1

Filed 11/12/20 In re B.S. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re B.S. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent;

v.

R.L. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

E074978

(Super.Ct.Nos. J259894, 

 & J261355)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant mother.
2

Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant father.

Pamela J. Walls, Special Counsel and Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Mother and father appeal from a judgment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 

Code1, section 366.26, terminating parental rights as to minors B.S. and K.S.2, following 

a protracted dependency case that commenced in 2015 over mother’s opiate use and 

failure to supervise the children.

3 Father did not seek services or to change his 

designation from alleged father to presumed father for more than a year, when San 

Bernardino County’s Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a supplemental petition 

pursuant to section 387. In the course of those proceedings, father made a request to have 

his status changed to presumed father at the detention hearing, as well as in a subsequent

petition for modification pursuant to section 388. Those requests were denied, and, at the 

jurisdictional hearing on the 387 petition, services were denied for either parent. Due to 

difficulty finding an adoptive placement for the children, the selection and 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless 

otherwise specified.

2 At oral argument, father stated he was only challenging the ruling terminating

parental rights as to B.S., Jr., but his notice of appeal and opening brief, as well as 

mother’s notice of appeal, referred to both children.

3 An older half-sibling, R.S., is not involved in this appeal. References to R.S. are 

for historical context only.
3

implementation hearing did not occur until March 2020, at which time the juvenile court 

terminated parental rights, freeing the children for adoption. Both parents appealed.

On appeal, father argues that (1) the juvenile court erred in not changing his status 

from that of biological father to presumed father; (2) his due process rights were violated 

by the trial court, which terminated his parental rights without a finding of his unfitness.

Mother joins father’s arguments. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

a. Original Dependency Petitions

On April 16, 2015, R.C., a severely autistic child then aged 8 years old, and B.S., 

Jr., then age 2, were taken into CFS custody when they were found to have been left 

alone at home without any supervision. Mother, who was pregnant at the time, returned 

home approximately 40 minutes later, and reported she had left the children in the care of 

a downstairs neighbor to go grocery shopping, but the neighbor was unaware of the 

arrangement and mother returned to the apartment without any groceries. Further, 

mother’s purse was in the apartment while she was gone. Mother was arrested for child 

endangerment. In attempting to locate relatives with whom to place the children, CFS 

learned that the father of B.S., Jr., does not visit the child, does not pay child support, and 

mother had not seen him for months. 

On April 21, 2015, a dependency petition was filed due to neglect by the mother

and father of B.S., Jr. The petition alleged that mother was arrested on April 16, 2015, 
4

for leaving B.S. Jr.4 unattended, within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b), and 

that father was negligent in failing to supervise the child and failing to provide adequate 

food, clothing, shelter or medical treatment. The petition also included an allegation 

under section 300, subdivision (g), that both parents had failed to make provision for 

support of the child in that father’s whereabouts were unknown and mother was 

incarcerated. The child was ordered detained, but father did not attend the original 

detention hearing or the continued hearing. 

The jurisdictional report noted that mother denied substance abuse but admitted to 

having a diagnosis of schizophrenia for which she had previously taken medication. 

During the interview, mother appeared to have developmental delays and displayed a flat 

affect, so the social worker informed mother that the petition would be amended to add 

an allegation of untreated mental health issues. On May 13, 2015, the amended petition 

was filed, adding an allegation that mother has mental issues affecting her ability to 

properly care for the children and which were left untreated.5

On June 4, 2015, the court conducted the jurisdictional hearing as to B.S., Jr., with 

mother present, but father was not present in court. Mother submitted on the petition, 

which was sustained. B.S., Jr. was declared a dependent and removed from the custody 

4 A similar petition respecting R.C. is not included in the record on appeal 

because his status is not at issue in this appeal.

5 Note that in the original petition relating to B.S., Jr., father B.S., Sr. was 

included in allegations under both section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). However, the 

amended petition respecting B.S., Jr., includes allegations against R.C., Sr., the father of 

R.C. 
5

of the parents. A reunification plan was adopted and mother was ordered to participate.

Father B.S., Sr. was deemed an alleged father. There was no appeal from the findings or 

judgment.

