtraining programs, career counseling, and the development of

entrepreneurial skills that will enable women to compete more

successfully in Russia's emerging market economy. Despite the

proliferation of such groups and programs, in the mid-1990s

most Russians (including many women) remain contemptuous

of their efforts, which many regard as a kind of Western subversion of traditional social values.

The rapidly expanding private sector offers women new

employment opportunities, but many of the Soviet stereotypes

remain; the most frequently offered job in new businesses is that of secretary, and advertisements often specify physical

attractiveness as a primary requirement. Russian law provides

for as much as three years' imprisonment for sexual harassment, but the law rarely is enforced. Although the Fund for

Protection from Sexual Harassment has blacklisted 300 Moscow firms where sexual harassment is known to have taken

place, demands for sex and even rape still are common on-thejob occurrences. Women's higher profile in post-Soviet Russia also has

extended to politics. At the national level, the most notable

manifestation of women's newfound political success has been

the Women of Russia party, which won 11 percent of the vote

and twenty-five seats in the 1993 national parliamentary elections. Subsequently, the party became active in a number of

issues, including the opposition to the military campaign in

Chechnya that began in 1994. In the 1995 national parliamentary elections, the Women of Russia chose to maintain its platform unchanged, emphasizing social issues such as the

protection of children and women rather than entering into a

coalition with other liberal parties. As a result, the party failed to reach the 5 percent threshold of votes required for proportional representation in the new State Duma, gaining only

three seats in the single-seat portion of the elections (see The

Elections of 1995, ch. 7). The party considered running a can254
The Society and Its Environment

didate in the 1996 presidential election but remained outside

the crowded field. A smaller organization, the Russian Women's Party, ran as part of an unsuccessful coalition with several other splinter parties in the 1995 elections. A few women, such as Ella Pamfilova

of the Republican Party, Socialist Workers' Party chief Lyudmila

Vartazarova, and Valeriya Novodvorskaya, leader of the Democratic Union, have established themselves as influential political figures. Pamfilova has gained particular stature as an

advocate on behalf of women and elderly people.

The Soldiers' Mothers Movement was formed in 1989 to expose human rights violations in the armed forces and to help

youths resist the draft. The movement has gained national

prominence through its opposition to the war in Chechnya.

Numerous protests have been organized, and representatives

have gone to the Chechen capital, Groznyy, to demand the

release of Russian prisoners and locate missing soldiers. The

group, which claimed 10,000 members in 1995, also has lobbied against extending the term of mandatory military service.

Women have occupied few positions of influence in the

executive branch of Russia's national government. One post in

the Government (cabinet), that of minister of social protection, has become a "traditional" women's position; in 1994 Ella

Pamfilova was followed in that position by Lyudmila Bezlepkina, who headed the ministry until the end of President Boris

N. Yeltsin's first term in mid-1996. Tat'yana Paramanova was

acting chairman of the Russian Central Bank for one year

before Yeltsin replaced her in November 1995, and Tat'yana

Regent has been head of the Federal Migration Service since

its inception in 1992. Prior to the 1995 elections, women held

about 10 percent of the seats in parliament: fifty-seven of 450

seats in the State Duma and nine of 178 seats in the upper

house of parliament, the Federation Council. The Soviet sys- tem of mandating legislative seats generally allocated about

one-third of the seats in republic-level legislatures and one-half

of the seats in local Soviets to women, but those proportions

shrank drastically with the first multiparty elections of 1990.

Sexual Attitudes

In the 1990s, Russian sexual values and attitudes generally

moved toward liberalization and autonomy, with distinct differ- ences according to age, sex, region, and level of education. In the Soviet era, the Russian attitude toward sexuality itself paral255
Russia: A Country Study

leled that toward artistic expression of the erotic: it simply was

concealed. Most Soviet philosophical, psychological, and biological reference works made little or no mention of sexuality

as a major characteristic of human beings. Soviet psychology,

notoriously backward and misused, ignored almost completely

the influence of sexual behavior and motivation on overall psy- chological makeup.

After decades of Stalinist repression, Russian erotic art, liter- ature, and theater began a gradual revival in the 1970s as censorship and ideological control weakened somewhat. Access to Western novels with erotic motifs, such as Henry Miller's Tropic

of Cancer and Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita, also improved in this

period. In 1992 restrictions on the publication of erotic litera- ture were loosened in Russia, heralding a rapid output of erotic

and pornographic material of all sorts. A collection of children's erotic folklore was prepared in 1995, and erotic film festivals and photography exhibits began to appear in the 1990s.

The public seemingly has accepted the frequent use of nudity

in Russian television, dance, and drama.

Especially in film and literature, the shift has produced

many instances of gratuitous or cruel sex and arbitrarily introduced nudity. Violence against women frequently is a central

motif of movies, and violence and sex often are linked. Russian

observers have expressed alarm that the release of longrepressed sexual expression in art will be accompanied by a

similar deluge of sex and violence in Russian society. Indeed,

the incidence of violence and sexual attacks against women in

the first half of the 1990s seems to confirm these fears (see The

Role of Women, this ch.).

Objections to the trend toward sexual liberation are concentrated in the older generations. In surveys younger and bettereducated Russians generally voice approval, and new enterprises selling cosmetics, high-fashion clothing, and health

products play to a new public interest in attractive display of

the human body. The individuality implicit in such marketing—and especially obvious in the new Russian youth culture

is a drastic change from the strict standards of dress and

grooming imposed in the Soviet era. The wearing of shorts, for

example, only was accepted in Russia in the 1980s; in the Soviet

era, women could not wear trousers in public without harassment or arrest; and vigilantes often forcibly cut the hair of

youths who exceeded the standard for hair length.

256
The Society and Its Environment

According to surveys taken in the early 1990s, most Russians

feel that romantic love is a precondition to marriage and to sexual intimacy. But there are great differences in attitude

toward this ideal between the older and younger generations,

between the sexes, and between rural and urban Russians. Russians in larger cities tend to take a more liberal outlook on premarital sex. The younger generations in Russia show a much

more casual attitude toward commitment to a long-term rela- tionship than do the older generations. However, in surveys

younger males showed a much stronger identification of sex with pleasure, and younger females a stronger identification of

sex with love. Russians' attitudes toward premarital sex became

somewhat more liberal in the 1990s; in a 1993 survey, the percentage of those disapproving was substantially lower than it had been in previous years. The official policy of the Soviet Union toward homosexuality was one of persecution and intimidation. Until the late 1980s,

Russian social scientists and society in general were completely

silent on the subject. Under those conditions, homosexuals,

known as "blues," lived in an underground culture circumscribed by the brutality of gangs and the police and by employment discrimination.

With the advent of glasnost and the appearance of acquired

immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in the Soviet Union,

open scientific and journalistic discussion of homosexuality

began in 1987. The issue became politicized in 1990 as gays

and lesbians began attacking discrimination as a human rights

issue. At this point, strong arguments appeared for abolishing

Article 121 of the Criminal Code, which stipulated that sex between men (but not between women) was a crime. Despite

increasingly strong opinion against Article 121, in the early

1990s nationalists and communists joined some religious organizations in opposing decriminalization. Meanwhile, the number of convictions under Article 121 decreased steadily.

Although Russia's new Criminal Code had not been ratified as of mid-1996, substantial modifications had been made to Article 121 by that time.

Hundreds of gay rights organizations appeared in Russia in

the 1990s, mostly in urban centers. Moscow became the center

of Russia's gay and lesbian communities, both of which

remained substantially less overt than their Western equivalents. Despite a gradual increase in public tolerance in the

1990s, substantial residues of homophobia remain in Russian

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Russia: A Country Study

society. The neofascist group Pamyat', for example, remained

violently antigay in the mid-1990s, and the communist and

extreme nationalist media have launched strident homophobic

attacks. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous surveys

identified homosexuals as the most hated group in Russian

society, although the number of Russians calling for their exter- mination or isolation decreased noticeably between 1989 and

the mid-1990s.

Education

In the Soviet period, education was highly centralized, and

indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist theory was a major element

of every school's curriculum. The schools' additional ideological function left a legacy in the post-Soviet system that has

proved difficult for educators to overcome. In the 1990s,

reform programs are aimed at overhauling the Soviet-era pedagogical philosophy and substantially revising curricula. Inadequate funding has frustrated attainment of these goals,

however, and the teaching profession has lost talented individuals because of low pay. The Soviet Heritage

The Soviet government operated virtually all the schools in

Russia. The underlying philosophy of Soviet schools was that

the teacher's job was to transmit standardized materials to the

students, and the student's job was to memorize those materials, all of which were put in the context of socialist ethics. That

set of ethics stressed the primacy of the collective over the

interests of the individual. Therefore, for both teachers and

students, creativity and individualism were discouraged. The

Soviet system also maintained some traditions from tsarist

times, such as the five-point grading scale, formal and regimented classroom environments, and standard school uniforms—dark dresses with white collars for girls, white shirts

and black pants for boys.

As in other areas of Soviet life, the need for reform in education was felt in the 1980s. Reform programs in that period

called for new curricula, textbooks, and teaching methods.

The chief aim of those programs was to create a "new school"

that would better equip Soviet citizens to deal with the modern, technologically advanced nation that Soviet leaders fore- saw in the future. Nevertheless, in the 1980s facilities generally

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The Society and Its Environment

were inadequate, overcrowding was common, and equipment

and materials were in short supply. The schools and universities

failed to supply adequately skilled labor to almost every sector of the economy, and overgrown bureaucracy further compromised education's contribution to society. At the same time,

young Russians became increasingly cynical about the MarxistLeninist philosophy they were forced to absorb, as well as the

stifling of self-expression and individual responsibility. In the

last years of the Soviet Union, funding was inadequate for the

large-scale establishment of "new schools," and requirements

of ideological purity continued to smother the new pedagogical creativity that was heralded in official pronouncements.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transition

toward democracy had a profound effect on national education policy. In 1992 a reform philosophy was set forth in the

Law on Education. The fundamental principle of that law was

the removal of state control from education policy. In regions

with non-Russian populations, that meant that educational

institutions could base their curricula and teaching methods

on national and historical traditions. In all regions, enactment

of the law meant significant autonomy for local authorities to choose education strategies most appropriate to the time and

place. Post-Soviet education reform also stressed teaching

objectively, thus discarding all forms of the narrow, institutional views that had dominated the previous era and preparing young people to deal with all aspects of the society they

would encounter by presenting a broader interpretation of the

world.

Post-Soviet educational philosophy also has sought to integrate education with the production and economic processes

into which graduates will pass in adult life. Envisioning a program of continuous education lasting throughout the lifetime

of an individual, this concept has as its goal converting the education process from an economic burden on the state to an

engine of economic progress. Especially important in this program is the reorientation of vocational training to complement

the economic reforms of the 1990s. New systems of education

for farmers and various types of on-the-job training for adults

have been introduced, and new curricula in economics stress understanding of market economies.

The Post-Soviet Education Structure

Article 43 of the 1993 constitution affirms each citizen's

259
Russia: A Country Study

right to education. It stipulates that "basic general education is compulsory" and that parents or guardians are responsible for

ensuring that children obtain schooling. "General access to free preschool, basic general, and secondary vocational education in state or municipal educational establishments and in

enterprises is guaranteed," according to the constitution.

Although such access continued to exist in principle in the

mid-1990s, various components of the system were increasingly

inadequate. In 1993 some 35.2 million students were enrolled

in Russian schools at all levels, including 20.5 million in general primary and secondary schools, 1.8 million in professional

and technical schools, 2.1 million in special secondary schools,

and 2.6 million in institutions of higher learning (see table 12,

Appendix). A total of 70,200 general primary and secondary

schools and 82,100 preschools were in operation at that time.

Of the former category, 48,800 were in rural areas and 21,000

in urban areas. In 1995 the projected budgetary expenditure for education was about 3.6 percent of the total state budget, a level Russian

experts agreed could not maintain the system as it was, to say

nothing of implementing the changes called for by post-Soviet

legislation. The financing system made educational institutions

fully dependent on state funds; outside sources of funding did

not exist because no tax advantages accrued from investing in

education.

Infrastructure

Because the Soviet Union had not built enough schools to accommodate increasing enrollment, Russia inherited a system

of very large, overcrowded schools with a decaying infrastructure. By the late 1980s, 21 percent of students were attending

schools with no central heating, and 30 percent were learning

in buildings with no running water. In 1992 Russia had nearly

67,000 primary and secondary schools, which provided an aver- age per-pupil space of 2.6 square meters, one-third the official standard. About one-quarter of schools housed 900 or more

students. In 1993 Russia was forced to close about 20,000 of its schools because of physical inadequacy, and an estimated onethird of the national school capacity was in need of large-scale

repair. In 1994 one of every two students attended a school

operating on two or three shifts. Rural schools, which make up

about 75 percent of the national total, were in especially bad

condition.

260
Children in middle school, Tyumen'

Courtesy G. W. Meredith, Jr.

Teachers

The Soviet Union suffered a shortage of teachers for

decades before the 1990s. Although society held the profession

in high regard, teacher salaries were among the lowest of all professions, at least partly because women dominated the field at the primary and secondary levels. The emerging market

economy of the 1990s improved the pay and career opportunities outside teaching for many who would have remained in

education under the more rigid Soviet system; thus, the shortage was exacerbated. In the 1992-93 school year, Russian

schools had about 29,000 teacher vacancies, and in the following year 25 percent of all foreign-language teaching positions were unfilled. Although low pay has damaged morale among

Russian teachers, they are more disillusioned by the end of the

idealistic first post-Soviet years of innovation and freedom of

261
Russia: A Country Study

speech and the continued decline of their material environment. In the mid-1990s, rural schools experienced particular

difficulty retaining teachers, as qualified young adults sought

opportunities in larger communities.

Curriculum

The end of the communist system has led to extensive cur- riculum revision. A new paradigm has been developed to guide

education, and more attention has gone to the arts, humanities, and social sciences. The 1992 Law on Education stressed

the humanistic nature of education, common values, freedom

of human development, and citizenship. Curriculum changes were laid out in another document, the Basic Curriculum of

the General Secondary School; the overall curriculum reform

program is to be put in place over a five-year period ending in

1998. In the mid-1990s, many public schools have designed special curricula, some returning to the classical studies prevalent

in the early 1900s. Local development of curricula and materials became legal in 1992, although financial constraints have

limited experimentation and the Soviet era left educators with

a strong bias toward standardized instruction and rote memorization. In contrast to the Soviet era, the quality and content of

curricula vary greatly among public schools. A major factor

encouraging local initiative is the disarray of federal education

agencies, which often leave oblast, regional, and municipal

authorities to their own devices. Nevertheless, only about onethird of primary and secondary schools have taken advantage

of the opportunity to develop their own curricula; many

administrations have been unwilling to make such large-scale

decisions independently.

Grade Structure Russian parents have the option of sending their children to preschool until age seven, when enrollment in elementary

school becomes mandatory. Because the overwhelming majority of mothers still have full-time employment, many preschool

facilities are colocated with enterprises. As businesses become

increasingly profit oriented, however, many have ceased or reduced their support of such facilities. The number of child- care facilities for working parents declined significantly after

1991, mainly because many such facilities lacked the funding to continue operation without state support. Of about 82,100 pre262
The Society and Its Environment

schools in operation in 1993, more than one-third were housed

in inadequate facilities. Although the 1992 Law on Education lowered the upper age

of the compulsory education range from seventeen to fifteen,

in the mid-1990s more than 60 percent of students remained in

school for the previously required ten years. Among Russia's

educational reforms is a regulation authorizing school officials to expel students fourteen years of age or older who are failing

their courses. By the end of 1992, about 200,000 students had

been expelled, and two to three times that number had

dropped out. In the mid-1990s, Russia had five types of secondary school: regular schools featuring a core curriculum;

schools offering elective subjects; schools offering intensive

study in elective subjects; schools designed to prepare students

for entrance examinations to an institution of higher education (vyssheye uchebnoye zavedeniye—VUZ; pi., VUZy); and alter- native schools with experimental programs.

Private Schools

State education is free, but by 1992 several state higher-education institutions had begun charging tuition. At that point,

almost half of the students above the secondary level were paying fees of some sort. The 1992 Law on Education provides

explicitly for private educational institutions; in the ensuing

years, several organizations for private education have

appeared, and a variety of private schools and colleges have

opened. By 1992 about 300 nonstate schools were being

attended by more than 20,000 students.

As public schools debated what to do with their new aca- demic freedom, private schools and preschools became centers

of innovation, with programs rediscovering prerevolutionary

pedagogy and freely borrowing teaching methods from West- ern Europe and the United States. Serving largely Western-oriented families intent on making progress up the newly

reconstructed social ladder, private schools emphasize learning

English and other critical skills. Student-to-teacher ratios are very low, and teacher salaries average about US$170 per month

(about three times the average for a public school teacher).

Tuition may be as much as US$3,000 per year, but some private

schools charge parents according to their means, surviving

instead on donations of money and time from wealthy parents.

Unlike public schools, all private schools must pay for rent, util263
Russia: A Country Study

ities, and textbooks, and many have struggled to retain adequate building space.

Educational Achievement

The literacy rate in Russia is nearly 100 percent except in

some areas dominated by ethnic minorities, where the rate may

be considerably lower. According to the 1989 census, threefifths of Russia's people aged fifteen and older had completed

secondary school, and 8 percent had completed higher education. Wide variations in educational attainment exist between

urban and rural areas. The 1989 census indicated that twothirds of the country's urban population aged fifteen and older

had finished secondary school, as compared with just under

one-half of the rural population. Schools can award diplomas

only in three languages—Russian, Tatar, and Bashkir—

a

requirement that puts many of the country's more than 100

ethnic groups at a disadvantage.

Higher Education

The VUZ category includes all of Russia's postsecondary

educational institutions; in 1995 these totaled about 500,

including forty-two universities. The other two types of VUZ are the institute and the polytechnic institute. Institutes, the largest

of the three groups, train students in a specific field such as law,

economics, art, agriculture, medicine, or technology. The polytechnic institutes teach the same range of subjects but without

specialization in a single area. Most universities teach the arts and pure sciences.

The institute program consists of two phases. After completing two years of general studies, a student receives a certificate;

he or she then may take an entrance examination to continue

for two more years or terminate the program and seek a job.

Completion of the next two years results in conferral of a baccalaureate degree. The next level of higher education is specialized study based on a research program in the area of

future professional activity. This phase lasts at least two years, at the end of which the individual is designated a specialist in the

chosen field. The top level of higher education is graduate

work, which entails a three-year program of study and research

leading to a degree of candidate (kandidat), then finally to a degree of doctor of sciences (doktor nauk) . In the post-Soviet era, the system of higher education has

undergone a more drastic transformation than the primary

264
The Society and Its Environment

and secondary systems. Authority has moved from the center to agencies in local and subnational jurisdictions. About 14 percent of institutions of higher learning are located in the twentyone republics of the federation (see table 13, Appendix).

Under the new system, each VUZ can determine its own admissions policy and the content of its academic programs. These

institutions also have their own financial resources and statutes of operation.

Most of Russia's universities are located in large cities. Moscow State University, which was founded in 1755 and has about

28,000 students and 8,000 teachers, enjoys the highest reputation. The Russian People's Friendship University in Moscow

has about 6,500 students and 1,500 teachers, and St. Petersburg

State University has about 21,000 students and 2,100 teachers.

The Soviet Union concentrated its vocational training

resources in areas such as space and military technology. It lagged behind the West in technical and vocational training in

other sectors because of the practice of ending students' preparation in these areas at the secondary level. In Russia vocational

schools traditionally have had a poor image; only in the early

1990s was comprehensive vocational education introduced for

postsecondary students. In 1993 some 400 VUZ offered specialized training in specific vocational areas ranging from engineering and electricity to agricultural specialties. Some

vocational schools have combined general and vocational curricula, with the goal of giving specialists a broader educational

background. Another trend is the integration of higher technical education with on-the-job training by linking educational

institutions with enterprises and factories.

In the post-Soviet era, business education has expanded dramatically because the demand for competent managers far out- strips the supply. Experts believe that Russia's business

education programs will play an important role in transforming social attitudes toward the market economy and capitalism

and establishing a new economic infrastructure. The primary

goal of the new programs is to create familiarity with the principles of the market economy while casting aside Marxist eco- nomic ideology. In the first two years after the Soviet Union

dissolved, more than 1,000 business schools and training centers were established.

Three types of institution offer business management education: state and private business schools and private consulting

firms. Many in the last category simply offer high-priced lec265
Russia: A Country Study

tures, but some business schools have developed sophisticated

programs. Examples are the International Business School of

Moscow State University, the Graduate School of International

Business of the Academy of the National Economy in Moscow,

and the International Management Institute in St. Petersburg.

Several schools offer full master of business administration

(MBA) degree programs based on Western models. Business

schools are funded by the state and by private enterprise. Competent faculty are at a premium in this field; many have been

trained by Western firms such as IBM.

Education and Society

Education plays a crucial role in determining social status in

Russia. People who leave school after eight years generally can

find only unskilled jobs. Even those who complete secondary

education may rise no higher than skilled labor or low-level

white-collar work. A college or university education is necessary

for most professional and bureaucratic positions and appears

to be highly desirable for a position of political power. For

example, a very high percentage of the members of Russia's

parliament are university graduates.

Access to higher education is roughly proportionate to the

social and financial situation of an individual's family. Children

whose parents have money and status usually have an advantage in gaining admission to an institution of higher education.

The reasons lie not only with the parents' possible influence

and connections but increasingly with the better quality of primary and secondary education that has become available to such children, enhancing their ability to pass difficult university entrance examinations. Moreover, such families can afford

to hire tutors for their children in preparation for the examinations and can more readily afford to pay university tuition in case the children do not receive stipends.

By the mid-1990s, the new phenomenon of individual commercial success began influencing the attitude of Russian society toward education and its goals. At the same time, the last generation of Soviet-educated Russians was finding itself ill prepared to deal with a new set of conditions for social and eco- nomic survival. In the new order, acquisition of money is much

more important for both self-respect and practical survival, and

career prestige by itself is of relatively less worth than it was in

the Soviet system, where every career label ensured a known

level of comfort. Significantly, in post-Soviet years, the phrase

266
The Society and Its Environment

delat' den'gi (to make money) has passed into common usage in

colloquial Russian. Together with the employment insecurity

felt in the 1990s by well-educated Russians, the new values have

dampened the educational ambitions of many, particularly

with regard to higher education. Although most older Russians

resent those who achieve commercial success in the new "system," the generation now in school shows increasing interest in

advancement in the private sector of the economy. At the same

time, polls show that education ranks ninth among the most

pressing concerns of Russians.

Health

Russia has an entrenched, albeit underfunded, system of

socialized medicine. Basic medical care is available to most of

the population free of cost, but its quality is extremely low by

Western standards, and in the mid-1990s the efficiency of the

system continued the decline that had begun before the collapse of the Soviet system. In the first four post-Soviet years,

that decline was typified by significant increases in infant and

maternal mortality and contagious diseases and by decreases in

fertility and life expectancy.

Health Conditions

The decline in health is attributable in part to such environmental and social factors as air and water pollution, contamination (largely from nuclear accidents or improper disposal of

radioactive materials), overcrowded living conditions, inadequate nutrition, alcoholism, and smoking, and in part to a lack

of modern medical equipment and technology. In 1991 life expectancy in Russia was 74.3 years for females and 63.5 years

for males. By 1994 the figure for males was 57.3 years. The

male-to-female ratio in the population reflects the higher male

mortality rate and the enduring impact of losing millions more

males than females in World War II. (In all age-groups below

thirty-five, there are more males than females.) In 1993 the

overall ratio was 884 males per 1,000 females, and experts predicted that the figure for males would decline to around 875 by

the year 2005 (see Demographic Conditions, ch. 3).

By the mid-1990s, Russia's death rate had reached its highest

peacetime level in the twentieth century. Curable infectious

diseases such as diphtheria and measles have reached epidemic

levels unseen since the Bolshevik Revolution, and the rates of

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Russia: A Country Study

tuberculosis, cancer, and heart disease are the highest of any

industrialized country.

In 1993 the incidence of a number of infectious diseases

increased significantly over the previous year: tuberculosis by

1.25 times, brucellosis by 1.9 times, diphtheria by 3.9 times,

and syphilis by 2.6 times (see table 14, Appendix). In 1995 the

Russian health system was overwhelmed by the return of epidemic diseases such as cholera and typhoid fever, even as it faced chronic staff and equipment shortages. In the winter of

1995-96, Russia suffered its most severe epidemic of influenza

in decades. An estimated 1 million people were infected in

Moscow alone, and numerous schools and public institutions were closed to prevent the spread of the disease. Experts attrib- uted the virulence of the epidemic to the generally low level of

resistance of much of the Russian population, the result of

poor overall health care and stressful economic conditions.

Other causes were the uneven availability of influenza shots

and the population's general belief that injections enhance

rather than decrease an individual's chances of becoming ill. Between 1980 and 1989, cancer and its complications

increased from 15 percent to 18 percent among causes of

death. In 1990 the most common types of cancer were breast

cancer, cancer of the stomach and liver, and skin cancer. In the

last years of the Soviet Union, about 680,000 new cases were

diagnosed annually. The causes of cancer are varied and complex, but contributing factors in Russia are heavy smoking,

radiation exposure, and contact with pervasive toxic emissions

and chemicals in soil, food, and water. According to the deputy

minister of environmental protection and natural resources, about 50 percent of all cancer-related illnesses can be attributed to environmental factors. Heavy-manufacturing regions

show especially high rates; in Noril'sk, the metallurgical center

located above the Arctic Circle, the incidence of lung cancer among males is the highest in the world (see Environmental

Conditions, ch. 3).

Russia's birthrate has shown an increasingly steep decline in

the 1990s, amounting to what one commentator calls "the

quiet suicide of a nation." For example, the annual birthrate

for the first six months of 1992 was 11.2 per 1,000 population

a 12 percent decline from the same period in the previous year. In some areas, the rate was even lower, for instance, 9.2 in St. Petersburg and 8.2 in the Moscow region.

268
Funeral procession with coffin onflatbed truck, village ofPertominsk

Courtesy Al Levine

Russia's Ministry of Health reported in June 1991 that the

country had a negative rate of population change for the first time since records have been kept. The declining number of

births is attributed in part to a drop in fertility, which presumably stems from a combination of physiological and environmental factors, and in part to women's reluctance to bear

children in a time of economic uncertainty.

Maternity, Infant Care, and Birth Control

Some of the same factors shortening the lives of adults cause

needless premature deaths of newborns in Russia. Poor overall

health care and lack of medicines, especially in rural areas, reduce infants' survival chances. In Russia an estimated 40 to 50 percent of infant deaths are caused by respiratory failure,

infectious and parasitic diseases, accidents, injuries, and

269
Russia: A Country Study

trauma. For developed countries, this share ranges between 4

and 17 percent.

Infant mortality rates vary considerably by region. Central

and northern European Russia's rates have been more in line

with West European rates. In the intermediate category are the

Urals, western Siberia, and the Volga Basin. The highest rates are found in the North Caucasus, eastern Siberia, and the Far

East. Several autonomous republics, including Kalmykia,

Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Tyva, consistently record

the highest rates in the Russian Federation. In these areas,

social and economic underdevelopment, poor health care, and

environmental degradation have had an impact on the health

of mothers and newborns.

Unwanted pregnancies are common because of the limited

availability and substandard quality of contraceptives and a reluctance to discuss sexual issues openly at home or to provide

sex education at school. No social stigma is attached to children born out of wedlock, and unmarried mothers receive

maternity benefits. Medical care for expectant mothers is among the least adequate aspects of the country's generally

substandard system of health care. A high percentage of pregnant women suffer from anemia and poor diets—factors that

have a negative effect on their babies' birth weight and general

health.

In the mid-1990s, modern forms of contraception are

unavailable or unknown to most Russian women. The Soviet

Union legalized abortion for medical reasons in 1955 and overall in 1968. But information about Western advances in birth

control—and all modern means of birth control—was systematically kept from the public throughout the remaining Soviet

decades. As a result of that policy, today's Russian gynecologists

lack the training to advise women on contraception, and public

knowledge of the subject remains incomplete or simply mistaken. Even in Moscow in the mid-1990s, most contraceptives were paid for by voluntary funds and international charities. In

the early 1990s, an estimated 22 percent of women of childbearing age were using contraceptives; the percentage was much lower in rural areas. Abortion remains the most widely practiced form of birth

control in Russia. In 1995 some 225 abortions were performed

for every 100 live births, up from a rate of 196 per 100 in 1991.

According to one study, 14 percent of the women in Russia with

sixteen or more years of school had undergone eight to ten

270
The Society and Its Environment

abortions. The conditions under which abortions are performed often are primitive. Moreover, it is estimated that

nearly three-quarters of abortions take place after the first tri- mester of pregnancy, involving substantially greater maternal

risk than those performed earlier. The number of abortions is much higher among Russian women than among Muslims and

other minority groups, however. Statistically, the higher her

social status and the extent of her Russification, the more likely a Muslim woman is to seek an abortion.

Infant and child health in Russia is significantly worse than

in other industrialized countries. According to official statistics,

only one child in five is born healthy. The inability of more

than half of all new mothers to breast-feed, mainly because of

poor diet, further undermines infants' health in a country

where diets generally are unbalanced. Another problem is that

most women of childbearing age are employed and thus must

place their young children in day care centers, where they

often contract contagious diseases. Illnesses such as cholera,

typhoid fever, diphtheria, pertussis, and poliomyelitis, which

have been virtually eradicated in other advanced industrial

societies, are widespread among Russia's children. Vaccines are

scarce. Even when immunizations are available, parents often

refuse them for their children because they fear infection from

dirty needles.

Alcohol, Narcotics, and Tobacco

Russia's rate of alcohol consumption, traditionally among

the highest in the world and rising significantly in the 1990s, is a major contributor to the country's health crisis, as well as to low job productivity. Rated as Russia's third most critical health

problem after cardiovascular diseases and cancer, alcoholism

has reached epidemic proportions, particularly among males.

In the twentieth century, periodic government campaigns

against alcohol consumption have resulted in thousands of

deaths from the consumption of alcohol surrogates. The latest such campaign was undertaken from 1985 to 1988, during the

regime of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in office 1985-91). Although

some authorities credited reduced alcohol consumption with a concurrent drop in Russia's mortality rate, by 1987 the production of samogon (home-brewed liquor) had become a largescale industry that provided alcohol to Russians while depriving the state of tax revenue. When restrictions were eased in

1988, alcohol consumption exceeded the pre-1985 level.

271
Russia: A Country Study

According to one study, between 1987 and 1992 annual per

capita consumption rose from about eleven liters of pure alcohol to fourteen liters in 1992; current consumption is esti- mated at about fifteen liters. (According to World Health

Organization standards, consumption of eight liters per year is likely to cause major medical problems.)

A 1995 Russian study found that regular drunkenness

affected between 25 and 60 percent of blue-collar workers and

21 percent of white-collar workers, with the highest incidence

found in rural areas. Because alcohol remains cheap relative to food and other items, and because it is available in most places

day and night, unemployed people are especially prone to drunkenness and alcohol poisoning. In 1994 some 53,000 people died of alcohol poisoning, an increase of about 36,000

since 1991. If vodka is unavailable or unaffordable, Russians

sometimes imbibe various combinations of dangerous substances. The Russian media often report poisonings that result

from consumption of homemade alcohol substitutes. Production of often-substandard alcohol has become a widespread

criminal activity in the 1990s, further endangering consumers. Alcohol consumption among pregnant women is partly responsible for Russia's rise in infant mortality, birth defects, and

childhood disease and abnormalities.

Smoking, a widespread habit, especially among women and

teenagers, compounds Russia's health crisis. Chain-smoking is endemic in Russia; in 1996 an estimated 55 percent of Russians were regular smokers, and health authorities believed that the

figure was rising. However, rather than urge patients to quit,

doctors often recommend the purchase of American cigarettes, which are more expensive but have less tar and nicotine

than Russian brands. When import restrictions ended in the

early 1990s, the American cigarette industry found a large new

market in Russia. A modest government antismoking campaign

paralleling Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign in the late 1980s

had little effect. In January 1996, cigarette advertising in the

print media was prohibited, and smoking in theaters and workplaces generally was restricted to designated locations.

The increasing incidence of drug abuse was belatedly

acknowledged by the Russian government as a public health

problem. In 1995 an estimated 2 million Russians used narcotics, more than twenty times the total recorded ten years earlier

in the entire Soviet Union, with the number of users increasing

50 percent every year in the mid-1990s. In the Soviet era, drugs

272
The Society and Its Environment

were viewed officially as a capitalist vice, but that attitude disappeared soon after the Soviet Union dissolved. Russia legalized

drug use (but not possession or sale) in 1991. According to experts, laws against possession are not dissuasive. Narcotics use has spread to new elements of society in recent years,

including alcoholics seeking a new means of escape. Russian

experts rate the new class of Russian businesspeople as the

group with the highest percentage of drug users; for them, suc- cess often includes the ability to purchase the most expensive

narcotic. The drug scene, once dominated by students and

intellectuals, now includes large numbers of housewives and

workers. Synthetic drugs now are manufactured in small laboratories by professional chemists; some are easily fabricated by

amateurs as well. Legally produced drugs often are stolen and

move into the black market (see The Crime Wave of the 1990s,

ch. 10).

Medical treatment and educational programs now include

hot lines in major cities and walk-in clinics that provide advice

and treatment on an anonymous basis. Some schoolteachers

have begun class discussions of drug-related issues and have

distributed antidrug literature to students. Nevertheless, Russia's drug problem remains largely intractable. Many addicts

overdose, and some who cannot afford heroin inject themselves with other substances that cause illness or death.

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) likely was brought to the Soviet Union by students from countries with

high levels of incidence of the disease. In 1987, after the first case of AIDS was confirmed in Russia, the Supreme Soviet of

the Soviet Union passed the strictest anti-AIDS law in the

world, making the knowing transmittal of the infection a criminal offense punishable by up to eight years in jail. A 1995 law,

which has been criticized vehemently for its human rights

implications and the cost of its administration, stipulates that

all visitors remaining more than three months must prove that

they are not infected with the AIDS-causing human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).

The government has established a diagnostic and screening

infrastructure for AIDS prevention and control at the central

and subnational levels. This system has been criticized heavily,

however, because it tests only populations with little chance of

infection, and because it fails to allocate scarce funds to root

273
Russia: A Country Study

causes of AIDS transmittal such as infection from hospital procedures and reuse of hypodermic needles. The release of statis- tics on the incidence of AIDS and other sexually transmitted

diseases has been extremely slow. In late 1995, the Ministry of

Health reported that 1,023 Russians, including 278 children,

had been registered as having HIV, and that to that point 160

Russians, of whom seventy-three were children, had died of

AIDS. Before 1992 several mass infections of children occurred

in medical facilities. Official diagnoses of HIV increased 50 percent from 1993 to 1994. However, according to an official of the Imena AIDS support group, which is devoted to rehabilitation of HIV victims,

the official statistics are understated at least tenfold because

Russians in the groups most at risk—prostitutes, homosexuals,

and drug users—have reason to fear that results will not

remain confidential and so refuse AIDS testing. Although the

1990 Law on Prevention of AIDS mandates confidentiality of

medical records, in practice jobs often are lost and social ser- vices denied after a positive diagnosis. The highest incidence of

HIV is in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, Volgograd,

and the Republic of Kalmykia, the last three of which have

medical facilities where unsanitary procedures have resulted in mass transmission of the virus. The majority of reported HIVpositive individuals are drug users. As in the Soviet period, the public receives little information

about precautions against AIDS or the identity of the high-risk

categories in society, and AIDS sufferers meet much intoler- ance in Russian society. Because the disease has been associated with foreigners, government officials and the public have

ignored the need for preventive measures among Russians.

AIDS transmittal is increased by a chronic shortage of condoms

(which Soviet medical officials euphemistically called "Article

Number 2") and by the lack of disposable hypodermic syringes

in hospitals and clinics, which results in the repeated use of

unsterilized needles.

The Health System

The glasnost period of the late 1980s first revealed the decay

of the Soviet system of socialized medicine, which nominally

guaranteed full health protection to all citizens without charge.

That system had been installed under Joseph V. Stalin (in

office 1927-53) with an emphasis on preserving a healthy work

force as a matter of national economic policy. In the 1980s,

274
Child undergoing an EKG at

children's hospital, Khabarovsk

Courtesy Barry Peril

Hospital staff members talking

in hospital hallway, Novgorod

CourtesyJudy Kramer

275
Russia: A Country Study

Russia had a huge network of neighborhood and work-site clinics and first-aid facilities to provide readily accessible primary

care, together with large hospitals and polyclinics to diagnose

and treat more complex illnesses and to perform surgery. In

1986 the Soviet Union had 23,500 hospitals with more than 3.6

million beds. Such facilities included about 28,000 women's

consultation centers and pediatric clinics, together with emer- gency ambulance services and sanatoriums.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was first in the world in the

ratio of hospital beds to population. Behind this system was a huge, multilevel bureaucracy directed from Moscow in consultation with organs of the CPSU. All aspects of health service

had nationwide annual programs with complex statistical

accounting and goals. Physicians devoted an estimated 50 percent of their time to filling out forms, and every year a large

part of the national health care budget went to construction of

new facilities. The structure of the Soviet system, which specified the

length of treatment for every disease, often caused people suf- fering from relatively minor ailments such as influenza to be

hospitalized. The result was a serious overcrowding problem in

hospitals despite the large number of beds available. Patients

preferred hospital treatment because hospitals were better

equipped than clinics and because crowded living conditions

made recuperation at home difficult. Many large enterprises

operated clinics that provided workers health care without

requiring them to leave the work site. Such clinics aimed at reducing the incidence of sick leave, which averaged 3 percent

of the workforce per day in the 1980s.

The most outdated and abuse-ridden aspect of Soviet health care was psychiatric treatment. That system never advanced

from the methodology of the 1950s, which included Pavlovian

conditioned-response treatment, heavy reliance on drug therapy, and little practice of individual or group counseling.

Therefore, most citizens preferred to suffer rather than submit

themselves to treatment. In addition, Soviet psychiatry was at the service of the government to declare dissenters "insane,"

commit them to psychiatric hospital-prisons, and administer

powerful psychotropic drugs. In the mid-1980s, estimates of

the number of political prisoners in such institutions ranged

from 1,000 to several thousand, and in 1983 the Soviet Union

withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association to avoid censure for its abuses of the profession. In 1988 the special psychi276
The Society and Its Environment

atric hospitals to which political dissidents had been

committed were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to that of the Ministry of Health.

In 1986 the Soviet Union had about 1.2 million doctors and

about 3.2 million paramedical and nursing personnel. Medical

training emphasized practical work over basic research and

pure science; only nine medical institutes were attached to universities. In the late 1980s, the average doctor's salary was

roughly comparable to that of the average industrial worker. In

1996 the average Moscow specialist made about US$75 per

month, and senior doctors made about US$150 per month.

Paramedics and nurses needed only two years of training and

no scientific background; however, in rural areas, which suf- fered a shortage of doctors, such individuals often were the

only medical personnel available.

Despite the nominally equitable nature of Soviet socialized

medicine, the actual system was highly stratified according to location, with far inferior care and facilities available in rural

areas, and especially according to political status. The Ministry

of Health maintained a completely separate, vastly superior sys- tem of clinics, hospitals, and sanatoriums for top party and government officials and other elite groups such as writers, actors,

musicians, and artists. The outline of the Soviet system did not change appreciably

in the first half of the 1990s, but quality declined in nearly

every aspect except the facilities designated for the elite. In

1992 Russia had 662,700 doctors, a drop of about 32,000 since

1990, and 131 hospital beds per 10,000 population, a drop of

97,000 beds (about 5 percent) since 1990. Among the doctors,

78,600 were surgeons, 77,600 pediatricians, 39,600 gynecologists, 20,300 psychiatrists, and 18,500 neurologists.

In the early 1990s, the public health delivery system in Russia was in crisis. Although the number of doctors and paramedics has remained sufficiently high to ensure the provision of

adequate treatment, most such personnel are poorly trained,

lack modern equipment, and are badly paid. In 1995 Russia

had one doctor for every 275 citizens (compared with one for

every 450 in the United States), but about half of medical

school graduates cannot diagnose simple ailments or read an

electrocardiogram when they enter practice. In 1993 about

forty institutions offered medical training, but the quality of

training varied considerably. Many medical schools suffer from

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Russia: A Country Study

shortages of instructors, textbooks, current medical journals,

contacts with Western experts, and equipment.

Low salaries have made corruption common among medical

personnel, who often extract bribes for both materials and ser- vices. Thus, although health care is free in principle, the

chances of receiving adequate treatment may depend on the

patient's wealth. The combination of bribes and authorized

charges puts many types of medical treatment beyond the

reach of all but the wealthy. Elderly people are hit especially

hard by this situation. Meanwhile, a sharp decline in state funding has affected all aspects of medical care, from prevention to emergency treatment. Between 1990 and 1994, state funding

declined from 3.4 percent of the national budget to 1.8 percent. Although Russia pioneered in some specialized fields of

medicine such as laser eye surgery and heart surgery, the country's medical establishment is generally deficient in hospital

equipment, technology, and pharmaceuticals. For example,

preventable infant deaths result from an absence of fetal heart

monitors, ultrasound units, and various other equipment for

monitoring labor and delivery; needless deaths from heart dis- ease occur because hospitals lack the equipment needed to perform bypass surgery and angioplasty.

Facilities for the disabled, of whom about 6 million reside in

Russia, also fall far below Western standards. Wheelchairs and

artificial limbs are in very short supply, rehabilitation centers

are few, and wheelchair ramps are virtually nonexistent. A 1995

law, On the Social Protection of Disabled Persons in the Russian Federation, provides for a wide range of benefits and ser- vices, including equal access to education, employment,

transportation, and services. The law requires businesses to set aside at least 3 percent of their jobs for the disabled. However, no funding was available for any of the law's programs in 1996.

The shortage of medicines in Russia is chronic and cata- strophic. Soviet-era supplies of materials and drugs have been

depleted and are not being adequately replenished. Domestic

production has plummeted because of the obsolescence of

pharmaceutical factories and shortages of requisite raw materials and supplies. Many of the items produced are ineffective.

Russia relies increasingly on imports from former Soviet-bloc

nations in Central Europe, which formerly accepted barter

transactions and payment in rubles but now demand hard cur- rency (see Glossary), a scarce item in Russia, for their products.

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The Society and Its Environment

The nonconvertibility of the ruble also has hindered Russia's

ability to purchase medicines abroad. Even when pharmaceuticals are available in Russia, they often are priced beyond the

reach of doctors and patients.

Russia's hospitals and polyclinics are generally old (about 15

percent were built before 1940), and they lack basic amenities.

Roughly 42 percent of the country's hospitals and 30 percent

of its clinics lack hot water, and 12 percent and 7 percent,

respectively, have no running water at all. About 18 percent of

hospitals and 15 percent of clinics are not connected to a sew- erage system, and only 12 percent in both categories have central heating. Even in the best hospitals, medical personnel do

not regularly wash their hands, surgical instruments are not

always properly sterilized, and rates of infection are abnormally

high.

Aside from shortfalls in Russia's health facilities and the

quality of medical personnel, much of the country's public

health crisis stems from poor personal hygiene and diet and

lack of exercise. Preventive medicine and wellness programs

are virtually nonexistent, as are programs to educate the public

about personal sanitation, proper diet, and vitamins. The aver- age Russian does not consume a balanced diet. Vegetables

often are scarce in Russia, except in rural areas where they are homegrown, and fruits never have constituted an important

element of the Russian diet. Per capita meat consumption also

has fallen in the 1990s (see table 6, Appendix).

Russia's government is attempting to equalize the distribution of health care by fragmenting the Soviet-era network of

top-level medical facilities for exclusive use of the elite. In the

spring of 1993, President Yeltsin signed a decree entitled On

Immediate Measures to Provide Health Care for the People of

the Russian Federation. The proclaimed goal, which already

had been established in the 1980s, was the creation by 2000 of a

"unified system of health care" for the entire population. However, economic constraints are likely to stymie achievement of

that goal in the near future. In 1995 less than 1 percent of Russia's budget was earmarked for public health, compared with 6

percent in Britain and more than 12 percent in the United

States. Experts forecast that such a meager outlay will not

address the major shortfalls in Russia's health care system, not

to mention the air, water, and soil pollution that continue to contribute insidiously to worsening public health.

279
Russia: A Country Study

The impersonality and inaccessibility of national health sys- tem facilities, with patients often standing in line at clinics for an entire day before receiving brief diagnoses and prescriptions for drugs they cannot afford, has encouraged many Russians to turn to unorthodox alternatives such as faith healing,

herbal medicine, and mysticism. By the mid-1990s, private

medical clinics were serving a growing number of Russians able

to afford their care. In the Soviet era, the state discouraged alternative medicine

by arresting practitioners. By 1995, however, the number of

such individuals was estimated at 300,000, and as many as 80

percent of Russians needing medical assistance have turned to them, according to a Yeltsin adviser on social policy. Traditional folk healers constitute the largest group of nontraditional practitioners. They offer personalized attention and

affordable cures such as birch bark and cranberries to cure a

variety of complaints. Russians with access to a plot of land

often grow their own herbs, and books describing home cures have become popular. Long-practiced cures such as wrapping

oneself in a vinegar-soaked blanket and drinking one's own

urine have become more widespread in the 1990s.

Housing

Always in short supply in the Soviet era, housing continues

to be at a premium in the 1990s. However, the old, state-controlled system has begun giving way to private enterprise and a rudimentary housing market. Despite severe inequalities in

housing opportunity and daunting financial disadvantages,

many Russians have been able to establish private homes that

would have been beyond their reach under the Soviet system.

Nevertheless, in 1996 housing subsidies remained a significant

drain on the national budget as the state continued the

attempt to protect citizens from the inequities of a nascent

housing market.

The Soviet Era

In the Soviet era, all land and most buildings belonged to the state; in rural areas, private home ownership was permitted, but the law limited such houses to a floor space of forty

square meters. The occupants of state-owned housing enjoyed

the rights to lifetime occupancy and to bequeath their housing

units to the next generation, as well as virtually complete pro280
The Society and Its Environment

tection against eviction. Rental rates remained at the same

extremely low, universal level—0.132 ruble per square meter

from 1927 until 1992. Maintenance of existing buildings and

construction of new housing were both financed from other

parts of the state budget; only 3 percent of funds used for these

purposes came from residents. State enterprises covered a significant share of housing expenses as part of their employees'

benefits. The design and construction of new housing had no

relation to aesthetics or even to cost; in cities the State Construction Committee (Gosstroy) simply erected monolithic

high-rise buildings containing a given number of housing

units, following the dictates of the five-year plan for that locality. In 1990 nearly 100 percent of the housing stock in Moscow

and St. Petersburg was publicly owned, and more than onequarter of Russia's total housing stock had been built before

1917.

As in other aspects of daily Soviet life, the elite were allotted

the best and most spacious housing, and influential friends

helped them avoid long waiting lists that sometimes lasted

more than ten years for ordinary Russians. The average urban

Russian family either occupied a very small single apartment or shared an apartment with one or more other families, with

joint access to the bathroom and the kitchen. According to a 1980 Soviet estimate, 20 percent of urban families (and 53 percent in Leningrad) shared apartments; that percentage had

dropped slightly by the end of the Soviet era. Young, unmarried Russians often found housing only in crowded hostels

operated by their employer; young married couples frequently

lived with one set of parents until they could locate an apartment. Housing in rural areas was more spacious, but it usually

had few amenities—the traditional wooden farmhouse contained two rooms divided by a raised corridor, with living space

for people on one side and for animals on the other. In 1990

the average floor area per person in Moscow was 17.8 square

meters, and in Russia as a whole it was 16.4 square meters, compared with averages in Western countries of between thirty and

forty-five square meters per person.

Post-Soviet Conditions

The economic reforms of the post-Soviet era brought drastic

and problematic changes in the Russian housing system. In the

first years of that period, state support for new construction

dwindled dramatically, making enterprises a more important

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Russia: A Country Study

source of financing in the absence of large-scale private investment. Privatization of existing housing increased substantially

in the mid-1990s, and more types of dwelling became eligible

for privatization. The rate of new construction did not keep

pace with demand, so waiting lists continued to exist, and the

beginning of landownership law reform encouraged construction of fully private housing by Russians who could afford it. However, in mid-1996 the average Russian still spent less than 3

percent of his or her budget on rent because a large share of

Soviet-era state housing subsidies remained in place.

The establishment of a full market system in housing was

complicated by several factors. First, the notion of private ownership of land and housing was diametrically opposed to the

concepts at the base of Soviet society, so the advantages of

privatization were not immediately understood—especially as low-rent state housing continued to exist alongside expensive

private property. Second, high inflation priced most Russians

out of the housing market, especially as the inflation-adjusted

incomes of most social groups declined. Third, continuing

monopolies in construction materials, finance, and urbanized

land kept construction costs very high; the first steps toward

privatization were taken in the building industry only in 1993.

Finally, a relatively high percentage of existing housing stock

remained in the public sector, which promised to remain a significant housing owner through the near future.

After a relatively slow beginning in 1992, privatization of

housing stock increased dramatically. The Soviet privatization

law of 1989 began the process, which was continued in Russia

by the 1991 Law on Privatization of Housing. But the newness

of the laws, the lack of administrative procedures, and the continuing attractiveness of low rents in state-owned housing limited the total number of units privatized in 1991 to about

122,000 units, or 0.3 percent of urban housing stock in the Russian Republic. By the end of 1993, more than 40 percent of

urban housing stock (about 8.6 million units) in Russia had

been privatized, and the total was between 55 and 60 percent one year later. Often the privatization process involved renters

buying the apartments in which they were living. An important

step in this process was a 1992 constitutional amendment that

allowed free distribution of housing, broadened the categories

of housing that could be privatized, and simplified privatization procedures. In the mid-1990s, the growing problem of

how to house military families formerly domiciled outside Rus282
The Society and Its Environment

sia caused the Ministry of Defense and agencies dependent

upon it to withhold their housing stock from privatization; in

1993 defense budgets financed 15 percent of Russia's total

housing investment.

Availability of new private housing improved somewhat by

the mid-1990s, after a sharp decline in the first post-Soviet

years. In 1993 the output of new housing was 57 percent of the

peak Soviet-era output reached in 1987, and in the early 1990s

the ratio of unfinished projects to usable housing output was more than three to one (compared with 84 percent in 1988)

because incentives promoted new starts rather than completions. Between 1986 and 1992, the number of names on housing waiting lists increased from about 8 million to some 10

million, mainly because in that period Russians began to change jobs and places of residence more frequently and

because family units became smaller. In 1993 more than 21 percent of urban households were on waiting lists for housing.

The waiting lists began to shrink in 1993, and by the end of

1994 about 9.1 million Russian households (including singleperson households) were registered for housing. Inflation also

played a major role in housing availability; in 1994 the price of a typical Moscow apartment of fifty-five square meters

increased by five times over the 1993 average. A housing allow- ance program has been established to bridge the gap between

rental costs and family incomes.

Because they felt the direct pressure of longer waiting lists and the support costs associated with the movement of people

into their jurisdictions, local housing authorities lobbied

against abolition of the internal passport (propiska; see Glossary) system that had restrained internal migration in the

Soviet period. In 1993 the system was officially abolished in all jurisdictions except Moscow and St. Petersburg (see Social Welfare, this ch.).

Housing maintenance has been problematic in the postSoviet era because local housing authorities, to whom full

maintenance responsibility was shifted in 1991, have reallocated funds from maintenance to more pressing needs. Meanwhile, individual attitudes toward routine maintenance have

been slow to compensate for this shift. In Soviet-era collective

living quarters such as urban high-rise apartment buildings,

which housed as many as 1,000 people, housing managers were

expected to uphold minimum standards of cleanliness and ser- vice. In the 1990s, those complexes still house people from all

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Russia: A Country Study

economic levels (a survival of Stalin-era policy), but, given the

newly fragmented condition of Russian society and economic

distractions facing tenants, initiatives by residents often give

way to disregard for voluntary maintenance of common property. Housing officials demand bribes for routine services, and

housing complexes have become increasingly shabby. In some

cases, the suspicion and anonymity of the Soviet era have been

reinforced among people of disparate backgrounds forced to

live in a more cramped environment than in Soviet times. However, in some apartment buildings condominium associations

have been formed to advance the common welfare of families

in a building or neighborhood.

Land Reform and Private Enterprise

Experts consider reform of landownership and condominium laws an important step toward full privatization of housing.

Privatization of land, both urban and agricultural, has been a

controversial issue for Russian legislators; there is a strong body

of opinion that land is fundamentally public property that can- not belong to any single person. In the late Soviet period, new

landownership laws confused rather than simplified the legal

status of various types of land. Consequently, housing privatization has been hindered because ownership of a residence may

not include ownership of the land on which it stands—a disparity rare in Western property law. Legislation passed in August

1993 legalized the sale of land, allowed villages to give away

plots of land to individuals, and removed the space limitation on private homes on collective farms. Although dwellings built

on suburban garden plots technically still could be no bigger

than a summer cottage, such land increasingly was used to build year-round housing, thus expanding the number of avail- able residences in Moscow and other cities. In general, Moscow was the center of land-use innovation

because it was the center of new commercial activity and for- eign influence. The constitution of 1993 recognized for the

first time the right to private ownership of land, a departure

that experts believed would have a major impact on overall real estate ownership. In late 1993, a presidential decree established Russia's first set of provisional condominium regulations, which were considered an important clarification of

housing ownership policy. But additional legislation, drafted by

the Yeltsin administration to expedite landownership, was

blocked in the State Duma in 1996.

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The Society and Its Environment

Especially in Moscow, the emergence of Western-style enterprises associated with housing construction, such as finance

companies, real estate offices, plumbing suppliers, and lumberyards, heralds more growth. The rapidly rising cost of existing

apartments has fueled a brisk property business, as speculators

buy privatized property in the hope that prices will continue to

rise. In the mid-1990s, private houses began to appear rapidly

just outside the ring of Soviet-era high-rises that surrounds

Moscow. According to a 1995 report, prices for private land

and housing in Moscow ranged from US$900 for an unimproved small plot to US$300,000 for a four-bedroom villa in a compound with security guards. As of mid-1996, mortgage

loans were not yet offered by the Russian banking system, so buyers had to pay cash. Many Russians build their own dwellings, bribing city officials and contractors when necessary and

collecting materials wherever possible. The demand for materials has prompted the emergence of numerous building supply

stores and a parallel rise in the price of materials. Thus,

although many Russians remain on waiting lists for existing

housing, others have begun what they hope will be a Westernstyle progression from a first modest dwelling to something

larger. The same divergence has appeared in housing as in

other aspects of socioeconomic activity: individuals with financial resources or unusual initiative have taken advantage of the

new opportunities of the 1990s. Those not so fortunate remain

dependent on state housing subsidies.

Social Welfare

As Russia makes the transition from a command economy to a partial free-market system, the provision of an effective social

safety net for its citizens assumes increasing urgency. A 1994

World Bank report described the current social-protection sys- tem as inappropriate for the market-oriented economy toward

which Russia supposedly was striving. Among the major shortcomings noted in the report were the continued major role

played by enterprises as suppliers of welfare services, as they

had been in the Soviet period; the absence of any coverage for

large groups of people and the inadequate level of benefits in

some regions; a growing disparity between a shrinking wage

base and the demands placed on the system; and the failure to target the neediest recipients. As the economic transition of

the 1990s forces more of Russia's citizens into poverty, the state

285
Russia: A Country Study

has tried to maintain the comprehensive Soviet system with

severely constrained resources. The system's inefficiency is exacerbated by its fragmentation.

As in the Soviet period, allowances and benefits are administered and financed by diverse agencies, including four

extrabudgetary funds, several ministries, and the lower levels of

government. The Ministry of Social Protection is the primary

federal agency handling welfare programs. However, that ministry focuses almost exclusively on the needs of people who are

retired or disabled; other vulnerable groups receive much less attention. The four extrabudgetary funds that provide cash

and in-kind social welfare benefits at the federal level are the

Social Insurance Fund, the Pension Fund, the Employment

Fund, and the Fund for Social Support.

Social security and welfare programs provide modest support for the most vulnerable segments of Russia's population:

elderly pensioners, veterans, infants and children, expectant

mothers, families with more than one child, invalids, and people with disabilities. These programs are inadequate, however,

and a growing proportion of Russia's population lives on the

threshold of poverty. Inflation has a particularly deleterious

effect on households that rely on social subsidies. Women traditionally have outnumbered men in such households.

The Fund for Social Support supplements a variety of inkind social assistance programs in Russia. It is financed

through the Ministry of Social Protection and supplements

social welfare programs at the subnational level. The federal

government has transferred most responsibility for social welfare, health, and education programs to subnational organs

but has failed to ensure their access to adequate revenue. The

total allocation of transfers from the federal budget to localities

amounted to less than 2 percent of Russia's gross domestic

product (GDP—see Glossary) in 1992. Thus, the quantity and

quality of social services at the local level—including the provision of food vouchers and cash payments to cover specific

items such as heating bills—are far from certain as time passes. Under these conditions, local jurisdictions have come to rely

increasingly on extrabudgetary sources, the instability of which

makes long-term planning difficult. Pensions

Pensions are the largest expenditure of the social safety program. The Pension Fund accounts for 83 percent of Russia's

286
The Society and Its Environment

extrabudgetary allocations. At the end of 1994, about 36 million citizens, or 24 percent of the country's population, were

receiving pensions, an increase of about 5 percent in the first three post-Soviet years. Two broad categories of pensions are paid in Russia: labor pensions, which are disbursed on the basis

of a worker's payroll contributions, and social pensions, which

are paid to individuals who have worked for less than the five years needed to qualify for a labor pension. All Russian citizens

who have worked for twenty years are entitled to at least a minimum pension. In 1994 about 75 percent of all pensioners

received labor pensions. The Pension Fund also finances some

child allowances and other entitlements.

The Pension Fund is administered by the Ministry of Social

Protection and financed by a 29 percent payroll tax and by

transfers from the state budget. Between 1991 and 1993, the

real income of pensioners was cut in half as prices rose rapidly

and pension indexation failed to keep pace. Inflation also

severely eroded the value of the life savings of retirees, and a disproportionate number of pensioners were victimized by

financial scams. A 1994 law requires quarterly indexation of

pensions, but the law was not observed consistently in its first year, and in mid-1995 the average pension fell below the subsistence minimum for pensioners. Beginning in 1994, the government's failure to pay pensions on time led to large rallies in

several cities. In August 1994, an estimated 10 million pensioners did not receive their checks on time, and pension arrears mounted in the two years that followed. By mid-1996 the payment backlog was estimated at US$3 billion. The present sys- tem includes an important provision that has kept many

pensioners above the poverty line: it allows workers to draw

pensions while continuing to work. In 1995 as many as 27 percent of Russian pensioners continued to work after retiring

from their primaryjob.

Russian and Western experts agree that the pension system

requires comprehensive reform—although its rate of payment

compliance by enterprises is substantially better than that of

the State Taxation Service. The most pressing needs are an

effective system of indexation of pensions to purchasing power, an insurance mechanism, individualized contributions, higher

retirement ages, and the closing of loopholes that allow early

retirement. In 1995 the Ministry of Social Protection began

work on a reform that would establish a three-tier pension sys- tem including a basic pension, a work-related pension in pro287
Russia: A Country Study

portion to years of service, and an optional private pension

program. In 1995 Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin admitted that the state budget lacked the money to continue indexing pensions according to living costs. In November 1995, a decree by President Yeltsin, On Additional Measures to

Strengthen Payments Discipline for Settling Accounts with the

Pension Fund, set stricter reporting standards for payments to the fund by organizations and citizens, in an effort to preclude

nonpayment. In the midst of his campaign to be reelected president, Yeltsin then approved two laws increasing minimum pension levels in three stages, by 5, 10, and 15 percent, between

November 1995 andJanuary 1996.

Women are entitled to retire when they reach age fifty-five,

and men when they reach age sixty. Nevertheless, financial

hardship leads many women to remain in the labor force past

retirement age, even while continuing to receive pensions, in

order to prevent a drop in their families' standard of living. In

1991 women constituted an estimated 72 percent of pensioners. The disproportion between the genders stems from

women's earlier permissible retirement age and their greater

longevity. Aside from pensions, women receive other retirement privileges. Mothers of five or more children are entitled

to a pension at age fifty. "Mother Heroines"—women with ten or more children—receive an allowance equal in sum to the

pension, and the time they spent on child care leave counts

toward the minimum twenty years of work required for labor

pensions. For these reasons, many women retire before age

fifty-five, while most men wait until they reach sixty-two. (Many

job categories routinely allow retirement for both sexes before

the standard ages.)

Worker Protection and Benefits

Legislation has established numerous protective devices at the enterprise level to provide a social safety net that is particularly attuned to the needs of women of childbearing age. Thus,

family policy and employment policy are inextricably linked. In

addition to basic allowances for all workers, special allowances

exist for children of military personnel, children with unmarried, divorced, or widowed mothers, and children who are dis- abled. Women who have an employment contract are entitled

to paid maternity leave from seventy days prior to giving birth

until seventy days afterward. Maternity leave benefits are based

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The Society and Its Environment

on the minimum wage rather than on a woman's current wage,

however.

Russia also provides a maternity grant, which is a onetime

payment totaling three times the minimum wage or 45 percent

of the minimum wage in the case of mothers who have worked

less than one year. In order to receive a maternity allowance

(or sickness benefits), a woman must have an employment contract. The maternity allowance amounts to 100 percent of the

mother's salary, regardless of her length of employment.

Maternity allowances in Russia are followed by a monthly

child allowance of 80 percent of the minimum wage in the case of children up to eighteen months old. This allowance may be

supplemented by a child-care allowance, set at 35 percent of

the minimum wage, to compensate for earnings lost in the course of caring for children in this age bracket. The latter

allowance is paid to mothers over the age of eighteen who have

been in the labor force at least one year. An additional compensatory child-care allowance, equivalent to 35 percent of the

minimum wage, is available to mothers or other caretakers of

children under the age of three.

Russia also has an extended child allowance of 45 percent of

the minimum wage (60 percent for children of military personnel, children living with a guardian or in an orphanage, and

children with AIDS) to assist families with the care of children

between the ages of eighteen months and six years. Single

mothers and those who receive no child support from the

father of their child may obtain an additional 45 percent of the

minimum wage up to their child's sixth birthday; this figure is then increased to 50 percent and remains effective until the

child is sixteen. In May 1992, special cost-of-living compensations were introduced to cover the increased expense of meeting children's basic needs. These compensations ranged from

30 percent of the minimum wage in the case of children less than six years old to 40 percent in the case of those ages thir- teen to sixteen.

Among other benefits provided by enterprises to their workers are access to special shops that sell subsidized milk for families with low incomes and small children and an allowance to children for the purchase of a school uniform when they start school and again at the age of thirteen. Other regulations focus

more specifically on families with small children. These include

protective legislation prohibiting the dismissal of pregnant

women or women with children under the age of three, ban289
Russia: A Country Study

ning night work and overtime for mothers of small children,

stipulating workload concessions to pregnant women and

mothers of young children, and providing flextime, part-time

work, home-based employment, nursing intervals, and additional paid and unpaid leave to mothers to care for sick children. Many workplaces also permit informal leave arrangements for the purpose of food shopping.

A significant portion of Russian workers have entitlements to housing, child care, and paid vacations, regardless of their rank

within an enterprise. Housing entitlements involve either out- right provision of a low-rent apartment (most apartment rents are very low) or various forms of cash or in-kind assistance.

Moreover, occupants obtain an implicit ownership right

extending beyond their term of employment. They may also

have the legal title of the apartment transferred to their own

names without paying any purchase price (see Housing, this

ch.).

Besides housing allowances, most large and medium-sized

enterprises provide on-site medical facilities or they contract

for outside health care facilities for their employees. The medical care provided through the auspices of enterprises is free

and often is of much higher quality than the care available in

government-run facilities (see The Health System, this ch.).

Finally, enterprises provide their employees with goods ranging

from foodstuffs to consumer durables. The enterprises procure

these items through direct purchase, barter, or from their own

farms, and make them available at below-market prices.

The Social Insurance Fund is the administrative mechanism

for payments to workers of birth, maternity, and sickness allow- ances, and child allowances for children between the ages of

six and sixteen. The fund is managed by the largest union

organization in Russia, the Federation of Independent Trade

Unions of Russia (Federatsiya nezavisimykh profsoyuzov

Rossii—FNPR) and serves as the repository of enterprise contributions consisting of 5.4 percent of the total payroll (see

Social Organizations, this ch.). Nominally an independent

institution since its establishment in 1991, the Social Insurance

Fund is in fact responsible to the FNPR.

In 1993 an overhaul of the fund's administrative structure

began as a result of enterprises' low levels of compliance with

contribution requirements, charges of serious abuse by trade

union officials, and the government's desire to promote democratic accountability. Since 1993 the management system has

290
Salvation Army young people's group, Red Square, Moscow

Courtesy Debbie Horrell

been in flux, and the quality of administration varies considerably throughout the country. Most worker contributions to the

fund are retained by the enterprise for distribution. About onehalf of the money goes to sick pay and one-fifth to subsidize

treatment at sanatoriums. Family support includes birth and

maternal allowances intended to replace lost wages, but child

allowances do not address poverty directly because payments

are not in proportion to household income.

Russia also has an overall system of family benefits. These

can be grouped into three broad categories: those payable to

all families with children, regardless of income or other qualifying conditions; those payable to working mothers; and those

payable to disadvantaged families.

The communist system, for all its economic and moral deformities, provided virtually universal employment, so that every

able-bodied citizen had an opportunity to earn income and

thus social security. In postcommunist Russia, the phenomenon of unemployment is openly acknowledged and growing

(see Unemployment, ch. 6). At the end of 1995, some 8.2 million people were registered as unemployed, indicating a far

higher actual number. Three years earlier, about 5 million were

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Russia: A Country Study

registered. The "new poor," in the parlance of the World Bank,

put a considerable strain on the resources available in Russia

for social welfare.

Administered by the Ministry of Labor, the Employment

Fund, which is financed by a 2 percent payroll tax from all enterprises, disburses compensation to jobless people. The

level of compensation, already low in 1995, was expected to drop further if unemployment rose. As part of its assistance

package to Russia, the World Bank is providing a computerized

system that will help the country register claimants for unemployment and pay adequate benefits.

The Ministry of Labor's subsistence minimum is based on

the cost of nineteen staple items considered sufficient to ensure survival, plus an estimated minimum cost for utilities,

transportation, and other necessities. The calculation varies

according to age-group and region; trade unions use other for- mulas that usually expand the number of people identified as living below the poverty line. In early 1996, the State Duma

considered a law that would make the Ministry of Labor's fig- ure the legal basis for establishing minimum wages, pensions,

and other levels of social support. Barring such legislation, the

subsistence minimum has no legal status. The Homeless

The urban homeless are a category of the socially disadvantaged that received no official recognition in the Soviet era. Because Soviet law banned beggars and vagrants, the homeless

(meaning anyone who lost his or her place of residence for any

reason) were imprisoned or expelled from the cities. When the

ban ended in the early 1990s, thousands of homeless people,

mostly men, appeared in Russia's cities; the majority had

migrated to urban areas seeking work or were refugees from

the armed conflicts that erupted in the Caucasus and Central

Asia when the Soviet Union dissolved.

In 1995 Moscow authorities estimated that city's homeless

population at 30,000, but Western experts put the figure as high as 300,000. An estimated 300 homeless people died in

Moscow in the first half of the winter of 1995-96, and on-site

medical personnel reported widespread disease. At that point,

Moscow had one shelter, with a capacity of twenty-four, and

other Russian cities offered no sanitation or temporary resi- dence centers of any sort. In the mid-1990s, the government of

mayor Yuriy Luzhkov followed the Soviet pattern of forcibly

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The Society and Its Environment

removing vagrants from the city, especially at times when large

numbers of Western visitors were expected. Police routinely

harass and beat vagrants found on the streets. The Soviet pro- piska system of residency permits, which granted housing and

employment to individuals only in the place where they were

officially registered, has been found unconstitutional several

times by Russia's Constitutional Court. However, many local

authorities, including those in Russia's largest European cities,

continue to require Soviet-era documentation; in 1995 Moscow

assessed a fee of 35 million rubles (about US$7,000) for registration as a permanent resident of the city, and several other

cities adopted similar measures. In the face of such restrictions,

many homeless individuals are unable to change their status. Through the first half of the 1990s, no specific agency of the

Russian government has borne responsibility for aiding the

homeless; the Federal Migration Service, a badly underfunded

and understaffed agency created in 1992, has not been able to carry out its legal responsibility to locate housing and employment for internal and external migrants (see Migration, ch. 3).

A number of Western humanitarian organizations, such as the

Salvation Army and Doctors Without Borders, are the main

source of assistance. In late 1995, the many deaths of homeless

people prompted the Moscow government to announce plans

to build ten new shelters and to ease the procedure for obtaining residency permits.

Private charities in Russia have suffered from an absence of

government support and a general lack of social acceptance. In

1995, for example, the soup kitchen of the Christian Mercy

Society in Moscow, which fed 400 poor people daily, had to pay

city officials to stay open, and the organization was unable to obtain a designated space in which to operate. In fact, Russian

law gives no status whatever to private charities, so such organizations must fend for themselves in helping the increasingly

large number of urban poor. Russian society generally distrusts

charities, partly because no such institutions existed either in

tsarist times (royalty and the nobility provided whatever assis- tance went to the needy) or in the Soviet era, and partly

because society has become fragmented by the difficult eco- nomic conditions of the 1990s.

According to Western experts, a comprehensive system of

social protection is an urgent need of the Russian government,

both for humanitarian reasons and as a prerequisite to financial stabilization and economic restructuring. The quality of

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Russia: A Country Study

future Russian society also will depend on reversing a steep

downward trend in the quality of education and health care

that has eroded the ability of Russians to improve their eco- nomic standing and to feel the sense of basic security that the

Soviet system provided to some degree. Under Russia's conditions of drastic social and economic change, such forms of support are especially missed in the mid-1990s.

* * * A number of useful monographs published in the 1990s

include discussion of various aspects of Russia's social conditions. In Redefining Russian Society and Polity, Mary Buckley dis- cusses major changes in housing, health care, and social

expectations, with substantial background on the Soviet

period. The Environmental and Health Atlas ofRussia, edited by

Murray Feshbach, provides useful details on the health crisis and its causes. Education and Society in the New Russia, edited by

AnthonyJones, includes discussion of education trends as they

apply to changes in post-Soviet society. Local Power and PostSoviet Politics, edited by Theodore Friedgut and Jeffrey Hahn,

illuminates the role of local governments in areas such as welfare and housing. The World Bank's 1995 report Russia, Housing Reform and Privatization gives a full picture of the economic

forces and existing traditions at work in forming a new housing

market. Igor Ron's The Sexual Revolution in Russia is a detailed

and well-documented analysis of sexual attitudes in the Soviet

and post-Soviet periods. Russia's Youth and Its Cultureby Hilary

Pilkington is a sociological study of groupings and behavior. A

series of articles by Penny Morvant, published in the Open

Media Research Institute's biweekly Transitionvsx 1995, are concise studies of poverty, the role of women, and the health crisis in Russia. (For further information and complete citations, see

Bibliography.)

294
Chapter 6, The Economy
The beautiful Vasilisa walks into theforest holding her magical doll while a horseman rides by (design from lacquer box made in village ofPalekh).
LIKE MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN LIFE, the Russian economy underwent a journey through uncharted waters

in the early 1990s. First came the disintegration of the centrally

planned economy that was a hallmark of the state-controlled

economy and then its replacement by an economy operating on the basis of market forces. Some of the former communist

states of Central Europe began their process of economic transition two years before Russia and have provided positive models. But Russia lacks experience with market economies and

the institutions needed to operate them. Moreover, deeply en- trenched remnants of central planning present challenges in

Russia that other countries were able to avoid.

Russia undertakes the transition with advantages and obstacles. Although only half the size of the former Soviet economy,

the Russian economy includes formidable assets. Russia possesses ample supplies of many of the world's most valued natural resources, especially those required to support a modern

industrialized economy. It also has a well-educated labor force

with substantial technical expertise. At the same time, Soviet- era management practices, a decaying infrastructure, and inefficient supply systems hinder efficient utilization of those

resources. For nearly 60 years, the Russian economy and that of the rest of the Soviet Union operated on the basis of central planning—state control over virtually all means of production and

over investment, production, and consumption decisions

throughout the economy. Economic policy was made according to directives from the communist party, which controlled

all aspects of economic activity. The central planning system

left a number of legacies with which the Russian economy must

deal in its transition to a market economy.

Much of the structure of the Soviet economy that operated

until 1987 originated under the leadership ofJoseph V. Stalin

(in office 1927-53), with only incidental modifications made

between 1953 and 1987. Five-year plans (see Glossary) and

annual plans were the chief mechanisms the Soviet government used to translate economic policies into programs.

According to those policies, the State Planning Committee

(Gosudarstvennyy planovyy komitet—Gosplan) formulated

countrywide output targets for stipulated planning periods.

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Russia: A Country Study

Regional planning bodies then refined these targets for eco- nomic units such as state industrial enterprises and state farms

(sovkhozy; sing., sovkhoz—see Glossary) and collective farms

(kolkhozy; sing., kolkhoz—see Glossary), each of which had its own specific output plan. Central planning operated on the

assumption that if each unit met or exceeded its plan, then

demand and supply would balance.

The government's role was to ensure that the plans were fulfilled. Responsibility for production flowed from the top down.

At the national level, some seventy government ministries and

state committees, each responsible for a production sector or

subsector, supervised the economic production activities of

units within their areas of responsibility. Regional ministerial

bodies reported to the national-level ministries and controlled

economic units in their respective geographical areas. The plans incorporated output targets for raw materials and

intermediate goods as well as final goods and services. In theory, but not in practice, the central planning system ensured a balance among the sectors throughout the economy. Under

central planning, the state performed the allocation functions

that prices perform in a market system. In the Soviet economy,

prices were an accounting mechanism only. The government

established prices for all goods and services based on the role

of the product in the plan and on other noneconomic criteria. This pricing system produced anomalies. For example, the

price of bread, a traditional staple of the Russian diet, was

below the cost of the wheat used to produce it. In some cases, farmers fed their livestock bread rather than grain because

bread cost less. In another example, rental fees for apartments were set very low to achieve social equity, yet housing was in

extremely short supply (see Housing, ch. 5). Soviet industries

obtained raw materials such as oil, natural gas, and coal at prices below world market levels, encouraging waste. The central planning system allowed Soviet leaders to marshal resources quickly in times of crisis, such as the Nazi invasion, and to reindustrialize the country during the postwar

period. The rapid development of its defense and industrial

base after the war permitted the Soviet Union to become a superpower.

The record of Russian economic reform through the mid1990s is mixed. The attempts and failures of reformers during

the era of perestroika (restructuring—see Glossary) in the

regime of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in office 1985-91) attested to

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The Economy

the complexity of the challenge. Since 1991, under the leadership of Boris N. Yeltsin, the country has made great strides

toward developing a market economy by implanting basic

tenets such as market-determined prices. Critical elements

such as privatization of state enterprises and extensive foreign

investment went into place in the first few years of the postSoviet period. But other fundamental parts of the economic

infrastructure, such as commercial banking and authoritative,

comprehensive commercial laws, were absent or only partly in

place by 1996. Although by the mid-1990s a return to Soviet-era

central planning seemed unlikely, the configuration of the

post-transition economy remained unpredictable.

Economists have struggled to achieve accurate measurement

of the Russian economy, and they have questioned the accuracy

of official Russian economic data. Although the market now

determines most prices, the Government (Russia's cabinet)

still fixes prices on some goods and services, such as utilities and energy. Furthermore, the exchange rate of the ruble (for

value of the ruble—see Glossary) to the United States dollar

has changed rapidly, and the Russian inflation rate has been

high. These conditions make it difficult to convert economic

measurements from rubles to dollars to make statistical comparisons with the United States and other Western countries.

According to official Russian data, in 1994 the national gross

domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) was 604 trillion rubles

(about US$207 billion according to the 1994 exchange rate), or about 4 percent of the United States GDP for that year. But

this figure underestimates the size of the Russian economy.

Adjusted by a purchasing-power parity formula to account for

the lower cost of living in Russia, the 1994 Russian GDP was

about US$678 billion, making the Russian economy approximately 10 percent of the United States economy. In 1994 the

adjusted Russian GDP was US$4,573 per capita, approximately

19 percent of that of the United States. A second important

measurement factor is the extremely active so-called shadow

economy, which yields no taxes or government statistics but

which a 1996 government report quantified as accounting for

about 50 percent of the economy and 40 percent of its cash

turnover. Historical Background

The Soviet economic system was in place for some six

decades, and elements of that system remained in place after

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Russia: A Country Study

the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The leaders exert- ing the most substantial influence on that system were its founder, Vladimir I. Lenin, and his successor Stalin, who established the prevailing patterns of collectivization and industrialization that became typical of the Soviet Union's centrally

planned system. By 1980, however, intrinsic defects became

obvious as the national economy languished; shortly thereafter,

reform programs began to alter the traditional structure. One

of the chief reformers of the late 1980s, Boris Yeltsin, oversaw

the substantial dissolution of the central planning system in the

early 1990s.

The Eras of Lenin and Stalin

The basic foundation of the Soviet economic system was

established after the Bolsheviks (see Glossary) assumed power

in November 1917 (see Revolutions and Civil War, ch. 2). The

Bolsheviks sought to mold a socialist society from the ruins of

post-World War I tsarist Russia by liberally reworking the ideas

of political philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

Soon after the revolution, the Bolsheviks published decrees

nationalizing land, most industry (all enterprises employing

more than five workers), foreign trade, and banking. The peasants took control of the land from the aristocracy and farmed it in small parcels.

Beginning in 1918, the new regime already was fighting for

its survival in the Russian Civil War against noncommunist

forces known as the Whites. The war forced the regime to organize the economy and place it on a war footing under a strin- gent policy known as war communism. Under such conditions,

the economy performed poorly. In 1920 agricultural output

had attained only half of its pre-World War I level, foreign trade

had virtually ceased, and industrial production had fallen to only a small fraction of its prewar levels. Beginning in 1921,

Lenin led a tactical retreat from state control of the economy

in an effort to reignite production. His new program, called

the New Economic Policy (Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika

NEP; see Glossary), permitted some private activity, especially

in agriculture, light industry, and services (see Lenin's Leadership, ch. 2). However, heavy industry, transportation, foreign

trade, and banking remained under state control.

Lenin died in 1924, and by 1927 the government had nearly

abandoned the NEP. Stalin sought a rapid transformation from

an agricultural, peasant-based country into a modern indus300
The Economy

trial power and initiated the country's First Five-Year Plan

(1928-32). Under the plan, the Soviet government began the

nationwide collectivization of agriculture to ensure production

and distribution of food supplies to the growing industrial sec- tor and to free labor for industry (see Industrialization and

Collectivization, ch. 2) . By the end of the five-year period, however, agricultural output had declined by 23 percent, according

to official statistics. The chemical, textile, housing, and con- sumer goods and services industries were also performing

poorly. Heavy industry exceeded the plan targets, but only at a great cost to the rest of the economy.

By the Third Five-Year Plan (1938-41), the Soviet economy

was once again on a war footing, devoting increasing amounts

of resources to the military sector in response to the rise of

Nazi Germany. The Nazi invasion in 1941 forced the government to abandon the five-year plan and concentrate all resources on support for the military sector. This period also

included the large-scale evacuation of much of the country's

industrial production capacity from European Russia to the

Urals and Central Asia to prevent further war damage to its economic base. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-50) was one

of repairing and rebuilding after the war. Throughout the Stalin era, the government forced the pace

of industrial growth by shifting resources from other sectors to heavy industry. The Soviet consumer received little priority in

the planning process. By 1950 real household consumption

had climbed to a level only marginally higher than that of

1928. Although Stalin died in 1953, his emphasis on heavy

industry and central control over all aspects of economic decision making remained virtually intact well into the 1980s.

The Postwar Growth Period

Soviet economic growth rates during the postwar period

appeared impressive. Between the early 1950s and 1975, the

Soviet gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) increased an average of about 5 percent per year, outpacing the average

growth of the United States and keeping pace with many West

European economies—albeit after having started from a much

lower point.

However, these aggregate growth figures hid gross inefficiencies that are typical of centrally planned systems. The Soviet

Union was able to attain impressive growth through "extensive

investments," that is, by infusing the economy with large inputs

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Russia: A Country Study

of labor, capital, and natural resources. But the state-set prices

did not reflect the actual costs of inputs, leading to enormous

misallocation and waste of resources. In addition, the heavily

bureaucratic economic decision-making system and the strong

emphasis on meeting targets discouraged the introduction of

new technologies that could improve productivity. Central

planning also skewed the distribution of investments throughout the economy.

The aggregate Soviet growth figures also did not reveal

either the generally poor quality of Soviet goods and services

that resulted from the state monopoly over production or the

lack of priority given the consumer sector in the planning process. Eventually, diminishing returns from labor, capital, and

other inputs led to a severe slowdown in Soviet economic

growth. Furthermore, the availability of inputs, especially capital, labor, and technology, was decreasing. Declining birth

rates, particularly in the European republics of the Soviet

Union, placed constraints on the labor supply. By the mid1970s and into the 1980s, average Soviet GNP growth rates had

plummeted to about 2 percent, less than half the rates of the

immediate postwar period.

Although such rates might have been acceptable in a mature, modern industrialized economy, the Soviet Union still trailed far behind the United States, other Western economies,

and Japan, and in the 1980s another challenge arose from the

newly industrializing countries of East Asia. Furthermore, the

standard of living of the average Russian citizen, which had

always been below that of the United States, was declining. In

the 1980s, with the advent of modern communications that even Soviet censors found impossible to restrict, Soviet citizens

began to recognize their relative position and to question the

rationale of their country's economic policies. This was the

atmosphere in which the Gorbachev regime undertook serious

economic reform in the late 1980s.

Reform and Resistance

During several distinct periods, Soviet leaders attempted to reform the economy to make the Soviet system more efficient.

In 1957, for example, Nikita S. Khrushchev (in office 1953-64)

tried to decentralize state control by eliminating many national

ministries and placing responsibility for implementing plans

under the control of newly created regional economic councils. These reforms produced their own inefficiencies. In 1965

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The Economy

Soviet prime minister Aleksey Kosygin (in office 1964-80)

introduced a package of reforms that reestablished central government control but reformed prices and established new

bonuses and production norms to stimulate economic productivity. Under reforms in the 1970s, Soviet leaders attempted to streamline the decision-making process by combining enterprises into associations, which received some localized decision-making authority.

Because none of these reforms challenged the fundamental

notion of state control, the root cause of the inefficiencies

remained. Resistance to reform was strong because central

planning was heavily embedded in the Soviet economic structure. Its various elements—planned output, state ownership of

property, administrative pricing, artificially established wage

levels, and currency inconvertibility—were interrelated. Fundamental reforms required changing the whole system rather

than one or two elements. Central planning also was heavily

entrenched in the Soviet political structure. A huge bureaucracy was in place from the national to the local level in both

the party and the government, and officials within that system

enjoyed the many privileges of the Soviet elite class. Such

vested interests yielded formidable resistance to major changes

in the Soviet economic system; the Russian system, in which

many of the same figures have prospered, suffers from the same handicap.

Upon assuming power in March 1985, Gorbachev took measures intended to immediately resume the growth rates of earlier decades. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) called for

the Soviet national income to increase an average of 4.1 percent annually and labor productivity to increase 4.6 percent

annually—rates that the Soviet Union had not achieved since

the early 1970s. Gorbachev sought to improve labor productivity by implementing an anti-alcohol campaign that severely

restricted the sale of vodka and other spirits and by establishing

work attendance requirements to reduce chronic absenteeism.

Gorbachev also shifted investment priorities toward the

machine-building and metalworking sectors that could make

the most significant contribution to retool and modernize

existing factories, rather than building new factories. Gorbachev changed Soviet investment strategy from extensive

investing to intensive investing that focused on elements most

critical to achieving the stated goal.

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Russia: A Country Study

During his first few years, Gorbachev also restructured the

government bureaucracy (see Perestroika, ch. 2). He combined

ministries responsible for high-priority economic sectors into

bureaus or state committees in order to reduce staff and red

tape and to streamline the administration. In addition, Gorbachev established a state organization for quality control to improve the quality of Soviet production.

The Perestroika Program

The Soviet economic reforms during Gorbachev's initial

period (1985-86) were similar to the reforms of previous

regimes: they modified the Stalinist system without making

truly fundamental changes. The basic principles of central

planning remained. The measures proved to be insufficient, as economic growth rates continued to decline and the economy

faced severe shortages. Gorbachev and his team of economic

advisers then introduced more fundamental reforms, which

became known as perestroika (restructuring). At the June 1987

plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU—see Glossary), Gorbachev

presented his "basic theses," which laid the political foundation

of economic reform for the remainder of the decade.

In July 1987, the Supreme Soviet passed the Law on State

Enterprises. The law stipulated that state enterprises were free

to determine output levels based on demand from consumers and other enterprises. Enterprises had to fulfill state orders,

but they could dispose of the remaining output as they saw fit. Enterprises bought inputs from suppliers at negotiated contract prices. Under the law, enterprises became self-financing;

that is, they had to cover expenses (wages, taxes, supplies, and

debt service) through revenues. No longer was the government

to rescue unprofitable enterprises that could face bankruptcy.

Finally, the law shifted control over the enterprise operations

from ministries to elected workers' collectives. Gosplan's

responsibilities were to supply general guidelines and national

investment priorities, not to formulate detailed production

plans.

The Law on Cooperatives, enacted in May 1987, was perhaps

the most radical of the economic reforms during the early part

of the Gorbachev regime. For the first time since Lenin's NEP,

the law permitted private ownership of businesses in the ser- vices, manufacturing, and foreign-trade sectors. The law initially imposed high taxes and employment restrictions, but it

304
The Economy

later revised these to avoid discouraging private-sector activity.

Under this provision, cooperative restaurants, shops, and manufacturers became part of the Soviet scene. Gorbachev brought perestroika to the Soviet Union's foreign

economic sector with measures that Soviet economists considered bold at that time. His program virtually eliminated the

monopoly that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had had on most

trade operations. It permitted the ministries of the various

industrial and agricultural branches to conduct foreign trade

in sectors under their responsibility rather than having to operate indirectly through the bureaucracy of trade ministry organizations. In addition, regional and local organizations and

individual state enterprises were permitted to conduct foreign

trade. This change was an attempt to redress a major imperfection in the Soviet foreign trade regime: the lack of contact

between Soviet end users and suppliers and their foreign partners. The most significant of Gorbachev's reforms in the foreign

economic sector allowed foreigners to invest in the Soviet

Union in the form ofjoint ventures with Soviet ministries, state enterprises, and cooperatives. The original version of the

Soviet Joint Venture Law, which went into effect in June 1987,

limited foreign shares of a Soviet venture to 49 percent and

required that Soviet citizens occupy the positions of chairman

and general manager. After potential Western partners complained, the government revised the regulations to allow

majority foreign ownership and control. Under the terms of

the Joint Venture Law, the Soviet partner supplied labor, infrastructure, and a potentially large domestic market. The foreign

partner supplied capital, technology, entrepreneurial expertise, and, in many cases, products and services of world competitive quality.

Although they were bold in the context of Soviet history,

Gorbachev's attempts at economic reform were not radical

enough to restart the country's chronically sluggish economy

in the late 1980s. The reforms made some inroads in decentralization, but Gorbachev and his team left intact most of the fundamental elements of the Stalinist system—price controls,

inconvertibility of the ruble, exclusion of private property ownership, and the government monopoly over most means of production.

By 1990 the government had virtually lost control over eco- nomic conditions. Government spending increased sharply as

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Russia: A Country Study

an increasing number of unprofitable enterprises required

state support and consumer price subsidies continued. Tax rev- enues declined because revenues from the sales of vodka plummeted during the anti-alcohol campaign and because republic

and local governments withheld tax revenues from the central

government under the growing spirit of regional autonomy.

The elimination of central control over production decisions,

especially in the consumer goods sector, led to the breakdown

in traditional supplier-producer relationships without contributing to the formation of new ones. Thus, instead of streamlining the system, Gorbachev's decentralization caused new

production bottlenecks.

Unforeseen Results of Reform

Gorbachev's new system bore the characteristics of neither

central planning nor a market economy. Instead, the Soviet

economy went from stagnation to deterioration. At the end of

1991, when the union officially dissolved, the national econ- omy was in a virtual tailspin. In 1991 the Soviet GDP had

declined 17 percent and was declining at an accelerating rate. Overt inflation was becoming a major problem. Between 1990

and 1991, retail prices in the Soviet Union increased 140 percent. Under these conditions, the general quality of life for Soviet consumers deteriorated. Consumers traditionally faced shortages of durable goods, but under Gorbachev, food, wearing

apparel, and other basic necessities were in short supply.

Fueled by the liberalized atmosphere of Gorbachev's glasnost

(literally, public voicing—see Glossary) and by the general

improvement in information access in the late 1980s, public

dissatisfaction with economic conditions was much more overt

than ever before in the Soviet period. The foreign-trade sector of the Soviet economy also showed signs of deterioration. The

total Soviet hard-currency (see Glossary) debt increased appreciably, and the Soviet Union, which had established an impeccable record for debt repayment in earlier decades, had

accumulated sizable arrearages by 1990.

In sum, the Soviet Union left a legacy of economic inefficiency and deterioration to the fifteen constituent republics

after its breakup in December 1991. Arguably, the shortcomings of the Gorbachev reforms had contributed to the eco- nomic decline and eventual destruction of the Soviet Union,

leaving Russia and the other successor states to pick up the

306
Economist Yegor Gaydar, acting

prime minister under Boris

Yeltsin in 1992 and major

advocate of economic reform

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

pieces and to try to mold modern, market-driven economies.

At the same time, the Gorbachev programs did start Russia on

the precarious road to full-scale economic reform. Perestroika

broke Soviet taboos against private ownership of some types of

business, foreign investment in the Soviet Union, foreign trade,

and decentralized economic decision making, all of which

made it virtually impossible for later policy makers to turn back

the clock.

Economic Reform in the 1990s

Two fundamental and interdependent goals—macroeco- nomic stabilization and economic restructuring—mark the

transition from central planning to a market-based economy.

The former entails implementing fiscal and monetary policies

that promote economic growth in an environment of stable

prices and exchange rates. The latter requires establishing the

commercial, legal, and institutional entities—banks, private

property, and commercial legal codes—that permit the econ- omy to operate efficiently. Opening domestic markets to for- eign trade and investment, thus linking the economy with the

rest of the world, is an important aid in reaching these goals.

Under Gorbachev, the regime failed to address these funda307
Russia: A Country Study

mental goals. At the time of the Soviet Union's demise, the

Yeltsin government of the Russian Republic had begun to attack the problems of macroeconomic stabilization and eco- nomic restructuring. As of mid-1996, the results were mixed.

The Yeltsin Economic Program

In October 1991, two months before the official collapse of

the Soviet regime and two months after the August 1991 coup

against the Gorbachev regime, Yeltsin and his advisers, including reform economist Yegor Gaydar, established a program of

radical economic reforms. The Russian parliament, the

Supreme Soviet, also extended decree powers to the president

for one year to implement the program. The program was

ambitious, and the record to date indicates that the goals for

macroeconomic stabilization and economic restructuring programs may have been unrealistically high. Another complication in the Yeltsin reform program is that since 1991 both

political and economic authority have devolved significantly

from the national to the regional level; in a series of agreements with the majority of Russia's twenty-one republics and

several other subnational jurisdictions, Moscow has granted a

variety of special rights and powers having important economic

overtones.

Macroeconomic Stabilization Measures

The program laid out a number of macroeconomic policy measures to achieve stabilization. It called for sharp reductions

in government spending, targeting outlays for public investment projects, defense, and producer and consumer subsidies.

The program aimed at reducing the government budget deficit

from its 1991 level of 20 percent of GDP to 9 percent of GDP by

the second half of 1992 and to 3 percent by 1993. The government imposed new taxes, and tax collection was to be

upgraded to increase state revenues. In the monetary sphere,

the economic program required the Russian Central Bank

(RCB) to cut subsidized credits to enterprises and to restrict

money supply growth. The program called for the shrinkage of

inflation from 12 percent per month in 1991 to 3 percent per

month in mid-1993.

Economic Restructuring Measures

Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was announced, the Government lifted price controls on 90 per308
The Economy

cent of consumer goods and 80 percent of intermediate goods.

It raised, but still controlled, prices on energy and food staples

such as bread, sugar, vodka, and dairy products. These measures were to establish a realistic relationship between production and consumption that had been lacking in the central

planning system.

To encourage the development of the private sector, fundamental changes were made in the tax system, including introduction of a value-added tax (VAT—see Glossary) of 28

percent on most transactions, a progressive income tax, and a

tax on business income; revisions in the system of import tariffs and export taxes; new taxes on domestic energy use to encour- age conservation (a necessary step because energy prices were

still controlled) ; and new taxes on oil and natural gas exports

to narrow the gap between subsidized domestic prices and

world prices and to prevent domestic energy shortages (see

Taxation, this ch.). A fixed exchange rate was to be established

for the ruble, which then would become convertible. Many

restrictions on foreign trade and investment also were to be

lifted to expose Russia to the discipline of world prices.

Monetary and Fiscal Policies

In 1992 and 1993, the Government expanded the money

supply and credits at explosive rates that led directly to high

inflation and to a deterioration in the exchange rate of the

ruble. In January 1992, the Government clamped down on

money and credit creation at the same time that it lifted price

controls. However, beginning in February the RCB loosened

the reins on the money supply. In the second and third quarters of 1992, the money supply had increased at especially

sharp rates of 34 and 30 percent, respectively, and by the end of

1992, the Russian money supply had increased by eighteen

times.

The sharp increase in the money supply was influenced by

large foreign currency deposits that state-run enterprises and

individuals had built up and by the depreciation of the ruble.

Enterprises drew on these deposits to pay wages and other

expenses after the Government had tightened restrictions on

monetary emissions. Commercial banks monetized enterprise

debts by drawing down accounts in foreign banks and drawing

on privileged access to accounts in the RCB (see Banking and

Finance, this ch.).

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Russia: A Country Study

Government efforts to control credit expansion also proved

ephemeral in the early years of the transition. Domestic credit

increased about nine times between the end of 1991 and 1992.

The credit expansion was caused in part by the buildup of

interenterprise arrears and the RGB's subsequent financing of

those arrears. The Government restricted financing to state enterprises after it lifted controls on prices in January 1992, but

enterprises faced cash shortages because the decontrol of

prices cut demand for their products. Instead of curtailing production, most firms chose to build up inventories. To support

continued production under these circumstances, enterprises

relied on loans from other enterprises. By mid-1992, when the

amount of unpaid interenterprise loans had reached 3.2 tril- lion rubles (about US$20 billion), the government froze interenterprise debts. Shortly thereafter, the government provided

181 billion rubles (about US$1.1 billion) in credits to enterprises that were still holding debt.

The Government also failed to constrain its own expenditures in this period, partially under the influence of the conser- vative Supreme Soviet, which encouraged the Soviet-style

financing of favored industries. By the end of 1992, the Russian

budget deficit was 20 percent of GDP, much higher than the 5

percent projected under the economic program and stipulated

under the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary)

conditions for international funding. This budget deficit was financed largely by expanding the money supply. These ill- advised monetary and fiscal policies resulted in an inflation

rate of over 2,000 percent in 1992.

In late 1992, deteriorating economic conditions and a sharp

conflict with the parliament led Yeltsin to dismiss economic

reform advocate Yegor Gaydar as prime minister. Gaydar's suc- cessor was Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former head of the State

Natural Gas Company (Gazprom), who was considered less favorable to economic reform.

Chernomyrdin formed a new government with Boris

Fedorov, an economic reformer, as deputy prime minister and

finance minister. Fedorov considered macroeconomic stabiliza- tion a primary goal of Russian economic policy. In January

1993, Fedorov announced a so-called anticrisis program to control inflation through tight monetary and fiscal policies. Under

the program, the Government would control money and credit

emissions by requiring the RCB to increase interest rates on

credits by issuing government bonds, by partially financing

310
The Economy

budget deficits, and by starting to close inefficient state enterprises. Budget deficits were to be brought under control by limiting wage increases for state enterprises, by establishing

quarterly budget deficit targets, and by providing a more effi- cient social safety net for the unemployed and pensioners.

The printing of money and domestic credit expansion moderated somewhat in 1993. In a public confrontation with the

parliament, Yeltsin won a referendum on his economic reform

policies that may have given the reformers some political clout

to curb state expenditures. In May 1993, the Ministry of

Finance and the RCB agreed to macroeconomic measures,

such as reducing subsidies and increasing revenues, to stabilize

the economy. The RCB was to raise the discount lending rate to reflect inflation. Based on positive early results from this policy,

the IMF extended the first payment of US$1.5 billion to Russia

from a special Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) the fol- lowingJuly.

Fedorov's anticrisis program and the Government's accord

with the RCB had some effect. In the first three quarters of

1993, the RCB held money expansion to a monthly rate of 19

percent. It also substantially moderated the expansion of credits during that period. The 1993 annual inflation rate was around 1,000 percent, a sharp improvement over 1992, but still very high. The improvement figures were exaggerated, however, because state expenditures had been delayed from the

last quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 1994. State enterprise

arrears, for example, had built up in 1993 to about 15 trillion

rubles (about US$13 billion, according to the mid-1993

exchange rate).

In June 1994, Chernomyrdin presented a set of moderate

reforms calculated to accommodate the more conservative ele- ments of the Government and parliament while placating

reformers and Western creditors. The prime minister pledged

to move ahead with restructuring the economy and pursuing

fiscal and monetary policies conducive to macroeconomic sta- bilization. But stabilization was undermined by the RCB, which

issued credits to enterprises at subsidized rates, and by strong

pressure from industrial and agricultural lobbies seeking additional credits.

By October 1994, inflation, which had been reduced by

tighter fiscal and monetary policies early in 1994, began to soar once again to dangerous levels. On October 11, a day that

became known as Black Tuesday, the value of the ruble on

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Russia: A Country Study

interbank exchange markets plunged by 27 percent. Although

experts presented a number of theories to explain the drop,

including the existence of a conspiracy, the loosening of credit

and monetary controls clearly was a significant cause of declining confidence in the Russian economy and its currency.

In late 1994, Yeltsin reasserted his commitment to macroeco- nomic stabilization by firing Viktor Gerashchenko, head of the

RCB, and nominating Tat'yana Paramonova as his replacement. Although reformers in the Russian government and the

IMF and other Western supporters greeted the appointment

with skepticism, Paramonova was able to implement a tight

monetary policy that ended cheap credits and restrained interest rates (although the money supply fluctuated in 1995). Fur- thermore, the parliament passed restrictions on the use of

monetary policy to finance the state debt, and the Ministry of

Finance began to issue government bonds at market rates to finance the deficits. The Government also began to address the interenterprise

debt that had been feeding inflation. The 1995 budget draft,

which was proposed in September 1994, included a commitment to reducing inflation and the budget deficit to levels

acceptable to the IMF, with the aim of qualifying for additional

international funding. In this budget proposal, the Chernomyrdin government sent a signal that it no longer would toler- ate soft credits and loose budget constraints, and that stabiliza- tion must be a top government priority.

