PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

____________ 

No. 22-3268 

____________ 

WILLIAM JOSEPH WEBB, JR., 

Appellant 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATES 

JUSTICE; ISLANDA L. FINAMORE, DEPUTY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL; JOELLE P. HITCH, JUDGE - 

FAMLY COURT, NEW CASTLE COUNTY; DIVISION 

OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; SUZANNE 

VALLE, SOCIAL WORKER; ROBERT MAY, WARDEN; 

UNKNOWN DEJESUS, STAFF LIEUTENANT FOR 

INTERNAL AFFAIRS; STACEY HOLLIS, TREATMENT 

ADMINISTRATOR; UNKNOWN THONGVONG, 

COUNSELOR 

____________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Delaware 

(D.C. Civil No. 1-22-cv-00933) 

District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews 

____________ 
2 

____________ 

Submitted Under 3rd Cir. LAR 34.1(a) 

on May 20, 2024 

Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and McKEE, Circuit 

Judges

(Opinion filed: September 27, 2024) 

____________ 

Don Arrington 

Cara Costanzo 

Jennifer Hance 

Mary E. Levy 

Stephanie Terinoni 

Temple University Beasley School of Law 

1719 N Broad Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19122 

Jessica Rickabaugh 

Tucker Law Group 

1801 Market Street 

Ten Penn Center, Suite 2500 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Counsel for Appellant 

Nicholas D. Picollelli, Jr. 

Office of Attorney General of Delaware 

Delaware Department of Justice 

820 N French Street 

Wilmington, DE 19801 
3 

Gregory E. Smith 

Office of Attorney General of Delaware 

Delaware Department of Justice 

102 W Water Street, 3rd Floor 

Dover, DE 19904 

Counsel for State of Delaware by Special Appearance 

_______________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

_______________ 

FREEMAN, Circuit Judge. 

William Webb, an inmate at Delaware’s James T. 

Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC), sued prison officials for 

failing to schedule court-ordered visits with his daughter. The 

District Court screened and dismissed the suit, holding that 

Webb did not exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process or 

allege a valid constitutional claim. Seeking to appeal, Webb 

placed a notice of appeal in a mailbox for JTVCC staff to 

collect and file electronically. We deem his notice filed on the 

day he placed it in that mailbox, so his appeal is timely. And 

because the complaint states a plausible claim for relief, we 

will reverse the District Court’s order and remand the case for 

further proceedings. 
4 

I 

A 

At all times relevant to this case, Webb has been 

incarcerated at JTVCC.1

 In October 2020, a Delaware family 

court issued an order granting him visits with his daughter. 

Since that order, however, prison officials have arranged only 

one father-daughter visit. That visit, held in 2021, lasted 

fifteen minutes, was supervised by an official from the state 

child-services agency, and concluded “without incident or 

intervention” from the supervising official. App. 21. But no 

visits have been scheduled since, and Webb has become 

estranged from his daughter as a result. 

Seeking additional visits, Webb filed a grievance 

through the prison’s internal procedure. That grievance was 

returned to him as unprocessed. He tried to follow up by 

writing to three prison officials, but none of them adequately 

responded. 

Webb, representing himself, then filed suit against 

several JTVCC employees. He alleged that prison officials 

violated his constitutional right to “reunification” and he 

sought money damages and injunctive relief. App. 24. 

The District Court dismissed the pro se complaint under 

the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 

1915(e)(2)(B), which authorize courts to quickly dismiss 

defective lawsuits from incarcerated plaintiffs. The Court held 

1

 We take these facts from Webb’s complaint and, at this stage 

of the case, assume that they are true. Durham v. Kelley, 82 

F.4th 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023). 
5 

that the complaint had two fatal flaws: it revealed that Webb 

failed to exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process, and it 

stated no valid claim for relief against the JTVCC employees.2

 

The Court determined that amendment would be futile, so it 

did not permit Webb to amend his complaint. 

B 

On November 22, 2022—twenty-eight days after the 

District Court dismissed his complaint—Webb signed his 

notice of appeal and took steps to send it to the Court. For 

reasons we will discuss below, the Court did not receive his 

notice of appeal until November 29, thirty-five days after it 

entered its dismissal order. 