In July 2015, K.S. was born with a positive toxicology screen for opiates. Mother 

informed the reporting party that the father, B.S., Sr., was incarcerated. A dependency 

petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), was filed on July 29, 2015, alleging that 

mother’s substance abuse negatively impacted her ability to provide for and parent the 

child and that father B.S., Sr., has a criminal history that negatively impacted his ability 

to provide for the child. The petition included an allegation under section 300, 

subdivision (g), that the alleged father failed to make adequate arrangements for the 

child, as well as under section 300, subdivision (j), that K.S. was at risk based on 

mother’s neglect of her sibling. Mother voluntarily signed a release to allow CFS to take 

the child into temporary custody, so K.S. was taken into custody. Both parents appeared 

at the detention hearing, at which the court ordered the temporary out-of-home placement 

of the child. 

The jurisdiction report for K.S. indicated father was aware of the dependency 

action relating to his son, B.S., Jr., and had contacted CFS about the matter. At that time, 

the social worker had advised him to attend the hearing and request reunification 

services, but father did not, and he did not maintain contact with CFS. The report also 

noted that mother had tested positive for opiates when the court had ordered an ondemand test at the detention hearing. 
6

On August 20, 2015, the jurisdictional hearing was held, for which father and 

mother were both present. Both parents waived trial rights and submitted the petition on 

the basis of the social worker’s reports. The court adopted the findings and 

recommendations set out in the social worker’s report (including the recommended 

finding that father remain an alleged father), declared K.S. a dependent of the court 

pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (g) and (j); it ordered reunification services for 

mother, while also directing her to participate in a psychological evaluation. The court 

dismissed one of the allegations against father, specifically, the allegation that he failed to 

protect the child from mother’s substance abuse. However, it sustained the allegation 

that his criminal history negatively impacts his ability to provide for and parent the child. 

Also as to father, the court found he was an alleged father who is not entitled to services, 

as recommended in the jurisdiction/disposition report. Neither parent appealed.

The six-month review hearing was held on March 21, 2016, at which time 

mother’s services were continued, and CFS was granted authority to liberalize her 

visitation. Father did not appear at the hearing or request to have his status changed to 

presumed father. Neither parent appealed this order.

In May 2016, the 12-month review report respecting B.S., Jr., was submitted, also 

recommending continued services for mother, with a good prognosis for reunification. 

As to father, that report again referred to him as an alleged father who was not entitled to 

services. Father did not attend the hearing on May 23, 2016, where the court ordered 

continued services for mother respecting B.S., Jr., including unsupervised visits. On that 
7

same day, CFS submitted a non-appearance review packet respecting K.S., 

recommending unsupervised visitation due to mother’s continued compliance and 

improved parenting. 

b. Return of the Children to Mother on Family Maintenance

On September 1, 2016, the court approved an extended visit for mother with B.S., 

Jr., as well as K.S. And while the recommendation for the upcoming review hearings 

was to continue reunification services, on September 23, 2016, CFS recommended that 

the children be returned to the mother. That day, the children were returned to mother 

under a family maintenance plan. Father was not present in court at this hearing and 

requested neither reunification services nor a change in his paternal status. 

By May 2017, when the status review report pursuant to section 364 was prepared, 

family maintenance continued, as mother continued to participate in the plan actively.

The only concern for CFS related to R.S., the older half-sibling of B.S., Jr., and K.S., 

whose autism was a substantial disability. In addition to his special needs of an 

educational nature, his behavior exacerbated problems finding an appropriate program for 

him. 

Curiously, the report refers to father’s status as that of alleged father for B.S., Jr., 

but states that as to K.S., he was determined to be “the presumed father, not entitled to 

services at the JD hearing on June 4, 2015.” This appears to be a typographical error 

because it is not supported by the record, which shows that K.S. had not yet been born, 
8

much less adjudicated a dependent, on that date. The minute order dated June 4, 2015, 

relates to B.S., Jr., and found that B.S., Sr., was an alleged father, not entitled to services. 