During most of 1995, the government maintained its com- mitment to tight fiscal constraints, and budget deficits

remained within prescribed parameters. However, in 1995 pres- sures mounted to increase government spending to alleviate

wage arrearages, which were becoming a chronic problem

within state enterprises, and to improve the increasingly tat- tered social safety net. In fact, in 1995 and 1996 the state's fail- ure to pay many such obligations (as well as the wages of most

state workers) was a major factor in keeping Russia's budget

deficit at a moderate level (see Social Welfare, ch. 5). Conditions changed by the second half of 1995. The members of the

State Duma (beginning in 1994, the lower house of the Federal

Assembly, Russia's parliament) faced elections in December,

and Yeltsin faced dim prospects in his 1996 presidential reelection bid. Therefore, political conditions caused both Duma

deputies and the president to make promises to increase

spending.

312
The Economy

In addition, late in 1995 Yeltsin dismissed Anatoliy Chubays, one of the last economic reform advocates remaining in a top

Government position, as deputy prime minister in charge of

economic policy. In place of Chubays, Yeltsin named Vladimir

Kadannikov, a former automobile plant manager whose views were antireform. This move raised concerns in Russia and the

West about Yeltsin's commitment to economic reform. Another

casualty of the political atmosphere was RCB chairman Paramonova, whose nomination had remained a source of controversy between the State Duma and the Government. In

November 1995, Yeltsin was forced to replace her with Sergey

Dubinin, a Chernomyrdin protege who continued the tightmoney policy that Paramonova had established.

By mid-1996 many Duma deputies raised concerns about the

Government's failure to meet its tax revenue targets. Revenue

shortages were blamed on a number of factors, including a heavy tax burden that encourages noncompliance and an inefficient and corrupt tax collection system. A variety of tax collection reforms were proposed in the parliament and the

Government, but by 1996 Russian enterprises and regional

authorities had established a strong pattern of noncompliance

with national tax regulations, and the Federal Tax Police Ser- vice was ineffectual in apprehending violators (see Ministry of

Internal Affairs (MVD), ch. 10).

Inflation

In 1992, the first year of economic reform, retail prices in

Russia increased by 2,520 percent. A major cause of the

increase was the decontrol of most prices in January 1992, a

step that prompted an average price increase of 245 percent in

that month alone. By 1993 the annual rate had declined to 840

percent, still a very high figure. In 1994 the inflation rate had

improved to 224 percent.

Trends in annual inflation rates mask variations in monthly

rates, however. In 1994, for example, the Government managed to reduce monthly rates from 21 percent in January to 4

percent in August, but rates climbed once again, to 16.4 percent by December and 18 percent by January 1995. Instability

in Russian monetary policy caused the variations. After tightening the flow of money early in 1994, the Government loosened

its restrictions in response to demands for credits by agriculture, industries in the Far North, and some favored large enterprises. In 1995 the pattern was avoided more successfully by

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Russia: A Country Study

maintaining the tight monetary policy adopted early in the

year and by passing a relatively stringent budget. Thus, the

monthly inflation rate held virtually steady below 5 percent in

the last quarter of the year. For the first half of 1996, the infla- tion rate was 16.5 percent. However, experts noted that control

of inflation was aided substantially by the failure to pay wages

to workers in state enterprises, a policy that kept prices low by

depressing demand.

Exchange Rates

An important symptom of Russian macroeconomic instability has been severe fluctuations in the exchange rate of the

ruble. From July 1992, when the ruble first could be legally

exchanged for United States dollars, to October 1995, the rate of exchange between the ruble and the dollar declined from

144 rubles per US$1 to around 5,000 per US$1. Prior to July

1992, the ruble's rate was set artificially at a highly overvalued

level. But rapid changes in the nominal rate (the rate that does

not account for inflation) reflected the overall macroeconomic

instability. The most drastic example of such fluctuation was

the Black Tuesday (1994) 2V percent reduction in the ruble's

value.

In July 1995, the RCB announced its intention to maintain

the ruble within a band of 4,300 to 4,900 per US$1 through

October 1995, but it later extended the period to June 1996.

The announcement reflected strengthened fiscal and monetary policies and the buildup of reserves with which the Government could defend the ruble. By the end of October 1995,

the ruble had stabilized and actually appreciated in inflationadjusted terms. It remained stable during the first half of 1996.

In May 1996, a "crawling band" exchange rate was introduced

to allow the ruble to depreciate gradually through the end of

1996, beginning between 5,000 and 5,600 per US$1 and ending between 5,500 and 6,100.

Another sign of currency stabilization was the announce- ment that effective June 1996, the ruble would become fully

convertible on a current-account basis. This meant that Russian citizens and foreigners would be able to convert rubles to other currencies for trade transactions.

Privatization

The essence of economic restructuring, and a critical consideration for foreign loans and investment in Russia's economy, is

314
Central meat market, Moscow

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

the privatization program. In most respects, between 1992 and

1995 Russia kept pace with or exceeded the rate established in

the original privatization program of October 1991. As deputy

prime minister for economic policy, the reformist Chubays was an effective advocate of privatization during its important early

stages. In 1992 privatization of small enterprises began through

employee buyouts and public auctions. By the end of 1993,

more than 85 percent of Russian small enterprises and more

than 82,000 Russian state enterprises, or about one-third of the

total in existence, had been privatized.

On October 1, 1992, vouchers, each with a nominal value of

10,000 rubles (about US$63), were distributed to 144 million

Russian citizens for purchase of shares in medium-sized and

large enterprises that officials had designated and reorganized

for this type of privatization. However, voucher holders also

could sell the vouchers, whose cash value varied according to the economic and political conditions in the country, or they

could invest them in voucher funds.

By the end ofJune 1994, the voucher privatization program

had completed its first phase. It succeeded in transferring ownership of 70 percent of Russia's large and medium-sized enter315
Russia: A Country Study

prises to private hands and in privatizing about 90 percent of

small enterprises. By that time, 96 percent of the vouchers

issued in 1992 had been used by their owners to buy shares in

firms directly, invest in investment funds, or sell on the secondary markets. According to the organizers of the voucher sys- tem, some 14,000 firms employing about two-thirds of the

industrial labor force had moved into private hands.

The next phase of the privatization program called for direct

cash sales of shares in remaining state enterprises. That phase

would complete the transfer of state enterprises and would add

to government revenues. After that procedure met stiff opposition in the State Duma, Yeltsin implemented it by decree in

July 1994. But the president's commitment to privatization soon came into question. In response to the monetary crisis of

October 1994, Yeltsin removed Chubays from his position as head of the State Committee for the Management of State

Property, replacing him with little-known official Vladimir Pole- vanov. Polevanov stunned Russian and Western privatization

advocates by suggesting renationalization of some critical

enterprises. Yeltsin reacted by replacing Polevanov with Petr

Mostovoy, a Chubays ally. In the ensuing eighteen months,

Yeltsin made two more changes in the chairmanship position. In 1995 and 1996, political conditions continued to hamper

the privatization program, and corruption scandals tarnished

the program's public image. By 1995 privatization had gained a negative reputation with ordinary Russians, who coined the

slang word prikhvatizatsiya, a combination of the Russian word

for "grab" and the Russianized English word "privatize," producing the equivalent of "grabification." The term reflects the

belief that the privatization process most often shifted control

of enterprises from state agencies to groups of individuals with

inside connections in the Government, the mafiya, or both. Distrust of the privatization process was part of an increasing public cynicism about the country's political and economic leaders,

fueled by the seeming failure of Yeltsin's highly touted reform

to improve the lot of the average Russian (see Social Stratification, ch. 5).

The second phase of the privatization program went ahead

with the sale of state-held shares for cash. Although the process was virtually complete by the end of the first quarter of 1996,

the Government failed to garner expected revenues. Meanwhile, Yeltsin's June 1996 bid for reelection brought a virtual

halt in privatization of state enterprises during the campaign

316
The Economy

period. In February 1996, the Procuracy announced a full-scale investigation into privatization practices, in particular a 1995

transaction in which state banks awarded loans to state firms in

return for "privatization" shares in those enterprises (see The

Procuracy, ch. 10). This loans-for-shares type of transaction

characterized the second phase of privatization; banks provided the government badly needed cash based on the collat- eral of enterprise shares that banks presumably would be able

to sell later. But most of the twenty-nine state enterprises originally slated to participate withdrew, and the banks that received

shares appeared to have a conflict of interest based on their

role in setting the rules of the bidding procedure. In the most

widely publicized deal, the Uneximbank of Moscow received a 38 percent interest in the giant Noril'sk Nickel Joint-Stock

Company at about half of a competing bid. Other banks and

commercial organizations joined the traditional opponents of

privatization in attacking the loans-for-shares program, and in

1996 the Government admitted that the program had been

handled badly. As a result of corruption allegations, the State

Duma formed a committee to review the privatization program. And Prime Minister Chernomyrdin requested off-budget

funds to buy back shares from the banks.

Because the faults of the Yeltsin privatization program were

an important plank in the 1996 presidential election platform

of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii—KPRF), the strongest

opposition party, Yeltsin's campaign strategy was to reduce

privatization as far as possible as a campaign issue (see The

Executive Branch, ch. 7). Part of that strategy was to shift the

privatization process from Moscow to the regions. In February

1996, a presidential decree simply granted shares in about

6,000 state-controlled firms to regional governments, which

could auction the shares and keep the profits.

After Yeltsin's reelection in July 1996, his financial representatives announced continuation of the privatization program,

with a new focus on selling ten to fifteen large state enterprises,

including the joint-stock company of the Unified Electric

Power System of Russia (YeES Rossii), the Russian State Insur- ance Company (Rosgosstrakh), and the St. Petersburg Maritime Port. The Communications Investment Joint-Stock

Company (Svyazinvest), sale of which had failed in 1995, was to be offered to Western telecommunications companies in 1996.

317
Russia: A Country Study

The new, postelection privatization stage also was to reduce

the role of enterprise workers in shareholding. Within the first years of such ownership, most worker shares had been sold at depressed prices, devaluing all shares and cutting state profits

from enterprise sales. Therefore, to reach the budget target of

12.4 trillion rubles (about US$2.4 billion) of profit from privatization sales in 1996, distribution was to target recipients who

would hold shares rather than sell them immediately.

Despite periodic delays, the inept administration of the program's more recent phases, and allegations of favoritism and

corrupt transactions in the enterprise and financial structures,

in 1996 international experts judged Russia's privatization

effort a qualified success. The movement of capital assets from

state to private hands has progressed without serious reversal of

direction—despite periodic calls for reestablishing state control of certain assets. And the process has contributed to the

creation of a new class of private entrepreneur.

Economic Conditions in Mid-1996

As of mid-1996, four and one-half years after the launching

of Russia's post-Soviet economic reform, experts found the

results promising but mixed. The Russian economy has passed

through a long and wrenching depression. Official Russian

economic statistics indicate that from 1990 to the end of 1995,

Russian GDP declined by roughly 50 percent, far greater than

the decline that the United States experienced during the

Great Depression. (However, alternative estimates by Western

analysts described a much less severe decline, taking into

account the upward bias of Soviet-era economic data and the

downward bias of post-Soviet data.) Such a decline, however, was to be expected in an economy going through the transition

from central planning to a market structure. Much of the

decline in production has occurred in the military-industrial

complex and other heavy industries that benefited most from

the skewed economic priorities of Soviet planners but have

much less robust demand in a freer market.

But other major sectors such as agriculture, energy, and light

industry also suffered from the transition. To enable these sec- tors to function in a market system, inefficient enterprises had

to be closed and workers laid off, with resulting short-term

declines in output and consumption. Analysts had expected

that Russia's GDP would begin to rise in 1996, but data for the

first six months of the year showed a continuing decline, and

318
Cossack running moneychanging operation,

Krasnodar

Courtesy A. James Firth,

United States Department of

Agriculture

some Russian experts predicted a new phase of economic crisis in the second half of the year. The pain of the restructuring has been assuaged somewhat

by the emergence of a new private sector. Western experts

believe that Russian data overstate the dimensions of Russia's

economic collapse by failing to reflect a large portion of the

country's private-sector activity. The Russian services sector,

especially retail sales, is playing an increasingly vital role in the

economy, accounting for nearly half of GDP in 1995. The ser- vices sector's activities have not been adequately measured.

Data on sector performance are skewed by the underreporting

or nonreporting of output that Russia's tax laws encourage.

According to Western analysts, by the end of 1995 more than

half of GDP and more than 60 percent of the labor force were

based in the private sector. An important but unconventional service in Russia's econ- omy is "shuttle trading"—the transport and sale of consumer

goods by individual entrepreneurs, of whom 5 to 10 million were estimated to be active in 1996. Traders buy goods in for- eign countries such as China, Turkey, and the United Arab

Emirates and in Russian cities, then sell them on the domestic

market where demand is highest. Yevgeniy Yasin, minister of

economics, estimated that in 1995 some US$11 billion worth of

319
Russia: A Country Study

goods entered Russia in this way. Shuttle traders have been vital in maintaining the standard of living of Russians who cannot

afford consumer goods on the conventional market. However,

domestic industries such as textiles suffer from this infusion of

competing merchandise, whose movement is unmonitored,

untaxed, and often ?na/z)>a-controlled.

The geographical distribution of Russia's wealth has been

skewed at least as severely as it was in Soviet times. By the mid1990s, economic power was being concentrated in Moscow at an even faster rate than the federal government was losing

political power in the rest of the country. In Moscow an eco- nomic oligarchy, composed of politicians, banks, businesspeople, security forces, and city agencies, controlled a huge

percentage of Russia's financial assets under the rule of Moscow's energetic and popular mayor, Yuriy Luzhkov. Unfortunately, organized crime also has played a strong role in the

growth of the city (see The Crime Wave of the 1990s, ch. 10).

Opposed by a weak police force, Moscow's rate of protection

rackets, contract murders, kickbacks, and bribes—all intimately

connected with the economic infrastructure—has remained

among the highest in Russia. Most businesses have not been

able to function without paying for some form of mafiya protection, informally called a krysha (the Russian word for roof).

Luzhkov, who has close ties to all legitimate power centers in

the city, has overseen the construction of sports stadiums, shopping malls, monuments to Moscow's history, and the ornate

Christ the Savior Cathedral. In 1994 Yeltsin gave Luzhkov full control over all state property in Moscow. In the first half of

1996, the city privatized state enterprises at the rate of US$1 bil- lion per year, a faster rate than the entire national privatization

process in the same period. Under Luzhkov's leadership, the

city government also acquired full or major interests in a wide

variety of enterprises—from banking, hotels, and construction

to bakeries and beauty salons. Such ownership has allowed

Luzhkov's planners to manipulate resources efficiently and

with little or no competition. Meanwhile, Moscow also became

the center of foreign investment in Russia, often to the exclusion of other regions. For example, the McDonald's fast-food

chain, which began operations in Moscow in 1990, enjoyed

immediate success but expanded only in Moscow. The concentration of Russia's banking industry in Moscow gave the city a huge advantage in competing for foreign commercial activity.

320
The Economy

In mid-1996 the national government appeared to have

achieved some degree of macroeconomic stability. However,

longer-term stability depends on the ability of policy makers to withstand the inflationary pressures of demands for state subsidies and easier credits for failing enterprises and other special

interests. (Chubays estimated that spending promises made

during Yeltsin's campaign amounted to US$250 per voter,

which if actually spent would approximately double the

national budget deficit; most of Yeltsin's pledges seemingly

were forgotten shortly after his reelection.)

By 1996 the structure of Russian economic output had

shifted far enough that it more closely resembled that of a developed market economy than the distorted Soviet centralplanning model. With the decline in demand for defense

industry goods, overall production has shifted from heavy

industry to consumer production (see The Defense Industry,

ch. 9). However, in the mid-1990s the low quality of most

domestically produced consumer goods continued to limit

enterprises' profits and therefore their ability to modernize

production operations. On the other side of the "vicious cir- cle," reliance on an outmoded production system guaranteed

that product quality would remain low and uncompetitive.

Most prices are left to the market, although local and

regional governments control the prices of some staples.

Energy prices remain controlled, but the Government has

been shifting these prices upward to close the gap with world

market prices.

Natural Resources

Russia is the largest country in the world; it covers a vast amount of topographically varied territory, including much

that is inaccessible by conventional modes of transportation.

The traditional centers of economic activity are almost exclusively located in the more hospitable European part of Russia,

which once offered considerable coal and natural gas to drive

heavy industry (see fig. 7). But the European fuel base was

largely depleted by the 1980s, forcing Russia to rely on Siberian

deposits much farther from the industrial heartland.

Russia is one of the world's richest countries in raw materials, many of which are significant inputs for an industrial econ- omy. Russia accounts for around 20 percent of the world's

production of oil and natural gas and possesses large reserves of both fuels. This abundance has made Russia virtually self-suf321
Russia: A Country Study

322
The Economy

ficient in energy and a large-scale exporter of fuels. Oil and gas were primary hard-currency earners for the Soviet Union, and

they remain so for the Russian Federation. Russia also is self- sufficient in nearly all major industrial raw materials and has at least some reserves of every industrially valuable nonfuel mineral—even after the productive mines of Ukraine, Kazakstan,

and Uzbekistan no longer were directly accessible. Tin, tungsten, bauxite, and mercury were among the few natural materials imported in the Soviet period. Russia possesses rich reserves of iron ore, manganese, chromium, nickel, platinum, titanium,

copper, tin, lead, tungsten, diamonds, phosphates, and gold,

and the forests of Siberia contain an estimated one-fifth of the

world's timber, mainly conifers (see fig. 8; Environmental Conditions, ch. 3).

The iron ore deposits of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly, close

to the Ukrainian border in the southwest, are believed to contain one-sixth of the world's total reserves. Intensive exploitation began there in the 1950s. Other large iron ore deposits are located in the Kola Peninsula, Karelia, south-central Siberia,

and the Far East. The largest copper deposits are located in the

Kola Peninsula and the Urals, and lead and zinc are found in

North Ossetia.

Agriculture

Climatic and geographic factors limit Russia's agricultural

activity to about 10 percent of the country's total land area. Of

that amount, about 60 percent is used for crops, the remainder

for pasture and meadow (see table 15, Appendix). In the European part of Russia, the most productive land is in the Central

Chernozem Economic Region and the Volga Economic

Region, which occupy the grasslands between Ukraine and

Kazakstan. More than 65 percent of the land in those regions is devoted to agriculture. In Siberia and the Far East, the most

productive areas are the southernmost regions. Fodder crops

dominate in the colder regions, and intensity of cultivation

generally is higher in European Russia. The last expansion of

cultivated land occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s,

when the Virgin Lands program of Nikita Khrushchev opened

land in southwestern Siberia (and neighboring Kazakstan) for

cultivation. In the mid-1990s, about 15 percent of the working

population was occupied in agriculture, with the proportion

dropping slowly as the younger population left rural areas to seek economic opportunities elsewhere (see Rural Life, ch. 5).

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Russia: A Country Study

324
The Economy

Crops

Grains are among Russia's most important crops, occupying

more than 50 percent of cropland. Wheat is dominant in most

grain-producing areas. Winter wheat is cultivated in the North

Caucasus and spring wheat in the Don Basin, in the middle

Volga region, and in southwestern Siberia. Although Khrushchev expanded the cultivation of corn for livestock feed, that

crop is only suitable for growth in the North Caucasus, and production levels have remained low compared with other grains.

Barley, second to wheat in gross yield, is grown mainly for animal feed and beer production in colder regions as far north as 65° north latitude (the latitude of Arkhangelsk) and well into

the highlands of southern Siberia. Production of oats, which

once ranked third among Russia's grains, has declined as machines have replaced horses in farming operations.

Legumes became a common crop in state farms in the

1980s. Potatoes, a vital crop for food and for the production of

vodka, are grown in colder regions between 50° and 60° north

latitude. Sugar beet production has expanded in recent years;

the beets are grown mainly in the rich black-earth districts of

European Russia. Flax, also a plant tolerant of cold and poor

soils, is Russia's most important raw material for textiles, and

the country produced about half the world's flax crop in the

1980s. Flax also yields linseed oil, which together with sunflowers (in the North Caucasus) and soybeans (in the Far East) is an important source of vegetable oil. Production of fruits and

vegetables increased as private farms began to expand around

1990. In the mid-1990s, the largest yields in that category were

in cabbages, apples, tomatoes, and carrots. Increased production of fodder crops and expansion of pastureland have supported Russia's livestock industry, although

economic conditions have caused cutbacks in animal holdings.

Cattle are the most common form of livestock except in the

drier areas, where sheep and goats dominate. The third-largest

category is pigs, which are raised in areas of European Russia

and the Pacific coast that offer grain, potatoes, or sugar beets

as fodder. Only very small numbers of chickens are kept, and

frozen chicken has become one of Russia's largest import

items.

Agricultural Policy

Agricultural reform has proved to be a tough challenge for

325
Russia: A Country Study

Russia during its transition to a market economy. The challenge comes from the legacy of the Soviet period and from

deeply imbedded cultural biases against individualism. Because

of agriculture's vital economic role, large-scale agricultural

reform is necessary for success in other sectors. In the mid1990s, however, private initiative was not rewarded, and ineffi- cient input distribution and marketing structures failed to take

advantage of agricultural assets.

Soviet Policy

Under Stalin the government socialized agriculture and cre- ated a massive bureaucracy to administer policy. Stalin's cam- paign of forced collectivization, which began in 1929,

confiscated the land, machinery, livestock, and grain stores of

the peasantry. By 1937 the government had organized approximately 99 percent of the Soviet countryside into state-run col- lective farms. Under this grossly inefficient system, agricultural

yields declined rather than increased. The situation persisted

into the 1980s, when Soviet farmers averaged about 10 percent

of the output of their counterparts in the United States. During Stalin's regime, the government assigned virtually all farmland to one of two basic agricultural production organizations—state farms and collective farms. The state farm was conceived in 1918 as the ideal model for socialist agriculture. It was

to be a large, modern enterprise directed and financed by the

government. The work force of the state farm received wages

and social benefits comparable to those enjoyed by industrial

workers. By contrast, the collective farm was a self-financed

producer cooperative that farmed parcels of land that the state granted to it rent-free and that paid its members according to their contribution of work.

In their early stages, the two types of organization also functioned differently in the distribution of agricultural goods.

State farms delivered their entire output to state procurement

agencies in response to state production quotas. Collective

farms also received quotas, but they were free to sell excess out- put in collective-farm markets where prices were determined

by supply and demand. The distinction between the two types

of farms gradually narrowed, and the government converted

many collective farms to state farms, where the state had more

control.

Private plots also played a role in the Soviet agricultural sys- tem. The government allotted small plots to individual farming

326
The Economy

households to produce food for their own use and for sale as an income supplement. Throughout the Soviet period, the

productivity rates of private plots far exceeded their size. With

only 3 percent of total sown area in the 1980s, they produced

over a quarter of agricultural output.

A number of factors made the Soviet collectivized system

inefficient throughout its history. Because farmers were paid

the same wages regardless of productivity, there was no incentive to work harder and more efficiently. Administrators who

were unaware of the needs and capabilities of the individual

farms decided input allocation and output levels, and the high

degree of subsidization eliminated incentives to adopt more

efficient production methods.

The Gorbachev Reforms

The Gorbachev agricultural reform program aimed to

improve production incentives. Gorbachev sought to increase

agricultural labor productivity by forming contract brigades

consisting of ten to thirty farmworkers who managed a piece of

land leased from a state or collective farm. The brigades were

responsible for the yield of the land, which in turn determined

their remuneration. After 1987 the government legalized family contract brigades and long-term leasing of land, removing

the restrictions on the size of private agricultural plots and cut- ting into the state's holdings of arable land.

Although Gorbachev's reforms increased output in the agricultural sector in 1986, they failed to address fundamental

problems of the system, such as the government's continued

control over the prices of agricultural commodities, the distri- bution of agricultural inputs, and production and investment

decisions. In the contract brigade system, farmers still had no

real vested interest in the farms on which they worked, and

production suffered accordingly. In the 1980s, the Soviet

Union went from being self-sufficient in food production to becoming a net food importer.

Yeltsin 's Agricultural Policies

The Yeltsin regime has attempted to address some of the

fundamental reform issues of Russian agriculture. But agricultural reform has moved very slowly, causing output to decline

steadily through the mid-1990s. Reform began in Russia shortly

before the final collapse of the Soviet Union. In December

1990, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Repub327
Russia: A Country Study

lie enacted a number of laws that were designed to restructure

the agricultural sector and make it more commercially viable.

The Law on Peasant Farms legalized private farms and allowed

them to operate alongside state and collective farms, to hire

labor, and to sell produce without state supervision. The same

session of the congress passed the Law on Land Reform, which

permitted land to be bequeathed as an inheritance from one

generation to the next, but not to be bought or sold. The government also established the State Committee for Agrarian

Reform, whose responsibility was to oversee the transfer of

available land to private farming.

The main thrust of Yeltsin's agricultural reform has been

toward reorganizing state and collective farms into more effi- cient, market-oriented units. A decree of December 1991 and

its subsequent amendments provided several options to state and collective farmers for the future structure of their farms.

The decree required that farmers choose either to reorganize

into joint-stock companies, cooperatives, or individual private

farms, or to maintain their existing structure. Under the first two arrangements, workers would hold shares in the farms and

be responsible for managing the enterprises. An individual

farmer could later decide to break from the larger unit and

establish private ownership of his or her share of the land, as determined by an established procedure.

This restructuring program has progressed slowly. Although

95 percent of the state and collective farms underwent some

form of reorganization, about one-third of them retained

essentially their earlier structure. Most of the others, fearing

the unstable conditions of market supply and demand that

faced individual entrepreneurs, chose a form of collective ownership, either as joint-stock companies or as cooperatives. The

conservatism of Russia's farmers prompted them to preserve as much as possible of the inefficient but secure Soviet-era controlled relationships of supply and output.

As of 1996, individual private farming had not assumed the

significance in Russian agriculture that reformers and Western

supporters had envisioned. Although the number of private

farms increased considerably following the reforms of 1990, by

the early 1990s the growth of farms had stalled, and by the mid1990s the number of private farms actually may have dropped

as some individuals opted to return to a form of cooperative

enterprise or left farming entirely. By the end of 1995, Russia's

328
Waitingfor grocery store to open in small town, Republic ofTyva

Courtesy Eugene Zakusib

280,000 private farms accounted for only 5 percent of the ara- ble land in Russia.

A number of factors have contributed to the slow progress of

agricultural reform. Until the mid-1990s, the state government

continued to act as the chief marketing agent for the food sec- tor by establishing fixed orders for goods, thus guaranteeing

farmers a market. The government also subsidized farms

through guaranteed prices, which reduced the incentive of

farmers to become efficient producers.

Perhaps most important, effective land reform has not been

accomplished in Russia. The original land reform law and subsequent decrees did not provide a clear definition of private

property, and they did not prescribe landholders' rights and

protections. The nebulous status of private landholders under

the new legislation made farmers reluctant to take the risk of

329
Russia: A Country Study

proprietorship. In March 1996, President Yeltsin issued a decree that allows farmers to buy and sell land. However, in

April 1996 the State Duma, heavily influenced by the antire- form KPRF and its ally, the Agrarian Party of Russia (representing the still formidable vested interests of collective and state farms), passed a draft law that prohibits land sales by anyone

but the state. Recent opposition to the new notion of private

landownership is based in a strong traditional Russian view that

land must be held as collective rather than individual property.

However, in 1996 several factors were exerting pressure on

the agricultural sector to become commercially viable. The federal government has retreated from its role as a guaranteed

purchaser and marketer, although some regional governments

are stepping in to fill the role. And private markets are emerging slowly. Increasingly, Russian agricultural production must

compete with imported goods as the gap between domestic

prices and world prices narrows. In addition, the fiscal position

of the federal government has forced it to reduce subsidies to many sectors of the economy, including agriculture. Subsidies

are among the targets of major budget cuts to comply with the

standards of the IMF and other Western lenders and achieve

macroeconomic stabilization.

Agricultural Production

Like the rest of the economy, the Russian agricultural sector has experienced a long, severe recession in the 1990s. Even

before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the output of grains

and other crops began to decline, and it decreased steadily

through 1996 because of the unavailability of fertilizers and

other inputs, bad weather, and major readjustments during the

period of transition. In 1995 overall agricultural production

declined 8 percent, including a drop of 5 percent in crop production and 11 percent in livestock production. That year Russia suffered its worst grain harvest since 1963, with a yield of

63.5 million tons. The most dramatic declines occurred in livestock production. Farmers reduced their holdings of animals as the price of

grains and other inputs increased. As meat prices rose, the

composition of the average consumer's diet included less meat

and more starches and vegetables. Reduced demand in turn

exacerbated the decline in livestock production.

330
The Economy

Energy

Energy plays a central role in the Russian economy because

it drives all the other elements of the system—the industrial,

agricultural, commercial, and government sectors. In addition,

energy, particularly petroleum and natural gas, is the most

important export and source of foreign exchange for the Russian economy. Experts forecast that the energy sector will con- tinue to occupy this central position until Russian

manufacturing reaches a level competitive with the West.

Exploitation and Consumption

Russia's self-sufficiency in fuels and power generation puts

the country in a good position for future economic growth and

development. But Russia is also one of the most energy-dependent countries. The International Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD—see Glossary) estimated that in 1993 it took 4.46 tons

of oil equivalent (TOE) to produce US$1,000 of Russia's GDP,

compared with an average of 0.23 TOE to produce US$1,000 of

GDP for the OECD member countries.

Russia's excessive consumption of energy results from the

Soviet system, which artificially priced energy far below the

level of world market prices and thus subsidized it. Soviet

energy-pricing policies disregarded resource utilization in the

quest for higher output volumes and discouraged the adoption

of conservation measures. Soviet planners also skewed

resources toward the defense-related and heavy industries,

which consume energy more intensively than other sectors of

the economy. Until the 1980s, the national economy managed

to survive under such policies because of the Soviet Union's

rich endowment of natural resources. The problems that plagued the Russian energy sector in the

last decades of the Soviet Union were exacerbated during the

transition period. Since 1991 the output of all types of fuel and

energy has declined, partly because of plummeting demand for

energy during a time of general economic contraction. But the

energy sectors also have suffered from the intrinsic structural

defects of the central planning system: poor management of

resources, underinvestment, and outdated technology and

equipment.

The structure of energy and fuel production began to change dramatically in the 1980s with the exploitation of large

331
Russia: A Country Study

natural gas deposits. In the mid-1990s, natural gas accounted

for more than half of Russia's energy consumption, a share that

is expected to increase in the next decades. Oil accounts for

another 20 percent, a proportion that is expected to remain

approximately constant. Goal and other solid fuels, water

power, and nuclear energy account for smaller shares that

experts predict likely will decline after 2000. Despite the waste

of fuel in the Russian economy, Russia manages to produce a

surplus of energy for export. Exports, particularly of natural

gas and oil, have accounted for 30 percent of Russian energy

production, and this share is expected to hold steady.

Russia's drive to become a market economy should help to

alleviate some of the problems of the energy sector. Russian

energy pricing policies have changed. Since January 1992,

energy has been gradually deregulated, closing the gap

between world market prices and domestic prices and forcing consumers to conserve. Russia is also adopting Western technology and more efficient management techniques that will

improve productivity in the sector. Oil

Russia ranks third in the world in oil production, after Saudi

Arabia and the United States. Estimates place proven and

potential oil reserves at 8 to 11 billion tons. Russia's oil production peaked in 1987, then began a decline that continued

through 1995. In the latter year, the yield was 741 million barrels, 13 million barrels less than the previous year. Output for

the first quarter of 1996 was 182 million barrels.

Wasteful Soviet oil exploration and extraction techniques

depleted wells, which often fell far below their potential capacity. Soviet technology was not capable of exploring and extract- ing as deeply and efficiently as Western technology. These

handicaps have been instrumental in Russia's plummeting oil production during the last two decades. In 1994 the number of

oil wells drilled was only one-quarter the number drilled in

1983. About two-thirds of Russia's oil comes from Siberia,

mostly from huge fields in the northwest part of the region.

The main European oil and gas fields are located in the VolgaUral region, the North Caucasus, and the far north of the

Republic of Komi (see fig. 9).

Russian oil companies are vertically integrated units that

control the entire production process from exploration to transmission. The largest company is Lukoil, which, according

332

19
The Economy

to some measurements, is the largest oil company in the world.

The dominance of a few large companies has made all stages of

petroleum exploitation and sale extremely inefficient. National

and local government policies have discouraged individual

retailers from establishing independent gasoline storage facilities and stations; therefore, retail gasoline likely will continue

to be in very short supply (only 8,900 stations were operating in

Russia in 1995). Until January 1995, government policy

applied quotas to oil exports, and until July 1996 tariffs were

applied to oil exports. Both policies, resulting from the gap

between controlled domestic prices and world market prices,

aimed at ensuring a sufficient supply of oil to meet domestic

demand; both were lifted as the gap narrowed.

The search for new oil deposits has been a primary force in

Russia's foreign policy toward states to the south. Russia has

staked its claim to the Caspian oil reserves that Western companies are exploring in conjunction with Azerbaijani, Turkmenistani, and Kazakstani state companies. The presence of

Western interests and the strong role being played by Iran and

Turkey, Russia's traditional regional rivals, have complicated

this policy, which aims to achieve maximum benefit from Russia's position on the shore of the north Caspian. Also a source

of international controversy is Russia's insistence that Caspian

oil flow northward through Russian pipelines rather than west- ward via new lines built through Georgia and Turkey (see Foreign Investment in Oil and Gas, this ch.).

Natural Gas

Russia is also one of the world's largest natural gas producers. Its proven reserves have been estimated at 49 billion cubic

meters, or roughly 35 percent of the world's total. Natural gas

has also been one of the most successful parts of the Russian

economy. In the early 1980s, it replaced oil as the Soviet

"growth fuel," offering cheaper extraction and transportation.

Although output has dropped in the 1990s, the decline has not

been as severe as that for other energy sources or the rest of the

economy. Natural gas production peaked in 1991 at 727 million cubic meters, then dropped throughout the early 1990s.

But 1995 production, 596 million cubic meters, was an increase

from the previous year. After European gas fields in the VolgaUral region dominated the industry through the 1970s, production shifted to giant fields in Siberia. The Urengoy and

Yamburg fields in the West Siberia region are among the most

335
Figure 9. Energy Facilities, 1996

334


The Economy

to some measurements, is the largest oil company in the world.

The dominance of a few large companies has made all stages of

petroleum exploitation and sale extremely inefficient. National

and local government policies have discouraged individual

retailers from establishing independent gasoline storage facilities and stations; therefore, retail gasoline likely will continue

to be in very short supply (only 8,900 stations were operating in

Russia in 1995). Until January 1995, government policy

applied quotas to oil exports, and until July 1996 tariffs were

applied to oil exports. Both policies, resulting from the gap

between controlled domestic prices and world market prices,

aimed at ensuring a sufficient supply of oil to meet domestic

demand; both were lifted as the gap narrowed.

The search for new oil deposits has been a primary force in

Russia's foreign policy toward states to the south. Russia has

staked its claim to the Caspian oil reserves that Western companies are exploring in conjunction with Azerbaijani, Turkmenistan!, and Kazakstani state companies. The presence of

Western interests and the strong role being played by Iran and

Turkey, Russia's traditional regional rivals, have complicated

this policy, which aims to achieve maximum benefit from Russia's position on the shore of the north Caspian. Also a source

of international controversy is Russia's insistence that Caspian

oil flow northward through Russian pipelines rather than west- ward via new lines built through Georgia and Turkey (see Foreign Investment in Oil and Gas, this ch.).

Natural Gas

Russia is also one of the world's largest natural gas producers. Its proven reserves have been estimated at 49 billion cubic

meters, or roughly 35 percent of the world's total. Natural gas

has also been one of the most successful parts of the Russian

economy. In the early 1980s, it replaced oil as the Soviet

"growth fuel," offering cheaper extraction and transportation.

Although output has dropped in the 1990s, the decline has not

been as severe as that for other energy sources or the rest of the

economy. Natural gas production peaked in 1991 at 727 million cubic meters, then dropped throughout the early 1990s.

But 1995 production, 596 million cubic meters, was an increase

from the previous year. After European gas fields in the VolgaUral region dominated the industry through the 1970s, production shifted to giant fields in Siberia. The Urengoy and

Yamburg fields in the West Siberia region are among the most

335
Russia: A Country Study

productive; the former is the largest field in the world. Soviet

plans called for rapid development of new reserves in the

Yamal Peninsula in the Arctic Ocean north of Urengoy, but

environmental problems and infrastructure costs slowed development. Hasty construction and poor maintenance have

caused chronic breakdowns and accidents in the long pipelines

of Russia's natural gas delivery system (see Transportation, this ch.).

The State Natural Gas Company (Gazprom) has a virtual

monopoly over Russia's gas production and transmission. A ver- tically organized enterprise, the company has been reorganized into a joint-stock company, in which 40 percent of the

shares remain under state control. Company employees hold

another 15 percent, managers of the company hold 10 percent,

and the remaining 35 percent were sold at public auction. Gazprom controls a network of regional production associations.

Its management, which once was headed by Prime Minister

Viktor Chernomyrdin, has been accused of corruption and tax evasion.

Coal

For more than 150 years, coal was the dominant fuel supporting Russia's industries, and many industrial centers were

located near coal deposits. In the 1960s, oil and natural gas

overtook coal when plentiful reserves of those fuels became

available and the coal shafts of the European Soviet Union

(located primarily in what is today Ukraine) were being

exhausted. Russian coal reserves are estimated at 200 billion

tons, an amount that experts say is more than ample for cur- rent usage trends. Siberia and the Far East produce about

three-quarters of Russia's coal, with the European contributions coming largely from the Vorkuta field (Pechora Basin) in

Komi, the Urals, the eastern Donets Basin in the southwest,

and the Moscow Basin. Largely untapped coal fields lie in the

Siberian Tunguska and Lena basins. Productive fields in Siberia are located along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, making their

exploitation more economical. The largest operational sources

in that region are the Kuznetsk, Kansk-Achinsk, and Cheremkhovo fields. Coal is one of the less important sources of

energy because its labor-intensive extraction makes production

much more costly than other fuels. Rossugol', the Russian coal

company, controls coal production through regional associations that are organized as joint-stock companies. Russian coal

336
The Economy

production has declined markedly over the last decade, and

the coal industry has suffered a long series of strikes. Coal miners, among the best paid industrial workers of the Soviet

period, have organized strikes that have gained national atten- tion to protest the industry's long delays in paying wages.

Experts predict that coal output will continue to dwindle as its relative usefulness in industry and domestic applications is reduced. In 1994 Russia produced 249 million tons of coal, and

in 1995 the total rose to 255 million tons. Production for the

first quarter of 1996 was 71 million tons. Nuclear Energy

In 1996 some twenty-nine nuclear reactors were operating at nine sites: Balakovo on the northwest border of Kazakstan,

Beloyarsk in the southern Urals, Bilibino in northeastern Siberia (the only station east of the Urals), Kola in the far northwest, Kursk near the Ukrainian border, Novovoronezh on the

Don River, St. Petersburg, Smolensk west of Moscow, and Tver' northwest of Moscow. Altogether these facilities accounted for

10 percent of Russia's energy generating capacity in 1994. The

plants are operated by regional joint-stock companies in which

the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) controls 51 percent

of the shares. The nuclear energy sector has undergone financial problems because of government funding reductions. The

industry has turned to selling goods related to nuclear

energy—equipment and instruments, nuclear fuel, medical

isotopes, and fertilizers. The industry's financial problems, along with the disaster

that occurred at the Chernobyl' plant in Ukraine in 1986, have

raised questions about nuclear safety. Western countries have

provided financial assistance in some cases because of their concern about Russia's lax standards of handling nuclear materials and the continued use of outmoded equipment. Russia's

piecemeal environmental laws have led to indiscriminate

dumping and burial of radioactive wastes, which are creating

severe environmental problems. The theft of nuclear materials

has become another source of danger emanating from Russia's

nuclear energy program (see Environmental Conditions, ch. 3; The Crime Wave of the 1990s, ch. 10).

Nevertheless, experts predict that nuclear energy probably

will play an important role in the Russian economy if enough

investment is available to expand existing capacity. In 1992

Minatom announced plans to double nuclear energy capacity

337
Russia: A Country Study

by 2010, but ensuing financial problems have caused a reduction of that goal, and no new capacity has been added since the

breakup of the Soviet Union. The International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) projects that construction of new capacity will

not begin until after 2005, even if the investment climate is favorable.

Conventional Power Generation

Much of the conventional fuel produced in Russia is burned

to produce electric power. The Unified Electric Power System

operates Russia's electric power plants through seventy-two

regional power distribution companies. The power system consists of 600 thermal generating systems, more than 100 hydroelectric plants, and Russia's nine nuclear plants. Of the total

rated generating capacity of 205 gigawatts, only about 188 gigawatts were available as of 1996. In 1995 Russia's power plants

generated a total of 846 million kilowatt-hours, compared with

859 million kilowatt-hours in 1994. Generation for the first quarter of 1996 (normally the peak demand period of the

year) was 268 million kilowatt-hours.

In 1993 natural gas provided 42 percent of electricity production; hydroelectric plants, 19 percent; coal, 18 percent;

nuclear power, 13 percent; and other sources such as solar and

geothermal plants, 8 percent. Natural gas and coal are burned

at thermoelectric plants, which produce only electricity, and ai

cogeneration plants, which produce electricity and heat for

urban centers. The largest hydroelectric plants are located on

the Volga, Kama, Ob', Yenisey, and Angara rivers, where large

reservoirs were built in massive Soviet energy projects. Thermoelectric and hydroelectric plants—located in Siberia

because of available fuels and water power—send power to European Russia through a system of high-voltage transmission

lines. Consumption of electric power divides into the following

categories: industrial, 61 percent; residential, 11 percent; the

services sector, 11 percent; transportation, 9 percent; and agriculture, 8 percent. Regional energy commissions control the

price of electricity.

Foreign Investment in Oil and Gas

In the mid-1990s, many analysts consider the oil and gas

industries to be the best targets for foreign investment in Russia. The record of foreign investment in that period illustrates

338
The Economy

both the potentials and the pitfalls of such ventures. Experts

have concluded that the Russian oil and gas sector will require

large amounts of foreign capital to improve output. According

to some estimates, the oil sector will require US$30 to US$50

billion in new investment just to maintain the mid-1990s level

of production. To return production to its peak levels will

require an estimated US$70 to US$130 billion in new investments, which clearly would have to come from foreign sources. The Russian oil and gas sector also would benefit from infusions of Western technology and expertise. However, according

to a 1995 report by Cambridge Energy Research Associates, key

figures in the oil industry, most of whom were schooled in the

isolated Soviet-era approach to commerce, have been indifferent or hostile to Western management methods.

By the end of 1994, the oil and gas sector accounted for

about 38 percent of total foreign direct investment in Russia,

but the total input was only about US$1.4 billion. Although

Western companies are poised to commit large amounts of capital for exploration, as of 1996 most foreign investment had

gone to repairing and maintaining current facilities. Some analysts have estimated that foreign investment in the oil and gas

sector could reach US$70 billion by the year 2000.

Among several United States oil companies active in Russia,

Texaco heads a consortium in the largest project, the development of oil fields in the Timan-Pechora section of the Komi

region north of the Arctic Circle. The project, under negotiation since 1989, has an estimated potential of US$45 billion in

investment over the next fifty years. Conoco, a subsidiary of the

DuPont de Nemours chemical firm, leads a consortium of

United States and European firms and a Russian firm in the

Polar Lights project to explore Siberian oil fields. Two United

States companies, Marathon Oil and McDermott, along with

the Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi and Britain's

Royal Dutch Shell, are engaged in one of several projects to explore for oil off Sakhalin Island on the Pacific coast. The last two projects each could bring in as much as US$10 billion.

Nevertheless, Russia's generally poor investment climate and

other obstacles such as special taxes have discouraged additional investment in gas and oil. As of mid-1996, a tax of about

US$5 per barrel was imposed on oil exports, and a tax of about

US$2.60 was levied per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas

exported. Foreign and domestic firms were also subject to royalty payments to the Government for the privilege of drilling

339
Russia: A Country Study

for oil. Foreign investors have argued that reduced profit margins are a substantial obstacle to the support of some projects.

Some major oil investors have received tax exemptions, but

delays in rebate payments have created additional deterrents.

Banking and Finance

Experts have agreed that establishing a viable financial sec- tor is a vital requirement for Russia to have a successful market

economy. In the first five years of the post-Soviet era, the development of Russia's financial sector as an efficient distributor of

money and credit to other parts of the economic structure has

mirrored the ups and downs of the rest of the economy. In

1996 some elements of the central planning system remained

obstacles to further progress.

The Soviet Financial System

The financial system of the Soviet period was a rudimentary

mechanism for state control of the economy. The government

owned and managed the banking system. The State Bank (Gosudarstvennyy bank—Gosbank) was the central bank and the

only commercial bank. In its capacity as a central bank, Gosbank handled all significant banking transactions, including

the issuance and control of currency and credit, the management of gold reserves, and the oversight of transactions among

enterprises. Enterprises were issued money and credits in

accordance with the government's planned allocation of wages

and its management strategy for other expenses.

Wages were paid only in cash, and households used cash

exclusively for making payments. Checkbooks, credit cards,

and other alternative forms of payment were not available in

the Soviet Union. Wage earners could keep savings deposits in

the Savings Bank (Sberbank), where they earned low interest,

and these funds were available to the government as a source

of revenue. Two other banks also existed prior to 1987. The

Construction Bank (Stroybank) provided investment credits to enterprises, and the Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtorgbank)

handled financial transactions pertaining to trade. In 1987 and 1988, the Gorbachev regime separated commercial banking operations from Gosbank and replaced the two

specialized banks with three banks to provide credit to designated sectors of the economy: the Agro-Industrial Bank (Agroprombank), the Industry and Construction Bank (Promstroy340
The Economy

bank), and the Social Investment Bank (Zhilsotsbank), which

managed credits for the social welfare sector. The Soviet econ- omy also had state-controlled insurance firms, but other forms

of finance such as stocks and bonds did not exist. The Financial Sector in the 1990s

In the 1990s, Russia's financial sector, particularly its banking system, has been one of the fastest changing elements of

the economy. Although changes have moved clearly in the

direction of market principles, in the mid-1990s much additional reform was necessary to achieve stability.

Reform of the Banking System

The Russian banking system has developed from the centralized system of the Soviet period into a two-tier system, including a central bank and commercial banks, that is the standard

structure in market-based economies. The Russian Central

Bank (RCB) assumed the functions of Gosbank in November

1991, and Gosbank was eliminated when the Soviet Union dis- solved one month later. In its first years of existence, the RCB

functioned under the guidelines of the 1977 Soviet constitution and Russian laws passed in 1990, which made the bank

essentially an arm of the Russian parliament, whose members

manipulated bank policy to help favored enterprises.

Russia's 1993 constitution gave the RCB more autonomy.

However, the president has substantial influence on bank policies through his power to appoint the bank chairman, who in

turn wields extensive authority over bank operations and policy. (The nomination is subject to the approval of the State

Duma.)

Viktor Gerashchenko, a former Gosbank chairman, was the

first chairman of the RCB. In late 1994, he resigned under

pressure from President Yeltsin after the so-called Black Tuesday plunge of the ruble's value on exchange markets (see Monetary and Fiscal Policies, this ch.). Yeltsin named Tat'yana

Paramonova to replace Gerashchenko, but she remained act- ing chairman throughout her tenure because the State Duma

refused to approve her appointment. Powerful Duma members

opposed Paramonova's policy of restricting credits to favored

industrial sectors. In November 1995, the Duma approved

Yeltsin's nomination of Sergey Dubinin to replace State Paramonova; Dubinin remained in that position through the end

of Yeltsin's first term as president in mid-1996.

341
Russia: A Country Study

The Law on the Central Bank, enacted in April 1995, provides the statutory authority for the RCB. Under the law, the

RCB is responsible for controlling the country's money supply,

monitoring transactions among banks, implementing the federal budget and servicing Russia's foreign debt, monitoring the

foreign-exchange rate of the ruble, implementing Russian

exchange-rate policies, maintaining foreign currency reserves and gold reserves, licensing commercial banks, and regulating

and supervising commercial banks.

The RCB has had the greatest impact on Russia's economy

through its role in monetary policy. The RCB controls the

money supply by lending funds to commercial banks and by

establishing their reserve requirements. For several years after

its establishment, the RCB issued direct credits to enterprises

and to the agricultural sector at subsidized rates. Such credits were directed via commercial banks to politically influential

sectors: agriculture, the industrial and energy enterprises of

the northern regions, the energy sector in general, and other

large, state-run enterprises.

In the early years, the RCB also financed state budget deficits

by issuing credits to cover Government expenditures. The

availability of such credits played a central role in the high

inflation that the Russian economy endured between 1991 and

1994. In 1995 new legislation and regulations reduced this type

of credit by prohibiting the use of credit to finance state budget deficits, and recent RCB chairmen have raised discount

rates for RCB borrowing by commercial banks. Such restrictions have been heavily influenced by requirements of the IMF

to maintain strict fiscal and monetary standards to be eligible

for international financial assistance (see Foreign Debt, this

ch.).

Initially, the RCB's regulation of commercial banks also was

lax because the banking sector grew rapidly as the centralized

economy collapsed and because Russia had no experience in

establishing a market-based system. In the early and mid-1990s,

the failure of regulation led to a plethora of new commercial

banks, most of which were of dubious quality. In the mid-1990s, the World Bank (see Glossary) assisted the

Russian government in establishing a core of large banks,

called international standard banks, that met the standards of

the Bank for International Settlements (BIS—see Glossary).

The new banks must conform to strict standards for the size

and interest rates of loans; the size of a bank's capital base; the

342
The Economy

volume of loan reserves that banks must maintain; and the

scrutiny under which banking activities will be monitored. The

International Standard Bank program anticipates that the core

of banks that meet its requirements will grow until the entire

banking system conforms to the BIS criteria. Meanwhile, plans called for the RCB to remain the foundation of the Russian banking system. Its success will depend

greatly on its retaining as much independence as possible from

both the executive and the legislative branches of government

and on bank officials' ability to maintain credible monetary

policies.

Commercial Banks

By the end of 1995, Russia had nearly 3,000 commercial

banks. However, most of these banks were small and had little capitalization. A large portion of them are financially linked to companies and act exclusively as conduits of subsidized credits

to these enterprises. The financial health of such institutions is highly questionable, and experts forecast that many of them

will merge into larger, more viable institutions or go bankrupt

as the RCB continues to tighten its requirements and as the

role of cheap credits diminishes.

The commercial banking system has a core of large, viable

banks that have attained financial credibility and that experts

expect to remain in operation under any foreseeable economic

conditions. The former state-controlled specialized banks of

the Soviet system form the foundation of the current commercial banking system, including the six largest commercial banks

in Russia. In 1991 three of the banks—the Agroprombank

(subsequently renamed Rossel'bank), the Promstroybank, and

the Zhilsotsbank (reorganized into Mosbusinessbank) —were

reorganized into joint-stock companies and became independent commercial operations, forming the foundation of the

commercial banking system.

The Soviet-era Savings Bank (Sberbank) was reorganized as the Sberbank of Russia, with the RCB holding controlling

shares. In 1996 the Sberbank held between 60 and 70 percent

of Russians' total household savings; that figure decreased from

90 percent in 1991 as other commercial banks began to provide competition. The Foreign Trade Bank (Rosvneshtorgbank) also remains state-controlled, and it continues to handle

most foreign transactions, although by the mid-1990s it received competition from newer, privately owned banks. The

343
Russia: A Country Study

Moscow International Bank handles business between the large

Russian banks and Western banks. Sberbank and Rossel'bank

have systems of nationwide branches.

The types and quality of services that the Russian banking

system offers to the public are still rudimentary according to the standards of Western industrialized countries. They are unable to offer diverse and efficient customer services because

the Soviet Union had no retail banking tradition and because

Russia lacks the sophisticated infrastructure, especially highspeed telecommunications and trained staffs, on which modern Western financial institutions depend.

Most of the commercial banks offer their customers savings

deposit accounts, and the more established banks provide for- eign-exchange services, investment services, and corporate ser- vices. Bank checks are still rarely used in Russia because check

clearance is a long process. Some banks offer debit cards that

allow customers to have payments for goods and services

deducted directly from their bank balances. Some banks also

offer credit cards to customers with impeccable credit ratings.

The continued predominance of cash transactions has slowed

the rate of Russia's commerce.

Although foreign banks have played a larger role in the Russian economy in the mid-1990s, that role has met substantial

resistance from nationalist factions. In early 1996, the State

Duma passed a statute prohibiting the RCB from licensing for- eign banks that did not have operations in Russia before

November 1993. However, opponents of such a policy have

pointed out that efforts to protect the fledgling domestic banking sector from foreign competition also deny access to West- ern financial techniques that eventually would improve the

competitiveness of Russian banks.

Other Financial Institutions

A Russian securities market has evolved with the rest of the

economy. When the first Russian stock market was established

in 1991, few private companies existed to offer shares, so trading activity was quite low. The securities market got a large

boost from the Russian government's privatization campaign.

Shares in privatized firms were issued, and then a secondary

market emerged for the privatization vouchers that the government issued to each citizen (see Privatization, this ch.). As the

first phase of the privatization program ended and companies'

344
The Economy

capital requirements rose, an efficient securities market

became increasingly important.

Russian laws and regulations of the stock market and other

elements of the securities market have not kept pace with the

growth in the industry, fostering irregularities in the market.

Among the most infamous was the operation of the MMM

investment company, which developed into a pyramid scheme

guaranteeing investors very high returns on their investments.

A number of Russian small investors, whose savings had been

eroded severely by inflation, were attracted to the scheme and

eventually lost large sums of money. The head of MMM, Sergey

Mavrodi, was arrested and jailed on tax fraud, but the MMM

case underlined the lack of Western-style commercial laws in

the Russian legal system. The Russian securities market also

lacks a modern communications infrastructure, so registration

and reporting of financial transactions are very slow.

In 1993 the Government added a new element to the securities market by issuing treasury bonds to help finance its budget

deficits. In addition, Russian citizens are able to buy and sell rubles for foreign currency at selected banks. The exchange

rate is established through weekly auctions on the Moscow

International Currency Exchange (MICEX).

Insurance remains a small part of the Russian financial market. In 1996 approximately 200 insurance companies were

operating in Russia, including the privatized versions of former

Soviet state insurance companies. According to experts, Russia's relatively new financial institutions are likely to face a long

period of adjustment as weaker banks close or merge with

stronger banks, and a regulatory framework must be developed

to ensure public confidence in the banking system and enable

banks to offer reliable support in the development of private

enterprise—a role that has expanded rapidly in the first five

post-Soviet years. Other aspects of the financial system, such as securities markets, also lack the degree of standardized regulation required for large-scale domestic participation. However,

as the private sector's role in the national economy grows and

as Russia develops needed regulations and infrastructure, the

securities markets and other nonbank financial institutions are expected to follow the banks as important elements of the

economy.

Taxation

Throughout the first half of the 1990s, international finan345
Russia: A Country Study

cial institutions warned Russia that major adjustments were needed in the structure and the administration of the country's tax-collection system. However, in 1996 few meaningful

changes had emerged. Tax reforms until that time had emphasized revenue from income, consumption, and trade, with the

value-added tax (VAT—see Glossary), corporate profits taxes,

and personal income taxes accounting for 60 to 70 percent of

total revenue (see table 16, Appendix). Beginning in 1993,

experts have pointed to changes in the bases and rates of the

profit tax and the VAT as a major cause of declining revenues. Between 1993 and 1994, the ratio of taxes collected to GDP

declined from 41 percent to 36 percent, although the percentage of GDP paid in taxes already was lower in Russia than in

any of the Western market economies. In the first quarter of

1996, only 56 percent of planned tax revenue was realized.

The system in place in 1996 taxed the profits of enterprises

heavily, especially in comparison with the tax burden of personal income. In 1993 business profit taxes were three to seven

times higher than in Western economies, and personal income

taxes were two to four times lower. That emphasis was not con- ducive to expanding investment, and many non-wage sources of income were not captured by personal income tax stan- dards. According to a 1996 estimate, Russians kept US$30 bil- lion to US$60 billion in foreign banks to avoid taxation.

The VAT, which is levied on imported and domestic goods, is set at 21.5 percent for most purchases and 10 percent for a

specified list of foods. Administration of that tax is complicated

by uneven compliance and accounting rules that do not define

clearly the amounts to be classified as value added. Taxation on

the extraction and sale of natural resources is a major revenue

source, but the current system yields disproportionately little revenue from the energy sector, especially the natural gas

industry. Excise taxes are levied on merchandise of both

domestic and foreign origin. The tax on imported luxury items

ranges from 10 to 400 percent, and the rate on imports has

been kept higher than for domestic products in order to protect domestic industries.

Taxes on trade are a major revenue source. In the mid1990s, export taxes became a more important source of reve- nue as other types of trade control were eliminated. Frequent

changes in the tariff schedule for imported goods have led to confusion among importers. The average tariff rate in mid346
The Economy

1995 was 17 percent, but a reduction of maximum rates was announced for the medium term.

Russia's taxation agency is the State Taxation Service (STS),

which was established to administer the new market-based tax system installed in 1991 and 1992. Although in the mid-1990s

its staff of 162,000 employees was much larger than tax agencies in Western countries, the STS has been hampered by poor

organization, inadequate automation, and an untrained staff. Training and reorganization programs were announced in

1995, and some streamlining has resulted in separating the

roles of various levels of government, identification of tax-eligible individuals and corporations, and application of penalties

for tax evasion and tax arrears. Experts have identified the most serious defect of the tax

administration system as the ad hoc granting of tax exemptions, which distorts the overall revenue system and undermines the authority of administrators. The most problematic

examples of this practice are exemptions granted to agricultural producers and the oil and natural gas industries.

The Labor Force

Literacy and education levels among the Russian population

(148 million in 1996) are relatively high, largely because the

Soviet system placed great emphasis on education (see The

Soviet Heritage, ch. 5). Some 92 percent of the Russian people

have completed at least secondary school, and 11 percent have

completed some form of higher education (university and

above). In 1995 about 57 percent of the Russian population

was of working age, which the government defined as between

the ages of sixteen and fifty-five for women and between the

ages of sixteen and sixty for men, and 20 percent had passed

working age. Women make up more than half the work force.

Although size, age, and education would seem to place the

Russian labor force in a good position to participate in developing a modern, industrialized economy, it is not clear that the

skills that Russian workers attained during the Soviet period

are those required for a market economy. In 1994 the construction, industry, and agriculture sectors employed 53.5 percent

of the work force, and the services sector employed 37 percent,

a distribution typical of developing economies. By contrast, 67

percent of the United States labor force is in the services sector,

and 22 percent is in agriculture, industry, and construction, a configuration typical of modern industrialized market econo347
Russia: A Country Study

mies. The Russian pattern reflects the emphasis that Soviet eco- nomic planners placed on the nonservice sectors. Even among

the highly skilled labor force, the Soviet economy (and the

national education system as a whole) skewed training toward

the sciences, mathematics, and engineering and gave little attention to education in management and entrepreneurship.

This pattern of work training and general education has con- tinued in the 1990s; according to experts, its continued pres- ence indicates that the economy may not be able to depend on

younger workers to expand the fund of service-sector skills needed for a modern market economy. In any case, as the Russian economy progresses toward a market structure, middleaged and older workers will increasingly find themselves playing a marginal role. The living standards of Russia's workers have been eroded by

two factors. First, the severe depression of the country's

extended economic transition has left a large share of the work

force either unemployed, underemployed, or receiving

reduced wages. Second, labor lacks an effective organization to protect its interests. Neither trade unions from the Soviet era nor new, independent organizations have provided effective,

united representation. As of mid-1996, negative conditions had

not yielded the large-scale unrest that many experts had predicted in the working class. Unemployment

The growth of unemployment has been the bane of many of

the Central and East European countries in the transition from

centrally planned to market economies. Russia's unemployment rate has been hard to measure accurately because many

firms unofficially furlough workers but leave them on company

rolls. This practice is a vestige of the paternalistic Soviet era, when the presence of workers in an enterprise often had no

relation to that enterprise's actual production. Many of these

furloughed workers find gainful employment in the private sector, where wages often go unreported. Such a system results in a haphazard, inefficient allocation of the labor force.

Western and Russian analysts have relied on International

Labour Organisation measurements, which indicate that at the

end of 1995, Russian unemployment had reached 8.2 percent

(see table 17, Appendix). The Russian journal Ekonomika i zhizn' estimated the figure at 8.6 percent, or 6.3 million people,

for the first quarter of 1996. Although the last figure still is

348
The Economy

below the unemployment rates of Poland and some other

countries in transition, the full extent of unemployment has

been masked by extended subsidies that delayed the shutdown

of large Russian enterprises. In 1995 nearly half of plant direc- tors surveyed said that they had more workers than they

needed.

Unemployment varies considerably according to region.

Moscow's unemployment rate, the lowest in Russia, was 0.6 percent in March 1996. The Republic of Ingushetia, which also has

had the highest immigration rate because of its proximity to Chechnya, reported a rate of 23.5 percent in December 1995.

In March 1996, Ivanovo, a textile center east of Moscow, had a

rate of 13 percent, and the Republic of Udmurtia, a center of

the struggling military-industrial complex, reported 9.4 percent (see The Defense Industry, ch. 9). At that time, women

constituted 62 percent of Russia's officially unemployed, and

37 percent of the total were people below the age of thirty.

The Federal Employment Service (Federal'naya sluzhba zanyatosti—FSZ), the agency in charge of issuing unemployment

benefits and placing unemployed workers, had only 3.7 percent of the working population registered for benefits in

March 1996; manyjobless workers do not register because benefits are so small (averaging US$22 per month in 1995) and

because, after the guaranteed employment of the Soviet era, joblessness entails a significant stigma for many Russians. However, as the average term of unemployment grew from six to eight months between 1994 and 1995, more workers participated in FSZ programs. In 1995 the service placed an estimated

1.7 million workers in newjobs. That year, 9.8 million workers

left positions and 8.7 million were hired, and the majority of

those who left did so voluntarily—many because wages were

not paid—rather than because of dismissal. Shortages exist in

some types of skilled labor, and some companies actively

recruit workers.

Wages

By 1995 delays in wage payment had become a chronic problem even in profitable Russian enterprises. In many cases, enterprises simply passed along the burden of late payments of

state subsidies and customer debts. At the end of 1995, the Government owed a total of US$112 billion of subsidies, of which

about 27 percent were more than three months overdue. Most

of its debt was to the military and energy sectors. Through 1995

349
Russia: A Country Study

an average of 19 percent of wages were paid late, and in January 1996 a total of US$2.1 billion was overdue in agriculture,

construction, industry, and transportation. The State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) began keeping separate statistics for wages formally paid and those actually delivered. The payment record of privatized enterprises was worse than that of

state enterprises, and in many cases workers were paid in merchandise rather than in cash. In early 1996, the average rates of

overdue payment were 62 percent in ferrous metallurgy, 86

percent in oil extraction, and 22 percent in food processing.

In his presidential campaign, Yeltsin promised to abolish

state-sector wage arrears and to encourage improvement in the

private sector. By squeezing the national budget, Yeltsin

achieved temporary results in the state sector, but his promise

had no effect on other enterprises. Officials proposed several

programs to raise average wages and streamline the inefficient

system by which wages are delivered, but no meaningful reform

had been achieved by mid-1996. In July 1996, coal strikes in the

Far East, southwestern Russia, southern Siberia, and the Urals

threatened a nationwide shutdown in response to continued

payment failures in that industry

Manufacturing

Beginning in 1921, Lenin's Soviet government made industrial modernization a priority. But it was under Stalin that the

system of central planning was fully developed and the industrialization of the Russian Republic reached its peak. Throughout

the Stalin period, investment resources were directed into

heavy manufacturing at the expense of consumer or light

industry

During the later Soviet period, economic reformers such as Nikita Khrushchev attempted to shift some resources to the consumer industries, but the emphasis eventually shifted back

to heavy and military industries. This emphasis was especially

strong while the Soviet Union was building its military base

during the Cold War. In the 1970s, manufacturing productivity

declined. As part of his perestroika program in the late 1980s,

Gorbachev redirected resources to consumer goods, but the

effort proved insufficient to forestall the decay of the manufacturing sector. In the 1990s, Russia urgently needed a revival of the manufacturing sector to provide employment and steer the restruc- turing of industrial priorities away from the impractical Soviet

350
The Economy

emphasis on subsidized heavy industry and the military-industrial complex (MIC). Although a substantial share of Russia's

MIC enterprises underwent full or partial conversion to civilian

production and most manufacturers were partially or fully

privatized, manufacturing output continued a general decline

in the mid-1990s (see table 18, Appendix). This trend had

slowed by 1995, when the decrease in total industrial production was 4 percent compared with 1994; the 1994 total had

been 23 percent below that of 1993.

Ferrous Metallurgy

The Soviet Union's ferrous metallurgy industry was a showpiece of centralized planning of heavy industry. The fast-growing industry, vital in supplying other heavy industries with

semifinished inputs, led the world in output in the 1970s and

the 1980s. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, ferrous metallurgy did not keep pace with the demands of domestic industry

and foreign markets for more sophisticated and stronger metal

materials. Many older plants with outmoded technology

remained in full production; Soviet plans called for refitting

the industry in the 1990s, but Russia's resources have not been

sufficient for such a massive project.

In 1994 the ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical industries

accounted for about 16 percent of industrial output. In 1996

more than 80 percent of Russia's steel output came from eight

plants, although about 100 plants were in operation. Among

the industry's most important products are pipe, pig iron,

smelted steel, finished rolled metal, and shaped section steel. The four largest steel enterprises are the Novolipetsk and

Cherepovets metallurgical plants, located southeast and north

of Moscow, respectively, and the Magnitogorsk and Nizhniy

Tagil metallurgical combines, located in the Ural industrial

region. In 1995 the Cherepovets plant was re-formed as the

Severstal' (Northern Steel) Joint-Stock Company. In the mid1990s, more than half of Russia's steel production came from

the outmoded open-hearth furnace process; the more modern

continuous casting method accounted for only 24 percent of

output.

In the first half of the 1990s, the steel industry was hit especially hard by Russia's overall economic decline, which caused

domestic consumption to drop sharply; by 1996 only 50 to 60

percent of capacity was in use. Between 1991 and 1994, output

of rolled steel dropped from 55.1 million tons to 35.8 millions

351
Russia: A Country Study

tons. Foreign sales were especially important as the only source

of hard currency for some enterprises, accounting for as much

as 60 percent of output in some cases. In 1995 Russian exports

increased by 30 percent, making Russia the second largest

exporter of ferrous metals in the world. The profitability of

such sales dropped substantially between 1994 and 1996, however. Much of the steel industry's domestic business was payment in kind to input suppliers and railroads. Production costs are raised by the prices of such domestic inputs as coal and

iron ore and transportation, which averaged at or above world

levels in 1996. Another major cost to the ferrous metallurgy

sector is social support programs for workers. Those costs in

turn raise domestic metal prices above international levels. Nonferrous Metallurgy

The Noril'sk Nickel Joint-Stock Company dominates Russia's

nonferrous metallurgy industries. It controls nearly all of the

country's aluminum and nickel production and 60 percent of

copper production. The largest operations in the industry are

Noril'sk Nickel in northwestern Siberia and Bratsk Aluminum,

Krasnoyarsk Aluminum, and Sayan Aluminum in south-central

Siberia. More than 90 percent of Russia's aluminum comes

from six smelters. Some smelters have been privatized and

export their semifinished products. Inputs, especially alumina

(of which Russia has little), became much more expensive in

the mid-1990s, as did transportation and electricity costs. At the same time, export revenues fell. The Automotive Industry

In 1993 Russia's automotive industry produced 956,000 passenger automobiles, a decrease from the 1991 figure of

1,030,000 automobiles. During the Soviet period, the industry

had gained a reputation for extremely slow production of very

unreliable vehicles. In the mid-1990s, the plant rated most effi- cient, the Volga Automotive Plant (Avtovaz) at Tol'yatti,

required about thirty times as long to assemble an automobile

as the leading plants in Japan. All Russian vehicle plants operated at far below capacity, with outmoded machinery and

bloated work forces. Avtovaz, the most productive plant, operated at about 70 percent of capacity, and the Gor'kiy Automotive Plant (GAZ) in Nizhniy Novgorod was the only other major

plant operating above 30 percent in 1995. The two main truck

manufacturers, the Likhachev Automotive Plant (ZIL) in Mos352
New "American car"

dealership, Moscow

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

cow and the Kama Automotive Plant (KamAZ) in Naberezhnyye Chelny, have suffered especially from reductions in orders

by their main customers—the armed forces and collective

farms. GAZ has successfully marketed a light truck, of which it sold 75,000 in 1995, mainly to small businesses. The traditional

Soviet truck was a heavy diesel model with limited service life. Although demand for passenger automobiles has increased

substantially in Russia over the last twenty-five years, output has

not responded even in the post-Soviet period. In 1994 only

eighty-four autos were registered per 1,000 people. In the mid1990s, all automobile plants retained the Soviet style of organization, which is incapable of self-financing or effective marketing. The lack of post-Soviet government subsidies has placed

most enterprises in danger of extinction. Some Russian enterprises have proposed joint ventures with Western firms, but in

many cases the Russian partners lack funding for such ventures. Meanwhile, foreign imports further endanger the industry: in 1994 only 65,000 automobiles were imported legally, but

another 250,000 to 500,000 entered Russia illegally. Therefore,

most new cars in Russian cities are foreign. (In 1996 government vehicles were exclusively Audi, Mercedes-Benz, Saab, or

Volvo). Exports of Russian passenger cars declined in the early

1990s.

353
Russia: A Country Study

Machine Building

In the Soviet period, the machine-building industry was at the center of the industrial modernization programs that

required a steady supply of capital equipment to respond to new demands. However, the inefficient organization of industrial planning caused bottlenecks in crucial programs and generally unreliable performance. The industry is concentrated in

the European part of Russia, with major facilities in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, and the Ural industrial region.

(Russian machine building includes the automotive, construction equipment, and aviation industries as well as the tractor,

electrical equipment, instrument making, consumer appliance,

and machine industries.)

Between 1985 and 1995, production of most categories of

machines decreased significantly, mainly because of declining

domestic orders. For example, by 1992 production of metalcutting machines had dropped by 20 percent, washing

machines by 47 percent, turbines by 36 percent, and tractors by

45 percent. In 1993 production of about one-third of sixty-two

major categories of products declined by at least 50 percent. In

1995 production for the entire machine-building complex was about 4 percent below the 1994 level. Light Industry

The most important branch of light industry is cotton textiles, which has production centers in Ivanovo, Kostroma, Yaroslavl', and about two dozen smaller cities between the Volga

and Oka rivers east of Moscow. The economic slump of the

1990s had a dramatic effect on textile production and other

light industries. In 1995 Russia's light industry suffered the

sharpest drop in production of all economic sectors, slumping

by an estimated 25 to 30 percent compared with the previous

year. Prices for light-industry goods increased by an average of

2.9 times in 1995 after having increased by 5.6 times in 1994.

Unemployment in Russia's textile production centers has

been among the highest in the country. In early 1996, an esti- mated 70 percent of workers in the industry were on furlough

or working part-time. The chief cause is the Russian consumers' decline in personal income, hence in demand. In the mid1990s, consumers purchased most of their textile products at flea markets, which offered both a wider variety of merchandise and cheaper prices than most stores. By the end of 1995,

354
The Economy

orders for all types of light-industrial production were 48 percent of the average for the previous years. Production declined

by 20 percent in fabrics, 21 percent in leather shoes, and 44

percent in knitted goods, but stocks of finished products grew

because demand decreased at a faster rate. The high price of cotton also has hampered the textile

industry, which had been accustomed to paying low prices for

its raw material when the major suppliers in Central Asia were

part of the Soviet economic system. Although their cotton is not of high quality, Central Asian sellers now charge world market prices. (Cotton from the "far abroad," outside the former

Soviet Union, is even more expensive, however.) In 1996 industry experts expect some improvement because of expanding

export markets in Europe and new investment in light industry

by Russia's banks. They also expect an increase in domestic

shoe manufacturing in the 1990s because the high import

duties on foreign shoes make them twice as expensive as Russian shoes—although in 1996 some 65 percent of shoes sold in

Russia were imported. The former member countries of the

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary) were the chief source of such goods.

Chemicals

The centers of the chemical industry traditionally have been

areas where critical raw materials and allied industries were

available. Before 1960 plants were near mineral deposits,

potato farms, coking coal, and nonferrous metallurgy plants.

When oil and natural gas became prime raw materials for

chemical production, plants were built near the Volga-Ural and

North Caucasus gas and oil fields or along pipelines. In the

1980s, major plants were built at Omsk, Tobol'sk, Urengoy, and

Surgut in the western Siberia oil region and at Ufa and Nizhnekamsk in the Volga-Ural region. In the same period, the government gave strong investment and research support to chemical production because of its importance to the rest of

heavy industry.

The major divisions of the chemical industry are paints and

varnishes, rubber and asbestos products, synthetic tar and plastic products, mined chemical products, household chemicals

and washing compounds, mineral fertilizers, chemical fibers

and filaments, and paper and pulp. In the 1990s, output has

decreased in all of those areas. Among representative products,

between 1985 and the early 1990s production of mineral fertil355
Russia: A Country Study

izers dropped by 29 percent, agricultural pesticides by 74 percent, industrial carbon by 28 percent, sulfuric acid by 19

percent, synthetic tars and plastics by 16 percent, paints and

varnishes by 43 percent, household soaps by 25 percent, and

caustic soda by 15 percent.

Based on Russia's huge supply of timber, a substantial lumber-processing and pulp industry developed in the Soviet

period as a subsidiary of the chemical industry In 1996 Russia's

largest pulp and paper enterprises were at Kondopoga near the

Finnish border, Bratsk west of Lake Baikal, Syktyvkar in the

Republic of Komi, and Kotlas southeast of Arkhangelsk. Most

pulp and paper companies do not own timber resources, but

timber suppliers, who lease timberland from the state, generally sell raw materials at below world prices, giving Russian

manufacturers a competitive advantage. Some mergers have

occurred between suppliers and manufacturing operations.

In the early 1990s, production of raw timber dropped by

about 25 percent, mainly because of equipment depletion, lack

of credit, higher railroad transport fees, and a drop in construction of lumber roads. In 1993 production of raw timber was 450,000 cubic meters, 75 percent of the 1992 total; production of commercial cellulose was 79 percent of the previous

year's total; and of cardboard, 73 percent (see Environmental

Conditions, ch. 3).

Transportation and Telecommunications

As with the rest of the economy, the transportation and tele- communications infrastructures of the Russian economy con- tinue to bear the imprint of Soviet central planning. CPSU

priorities shaped those systems, and they are generally inappropriate to serve the needs of a market economy. Many analysts

contend that inferior transportation and communications constitute a major impediment to Russian economic growth.

Transportation

The transportation system during the Soviet period was

organized in the form of vertically integrated monopolies controlled by the central government. Thus, for example, the same

administrative agency owned and operated the airports, air- lines, and enterprises that manufactured aircraft. The infrastructure eroded seriously in the late Soviet period and

356


The Economy

requires much modernization and reform, for which Russia

relies heavily on foreign investment and aid. Roads

Roads were one of the least-used forms of transportation in

the Soviet Union, a characteristic that has continued in the

Russian Federation. Soviet industry placed little emphasis on

the production of automobiles and other modes of personal

transport, and the privately owned vehicle was a relatively rare phenomenon; therefore, the demand for road construction was small. The dominance of the railroads for cargo transport

also constrained the demand for the construction of roads. In

1995 Russia had 934,000 kilometers of roads, compared with

6.3 million kilometers in the United States (see fig. 10). Of Russia's total, 209,000 kilometers were unpaved, and 445,000 kilometers were not available for public use because they served

specific industries or farms.

The World Bank has estimated that in twenty years the

demands of Russia's new economy will increase the road sys- tem's share of transportation to 41 percent from its 1992 level

of 13 percent. However, in 1992 some 38 percent of Russia's

highway system required rehabilitation or reconstruction, and

another 25 percent required repaving. Many major bridges also

required large-scale repair in the mid-1990s.

Railroads

Railroads are the dominant mode of transportation. In 1995

Russia had some 154,000 kilometers of railroads, 26 percent of

which were electrified, but 67,000 kilometers of that total

served specific industries and were not available for general use

(see fig. 11). The entire system is 1.52-meter gauge. In 1993

railroads accounted for 1,608 billion ton-kilometers of cargo

traffic, compared with the 26 billion ton-kilometers provided

by trucks. The prominence of railroads is the result of several

factors: the vast distances that need to be covered; the penchant of Soviet economic planners for locating manufacturing

facilities in politically expedient areas rather than where raw

materials and other inputs were available; and the conditions

for granting state fuel subsidies, which provided no incentives

to break up cargo transportation into shorter-haul operations

that could be covered by road. Cargo traffic is the predominant

use of railroads, in contrast to the emphasis on passenger traffic in West European railroad systems (see table 19; table 20,

359
Figure 10. Major Roads, 1996

358


The Economy

requires much modernization and reform, for which Russia

relies heavily on foreign investment and aid. Roads

Roads were one of the least-used forms of transportation in

the Soviet Union, a characteristic that has continued in the

Russian Federation. Soviet industry placed little emphasis on

the production of automobiles and other modes of personal

transport, and the privately owned vehicle was a relatively rare phenomenon; therefore, the demand for road construction was small. The dominance of the railroads for cargo transport

also constrained the demand for the construction of roads. In

1995 Russia had 934,000 kilometers of roads, compared with

6.3 million kilometers in the United States (see fig. 10). Of Russia's total, 209,000 kilometers were unpaved, and 445,000 kilometers were not available for public use because they served

specific industries or farms.

The World Bank has estimated that in twenty years the

demands of Russia's new economy will increase the road sys- tem's share of transportation to 41 percent from its 1992 level

of 13 percent. However, in 1992 some 38 percent of Russia's

highway system required rehabilitation or reconstruction, and

another 25 percent required repaving. Many major bridges also

required large-scale repair in the mid-1990s.

Railroads

Railroads are the dominant mode of transportation. In 1995

Russia had some 154,000 kilometers of railroads, 26 percent of

which were electrified, but 67,000 kilometers of that total

served specific industries and were not available for general use

(see fig. 11). The entire system is 1.52-meter gauge. In 1993

railroads accounted for 1,608 billion ton-kilometers of cargo

traffic, compared with the 26 billion ton-kilometers provided

by trucks. The prominence of railroads is the result of several

factors: the vast distances that need to be covered; the penchant of Soviet economic planners for locating manufacturing

facilities in politically expedient areas rather than where raw

materials and other inputs were available; and the conditions

for granting state fuel subsidies, which provided no incentives

to break up cargo transportation into shorter-haul operations

that could be covered by road. Cargo traffic is the predominant

use of railroads, in contrast to the emphasis on passenger traffic in West European railroad systems (see table 19; table 20,

359
Russia: A Country Study

Appendix). This pattern is a product of the Soviet emphasis on

heavy industry and production rather than on consumers. In

1992 Russia's railroads accounted for 253,000 passenger-kilometers, and by 1994 the total had dropped to 227,000 passenger-kilometers.

Railroad traffic has plummeted since the beginning of Russian economic reform, reflecting a general decline in eco- nomic activity. Between 1992 and 1994, freight haulage

dropped from 1.9 million ton-kilometers to 1.2 million tonkilometers, and Russia's rolling stock and roadbeds deteriorated, mainly because of insufficient maintenance funding. In

1993 an estimated 8.5 percent of Russian rail lines were defective. As a market economy takes shape, experts forecast a smaller relative role for the railroads. The combination of fuel

and material costs, substantially higher in the absence of government subsidies, and new alternative routing will likely

prompt Russian manufacturers to find more efficient means of

transporting goods. For shorter hauls, trucks will replace rail service, and intermodal transportation will receive greater

emphasis as an outgrowth of marketization.

Air Transportation

Of the modest amount of passenger traffic in Russia, air ser- vice accounts for a relatively large portion, although the volume of traffic declined in the first half of the 1990s. In 1990 the

monopoly service of Aeroflot, the Soviet Union's state-owned

airline, accounted for 22 percent of the total distance passengers traveled, a proportion comparable with the proportion of

travel on the airlines of the United States and Canada. However, the contribution of air service to total travel had dropped

to 12.5 percent by 1993, and the number of passengers flying was less than half the 1990 total. Subsidized air fares and longdistance flights between cities accounted for much of the air

activity in the early 1990s. In 1994 Russia had a total of 2,517

airports, of which fifty-four had runways longer than 3,000

meters, 202 had runways between 2,400 and 3,000 meters, and

another 108 had runways between 1,500 and 2,400 meters.

As with the rest of the economy, air travel has declined substantially as prices have increased and travelers' incomes have

declined. The airline industry also has undergone major

adjustments in the 1990s. Aeroflot, since 1995 a joint-stock

company with majority state ownership, remains the main Russian airline. However, more than 200 regional carriers have

360


The Economy

emerged in the former Soviet Union, and most of them are in

Russia. With flights from so many carriers, direct service is now

available between regions, including direct flights from the

Russian Far East to Japan and Alaska, without the previously

obligatory stop in Moscow or St. Petersburg.

At the same time that airlines decentralized, so did reserva- tion systems and navigation control networks, making those

aspects of airline travel less efficient. Experts predict that as market forces continue to work in the sector, higher fuel costs and declining passenger demand will force mergers and bankruptcies that eventually will lead to a more efficient system.

The airline industry also must deal with an aging capital

stock. As of 1993, some 48 percent of the national system's air- craft were more than fifteen years old. To upgrade, Russian air- line services have purchased aircraft from Western firms and

demanded more modern aircraft from domestic manufacturers. Water Transportation

Maritime transportation plays an important role in Russian

transit, but the country's geography and climate limit the

capacity of shipping. Many Russian rivers run from south to north rather than from east to west, constraining their use during the Russian winters.

Russia's major ports providing access to the Baltic Sea are St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, and Novorossiysk and Sochi are the main Black Sea ports (see fig. 12). Vladivostok, Nakhodka,

Magadan, and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy account for the bulk

of maritime transportation on the Pacific coast. The largest

Arctic port, Murmansk, maintains an ice-free harbor despite its location on the northern shore of the Kola Peninsula. In 1995

Russia's merchant marine had about 800 ships with a gross ton- nage of more than 1,000, of which half are standard cargo vessels, about 100 oil tankers, and eighty container ships. Russia

also owns 235 ships that are over 1,000 tons and sail under for- eign registry. In 1991 the merchant marine carried 464 million

tons of cargo.

Navigable inland waterways extend 101,000 kilometers, of

which 16,900 kilometers are man-made and 60,400 are navigable at night. Boats of the Russian River Fleet do most of the

inland shipping, which accounted for 514 million tons of cargo

in 1991. The Russian government has made efforts to decen363
Figure 11. Major Railroads, 1996


The Economy

emerged in the former Soviet Union, and most of them are in

Russia. With flights from so many carriers, direct service is now

available between regions, including direct flights from the

Russian Far East to Japan and Alaska, without the previously

obligatory stop in Moscow or St. Petersburg.

At the same time that airlines decentralized, so did reserva- tion systems and navigation control networks, making those

aspects of airline travel less efficient. Experts predict that as market forces continue to work in the sector, higher fuel costs and declining passenger demand will force mergers and bankruptcies that eventually will lead to a more efficient system.

The airline industry also must deal with an aging capital

stock. As of 1993, some 48 percent of the national system's air- craft were more than fifteen years old. To upgrade, Russian air- line services have purchased aircraft from Western firms and

demanded more modern aircraft from domestic manufacturers. Water Transportation

Maritime transportation plays an important role in Russian

transit, but the country's geography and climate limit the

capacity of shipping. Many Russian rivers run from south to north rather than from east to west, constraining their use during the Russian winters.

Russia's major ports providing access to the Baltic Sea are St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, and Novorossiysk and Sochi are

the main Black Sea ports (see fig. 12). Vladivostok, Nakhodka,

Magadan, and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy account for the bulk

of maritime transportation on the Pacific coast. The largest

Arctic port, Murmansk, maintains an ice-free harbor despite its location on the northern shore of the Kola Peninsula. In 1995

Russia's merchant marine had about 800 ships with a gross ton- nage of more than 1,000, of which half are standard cargo vessels, about 100 oil tankers, and eighty container ships. Russia

also owns 235 ships that are over 1,000 tons and sail under for- eign registry. In 1991 the merchant marine carried 464 million

tons of cargo.

Navigable inland waterways extend 101,000 kilometers, of

which 16,900 kilometers are man-made and 60,400 are navigable at night. Boats of the Russian River Fleet do most of the

inland shipping, which accounted for 514 million tons of cargo

in 1991. The Russian government has made efforts to decen363
Russia: A Country Study

tralize control over water transportation and to separate control of liners from ports.

Pipelines

Natural gas and petroleum pipelines play a crucial role in

Russia's economy, both in distributing fuel to domestic industrial consumers and in supporting exports to Europe and countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary). Their complex network connects production

regions with virtually all of Russia's centers of population and

industry. Pipelines are especially important because of the long

distances between Siberian oil and gas fields and Russia's European industrial centers as well as countries to the west. In 1993 Russia had 48,000 kilometers of pipeline carrying

crude oil, 15,000 kilometers for petroleum products, and

140,000 kilometers for natural gas. In recent decades, the natural gas lines have expanded at a much faster rate than the

crude oil lines. The main natural gas pipeline, one of the

Soviet Union's largest international trade projects, connects

the natural gas fields of northern Siberia with most of the

countries of Western Europe. Completed in 1984, the line

passes nearly 4,000 kilometers across the Ural Mountains, the

Volga River, and many other natural obstacles to connect Russian lines with the European system.

Also completed in the early 1980s, the Northern Lights natural gas line runs from the Vuktyl field in the Republic of Komi

to Eastern Europe. The Orenburg pipeline was built in the late 1970s to bring gas from the Orenburg field in Russia and the

Karachaganak field in northern Kazakstan to Eastern Europe.

Many of Russia's major oil pipelines parallel gas lines. A

trunk oil line runs eastward from the Volga-Ural fields to Irkutsk on Lake Baikal, westward from those fields into

Ukraine and Latvia, and southwest to connect with the North

Caucasus oil fields and refineries; the line is joined by a line

from the oil center at Surgut in the West Siberian Plain.

Public Transportation

Although the high price and scarcity of passenger automobiles required Soviet citizens to rely on public transportation,

Soviet policy makers gave low priority to civilian transportation.

Only six Russian cities have underground systems—Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Novosibirsk,

and Samara. The extensive and decorative Moscow subway sys364


The Economy

tern, built in the 1930s as a showpiece of Stalinist engineering,

remains the most reliable and inexpensive means of transportation in the nation's capital.

Elsewhere, buses are the main form of public transportation. In cities, tramways supplement bus service, accounting for onethird of the passenger-kilometers that buses travel. The Russian

Federation continues the Soviet-era 70 percent state subsidy,

which keeps fares artificially low. This subsidy has been a drain

on the budget and has blunted the public's demand for alter- native modes of transportation. The system's infrastructure and

vehicle fleets require extensive repair and modernization.

Transportation Reform

In the first half of the 1990s, market forces shifted some of

the demand among the various transportation services. Russian policy makers had not prescribed the proper role of the

transportation sector in the new economy. However, officials

indicated that Russia will follow the Western model of assuming government regulation of transportation systems while

reducing state ownership of those systems.

Many state-owned transportation monopolies have been dis- solved, but some monopolies such as public transportation are expected to remain in place. The role of government will be to ensure that the systems are commercially viable and allow private systems to emerge. The government also will continue to be responsible for maintaining the quality and availability of

the road, air, and water infrastructure and for maintaining

standards of transportation safety.

Telecommunications

By various measures, Russia's telecommunications infrastructure is inferior to that of most developed industrialized countries. In 1991 only 33 percent of Russian households had

telephones, compared with 94 percent in the United States. In

1995 Russia had seventeen telephone lines per 100 inhabitants,

compared with thirty-six in Spain, forty-four in Belgium, and

sixty-nine in Switzerland.

The Soviet Period

During the Soviet period, the state controlled all means of

communications and used them primarily to convey decisions

and to facilitate the execution of government directives affect- ing the economy, national security, and administrative govern367
Figure 12. Major Maritime Ports, Airports, and Sea Routes, 1996

366


The Economy

tern, built in the 1930s as a showpiece of Stalinist engineering,

remains the most reliable and inexpensive means of transportation in the nation's capital.

Elsewhere, buses are the main form of public transportation. In cities, tramways supplement bus service, accounting for onethird of the passenger-kilometers that buses travel. The Russian

Federation continues the Soviet-era 70 percent state subsidy,

which keeps fares artificially low. This subsidy has been a drain

on the budget and has blunted the public's demand for alter- native modes of transportation. The system's infrastructure and

vehicle fleets require extensive repair and modernization.

Transportation Reform

In the first half of the 1990s, market forces shifted some of

the demand among the various transportation services. Russian policy makers had not prescribed the proper role of the

transportation sector in the new economy. However, officials

indicated that Russia will follow the Western model of assuming government regulation of transportation systems while

reducing state ownership of those systems.

Many state-owned transportation monopolies have been dis- solved, but some monopolies such as public transportation are expected to remain in place. The role of government will be to ensure that the systems are commercially viable and allow private systems to emerge. The government also will continue to be responsible for maintaining the quality and availability of

the road, air, and water infrastructure and for maintaining

standards of transportation safety.

Telecommunications

By various measures, Russia's telecommunications infrastructure is inferior to that of most developed industrialized countries. In 1991 only 33 percent of Russian households had

telephones, compared with 94 percent in the United States. In 1995 Russia had seventeen telephone lines per 100 inhabitants,

compared with thirty-six in Spain, forty-four in Belgium, and

sixty-nine in Switzerland.

The Soviet Period

During the Soviet period, the state controlled all means of

communications and used them primarily to convey decisions

and to facilitate the execution of government directives affect- ing the economy, national security, and administrative govern367
Russia: A Country Study

mental functions. The Ministry of Communications had

responsibility for most nonmilitary communications, and the

Ministry of Defense controlled military communications.

Other ministries, including the Ministry of Culture, controlled

specialized elements of the communications infrastructure.

Moscow maintained control over communications, and

regional and local jurisdictions enjoyed little autonomy. This

centralization forced the Soviet Union to acquire the means to deliver signals over a vast area and provided the impetus for the

development of satellite communications, which began with

the launching of the Molniya satellite communications system

in 1965. Despite the success of the satellite system, Soviet technology was unable to meet the rapidly growing informational

demands of the 1980s. In that period, the Soviet government

began to import digital switching equipment from the West in an effort to modernize the national telephone system. The priority given to military and government applications skewed the

distribution of new equipment, and officials dedicated relatively few telephone lines and communications facilities to commercial and residential use. In addition, most communications facilities remained concentrated in a few urban areas at the expense of smaller cities and rural regions.

Telecommunications in the 1990s

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has been

engaged in the reorganization and modernization of its communications systems. In this process, control over communications has been decentralized and in large part privatized. In

domestic telephone and related communications, control

devolved to regional and local enterprises, which were then

reorganized into joint-stock companies. Long-distance and

international service operations were grouped together into a new organization, Russian Telecommunications (Rostelekom), which itself became a joint-stock company. The federal

government has retained control over the national satellite sys- tem, telecommunications research and development, and education systems through the Ministry of Communications.

Despite ownership changes, in 1995 only about 14 percent of

Russia's 24.4 million telephones were located outside urban

areas, the waiting list for telephone installation included more

than 10 million names, and only 34,100 pay telephones were

available for long-distance calls.

368
Hydrofoil on Don River, Rostov-na-Donu

CourtesyJim Howland

By mid-1994 the Russian telephone communications system

had been privatized through the voucher program. Employees

of the reorganized companies received about 25 percent of

company stock, the government retained some shares, and the

remainder were sold at public auction. Telecommunications

stocks reportedly have been among the most coveted items on

the fledgling Russian stock market. Domestic and foreign

investors have been especially attracted to stocks in major

regional telephone enterprises such as the Moscow and St. Petersburg telephone systems and Rostelekom. But the state has not relinquished its remaining telecommunications shares,

showing reluctance to cede full control to the private sector. Development of the telecommunications infrastructure

depends heavily on foreign funding and joint ventures. The

Ministry of Communications expected foreign investment in

telecommunications to increase by 24 percent in 1996 over

1995, matching domestic investment of US$520 million. In the

mid-1990s, state subsidies continue to fall. According to West- ern experts, that investment level is far below the amount

needed over a prolonged period to modernize Russian lines or even to upgrade existing equipment. However, Russia faces stiff

369
Russia: A Country Study

competition for foreign capital because Western andJapanese

companies already have made substantial commitments to tele- communications modernization and privatization projects in a number of other countries.

Russia's goals for 1996 were the laying of 1,815 kilometers of

cable and the installation of 9,500 kilometers of wireless lines,

5,000 long-distance exchanges, and 1.5 million new private

telephone lines in urban and rural areas. The latter addition

would bring the national total to 26 million lines. The regulatory framework for telecommunications in Russia

remains weak, but it is maturing. The Law on Communications, enacted in 1995, is the chief statute, but the lines of regulatory authority have not been clearly defined. The Ministry of

Communications is the chief regulatory agency for "civilian"

communications, but military and national security authorities

control their own communications networks outside the purview of the Law on Communications.

As Russia's telecommunications systems develop, the regulatory issues facing the Ministry of Communications include fre- quency assignments, standardization of equipment, levels of

competition, and establishment of optimal user rates. The military and internal security agencies traditionally have had priority use of most wireless frequencies, but the newer and

expanding commercial and individual users require more

access to frequencies. Standardization is needed so that older

equipment can operate with the new models on expanded sys- tems. A uniform policy is needed for regulation of telecommunications competition, which varied in the early post-Soviet

years. And the Ministry of Communications has not yet established telephone rates that are affordable to the users but provide enough profit for the company to operate and expand.

The government has promoted competition in some sectors. An example is the licensing of a number of companies to provide specialized, dedicated service networks. For cellular tele- phone lines, the government has encouraged competition in

densely populated areas, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg,

while developing single provider systems for small areas where

demand is limited. For long-distance service, in the mid-1990s

Rostelekom competed with local telephone companies for rev- enues in the potentially lucrative area of interzonal communications. In addition, Rostelekom is facing competition from

newer companies that are able to provide long-distance service

through their own cables and via satellite. Under these condi370
The Economy

tions, the shape and size of the Russian telephone system is changing rapidly and responding to the demands of the market.Experts estimate that Russia must expand its telephone net- works from around 24 million telephones to between 75 million and 80 million and provide the modern switching

equipment with which they can operate. They further expect

that Russia will require an investment of US$150 billion to bring its telephone system up to modern standards. Russia has

imported Western equipment in the modernization effort, but

this strategy has proved very costly. The Russian equipment

industry is trying to revive itself and develop indigenous technology to fulfill its needs.

Foreign investors could be an important source of capital

and technology in the Russian telecommunications sector, but

in the mid-1990s Russian laws and regulations limited foreign

participation to the supply of equipment and services that

would not hurt domestic producers. The Law on Communications gives preference to domestically produced equipment,

with the major exception of cellular phone production, where

officials have welcomed foreign participation. Domestic tele- phone services are the domain of Russian companies, but for- eign companies have established a presence in domestic and

international long-distance service.

Russian radio and television are undergoing similar changes

(see The Broadcast Media, ch. 7). The programming facilities and transmission operations are separate, as they were in the

Soviet system when the central government controlled all of

these facilities. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian

radio and television programming operations were decentralized at the regional and local levels. In the mid-1990s, three major countrywide state-owned programming companies provide most programming for the

country. They are Russian Public Television (Obshchestvennoye rossiyskoye televideniye—ORT), Russian State Television,

and St. Petersburg Television, which primarily serves the St. Petersburg metropolitan area. In 1995 Russian State Television was partially privatized when 49 percent of its shares were sold

to private companies, but the company remains under state control.

The privatization process moved large blocks of shares into

the hands of banks and powerful entrepreneurs, who formed

communications and newspaper empires and used close con371
Russia: A Country Study

nections in the Government to lobby for the release of additional state shares in the broadcasting enterprises. In 1996 the

two most powerful broadcast entrepreneurs were former

banker Vladimir Gusinskiy, head of the Media-Most holding

company including the Independent Television (Nezavisimoye

televideniye—NTV) network and several prominent periodicals, and Boris Berezovskiy, an automobile entrepreneur whose

organization, Logovaz, now controls ORT as well as banking,

oil, aviation, and print media enterprises.

Privately owned and operated, independent programming

companies are playing a growing role in Russian radio and tele- vision programming. As of 1995, some 800 companies were in

existence. In 1996 the largest private television channels are TV-6, which reaches sixty cities in Russia and elsewhere with a potential audience of 600 million viewers, and NTV, which

serves European Russia and has a potential audience of 100

million viewers. Both companies were founded in 1993.

Transmission facilities are state-owned, and programmers

must pay fees to the transmission companies to have their

material broadcast. The fee establishment mechanism remains an issue in Russian telecommunications policy. Control over

transmission gives the government powerful leverage over the

content of broadcasts. In 1996 independent companies were

considering cable and direct satellite television services to get

into the state-dominated market as transmission providers. In

1992 some 48.5 million radios and 54.9 million televisions were

in use. Because the Law on Communications does not address the

question of airtime allocation, policy makers also must grapple

with that issue. Subsidies for radio and television broadcasters,

including state-owned operations, have been reduced drastically in the first half of the 1990s, meaning that programmers

must rely on advertising revenues. Foreign Economic Relations

Integrating the Russian economy with the rest of the world

through commerce and expanded foreign investment has been

a high priority of Russian economic reform. Russia has joined

the IMF and the World Bank and has applied to join the World

Trade Organization (WTO—see Glossary) and the OECD. It also has been included in some functions of the Group of

Seven (G-7; see Glossary).

372
Sellers from Mongolia at outdoor market, Khabarovsk

Courtesy Floyd Reichman

Foreign Trade

By the end of 1993, the Russian government had liberalized

much of its import regime. It eliminated nontariff customs barriers on most imports, although it still requires some licenses

for health and safety reasons. In mid-1992 the government

took control of imports of some critical goods, including industrial equipment and food items, which it sold to end users at subsidized prices. In the early 1990s, government-controlled

imports constituted about 40 percent of total Russian imports,

but by 1996 most such controls had been phased out. Russia also established a two-column tariff regime in harmony with the United States and other members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which in January

1995 became the WTO. Russia differentiates between those

trade partners that receive most-favored-nation trade treatment

and, therefore, relatively low tariffs, and those that do not. Although Russia has eliminated many nontariff import barriers, it still maintains high tariffs and other duties on imports of

goods to raise revenue and protect domestic producers. All

imports are subject to a 3 percent special tax in addition to import tariffs that vary with the category of goods. Some of the

373
Russia: A Country Study

high tariffs include those of 40 to 50 percent on automobiles

and aircraft and 100 percent on alcoholic beverages. Excise

taxes ranging between 35 and 250 percent are applied to cer- tain luxury goods that include automobiles, jewelry, alcohol,

and cigarettes.