Because it appeared that Webb’s notice of appeal was 

untimely filed, the Clerk of this Court flagged the appeal for 

possible dismissal. Webb (still representing himself) opposed 

dismissal, arguing that his notice was timely filed under the 

prison mailbox rule. We appointed counsel for Webb and 

directed the parties to brief the timeliness issue alongside the 

merits.3

 

2

 Webb’s complaint also named other defendants and raised 

other claims. The District Court held that those defendants 

were immune from suit, and Webb does not challenge those 

holdings on appeal. 

3

 We thank appointed counsel from the Temple University 

Beasley School of Law for ably representing Webb in this 

appeal. We are also grateful to the Delaware Department of 

Justice, which entered a special appearance at our request and 
6 

II 

Before addressing the merits of Webb’s appeal, we must 

determine whether it was timely filed. The answer turns on an 

issue of first impression in our Court: whether the prison 

mailbox rule established in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 

(1988) and codified in Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure applies to a system in which prison 

officials electronically file inmates’ court documents. We hold 

that it does. Because Webb used this system and otherwise 

complied with Rule 4(c), his notice of appeal was timely filed. 

In civil cases, a party seeking to appeal a district court’s 

order or judgment must file a “notice of appeal . . . with the 

district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order 

appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).4

 This thirty-day 

deadline is “mandatory and jurisdictional,” Bowles v. Russell, 

551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (citation omitted), so we cannot hear 

expressed its positions on timeliness and the merits. Because 

the District Court dismissed Webb’s suit before any of the 

defendants were served, they were not obligated to participate 

in this appeal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 31.2 (2011). 

4

 There are some exceptions to this rule, none of which apply 

here. See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (extending the 

deadline to sixty days when the United States, a federal agency, 

or a federal officer or employee sued in their official capacity 

is a party). 
7 

an appeal if the notice was filed late, Sec’y of Lab. v. Doyle, 

675 F.3d 187, 189 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012).5

We assess whether the notice was timely by looking to 

the date it was “filed with the district clerk.” Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1)(A). For most litigants, a document is filed when it is 

delivered to the district clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(2); 

United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916). But we 

calculate filing dates differently for incarcerated litigants. 

Recognizing that these litigants face unique disadvantages, the 

Supreme Court developed the prison mailbox rule. Houston, 

487 U.S. 266. Under this rule, we treat an incarcerated 

litigant’s notice of appeal as “filed at the time [he] delivered it 

to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Id.

at 276. 

The prison mailbox rule was later codified in Rule 4(c) 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(c) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see Long 

v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 441 n.11 (3d Cir. 

2012).6

 As relevant here, Rule 4(c)(1) provides that “[i]f an 

inmate files a notice of appeal[,] . . . the notice is timely if it is 

deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before 

the last day for filing.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1). To benefit 

from this rule, an incarcerated litigant must meet two 

5

 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. Its order dismissing the complaint is a final order 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

6

 The rule announced in Houston applied to incarcerated pro se 

litigants, but codification extended it to any “[i]nmate 

[c]onfined in an [i]nstitution,” not just those representing 

themselves. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c). 
8 

conditions. First, “[i]f an institution has a system designed for 

legal mail, an inmate confined there must use that system.” Id. 

Second, the litigant must provide evidence corroborating the 

date that the notice was deposited in the prison’s mail system: 

either “a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746 . . . or a notarized statement,” id. 4(c)(1)(A)(i),7

 or 

some other “evidence (such as a postmark or date stamp) 

showing that the notice was . . . deposited and that postage was 

prepaid,” id. 4(c)(1)(A)(ii). If no such evidence accompanies 

the notice of appeal, we may “exercise[] [our] discretion to 

permit the later filing of a declaration or notarized statement 

that satisfies Rule 4(c)(1)(A)(i).” Id. 4(c)(1)(B). 

Our jurisdiction to hear this appeal turns on whether 

Webb benefits from the prison mailbox rule. His notice of 

appeal was delivered to the district clerk more than thirty days 

after the dismissal order. However, he argues that we should 

apply the prison mailbox rule and deem his notice of appeal 

filed on the date when he placed it in a designated electronicfiling mailbox in his housing unit, which was within the thirtyday window. We invited the State of Delaware to address this 

question by special appearance. The State accepted our 

invitation, described the electronic filing process at JTVCC, 

and conceded that the prison mailbox rule should apply to it. 

We agree. 

7

 To comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, a declaration executed in 

the United States must say “substantially the following”: “I 

declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that 

the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). 