In an addendum report, the social worker described difficulty mother experienced

getting services for R.S., because after he was returned to her custody, he was no longer 

eligible for AB 490 funding to assist foster children with special needs. Additionally, 

mother had financial difficulties related to the fact it took two months to begin receiving 

assistance for the children. The social worker was also concerned that mother had not 

submitted to random testing as required by her service plan. 

Nevertheless, mother had maintained a clean home with adequate food and 

clothing for the children, they were attached to her, and she showed no signs indicative of 

drug use. On April 21, 2017, the court continued the family maintenance services, and 

ordered mother to submit to on-demand drug testing, although her last on-demand drug 

test was negative. Father did not attend this hearing. 

c. Supplemental Petition and Father’s First 388 Petition

That status quo did not last long. On July 18, 2017, CFS filed a supplemental 

petition pursuant to section 387, alleging that the prior disposition had not been effective 

in the protection of the children, after mother was found passed out in her car, with 

temperatures of almost 100 degrees, with all three children in the vehicle, crying, and 

without child restraints. The car contained children’s clothing and hygiene items 

suggesting the family had been living in it, and prescription medication not prescribed to 

mother were also found. 
9

At the detention hearing, father was present and was ordered to return at a further 

hearing because mother, who had been arrested, had not been transported. The children 

were detained in foster care. At the continued detention hearing, mother was once again 

not transported, but father did appear. He did not request a change in his status.

Mother was finally transported to court on July 21, 2017, for the detention hearing, 

where father again appeared. The parents denied the allegations of the section 387

petition, and the court removed the children from mother’s custody and placed them in 

the temporary custody of CFS. The parents were admonished that pursuant to section 

361.5, the court might not order reunification services. At this hearing, for the first time, 

father requested presumed father status as to both children. 

When interviewed for the jurisdiction report, mother did not seem to grasp the 

seriousness of her actions, taking responsibility only for not having car seats for the two 

younger children. Additional allegations came to light as the social worker learned that 

father had burned K.S. with a cigarette and had hit her in the eye. Further, mother had 

placed B.S., Jr., in very hot bath water, although the time frames for these acts were 

unclear. Regarding paternity, the social worker indicated father was an alleged father as 

to both B.S., Jr., and K.S., having previously been found so by the court at the children’s 

respective jurisdictional/dispositional hearings, and indicated he was not entitled to 

services. 

Prior to the jurisdictional hearing on the section 387 petition, father filed a Request 

to Change Court Order (JV-180, § 388), seeking to be declared the presumed father of all 
10

three children, and to receive reunification services. The petition indicated that there 

were no allegations against him insofar as the prior petitions “only” related to his failure 

to protect the children from mother’s conduct and his in-custody status. Father explained 

he had lived with mother prior to May 2012, during which time he parented R.S., but he 

had been in custody from May 10, 2012 through April 2014, and again from June 1, 2015 

through May 31, 2016. He also stated he lived with mother sharing parental 

responsibilities for R.S. and B.S., Jr., after his 2014 release, until his 2015 reincarceration. And when the children were returned to mother’s custody, mother 

permitted him to visit the children. He explained that but for his custodial status, he 

would have executed voluntary declarations of paternity for each child. 

The court set the matter for hearing and directed CFS to respond to the petition. In 

its response, CFS recommended that the court deny father’s petition, although the social 

worker did note that the children appeared to be comfortable around him at a visit. The 

social worker noted father’s criminal history over the course of the past ten years, which 

included a drug related conviction as well as convictions for being a felon in possession 

of a firearm and actively participating in a criminal street gang, although father had 

attributed his incarceration to burglary. Because of father’s own custodial history, the 

social worker considered that awarding him custody of the children was out of the 

question. 

On October 16, 2017, the court ordered paternity testing for father, but denied the 

section 388 petition because the petition failed to state a change of circumstances and did 
11

not demonstrate the proposed change would be in the children’s interests. Subsequent 

testing confirmed biological paternity as to both B.S., Jr., and K.S. The social worker 

provided this additional information to the court on November 3, 2017. 