The Government has used licensing and quotas to restrict

the export of certain key commodities, such as oil and oil products, to ease the effect of price differentials between controlled

domestic prices and world market prices. Without such restric- tions, Russian policy makers have argued, the domestic market

would experience shortages of critical materials. The government finally eliminated quotas on oil exports in 1995 and

export taxes on oil in 1996. In addition to customs restrictions,

the government imposes other costs on exporters. It charges a 20 percent VAT on most cash-transaction exports and a 30 percent VAT on barter transactions. It applies additional tariffs on

the exports of industrial raw materials. By the mid-1990s, much

of Russia's foreign trade, even that with the former communist

countries of Central Europe, was conducted on the basis of

market-determined prices. Immediately after the dissolution of

the Soviet-dominated Comecon in 1991, the Soviet Union

sought to maintain commercial relations in Central Europe

through bilateral agreements. But as market economies developed in those countries, their governments lost control over

trade flows. Since 1993 Russian trade with former Comecon

member countries has been at world prices and in hard currencies.In the mid-1990s, Russia still maintained hybrid trade

regimes with the other former Soviet states, reflecting the web

of economic interdependence that had dominated commercial

relations within the Soviet Union. The sharp decrease in central economic control that occurred just before and after the

breakup of the Soviet Union virtually destroyed distribution

channels between suppliers and producers and between producers and consumers throughout the region. Many of the

non-Russian republics were dependent on Russian oil and nat- ural gas, timber, and other raw materials. Russia bought food

and other consumer goods from some of the other Soviet

republics. To ease the effects of the transition, Russia con- cluded bilateral agreements with the other former Soviet states to maintain the flow of goods. But, as in the case of the Central

European agreements, such arrangements proved impractical;

by the mid-1990s, they covered only a small range of goods.

374
The Economy

Russia now conducts trade with former Soviet states under vari- ous regimes, including free-trade arrangements and mostfavored-nation trading status. The volume of Russia's foreign trade has generally declined

since the beginning of the economic transition. Trade volume

peaked in 1990 and then declined sharply in 1991 and 1992.

Between 1992 and 1995, however, exports rose from US$39.7

billion to US$77.8 billion, and imports rose from US$34.7 bil- lion to US$57.9 billion. Many factors contributed to the

decline of the early 1990s: the collapse of Comecon and trade

relations with Eastern/Central Europe; the rapid decline of the

domestic demand for imports; contraction in foreign currency

reserves; a decline in the real exchange value of the ruble; the

Government's imposition of high tariffs, VATs, and excess taxes on imports; and the reduction of state subsidies on some key

imports. Russia's declining production of crude oil, a key

export, also has contributed significantly. Until 1994 Russia's arms exports declined sharply because the military-industrial

complex's production fell and international sanctions were

placed on large-scale customers such as Iraq and Libya (see

Foreign Arms Sales, ch. 9)

.

The geographical distribution of Russian foreign trade

changed radically in the first half of the 1990s (see table 21;

table 22, Appendix). In 1985 some 55 percent of Soviet exports

and 54 percent of Soviet imports were with the Comecon countries. By contrast, 26 percent of Soviet exports and 28 percent

of Soviet imports were with the fully developed market economies of Western Europe, Japan, the United States, and Canada.

By the end of 1991, Russia and its former allies of Central

Europe were actively seeking new markets. In 1991 only 23 percent of Russian exports and 24 percent of Russian imports were

with the former Comecon member states. In 1994 some 2V percent of Russian imports and 22 percent of exports involved

partners from Central Europe, with Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic generating the largest volume in both directions. Western Europe's share of Russian trade continued to grow, and in 1994 some 35 percent of Russia's imports and 36

percent of its exports were with countries in that region. Germany was by far the West European leader in exports and

imports, and Switzerland and Britain were other large export

customers. In 1994 the United States accounted for US$2.1 bil- lion (5.3 percent) of imports and US$3.7 billion (5.9 percent)

of exports; however, United States purchases of Russian goods

375
Russia: A Country Study

had increased by more than 500 percent between 1992 and

1994. The total value of trade with the United States in 1995

was US$7 billion; trade for the first half of 1996 proceeded at

virtually the same rate (see table 23, Appendix).

Russian trade with the so-called near abroad—the other

former Soviet states—has greatly deteriorated. This trend

began before the final collapse of the Soviet Union as Russian

producers sought hard-currency markets for raw materials and

other exportables. As Russia raised fuel prices closer to world

market levels, the other republics found it increasingly difficult to pay for Russian oil and natural gas. The RCB extended credits to these countries to permit some shipments, but eventually

the accumulation of large arrearages forced the Russian government to curtail shipments. At the end of 1995, Russian

trade with the near abroad accounted for 17 percent of total

Russian trade, down from 59 percent in 1991. Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine remained Russia's largest partners, as they

had been in the Soviet era. The failure to restore inter-republic

trade was an important factor in the economic collapse that

gripped the region around 1990.

Raw materials, especially oil, natural gas, metals, and minerals, have dominated Russia's exports, accounting for 65 percent

of total exports in 1993. Exports as a whole are heavily concentrated in a few product categories. In 1995 ten commodities, all of which are raw materials, accounted for 70 percent of Russian

exports. By contrast, for the United States the top ten export

commodities account for only 37 percent of its exports.

The lack of diversity in Russian exports is a legacy of the

Soviet period, when the central planning regime called for production of manufactured goods for domestic consumption

with little consideration for the export market. Given this priority, most of the Soviet Union's consumer goods were of low

quality by world standards. Post-Soviet concentration of Russian exportables in a few categories restricts Russia's potential sources of foreign currency to a few markets. And the frequent

price fluctuations typical of world raw materials markets also

make Russia's export revenues vulnerable to unforeseen

change.

Manufactured goods dominate Russian imports, accounting

for 68 percent of total imports in 1992. The largest categories

of imported manufactured goods are machinery and equipment (29 percent of the total); foods, 16 percent; and textiles

and shoes, 13 percent.

376
The Economy

Foreign Investment

Foreign investment is the second major element of Russia's

reform strategy to strengthen international economic links.

From the late 1920s to the late 1980s, the Soviet government

prohibited foreign investment because it would have undermined the state's decision-making prerogatives on investment,

production, and consumption.

The perestroika economic reforms of the late 1980s permitted

limited foreign investment in the Soviet Union in the form of

joint ventures. The first joint-venture law, which went into

effect in June 1987, restricted foreign ownership to 49 percent

of the venture and required that Soviet administrators fill the

positions of chairman and general manager. By 1991, however,

the Soviet government allowed foreign entities 100 percent

ownership of subsidiaries in Russia.

Although limited in scope, the joint-venture law did open

the door to direct foreign investment in the Soviet Union,

which provided Russia's economy wider access to Western capital, technology, and management know-how. But the overall

limitations of perestroika hampered the joint-venture program.

The nonconvertibility of the Russian ruble was an impediment

to repatriation of profits by foreign investors, private property was not recognized, government price controls remained in

effect, and most of the Soviet economy remained under state control.

The Yeltsin government's commitment to foreign investment has been hampered in some cases by Russia's ongoing

debates about the appropriate relationship with the West and

about the amount of assistance that Russia should accept from

the capitalist countries. Substantial political factions view the

infusion of foreign capital as a device for Western governments

to intrude on Russia's sovereignty and manipulate its economic

condition, and they advocate a more independent course. The Foreign Investment Law of 1991 provides the statutory

foundation for the treatment of foreign investment. The law

provides for "national treatment" of foreign investments; that

is, foreign investors and investments are to be treated no less favorably than domestically based investments. The law also

permits foreign investment in most sectors of the Russian econ- omy and in all the forms available in the Russian economy:

portfolios of government securities, stocks, and bonds, and

direct investment in new businesses, in the acquisition of exist- ing Russian-owned enterprises, in joint ventures, in property

377
Russia: A Country Study

acquisition, and in leasing the rights to natural resources. Foreign investors are protected against nationalization or expropriation unless the government declares that such a procedure

is necessary in the public interest. In such cases, foreign investors are to receive just compensation.

In response to demands by foreign oil investors for stronger

legal guarantees before making large capital commitments, in

July 1995 the State Duma passed the Law on Oil and Gas. It provides a basic framework for other laws and regulations pertaining to exploration, production, transportation, and security of oil and gas. In late 1995, the Duma passed the

Production-Sharing Agreement bill, which provides for foreign

investors to share output with domestic partners. Among other

things, the bill lifts many of the financial impediments by

removing excise and customs duties on the exportation of oil byjoint ventures, and it requires contract sanctity for the life of

the project. But in a clause that drew criticism from the United

States business community, the bill requires State Duma

approval of new joint-venture agreements on a case-by-case

basis. As of mid-1996, the United States Department of Commerce considered the Duma's veto power over such agreements a key obstacle to expanded United States investment in

Russia.

By the end of 1995, foreign investment in Russia since 1991

had totaled an estimated US$6 billion, a small amount considering the size of the Russian economy. Of that amount, US$3.2

billion had been invested between 1991 and 1993 and US$1 bil- lion in 1994. Of the approximately US$2 billion invested in

1995, about 28 percent came from the United States, 13 percent from Germany, 9 percent from Switzerland, and 6 percent

from Belgium. By sector, 15 percent of 1995 investments went

to trade and catering; 13 percent to finance, insurance, and

pensions; 10 percent to the fuel industries; and 8 percent to chemical industries. Telecommunications, food processing and

agriculture, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, and

housing are in particular need of additional foreign investment.

Russia's overall investment climate has not been robust

because of high inflation, a plunging GDP, an unstable

exchange rate, an uncertain legal and political environment,

and the capricious enactment and implementation of tax and

regulatory regimes. Nevertheless, experts predict that improve378
The Economy

ment in those conditions will bring a strong increase in foreign

activity.

Foreign Debt

Russia inherited a large foreign debt burden from the Soviet

Union that clouds its economic situation. Throughout its history, the Soviet Union was a conservative borrower of foreign

credits. Its ability to manage international accounts allowed the

Soviet Union to obtain both government-guaranteed and commercial credits on favorable terms. But, by the end of the

1980s, the Soviet hard-currency debt had increased appreciably. At the end of 1991, the debt was estimated at US$65 billion, an increase of over 100 percent since the end of 1986.

By arrangement with the other former Soviet states and its creditors, Russia accepted responsibility for repayment of the

Soviet Union's entire debt, in exchange for control of some of

the overseas assets of the other republics. In January 1996, Russia's total foreign debt was US$120.4 billion, including US$103

billion of the Soviet Union's debt that Russia assumed. Russia

has been hard pressed to service that amount.

In March 1996, the IMF approved a three-year loan of

US$10.1 billion to Russia. At that point, Russia already had

US$10.8 billion in outstanding IMF debts. The first loan payment of US$340 million was paid almost immediately, and it helped Russia to overcome a large budget deficit that it had

been trying to cover by issuing securities. The IMF made the

early monthly payments of the loan during Russia's 1996 presidential election campaign, despite Russia's failure to comply

with several loan requirements. However, once Yeltsin had

been reelected, the IMF withheld the July payment because

Russia's hard-currency reserves had been severely depleted

during the campaign and the tax collection system remained

unsatisfactory.

In April 1996, the Paris Club of seventeen lending nations

agreed to the largest debt rescheduling procedure in the his- tory of the organization by postponing US$40 billion of Russian debt in order to assist Russia in meeting its international

debt payments. The agreement followed the November 1995

provisional accord with the London Club of international commercial bank lenders (which spread repayment of US$32.5 bil- lion over a twenty-five-year period) and the IMF loan of

US$10.1 billion in March 1996. The new schedule gave Russia a

six-year grace period for repayment on the principal it owes.

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Russia: A Country Study

The Economic Outlook

In the first half-decade after the end of the Soviet Union,

Russia made significant strides in restructuring its economy

and providing an environment for the operation of market

forces rather than state control as the fundamental principle of

the economic system. By 1995 more than half of the recorded

GDP came from the private sector, with considerable unre- ported private activity also contributing to the vitality of the

economy. Almost all prices are now market determined. Most

of Russia's state enterprises have been placed under some

degree of private control, although many continue to operate

in much the same way as before privatization. By making the

ruble convertible in foreign trade and other current-account

transactions, Russia has accelerated the integration of its econ- omy with those of the rest of the world.

These strides have come at a cost, however. The Russian

economy has endured a severe contraction that experts predict

will not end before late 1996 or 1997. Many Russians are experiencing the new and disillusioning phenomenon of unemployment as the growing private sector slowly absorbs an

increasingly large labor pool jettisoned in the restructuring of

the state sector. Many, particularly those of middle age, are finding it difficult to adjust to the loss of the cradle-to-grave

social safety net of the Soviet system. The gap between Russia's

"haves" and "have-nots," which is determined by the possession

of skills, audacity, and connections needed to be successful

under the new economic system, widened alarmingly in the

mid-1990s.

Despite major problems, Russia is not likely to turn back the

clock on economic reform, although periodic slowdowns are

likely to recur. Western experts consider the results of the

June-July 1996 presidential elections an encouraging sign that

the government will not leave the path of conversion upon

which Yeltsin embarked in 1990. But Russia's market economy

remains partially formed, with some parts far advanced and

others lagging behind. Critical, unfilled needs include the fol- lowing: substantial improvement in the taxation system, which

is poorly enforced and fails to encourage private initiative or

foreign investment; a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal

set of commercial laws to establish consistent business conditions; continued reform of the banking system, including

removal of corrupt elements and ineffectual commercial

banks; continuation of meaningful privatization, including

380
The Economy

reform of voucher distribution, expansion of the entrepreneurial class, and restoration of public confidence in privatization

as more than redistribution of wealth among the entrepreneurial elite; continued government spending discipline (something forsaken completely during Yeltsin's 1996 campaign) to keep exchange rates, budget deficits, and inflation under control; establishment of agencies to promote trade and distribute

information; and wage reform to ensure timely payment and

gradually relieve the intense social pressure caused by the

increase of the have-not part of Russia's population.

Yeltsin's appointment of reform economist Anatoliy Ghubays

as his chief of staff in July 1996 was a signal that the advocates

of strong reform might overcome the factions that had blocked

or weakened reform legislation in the State Duma. But political

battles will continue over the speed and wisdom of market-oriented reform because strong vested interests continue to advocate state control of remaining economic assets, or even

reassumption of state control of privatized assets. As the first five years have demonstrated, the road to economic reform in

Russia is not straight or short, but, given continued outside

assistance and political stability, the chances of further progress seem reasonably good.

* * * A number of recent studies provide in-depth coverage of var- ious aspects of the Russian economy. The PlanEcon series

Review and Outlookfor the Former Soviet Republics offers short summaries of most aspects of the economy, with forecasts of trends

for the near future. The Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly Country Report: Russia analyzes key economic indicators

against the background of political and international conditions, with statistical information. The Congressional Research

Service of the Library of Congress and the World Bank have

issued series of useful studies on individual aspects of the econ- omy and the reform program, with the latter concentrating on

conditions for investment and business activity. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

offers its 1995 economic survey on the Russian Federation, a

detailed analysis of the entire domestic economic structure and

its supporting elements. Energy Policies of the Russian Federation:

1995 Survey, from the OECD's International Energy Agency,

analyzes the status and potential of Russia's energy sector.

381
Russia: A Country Study

Anders Aslund's How Russia Became a Market Economy describes

the reform process from the 1980s through 1995. The World

Bank's Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR provides indicative statistics on various economic categories. The

Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: Central

Eurasia includes periodic economic reviews devoted to statisti- cal and textual analysis of economic trends in Russia and else- where in the CIS. Russian Federation: Report on the National

Accounts is an in-depth 1995 report on Russia's financial status by a team from the World Bank and Russia's State Committee

for Statistics (Gosudarstvennyy komitet po statistike). (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

382
Chapter 7. Government and Politics
Lyudmila, a captive of the evil dwarf Chernomor, walks in the dwarfs beauti- ful garden while awaiting rescue (designfrom lacquer box made in village of

Kholuy).
SINCE GAINING ITS INDEPENDENCE with the collapse of

the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Russia (formally, the Russian Federation) has faced serious challenges in its efforts to forge a political system to follow nearly seventy-five years of

centralized, totalitarian rule. For instance, leading figures in

the legislative and executive branches have put forth opposing

views of Russia's political direction and the governmental

instruments that should be used to follow it. That conflict

reached a climax in September and October 1993, when President Boris N. Yeltsin used military force to dissolve the parliament and called for new legislative elections. This event

marked the end of Russia's first constitutional period, which

was defined by the much-amended constitution adopted by the

Russian Republic in 1978. A new constitution, creating a strong

presidency, was approved by referendum in December 1993.

With a new constitution and a new parliament representing

diverse parties and factions, Russia's political structure subsequently showed signs of stabilization. However, since that time

Russians have continued to debate the future of their political

system, with Western-style democracy and authoritarianism

being two widely considered alternatives. As the transition

period extended into the mid-1990s, the power of the national

government continued to wane as Russia's regions gained political and economic concessions from Moscow. Although the

struggle between the executive and the legislative branches was

partially resolved by the new constitution, the two branches

continued to represent fundamentally opposing visions of Russia's future. The executive was the center of reform, and the

lower house of the parliament, the State Duma, was a bastion of

antireform communists and nationalists.

Historical Background

The Soviet Union formally came into being under the treaty

of union in December 1922, which was signed by Russia and

three other union republics—Belorussia (now Belarus),

Ukraine, and what was then the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (an entity including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). Under the treaty, Russia became known

officially as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

385
Russia: A Country Study

(RSFSR). The treaty of union was incorporated into the first Soviet constitution, which was promulgated in 1924. Nominally, the borders of each subunit were drawn to incorporate

the territory of a specific nationality. The constitution endowed

the new republics with sovereignty, although they were said to have voluntarily delegated most of their sovereign powers to the Soviet center. Formal sovereignty was evidenced by the

existence of flags, constitutions, and other state symbols, and

by the republics' constitutionally guaranteed "right" to secede

from the union. Russia was the largest of the union republics in

terms of territory and population. Ethnic Russians dominated

Soviet politics and government; they also controlled local

administration.

Because of the Russians' dominance in the affairs of the

union, the RSFSR failed to develop some of the institutions of

governance and administration that were typical of public life in the other republics: a republic-level communist party, a Russian academy of sciences, and Russian branches of trade

unions, for example. As the titular nationalities of the other

fourteen union republics began to call for greater republic

rights in the late 1980s, however, ethnic Russians also began to demand the creation or strengthening of various specifically

Russian institutions in the RSFSR. Certain policies of Soviet

leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in office 1985-91) also encour- aged nationalities in the union republics, including the Russian Republic, to assert their rights. These policies included

glasnost (literally, public voicing—see Glossary), which made

possible open discussion of democratic reforms and longignored public problems such as pollution. Glasnost also

brought constitutional reforms that led to the election of new

republic legislatures with substantial blocs of pro-reform representatives.

In Russia a new legislature, called the Congress of People's

Deputies, was elected in March 1990 in a largely free and competitive vote. Upon convening in May, the congress elected

Boris N. Yeltsin, a onetime Gorbachev protege who had been

exiled from the top party echelon because of his radical reform

proposals, as president of the congress's permanent working

body, the Supreme Soviet. The next month, the congress

declared Russia's sovereignty over its natural resources and the

primacy of Russia's laws over those of the central Soviet government. During 1990-91, the RSFSR enhanced its sovereignty by

establishing republic branches of organizations such as the

386
Government and Politics

communist party, the Academy of Sciences (see Glossary) of

the Soviet Union, radio and television broadcasting facilities,

and the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti—KGB; see Glossary). In 1991 Russia created

a new executive office, the presidency, following the example

of Gorbachev, who had created such an office for himself in

1990. Russia held a popular election that conferred legitimacy

on the office, whereas Gorbachev had eschewed such an election and had himself appointed by the Soviet parliament.

Despite Gorbachev's attempts to discourage Russia's electorate

from voting for him, Yeltsin was popularly elected as president

in June 1991, handily defeating five other candidates with

more than 57 percent of the vote. Yeltsin used his role as president to trumpet Russian sover- eignty and patriotism, and his legitimacy as president was a major cause of the collapse of the coup by hard-line government and party officials against Gorbachev in August 1991. The

coup leaders had attempted to overthrow Gorbachev in order

to halt his plan to sign a confederation treaty that they believed

would wreck the Soviet Union. Yeltsin defiantly opposed the

coup plotters and called for Gorbachev's restoration, rallying

the Russian public. Most important, Yeltsin's opposition led ele- ments in the "power ministries" that controlled the military,

the police, and the KGB to refuse to obey the orders of the

coup plotters. The opposition led by Yeltsin, combined with

the irresolution of the plotters, caused the coup to collapse

after three days.

Following the failed coup, Gorbachev found a fundamentally changed constellation of power, with Yeltsin in de facto

control of much of a sometimes recalcitrant Soviet administrative apparatus. Although Gorbachev returned to his position as Soviet president, events began to bypass him. Communist party

activities were suspended. Most of the union republics quickly

declared their independence, although many appeared willing to sign Gorbachev's vaguely delineated confederation treaty.

The Baltic states achieved full independence, and they quickly

received diplomatic recognition from many nations. Gorbachev's rump government recognized the independence of

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in August and September 1991.

In late 1991, the Yeltsin government assumed budgetary

control over Gorbachev's rump government. Russia did not

declare its independence, and Yeltsin continued to hope that

some form of confederation could be established. In Decem387
Russia: A Country Study

ber, one week after the Ukrainian Republic approved independence by referendum, Yeltsin and the leaders of Ukraine and

Belarus met to form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary). In response to calls by the Central Asian

and other union republics for admission, another meeting was

held in Alma-Ata, on December 21, to form an expanded CIS.

At that meeting, all parties declared that the 1922 treaty of

union creating the Soviet Union was annulled and that the

Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Gorbachev announced the

decision officially December 25. Russia gained international

recognition as the principal successor to the Soviet Union,

receiving the Soviet Union's permanent seat on the United

Nations Security Council and positions in other international

and regional organizations. The CIS states also agreed that

Russia initially would take over Soviet embassies and other

properties abroad.

In October 1991, during the "honeymoon" period after his

resistance to the Soviet coup, Yeltsin convinced the legislature to grant him important special executive powers for one year

so that he might implement his economic reforms. In November 1991, he appointed a new government, with himself as act- ing prime minister, a post he held until the appointment of

Yegor Gaydar as acting prime minister in June 1992.

During 1992 Yeltsin and his reforms came under increasing

attack by former communist party members and officials,

extreme nationalists, and others calling for reform to be

slowed or halted in Russia. A locus of this opposition was

increasingly the bicameral parliament, whose upper house was

the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and lower house the

Supreme Soviet. The lower house was headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, who became Yeltsin's most vocal opponent. Under the

1978 constitution, the parliament was the supreme organ of

power in Russia. After Russia added the office of president in

1991, the division of powers between the two branches was

ambiguous.

Although Yeltsin managed to beat back most challenges to his reform program when the CPD met in April 1992, in

December he suffered a significant loss of his special executive

powers. The CPD ordered him to halt appointments of administrators in the localities and also the practice of naming additional local oversight emissaries (termed "presidential

representatives"). Yeltsin also lost the power to issue special

decrees concerning the economy, while retaining his constitu388
Placard ofMikhail Gorbachev

as Nazi at procommunist rally, Moscow, 1991

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

tional power to issue decrees in accordance with existing laws. When his attempt to secure confirmation of Gaydar as prime

minister was rejected, Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin,

whom the parliament approved because he was viewed as more

economically conservative than Gaydar. After contentious

negotiations between the parliament and Yeltsin, the two sides

agreed to hold a national referendum to allow the population

to determine the basic division of powers between the two

branches of government. In the meantime, proposals for

extreme limitation of Yeltsin's power were tabled.

However, early 1993 saw increasing tension between Yeltsin

and the parliament over the language of the referendum and

power sharing. In mid-March 1993, an emergency session of

the CPD rejected Yeltsin's proposals on power sharing and can- celed the referendum, again opening the door to legislation

that would shift the balance of power away from the president.

Faced with these setbacks, Yeltsin addressed the nation directly

to announce a "special regime," under which he would assume

extraordinary executive power pending the results of a referendum on the timing of new legislative elections, on a new constitution, and on public confidence in the president and vice

president. After the Constitutional Court declared his

389
Russia: A Country Study

announcement unconstitutional, Yeltsin backed down (see The

Judiciary, this ch.).

Despite Yeltsin's change of heart, a second extraordinary ses- sion of the CPD took up discussion of emergency measures to defend the constitution, including impeachment of the president. Although the impeachment vote failed, the CPD set new

terms for a popular referendum. The legislature's version of

the referendum asked whether citizens had confidence in

Yeltsin, approved of his reforms, and supported early presidential and legislative elections. Under the CPD's terms, Yeltsin

would need the support of 50 percent of eligible voters, rather

than 50 percent of those actually voting, to avoid an early presidential election. In the vote on April 25, Russians failed to provide this level of approval, but a majority of voters approved

Yeltsin's policies and called for new legislative elections. Yeltsin

termed the results, which were a serious blow to the prestige of

the parliament, a mandate for him to continue in power.

In June 1993, Yeltsin decreed the creation of a special constitutional convention to examine the draft constitution that he

had presented in April. This convention was designed to cir- cumvent the parliament, which was working on its own draft

constitution. As expected, the two main drafts contained contrary views of legislative-executive relations. The convention,

which included delegates from major political and social organizations and the eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions,

approved a compromise draft constitution in July 1993, incorporating some aspects of the parliament's draft. The parliament failed to approve the draft, however.

In late September 1993, Yeltsin responded to the impasse in

legislative-executive relations by repeating his announcement

of a constitutional referendum, but this time he followed the

announcement by dissolving the parliament and announcing

new legislative elections for December. The CPD again met in

emergency session, confirmed Vice President Aleksandr

Rutskoy as president, and voted to impeach Yeltsin. On September 27, military units surrounded the legislative building

(popularly known as the White House), but 180 delegates

refused to leave the building. After a two-week standoff,

Rutskoy urged supporters outside the legislative building to overcome Yeltsin's military forces. Firefights and destruction of

properly resulted at several locations in Moscow. The next day,

under the direction of Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev,

tanks fired on the White House, and military forces occupied

390
Government and Politics

the building and the rest of the city. This open, violent confrontation remained a backdrop to Yeltsin's relations with the

legislative branch for the next three years. The Constitution and Government Structure

During 1992-93 Yeltsin had argued that the existing, heavily

amended 1978 constitution of Russia was obsolete and self-contradictory and that Russia required a new constitution granting

the president greater power. This assertion led to the submission and advocacy of rival constitutional drafts drawn up by the

legislative and executive branches. The parliament's failure to endorse a compromise was an important factor in Yeltsin's dis- solution of the body in September 1993. Yeltsin then used his

presidential powers to form a sympathetic constitutional assembly, which quickly produced a draft constitution providing for a strong executive, and to shape the outcome of the December

1993 referendum on Russia's new basic law. The referendum

vote resulted in approval by 58.4 percent of Russia's registered

voters. The announced 54.8 percent turnout met the requirement that at least 50 percent of registered voters participate in

the referendum.

The 1993 constitution declares Russia a democratic, federative, law-based state with a republican form of government.

State power is divided among the legislative, executive, and

judicial branches. Diversity of ideologies and religions is sanc- tioned, and a state or compulsory ideology may not be

adopted. The right to a multiparty political system is upheld.

The content of laws must be made public before they take

effect, and they must be formulated in accordance with international law and principles. Russian is proclaimed the state language, although the republics of the federation are allowed to establish their own state languages for use alongside Russian

(see The Russian Language, ch. 4).

The Executive Branch

The 1993 constitution created a dual executive consisting of

a president and prime minister, but the president is the dominant figure. Russia's strong presidency sometimes is compared

with that of Charles de Gaulle (in office 1958-69) in the

French Fifth Republic. The constitution spells out many prerogatives specifically, but some powers enjoyed by Yeltsin were

developed in an ad hoc manner.

391
Russia: A Country Study

Presidential Powers

Russia's president determines the basic direction of Russia's

domestic and foreign policy and represents the Russian state within the country and in foreign affairs. The president

appoints and recalls Russia's ambassadors upon consultation

with the legislature, accepts the credentials and letters of recall

of foreign representatives, conducts international talks, and

signs international treaties. A special provision allowed Yeltsin to complete the term prescribed to end in June 1996 and to exercise the powers of the new constitution, although he had

been elected under a different constitutional order.

In the 1996 presidential election campaign, some candidates

called for reducing or eliminating the presidency, criticizing its powers as dictatorial. Yeltsin defended his presidential powers,

claiming that Russians desire "a vertical power structure and a strong hand" and that a parliamentary government would

result in indecisive talk rather than action.

Several prescribed powers put the president in a superior

position vis-a-vis the legislature. The president has broad

authority to issue decrees and directives that have the force of

law without legislative review, although the constitution notes

that they must not contravene that document or other laws.

Under certain conditions, the president may dissolve the State

Duma, the lower house of parliament (as a whole, now called

the Federal Assembly) . The president has the prerogatives of

scheduling referendums (a power previously reserved to the

parliament), submitting draft laws to the State Duma, and promulgating federal laws. The executive-legislative crisis of the fall of 1993 prompted

Yeltsin to emplace constitutional obstacles to legislative

removal of the president. Under the 1993 constitution, if the

president commits "grave crimes" or treason, the State Duma

may file impeachment charges with the parliament's upper

house, the Federation Council. These charges must be con- firmed by a ruling of the Supreme Court that the president's

actions constitute a crime and by a ruling of the Constitutional

Court that proper procedures in filing charges have been fol- lowed (see The Judiciary, this ch.). The charges then must be

adopted by a special commission of the State Duma and con- firmed by at least two-thirds of State Duma deputies. A twothirds vote of the Federation Council is required for removal of

the president. If the Federation Council does not act within

three months, the charges are dropped. If the president is

392
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin confer at session of Supreme

Soviet after 1991 coup, Moscow.

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

removed from office or becomes unable to exercise power

because of serious illness, the prime minister is to temporarily assume the president's duties; a presidential election then must

be held within three months. The constitution does not provide for a vice president, and there is no specific procedure for

determining whether the president is able to carry out his

duties.

The president is empowered to appoint the prime minister

to chair the Government (called the cabinet or the council of

ministers in other countries), with the consent of the State

Duma. The president chairs meetings of the Government,

which he also may dismiss in its entirety. Upon the advice of the

prime minister, the president can appoint or remove Government members, including the deputy prime ministers. The

president submits candidates to the State Duma for the post of

chairman of the Russian Central Bank (RCB) and may propose

that the State Duma dismiss the chairman (see Banking and

Finance, ch. 6). In addition, the president submits candidates

to the Federation Council for appointment as justices of the

Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Superior

393
Russia: A Country Study

Court of Arbitration, as well as candidates for the office of

procurator general, Russia's chief law enforcement officer (see

The Procuracy, ch. 10). The president also appoints justices of

federal district courts. Informal Powers and Power Centers Many of the president's powers are related to the incumbent's undisputed leeway in forming an administration and hir- ing staff. The presidential administration is composed of

several competing, overlapping, and vaguely delineated hierarchies that historically have resisted efforts at consolidation. In

early 1996, Russian sources reported the size of the presidential

apparatus in Moscow and the localities at more than 75,000

people, most of them employees of state-owned enterprises

directly under presidential control. This structure is similar to, but several times larger than, the top-level apparatus of the

Soviet-era Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU—see Glossary)

.

Former first deputy prime minister Anatoliy Chubays was

appointed chief of the presidential administration (chief of

staff) in July 1996. Chubays replaced Nikolay Yegorov, a hardline associate of deposed Presidential Security Service chief

Aleksandr Korzhakov. Yegorov had been appointed in early

1996, when Yeltsin reacted to the strong showing of antireform

factions in the legislative election by purging reformers from

his administration. Yeltsin now ordered Chubays, who had

been included in that purge, to reduce the size of the administration and the number of departments overseeing the functions of the ministerial apparatus. The six administrative

departments in existence at that time dealt with citizens' rights,

domestic and foreign policy, state and legal matters, personnel,

analysis, and oversight, and Chubays inherited a staff estimated

at 2,000 employees. Chubays also received control over a presidential advisory group with input on the economy, national

security, and other matters. Reportedly that group had competed with Korzhakov's security service for influence in the

Yeltsin administration.

Another center of power in the presidential administration

is the Security Council, which was created by statute in mid1992 (see The Security Council, ch. 8). The 1993 constitution

describes the council as formed and headed by the president

and governed by statute. Since its formation, it apparently has

gradually lost influence in competition with other power cen394
Aleksandr Rutskoy, vice president ofRussian Republic, speaks to crowd

at parliament building during 1991 coup, Moscow.

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

ters in the presidential administration. However, the June 1996

appointment of former army general and presidential candidate Aleksandr Lebed' to head the Security Council improved

prospects for the organization's standing. In July 1996, a presidential decree assigned the Security Council a wide variety of

new missions. The decree's description of the Security Council's consultative functions was especially vague and wide-ranging, although it positioned the head of the Security Council

directly subordinate to the president. As had been the case previously, the Security Council was required to hold meetings at

least once a month (see The President, ch. 8).

Other presidential support services include the Control

Directorate (in charge of investigating official corruption), the

Administrative Affairs Directorate, the Presidential Press Ser395
Russia: A Country Study

vice, and the Protocol Directorate. The Administrative Affairs

Directorate controls state dachas, sanatoriums, automobiles,

office buildings, and other perquisites of high office for the

executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, a function that includes management of more than 200 state industries with about 50,000 employees. The Committee on

Operational Questions, until June 1996 chaired by antireformist Oleg Soskovets, has been described as a "government within

a government." Also attached to the presidency are more than

two dozen consultative commissions and extrabudgetary

"funds."

The president also has extensive powers over military policy.

As the commander in chief of the armed forces, the president

approves defense doctrine, appoints and removes the high

command of the armed forces, and confers higher military

ranks and awards (see Command Structure, ch. 9). The president is empowered to declare national or regional states of

martial law, as well as states of emergency. In both cases, both

chambers of the parliament must be notified immediately. The

Federation Council, the upper chamber, has the power to con- firm or reject such a decree. The regime of martial law is defined by federal law. The circumstances and procedures for

the president to declare a state of emergency are more specifically outlined in federal law than in the constitution. In practice, the Constitutional Court ruled in 1995 that the president

has wide leeway in responding to crises within Russia, such as lawlessness in the separatist Republic of Chechnya, and that

Yeltsin's action in Chechnya did not require a formal declaration of a state of emergency (see Movements Toward Sovereignty, ch. 4; Chechnya, ch. 9; Security Operations in

Chechnya, ch. 10). In 1994 Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Ingushetia and North Ossetia, two republics beset by

intermittent ethnic conflict.

Presidential Elections

The constitution sets few requirements for presidential elections, deferring in many matters to other provisions established

by law The presidential term is set at four years, and the president may serve only two terms. A candidate for president must

be a citizen of Russia, at least thirty-five years of age, and a resi- dent of the country for at least ten years. If a president

becomes unable to continue in office because of health problems, resignation, impeachment, or death, a presidential elec396
Government and Politics

tion is to be held not more than three months later. In such a

situation, the Federation Council is empowered to set the election date.

The Law on Presidential Elections, ratified in May 1995,

establishes the legal basis for presidential elections. Based on a

draft submitted by Yeltsin's office, the new law included many

provisions already contained in the Russian Republic's 1990

election law; alterations included the reduction in the number

of signatures required to register a candidate from 2 million to

1 million. The law, which set rigorous standards for fair campaign and election procedures, was hailed by international analysts as a major step toward democratization. Under the law,

parties, blocs, and voters' groups register with the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and designate their candidates. These

organizations then are permitted to begin seeking the 1 million signatures needed to register their candidates; no more

than 7 percent of the signatures may come from a single federal jurisdiction. The purpose of the 7 percent requirement is to promote candidacies with broad territorial bases and eliminate those supported by only one city or ethnic enclave.

The law requires that at least 50 percent of eligible voters

participate in order for a presidential election to be valid. In

State Duma debate over the legislation, some deputies had

advocated a minimum of 25 percent (which was later incorporated into the electoral law covering the State Duma) , warning

that many Russians were disillusioned with voting and would

not turn out. To make voter participation easier, the law

required one voting precinct for approximately every 3,000 voters, with voting allowed until late at night. The conditions for

absentee voting were eased, and portable ballot boxes were to be made available on demand. Strict requirements were established for the presence of election observers, including emissaries from all participating parties, blocs, and groups, at polling places and local electoral commissions to guard against

tampering and to ensure proper tabulation.

The Law on Presidential Elections requires that the winner

receive more than 50 percent of the votes cast. If no candidate

receives more than 50 percent of the vote (a highly probable

result because of multiple candidacies), the top two vote-getters must face each other in a runoff election. Once the results

of the first round are known, the runoff election must be held

within fifteen days. A traditional provision allows voters to check off "none of the above," meaning that a candidate in a

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two-person runoff might win without attaining a majority.

Another provision of the election law empowers the CEC to request that the Supreme Court ban a candidate from the election if that candidate advocates a violent transformation of the

constitutional order or the integrity of the Russian Federation.

The presidential election of 1996 was a major episode in the

struggle between Yeltsin and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii—KPRF), which sought to oust Yeltsin from office and

return to power. Yeltsin had banned the Communist Party of

the Russian Republic for its central role in the August 1991

coup against the Gorbachev government. As a member of the

Politburo and the Secretariat of the banned party, Gennadiy

Zyuganov had worked hard to gain its relegalization. Despite

Yeltsin's objections, the Constitutional Court cleared the way

for the Russian communists to reemerge as the KPRF, headed

by Zyuganov, in February 1993. Yeltsin temporarily banned the

party again in October 1993 for its role in the Supreme Soviet's

just-concluded attempt to overthrow his administration. Beginning in 1993, Zyuganov also led efforts by KPRF deputies to impeach Yeltsin. After the KPRF's triumph in the December

1995 legislative elections, Yeltsin announced that he would run

for reelection with the main purpose of safeguarding Russia

from a communist restoration.

Although there was speculation that losing parties in the

December 1995 election might choose not to nominate presidential candidates, in fact dozens of citizens both prominent

and obscure announced their candidacies. After the gathering

and review of signature lists, the CEC validated eleven candidates, one of whom later dropped out. In the opinion polls of early 1996, Yeltsin trailed far behind

most of the other candidates; his popularity rating was below

10 percent for a prolonged period. However, a last-minute,

intense campaign featuring heavy television exposure,

speeches throughout Russia promising increased state expenditures for a wide variety of interest groups, and campaignsponsored concerts boosted Yeltsin to a 3 percent plurality over Zyuganov in the first round. At that point, Yeltsin took the tacti- cally significant step of appointing first-round presidential can- didate Aleksandr Lebed', who had placed third behind Yeltsin

and Zyuganov, as head of the Security Council. Yeltsin followed

the appointment of Lebed' as the president's top adviser on

national security by dismissing several top hard-line members

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Government and Politics

of his entourage who were widely blamed for human rights violations in Chechnya and other mistakes. Despite his virtual dis- appearance from public view for health reasons shortly

thereafter, Yeltsin was able to sustain his central message that

Russia should move forward rather than return to its communist past. Zyuganov failed to mount an energetic or convincing

second campaign, and three weeks after the first phase of the

election, Yeltsin easily defeated his opponent, 54 percent to 40

percent (see table 24, Appendix).

Turnout in the first round was high, with about 70 percent

of 108.5 million voters participating. Total turnout in the sec- ond round was nearly the same as in the first round. A contingent of almost 1,000 international observers judged the

election to be largely fair and democratic, as did the CEG.

Most observers in Russia and elsewhere concurred that the

election boosted democratization in Russia, and many asserted

that reforms in Russia had become irreversible. Yeltsin had

strengthened the institution of regularly contested elections

when he rejected calls by business organizations and other

groups and some of his own officials to cancel or postpone the

balloting because of the threat of violence. The high turnout

indicated that voters had confidence that their ballots would

count, and the election went forward without incident. The

democratization process also was bolstered by Yeltsin's willing- ness to change key personnel and policies in response to public

protests and by his unprecedented series of personal campaign

appearances throughout Russia.

The Government (Cabinet)

The constitution prescribes that the Government of Russia,

which corresponds to the Western cabinet structure, consist of

a prime minister (chairman of the Government), deputy prime

ministers, and federal ministers and their ministries and

departments. Within one week of appointment by the president and approval by the State Duma, the prime minister must

submit to the president nominations for all subordinate Government positions, including deputy prime ministers and federal ministers. The prime minister carries out administration

in line with the constitution and laws and presidential decrees.

The ministries of the Government, which numbered twentyfour in mid-1996, execute credit and monetary policies and

defense, foreign policy, and state security functions; ensure the

rule of law and respect for human and civil rights; protect

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property; and take measures against crime. If the Government

issues implementing decrees and directives that are at odds

with legislation or presidential decrees, the president may

rescind them.

The Government formulates the state budget, submits it to the State Duma, and issues a report on its implementation. In

late 1994, the parliament successfully demanded that the Government begin submitting quarterly reports on budget expenditures and adhere to other guidelines on budgetary matters,

although the parliament's budgetary powers are limited. If the

State Duma rejects a draft budget from the Government, the

budget is submitted to a conciliation commission including

members from both branches.

Besides the ministries, in 1996 the executive branch

included eleven state committees and forty-six state services

and agencies, ranging from the State Space Agency (Glavkosmos) to the State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat). There were also myriad agencies, boards, centers, councils, commissions, and committees. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's

personal staff was reported to number about 2,000 in 1995.

Chernomyrdin, who had been appointed prime minister in

late 1992 to appease antireform factions, established a generally smooth working relationship with Yeltsin. Chernomyrdin

proved adept at conciliating hostile domestic factions and at presenting a positive image of Russia in negotiations with other

nations. However, as Yeltsin's standing with public opinion

plummeted in 1995, Chernomyrdin became one of many Government officials who received public blame from the president for failures in the Yeltsin administration. As part of his

presidential campaign, Yeltsin threatened to replace the Chernomyrdin Government if it failed to address pressing social

welfare problems in Russia. After the mid-1996 presidential

election, however, Yeltsin announced that he would nominate

Chernomyrdin to head the new Government.

The Parliament

The 628-member parliament, termed the Federal Assembly,

consists of two chambers, the 450-member State Duma (the

lower house) and the 178-member Federation Council (the

upper house). Russia's legislative body was established by the

constitution approved in the December 1993 referendum. The

first elections to the Federal Assembly were held at the same

time—a procedure criticized by some Russians as indicative of

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Government and Politics

Yeltsin's lack of respect for constitutional niceties. Under the

constitution, the deputies elected in December 1993 were

termed "transitional" because they were to serve only a two-year

term. In April 1994, legislators, Government officials, and

many prominent businesspeople and religious leaders signed a

"Civic Accord" proposed by Yeltsin, pledging during the twoyear "transition period" to refrain from violence, calls for early

presidential or legislative elections, and attempts to amend the

constitution. This accord, and memories of the violent confrontation of the previous parliament with Government forces,

had some effect in softening political rhetoric during the next

two years. The first legislative elections under the new constitution

included a few irregularities. The republics of Tatarstan and

Chechnya and Chelyabinsk Oblast boycotted the voting; this

action, along with other discrepancies, resulted in the election

of only 170 members to the Federation Council. However, by

mid-1994 all seats were filled except those of Chechnya, which

continued to proclaim its independence. All federal jurisdictions participated in the December 1995 legislative races, although the fairness of voting in Chechnya was compromised

by the ongoing conflict there.

The Federal Assembly is prescribed as a permanently functioning body, meaning that it is in continuous session except

for a regular break between the spring and fall sessions. This

working schedule distinguishes the new parliament from

Soviet-era "rubber-stamp" legislative bodies, which met only a few days each year. The new constitution also directs that the

two chambers meet separately in sessions open to the public,

although joint meetings are held for important speeches by the

president or foreign leaders.

Deputies of the State Duma work full-time on their legislative duties; they are not allowed to serve simultaneously in local

legislatures or hold Government positions. A transitional

clause in the constitution, however, allowed deputies elected in

December 1993 to retain their Government employment, a

provision that allowed many officials of the Yeltsin administration to serve in the parliament. After the December 1995 legislative elections, nineteen Government officials were forced to resign their offices in order to take up their legislative duties.

Despite its "transitional" nature, the Federal Assembly of

1994-95 approved about 500 pieces of legislation in two years. When the new parliament convened in January 1996, deputies

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Russia: A Country Study

were provided with a catalog of these laws and were directed to work in their assigned committees to fill gaps in existing legislation as well as to draft new laws. A major accomplishment of

the 1994-95 legislative sessions was passage of the first two

parts of a new civil code, desperately needed to update antiquated Soviet-era provisions. The new code included provisions on contract obligations, rents, insurance, loans and

credit, partnership, and trusteeship, as well as other legal stan- dards essential to support the creation of a market economy.

Work on several bills that had been in committee or in floor

debate in the previous legislature resumed in the new body.

Similarly, several bills that Yeltsin had vetoed were taken up

again by the new legislature.

Structure of fine Federal Assembly

The composition of the Federation Council was a matter of

debate until shortly before the 1995 elections. The legislation

that emerged in December 1995 over Federation Council

objections clarified the constitution's language on the subject

by providing ex officio council seats to the heads of local legislatures and administrations in each of the eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions, hence a total of 178 seats. As composed in

1996, the Federation Council included about fifty chief executives of subnational jurisdictions who had been appointed to their posts by Yeltsin during 1991-92, then won popular election directly to the body in December 1993. But the law of 1995

provided for popular elections of chief executives in all subnational jurisdictions, including those still governed by presidential appointees. The individuals chosen in those elections then

would assume ex officio seats in the Federation Council.

Each legislative chamber elects a chairman to control the

internal procedures of the chamber. The chambers also form

committees and commissions to deal with particular types of

issues. Unlike committees and commissions in previous Russian and Soviet parliaments, those operating under the 1993

constitution have significant responsibilities in devising legislation and conducting oversight. They prepare and evaluate

draft laws, report on draft laws to their chambers, conduct

hearings, and oversee implementation of the laws. As of early

1996, there were twenty-eight committees and several ad hoc

commissions in the State Duma, and twelve committees and

two commissions in the Federation Council. The Federation

Council has established fewer committees because of the part402
Government and Politics

time status of its members, who also hold political office in the

subnational jurisdictions. In 1996 most of the committees in

both houses were retained in basic form from the previous parliament. According to internal procedure, no deputy may sit on more than one committee. By 1996 many State Duma committees had established subcommittees.

Committee positions are allocated when new parliaments

are seated. The general policy calls for allocation of committee

chairmanships and memberships among parties and factions

roughly in proportion to the size of their representation. In

1994, however, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal-Democratic

Party of Russia (Liberal'no-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii

LDPR), which had won the second largest number of seats in

the recent election, was denied all but one key chairmanship,

that of the State Duma's Committee on Geopolitics.

Legislative Powers

The two chambers of the Federal Assembly possess different

powers and responsibilities, with the State Duma the more

powerful. The Federation Council, as its name and composition implies, deals primarily with issues of concern to the subnational jurisdictions, such as adjustments to internal borders

and decrees of the president establishing martial law or states of emergency. As the upper chamber, it also has responsibilities

in confirming and removing the procurator general and con- firming justices of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme

Court, and the Superior Court of Arbitration, upon the recom- mendation of the president. The Federation Council also is entrusted with the final decision if the State Duma recom- mends removing the president from office. The constitution

also directs that the Federation Council examine bills passed by

the lower chamber dealing with budgetary, tax, and other fiscal measures, as well as issues dealing with war and peace and with

treaty ratification.

In the consideration and disposition of most legislative matters, however, the Federation Council has less power than the

State Duma. All bills, even those proposed by the Federation

Council, must first be considered by the State Duma. If the Federation Council rejects a bill passed by the State Duma, the two

chambers may form a conciliation commission to work out a compromise version of the legislation. The State Duma then

votes on the compromise bill. If the State Duma objects to the

proposals of the upper chamber in the conciliation process, it

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Russia: A Country Study

may vote by a two-thirds majority to send its version to the president for signature. The part-time character of the Federation

Council's work, its less developed committee structure, and its lesser powers vis-a-vis the State Duma make it more a consultative and reviewing body than a law-making chamber.

Because the Federation Council initially included many

regional administrators appointed by Yeltsin, that body often

supported the president and objected to bills approved by the

State Duma, which had more anti-Yeltsin deputies. The power

of the upper chamber to consider bills passed by the lower

chamber resulted in its disapproval of about one-half of such

bills, necessitating concessions by the State Duma or votes to override upper-chamber objections. In February 1996, the

heads of the two chambers pledged to try to break this habit,

but wrangling appeared to intensify in the months that fol- lowed.

The State Duma confirms the appointment of the prime

minister, although it does not have the power to confirm Government ministers. The power to confirm or reject the prime

minister is severely limited. According to the 1993 constitution,

the State Duma must decide within one week to confirm or

reject a candidate once the president has placed that person's

name in nomination. If it rejects three candidates, the president is empowered to appoint a prime minister, dissolve the

parliament, and schedule new legislative elections.

The State Duma's power to force the resignation of the Government also is severely limited. It may express a vote of no- confidence in the Government by a majority vote of all members of the State Duma, but the president is allowed to disregard this vote. If, however, the State Duma repeats the no- confidence vote within three months, the president may dismiss the Government. But the likelihood of a second no-confidence vote is virtually precluded by the constitutional provision

allowing the president to dissolve the State Duma rather than

the Government in such a situation. The Government's position is further buttressed by another constitutional provision

that allows the Government at any time to demand a vote of

confidence from the State Duma; refusal is grounds for the

president to dissolve the Duma.

The Legislative Process Draft laws may originate in either legislative chamber, or

they may be submitted by the president, the Government, local

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Government and Politics

legislatures, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, or

the Superior Court of Arbitration. Draft laws are first considered in the State Duma. Upon adoption by a majority of the

full State Duma membership, a draft law is considered by the

Federation Council, which has fourteen days to place the bill on its calendar. Conciliation commissions are the prescribed

procedure to work out differences in bills considered by both

chambers.

A constitutional provision dictating that draft laws dealing

with revenues and expenditures may be considered "only when

the Government's findings are known" substantially limits the

Federal Assembly's control of state finances. However, the legislature may alter finance legislation submitted by the Government at a later time, a power that provides a degree of

traditional legislative control over the purse. The two chambers

of the legislature also have the power to override a presidential

veto of legislation. The constitution provides a high hurdle for an override, however, requiring at least a two-thirds vote of the

total number of members of both chambers.

Clashes ofPower, 1993-96

Although the 1993 constitution weakened their standing vis- a-vis the presidency, the parliaments elected in 1993 and 1995

nonetheless used their powers to shape legislation according to their own precepts and to defy Yeltsin on some issues. An early

example was the February 1994 State Duma vote to grant

amnesty to the leaders of the 1991 Moscow coup. Yeltsin vehemently denounced this action, although it was within the constitutional purview of the State Duma. In October 1994, both

legislative chambers passed a law over Yeltsin's veto requiring

the Government to submit quarterly reports on budget expenditures to the State Duma and adhere to other budgetary

guidelines.

In the most significant executive-legislative clash since 1993,

the State Duma overwhelmingly voted no confidence in the

Government in June 1995. The vote was triggered by a Chechen rebel raid into the neighboring Russian town of

Budennovsk, where the rebels were able to take more than

1,000 hostages. Dissatisfaction with Yeltsin's economic reforms

also was a factor in the vote. A second motion of no confidence

failed to carry in early July. In March 1996, the State Duma

again incensed Yeltsin by voting to revoke the December 1991

resolution of the Russian Supreme Soviet abrogating the 1922

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Russia: A Country Study

treaty under which the Soviet Union had been founded. That

resolution had prepared the way for formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In his February 1996 state of the federation speech, Yeltsin

commended the previous parliament for passing a number of

significant laws, and he noted with relief the "civil" resolution

of the June 1995 no-confidence conflict. He complained, however, that the Federal Assembly had not acted on issues such as the private ownership of land, a tax code, and judicial reform.

Yeltsin also was critical of legislation that he had been forced to return to the parliament because it contravened the constitution and existing law, and of legislative attempts to pass fiscal legislation in violation of the constitutional stricture that such

bills must be preapproved by the Government. He noted that

he would continue to use his veto power against ill-drafted bills and his power to issue decrees on issues he deemed important,

and that such decrees would remain in force until suitable laws were passed. The State Duma passed a resolution in March

1996 demanding that Yeltsin refrain from returning bills to the

parliament for redrafting, arguing that the president was obligated either to sign bills or to veto them.

The Judiciary

The Ministry ofJustice administers Russia's judicial system.

The ministry's responsibilities include the establishment of

courts and the appointment ofjudges at levels below the federal district courts. The ministry also gathers forensic statistics and conducts sociological research and educational programs

applicable to crime prevention.

Many Western observers consider the judicial and legal sys- tems weak links in Russia's reform efforts, stymieing privatization, the fight against crime and corruption, the protection of

civil and human rights, and the general ascendancy of the rule

of law. Many judges appointed by the regimes of Leonid I. Brezhnev (in office 1964-82) and Yuriy V. Andropov (in office

1982-84) remained in place in the mid-1990s. Such arbiters were trained in "socialist law" and had become accustomed to basing their verdicts on telephone calls from local CPSU bosses

rather than on the legal merits of cases. For court infrastructure and financial support, judges must

depend on the Ministry ofJustice, and for housing they must

depend on local authorities in the jurisdiction where they sit. In 1995 the average salary for a judge was US$160 per month,

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Government and Politics

substantially less than the earnings associated with more

menial positions in Russian society. These circumstances, combined with irregularities in the appointment process and the

continued strong position of the procurators, deprived judges

in the lower jurisdictions of independent authority (see The

Procuracy, ch. 10).

Judicial Reform

In 1992 a new Law on the Status ofJudges was passed. The

law was intended to confer greater status on the judicial profession by raising salaries and benefits. The 1993 constitution provides for some degree of judicial reform by establishing an

independent judiciary and specifying that justices may only be

removed or their powers curtailed or terminated in accordance

with the law. Sitting justices also enjoy immunity from prosecution. However, judicial reform has moved slowly despite those

two legislative developments, and in 1996 the judiciary

remained subject to the influence of security agencies and politicians. A large case backlog, trial delays, and lengthy pretrial

detention also remain problems (see How the System Works,

ch. 10).

According to a provision approved in 1994, trial by jury may

take place in specific types of cases, including those involving

the death penalty. This reform supersedes in part the older sys- tem of trial by judges and lay "people's assessors" who usually

acceded to the judges' verdicts. In practice, trial by jury has

made little headway in the hidebound court system. In 1995

jury trials were only available in nine of the eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions, although other jurisdictions sought permission to introduce them.

In the mid-1990s, a total of about 14,000 judges were active

in approximately 2,500 courts at all judicial levels. To be eligible for appointment as a judge, an individual must be at least

twenty-five years of age, have a higher education in law, and

have at least five years of experience in the legal profession.

Structure of theJudiciary

The twenty-three-member Supreme Court is Russia's highest

court of origination and of appeals for consideration of criminal, civil, and administrative cases. Its chairman in 1996,

Vyacheslav Lebedev, had been a judge in Leningrad and Moscow for nineteen years before his appointment in 1989. The

Superior Court of Arbitration, which is headed by a board of

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Russia: A Country Study

one chairman and four deputy chairmen, is the highest court

for the resolution of economic disputes. Courts of arbitration

also exist at lower jurisdictional levels. The nineteen-member

Constitutional Court decides whether federal laws, presidential

and federal decrees and directives, and local constitutions,

charters, and laws comply with the federal constitution. Treaties between the national government and a regional jurisdiction and between regional jurisdictions are subject to the same

oversight. The Constitutional Court also resolves jurisdictional

disputes between federal or local organs of power, and it also

may be asked to interpret the federal constitution. The Constitutional Court temporarily ceased to exist after Yeltsin dissolved the parliament in October 1993. Although prescribed in

the new constitution, the court remained moribund in 1994

because no new law was passed governing its procedures and

composition. In 1995 the Federation Council finally approved

appointments to the Constitutional Court, and it resumed

operation that year. Under the constitution, judges of the three highest courts serve for life and are appointed by the Federation Council

after nomination by the president. The president appoints

judges at the next level, the federal district courts. The minister

ofjustice is responsible for appointing judges to regional and

city courts. However, in practice many appointments below the

national level still are made by the chief executives of subnational jurisdictions, a practice that has perpetuated local political influence on judges' decisions (see Local and Regional

Government, this ch.).

Local and Regional Government

In the Soviet period, some of Russia's approximately 100

nationalities were granted their own ethnic enclaves, to which

varying formal federal rights were attached (see Minority Peoples and Their Territories, ch. 4). Other smaller or more dis- persed nationalities did not receive such recognition. In most

of these enclaves, ethnic Russians constituted a majority of the

population, although the titular nationalities usually enjoyed

disproportionate representation in local government bodies.

Relations between the central government and the subordinate

jurisdictions, and among those jurisdictions, became a political

issue in the 1990s.

The Russian Federation has made few changes in the Soviet

pattern of regional jurisdictions. The 1993 constitution estab408
Government and Politics

lishes a federal government and enumerates eighty-nine subnational jurisdictions, including twenty-one ethnic enclaves with

the status of republics. There are ten autonomous regions, or okruga (sing., okrug), and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast

(Yevreyskaya avtonomnaya oblast1 , also known as Birobidzhan).

Besides the ethnically identified jurisdictions, there are six ter- ritories (kraya; sing., kray) and forty-nine oblasts (provinces).

The cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg are independent of

surrounding jurisdictions; termed "cities of federal significance," they have the same status as the oblasts. The ten autonomous regions and Birobidzhan are part of larger jurisdictions,

either an oblast or a territory (see fig. 1). As the power and

influence of the central government have become diluted, gov- ernors and mayors have become the only relevant government

authorities in manyjurisdictions.

The Federation Treaty and Regional Power

The Federation Treaty was signed in March 1992 by President Yeltsin and most leaders of the autonomous republics and

other ethnic and geographical subunits. The treaty consisted of

three separate documents, each pertaining to one type of

regional jurisdiction. It outlined powers reserved for the central government, shared powers, and residual powers to be

exercised primarily by the subunits. Because Russia's new constitution remained in dispute in the Federal Assembly at the

time of ratification, the Federation Treaty and provisions based

on the treaty were incorporated as amendments to the 1978

constitution. A series of new conditions were established by the

1993 constitution and by bilateral agreements.

LocalJurisdictions under the Constitution

The constitution of 1993 resolved many of the ambiguities

and contradictions concerning the degree of decentralization

under the much-amended 1978 constitution of the Russian

Republic; most such solutions favored the concentration of

power in the central government. When the constitution was

ratified, the Federation Treaty was demoted to the status of a subconstitutional document. A transitional provision of the

constitution provided that in case of discrepancies between the

federal constitution and the Federation Treaty, or between the

constitution and other treaties involving a subnational jurisdiction, all other documents would defer to the constitution.

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Russia: A Country Study

The 1993 constitution presents a daunting list of powers

reserved to the center. Powers shared jointly between the federal and local authorities are less numerous. Regional jurisdictions are only allocated powers not specifically reserved to the

federal government or exercised jointly. Those powers include

managing municipal property, establishing and executing

regional budgets, establishing and collecting regional taxes,

and maintaining law and order (see table 25, Appendix). Some

of the boundaries between joint and exclusively federal powers

are vaguely prescribed; presumably they would become clearer

through the give and take of federal practice or through adjudication, as has occurred in other federal systems. Meanwhile,

bilateral power-sharing treaties between the central government and the subunits have become an important means of

clarifying the boundaries of shared powers. Many subnational

jurisdictions have their own constitutions, however, and often

those documents allocate powers to the jurisdiction inconsis- tent with provisions of the federal constitution. As of 1996, no

process had been devised for adjudication of such conflicts.

Under the 1993 constitution, the republics, territories,

oblasts, autonomous oblast, autonomous regions, and cities of

federal designation are held to be "equal in their relations with

the federal agencies of state power"; this language represents an attempt to end the complaints of the nonrepublic jurisdictions about their inferior status. In keeping with this new equality, republics no longer receive the epithet "sovereign," as they

did in the 1978 constitution. Equal representation in the Federation Council for all eighty-nine jurisdictions furthers the

equalization process by providing them meaningful input into

legislative activities, particularly those of special local concern

(see The Parliament, this ch.). However, Federation Council

officials have criticized the State Duma for failing to represent

regional interests adequately. In mid-1995 Vladimir Shumeyko,

then speaker of the Federation Council, criticized the current

electoral system's party-list provision for allowing some parts of

Russia to receive disproportionate representation in the lower

house. (In the 1995 elections, Moscow Oblast received nearly

38 percent of the State Duma's seats based on the concentration of party-list candidates in the national capital.) Shumeyko

contended that such misallocation fed potentially dangerous

popular discontent with the parliament and politicians (see

The Elections of 1995, this ch.).

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Government and Politics

Despite constitutional language equalizing the regional

jurisdictions in their relations with the center, vestiges of Soviet- era multitiered federalism remain in a number of provisions,

including those allowing for the use of non-Russian languages

in the republics but not in other jurisdictions, and in the definitions of the five categories of subunit. On most details of the

federal system, the constitution is vague, and clarifying legislation had not been passed by mid-1996. However, some analysts

have pointed out that this vagueness facilitates resolution of

individual conflicts between the center and the regions.

Power Sharing

Flexibility is a goal of the constitutional provision allowing

bilateral treaties or charters between the central government

and the regions on power sharing. For instance, in the bilateral

treaty signed with the Russian government in February 1994,

the Republic of Tatarstan gave up its claim to sovereignty and

accepted Russia's taxing authority, in return for Russia's acceptance of Tatar control over oil and other resources and the

republic's right to sign economic agreements with other countries. This treaty has particular significance because Tatarstan was one of the two republics that did not sign the Federation

Treaty in 1992. By mid-1996 almost one-third of the federal

subunits had concluded power-sharing treaties or charters.

The first power-sharing charter negotiated by the central

government and an oblast was signed in December 1995 with

Orenburg Oblast. The charter divided power in the areas of

economic and agricultural policy, natural resources, international economic relations and trade, and military industries.

According to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the charter gave

Orenburg full power over its budget and allowed the oblast to participate in privatization decisions. By early 1996, similar

charters had been signed with Krasnodar Territory and Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk oblasts. In the summer of 1996, Yeltsin

wooed potential regional supporters of his reelection by signing charters with Perm', Rostov, Tver', and Leningrad oblasts

and with the city of St. Petersburg, among others, granting

these regions liberal tax treatment and other economic advantages.

By the mid-1990s, regional jurisdictions also had become

bolder in passing local legislation to fill gaps in federation stat- utes rather than waiting for the Federal Assembly to act. For

example, Volgograd Oblast passed laws regulating local pen411
Russia: A Country Study

sions, the issuance of promissory notes, and credit unions. The

constitution upholds regional legislative authority to pass laws

that accord with the constitution and existing federal laws.

Presidential Power in the Regions

The president retains the power to appoint and remove presidential representatives, who act as direct emissaries to the

jurisdictions in overseeing local administrations' implementation of presidential policies. The power to appoint these over- seers was granted by the Russian Supreme Soviet to Yeltsin in

late 1991. The parliament attempted several times during

1992-93 to repeal or curtail the activities of these appointees,

whose powers are only alluded to in the constitution. The pres- ence of Yeltsin's representatives helped bring out the local vote on his behalf in the 1996 presidential election.

The governments of the republics include a president or prime minister (or both) and a regional council or legislature.

The chief executives of lower jurisdictions are called governors

or administrative heads. Generally, in jurisdictions other than

republics the executive branches have been more sympathetic

to the central government, and the legislatures (called Soviets

until late 1993, then called dumas or assemblies) have been the

center of whatever separatist sentiment exists. Under the power

given him in 1991 to appoint the chief executives of territories,

oblasts, autonomous regions, and the autonomous oblast,

Yeltsin had appointed virtually all of the sixty-six leaders of

those jurisdictions. By contrast, republic presidents have been

popularly elected since 1992. Some of Yeltsin's appointees have

encountered strong opposition from their legislatures; in 1992

and 1993, in some cases votes of no-confidence brought about

popular elections for the position of chief executive.

After the Moscow confrontation of October 1993, Yeltsin

sought to bolster his regional support by dissolving the legisla- tures of all federal subunits except the republics (which were

advised to "reform" their political systems). Accordingly, in

1994 elections were held in all the jurisdictions whose legisla- tures had been dismissed. In some cases, that process placed

local executives at the head of legislative bodies, eliminating

checks and balances between the branches at the regional

level. Election results in the subnational jurisdictions held great

significance for the Yeltsin administration because the winners

would fill the ex officio seats in the Federation Council, which

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Government and Politics

until 1996 was a reliable bastion of support. The election of

large numbers of opposition candidates would end the Federation Council's usefulness as a balance against the anti-Yeltsin State Duma and further impede Yeltsin's agenda. In 1995 some

regions held gubernatorial elections to fill the administrative

posts originally granted to Yeltsin appointees in 1991. Faced

with an escalating number of requests for such elections,

Yeltsin decreed December 1996 as the date for most gubernatorial and republic presidential elections. This date was con- firmed by a December 1995 Federation Council law. The

decree also set subnational legislative elections for June or December 1997. (In July 1996, the State Duma advanced these

elections to late 1996.) Observers noted that by calling for most

of these elections to take place after the presidential election,

Yeltsin prevented unfavorable outcomes from possibly reducing his reelection chances—even though voter apathy after the

presidential election had the potential to help opposition candidates.

The Separatism Question

In the first half of the 1990s, observers speculated about the

possibility that some of the jurisdictions in the federation

might emulate the former Soviet republics and demand full independence (see Minority Peoples and Their Territories, ch.

4). Several factors militate against such an outcome, however.

Russia is more than 80 percent ethnic Russian, and most of the

thirty-two ethnically based jurisdictions are demographically

dominated by ethnic Russians, as are all of the territories and

oblasts. Many of the subnational jurisdictions are in the interior of Russia, meaning that they could not break away without

joining a bloc of seceding border areas, and the economies of

all such jurisdictions were thoroughly integrated with the

national economy in the Soviet system. The 1993 constitution

strengthens the official status of the central government in

relation to the various regions, although Moscow has made significant concessions in bilateral treaties. Finally, most of the dif- ferences at the base of separatist movements are economic and

geographic rather than ethnic.

Advocates of secession, who are numerous in several regions,

generally appear to be in the minority and are unevenly dispersed. Some regions have even advocated greater centralization on some matters. By 1996 most experts believed that the

federation would hold together, although probably at the

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Russia: A Country Study

expense of additional concessions of power by the central government. The trend is not toward separatism so much as the

devolution of central powers to the localities on trade, taxes,

and other matters. Some experts observe that the Russian republics pressing

claims for greater subunit rights fall into three groups. The first

is composed of those jurisdictions most vociferous in pressing

ethnic separatism, including Chechnya and perhaps other

republics of the North Caucasus, and the Republic of Tyva. The

second group consists of large, resource-rich republics, including Karelia, Komi, and Sakha (Yakutia) . Their differences with

Moscow center on resource control and taxes rather than

demands for outright independence. A third, mixed group

consists of republics along the Volga River, which straddle stra- tegic water, rail, and pipeline routes, possess resources such as

oil, and include large numbers of Russia's Muslim and Buddhist populations. These republics include Bashkortostan,

Kalmykia, Mari El, Mordovia, Tatarstan, and Udmurtia.

In addition to the republics, several other jurisdictions have

lobbied for greater rights, mainly on questions of resource control and taxation. These include Sverdlovsk Oblast, which in

1993 proclaimed itself an autonomous republic as a protest

against receiving fewer privileges in taxation and resource control than the republics, and strategically vital Maritime (Primorskiy) Territory on the Pacific coast, whose governor in the

mid-1990s, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, defied central economic

and political policies on a number of well-publicized issues.

Some limited cooperation has occurred among Russia's

regional jurisdictions, and experts believe there is potential for even greater coordination. Eight regional cooperation organizations have been established, covering all subnational jurisdictions except Chechnya: the Siberian Accord Association; the

Central Russia Association; the Northwest Association; the

Black Earth Association; the Cooperation Association of North

Caucasus Republics, Territories, and Oblasts; the Greater Volga

Association; the Ural Regional Association; and the Far East

and Baikal Association. The Federation Council formally rec- ognized these interjurisdictional organizations in 1994. Expansion of the organizations' activities is hampered by economic

inequalities among their members and by inadequate interregional transportation infrastructure, but in 1996 they began

increasing their influence in Moscow.

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Government and Politics

Regional and ethnic conflicts have encouraged proposals to abolish the existing subunits and resurrect the tsarist-era

guberniya, or large province, which would incorporate several

smaller subunits on the basis of geography and population

rather than ethnic considerations. Russian ultranationalists

such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy have been joined in supporting

this proposal by some officials of the national Government and

oblast and territory leaders who resent the privileges of the

republics. Some have called for these new subunits to be based

on the eight interregional economic associations.

Political Parties and Legislative Elections

After early 1990, when the Soviet constitution was amended

to delete the provision that the CPSU was the "leading and

guiding" force in the political system, many political groups

began to operate more openly in Russia. The constitution of

1993 guarantees Russians' right to a multiparty system. Political

party development has lagged, however, because many Russians associate parties with the repressiveness of the CPSU in

the Soviet era. In the mid-1990s, most of Russia's parties were

based on personal followings, had few formal members, and

lacked broad geographical bases and coherent platforms. Prior

to the legislative elections of 1993 and 1995, much shifting

occurred as parties formed and abandoned coalitions, sometimes involving partners with which they had little in common

politically. Even the KPRF, direct heir to the CPSU, waffled on

many central economic and foreign policy issues in the 1996

presidential campaign. One observer noted that for most Russian voters, the two major sides in the 1996 election had no

identification with broad national issues; they were simply the

anti-Yeltsins and the anti-communists. Experts identified the

lack of focused national party organizations as a key factor in

the diffusion of political power to subnational jurisdictions in

the mid-1990s (see The Federation Treaty and Regional Power,

this ch.).

The Elections of 1 993

In November 1993, Yeltsin issued decrees prescribing procedures for multiparty parliamentary elections, which would be

the first since tsarist times. Besides setting the configuration of

the new bicameral parliament, the Yeltsin plan called for half

of the 450 State Duma deputies to be elected from national

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Russia: A Country Study

party lists with representation proportional to the overall votes

received by each party. The other half would be elected locally,

in single-member districts (see The Parliament, this ch.). The

party-list procedure, a new feature in Russian elections, was

designed to strengthen the identification of candidates with

parties and to foster the concept of the multiparty system

among the electorate. To achieve proportional representation

in the State Duma, a party would need to gain at least 5 percent

of the nationwide vote. The CEC declared thirteen parties eligible for the party list, and 2,047 individual candidates were selected to compete for

Federation Council seats (490) and State Duma single-mandate

seats (1,567), allotted to individuals regardless of their parties'

overall performance vis-a-vis the 5 percent threshold. Although

the CEC reported some voting irregularities, the vast majority

of the more than 1,000 international observers termed the

elections largely free and fair, with some reservations expressed

about manipulation of results. In several republics, the referendum results were invalidated by low turnouts caused by boycotts, or because voters failed to approve the constitution.

Many experts divided the myriad parties of the 1993 elections roughly into three main blocs: pro-Yeltsin reformists, centrists advocating a slower pace of reform, and hard-liners

opposing reforms. The main reformist party was Russia's

Choice, led by former prime minister Yegor Gaydar. The main

centrist parties were the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, com- monly referred to as Yabloko (the Russian word for apple),

headed by economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and former ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin, and the Democratic

Party of Russia, headed by Nikolay Travkin. The main hard-line

parties were the LDPR, the KPRF, headed by Gennadiy Zyuganov, and the Agrarian Party, which represented state- and col- lective-farm interests and was headed by Mikhail Lapshin.

In 1993 the strongly nationalist, antireform LDPR emerged

with the largest vote on the State Duma party lists, followed by

Russia's Choice. By faring much better in the single-member

districts, however, Russia's Choice emerged with sixty-six seats, the most in the State Duma. The LDPR followed with sixty-four

seats. Altogether, reformist and centrist parties emerged with

the greatest number of seats in the State Duma, followed by

nationalist and antireform parties. Some 127 State Duma seats were won by individuals not formally affiliated with a party,

many of whom were former CPSU members.

416
Government and Politics Of the thirteen parties participating in the December 1993

legislative elections on the party lists, eight exceeded the 5 percent threshold to win seats in the State Duma. In addition, all thirteen parties, as well as some local parties, won seats in sin- gle-member districts. Once the new parliament was seated, the

parties aggregated into several factions. A number of deputies

coalesced into the Union of December 12 faction. Sixty-five

centrist deputies formed the New Regional Policy faction, and

some LDPR members shifted their affiliation to the KPRF or

the Agrarian Party, or supported former vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy's Concord in the Name of Russia policy agenda.

The Elections of 1 995

In June 1995, the Federal Assembly passed—and Yeltsin

signed—a new law to govern the next legislative elections,

which were planned for December. This legislation echoed

many provisions of Yeltsin's 1993 electoral decree, such as the

division of the State Duma seats into party-list and single-member districts. Yeltsin had urged a change in this provision

because he feared that Zhirinovskiy's LDPR might again gain

many seats in the party-list voting, but the Duma had insisted

on retaining the even-split voting procedure that gave such

meaning to the party lists. The 1993 election had demonstrated

that voting by party lists generally encouraged party formation

and program pledges, whereas voting by district encouraged

loyalty by deputies to local interests. The 5 percent threshold

for party-list voting also was retained. In September 1995,

Yeltsin decreed that the Federation Council seats would not be

filled by regional elections; instead, the upper house would be

composed of regional and republic executive and legislative

leaders—a group with which Yeltsin had close contacts and

from which he could expect strong loyalty. All of the suggested

provisions were incorporated into the new election law (see

The Parliament, this ch.).

In anticipation of the legislative races, early in 1995 Yeltsin

encouraged the creation of two political parties that would

lend support to his policies and form the basis of a stable, moderate, two-party system in Russia. One party would be led by

State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin, the other by Chernomyrdin

(who by that time had proven himself a loyal and competent

manager of the Yeltsin agenda). The unnamed "Rybkin bloc" was designed to attract centrist and leftist voters, and Chernomydin's party, Our Home Is Russia, was envisioned as a right417
Russia: A Country Study

center coalition. Both parties would occupy the moderate band

of the political spectrum. Having attracted the support of many

Russian Government ministers and regional leaders, Our

Home Is Russia became known as the "party of power." The

Rybkin bloc, which was supposed to serve as the loyal opposition in the parliament, attracted several tiny parties, but major

parties and groups refused to join the bloc because of opposition to some or all of Yeltsin's reforms. As a result, Rybkin's unification effort received little practical support.

To qualify for the party-list voting, parties were required to obtain 200,000 signatures, with no more than 7 percent of signatures coming from any single federal jurisdiction. The latter requirement was designed to encourage the emergence of

broad-based rather than regionally based parties. Candidates

wishing to run in single-member districts had to obtain signa- tures from at least 1 percent, or about 5,000, of their district's voters. Forty-three parties succeeded in getting on the party-list

ballot, and more than 2,600 candidates were registered in 225

single-member district races. Many individuals listed on the

party ballot also ran in single-member districts. This was especially true of locally popular candidates whose minor parties

could not surpass the 5 percent national threshold needed to get on the national party-list ballot. In the legislative elections of December 1995, voter turnout was high (about 65 percent), and international observers again

evaluated the balloting as largely free and fair. The second such

evaluation in two years boosted the image of electoral democratization in Russia. Dissatisfaction with the Yeltsin administration was conspicuous in the election results, but the showing of

the reformist and centrist parties that supported some or all of

Yeltsin's program was undermined by the disunity of that part

of the political spectrum. Among the forty-three parties participating in the party-list vote, only four met the 5 percent

requirement to win seats for their national party lists, although

several other parties won seats in individual races. In the aggregate of party-list voting, reformists and centrists performed

much better than they did in the single-member phase, receiving almost as many votes as the hard-liners. But pro-reform and

centrist votes were dispersed among a multitude of parties,

negating almost two-thirds of the party-list votes they received

and costing these parties dozens of seats by keeping them

below the 5 percent threshold. In contrast, the KPRF and its

418
Government and Politics

allies suffered much less from such dispersion and gained

many seats from the party-list vote. Although centrists and reformers split single-mandate seats about evenly with the antireform parties, nonaffiliated candidates gained more than one-third of these seats. About 40 percent of the sitting State Duma deputies were reelected, and

fifteen Federation Council deputies entered the State Duma,

providing some continuity of legislative expertise. Under a provision of the new constitution, Government officials were obligated to resign their positions if elected to the parliament.

Overall, reformist parties did not do as well in the 1995 elections as they had in 1993. Gaydar's party, now renamed Russia's

Democratic Choice, failed to meet the 5 percent requirement.

Altogether, reformists and centrists won 129 seats in the State

Duma (less than one-third of the total), and independent,

nominally nonaffiliated candidates won seventy-seven seats (about one-sixth). The KPRF and its ally, the Agrarian Party,

gained 179 seats as the KPRF achieved a plurality of seats, and

the anti-Yeltsin nationalist parties won another sixty-five.

Zhirinovskiy's LDPR received much less electoral support than

in 1993, gaining 11 percent of the vote—a distant second to the

KPRF—and fifty-one seats (see table 26, Appendix).

More than in the 1993 alignment, parties now tended to be

either for or against reform, with former centrists moving

either left or right. In the 1996 State Duma, the main reformist

parties were Chernomyrdin's "official" Our Home Is Russia, the

main advocate of Yeltsin's programs, and Yavlinskiy's Yabloko

coalition, which was highly critical of Yeltsin's approach to reform but supportive of reform principles. The main hardline, antireform parties in the Duma were the KPRF, headed by

Zyuganov, and the LDPR, headed by Zhirinovskiy.

Altogether, in 1996 communist, nationalist, and agrarian

parties controlled slightly more than half the State Duma seats. Their strength enabled them to pass some bills and resolutions

if they voted together, but they still lacked enough votes to override Federation Council votes or presidential vetoes (see

The Executive Branch, this ch.). The numerical proportions

also did not permit antireformists to approve changes in the

constitution, which require a two-thirds majority, that is, at least 300 votes of the full chamber.

Civil Rights

The constitution of 1993 includes a wide range of provisions

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Russia: A Country Study

guaranteeing the civil and human rights of Russia's citizens.

However, inadequacies in the criminal justice system and other

institutional flaws have hindered consistent observance of

those provisions.

General Civil Rights Guarantees

The constitution establishes wide-ranging civil and human

rights and social guarantees, several of which remained unattainable or unrealized in the mid-1990s. Social guarantees have

been difficult to meet because of Russia's persistent economic

crisis. Such guarantees include the right to a minimum wage

and welfare for the "family, mothers, fathers, children, invalids,

and elderly citizens." Protection of unemployed people and the

right to a safe and hygienic work environment also are proclaimed. The right to housing is guaranteed, including free or

low-cost housing for needy people and others. The right to free

health care and secondary-level education is also upheld, in an echo of the promises of Soviet constitutions. Perhaps in recognition of the economic burden of such widely inclusive state social guarantees, the constitution calls for adult children to care for disabled parents, and it safeguards the existence of private charitable and insurance operations, which were forbidden or discouraged under the Soviet system.

Equality before the law is proclaimed regardless of sex, race,

nationality, language, national origin, property and position,

ideological conviction, membership in public associations, and

other attributes and circumstances. Freedom of religion and

conscience is upheld, and alternatives to military service are to be accepted, although neither the law in force nor military

practice has upheld the latter provision. Individual privacy is protected, including that of correspondence and other communications and of housing. Nationality rights are upheld,

including the right to use a language other than Russian in

communications and education. The constitution asserts freedom of internal and foreign travel and the right to choose

one's place of domicile. No one may be expelled or exiled from

Russia. Freedom of the press is upheld, and censorship is prohibited. People have the right to assemble peaceably and to hold peaceful meetings and demonstrations of all types. The

right to own, dispose of, and inherit private property, including

land, is upheld, and private property may not be expropriated

except with full compensation.

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Government and Politics

Constitutionally guaranteed civil rights may only be

restricted upon the legal proclamation of a national or local

state of emergency. Even in a state of emergency, however, the

constitution prescribes that no one may be tortured or denied

judicial rights, although an individual may be held for an

unspecified period without being charged. The right of dual

citizenship for ethnic Russians residing in the near abroad (the

other fourteen former republics of the Soviet Union) is proclaimed. Presumably, such a right also exists for non-Russians

residing in Russia. The constitution also includes a pledge that

Russia will protect its citizens abroad. However, most member

nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

have resisted Russia's demand that they grant ethnic Russians

such dual citizenship, viewing it as an infringement on their

sovereignty (see Migration, ch. 3).

Massive civil and human rights violations have been committed in the Republic of Chechnya by Russian military units as well as by Chechen guerrillas, resulting in tens of thousands of

deaths and injuries and the displacement of more than 300,000

people. Official human rights monitoring of the conflict was undermined in 1995 when the State Duma dismissed human

rights activist Sergey Kovalev as its ombudsman for human

rights. Kovalev was removed because of his strident condemnation of Russian military and police atrocities in Chechnya.

Kovalev resigned as chairman of the presidential Human

Rights Commission in January 1996, accusing Yeltsin of backtracking on human rights in Chechnya and throughout Russia.

No figure of similar stature had filled Kovalev's position as of

mid-1996.

Criminal Justice Protections

According to Russia's 1993 constitution, the death penalty is applicable to some crimes "until its abolition" by federal law. Although the annual number of executions reportedly had

decreased by mid-1996, the public outcry at Russia's growing

crime wave made the death penalty a politically sensitive issue. In cases where the death penalty may be applied, the accused is guaranteed the right to trial by jury, although this provision was only partly in force in the mid-1990s (see How the System

Works, ch. 10). A condition of Russia's admittance to the Council of Europe (see Glossary), which it achieved in January 1996, was abolition of the death penalty within three years. Much

421
Russia: A Country Study

international pressure was applied toward that end both before

and after Russia was approved for council membership.

For all types of crime, punishment without trial and prosecution ex post facto are forbidden. The constitution also bars tor- ture and other "brutal or humiliating" treatment and

punishment. Citizens have nominal protection against arbitrary arrest without a judicial decision, and they may not be

held for more than forty-eight hours without being charged,

except in a state of emergency. However, this constitutional

provision has been directly contravened by Yeltsin's 1994

decree on combating organized crime, which allows police to detain persons suspected of involvement with organized crime

for as much as thirty days without a criminal charge and without access to a lawyer. This decree was used widely in 1995 to detain persons without judicial permission beyond the mandated maximum period. Russian human rights monitors

reported in 1995 that the few detainees who were aware of

their rights and complained of violations were subject to beatings. Nonetheless, about one in six cases of arrest was appealed

to the courts in 1995, and judges released one in six of those

on grounds of insufficient evidence or breach of procedure

(see Criminal Law Reform in the 1990s, ch. 10).

According to the constitution, judicial sentences may be

appealed to higher courts, as may decisions of government

organs at all levels. Those organs may be sued for damages

caused by action or inaction. Nominally, all citizens are guaranteed their "day in court," have the right to choose their own

defense counsel, or may be provided with free legal counsel if required. Legal aid may be requested from the earliest

moment a person is detained, placed in custody, or indicted, a change from previous practice whereby the individual could

receive counsel only upon being formally charged and after

being interrogated. Few citizens are aware of these rights, however. A person is considered innocent until proven guilty, but

where jury trials do not occur, the accused generally are expected to prove their innocence rather than defend themselves against prosecutors' efforts to prove their guilt. In cases where a judge imposes sentence, the average rate of conviction

is more than 99 percent, as opposed to an 84 percent conviction rate injury trials. The Media

For most of the Soviet era, the news media were under full

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Government and Politics

state control. The major newspapers, such as Pravda, Izvestiya,

Krasnaya zvezda, and Komsomol'skaya pravda, were the official

organs of party or government agencies, and radio and televi- sion were state monopolies. In the late 1980s, these monopolies began to weaken as stories such as the Chernobyl' disaster

reached the public in detail, an occurrence that would not

have been possible before glasnost. Then, after seventy-five

years of state control, the media began an era of significantly

less restricted activity in 1992.

In the post-Soviet era, the news media have played a central

role in forming public opinion toward critical national concerns, including the Chechnya conflict, the economic crisis,

and government policies and personalities. In the environment

of freewheeling expression of opinion, public figures such as Boris Yeltsin and government actions such as the Chechnya

campaign have received ruthless criticism, and the deterioration of Russia's environment, public health, national defense,

and national economy has been exposed thoroughly, if not

always accurately. However, the national and local governments

have exerted heavy pressure on the print and broadcast media

to alter coverage of certain issues. Because most media enterprises continue to depend on government support, such pres- sure often has been effective.

The Print Media

In the first post-Soviet years, major newspapers presented

varied approaches to critical issues. Among the most influential

titles were Izvestiya (in Soviet times, the organ of the Politburo,

but after 1991 an independent periodical owned by its employees, with a daily circulation in 1995 of about 604,765); Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1995 daily circulation about 50,400; and the weekly

Argumenty ifakty (1995 circulation about 3.2 million) (see table

27, Appendix). But by the mid-1990s, a new atmosphere of

intense competition was bringing rapid change to the print

media. In 1995 an estimated 10,000 newspapers and periodicals were registered, including more than twenty daily newspapers published in Moscow. The thousands of small regional

newspapers that appeared after 1991 were plagued by low

advertising revenue, high production costs, an increasingly

apathetic public, and intense pressure from local authorities to slant content. But in the mid-1990s, local newspapers gained

readers because of increased regional independence; they also

benefited from the competition that television gave to national

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Russia: A Country Study

newspapers in providing the regions with news from Moscow

and the rest of the world.

In 1995 the Moscow daily Nezavisimaya gazeta, which for five years remained true to its name (the independent newspaper)

by refusing advertising and state subsidies, was forced to close

because circulation had dropped to about 35,000 and many

top journalists had left for more lucrative positions. The paper

subsequently resumed publication under the ownership of a

large bank consortium (the Unified Bank) with close ties to the

Government. Pravda, formerly the main organ of the CPSU

and still representing antireform positions, underwent numerous crises in the early and mid-1990s. Purchased by a Greek

publishing firm in 1992, its circulation dropped from about 10

million in the 1980s to around 165,000 in 1995. After changing

its name to Pravda 5 in mid-1996, the newspaper broadened its procommunist position somewhat. The decline of Pravda left Sovetskaya Rossiya and Zavtra as the chief organs of the antireform faction of the legislature.

Official organs still have a place in the media, however;

Rossiyskaya gazeta, the heavily subsidized organ of the Government, publishes most of that body's official documents, including laws and decrees. Rossiyskiye vesti, organ of the office of the

president, reaches about 150,000 Russians daily. Both newspapers feature strongly pro-Government positions. The third offi- cial national newspaper, Krasnaya zvezda, representing the

Ministry of Defense, acquired a reputation in the 1990s as strongly pro-Yeltsin.

Although Russia's newspapers offer readers diverse opinions

on most issues, the quality of Russian journalism remains rela- tively low, and objectivity is random. Journalists generally do

not verify their sources fully or are denied access to relevant

individuals. A 1995 official report on press freedom indicated

that reporters without special connections have no better

access to state officials than their counterparts did in the Soviet

era. Most newspapers make no clear distinction between objective reports and editorials, and, according to a 1995 report by

the trade magazine Zhurnalist, most have some connection to a

political party or faction.

The Broadcast Media

In 1992 some 48.5 million radios were in use in Russia.

Domestic radio programming is provided by two state communications companies, the Federal Television and Radio Service

424
Government and Politics

of Russia and the All-Russian Television and Radio Company.

The Voice of Russia (Golos Rossii) is the main foreign-language

broadcast service, providing programs in thirty languages,

including Arabic, Chinese, English, Japanese, Farsi, and Spanish.In the 1990s, television reached an increasing number of

Russians with increasingly diversified programming. In 1992

about 55 million televisions were in use. For most Russians,

television is the chief source of news. Television channels and

transmission facilities gradually have been privatized, although

in 1996 the most prominent "private" stockholders were entre- preneurs with strong ties to the Yeltsin administration. The

largest of the four major networks, Russian Public Television

(Obshchestvennoye rossiyskoye televideniye—ORT, formerly

Ostankino), which reaches an estimated 200 million people,

remained 51 percent state-owned after partial privatization in

1994. However, ORT has offered regular programs, such as one

hosted by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, that are critical of the Government. ORT's news broadcasts tend to favor Government

policies.

The second-largest network, the All-Russian Television and

Radio Company (Vserossiyskaya gosudarstvennaya teleradiokompaniya, commonly called Russia Television—RTV), was

fully state-owned in 1996 and reaches about 140 million viewers

with relatively balanced news coverage. The largest private net- work is Independent Television (Nezavisimoye televideniye

NTV), which reaches about 100 million people. NTV has

received praise in the West for unbiased news reporting. Its Chechnya coverage forced other networks to abandon proGovernment reporting of the conflict. The TV-6 commercial

network brings its estimated 70 million viewers in European

Russia mainly entertainment programs. Its founder, Eduard

Sagalayev, was strongly influenced by an earlier partnership

with United States communications magnate Ted Turner.

Besides the four networks, state-run channels are offered in

every region, and an estimated 400 private television stations were in operation in 1995. More than half of such stations produce their own news broadcasts, providing mainly local rather

than national or international coverage. The Independent

Broadcasting System was established in 1994 to link some fifty

stations with shared programming.

By 1995 the administration of state television had become

heavily politicized. After the 1995 legislative elections, Yeltsin

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Russia: A Country Study

dismissed Oleg Poptsov, the head of RTV, for having aired what

the president considered unfairly negative coverage of his

administration. In exerting such overt political pressure,

Yeltsin likely had in mind the prominent role television would

play in the 1996 presidential election. In fact, all candidates in

that election were represented in an unprecedented wave of

televised campaign advertising, some of which was quite similar

to that in the United States and little of which provided useful

information to voters. Convinced that their independence

would be jeopardized if KPRF candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov

won, television broadcasters provided virtually no coverage of

his main campaign events, and even the independent NTV

aided Yeltsin by muting its criticism during the election. Criti- cal coverage of the Chechen conflict and other issues resumed

once Yeltsin's reelection seemed assured, however.

The Political Outlook

Russia's political culture made long strides toward democracy in the first five years of the post-Soviet era. By mid-1996

numerous political parties with widely varying agendas and

viewpoints had participated in three free national elections

two legislative, one presidential. Although the sitting president

enjoyed a distinct advantage in media coverage, all sides agreed

after the 1996 election that the people had spoken. Observers

noted the similarity of the 1996 campaign to those in the West,

including barnstorming speeches, generous promises to special interests, and ample use of "photo opportunities." Never in

the history of Russia had a head of state been subjected to open public evaluation and then been peacefully assured of a new term in power. Certainly this was a complete reversal of the

Soviet Union's programmed, one-party political rituals. Although the process of choosing a leader has been democratized, the process of governance remains a hybrid of Soviet

and Western practices. The first administration of Boris Yeltsin was a combination of bold democratic initiatives and secretive

decision making by committees and individuals beyond public

view and responsibility. As criticism of Yeltsin grew in 1993 and

1994, his hold on power depended increasingly on presidential

decrees rather than on open consultation with other branches

of government or with the Russian people. Yeltsin's relatively

easy reelection in mid-1996 fueled hopes that a second administration would revive some of the democratic processes that

had enthused Russians as Yeltsin struggled with Gorbachev for

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Government and Politics

Russia's sovereignty before the demise of the Soviet Union. As a

leader, however, Yeltsin showed little interest in the routine of

day-to-day governance, and he often exercised poor judgment

in delegating authority. Meanwhile, a formidable array of antireform factions retained their power base in the State Duma,

and Yeltsin's precarious health further endangered the continuation of his reform program.

According to many analysts, the long-term well-being of Russia's political system will be determined by the next generation

of political figures, who will not have been schooled in Sovietstyle power politics. The question is how well democratic insti- tutions will fare in the meantime.

* * *

Richard Sakwa covers Russian politics since the collapse of

the Soviet Union in his textbook Russian Politics and Society.

Boris Yeltsin offers an account of his forcible dissolution of the

legislature in October 1993 and other Russian political events

in The Strugglefor Russia. Among books with useful sections on

Russian politics are After the Soviet Union: From Empire to Nation,

edited by Timothy J. Colton and Robert Legvold, and Russia

and the New States ofEurasia by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Prognoses of the future of reform in Russia are given in

Anders Aslund's "Russia's Success Story," the "Russia Symposium" in the Journal ofDemocracy on the theme "Is Russian

Democracy Doomed?," and Russia 2010 by Daniel Yergin and

Thane Gustafson. Informative articles on federalism and local

politics include Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham's "The

Russian Federation's Fight for Survival," Paul B. Henze's "Ethnic Dynamics and Dilemmas of the Russian Republic," and

Robert Sharlet's "The Prospects for Federalism in Russian Constitutional Politics." In her article "Wrestling Political and

Financial Repression," Laura Belin describes the situation of

Russia's print and broadcast media in the mid-1990s. Information on current events in government and politics is provided

by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report:

Central Eurasia, the Open Media Research Institute's journal

Transition, and the Jamestown Foundation's Prism, a monthly

bulletin on Russia and the CIS. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

427

Chapter 8. Foreign Relations
Alyonushka, an orphan, -with her little brother, Ivanushka, who has turned

into a goat (design from lacquer box made in village ofFedoskino)
ONCE A PARIAH DENIED DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION by

most countries, the Soviet Union progressed from being an

outsider in international organizations and negotiations during the interwar period to being one of the arbiters of Europe's

fate after World War II. The Soviet Union had official relations

with the majority of nations by the late 1980s. In the 1970s,

after achieving rough nuclear parity with the United States, the

Soviet Union proclaimed that its own involvement was essential

to the solution of any major international problem. At that

time, regimes in countries containing about one-quarter of the

world's population emulated the socialist form of political and

economic organization proselytized by the Soviet Union. That

web of influence was built upon the political doctrine of class struggle and the geopolitical philosophy of a proletarian internationalism that would link together the workers of the world.

Although the spirit of those concepts remained at the base of

the Soviet Union's international attitudes even in 1991, pragmatic considerations often were the primary determinants of

policy in specific cases. Among the many bureaucracies involved in the formation

and execution of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU—see Glossary)

determined the major policy guidelines. The foremost objectives of that foreign policy were the maintenance and enhancement of national security and the maintenance of the

hegemony gained over Eastern Europe following World War II. Relations with the United States and with Western Europe also were of major concern; the strategic significance of individual

nations in the so-called Third World of developing nations

determined, at least partly, the relations with those nations.

The Twenty-Seventh Party Congress of the CPSU in 1986

produced the last formal enumeration of Soviet foreign policy

goals. That listing included ensuring favorable external conditions for building communism in the Soviet Union; eliminating

the threat of world war; disarmament; strengthening the

"world socialist system"; developing equal and friendly relations

with so-called liberated (Third World) countries; peaceful

coexistence with capitalist countries; and solidarity with communist and revolutionary-democratic parties, the international

workers' movement, and national liberation struggles.

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Russia: A Country Study

In the years that followed, the emphasis and ranking of these

priorities changed in response to domestic and international

stimuli. After Mikhail S. Gorbachev assumed power as GPSU

general secretary in 1985, for instance, some Western analysts

discerned in the ranking of priorities a deemphasis of Soviet

support for national liberation movements. As such shifts

occurred, two basic goals of Soviet foreign policy remained

constant: national security (safeguarding CPSU rule at home

and maintenance of adequate military forces) and influence

over Eastern Europe.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia claimed to be

the legal successor to Soviet foreign policies. That position

would allow Russia to assume a ready-made role as a leading

world power. At the outset, Russia accepted or built upon many

tenets of the conciliatory foreign policy toward the West of

Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, who had termed his revised

policy "New Thinking." New Thinking defined international

politics in common ethical and moral terms rather than military force, largely abandoning the Marxist-Leninist (see Glossary) idea that peaceful coexistence was merely a breathing

spell in the worldwide class war. The most important practical

result of Gorbachev's approach came in 1989 with the release

of the Soviet Union's forty-four-year hold on the states of East- ern Europe. Superpower competition between the Soviet

Union and the United States, known as the Cold War, gave way

to increased cooperation with the United States on issues such

as arms reduction, peace in the Middle East, and the Persian

Gulf War.

In the early period after Russia became independent, Russian foreign policy built upon Gorbachev's legacy by decisively

repudiating Marxism-Leninism as a putative guide to action,

emphasizing cooperation with the West in solving regional and

global problems, and soliciting economic and humanitarian

aid from the West in support of internal reforms. In that early

period, Russian foreign policy defended itself against arguments from former communists and ultranationalists that Russia had capitulated to the West and should renounce

entanglements such as Western foreign aid. Russia also faced

the challenge of reconciling the international commitments

and obligations it inherited from the former Soviet Union with

new and sometimes conflicting Russian interests, such as the

desire to sell arms and missile technology abroad. Although

Russia's leaders described Europe as its natural ally, they grap432
Foreign Relations

pled with defining new relations with the East European (now

termed Central European) states, the new states formed upon

the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and Western Europe. In Asia,

Russia faced territorial claims from China and Japan at the

same time that closer Russian relations with these states and

the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Taiwan became possible. Several challenges emerged in Russia's relations with the

fourteen other former Soviet republics, now called the "near

abroad." Among the most serious confrontations were Russia's

dispute with Ukraine over the status of Crimea, long and complicated conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan and within

Georgia, and numerous new economic frictions. The problem

of discrimination and ethnic violence against the 25 million

ethnic Russians living in the new states was a growing concern

in relations with several of the former Soviet republics, especially those in Central Asia. Russia also faced adapting to and

competing with changing regional politics along its borders,

such as the growing ties between the Central Asian states and

Iran and Turkey (see Federal Border Service and Border Security, ch. 10).

The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) of

the Soviet Union began developing a separate foreign policy

and diplomacy some time before the collapse of the Soviet

Union at the end of 1991. The Russian Republic had possessed

a foreign ministry and the "right" to conduct foreign policy

since the 1936 Soviet constitution was amended in 1944. This

power remained undeveloped, however, until the election of

Boris N. Yeltsin as president of Russia and Russia's declaration

of sovereignty in June 1990. Among the foreign policy institutions and procedures that emerged in Russia in this early

period, some paralleled and others competed with those of the

Soviet Union.

Recognized by world states and international organizations

as the Soviet Union's successor state after its collapse, Russia

aggressively assumed Soviet assets and most of the Soviet

Union's treaty obligations. The assets included diplomatic

properties worldwide and a large portion of the existing diplomatic personnel staffing those posts. Most foreign states simply

reassigned their ambassadors from the Soviet Union to Russia,

and international organizations allowed Russia to assume the

Soviet seat. Most notably, Russia took over the permanent seat

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Russia: A Country Study

of the Soviet Union in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which allowed it to join the elite power group with Britain,

China, France, and the United States. The Search for Objectives

In early 1992, Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev

announced that Russian foreign policy would differ from foreign policy under Gorbachev's New Thinking because democratic principles would drive it. These principles would provide

a solid basis for peaceful policies. Kozyrev also stressed that the

basis for the new foreign policy would be Russia's national

interests rather than the so-called international class interests

that theoretically underlay Soviet foreign policy. For two years

(1992-93), Russian foreign policy was generally low key and

conciliatory toward the West with endorsement of many West- ern foreign policy positions on world conflicts. Pressing domestic problems were a major determinant of this direction.

Kozyrev argued that good relations with the West were possible

because "no developed, democratic, civil society . . . can

threaten us." Domestic politics placed increasing pressure on this proWestern and generally benign attitude. Bureaucratic infighting

broke out in the government over foreign policy goals and the

means of implementing them, and the same questions stimulated a major conflict between the legislative and executive

branches of power. In this period, conflict and confusion exac- erbated or triggered foreign policy problems with Ukraine,

Japan, and the former Yugoslavia.