(Signature)[.]” 
9 

As the State explains, JTVCC has established an 

electronic filing system for inmates’ court documents. Under 

an agreement between the Delaware Department of 

Corrections and the United States District Court for the District 

of Delaware, prisoners at JTVCC file documents with the 

District Court by placing them in a mailbox in their housing 

unit. Security staff gather these filings and bring them to the 

prison’s central mailroom. Paralegals then collect the filings 

from the mailroom, log them in a spreadsheet, scan them, and 

email them to the District Court.8

 (Inmates housed in units 

with access to JTVCC’s law library have an additional option: 

they can bring their court filings directly to the law library for 

a paralegal to log, scan, and email to the Court. Webb is 

housed in a unit without access to the law library, so he must 

use an in-house mailbox for electronic filing.) 

Following this procedure, Webb placed his notice of 

appeal in an in-house mailbox on November 22. That is the 

date listed on the notice and the accompanying certificate of 

service, in which Webb stated that he “served a true and correct 

copy of the attached Notice of Appeal . . . by placing [the] 

same in the U.S. mailbag at JTVCC.” App. 14–15. Webb later 

confirmed in an affidavit that he “placed the Notice of Appeal 

in the in-house mail on the date it was signed.” App. 41. 

We have not yet applied the prison mailbox rule to a 

system like JTVCC’s, in which prison officials submit 

inmates’ filings electronically. When the rule was developed, 

court documents were delivered by hand or by mail. But 

changing filing methods have not disturbed the underlying 

8

 This agreement does not cover inmates at other Delaware 

prisons or filings in Delaware state courts. 
10 

legal principle. The Supreme Court developed the prison 

mailbox rule because incarcerated litigants lose control of their 

legal submissions as soon as they give them to prison officials. 

“Unskilled in law, unaided by counsel, and unable to leave the 

prison,” prisoners “ha[ve] no choice but to entrust the 

forwarding of [their] notice[s] of appeal to prison authorities 

whom [they] cannot control or supervise and who may have 

every incentive to delay.” Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. 

With this reasoning in mind, we see no meaningful 

distinction between inmate filings that prison staff submit to 

the court electronically and those that are delivered on paper. 

Even though Webb’s notice was filed electronically, he lost the 

ability to monitor its progress and ensure its timely delivery to 

the District Court as soon as he placed it in the prison’s inhouse mailbox. It is no surprise, then, that our sister circuit had 

little trouble extending the prison mailbox rule to electronic 

filings—after all, “pro se prisoners are no more able to 

guarantee that properly tendered documents are e-filed than 

that they’re mailed.” Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 859 (7th 

Cir. 2015). Following its lead, we hold “that a pro se prisoner’s 

legal documents are considered filed on the date that they’re 

tendered to prison staff in accordance with reasonable prison 

policies, regardless of whether they are ultimately mailed or 

uploaded” electronically. Id.9

9

 Like the Seventh Circuit, we recognize that some language in 

Rule 4(c) does not neatly translate to electronic filings. For 

instance, the rule requires incarcerated litigants to provide a 

declaration, notarized statement, or other evidence that postage 

was prepaid. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii). This 
11 

We also conclude that Webb met the other requirements 

of Rule 4(c)(1). By placing his notice in the in-house mailbox, 

he used his prison’s established system for handling legal mail. 

And the signed and dated certificate of service he submitted 

alongside his notice of appeal is “evidence . . . showing that the 

notice was so deposited” sufficient to satisfy Rule 

4(c)(1)(A)(ii). See Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 451 

n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (presuming that an incarcerated litigant filed 

a document on the date he executed it); United States v. 

Rinaldi, 447 F.3d 192, 194 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Long, 

670 F.3d at 439 n.4 (same); cf. Ford v. Wilson, 747 F.3d 944, 

949 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing “the certificate of service [the 

incarcerated litigant] included with his notice of appeal” as 

additional evidence of timely filing).10 Webb’s notice was 

therefore timely filed, and we may proceed to the merits of his 

appeal. 

III 

Turning to the merits, Webb challenges the District 

Court’s screening-stage dismissal on two grounds. First, he 

requirement “is obviously not applicable when e-filing.” 

Taylor, 787 F.3d at 859 n.10. 