On November 3, 2017, the court sustained the section 387 petition, removing the 

children from mother, terminated her services, and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing to 

select and implement permanent plans for the children. Father was not present at the 

hearing. The court adopted the social worker’s recommendation of a permanent plan of 

another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (PPLA) (§§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(B)(ii); 

16501, subd. (i)(2))

6

, pending an approved placement of R.S. with an out of state relative 

under the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC). The court also found 

that father was the biological father of the two children. 

d. Permanency Planning

On May 3, 2018, father appeared at the Post-Permanency Review Hearing (§ 

366.3), where the court affirmed the termination of services and found a compelling 

reason exists for determining that a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 is not in the 

children’s (R.S.) best interests, ordered a PPLA for all children with a goal of adoption, 

and directed the social worker to include a permanency plan for B.S., Jr., and K.S. 

On October 23, 2018, the social worker reported that the permanent plan of PPLA 

for all three children remained appropriate because the ICPC case was closed due to the 

noncooperation of the paternal grandmother in Oregon, and the maternal aunt’s failure to 

6 Such plans are designed for implementation respecting dependent children who 

are 16 years of age or older, or non-minor dependents, for whom adoption is not a goal. 
12

follow up the with the relative assessment for all three children. B.S., Jr., and K.S. were 

very close to their caretakers, but the caretakers were in late middle age and in the 

process of adopting another child. 

Regarding family visits, the social worker noted that the children had maintained 

relationships with their mother, maternal grandmother, and maternal aunt; in addition, the 

worker noted that father is present at many, but not all, weekly visits. The social worker 

had provided information about B.S., Jr. and K.S. to adoptions in hopes of finding an 

adoptive placement, but the current caretakers were comfortable with the children placed 

in their home. The section 366.3 review hearing was held on November 2, 2018, in 

father’s absence. The court was concerned that B.S., Jr. and K.S. were still in permanent 

foster care and directed CFS to identify a concurrent planning home and begin a broader 

search for a permanent placement. The court made a finding that as to R.S., that he was 

not a proper subject for adoption, but found that for B.S., Jr. and K.S. an adoptive home 

had not yet been identified. 

In May 2019, the social worker reported the children’s status was the same for the 

next post-permanency status review hearing. (§ 366.3.) The two younger children 

remained in their foster family placement, as the social worker continued efforts at 

finding a relative placement for them. Because those efforts had not been fruitful, the 

adoptions supervisor commenced paperwork to match the children with prospective 

adoptive parents. The section 366.3 review hearing was conducted on May 2, 2019, with 
13

father and mother in attendance, and the court adopted the findings and recommendations 

of CFS. 

This situation persisted until November 2019, when CFS made similar 

recommendations. During this review period, another relative came forward expressing a 

desire for placement of B.S., Jr. and K.S., but was eliminated from consideration after 

attending a single visitation and not showing the requisite interest in the children. 

Apparently, the search for non-relative prospective adoptive parents was impeded by 

missing information about the children. However, in September 2019, the goddaughter 

of the current caretakers expressed an interest, and around the same time, the current 

caretakers felt that they were now in a position to adopt the children. 

On November 1, 2019, the post permanency reviewing hearing took place. Father 

did not appear at the hearing. The court scheduled a section 366.26 hearing, and directed 

that father be notified of his writ rights. In March 2020, the social worker prepared an 

adoptability assessment of the children and the prospective adoptive parents, concluding 

that the children were adoptable and the prospective adoptive parents were an appropriate 

adoptive placement. The social worker recommended that parental rights be terminated 

for B.S., Jr. and K.S. 

On March 2, 2020, father filed a second Request to Change Court Order (JV-180; 

§ 388), this time pro se, omitting to state what order he desired changed or the precise 

date of the order, but indicating he desired to parent his children. As for the new order he 

sought, father said he wanted the court to help him the way it had helped the mother, 
14

back when he did not have the support he currently has. As for how the proposed order 

would be in the children’s best interests, father explained he came from a family where 

his mother and father raised him and he wanted to do the same with his children. The 

petition was summarily denied on March 3, 2020, because it failed to state new evidence 

or changed circumstances, and because the proposed change did not promote the best 

interest of the child. 

The selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26) occurred on March 13, 2020.