The lack of clarity in many aspects of foreign policy also

reflected opposing Russian viewpoints over Russia's place in

the world. Public debates raged over whether Russia should ori- ent itself toward the West or the East, whether Russia was still a superpower, and what the intentions of the West were toward

Russia—all indicating Russia's general search for a new identity

to replace the accepted truths of Marxism-Leninism and the

Cold War. In the debate, ultranationalists and communists

strongly criticized what they viewed as pro-Western policies and

argued that close relations with the West constituted a danger

to Russia's national security because the West remained Russia's

chief enemy. As early as December 1990, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze had cited harsh criticism of his conciliatory position toward the West as a major reason for his

resignation.

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Foreign Relations

To allay Russians' broad uncertainty about their country's

place in the world, in early 1992 Kozyrev presented the

Supreme Soviet (parliament) with his concept of three main

foreign policy objectives, but the conservative legislators did

not accept them. In January 1993, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs prepared another draft, which also met substantial criti- cism. Finally, in April 1993, the newly created Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission of the Security Council finalized a foreign policy concept that the parliament approved (see

The Security Council, this ch.).

According to the 1993 foreign policy concept, Russia is a great power with several foreign policy priorities: ensuring

national security through diplomacy; protecting the sover- eignty and unity of the state, with special emphasis on border

stability; protecting the rights of Russians abroad; providing

favorable external conditions for internal democratic reforms;

mobilizing international assistance for the establishment of a Russian market economy and assisting Russian exporters; fur- thering integration of the Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS—see Glossary) and pursuing beneficial relations

with other nearby foreign states, including those in Central

Europe; continuing to build relations with countries that have

resolved problems similar to those that Russia faces; and ensur- ing Russia an active role as a great power. The concept also

called for enhanced ties with Asian Pacific countries to balance

relations with the West. Beginning in 1993, public statements

about foreign policy placed greater emphasis on the protection

of Russia's vital interests and less emphasis on openly pro-West- ern policies.

The 1993 concept disclosed a dispute between liberals and

conservatives over the nature of Russian foreign policy toward

the CIS. Liberals warned of the great human and material costs Russia would be forced to shoulder if it reabsorbed the former

Soviet republics, a step the conservatives increasingly advocated in the 1990s. Liberals argued that Russia could be a great

power without pursuing that policy. Both liberals and conservatives agreed, however, that Russia should play an active role in

safeguarding the human rights of the 25 million ethnic Russians who found themselves in a foreign country for the first time after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The 1993 foreign-policy concept called for strengthening a

"unified military strategic space" in the CIS and protecting Russia's major interests there. It warned that a third state's military435
Russia: A Country Study

political presence in the CIS, or actions among the CIS states such as creation of an economic or religious bloc of Central

Asian states, could negatively affect Russia's interests. In the

case of Central Asia, this would occur if ethnic Russians were

forced to flee the region. On a somewhat more liberal note

that showed its compromise quality, the concept recognized

that intraregional cooperation could have positive results and

that Russia should react to each effort individually. The primacy of relations with the CIS was strengthened after the

December 1993 Russian legislative elections, in which nationalist factions expanded their power base.

For the conservatives, Russian dominance was necessary to secure southern borders and to ensure continued access to the

waterways, ports, and natural resources of the newly independent states. Some conservatives asserted that Russia's military

security required a line of defense outside Russia's own borders

and along the borders of the former Soviet Union (and even, according to some, including a "neutral" Central Europe) (see

The Geopolitical Context, ch. 9) . A related position called for

Russia to counter efforts by countries such as Turkey and Iran

to gain influence in the new states. Some Western observers suggested that the characteristic

positions of Russian conservatives and liberals regarding the near abroad differed only in the degree of hegemony they

demanded that Russia have over the CIS states. These observers also saw Russia engaging in a two-sided foreign policy that

distinguished policy toward the near abroad from policy

toward the rest of the world (see The Near Abroad, this ch.).

The 1993 concept and a new military doctrine were to be

parts of an all-inclusive Russian national security concept. In

April 1996, the Yeltsin government announced a draft national

security concept. That document included the seemingly progressive renunciation of strategic and military parity with the

United States, reaffirmation of collective security within the

CIS, and support for reductions in nuclear arsenals and domestic military reforms. Ratification of the new concept was subject

to the political events of mid-1996, including the presidential

election.

The State of the Federation Speeches

In February 1994, Yeltsin outlined Russia's foreign policy in

his first state of the federation address to the Russian parliament, as the 1993 constitution required. Yeltsin's address to the

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more nationalistic legislative body that had just been elected

called for a more assertive Russian foreign policy. However,

Yeltsin showed the still inchoate and even contradictory character of Russian foreign policy by making several references to

conciliatory, Western-oriented policies.

Yeltsin noted that as a great country, Russia had its own for- eign policy priorities to pursue, including prevention of cold or hot global war by preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By mentioning the possibility of global war, he supported the view of the Russian military and other conservative and hard-line groups that the United States and the West

remain a threat. Yeltsin voiced support for the Partnership for

Peace (PfP—see Glossary) program of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) and opposition to the expansion of NATO to include Central European states without including Russia (see Western Europe, this ch.). On

international economic matters, Yeltsin called for quick

removal of obstacles to trade with the West and for making the

CIS into an economic union with a common market as well as a common security system and guarantees on human rights. As a warning to those calling for reconstituting the empire, he

stated that such integration should not damage Russia by

depleting the nation's material and financial resources.

Yeltsin's February 1995 state of the federation address did

not repeat the contradictory and sometimes harsh tone of the

1994 speech. Yeltsin broadly depicted a cooperative and conciliatory Russian foreign policy, but he offered few details on policy toward specific countries or regions. Yeltsin outlined

Russia's cooperation with the Group of Seven (G-7; see Glossary) of top world economic powers, the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE—see Glossary),

the UN, and NATO; the need for Russia to adhere to arms control agreements; and reductions in Russian armed forces.

Despite his broadly conciliatory attitude toward the West and

his general support of world cooperation, Yeltsin still objected

to NATO enlargement as a threat to European security.

Some political analysts in the West suggested that the 1995

speech was an attempt to reassure the world of Russia's peaceful foreign policy in the wake of its widely censured attempt to suppress separatism in the Republic of Chechnya in December

1994 (see Movements Toward Sovereignty, ch. 4). Later in

1995, arguing that the West was wrong to fear Moscow's intentions toward Central Europe, Yeltsin announced that in 1995

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Russia: A Country Study

Russian foreign policy would be nonconfrontational and would

follow the principle of "real partnership in all directions" with

the United States, Europe, China, India, Japan, and Latin

America. The priorities of this stance would be enhanced interaction with the CIS states and partnership with the United

States on the basis of a "balance of interests."

The February 1996 state of the federation speech occurred

just after the convocation of the Federal Assembly (parliament)

following the December legislative elections and a few months

before the June 1996 presidential election. The legislative elections brought substantial gains for the Communist Party of the

Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiyskoy

Federatsii—KPRF) and losses for reformists, which indicated

deep discontent with the Yeltsin administration. Under these

conditions, Yeltsin gave foreign policy only brief mention in his

February speech. He noted that there had been problems in

defining Russia's foreign policy priorities and in matching policy to execution. He vaguely promised a more realistic and

pragmatic policy that would support Russia's national interests.

Yeltsin singled out NATO enlargement, efforts against Russian

interests in the CIS, conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and controversies over the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE

Treaty—see Glossary) and the Anti-Ballistic MissileTreaty

(ABM Treaty—see Glossary) as persisting problems of Russia's

foreign policy.

Despite these problems, Yeltsin emphasized that his foreign

policy had scored several major achievements, including moves

toward further integration of the CIS. Repeating statements

from the 1995 speech, he noted that Russia's strategic arms

control and security agreements ensured that the country

faced no real military or nuclear threat. He argued that such

security gains made Russia's signing of the second Strategic

Arms Reduction Treaty (START II—see Glossary) advisable.

He praised United States and Russian cooperation in extending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT—see Glossary),

and he noted the international prestige that Russia had gained

through participation in meetings of the G-7, membership in

the Council of Europe (see Glossary), and new ties with China

and the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) and the Persian Gulf.

The Foreign Policy Mechanism

In the Soviet system, the predominant foreign policy actor

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was the general secretary of the CPSU, who also was the preeminent figure in the party's Politburo (the highest executive

body of the government). By virtue of this position, the general

secretary also was the country's recognized foreign representative. Other Politburo members with major foreign policy

responsibility were the ministers of foreign affairs and defense

(always members of the Politburo), the chairman of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti—KGB; see Glossary), and the chief of the CPSU's

International Department. The minister of foreign economic

relations had foreign policy responsibility in commercial relations, and other members of the Council of Ministers provided

input when their specific areas involved foreign affairs. In 1988 constitutional revisions gave the Supreme Soviet, the

Soviet Union's national parliament, new powers to oversee for- eign policy and some input in policy formulation. The centralization of foreign policy decision making in the Politburo,

together with the long tenure of its members, contributed to the Soviet Union's ability to plan and guide foreign policy over long periods with a constancy lacking in pluralistic political sys- tems. When a large part of the Soviet Union's foreign policy functions devolved to Russia in 1992, the Soviet pattern of centralizing foreign policy continued. The Russian constitution of 1993

gives the executive branch the chief role in making foreign policy, with the legislative branch occupying a distinctly subsidiary

role. In the years since 1993, President Yeltsin has formed vari- ous organizations in the executive branch to assist him in for- mulating foreign policy. The mechanism of policy making has

remained unwieldy, however, and the increasingly nationalistic

parliament has used every power it commands to influence policy making.

The President

Under the provisions of the 1993 constitution, the president

exercises leadership in forming foreign policy, represents Russia in international relations, conducts talks and signs international treaties, forms and heads the Security Council, approves

military doctrine, delivers annual messages to the parliament

on foreign policy, appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives (after consultation with committees or commissions of the

parliament), and accepts credentials and letters of recall from

foreign diplomats.

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Russia: A Country Study

Between 1992 and 1996, there were indications that Yeltsin

made important foreign policy decisions with little or no consultation with other officials of his administration or with the

legislative branch. In that period, the size of the presidential

apparatus steadily increased until it reportedly numbered sev- eral thousand staffers, including a Security Council staff of

hundreds (see The Executive Branch, ch. 7). At the end of

1993, Yeltsin appointed a national security adviser who established his own staff, and during 1995 the Presidential Security

Service, under the direction of Aleksandr Korzhakov, apparently also assumed some responsibility for foreign policy analysis. According to some observers, the vast size of the

presidential apparatus exacerbated the confused and unwieldy

formulation and implementation of foreign policy. In the early

1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came directly under presidential control, which further enhanced presidential power.

The Security Council

The function of the Russian Security Council is somewhat

similar to that of the Defense Council that Nikita S. Khrushchev (in office 1953-64) created. Khrushchev's successor, Leonid I. Brezhnev (in office 1964-82), had retained the

Defense Council as a consultative body on foreign policy and

defense security, and this role was codified in the 1977 Soviet

constitution. Gorbachev replaced the Defense Council in 1990,

first by the Presidential Council and then by the Security Council.After its statutory establishment in mid-1992, the Russian

Security Council became part of Yeltsin's presidential apparatus. To distinguish his Security Council from earlier councils,

Yeltsin presented the new body as an open organization that

would obey the constitution and other laws and would work

closely with executive and legislative bodies. He said the new

council was based partly on that of the United States National

Security Council. By statute, the Security Council is a consultative rather than decision-making body. It has the authority to prepare decisions for the president on military policy, protection of civil rights, internal and external security, and foreign

policy issues, and it has the power to conduct basic research,

long-range planning, and coordination of other executivebranch efforts in the foreign policy realm.

The Security Council's founding statute stipulates that vot- ing members include the president, the vice president, the

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Foreign Relations

prime minister, the first deputy chairman of the Supreme

Soviet, and the secretary of the council. It also includes nonvoting members from the Government (Russia's cabinet), including the ministers or chiefs of defense, internal affairs, foreign

affairs, security, foreign intelligence, justice, and others. Other

officials and foreign policy experts, including the chairman of

the Supreme Soviet, also are invited to participate in council

sessions. By statute the Security Council is to meet at least once

a month. The 1993 constitution makes formation of the council the prerogative of the president, who is to be its chairman.

In February 1994, Yeltsin reapportioned the membership of

the council, giving additional influence to defense, internal

affairs, justice, civil defense, security, foreign intelligence, and

foreign affairs bureaucracies. Another adjustment in mid-1994

included the heads of both chambers of the new Federal

Assembly and the head of the Federal Border Service. In 1995

Yeltsin added the minister of atomic energy to the council.

After the election of a heavily antireformist parliament in

December 1995, Yeltsin announced that the speakers of the

two chambers of the Federal Assembly would be excluded from

membership in the Security Council.

Some Russian commentators complained that the methods

of the Security Council under its first secretary, Yuriy Skokov, were authoritarian, secretive, and antireformist. In early 1993, a major rift occurred between the Security Council and Yeltsin.

Skokov led the council in opposing Yeltsin's attempt to declare a so-called special rule for the executive branch as a means of

circumventing an executive-legislative deadlock and forcing

legislative elections. After Yeltsin won this power struggle

against the parliament, he felt strong enough to replace

Skokov as secretary of the council. He named Oleg Lobov as secretary in September 1993, and Lobov served until Aleksandr Lebed' replaced him in June 1996.

The Security Council reportedly has played an important

role in several vital foreign policy decisions. In September

1992, after an outcry from the Security Council over possible

concessions to Japan on the issue of possession of the Kuril

Islands, Yeltsin canceled a planned visit to Japan (see Japan,

this ch.). In 1993 the Security Council's Interdepartmental For- eign Policy Commission (IFPC) reworked Foreign Minister

Kozyrev's foreign policy concept to make it more conservative.

The IFPC also appeared to be influential in Russian troop withdrawal policy in the Baltic states, which concluded in mid-1994.

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Russia: A Country Study

The Security Council's agenda also reportedly included deliberations on United States-Russian relations, nuclear arms

reduction, ethnic relations within Russia, crime fighting, and

relations with the former Soviet republics. On many issues,

however, the council apparently failed to conciliate opposing

positions of the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, and

the council's overall influence appeared to wane after Skokov's

dismissal. In December 1994, the council rubber-stamped

Yeltsin's decision to send Russian security forces into Chechnya, and it invariably approved his policies there during 1995

and early 1996. Major questions remained about the quality of

debate in the council because military and police authorities

may not have furnished Yeltsin with complete information on

operations in Chechnya during this period. The council likely

had become moribund as a consultative body before Lebed'

attempted to revitalize its role in 1996.

The Security Council contains various subdepartments and

committees. Most significant to foreign policy formation is the

IFPC, which was created in December 1992. The IFPC analyzes

and forecasts information on foreign policy for the president.

Creation of the IFPC coincided with increased opposition to Kozyrev's conduct of foreign policy and to Yeltsin's pro-Western

policies. In 1993 the IFPC attempted to block Kozyrev's proWestern foreign policies and urged a more "imperial" foreign

policy toward the near abroad. After 1993, however, the IFPC

appeared more amenable to the foreign ministry's policies.

The Parliament

During the first two years of Russia's independence, the Russian parliament's foreign policy powers were a matter of contention with the executive branch. This discord was part of a broader legislative-executive branch standoff that culminated

in Yeltsin's forced takeover of the legislative building—the so- called White House—in early October 1993 and his rule by

decree until December. In 1992-93 the parliament still derived

its power from the 1978 constitution of the Russian Republic

and numerous amendments to that document. Its foreign policy prerogatives included the right to ratify or abrogate international treaties, to confirm or recall diplomats serving abroad,

to approve or reject the deployment of armed forces to areas of

conflict abroad, and to approve the general direction of foreign policy.

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Foreign Relations

In this period, the parliament increasingly attempted to widen its foreign policy prerogatives in opposition to official

policies. These efforts included attempts to influence Russia's

votes in the UN Security Council on economic and military

sanctions against the former Yugoslavia, an open letter decrying Yeltsin's planned September 1992 visit to Japan, ajuly 1993

resolution declaring the Crimean city of Sevastopol' a Russian

port although it is located in Ukrainian territory, and denunciation of United States aerial bombing of Iraq in 1993. Kozyrev

tried to work with the International Affairs Committee of the

Supreme Soviet and its successor, the State Duma, on several of

those issues, but legislative criticism became increasingly stri- dent in the period before Yeltsin forcibly dissolved the parliament in September 1993.

The 1993 constitution substantially reduced the parliament's

foreign policy powers. The State Duma retained broad responsibility for adopting laws on foreign policy, but the constitution

stipulated no specific foreign policy duties for the legislative

branch. The constitution gave the Federation Council, the

upper house of parliament, the responsibility for deciding on

the use of troops abroad and reviewing State Duma ratification

and denunciation of international treaties and Duma decisions

on war and peace. In January 1994, the newly elected parliament established committees dealing with foreign policy issues,

including a Committee on Geopolitics with a member of hardliner Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia as chairman. Vladimir Lukin returned from his post as ambassador to the United States to head the Duma's International Affairs Committee, which worked in 1994 with Kozyrev

and Yeltsin to forge a more conservative consensus on foreign

policy issues. After remaining relatively quiescent on foreign policy matters in 1994, the parliament stepped up its criticism of Government policy in 1995. Four State Duma committees investigated

Ministry of Foreign Affairs policies toward the near abroad,

Asia, and the West, timing their queries to enhance electoral

prospects for anti-Yeltsin deputies in the December legislative

elections. In September 1995, the State Duma called for Russia

to unilaterally lift UN-approved economic sanctions against

Serbia; then it demanded that Yeltsin condemn NATO air

strikes against Bosnian Serb targets and convened a special ses- sion to debate Russian policy toward the former Yugoslavia. In

that session, ultranationalist and communist deputies called for

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Russia: A Country Study

Kozyrev's resignation and for a wholesale redirection of foreign

policy.

After the legislative elections of 1995, more deputies called

for the parliament to take a more active role in foreign policy

oversight. The reformist Yabloko coalition managed to gain the

chairmanship of the International Affairs Committee in the

State Duma, somewhat mitigating the anti-Government and

anti-Western tone of legislative proceedings. However, many of

the State Duma's nonbinding resolutions complicated foreign

policy by arousing protests from foreign governments. In

March 1996, the State Duma passed nonbinding resolutions

abrogating the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought

condemnation from most CIS member states as a threat to their sovereignty and independence. In 1996 the Duma also

passed a resolution calling for elimination of international eco- nomic sanctions against Libya.

The Government (Cabinet)

According to the 1993 constitution, the chairman of the

Government, the prime minister, defines basic policy guidelines, and the Government enacts the nation's foreign policy

according to those guidelines. After referendum approval of

the 1993 constitution, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin,

whom Yeltsin had appointed in December 1992, began to play

a more prominent role in meeting with foreign officials, particularly CIS leaders. The prime minister focused primarily on

economic and governmental relations, however, and made few

foreign policy pronouncements.

The Ministry ofForeign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a central battleground of

foreign policy formation from October 1990 until January

1996, when Andrey Kozyrev led it. In the two years before the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's Ministry of Foreign

Affairs under Kozyrev had played an important role in challenging the supremacy of Soviet foreign policy. At the end of

1991, Kozyrev's ministry formally absorbed the functions and

many of the personnel of the defunct Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that point, budgetary constraints forced the clo- sure of three dozen former Soviet embassies and consulates

and the release of more than 2,000 personnel.

After some uncertainty about the role of the ministry, Yeltsin

decreed in 1992 that it should ensure a unified policy line in

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Russian relations with foreign states and coordinate the foreign

policy activities of other government agencies. At the end of

1992, increasing criticism of policy led Yeltsin to subordinate

the role of the ministry to the supervision of the IFPG.

Beginning in 1992, Kozyrev and his ministry became the tar- gets of increasingly forceful attacks from Russia's nationalist

factions, who found any hint of pro-Western policy a pretext to

call for Kozyrev's ouster. On several occasions, Yeltsin also criti- cized his foreign minister in public. Remarkably, Kozyrev

retained his position until January 1996, when Yeltsin replaced

him during a wave of nationalist appointments.

In December 1992, Kozyrev delivered what came to be called

his shock diplomacy speech at a meeting of the Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary). In

the speech, he outlined what he termed corrections to Russian

foreign policy in a list of priorities that ultranationalists advocated. The corrections included a shift in policy away from the

West and toward Asia; admonitions against NATO involvement

in the Baltic states or other areas of the near abroad; a call for

lifting UN economic sanctions against Serbia; and a demand

that the near abroad rejoin Russia in a new federation or confederation. Western foreign ministries expressed shock, and

Kozyrev retracted the speech by describing it as a rhetorical

warning of what might happen if ultranationalists came to dic- tate Russian foreign policy. Although some Russian and West- ern observers said the speech was irresponsible, others saw it as an attempt to discredit ultranationalist views (and prevent the

creation of the IFPC, then under consideration) by dramatizing the potential impact of extremist views.

In March 1995, Yeltsin criticized Kozyrev for his actions on

several policy fronts and assumed control of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs with the authority to appoint all deputy foreign

ministers. At the same time, Yeltsin enhanced the ministry's

powers by making it responsible for coordinating and controlling all governmental foreign policy actions. Perhaps to head

off mounting electoral criticism of foreign policy during 1995,

as well as to enhance coordination efforts, Yeltsin also established a governmental commission on foreign policy. Ostensibly, the commission was to evaluate the ministry's conduct of

foreign policy and to determine policy coordination needs

between the presidential apparatus and government agencies

having foreign policy responsibilities. Then, after intensified

NATO bombardment of Bosnian Serb military targets in Sep445
Russia: A Country Study

tember 1995, Yeltsin reiterated his dissatisfaction with the ministry and the need for personnel and policy changes.

In December 1995, Yeltsin created yet another advisory

group, the Council on Foreign Policy, to present him with proposals for coordinating the foreign policy activities of various

government bodies and to inform him of their activities. Members of the council were to be the ministers of foreign affairs,

defense, foreign trade, and finance; the heads of the foreign

intelligence, security, and border guard services; and Yeltsin's

foreign policy adviser. Scheduled to meet monthly, the council

had projected functions virtually indistinguishable from those

of the Security Council.

In January 1996, Yeltsin announced Kozyrev's resignation,

which had long been expected in view of the harsh criticism of

Russian foreign policy. Western analysts explained that the

powerful reactionary forces in the State Duma had been poised

to name their own candidate to head the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, so Yeltsin forestalled their move by dismissing Kozyrev

and naming the more moderate Yevgeniy Primakov, an Arabist

who had been KGB chief of espionage in 1991. Analysts viewed

Primakov as a pragmatist with no strong views toward the West

and predicted he would serve only until the winner of the

upcoming presidential election replaced him. They expected

Primakov to follow Yeltsin's lead in foreign policy by making no new gestures of friendship toward the West during the presidential election year. Although Primakov began his tenure by

reassuring the United States that Russia would remain true to

its international commitments, he also declared that Russia was and remains a great power and that his primary goal was to reintegrate the former Soviet republics, especially the Baltic

states and Ukraine. These statements blunted the nationalist

factions' complaints that Yeltsin was a puppet of Western interests. The Ministry ofDefense

In the Soviet era, the Ministry of Defense and its General

Staff officers played a central role in the formation of national

security policy because of their monopoly of defense information. After 1991 many senior officers in the armed forces con- tinued to view military coercion as the main instrument for

preventing the other side from gaining in foreign policy dis- putes (see Military Doctrine, ch. 9). In the early 1990s, most of

the military establishment appeared to back both an assertive

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stance in the near abroad, where the Soviet military had exer- cised substantial influence through its military districts and

played a role in local politics, and a less conciliatory relationship with the West. Some reformist elements of the military,

mainly junior officers, rejected these views, and local military

leaders sometimes seemed to act independently of their ministry in such areas of the near abroad as Moldova and Abkhazia,

Georgia's breakaway autonomous republic. More often, the

military leadership was united on actions having foreign policy

repercussions, such as their advocacy of violating CFE Treaty

limitations on military equipment deployed in the Caucasus

region.

Regional Policies

The geographical extent of Russia's foreign policy interests is considerably less than that of the Soviet Union, which sought

support and bases of operation wherever they might be avail- able in the world. Nevertheless, most of the Soviet Union's primary zones of interest-—Central and Western Europe, the Far

East, the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and the United

States—are priorities for Russia in the 1990s. To that list has

been added the near abroad, which has become a zone of insecurity and the subject of constant debate.

The Near Abroad

Many Russians use the term "near abroad" (blizhneye

zarubezhiye) to refer to the fourteen other former Soviet republics that had declared their independence by the time the

Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991. Leaders and elites in

those republics objected that the term implied limitations on

the sovereignty or status of the new states. Since independence,

Russian policy makers have tried both to restore old bilateral

connections and to create new relationships wherever possible.

Throughout the first half of the 1990s, inconsistency and

reverses characterized these diplomatic efforts because no firm

principles underlay them. However, Russia maintained strong

influence with all but the Baltic states, so the nationalists' hope

of reclaiming part of the lost empire stayed alive. Particularly perplexing for Western observers were apparent

contradictions between Yeltsin government policies and the

Russian military forces' actions in certain of the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. An example was

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Russia: A Country Study

Russian military support of Abkhazian rebels against the Georgian government in 1993 at the same time that the Yeltsin government was promoting a cease-fire in the region. Some

Western observers explained those contradictions as partly a

result of differing bureaucratic interests and turfs, with the military seeking to continue its traditional influence and presence

in the near abroad against the meddling of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If Russia's overall policy goal were to emasculate

Georgia and force it farther into the Russian sphere of influence, ran the argument, then military and diplomatic actions

would have been more compatible.

However, beginning in 1993 a greater degree of concor- dance appeared between the actions of the military and the

government. Yeltsin and Kozyrev stressed that Russia ensured

regional stability and acted in accordance with international

standards in offering Russian diplomatic and military "peacekeeping" services to help end conflicts in the NIS. They also

emphasized, however, that Russia had vital interests in using

diplomatic or military means to protect the rights of the more

than 25 million ethnic Russians residing in the near abroad.

Accordingly, Russia pressured the NIS to enact legal protections such as dual citizenship for ethnic Russians. At the same

time, Russia provided some aid to ease the internal economic

distress that stimulated the emigration of ethnic Russians from

the new states. The new states signed friendship treaties and other agreements with Russia pledging them to protect ethnic Russian res- idents from harm and to respect their human and cultural

rights. Because the borders among the states were open

(except for Russia's borders with the Transcaucasus states,

which were wholly or partly closed in 1994-96 during the

Chechnya conflict), Russia's leaders asserted that Russia had

important interests in ensuring the security of NIS borders with

other states, such as Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. In

some cases, Russian troops served as so-called peacekeepers in

conflict areas at the request of host governments such as Tajiki- stan and Georgia. In April 1994, at the request of the Ministry

of Defense, Yeltsin decreed that Russia would seek military

bases throughout most of the NIS.

Some analysts in the NIS and the West warned that Russia was showing a desire either to reconstitute its traditional

empire or at least to include the NIS within an exclusive sphere

of influence. They speculated that its arrangement with the

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near abroad might take the form of a collective security pact,

similar to the former Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), that would

counter NATO. Western analysts concluded that Russia's political and military elites adopted a more assertive foreign policy

after the election of large numbers of ultranationalists and

communists to the parliament in December 1993. They

observed this trend toward assertiveness again during campaigns for the legislative elections of December 1995 and in

the rhetoric of the 1996 presidential election campaign.

However, the Yeltsin government took considerable diplomatic actions to end NIS conflicts, and it stated that the financial burdens and human loss involved in burgeoning regional

peacekeeping efforts precluded continuing such operations.

Opinion polls showed that although some Russians supported

a greater role in the near abroad, particularly in safeguarding

ethnic Russians, the majority did not want Russia to assume new economic and defense burdens, particularly in Central

Asia. Even in the State Duma, many members expressed doubt

about the wisdom of even the peacekeeping efforts already

under way in Tajikistan and Georgia.

Russian peacekeeping efforts in the NIS began with ad hoc

agreements. For example, in August 1993 Russia formally

invoked a Collective Security Agreement, signed by members

of the CIS and ratified by the Russian parliament, to justify

those efforts in Tajikistan. Avowing in the UN and the CSCE

that its diplomatic and military efforts in the NIS supported

regional stability, Russia requested international approval and

financial support for its efforts. Kozyrev called for the deployment of UN and CSCE observers and the involvement of the

international diplomatic community in solving the conflict in

Georgia. In March 1994, Kozyrev asked the UN to recognize

the CIS as an observer international organization and asked

the European Union (EU—see Glossary) and the CSCE to rec- ognize the CIS as a regional organization. Acknowledgment

from these organizations would implicitly endorse the regional

peacekeeping actions of the CIS.

At the December 1993 CIS meeting of heads of state, held

after the Russian elections, Yeltsin's calls for strengthening military and economic cooperation within the CIS met with

greater approval than they had previously. Since then the CIS

states have been far from unanimous in supporting closer CIS

integration, however: Armenia, Tajikistan, and Belarus have

been most amenable; Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyr449
Russia: A Country Study

gyzstan, and Uzbekistan have maneuvered to maintain independence while seeking support in some areas; and Ukraine,

Moldova, and Turkmenistan have been most opposed (see The

Commonwealth of Independent States, ch. 9)

.

In September 1995, Yeltsin again maneuvered toward a more

conservative CIS policy by repeating the Russian nationalists' concerns with border security and the treatment of ethnic Russians. In a program stressing regional integration, including a "defensive alliance," Yeltsin stipulated that the CIS should consist of countries "friendly toward Russia" and that Russia should

be "a leading power" in the CIS, while reiterating the call for

UN and OSCE participation in CIS peacekeeping actions.

Among CIS regional problems of concern to Russia were rela- tions between China and Kazakstan, the effect of ethnic separatism in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on

neighboring nations of Central Asia, ethnic problems in Russian regions bordering Transcaucasia and Mongolia, and emigration of ethnic Russians from Central Asia.

Moldova

In the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, ethnic minority

Russians had proclaimed the autonomous Dnestr Moldavian

Republic, or Transnistria, in September 1990. By late 1992,

forces of the Russian 14th Army had enabled these Russians to consolidate control over most of the Dnestr region. Russia's

actions chilled its relations with the now-independent Moldova,

whose legislature had not ratified the 1991 CIS agreement. The

pressure of a Russian trade blockade contributed to the victory

of anticommunist candidates in Moldova's February 1994 legis- lative elections. In April 1994, the new legislature ratified Moldova's membership in the CIS, bringing the last of the nonBaltic Soviet republics into the organization. In October 1994,

Russia and Moldova agreed on the withdrawal of the 14th

Army, pending settlement of the political status of Transnistria.

The agreement was jeopardized immediately, however, when

Russia unexpectedly declared that the State Duma had to ratify

the agreement, an outcome that had not occurred as of mid1996.

Georgia

In Georgia, Russian mercenaries, allegedly bolstered by Russian military support, fought alongside separatist forces from

Georgia's Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, who finally

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defeated Georgian forces in September 1993. In October Georgia was forced to end its strong opposition to membership in

the CIS by becoming a full member and signing a series of

security cooperation agreements. That step prompted Russia to send military peacekeepers to support government forces,

which saved Georgia's president Eduard Shevardnadze from

large-scale insurrection and further fragmentation of the country. The terms of the so-called rescue included a Georgian-Russian friendship treaty calling for the establishment of Russian

military bases in Georgia. In June 1994, Abkhazia and Georgia

agreed to the interpositioning of Russian peacekeepers

between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia to enforce a ceasefire. In September 1995, a Russian-Georgian treaty established

twenty-year Russian leases of three bases. The Russian forces

continued to share cease-fire enforcement in Georgia's breakaway South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, where they had been

since 1992, because no treaty had ended that conflict. The UN

military observer group deployed in Abkhazia reported cooperative relations with the Russian peacekeepers.

Central Asia

In Tajikistan, oppositionist forces ousted the procommunist

government in September 1992. Strong circumstantial evidence indicates that Russian forces assisted in the routing of

the Tajikistani coalition government three months later. In

1993 several agreements formalized Russian military assistance.

That year the new Tajikistani government deployed about

24,000 CIS peacekeeping troops from Russia, Uzbekistan,

Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan (the majority of them Russian)

along Tajikistani borders and at strategic sites. In late 1993,

Tajikistan agreed to Russia's conditions on joining the ruble zone (see Glossary), including giving Russia control over monetary and fiscal policy, in return for subsidies. Tajikistan and

Russia signed a cease-fire agreement in September 1994, but

Tajikistani settlement talks, held under UN supervision with

close Russian participation, remained inconclusive as of mid1996. A small team of temporary UN military observers

deployed in Tajikistan after the cease-fire agreement reported

cooperative relations with CIS troops.

In Kazakstan in the mid-1990s, ethnic tensions increased

between the Kazaks and the large minority population of Slavs

(Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) located primarily in

northern areas of Kazakstan. The two groups represented an

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Russia: A Country Study

approximately equal share of the population, and Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbayev did a skillful job of balancing ethnic needs. He addressed many ethnic Russians' concerns while

pushing language and other policies that were in the interests

of the Kazak population. He resisted Russia's pressure to grant

ethnic Russians dual citizenship; the legislature elected in 1995

contained a majority of ethnic Kazaks. In 1993 Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan introduced their own national currencies rather

than accept Russia's onerous conditions for membership in the

ruble zone. Kazakstan also defied Russian pressure on its vital fuel industry by seeking new pipeline routes that Russia could

not control. Nevertheless, for all five Central Asian republics,

cooperation with Russia remains an essential element of eco- nomic and military policy.

In 1995 Yeltsin achieved a customs union with Belarus that

later included Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. In March 1996, a new

treaty among the four countries strengthened the terms of

their economic integration. That treaty was part of Yeltsin's

presidential campaign effort to show that he advocated gradual

and voluntary integration among CIS members, in contrast to the threatening gestures of the State Duma and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. However, an April 1996

agreement between Russia and Belarus to set a timetable for

closely coordinating their governments and foreign policies

brought opposition from Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan, which saw the agreement as a danger to their

national sovereignty.

Other Former Soviet Republics

Although a strong body of opinion in Belarus supported the

April 1996 bilateral agreement that would bring closer integration with Russia, independence-minded Belarusians in Minsk

staged large-scale protests, and the policy encountered substantial opposition in Belarus's parliament and among reform fac- tions in Russia. Nuclear weapons in Belarus, which reportedly were under tight Russian control after 1991, were scheduled

for transfer to Russia by the end of 1996.

The last Russian troops left Estonia and Latvia in 1994, leav- ing significant populations of Russians behind. Russian officials criticized citizenship and other laws allegedly discriminating

against those groups in the Baltic republics, and some Russian

enclaves in the Baltic states made separatist threats. Border dis452
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putes with Estonia and Lativa remained unresolved and heated

in mid-1996.

Azerbaijan, which anticipated substantial economic rewards

from Western development of its Caspian Sea oil, resisted Russian offers to station peacekeeping troops in its war-torn

Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijan's president Heydar

Aliyev was a former member of the Soviet Politburo and came

to office in a Russian-supported coup in 1993. But Aliyev has

proven more independent than Russian policy makers

expected. He has accused Russia (with some justification) of

supporting Armenia against Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 1994 Russia demanded and received a 10 percent interest in a Western-dominated oil consortium that is to develop rich offshore Caspian Sea deposits for Azerbaijan. Russia called for construction of a new export pipeline that would

terminate at the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk and

allow Russia to collect transit fees and control the flow. In

1995-96 Russia objected to a territorial delineation of Caspian

Sea resources to pressure Azerbaijan for concessions on oil rev- enue sharing and political and security matters. Azerbaijan

decided on dual routes for oil shipments, one of which would

bypass Russian territory by crossing Georgia to reach the Black

Sea.Many Western experts believe that Russia's relationship with

Ukraine was the truest test of its willingness to accept the independence of the former Soviet republics. After regaining its independence at the end of 1991, Ukraine argued with Russia over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the disposition of

the Crimean Peninsula, which Nikita Khrushchev had

"awarded" to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 to mark the 300th anniversary of the union of Ukraine and Russia. After the end of the Soviet Union, the ethnic Russians who

had come to dominate the Crimean Peninsula lobbied for

autonomy from Ukraine or reunification with Russia. Ukrainian-Russian relations improved after the election of Ukraine's

president Leonid Kuchma in July 1994. Russia did not support

Crimean separatism, and both countries moved toward a peaceful settlement on dividing the Black Sea Fleet (see Naval

Forces, ch. 9) . The United States-Russian-Ukrainian Trilateral

Nuclear Statement signed in early 1994 resolved many disputes over compensation for the transfer of nuclear weapons from

Ukraine to Russia, and Ukraine transferred its last nuclear

weapon to Russia in June 1996.

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Russia: A Country Study

The United States

Relations with the United States have been a central concern

of Soviet and Russian foreign policy since World War II. The

United States gained unique stature in the Soviet Union when

it emerged from World War II as the ultimate guarantor of

European security against attack from the east and the top military power in the NATO alliance. A crucial factor of SovietUnited States relations was the mutual nuclear threat that arose

in the 1950s as the Soviet Union developed first a nuclear capability and then a nuclear strategy. The nuclear threat and the

underlying potential of "mutually assured destruction" created

a chilling presence for the rest of the world. A high point in

Soviet-United States relations was the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty (ABM Treaty) that resulted from the Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972. This agreement was an early

achievement of the detente, or easing of tensions, that prevailed between the superpowers through most of the 1970s

until the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The early 1980s were a time of tense relations and confrontations. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan brought trade and

cultural embargoes from the United States and highly visible

gestures such as the United States boycott of the 1980 Summer

Olympics in Moscow. In Europe the superpowers publicly

traded threats and took actions such as the deployment of

advanced nuclear weapons while they exchanged compromise

positions at the negotiating table. Several events of 1983—the

downing of a South Korean civilian airliner by the Soviet air

force, the United States invasion of the Caribbean island of

Grenada to evict a Marxist regime, and the exit of the Soviet

delegation from arms control talks—kept bilateral tensions

high.

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union had resumed talks on

intermediate-range nuclear forces and strategic arms reduction. During that period, Soviet leadership underwent a major

shift from Leonid I. Brezhnev, who died in November 1982, to Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who became general secretary in March

1985. The accession of Gorbachev ultimately ended a period of

strident Soviet propaganda against United States president

Ronald W. Reagan, whom Russia blamed for prolonging Cold

War tensions because of his staunchly anticommunist positions.

In 1985 Reagan and Gorbachev began a series of annual

summit meetings that yielded cultural exchange agreements,

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty

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see Glossary) in 1987, and less tangible benefits. The sight of

the "cold warrior" Reagan consorting with his Russian opposite

number combined with the instant popularity that Gorbachev

gained in the United States to again warm relations. In the

mid- and late 1980s, the Soviet Union also stepped up media

access and contacts. Soviet spokesmen began appearing regularly on United States television, and United States journalists

received unprecedented access to everyday life in the Soviet

Union.

In the early 1990s, relations with the United States lost none

of their significance for Russia. Russia viewed summitry with

the United States as the mark of its continued status as a great

power and nuclear superpower. Presidents Gorbachev and

George H.W. Bush declared a United States-Soviet strategic

partnership at the summit ofJuly 1991, decisively marking the

end of the Cold War. President Bush declared that United

States-Soviet cooperation during the Persian Gulf crisis of

1990-91 had laid the groundwork for a partnership in resolving bilateral and world problems. For Russia, the closer relations of the early 1990s included a broad range of activities,

including tourism and educational exchanges, the study of

United States institutions and processes to adapt them for a new "Union of Sovereign States" (one proposed title for a new,

nonideological Soviet Union), and the beginning of United

States aid to Russia.

During this period, the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia supported the United States on several international issues.

In the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union and Russia supported sanctions and operations against Iraq before, during,

and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990; called on the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) to abide

by safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA); supported sending UN observers to conflict-ridden

Georgia and Tajikistan; and supported UN economic sanctions

against Serbia. The Soviet Union cosponsored Middle East

peace talks that opened in October 1991.

In its cooperation with the United States on strategic arms

control, Russia declared that it was the successor to the Soviet

Union in assuming the obligations of START, which had been

signed in July 1991. The Supreme Soviet ratified this treaty in

November 1992. Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed the second

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) in January 1993.

The United States ratified that treaty in January 1996, but the

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Russia: A Country Study

much more problematic ratification by the new, nationalistdominated State Duma was left until after the midyear presidential election. In September 1993, Russia acceded to the Missile Technology Control Regime, reaffirming an earlier

decision not to transfer sensitive missile technology to India.

However, Soviet and Russian parliaments often opposed policies that they deemed helpful to the United States. The

Supreme Soviet, which was less supportive than the Gorbachev

government had been of international actions against Iraq,

condemned United States air strikes in 1993. The Supreme

Soviet approved START I in November 1992 with some conditions and after some delay, but then successive parliaments

conducted hearings and debates on START II, without ratifying

the treaty, from 1993 through mid-1996 (see Nuclear Arms

Issues, ch. 9).

Beginning in 1993, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

issued statements critical of United States actions and policies.

Some United States observers interpreted them as part of a more assertive Russian foreign policy that insisted on protecting nebulous Russian vital interests. Other observers saw such

statements primarily as rhetoric designed to mollify hard-line

critics of Russian foreign policy in the parliament and elsewhere. Events corroborating the former interpretation

included Russia's opposition to NATO membership for Central

European and Baltic states, Russian military moves in Georgia

that raised questions of its intentions in the near abroad, and

Russia's insistence on selling nuclear reactor technology to Iran, as well as doubts about Russia's adherence to chemical

and biological weapons bans, the Conventional Forces in

Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty), and other arms control pacts.

Another blow to United States-Russian relations came in 1994

with the United States arrest of Aldrich Ames, a longtime

Soviet and Russian spy. These events led some in the United States to question Russia's commitment to bilateral cooperation and the soundness

of continued United States aid for Russia. Nevertheless, many

elements of bilateral cooperation, including most United

States aid programs, continued in 1995. From its high point in

September 1993, when the United States Congress approved

US$2.5 billion in aid to Russia and the NIS, the amount had

declined to less than US$600 million for 1996. Only about onethird of the 1996 NIS appropriation was earmarked for Russia.

In 1995 Congress placed several conditions on providing aid to

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Russia, such as requiring that Russia reduce assistance to Cuba.

The United States also censured Russian behavior such as nuclear energy agreements with Iran (see Latin America; The

Middle East, this ch.).

The Yeltsin-Bush Summits

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, President Bush

met with Boris Yeltsin in 1990, when Yeltsin was chairman of

the Russian Supreme Soviet, and again in July 1991, immediately after Yeltsin's election as president of Russia. After the

demise of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin met with Bush at a full-scale summit meeting in Washington in June 1992. The two leaders

then agreed on many of the START II terms, and ajoint session

of the United States Congress enthusiastically received Yeltsin.

According to some observers, that summit and Yeltsin's speech

to Congress were the high points of Russia's conciliatory, proWestern foreign policy orientation. At Bush's final summit with

Yeltsin in January 1993, the leaders signed the landmark

START II agreement.

The Yeltsin-Clinton Summits

The administration of William J. Clinton, which took office

in January 1993, advocated more concerted United States

efforts to aid Russian and NIS transitions to democracy and

market economies. The justification of that policy was that

these transitions served United States security and human

rights interests and would provide markets for United States

products. The April 1993 Vancouver summit, the first formal

meeting between Yeltsin and Clinton, furthered United States- Russian cooperation on many bilateral issues. The resulting

Vancouver Declaration pledged the two sides to uphold "a dynamic and effective United States-Russian partnership." The

joint communique noted Yeltsin's pledge to continue reform

efforts such as privatization.

The major summit initiative was finalization of a United

States aid package of US$1.6 billion. On bilateral and international security issues, the two sides called for strengthening the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and urging North

Korea not to carry out its threat to withdraw from the NPT. The

sides also agreed to work for implementation of the START

treaties. An important by-product of the Vancouver meeting was the

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which initially was a vehicle

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Russia: A Country Study

for Vice President Albert Gore and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to work out the details of bilateral agreements on

space, energy, and technology. Between 1993 and early 1996,

the two men met six times, each time with an expanded

agenda. By 1996 the commission was a forum for establishing

joint endeavors on topics ranging from the sale of Siberian timber to delivery of diphtheria vaccine to rural Russia. The

United States also used the relationship to send messages to

Yeltsin on urgent diplomatic topics such as Bosnia and Chechnya. In 1996 a similar commission brought Chernomyrdin into

regular consultation with French foreign minister Alain Juppe.

Whereas the Vancouver summit had highlighted economic

aid to Russia, the Moscow summit ofJanuary 1994 emphasized

issues of arms control and nonproliferation. The summit

included a hastily arranged meeting of the leaders of the

United States, Russia, and Ukraine that produced Ukraine's

commitment to give up all nuclear weapons on its territory and

sign the NPT. The meeting's Trilateral Nuclear Statement also

committed Russia and the United States to provide Soviet-era

"nuclear powers" Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine with security

guarantees in exchange for giving up the uranium in the

nuclear weapons located on their territory. Presidents Clinton

and Yeltsin also pledged that, beginning in May 1994, strategic

ballistic missiles no longer would be aimed at any country. This

agreement marked the superpowers' first cessation of the

nuclear operations that had been based on Cold War presumptions of mutual enmity.

A potential stumbling block to the success of the 1994 summit was Russia's objection to proposals for early admission of

some Central European states into NATO (see Western

Europe, this ch.; The NATO Issue, ch. 9). Nevertheless, the

summit communique affirmed that the new European security

order must include all nations as equal partners. The role of

Russia in its near abroad was also an important point of discussion at the summit. Yeltsin sought to reassure the West that Russia's border policy was aimed only at stability, not neoimperialist goals. Yeltsin repeated his call for peacekeeping

assistance from the UN, CSCE, and other international organizations and complained about the international community's

restrained response to Russian appeals for mediation in the

conflict regions of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan.

United States aid played a less prominent role in the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Washington in September 1994. Instead,

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both sides emphasized the growth of future bilateral trade and

investment. International policy differences were more visible

in the Washington meeting than they had been previously, but

both sides stressed the nonconfrontational nature of the "working partnership" in resolving differences. The two presidents

signed a framework agreement termed the Partnership for

Economic Progress (PFEP), which outlined principles and

objectives for the development of trade and economic cooperation and for United States business investment in Russia. They

also planned a Commercial Partnership Program to help guide

Russia toward better bilateral commercial relations. United

States business leaders warned Yeltsin, however, that private

investment in Russia could not increase appreciably under the

still capricious and complex Russian laws, taxes, import duties,

and governmental red tape.

A major initiative at the summit was agreement that once Moscow and Washington had ratified START II, the two sides

would quickly remove warheads from missiles whose launchers

would be eliminated under START II. Other initiatives covered

the storage and security of nuclear materials and continued

moratoriums on nuclear weapons tests. The conflict in Bosnia remained an issue of contention.

Yeltsin refused to support a UN Security Council resolution lift- ing the arms embargo against Bosnia's Muslim-led government. The United States also voiced concern about Russian

peacekeeping activities in former Soviet republics, although

Russia insisted that its actions respected the sovereignty of the

new states. Russian recalcitrance on arms sales to Iran, classi- fied by the West as a terrorist state, also was a source of conflict.

While agreeing that no new arms contracts would be signed

with Iran, Yeltsin insisted that existing commitments would be

upheld.

Three issues dominated the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting

held in Moscow in May 1995—NATO enlargement, Russia's

sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, and the Chechnya conflict. In

spite of their differences on key issues, Clinton and Yeltsin

pledged to continue a cooperative relationship.

The two leaders referred the matter of nuclear sales to Iran

to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which subsequently

crafted an agreement on two Russian concessions on the trans- fer issue. On the subject of European security, the two sides

underscored the importance of ongoing integration and of

joint participation in international bodies, including Russia's

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Russia: A Country Study

membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). Discussions of NATO enlargement remained inconclusive.

At the May 1995 summit, President Clinton expressed his

expectation that Russia would meet all conditions of the CFE

Treaty, which was due to come into full force in November

1995. Meeting this deadline would require withdrawing several

hundred tanks and other weapons from the North Caucasus

region of Russia, including many in Chechnya. At the review

conference in May 1996, Clinton offered to support modifications to the CFE Treaty to meet Russia's "legitimate security

interests." Clinton reiterated United States concerns about

human rights abuses in Chechnya and called for a permanent

cease-fire. Yeltsin responded by calling Russia's Chechnya campaign a battle against terrorism rather than a conventional military action.

The summit meeting of October 1995, held in Hyde Park,

New York, continued the previous emphasis on the most contentious issues of bilateral relations. These included Russian

nuclear sales to Cuba and Iran, objections to expansion of

NATO in Central Europe and to United States plans to build a

ballistic missile defense system, and Russia's noncompliance

with the CFE Treaty. The dominant question of this summit,

which yielded no agreements, was the form of Russia's participation in NATO-commanded international peacekeeping

forces to be sent into Bosnia. Clinton and Yeltsin referred most

of the contentious issues to lower levels for detailed discussion

and emerged from the summit emphasizing the continued

strength of Russian-United States cooperation.

The Moscow summit of April 1996 took place during presidential campaigns in both countries. It also followed directly

the G—7 meeting on nuclear safety and security in Moscow. As

in Hyde Park, the two leaders emphasized the positive aspects

of their partnership and announced progress in negotiations over the CFE and ABM treaties, but without citing any details.

Yeltsin briefed Clinton on his progress toward ratification of

the START II agreement, and Clinton criticized Russia's fears

of NATO enlargement as completely unfounded. For Yeltsin,

the meeting was an opportunity to demonstrate to the elector- ate that the leader of the United States respected him, but he

also felt constrained to demonstrate that he was independent

of coercion by Clinton.

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Western Europe

The Soviet Union's relations with Western Europe following

World War II were colored heavily by Soviet relations with East- ern Europe and by the Warsaw Pact forces arrayed in Europe

against NATO forces. The Soviet influence over Eastern

Europe, punctuated by the 1956 invasion of Hungary and the

1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and by a constant buildup of

conventional and nuclear forces, prompted West European

NATO member nations to reinforce their defenses and discouraged direct relations between those nations and the Soviet

Union.

The Soviet Union's policy toward Western Europe had five

basic goals: preventing rearmament and nuclearization of the

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); preventing the

political, economic, or military integration of Western Europe;

obtaining West European endorsement of the existing territorial division of the continent; splitting the NATO alliance by

encouraging anti-Americanism on various issues; and creating

nuclear-free zones by encouraging European peace groups and

leftist movements. The more general aim was to make Western

Europe as similar as possible to the Soviet Union's highly

advanced northwestern neighbor, Finland: a neutral buffer zone whose political reactions could be anticipated under any

circumstances, and which would refrain from commitments to Western nations. In the early 1980s, a conflict in Western

Europe over NATO and Warsaw Pact nuclear installations

accelerated Soviet efforts to neutralize NATO's European contingent. The Soviet Union tried to foster a European detente

separate from one with the United States. The effort was

defeated because West European governments were determined to uphold and modernize NATO, and Soviet-sponsored

peace groups failed to arouse public opinion against NATO

participation.

The Soviet-era division of Europe into two distinct military

alliances continues to influence Russia's policy toward Western

Europe. NATO remains an active presence in Western Europe,

and Russia sees a persistent threat that NATO will embrace the

former Warsaw Pact allies and leave Russia without its European buffer zone. Because of this perceived threat, sharpened

in the rhetoric of Russian nationalist factions, Russia has been

reluctant to accommodate West European nations on a number of issues, even as it has hastened to bolster relations in

other areas such as commerce.

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Russia: A Country Study

Even before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin pursued closer relations with Western Europe on behalf of the Russian Republic. In his first foreign trip after the failure of the

August 1991 coup had substantially improved his stature as president of the Russian Republic, Yeltsin visited Germany to seek safeguards for Germans residing in Russia. After 1991 Russia's relations with Western Europe achieved a level of integration and comity that the Soviet Union had aspired to but had

never reached. The draft foreign policy concept ofJanuary

1993 called for Russian foreign policy to consolidate the

emerging partnership with the states of Western Europe, but it also emphasized that Russia's vital interests might cause disagreement on some issues. Russia's major goals included gaining West European aid and markets, recognition of Russia's

interests in Central Europe and the CIS, and regional cooperation in combating organized crime and nuclear smuggling.

Germany emerged as the largest European aid donor to Russia

and its largest trade and investment partner. In June 1994, Yeltsin and the leaders of the European Union

(EU) signed an agreement on partnership and cooperation.

Pending the ratification of the agreement by the member

states, a provisional economic accord was drawn up in early

1995 extending most-favored-nation status to Russia and reducing many import quotas. Because of Western disapproval over

the war in Chechnya, the EU did not sign the agreement until

July 1995, following a cease-fire in Chechnya.

The Council of Europe also sidelined a Russian application

for membership as a sign of disapproval of events in Chechnya,

and in July 1995 the council issued a report detailing Russian

(as well as some Chechen) human rights abuses in Chechnya.

After the conclusion of the cease-fire, Russian officials

requested reconsideration of Russia's application. The council

granted Russia full membership in January 1996. European

authorities explained that admitting Russia into Europe's foremost body on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law

would promote democratic trends in Russia more effectively

than the isolation that would result if membership were

denied. A substantial body of European opinion continued to oppose admission, however, especially when Russian army

attacks on Chechen civilians continued and Russia failed to impose a required moratorium on capital punishment (see

Chechnya, ch. 9; The Criminal Justice System, ch. 10).

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In February 1996, the Council of Europe and the EU

announced an aid package to help Russia meet the legal and

human rights requirements of membership in the council.

Tensions in Russia's relations with the West continued, however, with its refusal in April 1996 to provide arms sales data.

These data are necessary for establishment of a military technology export control regime to replace the Coordinating

Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which

NATO used during the Soviet era to monitor world arms shipments.

The CFE Treaty, which the Soviet Union signed in 1990,

aimed at stabilizing and limiting the nonnuclear forces of all European nations. Signed in the context of the NATO-Warsaw

Pact division of Europe, the treaty remained a basis for reduction of tensions in Europe after the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet

Union dissolved.

Although the Russian military accepted the CFE Treaty, in

the ensuing years it increasingly insisted that the signatories

allow modification of force limits on Europe's flanks, which

included the still substantial garrison in Kaliningrad Oblast on

the Baltic and the troublesome Caucasus region (see The Geopolitical Context, ch. 9). In the early 1990s, Russia shifted

much weaponry to the southern flank area to stabilize its North Caucasus republics, particularly breakaway Chechnya, as well as the independent but conflict-plagued Caucasus states of

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Although NATO proposed

some alterations in Russia's flank limits in September 1995,

Russia still was not in compliance when the treaty came into

full force in November 1995. Russia met the treaty's overall arms reduction targets, however. Russia called for further modifications of the treaty's troop disposition requirements to be

put on the agenda of a planned Mayl996 review conference.

After intense negotiations, the conferees finally agreed to allow

Russia to retain additional equipment in the southern flank

area for three years. NATO

The January 1993 draft foreign policy concept of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for increasing ties with NATO

through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and other

means, including military liaison, joint maneuvers, and

exchange visits. Russia objected to full NATO membership for

Poland and other Central European states, so the United States

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Russia: A Country Study

proposed establishment of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP)

in the fall of 1993. The PfP was to be an ancillary of NATO,

consisting entirely of the former Warsaw Pact states and former

Soviet republics. By the end of 1995, twenty-seven states—the

entire complement of those two groups—had joined. Yeltsin

supported Russia's membership in the PfP in his "state of the

federation" address to the Russian parliament in February

1994, but he opposed the future inclusion in NATO of Central

European states as unacceptably excluding Russia from participation in European affairs. In response to NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces in

April 1994, Yeltsin hinted that Russia might delay signing the

PfP agreement. Instead, Kozyrev announced shortly thereafter

that the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defense had

decided that Russia should have a special status in the PfP "to protect it from hostile acts by NATO." In May 1994, the Russian

Security Council called unsuccessfully for NATO to agree to a

list of special privileges for Russia. The Russian delegation

walked out of the December 1994 signing ceremonies for

membership in the PfP before finally joining in June 1995.

At the Budapest meeting of CSCE heads of state in December 1994, Russia called for the CSCE to transform itself into the

major security organization in Europe. The CSCE rejected Russia's proposal, but it did agree to change its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to

reflect its status as a permanent organization. The West viewed

Russia's overture as seeking a new forum from which to gain

influence over NATO and other Western organizations.

Through 1995 Russian spokesmen continued their criticism of

NATO, including its air strikes in Bosnia, and called for an

alternative European security structure. Nevertheless, Yeltsin

vetoed a State Duma resolution canceling Russia's PfP membership.

In late 1995, Russia agreed to join NATO's efforts to enforce

the Dayton Peace Accords, formally signed in December as the

Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, to end the conflict

in Bosnia. In January 1996, some 1,600 Russian troops arrived

in northern Bosnia to work closely with United States forces as part of the Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). In

the first six months of that arrangement, little controversy

arose over command roles or goals.

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Central Europe

Soviet influence in Eastern Europe began with Soviet occu- pation of territories during World War II. By 1949 communist

regimes had been put into place in all the occupied states: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East

Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Under the leadership ofJosip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia maintained an independent

position as a communist state that Soviet leaders first vilified

but ultimately recognized in 1955. Domination of the East

European countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact and the

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (known as Comecon—see Glossary) remained a fundamental priority of Soviet

foreign policy through the disintegration of both organizations

in 1991. Soviet leaders used the continued existence of socialist

regimes in Eastern Europe as part of the ideological justification of socialism at home because it fulfilled the Marxist-Leninist recipe of the rule of the multinational proletariat. Because

of that logic, a threat to Eastern Europe became a threat to the

Soviet Union itself. In the 1950s, the Soviet military used force to restrain mass

expressions of resistance to conventional, Soviet-backed

regimes in East Germany (1953), Poland (1956), and Hungary

(1956). After the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia

quelled political liberalization in that country, the irreversibility of communist control in East European countries was formulated in what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine,

which for the next twenty years was the foundation of Soviet

policy toward the region. Soviet policy makers determined that

occupation forces were the only sure guarantee of continued

communist rule in Eastern Europe and that some limited local

control over domestic policy was necessary to avoid future resis- tance. When Polish workers pushed their demands for independent trade unions and the right to strike in 1980-81, the

implicit threat of invasion by Soviet forces led Polish police and

security forces to quell disturbances and a new, military prime

minister, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, to declare martial law. In the mid-1980s, Gorbachev's internal liberalization was

paralleled by his doctrine of "many roads to socialism," which

called for cooperation rather than uniformity among East

European nations. That call coincided with the implicit revocation in 1988 of the Brezhnev Doctrine as Soviet military doctrine recognized the need to conserve resources (see Soviet

Doctrine, ch. 9). Gorbachev's internal reform programs of glas465
Russia: A Country Study

nost (see Glossary) and perestroika (see Glossary) received vary- ing degrees of support and imitation among East European

leaders. Regimes in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland showed

substantial support, but those in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania refused to adopt the type of far-reaching

domestic reforms that Gorbachev introduced at home (see

The Gorbachev Era, ch. 2). Nevertheless, by the late 1980s the

nature of Soviet influence had shifted unmistakably away from

coercion toward political and economic instruments of influ- ence. The last stage of Soviet relations with the region, 1989-

91, was fundamentally different. By 1990 all the East European

member states of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon had rejected

their communist regimes and were straining toward the West.

Although Soviet policy makers struggled to keep the two multinational organizations alive as instruments of influence, events

had rendered them moribund before their formal demise in

1991. Now the world redesignated Eastern Europe as Central

Europe, and the great western buffer zone disappeared.

Immediately after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and

Comecon and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, rela- tions with Central Europe were a relatively low priority of Russian foreign policy. This situation began to change during

1992, when many Russian reformists argued that closer ties with the new Central European democracies would bolster Russia's own commitment to democratization. Closer commercial

ties also would make Central Europe's relatively inexpensive

goods more readily available and afford better opportunities to make valuable connections with Western Europe as the former

Warsaw Pact states moved closer to full integration into

Europe.

Russia's January 1993 draft foreign policy concept stressed

the importance of Central Europe. The concept proclaimed

that the region "falls within the historical sphere of our interests" because it abuts "the belt of sovereign states"—Ukraine,

Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—of great

interest to Russia. The concept warned against attempts by the

West to push Russia out of Central Europe and to make the

region into a buffer zone that would isolate Russia from West- ern Europe. Russia would counter such movements by reestablishing good trade and other relations with the Central

European states.

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The NATO Issue The draft concept did not present NATO involvement in

Central Europe as inherently threatening to Russian interests.

Later in 1993, however, Yeltsin reversed course under the political exigency of his upcoming confrontation with the State

Duma. The new position was that former members of the Warsaw Pact could join NATO only if Russia also were included.

This opposition then spurred the United States proposal of the

Partnership for Peace.

The military doctrine that Yeltsin decreed in November

1993 was not directed clearly at NATO. Calling for a neutral

Central Europe, the doctrine warned that Russia would interpret as a threat the expansion of any alliance in Europe to the

detriment of Russia's interests or the introduction of foreign

troops in states adjacent to the Russian Federation. Throughout 1995 and the first half of 1996, Russian military officials

continued to demand that the Central European states remain

neutral. During the Moscow visit of Poland's president Alexander Kwasniewski in April 1996, Yeltsin hailed warmer ties,

but he noted that the NATO issue remained the single obstacle over which the two sides disagreed.

Russia's Role in the Former Yugoslavia

In Russia's debate over its national interests and in Yeltsin's

power struggle with hard-liners, a major issue was the appropriate attitude toward Serbia, a long-time ally whose aggression

against several other republics of the former Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia, most notably Bosnia and Herzegovina,

had made it an international pariah. The key question was how

to cooperate with Western efforts to end the crisis in the

former Yugoslavia while preserving Russia's traditional support

of Serbia.

After the Serbian government expressed support for the

August 1991 coup in Moscow, the Yeltsin government of the

Russian Republic condemned the Serbian attacks of late 1991

on Croatia, one of the two initial breakaway republics from the

Yugoslav federation. Russia supported efforts in the UN to compel Serbia to accept a negotiated settlement of the conflict

with Croatia. This relatively low-key involvement shifted to a more active policy in 1993.

The 1993 foreign policy concept's language on the former

Yugoslavia was rather neutral; it simply called for Russia to cooperate with the UN, the CSCE, and other parties in peace467
Russia: A Country Study

making efforts and to use its influence in the former Yugoslavia

to encourage a peaceful settlement. As it began to speak more

specifically for Serbian interests later in 1993, Russia hoped at the same time to maintain its image with the West as a useful

mediator of a thoroughly frustrating conflict. However, this

approach caused some tensions with the United States and its Western allies, who had hoped for straightforward Russian support of UN-sanctioned military actions against Serbian aggression. Russian hard-liners, meanwhile, urged that Russia give

priority to defying what they called a "Western drive for hegemony" over the former Yugoslavia and to otherwise protecting

Russian and Serbian geopolitical interests.

Hard-liners in Russia and Serbia espoused a so-called panSlavic solidarity that emphasizes ethnic, religious, and historical ties. Its adherents shared a frustration at diminished geopolitical dominance (in Serbia's case, the loss of influence over other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and in Russia's case the

loss of control over the near abroad). Perceived threats to Serbs and Russians now outside the redrawn borders of their

respective states aggravated this frustration. However, the

rocky, thirty-five-year relationship between the Soviet Union

and Tito's Yugoslavia disproved the natural affinity of the two

nations.

Russia launched a more assertive phase of involvement in

the former Yugoslavia when it opposed NATO air strikes

against Bosnian Serb forces around Sarajevo in 1994 and 1995.

Russia argued that there should be no air strikes until peace

negotiations had been exhausted. Russia also demanded a

larger role as a superpower in decision making on UN, NATO,

and other international actions involving the former Yugoslavia.In August 1995, Yeltsin and the Russian parliament harshly

criticized intensified NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb military

targets. When mediation efforts finally led to a cease-fire in

Bosnia in October 1995, Russia agreed to provide troops for a NATO-sponsored peacekeeping force. After some rearrangement of lines of command to avoid direct NATO command of

Russian forces, Russian troops joined the peacekeepers inJanuary 1996. Although it cooperated with IFOR, Russia asserted its views on other aspects of the Bosnia situation. In February

1996, Russia withdrew unilaterally from UN-imposed economic

sanctions on Bosnian Serbs, arguing that the Serbs had met the

conditions for withdrawing the sanctions.

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Foreign Relations

China

Relations between China and the Soviet Union were cool

and distrustful from the mid-1950s until the demise of the

Soviet Union. Joseph V. Stalin (in office 1927-53) fostered an

alliance when communists took over mainland China in 1949.

When Khrushchev announced his de-Stalinization policy in

1956, Chinese leader Mao Zedong sharply disapproved, and

the alliance was weakened. In 1959 and 1960, the Sino-Soviet

rift came to full world attention with Khrushchev's renunciation of an agreement to provide nuclear technology to China,

the Soviet withdrawal of all economic advisers, and mutual

accusations of ideological impurity. Leonid Brezhnev

attempted to improve relations, but serious border clashes and

Brezhnev's proposal of an Asian collective security system that

would contain China were new sources of hostility. In the

1970s, China began to improve relations with the West to counter Soviet political and military pressure in Asia. After

Mao's death in 1976, the Soviet Union again sought to improve

relations with China. But polemics were renewed in 1977, and

tension between two Southeast Asian client states, Cambodia

and Vietnam, further damaged relations. In 1979 China

invaded Vietnam to defend Cambodia from the Vietnamese

incursion of 1978. The Soviet Union condemned the invasion

and increased arms shipments to Vietnam. Competing goals in

Southeast Asia remained a key issue for nearly a decade.

A new set of bilateral negotiations began in 1979, but the

Chinese ended talks shortly after the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan in late 1979. Thereafter, China added withdrawal

of Soviet troops from Afghanistan to its conditions for renewing the two nations' 1950 friendship treaty. Talks on the SinoSoviet border situation finally resumed in late 1982, but rela- tions remained static until Gorbachev began making conciliatory gestures in 1986 and 1987. In 1988 two major obstacles were removed when the Soviet Union committed itself to removing troops from Afghanistan, and Vietnam did likewise

for Cambodia. The Sino-Soviet summit meeting ofJune 1989

was the first since the Khrushchev regime.

Russia's foreign policy toward China generally has had two

goals: to preserve a counterweight against United States influ- ence in the Pacific and to prevent Chinese regional hegemony

and a Sino-Japanese alliance that could exclude Russia. This

balancing act appeared in Russia's 1993 foreign policy concept

in its call for weighing the benefits of increased Russian arms

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Russia: A Country Study

sales to China against the danger of re-creating a Cold War

arms race in which the respective proxies would be Taiwan and

China. Accordingly, the concept endorsed neighborly and substantive relations with China while ensuring that "third countries," such as the United States or Japan, would not be able to use China as an ally against Russia.

In the early 1990s, relations got a boost from China's interest

in renewed weapons imports from Russia and other forms of

military cooperation. In 1992 an exchange of visits by high

defense officials established defense ties and included the signing of a major arms technology agreement with a reported

value of US$1.8 billion. In 1993 another series of defense

exchange visits yielded a five-year defense cooperation agreement (see Foreign Arms Sales; China, ch. 9). A strategic partnership, signed in early 1996, significantly strengthened ties. In December 1992, Yeltsin went to China and signed a nonaggression declaration that theoretically ended what each

called the other's search for regional hegemony in Asia.

Another treaty included Russian aid in building a nuclear

power plant, the first such provision since Sino-Soviet relations

cooled in the late 1950s. Chinese party chairman Jiang Zemin

visited Moscow in September 1994 and concluded a protocol

that resolved some border disputes and generally strengthened

bilateral ties. During Yeltsin's visit to China in April 1996, both

sides described their relationship as evolving into a "strategic

partnership," which included substantially increased arms

sales. At the April meeting, new agreements made progress

toward delineating and demilitarizing the two countries' 3,645

kilometers of common border. Although border security and

illegal Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East were con- troversial issues for Russian regional officials, Yeltsin

demanded regional compliance with the agreements. Russia

has respected China's claim that Taiwan is part of its territory,

although Russia's trade with Taiwan increased to nearly US$3

billion in 1995 and Russia planned to open trade offices on the

island in 1996.

In 1994-96 China emerged as a major market for Russian

arms, having bought several dozen Su-27 fighter aircraft and

several Kilo-class attack submarines. Russia also had a positive

trade balance in the sale of raw materials, metals, and machinery to China. A series of high-level state visits occurred in 1994

and 1995. Both countries pursued closer ties, in each case

partly to counterbalance their cooling relations with the

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United States. In March 1996, Russia announced that it would

grant China a loan of US$2 billion to supply Russian nuclear

reactors for power generation in northeast China, and further

cooperation was proposed in uranium mining and processing,

fusion research, and nuclear arms dismantlement.

Japan

Historians identify the crushing victory ofJapan over Russia

in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 as the beginning of

those countries' poor relations. After World War I, Japan took

Vladivostok and held the key port for four years, initially as a member of the Allied interventionist forces that occupied parts

of Russia after the new Bolshevik (see Glossary) government

proclaimed neutrality in 1917. At the end of World War II, Stalin broke the neutrality pact that had existed throughout the war in order to occupy vast areas of East Asia formerly held by

Japan. His action resulted in the incorporation of the entire

Kuril Islands chain and the southern half of Sakhalin Island

into the Soviet Union, and it created an issue that blocked the

signing of a peace treaty and forging closer relations. In the

Gorbachev era, relations thawed somewhat as high officials

exchanged visits and the Soviet Union reduced its Far East

nuclear forces and troops, but fundamental differences

remained unchanged when the Soviet Union dissolved.

Since World War II, twin concerns have dominatedJapanese

relations with the former Soviet Union: the East-West Cold War

and the so-called Northern Territories—the four southernmost

Kuril islands—that the Soviet Union occupied under the terms

of the Yalta Conference in 1945 and continued to occupy on

grounds of national security. The dissolution of the Soviet

Union initially raisedJapanese expectations of a favorable reso- lution of the islands dispute and Russian hopes of significant

Japanese economic aid and investment in return. But the

return of the islands to Japan remained politically inadvisable

for Soviet and Russian leaders throughout the first half of the

1990s.

Just before he became de facto president of Russia in 1990,

Yeltsin had advanced a bold, five-point plan to deal with the ter- ritorial issue. After initially criticizing the plan, the Gorbachev

government incorporated several of Yeltsin's recommendations

into its foreign policy position. The plan envisioned several

steps leading to a full peace treaty, without a firm Russian com- mitment to return the islands, and in 1992 the Russian Federa471
Russia: A Country Study

tion continued the discussions that the Gorbachev regime had

initiated.

However, Japan refused to increase commercial activity with

Russia until the countries resolved the territorial issue (by

whichJapan meant that Russia would recognize its sovereignty)

and signed a peace treaty. Russia offered only to return two

islands after a peace treaty was signed. In the meantime,

Yeltsin's efforts to improve bilateral relations faced increased

domestic criticism from hard-line legislators, regional officials

in Russia's Far East, and elements within the military establishment. In 1992 this criticism culminated in Yeltsin's Security

Council forcing an embarrassing, last-minute cancellation of a

presidential trip to Japan. Russia's January 1993 foreign policy

concept approached the problem only obliquely. It made an improved role in Asian geopolitics a top general priority and

improved relations with Japan a primary specific goal in that

process.

In 1993-96 Russo-Japanese relations showed signs of

improvement, although there were also repeated setbacks as both sides proposed and then withdrew conditions. After postponing a second visit, Yeltsin finally made an official visit to Japan in October 1993. The resulting bilateral Tokyo Declaration represented some movement on both sides, but Russia's

dumping of nuclear waste in the Sea ofJapan and the issue of

Japanese fishing rights off the Kuril Islands marred relations in

the ensuing years. In 1995 the two sides came close to agreements on both issues—including Japanese aid to build sorely

needed nuclear waste processing facilities in Russia's Maritime

(Primorskiy) Territory—but the terms of the treatment plant

remained mired in controversy, and continued Japanese violations stymied the fishing agreement in 1995 (see Environmental Conditions, ch. 3).

After two years of talks, in January 1996 Russia reached an

agreement with Japanese and United States firms to build a liquid nuclear waste treatment ship with financing from Russia,

Japan, and the United States. Negotiations over fishing rights

remained deadlocked after a fifth round of talks ended in February 1996, and Russian border troops continued to fire on

Japanese fishing vessels. The Russians protested ajapanese proposal to extend a 200-mile economic exclusion zone around its coastlines, in line with Japan's imminent ratification of the UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea prescribing the limits of

national coastline authority. Because of the proximity of the

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two countries, such a zone would include substantial Russian

coastal waters. Meanwhile, the Kuril Islands issue remained

unresolved in the first half of 1996, although at the Moscow G7 meeting the two sides agreed to resume talks. Other Asian States The four major goals of Soviet policy in Asia were defense of

the Soviet Union's eastern borders, including areas disputed

with China, Japan, and Mongolia; maintenance of a set of alli- ances with key nations along the Asian periphery; improved

relations with Western-oriented, relatively advanced states in

order to obtain assistance in developing Siberia; and as much

isolation as possible of China, South Korea, and the United

States. In pursuit of these goals, the main instrument was the

large Soviet military presence in Asia, which backed foreign

policy assertions that the Soviet Union was an Asian power. In

the late 1980s, Gorbachev sought to update this approach by

improving relations with China, India, andJapan.

According to the 1993 draft foreign policy concept, Russia

aimed to correct the imbalance in the former Soviet Union's

East-West relations by paying greater attention to ties with

Asian states. This view reflected the debate in Russian foreign

policy between the westward-looking so-called Atlanticists and

the so-called Eurasianists who would focus on relations with the near abroad and the wealthiest Asian states. Reflecting the Eurasian alternative, the January 1993 concept called for a flexible policy of mutually beneficial relations

with all the states of Asia, thus fostering good relations by

reducing Russian military forces and cooperating with the

United States and other regional powers to bolster security and

regional stability. Such cooperation would include joint prevention of undesirable and unstable behavior, including organized crime and drug dealing. By following such a policy,

Russia would come to be seen as an "honest prospective partner" in the region.

Some conservatives argued that the breakup of the Soviet

Union pushed Russia geopolitically toward Asia because the

great bulk of Russia's territory and resources are in its eastern

regions and because the most European territories of the

Soviet Union—Belarus, the Baltic states, and Ukraine—now

were gone. Russian territory directly abuts three Asian powers:

China, Japan, and North Korea. The security of the large populations of Russians remaining in Central Asia, which has an

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Russia: A Country Study

extensive border with China, were a continuing concern; thus,

events such as changes in Chinese-Kazakstani relations have

focused added Russian attention on Asia. Russia's relations with

Mongolia, an adjoining state that moved decisively out of the

Soviet sphere of influence in 1991, have been affected by separatism in areas of Russia bordering Mongolia.

Russia's presence and influence in Asia generally declined in

the early 1990s. Elements of that movement were shifts of ethnic Russian populations away from areas near the Russo-Chi- nese border, growing anti-Russian sentiment in Vietnam, loss of

Russian influence over an increasingly unpredictable North

Korea, and a rapidly expanding, uncontrolled Chinese eco- nomic and even demographic influence in Russia's Far East. Russia soon took a series of measures to stem the erosion of its influence, including efforts to maintain and rebuild military

ties with Vietnam and increased arms sales to China and Malaysia. In 1993 and 1995, Russia protested the failure of the AsiaPacific Economic Conference (APEC) to offer it membership,

and it characterized the decision as a national insult. Analysts interpreted the replacement of Kozyrev with Middle

East specialist Primakov in early 1996 as marking a further tilt of Russian foreign policy toward the Eurasian emphasis. Early

in his term, Primakov noted that his priorities would include

reinforcing ties with the former Soviet republics and with such

countries as China, Japan, and the Middle Eastern states. At the same time, Russia announced a new trade policy that called for

increased commercial links with China, Pakistan, India, and

South Korea, among other Asian nations. Yeltsin reaffirmed

the new emphasis in his 1996 state of the federation speech.

Economic interests played a large part in this change. In 1995

exports to Asian countries had increased to US$20 billion,

more than one-quarter of Russia's total trade that year. Many

Russian analysts observed that economically sound and technologically developed Asian states could provide markets, technology, and investments at advantageous terms. Soviet policy in Southeast Asia, aimed at limiting the influ- ence of China and eliminating the influence of the United

States, was not especially successful in the 1970s. In 1978 support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia eliminated the proChinese government of Cambodia, but it also pushed the member states of the pro-Western Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) to cooperate more closely among themselves

and with the United States. In the late 1980s, Russia established

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bilateral ties with ASEAN states as part of Gorbachev's revised

Third World policies, which included improved relations with

Asian nations of all economic descriptions. In the early 1990s, Russia's efforts to improve relations with

Vietnam met significant obstacles. In October 1993, the two

sides discussed extending Russian use of the port at Gam Ranh

Bay beyond its expiration date in the year 2005. Vietnam called

for rental payments for use of the base, but the two countries

reached no agreement. During Kozyrev's July 1995 visit to Vietnam, the two sides discussed enhancing bilateral and regional

cooperation, which had reached a low level. Stumbling blocks

to improved relations included Vietnam's repayment of its large debt to Russia, Russia's desire to repatriate many of the

50,000 to 80,000 Vietnamese guest workers stranded in Russia

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the status of Cam

Ranh Bay. Vietnam also requested that Russia aid its army in

modernizing itself as a counterweight to China, which remains

a regional threat.

In the Soviet period, India was among the Third World states that responded the most positively to Soviet overtures, and the

closeness of Indian-Soviet relations was a source of tension

between China and the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet Union

saw India as an important means of containing Chinese expansionism. Despite occasional declines, relations with India

remained close through the end of the Gorbachev era, and

India profited from abundant military and other foreign aid.

On a visit to India in January 1993, Yeltsin stressed that con- tinued good relations were pivotal to Russia's balanced foreign

relations, including its pro-Eastern policy. Although Russian

trade with India had plummeted in the early 1990s, commercial relations recovered somewhat in 1994-95 following the

establishment of an Indian-Russian Joint Commission. Much of

the trade was linked to Indian repayment of past debts.

In March 1996, Primakov became the first Russian foreign

minister to visit India. At that time, he termed India a priority

partner, and he signed an agreement reestablishing the Soviet- era hot line communications link between New Delhi and Moscow. Primakov stressed that both Russia and India were seeking

closer relations with China and that those new ties would not

threaten the closer Russian-Indian ties. Relations with communist North Korea and capitalist South

Korea, defined clearly by the dichotomy of the Cold War,

changed noticeably in the early 1990s. The January 1993 for475
Russia: A Country Study

eign policy concept endorsed the goal of a peaceful Korean

unification to reduce regional instability on Russia's borders.

Although the concept called for full ties with South Korea,

which it described as sharing Russia's "basic values of world civ- ilization," the concept also urged the maintenance of some

levers of containment over North Korea to prevent that country from developing nuclear arms. The Soviet Union's treaty ties with North Korea included the

friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance treaty of 1961.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kozyrev indicated that

many of the Soviet friendship treaties would be reevaluated,

but at that time Russia did not renounce the pact with North

Korea. In August 1995, Russia forwarded a new draft "friendly

relations" treaty to North Korea that excluded a crucial provision calling for mutual military assistance in the case of attack.

In April 1996, a Russian government delegation traveled to P'yongyang to discuss that proposal and to convince North

Korea to halt bellicose moves along its border with South

Korea.

North Korea's inconsistent positions on the issue of nuclear

technology have been a major concern for Russia. The Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized North Korea's March 1993

announcement that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and Russia subsequently supported

the international community in urging North Korea to adhere

to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons power and to accept international inspections of its nuclear facilities. To ease the tension

caused by the potential of nuclear weapons in the two Koreas,

Russia called an international conference to declare the

Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone. In October 1994, Russia

endorsed a United States-North Korean agreement on halting

North Korean nuclear proliferation while urging that Russian

reactors be supplied to North Korea under the agreement.

Moscow criticized the decision to supply South Korean reactors

instead, and the new disagreement became another sore point

in United States-Russian relations.

Other issues of conflict between Russia and North Korea

were allegations of human rights violations against North

Korean guest workers in Siberian forests and North Korea's

unpaid debt to Russia of more than US$3 billion. In 1995 Russian conservatives urged renewal of arms sales and other ties with North Korea as a means of encouraging it to repay the

debt.

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On his 1992 visit to South Korea, Yeltsin signed the Treaty on

Principles of Relations, which called for relations to be based

on "common ideals of freedom, democracy, respect for human

rights, and the principles of a market economy." This treaty

placed Russia in the unique position of having treaty ties with

both North and South Korea, each based on fundamentally dif- ferent principles. Russia and South Korea reportedly also dis- cussed joint projects in natural gas exploitation and industrial

development. In 1995 the two countries signed an agreement

that alleviated a sore point in relations by authorizing Russia to

partially repay its debt to South Korea in goods. Russian arms

transfers have included T-80 tanks and BMP-3 armored fighting vehicles. South Korea is assisting in the development of an

industrial park in the Russian city of Nakhodka, a port on the

Sea ofJapan that Russia has declared a free economic zone. The Third World

The Cold War affected the relations the United States and

the Soviet Union had with Third World states. Both superpowers wooed Third World allies, many of which used the Cold

War to extract favorable aid as the price of closer relations. The

Soviet Union endeavored to construct socialism in the Third

World to demonstrate that Marxism-Leninism would someday

triumph worldwide. Many of its so-called client states were proclaimed as "socialist oriented" or following the path of "noncapitalist development," and the Soviet Union signed

friendship treaties and other security and aid agreements with

them. Some Third World states, however, involved themselves

in the influential Nonaligned Movement, which began in 1955

and represented more than half the world's population. Most

of those countries formally eschewed major security and other

relations with the superpowers, with conspicuous exceptions

such as Cuba. At some stages of its existence, however, the Nonaligned Movement appeared to have a pro-Soviet bias. The collapse of the Soviet Union broke most of Russia's ties with Third World states. The Soviet ideological mission of fos- tering socialism also ceased. Russia was unable to continue eco- nomic subsidies to client regimes, including the Soviet-installed

regime in Afghanistan that collapsed in 1992. Russia continued

to play a reduced role in some of the regional peace negotiation efforts it had inherited from the Soviet Union, notably in

the Middle East and in Cambodia.

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Russia: A Country Study

Relations with Africa received a relatively low priority, and in

1992 Russia closed nine embassies and four consulates on that

continent. Relations with some African states already had wors- ened in late 1991 when Yeltsin ordered the end of all foreign

aid and demanded immediate repayment of outstanding debts.

Most African states responded that their debts with the former

Soviet Union should be forgiven or reduced because they had

been largely military outlays resulting from a moribund superpower rivalry.

The January 1993 draft foreign policy concept made no

mention of Russian support for former Soviet client states in

Africa or elsewhere. Instead, the concept emphasized the use of diplomatic leverage to induce payment of debts by those

states. Beginning in mid-1994, a shift began toward increased

economic ties with more economically developed African states such as South Africa and Nigeria.

The Middle East The Middle East was among the most important Third

World regions for Soviet foreign policy and national security.

The Soviet Union shared boundaries with Middle Eastern

states Iran and Turkey, and some of those states' ethnic, reli- gious, and language groups also were represented on the

Soviet side of the border. The region's oil resources and shipping lanes were of significant interest to the Soviet Union and

to the West. After World War II, the main Soviet goal in the

region was to minimize the influence of the United States. Toward that end, the Soviet Union gave large-scale support to a group of radical Arab states that were united by their quest to eliminate Israel and to oust all vestiges of Western influence in

the region. At various times, the strategy also included extensive economic assistance to NATO member Turkey, unsuccessful attempts at negotiation of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid1980s (during a period of strained relations with both countries), and, in the late 1980s, pursuit of closer relations with

moderate states of the region such as Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,

Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia as well as United States ally Israel. In

1987 the Soviet Union protected Kuwaiti shipping in the Per- sian Gulf against Iranian attack, and it established consular

relations with Israel. At the same time, the Soviet Union continued ties with radical regimes in Libya, Syria, and the People's

Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).

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Foreign Relations

In the last years of the Soviet Union, influence with Libya,

Iraq, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Kuwait

ebbed, and the Soviet Union played a peripheral role in the

Persian Gulf War of 1991. Despite its friendship treaty with

Iraq, the Soviet Union supported the United States-led international effort to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. After the

war, the Soviet Union found itself marginalized by United

States dominance in the region. The Soviet Union played a minor but significant role as co-coordinator with the United

States of peace talks between Israel and the Arab states that

began in January 1992.

The independence of the five former Soviet Central Asian

republics put a geographical barrier between Russia and the

states of the Middle East. Some Russian democrats and some

ultranationalists believed that the Soviet Union's involvement

with Islamic states such as Afghanistan and the Central Asian

republics had drained resources and harmed Russia's eco- nomic and political development and stability. This sentiment

was a major factor in the original formulation of the CIS, which

included only the Slavic republics in that new organization and

added the Central Asian and Caucasus states only at the insis- tence of Kazakstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Beginning in 1993, however, Russian policy toward the Middle East and the Persian Gulf became more assertive in selected

areas. In late 1992, Russia endeavored, with limited success, to prevent Iran from supporting the Islamic elements of a coalition government in Tajikistan, then under siege by antireformist Tajikistani elements. On other issues, Iran and Russia

pursued similar interests in constraining anti-Russian and antiIranian political currents in Azerbaijan, and Iran used relations

with Russia to counteract United States-led international eco- nomic and political ostracism.

A major factor in renewed Russian interest in the region was

the prospect of arms sales and other trade, which were the

goals of Chernomyrdin's visit to Saudi Arabia and other Persian

Gulf states in November 1994. In December 1994, Russia

signed a trade agreement with Egypt with the stated purpose of

resuming Egypt's Soviet-era position as the most important

trade partner in the Middle East. Russia moved to reestablish

its earlier lucrative arms sales ties with Iran, selling that country

fighter aircraft, tanks, submarines, fighter-bombers, and other

arms. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Algeria also made

arms purchases in the early 1990s, as did Egypt and Syria. How479
Russia: A Country Study

ever, the level of Russian arms sales remained low compared

with the previous decades of high Soviet visibility in the region.

In 1996 Russia continued to observe international bans on

arms sales to Libya and Iraq.

Ultranationalists and other deputies in the Russian parliament called for rebuilding ties with Iraq and condemned

United States air strikes against that country in January and

June 1993. Among Russia's overtures for better relations was an

appeal in the UN Security Council for easing international eco- nomic sanctions on Iraq, but in late 1995 these efforts were set back by revelations that Iraq was seeking to develop a nuclear

weapons program. The apparently poor performance of Russian equipment during the Persian Gulf War discouraged many

Middle Eastern states from buying Russian arms. Another negative effect on Russia's ties with the Middle East was Russia's

aggression against Chechen Muslims and its stance favoring

Serbia against Muslim Bosnia.

A series of Russian contracts to build nuclear power plants

and to share nuclear technology with Iran became a major

international issue and a source of particular friction with the

United States. The initial 1993 contract was not fulfilled; a new

contract, worth a reported US$800 million, called for construction of a nuclear reactor on the Persian Gulf. In September

1995, Moscow announced a further contract to build two additional, smaller reactors. Although the United States strongly

protested what it viewed as potential nuclear proliferation to a

terrorist state, Russia responded that international law permitted such deals and that the reactors would be under full safe- guards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Russian diplomats encouraged Arab participation in the

Arab-Israeli peace talks that began in 1992, and Russians participated in talks between Israel and the PLO on the issue of PLO

self-rule in Israeli-occupied territories. Among other reasons, Russia supported the peace process as a means of reducing the

threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

Russian foreign minister Primakov launched shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East in April 1996 in an attempt to end

fighting in southern Lebanon and to increase Russia's diplomatic role in the region. However, Russia's condemnation of

Israeli attacks against militant Arab Hezbollah guerrillas in

southern Lebanon led Israel to respond that it preferred the

more evenhanded diplomatic approach of the United States. Russia subsequently was excluded from a multilateral force

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Foreign Relations

agreed upon by Israel, Lebanon, and Syria to monitor a United

States-brokered cease-fire in Lebanon.

Latin America

In the Soviet period, the main reasons for involvement in

Latin America were not historical, cultural, or economic, but

related to strategic competition with the United States. Accordingly, the Soviet Union endeavored to foster leftist insurgencies

and other distractions to interfere with United States foreign

policy in the region.

The main bases of Soviet involvement in Latin America were Cuba and Nicaragua, but the Soviet Union also attempted

some involvement in Peru and Grenada. The Soviet Union

placed military and intelligence facilities in Cuba to spy on the

United States. It also supported Cuba as an attractive and suc- cessful model of Latin American socialism that would induce

other countries to move into the same sphere and become

export bases for ideology. In 1962 Khrushchev attempted to redress Soviet strategic nuclear inferiority by surreptitiously

placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. The

resulting crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union

to the brink of war. Although tensions over Cuba subsided con- siderably in the decades that followed, Cuba remained an

important Soviet outpost until the Gorbachev regime began

substantially cutting aid in the late 1980s. The other potential

outpost of communism in Latin America, Nicaragua, was lost when a free election rejected the procommunist Sandinista

Party in 1990. Meanwhile, Soviet purchases of grain and other

goods from Latin America slumped severely in the decade

before the breakup of the Soviet Union and thereafter because

of the Soviet Union's inability to pay in hard currency (see

Glossary)

.

The January 1993 draft foreign policy concept viewed relations with Latin America as particularly important for Russia's

economic development. Russia saw the Latin American countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, as a source of

low-price food and other goods for the Russian market, as a source of mutually beneficial technological cooperation, and

as a market for arms. The 1993 concept called for establishing

and consolidating ties with regional organizations such as the

Organization of American States, in which Russia is a permanent observer. The concept was vague about relations with

Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and it avoided

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Russia: A Country Study

mention of Soviet-era support for Marxist-Leninist ideological

movements in those states. Some Russian analysts argued for revival of the mutually

profitable pre-Soviet trade ties that had exchanged goods from

Siberia for goods from Latin America. These analysts advocated obtaining Latin America's trade products—coffee, cocoa,

sugar, fruit, footwear, and oil—in exchange for Siberian timber,

coal, fish, and furs. Some also argued that Russia's trade in the

entire Pacific Basin should intensify to compensate for the loss of ports on the Baltic and Black seas. In the first post-Soviet years, the Russian government

received criticism from nationalist factions for declining trade

and lax diplomacy with Latin America. In 1993 commercial

activity recovered somewhat as Brazil and Russia concluded a trade agreement that was worth about US$2 billion and

included arms purchases by Brazil. In 1994 Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the Federation Council, Russia's upper legislative chamber, toured Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and

Venezuela. Many Russians urged restored ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru in order to persuade those states to pay back

Soviet-era loans. Some of the many Latin American students

who had benefited from the Soviet Union's large studentexchange program also began to seek new entrepreneurial and

cultural contacts with Russia on behalf of their native countries. In 1994 Russia cooperated with the United States by supporting a United States-led international intervention force in

Haiti.

In early 1996, Foreign Minister Primakov traveled to Cuba

and other Latin American states to indicate Russia's determination to expand ties in the region. In March 1996, Russia and

Colombia announced an agreement on the supply of Russian

small arms and ammunition. Seeking to restore ties with Nicaragua, Russia agreed in April 1996 to cancel the bulk of that

nation's debt (US$3.4 billion) to the former Soviet Union.

The Soviet-era status of Cuba deteriorated seriously late in

the Gorbachev regime. Ties between the communist parties of

the two countries were severed, economic subsidies were sus- pended, and, in late 1991, Gorbachev announced the pullout

of the Soviet military brigade from Cuba. The Soviet Union

announced that "mutual benefit" and world prices would dictate future economic relations and that Cuba no longer would

enjoy the special status it had had until that time. The end of

subsidies was a severe blow to the Cuban economy. In Novem482
Foreign Relations

ber 1992, a Russian-Cuban trade agreement endeavored to restore some trade ties with a sugar-for-oil barter arrangement,

but it did not include subsidies for Cuba. During 1992 the Russian government also failed to defend Cuba against increased

commercial sanctions based on international accusations of

human rights violations. Some Russian hard-liners criticized

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' treatment of Cuba, and that

policy was reversed partially between 1993 and 1995. First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets committed Russia to a credit

of US$350 million and a sugar-for-oil barter agreement in 1993,

and he made a high-level visit to strengthen bilateral ties in

1995.

Renewed Russian connections in Cuba have been of significant concern in the United States. Russia has argued that barter arrangements with Cuba do not violate provisions of the

United States trade embargo on Cuba, which sets severe penalties for United States trading partners that deal with Cuba. In

1995 the United States voiced concern over Russian plans to

assist Cuba in completing a nuclear power reactor. In February

1996, the United States tightened economic sanctions against

Cuba in response to the shooting down of two United States

civilian airplanes in international airspace. At that time, Yeltsin

criticized the United States for overreacting, and he reaffirmed

his intention of reestablishing traditional ties with Cuba.

Foreign Policy Prospects

In the 1990s, a number of sometimes contradictory factors

have driven Russian foreign policy. The most formidable and

unchanging factor is the country's immense geographical span,

which gives Russia natural interests in three vastly different

regions—Europe, the Pacific, and the vast, largely Muslim

stretch of the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia's recent his- tory gives it particular geopolitical motivation to perpetuate

relations with the fourteen nations that emerged along its periphery when the Soviet Union dissolved. Recent history also

has motivated efforts to maintain an influence over some states of the Third World in which the Soviet Union had a substantial

foothold.

The process of focusing priorities among a number of possibilities has proved to be unusually complex in an era when ideology and bilateral rivalry no longer dictate responses. The

main recurring disagreement in post-Soviet foreign policy pits

advocates of stronger ties with the capitalist world, especially

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Russia: A Country Study

Western Europe, against advocates of some form of reconstituted union in which Russia would be the dominant force,

politically and economically. The first option truly could take

Russia in a new direction. The second option offers the security

of returning to a familiar role, but it also threatens to burden

Russia with client states that it no longer can afford.

Between 1992 and mid-1996, the Yeltsin administration

wavered from one side to the other, emitting contradictory signals as it tried to maintain as many options as possible. At the same time, however, Russia moved into Western organizations

such as the Council of Europe, and treaty arrangements such

as START I, which gave it stronger connections with, and obligations to, the West than it had ever had in the Soviet era. In

this process, Russia showed consistently that it wished to be

taken seriously as a diplomatic power upon which the world

could rely, not merely as a plaintiff for its own national causes. Meanwhile, in the mid-1990s, increasingly strong political

forces in Russia have blocked further movement toward the

West by arguing that Russia cannot recapture superpower sta- tus as a second-rate partner of rich capitalist states. The center- piece of this position is opposition to NATO expansion

eastward, which has been the pretext for nationalists to block

other international commitments such as the START II disarmament agreement. At the same time, Russia has maintained

substantial influence in parts of the former Soviet Union, tak- ing advantage of destabilizing ethnic struggles in the new

nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia to play a dual role as peace negotiator and military guarantor of security. Finally,

Russia's closer ties with China, a country that still is the object

of substantial suspicion in the West, have increasingly alarmed

Western policy makers.

The replacement of Foreign Minister Audrey Kozyrev by Ye\-

geniy Primakov in January 1996 was an indication that Russia

might be more concerned with restoring power than with con- forming to international standards, although its Great Power

infrastructure continued to crumble and Primakov proved to be more pragmatic than dogmatic in his initial policy state- ments. After Yeltsin's reelection in mid-1996, the president's ill- ness obscured the locus of power in all areas of governance,

including foreign policy. Western observers wondered whether

a nation in acute economic distress, with a disastrously ineffi- cient military and few dependable allies around the world,

might still be willing to make the sort of pragmatic concessions

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Foreign Relations

that Yeltsin and Kozyrev practiced in the first years of Russia's

post-Soviet existence.

Because Russian foreign policy is in a period of formation

and flux, most scholarly publications are articles or edited

works, but some useful monographs have appeared. Noteworthy among the latter are Suzanne Crow's The Making ofForeign

Policy in Russia under Yeltsin; Gerard Holden's Russia after the Cold War: History and the Nation in Post-Soviet Security Polities', and

John George Stoessinger's Nations at Damn—China, Russia, and

America. Useful compilations of articles are Damage Limitation or

Crisis?: Russia and the Outside World, edited by Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov; The Making ofForeign Policy in Russia and the New States ofEurasia, edited by Adeed and Karen

Dawisha; Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union:

Domestic and International Dynamics and Russia and the Third

World in the Post-Soviet Era, both edited by Mohiaddin Mesbahi;

Rethinking Russia's National Interests, edited by Stephen

Sestanovich; and Russian Foreign Policy since 1990, edited by

Peter Shearman. For more current coverage of foreign policy

developments, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's

Daily Report: Central Eurasia digests and translates items from

the Russian press, the Jamestown Foundation's Prism and Monitor publications offer short articles, and the Open Media

Research Institute's biweekly Transition provide longer articles

on domestic and foreign policy issues. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

485

Chapter 9. The Armed Forces
Tsar Saltan approaches three sisters, who are wistfully talking about what each would do if the tsar were to marry her (designfrom lacquer box made in village

ofPalekh).
IN THE SOVIET ERA, THE ARMED FORCES were the most

stable institution in the nation, exercising strong influence

over general national security policy as well as over specific

issues of military doctrine. However, the last regime of the

Soviet Union, that of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in office 1985-91), saw unprecedented debate over military issues, including a movement away from the primarily offensive concerns (which

always had been cloaked in declarations of their necessity for an effective national defense) to a more defensive position in

military doctrine. It is now known that discussion of such a change began in the Soviet Union as early as the 1970s but only

became manifest between 1987 and 1989. Ultimately, the

change was dictated by policy makers' recognition of grave

shortcomings in the Soviet Union's political, economic, and

technological positions versus the West. After long discussion,

in 1993 Russia finally produced a military doctrine that nominally reflected the new military thinking. But that doctrine was

only the first step in a long and painful process of reassessing

the needs and capabilities of Russia's armed forces under a completely new set of global and domestic circumstances.

When the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, the

former Russian Republic, henceforth known as the Russian

Federation, inherited about 85 percent of the union's overall

military establishment, including manpower, defense industries, and equipment. However, Russia inherited only about 60

percent of the union's economic capacity—the resources needed for future support of that military machine. Moreover,

the military power that remained was a fragmentary mixture of

elements from the former Soviet military structure rather than an organized whole. Many of the priorities in the Soviet

Union's national security doctrine—such as the capability to launch amphibious invasions in support of client states on the

other side of the world—had no logical priority in the new Russian state. Requiring substantial reshaping of their capabilities

according to economic resources, the Russian armed forces in

the 1990s have received budget allocations sufficient to maintain a force numbering less than half the 1.5 million personnel

on duty in mid-1996. Beginning in 1994, the campaign fought

in Chechnya illustrated clearly that Russian forces were poorly

coordinated and not combat ready.

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Russia: A Country Study

The decline of the Russian armed forces—and the shocking

shrinkage of the territory they had occupied until the beginning of the 1990s—was a blow to national pride. Nationalist

politicians urged a new military buildup that would return Russia to the superpower status of the Cold War years. Particularly

in the election year of 1996, national security policy became

entwined in political rhetoric, and, as with other urgent issues

in Russia, constructive solutions were delayed until the nature

of the next presidential regime could be clarified. In the mid1990s, individual steps such as arms agreements and an apparent shift of strategic emphasis from the West toward China continued, but overall public and state support for the armed

forces languished.

At the same time, the Russian military retained a strong role

in the formation of a new national foreign policy, especially

policy relating to the recently independent former Soviet

states, referred to in Russia as the "near abroad." Military occu- pation under various guises continued in the Caucasus, Moldova, and Central Asia, as well as the separatist Republic of

Chechnya, and in 1996 strong nationalist factions exerted pres- sure to increase the Russian presence in order to tighten Russia's links with the other former republics of the Soviet Union.

