The Honorable Diana E. Murphy, then United States District

1

Judge for the District of Minnesota, now United States Circuit

Judge for the Eighth Circuit.

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No. 96-2288

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Reginald Woodards, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

United States of America, *

* [UNPUBLISHED] 

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: January 15, 1997

 Filed: January 21, 1997

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Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In 1991, Reginald Woodards and several others were convicted of

conspiring to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113(a)

(1994), aiding and abetting attempted bank robbery in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a) (1994), and aiding and abetting the use or carrying

of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 924(c)(1), and 2113(a) (1994). The District Court1

sentenced Woodards to 183 months' imprisonment, including a consecutive 60-

month term on the firearm count, and we affirmed on direct appeal. United

States v. Johnson, 962 F.2d 1308, 1311-12, 1315 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 928 (1992) and 507 U.S. 974 (1993).
 The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge 2

for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and

recommendations of the Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, then United

States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota, now United

States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

 A defendant who did not personally use or carry a firearm may 3

be found guilty of violating section 924(c)(1) under either a

coconspirator theory of liability, see Pinkerton v. United States,

328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946) (conspirator is criminally liable for

substantive offense committed by another conspirator within scope

of and in furtherance of conspiracy, unless that offense could not

reasonably have been foreseen as necessary or natural consequence

of conspiracy), or an aiding-and-abetting theory, see United States

v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1151 (8th Cir. 1996) (individual may be

found guilty of aiding and abetting if, before or at time crime was

committed, he knew offense was being committed or was going to be

committed; he knowingly acted to encourage, aid, or cause offense;

and he intended offense be committed). We recently held that

Bailey does not preclude the continued application of a

coconspirator theory of liability to section 924(c)(1) offenses.

See Rodger, 100 F.3d at 91 n.2. We now conclude that the same

holds true for aiding-and-abetting liability. See United States v.

Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir.) (post-Bailey application of

aiding-and-abetting theory to § 924(c)(1) offense), cert. denied,

117 S. Ct. 135 (1996).

-2-

In January 1996, Woodards filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) motion,

claiming that his section 924(c)(1) conviction should be set aside, because

he did not “use” a firearm as defined in Bailey v. United States, 116 S.

Ct. 501 (1995), and because section 924(c)(1) is unconstitutionally vague.

The District Court denied relief. Woodards appeals, and asserts

2

additional claims of trial error. We affirm.

Woodards procedurally defaulted these claims by not raising them on

direct appeal, and he has made no showing of cause and prejudice or of

actual innocence. See United States v. Rodger, 100 F.3d 90, 91 (8th Cir.

1996) (per curiam); Williams v. United States, 98 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir.

1996); Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (per

curiam). We agree with the District Court that the evidence at trial was

sufficient to convict Woodards of a “carry” violation under established

principles of coconspirator and aiding-and-abetting liability. See

3

Bailey, 116
-3-

S. Ct. at 507-09 (preserving “carry” as alternative basis for § 924(c)(1)

charge); Williams, 98 F.3d at 1054-55 (holding § 2255 movant procedurally

defaulted argument that § 924(c)(1) conviction was invalid in light of

Bailey; no actual prejudice because evidence was sufficient to convict him

of § 924(c)(1) “carry” violation). It is undisputed that some of

Woodards’s codefendants were carrying firearms at the time of their arrest,

and the jury found that Woodards knew about and was involved in the armedbank-robbery scheme. Cf. United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1285-86

(8th Cir. 1993) (affirming § 924(c)(1) conviction under aiding-and-abetting

theory; acts of codefendant in committing armed bank robbery became those

of defendant, as aider and abettor, where defendant’s conduct in providing

transportation and means of concealment was integral to crime).

We need not address the claims Woodards raises for the first time on

appeal. See Thomas v. United States, 27 F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, we affirm. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.