Both parents appeared. Father sought to have the children testify, but the County argued 

he lacked standing to call witnesses because he was still an alleged father who did not 

qualify as a Kelsey S.7father. Nevertheless, minors’ counsel called B.S., Jr. to testify at 

the hearing. B.S., Jr. testified he lived with this grandparents and he wished to be 

adopted by them. It is unclear if he was in a new placement with his maternal 

grandmother as indicated by mother’s counsel or if was still placed with his caretakers, 

to whom he referred variously as “Grandma” and “Grandpa” or “mom” and “paw paw” 

after adoption had been identified as the permanent plan. He also enjoyed visits with his 

parents and would be sad if he were unable to visit with them anymore. 

After hearing testimony and argument by counsel, the court terminated parental 

rights, freeing the children for adoption. Both parents appealed. 

7 Referring to Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816.
15

DISCUSSION

1. Father Did Not Qualify As a Presumed Father.

Father argues that at the section 366.26 hearing, the issue of paternity arose again, 

and the juvenile court erred by finding him to be merely a biological father. He does not 

challenge the denial of his previous 388 petition requesting such relief, which was denied 

on October 16, 2017, and such a claim would be barred by failing to timely file a notice 

of appeal. Nor does he claim the court erred in denying his second modification request, 

summarily denied on March 3, 2020. Instead, he claims the court erred in considering 

him to be merely a biological father, a designation that occurred on November 3, 2017. 

Father did not properly preserve the issue for appeal, where the time to challenge the 

earlier determination is long past. 

At the section 366.26 hearing, when the court referred to father as an alleged 

father in discussing whether the children could be called to testify at the hearing, father 

corrected the court by stating that he had previously been found to be the biological 

father. The court made no findings, per se as to father’s status at the 366.26 hearing, 

other than to clarify it was adopting the prior findings and orders regarding paternity 

issues. The court had referred to father in passing as the alleged father, but father’s 

counsel corrected the court to indicate he had been deemed a biological father. But father 

made no motion to be deemed a presumed father. By failing to litigate this issue or 

request a ruling from the juvenile court, father failed to preserve the issue on appeal. (In 

re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 501.)
16

In this manner, father has forfeited any challenge to his status being “considered”

that of a biological father by failing to object or make a specific request before the 

juvenile court. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [holding that dependency 

matters are not exempt from the rule that “a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a 

challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”]; 

In re Aaron S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507, 521.) 

To the extent father wishes to revisit the issue by challenging the court’s adoption 

of the prior finding, the rule is clearly established that a “[c]hallenge to the most recent 

order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the 

statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.” (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 

Cal.App.4th 798, 811; see also In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App. 3d 553, 563.) As 

a consequence, “‘“an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding 

and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.]” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532.)

Here, the father’s status was established in November 2017, and cannot be 

reviewed in this appeal, simply because the court adopted its prior findings and orders.

In any event, even if father had preserved the issue for review, he failed to satisfy

the requirements of Family Code section 7611 entitling him to recognition as a presumed 

father, because he never received the children into his home or fully committed to his 

parental responsibilities. (Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th 816, 849.)
17

A biological father has the burden in the juvenile court to demonstrate he is 

entitled to presumed father status based on Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th 816 status.

(Adoption of O.M. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 672, 679.) In particular, the father must 

demonstrate a willingness himself to assume full custody of the child—not merely to 

block adoption by others. (Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849.) “A court should also 

consider father’s public acknowledgment of paternity, his payment of pregnancy and 

birth expenses commensurate with his circumstances, and prompt legal action to seek 

custody of the child.” (Ibid.; see also, In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 610-611, 

citing Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1055.)

Father never executed a voluntary declaration of paternity, nor provided support 

for mother and the children, nor initiated prompt legal action to seek custody, nor ever 

acted in a parental capacity respecting his children other than to visit them while other 

caretakers shouldered the day-to-day responsibility of parenthood. He is not a presumed 

father. We do not need to reach the assertion he signed a voluntary declaration of 

paternity where there is no evidence in the record that one was ever executed.

2. As a Biological, Rather than a Presumed Father, the Court Was Not 

Required to Find Detriment or Unfitness Before Terminating Parental Rights.