Historical Background

Modern Russian military history begins with Peter the Great,

who established the Imperial Russian Army (see Peter the

Great and the Russian Empire, ch. 1). That force, conceived by

Peter along the Western lines that he had studied, won its first great battle against the Swedish army of Charles XII at Poltava

in 1709. The first great Russian naval victory, at the Hango Peninsula on the Baltic Sea in 1714, also came at the expense of

the Swedes; Peter had modernized the Russian navy with the same diligence he applied to the army. The victories over Sweden made Russia the dominant power in the Baltic region.

For the first time, under Peter the armed forces were staffed

by recruits from the peasantry, whose twenty-five-year obligation made them professional soldiers and sailors devoted to service because they had been liberated from serfdom

together with all their offspring—in the bargain. Officers were

nobles called to an equally rigorous lifetime service. Under

Peter, Russia had the largest standing army in Europe, and ele- ments of the military system he introduced lasted until 1917.

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The Armed Forces

Under Catherine II (the Great; r. 1762-96), the Russian

Empire expanded to the west, the south, and the east, and wars were fought with the Ottoman Empire (1768-74 and 1787-92)

and Poland (1794-95) (see Imperial Expansion and Maturation: Catherine II, ch. 1). The greatest Russian military leader

of Catherine's time was Aleksandr Suvorov, who fought in the

second Russo-Turkish War and the Polish campaign, then led a Russian and Austrian army against the revolutionary French in

northern Italy in 1799. In the first decades of the nineteenth

century, Russian armies continued a long series of wars against

the Ottoman Empire. They also met Napoleon's French forces

at several points in Europe; the most famous encounter was the

legendary defeat of Napoleon's 1812 invasion force by the Russians under Mikhail Kutuzov. That victory established the pattern of scorched-earth retreat that left Napoleon and

succeeding invaders without material support, and it brought a Russian army to Paris in triumphant occupation.

Under Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825- 55), Russia became known

as the "gendarme of Europe," an archconservative defender of

monarchies against the forces of liberation that had begun to sweep Europe in the previous century. In 1831 Nicholas

quelled a Polish rebellion against his own empire, and in 1849

Russia sent 100,000 troops to suppress an uprising by Hungarian patriots against the Austrian Empire. The Crimean War

(1853-56), the fruit of Europe's complex system of alliances

and a series of diplomatic misunderstandings, centered on the

British and French siege of the Russian port of Sevastopol',

which was well defended for nearly a year before surrendering.

However, the Russian defeat in that campaign revealed that

Russian command and supply systems had fallen behind those

of Western Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century.

In the second half of the century, Russia waged a series of

military campaigns to conquer the khanates of Central Asia,

extending the empire and providing a domestic supply of cot- ton. With relatively little military resistance, the entire region

had been incorporated into the empire by 1885. Russia's next

military campaign, however, was not so reassuring. The RussoJapanese War of 1904-05 brought stunning defeats on land

and at sea, capped by the naval Battle of Tsushima in which the

Russian Baltic Fleet was decimated (see Imperialism in Asia

and the RussoJapanese War, ch. 1). Like the Crimean War, the

Russo-Japanese War was a signal that Russia's war machine was not keeping pace with the modern world. Ten years later,

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World War I would confirm that evaluation, as an inept defense

administration and poorly equipped troops suffered heavy

losses to the Germans.

Despite those failures, it was growing dissatisfaction on the

home front that ultimately undermined Russia's military effort

in World War I. Under the direct command of the tsar, the

army actually performed quite well in 1916, but by 1917 the war effort had crippled civilian society and readied Russia for

the overthrow of the tsar. As the home front faltered in its moral and material support of the military, the results of 1916 were reversed. The Provisional Government that followed the

tsar in 1917 was determined to continue the war; that policy was a major factor in the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in

toppling the Provisional Government only eight months after it took power.

The imperial army and navy disintegrated after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Although the Bolsheviks quickly signed

a peace treaty with Germany, there was soon a need for a military force to defend the new state against the anticommunist

Whites in what became a bloody, three-year civil war. In April

1918, the Red Army was established when the Soviet government announced compulsory military service for peasants and

workers. The army's chief organizer was Leon Trotsky, the new

nation's first commissar of war (1918-24); Trotsky's initial offi- cer cadre was made up of about 50,000 former tsarist officers.

Trotsky was able to mold his peasant and worker recruits into an effective force that eventually prevailed over five separate

White armies, with the benefit of access to Russia's industrial

heartland and concentrated lines of supply and communications. Under Trotsky, political officers were attached to all military units to ensure the loyalty of all individuals—a practice

that persisted throughout the Soviet era. When the Civil War ended in 1921, General Mikhail Tukhachevskiy led an extensive program of reorganization and equipment modernization; he also established several military

schools. In the first fifteen years of the Red Army, communist

party membership increased rapidly among the enlisted ranks

and, especially, among the officer corps. By the mid-1930s,

training schools and academies had turned out a generation of

young officers and noncommissioned officers with strong political indoctrination, thus ensuring the ideological loyalty of the

entire armed forces. Beginning in 1931, Tukhachevskiy began

a large-scale rearmament program based on the industrial

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The Armed Forces

development of the five-year plans (see Glossary), and the

armed forces and their supplies of equipment were enlarged

greatly as the shadow of war began falling over Europe in the

mid-1930s.

In 1937 the purges instigated by Joseph V. Stalin (in office

1927-53) reached the army. Tukhachevskiy, now first deputy

commissar of war, was executed for treason together with seven

top generals. As many as 30,000 other officers were imprisoned

or dismissed, leaving the Red Army without experienced com- manders at the end of the 1930s. The first campaign that

revealed this weakness was the so-called Winter War against

Finland (1939-40), in which an estimated 100,000 troops of

the Red Army died while defeating a small Finnish army.

Although the Nazi invasion of 1941 drove far into the Russian interior to threaten Leningrad and Moscow, a new generation of officers gradually asserted themselves as the Germans

were driven from Russian territory in 1943 and 1944 after the

climactic Battle of Stalingrad. A crucial event in that turnaround was Stalin's removal of political officers having parallel

command authority, allowing his top officers to exercise military judgment independent of ideological concerns. The most important Russian military leader of World War II was Marshal Georgiy Zhukov, who was instrumental at four key

points of Soviet resistance: the siege of Leningrad; the defense

of Moscow, the first point at which the German advance was

stopped; the Battle of Stalingrad (February 1943); and the Battle of Kursk (July 1943), in which the last strong German counteroffensive was defeated. Zhukov also commanded the final

push against the German armies across Belorussia, Ukraine,

and Poland. In April 1945, Zhukov led the Red Army's final

assault on Berlin that ended what Russians called the Great

Patriotic War.

By the end of World War II, the Soviet armed forces had

swelled to about 11.4 million officers and soldiers, and the military had suffered about 7 million deaths. At that point, this

force was recognized as the most powerful military in the

world. In 1946 the Red Army was redesignated as the Soviet

army, and by 1950 demobilization had reduced the total active

armed forces to about 3 million troops. From the late 1940s to the late 1960s, the Soviet armed forces focused on adapting to the changed nature of warfare in the era of nuclear arms and

on achieving parity with the United States in strategic nuclear

weapons. Conventional military power showed its continued

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importance, however, when the Soviet Union used its troops to invade Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to keep

those countries within the Soviet alliance system.

In the 1970s, the Soviet Union began to modernize its con- ventional warfare and power projection capabilities. At the

same time, it became more involved than ever before in

regional conflicts and local wars. The Soviet Union sent arms and military advisers to a variety of Third World allies in Africa,

Asia, and the Middle East. Soviet generals planned military

operations against rebels in Angola and Ethiopia. However,

Soviet troops saw little combat in such assignments until the

invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. There, they fought

a counterinsurgency campaign against Afghan rebels for nearly

eight and one-half years. An estimated 15,000 Soviet soldiers

had been killed and 35,000 wounded in the conflict by the time

Soviet forces began to withdraw from Afghanistan in May 1988.

By early 1989, all of the roughly 110,000 Soviet troops who had

been deployed had left Afghanistan.

After incurring the heavy blow of failure in the Afghanistan

campaign, the Soviet armed forces faced an even larger, albeit

nonviolent setback as the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe

began to crumble in 1989. It disappeared entirely by 1991,

when the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) alliance dissolved. As a

result, by 1994 all Soviet/Russian troops had been withdrawn

from territory west of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as from the

three Baltic states, which achieved independence in 1991.

Together with the end of the Soviet Union as a state, the events

of that period set the military on a bewildering search for a new

identity and a new doctrine.

Military Doctrine

In Russia military doctrine is the official formulation of concepts on the nature of present and future war and the nation's

potential role, given existing or anticipated geopolitical conditions. In the late 1980s, the military doctrine of the Soviet

Union underwent a dramatic change toward defensive readi- ness before the dissolution of the union. After inheriting the

unfinished transition of that period, Russia struggled to develop a suitable new set of concepts in the 1990s. The first step, the doctrine of 1993, was considered a temporary document leading to a full statement of goals and circumstances to be formulated around 2000.

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Soldier on guard at World

War II memorial, Volgograd

(formerly Stalingrad)

Courtesy Carolou Marquet

Soviet Doctrine

The Soviet Union's first military doctrine was based on the

teachings of Vladimir I. Lenin about defense of the socialist

homeland and on the military theories of Civil War general

Mikhail Frunze. Starting in the early 1920s, doctrine underwent a series of changes in response to geopolitical and eco- nomic conditions. After World War II, Stalin introduced the

concept of two mutually irreconcilable international coalitions—the capitalist and the socialist—that inevitably would

come into armed conflict. In the 1950s, the Soviet acquisition

of nuclear weapons added a new dimension to Stalin's postwar

concept of a massive, combined-arms struggle on the fields of

Europe. Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev (in office 1953-64) saw adequate nuclear deterrence as a guarantee that socialism

would be able to advance in peace toward its inevitable tri- umph. Based on that theory, he shifted support from conventional forces to a new military group, the nuclear-armed

strategic rocket forces. However, in this period the Soviet military establishment argued for the use of nuclear weapons in

fighting, rather than preventing, a war—including the initia- tion of nuclear attack. In the 1960s, that idea was refined with

the addition of small-scale nuclear strikes and a renewed

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Russia: A Country Study

emphasis on conventional warfare. By 1970 the doctrine envisioned two major possibilities: an entirely conventional war or a nuclear war fought between the Soviet Union and the United

States solely in Western and Central Europe.

In the 1970s and the 1980s, military thinkers continued to question the military efficacy of nuclear weapons, although

official doctrine assumed that the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war. In this period, the concept of a nonnuclear, hightechnology global war, advanced by Chief of the General Staff

Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, attracted substantial support. By the

late 1980s, military doctrine had begun to evolve toward a defensive concept of "reasonable sufficiency" of military force

to ensure national security but not to initiate offensive operations. At the behest of the Soviet Union, in 1987 the Warsaw

Pact officially adopted a defense-oriented military doctrine and

called for reductions in conventional arms in Europe.

The Doctrine of 1 993

Although it is verbose and highly theoretical, the 1993 military doctrine contains important indicators of policy under var- ious scenarios. It is the statement of the military policy of the

Russian government, arrived at after long and intense debate

among all interested parties, whose input reflects their relative

political power. Russian military doctrine is roughly the equivalent of a formal statement of the military policy of a presidential administration in the United States. The official Russian definition of military doctrine is "a nation's officially accepted system of scientifically founded

views on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed

forces in them, and also on the requirement arising from these

views regarding the country and its armed forces being made

ready for war." Military doctrine answers these five basic questions for the Russian armed forces: Who is the enemy in a probable war? What is the probable character of a war, and what will be its aims and tasks? What forces will be necessary to fulfill these tasks, and what direction will military development fol- low? How should preparation for war be carried out? What will be the means of warfare?

The demise of the Soviet Union made the formulation of a new military doctrine to replace that of the Gorbachev regime an obvious necessity. However, urgent political questions

delayed the onset of deliberation on a new doctrine until May

1992. From that time, completion of the doctrine required sev496
The Armed Forces

enteen months, much of which was filled with acrimonious

debate. In November 1993, the final version was approved by

the Russian Federation's Security Council and signed by President Boris N. Yeltsin as Decree Number 1833 (see The Security

Council, ch. 8).

Although the full doctrine text had not been published as of

mid-1996, detailed accounts have been released to the public.

According to these summaries, the document includes three

main sections, entitled political principles, military principles,

and military-technical and economic principles.

The introduction to the 1993 military doctrine defines the

document as an interim policy covering the period of transition from the Soviet Union to the establishment of Russian

statehood and the emergence of a new form of international

relations. The interim period is defined as continuing from the

time of adoption to 2000.

From 1993 until 1996, the primary goal was to restructure

and reduce the armed forces as units were withdrawn from

locations outside Russia. The remaining four years would be

devoted to conversion from a purely conscript personnel base

to a mixed (conscript and voluntary) system, together with the

creation of a new military infrastructure.

Political Principles

The first main section of the doctrine describes the Russian

Federation's attitude toward armed conflicts, and how the

armed forces and security troops are to be used in them. It defines what the Russian Federation perceives as the military

danger to it, the sociopolitical principles supporting military

security, and national policy for ensuring military security. The

underlying goal of the principles is to maintain domestic and

international political stability on the borders while the Russian Federation is consolidating itself. In describing this goal,

the doctrine makes no reference to defending an ideology or

the gains of previous years, as was standard practice in all Soviet

military doctrines.

Peace on the borders, especially in and among the newly

independent republics of the former Soviet Union, is part of

the defensive strategy. The only departure from this self-inter- ested approach is a stated willingness to participate in international peacekeeping efforts. In 1996 Russian participation in

the Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) was justified

by this clause in the military doctrine.

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Russia: A Country Study

The military doctrine retains no vestige of the international

activism that pervaded its Marxist-Leninist (see Glossary) ante- cedents. Resolution of internal Russian economic, political,

and social problems is the principal order of business. The only

formal international obligations that are recognized are formal

treaty obligations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary); the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), since 1995 known as the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE—see Glossary); and those resulting from membership in the United

Nations (UN). The document does not refer to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty—see Glossary),

which in the 1990s is a key constraint on Russia's deployment of

military forces in certain areas. The paramount goal of this interim doctrine is to protect

Russia from attack in the weakened condition in which it has

found itself in the 1990s. The principal threats to the Russian

Federation are defined as wars and armed conflicts on the Russian borders, the potential employment of weapons of mass

destruction against the Russian Federation or on its borders,

the buildup of armed forces along Russian borders, or physical

attacks on Russian installations or territories. The term "instal- lations" refers to Soviet-era bases in the newly independent

former Soviet republics that continue to be garrisoned by Russian troops. (The last Russian troops in Central Europe left Germany in August 1994.)

Military Principles

The interim Russian military doctrine sets the primary

objective for the armed forces as the prevention, early termination, and containment of military conflict through employment of peacetime standing forces. The principal areas of concern are the territory and property of the Russian Federation, the areas contiguous to its borders, and the threat of

nuclear attack by a foreign power.

Military operations in Chechnya are justified under the paragraph on protection of the territory and property of the Russian Federation. Justification for a continued Russian military

presence in the former Central Asian republics derives from

the paragraph on protection of areas contiguous to Russian

borders, as well as provisions of the CIS treaty (see The Geopolitical Context, this ch.).

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The Armed Forces

Russia reserves the right of first use of weapons of mass

destruction, which remain a primary concern of policy makers

in the age of nuclear disarmament. This reservation, which is in apparent violation of the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT—see Glossary), has been retained nevertheless in response to Russia's uncertainty as to the intentions of

the three neighboring states—Belarus, Kazakstan, and

Ukraine—that were left with nuclear weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the last nuclear weapons in

Kazakstan were destroyed in 1995, the last nuclear weapons left Ukraine in mid-1996, and the last nuclear weapons were scheduled to leave Belarus by the end of 1996—seemingly eliminating this rationale. Suspicion of the nuclear intentions of the

United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO—see Glossary) is the remaining foundation for the

first-use provision of the doctrine.

Military-Technical and Economic Principles

The military doctrine's treatment of the military-technical

and economic foundations of the armed forces—the process of

providing and maintaining modern military hardware—is the

aspect that shows the greatest gap between policy and reality.

The doctrine describes a policy of preserving a military-industrial base capable of manufacturing modern military equipment in quantity. It also describes a ten- to fifteen-year

research, development, testing, and evaluation cycle for new

weapons. In the mid-1990s, only a very fragmentary commitment to those goals was visible in Russia's assignment of spending priorities (see Structure and Conditions, this ch.). At the

very least, defense policy has delayed until after the turn of the

century a large share of the acquisition costs and demands on

the national industrial base that such a commitment would

involve. At that point, a new military doctrine probably will

address the issue of technological and economic support.

The Doctrine of the Future

The concluding section of the military doctrine contains an

assurance of the defensive and peaceful intentions of the Russian Federation and of its intention to adhere strictly to the UN

Charter and the tenets of international law. However, the conclusion also states that this document will be supplemented,

adjusted, and improved as Russian statehood is established and

as a new system of international relations is formed.

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Russia: A Country Study

Assumedly, the nature of such changes would depend on

Russia's success in achieving another primary goal: preserving

the basis of military power inherited from the Soviet Union

and setting the stage for making the Russian Federation a major military power after the turn of the century. The view of

the future contained in the doctrine is projected against specific time lines. The new Russian armed forces and the basis for

their military power are projected to be in place by 2000, when

a new, and presumably more assertive, military doctrine is promised. Serious consideration of the content of a more permanent doctrine was not expected to begin until a new government was in place after the 1996 presidential election.

Meanwhile, early in 1996 the government-supported Insti- tute for Defense Studies produced a set of "conceptual theses" on Russia's national security against external threats. Although

not a formal outline for a new military doctrine, experts saw

the theses as an important indication of current military

thought.

The 1996 report lists four major threats to Russia's national

security: interference in its internal affairs by the United States and its allies; political and economic penetration of Azerbaijan

by Turkey and its Western allies; expansion of NATO into Central Europe, the Baltic states, and ultimately Ukraine; and unilateral disarmament of Russia through forced treaties,

modification of the existing Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM

Treaty—see Glossary), degradation of existing Russian strate- gic weapons systems and research and development centers, or

obstructions to the integration of the CIS.

Among "recommended strategies" to neutralize such threats,

the report lists refusing to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) and the World Bank (see Glossary), preventing Western access to Caspian Sea oil,

establishing a military alliance of CIS members to block NATO

expansion (and invading the Baltic states if they try to join

NATO), and deploying tactical nuclear weapons in the Caucasus, Baltic, or Far North regions. The report also recommends

enlarging Russia's stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons when

the limits of phase one of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START—see Glossary) end in 2009. The particular concern

with NATO expansion drives several of these proposals, and

comments made in 1996 by top military officials confirm that a

set of active responses has been prepared for such an eventuality (see The NATO Issue, this ch.). However, experts see both

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The Armed Forces

the Institute for Defense Studies report and supporting state- ments by military authorities as part of a pattern of pressure

applied to potential new NATO states to discourage them from

pursuing membership.

In June 1996, the office of the president's national security

adviser, Yuriy Baturin, released a draft statement on national

security policy goals for the period 1996-2000 that indicated a

less aggressive approach to the next military doctrine. The document's authors recognized that Russia faces no external

threat, stressing instead that Russia's chief national security

need is to strengthen the Russian state economically and politically rather than to maintain military parity with the West.

Because the United States no longer is interested in manipulating European geopolitics, according to the document, it is now

safe to make concessions—including arms reduction treaties

in the search for balanced and cooperative relations (see The

United States, ch. 8). The NATO expansion issue was recognized as the chief obstacle to achieving such relations in 1996.

Although the draft policy statement was generally pro-Western,

it assigned the highest value to relations with the CIS rather

than the West. Experts saw the draft as an attempt to counter

the nationalist faction that continues to emphasize military

power as the most important element of national security and

whose position was forcefully stated in the report of the Insti- tute for Defense Studies.

The Geopolitical Context

According to the Ministry of Defense, between 1991 and

1995 the Soviet Union and then Russia withdrew about 730,000

troops from eleven countries: Azerbaijan, Cuba, the Czech

Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, and Slovakia. Including military families, about

1.2 million people were involved in this shift. Besides the

troops, all the paraphernalia of fifteen army directorates, fortynine combined-arms divisions, seventy brigades, seventy-two

aviation regiments, and twenty-four helicopter regiments also were moved from foreign posts.

The unprecedented speed with which Russia's direct military

influence shrank had a strong effect on the national psyche.

Beginning in 1993, Russia's foreign policy increasingly

reflected the views of influential nationalist and communist

elements of the government. Those elements sought political

support by reviving the memories of Soviet world power, prom501
Russia: A Country Study

ising an end to the "subservient" role being played by Russia on

the world political stage of the 1990s. Inevitably, Russia's real- world application of its military doctrine is an implicit and

explicit element in expanding influence in the directions dictated by a revised foreign policy program. (The 1996 Institute

for Defense Studies report indicates that viewpoint.) Given

severe funding limitations, however, that expansion seemed to have limited possibilities in mid-1996.

Chechnya

The Republic of Chechnya, located on the north slope of

the Caucasus Mountains within 100 kilometers of the Caspian

Sea, is strategically vital to Russia for two reasons. First, access routes to both the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea go from the

center of the federation through Chechnya. Second, vital Russian oil and gas pipeline connections with Kazakstan and Azerbaijan also run through Chechnya. The declaration of full independence issued in 1993 by the Chechen government of

Dzhokar Dudayev led to civil war in that republic, and several

Russian-backed attempts to overthrow Dudayev failed in 1993

and 1994. After a decision of unclear origin in the Yeltsin

administration, three divisions of Russian armor, pro-Russian

Chechen infantry, and internal security troops—a force including units detailed from the regular armed forces—invaded

Chechnya in December 1994. The objective was a quick victory

leading to pacification and reestablishment of a pro-Russian

government. The result, however, was a long series of military

operations bungled by the Russians and stymied by the traditionally rugged guerrilla forces of the Chechen separatists.

Although Russian forces leveled the Chechen capital city of

Groznyy and other population centers during a long and

bloody campaign of urban warfare, Chechen forces held extensive territory elsewhere in the republic through 1995 and into

1996. Two major hostage-taking incidents—one at Budennovsk

in southern Russia in June 1995 and one at the Dagestani border town of Pervomayskoye in January 1996—led to the embarrassment of unsuccessful military missions to release the

prisoners. The Pervomayskoye incident led to the complete

destruction of the town and numerous civilian casualties.

As the campaign's failures and substantial casualties were

being well documented by Russia's independent news media

(an estimated 1,500 Russian troops and 25,000 civilians had

died by April 1995, and the total killed was estimated as high as

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The ArmedForces

40,000 one year later), public opinion in Russia turned strongly

against continued occupation. However, fearing that capitulation to a separatist government in one ethnic republic would

set a precedent for other independence-minded regions, in

1995 President Yeltsin wavered between full support of Chechnya operations and condemnation of the supposed incompetence of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and his generals (see

Movements Toward Sovereignty, ch. 4) . Yeltsin fired several top

generals, including Deputy Minister of Defense Boris Gromov,

who were critical of the war. In 1995 and early 1996, Chechen forces fought from mountain enclaves, into which they had been driven by Russian

forces with superior firepower and air support. The Chechens

used various opportunities to attack targets outside their

enclaves, including the Budennovsk raid ofJune 1995. On sev- eral occasions, Russian forces continued bombardments of

Chechen strongholds after Yeltsin had announced a cease-fire.

In May 1996, Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev signed a

cease-fire with Yeltsin in Moscow, followed by full armistice protocols negotiated by the OSCE in the Ingush city of Nazran.

The protocols set August 30 for withdrawal of "temporary" Russian forces (plans already existed for permanent stationing of

two brigades), contingent on parallel disarmament of Chechen

forces. At the end ofJune, Russian forces began a partial withdrawal, but fighting continued in some regions, and negotiations stalled amid mutual recriminations. In July Russian forces

began a new assault on villages described as harboring guerrilla

forces, and Russia again seemed to lack a unified policy toward

Chechnya.

Russian military and political actions immediately before

and after the protocols indicated little respect for their terms.

The Russian-supported regime in Groznyy signed a draft political status on Chechnya without consulting the rebels, and the

Russian Ministry of Defense reaffirmed its plan to keep troops

in Chechnya indefinitely. Those circumstances indicated

strongly that peace negotiations were a short-term strategy to reduce the Chechnya obstacle to Yeltsin's reelection in the

summer of 1996.

Because of the poor performance of regular troops in

Chechnya, Russia had been forced to use elite naval infantry

and airborne assault units—the former gathered from fifty

units of the Baltic Fleet and more than 100 ships or units of the

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Russia: A Country Study

Pacific Fleet. Airborne units from two divisions were used to end the Pervomayskoye hostage crisis in January 1996.

According to Russian and Western experts, the many serious

command errors made in the Chechnya campaign were at least partly the result of a fragmented command system in which the

lack of direct coordination deprived commanders of the ability to make timely decisions. A major cause of this problem was

the lack of field training among all levels of the officer corps

(see Training, this ch.).

The Chechnya crisis was the most visible indication of the

division in Russia's government over the application of military

doctrine, and of a disintegration process that even Boris Yeltsin

had recognized in 1994. With numerous declarations of sover- eignty having emerged from ethnic republics and regions in

1991 and 1992, the 1993 military doctrine had stipulated that

the military could be used against separatist groups within the

federation, providing a theoretical justification for the Chechnya action. Many military authorities argued that such a cam- paign was foolhardy, given military budget cuts that made

proper training and equipping of troops impossible. Nevertheless, the "war party" of officials and advisers surrounding Yeltsin

failed to foresee the media storm that resulted from a bloody

military struggle within the federation. In 1995 and early 1996,

Grachev's inability to obtain a favorable outcome and continued disarray in top command echelons indicated that he had

lost control of the military establishment.

The Commonwealth of Independent States

In the mid-1990s, an increasingly prominent component of

Russian foreign policy was recovery of military and economic

influence in as many Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) nations as possible. Along Russia's southern borders,

postindependence instability offered a series of opportunities

to retain a military presence in the name of "peacekeeping"

among warring factions or nations, some of whose hostility

could be traced back to actions taken by Russian forces. Variations of this theme occurred in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,

Moldova, and Tajikistan.

Georgia

The course of events along Russia's southwestern frontiers

has given Georgia increased military significance since 1991. A

critical event was Russia's recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty

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The Armed Forces

in Crimea, formerly Russia's only basing area for its Black Sea

Fleet. The drive of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic for

independence from Georgia provided Russia with an opportunity to bargain for access to Black Sea ports in Georgia. Reportedly organized by Russian intelligence agencies and heavily

supported by Moscow, a mercenary force of North Caucasus

Muslim troops threatened to occupy large portions of Georgia

in the early fall of 1993. At this desperate point, the Georgian

government offered Russia extended basing privileges in

return for the protection of Russian "peacekeeping" forces.

Ironically, the Russian-supported mercenaries fighting for

Abkhazia formed the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of

the North Caucasus, which declared its intention of destabilizing Russia's Muslim North Caucasus republics. Therefore, con- tinued access to Georgian territory acquired the additional

purpose of encircling potentially separatist enclaves—which is exactly what Russia did in 1994 in preparing to enter Chechnya.The 1995 basing agreement that resulted from the Georgian

capitulation of 1993 permits the presence of three Russian

bases—in Tbilisi, Poti, and Batumi—with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy artillery. However, other Russian

forces in Georgia also were identified in 1995 after they took

part in bombardments in Chechnya. The troops in Georgia,

designated strictly for control of domestic conflicts such as the one in Chechnya, also constitute a violation of the CFE Treaty,

to which Russia has sought a special adjustment.

In mid-1996 there were an estimated 1,700 Russian troops

on peacekeeping duty between Georgian and Abkhazian lines

in northwestern Georgia, including one airborne regiment

and two motorized rifle battalions. The three main Russian

bases housed about 8,500 troops with 110 main battle tanks,

510 armored combat vehicles, and 238 artillery pieces.

Armenia

Armenia's continued desperate position, locked between

Muslim states Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey and still reeling

from the long blockade inflicted by Azerbaijan and Turkey in

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, provides ample justification

for heavy reliance on Russia for national security. For Russia,

Armenia's position on the eastern border of Turkey is a prime

location for preventing Russia's traditional enemy from

expanding its influence to the north and east. A new unified

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Russia: A Country Study

CIS defense system being created by Russian military planners

in 1996 has included the long-term basing of Russian troops on

Armenian soil and joint Armenian-Russian exercises on Armenian territory. Russia has lent substantial nonmilitary aid to Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but Russia does

not see supporting a complete victory by Armenia over Azerbaijan as strategically advantageous. In mid-1996 Russia had an

estimated 4,300 troops at a single base in Armenia, with eighty

main battle tanks, 190 armored personnel carriers, and 100

artillery pieces. Russian border troops also assisted in patrolling Armenia's border with Turkey.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan, whose location adjacent to the rich oil resources of the Caspian Sea makes it strategically more vital to Russia

than Armenia, is the only one of the three Caucasus states to refuse any deployment of Russian troops on its soil. Russia fears

the increasing influence of Turkey in Azerbaijan, which,

according to national security planners, is a likely bridge for

Turkish influence into Central Asia and Russia's Muslim republics to the north and east of Azerbaijan. Because of these factors, Russia has exerted substantial diplomatic and economic

pressure on Azerbaijan to reappraise its independent policy.

However, former Soviet Politburo member Heydar Aliyev, now

president of Azerbaijan, has proven much more independent

than Russia expected when it assisted him in becoming head of

state in 1993.

Moldova

The Russian (formerly Soviet) 14th Army has been based on

Moldovan (formerly Moldavian) territory since 1956. In September 1990, Slavs on the east bank of the Nistru (Dnestr)

River in the Moldavian Republic declared an independent

Dnestr Moldavian Republic, or Transnistria. After armed conflict began between forces of the new republic and Moldovan

troops in the spring of 1992, part of the 14th Army became a peacekeeping force following an agreement between Russia

and the government of newly independent Moldova. The original Russian force included six battalions (2,400 troops), which

occupied a security zone together with troops of Moldova and

Transnistria. Subsequently, Transnistrian units began replacing

units of the 14th Army, taking advantage of what observers

called a decided bias by the army in favor of its fellow Slavs.

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The Armed Forces

By the end of 1994, about 3,500 Transnistrian troops were in

the security zone with the tacit approval of the Russian forces,

enabling the separatists to consolidate their state. At the same

time, Russia violated the agreement with Moldova by withdrawing all but 630 of its peacekeepers, citing the Russian military's

funding problems. However, in 1996 the bulk of the 14th Army

remained in Moldova, subject to the outcome of long-inconclusive negotiations, under the title Operational Group of Russian

Forces in Moldova. (A bilateral 1994 agreement to withdraw

the 14th Army entirely never was ratified by the State Duma,

the lower house of Russia's parliament.) In mid-1996 some

6,400 Russian troops of the 14th Army and two "peacekeeping"

battalions remained. Russia has opposed participation by the

OSCE in the withdrawal negotiations. Some experts have

described Moldova as a potential staging point for Russian

operations in Central Europe.

In 1994 Moldova also was the scene of a divisive struggle in

the military command. In midyear Minister of Defense

Grachev attempted to remove the popular General Aleksandr

Lebed' from command of the 14th Army after Lebed' voiced

increasingly sharp criticism of the Yeltsin administration. But

Yeltsin refused to remove Lebed', magnifying the open struggle

between two top military commanders and polarizing the military. Lebed' resigned his command in May 1995 to begin a

political career.

Central Asia

Large numbers of Soviet military forces were located in the

five Central Asian republics when the Soviet Union dissolved

officially at the end of 1991. All the newly independent states took measures to gain control over the Soviet units they inherited, establishing a variety of agencies and ministries to define

the gradual process of localization. In the mid-1990s, as support grew in Russia for recapturing in some form the lost terri- tories of the former Soviet Union, attention focused on the five Central Asian republics, which still had substantial economic

and military ties with the Russian Federation. When the Soviet

Union dissolved at the end of 1991, the main military force in

Tajikistan was the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, whose position and resources the Russian Federation inherited. Although

nominally neutral in the civil war that broke out in Tajikistan in

the fall of 1992, the 201st Division, together with substantial

forces from neighboring Uzbekistan, played a significant role

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Russia: A Country Study

in the recapture of the capital city, Dushanbe, by former com- munist forces. As the civil war continued in more remote

regions of Tajikistan during the next three years, the 201st Division remained the dominant military force, joining with Russian border troops and a multinational group of "peacekeeping" troops (dominated by Russian and Uzbekistani forces

and including troops from Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan) to patrol

the porous border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

The openly avowed purpose of the continued occupation

was to protect Russia's strategic interests. Those interests were

defined as preventing radical Islamic politicization and the

shipment of narcotics, both designated as serious menaces to Russia itself. Meanwhile, Tajikistan formed a small army of its own, of which about three-quarters of the officer corps were

Russians in mid-1996. Tajikistan, having no air force, relied

exclusively on Russian air power. In mid-1996 the preponderance of the estimated 16,500 troops guarding Tajikistan's borders belonged to Russia's Federal Border Service. Border

troops received artillery and armor support from the 201st

Division, whose strength was estimated in 1996 as at least

12,000 troops.

Russia has kept more limited forces in the other Central

Asian republics. Turkmenistan consistently has refused to join

multilateral CIS military groupings, but Russia maintains joint

command of the three motorized rifle divisions in the Turkmenistan! army. Under a 1993 bilateral military cooperation

treaty, some 2,000 Russian officers serve in Turkmenistan on

contract, and border forces (about 5,000 in 1995) are under

joint Russian and Turkmenistan! command. Altogether, about

11,000 Russian troops remained in Turkmenistan in mid-1996.

Uzbekistan has full command of its armed forces, although the

air force is dominated by ethnic Russians and Russia provides

extensive assistance in training, border patrols, and air defense.

Kazakstan, which has the largest standing army (about 25,000

in 1996) of the Central Asian republics, had replaced most of

the Russians in its command positions with Kazaks by 1995

mainly because a large part of the Russian officer corps trans- ferred elsewhere in the early 1990s. No complete Russian units are stationed in Kazakstan, but an estimated 6,000 troops from

the former Soviet 40th Army remained there in training positions in 1996, including about 1,500 at the Baykonur space

launch center, which Russia leases from Kazakstan.

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The Armed Forces

In Kyrgyzstan, which has developed little military capability

of its own, Russian units guard the border with China. But

maintaining military influence in Kyrgyzstan has not been a high priority of Russian military planners; a 1994 bilateral

agreement improves incentives for Russian officers to remain

in the Kyrgyzstan's army on a contract basis through 1999, but,

as in Kazakstan, the Russian exodus has continued. President

Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan lobbied for a larger Russian military presence to improve his country's security situation, but no action had been taken as of mid-1996.

Kaliningrad

In the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union established a formidable, closed enclave in the former East Prussia,

including a large naval port at Kaliningrad (formerly Konigsberg). When the Soviet Union collapsed, the independence of

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania deprived the new Russian state of major ports on the Baltic Sea, and 15,000-square-kilometer

Kaliningrad Oblast between Poland and Lithuania was cut off

from Russia. When Russia insisted on maintaining Kaliningrad

as a heavily armed garrison, it aroused considerable international criticism, especially from Poland. Konigsberg was awarded to the Soviet Union under the Potsdam Accord in

1945, but the Russian Federation holds no legal title to the

enclave.

When Russia withdrew all its former Warsaw Pact forces from

Poland and the Baltic states during 1992-94, some air, naval,

and ground forces were relocated to Kaliningrad, ostensibly

because of housing shortages elsewhere in Russia. In mid-1996

the official military garrison was estimated at 24,000 ground

troops of the 11th Guards Combined Arms Army, including

one tank division and three motorized rifle divisions, three

artillery brigades, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles,

and attack helicopters. The Baltic Fleet, which has its headquarters at Kaliningrad, includes three cruisers, two destroyers,

eighteen frigates, sixty-five patrol boats, and 195 combat air- craft, together with one brigade of naval infantry and two regiments of coastal defense artillery. Western experts estimate

that the total Kaliningrad garrison includes as many as 200,000

military personnel, compared with the official Russian figure of

100,000.

In 1993 the population of the enclave was about 900,000, of

whom about 700,000 were Russians. There is strong sentiment

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Russia: A Country Study

in favor of autonomy among the civilian population, and international pressure continues to advocate reducing the garrison

to a level of "reasonable sufficiency," far below its current size. Many Russian military authorities agree with this idea because

maintaining the Kaliningrad force is extremely expensive.

However, a large-scale deemphasis of the military would be dif- ficult because the entire oblast has been structured to meet the

needs of the armed forces. In addition, Russian nationalists

argue that Kaliningrad is a vital outpost at a time when Russia is menaced by possible Polish or even Lithuanian membership in

NATO.

China

In 1995 and 1996, Russia and China moved closer on eco- nomic and military issues, after many years of insecurity along

the two countries' long common frontier. On the Russian side,

the move was prompted by a new general emphasis on relations with Asia that also includes the Korean Peninsula and

Southeast Asia; on the Chinese side, there was concern about

the stability of the Central Asian republics and the possible

spread of separatist sentiments together with politicized Islam,

especially in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which borders Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and

Kazakstan. With Russia sharing those concerns, in April 1996

Beijing and Moscow announced a "strategic partnership" that was hailed as a watershed agreement and was accompanied by

combined blasts at Western attempts to dominate lesser countries. China voiced support for Russia's Chechnya operation,

and Russia backed China's claims of hegemony in Taiwan and

Tibet.

New military agreements provide for long-term military and

technical cooperation, including Russian aid to Chinese arms

industries, modernization of weapons already sold to China,

and the sale of new weapons to China at advantageous prices.

Among the reported terms of the April 1996 agreement is the

sharing of space technology by Russia's State Space Agency, the

sale of diesel submarines and S-300 air defense missile complexes, and production in China of Su-27 jet fighters. In the April 1996 talks, the two sides pledged to observe earlier border demarcation agreements, and Russia ceded some

disputed pieces of land. The issue of reducing military forces

and defining the border was the subject of ongoing talks in

1996.

510
Display ofnaval power on NavalForces Day, July 1991, Vladivostok

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

Sailors on NavalForces Day, July 1991, Vladivostok

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

511
Russia: A Country Study

The NATO Issue The Russian military has unanimously opposed any expansion of NATO in Central Europe or the former Soviet Union

since the idea first appeared in the early 1990s, and virtually all political factions are in agreement. Russia worries that such

expansion would leave it in a strategically untenable position,

despite NATO's claims of the purely defensive character of its alliance. In the mid-1990s, Russian fears have been fanned by

the increasingly influential anti-Western factions in the State

Duma and by the increased urgency with which Central European and Baltic states have sought NATO membership.

Russian military thinkers see NATO expansion as moving

the world's most powerful military force to the very border of

the former Soviet Union (or even past the border, were

Ukraine and the Baltic states to join). Contrary to Western

claims, Russians see no potential for improvement in Russia's

security in this process, except in the unlikely inclusion of Russia as a full NATO member. In 1994 Russia was offered, and

eventually accepted, membership in the NATO Partnership for

Peace (PfP—see Glossary), into which all former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact members were admitted by the

end of 1995 (see NATO, ch. 8).

In the period 1994-96, top-level Russian national security

representatives put forward a variety of threats and proposals

on the subject of NATO expansion. Extreme nationalist factions used the issue to back their argument that the United

States is leading an international plot against Russia. In 1995 a

set of perceived NATO deceptions of Russian negotiators in

Bosnia and Herzegovina was used as evidence of NATO's

untrustworthiness. Russia counterproposed that NATO trans- form itself into a strictly political alliance that would become

part of a new pan-European security system on the model of

the OSCE. Meanwhile, Russia has exerted strong pressure on

the states most imminently eligible for NATO membership,

especially Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states, including

threats that nuclear war might break out in Central Europe if Russia needed to defend itself against NATO forces that had

moved into the region. In 1995 Russian national security representatives promised that NATO expansion would suspend Russian compliance with the CFE Treaty and make impossible

Russian ratification of part two of the Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty (START II) —two cornerstones of disarmament in the

view of Western policy makers. Meanwhile, the "NATO threat"

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The ArmedForces

was a rationale for maintaining a large garrison at the western

outpost in Kaliningrad.

Nuclear Arms Issues In the 1990s, Russia's status as a nuclear power raised two

major issues. First, the deactivation of nuclear weapons in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union caused a series of

problems that affected primarily the civilian population. Second, the rate and conditions for reduction of Russia's nuclear

arsenal were matters of heated debate among military and civil- ian policy makers in the mid-1990s.

During five decades of the Cold War, the Soviet Union stockpiled an estimated 40,000 nuclear warheads, which were

located from the Far East to the Ukrainian Republic on the

western border. Besides the Russian Republic, three other

Soviet republics—Belorussia, Kazakstan, and Ukraine—had

nuclear weapons on their soil. In the early 1990s, Russia and

the United States agreed that, to prevent proliferation of

nuclear weapons and materials, the three other republics

should relinquish their entire stockpiles to Russia or destroy

them. Although the final cleanup of nuclear materials promises to last into the next century, by the end of 1994 the three

former Soviet republics had signed START I and the NPT as nonnuclear states. (Ukraine required additional security assur- ances and financial aid from the United States as a condition of

its participation.)

Experts estimated that disposal of all deactivated nuclear

warheads would require at least ten years because Russian facilities can only dismantle 2,000 warheads per year. Another complication is the disposition of an estimated 100,000 nowsuperfluous employees of nuclear weapons installations who

had access to nuclear technology; failure to find suitable

employment for such individuals might cause them to sell their

highly valuable knowledge abroad. And the total number of

displaced employees of nuclear installations is estimated to be

much larger.

The presence of nuclear material in Russia has caused other

problems. Between 1990 and 1994, the number of documented

cases of smuggling of nuclear materials out of Russia went from

zero to 124, mainly because of lax security at nuclear sites (see

Crime, ch. 10). Although most cases of nuclear smuggling have

involved civilians, in 1994 naval officers stole three uranium

fuel rods from a submarine in Murmansk—and in the mid513
Russia: A Country Study

1990s the fast-deteriorating living standards of Russia's military

made such incidents more likely (see Troop Support Elements,

this ch.). The Ministry of Defense has voiced concern that ter- rorists might take advantage of security lapses to seize a nuclear

weapon; in 1995 a Chechen guerrilla leader threatened to use nuclear terrorism against Russia's civilian population. In a deal

signed in 1992, the United States agreed to buy 500 tons of

weapons-grade uranium, mainly to ensure that such material

did not move into unscrupulous hands. In December 1994,

Russia and the United States agreed to inform each other of

dangerous incidents involving nuclear materials, and the

United States has provided assistance in upgrading Russia's

nuclear security procedures.

A second problem related to Russia's nuclear arms is the

radiation pollution that has resulted from the discarding of

nuclear materials into the ground and the sea. The naval forces

have continued the Soviet-era practice of dumping nuclear

materials overboard in the Sea ofJapan and the Kara Sea, provoking strong reactions from neighboring countries. In mid1996 at least fifty of Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines were standing with fuel rods intact along the Arctic coast,

awaiting dismantlement (see Environmental Conditions, ch.

3).

The geopolitical and diplomatic aspects of the nuclear situation are equally problematic. Russia ratified START I in

November 1992. That treaty limited the United States and Russia to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (bombers, submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles—ICBMs) and

6,000 nuclear warheads each. (The actual number was between

7,000 and 9,000 because of the treaty's counting rules.) The

treaty also set a limit of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads and

1,100 warheads mounted on mobile ICBMs. The number and

configuration of bombers also was prescribed.

In January 1993, United States president George H.W. Bush

and President Yeltsin signed START II. That treaty, which is based on the limitations of START I, would eliminate heavy

ICBMs and ICBMs with multiple warheads, and the total number of warheads would be reduced from the nominal START I level of 6,000 to an actual figure between 3,000 and 3,500.

START II calls for two phases of reduction, the first of which

would begin in 2000. At the end of the second phase, new

reductions would be complete in all three delivery modes:

land-based ICBM, submarine, and bomber.

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The Armed Forces

In March 1993, the Supreme Soviet (later in 1993 renamed

the State Duma) began discussion of START II. The debate

over ratification of the treaty continued sporadically for three

years and showed no signs of reaching a resolution as of mid1996. Opponents of the treaty described it as another Western

effort to penetrate Russia's national security; treaty backers,

including Yeltsin, argued that maintaining the nuclear force at START I levels was financially impossible for Russia, so the

much lower START II level matches Russia's capabilities while

holding the United States far below its potential. In any case, most of the 2,500 warheads that START II would eliminate were outmoded and scheduled for retirement by the mid1990s. According to Western experts, in 1996 Russia had the

financial resources to deploy only about 500 single-warhead

ICBMs, although more than 900 were permitted under START

I at that point (see Strategic Rocket Forces, this ch.). Also, Russia's failure to ratify START II encouraged the United States to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system that would negate

much of Russia's nuclear potential. The matchup of potential

United States ABM capabilities with existing Russian nuclear

strike capabilities became a key consideration in the START II ratification debate.

Nevertheless, beginning in 1995 the question of NATO

expansion overshadowed other aspects of the START II debate;

the more anti-Western State Duma that was seated in January

1996 made the impending expansion of NATO a primary argument against START II ratification. Some Russian treaty supporters concurred that the treaty should not be ratified unless

NATO expansion plans were shelved.

The Defense Industry

The Russian Federation inherited the largest and most productive share of the former Soviet defense industry, employing

as many as 9 million workers in 1,125 to 1,500 research, design,

and production facilities. Those installations are concentrated

in particular regions, whose economies tend to be heavily

dependent on the industry; in the Republic of Udmurtia, for

example, more than two-thirds of workers and industrial capacity were attached to defense in some way in the early 1990s.

Moscow has large plants for air force and missile components,

and St. Petersburg specializes in naval design and production

as well as infantry weapons.

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Russia: A Country Study

Structure and Conditions

Russia's military-industrial complex (MIC) is coordinated by

the State Committee for the Defense Industry (Gosudarstvennyy komitet po oboronnoy promyshlennosti—Goskomoboronprom). In 1996 this agency included about 2,000 production

enterprises and 920 research organizations with a directly

employed work force of about 5 million. However, a 1996 esti- mate identified about 35 million Russians as receiving their

income from enterprises linked in some way to Goskomoboronprom. The research organizations are the heart of Russian

military research and development. They take new weapons

and military materiel projects from concept to prototype, then

hand them off to the production enterprises. Production

enterprises do prototype construction, production runs, and

modifications.

Zinoviy Pak was appointed director of Goskomoboronprom

in January 1996. Prior to his promotion, Pak managed a large

defense enterprise in Moscow. His predecessor, Viktor

Glukhikh, was dismissed by President Yeltsin for mismanagement—a move that made Glukhikh the scapegoat for a multitude of problems that beset the defense industry in the first half of the 1990s.

The Russian MIC includes an industrial base that is wholly

owned by the Russian military. In the Soviet era, defense industries were created solely to arm the Soviet Union, and as such

they had the highest national priority in the allocation of technology and talent. The complex regularly consumed 20 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) and 15

percent of the industrial labor force. In the drive for privatization after the fall of communism, Russian planners initially

believed that this, the best supplied and most efficient of Russian industries, could be converted easily to production for the

civilian market and thereafter would become an engine of eco- nomic growth. Such optimism obscured the complex's total

lack of a civilian market for its products and its inexperience in

developing and selling goods in a competitive marketplace.

Beginning in the late Gorbachev era, planners mistakenly

expected to achieve conversion by a Soviet-style centralized

program and without additional funding to support the

lengthy, stagewise conversion process.

Although MIC conversion received much publicity and bil- lions of dollars in Western aid after 1992, government funding

for that program decreased steadily in the mid-1990s, and only

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The Armed Forces

a small percentage of allotted funds actually were spent for

conversion. No funds were authorized for conversion in the

1995 budget. Some defense industries have mounted successful

conversion and restructuring programs, however. Russia's leading aviation firm, the Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG) Aviation-Scientific Production Complex, has formed joint ventures with the

Moscow Aircraft Production Association (MAPO) and enterprises in Germany, India, and Malaysia. The Sukhoy Holding

Corporation has been formed to combine formerly separate

design, development, and production operations for high-performance aircraft; Sukhoy has branched out into production of

business and commuter aircraft, which accounted for about

half its sales in 1995. The MiG and Yakovlev design bureaus

also began developing commercial aircraft in the early 1990s.

Given its intrinsic shortcomings, the MIC became a major

liability rather than a boon to the Russian economy as the initial momentum of conversion dissipated. In December 1995,

the complex's average basic wage rate fell to two-thirds the

average for industries in the nonmilitary sector. Shortly after assuming the Goskomoboronprom directorship, Pak admitted that the defense industry could not survive

unless it were reconfigured. He proposed a smaller military

and a smaller defense industry—a course whose wisdom was

reflected in statistics on recent performance. In 1995 defense

industrial production fell by 21 percent compared with 1994,

when production in turn was 25 percent lower than 1993. In

January 1996, orders were 25 percent below the level for January 1995, and in the first half of 1996 the Ministry of Defense

had not completed payment for its 1994 and 1995 deliveries

from defense plants. Hardest hit were the shipbuilding, radio,

electronics, and ammunition industries. The reason for such a steady decline is that the MIC had only a single customer, the

Ministry of Defense, which had an ever-shrinking budget allo- cation for repairing and modernizing old equipment, buying

new materiel, and funding research for future models. Because

few enterprises of the MIC had been privatized (a situation that

ensured that complete state control would continue), government subsidies kept many alive through the mid-1990s.

Between 1991 and 1994, annual production of main battle

tanks dropped from 900 to forty, of infantry fighting vehicles

from 3,000 to 400, of fighter aircraft from 225 to fifty, and of

helicopters from 350 to 100. Those statistics partly reflect the

intentional reduction of forces that began in the late Gor517
Russia: A Country Study

bachev era before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991,

but they also indicate the overall deterioration of the industry.

In the first half of 1996, the only fully active production program was that for the SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile

(ICBM). Some other enterprises were producing relatively

small batches of armored vehicles, most of which were for

export. The great majority of the production facilities, including most of the aircraft and shipbuilding installations, were

dormant.

The Defense Budget

The 1996 defense budget of the Russian Federation, ratified

by the State Duma in December 1995, allotted 78.9 trillion

rubles (about US$19 billion—see Glossary for value of the

ruble), of which about 16 percent, or 12.6 trillion rubles

(about US$3.0 billion), was allocated to acquisitions, and 7.3

percent, or 5.8 trillion rubles (about US$1.4 billion), was ear- marked for research and development (R&D). Russia's 1995

budget had allocated 10.2 percent to R&D and 21.2 percent to acquisitions. By comparison, the 1996 United States budget for

the Department of Defense totaled US$249 billion, of which

US$39 billion (15.7 percent) was designated for acquisitions

and US$34 billion (13.7 percent) for R&D. In February 1996,

the Security Council allocated between 50 and 54 trillion

rubles (US$10 to US$11 billion) to fund additional state orders

from the MIC, including money for accelerated R&D and production of advanced weapons systems. This supplementary, tar- geted allocation represented a significant increase over the

allocations for 1994 (US$2 billion) and 1995 (about US$3.4 bil- lion), indicating a possible redirection of resources to R&D

even as the military operating budget remained flat. New Weaponry Acquisitions

Despite the general crisis besetting the defense industry,

examples of highly advanced military technology continued to emerge from Russia's defense plants in the mid-1990s. The T—

90 main battle tank, the most modern tank in the army arsenal,

went into low-level production in 1993, based on a prototype

designated as the T-88. The T-90 was developed by the Kartsev-Venediktov Design Bureau at the Vagonka Works in Nizhniy Tagil. Initially seen as an entirely new design, the

production model is in fact based on the T-72BM, with some

added features from the T-80 series. The T-90 features a new

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The Armed Forces

generation of armor on its hull and turret. Two variants, the T90S and T-90E, have been identified as possible export models. Plans called for all earlier models to be replaced with T-90s

by the end of 1997, subject to funding availability. By mid-1996

some 107 T-90s had gone into service in the Far Eastern Military District. In the mid-1990s, the first priority for the air forces was the

Su-T-60S multirole bomber, which had been designed to replace the Tu-22M and the Su-24 (see Force Structure, this

ch.). The Su-T-60S is a long-range supersonic tactical/operational nuclear-capable bomber with built-in stealth technology

developed by the Sukhoy Design Bureau. Although its development was officially secret, the Su-T-60S was reported to be in

the prototype stage and ready for flight testing in mid-1996.

The second priority for the air forces was the Su-27IB tacti- cal fighter-bomber being built for the Frontal Aviation Command. A naval aviation version was designated the Su-32FN.

This side-by-side, two-seat aircraft was in serial production in

the mid-1990s at the Sukhoy Chkalov Aircraft Plant in Novosibirsk. In its bomber mode, the Su-27IB was expected to be

armed with the AA-11 Archer short-range air-to-air missile, and

in its fighter mode with the AA-12 Adder mid-range, air-to-air,

fire-and-forget missile.

Russia's submarine technology developed faster in the mid1990s than Western experts had expected, as the fleet underwent reduction from its 1986 total of 186 vessels to ninety-nine.

According to one intelligence estimate, more than half of the

1996 fleet was capable of moving undetected into Western sealanes. In mid-1996 the navy scheduled four submarines for production, including one upgraded addition to its existing fleet

of Akula-class vessels and three of the new Severodvinsk class,

which were expected to go into service in 2000. The Severodvinsk is a state-of-the art submarine that allegedly is so quiet

that it eliminates the United States technical lead in this area, and it is armed with the new 650mm Shkval rocket that travels

at 200 knots underwater.

The new modification of the SS-25 ICBM, the Topol M-2, is a three-stage, solid-fuel rocket designed to carry a single war- head. Scheduled to go into production in 1996, the Topol M-2

is a permitted modernization under START I terms; it can be

deployed in a fixed silo or made mobile. Because it is ear- marked for the elite strategic rocket forces as a replacement for

missiles being destroyed under START I, the Topol is a high519
Russia: A Country Study

priority project protected from cutbacks in the acquisitions

budget.

Information about the funding of Russia's defense R&D programs remains hard to obtain because many such programs are

secret. The official budget allocation of US$1.4 billion, even

with the addition of the Security Council's supplemental funding in February 1996, seems extremely modest in an era of

rapid technological advances. Most of the acquisition programs

of the mid-1990s do not have known R&D follow-on programs;

instead, they are products of R&D programs started in the early

1980s.

The MiG-MAPO 1.42 R&D program has been advertised as the Russian response to the United States Air Force's F-22

advanced tactical fighter (ATF) program. The MiG-MAPO

1.42, a single-seat, multirole stealth fighter, is projected to reach operational capability between 2005 and 2008. The air

force R&D funds also reportedly have been shifted to a highpriority program to field highly accurate precision-guided

munitions (PGM) in response to the United States success with

that type of weapon in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. A shift of

funds to the PGM program may further delay the MiG-MAPO

1.42 program.

Beginning in 1993, the defense industry had an influential

spokesman at Yeltsin's side to lobby for improved support. First

Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, long a top metallurgy

industry executive in the Soviet era, was a forceful proponent

of bolstering the existing complex with minimum privatization or conversion to civilian production. However, Soskovets, who

was chiefly responsible for increasing Russia's defense budget

by 3 trillion rubles in 1996, was dismissed unexpectedly in June

1996 when Yeltsin ousted most of the hard-liners from his inner

circle in preparation for the second round of that year's presidential election.

Foreign Arms Sales

In the first half of 1996, defense planners appeared to favor

delaying privatization and civilianization and letting the MIC

do what it does best: make weapons. Instead of depending

upon Russia's armed forces as the customer, Soskovets intensified his pursuit of the international arms market in an attempt

to improve the industry's earnings. Russia offered military

hardware both for sale as a means to raise capital and in barter

arrangements to repay international debts. In April 1996, the

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The Armed Forces

State Corporation for Export and Import of Armaments (Rosvooruzheniye) reported fifty-one countries as current customers, with the largest sales totals involving China, India, Syria,

and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Together with lesser cus- tomers Algeria, Cuba, Kuwait, Malaysia, Turkey, and Vietnam,

those countries accounted for 75 percent of arms sales in early

1996. Arms exports were being produced at more than 500

enterprises in Russia and more than 1,200 enterprises in ten

other CIS nations having production-sharing agreements with

Russia.

Arms sales and military technology transfers to China

expanded rapidly in the mid-1990s, although many defense

authorities had strong reservations about sharing advanced

technology with such an unpredictable neighbor. For China,

Russia is a source of sophisticated, reasonably priced armaments unavailable from the West. For Russia, China is another

source of hard currency (see Glossary). Among China's key

purchases in recent years were Su-27 fighter-bombers, MiG-31

fighters, heavy transport aircraft, T-72 tanks, and S-300 antiaircraft missile launchers. In 1994 and 1995 agreements, China

bought a total of ten Kilo-class diesel submarines, the first four

of which cost US$1 billion altogether. Russia received repeated

warnings from the United States about the dangers of enhancing China's military capabilities. Such a warning came in May

1996 against the sale of technology for SS-18 ICBMs, which

China had requested ostensibly for its space program.

Russia has agreed to repay part of its trade debt to Finland

with its modern SA-11 air defense missile system in a deal

worth US$400 million. The SA-1 1 is an army-level, mobile, lowto medium-altitude, surface-to-air missile system that went into

serial production in 1979. The SA-11 can successfully engage

any aircraft at altitudes from fifteen to 22,000 meters at a range

of up to 35,000 meters using its tracking and engagement radar

system. It has an on-board identification friend-or-foe (IFF) sys- tem and an electronic countermeasures suite. Experts predicted that Finland would employ the SA-11 as its national air defense system. The SA-11 also is in service in India, Poland,

Syria, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia), and several former Soviet republics.

In yet another debt reduction arrangement, Russia is furnishing Hungary 200 BTR-80 wheeled armored personnel carriers (APCs) as replacements for the thirty-year-old Hungarianmanufactured FUG APC. The BTR-80 is a modern, lightly

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Russia: A Country Study

armored vehicle with a diesel power plant. It is manufactured

at the Gorkiy Automobile Factory in Nizhniy Novgorod and has

been in service since the early 1980s. The BTR-80 is a lightly

armored amphibious vehicle with a collective chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) protective system. Operated by a crew of

three, the vehicle can carry a squad of seven infantry troops. In the mid-1990s, the Russian defense industry was anticipating the end of the arms embargo against Serbia as an opportunity to generate hundreds of millions of dollars in sales.

Russia's long association with the Serbs has established a traditional Russian arms market in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia). However, in the aftermath of an

extremely expensive economic embargo, it is not clear that the

Ministry of Defense of Yugoslavia has the funds to purchase

large quantities of Russian military materiel.

Russia is aggressively promoting its combat aircraft in the

East Asian arms market. Russia and India signed a defense

agreement in November 1994 during a state visit by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. This agreement marked the end of

the strained relations that had resulted from India's loss of

access to generous Soviet credit terms and low prices when

cash-strapped Russia demanded hard currency (see Glossary)

after the fall of the Soviet Union (see Other Asian States, ch.

8). During a related visit to India in March 1995, First Deputy

Minister of Defense Andrey Kokoshin made a sale of ten MiG29 aircraft for US$200 million. At the time, Kokoshin asserted

that this and future defense deals with India would save several

hundred thousandjobs in the Russian defense sector. India and Russia have a tradition of cooperation in arma- ments that began in the 1960s; in the mid-1990s, India needed

new equipment from Russia to modernize its armed forces in

view of ongoing arms imports by traditional enemy Pakistan

and persistent suspicion of neighboring China. In early 1996,

India and Russia signed a treaty of military technical cooperation, estimated to be worth US$3.5 billion through the expiration date of 2003. Among key purchases are Russian

technology for armored vehicles, artillery, and naval systems in

addition to aircraft. In early 1996, experts estimated that as much as 70 percent of India's armaments had been purchased

from Russia.

In early 1996, MIC chairman Pak astounded the United

States Army by marketing the Russian SA-12 surface-to-air missile system in the UAE in direct competition with the United

522
The Armed Forces

States Army's Patriot system. He directed Rosvooruzheniye to offer the UAE the highest-quality Russian strategic air defense

system, the SA-12 Gladiator, as an alternative to the Patriot at half the cost. The offer also included forgiveness of some of

Russia's debt to the UAE.

Prospects for the Defense Industry

As the defense budget faces annual threats of receiving a smaller share of a shrinking GNP, experts predict that either

the defense industry will collapse under its own weight in the near future or that the national budget will reallocate so much

money to civilian programs that the industry simply will wither

away. The collapse theory is based on the fact that the two sources of funds in the military budget appropriations that support the

defense industry—acquisitions and R&D—are shrinking at a

rate faster than the industry can absorb. Although Pak claimed

in early 1996 that defense orders constituted only 15 to 20 percent of the MIC's current orders, the civilian economy was not

healthy enough to absorb the industry's new products, and

most of the converted industries were not producing items with

high market appeal. Therefore, Pak's Goskomoboronprom has

emphasized dual-use technology that would bridge the gap

between the two production sectors. The fund reallocation theory is based on the premise that

the real threats to Russian national security are domestic problems such as regionalism, terrorism, corruption, and crime. A

hungry and disillusioned population existing on the edge of

economic catastrophe since 1991 does not favor spending

scarce funds on a military for which it perceives no immediate

need.

The real long-term threat to the Russian defense industry is the reduced R&D funding allotment in the Russian military

budget. In the opinion of Western experts, foreign sales will

not provide the long-term security required to revive the R&D

programs of Russia's military laboratories. In turn, the absence

of an aggressive research program for new technology will cause foreign markets to dry up. In June 1996, President Yeltsin

named Aleksandr Lebed', an outspoken advocate of smaller,

better-equipped armed forces, to chair the Security Council.

That move was expected to end arbitrary funding of inefficient

MIC enterprises, but its meaning for future R&D was not clear.

523
Russia: A Country Study

The Soviet Union produced an excellent array of military

equipment that has been distributed around the world. However, modernization has not continued under the Russian Federation, and the poor performance of Soviet equipment

against United States equipment in Operation Desert Storm

reduced the eagerness of international arms purchasers.

Another problem is repair and replacement. The Russian

record on resupply to foreign defense ministries has not been

good, and the well-documented prospect of further deterioration in the Russian MIC does not build customer confidence.

From the onset of his tenure as director of Goskomoboronprom, Zinoviy Pak proved to be an imaginative and aggressive

marketer of Russian military hardware. He energized the moribund Rosvooruzheniye to the point that it even was placing

sophisticated advertisements in Western commercial publications aimed at United States and NATO armed forces. Pak also

entered Russian dual-use technology, applied in such products

as sports airplanes and high-speed passenger boats, in numerous international exhibitions. In March 1996, Soskovets

reported that Russia's 1995 arms sales abroad exceeded US$3

billion, an increase of 80 percent over 1994 and 60 percent

more than sales to the Russian military. About 75 percent of

foreign payments for weapons were made in cash. By mid-1996

new sales of about US$7 billion already had been identified,

and the predicted 1996 income was US$3.5 billion.

Force Structure

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are organized

into six services subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. In

1996 approximately 1.5 million personnel were serving, including about 160,000 women. The services are the ground forces,

the naval forces, the air forces, the air defense forces, the stra- tegic rocket forces, and the airborne troops (see fig. 13). There

were plans to reduce the number of armed services to three by

combining the air forces, air defense forces, and strategic

rocket forces into a single space force, but this change had not

been approved officially by mid-1996. Another proposed

change, aimed at improving cost and operational efficiency,

would establish a regional command structure that would

encompass ground, air, and naval forces in a particular region.

Altogether, the 1996 state budget authorized funding of

1,470,000 military personnel and 600,000 civilian support personnel.

524
The Armed Forces Command Structure

The armed forces chain of command prescribed in the military doctrine clearly establishes central government control of

the military. The president of the Russian Federation is the

commander in chief. The Government (called a council of

ministers or cabinet in other countries) is responsible for maintaining the armed forces at the appropriate level of readiness.

Direct leadership of the armed forces is vested in the Ministry

of Defense; the General Staff exercises operational control.

Executive authority over the military lies in the office of the

president of the Russian Federation. The State Duma exercises

legislative authority through the Government. The minister of

defense exercises operational authority, and the General Staff

implements instructions and orders. This structure, which has

a superficial similarity to the division of power in the United

States military establishment, does not imply military subordination to civilian authority in the Western sense, however. The

historical tradition of military command is considerably different in Russia. The tsars were educated as officers, and they reg- ularly wore military uniforms and carried military rank. Stalin

always wore a military uniform, and he assumed the title generalissimo. Even General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (in office

1964-82) appointed himself general of the army, and he

encouraged portraits of himself in full uniform.

By tradition dating back to the tsars, the minister of defense

normally is a uniformed officer. The State Duma also seats a large number of deputies who are active-duty military offi- cers—another tradition that began in the Russian imperial era. These combinations of military and civilian authority ensure

that military concerns are considered at the highest levels of

the Russian government. They also demonstrate that strict subordination of the military to civilian authority in the Western

sense is neither a tradition nor a concern in Russia.

The minister of defense is the nominal commander of all the armed forces, serving under the president of the Russian

Federation. In this capacity, the minister exercises day-to-day

authority over the armed forces. President Yeltsin appointed

General of the Army Pavel Grachev to the post in May 1992.

Grachev's decision to side with Yeltsin in the president's October 1993 confrontation with parliament deprived a rebellious

State Duma of an opportunity to overturn the president's

authority. At least partly for that reason, Yeltsin retained his

defense minister despite intense criticism of Grachev's manage525
Russia: A Country Study

Figure 13. Organization of the Ministry ofDefense, 1996

ment of the Chechnya campaign and the Russian military

establishment in general. Finally, victory in the first round of

the 1996 presidential election spurred Yeltsin to dismiss

Grachev; General Igor' Rodionov, who had commanded troops

in the controversial occupation of Tbilisi in 1989 but had a reputation as a soldier of integrity who was sympathetic to reform, was appointed minister of defense in July 1996.

The Ministry of Defense is managed by a collegium of three

first deputy ministers, six deputy ministers, and a chief military

inspector, who together form the principal staff and advisory

board of the minister of defense. The executive body of the

Ministry of Defense is the General Staff. It is commanded by

the chief of the General Staff. In keeping with the Soviet practice of permitting senior officers to hold civilian positions, in

1996 the chief of staff also was a first deputy minister of

defense.

Contrary to the United States tradition of military authority

derived strictly from the civilian sector, Russian General Staff

officers exercise command authority in their own right. In

1996 the General Staff included fifteen main directorates and

an undetermined number of operating agencies. The staff is organized by functions, with each directorate and operating

agency overseeing a functional area, generally indicated by the

organization's title (see table 28, Appendix).

The most secret of the General Staff directorates is the Main

Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye razvedochnoye upravleniye—GRU), which has been an important and closely

526
The ArmedForces

guarded element of national security since its establishment in

the 1920s. The GRU system delivers detailed information on

the capabilities of Russia's most likely military adversaries to the General Staff and to political leaders. The organization is divided into five operational directorates, each covering a designated geographical area. The first four cover Europe, Asia,

the Western Hemisphere and Britain, and the Middle East and

Africa, respectively. In the Soviet era, the fifth directorate coor- dinated military intelligence activities, but in the 1990s that

agency has been assigned to provide intelligence from the

other former Soviet republics. Headquartered in Moscow, the

GRU has an estimated 2,500 personnel, including area and

technical specialists and field offices abroad. Each military district and fleet also has its own intelligence directorate.

Ground Forces

The commander in chief of the ground forces, who in 1996

was Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev (appointed in September 1992), has two first deputy commanders, three deputy commanders, and a Main Staff. The first deputies have general

responsibilities, and the deputies have specified functional

responsibility for armaments, aviation, and combat training,

respectively. The executive agency for the commander in chief

is the Main Staff of the Ground Forces. The Ground Forces of the Russian Federation are estimated

to number approximately 670,000 officers and enlisted personnel. Of that number, about 170,000 are contract volunteer

enlistees and warrant officers, and about 210,000 are conscripts. Presumably, the remaining 290,000 are commissioned

officers. These figures indicate that 43 percent of ground

forces personnel are officers, an extraordinarily high percentage that reflects the Soviet and Russian tradition of giving little authority to the enlisted ranks, as well as the vestiges of the

much larger military cadre inherited from the Soviet army.

Much of this bulge is made up of senior field-grade officers and

generals who no longer are needed in a smaller military but

who are too young to retire. In the mid-1990s, this situation was one of the most difficult personnel problems facing the

ground forces command.

The ground forces are organized into eight military districts, one independent army, and two groups of forces (see fig. 14;

fig. 15). Although the districts are ground forces commands,

they may include forces from the other services, in which case

527
Russia: A Country Study

528
The Armed Forces

they also serve as regional commands. In February 1996, four

of Russia's eight independent airborne brigades were placed

under ground forces command, with one each going to the

North Caucasus, Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far Eastern districts. At the same time, two of five airborne divisions, stationed

at Pskov and Novorossiysk, were assigned for special joint operations to the Northern and Siberian districts, respectively.

These shifts, which outside observers interpreted as the end of

plans to form a mobile force for rapid insertion in trouble

areas, reflected a shortage of the airlift capacity needed to support independent operations by such troops, as well as a possible fear of coup activity in independent elite military units.

Altogether, in 1996 the ground forces included sixty-nine

divisions: seventeen armored, forty-seven motorized infantry,

and five airborne. Included in their armaments were 19,000

main battle tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 600 surface-to-surface

missiles with nuclear capability, and about 2,600 attack and

transport helicopters.

Among the specially designated units, the Operational

Group of Russian Forces in Moldova (also known as the Group

of Russian Forces in the Dnestr Region) is part of the ground

forces, but operationally the group is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. This command arrangement probably

derives more from political than military concerns. The second

force group, the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus,

stationed in Armenia and Georgia, is operationally subordinate

to the ground forces command (see The Commonwealth of

Independent States, this ch.). The Northwest Group of Forces

is an administrative title given to ground forces headquarters in

Kaliningrad, whose troops are under the command of the 11th

Independent Army. That army, in turn, is operationally subordinate to the ground forces.

The eight military districts are the Northern, Moscow, Volga,

North Caucasus, Ural, Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far Eastern.

The Northern Military District is the successor to the Soviet-era

Leningrad Military District, although the old name still was in use in 1995, and reports in 1996 indicated that it might be reinstated officially. The district includes the 6th Combined Arms

Army, the 30th Army Corps, the 56th District Training Center,

and several smaller units. One air army also is stationed in the

district, but it appears to be subordinate to the Air Force High

Command. The airborne division stationed at Pskov, formerly

529
Russia: A Country Study

GROUND FORCES

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

GROUP OF

RUSSIAN FORCES

IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS

NORTH CAUCASUS

MILITARY

DISTRICT

TRANSBAIKAL

MILITARY

DISTRICT

MOSCOW

MILITARY

DISTRICT

URAL

MILITARY

DISTRICT

FAR EASTERN

MILITARY

DISTRICT

NORTHERN

MILITARY

DISTRICT

OPERATIONAL GROUP OF

RUSSIAN FORCES

IN MOLDOVA

11th INDEPENDENT ARMY

VOLGA

MILITARY

DISTRICT

SIBERIAN

MILITARY

DISTRICT

Figure 15. Organization of the Ground Forces, 1996

operationally subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, was reas- signed for special combined duty in 1996.

The Moscow Military District is an anomaly in the command

structure because it includes the national capital. It has special

significance because of its proximity to the western border with

Belarus and Ukraine, traditionally the routes followed by invaders from the west. The district's official troop strength includes

the 1st and 22d combined arms armies and the 20th Army

Corps. However, CFE Treaty data indicate that operational control of these forces is vested in the Ministry of Defense rather

than the ground forces or the district commanders. Other

forces within the Moscow district include the Moscow Air

Defense District, one airborne brigade, and one brigade of special forces (spetsnaz) troops. The Moscow Air Defense District

has boundaries coterminous with those of the Moscow Military

District, but it is under the command of the air defense forces.

The special forces brigade is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

The Volga Military District, headquartered at Samara, is an

interior district that includes the 2d Combined Arms Army,

together with an airborne division that is operationally subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The 2d Combined Arms Army

is an understrength unit consisting of the 16th and 90th Tank

530
The Armed Forces

Divisions. Also in the Volga district are the 27th Motorized Rifle

Division and the 469th District Training Center, which are

directly subordinate to the district commander.

The North Caucasus Military District, headquartered at Rostov-na-Donu, faces the former Soviet republics of Georgia,

Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It is defended by the 58th Combined

Arms Army and the 8th and 67th Army Corps. However, these

are not robust forces. The 8th Army Corps and the 58th Army

each include only one motorized rifle division, and the 67th

Army Corps has only reserve forces with no heavy equipment.

The weakness of these units has helped motivate Russian proposals to renegotiate CFE Treaty limitations to allow additional

forces along Russia's southern flank.

The Ural Military District lies south of the Northern district

and east of the Ural Mountains, with the Siberian district to its east. The Ural district, whose headquarters is at Yekaterinburg,

includes two tank divisions and two motorized rifle divisions.

The Siberian Military District lies in the center of Asiatic Russia, with its headquarters in Novosibirsk. Its ground forces are organized into one corps of four motorized rifle divisions and

one artillery regiment.

The Transbaikal Military District is headquartered in Chita.

The district comprises three combined arms armies totaling

four tank divisions and six motorized rifle divisions. One tank

division and one motorized rifle division are headquartered at

district training centers that are believed to be directly subordinate to the district headquarters. One artillery division and two

machine gun-artillery divisions deployed on the Chinese border also have district training-center status. The Far Eastern Military District, headquartered in Khabarovsk, includes four combined arms armies and one army

corps. Among them, those units have three tank divisions and

thirteen motorized rifle divisions, of which one tank division

and two motorized rifle divisions have headquarters that serve

as district training centers. One artillery division and five

machine gun-artillery divisions are directly subordinate to the

district headquarters.

Naval Forces

The naval forces include about 200,000 sailors and marines,

about 20 percent of whom are conscripts, and 500,000 reserves. Of the active-duty personnel, about 30,000 are in naval aviation

and 24,000 in coastal defense forces. The primary missions of

531
Russia: A Country Study

the naval forces are to provide strategic nuclear deterrence

from the nuclear submarine fleet and to defend the sea-lanes

approaching the Russian coast. The naval forces include shorebased troops, naval aviation units, four fleets, and one flotilla (see fig. 16). The shore-based forces and naval aviation forces

are operationally subordinate to the fleets. The strategic naval

forces, comprising forty-five nuclear submarines and 13,000

personnel, are operationally subordinate to the Ministry of

Defense and logistically supported by the fleets in whose ports

they are based. Some 138 other submarines are in service,

although in the mid-1990s a major reduction of the nonstrategic submarine force was in progress (see table 29, Appendix).

In the mid-1990s, Russia's naval aviation force was almost

entirely shore based, after having achieved substantial sea- based strike capability in the Soviet era. In 1996 only the steampowered aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, assigned to the

Northern Fleet, conducted active flight operations at sea. Two

new nuclear-powered carriers were scrapped before completion, indicating abandonment of that program, and older air- craft-carrying cruisers were sold to the Republic of Korea

(South Korea) for scrap. However, in 1996 the nuclear-powered cruiser Petr Velikiy (Peter the Great) was scheduled for

launching at St. Petersburg after eight years under construction; assigned to the Pacific Fleet, the 28,000-ton vessel is armed with guided missiles believed to be designed to destroy

enemy aircraft carriers. Experts rated the Petr Velikiy the most

powerful cruiser in the world.

Each of Russia's four fleets has a subordinate, land-based

naval air force. The Caspian Flotilla has no naval air arm. The

naval shore-based troops consist of naval infantry and coastal

defense forces. The naval infantry forces include one infantry

division subordinate to the Pacific Fleet and four naval infantry

brigades—one in the Baltic Fleet, one in the Black Sea Fleet,

and two in the Northern Fleet. The coastal defense forces are a combination of infantry regiments, brigades, and divisions with

air defense missile regiments. Amphibious landings are a low

priority; according to intelligence estimates, only 2,500

marines and 100 tanks could be put ashore by Russia's thirteen

amphibious ships. According to a Russian source, in 1996 most

ships were at a relatively low readiness level, with most units

remaining close to home port.

The Northern Fleet is headquartered at Severomorsk, at the

top of the Kola Peninsula near Murmansk, with additional

532
The Armed Forces home ports at Kola, Motovskiy, Gremikha, and Ura Guba. The

mission of the Northern Fleet is to defend Russia's far northwestern Arctic region surrounding the Kola Peninsula. The

fleet provides home ports for thirty-seven nuclear submarines,

twenty-two other submarines, forty-seven principal surface

combatants, and ten coastal and smaller ships. The naval aviation contingent includes a complement of twenty Su-39 fixedwing aircraft and ten antisubmarine warfare helicopters on

board the Admiral Kuznetsov, which heads the air defense of the

Barents Sea. Shore-based naval aviation includes 200 combat

aircraft and sixty-four helicopters. The Northern Fleet has two

naval infantry brigades, one coastal defense regiment, and an

air defense missile regiment.

The Baltic Fleet is headquartered in Kaliningrad, where it is defended by a naval infantry brigade. From this rather exposed

location, the fleet controls naval bases at Kronshtadt and Baltiysk. Operational forces include nine submarines, twenty-three

principal surface combatants, and approximately sixty-five

smaller vessels. The air arm of the Baltic Fleet includes five regiments of combat aircraft and a number of other fixed-wing air- craft and helicopters.

Headquartered at Sevastopol', with an additional home port

in Odessa, the Black Sea Fleet became an object of contention

between Russia and Ukraine when the latter republic achieved

independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Although Ukraine has no use for a blue-water navy and cannot

afford to maintain one, it has been reluctant to surrender its share of the fleet, both of whose home ports are in Ukraine, to a larger neighbor with a tradition of domination. A long international squabble ended temporarily when ajune 1995 summit

meeting arrived at a formula for disposition of the Black Sea

Fleet's assets: the ships of the fleet were to be divided equally

between the two nations, but Russia eventually would buy back

approximately 60 percent of Ukraine's share. The Russian portion of the Black Sea Fleet continued to be based in Sevastopol', with separate Russian and Ukrainian ports designated on

the coast. All ships were to be under dual command until the

agreement took effect in 1998. However, substantial nationalist

opinion on the Russian side opposed this solution.

The Black Sea Fleet comprises fourteen submarines, thirty- one capital ships of the line, and forty-one coastal ships. The

Moskva, Russia's first seagoing aircraft cruiser, is assigned to the

Black Sea Fleet. It is an antisubmarine warfare helicopter car533
Russia: A Country Study

NAVAL

HIGH COMMAND

NAVAL

INFANTRY

BLACK SEA

FLEET

COASTAL

DEFENSE NAVALAVIATION

NORTHERN

FLEET CASPIAN

FLOTILLA

BALTIC FLEET

PACIFIC FLEET

Figure 16. Organization of the Naval Forces, 1996

rier with a complement of eighteen KA-25 helicopters. The

land component of the Black Sea Fleet comprises one naval

infantry brigade, a coastal defense division, and a surface-to-air

missile (SAM) regiment. It is not known how these assets will

be distributed between Russia and Ukraine. The naval aviation

component of the fleet includes an inventory of nearly 8,000

aircraft of all types. Its strike power is concentrated in a bomber regiment and a mixed fighter and ground-attack regiment.

The Caspian Flotilla is a small force for coastal defense and

waterways patrol consisting of two frigates, twelve patrol boats,

and about fifty other small craft based in Astrakhan'. Command and equipment are shared with Azerbaijan and Kazakstan, other former Soviet republics on the Caspian littoral. The Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet are rated as the two

most powerful Russian naval forces. Pacific Fleet headquarters

is in Vladivostok, with additional home ports in PetropavlovskKamchatskiy, Magadan, and Sovetskaya Gavan'. The Pacific

Fleet includes eighteen nuclear submarines that are operationally subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and based at Pavlovsk and Rybachiy. The blue-water striking power of the

Pacific Fleet lies in thirty-four nonnuclear submarines and

forty-nine principal surface combatants.

The air power of the Pacific Fleet consists of the 250 combat

aircraft and helicopters of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, all of

which are land-based. Its most powerful strike force is two

bomber regiments stationed at Alekseyevka. Each regiment

534
The Armed Forces

consists of thirty supersonic Tu-26 Backfire aircraft. The land

power of the Pacific Fleet consists of one naval infantry division

and a coastal defense division. The naval infantry division

includes more than half of the total manpower in the Russian

naval infantry. Following the pattern established elsewhere in

the naval infantry, in the mid-1990s the Pacific Fleet infantry is expected to be reorganized into brigades in the near future.

Air Forces

The air forces include about 130,000 troops, of which 40,000

are conscripts. According to CFE Treaty figures, at the end of

1994 Russia's air forces, including air defense, possessed a total of 3,283 combat aircraft. The air forces are organized into four

commands under the Air Force High Command (see fig. 17).

These commands are the Long-Range Aviation Command, the

Frontal Aviation Command, the Military Transport Aviation

Command, and the Reserve and Cadre Training Command.

The usual command configuration includes a division of three

regiments, each with three squadrons of aircraft, plus independent regiments. Like units of the ground forces, most air force

units are deployed according to military district. The air force contingent of the Far Eastern Military District

consists of 124 Su-24 Fencer bombers of the long-range aviation force, and 245 ground-attack and fighter aircraft of the

Su-17, Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, and MiG-29 classes in frontal avia- tion. The Transbaikal Military District hosts an air army comprising 185 combat aircraft. The long-range contingent in that

district consists of eighty Su-24 bombers. The frontal aviation

portion includes thirty MiG-29 and seventy-five Su-17 and Su24 ground-attack and dual-role aircraft. The Siberian Military District has no frontal or long-range

assets. It deploys only 239 L-39 jet training aircraft of the

Reserve and Cadre Training Command. The Ural Military District is supported by one regiment of thirty Su-24 fighterbombers of the Frontal Aviation Command. The North Caucasus Military District's air assets are organized as an air army that

includes a long-range bomber division of eighty-five Su-24

bombers, together with two frontal aviation divisions, a groundattack division of 110 Su-25 fighter-bombers, and a fighter divi- sion of 110 MiG-29 fighters. The North Caucasus Military District air army also has a reconnaissance regiment consisting of

thirty-five Su-24 aircraft.

535
Russia: A Country Study

AIR FORCE

HIGH COMMAND

LONG-RANGE

AVIATION COMMAND

FRONTAL AVIATION

COMMAND

MILITARY TRANSPORT

AVIATION COMMAND

RESERVE AND

CADRE TRAINING

COMMAND

Figure 17. Organization of the AirForces, 1996

Two training centers of the Reserve and Cadre Training

Command are located in the North Caucasus district. They

base five training regiments equipped with 500 operational and

training aircraft of various types. Two more fighter training regiments deploying a combination of ninety-four combat aircraft are stationed in the Volga Military District. The Moscow Military District is supported by an air army that consists of a bomber division of ninety Su-24 aircraft of the Long-Range

Aviation Command, a fighter division of 145 Su-27 and MiG29 aircraft, a ground-attack regiment of forty Su-25 fighters,

and a reconnaissance regiment of fifty-five Su-24 and MiG-25

aircraft. The Moscow Military District also hosts two training

regiments of the Reserve and Cadre Training Command.

The Northern Military District is supported by an air army

consisting of a bomber division under the Long-Range Aviation

Command and a fighter division and a reconnaissance regiment under the Frontal Aviation Command. The bomber divi- sion is equipped with eighty Su-24 bombers, the fighter

division with ninety-five Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft. In addition to the allocations made by district, forty-six air- craft officially belong to the Long-Range Aviation Command

but are under the control of Ukraine. Their operational readi- ness is suspect. A composite regiment of transport aircraft and

536
The Armed Forces

helicopters from the Military Transport Aviation Command is stationed at Kaliningrad.

The Military Transport Aviation Command is organized into

three divisions, each comprising three regiments of thirty air- craft. In addition, there are a few independent aviation trans- port regiments, including one stationed in Kaliningrad.

Overall, the independent training regiments deploy about 350

aircraft of the 11—76 Kandid, An-12, An-22, and An-124 types.

Strategic aviation is an intercontinental nuclear strike force

that includes about 15,000 personnel. In concert with the stra- tegic rocket forces, it provides the Russian Federation's strate- gic nuclear threat. Organizationally, strategic aviation falls under the Long-Range Aviation Command of the air forces,

but it is under the operational control of the Ministry of

Defense. Bases are located in the Far Eastern, Moscow, and

Northern military districts. According to the reckoning of

START I, strategic aviation aircraft can deliver a total of 1,506

nuclear warheads, including bombs, cruise missiles, and air-to- surface missiles. The Far Eastern force deploys 107 Tu-95 Bear

bombers of the G and H models and twenty Tu-160 Blackjack

bombers.

The Bear is a long-range subsonic turboprop bomber modeled after the United States B-29 of World War II vintage.

Although still serviceable, it is an obsolete combat aircraft by

modern military standards. Its operational range would carry it over the United States, however. The Blackjack is a modern,

high-performance aircraft that has a shorter range than the

Bear. The Blackjack can reach long-range targets in the United

States with the aid of midair refueling. For this purpose, the

strategic bomber force has forty tanker aircraft in its inventory.

The Northern and Moscow military districts each house a heavy bomber regiment of twenty modern Tu-22M high-performance jet bombers. The Tu-22M has less range than the

older Tu-95 models, but it is better suited to modern air warfare. According to experts, the Bears are located in Asia

because they match China's obsolete air defenses, and the

more modern aircraft are in Europe to be matched against the

more formidable West European defenses.

Air Defense Forces

The air defense forces, charged with defense against enemy

air attack, have a total of about 200,000 troops, of whom 60,000

are conscripts. The air defense forces include missile, air force,

537
Russia: A Country Study

and radio-technical units and an air defense army. There also are two independent air defense corps (see fig. 18). The missile

forces are equipped with approximately 2,500 launchers

deployed in about 250 different sites around the country. Air

defense forces have particular responsibility for defending

administrative and industrial centers; for instance, they sur- round Moscow with about 100 missile launchers. The air force

troop contingent consists of about 850 combat aircraft, including 100 MiG-23, 425 MiG-31, and 325 Su-27 aircraft. The air defense forces also operate twenty 11-76 aircraft configured for airborne early warning and command and control.

The air force troops operate their own training program from

one training center that includes four regiments equipped with

more than 380 MiG-23 and L-39 aircraft. The missile troops are equipped with about 150 SA-2 Guideline, 100 SA-3 Goa, 500 SA-5 Gammon, and 1,750 SA-10

Grumble missile launchers. A program to replace all of the

older systems with the SA-10, well under way by 1996, has been

considered by experts to be one of the most successful reequipment programs of the post-Soviet armed forces. Seven of the

military districts have at least one aviation air defense regiment

each; two districts, Moscow and the Far Eastern, have specially

designated air defense districts. The borders of the Moscow Air Defense District are the same

as those of the Moscow Military District. The Far Eastern Air

Defense District combines the territory of the Far Eastern Military District and the Transbaikal Military District. Presumably,

the boundaries of the other military districts are the same for

air defense as for other defense designations.

Strategic Rocket Forces

In the Soviet era, the strategic rocket forces (SRF) were

established as the elite service of the nation's military because

they have the vital mission of operating long- and mediumrange missiles with nuclear warheads. They remained so in the

mid-1990s. In 1996 the SRF had about 100,000 troops, of which

about half were conscripts; the SRF has the highest proportion

of well-educated officers among the armed services. The SRF

also is the only service with an active force modernization program.

Russia's report for the GFE Treaty indicated the existence of

ten SRF missile bases within the European scope of the treaty,

including sites at Plesetsk (north of Moscow), Kapustin Yar

538
The Armed Forces

(near Volgograd), Vladimir (east of Moscow), Vypolzovo

(northwest of Moscow), Yoshkar Ola (in the Republic of Mari

El), Kozel'sk (southwest of Moscow), Tatishchevo (north of Volgograd), Teykovo (northeast of Moscow), and Surovatikha

(south of Nizhniy Novgorod). Indicating the priority given air defense of the European sector, Russia listed only four additional missile bases outside the CFE Treaty reporting area, at Nizhniy Tagil, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, and Kansk. There is a training regiment at the missile test facility near Plesetsk and

another at the Kapustin Yar test facility. Russia has continued

the reduction in strategic missile inventory required under

START I, although at a pace slower than the United States

would like. By mid-1996 all nuclear warheads on former Soviet

SRF missiles in Kazakstan and Ukraine had been returned to Russia or destroyed, and all missiles were scheduled to leave

Belarus by the end of 1996 (see Nuclear Arms Issues, this ch.).

The Russian SRF missile inventory not only is shrinking in

response to treaty requirements but also is changing in character. The new SS-25 Topol is the only system suited to Russian

strategic requirements and acceptable under the requirements

of START I, so rocket production efforts will concentrate on

this model for the foreseeable future.

The Topol is fielded in SRF regiments comprising three battalions totaling nine launch vehicles. In 1996 forty such regiments were operational. Several older operational ICBM

systems also remained in the field. These included an SS-17

regiment of ten silos, six SS-18 silo fields totaling 222 missiles

with multiple warheads, four SS-19 silo fields totaling 250 missiles with multiple warheads, and ninety-two SS-24 missiles of

which thirty-six are mounted on trains. All except the SS-24

were being phased out in favor of the SS-25 Topol. Two

remaining SS-25 regiments without warheads were scheduled

for redeployment from Belarus to the Perm' region in 1996.

Airborne Troops

The airborne troops comprise five airborne divisions and

eight air assault brigades. They were designated as a separate

service in 1991, at which time the air assault brigades were reas- signed from ground forces units and military districts to Airborne Troop Headquarters, with direct responsibility to the

Ministry of Defense. The justification for this reorganization was that airborne troops could not respond as quickly to an emergency under ground forces command as they could as a

539
Russia: A Country Study

AIR DEFENSE FORCES

HIGH COMMAND

MISSILE TROOPS

AIR FORCE TROOPS

RADIO-TECHNICAL TROOPS

MOSCOW

AIR DEFENSE

DISTRICT

5th SEPARATE

AIR DEFENSE CORPS

6th INDEPENDENT

AIR DEFENSE ARMY

12th SEPARATE

AIR DEFENSE CORPS

Figure 1 8. Organization of the Air Defense Forces, 1 996

separate command. Experts believe that the decision to reorganize came mainly in response to internal politics rather than

military necessity; at that time, the Russian national leadership

did not want airborne troops under the control of the General

Staff or the ground forces. In early 1996, four of the eight independent airborne brigades and two of the five airborne divisions were placed under the command of their respective

district commanders, and the remaining three divisions

became part of the strategic reserve. The command adjustments constituted a return to the pre-1991 arrangement.

The reason given for the transfer of authority was that the

military districts already controlled the helicopter, fixed-wing,

and other resources needed to support the air assault brigades,

and that historically air assault brigades were created to operate in an operational-tactical role attached to a high-level headquarters. They were never intended to be a strategic asset. In

the case of the Novorossiysk Division engaged in Chechnya, a chain of command running back to Moscow allegedly proved

unworkable. However, the reassignment of the airborne units

brought interservice charges that the move was an attempt to rein in a service branch perceived as having a dangerous combination of independence and mobility. The chief of the General Staff, General Mikhail Kolesnikov, characterized the

decision as purely operational.

The mission of the airborne forces is to make possible a quick response to national emergencies. The airborne troops

540
The Armed Forces

are considered an elite force because they are individually

selected from volunteers based on physical fitness, intelligence,

and loyalty. By traditional military standards, the airborne

troops are not a powerful force. Each division is assigned about

6,000 lightly armed troops with lightly armored vehicles. Their

value is that they have special training and have operational

and strategic mobility provided by long-range aircraft. Their

parachute assault capability means that they can be deployed

anywhere within airlift range in a matter of hours without the

need for an air base in friendly hands. However, resupply and

support by heavy ground troop formations are necessary in a matter of days because the airborne troops lack the self-sustaining combat and logistical power of regular ground forces.

All of the airborne divisions are based in European Russia.

One division is based in the Northern Military District, two in

the Moscow Military District, and one each in the Volga and

North Caucasus districts. The division in the North Caucasus

Military District has taken part in the Chechnya conflict.

The eight airborne assault brigades are smaller than divisions, and they lack the armor and artillery assets that give con- ventional divisions ground mobility and firepower. Once the

airborne brigades are on the ground, they can move no faster

than walking speed. Their role is primarily focused on helicopter operations, but they also are trained for parachute assault

from fixed-wing aircraft. Performance

In the 1990s, the direction of change in the Russian armed

forces is toward a smaller and more defense-oriented force

almost entirely deployed within the borders of Russia. As of

mid-1996, that change was occurring faster than military or

civilian leaders could manage. The result was a large armed

force with too many officers and not enough enlisted personnel, one unable to provide adequate training, and, according

to Russian and Western experts, deficient in purpose and direction. The military leadership remained in the hands of holdovers from the Soviet regime who had failed to adjust to new

political and military realities. The force's one strength lay in

the sheer numbers of its personnel and the size of its equipment inventory.

The performance of Russia's armed forces in the Chechnya

conflict provided a glimpse of the capabilities of Russian

541
Russia: A Country Study

ground and air forces. The image is not an impressive one, particularly if evidence on training and force morale is considered.

Troop Support Elements

The social implications of Russia's troop support effort in

the mid-1990s are staggering. In the United States, a lack of

military housing means that military families have to find

homes or apartments in the civilian community. Because that

option does not exist in Russia, a military family without military housing is literally homeless. Families of field-grade offi- cers subsist in tents or packing crates salvaged from troop

redeployments from Central Europe. In other cases, homeless

military families have been sheltered for years at a time in gymnasiums or warehouses set up like emergency shelters. At the

end of 1994, an estimated 280,000 military personnel and family members were homeless. Many units live in permanent field

conditions under canvas. In 1995 only 2,500 of 5,000 rated

pilots in flight-status jobs had apartments. The elite strategic

rocket forces (SRF) have not fared much better than the other

branches of the armed forces. In 1995 the SRF commander in

chief, General Igor' Sergeyev, stated that only fourteen of fortytwo apartment blocks needed in 1994 to house his troops and

their families had been constructed, leaving 11,000 of his

troops unhoused; one year later, 4,000 of his troops still were

without housing. In 1996 the overall housing situation worsened.

The impact on military preparedness is immense. The daily

lives of officers and enlisted personnel are consumed with providing the means of survival for themselves and their families.

This marginal existence provides ferule ground for illegal activities such as trading military property for means of sustenance, or engaging in illicit acts to obtain money earned, but not

received, in pay (see Crime in the Military, this ch.). There is little energy, time, funds, materiel, or even motivation to con- duct individual or small-unit training.

Soldiers often wait two to four months to be paid, and often

only partial pay is issued. According to a complex financial sys- tem, Russian commercial banks have responsibility for issuing

funds from the Ministry of Defense's budget account to individuals, but the system has proved extremely cumbersome, and

substantial amounts of money have simply disappeared or have

been long delayed while being processed. The pay level also is unsatisfactory. In early 1996, a Russian pilot holding the rank

542
MiG-29KFulcrum naval variant armed with missiles, on display at 1992 Moscow Air Show

of major was paid approximately 1.5 million rubles per month,

or about US$300. By comparison, a NATO pilot of equivalent

rank earned US$6,000 per month.

Force readiness also depends on equipment maintenance

and resupply. In 1995 aviation units received only 39 percent of

the required fuel, reducing annual flight time by a factor of

3.5. In 1994 the Ministry of Defense purchased only thirty of

the 300 aircraft listed as being required, and only one aircraft was purchased in 1995. General Petr Deynekin, air forces com- mander in chief, has estimated that, at that rate of acquisition

and maintenance, the air forces would have no flyable aircraft

by 2005.

The naval forces are in approximately the same state of

readiness as the air forces. Only one ship, the aircraft carrier

Admiral Kuznetsov, had as much as five months of time at sea in

543
Russia: A Country Study

1994. Other naval sea time training was described as "infrequent." In 1995 nearly 95 percent of the ready naval vessels

remained at dockside because of shortages of fuel, ammunition, and crews, and a backlog of repairs. Fuel shortages have

caused the Pacific Fleet to cancel visits by single ships to Asian

ports, and electricity was cut off to a nuclear submarine base in

the Kola Peninsula, nearly causing a serious nuclear accident,

because the base could not pay its bills. The Black Sea Fleet was embarrassed when a cruiser in the Mediterranean in 1996 ran

out of water and had to request emergency resupply from the

United States Navy. The once-proud aircraft carrier Admiral

Gorshkov, the last of the Kiev class in service, was in drydock in

1996 for repair after a serious fire, and there were proposals to

sell the ship for scrap or to the Indian navy. Naval logistics had reached a crisis state by the mid-1990s. In

1996 fuel allocations were reduced by 65 percent from 1995,

and rations were cut by 60 percent. Similar cuts were made in

funds for maintenance, parts, tools, and batteries. The result was that fleet readiness was reduced by an estimated 30 percent

for coastal forces and 50 percent for the blue-water navy. Russia's four Kirov-class nuclear cruisers have fallen into dis- use because they require large crews and are expensive to operate. Of the ships in that category, the Ushakov had been at dockside in its home port, Murmansk, for nearly five years in

1996 because of a lack of spare parts. The Petr Velikiy began sea

trials in 1996 after a delay of three years. The Lazarev was scheduled to be refueled in 1996, but scrapping also was considered.

Conventionally powered ships also have experienced mainte- nance difficulties. The Slava-class Marshal Ustinov was in drydock in St. Petersburg for two years for refurbishing, but it was

expected to be scrapped for lack of parts and funds.

The air defense forces also have found it difficult to maintain readiness. In February 1996, the commander in chief,

General Viktor Prudnikov, admitted that inadequate funding

and poor materiel and technical support had lowered his

branch's standard of combat readiness. Russia's missile forces

receive no systematic daily training, and there is no firingrange practice. Air defense pilots get little flight time, and no

funds are available for maintenance or aircraft parts. An esti- mated 50 percent of Russia's border is unprotected by radar

because equipment of the radio-technical forces is inoperable.

As of 1996, the air defense forces had not had funds for new

544
AS-14 Kedge air-to-surface missile on display at 1992

Moscow Air Show

orders for two years, and no improvement was expected in the near future.

The readiness condition of the ground forces is comparable

to that of the other branches. In 1994 General Vladimir

Semenov, commander in chief of the ground forces, admitted

that the ground forces lacked the capacity to perform their

assigned tasks. The council reported that more than a third of

the helicopters cannot fly and that even emergency supplies

(war stocks) had been partially consumed. General Semenov

has reported that ground forces units are drastically understaffed; motorized rifle regiments, the heart of ground combat

power, are said to be understaffed by 60 percent. Semenov has

concluded that Russian ground combat units lack adequate

personnel to participate in military actions and that full staff- ing of units would take a prohibitively long time.