10 Even if the certificate of service were insufficient, we would 

exercise our discretion to accept Webb’s subsequently 

submitted affidavit, which supports his version of events and 

complies with Rule 4(c)(1)(A)(i). Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(B); 

see Carney v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 

1351 (10th Cir. 2017) (“We exercise our discretion under Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(B) to permit the later filing of [the 

incarcerated litigant’s] declaration and deem the appeal 

timely.”). 
12 

says that his complaint did not definitively allege that he failed 

to exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process. And second, 

he argues that his complaint stated a valid constitutional claim. 

We review the dismissal de novo, accepting the complaint’s 

factual allegations as true. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 

(3d Cir. 2020).11 Applying this standard, we agree with Webb 

on both fronts. 

A 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 

inmates must “exhaust[]” “such administrative remedies as are 

available” in the prison system before bringing a lawsuit about 

prison conditions in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate 

suits about prison life . . . .” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 

532 (2002). 

As the statute makes clear, prisoners need only exhaust 

“available” administrative remedies. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 

632, 635–36 (2016). In this context, “available” means 

“capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained 

of.” Id. at 642 (cleaned up). A prison’s internal grievance 

process is not “available” if, for example, (1) “it operates as a 

simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently 

unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates,” (2) it is 

“so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of 

use” because “no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it,” 

11 Because Webb drafted the complaint himself, we construe it 

liberally, holding it to “less stringent standards” than one 

drafted by a lawyer. Durham, 82 F.4th at 223 (quoting Shorter 

v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 371 (3d Cir. 2021)). 
13 

or (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking 

advantage of [it] through machination, misrepresentation, or 

intimidation.” Id. at 643–44. 

In addition, an incarcerated plaintiff generally need not 

demonstrate that he exhausted his prison’s available grievance 

procedures in his complaint. Failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies “is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead 

and prove,” so the issue is typically resolved later in the 

litigation process. Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 

295 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 

265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013)); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 

(2007). But there is a narrow exception to this rule: when the 

inmate’s complaint itself makes clear that he failed to exhaust 

the prison’s available grievance procedures, a court may 

dismiss the suit without waiting for the defendants to raise the 

issue and meet their burden of proof. Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 

255, 264 (3d Cir. 2024). 

The District Court concluded that the exception applied 

here. Yet a review of Webb’s complaint leaves us far from 

certain that his allegations conveyed a failure to exhaust 

JTVCC’s available grievance procedures. True, Webb marked 

the “No” checkbox in response to the complaint form’s 

question “[i]s the grievance process completed?” App. 24. But 

the form offered a section for further explanation, in which 

Webb wrote that his grievance “was returned as unprocessed,” 

that he then “went on the tablet and wrote” to prison officials, 

and that he received “an illegal response.” Id.

Reading Webb’s complaint as a whole, then, it is not 

obvious that he failed to exhaust JTVCC’s available grievance 

procedures. His explanation raises the “reasonable 

inference[]” that, by the time he filed his complaint, he had 
14 

taken his grievance as far as it could go in the prison’s internal 

process. Durham, 82 F.4th at 223; see Small, 728 F.3d at 273 

(holding that a prisoner exhausted available remedies when he 

did not receive a decision on his grievance and the prison had 

no process for appealing non-decisions); Hacker v. Dart, 62 

F.4th 1073, 1081 (7th Cir. 2023) (prisoner exhausted when 

there was “no conceivable next step for [him] to take” (cleaned 

up)); cf. Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019) 

(prisoner exhausted administrative remedies when his prison 

failed to respond to his grievance on time). Alternatively, 

Webb has plausibly alleged that JTVCC’s rules for 

unprocessed grievances were “so opaque” that they rendered 

administrative remedies unavailable. Ross, 578 U.S. at 643. 

Without a developed record on JTVCC’s grievance 

procedures, we will leave it to the District Court to make these 

determinations in the first instance. But the complaint raises 

enough uncertainty about exhaustion to preclude dismissal at 

the screening stage.12

12 While we reach this conclusion based on Webb’s complaint 

alone, we observe that the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware has repeatedly found JTVCC’s policies 

for unprocessed grievances to be confusing or indeterminate. 

See, e.g., Fatir v. Phelps, No. 18-1549, 2021 WL 827142, at 

*8 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2021) (“If the [Delaware Department of 

Corrections] requires inmates to administratively exhaust 

grievances returned as ‘unprocessed’ then prison policy should 

indicate the process to exhaust unprocessed grievances.”); 

Abbatiello v. Metzger, No. 19-1317, 2021 WL 678137, at *4 

(D. Del. Feb. 22, 2021) (“Our District Court has previously 
15 

B 

Webb’s complaint withstands the screening stage for an 

additional reason: construed liberally, it states a valid claim for 

relief. The complaint alleges that “[s]ince October 19, 2020, 

[Webb] has had court ordered visits to be scheduled” by prison 

officials, that those visits have “only been performed once” 

despite that single visit concluding “without incident or 

intervention,” and that he is in “immediate danger of 

estrangement” from his daughter as a result. App. 21–22. 