Father argues that his due process rights were violated by terminating his parental 

rights without a finding of detriment or unfitness being made against him prior to the 

section 366.26. We disagree. 
18

It is correct to say that “[p]rinciples of due process require that a juvenile court not 

terminate a presumed father’s parental rights without first finding, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that the father is unfit.” (In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202, 

1205.) However, as we discussed in the previous section, father’s status at the section 

366.26 hearing was that of a biological, not a presumed father. There is no constitutional 

requirement to find unfitness before terminating parental rights as to an alleged or 

biological father. (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 933-934.) Thus, there is a 

flaw in father’s reasoning: he was not a presumed father entitled to a finding on his 

unfitness, he was a biological father. 

The cases uniformly hold that as to a presumed father, a juvenile court may not 

terminate parental rights without having made a finding of unfitness or detriment as 

against the father during the dependency, but that this requirement is inapplicable to 

fathers’ whose statuses are limited to “alleged” fathers or “biological” fathers. (In re A.J. 

(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154, 163.) Father’s assertions respecting the requisite findings to 

be made before parental rights can be terminated do not apply to a man who, like father, 

has never achieved that status.

Additionally, there was, in fact, a detriment finding against father. While the 

allegation as to father was dismissed from the original petition respecting B.S., Jr., as an 

alleged father, the court was not required to find detriment before terminating parental 

rights. (In re D.R. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 885, 893.) As to K.S., the petition included an

allegation that father’s criminal history negatively impacted his ability to adequately and 
19

appropriately provide for and parent the child, which was sustained, although the court 

dismissed another allegation that he failed to protect K.S. from mother’s substance 

abuse.8

Because the court made a finding of substantial risk of severe physical or 

emotional harm (§ 361, subd. (c)) and removed custody from both parents in the 

proceeding relating to K.S., he was not a non-offending parent, and he had been the 

subject of an unfitness or detriment finding. (In re D.H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 719, 722, 

fn. 1 [a “nonoffending” parent is one who has not been the subject of a jurisdictional 

finding under section 300, citing In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 606].)

Father’s continued status as a biological father rendered inevitable what followed. 

California law distinguishes between presumed fathers, biological fathers, and biological 

fathers who come forward early in the dependency case and display full commitment to 

8 At oral argument, father urged us to not “muddle” the detriment findings 

respecting K.S., asserting that there were no separate or specific detriment findings

respecting B.S., Jr. Father acknowledged that as a biological father rather than a 

presumed father, there was no requirement that the juvenile court make a specific finding 

of detriment as to father. We agree with the statement in part, but father’s notice of 

appeal referred to both minors and his opening brief challenged the termination of 

parental rights on the ground there was no finding unfitness at any point in the 

dependency. We were thus required to address the findings of detriment made, which 

were applicable to father, notwithstanding his status as a biological father. “Detriment, as 

that term is used in dependency proceedings, is the standard. It is the standard used in 

dependency proceedings to remove custody from a parent and eventually terminate 

parental rights.” (In re D.H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 719, 738, citing Cynthia D. v. 

Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 256.) To address father’s contentions on appeal as 

to the lack of unfitness findings, it was incumbent upon us to point out the allegations and 

findings respecting father’s conduct which formed the basis for the petitions relating to 

both children, as well as the detriment findings in their dispositional orders, which 

ultimately led to the termination of parental rights. 
20

the child (Kelsey S. fathers). (In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 362, citing In re 

Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451; Adoption of Kelsey S., supra,1 Cal.4th 816; In re 

Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 931–932.) “[T]he court does not err by terminating 

a biological father’s parental rights when he has had the opportunity to show presumed 

father status and has not done so.” (In re A.S., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 362; In re 

Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 811; In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 

1652–1655.)

Father never availed himself of the opportunity to show his commitment to 

parenting his children, and acknowledges that mere biological parents do not have the 

same fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause as presumed 

fathers. (In re A.S., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 359; In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 

Cal.App.4th 155, 160.) Because father’s status was not that of a presumed father, the 

termination of his parental rights did not violate his constitutional rights.

Mother raises no independent issues affecting the validity of the findings or

judgment as to the termination of her parental rights. Therefore, the judgment was 

correct.
21

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

J.

FIELDS

J.