Crime in the Military

By the mid-1990s, both organized and random crime had

penetrated Russia's military, as they had penetrated many

other parts of society. As the military reorganizes, personnel

are faced with strong temptations to engage in criminal activity,

545
Russia: A Country Study

particularly when valuable state property is available for sale

and when the professional prospects and social prestige of military service are sinking. Military and security personnel also

offer criminal organizations a useful set of skills. Petty criminal activity and systematic abuses by the officer

corps have long been acknowledged aspects of the Soviet military system. As early as the late 1980s, authorities noticed esca- lating rates of weapons and munitions theft, narcotics

trafficking, and diversion of various types of military resources. But the fragmentation of military authority and organization

that began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union multiplied

the opportunities for such activities. Drug use afflicted the military on a large scale during the nine-year occupation of

Afghanistan, and the general increase in drug use in civilian

society brought more users into the armed forces in the 1980s

and 1990s. Episodes of random violence also increased. In

1989 fifty-nine officers were killed in attacks unrelated to military action. As morale dropped, cases of severe hazing of new

recruits (dedovshchina—a tradition that began under Peter the

Great) increased until, in 1994, an estimated 2,500 soldiers

died and another 480 committed suicide as a direct result of

hazing.

The illegal sale of weapons of all sizes became pervasive in

the 1990s. Already in the late 1980s, Soviet troops in Europe

were selling large numbers of individual weapons; as withdrawal from Europe progressed in the early 1990s, the sale of

heavy equipment, including armored vehicles and jet fighters,

also was reported. The largest force group in the region, the

Western Group of Forces stationed in Germany, was the most

active in this area, according to a series of investigations in the

early and mid-1990s. Underground sales were reported inside

Russia as well, with large numbers of weapons moving to civil- ian criminal organizations. In late 1993, President Yeltsin formed the State Corporation

for Export and Import of Armaments (Rosvooruzheniye) to consolidate and control arms sales under a single agency, but

after that time the state still realized only a small part of the

huge hard-currency profits from arms sales, while a number of

top Rosvooruzheniye officials, with ties to a complex web of

financial enterprises in Russia and abroad, flourished as sales

continued to go undocumented. The agency acquired the

nickname "Ros-vor," meaning "Russian thief," as the controversial activities of its officers were publicized and public confi546
The Armed Forces

dence dropped. Shortly after creating Rosvooruzheniye, the

government approved direct arms sales activities by weapons

manufacturers, further complicating the effort to monitor

sales. Another state agency, the State Armament and Military

Equipment Sales Company (Voyentekh), was established in

1992 to sell used equipment and arms overseas, with the proceeds to finance housing for troops. According to frequent

allegations, that program also is riddled with corruption, most

of its profits have not reached the housing fund, and much

equipment has gone to the criminal world. Among the beneficiaries of such uncontrolled movement have been the Chechen

guerrillas, who apparently were able to buy Russian arms even

after the beginning of hostilities in late 1994.

Training

According to Russian and Western reports, inadequate funding and bad organization have caused all of the armed forces

to suffer from extremely poor training. Although numerous

top military leaders criticized this situation, little progress has

been made in the mid-1990s.

Military Schools

In 1996 the Ministry of Defense administered a multilevel

system of military training institutions, none of which had full enrollment in the mid-1990s. The system included eight military academies and one military university, offering universitylevel training and education in military and related fields.

There were specialized academies for artillery, chemical

defense, air defense, air engineering, space engineering, and

medicine. The Military University in Moscow specialized in

jurisprudence and journalism. In addition, there were about

seventy institutions of higher education (vysshiye uchebnyye

zavedeniya—VUZy; sing., VUZ) for military studies, most of

which fell under one of the main force groups and were further specialized according to subject (for example, the Kazan'

Higher Artillery Command-Engineer School and the Ufa

Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots).

Field Training

Nominally, the Russian armed forces operate on the same

six-month training cycle that was observed by the Soviet armed

forces. Each cycle begins with induction of draftees and basic

individual training, proceeds to unit training at the levels of

547
Russia: A Country Study

squad through division, and terminates with an army-level

exercise. In 1994 General Semenov reported that the ground

forces had not conducted any divisional exercises for the previ- ous two years. As early as 1989, a reduction in Russia's military

training activity became obvious in CSCE reports of major

training exercises. This means that by 1996 the armed forces

had passed through more than ten cycles without conducting

any serious training.

Considering the Russian military five-year personnel assignment cycle, the training hiatus means that there was one, and

part of another, military generation in each rank with a serious

training deficiency, or no training at all in their nominal assignments. There were platoon and company commanders with no

field experience. Few battalion, regimental, and division com- manders had practical experience in commanding troops in

the field at their present or preceding level. The air forces of the Russian Federation are the most technologically sensitive of the armed forces. Modern high-performance aircraft demand skilled crews to operate and maintain

them. However, in 1995 General Deynekin reported receiving

only 30 percent of required funding for fuel, equipment, and

parts in 1995—a shortfall that cut pilot flight time in operational squadrons to thirty to forty hours per year, approximately three hours per month in the cockpit. By contrast, the

United States standard for pilot proficiency is 180 to 260 hours

per year. Reform Plans

In 1996 Aleksey Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma

Defense Committee, stated that the armed forces must be

reduced by at least 500,000 personnel, a force reduction of

one-third, with a simultaneous increase in the annual military

budget of about US$20 billion—more than twice its level at the

time.

The official plan for armed forces reorganization was put

forth in a presidential decree of August 1995. Reforms would

occur in two stages, which were outlined only vaguely. The first stage, to last from 1996 to 2000, would include reorganization

of the civilian economy to provide better overall budgetary support, stabilize the defense industry, and revamp the territorial

divisions of the national defense system to match a new concept of strategic deployment. The second stage, 2001 to 2005,

548
The Armed Forces

would address the international role of the Russian armed

forces, ending with the creation of the "army of the year 2005."

The first phase was defined by five goals. First, a "rational"

level of strategic nuclear forces would remain in place on land,

sea, and air to defend against a global nuclear or conventional

war. The level of such forces would be influenced by whether

other powers had developed ABM defenses. Second, further

downsizing was possible, depending on the leadership's estimation of optimal size given world conditions. Third, organizational structure would be changed only after comprehensive

research, with numerous ground forces units to be combined

and maintained at cadre strength. Fourth, procurement would

be centralized, spending priorities strictly observed, and

expenditures carefully monitored. Fifth, the command and

control system would be improved in all operational-strategic

groupings, optimizing control to ensure maximum combat

readiness. There would be a clear definition of the respective

functions of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the

main directorates. The newly created State Commission for

Military Organization and Development and the General Staff were to direct the fifth phase.

After issuing the reform decree, President Yeltsin periodically criticized the military (most notably Minister of Defense

Grachev) for what he described as a complete lack of progress

toward the stated goals. According to Western experts, this was

a justified criticism, given the disorder and internal friction

that prevented the military establishment from reaching consensus on any policy.

Military service became particularly unpopular in Russia in

the mid-1990s. Under conditions of intense political and social

uncertainty, the traditional appeal to Russian patriotism no

longer resonated among Russia's youth (see Social Stratification, ch. 5). The percentage of draft-age youth who entered the

armed forces dropped from 32 percent in 1994 to 20 percent

in 1995. The Law on Military Service stipulates twenty-one

grounds for draft exemption, but in many cases eligible individuals simply refuse to report; in July 1996, a report in the

daily Pravda referred to a "daily boycott of the draft." In the

first half of 1995, about 3,000 conscripts deserted, and in all of

1995 between 50,000 and 70,000 inductees refused to report.

According to a 1996 Russian report, such personnel deficiencies meant that only about ten of Russia's sixty-nine ground

forces divisions were prepared for combat. The armed forces

549
Russia: A Country Study

responded to manpower shortages by extending the normal

two-year period of active-duty service of those already in uniform; only about 19,000 of the approximately 230,000 troops

scheduled for discharge in December 1994 were released on

time.

The two most compelling reasons for the failure of conscription are the unfavorable living conditions and pay of soldiers

(less than US$1 per month at 1995 exchange rates) and the

well-publicized and extremely unpopular Chechnya operation.

The Russian tradition of hazing in the ranks, which became

more violent and was much more widely reported in the 1990s,

also has contributed to society's antipathy toward military ser- vice (see Crime in the Military, this ch.). By 1996 the approval

rating of the military as a social institution had slipped to as lit- tle as 20 percent, far below the approval ratings achieved in the

Soviet era. Although by 1996 Russia's armed forces were less than onethird the size they reached at their Cold War peak in the mid1980s, there still was a need for large numbers of personnel

who were appropriately matched to their assigned duties and

who could be motivated to serve conscientiously. The issue of

gradually replacing Russia's ineffectual conscription system

with a volunteer force has brought heated discussion in the

defense establishment. The semiannual draft, which has set about 200,000 as its regular quota, has been an abysmal failure

in the post-Soviet era because of evasion and desertion. During

evaluation of an initial, experimental contract plan, in May

1996 Yeltsin unexpectedly proposed the filling of all personnel

slots in the armed forces with contract personnel by 2000. In

1996 some units already were more than half staffed by contract personnel, and an estimated 300,000 individuals, about 20

percent of the total nominal active force, were serving under

contract. At that time, more than half of new contractees were women.

But the main obstacle to achieving Yeltsin's goal is funding.

To attract competent contract volunteers, pay and benefits

must be higher than those offered to conscripts. Already in

early 1996, a reported 50,000 contract personnel had broken

their contracts because of low pay and poor housing, and many

commanders expressed dissatisfaction with the work of those

who remained. In mid-1996 a final decision on the use of volunteers awaited discussion in the State Duma and a possible

challenge in the Constitutional Court.

550
The Armed Forces

Prospects for the Military

In the mid-1990s, Russia's military establishment included a number of influential holdovers from the Soviet era, together

with incomplete plans for reform. That inauspicious combination of elements was not reconciled because there was little agreement among military or civilian policy makers on the

appropriate speed and direction of change, and because eco- nomic conditions offered no flexibility for experimentation.

To the extent that the Chechnya conflict of 1994-96 was a

fair test of combat capability, Russia's armed forces were far

from fighting form, even by their own evaluation. As they

received pessimistic assessments of the current and future situ- ation, Russian policy makers faced a complex of other adjustments. In 1996 the shapers of policy on international relations

and national security could not agree on Russia's status in the

post-Soviet world (see Foreign Policy Prospects, ch. 8). Utilization of the military's very limited financial resources would

require a consensus on the areas of the world most vital to national security. For example, would a second Chechnya-type

uprising within the Russian Federation merit the kind of effort

expended on the first one? What sort of response should the

seemingly inevitable expansion of NATO elicit? Should Russia

seek a permanent military presence in other CIS nations, to bolster national security? In answering such questions, military

policy makers confront a national psyche still damaged by the

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. They also are tempted to divert attention from fundamental

problems by renewing campaigns against old enemies.

No redirection of national security priorities could have

meaning without a strong commitment to reorganize the military establishment that was inherited from the Soviet era. Only

a leaner force could recapture the Soviet-era reservoir of skill, pride, and dedication that was dissipated in the first half of the

1990s. Through 1996 the budgetary strategy was to finance

selected high-technology R&D projects and MIC enterprises

capable of satisfying foreign arms customers (together with

internal security "armies" such as that of the Ministry of Inter- nal Affairs), while literally starving conventional troops and

neglecting maintenance budgets. With the formation of a new

government in mid-1996, the voices of reform became louder,

but consensus on the basic requirements had grown no closer.

551
Russia: A Country Study

* * * The Russian CFE Data Exchange, supplied in concurrence

with the terms of the CFE Treaty, provides current and accurate information on the organization, deployment, equipment,

and staffing of Russia's armed forces in the European sector

covered by the treaty. Translations of Russian military periodicals and press releases in the military affairs section of the For- eign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: Central

Eurasia are an invaluable primary source of current material.

The best recent monograph on the Russian armed forces is Richard F. Staar's The New Military in Russia, which evaluates

recent policy shifts and prospective changes of doctrine. Jane's Defence Weekly and Jane's Intelligence Review provide articles on

specific issues of military policy. The annual The Military Bal- ance contains detailed listings of force strength, weaponry, and

deployment, and the annual World Defence Almanac addresses

the same information with background on treaties such as START I and START II. The journals Military Technology and

Defense News articles on the Russian defense industry and arms

trade. A study by Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Mafia in Uniform:

The Criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces," is a

detailed report on post-Soviet criminal activity in the military.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

552
Chapter 10. Internal Security
Sadko, a Russianfolk hero, sings at the shore ofLake R'men' near Novgorod

(design from lacquer box made in village ofKholuy).
RUSSIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS underwent

fundamental changes beginning in 1992, after the Soviet

Union dissolved and what had been the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was reconstituted as the Russian Federation. These changes, initiated by the government of

Russian Federation president Boris N. Yeltsin, were part of a more general transition experienced by Russia's political sys- tem. The state security apparatus was restructured in the

period after 1991, when the functions of the Committee for

State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti—KGB)

were distributed among several agencies. In that period, the

interactions among those agencies and the future course of

internal security policy became key issues for the Russian government. As the debate proceeded and the Yeltsin government's hold on power became weaker in the mid-1990s, some

aspects of the Soviet-era internal security system remained in

place, and some earlier reforms were reversed. Because Yeltsin was perceived to use the security system to bolster presidential

power, serious questions arose about Russia's acceptance of the

rule of law. In the same period, Russia suffered an escalating crime wave

that threatened an already insecure society with a variety of

physical and economic dangers. In the massive economic trans- formation of the 1990s, organized-crime organizations pervaded Russia's economic system and fostered corruption

among state officials. White-collar crime, already common in

the Soviet period, continued to flourish. The incidence of ran- dom crimes of violence and theft also continued to increase in

the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, Russia's police were handicapped in

their efforts to slow the crime rate by a lack of expertise, funding, and support from the judicial system. In response to public

outrage at this situation, the Yeltsin government increased the

powers of internal security agencies, endangering the protections theoretically enjoyed by private citizens in post-Soviet Russia. Internal Security Before 1991

The KGB had been an integral feature of the Soviet state since it was established by Nikita S. Khrushchev (in office

555
Russia: A Country Study

1953-64) in 1954 to replace the People's Commissariat for

Internal Affairs (Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del

NKVD), which during its twenty-year existence had conducted

the worst of the Stalinist purges. Between 1954 and 1991, the

KGB acquired vast monetary and technical resources, a corps

of active personnel numbering more than 500,000, and huge

archival files containing political information of the highest

sensitivity. The KGB often was characterized as a state within a

state. The organization was a rigidly hierarchical structure

whose chairman was appointed by the Politburo, the supreme

executive body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU—see Glossary). Key decisions were made by the KGB

Collegium, a collective leadership including the agency's top

leaders and selected republic and departmental chiefs. The

various KGB directorates had responsibilities ranging from suppressing political dissent to guarding borders to conducting

propaganda campaigns abroad. At the end of the Soviet

period, the KGB had five chief directorates, three smaller

directorates, and numerous administrative and technical support departments.

In contrast to the United States government, which assigns

the functions of domestic counterintelligence and foreign

intelligence to separate agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

respectively, the Soviet system combined these functions in a

single organization. This practice grew out of the ideology of

Soviet governance, which made little distinction between exter- nal and domestic political threats, claiming that the latter were

always foreign inspired. According to that rationale, the same

investigative techniques were appropriate for both foreign espionage agents and Soviet citizens who came under official suspicion. For example, the KGB's Seventh Chief Directorate, whose

task was to provide personnel and equipment for surveillance

operations, was responsible for surveillance of both foreigners

and Soviet citizens.

The KGB's branches in the fourteen non-Russian republics

duplicated the structure and operations of the unionwide

organization centered in Moscow; KGB offices existed in every

subnational jurisdiction and city of the Soviet Union. The

KGB's primary internal function was surveillance of the Soviet

citizenry, using avast intelligence apparatus to ensure loyalty to the regime and to suppress all expressions of political opposition. This apparatus served as the eyes and ears of the party

556
Uniformed members ofKGB at the Kremlin, Moscow, 1985

Courtesy Charles Trew

leadership, supplying information on all aspects of Soviet society to the Politburo.

The First Chief Directorate was responsible for KGB operations abroad. It was divided into three subdirectorates, responsible respectively for deep-cover espionage agents, collection of

scientific and technological intelligence, and infiltration of for- eign security operations and surveillance of Soviet citizens

abroad. Segmented into eleven geographical regions, the First

Chief Directorate placed intelligence-gathering officers in legal

positions in embassies and elsewhere abroad. Such activities

increased markedly after detente with the West in 1972 permitted many more Soviet officials to take positions in Western and

Third World countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, as many as 50

percent of such officials were estimated to be conducting espionage.

The KGB Security Troops, which numbered about 40,000 in

1990, provided the KGB with coercive potential. Although

Soviet sources did not specify the functions of these special

troops, Western analysts believed that one of their main tasks was to guard the top leaders in the Kremlin, as well as key government and party buildings and officials at the major subna557
Russia: A Country Study

tional levels. Such troops presumably were commanded by the

Ninth Directorate of the KGB.

The Security Troops also included several units of signal personnel, who reportedly were responsible for installation, maintenance, and operation of secret communications facilities for

leading party and government bodies, including the Ministry

of Defense. Other special KGB troops performed counterterrorist and counterintelligence operations. Such troops were

employed, together with the Internal Troops of the Ministry of

Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del—MVD), to suppress public protests and disperse demonstrations. Special KGB

troops also were trained for sabotage and diversionary missions

abroad.

The Internal Troops were a component of the armed forces

but were subordinate to the MVD. Numbering about 260,000

in 1990, the Internal Troops were mostly conscripts with a twoyear service obligation. Candidates were accepted from both

the active military and civilian society. Four schools trained the

Internal Troops' officer corps.

The Internal Troops supported MVD missions by aiding the

regular police in crowd control in large cities and by guarding

strategically significant sites such as large industrial enterprises,

railroad stations, and large stockpiles of food and materiel. A

critical mission was the prevention of internal disorder that

might endanger a regime's political stability. Likely working in

concert with KGB Security Troops, the Internal Troops played

a direct role in suppressing anti-Soviet demonstrations in the

non-Russian republics and strikes by Russian and other workers. Most units of the Internal Troops were composed solely of

infantry with no heavy armaments; only one operational divi- sion was present in Moscow in 1990. In this configuration, the

Internal Troops also might have been assigned rear-echelon

security missions in case of war; they performed this duty in

World War II. Regular police forces, called the militia, which were the

direct responsibility of the MVD, also played an important role

in preserving internal order and fighting corruption; regional

and local jurisdictions had no police powers. The Procuracy

was the chief investigatory and prosecutorial agency for nonpolitical crimes, with a hierarchical organization that provided

procurators (state prosecutors) at all levels of government.

Although the new Russian government made several changes

in the laws and organization of criminal justice after 1991, the

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Internal Security

overall system of internal security retained many of the characteristics of its Soviet predecessor.

Successor Agencies to the KGB

By early 1991, the powerful KGB organization was being dis- mantled. The development of the post-Soviet internal security

apparatus took place in a highly volatile political environment,

with President Yeltsin threatened by political opposition, eco- nomic crises, outbreaks of ethnic conflict, and sharply escalating crime. Under these circumstances, Yeltsin and his advisers

had to rely on state security and internal police agencies for

support in devising and implementing internal security strategies.

The KGB was dissolved officially in December 1991, a few

weeks before the Soviet Union itself. Foreign observers saw the

end of the KGB as a sign that democracy would prevail in the

newly created Russian Federation. But President Yeltsin did not

completely eliminate the security apparatus. Instead, he dispersed the functions of the former KGB among several different agencies, most of which performed tasks similar to those of

the various KGB directorates.

In 1992 Yeltsin never made a clear statement of his plans for

the security services, except for occasional claims that the new

services would be very different from the KGB. Nevertheless,

early in 1992 certain trends already could be discerned. Generally speaking, Yeltsin had three main aims for the internal security services. Above all, he wanted to use the services to support

him in his battles with high-level political opponents. Second,

he wanted the security apparatus to counter broader domestic

threats—ethnic separatism, terrorism, labor unrest, drug traf- ficking, and organized crime. Third, he intended that the security apparatus carry out counterintelligence against foreign

spies operating in Russia.

After the creation of fifteen new states from the republics of

the former Soviet Union, the territorial branches of the former

KGB were transferred to the control of the new governments of

these states, each of which made reforms deemed appropriate

to the political and national security needs of the regime in

power. The Russian Federation, however, which as the RSFSR

had housed KGB central operations in Moscow, inherited the

bulk of the KGB's resources and personnel. As early as January

1992, five separate security agencies had emerged in Russia to take the place of the KGB. Four of them were concerned with

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Russia: A Country Study

internal security; the fifth was the Foreign Intelligence Service,

which replaced the KGB's First Chief Directorate.

Ministry of Security (MB)

Within Russia the largest KGB successor agency was the Ministry of Security ( Ministerstvo bezopasnosti—MB), which numbered some 137,000 employees and was designated a

counterintelligence agency. The Ministry of Security inherited

the tasks of several KGB directorates and chief directorates: the

Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence against foreigners), the Third Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence), the Fourth Directorate (transportation security), the

Fifth Chief Directorate (domestic political security), the Sixth

Directorate (activities against economic crime and official cor- ruption), and the Seventh Directorate (surveillance activities).

In July 1992, Yeltsin signed—and Russia's Supreme Soviet

(parliament) ratified—a law concerning the governance of the

Ministry of Security. The law gave Yeltsin sweeping authority over security operations and aroused concern among Russian

democrats. They worried because the new law so closely resem- bled the one on the KGB that had been enacted by the Soviet

government just fourteen months earlier. The law conferred

essentially the same mission and powers on the Ministry of

Security that the earlier law had granted to the KGB, in some

cases almost verbatim. The main difference was that in the past

the KGB had been controlled by the leadership of the CPSU,

whereas the 1992 law gave Yeltsin, as president, control of the

Ministry of Security. The Russian parliament was granted some

theoretical oversight functions, but they never were exercised

in practice.

Yeltsin's first minister of security, former MVD chief Viktor

Barannikov, left most of the organization's former KGB offi- cials in place. In the spring of 1993, when an uneasy truce

between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament was broken and

the Supreme Soviet voted to deprive Yeltsin of his extraordinary presidential powers, Yeltsin called upon Barannikov and

the Ministry of Security for support as the president declared

the imposition of "special ruje" giving him veto power over parliamentary legislation until new elections were held. However,

Barannikov declined to involve his ministry in the political confrontation between the executive and legislative branches, urging that a compromise be found. When the Ministry of Defense

560
Parade on last Soviet "May Day, " on Dzerzhinskiy Square with KGB

building in background, 1991

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

also failed to support his position, Yeltsin backed down from

his confrontational stance. The split between Yeltsin and Barannikov was exacerbated

by Barannikov's response to the government corruption issue

in 1992-93. Bribe taking and behind-the-scenes deals, which

had been accepted practices for Soviet officials, were traditions

that died hard, especially in the absence of laws and regulations prohibiting officials from abusing their positions. When

privatization of state property began, the scale of corruption

increased dramatically. The overlap between government-controlled economic enterprises and private entrepreneurial ventures created vast opportunities for illegal economic activity at the highest levels. Beginning in 1992, the Ministry of Security became involved

in the war against organized crime and official corruption.

Before long, however, the campaign turned into an exchange

of accusations of corruption among Russia's political leaders,

with the Ministry of Security in the middle. Yeltsin wanted to use the corruption campaign as a political weapon in fighting

his opponents, but his own entourage was soon hit with

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Russia: A Country Study

charges of covering up crimes—a tactic of Yeltsin's enemies to which Barannikov lent at least passive support. Barannikov's

failures to support Yeltsin led to the security minister's dismissal in mid-1993.

Barannikov's replacement, Nikolay Golushko, did not last long in his job. After Yeltsin's threat to dissolve the Russian parliament in September 1993, which ended in bloodshed on the

streets of Moscow, the president realized that Golushko was

also unwilling to use the forces of the Ministry of Security to back up the president. In this case, Yeltsin not only dismissed

his minister of security but also disbanded the ministry and

replaced it with a new agency, the Federal Counterintelligence

Service (Federal'naya sluzhba kontrarazvedki—FSK).

Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK)

The law creating the FSK, signed in January 1994, gave the

president sole control of the agency, eliminating the theoretical monitoring role granted to the parliament and the judiciary in the 1992 law on the Ministry of Security. The original

outline of the FSK's powers eliminated the criminal investigative powers of the Ministry of Security, retaining only powers of

inquiry. But the final statute was ambiguous on this issue,

assigning to the FSK the task of "carrying out technical-operational measures, [and] criminological and other expert assess- ments and investigations." The statute also stipulated that the

FSK was to "develop and implement measures to combat smuggling and corruption." Such language apparently assigned a key role to the successor of the Ministry of Security in the

intensifying struggle against economic crime and official cor- ruption.

According to its enabling statute, the FSK had eighteen

directorates, or departments, plus a secretariat and a public

relations center. Because some of the Ministry of Security's

functions were dispersed to other security agencies, the initial FSK staff numbered about 75,000, a substantial reduction from

the 135,000 people who had been working for the Ministry of

Security in 1992. The reduction process began to reverse itself within a few months, however, as the FSK regained the criminal

investigation functions of the Ministry of Security. ByJuly 1994,

the FSK reported a staff of 100,000.

Golushko's replacement as minister of security was his

former first deputy, Sergey Stepashin, who had served as head

of the Parliamentary Commission on Defense and Security dur562
Internal Security

ing 1992-93. Stepashin's arrival coincided with the establishment of a new economic counterintelligence directorate in the

FSK and development of new laws to improve the FSK's ability to fight corruption. Stepashin announced measures against

underground markets and "shadow capital," phenomena of the

transition period that had been defended as stimuli for the

national economy. He also defended the FSK against critics

who accused the agency of persecuting private entrepreneurs.

In addition to fighting crime and corruption, the FSK played

a prominent role in dealing with ethnic problems. One worry

for the agency was the possibility of terrorist acts by dissident

non-Russian nationalities within the Russian Federation.

Approximately 20 percent of Russia's population is non-Russian, including more than 100 nationalities concentrated in

Russia's thirty-two ethnically designated territorial units. Tension over unresolved ethnic and economic issues had been

mounting steadily since 1990, as non-Russian minorities

became increasingly belligerent in their demands for autonomy from Moscow (see Ethnic Composition, ch. 4). The FSK

was responsible for cooperating with other agencies of the

Yeltsin government in monitoring ethnic issues, suppressing

separatist unrest, and preventing violent conflict or terrorism. In keeping with this mandate, FSK troops joined MVD forces in

backing Russian regular armed forces in the occupation of

Chechnya (see Security Operations in Chechnya, this ch.). Russian security elements also have been active in Georgia, where

they have assisted regular forces in containing the independence drive of Abkhazian troops and policing a two-year ceasefire that showed no sign of evolving into a permanent settle- ment as of mid-1996.

Federal Security Service (FSB)

The FSK was replaced by the Federal Security Service (Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti—FSB) in April 1995. The new

Law on Organs of the Federal Security Service outlined the

FSB's mission in detail. The FSB regained a number of the

functions that had been eliminated in earlier post-KGB reorganizations. Investigative authority was fully restored by the law,

although the FSK had already been conducting criminal investigations on the basis of a presidential decree issued months

before. Russia's fourteen investigative detention prisons and

several special troop detachments also returned to the control

of the security service.

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Russia: A Country Study

The 1995 law authorizes security police to enter private resi- dences if "there is sufficient reason to suppose that a crime is being or has been perpetrated there ... or if pursuing persons

suspected of committing a crime." In such cases, related laws

require the officer in charge only to inform the procurator

within twenty-four hours after entering a residence. Like the

FSK statute, the new law gave the president direction of the

activities of the security service, which has the status of a federal executive organ. Article 23 of the law stipulated that the

president, the Federal Assembly (parliament), and the judicial

organs monitor the security service. But the only right given

deputies of the State Duma (the assembly's more powerful

lower house) in this regard was a vague stipulation that deputies could obtain information regarding the activity of FSB

organs in accordance with procedures laid down by legislation.

The imprecision of actual oversight functions was compounded by the security law's provision that unpublished "nor- mative acts" would govern much of the FSB's operations.

The law gave the FSB the right to conduct intelligence operations both within the country and abroad for the purpose of

"enhancing the economic, scientific-technical and defense

potential" of Russia. Although FSB intelligence operations

abroad are to be carried out in collaboration with the Foreign

Intelligence Service, the specifics of the collaboration were not

spelled out. The liberal press reacted with great skepticism to the new law's potential for human rights violations and for reincarnation of the KGB.

Although the FSB is more powerful than its predecessor, FSB

chief Stepashin operated under a political cloud because of his

support for the botched Chechnya invasion. In July 1995, pressured by the State Duma and members of his administration,

Yeltsin replaced Stepashin with the head of the Main Guard

Directorate, General Mikhail Barsukov (see Main Guard Directorate (GUO), this ch.). Barsukov was closely linked to the

director of Yeltsin's personal bodyguard organization (the Pres- idential Security Service), Aleksandr Korzhakov, who had

acquired powerful political influence in the Kremlin.

Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI)

The KGB's Eighth Chief Directorate, which oversaw government communications and cipher systems, and another technical directorate, the sixteenth, were combined as the Federal

564
Internal Security

Agency for Government Communications and Information

(Federal'noye agentstvo pravitel'stvennykh svyazi i informatsii—FAPSI), of which the former head of the Eighth Chief

Directorate, Aleksandr Starovoytov, was named director. FAPSI

has unlimited technical capabilities for monitoring communications and gathering intelligence. When the Law on Federal

Organs of Government Communications and Information was published in February 1993, Russia's liberal press protested

loudly. The newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta called it the "law of

Big Brother," pointing out that it not only gives the executive

organs of government a monopoly over government communications and information but permits unwarranted interference

in the communications networks of private banks and firms.

The communications and information law authorized FAPSI

to issue licenses for the export and import of information technology, as well as for the telecommunications of all private

financial institutions. Equipped with a body of special communications troops (authorized by the 1996 budget to number

54,000), FAPSI was given the right to monitor encoded communications of both government agencies and nonstate enterprises. This means that the agency can penetrate all private

information systems. The law stipulated little parliamentary

supervision of FAPSI aside from a vague statement that agency

officials were to give reports to the legislative branch. The president, by contrast, was given specific power to monitor the exe- cution of basic tasks assigned to FAPSI and to "sanction their

operations."

Some of the functions of FAPSI overlap those of the FSB.

The FSB's enabling law mandated that it detect signals from

radio-electronic transmitters, carry out cipher work within its own agency, and protect coded information in other state organizations and even private enterprises. No specific boundary

between the ciphering and communications functions of the

two agencies was delineated in their enabling legislation, and

there was even speculation that FAPSI would be merged into

the FSB. A presidential decree of April 1995 defined agency

responsibilities in the area of telecommunications licensing.

A critical area of overlap—and competition—is protection

of data of crucial economic and strategic significance. By mid1995 FAPSI director Starovoytov was pushing for a larger role

for FAPSI in this area. He began issuing warnings about the

intensified threat to secret economic data (including that of

the Russian Central Bank) from Western special services, which

565
Russia: A Country Study

he said required his agency to take more stringent security measures. Main Guard Directorate (GUO)

In mid-1992 the KGB's Ninth Directorate, charged with

guarding government leaders and key buildings and installations, became the Main Guard Directorate (Glavnoye upravleniye okhraneniya—GUO), which until July 1995 was headed

by Mikhail Barsukov. When Barsukov moved to the FSB, he was replaced as chief of the GUO by his deputy, General Yuriy

Krapivin. Until mid-1996 the GUO included an autonomous

subdivision, the Presidential Security Service, headed by Aleksandr Korzhakov. Beginning in 1991, both the GUO and

Korzhakov's service grew steadily. By late 1994, the GUO staff reportedly had increased from 8,000 to more than 20,000 per- sons assigned to guard the offices, automobiles, apartments,

and dachas of Russia's highest leaders, together with a variety

of secret "objects of state importance."

The tasks and missions of the GUO are described in the Law

on State Protection of Government Bodies and Their Officials,

passed in April 1993. As of mid-1996, the agency had the same

status as a state committee, but in fact the general statutes describing the government and the office of the presidency

made no provision for such a structure (see The Constitution

and Government Structure, ch. 7). The GUO's legal authorization to engage in investigative operations gives its officers the

power to undertake invasive activities such as shadowing citi- zens and tapping telephones. The GUO was reported to have an unlimited budget, which it used to acquire sophisticated

Western listening devices for use in Kremlin offices.

Shortly after the creation of the GUO, Yeltsin included in it the elite Alpha Group, a crack antiterrorist unit of 500 personnel (200 in Moscow, 300 elsewhere in Russia) that had been

involved in operations in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Lithuania. The Alpha Group had played a decisive role in the coup of

August 1991 by refusing the coup leaders' orders to storm the

parliament building, in spite of the group's subordination to the KGB, whose chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov, was a coup leader. In the following years, the Alpha Group gained a national reputation and became connected with figures in legitimate business, organized crime, and politics. In early 1996, Alpha Group

veterans headed an estimated thirty-five commercial enterprises in Moscow.

566
Internal Security

In June 1995, the Alpha Group was sent to break the Budennovsk hostage crisis when Chechen rebels seized a hospital in

southern Russia. Yeltsin disavowed responsibility for the

attack's subsequent failure, and two months later he trans- ferred the Alpha Group back to the jurisdiction of the FSB. In 1995, under the leadership of Sergey Goncharov, the Alpha vet- erans' association became politically active, strongly opposing

Yeltsin loyalists in the December parliamentary elections (see

The Elections of 1995, ch. 7). This antigovernment activity by

former members of Yeltsin's security force raised questions

about the loyalty of active security agencies. Following the 1995

elections, Goncharov's group continued to advocate restora- tion of Russia's military influence among the former Soviet

republics that make up its "near abroad," as well as harsh measures against domestic organized crime.

By December 1993, Korzhakov's Presidential Security Service had become independent of the GUO, placing Korzhakov

in a position subordinate only to Yeltsin. From the time of his

appointment, Korzhakov was at Yeltsin's side constantly, becoming the most indispensable member of the presidential security

force. Besides overseeing about 4,000 guards, Korzhakov came

to supervise all the services in support of the president's operations. These included communications, presidential aircraft,

and the secret bunker to be occupied in case war broke out. This prominent role led to speculation about Korzhakov's

influence on policy matters outside the area of security, and his

infrequent policy statements were closely analyzed by the news

media. In June 1996, Yeltsin dismissed Korzhakov, together

with FSB chief Barsukov and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg

Soskovets, eliminating some of the most influential government figures of the anti-Western political faction prior to the

second round of the presidential election.

Federal Border Service and Border Security

The fourth agency to emerge from the dismantled KGB was

the national border troops command, which formerly had

been administered as the KGB's Border Troops Directorate. By

the mid-1990s, both the subordination and the size of this

organization had undergone considerable change. For the

Russian Federation, national border security issues have been

much different from those of the Soviet Union; for this reason, and because of depleted resources to support security operations, border policy has become an especially important part of

567
Russia: A Country Study

Russia's overall relations with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary).

Border Security Agencies

In 1989 the Border Troops' personnel strength was esti- mated at 230,000. Although under the operational authority of

the KGB, border troops were conscripted as part of the biannual callup of the Ministry of Defense, and troop induction

and discharge were regulated by the 1967 Law on Universal

Military Service applicable to all the armed forces of the Soviet

Union.

In the 1980s, the duties of the Border Troops included

repulsing armed incursions into Soviet territory; preventing

illegal crossings of the border or the transport of subversive or dangerous materials; monitoring the observance of established

procedures at border crossings and of navigation procedures in

Soviet territorial waters; and assisting state agencies in the preservation of natural resources and in environmental protection.

In carrying out these duties, border troops were authorized to examine documents and possessions of persons crossing the

borders and to confiscate articles; to conduct inquiries in cases of violation of the state border; and to arrest, search, and interrogate individuals suspected of border violations.

In the Soviet system, the border soldier was expected to defend both the physical border and the state ideology. The

second of those assignments involved detecting and confiscating subversive literature and preventing, by violent means if necessary, the escape of citizens across the border.

In 1992 the Committee for the Protection of State Borders, an agency subordinate to the Ministry of Security, succeeded

the KGB's Border Troops Directorate in administering frontier

control. Although the personnel level had been reduced to about 180,000, the basic structure of the agency and the border

configuration remained substantially the same as they had

been in the late Soviet period. Viktor Shlyakhtin, the first postSoviet chief of the border troops, was dismissed in July 1993

after more than twenty Russian border guards were killed in an

attack on their post along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border.

Yeltsin replaced Shlyakhtin with General Andrey Nikolayev,

who had been first deputy chief of the General Staff of the

armed forces. This appointment was a sharp departure from

the usual practice of naming a career border troops officer to the top post.

568
Internal Security

In late 1993, Yeltsin established the Federal Border Service

to administer frontier control and gave that agency the status of a federal ministry under direct presidential control. The

FSK (and then its successor, the FSB) retained operational

responsibility for counterintelligence along the borders, however. In 1995 Nikolayev announced an ambitious program for

building up and improving the border service in the years

1996-2000. The 1996 federal budget authorized a total troop

strength of 210,000, which would be a significant increase from

the 135,000 troops on duty in 1994. In 1996 the Federal Border

Service oversaw six border districts and three special groups of

border troops in the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Moscow, as well as an independent border control detachment operating at Russia's major airports.

Given the agency's ambitious personnel requirements, staff- ing and financing the new border posts became problematic in

the mid-1990s. Although Nikolayev warned parliament that his resources were insufficient, the Federal Border Service's 1995

budget was only 70 percent of the amount requested. Equipment was hopelessly outdated and in need of repair. According

to estimates, in 1995 some 40 percent of the signaling and communications systems along the border had surpassed their ser- vice lives.

Post-Soviet Border Policy

In the 1990s, Russia lacked the secure buffer zone of Soviet

republics and subservient East European countries that had

provided border security in the Soviet era. The status of Russia's borders with neighbors Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia,

Latvia, and Ukraine has required the presence of a substantial

force of armed troops. In Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan,

ethnic conflict has caused chronic instability near Russia's borders in the first half-decade of independence. In early 1996,

the FSB reported that 13,500 kilometers of the national borders were not defined by internationally recognized treaties.

After negotiations with Estonia failed in 1996, Russia unilaterally defined its border with that state, requiring the presence of

border forces until disputes can be resolved. The border

between Latvia and Russia also remained in dispute as of mid1996.

After the Soviet Union was dissolved, it soon became clear

that Russia did not have the resources to establish a fully

equipped border regime along its boundaries within the CIS.

569
Russia: A Country Study

In 1993 Russia stated openly that its top priority was to guard

the outside borders of the CIS (hence most of what had been

the international borders of the Soviet Union) rather than the

borders that Russia now shared with CIS countries (see The

Near Abroad, ch. 8). Such a policy reestablished the border

republics as a buffer zone against potential invasion from

China or the Islamic states of Central Asia. The other CIS states do not have the resources to secure their outer boundaries, a

situation that led in the early and mid-1990s to the mutually

acceptable deployment of Russian border forces in each of the

five Central Asian republics. In Kyrgyzstan a few thousand

troops were stationed along the Chinese border. Certain outer

boundaries of the CIS, such as the Tajikistani border with

Afghanistan, required extra troop strength because of constant

armed conflict. In 1994 Russia doubled its Tajikistan border

force to about 15,000 troops.

One goal of this policy was to preserve the capability for

quick action in case of border conflict and to protect Russia's

"internal" frontiers from the smuggling of people and contraband, including arms. The second goal, most visible in Georgia

and Tajikistan, was "peacekeeping" in pursuit of Moscow's for- eign policy priorities within the border country. In pursuit of

the second goal, in the mid-1990s border forces increasingly were used as an extension of Russia's military power in the CIS.

The revised view of border security naturally brought with it an effort at reintegration of the former Soviet republics. Russia

began to advocate "transparent borders" with the coterminous

CIS states—Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, and

Ukraine. This meant that borders would remain open for the

unrestricted passage of people and goods. Strict border

regimes would be established only in zones of acute conflict,

such as the North Caucasus. The April 1993 Law on the State

Border of the Russian Federation reflected this policy by abolishing the specially designated border districts of the Soviet sys- tem, leaving only border strips five kilometers wide. The law

stipulated the goal of establishing a reduced and simplified

border regime with all CIS states. Security Operations in Chechnya

The internal instability of the Soviet government during

1990-91 invited expressions of separatism in many of Russia's

distinct ethnic enclaves, as well as in ethnically Russian districts in the Soviet Far East. The most volatile and troublesome area

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Internal Security

within the new Russian Federation was the North Caucasus,

where the predominantly Muslim former Chechen-Ingush

Autonomous Republic is located. A crisis had been building

there for some time (see Movements Toward Sovereignty, ch.

4). In October 1991, a Chechen nationalist movement headed

by former Soviet air force general Dzhokar Dudayev overthrew

the existing government and installed Dudayev as president.

Shortly thereafter, the Chechen Supreme Soviet declared

Chechnya a sovereign republic.

Yeltsin responded by deploying Ministry of Internal Affairs

(MVD) troops in the region, but the Russian Supreme Soviet

declared the action invalid and ordered him to settle the conflict peaceably. The perceived indecision by the Russian government encouraged Chechen nationalists to pursue complete

political independence and Russian recognition of that status. The Yeltsin administration was equally adamant in its refusal to negotiate until Chechnya redesignated itself part of the Russian Federation. Violence erupted in Chechnya on numerous

occasions during 1993-94, and Russian security forces became

fully involved in the conflict. In July 1994, a group of hostages

taken by Chechen guerrillas near Pyatigorsk in Russian terri- tory perished during an unsuccessful rescue operation by the

MVD. The FSK armed Chechen opposition forces, which

launched several unsuccessful attacks against the Dudayev government in the fall of 1994. When Russian conventional forces

finally invaded Chechnya in December, they received substantial support from troops of the FSK, its successor the FSB, and

the MVD. The FSB and MVD remained part of an uneasy occu- pation force through mid-1996 (see Chechnya, ch. 9).

Crime

The liberalizing changes of the post-Soviet era brought new

types of crime, many of them associated with economic activi- ties that had not existed until 1992. As the opportunities for

legal commercial initiatives expanded rapidly, so did the

opportunities to defraud Russian citizens inexperienced in eco- nomic matters and to take advantage of Russia's complete lack

of laws covering many types of crime, including the organized

extraction of protection money from economic enterprises.

Crime in the Soviet Era

Because the Soviet Union did not publish comprehensive

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Russia: A Country Study

crime statistics, comparison of its crime rates with those of

other countries is difficult. According to Western experts, robberies, murders, and other violent crimes were much less prevalent than in the United States because of the Soviet Union's

larger police presence, strict gun controls, and relatively low

incidence of drug abuse. By contrast, white-collar economic

crime permeated the Soviet system. Bribery and covert payments for goods and services were universal, mainly because of

the paucity of goods and services on the open market. Theft of

state property was practiced routinely by employees, as were

various forms of petty theft. In the last years of the Soviet

Union, the government of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in office

1985-91) made a concerted effort to curtail such white-collar

crime. Revelations of corruption scandals involving high-level

party employees appeared regularly in the Soviet news media,

and many arrests and prosecutions resulted from such discoveries. The Crime Wave of the 1 990s

In the first half of the 1990s, crime statistics moved sharply

and uniformly upward. From 1991 to 1992, the number of offi- cially reported crimes and the overall crime rate each showed a 27 percent increase; the crime rate nearly doubled between

1985 and 1992. By the early 1990s, theft, burglary, and other

acts against property accounted for about two-thirds of all crime in Russia. Of particular concern to citizens, however, was

the rapid growth of violent crime, including gruesome homicides.

Crime Statistics Moscow's 1995 statistics included 93,560 crimes, of which

18,500 were white-collar crimes—an increase of 8.3 percent

over 1994. Among white-collar crimes, swindling increased 67.2

percent, and extortion 37.5 percent, in 1995. Among the con- ventional crimes reported, murder and attempted murder

increased 1.5 percent, rape 6.5 percent, burglaries 6.6 percent,

burglaries accompanied by violence 20.8 percent, and serious

crimes by teenagers 2.2 percent. The rate of crime-solving by

the Moscow militia (police) rose in 1995 from 57.7 percent to 64.9 percent, but that statistic was bolstered substantially by success in solving minor crimes; the projected rate of solving burglaries was 18.8 percent, of^ murders 42.2 percent, and of

crimes involving use of a firearm, 31.4 percent. Moscow and St.

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Petersburg were the centers of automobile theft, which

increased dramatically through the first half of the 1990s. In

Moscow an estimated fifty cars were stolen per day, with the

estimated yearly total for Russia between 100,000 and 150,000.

In the first quarter of 1994, Russia averaged eighty-four murders a day. Many of those crimes were contract killings attributed to criminal organizations. In 1994 murder victims

included three deputies of the State Duma, one journalist, a

priest, the head of a union, several local officials, and more

than thirty businesspeople and bankers. Most of those crimes

went unsolved.

The 1995 national crime total exceeded 1.3 million, including 30,600 murders. Crime experts predicted that the murder

total would reach 50,000 in 1996. In 1995 some 248 regular

militia officers were killed in the line of duty.

Confiscation of firearms, possession of which has been identified as another grave social problem, increased substantially

in 1995, according to the Moscow militia's Regional Organized

Crime Directorate. About 3 million firearms were registered in

1995, but the number of unregistered guns was assumed to far

exceed that figure. Military weapons are stolen frequently and

sold to gangsters; in 1993 nearly 60,000 cases of such theft were

reported, involving machine guns, hand grenades, and explosives, among other weapons (see Crime in the Military, ch. 9).

The ready availability of firearms has made the work of the

poorly armed militia more dangerous.

Organized Crime

By early 1994, crime was second only to the national econ- omy as a domestic issue in Russia. In January 1994, a report

prepared for President Yeltsin by the Analytical Center for

Social and Economic Policies was published in the national

daily newspaper Izvestiya. According to the center, between 70

and 80 percent of private enterprises and commercial banks were forced to pay protection fees to criminal organizations,

which in Russia received the generic label mafiya. Unlike organized crime in other countries, which controls only such criminal activities as drug trafficking and gambling, and specific

types of legitimate enterprise such as municipal trash collection, the Russian crime organizations have gained strong influ- ence in a wide variety of economic activities. In addition,

beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakening of border controls, Russia has been drawn into the net573
Russia: A Country Study

work of international organized crime. In this way, Russia has

become a major conduit for the movement of drugs, contraband, and laundered money between Europe and Asia. In 1995 an estimated 150 criminal organizations with transnational

links were operating in Russia.

Among the main targets of organized crime are businesses

and banks in Russia's newly privatized economy and foreigners—both individual and corporate—in possession of luxury

goods or the hard currency (see Glossary) to purchase them.

Many of Russia's mafiya figures began their "careers" in the

black market during the communist era. They are now able to operate overtly and are increasingly brazen. Many current and

former government officials and businesspeople have been

identified as belonging to the mafiya network.

The 1994 report to the president described collusion

between criminal gangs and local law enforcement officials,

which made controlling crime especially difficult. The enforcement problem, which became acute in 1993, was exacerbated

by overtaxation, confusing regulations, and the absence of an

effective judicial system. By 1993 criminal groups had moved

into commercial ventures, using racketeering, kidnapping, and

murder to intimidate competition. In 1994 an MVD official

estimated that there were 5,700 criminal gangs in Russia, with a membership of approximately 100,000. In March 1995, Vladislav List'ev, a prominent television journalist, was assassinated. List'ev had been a supporter of efforts to stop corruption in state television, where large amounts of

advertising revenues were being extorted by organized crime.

A Russian news agency reported that, between 1992 and mid1995, there had been eighty-three attempts—forty-six of which

were successful—to kill bankers and businesspeople. In 1996

contract killings remained a regular occurrence, especially in

Moscow.

Nuclear Security

Neither civilian nor military nuclear facilities have adequate

security. Thefts of nuclear materials from Russia gained international attention in 1993 and 1994. In 1995 the FSB reported

investigations of thirty such incidents. Such thefts assumedly were intended to supply smuggling operations into Iran and

Germany, among other destinations. Although the Russian government took nominal steps to improve nuclear security early

in 1995, the minister of internal affairs reported that 80 per574
Internal Security

cent of nuclear enterprises lacked checkpoints. Western

experts pointed to the potential for organized criminals to obtain weapons-grade nuclear materials, and in 1996 new

reports described lax security at nuclear installations.

Terrorism

Security police reported that between 1991 and 1993 the

incidence of terrorist bombings rose from fifty to 350. The

methods used by organized criminals in Russia caused experts

to include Russia as a likely location in their identification of a new wave of world terrorism in the 1990s. Besides organized

crime, a second factor potentially contributing to terrorism is the extreme instability of economic and social conditions: high

unemployment and job insecurity, friction among ethnic

groups and between urban populations and job-seeking

migrants into their cities, and a general decline in the standard

of living. The vulnerability of Russia's isolated transport and

pipeline systems and the proximity of hazardous-materials centers to cities further increase the prospect of terrorist activities. In 1995 terrorist acts and two major instances of hostage taking

by Chechen separatists promoted fears that vulnerable citizens

and locations in other parts of Russia might be targeted by separatist groups. In December 1995, an international conference

on terrorism in Ottawa categorized the Budennovsk hostage

incident ofJune 1995—in which Chechen guerrillas captured

more than 1,000 hostages 120 kilometers inside Russian terri- tory—with the Oklahoma City bombing and Middle Eastern

terrorist acts as examples of flagrant international terrorism.

Narcotics

In the mid-1990s, narcotics addiction and sales play a growing role in the disruption of Russian society. This trend has

been promoted by an adverse economic situation, a general

lack of high-level control over the use and movement of narcotic substances, and the continued laxity of border controls.

Between 1993 and 1995, the annual amount of seized drugs

increased from thirty-five to ninety tons; experts believe that

Russia has the largest per capita drug market of all the former

Soviet republics.

According to the Russian government's Center for the Study

of Drug Addiction, in early 1996 at least 500,000 Russians were dependent on illegal drugs. With use increasing at an esti- mated rate of 50 percent per year, the total number of users

575
Russia: A Country Study

was estimated at 2 million in 1995. Drug traffickers, supplied

mainly with opium from Central Asia and heroin from Iran,

Pakistan, and Afghanistan, have targeted Russia as a market

and as a conduit to Western markets. In the early 1990s,

cocaine use appeared among affluent young Russians, and

beginning in 1993 the interception of cocaine shipments in St. Petersburg indicated that South American producers had

entered the Russian market. Criminal organizations are

believed to control most trafficking and distribution in Russia.

Some local Russian distributors are closely linked with criminal

groups in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Ukraine. Russian sol- diers and officers in Afghanistan and later in Central Asia

became active in smuggling the narcotics easily available in

those countries into Russia. Reportedly, members of the Russian 201st Motorized Infantry Division, stationed in Tajikistan,

have established a profitable enterprise that is tacitly accepted

by Russian and Tajikistani authorities. The Moscow State Insti- tute of International Relations has reported the existence of a

regular smuggling route going fromTajikistan to Russia's Black

Sea port of Rostov-na-Donu via Turkmenistan, and from there

to Western Europe. One explanation of the Russian attack on

Chechnya, published in the independent newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta, was that it was a reprisal against Chechen president

Dzhokar Dudayev for demanding more protection money for

narcotics shipments through Chechnya to Rostov-na-Donu.

Narcotics production in Russia also is rising. In 1993 the government seized 215 laboratories, many of them small-scale

amphetamine producers who used stolen government equipment. Newly privatized chemical laboratories are more difficult to monitor than were Soviet-era state facilities. Opium poppies

and marijuana are grown in southern Russia, although cultivation is illegal. In 1995 an MVD official estimated that about 1 million hectares of wild cannabis was growing and easily avail- able in Siberia; opium cultivation also is believed to be increasing.

The laundering of drug money is encouraged by Russia's lax

monetary regulations and controls. Some local banks are controlled by criminal groups that use them to launder profits

from illegal activities, including drug sales. According to one

1995 estimate, as many as 25 percent of Moscow's commercial

banks are part of this operation. Legislation against money

laundering was proposed but had not been passed as of mid1996.

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Internal Security

In 1994 the Yeltsin administration formed an interministerial counternarcotics committee, involving twenty-four agencies, to coordinate drug policy. In 1995 a three-year antidrug

program was approved to support interdiction and drug treat- ment facilities. The program also was intended to criminalize

drug use, extend sentences for drug trafficking, and establish a pharmaceuticals-monitoring process. In 1995 the full-time staff of the anti-drug-trafficking department of the MVD increased

from about 3,500 to 4,000. The State Customs Committee

increased its drug control staff by 350 and added fifty field

offices, and the Federal Border Service created an antidrug

force. The Moscow City Council instituted drug education programs in some city schools in 1993, and several private organizations have sponsored national programs to curb demand.

The government has not aggressively addressed the rehabilitation of drug addicts or the reduction of demand, however; in

1995 an estimated 90 percent of Russia's drug addicts went

untreated (see Health Conditions, ch. 5).

The Russian government has signed a number of international conventions on narcotics (responsibility for some of

which it inherited from the Soviet Union), including the 1988

United Nations Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Russia will not

be in full compliance with the convention, however, until it has

stricter controls on production and distribution and tougher

criminal penalties for possession of drugs. The United States

government has offered Russia advice and training courses on

various aspects of narcotics control. A mutual legal-assistance

agreement with the United States went into effect in early

1996, and the Federal Border Service has memorandums of

understanding on narcotics cooperation with the United States Coast Guard and with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The Criminal Justice System

The Federal Security Service (FSB) has a staff of several

thousand responsible for investigating crimes of national and

international scope such as terrorism, smuggling, treason, violations of secrecy laws, and large-scale economic crime and cor- ruption—an area ofjurisdiction similar to that of the United

States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Several other

state organizations also have designated criminal investigatory

responsibilities.

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Russia: A Country Study

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)

Unlike the successor agencies to the KGB, the Ministry of

Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del—MVD) did not

undergo extensive reorganization after 1991. The MVD carries

out regular police functions, including maintenance of public

order and criminal investigation. It also has responsibility for

fire fighting and prevention, traffic control, automobile registration, transportation security, issuance of visas and passports,

and administration of labor camps and most prisons.

In 1996 the MVD was estimated to have 540,000 personnel,

including the regular militia (police force) and MVD special

troops but not including the ministry's Internal Troops. The

MVD operates at both the central and local levels. The central

system is administered from the ministry office in Moscow. As

of mid-1996, the minister of internal affairs was General Anatoliy Kulikov. He replaced Viktor Yerin, who was dismissed in

response to State Duma demands after the MVD mishandled

the 1995 Budennovsk hostage crisis. MVD agencies exist at all levels from the national to the

municipal. MVD agencies at lower operational levels conduct

preliminary investigations of crimes. They also perform the

ministry's policing, motor vehicle inspection, and fire and traffic control duties. MVD salaries are generally lower than those

paid in other agencies of the criminal justice system. Reportedly, staffers are poorly trained and equipped, and corruption

is widespread.

Until 1990 Russia's regular militia was under the direct

supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Soviet

Union. At that time, the Russian Republic established its own

MVD, which assumed control of the republic's militia. In the

late 1980s, the Gorbachev regime had attempted to improve

training, tighten discipline, and decentralize the administration of the militia throughout the Soviet Union so that it might

respond better to local needs and deal more effectively with

drug trafficking and organized crime. Some progress was made

toward these objectives despite strong opposition from conservative elements in the CPSU leadership. However, after 1990

the redirection of MVD resources to the Internal Troops and to the MVD's new local riot squads undercut militia reform. In the

August 1991 coup against the Gorbachev government, most

Russian police remained inactive, although some in Moscow

joined the Yeltsin forces that opposed the overthrow of the government.

578
Police watch demonstration in Red Square, Moscow, March 1992.

Courtesy Mike Albin

In early 1996, a reorganization plan was proposed for the

MVD, with the aim of more effective crime prevention. The

plan called for increasing the police force by as many as 90,000,

but funding was not available for such expansion. Meanwhile,

the MVD recruited several thousand former military personnel, whose experience reduced the need for police training. At

the end of 1995, the MVD reported debts of US$717 million,

including US$272 million in overdue wages. In February 1996,

guards at a jail and a battalion of police escorts went on a hunger strike; at that point, some of the MVD's Internal Troops

had not been paid for three months. Minister of Internal

Affairs Kulikov described the ministry's 1996 state budget allo- cation of US$5.2 billion as wholly inadequate to fulfill its missions. Participation in the Chechnya campaign added

enormously to ministry expenditures.

The MVD's militia is used for ordinary policing functions

such as law enforcement on the streets, crowd control, and traffic control. As part of a trend toward decentralization, some

municipalities, including Moscow, have formed their own militias, which cooperate with their MVD counterpart. Although a new law on self-government supports such local law enforce579
Russia: A Country Study

ment agencies, the Yeltsin administration attempted to head

off further moves toward independence by strictly limiting

local powers. The regular militia does not carry guns or other

weapons except in emergency situations, such as the parliamentary crisis of 1993, when it was called upon to fight antigovernment crowds in the streets of Moscow.

The militia is divided into local public security units and

criminal police. The security units run local police stations,

temporary detention centers, and the State Traffic Inspectorate. They deal with crimes outside the jurisdiction of the

criminal police and are charged with routine maintenance of

public order. The criminal police are divided into organizations responsible for combating particular types of crime. The

Main Directorate for Organized Crime (Glavnoye upravleniye

organizovannogo prestupleniya—GUOP) works with other

agencies such as the MVD's specialized rapid-response detachments; in 1995 special GUOP units were established to deal

with contract killings and other violent crimes against individuals. The Federal Tax Police Service deals primarily with tax eva- sion and similar crimes. In an attempt to improve Russia's

notoriously inefficient tax collection operation, the Federal

Tax Police Service received authority in 1995 to carry out preliminary criminal investigations independently. The 1996 budget authorized a staff of 38,000 for this agency.

Throughout the first half of the 1990s, Russia's militia functioned with minimal arms, equipment, and support from the

national legal system. The inadequacy of the force became particularly apparent in the wave of organized crime that began

sweeping over Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Many highly qualified individuals have moved from the militia

into better-paying jobs in the field of private security, which has

expanded to meet the demand of companies needing protection from organized crime. Frequent bribe taking among the

remaining members of the militia has damaged the force's public credibility. Numerous revelations of participation by militia

personnel in murders, prostitution rings, information peddling, and tolerance of criminal acts have created a general

public perception that all police are at least taking bribes. Bribery of police officers to avoid arrest for traffic violations and

petty crimes is a routine and expected occurrence.

In a 1995 poll of the public, only 5 percent of respondents

expressed confidence in the ability of the militia to deal with

crime in their city. Human rights organizations have accused

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Internal Security

the Moscow militia of racism in singling out non-Slavic individuals (especially immigrants from Russia's Caucasus republics),

physical attacks, unjustified detention, and other rights violations. In 1995 Kulikov conducted a high-profile "Clean Hands

Campaign" to purge the MVD police forces of corrupt elements. In its first year, this limited operation caught several

highly placed MVD officials collecting bribes, indicating a high

level of corruption throughout the agency. According to

experts, the main causes of corruption are insufficient funding

to train and equip personnel and pay them adequate wages,

poor work discipline, lack of accountability, and fear of reprisals from organized criminals.

The Special Forces Police Detachment (Otryad militsii

osobogo naznacheniya—OMON), commonly known as the

Black Berets, is a highly trained elite branch of the public security force of the MVD militia. Established in 1987, OMON is assigned to emergency situations such as hostage crises, widespread public disturbances, and terrorist threats. In the Soviet

period, OMON forces also were used to quell unrest in rebellious republics. In the 1990s, OMON units have been stationed

at transportation hubs and population centers. The Moscow

contingent, reportedly 2,000 strong, receives support from the

mayor's office and the city's internal affairs office as well as from the MVD budget. OMON units have the best and most

up-to-date weapons and combat equipment available, and they

enjoy a reputation for courage and effectiveness.

The MVD's Internal Troops, estimated to number 260,000 to 280,000 in mid-1996, are better equipped and trained than the

regular militia. The size of the force, which is staffed by both

conscripts and volunteers, has grown steadily through the mid1990s, although the troop commander has reported serious

shortages of officers. Critics have noted that the Internal

Troops have more divisions in a combat-ready state than do the

regular armed forces (see Force Structure, ch. 9).

According to the Law on Internal Troops, issued in October

1992, the functions of the Internal Troops are to ensure public

order; guard key state installations, including nuclear power

plants; guard prisons and labor camps (a function that was to end in 1996); and contribute to the territorial defense of the

nation. It was under the last mandate that Internal Troops were

deployed in large numbers after the December 1994 invasion

of Chechnya. In November 1995, MVD troops in Chechnya

totaled about 23,500. This force included unknown propor581
Russia: A Country Study

tions of Internal Troops, specialized rapid-response troops, and

special military detachments. Internal Troops are equipped

with guns and combat equipment to deal with serious crimes,

terrorism, and other extraordinary threats to public order. In

1995 the crime rate among Internal Troops personnel doubled. A contributing factor was a steep increase in desertions

that coincided with service in Chechnya, where the Internal

Troops were routinely used for street patrols in 1995.

The Procuracy

In the Soviet criminal justice system, the Procuracy was the

most powerful institution dealing with nonpolitical crimes.

Since 1991 the agency has retained its dual responsibility for

the administration ofjudicial oversight and for criminal investigations—which means, essentially, that prosecution of crimes

and findings of guilt or innocence are overseen by the same

office. As it was under the Soviet system, the Procuracy in the

1990s is a unified, centralized agency with branches in all subnational jurisdictions, including cities. The chief of the agency

is the procurator general, who is appointed by the president

with the approval of the State Duma. (Under the Soviet system,

the Supreme Soviet appointed the procurator general.)

Proposed reforms of the notoriously corrupt and inefficient

Procuracy had not yet been enacted by the Russian government as of mid-1996, so the agency continued to function in

much the same way as it did in the Soviet period. Experts did

not believe that a new law on the Procuracy, proposed in 1995

and 1996, would establish a reliable oversight system over secu- rity-agency and regular police operations. In the meantime,

procurators continued to arrest citizens without constitutionally mandated arrest warrants, and the general surveillance

departments of the Procuracy continued to spy on law-abiding

groups and individuals. In 1995 about 28,000 procurators were active at some level in

the Russian Federation. Appointed to five-year terms, procurators must have a postgraduate education in jurisprudence. The

Procuracy employs a large number of investigators who carry

out preliminary investigations in what are called specific areas of competence. Special investigators are designated for cases identified as "essentially important" by state authorities. The

Procuracy also has several institutions for research and education attached to it.

582
Internal Security

Criminal Law Reform in the 1990s

In the mid-1990s, several efforts were made to pass a Criminal Code of the Russian Federation to replace the inadequate

and antiquated Criminal Code of the RSFSR, which was passed

in the 1960s and had remained the fundamental law of the

land, with numerous amendments, since that time. In December 1995, Yeltsin, heeding MVD objections to certain articles,

vetoed a code that had been developed by his own State Law

Directorate and passed by parliament. No amended code was expected until after the presidential election ofJuly 1996.

Meanwhile, Russia lacked laws on organized crime and corruption under which maflya and economic crimes could be prosecuted.

In the absence of a comprehensive overhaul of the Criminal

Code, Yeltsin responded to the growing problem of crime by

enacting measures that broadly expanded police powers. In

June 1994, he issued a presidential decree, Urgent Measures to Implement the Program to Step Up the Fight Against Crime.

The decree included major steps to increase the efficiency of

the law enforcement agencies, including material incentives

for the staff and better equipment and resources. The decree

also called for an increase of 52,000 in the strength of the MVD

Internal Troops and for greater coordination in the operations

of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), the MVD,

and other law enforcement bodies. Control over the issuing of

entry visas and the private acquisition of photocopiers was to be tightened. The decree also mandated the preparation of

laws broadening police rights to conduct searches and to carry

weapons.

Yeltsin's anticrime decree had the stated purpose of preserving the security of the society and the state; however, the system

of urgent measures it introduced had the effect of reducing

the rights of individuals accused of committing crimes. Under

the new guidelines, individuals suspected of serious offenses

could be detained up to thirty days without being formally

charged. During that time, suspects could be interrogated and

their financial affairs examined. The secrecy regulations of

banks and commercial enterprises would not protect suspects

in such cases. Intelligence service representatives have the

authority to enter any premises without a warrant, to examine

private documents, and to search automobiles, their drivers,

and their passengers. Human rights activists protested the

decree as a violation of the 1993 constitution's protection of

583
Russia: A Country Study

individuals from arbitrary police power (see Civil Rights, ch.

7). Already in 1992, Yeltsin had expanded the infamous Article

70, a Soviet-era device used to silence political dissent, which

criminalized any form of public demand for change in the constitutional system, as well as the formation of any assemblage

calling for such measures. Meanwhile, the Russian police immediately began acting on

their broad mandate to fight crime. In the summer of 1994, the

Moscow MVD carried out a citywide operation called Hurri- cane that employed about 20,000 crack troops and resulted in

759 arrests. A short time later, the FSK reported that its operatives had arrested members of a right-wing terrorist group, the

so-called Werewolf Legion, who were planning to bomb Moscow cinemas. Although crime continued to rise after Yeltsin's

decree, the rate of crime solving improved from its 1993 level

of 51 percent to 65 percent in 1995, assumedly because of

expanded police powers.

Although the Russian parliament opposed many of Yeltsin's

policies, the majority of deputies were even more inclined than

Yeltsin to expand police authority at the expense of individual

rights. In July 1995, the State Duma passed the new Law on

Operational-Investigative Activity, which had been introduced

by the Yeltsin administration to replace Article 70. The law widened the list of agencies entitled to conduct investigations, at the same time broadening the powers of all investigatory agencies beyond those stipulated in the earlier law. The 1995 draft Criminal Code included an article specifically prohibiting "conspiracy with the aim of seizing power and

forcibly changing the constitutional form of government," an

activity subject to a sentence of up to life imprisonment. The

new law opened the concept of conspiracy to broad interpretation by state authorities, varying from a meeting held by the

leadership of an opposition party to a simple telephone conversation between two citizens.

The draft code also broadened the law on violations of civil rights on the basis of nationality or race, which carries a maximum sentence of five years. As in the case of conspiracy and

political statutes, the ambiguity of the nationality and race law

opened the door for serious abuses of individual rights. Prosecutors and judges were granted wide latitude in deciding what

constitute "acts directed at incitement of social, national, racial, or religious hostility or discord." Such a charge could be lev- eled easily in a society with a huge variety of ethnic and reli584
Internal Security

gious groups, particularly groups with existing claims of

autonomy or traditions of hostility toward one another (see

Ethnic Composition, ch. 4).

Many legal experts considered the new draft Criminal Code,

which is a synthesis of presidential and State Duma proposals,

to be a significant improvement over the old code. But, unlike

Western states, Russia does not have a tradition of respect for

legal rights or a well-established, balanced system ofjustice to interpret and administer the laws. Many of the laws adopted in

the early 1990s concern crimes whose investigation is delegated

to the security police, which have a history of human rights

abuses and were not placed under effective oversight by the

reforms of the early 1990s. Thus, in the atmosphere of relative

political pluralism and freedom of expression in the first years

of the Yeltsin administration, security agents still sometimes

take advantage of the law to employ KGB-style tactics. Despite a lack of sympathy for personal liberty, in the early

1990s the Yeltsin administration made some reforms in the

legal system to protect the rights of the individual. In June

1992, the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to give a detainee the right to legal counsel immediately, rather than, as in the past, only after initial questioning. A detainee's right to demand a judicial review of the legality and grounds for detention also was recognized. In practice, however, these changes

often have been offset by other laws intended to protect the

state at the expense of the individual. The clearest example is Yeltsin's sweeping anticrime decree of 1992, but other

instances have followed. In March 1995, Yeltsin issued a decree

against fascist organizations and practices, which gave the security police broad new authority to arrest and investigate sus- pects. Under the 1995 draft Criminal Code, a person under

arrest could not appeal to the courts to protest his or her confinement, but only to the procurator. The president also could

appoint a special prosecutor to bring "highly placed individuals" to justice, thus undermining the principle of independent

judges. The new code also extended the maximum period of

internment of suspects without formal charges from three to seven days, although the counsel for the defense could not

become acquainted with the materials of the criminal case

until after the preliminary investigation had been completed.

Secrecy Laws

The passage of a new secrecy law in 1993 indicated that the

585
Russia: A Country Study

Yeltsin government was not prepared to abjure the protection

of state secrets as a rationale for controlling the activities of

Russian citizens. The secrecy law of 1993, harshly criticized by

human rights activists, set forth in detail the procedure for

labeling and protecting information whose dispersal would

constitute a danger to the state. The concept of secrecy was

given a broad interpretation. The law prescribed secret classifi- cations for information on foreign policy, economics, national

defense, intelligence, and counterintelligence. However, a more specific description of the classification process, including which specific types of information were to be classified as secret and which agencies and departments were authorized to

classify information, was to be made public at a later date.

In general, the security police under Yeltsin do not use

secrecy laws to prosecute individuals, but there have been

exceptions. In October 1992, officers from the Ministry of

Security arrested two chemical scientists, Vil1 Mirzayanov and

Lev Fedorov, for having written an article on current Russian

chemical weapons research in a widely circulated daily newspaper. The article's revelation was embarrassing to the Yeltsin government because Russia had claimed it was no longer

conducting such research. Although Mirzayanov was brought

to trial in early 1994, public and international protest caused

the Yeltsin government to release him two months later. In a landmark decision, the procurator's office awarded Mirzayanov

about US$15,500 in damages for having been illegally

detained.

How the System Works

According to Russian criminal procedure, officers of the

MVD, the Federal Security Service (FSB), or the Procuracy can

arrest an individual on suspicion of having committed a crime.

Ordinary crimes, including murder, come under the jurisdiction of the MVD; the FSB and the Procuracy are authorized to deal with crimes such as terrorism, treason, smuggling, and

large-scale economic malfeasance. The accused has the right to obtain an attorney immediately after the arrest, and, in most

cases, the accused must be charged officially within seventy-two

hours of the arrest. In some circumstances, the period of con- finement without charge can be extended. Once the case is investigated, it is assigned to a court for trial. Trials are public,

with the exception of proceedings involving government

secrets.

586
Sevastopol' District Court, Moscow

Courtesy Michael E. Samojeden

In August 1995, the State Duma passed a law giving judges

andjurors protection against illegal influence on the process of

trying a case. To the extent that it actually is practiced, the new

law is a significant barrier to the Soviet-era practice ofjudges

consulting with political officials before rendering verdicts.

The protection ofjurors became a concern in 1995 as jury tri- als, outlawed since 1918, returned on an experimental basis in

nine subnational jurisdictions. Between January and September 1995, some 300 jury trials were held in those areas. Although another sixteen jurisdictions applied to begin holding jury trials, in mid-1996 the State Duma had not passed

enabling legislation. In 1996 the court system convicted some

99.5 percent of criminal defendants, although only 80 percent were convicted injury trials—about the same percentage as in

Western courts. Expansion of the jury system faced strong

opposition among Russia's police and prosecutors because the

conviction rate is much lower and investigative procedures are held to much higher standards under such a system. Meanwhile, the advent of trial by jury and a nominally independent

judiciary exposed a serious problem: in 1995 there were only

about 20,000 private attorneys and about 28,000 public prose587
Russia: A Country Study

cutors in all of Russia, and most judges who had functioned

under the old system had never developed genuine juridical

skills. By the mid-1990s, a number of younger judges were

actively promoting the jury system.

In the mid-1990s, claims of illegal detention received some- what more recognition in the Russian legal system than they

had previously. An estimated 13,000 individuals won their

release by court order in 1994—about 20 percent of the total

number who claimed illegal detention that year. In general, the

criminal justice system is more protective of individual rights

than it was in the Soviet period, although the Mirzayanov case demonstrated that substantial obstacles to Western-style jurisprudence remain in Russia's legal system.

Capital punishment is reserved for grave crimes such as murder and terrorism; it cannot be inflicted on a woman or on an

individual less than eighteen years old. In 1995 four offenses

terrorist acts, terrorist acts against a representative of a foreign

state, sabotage, and counterfeiting—were removed from the

list of capital crimes. In March 1991, Yeltsin formed a thirteenmember Pardons Commission of volunteer advisers for the specific purpose of considering reductions of death sentences.

According to one member of that commission, between 1991

and 1994 the incidence of capital punishment (inflicted in Russia by firing squad) dropped sharply; in 1994 only four execu- tions were carried out, and 124 death sentences were

commuted. In 1995, however, the political pressure generated

by Russia's crime wave changed the totals to eighty-six executions and only six commutations. After Yeltsin repeatedly

ignored its clemency recommendations in 1995, the Pardons

Commission reportedly ceased functioning in early 1996,

despite the protests of Russian and international human rights

organizations. Russia's membership in the Council of Europe

(see Glossary), which became official in January 1996, requires an immediate moratorium on executions, plus complete elimination of the death penalty from the Criminal Code within

three years. Russia's execution rate rose in the first months of

1996 before declining sharply.

Prisons

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union had few conventional prisons.

About 99 percent of convicted criminals served their sentences

in labor camps. These were supervised by the Main Directorate

for Corrective Labor Camps (Glavnoye upravleniye ispravi588
Internal Security

tel'no-trudovykh lagerey—Gulag), which was administered by

the MVD. The camps had four regimes of ascending severity. In the strict-regime camps, inmates worked at the most difficult

jobs, usually outdoors, and received meager rations. Jobs were

progressively less demanding and rations better in the three

classifications of camps with more clement regimes. The system

of corrective labor was viewed by Soviet authorities as successful

because of the low rate of recividism. However, in the opinion

of former inmates and Western observers, prisons and labor

camps were notorious for their harsh conditions, arbitrary and

sadistic treatment of prisoners, and flagrant abuses of human

rights. In 1989 new legislation, emphasizing rehabilitation

rather than punishment, was drafted to "humanize" the Gulag

system. Nevertheless, few changes occurred in the conditions

of most prisoners before the end of the Soviet period in 1991.

In the post-Soviet period, all prisons and labor camps except

for fourteen detention prisons fell under the jurisdiction of the

MVD. In the early and mid-1990s, the growth of crime led to a rapid rise in the number of prisoners. Because of overcrowding

and the failure to build new prison facilities, conditions in pris- ons deteriorated steadily after 1991, and some incidents of

Soviet-style arbitrary punishment continued to be reported. In 1994 a Moscow prison designed to hold 8,500 inmates was

housing well over 17,000 shortly after its completion. Many

prisons are unfit for habitation because of insufficient sanitation systems. In 1995 Nezavisimaya gazeta reported that the

capacity of isolation wards in Moscow and St. Petersburg pris- ons had been exceeded by two to two-and-one-half times.

Observers claimed that some prisons stopped providing food

to prisoners for months at a time, relying instead on rations

sent from outside. The lack of funding also led to a crisis in

medical care for prisoners. In 1995 Yeltsin's Human Rights

Commission condemned the prison system for continuing to allow violations of prisoners' rights. The report cited lack of

expert supervision as the main reason that such practices,

which often included beatings, were not reported and punished.

In 1995 conditions in the penal system had deteriorated to the point that the State Duma began calling for a transfer of

prison administration from the MVD to the Ministry ofJustice.

According to Western experts, however, the MVD's Chief Directorate for Enforcement of Punishment has been prevented

from improving the situation by funding limitations, personnel

589
Russia: A Country Study

problems, and lack of legislative support, rather than by internal shortcomings.

By the mid-1990s, Russian penal legislation resembled that

enacted in Western countries, although the conditions of

detention did not. Post-Soviet legislation has abolished arbitrary or inhumane practices such as bans on visitors and mail,

head shaving, and physical abuse. Also, prison officials now are required to protect prisoners who have received threats, and

freedom of religious practice is guaranteed. Prisoners are rewarded for good behavior by being temporarily released outside the prison; in 1993 the MVD reported a 97 percent rate of

return after such releases. However, the penalty for violent

escape has increased to eight additional years' detention. In

1996 the function of guarding prisons was to pass completely

from the MVD to local prison administrations, and a complete

restructuring was announced for that year. Although conditions in the labor camps are harsh, those in

pretrial detention centers are even worse. According to the

Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions, the

government's inability to implement a functional system of

release on bail meant that by the end of 1994 some 233,500

persons—more than 20 percent of the entire prison population—were incarcerated in pretrial detention centers, sometimes for a period longer than the nominal punishment for the

crime of which they were accused.

In 1994 the total prison population was estimated at slightly

more than 1 million people, of whom about 600,000 were held

in labor camps. Of the latter number, about 21,600 were said to be women and about 19,000 to be adolescents. Among the

entire prison population in 1994, about half were incarcerated

for violent crimes, 60 percent were repeat offenders, and more

than 15 percent were alcoholics or drug addicts.

As in the Soviet period, corrective-labor institutions have

made a significant contribution to the national economy. In

the early 1990s, industrial output in the camps reached an esti- mated US$100 million, and forest-based camps added about

US$27 million, chiefly from the production of commercial

lumber, railroad ties, and summer cabins. Because the camps

supply their products to conventional state enterprises, however, they have suffered from the decline in that phase of Russia's economy; an estimated 200,000 convicts were without work

in the camps in early 1994 (see Economic Conditions in Mid1996, ch. 6). In 1995 the chief of the Directorate for Supervi590
Internal Security

sion of the Legality of Prison Punishment reported that the

population of labor camps exceeded the capacity of those facilities by an average of 50 percent.

Outlook

In the mid-1990s, the Russian government maintained a precarious balance between the newly discovered rights of citizens

and the government's perceived need for security from domestic criticism and threats to its power. Between 1992 and 1996,

the record of the Yeltsin administration was decidedly mixed.

Reforms gradually appeared in prison administration, the

rights of those accused of crimes, and the introduction of trial byjury, but beginning in 1993 legislation and executive decrees

increasingly had the objective of strengthening the arbitrary

powers of government over its citizens in the name of national

security. The Procuracy maintains much of the independence

it had in the Soviet period; although the role ofjudges and

defense attorneys nominally is greater in the post-Soviet system,

Russia suffers a severe shortage of individuals experienced in

the workings of a Western-style legal system.

The national security establishment, generally smaller and

less competent than the pervasive KGB monolith of the Soviet

period, has undergone reorganization and internal power

struggles in the 1990s, and in some instances it has been made

the scapegoat for setbacks such as the Chechnya invasion.

Agencies such as the regular militia (police) and the Federal

Border Service have not been able to deal effectively with

increased crime, smuggling, and illegal immigration; lack of

funding is an important reason for this failure. More specialized national security agencies such as the FSB maintain special

investigative prerogatives beyond the purview of normal law

enforcement.

As average Russian citizens have gained marginally greater

freedom from the fear of arbitrary government intrusion, they

have been plagued with a crime wave whose intensity has

mounted every year since 1991. All types of illegal activity

common street theft, drug-related crime, murder, white-collar

financial crime, and extortion by organized criminals—have

flourished. Although the government has announced studies

and special programs, Russian society continues to present an

inviting target to criminals in the absence of effective law

enforcement and the presence of rampant corruption.

591
Russia: A Country Study

* * * The status and development of Russia's internal security

agencies and crime situation are described in numerous periodical articles and a few substantive monographs. In The KGB:

Police and Politics in the Soviet Union, Amy Knight describes the

structure and influence of the KGB in its final stage before the

end of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet position of internal

security agencies is described by J. Michael Waller in Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. In Comrade Criminal: Russia's

New Mafia, Stephen Handelman investigates Russia's organized

criminal element and official corruption, against the backdrop

of social conditions and government attitudes prevalent in the

1990s. The 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of

the United States Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters provides a summary of narcotics activ- ity and government prevention measures in Russia. Penny

Morvant's article "War on Organized Crime and Corruption"

describes Russia's crime wave and government attempts to combat it; two articles in the RFE/RL Research Report, Christopher J. Ulrich's "The Growth of Crime in Russia and the Baltic

Region" and Julia Wishnevsky's "Corruption Allegations

Undermine Russia's Leaders," approach the same topics from

different perspectives. Numerous articles in the Christian Sci- ence Monitor, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily

Report: Central Eurasia, and the Moscow daily newspapers Nezavisimaya gazeta and Izvestiya include current information on

Russia's criminal justice and prison systems and on the crime

problem. (For further information and complete citations, see

Bibliography.)

592
Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Rulers of Muscovy and the Russian Empire, 1462-1917

3 Populated Places in European Russia Irradiated by Chernobyl' and Other Industrial Accidents

4 Area, Population, and Capitals of the Soviet Republics, 1989

Census

5 Largest Nature Reserves and National Parks, 1992

6 Per Capita Annual Consumption of Selected Foods, 1991-

94

7 Population by Age and Sex, 1992

8 Major Ethnic Groups, Selected Years, 1959-89

9 Ethnic Composition of Autonomous Republics, 1989

10 Ethnically DesignatedJurisdictions, 1996

11 Indicators of Living Standards, 1991-94

1 2 Students in Primary and Secondary Schools, Selected Years,

1986-93

13 Education Statistics for the Autonomous Republics, 1994

14 Incidence of Selected Diseases, 1990-94

15 Land Utilization, 1993 and 1994

16 Revenue Sources of Subnational Jurisdictions, 1992, 1993,

and 1994

17 Labor Force Employment Indicators, 1995 and 1996

1 8 Production Trends in Selected Branches of Heavy Industry,

1992-96

19 Modes of Public Transportation, Selected Years, 1985-92

20 Modes of Transportation of Selected Products, Selected

Years, 1985-92

21 Major Import Partners, 1992, 1993, and 1994

22 Major Export Partners, 1992, 1993, and 1994

23 Trade with the United States by Selected Products, 1995 and

1996

24 Presidential Election Second-Round Results by Autonomous Republic, 1996

25 Funding of Government Functions byJurisdiction, 1994

26 Political Parties and Groups Receiving Highest Vote Count

593
in State Duma Elections, 1995

27 Major Periodicals, 1995-96

28 Main Directorates of the Armed Forces General Staff, 1994

29 Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1995

594
Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

vriicii yyj\A miuw ivxu.iu.iJiy uy

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 39 inches

3.3 feet 62

9 47

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles

35.3 cubic feet 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit and add 32

595
Russia: A Country Study

Table 2. Rulers ofMuscovy and the Russian Empire, 1462-191

7

Period Ruler

Rurik Dynasty 1462-1505 Ivan III (the Great) 1505-33 Vasiliym

1533-84 Ivan IV (the Terrible) 1584-98 Fedorl Time of Troubles 1598-1605 Boris Godunov

1605 FedorH

1605-06 First False Dmitriy 1606-10 VasiliyShuyskiy 1610-13 Second False Dmitriy Romanov Dynasty 1613-45 Mikhail Romanov

1645-76 Aleksey 1676-82 FedorlH

1682-89 Sofia (regent)

1 682-96 Ivan V ( co-tsar) 1682-1725 Peter I (the Great) 1725-27 Catherine I 1727-30 Peter H

1730-40 Anna

1740-41 Ivan VI

1741-62 Elizabeth 1762 Peter ffl 1762-96 Catherine II (the Great) 1796-1801 Paul I 1801-25 Alexander I 1825-55 Nicholas I 1855-81 Alexander U

1881-94 Alexander III 1894-1917 Nicholas H

Source: Based on information from Marc Raeff, "History of Russia/Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics " Academic American Encyclopedia, 16, Danbury, Connecticut,

1986, 358.

596
Appendix

Table 3. Populated Places in European Russia Irradiated by

Chernobyl' and Other Industrial Accidents 1

T . ,. . Populated Places by Degree of . Jurisdiction r

T ,. . 2 Total J Irradiation^ 0-1 1-5 5-15

Belgorod Oblast 318 232 550

Bryansk Oblast3 1,183 479 264 1,926 Kaluga Oblast 262 281 69 612

Kursk Oblast 915 201 1,116 Leningrad Oblast 68 87 155

Lipetsk Oblast 123 92 215 Moscow Oblast 9 9 Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast 137 137 Orel Oblast 683 876 15 1,574 Penza Oblast 57 23 80

Republic of Bashkortostan 16 16 Republic of Chuvashia 34 34

Republic of Mari El 25 25

Republic of Mordovia 290 48 338

Rostov Oblast 2 2

Ryazan' Oblast 246 293 539 Smolensk Oblast 89 89 Tambov Oblast 116 7 123 Tula Oblast 1,072 1,150 144 2,366 Ul'yanovsk Oblast 101 8 109 Volgograd Oblast 2 3 5 Voronezh Oblast 758 214 972 TOTAL 6,506 3,994 492 10,992

Includes results of 1986 accident at Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station in Ukraine and three nuclear acci- dents at Mayak nuclear weapons plant in Chelyabinsk.

2 In curies per square kilometer.

3 Bryansk Oblast also has ninety-three populated places with more than fifteen curies per square kilometer. Source: Based on information from Russia, Committee on Land Resources and Utiliza- tion, Zemlya Rossii 1995: Problemy, tsifry, kommentarii, Moscow, 1996, 35-36.

597
Russia: A Country Study

Table 4. Area, Population, and Capitals ofthe Soviet Republics, 1989

Census

Republic Area of Republic1 Population of Populauonof

(in square kilometers) Republic1 Capital Capital2

1 /, 0/5,400 1 AC Q1 1 AAA 145,311,000 Moscow O OTP AAA 8,815,000

2, 11 /,300 T C Q A A AAA 16,244,000 Alma-Ata 1 1 AO AAA 1,108,000 CAQ *7AA 003, /00 C 1 OA 1 AAA 51,201,000 Kiev O C A A AAA 2,544,000 luntmenistan . .

.

y* o o i aa 480,100 £ AAA 3,301,000 Ashkhabad QOO AAA 382,000 447 400 1 Q f)9fi nnn Tashkent 9 1 94 nnn

i n n7ft nnn Minsk i nnn

Kyrgyzstan 198,500 4,143,000 Frunze 632,000

Tajikistan 143,100 4,807,000 Dushanbe 582,000

Azerbaijan 86,600 6,811,000 Baku 1,115,000 Georgia 69,700 5,266,000 Tbilisi 1,194,000 Lithuania 65,200 3,641,000 Vilnius 566,000

Latvia 64,500 2,647,000 Riga 900,000

Estonia 45,100 1,556,000 Tallin 478,000 Moldavia 33,700 4,185,000 Kishinev 663,000 Armenia 29,800 3,412,000 Yerevan 1,168,000 TOTAL 22.403.0003 286,717,0004 24,008,000

1 Estimated.

2 Estimated. Each republic's capital is also the largest city in the republic.

3 Includes the area of the White Sea and the Sea ofAzov.

4 Soviet citizens outside the Soviet Union are included. Source: Based on information from hvestiya [Moscow] , April 29, 1989, 1-2.

598
Appendix

Table 5. Largest Nature Reserves and National Parks, 1992

Name and Location

Year Area1 Number of Protected Species

Established Animals Birds Plants

Putoran Reserve, Krasnoyarsk. Territory 1988 1,887 38 142 650

Ust'-Lena Reserve, Republic

of Sakha 1986 1,433 32 99 523 Taymyr Reserve, Krasnoyarsk

Territory 1979 1,349 16 85 714 Tunka Park, Republic of Buryatia 1991 1,184 47 200 100

Kronotskiy Reserve, Kamchatka

1967 1,142 42 217 810

Central Siberian Reserve, Krasnoyarsk Territory 1931 972 45 241 545 Magadan Reserve, Magaden

1982 884 46 135 300

Altay Reserve, Republic

of Gorno-Altay 1932 881 67 320 1,454 Dzhugdzhur Reserve, Khabarovsk Territory 1990 860 29 69 480 Olekminsk Reserve, Republic

1 Qftzl iyc>4 o49.A1/ 40 180 450 Wrangel Island Reserve, Magadan Oblast 1976 796 15 151 438

Pechero-E'ich Reserve, Republic of Komi 1930 722 46 215 702

Baikal-Lena Reserve, Irkutsk Oblast 1986 660 48 171 679

Verkhnetazov Reserve, Tyumen'

Oblast 1986 631 25 55 291 Yugan Reserve, Tyumen'

Oblast 1982 623 24 180 739

In thousands of hectares. Source: Based on information from Novaya Rossiya '94: Informatsionno-stalisticheshiy al'manakh, Moscow, 1994, 95-96.

599
Russia: A Country Study

Table 6. Per Capita Annual Consumption ofSelected Foods, 1991-94

(in kilograms unless otherwise specified)

Food 1991 1992 1993 1994

Meat and meat products 63 55 54 53 347 281 294 278 Eggs (units) 288 263 250 234

Fish and fish products 16 12 12 10 Sugar and confections 38 30 31 31 86 77 71 65

Fruits 35 32 29 n.a.

1 Potatoes 112 118 127 122

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development, OECD Economic Surveys: The Russian Federation 1995, Paris, 1995,

124.

Table 7. Population by Age and Sex, 1992

Age-Group Males Females Total

0-1 861,576 818,432 1,680,008 1-4 4,351,791 4,159,567 8,511,358 5-9 6,168,816 5,957,872 12,126,688 10-14 5,578,416 5,418,283 10,996,699 15-19 5,274,609 5,142,603 10,417,212 20-24 4,960,535 4,648,853 9,609,388 25-29 5,274,783 5,146,580 10,421,363 30-34 6,498,819 6,414,389 12,913,208 35-39 6,172,658 6,217,575 12,390,233 40-44 5,403,038 5,563,779 10,966,817 45-49 2,839,814 3,041,791 5,881,605 50-54 4,518,016 5,270,041 9,788,057 55-59 3,576,791 4,410,415 7,987,206 60-64 3,580,852 4,957,475 8,538,327 65-69 2,194,867 4,362,140 6,557,007 70-74 966,641 2,476,577 3,443,218 75-79 727,427 2,254,410 2,981,837 80-84 432,457 1,602,017 2,034,474 85 and over 180,568 884,901 1,065,469 TOTAL 69,562,474 78,747,700 148,310,174 Source: Based on information from United Nations, Department for Economic and

Social Information and Policy Analysis, Demographic Yearbook, 1993, New York, 1995,214-15.

600
Appendix

Table 8. MajorEthnic Groups, Selected Years, 1959-89

(in thousands of people)

Ethnic Group 1959 1970 1979 1989

Q7 ftfift 1 (\1 7/lft IK) /, /4o lift K99 1 13.DZZ i iy,ooo

a niK A *7KQ 4, /OO 5,U1

1

5,522

3,346 3,658 4,368

1 A ftfi 1,03/ 1 AOA i.oyu 1 77/1 1,1 /4 707 1,1£>Z 1 A(\c> 1.4UZ 1, /4y 954 1 181 1 9Q1 1 ft4£ AAA yo4 i OK9 i 9nfi l.ZUO 1911 1 177 1,1/ / 1111 1,1 1

1

1 (\1A 1,0/4

9fi1 K79 O/Z 71 9 / 1Z ftQQ oyy

ft9A 7fi9 /04 7Q1 /y ift/19 o4Z 616 678 686 715

4Q» EQ "I OOl fioo fi44 4/o Olo Kl ft 030

ft7K ftOft OUo 7ni IK) I Kft7 9&fi 9QQ D3Z £ft9 qcc) ai a 313 30U 417 41 / 94ft 313 409 1V/A 901 977 319 386

9ftft 9QC ft97 3Z/ 300 ftftO 283 315 320 336

71 Qfi yo 1 K9 li>Z 330 ftftfi

1 ft7 13/ loo 91 K ZlO

i oo 1ioyftQ lOO 90fi ZOO

Moldavians 62 88 102 173 Kalmyks 101 131 140 166 Roma 72 98 121 153

71 107 126 150

. . 58 69 89 131 Karelians 164 141 133 125 Adyghs 79 98 107 123 Khakass 56 65 69 79

35 53 59 69

45 55 59 69 29 38 45 51

Category based on about thirty nationalities. Source: Based on information from Novaya Rossiya '94: Informatsionno-statisticheskiy aVmanakh, Moscow, 1994, 110.

601
Russia: A Country Study

Table 9. Ethnic Composition ofAutonomous Republics, 1989

(in percentages)

Republic Russians

Titular Nationality Other Major

Group

68 22 T TV tci i n i ck n c BcLshkor tost3Ji 39 Bashkirs 22 28

70 Buryats 94 _l

Chcchnys. 3.nd In.g"u.shcti3.^. . . . Chechens 53

Inrush 13 97 Chuvash 68 Tatars ao 9 Dagestanis 80 Azerbay anis A1 60 Vo }"vaT"Hin rwRsi llf ana 32 K a ha rHi n Q 48

Rallrars 9 Kalmyks 4K Dagestanis 49 Karachay 31 Cherkess 10

Karelia 74 Karelians 10 Belorussians 7 Khakassia 80 Khakass 11 Komi 58 Komi 23

Mari El 48 Mari 45 Tatars 6 Mordovia 61 Mordovians 33 Tatars 5 North Ossetia (Alania) 30 Ossetians 53 Ingush 5 Sakha (Yakutia) 50 Yakuts 33 Ukrainians 7 43 Tatars 49 Chuvash 4

Tyva (Tuva) 32 Tuvinians 64 Udmurtia 59 Udmurts 31 Tatars 7 —indicates no other major group present. Republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia were united until 1992. Category includes about thirty nationalities.

602
Appendix

Table 10. Ethnically DesignatedJurisdictions, 1996

Jurisdiction AreaJ Capital Population

Republics Adygea 7,600 Maykop 450,400

Bashkortostan 143,600 Ufa 4,000,000

Buryatia 351,300 Ulan-Ude 1,050,000 Chechnya (Chechnya- Ichkeria) .... 19,300 Groznyy n.a.

3 Chuvashia 18,000 Cheboksary 1,361,000 Dagestan 50,300 Makhachkala 2,067,000 Gorno-Altay 92,600 Gorno-Altaysk 200,000

Ingushetia 19,300 Nazran 254,100

Kabardino-Balkaria 12,500 Nalchik 800,000 Kalmykia 75,900 Elista 350,000

Karachayevo-Cherkessia 14,100 Cherkessk 422,000

Karelia 172,400 Petrozavodsk 800,000

Khakassia 61,900 Abakan 600,000 Komi 415,900 Syktyvkar 1,227,900 MariEl 23,300 YoshkarOla 754,000 Mordovia 26,200 Saransk 964,000 North Ossetia 8,000 Vladikavkaz 660,000 Sakha 3,100,000 Yakutsk 1,077,000

Tatarstan 68,000 Kazan' 3,800,000 Tyva 170,500 Kyzyl 314,000 Udmurtia 42,100 Izhevsk 1,500,000 Autonomous oblast Birobidzhan (Yevreyskaya autonomnaya oblast') 36,000 Birobidzhan 218,000 Autonomous regions (ohruga) Aga Buryat 19,000 Aga 77,000 Chukchi 737,700 Anadyr 156,000 Evenk 767,600 Tura 25,000 Khanty-Mansi 523,100 Khanty-Mansiysk 1,301,000 Koryak 301,500 Palana 39,000 Nenets 176,700 Naryan-Mar 55,000 Permyak 32,900 Kudymkar 160,000 Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) 862,100 Dudinka 55,000 Ust'-Orda Buryat 22,400 Ust'-Ordynskiy 137,000 Yamalo-Nenets 750,300 Salekhard 495,000

1 In square kilometers.

2 1995 estimates for all republics except Karachayevo-Cherkessia (1990) and Buryatia, Karelia, Komi, and

Sakha ( 1994) ; 1990 estimates for autonomous oblast and all autonomous regions.

3 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth ofIndependent

States 1997, London, 1996, 666-76, 691-94.

603
Russia: A Country Study

Table 11. Indicators ofLiving Standards, 1991-94

Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994

Life expectancy, males (in years) 63.5 62.0 58.9 57.3

Life expectancy, females (in years) 74.3 73.8 71.9 71.1 Daily caloric intake 2,527 2,438 2,552 2,427 Percentage of consumer expenditure

38.4 47.1 46.3 46.8 Automobiles per 1,000 persons 63.5 68.5 75.7 84.4 Telephones per 1,000 persons 164.0 167.0 172.0 176.0 Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development, OECD Economic Surveys: The Russian Federation 1995, Paris, 1995,

123.

Table 12. Students in Primary and Secondary Schools, Selected Years, 1986-93

(in millions of students)

1986 1991 1992 1993

Grades 1 to 4 Urban 4.6 5.3 5.3 5.3 Rural 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 Total grades 1 to 4 6.6 7.6 7.7 7.8 Grades 5 to 9 Urban 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 Rural 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 Total grades 5 to 9 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.4 Grades 10 to 11 (or 12) Urban 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 Rural 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 Total grades 10 to 11 (or 12) 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 Schools for the mentally or physically handicapped 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 TOTAL 18.6 20.3 20.4 20.5 Source: Based on information from Novaya Rossiya '94: Informatsionno-statisticheskiy al'manakh, Moscow, 1994, 557.

604
Appendix

Table 13. Education Statistics for the Autonomous Republics, 1994

Republic Number of General

Schools

Number of General

School

Students

Vocational Schools Higher

Schools

Adygea 169 63,500 10 1 3,264 606,300 157 9

Buryatia 602 190,600 44 4 554 250,700 22 3 Chuvashia 715 210,100 35 3 Dagestan 1,589 395,000 29 5 Gorno-Altay 135 36,700 4 1 Kabardino-Balkaria 249 131,300 19 3 Kalmykia 250 56,300 12 1 Karachayevo-Cherkessia 186 71,600 8 2

a3 Khakassia 281 93,900 12 1 Komi 591 196,200 12 1 Man El 435 120,500 34 3 Mordovia 823 132,800 42 2 North Ossetia 210 105,900 17 4 Sakha 711 197,900 33 2

Tatarstan 2,422 525,100 118 15

Tyva. 163 61,200 11 1 Udmurda 882 252,700 45 5 Combined figures for Chechnya and Ingushetia. Source: Based on information from Russian Business Agency et al., Russia 1994-95:

Business, Social, Economic Analytic Profile, 2 and 3, Moscow, 1994.

605
Russia: A Country Study

Table 14. Incidence ofSelectedDiseases, 1990-94

(rate per 1,000 persons)

Disease 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Infectious diseases 34.9 33.4 34.9 38.6 44 9 Cancer 5.5 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.5 Endocrinological diseases 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.5 5.2

1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 Diseases of the nervous system. . .

.

45.8 47.6 50.6 54.3 56.5 Circulatory diseases 11.2 11.0 11.5 11.8 12.9 Respiratory diseases 336.2 351.9 289.7 309.2 283.2

Diseases of the digestive organs . . . 27.2 28.6 31.2 32.3 33.2

Diseases of the urinary tract 19.6 20.1 22.3 24.1 26.9 Skin diseases 35.0 35.0 35.7 39.9 45.6 Bone and muscle diseases 24.8 25.5 25.6 25.9 26.9 Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development, OECD Economic Surveys: The Russian Federation 1995, Paris, 1995,

129.

Table 15. Land Utilization, 1993 and 1994

(in millions of hectares)

1993 1994

Agricultural (enterprise and individual ownership) 656.6 667.7 Under municipal or village jurisdiction 38.0 38.6 Designated for industry, transportation, or other

nonagricultural purpose 17.8 17.6 Protected lands 26.7 27.3 Owned by timber companies 843.3 838.6 Water resources 19.0 19.4 Lands held in reserve 108.3 100.6 TOTAL 1,709.7 1,709.8 Source: Based on information from Russia, Committee on Land Resources and Utiliza- tion, Zemlya Rossii: Problemy, tsifry, kommentarii, 1995, Moscow, 1996, 5.