Though “inartfully pleaded,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citation omitted), these allegations 

support a plausible freedom-of-association claim under the 

First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Constitution “protects 

noted that the returns of unprocessed grievance instructions in 

use at JTVCC are confusing at best.” (cleaned up)); 

Montgomery v. Onuoha, No. 19-001, 2020 WL 4673828, at *3 

(D. Del. Aug. 12, 2020) (holding that the “[p]laintiff had no 

available administrative remedies” because his grievances 

were returned as unprocessed and the prison had no rules 

outlining how to proceed). Because the PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement is so unforgiving, “prisons should create 

understandable grievance procedures” that are “clear and 

transparent enough to allow ordinary inmates to navigate 

them.” Hacker, 62 F.4th at 1078. Fair, transparent procedures 

further the interests of inmates and prison officials alike. See 

Mack, 839 F.3d at 296 (observing that grievances processes 

offer prison officials an opportunity to gather information and 

“take appropriate responsive measures” before an inmate sues 

(quoting Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 

2004)). 
16 

an individual’s right to enter into and maintain certain intimate 

human relationships,” including the parent-child relationship. 

Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist., 

971 F.3d 416, 431 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Because 

“freedom of association is among the rights least compatible 

with incarceration,” this right is sharply curtailed in prison. 

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). But it is not 

extinguished altogether. Id. (“We do not hold, and we do not 

imply, that any right to intimate association is altogether 

terminated by incarceration . . . .”); see also Inmates of 

Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 759 (3d Cir. 

1979) (upholding a ban on contact visits but observing that the 

policy did “not preclude[] [a prisoner] from visiting with 

members of his family and others”). Indeed, “while the 

[Supreme] Court has sustained significant abridgments of 

prisoners’ associational rights, . . . [those] sustained policies 

have often contained exceptions expressly privileging 

prisoners’ communications with immediate family members.” 

Tiedemann v. von Blanckensee, 72 F.4th 1001, 1013 (9th Cir. 

2023). 

To evaluate policies that burden prisoners’ 

constitutional rights, courts use the well-worn, four-factor test 

set out in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987).13 At its 

13 Webb also argues on appeal that his complaint plausibly 

alleges a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. This claim is closely intertwined with the 

freedom-of-association claim: both rely on the complaint’s 

allegations that prison officials impeded Webb’s relationship 

with his daughter. We decline to define the boundaries 
17 

core, that test asks whether the challenged policy is 

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634, 653 (2019) (quoting 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). This “highly fact sensitive” inquiry is 

ill-suited to resolution on the complaint alone. Jones v. Brown, 

461 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2006). And while the inquiry is 

deferential to prison officials by design, “it is also not a blank 

check.” Tiedemann, 72 F.4th at 1013. 

Unsurprisingly, then, we cannot resolve the Turner

analysis at this early stage. We read Webb’s claim that the visit 

with his daughter concluded “without incident or intervention” 

to allege that prison officials’ failure to schedule further visits 

was not rationally related to legitimate penological interests—

an allegation that we must take as true for now. App. 21. And 

without any responsive pleading from the defendants, we 

cannot assess how they justify their actions. While we express 

between these claims at this early stage because both would be 

subject to the Turner test. Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 370 

(3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has 

consistently applied the Turner standard to prisoners’ 

constitutional rights claims,” including substantive due process 

claims); see Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 323 (3d Cir. 2001) 

(holding that “prison inmates retain a Fourteenth Amendment 

substantive due process right to privacy in their medical 

information” but that the right’s scope was limited by the 

Turner test). 
18 

no opinion on the ultimate merit of Webb’s claim, the 

complaint’s allegations are sufficient at this juncture.14

* * * 

For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 

District Court’s order dismissing Webb’s complaint and 

remand the case for further proceedings. 

14 Because we conclude that Webb’s complaint, read liberally, 

states a constitutional claim, we need not determine whether 

the District Court erred in denying Webb permission to amend 

it. See Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 n.3 (3d Cir. 

2017).