606
Appendix

Table 16. Revenue Sources ofSubnationalJurisdictions, 1992, 1993,

and 1994

(in millions of United States dollars) 1

1992 1993 1994

Transfers from national and other government

levels 1,419 4,686 7,345 Percentage of total transfers (86.0) (99.0) (98.0)

Profit taxes 4,150 12,110 10,560 Percentage of total profit taxes (58.5) (67.4) (64.9) Value-added taxes (VAT) 2,290 4,309 5,023 Percentage of total VAT . . . (24 9) (35 7) (35 0) Excise taxes 500 941 990

(52.5) (49.4) (40.0) Sales taxes 21

5 n.a/ n.a. Percentage of total sales taxes (100.0) (n.a.) (n.a.) Personal income taxes 1,943 4,700 5,799 Percentage of total personal income taxes .... (100.0) (100.0) (99.3) Property taxes 247 585 1,611

(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 36 97 58

Percentage of total foreign economic

(2.1) (4.5) (0.8) 496 639 681

Percentage of total natural resource use payments (100.0) (70.6) (84.3) 243 293 517

(76.1) (86.8) (93.3) Government duties n.a. 109 60

Percentage of total government duties (n.a.) (71.5) (61.7) Privatization revenues 196 271 n.a. Percentage of total privatization revenues .... (69.7) (79.2) (84.5) Other tax and nontax revenue 392 187 n.a.

(n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) TOTAL3 11,887 30,722 36,619

1 Exchange rate used in calculations: 1992, 222 rubles per US$1; 1993, 933 rubles per US$1; 1994, 3,000

rubles per US$1.

2 n.a.—not available.

3 Figures do not add to totals because of "n.a." figures. Source: Based on information from World Bank, Russian Federation: Toward MediumTerm Viability, Washington, 1996, 44.

607
Russia: A Country Study

Table 17. LaborFarce Employment Indicators, 1995 and 1996

(in percentage of workforce unless otherwise indicated)

Date Unemployment Underemployment Vacancies

Short-Time Onadministrative

leave

(in thousands)

1995January 7.3 2.8 1.6 311 February 7.4 2.9 1.5 316 March 7.5 3.1 1.7 329

April 7.7 2.8 1.4 368 May 7.7 2.6 1.6 405 June 7.7 2.7 1.3 445

July 7.8 2.5 1.3 454

August 7.8 2.5 1.3 460 September 7.9 2.6 1.3 446 October 8.1 2.5 1.3 404 November 8.1 2.7 1.1 352 December 8.2 n.a.2

n.a. 309

1996January 8.3 n.a. n.a. 294

February 8.4 n.a. n.a. 287 March 8.5 n.a. n.a. 286

1 As estimated by United Nations International Labour Organisation.

2 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Russia, 2d Quarter 1996, London, 1996, 27.

608
Appendix

Table 18. Production Trends in Selected Branches ofHeavy Industry,

1992-96

(January 1990=100)

Date ^ Ferrous Chemical and Buildin^and

Industry Metallurgy Petrochemical .,

U1

. m^

1a

.n

' °' Metalworking

1992January 81 July 70

1993January 70

July 62

1994January 51 July 50

1995January 50

July 50

1996January 46

April 45

73 80 81 65 69 75

66 67 79

58 58 66

47 40 37

52 41 37

54 49 37

55 48 34

53 44 31 54 43 32 Source: Based on information from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily

Report: Central Eurasia Economic Review, September 3, 1996, 50.

609
Russia: A Country Study

Table 19. Modes ofPublic Transportation, Selected Years, 1985-92

(in millions of passengers)

Mode 1985 1990 1991 1992

International Bus 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.5 Air 3.4 4.4 3.6 3.5 Boat n.a.

1 n.a. 0.1 0.2

Intercity Bus 702 705 790 520

Railroad 236 261 274 245

Air 69.9 86.4 82.4 59.1 Inland waterway 20.8 20.6 17.1 7.9 Suburban

Bus 5,498 5,052 5,153 4,531 Railroad 2,799 2,882 2,421 2,127 Inland waterway 30.5 26.5 36.8 21.2 Municipal Bus 19,818 22,869 21,359 19,739 Taxi 680 557 526 266

Trolley 5,314 6,020 8,005 8,619 Tramway 5,997 6,000 7,619 8,071 Subway. 3,319 3,659 3,229 3,567

1 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Novaya Rossiya '94: Informatsionno-statisticheskiy al'manakh, Moscow, 1994, 481.

610
Appendix

Table 20. Modes of Transportation ofSelected Products, Selected Years, 1985-92

(in millions of tons)

Product and Mode lyoo tyyu iyyi 1992

Coal

Railroad 371.6 387.4 341.0 321.4 Inland waterway 16.8 14.6 12.7 10.8 Truck 22.0 23.3 n.a.

1 n.a. Sea 9.8 16.2 11.7 10.4 Coke

Railroad 16.0 12.2 10.1 10.9 Truck 0.1 0.1 Petroleum products

Railroad 265.9 246.7 234.9 212.0 Inland waterway 38.8 33.0 31.0 20.5 Truck 27.4 28.3 n.a. n.a Sea 51.3 53.4 33.9 38.3 Iron and manganese ore

Railroad 110.3 113.0 96.4 89.8 Inland waterway 3.1 2.3 1.4 1.1 Truck 1.4 4.5 n.a. n.a. Sea 3.7 4.1 2.4 2.8 Ferrous metals

158.0 142.1 118.6 94.5 Inland waterway 3.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 Truck n.a. 30.8 n.a. n.a. Sea 3.0 2.2 3.1 Chemical and mineral fertilizers Railroad 79.6 76.4 69.1 51.7

4.4 5.0 4.2 3.6 Truck 5.5 3.7 n.a. n.a. Sea 4.3 2.8 1.3 1.3 Timber

Railroad 137.5 131.7 116.3 97.2

67.5 49.7 37.5 27.5 Truck 19.7 15.0 n.a. n.a. Sea 13.2 11.3 7.1 4.7 Grains

Railroad 79.3 81.5 69.9 63.2 Inland waterway 5.6 5.9 5.3 6.3 59.6 60.5 n.a. n.a.

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Novaya Rossiya '94: Informatsionno-statisticheskiy al'manakh, Moscow, 1994, 479.

611
Russia: A Country Study

Table 21. MajorImport Partners, 1992, 1993, and 1994

(in millions of United States dollars)

Country 1992 1993 1994 Germany 6,725 5,142 5,597 Ukraine n.a.

1 n.a. 4,473 Belarus n.a. n.a. 2,088 United States 2,885 2,304 2,053 Kazakstan n.a. n.a. 2,016 Finland 1,223 724 1,618 Netherlands 368 431 1,603

Italy 3,052 1,106 1,510 Japan 1,680 1,367 1,004 Poland 1,230 529 1,001

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Russia, 2d Quarter 1996, London, 1996, 35.

Table 22. MajorExport Partners, 1992, 1993, and 1994

(in millions of United States dollars)

Country 1992 1993 1994

Ukraine n.a. n.a. 6,602 Germany 5,873 5,074 5,296

Switzerland 865 1,726 3,748 United States 694 1,998 3,694

Britain 2,287 3,353 3,640

Belarus n.a. n.a. 3,112 China 2,737 3,068 2,833

Italy 2,951 2,629 2,729 Netherlands 2,277 979 2,389 Kazakstan n.a. n.a. 2,288 Japan 1,569 2,005 2,165 Finland 1,564 1,364 2,028

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Russia, 2d Quarter 1996, London, 1996, 35.

612
Appendix

Table 23. Trade with the United States by Selected Products, 1995 and

1996

(in thousands of United States dollars)

Product 1995 1996

Exports Unwrought aluminum 782,865 588,247

Precious metals and related items 425,348 533,856

Milled steel products 462,252 461,297 Base metals and chemicals 411,749 397,519 Uranium and plutonium 277,010 228,484

Fertilizers 208,080 169,609 Frozen fish 58,869 90,755 Petroleum products 52,129 81,686 Crude petroleum 68,055 79,698

Shellfish 73,015 77,166

Ferroalloys 132,250 74,168

Inorganic chemicals 70,282 62,897 Other 1,097,975 682,437

Total exports 4,019,879 3,527,819 Imports

Poultry 606,622 912,705

Cigarettes 69,874 360,792

Construction and mining equipment 191,755 174,395 Miscellaneous animals and meats 103,902 140,429

Vehicles and vehicle chassis 88,452 95,100 Commercial and pleasure vessels 9,326 93,323 Automatic data processing machines 113,947 92,847 Medical goods 59,488 65,392 Telephone and telegraph equipment 53,538 59,044

Scientific and industrial instruments 37,537 50,579

Cereals 63,289 46,211

Edible preparations 33,471 44,456 Other 1,322,536 1,125,329

Total imports 2,753,737 3,260,602 Source: Based on official statistics of the United States Department of Commerce.

613
Russia: A Country Study

Table 24. Presidential Election Second-Round Results by Autonomous

Republic, 1996

Republic

Boris

Yeltsin

Gcn.n.3.diy Zyuganov

Against Both

Candidates Absentee Voided

76,146 133,665 7,575 12,595 118,457 Bashkortostan . .

.

1,170,774 990,148 83,484 81,180 535,815

Buryatia 192,933 210,791 16,036 26,454 26,448 Chechnya 275,455 80,877 15,184 33,541 122,438 Chuvashia 205,959 405,129 21,614 27,5% 313,864 Dagestan 471,231 401,069 7,423 26,446 249,200 Gorno-Altay 40,026 48,057 3,527 5,805 35,166

Ingushetia 75,768 14,738 3,136 1,973 19,681 KabardinoBalkaria 259,313 135,287 7,952 16,739 95,083 Kalmykia 103,515 39,354 2,919 14,642 53,731 Karachayevo1 (\C\ 1Al iuy, /4/ lUl,3/y 0,400 12,MO la, /4y

Karelia 251,205 100,104 25,025 17,669 96,990

Khakassia 116,729 116,644 11,842 11,030 96,086 Komi 308,250 134,224 31,577 15,955 301,146 Mari El 154,301 199,872 19,628 26,479 171,064 Mordovia 238,441 249,451 16,328 29,106 167,499 North Ossetia . . . 133,748 164,308 7,317 11,630 98,451 Sakha 274,570 126,888 17,293 30,581 62,849

Tatarstan 1,253,121 658,782 74,178 73,109 569,118 Tyva 73,113 37,227 2,423 11,474 33,625 Udmurtia 392,551 302,649 40,302 29,756 279,947 RUSSIA 40,208,384 30,113,306 3,604,550 3,615,336 31,013,641 Source: Based on information from Rossiyskaya gazeta. [Moscow], July 16, 1996, trans- lated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia, July 31, 1996, 1-3.

614
Appendix

Table 25. Funding of Government Functions byJurisdiction, 1994

Function Federal

Republic, Oblast, or

Territory Rayon

Defense 100 percent, except

military housing

Internal security. ... 100 percent Foreign economic

relations 100 percent Education All expenses of

universities and

research institutes

Health2 Medical research

institutes

Public transportation —

Libraries Special libraries such as Lenin

Library Housing A portion of construction

Price subsidies A portion of food and medicine

Welfare payments .. A portion Environment National issues

All technical and

vocational schools

Tertiary, veterans', and specialized

hospitals

In terj urisdic tional highways, air, and

railroad facilities (former federal) Special services

A portion of construction

A portion

Regional functions such as forest preservation

Military housing

Wages and mainte- nance of primary and secondary

schools Secondary hospitals

Some facilities such

as subways

Most services

A portion of construction; mainte- nance

Fuels, mass trans- portation, basic foods, and medicines Program manage-

—no jurisdictional responsibility.

2 Towns and villages are responsible for paramedical personnel. Source: Based on information from World Bank, Russian Federation: Toward MediumTerm Viability, Washington, 1996, 40-41.

615
Russia: A Country Study

Table 26. Political Parties and Groups Receiving Highest Vote Count

in State Duma Elections, 1995

Full Name of Party or Group National Vote Count

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) 1 15,432,963 Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)2 7,737,431 Our Home Is Russia All-Russian Political Movement (NDR) 3 7,009,291 Yabloko Public Association 4,767,384 Women of Russia Political Movement 3,188,813 Communist Workers of Russia for the Soviet Union 3,137,406 Congress of Russian Communities Public Political Movement

(KRO) 4 2,980,137

Party of Workers' Self-Government 2,756,954

Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats (DVR-OD) 5 2,674,084 Agrarian Party of Russia 2,613,127 Derzhava (State Power) Social-Patriotic Movement 1,781,233 Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement 1,343,428 Power to the People! 1,112,873 Republican Party of the Russian Federation (RPRF-PamnlovaGurov-Vladimir Lysenko) 6 1,106,812 Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia-Union of Labor 1,076,072 Votes against all federal tickets 1,918,151

1 KPRF—Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiyskoy Federatisii.

2 LDPR—Liberal'no-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii.

3 NDR—Nash dom Rossiya.

4 KRO—Kongress russkikh obshchin.

5 DVR-OD—Demokraticheskiy vybor Rossii-Ob"yedinennoye dvizhcniye.

6 RPRF—Respublikanskaya partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Source: Based on information from Rossiyskaya gazeta. [Moscow] , January 24, 1996,

translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia: Russia, Results ofDecember 1995 State Duma Elections, April 24, 1996, 20-21.

616
Appendix

Table 27. Major Periodicals, 1995-96

Newspaper Type

Date

Established

Circulation

Argumenty ifahty Weekly, independent 1992 3,200,000

T*tailv LJa.lL V, inflpnpnHpnt 111UCUCUUC11L 5in/*^ Jllfl^C 1QQ1 L u U 1 1917 604 765

Kormnersant Daily Daily, focuses on business, youth 1990 104,400

Komsomol'skaya pravda. . . Daily, lacks former strong ideol- "5/ O0V

1925 1,547,000

Daily, conservative, mainly mili- tary

1fi7 ttft

Literatumaya gazeta Weekly, liberal, cultural coverage 1929 280,000

Megapolis ekspres Weekly, international, neoconservative 1990 400,000

Moshovskiye novosti Weekly, independent, antiestab- lishment 1930 167,367

Moskovskaya pravda .... Daily 1918 377,000

Nezavisimaya gazeta Daily, independent, owned by banker Boris Berezovskiy 1990 50,400

Weekly, independent, owned by 1899 100,000 banker Boris Berezovskiy Pravda Independent, pro-communist 1912 210,000

Rossiyskaya gazeta Daily, source of official documents, very pro-government1990 500,000

Weekly, highest-quality govern- ment voice 1991 131,000

Daily, political and business emphasis

1993 100,000

Sovetskaya Rossiya Daily, communist and nationalist views 1956 250,000

Trud Daily, trade union paper 1921 800,000 Source: Based on information from Richard F. Staar, The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image, Annapolis, 1996, 229-32; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Russia, Pre-Election Survey ofMajor Russian Media, December 5, 1995, 9-19.

617
Russia: A Country Study

Table 28. Main Directorates of the Armed Forces General Staff] 1994

Directorate Function

Armaments Liaison with military industrial complex Armor Staff supervision of maintenance and modernization of combat vehicles Ardllery Staff supervision of maintenance and modernizadon of weapons

Billeting and Maintenance Maintenance and operation of military real estate Cadres Management of careers of professional military officers and warrant officers Construction Supervision of funding and resources for new military construction Construction Industry of Ministry of Defense Supervision of classified construction projects Education Education and training of cadres and specialists Foreign Relations Direction of foreign assistance programs and military attaches

Intelligence Successor to Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) ; collection of strategic, technical, and tacti- cal information for armed forces1 Military Counterintelligence Oversight of military security matters Motor Vehicles Supervision of maintenance and modernization of wheeled vehicles Organization-Mobilization Development and dissemination of mobilization plans

for national emergencies

Personnel Work Successor to Soviet political office, for management of

enlisted personnel Trade Management of foreign military sales GRU—Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye. Source: Based on information from Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS Report: Central Eurasia Military Affairs: Directory ofMilitary Organizations and Personnel, Washington, 1994, 32-53.

618
Appendix

Table 29. Strategic NuclearForces, 1995

Type Number in InventoryDescription

Submarines Typhoon

Delta-IV Delta-m

Delta-n

Delta-I

Total

Intercontinental ballistic missiles SS-17 Spanker (RS-16) SS-18 Satan (RS-20)

SS-19 Stiletto (RS-18) SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22)

SS-25 Sickle (RS-12M)

250

92

354

20 Sturgeon SS-N-20 missiles 16 Skiff SS-N-23 missiles each

16 Stingray SS-N-18 missiles each

16 Sawfly SS-N-8 missiles each

12 Sawfly SS-N-8 missiles each 684 missiles

All MIRV, all in Russia1 10 MIRV, 174 in Russia, remainder

without warheads in Kazakstan

6 MIRV, 160 in Russia, 90 in Ukraine

10 MIRV, 46 in Russia, 46 in Ukraine;

in Russia, 10 in silos, 36 on rails Mobile, single-warhead, at 10 bases; 336 in Russia, 18 in Belarus

1 MIRV—multiple-warhead independently targeted reentry vehicle. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1995-1996, London, 1995, 113-14.

619

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665

Glossary

Academy of Sciences (Akademiya nauk) —Russia's most prestigious scholarly institute, established in 1725 by Peter the

Great. The Academy of Sciences has historically carried

out long-range research and developed new technology.

The Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union conducted

basic research in the physical, natural, mathematical, and

social sciences. In 1991 Russia established its own academy

for the first time in the Soviet era. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) —A 1972 agreement

limiting deployment of United States and Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. A protocol signed in 1974 limited each party to a single ABM system deployment area. In 1996 the United States and Russia negotiated to modify

the terms of the treaty in order to permit testing of technology against non-intercontinental delivery systems.

balance of payments—A record of receipts from and payments

to the rest of the world by a country's government and its residents. The balance of payments includes the international financial transactions of a country for commodities,

services, capital transactions, and gold movements.

balance of trade—A record of a country's trade in goods with

the rest of the world. The balance of trade differs from the

balance of payments (q.v.) because the latter includes

transactions for services and the former does not. When

the exports of merchandise exceed imports, a country is said to have a balance of trade surplus or to have a favorable balance of trade. When the imports of merchandise

exceed exports, a country is said to have a balance of trade

deficit or to have an unfavorable balance of trade.

Bank for International Standards (BIS) —Established in 1930

to assist national central banks in managing and investing

monetary reserves and to promote international cooperation among those banks.

Bolshevik—Originally referring to a member of the majority

(bol'shinstvo), a name adopted by the radical members of

the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903. In

March 1918, the Bolsheviks formed the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) . That Party was the precursor of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU

q.v.).

667
Russia: A Country Study

boyar—Between the tenth and seventeenth centuries, a member of the upper level of the nobility and state administration in Kievan Rus1 and Muscovy. Abolished as a class by

Peter the Great.

Brezhnev Doctrine—The Soviet Union's declared right to intervene in the internal affairs of another socialist state if the leading role of that state's communist party was threatened. Formulated as justification for the Soviet Union's

invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Mikhail S. Gorbachev implicitly abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine in

1989.

chernozem—Literally, black earth. A type of rich, black soil

indigenous to large parts of Ukraine and southwestern

Russia.

collective farm (kollektivnoye khozyaystvo—kolkhoz) —In the

Soviet agricultural system, an agricultural "cooperative"

where peasants, under the direction of party-approved

plans and leaders, were paid wages based in part on the

success of their harvest. Still in existence in the 1990s.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) —Created on

December 21, 1991, when eleven heads of state signed the

Alma-Ata Declaration, expanding membership of the all- Slavic CIS established at Minsk two weeks earlier by

Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. The eight other members

were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The CIS

aims to coordinate intracommonwealth relations and over- see common interests of its members in economics, foreign policy, and defense matters. In October 1993,

Georgia became the twelfth member of the CIS. Efforts to strengthen CIS authority and interaction generally have

not been successful.

communism/communist—A doctrine based on revolutionary

Marxist socialism (q.v.) and Marxism-Leninism (q.v.). As

the official ideology of the Soviet Union, it provided for a system of authoritarian government in which the CPSU

(q.v.) alone controlled state-owned means of production.

Communism nominally sought to establish a society in

which the state would wither away and goods and services

would be distributed equitably.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—The official

name of the communist party in the Soviet Union after

1952. Originally the Bolshevik (q.v.) faction of the Russian

668
Glossary

Social Democratic Labor Party, the party was named the

Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) from March 1918 to December 1925, then the All-Union Communist Party

(Bolshevik) from December 1925 to October 1952. After

the August 1991 Moscow coup, Russian president Boris N.

Yeltsin banned the party in Russia and ordered its property

turned over to the government.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Congress of People's Deputies—Established in 1988 by constitutional amendment, the highest organ of legislative and

executive authority in the Soviet Union. As such, it elected

the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Union's standing legislative

body. The Congress of People's Deputies elected in

March-April 1989 consisted of 2,250 deputies. The congress ceased to exist with the demise of the Soviet Union.

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) —An

agreement signed in November 1990 by the members of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATOq.v.) and

the Warsaw Pact (q.v.) states. The CFE Treaty sets ceilings

from the Atlantic to the Urals on armaments essential for

conducting a surprise attack and initiating large-scale

offensive operations. The treaty includes a strict system of

inspection and information exchange. The CFE Treaty

entered into force in November 1992.

Cossacks—Originally an amalgamation of runaway peasants,

fugitive slaves, escaped convicts, and derelict soldiers, primarily Ukrainian and Russian, settling frontier areas along

the Don, Dnepr, and Volga rivers. They supported themselves by brigandry, hunting, fishing, and cattle raising.

Later the Cossacks organized military formations for their

own defense and as mercenaries. The latter groups were renowned as horsemen and were absorbed as special units

in the Russian army.

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon; also

CEMA or CMEA)—A multilateral economic alliance cre- ated in January 1949, ostensibly to promote economic

development of member states and to provide a counterweight to the United States-sponsored Marshall Plan.

Shortly before its demise in January 1991, organization

members included Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the

German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary,

Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and

669
Russia: A Country Study

Vietnam.

Council of Europe—Founded in 1949, an organization over- seeing intergovernmental cooperation in designated areas such as environmental planning, finance, sports, crime,

migration, and legal matters. In 1995 the council had

thirty-five members. Russia achieved membership in January 1996.

Cyrillic—An alphabet based on Greek characters that was cre- ated in the ninth century for translating Eastern Orthodox

religious texts into Old Church Slavonic (q.v.). Named for

Cyril, the leader of the first religious mission from Byzantium to the Slavic people, the alphabet is used in Russia,

Belarus, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. The Central

Asian republics, Moldova, and Azerbaijan used a modified

Cyrillic alphabet in the Soviet period.

demokratizatsiya (democratization) —Campaign initiated in the

late 1980s by Mikhail S. Gorbachev to expand the participation of a variety of interest groups in political processes.

duma (pi., dumy) —An advisory council to the princes of Kievan

Rus' and the tsars of the Russian Empire.

Duma (In full, Gosudarstvennaya duma—State Assembly)

Lower chamber of the legislature of Russia, established by

Nicholas II after the Revolution of 1905, and functioning

until 1917. Unlike advisory bodies such as the boyar (q.v.)

dumy of the Kievan Rus' period and city dumy of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Duma originally was to be a national representative body with the power to approve legislation. The first two Dumy (1905-07) were

quickly dissolved because they opposed tsarist policies; the

next two (1907-17) were more conservative and served

full five-year terms.

East Slavs—A subdivision of Slavic peoples including Russians,

Ukrainians, and Belarusians.

European Union (EU) —Successor organization to the European Community. Began official operation in November

1993 to promote the economic unification of Europe,

leading to a single monetary system and closer cooperation in matters ofjustice and foreign and security policies.

In 1995 members were Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.

five-year plan—A comprehensive plan that set the middle670
Glossary

range economic goals in the Soviet Union. Once the

Soviet regime stipulated plan figures, all levels of the econ- omy, from individual enterprises to the national level, were

obligated to meet those goals. Such plans were followed

from 1928 until 1991.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—An integrated set of bilateral trade agreements among more than

100 contracting nations. Originally drawn up in 1947 to abolish quotas and reduce tariffs among members. The

Soviet Union eschewed joining GATT until 1987, when it applied for membership. It achieved observer status in

1990. In January 1995, GATT became the World Trade

Organization (WTO

-q.u).

general secretary—The title of the head of the Communist

party Secretariat, who presided over the Politburo and was

the Soviet Union's de facto supreme leader. From 1953

until 1966, the title was changed to first secretary.

glasnost—Russian term for public discussion of issues and accessibility of information to the public. Devised by Soviet

leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev to provoke public discussion,

challenge government and party bureaucrats, and mobilize support for his policies through the media.

Golden Horde—A federative Mongol state that extended from

western Siberia to the Carpathian Mountains from the

mid-thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century.

Generally, it exacted tribute and controlled external rela- tions but allowed local authorities to decide internal

affairs. Great Terror—A period from about 1936 to 1938 of intense

repression in the Soviet Union when millions were imprisoned, deported, and executed by Stalin's secret police for

spurious political or economic crimes. The Great Terror

affected all of Soviet society, including the highest levels of

the party, government, and military.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A measure of the total value of

goods and services produced by the domestic economy

during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in

the form of profits, compensation to employees, and

depreciation (consumption of capital). Only domestic

production is included, not income arising from investments and possessions owned abroad.

gross national product (GNP)—The total market value of final

671
Russia: A Country Study

goods and services produced by an economy during a year. Obtained by adding the gross domestic product (GDP

q.v.) and the income received from abroad by residents

and subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real GNP is the value of GNP when inflation has

been taken into account.

Group of Seven (G-7) —Formed in September 1985 to facili- tate cooperation among the seven major noncommunist

economic powers: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, and the United States. Russia took part in numerous G-7 meetings, and when Japan ended its opposition,

Russia achieved full membership in the renamed G-8 in

1997.

hard currency—Currency freely convertible and traded on

international currency markets.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) —

A

bilateral treaty signed in Washington in December 1987,

eliminating United States and Soviet land-based missiles

with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Most of the

Soviet missiles were deployed inside the Soviet Union; all of the United States missiles were in Belgium, Italy, the

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Britain.

internal passport (propiska) —Government-issued document

presented to officials on demand, identifying citizens and

their authorized residence. Used in both the Russian

Empire (q.v.) and the Soviet Union to restrict the move- ment of people. More limited use continued in some parts

of Russia in the 1990s.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) —Established along with

the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF has regulatory sur- veillance and financial functions that apply to its more

than 150 member countries. The IMF is responsible for

stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. Its main function is to provide loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they

experience balance of payments (q.v.) difficulties. These

loans frequently have conditions that require substantial

internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of

which are developing countries.

KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti) —Committee for

State Security. The predominant Soviet agency for espionage and internal security since 1954. After the dissolution

672
Glossary

of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the central agency in

Moscow. Governments of other former Soviet republics

took over KGB property on their territory.

kolkhoz—See collective farm.

kray (territory) —Term for six widely dispersed administrative

subdivisions whose boundaries are laid out primarily for ease of administration. Two include subdivisions based on

nationality groups—one autonomous oblast (q.v.) and two

autonomous regions (okruga—q.v.).

kremlin (kreml1 ) —Central citadel in many medieval Russian

towns, usually located at a strategic spot along a river. Moscow's Kremlin is the seat and symbol of the Russian government.

Lisbon Protocol—Agreement that implemented the first phase

of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START

q.v.)

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The protocol is an amendment to the START agreement by which Russia,

Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan undertook the Soviet

Union's obligations under START I. Marshall Plan—A plan announced in June 1947 by United

States secretary of state George Marshall for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. The plan was

extended to all European countries, but the Soviet Union

refused the offer and forbade the East European countries

to accept aid under the Marshall Plan. As a counterweight,

the Soviet Union created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon

q.v.).

Marxism/Marxist—The economic, political, and social theories of Karl Marx, a nineteenth-century German philosopher and socialist, especially his concept of socialism

(q.v.).

Marxism-Leninism/Marxist-Leninist—The ideology of com- munism (q.v.) developed by Karl Marx and refined and

adapted to social and economic conditions in Russia by

Vladimir I. Lenin. Marxism-Leninism was the guiding ideology for the Soviet Union and its satellites. Menshevik—A member of a wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party that existed until 1917. Unlike the Bolsheviks (q.v.), the Mensheviks believed in the gradual

achievement of socialism (q.v.) by parliamentary methods.

The term Menshevik is derived from the word men'shinstvo

(minority). near abroad (blizhneye zarubezh'ye) —Collective Russian term for

673
Russia: A Country Study

the other fourteen newly independent states of the former

Soviet Union. Frequently used in policy discussions about

Russia's continued domination of certain of those states, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

New Economic Policy (Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika

NEP) —Instituted in 1921, it let peasants sell produce on

an open market and permitted private ownership of small

enterprises. Cultural restrictions also were relaxed during

this period. NEP declined with the introduction of collectivization and was officially ended by Joseph V. Stalin in

December 1929.

nomenklatura—The communist party's system of appointing

reliable party members to key government positions and

other important organizations. Also refers to the individuals as a social group.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) —Founded in

1949, NATO served as the primary collective defense alli- ance in the containment of Soviet expansionism. Its military and administrative structure remain intact. The

question of expanding NATO to include former Warsaw

Pact (q.v.) members and successor states to the Soviet

Union became a key issue in Russian foreign policy in the

mid-1990s. In 1994 the alliance introduced a program for

the former Soviet republics and the former Warsaw Pact

countries called Partnership for Peace (q.v.).

Nuclear Nonpoliferation Treaty (NPT; full title Treaty on the

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons)—Went into effect

in 1970 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy over a period of

twenty-five years. In May 1995, it was extended indefinitely.

Only thirteen countries have not joined the NPT.

oblast—A major territorial and administrative subdivision in

the newly independent states. Russia has forty-nine such

divisions, which approximate provinces.

okrug (pi., okruga) —An autonomous territorial and administrative subdivision of a territory (kray—q.v.) or oblast (q.v.) in

the Russian Federation that grants a degree of administrative autonomy to a nationality; most are in remote, sparsely

populated areas. In 1997 the Russian Federation had ten

such jurisdictions.

Old Believers—A sect of the Russian Orthodox Church that

rejected the liturgical reforms made by Patriarch Nikon in

the mid-seventeenth century.

674
Glossary

Old Church Slavonic (also known as Old Church Slavic) —The

first Slavic literary language, which influenced the development of the modern Slavic languages, including literary

Russian. Used in liturgies of the Slavic Orthodox churches.

After the twelfth century, known as Church Slavonic.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD)—Founded by Western nations in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. It also coordinated economic aid to less developed countries. In late

1996, twenty-eight nations were members, and Russia had

been invited to join at an unspecified date.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE)—Established as the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in July 1972 by Canada,

the United States, and all of the European states except

Albania. In August 1975, these states signed the Helsinki

Accords, confirming existing, post-World War II boundaries and obligating signatories to respect basic principles

of human rights. Subsequently the CSCE held sessions and

consultations on European security issues. The Charter of

Paris (1990) established the CSCE as a permanent organization. In 1992 new CSCE roles in conflict prevention and

management were defined, potentially making the CSCE

the center of a Europe-based collective security system—

a

role advocated by Russia in the mid-1990s. The CSCE

became the OSCE in January 1995. As of 1996, fifty-three

nations were members.

Partnership for Peace (PfP) —An initiative by NATO (q.v.) for

the former Warsaw Pact (q.v.) member countries and the

former Soviet republics, including Russia, to expand political and military cooperation and promote democratic

principles in those countries. PfP aims to facilitate trans- parency in defense planning and budgeting, ensure democratic control of defense forces, maintain readiness to contribute to United Nations and OSCE (q.v.) operations,

and develop cooperative military relations with NATO for

peacekeeping, search-and-rescue, and humanitarian operations. All former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states were members by 1996, and many had conducted joint military

exercises with NATO forces.

patriarch—Head of an independent Orthodox Church, such

as the Russian Orthodox Church or one of the Uniate

(q.v.) churches.

675
Russia: A Country Study

perestroika—Literally, rebuilding. Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign to revitalize the communist party, the Soviet econ- omy, and Soviet society by reforming economic, political,

and social mechanisms.

permafrost—Permanently frozen condition of soil except for

surface soils that thaw when air temperatures rise above

freezing. Thawing and refreezing cause instability of the

soil, which greatly complicates the construction and maintenance of roads, railroads, and buildings. Permafrost cov- ers roughly the northern one-third of the Russian

Federation.

rayon—A low-level territorial and administrative subdivision for

rural and municipal administration. A rural rayon is a

county-sized district in a territory (kray—q.v.), oblast (q.v.),

republic (q.v.), region (okrug—q.v.), or autonomous

oblast. A city rayon is similar to a borough in some large cit- ies in the United States. republic—A territorial and administrative subdivision of the

Russian Federation created to grant a degree of administrative autonomy to some large minority groups. In 1996

the Russian Federation had twenty-one republics (before

1992 called autonomous republics), including the wartorn Republic of Chechnya.

ruble—The monetary unit of the Soviet Union and the Russian

Federation; divided into 100 kopeks. The exchange rate as ofJuly 1997 was 5,790 rubles per US$1. Historically, the

ruble has not been considered hard currency (q.v.). It became convertible on the international market in June

1996.

ruble zone—Name given the group of newly independent

states that continued to use the Soviet, then Russian, ruble

as the primary currency for financial transactions after the

collapse of the Soviet Union. The ruble zone existed from

December 1991 until July 1993, when the Russian Central

Bank withdrew all ruble notes issued before January 1993.

Russian Empire—Successor state to Muscovy. Formally proclaimed by Tsar Peter the Great in 1721 and significantly

expanded during the reign of Catherine II, becoming a major multinational state. The empire's political structure

collapsed with the revolution of February 1917, but most

of its territory was included in the Soviet Union, which was

established in 1922.

* Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Rossiyskaya

676
Glossary

Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika

RSFSR) . Official name of the largest of the fifteen union

republics of the Soviet Union. Inhabited predominantly by

Russians, the RSFSR comprised approximately 75 percent

of the area of the Soviet Union, about 62 percent of its population, and more than 60 percent of its economic output.

serf—Peasant legally bound to the land. Serfs were emancipated by Tsar Alexander II in 1861.

Slavophiles—Members of the Russian intelligentsia in the midnineteenth century who advocated the preservation of

Slavic, and specifically Russian, culture rather than opening Russian society and institutions to the influences of

West European culture. Philosophically opposed to Westernizers (q.v.).

socialism/socialist—According to Marxism-Leninism (q.v.), the

first phase of communism (q.v.). A transition from capitalism in which the means of production are state owned and

whose guiding principle is "from each according to his

abilities, to each according to his work." Soviet socialism

bore scant resemblance to the democratic socialism that

some West European countries adopted in the twentieth

century.

sovkhoz—See state farm.

state farm (sovetskoye khozyaystvo—sovkhoz) —A governmentowned and government-managed agricultural enterprise

where workers are paid salaries. Still in existence in 1997.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) —Name of two treaties. START I, signed in July 1991 by the Soviet Union and

the United States, significantly reduced limits for the two

parties' intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and

their associated launchers and warheads; submarinelaunched ballistic missile launchers and warheads; and

heavy bombers and their armaments, including long-range

nuclear air-launched cruise missiles. START II, signed in

January 1993 by Russia and the United States but still unratified by Russia in mid-1997, further reduced strategic

offensive arms of both sides by eliminating all ICBMs with

multiple-warhead independently targeted reentry vehicles

(MIRVs) and reducing the overall total of warheads for

each side to between 3,000 and 3,500. In 1997 an important part of Russia's debate over future military and foreign policy.

677
Russia: A Country Study

taiga—The extensive, sub-Arctic evergreen forest of the Soviet

Union. The taiga, the largest of the five primary natural

zones, lies south of the tundra (q.v.).

territory

See kray.

tundra—The treeless plain within the Arctic Circle that has

low-growing vegetation and permanently frozen subsoil

(permafrost

q.v.). The northernmost of the five primary

natural zones of the Soviet Union.

Uniate—A branch of the Roman Catholic Church that preserves the Eastern Rite (Orthodox) liturgy and discipline

but recognizes papal authority.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—Successor state to the Russian Empire. Officially founded by Vladimir I. Lenin, head of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik),

in 1922. Dissolved on December 25, 1991.

value-added tax (VAT)-—A tax applied to the additional value

created at a given stage of production and calculated as a percentage of the difference between the product value at that stage and the cost of all materials and services purchased or introduced as inputs.

Warsaw Pact—Political-military alliance founded by the Soviet

Union in 1955 as a counterweight to NATO (q.v.). Members included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland,

Romania, and the Soviet Union. Served as the Soviet

Union's primary mechanism for keeping political and military control over Eastern Europe. Disbanded in March

1991.

Westernizers—Russian intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth cen- tury who emphasized Russia's cultural ties with the West as a vital element in the country's modernization and development. Opposed by the Slavophiles (q.v.).

White armies—Various noncommunist military forces that

attempted to overthrow the Bolshevik (q.v.) regime during

the Civil War (1918-21). Operating with no unified com- mand, no clear political goal, and no supplies from the

Russian heartland, they were defeated piecemeal by the

Red Army.

World Bank—Name used to designate a group of four affiliated

international institutions that provide advice on long-term

finance and policy issues to developing countries: the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(IBRD), the International Development Association

678
Glossary

(IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and

the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of

providing loans to developing countries for productive

projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish

credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier

terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in

the less developed countries. The president and certain

senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the

IFC. The MIGA, which began operating in June 1988,

insures private foreign investment in developing countries

against such noncommercial risks as expropriation, civil

strife, and inconvertibility. The four institutions are owned

by the governments of the countries that subscribe their

capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member

states must first belong to the International Monetary

Fund (IMF

q.v.).

World Trade Organization (WTO) —The legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system and

successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT

q.v.) as ofJanuary 1, 1995. The WTO acts as a forum for multinational trade negotiations, administers

dispute settlements, reviews the trade policies of member

nations, and works with organizations such as the International Monetary Fund {q.v.) and the World Bank (q.v.) in

developing coherent global economic policies. The WTO

also covers new commercial activities beyond the jurisdiction of GATT, such as intellectual property rights, services,

and investment. Russia sought membership in 1996, but it had not been accepted as of mid-1997.

Yalta Conference—Meeting of Josph V. Stalin, Winston

Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt in February 1945

that redrew post-World War II national borders and established spheres of influence in Europe.

679

Index

Abkhazian rebels, xciv-xcv; Russian mili- tary support for, xciv-xcv, 448, 451 ABM Treaty. See Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty abortion, 158-59; abolished, 74, 159;

legalized, 70, 159, 270; rate, 159, 270-

71; under Stalin, 70, 74 Academy of Fine Arts, 24, 233 Academy of Sciences: brain drain from, 156-57; foundation of Russian, 387; founded, 22-23 Academy of the National Economy: 266

acmeists, 225-26

acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 257, 273-74; attitudes toward, 273-74; death from, 274; infection

rate, lxiii-lxiv, ciii, 274; information

about, 274; laws against transmittal, 273; prevention, 273-74; transmittal, 274

Administrative Affairs Directorate, 395, 396

Adygea, Republic of, 175, 176; area, 176; ethnic groups, 176; language, 176,

177; population, 176; religion, 176 Adygh language, 177 Adygh people, 172, 176

Aeroflot, 360 Afanas'yev, Yuriy: in Interregional

Group, 110

Afghanistan: border, 570; invasion of, lvi, 57, 94, 95, 101, 454, 494, 546; refugees

from, 162; withdrawal of troops from,

lvi, 103, 163, 477

Africa: relations with, 478 Aga Buryat Autonomous Region, 175 Agrarian Party: in 1993 elections, 416; in 1995 elections, 419

agricultural development: under Brezhnev, 96; investment in, 96

agricultural estates, 34

agricultural policy, 325-30; under Soviet

system, 326-27; under Yeltsin, 327-30

agricultural production, lxvii, 330; under

First Five-Year Plan, 301; under Gorbachev, 327; of grain, 41-42; under

Yeltsin, lxxiv, 327-28

agricultural products {see also under indi- vidual crops), 325; corn, 325; exports,

42; flax, 325; fruits, 325; grain, 65, 325;

prices, 329; requisitions, 65; vegetables, 325

agricultural reforms, 56, 90-91, 325-26; under Gorbachev, 327; impediments

to, 329; under Yeltsin, 328-30

agriculture {see also peasants) , 183, 323-

30; under Chernenko, 100; collectivized, 56, 70, 71-72, 124, 159, 300, 301, 325; denationalized, 66; employment

in, 323, 347; energy consumption by, 338; under five-year plans, 55; under

Khrushchev, 56, 90-91; inefficiencies

in, 4, 34; in Mordovia, 186; neglected,

82; under New Economic Program,

66; pollution from, Ixi, 140; in Russian Empire, 4; in Sakha, 190; under Soviet system, 325; under Stalin, 55-56, 70, 82, 326; in Tatarstan, 187; taxes on, 347; under war communism, 300; under Yeltsin, 318

Agro-Industrial Bank (Agroprombank),

340, 343 Agroprombank. See Agro-Industrial Bank

Agul people, 179 AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

Aigun, Treaty of (1858), 38 airborne troops, 539-41; mission, 540-

41; reorganization, 539-40

air defense forces, 537-38; conscripts,

537; districts, 538; materiel, 538, 544; mission, 537, 538; personnel, 537;

readiness, 544-45; training, 544

air forces, 535-37; aircraft, 519; bases, 537; commands, 535, 536-37; materiel, 537, 543; personnel, 535; organization, 535-37; readiness, 543;

shortages, 548; training, 536, 548

airline industry, 360-63; aircraft of, 363

air pollution: lxi, 123, 137, 138-39, 146,

681
Russia: A Country Study

267

airports, 360

Akayev, Askar, 509 Akhmatova, Anna, 226

Aksyonov, Vladimir, 227

Alania. See North Ossetia

Alaska, 30; acquired, 28; sold, 38

Albania: Soviet influence in, 83, 89

alcohol, lxiii, 271-73; availability, 97,

244; campaigns against, 271, 303, 306; consumption, ciii, 271-72; substitutes, 271,272

alcoholism, 97, 267, 271; death from,

lxiv, 160-61

Aleksey (son of Peter I), 23

Aleksey I (Romanov) (r. 1645-76), 17, 20

Aleksiy II, Patriarch, lxv, 209 Alexander I (r. 1801-25), 29; death of, 30 Alexander II (r. 1855-81): assassination

of, 37, 41; attempt to assassinate, 36; reforms under, 34-37, 217 Alexander III (r. 1881-94), 37; attempt

to assassinate, 41; counterreform

under, 37 Alexandra, Tsarina: executed, 64; in World War I, 50

Algeria: arms sales to, 479-80, 521

Aliyev, Heydar, 452, 506

Alliance of Orthodox Brotherhoods, 209

Allied Powers: support for White Army,

63

All-Russian Congress for the Protection of Nature, 150

All-Russian Television and Radio Company, 425

Ail-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)

(see also Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Russian Communist Party

[Bolshevik]), 68, 11 5; Jewish sections

of, 218; name changed, 85; power of, 74

All-Union League of Seventh-Day Adventists, 213

Altaic peoples, 172, 189; distribution, 172

Altay. See Gorno-Altay

Altay Mountains, 130, 131 Ames, Aldrich, 456 Amur River, 133

Analytical Center for Social and Eco- nomic Policies, 573

Andreyev, Leonid, 226 Andropov, Yuriy V., 57, 98, 99-100; anti- corruption campaign of, 99; chairman of Presidium, 99; death of, 100; domestic policy of, 99; leadership

changes by, 99; as mentor of Gorbachev, 100; as rival of Chernenko, 99 Andrusovo, Treaty of (1667) , 19 Angara River: hydroelectric plant on, 338

Angola: refugees from, 162; Soviet influ- ence in, 94, 494 Anna (r. 1730-40), 23 Anna Karenina (Tolstoy) , 225

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, xci, 95, 454;

as foreign-policy problem, 438

Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), 76

anti-Semitism, 216, 219; under Brezhnev, 93 APEC. See Asia-Pacific Economic Confer- ence

April Days, 59

April Theses (Lenin) , 60

Arab-Israeli dispute: Soviet role in, xcvi,

xcviii, 94, 479, 480

Arabic language, 179; broadcasts in, 425

Aral Sea: desiccation of, 123, 137, 144

Arbatov, Aleksey, 548

architecture, 232-34; Christian, 232;

constructivist, 234; under Peter the Great, 232; Russian Revival, 233;

socialist realist, 234

Arctic drainage basin, 132

Arctic Ocean: pollution of, Ixi, 142, 147; ports on, 363

Argentina: foreign policy toward, 481;

trade with, 482

Argumeniy ifakty, 423

aristocracy: evolution of, 1 2-1

3

armed forces: attitudes toward, lv-lvi, 423; bases, 451, 505; budget, lvii, 489; buildup, 57; casualties, 492, 493, 494, 502, 546; chain of command, 525; commander in chief, 396, 525; com- mand structure, 525-27; contract per- sonnel, 550; corruption, lvi, lviii-lix; crime, 545-47; decline, 489-90; deser- tions from, 549; established, 490; for- eign policy role, 490; hazing, 546, 550;

historical background, 490-94; housing, 282-83; human rights violations, 255; language, 221; materiel, 518-20,

682
Index

541; modernization, 492, 494;

morale, lvi; in near abroad, lvi, 447-

48, 451, 456, 490; personnel, lvii, 524; occupation of White House, 390-91; performance, 541-42; prospects, 551-

52; purges, 73, 493; recruitment, 490; reductions, lvii, cii, 437, 548; reforms,

lvii, lxxxiii, cii, 34, 36, 524, 541, 548-

50; religion in, 209; restructuring, lviii, cii, 492-93, 500, 548-49; service requirements, 18; structure, 524;

training, 504, 541 , 547-48; troop sup- port elements, 542-45; withdrawal of, 501-2; women in, 524, 550 Armenia, 505-6; aid to, 506; arms sales

to, ci; in Commonwealth of Indepen- dent States, 118, 449; peacekeeping

forces in, c-ci, 505, 529 Armenia, Republic of: autonomy for, 108; conflict with Azerbaijan, 433; military assistance for, xcv; popular fronts

in, 113; refugees from, 162; sovereignty, 114; in Soviet Union, 63, 66, 385 Armenian Apostolic Church, 212; in Russian Empire, 28 Armenians: emigration by, 161; geographic distribution of, 176; immigration by, 164; nationality clashes of, 113; as percentage of population, 173, 176, 182; pogrom against, 113; political parties of, 42 army (ground forces), 527-31; com- mander in chief, 527; conscription,

22, 255, 527; deployment, 237; districts, 527-31; divisions, 529; materiel, 518-20; mutinies, 45; officers, 22; per- sonnel, 527, 545; peacekeeping units, 529; under Peter the Great, 22; purges, 493; readiness, 545; restructuring, 22; shortages, 545, 550; special

units, 529; training, 548

Article 70 (of 1978 Constitution), 584

arts, xcvi; ancient, 232; under Brezhnev, 97-98; collectivization of, 74; cultural thaw in, 87; erotic, 256; impressionist, 233; influences on, 232; realist, 233,

234; under Stalin, 70, 74 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast

Asian Nations

Ash-shafii Islamic Institute, 216

Asia: exports to, 474; foreign policy in,

469, 473-77, 483; Russian influence

in, 474; Soviet military presence in, 473

Asia-Pacific Economic Conference

(APEC),474

Association of Ethnic Koreans, 192

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), xcv, 438; bilateral ties with, 475

Astrakhan': pollution in, 139

Astrakhan' Khanate: annexed, 14 Atomic Energy, Ministry of (Minatom),

149, 337

Austerlitz, Battle of (1805), 29

Austria (see also Austria-Hungary): bor- der with Austria, 103; and partition of

Poland, 25; in Quadruple Alliance, 30; relations with, 28, 29, 88 Austria-Hungary (see also Austria): allied with Germany, 40; Bosnia annexed by, 48-49; in League of the Three Emperors, 38-39; relations with, 37, 39

autocracy: powers of, 3 automotive industry, 352-53; demand,

352-53; output, 352 Avar people, 5, 179; as percentage of

population, 173

Avtovaz. See Volga Automotive Plant Awakum, 20

Azerbaijan: border of Russia with, 126, 569; in Commonwealth of Indepen- dent States, c, ci, 118, 449; conflict with Armenia, 433; cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine, ci; ethnic conflict in, 569; influence of Turkey in, 505, 506; natural resources, xcii, 335; peacekeeping forces in, 458, 459; refu- gees from, 162; relations with, 453; trade agreements, ci; treaty with

(1997), ci; troop withdrawal from, 501

Azerbaijan, Republic of: autonomy, 108; immigration from, 166; nationality

clashes in, 113, 114; popular fronts in, 113; in Soviet Union, 63, 66, 385

Azerbaijani people: geographic distribu- tion of, 179

Babel', Isaak, 217, 226

Bahrain: relations with, 478

Baikal, Lake, 131-32, 134; pollution of

138, 144

683
Russia: A Country Study

Baikal mountain system, 1 31 Bakunin, Mikhail, 40

Balakirev, Miliy, 228

Balakovo nuclear reactor, 337

Balanchine, George, 231 Balkan War: First (1912), 49; Second

(1913), 49

Balkans: policy on, 39, 48-49, 182

Balkar people, 172; exiled, 180; as per- centage of population, 180

ballet, 32, 230-32; introduced, 230;

schools, 230-31; socialist realism in, 231; in Soviet Union, 231

Ballet Russe, 231

Baltic Fleet, 509, 532, 533

Baltic Sea: pollution of, 142

Baltic tribes, 174 Bank for International Settlements, 342 banking, lxviii-lxix, 340-47; nationalized, 300; reform, 341-43, 380; services, 344; under Soviet system, 340

banks: commercial, 343-44; foreign, 344; international, 44; land, 36; money

laundering by, 576; reorganization of, 343; under Soviet system, 340; state, 36

Baptist Church, 212; members of, 212 Barannikov, Viktor, 560; conflict with

Yeltsin, 560-62; dismissed, 562

Barge Haulers on the Volga (Repin) , 233

Barsukov, Mikhail, 566, 567

Baryatinskiy, Aleksandr, 38

Baryshnikov, Mikhail, 231 Bashkir language, 221 Bashkir people, 172, 184; origins, 184; as percentage of population, 153, 173,

185; social structure, 185

Bashkiria. See Bashkortostan

Bashkortostan, Republic of, 175, 184-85;

area, 184; ethnic groups, 185; natural

resources, 185; population, 185; posi- tion in Russian Federation, 414; reli- gion, 185; sovereignty declaration,

196,414

Basic Curriculum of the General Sec- ondary School, 262

Baturin, Yuriy, lviii, lxxxiii, 501 Bazhenov, Vasiliy, 233

Beijing, Treaty of (1860), 38

Belarus (see also Belorussia): border of

Russia with, 126; in Commonwealth of Independent States, 118, 388, 449; customs union with, xciii, 452; integration with Russia, 452; nuclear weapons

in, 452, 513, 539; relations with, xciiixciv, 452; trade with, 376

Belarusian people, 123, 172; origins, 9, 174; as percentage of population, 153,

173, 183; in Russian Empire, 25, 28

Belgium: investment from, 378 Belgorod Oblast: population growth,

157

Belinskiy, Vissarion, 224

Bellona Foundation, lxi, 147

Belorussia (see also Belarus): political

parties in, 42

Belorussian Autocephalous Orthodox

Church, 212

Belorussian Republic: autonomy, 108, 114; nationalism in, 114; in Soviet Union, 55, 63, 66, 385

Beloyarsk nuclear reactor, 337

Beloye, Lake, 134

Belukha, Mount, 131

Benois, Alexandre, 231

Berezovskiy, Boris, lxxxi, c, 372

Beria, Lavrenti: 85, 86

Berlin: airlift, 84; blockade, 84; Soviet capture of, 79; zones of occupation, 83-84

Berlin Wall: built, 90; opened, 104

Bessarabia: annexed, 29, 77

Bezlepkina, Lyudmila, 255

Bilibino nuclear reactor, 337

Billington, James, 208 Birobidzhan. S^Jewish Autonomous

Oblast

birth control, 269-71; and abortion, 159, 270; availability, 159, 270

biznesmeny, 241 Black Earth Association, lxxxvi, 414

Black Hundreds, 217

black market, 193, 574

Black Repartition (Chernyy peredel), 41 Black Sea: access to, 37; fishing in, 142; pollution of, 138, 142; ports on, 363;

resort area, 1 34

Black Sea Fleet, xcii, ci, 453, 533-34

Black Tuesday, 311, 314, 341

Blok, Aleksandr, 225 Bloody Sunday, 45

Bogolyubskiy, Andrey, 9 Bolshevik government: and dictatorship of the proletariat, 61-62; economy

under, 300; moved to Moscow, 62; reli684
Index

gion under, 206; revolutionary

decrees of, 61 Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 60-62,

492; initiated, 61 Bolsheviks {see also Russian Communist

Party [Bolshevik]), 43, 55; outlawed,

60; in Petrograd Soviet, 59; popularity

of, 59

Bol'shoy Theater, 232

border problems: with China, xcviii, 93-

94; with Estonia, xcii; with Latvia, xcii; with Poland, 63

borders, 125; of Afghanistan, 570; with Azerbaijan, 126, 569; with Belarus,

126; with China, 126, 469, 470, 473,

529, 570; disputed, 569; drawing of, 30, 175; with Estonia, 125, 569; with

Finland, 126; with Georgia, 126, 569; with Japan, 473; with Kazakstan, 125; with Latvia, 125, 569; with Lithuania, 126; with Mongolia, 126, 473; with North Korea, 126; with Norway, 126; with Poland, 126; of Russia, 125-26; of Soviet Russia, 63-64; of Tajikistan,

508, 570; with Ukraine, 126, 569;

undefined, 569 border security, xcviii, 125, 436, 448, 508, 529, 567-70; decline in, 162, 544, 575;

in military doctrine, 497; in near

abroad, 451; policy, 569-70

Boris Godunov (Musorgskiy) , 228

Borodin, Aleksandr, 228 Bosnia and Herzegovina: annexed by

Austria-Hungary, 48-49; NATO air strikes on, 464, 468; peacekeeping

forces in, xci, 460, 468; rebellions in, 39, 220, 459 Bosnian Peace Implementation Force,

464, 497

bourgeoisie: and political activity, 42 Boxer Rebellion (1900), 44

boyars, 13, 14, 15 Bratsk Aluminum, 352

Bratsk Reservoir, 1 34

Brazil: foreign policy toward, 481; trade

with, 482

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 62; repudiated, 63

Brezhnev, Leonid I., 56-57, 91-98; back- ground, 92, 113; as chairman of pre- sidium, 92; cult of personality, 98;

culture under, 221 ; death of, 98; economy under, 57, 95-97, 240; as first sec- retary, 92; foreign policy of, 56, 440,

469; religion under, 98, 207; scandals surrounding, 98 Brezhnev Doctrine, 94, 465; repudiated, 103

Britain: in Caspian Pipeline Consortium,

c; Continental Blockade against, 29; in Limited Test Ban Treaty, 90; in Quadruple Alliance, 30; relations with, 28, 29, 37, 39, 43, 48, 69, 79-81; trade

with, 375; in Triple Entente, 48; in World War I, 50

Brodsky, Joseph, 227

Brothers Karamazov (Dostoyevskiy) , 225 Buddhism, 191, 206; and ecumenism,

211 Budennovsk hostage crisis, 405, 502, 503,

567, 575, 578 budget deficit, ciii; efforts to finance,

312, 342; as percentage of gross domestic product, 308, 310; under

Yeltsin, 308 Bukhara Khanate. See Bukhoro Khanate

Bukharin, Nikolay, 43, 67; executed, 73; rehabilitated, 108; purged, 71, 72 Bukhoro (Bukhara) Khanate: annexed,

38 Bukovina: annexed, 77

Bulgakov, Mikhail, 226, 227

Bulganin, Nikolay: as prime minister, 86; resignation, 88

Bulgaria: in Balkan wars, 49; environ- mental protection in, 142; NATO

membership, lxxxviii; rebellions in, 39; relations with, 39; in revolutions of

1989, 104; Russian protection of, 39; Soviet influence in, 83, 465

Bulgarians, 173 Bund (workers' group), 42, 43 Bunin, Ivan, 226

bureaucracy: expansion of, 17; restruc- tured, 304; service by nobles in, 22; strength of, 1

7

Buryat people, 172; geographic distribu- tion of, 175; as percentage of population, 188

Buryatia, Republic of, 175, 188-89; area, 188; economy, 189; ethnic groups,

175, 188; natural resources, 189; population, 188; sovereignty, 196 Bush, George H.W.: summit meeting

685
Russia: A Country Study

with Gorbachev, 104, 455; summit

meeting with Yeltsin, lxxxvii, lxxxix, 457

Bykov, Andrey, 227 Byzantine Empire: influences of, 3; treaty with, 6

cabinet See Government

cadres: stability of, 92-93 Cambodia: ties with, 477 Cam Ranh Bay, 475 Canada: trade with, 375

canals, 133

cancer, 268

Carter, Jimmy, 95

Caspian Flotilla, 532, 534

Caspian Pipeline Consortium, c Caspian Sea: access to, xcii; oil fields,

xcii; pollution of, 138, 142; rising level

of, 143-43, 144-45

Catherine I (r. 1725-27), 23 Catherine II (the Great) (r. 1762-96),

24-27; armed forces under, 491; art under, 233; death of, 28; literature under, 223; reforms under, 26-27

Caucasian languages, 220 Caucasus (see also under individual republics): ethnic groups, 172, 200; expan- sion into, 38, 201; military

intervention in, 490; natural

resources, 201; revolts in, 38; in Russian Federation, 200-201

Caucasus Mountains, 130, 131 Caucasus peoples, 1 72

Cecchetti, Enrico, 231 censorship: lifted, 40; prohibited, 420;

religious, 37; in Russian Empire, 28,

36, 37 Center for Gender Studies, 252, 253-54 Center for Russian Environmental Policy, 146 Center for the Study of Drug Addiction, 575-76

Central Asia: annexed, 39, 66, 491; emi- gration from, 450; ethnic groups

exiled to, 177, 180, 181, 182, 191, 198; expansion into, 38; foreign policy

toward, 451-52, 510; industry moved

to, 78, 301; military intervention in, 490, 491, 498, 507-9; relations with, 479, 483

Central Bank, Law on the (1995), 342

Central Chernozem Economic Region, 323

Central Electoral Commission, 397

Central Europe: commercial relations

with, 374-75, 466; in NATO, 456, 458;

relations with, 465-68; trade with, 375

centralized economic planning (see also under individual plans), 297; advantages of, 298; under Brezhnev, 96; under Khrushchev, 91; legacy of, 297; process, 297-98; under Stalin, 55-56,

72; targets, 298

Central Russia Association, lxxxvi, 414

Central Siberian Plateau, 129, 130, 131 CFE Treaty. See Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Chabad Lubavitch, 219

Chagall, Marc, 233

Chany, Lake, 134

charities, 249, 293, 420; attitudes toward, 293

Charter to the Nobility, 26

Charter to the Towns, 26

Chaykovskiy. See Tchaikovsky

Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast,

177, 198 Chechen people, 172; conflict with Russians, 199; exiled, 177, 198; geographic distribution, 175, 177-78, 179, 181; languages, 178; as percentage of

population, 173, 181; population, 177;

religion, 178; social structure, 178 Chechnya, Republic of, 175, 177-78; aid

to, c; corruption, 198; crime, 198, 576;

elections, lxxxi; ethnic groups, lxxxi, 174, 177-78; immigration from, 166; independence declared, lv, lxxxi, 171,

175, 177, 178, 194, 197, 198-200, 414, 504, 571; infant mortality, 270; pipelines through, 502; pollution in, 140; population, 157; revolts in, 38, 178;

strategic importance, 502; terrorism

in, lxxx-lxxxi, c, 201, 575 Chechnya conflict, 198, 199, 570-71;

armistice protocols, 503; arms sales in, 547; casualties, 502-3; causes, 576;

cease-fire, lxxx, lxxxviii; hostage crises, 405, 502, 567, 571, 575, 578; human

rights abuses, 421, 460, 462; ineffec- tiveness of Russian troops in, lv, lvii, 503^1, 541-42; intelligence service in,

686
Index

lx, 563; negotiations in, lxxxi, xcix-c; reactions to, lxxvi, Ixxvii, lxxxvii, 199-

200, 254, 255, 423, 459, 462, 480, 503, 510, 550, 564; refugees from, lxxxi, 200; security forces sent to, 442, 489,

490, 498, 502, 540, 541, 571, 576, 579,

581; troop withdrawal from, lxxx, 503

Chechnya-Ichkeria, Republic of, lxxxi, xcix-c Cheka (secret police) , 62 Chekhov, Anton, 225

Chelyabinsk: population, 154 chemicals industry, 178, 182, 355-56; under First Five-Year Plan, 301; invest- ment in, 355, 378; in Mordovia, 186; output, 355-56; in Russia, 355; in Tatarstan, 187 Chemical Weapons Convention, xcvii Chemyakhin, Mikhail, 234

Cheremiss people. SeeMaii people

Cheremkhovo coal fields, 336 Cherepovets: metallurgical combine,

351 Cherkess Autonomous Oblast, 1 76

Cherkessia: revolts in, 38 Cherkess (Circassian) people, 172, 181-

82; as percentage of population, 182;

tribal groups of, 1 82 Chernenko, Konstantin U., 57, 98, 100-

101; as rival of Andropov, 99

Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station disaster, 107, 137, 147,337

Chernomyrdin, Viktor, lxx, lxxxvii,

lxxxix, 150, 336; party of, Ixxvii, 417-

18; as prime minister, Ixviii, cii, 310,

389, 400, 444, 457-58, 479; presidential aspirations, lxxxii; staff of, 400

Chernyshevskiy, Nikolay, 40, 225 Chernyy peredel. See Black Repartition The Cherry Orchard (Chekhov), 225 Chiang Kai-shek, 70

Chicherin, Georgiy, 69

children: attitudes toward, 250; custody

of, 250; daycare for, lxii, 262-63, 269-

71, 289, 290; death of, 269-70; sup- port for, civ, 286, 288, 289, 291

Chile: trade with, 482

China: relations with, 19, 38, 48; as security threat, 41 China, People's Republic of: aid to, 471; arms sales to, lix, 469-70, 474, 510,

521; border disputes with, xcviii, 93-

94, 433, 469, 470, 570; border with

Russia, 126, 529; defense treaty with,

84; investment by, 197; migration to, 156; military cooperation with, 470; refugees from, 162; relations with

Kazakstan, 450; relations with Russia,

lxxxvii, xc, xcv, 84, 89, 93, 103, 433,

438, 469-71, 473, 474, 484, 510; Soviet involvement in, 56, 69-70; state visits with, 470; summit meeting with, 469;

trade with, 470

China, Republic of (Taiwan): relations

with, 433; trade with, 470

Chinese-language broadcasts, 425

Chirac, Jacques, xc

Chita Oblast: ethnic groups, 175; population growth, 157

Christianity (see also under individual

denominations): adoption of, 3, 7, 173;

art and architecture, 232; regional dis- tribution, 180

Christian Mercy Society, 293

Christian missions. See missionaries

Christ the Savior Cathedral, 209, 320

Chubays, Anatoliy, lxx, cii, 313, 315, 381;

as chief of presidential administration,

394; dismissed, 316; power of, lxxxiilxxxiii Chukchi Autonomous Region, 175; sov- ereignty declaration, 196 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day

Saints, 213 Church of Scientology, 210

Chuvashia, Republic of, 175, 185-86;

area, 185; industry, 185; natural

resources, 196; sovereignty movement,

196 Chuvash language, 196 Chuvash people, 172, 185; language,

185; origins, 185; population, 153,

173, 185, 186, 187; religion, 185;

Circassian people. See Cherkess people

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent

States

citizenship: dual, for Russians, 421, 448,

452; for immigrants, 163

civil code, 402

civil rights, 419-22; under constitution of 1936, 73-74; under constitution of

1993, 419-20; under criminal code, 584-85; guarantees, 420-21; violations, 421

687
Russia: A Country Study

Civil War (1918-21), 55, 62-65, 185, 300

Clean Hands Campaign, lx, cii climate, 134-36; permafrost, 134, 136; precipitation, 136; seasons, 134-36; impact, 135-36; temperature, 130, 134-36

Clinton, William J.: summit meetings

with Yeltsin, lxxxvii, 457-60

coal (see also energy), 336-37; consumption, 332, 338; geographic distribution

of, 180, 321; miners' unions, 249; mining, 137, 189; production, 34, 41, 337;

reserves, 336; strikes, lxxv, ciii, 350 Code of Criminal Procedure (1992), 585 Cold War, 495-96; ended, 104, 432, 455; and foreign policy, 56, 431, 432, 471; onset of, 82-85

Collective Security Agreement (1993), 449

collectivization (see also farms, collective): of agriculture, 56, 70, 71-72,

124, 159, 300, 301, 326; of arts, 74; forced, 56, 70, 71-72, 124, 159, 300,

326; resistance to, 72; of science, 74 Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- nomic Assistance Cominform. See Communist Information Bureau Comintern. See Communist International Commercial Partnership Program, 459 Commission on Ecological Security, lxilxii, 150 Committee for State Security (KGB) (see also police, secret), lix, 387; Border

Troops, 567, 568; branches, 556; direc- torates, 560, 564, 566; dismantled,

555, 559; domestic intelligence, 556-

57; established, 555; First Chief Directorate, 557, 560; foreign intelligence, 556; infiltration by, 207; Ninth Directorate, 558; personnel, 556; repression of dissidents, 100; Seventh Chief

Directorate, 556; successor agencies,

555, 559-60; structure, 556 Committee for the Protection of State Borders, 568 Committee on Fishing, 141 Committee on Operational Questions, 396 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 504-9; brain drain from, 156-

57; created, liv, 118, 479; debt, xciii; as foreign policy problem, 438; integration, 449-50; members, 118, 388, 450;

relations with, 435-36, 438, 448-49;

Russian influence in, c, ci, 504; treaty obligations, 498 communes, 18; breakup of, 47 communications. See telecommunications Communications, Law on (1995), 370, 371 Communications, Ministry of, 368, 370 Communications Investment Joint- Stock Company (Svyazinvest) , 317;

privatized, Ixx, cv, 317 Communist Information Bureau (Corn- inform) , 84 Communist International (Comintern) , 63; abolished, 84 Communist Party of Germany: aid to Nazis, 75 Communist Party of Kazakstan, 113 Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), lxxiii, 317; banned, liv, 398; budget vote (1997), lxxiii; impeachment motions, Ixxxiv; in 1993

elections, 416; in 1995 elections, 419;

in 1996 elections, lxxvii; party reform

(1996) , lxxviii; in regional elections of

1997, Ixxxiv; support for, lxxviii, 438 Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU), 85; banned, 118; crimes

revealed, 108; factions, 112; party Congresses, 85, 87, 102, 109, 431; purges,

56, 57; reorganized, 91 Communist Youth League (Komsomol),

208 Concept for Integrated Economic Devel- opment of the CIS, xciv Concord in the Name of Russia, 417

Confederation of Mountain Peoples of

the North Caucasus, 201, 505 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Ixxx; recogni- tion of CIS, 449; treaty obligations, 498

Congress of Berlin (1878), 39 Congress of People's Deputies: formed,

110, 386; opposition groups, 110; ses- sions, 110 Congress of Soviets, Second (1917), 61 Congress of Vienna (1815), 30

688
Index

Conoco, 339

Constantine, 30

Constituent Assembly, 58

constitutional convention, 390

Constitutional Court: judges, 393, 403;

jurisdiction, 408 Constitutional Democratic Party

(Kadets) , 45; in First Duma, 46

constitution of 1905, 5, 45-46; suffrage under, 46

constitution of 1918: civil rights under, 64

constitution of 1924, 386

constitution of 1936, 73; civil rights

under, 73-74; elections under, 73

constitution of 1977 (Soviet Union), 93; women under, 251-52

constitution of 1978 (Russian Republic), 388, 391, 409, 410

constitution of 1993, 385, 391-408; civil rights under, 419-20; education

under, 259-60; environment under,

151; ethnic groups in, 175; executive branch under, lxxxiv; finance under,

341; foreign policy under, 439; form

of government under, 391; govern- ment structure under, 408-9; land ownership under, 284; language

under, 221, 391; local jurisdictions

under, 408-11; nationality under, 219;

political parties under, 415; privacy

under, 420; religion under, 172, 210

Construction Bank (Stroybank) , 340

construction industry: employment in, 347

Consultative Council, lxxxiii consumer goods: under Chernenko,

100; demand for, cvi; under First Five- Year Plan, 301; under Gorbachev, 306; production, lxvii, 72, 96, 321; quality,

cvi, 321, 376; shortages, 71, 82, 97,

306; under Stalin, 82 Continental Blockade, 29 Control Directorate, 395 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

(CFE Treaty), 456; compliance with,

lxxxviii, 105, 463; as foreign policy

problem, 438, 460, 512; signed, 104;

violations, 505 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1973), 153* Cooperation Association of North Caucasus Republics, Territories, and

Oblasts, lxxxvi, 414

Cooperatives, Law on (1987), 304-5

corruption, Ixxiv, xcvi, xcvii, cii; causes, 580, 581; in Chechnya, 198; in energy

industry, 336; in government, lxxii, 152, 561, 578; in health care, 278; in housing, 284, 285; in industry, lxxi; by

mafiya, cii, 320; in military, lvi, lviii-lix; in police force, lx, lxxii, cii, 578, 580,

581; in privatization, lxix-lxx, lxxvii, 316-17, 561; and reform, 99; in Soviet Union, 572; in tax collection, 313; war

against, 561-62, 563

Cossacks: Ukrainian, 18

cotton, 491; price, 355 Council for Cooperation with Religious

Associations, 211-12

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), lxvii-lxviii, 465; dissolved, 104

Council of Churches of Evangelical Baptist Christians, 212 Council of Europe, 438, 462; admission

to, lxxxviii, cii, 421 , 484, 588; aid from, 463 Council of People's Commissars

(Sovnarkom) , 61 Council on Foreign Policy, 446 coup d'etat by Beria, 86; of 1762, 24; of 1801,29 coup d'etat of August 1991, liv, lxxvi, 57, 117-18, 387, 467, 578; instigators of, 117; opposition to, 117, 566

courts: backlog in, lxi, 407; number of, 407

court system: appeals, 422; conviction

rate, 422; legal aid, 422; trial by jury, 407,421,587,591 CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet Union

credit, lxviii-lxix; control and issuance

of, 340; increased, 310, 311; policy, 309

crime (see also corruption; internal security), 571-77; auto theft, 573; in Chechnya, 198; crackdown on, 442,

572, 583, 584; drug-related, 574; eco- nomic, 563, 571; murder, 160, 573,

574; rate, 239, 572, 573; by soldiers, 542, 545-47, 582; solving, 572, 584; in Soviet system, 571-72, 578; statistics,

689
Russia: A Country Study

572-73; by teenagers, 572; types, 572;

violent, 572, 573, 580; wave, lx-lxi,

lxxvi, cii, 555, 572-77, 591; white-collar, 555, 572

crime, organized (see also mafiya), 555, 573-74, 580; contract killings by, 574, 580; crackdown on, 422, 473, 559,

561-62; drug trafficking by, 576; influ- ence of, 573; legality of, 583; in Moscow, 320; number of gangs, 574; police

cooperation with, lx, Ixxi-lxxii, 574,

580; and prostitution, 253; protection

money to, cii, 242, 244, 320; in Soviet

system, 578; targets of, 574; terrorism

by, 575

Crimea: annexed, 25; ethnic Russians in, 453; status of, 433

Crime and Punishment (Dostoyevskiy), 225 Crimean War (1853-56), 4, 33, 491 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, lxi, 583; civil rights under, 584;

draft, 584, 585

criminal correction code, lxi criminal justice system (see also judiciary), 577-78, 586-88; arrest under,

586; attorneys in, 587; backlogs in, 407; capital punishment in, cii, 421-

22, 462, 588; defendants' rights in, 583, 585, 586, 591; human rights abuses in, 583-84, 588; judges in, 393, 403, 406, 407, 408, 588; protections in, 421-22; public prosecutors in, 587-88; punishment in, 422; reform of, lx; tri- als in, 407, 421,586,587

criminal law reform, 583-85

Croats, 173 CSCE. See Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe

Cuba: arms sales to, 521; missile crisis in, 481; nuclear sales to, 460, 483; rela- tions with, 88, 481, 482; subsidies to, 482; trade with, 483; troop withdrawal from, 501 Cuban missile crisis, 90

Cui, Cesar, 228

cult of personality: of Brezhnev, 98; of

Stalin, 74, 87 culture: under Brezhnev, 97-98;

reforms in, 36; under Stalin, 70; sup- pression of non-Russian, 221; westernization of, 4

Culture, Ministry of: communications

oversight by, 368

currency: under Alexander II, 36; capital

flight, civ; control and issuance, 340;

convertibility, 380; depreciation, lxxii; exchange rate, lxxii, 299, 309, 314,

342, 378; under Gorbachev, 107; stabi- lization, 314; value, 311-12

Cyprus, Republic of: arms sales to, lix Cyrillic alphabet, 7; development, 222

Czechoslovakia: military relations with,

76; in "Velvet Revolution," 104; Soviet influence in, 83, 465; Soviet invasion

of, 94, 461, 465, 494; Soviet troops withdrawn from, 104, 163, 501 Czech people, 173 Czech Republic: NATO membership,

lxxxviii; trade with, 375

Dagestan, Republic of, 175, 178-80;

area, 178; ethnic groups, 174, 179;

infant mortality, 270; languages, 179, 180; life expectancy, 160; population

growth, 157, 158; religion, 178, 179;

revolts in, 38, 178; terrorism in, 178

Dagestani people, 172; as percentage of

population, 181 dams, 146

Daniel, Yiiliy, 227

Daniil, Prince, 10

Daniil Aleksandrovich, Prince, 12

Danilov-Danil'yan, Viktor, lxxix, 149-50 Danube River: pollution of, 142

Danylo, Prince. See Daniil, Prince Dargin people, 179 Days of Defense Against Environmental

Hazards, 150 Dayton Peace Accords (1995), 464

death rate, 157, 159, 267

debt: interenterprise, lxviii-lxix, 310, 312

debt rescheduling: with Paris Club, 379 Decembrist Revolt, 30-31 Defense, Ministry of, 446-47; in com- mand structure, 525, 537; defense

minister in, 525; foreign policy role, 446-47; military communications

under, 368; national security policy

role, 446^17; in Soviet era, 446

Defense Council, lxxxiii defense industry, 515-24; conversion to

civilian industry, 516-17; coordina690
Index

tion, 516; employment, 515, 516;

enterprises, 516; exports, lix, 459, 463, 469-70, 477, 479-80, 510, 518, 520-

23, 546-47; geographic distribution, 515; modernization, 524; under Peter

the Great, 22; production, lix, 517-18;

prospects, 523-24; research organizations, 516, 518; resources, 516; in Soviet system, lxvii, 516; under Stalin, 72, 351; structure and conditions,

516-18; subsidies, 517

defense spending: budget, 518; reductions in, 308; on research and develop- ment, 520

Delyanov, Ivan, 37

democratic centralism, 68 Democratic Party of Russia, 416 Democratic Platform, 112 Democratic Union, 255; formed, 109

demokratizatsiya, 105, 108-9

demonstrations. See political demonstrations Denmark: wars against, 14

Derzhavin, Gavriil, 224

desertification, 144

de-Stalinization, 87, 469; ended, 93

Desyatinnaya Church, 7 detente, 56, 95, 454; demise of, 57; with Europe, 461 Deynekin, Petr, 543

Diaghilev, Sergey, 231 , 233 diamonds, 323

dictatorship of the proletariat, 61-62, 68

diet, lxiii, 267, 279

disabled people: facilities for, 278

disease: of children, 271; death from,

160-61, 268; heart disease, 268, 274,

278; increases in, 239, 267-68; tuberculosis, cii, ciii, 268; waterborne, 140

dissidents: under Brezhnev, 93; under

Ghernenko, 100; persecuted, 93, 100

divorce: causes of, 250; procedures for, 250; rate, 250, 253; under Stalin, 70,

74; unofficial, 250

Dmitriy, First False (r. 1605-6); crowned,

15; overthrown, 15

Dmitriy, Second False (r. 1610-13), 15 Dnepr River, 133; as commercial route,

7; pollution of, 141, 142 Dnepropetrovosk-Donets mining center, 137 Dnestr Moldavian Republic, xcii, 450,

506

Dobrolyubov, Nikolay, 225

Doctors Without Borders, 293

Doctor Zhivago (Pasternak), 226-27 Dolgan people, 172 Donets Basin: coal in, 336 Don River, 133; pollution of, 142 Don River rebellion (1670-71), 18

Dostoyevskiy, Fedor, 225

drainage, 126-29, 132-34 drought: under Brezhnev, 96; in the

steppe, 130 drug addiction {see also narcotics), lxiii—

lxiv, ciii, 272-73, 575; education, 273;

increases in, 239, 575; rate, 575-76; by

soldiers, 546; treatment, lxiv, 577 drug trafficking, xciii, 473, 574, 575-77; crackdown on, 559, 577; money laun- dering in, 576; by soldiers, 546; in Soviet system, 578

Dubinin, Sergey, 313, 341 Dudayev, Dzhokar, 199, 571 Duma (1905-18), 46, 47, 51 Dyachenko, Tat'yana, lxxxii

earthquakes, 132 Eastern Europe: purges in, 84; Soviet intervention in, 56, 82, 465; Soviet occupation of, Ivi, 81, 465; trade with,

83; unrest in, 88-90

Eastern Sayan Mountains, 131-32

East European Plain, 5-6, 129

East Germany. See German Democratic

Republic

Economic Cooperation Organization,

xciv economic depression (1890s), 41 -42 economic reform, lxv-lxvi, 302-4; under Brezhnev, 57, 95-96, 300;

restructuring measures, 308-9; goals,

lxix, 307-8; under Gorbachev, lxviii, 106, 298-99, 300, 303-4; under Khrushchev, 302; macroeconomic stabiliza- tion measures, 308; resistance to, 303;

results, 306-7; shortcomings, 305, 308; under Yeltsin, lxviii, 106, 298-99, 300, 307-21

Ecuador: trade with, 482

education (see also schools) , lxii, 258-67;

access to, 260; under Alexander II, 34; attitudes toward, 266-67; budgets for,

691
Russia: A Country Study

260; business, 265; completion of, 264, 347; continuous, 259; curriculum,

262; expansion, 70; experimentation

with, 70; infrastructure, 260; Marxist- Leninist indoctrination in, 258; of

nobles, 22; under Peter the Great, 22; reforms, lxiv, 34, 36, 258, 259, 262;

right to, 420; in rural areas, 260, 264; and society, 266-67; in Soviet Union,

258-59; under Stalin, 70, 75, 258; in urban areas, 260, 264; vocational, 259, 265, 348; westernization of, 22-23

education, higher, 264-66; access, 240, 266; admissions policies, 70, 75, 97; attitudes toward, 266-67; under

Brezhnev, 97; completion of, 264, 347; enrollment in, 260; language in, 221; reform, 264-65; under Stalin, 70, 75

Education, Law on (1992), 262, 263

Egypt: arms sales to, 479-80; military

support for, 94; relations with, 88, 94, 478; trade agreement with, 479

Ehrenburg, Ilya, 217 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: meeting with

Khrushchev, 89

Eisenstein, Sergey, 70, 217

Ekho Kavkaza, 216

Elbrus, Mount, 131

elections: campaigns for, 397; candidates

for, 396, 397, 398; under Gorbachev,

108, 109, 117; laws, 46, 73; of 1906, 46; of 1987, 46-47; of 1989, 110; of 1990,

386; of 1991, 117; for president, 396-

99; runoff, 397; voter participation in, 397

elections of 1993, lxxvi, 390, 415-17; boycotts of, 416; constitutional referen- dum, 391; irregularities in, 416;

parties in, 416; procedures for, 415-16

elections of 1994: irregularities in, 401;

local, 412; parliamentary, 401

elections of 1995, lxxvi; campaign, 567; candidates in, 418; international

observers in, 418; laws governing, 417; parliamentary, 150, 401, 417-19;

party-list voting in, 417-18; results, 418-19; voter turnout in, 418

elections of 1996: campaigns, lxxvii-lxxviii, 317, 392, 426; candidates, lxxvii, 398; international observers, 399;

local, 413; parties in, lxxvii; presidential, lxxxi-lxxxii, 317, 392, 398-99;

regional, lxxxiv-lxxxv; voter turnout, 399

elections of 1997: regional, lxxxiv-lxxxv

electric power, 338; capacity, 338; con- sumption, 338; generation, 338;

hydro, 146, 180, 181, 191, 332, 338;

reform, cv; thermal, 338

elite class, 241; conspicuous consumption by, lxvi, xcvi, 241; economic

power, lxvi; education of, 97; in Kievan

Rus', 7; privileges, 240; rural, 247; in Soviet Union, 240; westernization of, 26-27

Elizabeth (r. 1741-62), 23-24, 232-3

El Salvador: relations with, 481 employment: in agriculture, 323; benefits, 245; in defense industry, 515; dis- tribution, 347-48; and downsizing,

245; supplementary, 246; training,

348; of women, 158, 246-17, 347 Employment Fund, 286, 292 energy (see also electric power; see also under individual energy sources) , 331—40; consumption, 331-32, 338; exploitation, 331-32; export, 331, 332; foreign investment in, lxxv, 338-40; and for- eign policy, 335; hard currency from,

323, 331; investment in, 378; output, 331; prices, 299, 321, 331, 332;

resources, 123; shortages, 52; taxes on,

309; under Yeltsin, 318

English-language broadcasts, 425 environment: degradation of, lxi-lxii, 123-24; investment in, 151-52; protec- tion of, lxxix, 152-53, 249-50; in

Soviet Union, 136-37 environmental problems (see also pollution), 136-53; exposure, 136-37, 423; and health problems, lxiii, 136, 140,

239, 267; obstacles to correcting, 152; response to, 148-53 Environmental Protection, Law on

(1991), 152 Environmental Protection and Natural

Resources, Ministry of, lxxix, 149-50, 446-47

Epitsentr, 249 Eskimo languages, 220

estates (social groups), 26

Estonia: annexed, 77; border with, xcii, 125, 452-53, 569; declaration of sover- eignty, 113; independence, lv, 118,

692
Index

387; military withdrawal from, 441,

501; NATO membership, lxxxviii, 456; relations with, 452-53; Russians in, 452; Soviet influence over, 76 Estonians: nationalism of, 113; in Russian Empire, 28 Ethiopia: refugees from, 162; Soviet

influence in, 94, 494

ethnic groups (see also nationalities; see also under individual groups) , 1 72—202;

discrimination against, xcvi; distribution, 172; in Kievan Rus', 173; number

of, 172; relations among, 442; stereo- types of, 194; tensions among, 195, 200-201,450 EU. See European Union

Eurasian Federation of Unions of Evangelical Baptist Christians, 212 European Union (EU): aid from, 144, 463; cooperation with, 462; recognition by, 449

Evangelical Reformed Church, 213 Evenk Autonomous Region, 175 Evenk people, lxii, 160, 172 exchange rate, 299, 309, 314, 342, 378; and Black Tuesday, 31 1, 314, 342 executive branch (see also president), 391-400

Executive Committee, 58

expatriates: return of, 82

Experts' Consultative Council, 211 exports (see also under individual products): to Asia, 474; of crops, 42; of

energy, 309, 331, 332, 335, 375; of

materiel, lix, 459, 463, 469-70, 477, 479-80, 510, 518, 520-23, 546-47; of

metals, 352, 376; of minerals, 376;

taxes on, 346-47, 374

Faberge, Karl, 233

families, 250-51; dynamics, 250-51;

importance, 250; number, 250; in poverty, 244; rural, 248; size, 157, 250; support for, 286, 289-90, 291; women

in, 251

family planning. See birth control famine: deaths from, 124, 153, 159; in 1891, 41; under Stalin, 124, 153 FAPSI. See Federal Agency for Govern- ment Communications and Information

Far East: agriculture in, 323; coal mining

in, 336; infant mortality in, 270; iron

in, 323

Far East and Baikal Association, lxxxvi, 414

Far Eastern Military District, 529, 531;

air force contingent of, 535

farms, collective (see also collectivization), lxvii, 247, 326; controls on, 82; converted to state farms, 96; economic

targets for, 298; established, 56, 300; production on, 326, 327; reorganized,

91, 328; subsidies for, 329

farms, private, 326-27; legalized, 328; productivity of, 327; under reform

program, 328-29; subsidies for, 329

farms, state, lxvii, 96, 247, 326; economic

targets for, 298; production quotas for, 326; reorganized, 328; subsidies for, 329

Farsi: broadcasts in, 425

fascism: decree against, 585; policy

against, 76 February Revolution (1917), 57-58

Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information

(FAPSI), lx, 564-66; mission, 565-66

Federal Assembly (see also parliament):

established, 400; legislation produced

by, 401-2; members, 400; powers, 403-

4, 564; sessions, 401; structure, 402-3;

transitional, 401 Federal Border Service, 508, 567-70; antidrug force, 577; materiel, 569;

personnel, 569

federal budget, lxxxv; implementation,

342; increases, 34, 42; 1997, lxxiii, lxxviii; under Witte, 42 Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) (see also Federal Security Service) , 562-63, 583; control of, 562; cre- ated, 562; dismanded, 563; economic

counterintelligence directorate, 563;

personnel, 562; powers, 562

federal debt: expenditures, 34; as per- centage of gross domestic product,

lxxiii; under Stolypin, 47

Federal Employment Service (FSZ) , 349

Federal Migration Service (FMS), lxxxi, 162, 293; funding for, 163

Federal Organs of Government Communications and Information, Law on

693
Russia: A Country Study

(1993), 565

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- many, Federal Republic of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: arms

market in, 522

Federal Security Service (FSB) {see also Federal Counterintelligence Service), 563-64; control of, 564; established,

563; mission, lix-lx, 563, 564, 565-66, 577

Federal Tax Police Service, 313, 580;

staff, 580

Federal Television and Radio Service of

Russia, 424-25 Federation Council: chairman, 402; committees, 402-3, 443; members,

400, 402, 412-13, 417; powers, 403-4, 443 Federation of Independent Trade

Unions of Russia (FNPR), 248-49,

290; strikes called by, lxxv-lxxvi Federation Treaty (1992), lv, 197, 409 Fedorl (r. 1584-98), 14-15 Fedorll (r. 1605), 14 Fedorlll (r. 1676-82), 21 Fedorov, Boris: as finance minister, 310

Fedorov, Lev, 586

Feminist Alternative, 254

fertility rate, 157-58, 269

Fet, Afanasiy, 225

Filaret (Romanov) , 1

filmmaking: under Stalin, 70 Finland: arms sales to, 521; border of

Russia with, 126; concessions from, 81; invasion of, 77; reparations from, 81 Finland, Grand Duchy of: annexed, 29, 30

Finnic peoples, 172

Finnish Social Democrats, 42

Finno-Ugric languages, 220

Finno-Ugric tribes, 9, 174

Finns: in Russian Empire, 28; Russifica- tion of, 37

firearms: availability of, 573; theft of, 573

The Firebird (Stravinskiy) , 229

fishing, 129; commercial, 183, 189; and

poaching, 152; rights, 472; and water

pollution, 141, 142

Five-Year Plan, First (1928-32), 71, 301; agriculture under, 55-56; industry

under, 55-56

Five-Year Plan, Second (1933-37), 72

Five-Year Plan, Third (1938-41), 72, 301

Five-Year Plan, Fourth (1946-50), 301

Five-Year Plan, Twelfth (1986-90), 303

floods, 144-45 FNPR. See Federation of Independent

Trade Unions of Russia Fokine, Michel, 231

Fonvizin, Denis, 224

food: imports of, 376; shortages, 52, 97

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, 440, 444-46;

foreign policy role, 444-45

foreign assistance: to China, 471; from

Council of Europe, 463; from Euro- pean Union, 144, 463; from Germany,

462; from International Monetary

Fund, lxix, Ixxxviii, 311, 379; to Turkey, 478; from the United States, 147, 455, 456-57, 458

foreign debt, 379; hard-currency, 306; repudiated, 69; service, 342; Soviet, 379

foreign economic relations, 372-79

Foreign Intelligence Service, 560

foreign investment, Ixxiv-lxxv, 299, 377-

79; amount, 378; by China, 197; in energy, lxxv, 338; by Germany, 378,

462; by Japan, 197; in Moscow, Ixvi, 320; obstacles, 378; protections, 378;

sources, 378; under Soviet system, 377;

in telecommunications, cv, 369-70; by

United States, 378, 459

Foreign Investment Law (1991), 377

foreign policy (see also foreign policy

concept), xcvii, 447-83; under Alex- ander II, 37-40; under Andropov, 99-

100; armed forces in, 490; under

Brezhnev, 93-95; centralized, 439; in Cold War, 56, 431, 438-39, 446-47;

conflict over, 483-84; under constitution of 1993, 392; and energy, 335; on Georgia, 450-51; under Gorbachev,102-5, 432; influences on,

501-2; of Khrushchev, 88-90; on Latin America, 481; mechanism, 438-47; on

Moldova, 450; on near abroad, 447-

53; of Nicholas I, 32; of Nicholas II, 43; objectives of, 431, 434-36, 469; problems in, 438; and religion, 220; on Southeast Asia, 469; Soviet, 461,

469; as Soviet successor, 433; of Stalin, 69-70, 75-76; transition, 433; of

Yeltsin, lxxxvii, 433-38

694
Index

foreign policy concept (1993) (see also foreign policy) , 462; Atlanticist view, 473; Central Europe in, 466; China in, 469-70; debt payments in, 478; dis- pute over, 435; Eurasian view, lxxxvii, 473; former Yugoslavia in, 467-68; government commission on, 445; Japan in, 472; Latin America in, 481-

82; military strategy in, 435-36; NATO

in, 463; North Korea in, 476; priorities

of, 435, 462; South Korea in, 476

foreign relations: with Armenia, 433; with Austria, 28, 29, 37, 39, 88; with

Azerbaijan, c, ci, 433, 453; with Baltic

states, 452; with Belarus, 452; with

Britain, 28, 29, 37, 39, 43, 48, 79-81; with Bulgaria, 39; with Central Asia, 451-52; with China, lxxxvii, 19, 38, 48, 84, 93, 103, 433, 469-71, 510; with the Commonwealth of Independent

States, xci-xciv, c, ci; with Egypt, 94; with Europe, 103; with France, 37, 38, 40, 43; with Georgia, 433, 450-51; with Germany, 39, 43, 48, 104; with Israel, 105; with Japan, 38, 48, 433, 471-73;

with Kazakstan, 452; with Latin America, 481-83; with North Korea, 192, 475-77, 510; after Peter the Great, 24; under Peter the Great, 21-22; with

Prussia, 37, 38; with Saudi Arabia, 105; with South Korea, 105, 433, 474, 475-

77, 510; with Syria, 94; with Taiwan,

433; with Turkmenistan, 452; with Ukraine, 433, 452; with the United

States, 37, 69, 79-81, 89-90, 99-100,

101, 102-3, 104, 438, 442, 454-60,

476; with Uzbekistan, 452; with the

West, 88 Foreign Trade Bank (Rosvneshtorgbank),340, 343

forests: area of, 145; clear-cutting, 145-

45; damage to, 144-46; exploitation,

181, 183, 185, 189, 190, 323, 356; management, lxii, 146; timber production,

lxvii, 356

France: in Continental Blockade, 29; military relations with, 76; relations

with, xc, 37, 38, 40, 43, 75; in Triple

Entente, 48; in World War 1, 50 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke: assassi- nated, 49

Frederick the Great, 24

Friedland, Batde of (1807), 29

Frunze, Mikhail: theories of, 495

FSB. See Federal Security Service FSK. See Federal Counterintelligence

Service FSZ. See Federal Employment Service Fund for Protection from Sexual Harass- ment, 254 Fund for Social Support, 286

futurists, 225-26

G-7. See Group of Seven

G-8. See Summit of the Eight

Gainurtdin, Ravil, 214

Galicia-Volhynia, 10 Ganelin Trio, 230 Gapon, Georgiy, 45 Garabogaz Gulf: dam on, 143

gasoline, 335 GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Gaydar, Yegor, 150, 308, 416; as acting

prime minister, 388; dismissed, lxviii, 310 Gazprom. See State Natural Gas Company GDP. See gross domestic product

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 373 General Staff (military): in command

structure, 525; Main Intelligence

Directorate, 526-27; officers, 526;

organization, 526; personnel, 527

Georgia, 504-5; border with, 126, 569; in Commonwealth of Independent

States, 451; conflicts within, 433, 448,

569; cooperation with Azerbaijan and

Ukraine, ci; environmental protection in, 142; foreign policy toward,

448, 450-51; immigration from, 166; intelligence service in, 563; military

bases in, 505; peacekeeping forces in, xci, xcv, 448, 449, 451, 456, 458, 459, 505, 529, 570; relations with NATO,

lxxxviii; Russian military bases in, 451;

trade agreements, ci Georgian Orthodox Church, 212 Georgia, Republic of: autonomy, 108; border of Russia with, 1 26; demonstrations in, 113, 114; independence for, 114; popular fronts in, 113; in Soviet

695
Russia: A Country Study

Union, 63, 66, 385

Georgians: immigration by, 164; political parties of, 42; in Russian Empire, 28 Gerashchenko, Viktor, 312, 341 German Democratic Republic (East Ger- many) : created, 84; emigration from,

103-4; revolution in, 104; Soviet influ- ence in, 465 German people, 191-92; autonomous

republic for, 191-92; emigration by, 161, 191, 192; exiled, 191; as percent- age of population, 173, 181; population, 191; religion, 212; in Russian

Empire, 28 Germany (see also Prussia): aid from,

462; allied with Austria-Hungary, 40;

in Anti-Comintern Pact, 76; invasion of Soviet Union, 56, 78-79, 207, 218,

301, 493; investment from, 378, 462;

in League of the Three Emperors, 38-

39; migration to, 191; relations with,

xc, 39, 43, 48, 69, 104-5; reparations

from, 81; reunification, 104; trade

with, 375, 462; troop withdrawal from,

501; zones of occupation, 83-84 Germany, Federal Republic of (West

Germany): relations with, 104-5; as

security threat, 90

glasnost, liv, 57, 105, 107-8; aims, 107;

arts under, 234; and economy, 306; and environment, 137; introduced,

107; literature under, 227; media

under, 423; and migration, 161;

nationalities under, 386; results, 107, 465-66; and youth culture, 244

Glazunov, Aleksandr, 229

Glinka, Mikhail, 32, 228

Glukhikh, Viktor, 516 GNP. See gross national product

Godunov, Boris (r. 1598-1605), 14; pro- claimed tsar, 15

Gogol', Nikolay, 32, 224-25, 229

gold: mining, 181, 189, 190, 191, 323;

reserves, 340, 342 Golden Horde (see also Mongols), 10,

184, 187; defeated, 10 Golos Rossii. See Voice of Russia Golushko, Nikolay, 562

Goncharov, Ivan, 225 Goncharov, Sergey, 567

Goncharova, Natal'ya, 233 Gorbachev, Mikhail S.: and Andropov,

100; background, 113; banking and

finance under, 340; coup against, liv, 57; demokratizatsiya under, 105; domestic policy, 105-9; economic reform

plan, lxviii, 106, 303-4; elections

under, 108; environment under, 149; foreign policy under, 102-5, 432, 440, 465-66, 473, 475; glasnost under, 57,

105, 227, 465; at Group of Seven summit, 105; industry under, 516; internal security under, 578; manufacturing

under, 350; music under, 229; nationalities under, 386; New Thinking

under, 432; Nobel Prize for Peace

award, 105; opposition to, 116; perestroika under, 105; personnel changes

by, 101-2; as president, 112; purges

under, 57; reforms under, 57, 102, 109-12, 271, 303, 327; religion under,

208; selected, 101; summit meeting

with Bush, 104, 455; summit meeting

with Reagan, 102-3, 454-55; and

Yeltsin, 116 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, 144, 457-58, 459

Gor'kiy, Maksim, 70, 226

Gor'kiy Automotive Plant, 352, 522

Gorno-Altay, 175, 189; area, 189; econ- omy, 189; ethnic groups, 189; population growth, 157; population, 189;

religion, 189; sovereignty, 196 Gosbank. See State Bank

Goskomoboronprom. See State Committee for the Defense Industry

Goskompriroda. See State Committee for the Protection of Nature Goskomstroy. See State Construction

Committee

Gosplan. See State Planning Committee

Goths, 5 Government (cabinet), 399-400, 444-

47; armed forces under, 525; duties, 400, 444; foreign policy under, 444;

goals, lxxix; members, 399; ministries, 399-400; no-confidence votes on, 404, 405, 406; reorganization, lxxviiilxxix, civ, cvi; role of president in, 393 government, provincial, 408-15; envi- ronmental commissions of, 149; head

of, 412; intergovernment cooperation,

414; legislation, 411-12; opposition to, 415; organization, 35; powers, 410;

696
Index

power sharing by, lxxxv, lxxxvi, 411-

12, 412-13, 414; presidential representatives in, 412; reform, 35; reorganization, 26; restrictions on, 37; status, 410, 411; tax payments, lxxxv government spending, 381; financing of, 342; under Gorbachev, 305-6; on

wages, 312 Governorate General of Turkestan. See Turkestan, Guberniya of

Grachev, Pavel, lvii, 209, 503, 525-26 Graduate School of International Business, 266

grain, 65; cultivation, 182, 185, 325; embargo on, 95; imports of, 96 Grand Embassy, 21 Greater Volga Association, lxxxvi, 414

Great Northern War, 22 Great Patriotic War (see also World War

II), Iv, 78-81, 493; economy under,

301; religion in, 207

Great Terror, 56, 70, 124

Greece: in Balkan wars, 49; communist

aims in, 83; cultural influences of, 7

Greeks: in Russian Empire, 28 green movement, 148-49 Grenada: Soviet involvement in, 481; United States invasion of, 454 Gromov, Boris, 503 Gromyko, Andrey, 101, 109

gross domestic product (GDP), 378; in 1991, 306; in 1994, 299; in 1995, 318-

19; in 1996, lxxiii; in 1997, civ; per

capita, 299; projected, lxxiii gross domestic product fractions: budget

deficit, 308, 310; government debt,

lxxiii; health care, lxiii; private sector, 380; services sector, 319

gross national product (GNP): growth

rates, 301 , 302; after World War II, 301 ground forces. See army Group of Seven (G-7) ( see also Summit

of the Eight), 105, 372; cooperation

with, lxxxvii, xcviii, 437, 438

Groznyy, lvii, 502 GRU. See Main Intelligence Directorate Guatemala: relations with, 481

guberniya concept, 415 Guberniya of Turkestan. See Turkestan,

Guberniya of guest workers: from North Korea, 192,

476; from Vietnam, 475

Gulag. See Main Directorate for Corrective Labor Camps

Gulf of Finland: pollution in, 141-42 GUO. See Main Guard Directorate Guomindang (Nationalist Party): Soviet support for, 56, 69-70; victory over, 84 GUOP. See Main Directorate for Organized Crime

Gusinskiy, Vladimir, 372

Gypsies. See Roma people

Haiti: intervention in, 482 Hango Peninsula, Battle of (1714), 490

hard currency reserves, 379 Hare Krishnas, 210

health care, 269, 270, 274-80; alternative, 280; availability, 267, 277; for chil- dren, 271; criticism, 423; decline, lxii, 154-55, 160, 267; funding, lxiii, 278; prenatal, 270; preventive, ciii, 279;

right to, 420; psychiatric, 276-77; for workers, 290

health care professionals: corruption,

278; education, 36; number, 277; sala- ries, lxiii, 277; strikes by, lxxv, ciii; training, lxiii, 277-78; women as, 246

health conditions, 267-74; decline, lxiii,

ciii, 154-55

health facilities: conditions, 276, 279;

Soviet, 274-77

health problems: from alcohol, lxiii, 271; death from, 160-61; malnutrition,

lxiii, 154-55; from pollution, lxiii, 136,

140, 239, 267

health system, lxiii-lxiv, 274-80; quality

of, lxiii, 277; drug shortages in, 278-

79; Soviet, 274-77; stratification of, 277

Helsinki Accords (1975): signed, 93, 95;

violated, 95 Holy Alliance, 30 Holy Synod: under Alexander III, 37; under Peter the Great, 22, 204

homelessness, 292-93; attitudes toward, 292-93; increase in, 165, 239; of mili- tary families, 542; shelters, 292, 293 homosexuals: attitudes toward, 257; communities of, 257; prosecution of, 257; rights of, 257; violence against, 258 Honecker, Erich, 101; ousted, 104

697
Russia: A Country Study

Horowitz, Vladimir, 229

housing, 280-85; availability, 283; construction, 281, 285; corruption, 284,

285; demand, 282; entitlements, 290, 420; expenses, 281, 283, 290; under

First Five-Year Plan, 301; maintenance,

283-84; market, lxvi, 280, 285; materials, 285; for military families, lvi, 282-

83, 542; ownership, 280; privatization,

lxvi, cv, 282; shared, 281; shortages,

97, 158, 280; in Soviet Union, 280-81;

speculation in, 285; subsidies, Ixii, cv, 280, 282 How the Steel Was Tempered (Ostrovskiy), 226 human rights abuses, lx, lxxxvii, cvi, 95, 460, 462, 421, 476, 580-81, 583-84,

588 Human Rights Commission, 421 Hungarian Revolution, 89 Hungary: arms sales to, 521-22; border

with Austria, 103; NATO membership,

lxxxviii; reforms in, 103; Soviet influ- ence in, 83, 465; Soviet invasion of, 461 , 465, 494; Soviet troops withdrawn

from, 104, 163, 501; trade with, 375;

uprisings in, 32, 89, 491 Huns, 5

Il'men', Lake 134

Ilyushin, Viktor, lxiv IMF. See International Monetary Fund

Immediate Measures to Provide Health Care for the People of the Russian

Federation, Law on (1993), 279 immigration (see also migration; refu- gees), 162-65; by ethnic group, 164;

illegal, 162, 164 immunization, 271

Imperial Russian Army, 490

Imperial School of Ballet, 231

imports, 376; control, 373; of food, 376; of grain, 96; of machinery, 376; tariffs on, 373-74 income (see also wages): of state employees, 245; taxes on, 309; unreported,

242, 245 Independent Broadcasting System, 425 Independent Miners' Union (NPG) , 249 Independent Television (NTV) net- work, 372, 425

Independent Trade Union of Workers in the Coal-Mining Industry (NPRUP)

249

India: arms sales to, 521, 522; relations

with, 88, 438, 473, 474, 475

Indigirka River, 133

Indochina: Soviet involvement in, 84

industrialization: under Alexander II, 4; in Russian Empire, 34; under Stalin, 55-56, 71-72, 82, 300

industrial output: under Brezhnev, 96; in labor camps, 590; in light industry, 354, 355; in metallurgy, 351; under

war communism, 65; under Yeltsin,

lxxiii-lxxiv, 318

industry (see also under individual industries): banks connected with, 343; cor- ruption in, lxxi; decentralized, 91; distribution, 34, 186; employment,

347; energy consumption, 338; under

five-year plans, 55, 71, 301, 301, 303; heavy, lxvii, 350-54; investment in, 303, 355; light, 354-55; moved to Central Asia, 78, 301; nationalized, 65, 70, 71, 300; under New Economic Pro- gram, 66; ownership of, 42, 60; under

perestroika, 1 06; under Peter the Great,

22; quotas, 71; under Stalin, 55, 70, 71;

state control, 55

Industry and Construction Bank (Promstroybank), 340-41, 343

infant mortality, 97, 269-70, 278

inflation, lxii, lxxii, 313-14, 378;

attempts to reduce, lxix, 308, 310-11;

effects, lxii, 286, 287; under Gorbachev, 306; of housing costs, 283; projected, Ixxiii; rate, civ, 299, 311, 313, 314; under Stalin, 71; under

Yeltsin, lxix, 245, 313

informers: under Nicholas I, 31; under

Stalin, 73 INF Treaty. See Intermediate-Range

Nuclear Forces Treaty Ingushetia, Republic of, 175; ethnic

groups, 174; infant mortality, 270;

population, 157, 177; sovereignty declaration, 175, 178, 197, 199; unemployment, 349 Ingush people, 172; exiled, 177, 198; geographic distribution, 175, 177-78;

languages, 178; as percentage of population, 182; population, 177; social

698
Index

structure, 178

Institute for Defense Studies, 500-501, 502

institutes, 264; polytechnic, 264; pro- gram, 264

Instruction to the Commission, 26

insurance services, 345, 420; investment

in, 378; under Soviet system, 341

intelligentsia: political unrest by, 26, 33

interest rates, lxxii Interim Agreement on the Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms, 95 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Treaty (1987), 103,454-55

Internal Affairs, Ministry of (MVD),

578-82; budget, 579; corruption, 578, 581; debts, 579; duties, lx, 578; Inter- nal Troops, 558; personnel, 578;

prison system under, 589-90; recruiting, 579; reorganization, 579; salaries, 578

internal security, lix-lx, cii-ciii; human

rights violations, lx; missions of, 559; reforms in, 555; under Soviet system,

lix, 555-59; support for, lix-lx; threats

to, 572-77; under Yeltsin, 555, 559-60

Internal Troops, Law on (1992) , 581

Internal Troops of the MVD, 558, 579, 581-82, 583; crime by, 582; mission, 558, 581; personnel, 558, 581; training, 558; weapons, 582

International Atomic Energy Agency,

338

International Labour Organisation, 348

International Management Institute, 266

International Monetary Fund (IMF):

loan conditions, 310, 342; loans from,

lxix, lxxxviii, civ, 311, 379; membership in, 372

international standard banks, 342-43

International Tropical Timber Agree- ment (1983), 153

Interregional Group, 110-12

investment (see also foreign investment),

lxxiii; in agriculture, 96; in chemicals,

355; in environment, 151-52; in industry, 303, 355; public, 308

Iran: arms sales to, lix, lxxxviii, xcvi, 459, 479-80; nuclear technology for, lxxxviii, xcvi, 456, 457, 459, 460, 480; policy toward, 479; relations with, xcii, xcvi, xcvii-xcviii, 83, 436; Russian scientists sought by, 156

Iranian languages, 221

Iran-Iraq War, 478

Iraq: nuclear weapons of, 480; oil from,

xcvi; refugees from, 162; relations

with, xcv-xcvi, 479, 480; Russian scientists sought by, 156

Irkutsk Oblast: ethnic groups in, 175;

pollution in, 139

iron: deposits, 323; mining, 181, 185,

189, 190; production, 34, 41 Iron Curtain, 83

irrigation: environmental problems

from, 138

Irtysh-Ob' river system, 1 33

Iset' River: pollution of, 140

Iskander, Fazil', 227

Iskra, 43

Islam, lxv, 214-16; conciliation toward, 216; conversion to, 181; and ecu- menism, 211; fear of, 201, 214-15,

220, 508, 510; followers, 202, 214, 234; geographic distribution, 179, 214;

muftiates, 215-16

Islamic Cultural Center of Russia, 216

Islamic Renaissance Party, 214-15

Islamskiye novosti, 216

Islamskiy vestnik, 216

Israel: emigration to, 218; relations with,

xciv, 105,478,480

Italy: in Caspian Pipeline Consortium, c; in World War I, 50

Ivan Kalita (Ivan I) (r. 1325-40), 12

Ivan III (the Great) (r. 1462-1505), 12, 13

Ivan IV (the Terrible) (r. 1533-84), 13-

14; accomplishments, 13; crowned, 13;

instability of, 13

Ivan V (r. 1682-96): as co-tsar, 21 Ivan VI (r. 1740-41), 23

Ivanovo: industry, 354; unemployment,

349

Ivanovo Oblast: population growth, 157;

Isvestiya, 423

Izvol'skiy, Aleksandr, 48

Japan: aid from, 147; in Anti-Comintern

Pact, 76; conflicts with, 433, 434, 441; investment by, 197; relations with,

xcviii, 38, 48, 147, 433, 438, 471-73,

474; as security threat, 41; state visit to,

699
Russia: A Country Study

xcv, 472; territorial disputes with, xcv, 44, 81, 471; territorial waters of, 472-

73; trade with, 375; in World War I, 50;

in World War II, 80 Japanese-language broadcasts, 425

Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 465

Jassy, Treaty of (1792), 25 Jehovah's Witnesses, 213

Jewish Agency, 219 Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Birobidzhan), 176, 218, 409

Jews: as communists, 217-18; discrimina- tion against, lxv, 25, 48, 82; and ecu- menism, 211; geographic distri- bution, 25, 217, 218; language, 218;

migration, 37, 161, 216-17, 218-19; as percentage of population, 173, 202; pogroms against, 217; political parties

of, 42; population, 217, 218, 219; purged, 218; religiously active, 219;

restrictions on, 25, 217; in Russian Empire, 25, 37, 216-17; schools for, 219-20; in World War II, 218 Jiang Zemin: summit meeting with

Yeltsin, xcviii Johansson, Christian, 231

Joint Venture Law (1987), 305

joint ventures, lxix; in Soviet Union, 377

Jordan: relations with, 478 Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow

(Radishchev) , 27

Judaism, 216-20; revival of, 219

judges, 588; appointment, 393, 408; con- firmation, 403; former Soviet, 406; independence, 407; number, 407; salaries, 406-7

judicial reform, 407

judiciary, 406-8; powers, 564; reforms,

34, 35; show trials, 73; structure, 407-

8; trials, 407, 421,586

July Days, 60 June 1967 War, 94

Juppe, Alain, 458

Justice, Ministry of, 406

Kabardino-Balkaria, Republic of, 175, 180-81; area, 180; ethnic groups, 180; industry, 181; population, 157, 180;

religion, 180; social structure, 180-81;

sovereignty, 197 Kabardin people, 172; as percentage of

population, 180

Kadannikov, Vladimir, 313

Kadets. See Constitutional Democratic

Party Kaganovich, Lazar, 217; purged, 87

Kaliningrad, 126, 509-10, 513; auton- omy for, 510; climate, 134; military

forces in, 509; population, 509; port

of, 363, 509; power sharing by, 411 Kalmykia, Republic of, 175, 181; area, 181; environmental degradation in, 137, 138, 144; ethnic groups, 181; HIV

infection rate, 274; infant mortality, 270; population, 157, 181; sovereignty

movement, 414 Kalmyk people, 172, 181; exiled, 181; as percentage of population, 181

Kaluga: immigration to, 165 Kama Automotive Plant, lxxxv-lxxxvi, 353 Kama River, 132; hydroelectric plant on,

338; pollution of, 141 Kamchatka Peninsula, 130, 132 Kamenev, Lev, 217; deported to Siberia,

73; executed, 73; in troika, 67, 68

Kandinskiy, Vasiliy, 233-34

Kansk-Achinsk coal field, 336

Kantemir, Antiokh, 223 Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Republic of, 175, 181-82; agriculture, 181; area,

181; ethnic groups, 181-82; industry, 181; population, 157, 181, 182; reli- gion, 181 Karachay people, 172, 181; exiled to Central Asia, 182; as percentage of

population, 182 Karamzin, Nikolay, 224

Kara Sea, 147; pollution of, 514

Karelia, Republic of, 175, 183; area, 183; environmental damage in, 183; ethnic groups, 183; industry, 183; iron in, 323; population, 183; religion, 183;

sovereignty, 196, 414

Karelian people, 172; origins of, 183; as percentage of population, 183

Karimov, Islam, xciv Kartsev-Venediktov Design Bureau, 518

Kaverin, Veniamin, 217, 226

Kazakov, Matvey, 233

Kazakov, Yuriy, 227 Kazak people: as percentage of population, 173, 181

700
Index

Kazakstan: autonomy for, 108; border

with, 125; in Caspian Pipeline Consortium, c; in Commonwealth of Inde- pendent States, 118, 388, 449; customs union with, xciii, 452; ethnic Russians

in, 452, 473-74; immigration from,

166; nationality clashes in, 113, 451-

52; natural resources, 335; nuclear weapons in, 513, 539; relations with

China, 450; relations with Russia, xcii, 452; in Soviet Union, 66; trade with,

ci, 376; and Virgin Lands campaign,

90-91

Kazan': population, 154

Kazan' Khanate, 187; annexed, 14 Kedr coalition, 150 Kennedy, John F.: meeting with Khrushchev, 89

Kerenskiy, Aleksandr: and Bolshevik Revolution, 61; as prime minister, 60; as war minister, 59 KGB. See Committee for State Security

KGB Security Troops: personnel, 557;

missions, 557-58 Khabarovsk Territory: alcoholism in, 161; pollution in, 139 Khachaturyan, Aram, 229, 230 Khakassia, Republic of, 175, 189-90; economy, 190; language, 190; population, 190 Khakass people, 190 Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region, 175; population, 153 Khanty tribe, 153; geographic distribution of, 175 Khasavyurt accords (1996), lxxx, lxxxi Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 388 Khatyb Mukaddas, Imam, 216

Khazars, 6 Khmernitskiy, Bogdan, 19 Khovanshchina (Musorgskiy) , 228 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 85-91; background, 86, 113; foreign policy under, 88-90, 440, 481; internal security

under, 555; manufacturing under,

350; military doctrine of, 495; over- thrown, 56, 91; as prime minister, 88; reforms, lxvii, 56, 85-87, 90-91; reli- gion under, 207; rise to power, 86-88; denunciation of Stalin, 86,<87, 469; summit meetings, 89

Kiev (city): art of, 232; sacked, 9, 10

Kievan Rus': Christianity adopted by, 7, 173, 203; disintegration, 8-10, 174; ethnic groups, 173; expansion, 6; for- eign relations, 6; golden age, 6-7; leg- acy, 11; origins, 3, 6; politics in, 7; schools in, 7; social classes in, 7-8;

trade by, 6, 7 Kipchak tribes, 179

Kirilenko, Audrey, 98

Kirov, Sergey, 72-73

Kirov Ballet, 231

Kirov Theater, 232

Klyuchevskaya Volcano, 132 Knyazhnin, Yakov, 224

Kohl, Helmut, xc Kokand Khanate. SeeQuqon Khanate

Kokh, Al'fred, lxxi, lxxviii Kokoshin, Audrey, 522

Kokovtsov government, 47

Kola nuclear reactor, 337

Kola Peninsula, 129; iron in, 323; pollution in, 137

Kolesnikov, Mikhail, 540 Kolyma Lowland, 129 Kolyma River, 133 Komi, Republic of, 175, 183-84; area,

183; coal in, 336; environmental damage in, 183, 184; industry, 184; oil

fields, 332; sovereignty, 196, 414 Komi people, 172, 184; as percentage of

population, 184 Komsomol. See Communist Youth

League

Komsomol'skaya pravda, 423

Korea: economic ventures in, 41, 42

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea): border of Russia with, 126; debt of, 476; guest workers from,

192, 476; migration to, 156; relations

with, 192, 475-77, 510

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): air- liner incident (1983), 100, 454; arms

sales to, 477; debt to, 477; migration

to, 156; relations with, 105, 433, 474, 475-77,510 Korean people, 192; discrimination

against, 192; migration, 192; population, 192 Korean War (1950-53), 84-85

Kornilov, Lavr, 60 Korolenko, Vladimir, 226 Koryak Autonomous Region, 175

701
Russia: A Country Study

Korzhakov, Aleksandr, lxxvii, Ixxxii, 440, 566, 567 Kostroma: industry in, 354; nuclear power station, lxii Kosygin, Aleksey, 96; as prime minister,

92; reforms under, 303

Kovalev, Sergey, 421 Kozyrev, Andrey, 220; dismissed, 445,

446, 484; foreign policy of, lxxxvii, 435; shock diplomacy speech, 445 KPRF. See Communist party of the Russian Federation Kramskoy, Ivan, 233

Krapivin, Yuriy, 566

Krasnaya zvezda, 423, 424 Krasnodar Territory, 126; immigration

to, 165; pollution in, 140; power shar- ing by, 41

Krasnoyarsk Aluminum, 352

Krasnoyarsk Territory, 126

Kremlin, 232

Kronshtadt rebellion, 65 Krymov, Yuriy, 226

Kryuchkov, Vladimir, 117, 566

Kuban' River: pollution of, 141 Kuchma, Leonid, xcii Kuchuk-Kainarji, Treaty of (1774), 24-

25, 37

Kulikov, Anatoliy, lxxi, lxxvii, lxxix, 578

Kulikovo, Battle of (1380), 10 Kumyk people, 172, 179; origins of, 179

Kuprin, Aleksandr, 226

Kurayev, Michael, 227

Kuril Islands dispute, xcv, xcviii, 441,

471-72, 473

Kursk, Battle of (1943) , 493

Kursk Magnetic Anomaly, 323

Kursk nuclear reactor, 337

Kutuzov, Mikhail, 491

Kuwait: arms sales to, 479-80, 521; rela- tions with, 478, 479

Kuznets mining center, 137, 336

Kyrgyzstan: army of, 509; in Commonwealth of Independent States, 118,

388, 450; customs union with, xciii, 452; ethnic Russians in, 473-74; immigration from, 166; military influence

in, 509; riots in, 114; in Soviet Union,

66

Labor, Ministry of, 292; subsistence minimum, 292

Ladoga, Lake, 133; pollution of, 142 Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District (Shosta- kovich) , 229-30 Lak people, 179

land: arable, 144, 323; area, liii, 123, 125,

144; condominium laws, 284; degradation, 144; nationalized, 300; of nobles,

18; ownership, 18, 60, 284, 420; pollution, 144-46, 146; privatization, 284; reform, 284-85, 329-30; use in Russian Empire, 34 Land and Liberty (Zemlya i volya) , 40-

41 Land Reform, Law on (1990), 328 language (see also under individual lan- guages): under constitution of 1993, 221; groups, 220-21; non-Russian,

221-22; rights, 420

Lapshin, Mikhail, 416

Larionov, Mikhail, 234

Latin America: foreign policy toward,

481; relations with, 438, 481-83; trade

with, 482

Latvia: annexed, 77; border with, xcii, 125, 452-53, 569; declaration of sover- eignty, 113; independence, lv, 118,

387; military withdrawal from, 441,

501; NATO membership, lxxxviii, 456;

political unrest, 45; relations with, 452-53; Russians in, 452; Soviet influ- ence over, 76

Latvians: political parties of, 42; in Russian Empire, 28; Russifi cation of, 37

Lavrov, Petr, 40 Lay ofIgor's Campaign, 222 LDPR. See Liberal-Democratic Party of

Russia League of Nations: Soviet Union in, 76 League of the Militant Godless, 206 League of the Three Emperors, 38-39 Lebanon: relations with, 480-81

Lebed', Aleksandr, lxxviii, cvi, 398, 441, 507; dismissed, lxxx, Ixxxii; presidential aspirations, Ixxxii; as Security

Council head, lxxx, lxxxiii, 523

Lebedev, Vyacheslav, 407

legal code: in Kievan Rus', 7; of 1649,

17-18; westernization of, 26

Legislative Commission (1767), 26 Lena Plateau, 129 Lena River, 133

702
Index

Lenin, Vladimir {see also Ul'yanov,

Vladimir), 55, 67; assassination attempt on, 64; background, 59; death, 67; economy under, 66-68,

300-301; exiled, 60; and military doctrine, 495; name change, 43

Leningrad: seige of, 493 Leningrad Oblast: population growth,

157; power sharing, 411 Leningrad Rock Club, 230 Leonov, Leonid, 226 Lermontov, Mikhail, 224-25

Leskov, Nikolay, 225, 230

Lezgin people, 179

Li Peng, xc Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 403; in 1993 elections, 416;

in 1995 elections, 419

Liberman, Yevsey, 95-96

Libya: policy toward, 444; relations with, 478, 479

life expectancy, 124, 155; for men, Ixiv,

ciii, 155, 159-60, 267; for women, lxiv, 155,267

A Lifefor the Tsar (Glinka), 228

Life of the Archpriest Avvakum, 223

Ligachev, Yegor, 1 09

Likhachev, Dmitriy, 162 Likhachev Automotive Plant, 352

Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), 90

List'ev, Vladislav, 574

literacy rate, 264, 347; of peasants, 36

literature, xcvi, 222-28; acmeist, 225-26; Aesopic language in, 225; under

Brezhnev, 97; under Catherine the Great, 223; collectivization of, 74;

erotic, 256; futurist, 225-26; under

Gorbachev, 227; history of, 222-23;

influences on, 222; nineteenth-century, 224-26; under Peter the Great,

223; post-Soviet, 227; realist, 224-25,

226; social questions in, 224, 225;

Soviet, 70, 74, 97, 226-28; under Stalin, 70, 74, 226; symbolist, 225; under

Yeltsin, 227-28

Lithuania: annexed, 77; blockade of, 114; border of Russia with, 126; decla- ration of independence, 114, 118,

387; declaration of sovereignty, lv, 113; military withdrawal from, 441, 501; NATO membership, lxxxviii, 456;

political parties in, 42; Soviet influence over, 76; Volhynia annexed by,

10; wars against, 14

Lithuanians: in Russian Empire, 28; Russifi cation of, 37

Litvinov, Maksim, 76, 217

livestock, 325; cattle, 191, 325; overgrazing by, 138; pigs, 325; production, 330;

raising, 181, 182, 185, 189, 191; sheep,

325; slaughtered, 72

living standards, lxviii; under Brezhnev,

96-97, 348; decline, 158, 242, 245,

267, 302; under New Economic Pro- gram, 66; under Nicholas II, 42; under

Yeltsin, 245, 348

Livshits, Aleksandr, lxx, lxxviii Lobov, Oleg, 441 Logovaz, 372 Lomonosov, Mikhail, 24, 223 London Club, lxix, 379 London Straits Convention (1841), 32

Lucinschi, Petru, xciv Lukashyenka, Alyaksandr, xciii-xciv Lukin, Vladimir, 443, 416

Lukoil, 332-35

Luk'yanov, Anatoliy, 112

Lunacharskiy, Anatoliy, 70

Lutherans: missionaries, 210; in Russian Empire, 28, 213

Luzhkov, Yuriy, lxvi, xcii, 320; presidential aspirations, lxxxii L'vov, Georgiy, 58

Lysenko, Trofim, 82

McDermott Oil, 339 machine-building industry, 354; in Dagestan, 178; investment in, 303; in Mordovia, 186; in Russia, 354; in Tatarstan, 187; production, 354

mafiya (see also organized crime), lxvi, lxxi-lxxii, 573; corruption by, lxxi, 320; influence, 573; members, 574; in privatization program, 316; protection

payments to, lxxi, cii, 242, 244, 320; shutde trading by, 320 Magadan, 363

magnitizdat, 230 Magnitogorsk: metallurgical combine,

351; pollution in, 137, 139

Magyars, 5 Main Directorate for Corrective Labor

Camps (Gulag), 588-89

703
Russia: A Country Study

Main Directorate for Organized Crime

(GUOP),580

Main Guard Directorate (GUO), 566-

67; Alpha Group, 566-67; missions, 566 Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU),

526-27

Malaya: Soviet involvement in, 84

Malaysia: arms sales to, 474, 521 Malenkov, Georgiy, 85; as prime minister, 86; purged, 85, 87

Malevich, Kazimir, 234

Manchuria: ventures into, 42, 44

Mandel'shtam, Osip, 217, 226 Mansi tribe, 153; geographic distribution, 175 manufacturing, 350-56; decline, 350-51; under Gorbachev, 350; under Khrushchev, 350; under Stalin, 350 Mao Zedong, 84, 89, 469 Marathon Oil, 339 Mari El, Republic of, 175, 186; area, 186; ethnic groups, 186; language, 196;

population, 186; religion, 186 Mari people, 172, 186; as percentage of population, 173, 185, 186, 188; sovereignty, 196, 414 Maritime (Primorskiy) Territory, lxxxv, 192; commercial activity, xcv; sover- eignty movement, 414

marriage: ceremonies, 207-8; commonlaw, 158; rates, 156, 253; under Stalin, 70

Marshall Plan, 81, 83 Marx, Karl, 206 Marxism-Leninism, 67-68; repudiated, 432

Maskhadov, Asian, lxxxi maternity, 269-71; benefits, lxii, 251-52,

288-89, 291; prenatal care, 270

materiel: buildup, 57, 95; joint production, 522; maintenance, 543, 544;

nuclear, 95, 100; procurement, 518-

20; production, 72, 517-18; sales, lix, lxxxviii, ci, 459, 463, 469-70, 477, 479-

80, 510, 518, 520-23, 546-47

Mavrodi, Sergey, 345

Mayakovskiy, Vladimir, 70, 226 MB. See Security, Ministry of media, 422-26; broadcast, 424-26;

under glasnost, 423; print, 423-24; and

public opinion, 423; in Soviet system,

422-23 Media-Most holding company, 372 men: life expectancy, lxiv, ciii, 155, 159-

60, 267; mortality rate, 155; retirement

age, 288

Mensheviks, 43; exiled, 67; in Petrograd

Soviet, 59 merchant marine, 363

metallurgy: exports, 352, 376; ferrous,

34, 47, 82, 351-52; investment in, 303;

in Kabardino-Balkaria, 181; nonferrous, 352; obsolete, 351; under Peter the Great, 22; pollution caused by, 137; production in, 351; production

costs, 352; refitting of industry, 351 Methodist Church, 213

Mexico: foreign policy on, 481 MICEX. See Moscow International Currency Exchange

Michael, Grand Duke, 58 middle class: discontent, 4; poverty in, 244

Middle East, 478-81; policy toward, 479;

relations with, 474, 477, 483

"Mighty Five," 228 migration (see also immigration; refugees), 161-67, 161-67; by Armenians,

161; freedom of, 420; by Germans,

161, 191; issues, 162-65; by Jews, 37, 161, 216-17, 218-19; by Koreans, 192; patterns, 165-67; from rural areas,

156, 247-48; to rural areas, 156; from

Russia, 156-57; to Russia, 124, 154, 156-57, 162, 448, 450; by Russians,

lxxxi, 164, 165, 166, 448, 450; from

Soviet Union, 161

migration, internal, 161-62; passport for, 161, 164, 283, 293; restrictions, 164-

65; to urban areas, 156 Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG) Aviation-Scientific Production Complex, 517;

research and development, 520

military communications, 367

military conscription: failure, 549-50; under Peter the Great, 22; resistance

to, lviii, 255

military doctrine, Ivii, of the future, 499-

501

military doctrine, Soviet, lvi, 495-96;

basis, 495; defense-oriented, 496; emphasis, 496; and high-technology

war, 496; and reasonable sufficiency,

704
Index

496

military doctrine of 1993, lvii, 436, 494-

501; approved, 497; and border security, 497; and chain of command, 525; defensive, 489; economic principles, 499; goals, 497, 498; interim, 497-98;

military principles, 498-99; military- technical principles, 499; offensive, 489; official definition, 496; and

peacekeeping role, 497; political principles, 497-98; and weapons of mass

destruction, 499

military-industrial complex. See defense

industry

military officers, lvi, lvii, 541; crime by, 546, 576; under Peter the Great, 22, 490; political, 492, 493

military schools, 492, 547

military service: alternative, 420; resis- tance to, 255, 549

Military Service, Law on, 549

military technology: Western influence

on, 20, 21 military training, 504, 541, 544, 547-48;

in the field, 547-48; in schools, 547

Military University, 547

militia. See police

Minatom. See Atomic Energy, Ministry of

minerals, lxvii; export of, 376 mining: of coal, 137, 189, 190; of dia- monds, 190; geographic distribution, 181, 182, 183, 185; of gold, 181, 189,

190, 191; of iron, 181, 185, 189, 190; pollution caused by, 137, 138

minorities. See ethnic groups; nationalities Mirzayanov, W, 586, 588

Missile Technology Control Regime

(1993), 456

missionaries, lxv, 210-11; registration of, 211; restrictions on, cvi, 211

Mitsubishi, 339

Mitsui, 339 MMM investment company, 345 Mogila (Mohyla), Metropolitan, 20 Moldavian Republic: ethnic clashes in, 114; independence movement in, 114 Moldova, 450, 506-7; in Commonwealth

of Independent States, 450; ethnic Russians in, 450; foreign policy

toward, 450; military intervention in, xci, 490, 506, 507; and NATO, lxxxviii

Molniya satellite communications sys- tem, 368

Molotov, Vyacheslav, 76; purged, 85, 87 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. See Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact

monasteries, 203, 204-6 monetary policy, 342; credits, 309, 342; under Yeltsin, lxix, 309 Mongolia: border of Russia with, 126;

relations with, xcv; troop withdrawal

from, 501 Mongols (see also Golden Horde), 12; influences of, 11; invasions by, 3, 10-

11, 174, 187 Montenegro: in Balkan wars, 49

Montreal Protocol, 153

Mordovia, Republic of, 175, 186-87; eco- nomic sovereignty, 197, 414; economy,

186; ethnic groups, 186; population,

186; religion, 186; social structure, 186 Mordovian people, 172, 186; as percent- age of population, 153, 173, 186, 187 Mormons, 213

Morozov, Boris, 17 Mosbusinessbank, 343 Moscow, 126; birthrate, 268; crime, 572-

73; defense, 493; defense industry,

515; economic power, lxvi, 320; elite

class, lxvi; gay community in, 257; gov- ernment moved to, 62; HIV infection

rate, 274; homeless population, 292-

93; industry, 34, 352, 354; investment

in, lxvi, 320; occupations of, 15; ori- gin, 10; political unrest in, 45; pollu- tion in, lxii, 137-38, 139, 140;

population, 154, 160; privatization in, 320; refugees in, 162-63, 164; status, 409; subway system, 364, 367; unemployment, 349 Moscow, patriarchate of, 15 Moscow Aircraft Production Association (MAPO),517 Moscow Basin: coal in, 336 Moscow International Bank, 344 Moscow International Currency

Exchange (MICEX), 345 Moscow Military District, 529, 530, 541 Moscow Oblast: population growth, 157 Moscow State University, 265; founded,

24; business school, 266 Mother Heroines, 288

mountains, 126-29, 130-32

705
Russia: A Country Study

Mozambique: Soviet influence in, 94

Mstislavich Dynasty, 10 Murmansk, 363 Muscovy, 3, 11-20; expansion of, 3, 12,

14, 18, 174; influences of, 3, 11; ori- gins, 9; rise of, 11-12; wars of, 19

music, 228-30; ballet, 229; under Brezhnev, 97-98; classical, 32, 228-30; folk, 228,230; jazz, 230; opera, 228, 229; rock, 230; of Roma, 193; in Soviet Union, 97-98, 229, 230 Muslims {see also Islam): number of, 202;

political parties of, 43; repression of, 179; in Russian Empire, 28

Musorgskiy, Modest, 228 MVD. See Ministry for Internal Affairs

Nagorno-Karabakh, 113, 114; peace- keeping troops in, xcv, ci, 453, 459,

505, 506; refugees from, 162

Nagy, Imre, 89; rehabilitated, 103 Nakhodka, 363, 477 Napoleon: invasion of Russia, 29-30;

wars against, 28-31 , 491

narcotics {see also drug addiction; drug

trafficking), 272-73, 575-77; availability, 244; international conventions on, 577; legalized use, 273; production,

576; users, 272 Narodnaya, Mount, 131 Narodniki. See Populists

Nateq-Noori, Ali Akbar, xcvii nationalism: Russian, 31-32, 82

nationalist factions, Ixv, lxxii, lxxvi, Ixxviii, lxxxiv, lxxxvii, xc, xci, xcii, xciii Nationalist Party (China). See Guomindang

nationalities {see also ethnic groups; see also under individual nationalities) , 1 23, 174-94; birthrates, 157; under consti- tution, 219; inclusion, 25; number,

172; origins, 9; political parties, 42; regions for, liv, 408; rights, 386, 420;

Russification, 37; suppression of, 31

nationality problems: under Gorbachev,

112-17; under Russian Empire, 4, 27;

in Russian Federation, 195, 200-201

nationalization: of banking, 300; of

industry, 65, 70, 71, 300; of land, 300; of trade, 300

National Patriotic Union of Russia, lxxviii national security: collective pact for, 449; conceptual theses on, 500-501; criti- cism of, 423; as foreign policy problem, 459-60; policy, ci, 446-47, 490,

501; strategies to protect, 500; threats, 90, 437, 453, 461, 467, 498, 500, 501 National Socialist German Workers'

Party. See Nazi Party NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization natural gas, 335-36; consumption, 332, 338; deposits, 332; export, 309, 331,

332, 339, 376; fields, 129, 335; foreign

investment, 338-40; geographic distri- bution, 177, 180, 184, 185, 190; hard

currency from, 323, 331; prices, 376; production, 335; reserves, 321-23.

335; taxes on, 309, 339, 347

natural resources, lxvii, 195, 297, 321-23;

access to, lxvii, lxxxvi, 436; of Bashkortostan, 185; of Buryatia, 189; of Chuvashia, 196; of Mari El, 196; of Sakha,

190, 197; of Tatarstan, 187

Natural Resources, Ministry of, lxxix navy: access to Black Sea, 37; aviation

force, 532; conscripts, 531; fleets, 532-

33, 544; materiel, 519, 532, 533; mission, 531-32, 533; modernized, 490; personnel, 531; origins, 22; under

Peter the Great, 21, 22; pollution by, 147; shortages, 544; readiness, 543-44;

training, 544

Nazarbayev, Nursultan, xciii Nazdratenko, Yevgeniy, lxxxv, 414

Nazi Party: Soviet support for, 75

Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1939),

56, 76; repudiated, 77 near abroad: collective security with, 449; foreign policy toward, 447-48;

immigration from, 166; influence in, 447; military actions in, 447-48, 490;

relations with, 433, 436, 442, 474; Russians in, lvi, 124, 433, 435, 448; security in, 559; trade with, 376

Nechayev, Sergey, 40

neformaly, 108-9

Neftegorsk: destroyed, 132

Neizvestnyy, Ernest, 234

Nekrasov, Nikolay, 225 Nemtsov, Boris, lxxix, cvi Nenets Autonomous Region, 176

706
Index

Nenets people, 160 NEP. See New Economic Policy

Nerchinsk, Treaty of (1689), 19 New Economic Policy (NEP), 65-70,

300; discontinued, 71 newspapers (see also media), 423-24; number of, 423; privatized, 371-72;

quality, 424 New Regional Policy faction, 417

Nezamsimaya gazeta, 423, 424 Nicaragua: relations with, 481, 482;

Soviet influence in, 94, 481 Nicholas I (r. 1825-55), 31-33; death,

33; foreign policy, 32; as gendarme of Europe, 32, 491 Nicholas II (r. 1894-1917): abdication,

55, 58; executed, 64; foreign relations under, 43; reforms under, 5, 47-48; in World War I, 50, 57-58

Nigeria: relations with, 478

Nijinsky, Vaslav, 231

Nikolayev, Andrey, 568

Nikitin, Aleksandr, lxi Nizhniy Novgorod: industry, 352, 354,

522; population, 154; subway system, 364

Nizhniy Tagil: defense industry in, 518;

metallurgical combine, 351; pollution

in, 139 NKVD. See People's Commissariat for

Internal Affairs Nobel Prize for Literature, 226, 227 Nobel Prize for Peace, 105

nobles: education for, 22; military ser- vice by, 22, 490; under Peter the Great,

22; privileges, 18; state service, 17-18,

22, 26

Nobles' Land Bank, 36 Nogay people, 172, 179; origins of, 179

nomenklatura, lxvi, 240, 241 Nonaligned Movement, 477

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Treaty on the (1970), 95, 438, 457,

499, 513

Noril'sk, 129; cancer in, 268; pollution

in, 139; population, 129

Noril'sk Nickel Joint-Stock Company,

317,352

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 463-64; in Bosnia, 464; cooperation with, lxxxvii, 437j criti- cism of, 464; expansion of, lxxxvii,

Ixxxviii-lxxxix, xc, xcii, xciv, xcviiixcix, ci, 460, 484, 510; as foreign policy problem, 438, 459-60, 463-64,

467, 468, 512-13; members, 456, 458,

460, 463-64, 467; membership, lxxxix, 456; origins, 84; as security threat, 461,

484, 500-501 North Caucasus, 176-83; ethnic groups,

172; immigration to, 166; industry,

355; infant mortality, 270; oil fields, 332; sovereignty movement, 171 North Caucasus Military District, 529,

531,535,541 North Dvina River, 1 33; pollution of, 141 Northern Fleet, 532, 534; mission, 533 Northern Lights natural gas pipeline, 364 Northern Military District, 536, 541 Northern Territories, 471-72 North Korea. See Korea, Democratic People's Republic of North Ossetia, Republic of, 175; agricul- ture, 183; area, 182; ethnic groups,

174, 182; Ingushetia's claim in, 178; mining in, 183, 323; population, 157,

182; refugees from, 200; refugees in, 165 North Siberian Lowland, 129, 131 Northwest Association, lxxxvi, 414 Norway: aid from, 147; border of Russia

with, 126

The Nose (Shostakovich) , 229 Novgorod, Republic of, 9; political struc- ture, 9; tribute to Mongols, 10 Novgorod Oblast: architecture of, 232; population growth, 157

Novodvorskaya, Valeriya, 255

Novokuznetsk: pollution in, 139

Novolipetsk: metallurgical combine, 351

Novorossiysk, 363

Novosibirsk: defense industry, 519; pol- lution in, 140; population, 154; sub- way system, 364 Novovoronezh nuclear reactor, 337 NPG. See Independent Miners' Union NPRUP. See Independent Trade Union

of Workers in the Coal-Mining Industry NTV. See Independent Television nuclear arms, 513-15, 537; in Belarus,

452, 513, 539; buildup, 95, 461, 493,

500; in China, 89; control talks, 100,

707
Russia: A Country Study

103; deactivation, 513; deployment,

100, 454, 458, 495-96; disposal, 513; in Kazakstan, 513, 539; in national security doctrine, ci; in North Korea, 476; number of, 513; pollution from, 137,

147; reduction, 442, 513; security, 513, 514, 574-75; testing, 137, 459; theft, 337, 513-14, 574; threat, 454; transfer, 453, 458; in Ukraine, 453, 458, 513, 539

nuclear energy consumption, 332

nuclear energy generation, 337-38; acci- dents from, 107, 137, 147, 267; financial problems, 337; new capacity, 337-

38; pollution from, lxi, 137, 138, 146-

48, 268, 337, 472, 514; reactors, 337

nuclear materials: disposal, 337; illness caused by, 268; theft, 337, 513-14 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. See Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

nuclear technology sales: to China, 469;

to Cuba, 460, 483; to Iran, lxxxviii, 456, 457, 459, 460, 480

nuclear war: views of, 88 Nur All-Russia Muslim Public Movement, 216

Nureyev, Rudolf, 231 The Nutcracker (Tchaikovsky) , 229

Nystad, Treaty of ( 1 72 1 ) , 22

oblasts, 409

Ob' River: hydroelectric plant on, 338 October Manifesto (1905), 45

Octobrists, 46, 47 OECD. See Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development

Ogarkov, Nikolay, 101, 496

oil, 332-35; companies, 332-35; consumption, 332; exploration, 332, 335, 339; export, 309, 331, 332, 335, 339,

375, 376; fields, xcii, 129, 332; foreign

investment, 338^40; geographic distri- bution, 177, 180, 184, 185, 187, 201, 332; hard currency from, 323, 331;

prices, 376; production, 41, 332;

reserves, 332; spills, 138; taxes on, 309, 339, 347, 374; waste of, 332

Oil and Gas, Law on (1995), 378

Oirot people. See Kalmyk people

Oka River: pollution of, 141

Okhrana, 37 Okudzhava, Bulat, 230 Old Church Slavonic: development of, 222

Oleg, 6 Olesha, \liriy, 226 Olympic boycotts: Los Angeles, 101; Moscow, 95, 454 Oman: in Caspian Pipeline Consortium,

c OMON. See Special Forces Police

Detachment

Omsk: industry, 355; pollution in, 139; population, 154 One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich

(Solzhenitsyn), 227 Onega, Lake, 133; pollution of, 142 Operation Hurricane, 584

Operation Barbarossa, 56, 78

Operational-Investigative Activity, Law

on (1995), 584 Opium War, Second (1856-60), 38

oprichnina, 14 Order Number One, 59 Orenburg gas field, 364; pipeline, 364 Orenburg Oblast: immigration to, 165; power sharing by, 41

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): membership in, 372

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) , 464; cooperation with,437; peacekeeping by, 450;

treaty obligations of, 498 Organization of American States: ties with, 481 Organs of the Federal Security Service, Law on (1995), 5663, 564

Orlov, Aleksey, 24 ORT. See Russian Public Television OSCE. See Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe

Ossetia: annexed, 182

Ossetians: immigration by, 164; lan- guage, 182; origins, 182; as percentage

of population, 182

Ostrovskiy, Aleksandr, 225

Ostrovskiy, Nikolay, 226 Ottoman Empire: in Balkan wars, 49; peace with, 21; relations with, 7, 32; wars with, 6, 21-22, 24, 25, 26, 32, 33,

39, 491

708
Index

Our Home Is Russia party, 417-18; in 1995 elections, 419; in 1996 elections,

Ixxvii

Pacific Fleet, 532, 534-35

painting, 232-34; ancient, 232; of icons, 232, 233; impressionist, 233; realistic, 233

Pak, Zinoviy, 516, 524

Pakistan: relations with, 474

Pale of Settlement, 25, 217 Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO): relations with, 479

Palestinians: Soviet support for, 94

Pal'm, Viktor: in Interregional Group,

112

Pamfilova, Ella, 255

Pamyat', 258 Paramonova, Tat'vana, 255, 312, 313, 341 Pardons Commission, 588

Paris, Treatv of (1856), 37

Paris Club, lxix, 379 parliament {see also Federal Assembly), 400-406; conflicts with Yeltsin, lxviii, lxxvi, 385, 405-6, 442, 560-61; dis- solved, lxxvi, 385, 390, 442, 443; factions, lxxxvii, 417; foreign policy, 442-

44; threats to dissolve, 562; women in, 255 Partnership for Economic Progress

(PFEP),459

Partnership for Peace (PfP) program,

xciv, 437, 460, 464, 467, 512

passport, internal, 161, 164, 283, 293;

fees for, 293

Pasternak, Boris, 217, 226

Patrikeyev, Valeriy, 527

Paul I (r. 1796-1801), 28; assassinated, 29

Pavlov, Valentin, 106, 117

Pavlova, Anna, 231 Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), 464 peacekeeping forces: in Armenia, c-ci, 505; in Azerbaijan, 458, 459; in Bosnia, xci, 460, 468; in Central Asia, 490, 491, 498, 507-9; in Georgia, xci, 448, 449, 451, 456, 458, 459, 505, 570; in Moldova, xci, 490, 506, 507; in Nagorno-Karabakh, 453, 459, 505, 506; strategic importance, 504; in

Tajikistan, xci, 448, 449, 451,458, 459, 507-8, 570

Peasant Farms, Law on (1990) , 328

Peasant Land Bank, 36

peasants: agricultural role after emancipation, 34; in armed forces, 490; deported, 72; escapes by, 18; forced

collectivization, 56, 71-72, 108; gov- ernment requisitions from, 65; in Kievan Rus', 8; as kulaks, 72; literacy, 36; living conditions, 241, 244; political parties, 42; reforms for, 47; in 1905 revolution, 4-5, 45; under the Romanovs, 18, 34, 36; starvation of, 72, 108; state, 18, 34; traditional justice by, 35; uprisings, 65; wages, 96; under war communism, 65 Pechora River, 133

Peipus, Lake, 133 pensioners: employment, 246, 287; income, 287; number, 287; sex ratio among, 288; support for, 286

Pension Fund, lxiii, 286-87; administration, 287; budget, 287

pensions, lxii, 286-88; categories, 287; indexation, lxii, lxiii, 287, 288; nonpayment, lxiii, lxxxii, civ, 287; reform,

lxiii, 287-88

Pentecostal Church, 212, 213 People's Commissariat for Internal

Affairs (NKVD), 73, 556

People's Will, 41

perestroika, lxviii, 105-7, 298, 304-6; campaign, 106; in industry, 106; invest- ment under, 377; and migration, 161;

results of, 106-7, 466; and trade, 305

Pereyaslavl', Treaty of (1654), 19

periodicals, 424; number of, 423; thick

journals, 225, 228

Perm' Oblast: power sharing by, 41

1

Permyak Autonomous Region, 176

Perov, Vasiliy, 233

Perry, William, xc

Persian Gulf, 438; policy toward, 479

Persian Gulf War (1990-91): support for, 104-5, 455, 479

Peru: relations with, 482; Soviet involve- ment in, 481 Pervomayskoye: destroyed, 199, 502

Peshcherskiy monastyr' (Monastery of

the Caves) , 7

Peter the Great (Peter I) (r. 1682-1725),

709
Russia: A Country Study

20-23; architecture under, 232-33; armed forces under, 21, 490; ballet under, 230; as co-tsar, 21; crowned, 21; Grand Embassy of, 21; literature under, 223; reforms under, 21-23,

204; religion under, 204; successor to, 23; Western influence under, 4, 21,

230, 232-33

Peter II (r. 1727-30), 23 Peter III (r. 1762): crowned, 24; deposed, 24

Petipa, Marius, 231 Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Sol- diers' Deputies, 58; factions, 59;

Trotsky as chairman, 60

Petropavlosk-Kamchatskiy, 363

Petrushka (Stravinskiy) , 229 PFEP. See Partnership for Economic

Progress

PfP. See Partnership for Peace

Pil'nyak, Boris, 226

pipelines, 364; through Chechnya, c, 502; gas, xciii, 336, 364, 453, 502; net- work, 364; petroleum, xciii, 177, 335,

364, 502

Plekhanov, Georgiy, 41 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization Pobedonostsev, Konstantin, 37

Podgornyy, Nikolay, 92

poetry, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227 pogroms, 217

Poland: border with, 63, 126; elections

in, 103; Galicia annexed by, 10; industry, 34; influences by, 20; martial law

in, 465; Moscow occupied by, 15; in NATO, lxxxviii, 463-64; oppression

under, 19; partitioned, 25, 76; political parties, 42; reforms in, 25; relations

with, 17; Soviet influence in, 83, 465; Soviet invasion of, 77, 465; Soviet

troops withdrawn from, 104, 163, 501; trade with, 375; uprisings against, 18-

19; uprisings in, 25, 32, 45, 89, 465,

491; wars against, 14, 19, 24, 63

Poland, Kingdom of: created, 30

Polar Lights, 339

Poles, 173; discrimination against, 48; political parties of, 42; in Russian

Empire, 25, 28; Russification of, 37

Polevanov, Viktor, 316

police (militia), 558, 578, 579-80; cooperation with organized crime, lx, lxxilxxii, cii, 574, 580; corruption, lx,

lxxii, cii, 580; functions, 579, 583, 584; human rights abuses by, 580-81; inad- equacy, 580; organization, 580;

reform, 578; weapons, 580, 583

police, secret (see also Committee for

State Security): under Bolshevik rule, 62; in Russian Empire, 28, 31, 37; under Stalin, 73

Polish Socialist Party, 42

Politburo (Political Bureau): foreign policy under, 431; members, 93; purged, 67

Political Bureau. See Politburo

political demonstrations: against subsidy

cuts, cv; against World War I, 59

political opposition: against Yeltsin,

lxxvi, lxxviii, lxxxiv, Ixxvii; in Belarus,

xciii; suppression of, 559

political parties (see also under individual

parties): under constitution of 1993,

415; creation, 417-18; in elections of 1993, 416; of nationalities, 42; peasant, 42; Polish, 42; working class, 42

political unrest: of intelligentsia, 33; under Romanovs, 18, 33, 51; in World War I, 50

political uprisings: by nationalities, 113,

184; by peasants, 65; against Poles, 18; of 1648, 17, 18-19; of 1905, 45; of

1917,52,58

pollution: and acid rain, 146; of air, ciii, lxi, 123, 137, 138-39; diseases caused

by, ciii, 268; geographic distribution

of, 143; radioactive, lxi, 137, 138, 146-

48, 268, 337, 472, 514; of water, lxi, 123,137,138,139-44

Poltava, Battle of (1709) , 490

Poor Lisa (Karamzin), 224

Popov, Gavriil: in Interregional Group,

112

Popov, Valeriy, 227

Poptsov, Oleg, 426 popular fronts: growth, 108-9; in republics, 108, 113, 114 Popular Movement for Perestroika

(Rukh), 114 population, 153-67; age distribution,

155, 161; decreases, lxiv, 153, 154, 155;

density, 154; distribution, liii, 33-34,

123, 129, 130, 154; ethnic distribution,

710
Index

153, 173; in 1995, 124, 154; projected,

ciii; in taiga, 130; in tundra, 129 population statistics: birthrate, 124, 155, 156, 157, 158, 268; death rate, 157,

159, 267; fertility rate, 157-58, 269; growth rate, 34, 269; infant mortality

rate, 97, 158, 269-70, 278; life expectancy, 97, 124, 155, 159-60, 267; maternal mortality rate, 158; mortality rate, 124, 155; sex ratio, 155, 267

Populists, 40

ports, 129, 363; access to, 436

Potanin, Vladimir, Ixx Potsdam Conference (1945), 83 poverty, 154-55; of families, 244;

increase in, lxii, lxv, lxvi, 285-86; in middle class, 244; number living in, 245; among state employees, 244, 245; subsistence minimum, 292 Prague Spring, 94

Pravda, 423, 424

Presbyterian Church, 213

presidency, 112; established, 387

president (see also executive branch): as commander in chief, 396, 525; conflicts with parliament, 406, 442-43;

election, 396-99; foreign policy, 439-

40; informal powers, 394-96; powers,

391, 392-96, 412-13, 564; qualifications, 396; staff, 394; succession to,

lxxxiv, 393, 396-97; term of office, 396

Presidential Elections, Law on (1995), 397

Presidential Press Service, 395-96

Presidential Security Service, 440, 566, 567

press (see akojournalists; media; newspapers) : freedom of, 420

Prevention of AIDS, Law on (1990), 274

price controls, 298, 299, 302, 303, 308-9,

321, 331

price decontrol, lxviii, lxix, 313 Primakov, Yevgeniy, lxxviii, lxxxvii,

lxxxix, xcv, xcviii, 104, 446, 474, 482, 484

Primary Chronicle, 6, 222 prime minister, 391, 399; appointment,

404; staff, 400

Primorskiy Territory. See Maritime Terri- tory

Prince Igor' (Borodin) , 228

Principles of the Forest (1993), 146

Principles of Relations, Treaty on

(1992), 477

prisoners, political: under Khrushchev,

87; psychiatric hospitalization of, 276-

77

prison inmates: amnesty for, cii; awaiting

trial, cii, 407, 590; drug addiction, 390; number of, cii, 589, 590

prisons, 588-91; budget, ciii; conditions,

lx-lxi, cii, 589-90; labor camps, 588-

89; overcrowding, cii, 589, 591;

reforms, lx, ciii, 591

private sector: under Gorbachev, 304; as percentage of gross domestic product, 380

privatization, lxviii, lxix, civ-cv, 314-18,

380-81; corruption scandals, lxix-lxx,

lxxvii, 316-17, 561; financing, 344;

goals, cv; of housing, lxvi, cv, 282;

investigations into, 317; of land, 284; of media, 425; in Moscow, 320; resis- tance to, civ-cv; share sales for, lxx, 316; of state enterprises, 299, 318; of telecommunications, cv, 368, 369,

371-72; vouchers for, 315-16

Privatization of Housing, Law on (1991), 282

Procuracy, 558, 582, 591; corruption,

lxxii, 582; personnel, 582; reforms,

582; role, 582 procurator general, lxi; appointment,

394 Production-Sharing Agreement (1995), 378

Progressive Bloc, 51 Prokofyev, Sergey, 229, 230

proletariat (see also workers): living conditions, 240-41; origins, 4 Promstroybank. See Industry and Construction Bank

property, private, 420

prostitution, 253

Protestantism (see also under individual

denominations), lxv, 212; ethnic affilia- tions with, 212; followers, 212; missionaries, 211

Protocol Directorate, 396

provinces: organization of, 26

Provisional Government (1917), 55, 492; constituents of, 59; organized, 58; overthrown, 61; religion under, 206;

rights granted by, 59

711
Russia: A Country Study

Prudnikov, Viktor, 544

Prussia (see also Germany): and partition of Poland, 25; in Quadruple Alliance,

30; relations with, 37, 38

Pskov, 12 Pskov Oblast: population growth, 157

publishing: private, 227-28; samizdat,

226, 227

Pugachev, Emel'yan, 26 Pugachev Uprising, 26 Pugo, Boris, 117

purges: cultural, 82; in Eastern Europe,

84; ofJews, 218; by KGB, lix, 556; of

party, 82; of Politburo, 67; under Stalin, 56, 70-71, 72-74, 82, 84, 493

Pushkin, Aleksandr, 32, 224-25

Putoran Mountains, 131

Pyatigorsk: hostage crisis in, 571

Quaker missionaries, 210

The Quiet Don (Sholokhov), 226 Qizilqum Desert: expansion of, 144 Quqon (Kokand) Khanate: annexed, 38

Rabin, Oskar, 234 Rachmaninov, Sergey, 229

radio, 371-72; programming, 371, 424-

25; sets, number of, 372, 424; in Soviet system, 423; transmission operations,

371 Radishchev, Aleksandr, 27, 224 Rahmonov, Imomali, xciv

railroads, 359-60; construction, 44, 48; debts to, cv; development, 34, 36, 41,

42; network, 34, 359; reform, cv Rapallo, Treaty of (1922) , 69

Rasputin, 51; assassinated, 51

Rastrelli, Bartolomeo, 232-33

Razin, Stenka, 18 RCB. See Russian Central Bank

Reagan, Ronald W., 99-100; summit

meetings with Gorbachev, 102-3, 454-

55

reconstruction, 81-82 Red Army, 492; casualties in, 493; in Civil War, 62; communists in, 492; purges

in, 493; terror by, 64-65; under

Trotsky, 62 Red Terror, 64-65 reform: under Alexander II, 34-37;

under Catherine II, 26-27; demands

for, 4-5; under Gorbachev, 57, 102, 109-12; under Khrushchev, 85-86, 90-91; under Nicholas II, 5; under

Peter the Great, 21-23; in Poland, 25; resistance to, 47-48, 388; under

Stolypin, 46-47; under Yeltsin, liv, lxxvi, 388

refugees (see also immigration; migration): from Chechnya, lxxxi, 200; geo- graphic distribution, 166-67, 200;

illegal, 162; laws on, 163; number, 162, 164; origins, 162; registration, 163; resentment toward, 165; support for, 163

Regent, Tat'yana, 255

religion (see also under individual sects) , lxiv-lxv, 202-20; animist, 186; under

Bolsheviks, 206-7; under Brezhnev,

98; censorship of, 37; and foreign policy, 220; freedom of, 172, 202-3, 211,

420; under Gorbachev, 208; influences on, 171; under Khrushchev, 207; in Kievan Rus', 7, 173; persecution of, 37,

75, 206, 212; practice, 98, 171; restric- tions on, cvi-cvii, 211; revival, xcvi, 207-8; under Stalin, 75 Repin, Il'ya, 233

Republican Party, 255

reservoirs, 133-34, 145 Revolution of 1905, 4-5, 44-45; origins, 45

revolutionary movements, 40-41; under

Alexander II, 30, 40; Decembrist, 30-

31; Jews in, 217

Rimskiy-Korsakov, Nikolay, 228

The Rite ofSpring (Stravinskiy) , 229, 231

rivers: geographic distribution of, 133; in Siberia, 129; transportation on, 363

roads, 359; maintenance, 359; network, 359

Rodionov, Igor', lviii, lix, lxxix, cii, 526

Rodionov, Petr, cvi Roma (Gypsies), 193-94; discrimination

against, 193-94; occupations, 193; ori- gins, 192-93; population, 192; Russka,

193; Vlach, 193 Roman Catholic Church, lxv; and ecu- menism, 21

Roman Catholicism: missionaries, 210 Roman Catholics: in Russian Federation,

213; in Russian Empire, 28

712
Index

Romania: environmental protection in, 142; Soviet influence over, 76, 83, 89, 94, 465; Soviet invasion of, 77, 465 Roman Mstislavich, Prince, 10 Romanov, Mikhail: proclaimed tsar, 15 Romanov Dynasty, 15, 17-18

Roosevelt, Theodore, 44

Rosgosstrakh. See Russian State Insur- ance Company

Rossel', Eduard, lxxxv

Rossel'bank, 343; branches of, 344

Rossiyskaya gazeta, 424

Rossiyskiye vesti, 424

Rossugol', 336 Rostelekom. See Russian Telecommunications

Rostov, 9, 12 Rostov-na-Donu: HIV infection rate in, 274

Rostov Oblast: pollution in, 140; power

sharing by, 411

Rostropovich, Mstislav, 229 Rosvneshtorgbank. See Foreign Trade

Bank

Rosvooruzheniye. See State Corporation

for Export and Import of Armaments

Royal Dutch Shell, 339

Rubinstein, Anton, 228

Rubinstein, Nikolay, 228

ruble. See currency ruble zone: conditions for, 452; Tajiki- stan in, 451

Rublev, Andrey, 232 Rukh. See Popular Movement for Perestroika Rukhin, Yevgeniy, 234

rural areas, 247-48; education in, 260, 264; migration from, 156, 247-48;

migration to, 156, 248; social mobility

in, 247; Soviets in, 247

Rurik, 6 Rurik Dynasty, 1

2

Rus'ka pravda, 7 Ruslan and Lyudmila (Glinka) , 228

Russian Central Bank (RCB), 308, 309,

341; chairman, 341, 393; credits issued

by, 311, 342; debt service under, 342; exchange rates under, 314, 342; money supply under, lxxii, 3^2

Russian-Chinese Bank, 44

Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)

{see also Ail-Union Communist Party

[Bolshevik]; Bolsheviks; Russian

Social Democratic Labor Party), 115; membership, 492; party congresses,

66; religion under, 206; Soviet Union

established by, 55

Russian Communist Party, 116; banned,

118; established, 387

Russian Empire: in Continental Blockade, 29; expansion of, 3, 24, 38, 174, 201, 491; industrial development

under, 34; in League of the Three

Emperors, 38-39; nationality problems, 4, 216-17; origins, 3, 20; palace

revolutions in, 23-24; and partition of

Poland, 25; in Quadruple Alliance, 30;

in Triple Entente, 48; in World War I, 50-52

Russian Far East climate, 134

Russian language, 220-22; under Brezhnev, 221; under constitution of 1993,

391; compulsory study of, 221; domi- nance of, 172, 177; use in Soviet

republics, 221; as official language,

221,391

Russian Music Society, 228

Russian Orthodox Church, 15, 183, 185, 203-10; anti-Semitism in, 219; beliefs, 203; brotherhoods, 209; under communism, 202, 206-7; cooperation with government, lxiv, lxv, 171-72, 204,

210; dominant postion, lxv, cvi-cvi, 211, 213-14; and ecumenism, 211; fol- lowers, 202, 234; history, 203-10; isola- tion, 19-20, 204; laws regarding, 208; millennium of, lxv, 208; monasteries,

203, 204-6; origins, 203-4; parishes, 207, 209; in public opinion, 209-10;

repression of, 48, 206; rituals, 203; schism, 19-20, 204; social services,

209; structure, 203; under tsarism, 22,

28, 202, 204 Russian people, 123, 172, 173-74; in Adygea, 176; in Bashkortostan, 184-

85; birthrates, 157; in Buryatia, 188; in Chechnya, 177; in Chuvashia, 186; in Dagestan, 179; dual citizenship, 448, 453, 421; ethnic conflicts, 195, 199,

433, 435; in Gorno-Altay, 189; immigration by, 164, 165, 166, 448, 450;

institutions of, 386, 387; in KabardinoBalkaria, 180; in Kalmykia, 181; in Karachay-Cherkessia, 182; in Karelia,

713
Russia: A Country Study

183; in Khakassia, 190; in Komi, 184;

as majority ethnic group, liv, 153, 171, 176, 386, 408, 453; in Man El, 186; in Mordovia, 186; nationalism of, 113, 115-16; in near abroad, 124, 433, 435, 448, 451, 452, 453, 508, 509; in North

Ossetia, 182; origins, 9, 174; in Russian

Federation, 124, 153; in Sakha, 190; in Tatarstan, 187; in Tyva, 191; in Udmurtia, 188

Russian People's Friendship University, 265

Russian People's Republican party, lxxx Russian Poland. See Poland, Kingdom of Russian Public Television (ORT), 371, 425

Russian Republic: borders, 63, 64; decla- ration of sovereignty, 116, 386-87;

nationality issues in, 115-16; distribu- tion of power in, 409-10; in Soviet Union, 55, 66; Virgin Lands campaign

in, 90-91

Russian River Fleet, 363 Russian Social Democratic Labor Party

(see also Bolsheviks; Mensheviks; Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik]),

42; factions of, 43, 59; party congresses, 43; in Petrograd Soviet, 59

Russian State Insurance Company (Rosgosstrakh): privatized, 317

Russian State Television, 371; privatized, 371 Russian Telecommunications (Rostele- kom) , lxix-lxx, 368

Russian Women's Party, 255 Russia-United States International

Space Station, lxxiv Russifi cation, 116; and language, 221; of

nationalities, 37; origins, 26; by reli- gion, 207; resistance to, 4

Russia's Choice party (see also Russia's Democratic Choice), 149, 416

Russia's Democratic Choice party (see

also Russia's Choice) , 150, 419; in 1995

elections, 419

Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), 4, 43-44, 471,491

Rutskoy, Aleksandr, lxxxiv, 417; as presi- dent, 390

Rutul people, 179

Ryazan', 12 Rybinsk Reservoir, 133

Rybkin, Ivan, lxxx, 417

Rybkin bloc, 417

Ryzhkov, Nikolay, 106

Sadko (Rimskiy-Korsakov), 228

Sagalayev, Eduard, 425

St. Basil's Cathedral, 232

St. Petersburg (see also Leningrad), 126; architecture, 232-33; birthrate, 268; climate, 135; construction of, 23; crime, 572-73; defense industry, 515; HIV infection rate, 274; industry, 34, 354; pollution in, lxii, 139; population, 154, 160; power sharing by, 411;

status, 409; subway system, 364

St. Petersburg Maritime Port, 363; privatized, 317

St. Petersburg nuclear reactor, 337

St. Petersburg State University, 265

St. Petersburg Television, 371 Sakha, Republic of (Yakutia), 126, 175,

190; area, 190; economy, 190; ethnic groups, 190; natural resources, lxii, 190, 197; population, 157, 190; sovereignty, lv, 197, 414

Sakhalin Island: ceded to Japan, 44, 471; Koreans in, 192 Sakharov, Andrey: in Interregional

Group, 110

salinization, 138 SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail, 225

Salvation Army: homeless services, 293;

missionaries, 210 Samara: pollution in, 139; population,

154; subway system, 364

samizdat, 226, 227

Samsonov, Viktor, cii San Stefano, Treaty of (1878), 39

Saratov: immigration to, 165 Saudi Arabia: relations with, 105, 478;

visits to, 479

Savings Bank (Sberbank) , 340; branches,

344; reorganized, 343

Sayan Aluminum, 352

Sayan Mountains, 130

Sberbank. See Savings Bank

Scheherezade (Rimskiy-Korsakov), 228

Schnittke, Alfred, 230

schools: business, 265-66; curricula, 36,

714
Index

262; enrollment, 260, 263; grade struc- ture, 262-63; infrastructure, 260; in Kievan Rus', 7; military, 492; number

of, 260; under Peter the Great, 22; pri- mary, 36; private, lxiv, 263-64; problems, 258-59; religious, 216, 219-20;

rural, 260; secondary, 263; tuition,

263; urban, 260

science: under Brezhnev, 97; collectivized, 74; language in, 221; Marxist the- ories of, 74-75; under Stalin, 82

Scythians, 5 The Seagull (Chekhov) , 225 Sea of Azov: pollution of, 138 Sea ofJapan: pollution of, 147, 472, 514

secrecy laws, 585-86

securities market, 344-45; irregularities

in, 345; treasury bonds in, lxxii-lxxiii,

lxxv, 345

Security, Ministry of (MB) {see also Federal Counterintelligence Service), 560; Committee for the Protection of State Borders, 568; control of, 560; counterintelligence by, 560; dismantled, 562;

missions, 560, 561-62; personnel, 560; powers, 560

Security Council, ci, 394-95, 440-42;

function, 440; head, lxxx, lxxxiii, 398, 523; Interdepartmental Foreign Policy

Commission, 435, 441; meetings, 441; members, 440-41

Seleznev, Gennadiy, lxxxiii Semenov, Vladimir, 545

Semipalatinsk: nuclear testing at, 137

Serbia: arms embargo against, 522; policy toward, 443^4, 445, 467, 480; Russian protection of, 39, 49; sanctions

against, xci, 468

Serbs, 173

serfs, 18, 20, 71; emancipation, 4, 27, 34-

35; post-emancipation agricultural

role, 34

Sergeyev, Igor', cii, 542

services sector: under Chernenko, 100; denationalized, 66; employment in, 347; energy consumption by, 338; under New Economic Program, 66; as percentage of gross domestic product, 319

Sevastopol': jurisdiction dispute, xcii, ci; siege of, 491 Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 212, 213

Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), 91 Seven Years' War (1756-63), 24

Severstal' Joint-Stock Company, 351 sexual attitudes, ciii, 255-58; toward

homosexuality, 257-58; toward premarital sex, 257

sexual harassment, 252-53, 254, 256

Shaimiyev, Mintimer, Ixxxvi shamanism, 206

Shamil, 38 Shevardnadze, Eduard, xciv, 101-2; as Soviet foreign minister, 434

Shlyakhtin, Viktor, 568

Sholokhov, Mikhail, 226

Shostakovich, Dmitriy, 229, 230 Shumeyko, Vladimir, 410, 482

Shuyskiy, Vasiliy: proclaimed tsar, 15 Siberia, 188-91; agriculture, 323;

annexed, 19; coal mining, 336; deportation to, 73, 191, 198; development,

123; gas fields, 335; infant mortality, 270; iron, 323; metallurgy, 352; oil

fields, 332

Siberian Accord Association, Ixxxvi, 414

Siberian Khanate, 14

Siberian Military District, 529, 531, 535 Sigismund III, 17

Sinyavskiy, Andrey, 227

Sisters of Charity, 210

Skokov, Yuriy, 441

Skryabin, Aleksandr, 229

Skuratov, Yuriy, lxi slaves: in Kievan Rus', 8

Slavic languages, 220

Slavophiles, 31-32; lxxxvii

Slavs, 123, 172; origins and culture, 5

Slavs, East, 5-6, 173; expansion, 5-6, 9; isolation, 7; literature, 222; origins, 5; religion, 173

Slavs, West, 173

Slavs, South, 173

Sleeping Beauty (Tchaikovsky), 229

Slovakia: troop withdrawal from, 501

Slovaks, 173

Slovenes, 173 smoking, ciii, 267, 272; campaign

against, 272; cancer from, 268 Smolensk nuclear reactor, 337

The Snow Maiden (Rimskiy-Korsakov)

,

228

Sochi, 363

Social Insurance Fund, 248, 286, 290-91;

715
Russia: A Country Study

reform of, 290-91

Social Investment Bank (Zhilsotsbank),

341, 343

"socialism in one country," 68-69

socialist realism, 74; in architecture, 234;

in art, 233, 234; in ballet, 231; in litera- ture, 224-25, 226; in painting, 233

Socialist Revolutionary Party, 45; members of, exiled, 67; in Petrograd Soviet, 59

Socialist Workers' Party, 255

Social Protection, Ministry of, lxiii, 286,

287; funds, 286

Social Protection of Disabled Persons in the Russian Federation, Law on

(1995), 278

social security: decline, 239, 312

social stratification, 240-45; increase,

241 , 242; in Soviet Union, 240-41

social structure, 239-58; class status within, 246; mobility within, 245; in Soviet Union, 239-40, 248; transition

of, 240, 242, 248, 285

social welfare, lxii-lxiii, 285-94, 420; administration, 286; budget, 286;

problems, lxii, 285-86

Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions, 590

Socio-Ecological Union, 250

Sofia (r. 1682-89): as regent, 21 Solana, Javier, lxxxix, xciv

Soldiers' Mothers Movement, 255

Solidarity trade union, 94

Solomentsev, Mikhail, 109

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 227, 425

Somalia: refugees from, 162 Sophia Paleologue, 13 Soskovets, Oleg, lxxvii, 396, 483, 520, 567 South Africa: ties with, 478 South Bug River: pollution of, 142 South Korea. See Korea, Republic of South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast

(Georgia), 451 sovereignty movements, lv, lxxvi, 113,

114, 171, 172-73, 194-202, 387, 412, 413-15, 474, 570-71; in Adygea, 196;

in Bashkortostan, 196; in Buryatia,

196; campaign to reverse, lxxxvi; in Chechnya, 171, 175, 177, 178, 194,

197; in Chukchi Autonomous Region,

196; in Chuvashia, 196; domino effect

of, 201-2; in Gorno-Altay, 196; impetus for, 413, 414; in Ingushetia, 175,

178, 197; in Kabardino-Balkaria, 197;

in Karelia, 196; in Komi, 196; in Mari

El, 196; in Mordovia, 197; policy

toward, 201, 559, 563; in Tatarstan, 196

Sovetskaya Rossiya, 424

Soviet-Finnish War (1939-40), 77

Soviets, 55

Soviet Union: Afghanistan invaded by, 57, 94, 454; and China, 56; crime in, 571-72, 578; dissolved, lvi, 388; and

Eastern Europe, 56; economy, lxvii; education, 258-59, 265; environment, 136-37; established, 55, 66, 385-86; expansion, 77, 82-83; foreign relations, 79, 84, 104, 444, 461; German

invasion of, 56, 78-79; health care, 274, 274-77; hot line to, 90; housing, 280-81; investment in, 377; Jews in, 217; in League of Nations, 76; in Limited Test Ban Treaty, 90; migration

from, 161; music, 97-98, 229, 230; nostalgia for, lxvi; republics, 55, 66-67,

108, 385-86; social security, 239; social status in, 240; social structure, 239-40;

standards of dress in, 256; support for liberation movements, 76, 84; with- drawal from Afghanistan, 103; women

in, 251-52 Sovnarkom. See Council of People's

Commissars

Spanish Civil War, 76 Spanish language: broadcasts in, 425 Special Forces Police Detachment

(OMON),581

Speranskiy, Mikhail, 29

spies: under Nicholas I, 31; under

Yeltsin, 582

Stalin, Joseph V., 43; ballet under, 231; as commander in chief, 525; cult of personality, 74, 87; death, 85; denounced

by Khrushchev, 86, 87; economy

under, 300-301; foreign policy, 69-70;

as general secretary, 67; literature under, 70, 74, 226; manufacturing

under, 350; military doctrine of, 495; opinions of, 67; purges by, 56, 70-71,

72-74, 82, 84, 493; rehabilitated, 100-

101; rise to power, 55, 68-69; succession to, 86; in troika, 67, 68

716
Index

Stalingrad, Battle of (1943), 56, 78, 493

Stanovoy Range, 132

Starodubtsev, Vasiliy, lxxxiv

Starov, Ivan, 233

Starovoytov, Aleksandr, 565 START I. ^Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty State Armament and Military Equipment Sales Company (Voyentekh), 547

State Bank (Gosbank), 340; established,

36; eliminated, 341

State Border of the Russian Federation, Law on the (1993), 570

State Committee for Agrarian Reform,

328

State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) , 350

State Committee for the Defense Industry (Goskomoboronprom), 516

State Committee for the Management of

State property, 316

State Committee for the Protection of Nature (Goskompriroda), 149

State Construction Committee (Goskomstroy), 149, 281 State Corporation for Export and

Import of Armaments (Rosvooruzheniye): customers of, 521, 546

State Customs Committee: drug control

staff, 577

State Duma: antireform activities, lxix,

lxxvi, lxxix; budget votes, lxxiii, lxxviii; chairman, 402; committees, 402-3,

443; distribution of power in, 410, 419; members, 400, 401; military reform hearings, lvii; powers, 403-4,

443; production sharing agreements,

lxxv; religion legislation, lxv, cvi, cvii; role in Consultative Council, lxxxiii; START II deliberations, xc, xci State Emergency Committee, 117

state enterprises: control over, 304;

debts, 310, 311, 312; economic targets, 298; employees, 311; under perestroika, 304; privatization, 299

State Enterprises, Law on (1988), 106, 304

State Environmental Protection Committee, lxxix

state of emergency, 396, 421

state of the federation speeches, 436-38;

of 1994, 436-37; of 1995, 437-38; of

1996, 406, 438; of 1997, lxxxii State Natural Gas Company (Gazprom),

lxx, 310, 336; corruption in, civ, cvcvi, 336; investment in, lxxiv-lxxv; takeover of, cv-cvi State Planning Committee (Gosplan),

71, 297

State Space Agency, 510

State Taxation Service (STS), lxx, lxxi, 347

State Traffic Inspectorate, 580

Stavropol' Territory: flooding in, 145; immigration to, 165; pollution in, 140

steel, 351; production, 34, 47, 82, 351

Stepashin, Sergey, 562-63, 564

steppe, 126, 130; environmental degradation in, 138; overgrazing in, 138

stock market, 344-45; irregularities in, 345

Stolypin, Petr: assassinated, 47; as prime

minister, 46, 47

Stolypin government, 46-47; reforms

under, 46

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT),

95, 454; signed, 95 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START I), 105, 455, 484, 500, 513,

514,519

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), lxxxix-xc, xci, 438, 455-

56, 457, 459, 512, 514-15; opposition

to, 515, xc, xci Strategic Rocket Forces, 538-39; bases, 538-39; conscripts, 538; mission, 538; nuclear weapons, 538; personnel, 538

Stravinskiy, Igor', 229

strikes, lxxv-lxxvi; coal, lxxv, 350; under

Nicholas II, 42, 45, 51, 52; teachers',

lxiv; under war communism, 65 Stroganov family, 14

Stroybank. See Construction Bank

Stroyev, Yegor, lxxxiii STS. See State Taxation Service student associations: environmental,

249-50

student demonstrations: in Estonia, 113

students: activism of, 249-50; expelled from school, 263

subsidies: to Cuba, 482; for defense

industry, 517; housing, lxii, cv, 280,

282; transportation, 360, 367; under

717
Russia: A Country Study

Yeltsin, lxviii, lxxi, 308

suffrage: under constitution of 1905, 46; under constitution of 1936, 73

suicide, 160, 239,546

Sukhoy Chkalov Aircraft Plant, 519 Sukhoy Design Bureau, 519 Sukhoy Holding Corporation, 517

Sumarokov, Aleksandr, 223 Summit of the Eight, xc-xci, xcviii Superior Court of Arbitration: judges,

393, 403; jurisdiction, 408; members,

407-8 Supreme Court: judges, 393, 403; juris- diction, 407; members, 407 Supreme Soviet: dissolved, 110; and for- eign policy, 456; Yeltsin in, 110, 386, 560 Surgut industry in, 355

Suslov, Mikhail, 98

Suvorov, Aleksandr, 28, 491

Suzdal', 9

Sverdlovsk Oblast, lxxxv; power sharing

by, 411; sovereignty movement in, 414

Svyazinvest. See Communications Invest- mentJoint-Stock Company

Swan Lake (Tchaikovsky) , 229 Sweden: wars against, 14, 21, 490

Switzerland: investment from, 378; trade

with, 375

symbolists, 225

Syria: arms sales to, 479-80, 521; military support for, 94; relations with, 94, 478

Tabasaran people, 179 Table of Ranks: introduced, 22

Taglioni, Marie, 231

taiga, 126, 129-30; environmental degra- dation in, 138; population in, 130

Taiwan. See China, Republic of

Tajikistan: armed forces, 508; border,

508, 570; in Commonwealth of Inde- pendent States, 118, 388, 449; ethnic

conflict in, 569; ethnic groups, 187; ethnic Russians in, 473-74; immigration from, 166; peacekeeping forces

in, xci, 448, 449, 451, 458, 459, 507-8,

570; riots in, 114

Tajiks: immigration by, 164 Tambov Oblast: population growth, 157

Tanker Derbent (Krymov), 226 Tannenberg, Battle of (1914), 50

Tatar language, 221

Tatars, 187; geographic distribution,

187; language, 187; migration, 164, 187; origins, 187; as percentage of

population, 153, 173, 185, 186, 187,

188, 190

Tatars, Crimean, 180; independence of, 25

Tatarstan, Republic of, 175, 187; industry, 187; natural resources, lv, 187; power sharing by, lxxxvi, 411; sover- eignty, 196, 198, 414; trade agreements, ci tax code, ciii-civ taxes, 345-47; avoidance of, lxx, lxxxvlxxxvi, civ, 242, 245, 346, 580; under

Bolsheviks, 66; collection, lxiii, lxxlxxi, ciii, civ, 313, 346, 379, 410; corporate profits, 346; energy, 309, 339, 347,

374; excise, 346, 374; exemptions, 347; export, 346-47, 374; under Gorbachev, 306; import, 346-47, 373; income, 309; under Peter the Great,

22; reform, lxviii, lxx, 309, 346, 380; revenue from, lxx, civ, 313, 319; under

the Romanovs, 18, 42; value-added,

309, 346, 374; under Yeltsin, 308-9 Taymyr Autonomous Region, 176 Taymyr Peninsula, 130

Tchaikovsky, Peter Ilich, 229, 231

teachers, 261-62; income of, lxiv, 247,

261, 263; shortage of, 261-62; status

of, 247, 261; strikes by, lxiv, lxxv, ciii; women as, 246

technology: Western influences on, 4

telecommunications, 367-72; decentralized, 368; foreign investment in, cv, 369-70; infrastructure, 356, 367, 369, 370; modernized, 368; monitored,

565; privatized, 368; regulations, 370; reorganized, 368; by satellite, 368; under Soviet system, 367-68

telephones: cellular, 370; distribution, 368; expansion of system, 371; invest- ment in, 371; long-distance service, 370-71; modernization, 368, 371; number of, 367, 368; privatized, 369;

rates, 370

television, 371-72; channels, 372; number of sets, 372, 425; political campaign advertising on, 426; privatized, 425; programming, 371, 425; in Soviet

718
Index

system, 423; state-run, 425-26; trans- mission, 371, 372

territories, 409

terrorism, 575; in Chechnya, c, 201, 575;

in Dagestan, 178; incidence of, 575; under Nicholas II, 45, 46; by organized crime, 575; suppression of, 559,

563, 566-67

Texaco, 339

textile industry, 354; under First

Five-Year Plan, 301; under Peter the

Great, 22

theater, 232; erotic, 256 Third Section, 31 Third World, 477-78; influence in, 88, 94, 494; policies, 475; Soviet client

states, 477; ties with, 477

The Three Sisters (Chekhov) , 225

Tilsit, Treaty of (1807), 29 Time of Troubles, 14-17

Tito, Josip Broz, 84, 465

Tkachev, Petr, 40

Tobol'sk: industry in, 355 Tokyo Declaration (1993), 472

Tolstaya, Tat'yana, 227

Tolstoy, Dmitriy, 37

Tolstoy, Lev, 225

topography, 126-32; arid zone, 126; lowlands, 129; mountains, 126-29; plains, 129; plateaus, 129; steppe, 126, 130;

taiga, 126, 129-30; tundra, 126, 129 Topozero, Lake, 134

trade {see also exports; imports), lxxiv,

lxvii-lxviii, Ixix, 373-76; with China, 470; with Cuba, 483; with Eastern

Europe, 83; geographical distribution, 375-76; investment in, 378; by Kievan

Rus', 6, 7; with Latin America, 482; nationalized, 300; under New Eco- nomic Policy, 66; under perestroika, 305, 306; in Russian Empire, 34; shuttle, 319-20; with Taiwan, 470; taxes

on, 346-47, 373-74; volume, 375 trade unions, 248-49; strikes by, lxiv, lxxv, ciii, 42, 45,51,52, 54, 350 Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia, 249 Transbaikal Military District, 529, 531, 535

Transcaucasian Republic: autonomy for, 108; in Soviet Union, 55, 63, 66, 385

transportation, 356-67; air, 360-63; airports, 360; bus, 367; energy consumption by, 338; of freight, 359-60;

infrastructure, 356, 367; under New

Economic Policy, 66; of passengers,

360; pipelines, xciii, c, 177, 335, 336,

364, 453, 502; ports, 363; public, 364; railroads, cv, 34, 36, 41, 42, 44, 48, 359-60; reform, 367; roads, 359; under Soviet system, 356; subsidies, 360, 367; tramway, 367; water, 133, 363-64

Trans-Siberian Railroad, 42, 336

treaties: with Byzantine Empire, 6; defense, 84; power-sharing, 411

Trediakovskiy, Vasiliy, 223

Trezzini, Domenico, 232-33

Trifonov, Yuriy, 97

Trilateral Nuclear Statement (1994),

453, 458

Triple Entente, 48

Trotsky, Leon, 217; as chairman of Petro- grad Soviet, 60; as commissar of war,

62, 492; imprisoned, 60; murdered,

73; purged, 68; released from prison, 60 Truman Doctrine, 83 Tsakhur people, 179

tsar: origins of title, 12-13; succession,

28; training, 525

Tsushima, Battle of (1905), 491

Tsvetayeva, Marina, 226 Tukhachevskiy, Mikhail, 492; executed,

77, 493

Tula Oblast: population growth, 157

Tuleyev, Aman, lxxix tundra, 126; environmental degradation

of, 138, 184; population in, 129

Turgenev, Ivan, 32, 225

Turkestan, Guberniya of: formed, 38

Turkey: aid to, 478; arms sales to, 521; environmental protection in, 142; expansion into, 83; influence of, 506;

relations with, 436

Turkic languages, 220 Turkmenistan: in Commonwealth of Independent States, 118, 388, 450;

ethnic Russians in, 473-74, 508; mili- tary intervention in, 508; natural

resources, xcii, 335; relations with, 452 Turkmen Republic: autonomy for, 108;

in Soviet Union, 66

Turks, 180; nationality unrest by, 114; as

719
Russia: A Country Study

refugees, 162

Turner, Ted, 425

Tuva. SeeTyvz Tuvinian people, 191; conflicts of, with

Russians, 195

Tver' nuclear reactor, 337

Tver' Oblast: population growth, 157; power sharing by, 41

TV-6, 425 Tyumen' Oblast: population growth, 157

Tyutchev, Fedor, 225

Tyva, Republic of, 175, 190-91; economy, 191; ethnic conflict, 195; infant

mortality, 270; life expectancy, 160; population, 157, 191; religion, 191;

sovereignty movement, 414

Udmurtia, Republic of, 175, 188;

defense industry, 515; ethnic distribu- tion, 188; industry, 188; population, 188; sovereignty movement, 414; unemployment, 349 Udmurt people, 172, 188; as percentage

of population, 173, 188

Ufa: founded, 184; pollution in, 139 Ukraine: air force, 536; annexed, 18; border of Russia with, 126, 569; in Commonwealth of Independent

States, 118, 388, 450; conflicts with, ci, 433, 434; cooperation with Azerbaijan

and Georgia, ci; environmental pro- tection in, 142; immigration from,

166; navy, ci, 533; nuclear weapons in, 453, 458, 513, 539; political parties, 42; relations with, ci, 433, 434, 453;

relations with NATO, lxxxviii, xcii; sov- ereignty, 504; trade with, ci, 376; upris- ings in, 18-19 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox

Church, 212 Ukrainian people, 123, 172; discrimination against, 48; immigration by, 164;

origins, 9, 174; as percentage of population, 153, 173, 176, 183, 187, 188,

190; in Russian Empire, 25, 28; Russifi- cation of, 37

Ukrainian Republic: autonomy, 108, 114, 388; nationalism in, 114; popular

front in, 114; in Soviet Union, 55, 63,

66, 385

Ul'yanov, Aleksandr, 41

Ul'yanov, Vladimir {see also Lenin,

Vladimir), 41; exiled, 43; name

change, 43 underemployment, 348 unemployment, lxv, 348-49, 380; aver- age term of, 349; compensation, 292,

349, 420; distribution, 354; rate, lxxiii, 291-92, 348-49; of women, 252 Uneximbank of Moscow, cv, 317 UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Uniate Church: repression of, 31; in Russian Empire, 28, 31 Unification Church, 210

Unified Electric Power System of Russia, 338; privatized, 317 Union, Treaty of (1922), 385; annulled, 388 Union of Christians of the Evangelical

Faith Pentecostal, 213 Union of December 12 faction, 417 Union of Evangelical Baptist Churches,

212 Union of Evangelical Christian

Churches, 212-13 Union of Evangelical Christians, 213 Union of Liberation: formed, 45 Union of Muslims of Russia, 216 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union

Union of Soviet Writers, 226 Union of Unions, 45 United Arab Emirates: arms sales to, 479-80,521,522-23

United Confederation of Koreans in

Russia, 192 United Nations: cooperation with, 437,

498; membership in, 434, 468; peace- keeping missions, 450

United Nations Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 577 United Nations Convention on Refugees, 162 United Nations Convention on the Law

of the Sea (1982), 153 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 162 United Socialist Revolutionary Party, 43 United States: aid from, 147, 455, 456-

57, 458; Alaska sold to, 38; in Caspian

Pipeline Consortium, c; grain

embargo by, 95; hot line to, 90; invest720
Index

ment from, 378, 459; in Limited Test Ban Treaty, 90; military assistance from, 514; narcotics control training

by, 577; nuclear arms deployed by, 100; relations with, 37, 69, 79-81, 89-

90, 99-100, 101, 102-3, 104, 438, 442, 454-60, 476; as security threat, 90,

437, 453; trade with, 375-76

universities, 264, 265; autonomy of, 36;

restrictions on, 36, 37

Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), 32

Uralic peoples, 1 72 Ural Military District, 529, 531 , 535

Ural Mountains, 123, 130, 131 Ural Regional Association, lxxxvi, 414

Ural republics: coal, 336; ethnic groups,

172; gas fields, 335; immigration to, 166; industry, 354, 355; infant mortality, 270; minerals, 323; oil fields, 332;

political unrest, 45; sovereignty movement, 171 Ural River: pollution of, 141

urbanization, 156; end of, 157; and fertility rate, 157 Urengoy: gas fields, 335-36; industry in, 355 Urgent Measures to Implement the Pro- gram to Step Up the Fight Against

Crime (1994), 583

Ussuri River, 133 Ust'-Orda Buryat Autonomous Region,

176

utilities prices, 299

Uvarov, Sergey, 31 Uzbekistan: autonomy for, 108; in Commonwealth of Independent States, 118, 388; ethnic groups, 187; ethnic

Russians in, 473-74; foreign relations,

xciv; immigration from, 166; nationality clashes in, 113; refugees from, 162; relations with, 452; in Soviet Union,

66

Uzbeks: nationality unrest by, 114

Vagonka Works, 518 Vancouver Declaration (1993), 457

Varangians, 6 Vartazarova, Lyudmila, 255

Vasiliylll (r. 1505-33), 12 Vasyugane Swamp, 133 VChK. S^Cheka

Venetsianov, Aleksey, 233

Venezuela: trade with, 482

Verkhoyansk: climate in, 135 Vietnam: arms sales to, 521; guest workers from, 475; military ties with, 474;

relations with, 475

Virgin Lands campaign, 90-91, 323

Vladimir, Prince (r. 978-1015), 6; Christianity adopted by, 7, 203; marriage of, 6-7

Vladimir (city), 9; architecture of, 232

Vladimir-Suzdal', 9

Vladivostok: guest workers in, 192; Japa- nese occupation of, 471 ; port, 363 Vneshtorgbank. See Foreign Trade Bank

vodka: availability, 97; price controls,

309; revenues from, 306

Voice of Russia, 425

Voinovich, Vladimir, 227

Volga Automotive Plant (Avtovaz), 352

Volga Economic Region, 323

Volga Military District, 529, 530-31, 541 Volga republics: ethnic groups, 172; immigration to, 166; infant mortality, 270; life expectancy, 160; sovereignty

movement, 171 Volga River, 132, 133; hydroelectric plant on, 338; pollution of, 138, 140, 141, 143-44

Volga-Ural region: gas and oil fields, 332,

335, 355 Volgograd: HIV infection rate in, 274;

legislation in, 411-12; pollution in, 139

Volkonskiy, Aleksey, 230

Vorkuta coal field, 336

Voronezh: immigration to, 166

Voyentekh. See State Armament and Mili- tary Equipment Sales Company

Voznesenskiy, Andrey, 227

Vrubel', Mikhail, 233

Vuktyl gas field, 364

Vyg, Lake, 134

Vysotskiy, Vladimir, 98, 230

wages, 245-47, 349-50; failure to pay, lvi, lviii, lxiii, lxix, lxxii, lxxv, lxxxii, ciii, civ, 245, 249, 312, 314, 337, 349-50,

381, 542, 579; of health care workers,

277; increase in, lxxiii, 350; minimum,

245, 420; payment, 340; of peasants,

721
Russia: A Country Study

96; reduction, lxvi, 348; of soldiers, lvi, 542-43; of state employees, 311; of women, 252; of workers, 106 War and Peace (Tolstoy) , 225 war communism, 64-65, 300 War Industries Committee, 51 War of Polish Succession (1733-35), 24 Warsaw Pact, 465; dissolved, lvi, 104, 466, 494; military doctrine, 496

water: contaminants, 140-41, 142; geo- graphic distribution, 132-33; pollution, lxi-lxii, 123, 137, 138, 139, 152, 267; quality, 139-44; reservoirs, 133-

34; resources, 123, 132-33; shortages, 140; transportation, 133, 363-64;

treatment, 140

waterways, inland, 363 Werewolf Legion, 584 Western countries: cooperation with, 432; as security threat, 437; relations

with, xciv, 88 Western Europe: detente with 461; influ- ences by, 20; relations with, 103, 438, 461-63, 483; trade with, lxix, 375 Western influence, xcvii; on art, 232-33; under Catherine the Great, 28; on lit- erature, 222; on music, 230; under

Peter the Great, 4, 20, 230, 232-33; on

religion, 171; on technology, 4, 21 westernization, 24, 31; attraction of, 210, 211; of culture, 4; of education, 22-23;

of elite, 26-27; of legal code, 26; rejec- tion of, xcvii, 211

Westernizers, 31 Western Sayan Mountains, 131 West Siberian Plain, 129, 130, 131, 133; climate in, 135 What is to Be Done? (Chernyshevskiy) , 40 What is to Be Done? (Lenin) , 43 White Army: defeat of, 63-64; in Civil War, 62, 64; support for, 63; terror by, 64-65 White House: military occupation of, 390-91 Winter War (1939-40) , 77, 493

Witte, Sergey: dismissed, 42; economic

programs, 41-42; as prime minister,

46; and October Manifesto, 45 Wladyslaw IV, 17 women: alcohol consumption by, 272; in armed forces, 524, 550; discrimination

against, 252; education of, 36; employment, 158, 246-47, 347; family situa- tion of, 251, 253; fertility of, 158; life expectancy of, lxiv, 155, 267; maternity

leave for, lxii, 251-52, 288-89, 291;

mortality rate of, 155; political influ- ence of, 254—55; retirement age, 288; rights, 251; roles, 251-55; sexual harassment of, 252-53, 254, 256; as single mothers, 158; in Soviet Union,

251-52; status, 252; support for, 251-

52, 286; unemployed, 252, 349; vio- lence against, 252-53, 254, 256; wages, 252 Women of Russia party, 254-55 women's organizations, 253-54 Women's Union of Russia, 254

workers (see also proletariat): absenteeism, 99, 303; benefits, 288-92; drunkenness, 272; number of, 34; as owners

of means of production, 60; productivity, 271; protections, 288-92; repression, 48; in Revolution of 1905, 4-5;

stores for, 290; wages, 106

workers' councils. See Soviets workforce, 347-50 working class: living conditions, 244;

political parties, 42 World Art group, 233 World Bank: aid from, civ, 144, 342; membership in, 372 World Congress of Tatars, 187 World Trade Organization: membership

in, lxxiv, 372 World War I, 49-52, 492; costs, 51, 52; extrication from, 62; public reaction

to, 51, 59 World War II, 76-81; birthrate during,

158; casualties in, 81, 124, 153, 493; and religion, 207, 218

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

(China), 450, 510

Yabloko coalition, lxxiii, 149, 416; in 1995 elections, lxxvii, 419

Yablokov, Aleksey, lxi-lxii, 146, 149

Yakovlev, Aleksandr, 102, 107

Yakunin, Gleb, 208

Yakutia. See Sakha, Republic of Yakut people, 172; origins, 190; as per722
Index

centage of population, 190

Yakutsk: climate, 135

Yalta Conference (1945), 80 Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region,

176 Yamal Peninsula: gas fields, 336 Yamburg gas fields, 335-36

Yanayev, Gennadiv, 117

Yandarbiyev, Zelimkhan, 503

Yaroslav, Prince (the Wise) (r. 1019-54), 6-7

Yaroslavl', 12; industry in, 354

Yaroslavl' Oblast: population growth in, 157

Yasin, Yevgeniy, Ixxiii, lxxviii Yastrzhembskiy, Sergey cvi Yavlinskiy, Grigoriy, lxxviii, 416 Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc (Yabloko), 416, 419

Yazov, Dmitriy, 117 YeEs Rossii. See Unified Electric Power

system of Russia

Yegorov, Nikolay, 394

Yekaterinburg: pollution in, 139; population, 154; subway system, 364

Yeltsin, Boris N., 102; as acting prime

minister, 388; competence of, 427;

conflicts with parliament, lxviii, Ixxvi, 385, 405-6, 442-13, 443, 560-61, 562; criticism of, 423; economic reform

plan, lxviii, 106, 300, 308-9; economic

transition under, 299; elected presi- dent, lxxvi, 117; foreign investment

under, 377; foreign relations under,

117, 471-72; and Gorbachev, 116, 387; heart problems, lxxxi, lxxxii, lxxxiv,

xci; internal security under, 555, 560;

in Interregional Group, 110; move to impeach, lxxxiv, 390, 392; popularity,

lxxxii; possible successors, lxxxii,

lxxxiv; purged, 109; reforms under, liv, 388; special executive powers, lxxvii,

lxxxiii, 388, 389, 426, 441; state of the

federation speeches, lxxxii, 406, 436-

38; summit meetings with Bush, lxxxvii, lxxxix, 457; summit meetings with

Clinton, lxxxvii, 457-60; in Supreme

Soviet, 110, 116, 386 Yemen, Democratic Republic of, 478

Yenisey River, 133; hydroelectric plant

on, 338

Yenisey Valley, 130

Yerin, Viktor, 5 "8 Yermak, 14

Yerofeyev, Viktor, 227

Yesenin, Sergey, 226

Yevtushenko, Yevgeniy, 227

Yezhov, Nikolay, 73 Yezhovsh china, 73

Yiddish language, 221 youth culture, 244-45; tusovki in, 244-45

Yugoslavia: conflicts with, 434, 438;

Soviet influence in, 83, 84, 465

Yugoslavia, former: policy toward, 443-

44, 467-68; Russia's role in, 467-69

Yumashev, Valentin, cvi

Zadanshchina, 222

Zaire: refugees from, 162

Zamyatin, Yevgeniy, 226, 227

Zavtra, 424

Zhdanov, Andrey, 82; murdered, 85 Zhdanovshchina, 82, 229

Zhilsotsbank. See Social Investment Bank

Zhirinovskiy, Madimir, 415

Zhivkov, Todor: deposed, 104

Zhukov, Georgiy, 78, 493; purged, 87

ZhurnaUst, 424

Zinov'yev, Grigoriy, 217; deported to

Siberia, 73; executed, 73; in troika, 67, 68 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 226

Zyuganov, Gennadiy, 398, 416; presidential campaign (1996), lxv, lxxvii, 426

723

Contributors

William Baxter is an analyst of Central Eurasian military affairs for BDM Federal, Inc. William Cooper is a specialist in international trade and

finance for the Congressional Research Service, Library

of Congress.

Glenn E. Curtis is senior research analyst for Central Eurasia

and Central Europe in the Federal Research Division,

Library of Congress.

David M. Goldfrank is professor of history at Georgetown University.

Amy W. Knight has published several monographs on the internal security organizations of the Soviet Union and Russia.

Zenon E. Kohut is director of the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta.

Marian Leighton is an independent researcher on Soviet and

Russian affairs. David McClave is an independent researcher on Soviet and

Russian affairs. James P. Nichol is a specialist in Central Eurasia for the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

Thomas Skallerup is a former research analyst in Soviet affairs in the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

725

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

cca /rc 550-65 Afghanistan CCA f 550-36 Dominican Republic

550-98 Albania and Haiti 550-44 Algeria 550-52 Ecuador

550-59 Angola 550^3 Egypt

550-73 Argentina 550-150 El Salvador

C CA 111 550-111 Armenia, Azerbaijan, CCA 1 1 O 550-113 Estonia, Latvia, and

and Georgia Lithuania

550-169 Australia 550-28 Ethiopia

550-176 Austria 550-167 Finland

550-175 Bangladesh 550-173 Germany

cca in 550-112 Belarus and Moldova CCA 1 CO 550-153 Ghana

550-170 Belgium 550-87 Greece

550-66 Bolivia 550-78 Guatemala

550-20 Brazil 550-174 Guinea

550-168 Bulgaria 550-82 Guyana and Belize

CCA ZT

1

550-61 Burma CCA 1 C

1

550-151 Honduras

550-50 Cambodia 550-165 Hungary

550-166 Cameroon 550-21 India 550-159 Chad 550-154 Indian Ocean

550-77 Chile 550-39 Indonesia

550-60 China 550-68 Iran 550-26 Colombia 550-31 Iraq

550-33 Commonwealth Carib- 550-25 Israel bean, Islands of the 550-182 Italy

550-91 Congo 550-30 Japan

550-90 Costa Rica 550-34 Jordan

550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory 550-114 Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan

Coast) Tajikistan, Turkmeni550-152 Cuba stan, and Uzbekistan

550-22 Cyprus 550-56 Kenya

550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-81 Korea, North

727
550-41 Korea, South 550-37 Rwanda and Burundi

550-58 Laos 550-51 Saudi Arabia

550-24 Lebanon 550-70 Senegal

550-38 T iberia 550-180 Siprra T potip

550-85 Libya 550-184 Sin^anore

550-172 Malawi 550-86 Somalia

550-45 Malavsia 550-93 South Africa

550-161 Mauritania 550-95 Soviet Union

550-79 Mexico 550-179 Spain

550-76 Mongolia 550-96 Sri Lanka

550-49 Morocco 550-27 Sudan

550-64 Mozambique 550-47 Syria

550-35 Nepal and Bhutan 550-62 Tanzania

550-88 Nicaragua 550-53 Thailand

550-157 Nigeria 550-89 Tunisia

550-94 Oceania 550-80 Turkey

550-48 Pakistan 550-74 Ueanda

550-46 Panama 550-97 Uruguay

550-156 Parasuav 550-71 Venezuela

550-185 Persian Oulf States 550-32 Vietoam T IVUH 1 1 1 A Ppm rCIU J J\J lOJ YiprnprtQ TT-io ACaHGaIO, 1 lit 550-72 Philippines 550-99 Yugoslavia

550-162 Poland 550-67 Zaire

550-181 Portugal 550-75 Zambia

550-160 Romania 550-171 Zimbabwe

550-115 Russia

728



PIN: 076185-000